



安全理事会

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安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 [2464\(2019\)](#) 号决议第 2 段请第 [1874\(2009\)](#) 号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。

主席谨因此而分发收自专家小组的报告(见附件)。



附件

2020 年 2 月 26 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段随函转递专家小组工作的最后报告。

报告已于 2020 年 2 月 7 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，并于 2020 年 2 月 19 日经过委员会审议。

请将本信和报告提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号
决议所设专家小组

附文

2020 年 2 月 7 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

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请将本信和报告提请安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号
决议所设专家小组

第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组的报告

摘要

2019 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国没有停止其非法核计划和弹道导弹计划，而是继续加强，这违反了安全理事会决议。它继续维持并建设核设施，尽管它没有宣布进行核试验，也没有进行洲际弹道导弹发射。2019 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进行了其他 13 次发射试验，发射了至少 25 枚导弹，包括多种新型短程弹道导弹和一种新型潜射弹道导弹。它继续为其导弹计划发展基础设施和能力。2019 年 2 月之后，外交领域未见任何进展报道，据此，平壤在年底声明，没有理由继续其自行宣布的暂停洲际弹道导弹发射。尽管朝鲜民主主义人民共和国拥有广泛的本土能力，但它仍使用非法外部采购来购买一些部件和技术。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反决议，非法进口石油。通过船对船交货和悬挂外国旗的船只直接交货，非法进口精炼石油产品仍在继续。它增加了采购，包括通过显著增加这些悬挂外国旗的大型油轮多次直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交货。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和悬挂外国旗的船只及其船东继续精心策划逃避做法。安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组收到美利坚合众国提交的一份报告，其中载有 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 10 月 31 日期间的图像、数据和计算。根据这些估算，安全理事会设定的 2019 年精炼石油产品总量 50 万桶的年度上限被超出多倍。俄罗斯联邦和中国要求提供更多确凿证据以做出判断。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续藐视安全理事会决议，非法通过海路出口大宗商品，特别是煤炭和沙子。这种出售产生的收入来源在历史上为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核计划和弹道导弹计划做出过贡献。专家小组从一个会员国收到的图像和信息显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国利用自推型远洋驳船，通过直接交货和船对船交货，向另一个会员国运交了大量非法煤炭和沙子(见第二节)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只还将煤炭从船上转移到更大的散货船上，然后再进行这样的运交。专家小组观察到购买了一艘本是要报废的船只，但实际上是用来出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还继续非法出售捕鱼权，从中获利。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进口奢侈品和其他受制裁物品，包括豪华汽车、酒和机器人机械。往往隶属于被指认的军需工业部或本身也是被指认实体的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易公司继续参加该国境内的交易会。这些交易会可能被用来扩大与大规模杀伤性武器相关的采购和其他被禁止贸易的网络。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反联合国制裁进入国际银行渠道，主要是通过第三方中介。它继续非法获取虚拟货币，并对全球银行进行网络攻击以逃避金融制裁。被指认实体，如侦察总局和军需工业部，正想方设法通过非法手段获取法定货币和虚拟资产，前者通过黑客攻击，后者通过非法派遣信息技术人员出国。

2017 年以来，安全理事会连续通过决议，限制并最终禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民发放工作许可，指出此类朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民经常在海外工

作的目的是创造外国出口收入，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国用这些收入支持其被禁止的核计划和弹道导弹计划。安理会在第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段要求在 2019 年 12 月 22 日前将在海外赚取收入的任何朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。专家小组正在调查涉嫌在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民，无论签证类别或收入性质如何，包括体育运动员、医生和信息技术工作者等专业人员以及体力劳动者。在编写本报告时，安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会和专家小组已从约 50 个会员国收到关于遣返的中期信息。所有会员国必须在 2020 年 3 月 22 日之前提交第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段的执行情况最后报告。

制裁决议无意给平民带来不良后果，也无意对人道主义组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的行动产生负面影响。联合国制裁可能会对平民人口产生一些意想不到的负面影响，尽管这是无法精确量化的，也不能轻易与其他因素包括国内因素分开。不过，观察到了一些负面影响，包括继续缺乏银行渠道所致的负面影响。专家小组注意到，提交委员会的人道主义豁免请求处理时间大为缩短。

专家小组提出一系列指认和实际措施建议，为安全理事会、委员会和会员国提供更多工具，用于应对相关决议执行方面的挑战和不足。

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一. 导言

1. 安全理事会在第 2464(2019)号决议第 2 段请第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会提交一份载有调查结果和建议的最后报告。本报告所述期间为 2019 年 8 月 3 日至 2020 年 2 月 7 日。

二. 部门制裁和海上制裁

油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运货


直接交货和船对船交货

2. 若干会员国提交专家小组的报告以及专家小组自己的调查都表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的进口以及违禁或限制商品出口都有所增加。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反决议，通过非法船对船交货和非法直接交货进口精炼石油。悬挂外国旗的船只直接驶入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦交货，采购精炼石油产品的次数和涉及的船只数量大幅增加(见 S/2019/691)。南浦海运进口码头是悬挂外国旗的船只运送精炼石油的主要港口。¹ 专家小组继续观察朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和代表其行事的船只逃避和规避技术的演变情况。

3. 专家小组于 2019 年 11 月 8 日收到美利坚合众国的一份报告，其中载有 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 10 月 31 日期间油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运交精炼石油产品的最新数据。在 2019 年 6 月至 10 月这几个月，悬挂外国旗的油轮估计交货量超过了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮的交货量(见图 1 和附件 1)。

图 1

2019 年悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮与悬挂外国旗的油轮交货量比例



资料来源：会员国、专家小组。

¹ 一个会员国评估指出，南浦港基础设施配备有必要的油轮卸货支持手段，有大量精炼石油储存设施，并有铁路线提供服务，使精炼石油产品能够运输到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国各地的石油需求中心，因此着重于接收精炼石油产品。

4. 2019 年 11 月 8 日报告更新了美国上次关于油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运交精炼石油产品的 2019 年 6 月 11 日报告内容, 后者涵盖 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 4 月 23 日期间。² 2019 年 11 月 8 日报告的编写依据与 2019 年 6 月 11 日报告依据相同。据美国所述, 截至 2019 年 10 月 31 日, 按照三分之一负载设想场景估算, 这些交付量是第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段规定的共计 50 万桶上限³ 的近 3 倍, 在半负载情况下, 交货量将是上限的 4 倍以上, 在满载情况下将是上限近 8 倍。⁴

5. 截至 2020 年 1 月, 俄罗斯联邦已按照第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段告知委员会, 截至 2019 年 11 月底出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的精炼石油累计 30 886.328 吨。中国告知的 2019 年累计数量是 22 739.24 吨。

6. 专家小组还收到 2019 年 12 月 5 日塞拉利昂海事局执行主任给委员会主席的来函, 其中通知了悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的船只向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送精炼石油产品的情况⁵ (见附件 2)。

建议

7. 专家小组再次建议委员会商定精炼石油产品吨与桶之间单一换算率, 并具体说明安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议中提及的吨度量单位。

8. 专家小组建议委员会在收到任何交货通知后公布换算为桶的精炼石油交货量。

9. 专家小组再次建议, 会员国按照第 2397(2017)号决议要求, 及时向委员会报告任何已知的精炼石油产品转运情况。

² 见 S/2019/691, 第 2 至 4 段、脚注 1 至 3 以及附件 1 和 2。

³ 安全理事会在第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段没有具体说明吨和桶的转换率应使用什么比率。专家小组利用该决议第 4 段中关于原油的吨桶比(即每吨 7.61904762 桶)计算出, 中国和俄罗斯联邦告知委员会的累计数量总计将达 408 575.756 桶。根据这些精炼石油产品的实际具体重力(没有记录), 确切的桶数可能高于或低于这一数字。使用这一转换率得出的数字低于应用行业标准“产品-篮子”转换系数 8.0 桶/吨得出的数字(英国石油公司, 载于 2019 年《世界能源统计回顾》的“近似转换系数”)。特定精炼石油产品的近似换算系数从残渣燃料油每吨 6.4 桶到汽油每吨 8.4 桶不等。几位专家不同意以此为基础做出上述转换率和计算。

⁴ 见 S/2019/691 号文件, 第 3 段。专家小组回顾指出, 2019 年 6 月 11 日来自美国并得到其他 25 个共同签署国支持的来文要求委员会把根据美国计算已超出精炼石油上限的违反决议情况通知会员国, 并停止其后所有向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国转运精炼石油的活动。俄罗斯联邦回应说, 委员会作出定论性决定还为时过早, 中国表示需要更多的证据和信息来对这一问题做出判断。

⁵ 通知中包括“Sen Lin 01”号、“hokong”号、“Vifine”号、“天佑”号和“Unica”号等船的货运。没有一次货运是在 30 天内发出通知。据记录, 这些船只都有未经发出通知而向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运货的其他情况, 可能的例外是“Vifine”号(货运日期可能错报)。

悬挂外国旗的船只直接交货

10. 据一个会员国所述, 由于悬挂外国旗的大型油轮向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运货, 精炼石油产品非法进口得以扩大。该会员国计算认为, 2019 年前 10 个月, 仅悬挂外国旗的油轮便运交共 64 次, 精炼石油产品总量在 56 万至 153.1 万桶之间⁶ (见图 2 和附件 1)。

11. 悬挂外国旗的油轮还多次停靠港口运送货物, 有一艘船在 7 个月内返回多达 15 次。据评估, 这种直接交货比朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮在返回港口之前与较小船只进行船对船交货更有效率。

12. 专家小组从调查中注意到, 一些直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送货物的船只在运送货物前几个月才更换了所有权。在其中一些情况下, 被列为船只注册船东的公司被解散或从公司登记册上除名。其中一些船只开始向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送货物时, 没有在专业海事数据库上更新信息;⁷ 这是一种混淆信息的策略, 使识别实际所有人变得更加困难。

13. 根据国际海事组织(海事组织)的历史数据, 一些直接交货货物的船只曾被记录系虚假悬挂旗帜。⁸ 一些悬挂外国旗的船只, 如“万衡 11”号(海事组织编号: 8791667, 目前以“金津港 3”号运营)、⁹ “新丽晶”号(海事组织编号: 8312497)和“天佑”号(海事组织编号: 8817007), 以前与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行船对船交货, 现在已经从接驳船变身为运交船。可疑船只在船东、营运方和管理方以及船只概况方面共有的相似之处详载于附件 3。


⁶ 上文提及的关联交货量范围是基于该会员国提供的关联交货量设想场景低端(33%负载)和高端(90%负载)。

⁷ IHS Markit 公司是国际海事组织(海事组织)船舶编号办法的原始来源, 是负责分配和验证这些编号的唯一机构。它也是海事组织公司和注册船东统一编号办法的原始来源, 并代表海事组织管理该办法。

⁸ 这些船包括“Vifine”号(海事组织编号: 9045962)和“Subblic”号(海事组织编号: 8126082)。

⁹ “万恒 11”号(海事组织编号: 8791667)是一艘曾悬挂伯利兹旗帜的油轮, 因与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“Rye Song Gang 1”号(海事组织编号: 7389704)进行船对船交货而于 2018 年 3 月 30 日被指认, 据报道, 2018 年 1 月又与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行了两次船对船交货。

图 2
悬挂外国旗的船只在南浦直接交货货物的例子



资料来源：会员国；制图：专家小组。

注：见附件 1。

(一) “Sen Lin01”号

14. 专家小组注意到，当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Sen Lin 01”号(海事组织编号：8910378)¹⁰ 继续在南浦直接交货精炼石油，2019 年 1 月至 7 月期间共计至少 15 次停靠港口。¹¹ “Sen Lin 01”号似乎还在所停靠的干船坞使用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国设施(图(3a))。一个专业海事数据库显示，2018 年 12 月至 2019 年

¹⁰ 2018 年 11 月至 2019 年 10 月，“SEN LIN 01”号悬挂塞拉利昂旗帜航行(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料，2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。

¹¹ 专家小组以前曾报告，“SEN LIN 01”号向南浦运交货 10 次(见 S/2019/691，第 10 段)。

10 月期间, 这艘船的自动识别系统有 10 个月以上空白无记录。¹² 2019 年 11 月 13 日, 根据记录, “Sen Lin 01” 号是在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(图 3(b))。¹³

图 3(a)


2019 年 8 月 20 日 “Sen Lin 01” 号在南浦



资料来源: 会员国; 制图: 专家小组。

图 3(b)

2019 年 11 月 13 日 “Sen Lin 01” 号在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国



资料来源: Windward 公司。

15. Deepika 航运和贸易有限公司(以下称 Deepika 航运公司)从 2018 年 4 月起在专业海事数据库上被列为注册船东、管理方和经营者。¹⁴ 该公司是在马绍尔群岛注册成立, 于 2019 年 11 月被马绍尔群岛注册官宣布无效。Deepika 航运公司此前曾将其地址列为 “Circle Ocean International Shipping Limited 代转”,¹⁵ 后者于 2015 年 4 月注册成立。¹⁶ 专家小组尚未收到这些公司的答复。

(二) “天佑”号

16. 当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“天佑”号¹⁷ (海事组织编号: 8817007)在 2019 年 7 月至 10 月期间至少四次在南浦停靠运交精炼石油。¹⁸ 根据专业海事数据库记录, “天佑”号自 2018 年 12 月以来没有传输过船舶自动识别系统信号, 除了 2019 年 4 月 11 日一次短暂传输。¹⁹ 在直接运货之前, 该船于 2019 年 1 月 2 日与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 “Ji Song 6” 号油轮(海事组织编号:

¹² 根据 Windward 公司的资料(2019 年 12 月 2 日查阅)。

¹³ 同上。

¹⁴ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。

¹⁵ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 6 月 7 日查阅)。

¹⁶ 公司注册处(香港), 综合资讯系统, 可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk(2019 年 11 月 27 日查阅)。

¹⁷ 2018 年 3 月至 9 月, “天佑”号悬挂塞拉利昂旗航行(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅))。

¹⁸ 会员国资料。

¹⁹ 根据 Windward 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。

8898740)进行了船对船交货,并于2019年3月31日与另一艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮“Chon Ma San”号(海事组织编号:8660313)进行了船对船交货。天佑航运有限公司²⁰(以下称天佑公司)²¹被列为注册船东,把列入专门海事数据库的一个在新加坡注册公司(下称管理公司-TY)列为“代转”地址以及该船的管理方、营运方和技术管理方。²²

17. 据管理公司-TY称,“天佑”号于2019年5月10日出售给一家香港注册公司(下称买方-TY)(见附件4)。²³这艘船在出售两个月后开始直接向南浦运货。管理公司-TY表示,鉴于该船在2018年8月关闭了自动识别系统信号,并鉴于其他投诉,公司“已向船东发信,鉴于船东的不合作态度以及付款问题……要求终止我们的管理服务”。²⁴管理公司-TY表示如下:“鉴于船东违约,我们已解除合同”。所有与该船有关的通信都是通过船东代表江先生处理。专家小组注意到,根据注册处(香港)的综合资讯系统,卖方天佑公司于2019年11月22日解散,买方-TY于2019年11月22日解散。²⁵管理公司-TY表示,它“无法获得货物固定装置、货运单据和货运路线”信息,并表示“后期标普我们没有参与,我们只是在提出要求后才从他们那里得到了文件复本”。天佑公司尚未对专家小组的问询作出答复。调查还在继续。

(三) “Vifine”号

18. 当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Vifine”号(也称为“Tealway FV”号(海事组织编号:9045962)²⁶在2019年5月至7月期间至少5次在南浦停靠运送精炼石油。²⁷专业海事数据库显示,“Vifine”号于2019年7月开始(重新)传输自动识别系统信号,此前从2016年11月开始很长一段时间没有信号传输。²⁸鸿信国际船舶管理有限公司²⁹(以下称鸿信公司)从2019年5月起在专业海事数据库被列为注册船东以及船舶管理方、营运方和技术管理方,当月该船开始在南浦运交精炼石油。³⁰鸿信公司尚未对专家小组的问询作出答复。

²⁰ 中文:天佑航运有限公司。

²¹ 公司注册处(香港),综合资讯系统,可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk (2019年11月22日查阅)。

²² 2019年11月28日查阅。

²³ 专家小组要求澄清出售单上记录的数字数额与括号中文字数额“200 000 美元(一美元)”之间的差异。

²⁴ 专家小组正在等待所要求的关于管理公司-TY提供的船舶管理服务终止日期的文件。

²⁵ 公司注册处(香港),综合资讯系统,可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk (2019年12月31日查阅)。

²⁶ 2018年11月至2019年10月,“Vifine”号悬挂塞拉利昂旗帜航行(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅))。

²⁷ 会员国资料。

²⁸ 根据 Windward 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅)。

²⁹ 中文:鸿信国际船舶管理有限公司。2019年3月18日成立(公司注册处(香港),综合资讯系统,可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk)。

³⁰ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅)。

(四) “Hokong” 号

19. 当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Hokong”号³¹ (海事组织编号: 9006758)在2019年5月至10月期间至少6次在南浦停靠运交精炼石油。³² 2019年2月,全安海洋国际贸易有限公司³³ (以下称全安公司)在专业海事数据库中被列为该船的注册船东以及船舶管理方和营运方,³⁴ 该船在三个月后直接向南浦运货。该公司成立于2018年4月,³⁵ 也是直接向南浦运交精炼石油的“Vifine”号的前注册船东。全安公司尚未对专家小组的问询作出答复。

(五) “Unica” 号

20. 当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Unica”号(海事组织编号: 8514306)³⁶ 在2019年7月至10月期间至少5次在南浦停靠运交精炼石油。³⁷ 英属维尔京群岛的一家注册公司(以下称公司-U)在专业海事数据库中被列为该船的注册船东、船舶管理方、营运方和技术管理方。³⁸ 持有该船合规文件的公司系纽曼日国际船舶管理有限公司³⁹ (以下称纽曼日公司),于2018年4月注册成立,2019年7月解散,⁴⁰ 与全安公司所列地址相同。英属维尔京群岛当局已确认公司-U于2018年10月注册成立,并提供了有关船只所有权的进一步信息。调查还在继续。

(六) “Diamond 8” 号

21. 悬挂塞拉利昂国旗的“Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号: 9132612)⁴¹ 于2019年10月27日⁴² 在南浦交付精炼石油,此前一个月这艘船将塞拉利昂注册为船旗国,并注册了新船东。一家住所地为印度尼西亚的公司(以下称“管理公司-D8”)自2019年9月⁴³ 起被列为这艘船的船舶管理方和经营方,同时也是“Diamond 8”号注册船东的“转交”地址。印度尼西亚答复专家小组称,目前正通过机构间程

³¹ 2019年2月至2019年10月,“Hokong”号悬挂塞拉利昂旗帜航行(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅))。

³² 会员国资料。

³³ 中文: 全安海洋国际贸易有限公司。

³⁴ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅)。

³⁵ 公司注册处(香港),综合资讯系统,可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk (2019年11月27日查阅)。

³⁶ 2018年10月至2019年10月,“Unica”号悬挂塞拉利昂旗帜航行(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅))。

³⁷ 会员国资料。

³⁸ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月28日查阅)。

³⁹ 中文: 纽曼日国际船舶管理有限公司。

⁴⁰ 公司注册处(香港),综合资讯系统,可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk (2019年11月27日查阅)。

⁴¹ “Diamond 8”号自2019年9月起在塞拉利昂国旗下航行根据(IHS Markit 的资料(2019年11月28日查阅))。

⁴² 会员国资料。

⁴³ 根据 IHS Markit 的资料(2019年11月28日查阅)。

序进行调查，为了向专家小组提供必要的信息，还需要相关机构提供进一步确认和佐证数据。调查结果将适时传达。

(七) “New Regent” 号

22. 专家小组于 2019 年 3 月⁴⁴ 首次报告称，“New Regent”号(海事组织编号：8312497)与一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行了船对船移交。当“New Regent”号开始直接向南浦⁴⁵ 运送精炼石油时即已被摘旗并遭受全球港口禁令。⁴⁶ 这艘船自此以后又在 2019 年 5 月至 7 月期间至少继续交货两次。⁴⁷

23. 根据“New Regent”号新加坡的船舶经纪人 Tan 先生的一份宣誓书，⁴⁸ 这艘船的前船东福满集团有限公司将其售出并于 2018 年 4 月在香港将其交付给丰百贸易拓展有限公司⁴⁹ (以下称“丰百”)⁵⁰ (见第 168 段和附件 5)。据 Tan 先生称，新船东没有更新船舶注册信息，也没有回应 Tan 先生和前船东售船后的进一步沟通尝试，Tan 先生报告称，他在 2018 年底更换手机后失去了与买家相关的所有联系信息。⁵¹ Tan 先生表示，因自己是经纪人，一位寻求购买该船的相关方 Yu 先生曾与他联系，但 Tan 先生之前并不认识他。Tan 先生还表示，据他所知，福满集团有限公司与丰百之前没有任何关系。专家小组已要求 Tan 先生进一步澄清和提供文件，目前正在等待答复。调查还在继续。

(八) “Subblic” 号

24. 这艘之前悬挂多哥国旗的“Subblic”号(海事组织编号：8126082)⁵² 在 2019 年 6 月至 10 月期间至少 10 次停靠朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口并交付精炼石油。⁵³ 这艘船在开始直接交货前两个月被登记为悬挂未知旗帜。⁵⁴ “Subblic”号更换了注册名称和航行旗帜，最后一次记录到其自动识别系统信号传输是在两年多前的 2017

⁴⁴ S/2019/171 号文件，第 15 至 17 段。

⁴⁵ S/2019/69，第 10 段。

⁴⁶ 该船于 2018 年 10 月 16 日被委员会指认。

⁴⁷ 会员国资料。

⁴⁸ 宣誓书及提交的相关文件由专家小组保管。

⁴⁹ 中文：丰百贸易拓展有限公司

⁵⁰ 登记于公司注册处(香港)综合资讯系统。

⁵¹ Tan 先生在其宣誓书中表述如下：“然而，在出售之后，买家拒绝与我就这件事进行沟通。由于系统故障，我在 2018 年底更换了手机，失去了与买家的所有联系和记录。我不再与买方沟通，我对丰百在获得‘New Regent’号所有权后的表现感到非常失望。”

⁵² 2018 年 10 月至 2019 年 4 月期间，“Subblic”号悬挂多哥国旗航行(IHS Markit(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅))。

⁵³ “Subblic”号向南浦交付精炼石油，但 2019 年 8 月 24 日除外，当时它向朝鲜兴南交付精炼石油。

⁵⁴ 根据 Windward 公司的资料。

年 10 月。⁵⁵ 2017 年 12 月, 马尔代夫船舶登记处记录这艘船悬挂虚假旗帜。⁵⁶ 迈源红贸易国际有限公司⁵⁷ (下称“迈源”)自 2018 年 10 月起被列为“Subblic”号的注册船东以及该船的船舶管理方和经营方。⁵⁸ 两名菲律宾国民在不同阶段被列为迈源的董事。⁵⁹ 该公司于 2018 年 3 月 26 日成立, 于 2019 年 7 月 26 日解散,⁶⁰ 与全安(“Hokong”号的注册船东)的所列地址相同, 并将纽曼日公司⁶¹ 作为其合规文件公司。纽曼日公司为“Unica”号提供相同服务。

25. 据一个会员国报告, “Subblic”号曾涉嫌使用其曾用名“Xin Yuan 18”号于 2018 年 2 月 24 日与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“Chon Ma San”号进行船对船移交。⁶² “Xin Yuan 18”号被出售给迈源。菲律宾当局向专家小组提供了一些信息。调查还在继续。

(九) “Bonvoy 3”号

26. “Bonvoy 3”号(海事组织编号: 8978784)在 2019 年 8 月至 9 月期间至少两次停靠南浦港并交付精炼石油。⁶³ 这艘船自 2017 年 4 月⁶⁴ 以来被记录为悬挂何国旗帜不明, 其最后列出的注册船东、船舶管理方和经营方为 Bright Clear Global Ltd-HKG。⁶⁵ 专家小组已收到该船最后的注册船旗国洪都拉斯当局提供的信息, 其中确认发放给该船的临时航行牌照已于 2016 年 3 月 1 日到期, 自那时起该船未获授权悬挂洪都拉斯国旗航行。调查还在继续。

⁵⁵ 同上。

⁵⁶ 马尔代夫政府证实, 这艘当时被称为“Xin Yuan 18”号的船只在其旗帜下虚假注册(Mariyam Shaushath “马尔代夫确认“Xin Yuan 18”号使用的海上移动业务识别码从未注册过”, 公共服务传媒, 2018 年 3 月 1 日)。

⁵⁷ 中文: 迈源红贸易国际有限公司。

⁵⁸ 在 IHS Markit 内列为船舶管理方和经营方(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。

⁵⁹ 公司注册处(香港)综合资讯系统。可查阅 www.icris.cr.gov.hk(2019 年 11 月 27 日查阅)。

⁶⁰ 同上。

⁶¹ 2018 年 10 月至 2019 年 9 月期间列为“Subblic”号的合规文件公司(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅))。专家小组注意到, 共享登记地址属于一家公司服务注册公司。

⁶² 日本外务省, “悬挂朝鲜国旗的油轮‘Chon Ma San’号和悬挂马尔代夫国旗的油轮‘Xin Yuan 18’号疑似非法船对船移交货物”, 2018 年 2 月 24 日。

⁶³ 会员国资料。

⁶⁴ “Bonwo 3”号最后一次悬挂洪都拉斯国旗是在 2017 年 4 月(根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅))。

⁶⁵ 该公司不再登记于公司注册处(香港)综合资讯系统。

(十) “Yun Hong 8” 号

27. 2019 年 2 月至 10 月，悬挂中国国旗的“Yun Hong 8”号(海上移动业务识别码：413459380)⁶⁶ 至少 10 次停靠南浦港并交付精炼石油。⁶⁷ 在此期间，“Yun Hong 8”号还被看到从其他悬挂外国旗的船只接收精炼石油，一个会员国评估认为可能用于运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。专家小组注意到，这艘船于 2018 年 6 月由宁波船舶交易市场有限公司登广告拍卖。⁶⁸ 专家小组已致函中国当局要求协助。中国答复专家小组询问时表示，相关信息严重缺乏准确性，给中国调查工作带来很大困难，中国根据现有信息进行进一步调查的难度更大。中国希望专家小组按照安理会决议的任务授权开展工作，切实协助会员国更好地执行决议。

悬挂外国旗的船只向悬挂外国旗的船只进行船对船移交，以向南浦交货

28. 一个会员国评估认为，一些直接向南浦交付精炼石油产品的悬挂外国旗的船只也利用船对船移交方式代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购得精炼石油产品。专家小组注意到，进行船对船移交的供货船可能有也可能没有关于收货船真实预定目的地的信息。悬挂外国旗的船只在国际水域进行船对船移交后直接向南浦⁶⁹ 非法交货是相对较新的现象，是一个令人严重关切的问题。由于信息格外模糊，更需要对供货油轮货物的最后目的地进行尽职调查。

29. 一个会员国查明了下列关于收货船通过船对船移交获得货物后直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油的个案：

(一) “Yun Hong 8” 号和供货船 A

30. 除了直接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交货(见第 27 段)外，一个会员国拍摄到“Yun Hong 8”号于 2019 年 8 月 31 日在东海从一艘悬挂大韩民国国旗的船只(以下称“供货船 A”)接收船对船移交的货物(见图 4)。2019 年 7 月至 8 月中旬，“Yun Hong 8”号又通过与供货船 A 的船对船移交，至少在 3 次其他场合获得了精炼石油。⁷⁰ 专家小组注意到，供货船 A 与“Yun Hong 8”号进行的 4 次船对船

⁶⁶ “Yun Hong 8”号在数个海事数据库(2019 年 11 月 13 日查阅)上登记为悬挂中国国旗的船只，这艘船回应了一个会员国的普通话呼叫和询问，这个会员国记录了“Yun Hong 8”号与另一艘船 2019 年 10 月 23 日进行的船对船移交活动(见第 31 段)。“Yun Hong 8”号称母港是中国浙江舟山。

⁶⁷ 会员国资料。

⁶⁸ 见 www.shipbid.net。


⁶⁹ 根据会员国提供的悬挂外国旗的油轮的交货情况，除了曾悬挂多哥旗的“Subblic”号于 2019 年 8 月 24 日在兴南交货外，其余悬挂外国旗的油轮都是向南浦交货。

⁷⁰ 与“Yun Hong 8”号的移交于 2019 年 6 月 26 日和 27 日以及 2019 年 8 月 16 日进行。据记录，供货船 A 向“Yun Hong 8”移交了 4 次，包括 2019 年 8 月 31 日的移交，共移交 4 731 吨船用汽油。

移交中，有 3 次移交是在“Yun Hong 8”号被记录停靠南浦前几天发生。⁷¹ 供货船 A 的注册船东向小组专家提供了协助，提供了所有必要文件⁷² (见附件 6)。调查还在继续。

图4

“Yun Hong 8”号与供货船A之间的船对船移交，2019年8月31日



资料来源：会员国。

(二) “Yun Hong 8”号和供货船 B

31. 一个会员国拍摄到“Yun Hong 8”号于 2019 年 10 月 23 日在东海从悬挂印度国旗的船只(以下称“供货船 B”)接收船对船移交的货物(见图 5)。当时，供货船 B 被定期租给 CPC 有限公司，这个实体的注册地址位于阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜。⁷³ 此外，供货船 B 在 2019 年 9 月至 11 月中旬期间又 4 次向“Yun Hong 8”交付精炼石油(见附件 7(a))。⁷⁴ 船对船移交发生后数天内“Yun Hong 8”号被记录停靠南浦港。⁷⁵ 供货船 B 的注册船东提供了文件，并正在协助专家小组。⁷⁶ 该船东最初说，2019 年 10 月 23 日的移交方不是“Yun Hong 8”号，而是“Yun

⁷¹ 7 月至 8 月中旬的移交发生在“Yun Hong 8”号停靠南浦港前 4 至 8 天之间，2019 年 8 月 31 日的移交发生在最近一次停靠南浦港前约 1 个月。

⁷² 船东提交了为船东的尽职调查和预防目的收集的下列文件和相关照片：已签署并注明日期的舱载燃油交付收据、接货船最终目的地的承诺函和确认函、船舶登记确认函、每笔交易的卸货报告、船舶证书和国籍确认函、流量仪照片和付款记录复印件。

⁷³ 供货船 B 与 CPC 有限公司签订了长期包租契约，租船协议日期为 2019 年 8 月 5 日。供货船 B 的船东告知专家小组，它“今后不会同意与同一承租人 CPC 有限公司或与承租人有关的人合作”。

⁷⁴ 向“Yun Hong 8”号的 5 次移交发生在 2019 年 9 月 28 日、10 月 5 日和 23 日，以及 2019 年 11 月 11 日最后进行的 2 次移交。


⁷⁵ 供货船 B 与“Yun Hong 8”号之间的 5 次移交中，有 3 次移交发生在 2019 年 9 月和 10 月，2 次移交发生在 2019 年 10 月 31 日之后，超出了会员国向专家小组所提供信息的时间框架。这 3 次移交发生在“Yun Hong 8”号停靠南浦港前 2 至 6 天之间。据记录，供货船 B 共向“Yun Hong 8”号移交了 6 297.29 吨含硫量为百万分之五百的汽油。

⁷⁶ 据船东称，“所有经营事宜均由承租人向船东和船东向船长处理，由承租人 PIC” (作为转租人) 与供货船 B 的船长当地协调。

Hong 18”号⁷⁷ (见附件 7(b))。但该船东随后在与船长交谈后澄清了“Yun Hong 8”号的身份。⁷⁸ 据船东称，转租人提供了与货物数量有关的卸货指示，而船上的承租人代表 Looi 先生提供了进一步的指示。承租人尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。调查还在继续。

图5

“Yun Hong 8”号与供货船B之间的船对船移交，2019年10月23日



资料来源：会员国。

(三) “Vifine”号与“New Konk”号

32. 一个会员国拍摄到当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Vifine”号于2019年6月19日在东海与“New Konk”号⁷⁹ (海事组织编号: 9036387)进行船对船移交(见图6)。“Vifine”号多次向南浦交付精炼石油(见第 18 段)。专家小组调查显示，“Vifine”号的注册船东鸿信国际船舶管理有限公司和“New Konk”的注册船东新康海洋国际有限公司⁸⁰ 共用一个注册地址。⁸¹ 2019年5月这两艘船分别有了

⁷⁷ 船东称，如电子邮件和一张由承租人提供的舱载燃油交付收据所示，参与船对船移交的是“Yun Hong ‘18’”号，而不是“Yun Hong ‘8’”号。

⁷⁸ 据船东称，船长在船上承租人代表的压力下，同意“船名应涂成“Yun Hong 18”，这样他就可以向他的管理方报告这不是“Yun Hong 8”号”，并指示在所有文件中如此记录船名。在其他场合，船东陈述如下：“你会赞同船长将船名涂为‘Yun Hong 8’，这样他就可以违反我们关于损坏风险的指示，不用担心他的行动有可能违反制裁条款。”据报道，“Yun Hong 8”号在一次移交过程中与供货船 B 相撞，船东为确保船只安全运营拒绝进一步移交。事件相关文件附后。专家小组注意到，与此同时，船长已于 2019 年 10 月 20 日报告称，一艘美国监测资产“已经围绕我船转了两圈”。随后“每隔几个小时”就会播放警告，称对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实施了制裁，“船只间进行的违反制裁的交易都是非法的”。2019 年 11 月 11 日又进行了船对船移交。

⁷⁹ 2019 年 4 月至 10 月期间，“New Konk”号悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行(IHS Markit(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅))。

⁸⁰ 中文：新康海洋国际有限公司。

⁸¹ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 28 日查阅)。专家小组注意到，列出的共享地址可能是提供公司注册服务的公司的地址。

新船东，在此之前其注册船东、船舶管理方和经营方也一样，都是全安。新康海洋国际有限公司尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

图6

“Vifine”号和“New Konk”号之间的船对船移交，2019年6月19日



资料来源：会员国。

涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮的船对船移交

33. 据一个会员国称，2019 年头 10 个月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只至少 157 次停靠朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口，交付通过船对船移交非法购得的精炼石油产品(见附件 1)。这些移交违反了安全理事会决议，使该国能够大规模逃避制裁。其中许多移交采用了专家小组以前查明的模糊策略，包括关闭自动识别系统、夜间移交、使用没有海事组织编号的小船和船只伪装。

34. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和代表其行事的行为体继续推进、调整和发展规避方法，以避免决议禁止的活动被发现、识别和监测。一种相对较新的做法是，船只知道在会员国领水不能跟踪，因此会通过进入会员国领水避开跟踪。据一个会员国观察，2019 年 7 月 1 日至 9 月 30 日期间从事此类活动的船只包括直接向南浦交货的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只、被指认船只和悬挂外国旗的船只，以及与其他直接交货的悬挂外国旗的船只或与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮进行船对船移交的悬挂外国旗的船只(见附件 8)。⁸² 这些悬挂外国旗的船只也可能依靠其非朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗的地位来获得船舶加油和其他供应服务，为其非法行动提供便利。

35. 若干会员国记录的涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮的船对船移交的例子包括：

⁸² 据报有更多船只，专家小组目前正在调查这些案件。

(一) “Rui Hong 916”号与“Kum Un San”号

36. 当时悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行的“Rui Hong 916”号(海事组织编号: 9058866)⁸³与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“Kum Un San”号(海事组织编号: 8720436)于2019年5月28日在东海进行了船对船移交。一个专业海事数据库记录这艘船于2019年1月被出售给一家未披露的实体。⁸⁴不久之后,这艘船于2019年3月被记录注册了塞拉利昂船旗,注册该船旗3个月。移交时,“Rui Hong 916”号试图通过在船体上涂抹其名称的数字“9”来掩盖其身份,没有发送自动识别系统信号,并在夜间进行移交。

37. 专家小组通过向专家小组提供文件的前船东追踪了2019年1月“Rui Hong 916”号售出后的所有权情况。专家小组能够追踪到这艘船当时船名为“Taiyo Maru No. 2”号,于2019年1月卖给瑞仕(香港)船务有限公司(以下称“瑞仕”)⁸⁵的日本代理“Toei Shipping”有限公司⁸⁶(以下称“Toei”)。这笔交易通过卖方经纪人和买方经纪人进行。在该船前船东提供的文件中,Toei被描述为同时代表卖方⁸⁷和买方。⁸⁸买方瑞仕要求该船的前船东在协定备忘录中表示Toei是前船东代表。据Toei称,⁸⁹“Taiyo Maru No. 2”号出口后,其实际所有人为Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry有限公司,这家公司对该船进行修理和维修,之后将其出售给“最终买家”Wang先生(见附件9)。调查还在继续。

(二) “Sea Prima”号和“Saebyol”号

38. 曾悬挂圣基茨和尼维斯国旗的“Sea Prima”号(海事组织编号: 8617524)于2019年9月25日与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“Saebyol”号(海事组织编号: 8916293)进行了船对船移交,此前一个月,该船被记录为悬挂未知旗帜。⁹⁰“Saebyol”号和“Sea Prima”号都没有发送自动识别系统信号,包括在进行船对船移交时。⁹¹一家新加坡公司(以下称“管理公司-SP”)被列为“Sea Prima”号的船舶管理方和经营方以及该船注册船东(一家英属维尔京群岛注册公司)的“转交”地址。⁹²管理公司-SP的代表答复称,这艘船于2019年7月出售给一家注册地

⁸³ “Rui Hong 916”号在2019年3月至6月期间悬挂塞拉利昂国旗航行(IHS Markit(2019年10月22日查阅))。

⁸⁴ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年10月22日查阅)。

⁸⁵ 中文: 瑞仕(香港)船务有限公司。

⁸⁶ 日文: 東栄汽船株式会社。

⁸⁷ 一份日期为2018年10月24日的协定备忘录提到 Toei Shipping 有限公司代表卖方向行事。

⁸⁸ 一份日期为2018年10月25日的船舶销售合同提到 Toei Shipping 有限公司为代表瑞仕(香港)船务有限公司的买方。

⁸⁹ 日期为2019年11月5日来自 Toei 的电子邮件。

⁹⁰ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019年11月25日查阅)。


⁹¹ 同上。

⁹² 同上。

址在厦门的公司(以下称“买方-SP”),并已在高雄港交付(见附件 10)。此后,管理公司-SP 及其注册所有人“不再与该船有任何牵连、任何权益、管理或控制权”。调查还在继续。⁹³

图7(a)

与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮的船对船移交: (左)“Rui Hong 916”号与“Kum Un San”号; (右)“Sea Prima”号与“Saebjol”号



资料来源: 会员国; 制图: 专家小组。

39. 专家小组继续观察朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮使用欺骗手法与身份不明的船只进行非法移交的趋势。

(三) “Bok Un 1/Myong Ru 1”号与一艘身份不明的船只

40. 一个会员国评估认为,很可能是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“*Myong Ryu 1*”号(海事组织编号: 8532413)的“*Bok Un 1*”号于2019年10月27日在东海与一艘身份不明⁹⁴的船只“*华顺 168*”号进行了船对船移交(见图 7(b))。专家小组的调查另外显示,“*华顺 168*”号与供货船 B 进行了船对船移交,⁹⁵ 供货船 B 的船东向专家小组提供了关于这些移交的资料,显示所涉个人和实体中至少有一些也参与安排人与“*Yun Hong 8*”号的船对船移交(见第 31 段)。专家小组先前曾建议指认“*Myong Ryu 1*”号(见 S/2019/171, 第 50 段)。调查还在继续。

⁹³ 为答复专家小组的进一步询问,管理公司-SP 的代表提供了有关交易过程的补充资料。

⁹⁴ 这艘船没有海事组织编号,因此身份不明。

⁹⁵ 据观察,移交发生在2019年10月25日、26日和28日。这艘船由CPC有限公司租用,转租人向船长和承租人提供了卸货指示,船上的承租人代表 Looi 先生提供了进一步的指示。

图7(b)

不同场合拍到的“华顺168”号



资料来源：会员国、专家小组。

41. 其他此类移交的例子载于附件 11。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮之间的船对船移交

42. 被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“Chon Ma San”号(海事组织编号：8660313)和“Kum Jin Gang 3”号(海事组织编号：8791667)被拍到于 2019 年 9 月 23 日进行了船对船移交(见图 8)，表明并非所有朝鲜油轮都返回港口交付非法货物。

图8

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮之间的船对船移交个案



资料来源：会员国。

关于参与逃避制裁活动的船只的最新情况

43. 专家小组继续调查悬挂越南国旗、曾于 2019 年 2 月下旬在南浦卸载精炼石油(见 S/2019/691，第 10 至 12 段)的“Viet Tin 01”号(海事组织编号：8508838)和参与身份欺诈并分别于 2018 年 5 月 18 日和 6 月 2 日与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮“Paek Ma”号(海事组织编号：9066978)和“Myong Ryu 1”号(海事组织编号：8532413)进行船对船移交的被指认船只“Shang Yuan Bao”号(海事组织编号：8126070)(见 S/2019/171，第 16 和 17 段)。有关个案的最新资料载于附件 12。

给予以下各方的建议

委员会

44. 专家小组建议指认下列船只违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段：

- “Bonvoy 3”号(海事组织编号 8978784)，船旗不明
- “Diamond 8”号(海事组织编号 9132612)，悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Hokong”号(海事组织编号 9006758)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Sen Lin 01”号(海事组织编号 8910378)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Subblic”号(海事组织编号 8126082)，以前悬挂多哥国旗
- “Tianyou”号(海事组织编号 8817007)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Unica”号(海事组织编号 8514306)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Viet Tin 01”号(海事组织编号 8508838)，悬挂越南国旗
- “Vifine”号，亦称“Tealway FV”号(海事组织编号 9045962)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Yun Hong 8”号(海上移动业务识别码 413459380)，悬挂中国国旗

45. 专家小组建议指认以下与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行船对船移交的船只违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段：

- “Rui Hong 916”号(海事组织编号 9058866)，以前悬挂塞拉利昂国旗
- “Sea Prima”号(海事组织编号 8617524)，以前悬挂圣基茨和尼维斯国旗

46. 专家小组重申建议指认以下朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只违反第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段：

- “Bok Un 1”号/“Myong Ryu 1”号(海事组织编号 8532413)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗
- “Mu Bong 1”号(海事组织编号 8610461)，悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗

会员国，关于针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国活动的最佳做法

关于分享信息

47. 掌握证据的会员国应与相关会员国当局分享涉嫌向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付石油产品的船只名单，以便相关会员国当局进行尽职调查，阻止为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口精炼石油提供便利的船只。

48. 会员国应鼓励船只所有人、经营人和承租人在尽职调查中纳入提供船只位置、船只登记信息和船旗信息等数据的组织提供的数据以及委员会提供的信息。

关于提高透明度

49. 会员国应要求各自相关主管当局披露所有与寻求在其船舶登记处登记船只的法律实体相关的实际所有人信息。开放登记的会员国应努力收集拥有或控制每艘船只所属外国实体的每个人的身份和联系信息，无论是控股股东、企业融资人，还是高级管理人员或决策者。

50. 如果在本国管辖范围内没有相关法律实体，开放登记的会员国应努力收集由常驻代理国民代表的船只所有人的身份和联系信息。

关于利用技术支持海上制裁措施的有效执行

51. 为避免滥用自动识别系统，船旗国和海运业应考虑技术解决方案，如利用“软锁”系统确保使用严格控制的访问代码传输有效的船只识别数据。

52. 船旗国和海运业应考虑开发和采用电子文件管理系统，以便能够使用移动电话应用程序或通过在线访问船旗国网站，对真实性、有效性或取消情况(出于制裁原因)进行快速现场检查。

关于推广最终用户认证最佳做法

53. 会员国应考虑对商品交易商、供应商和经纪公司采取指导措施，根据这些措施，出售的商品需要最终原产地和目的地证书，以便实施“了解您客户的客户”尽职调查措施。

被禁源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商品的海上贸易

54. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国持续违反商品出口禁令，不仅藐视安理会决议，而且出口收入还长期为该国被禁止的核计划和弹道导弹计划提供资金。


55. 尽管根据第 2371(2017)号决议实施了煤炭禁令，但朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法煤炭出口在 2019 年有所增加。据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2019 年 1 月至 8 月期间出口了 370 万吨煤炭，估计价值为 3.7 亿美元⁹⁶ (见图 9)。据报告，仅在 5 月至 8 月期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国就非法出口了至少 270 万吨煤，与 2019 年前四个月 928 000 吨的出口量相比，这一期间的出口量增长了约 191%。据该会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的大部分煤炭出口(估计为 280 万吨)是通过从悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只船对船移交到中国当地驳船进行的。⁹⁷

⁹⁶ 提供信息的会员国根据每吨 100 美元的价格进行计算，据此估计出煤炭价值。

⁹⁷ 一些专家认为，该信息不妨予以进一步查证。

图 9

2019 年 1 月至 8 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的非法煤炭出口



资料来源：会员国。

56. 专家小组对 2019 年 11 月和 12 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦和松林煤港卫星图像的研究⁹⁸ 表明，包括较大尺寸船只在内的煤船，继续停靠煤码头，这表明煤炭出口贸易仍在进行(见附件 13)。

逃避制裁的方法

新情况

57. 专家小组发现了逃避制裁的新方法，包括：用长度超过 100 米的远洋自推型驳船运输违禁商品；将煤炭从悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只移交到悬挂外国国旗的更大的散装货船进行交付，而非将煤炭移交到较小的驳船进行交付；怀疑朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购得一艘准备报废的散装货船进行非法煤炭出口。此外，据一个会员国报告，与转运源自该国的违禁商品有关的船只更多停靠中国沿海港口。

航行违规行为

58. 专家小组还继续观察以前记录的逃避模式，包括在运输源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的商品时使用间接路线、绕道、无定向航行和假文件。这些策略旨在混淆实际路线，隐藏港口停靠情况，让人以为被禁商品在该国以外的港口装载。这些策略的使用突出表明，在确认港口停靠目的地以及核实商品原产地相关文件时，需要加强尽职调查措施。“Rui Jin”号(海事组织编号 8919104)(见第 86 至 89 段)

⁹⁸ 通过 Planet Labs 可获得卫星图像并且能见度足够清晰时，对货船进行了计数。计算基于非常保守的估计。

的案例突出展示了此类策略的运用，以及当时其船旗登记处，即帕劳国际航运登记处如何采取措施跟踪该船，确定其参与了可制裁活动。

用自推型驳船交付违禁商品

59. 专家小组注意到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国商品非法出口的一个新情况，即使用自推型驳船从该国运输数百万吨违禁商品。

60. 据一个会员国称，驳船的尺寸和结构符合一种称为自推型远洋驳船的特定船只类型。⁹⁹ 与典型的散装货船相比，这些自推型驳船上部结构低矮，货舱上没有盖板，可据此识别(见图 10)。据了解，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的船队中并没有此类驳船。专家小组注意到，这些驳船有海上移动业务识别码，但没有海事组织编号。¹⁰⁰

图 10

运送煤炭的自推型驳船



资料来源：会员国。

61. 一个会员国报告说，自 2019 年 5 月以来，来自中国的自推型驳船¹⁰¹ 一直在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国南浦和天安港装载煤炭。这些驳船直接驶往中国杭州湾的三个港口进行交付。2019 年 5 月至 8 月，这些驳船分 47 批至少交付了 540 000 吨朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭。从 2019 年 5 月到 9 月，至少有 37 艘不同的中国籍驳船参与了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭出口。该会员国评估称，这些驶往中国长江的驳船中很多将货物交付至长江沿岸设施。¹⁰²

用自推型驳船装运煤炭

62. 以下是 2019 年 6 月至 11 月煤炭交付的例子：¹⁰³

2019 年 6 月至 8 月，“Xin Da Hai”号交付朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭

⁹⁹ 海事组织大会在其最新的关于海事组织船只识别编号办法的 A.1117(30)号决议中建议，除其他外，总吨位 100 吨及以上的船只自愿登记海事组织编号，以加强海上安全和防止污染，并促进防止海事欺诈。

¹⁰⁰ 船只的国际海事组织编号独一无二，绝不会分配给另一艘船。海上移动业务识别码是由船只的登记国或船旗国管理机构提供的分配号。

¹⁰¹ 会员国评估认为，几乎可以肯定这些驳船是中国人拥有和经营。

¹⁰² 一些专家认为，本段信息不妨予以进一步查证。

¹⁰³ 2019 年 11 月收到的会员国信息。

63. “Xin Da Hai”号(海上移动业务识别码 413690886)于 2019 年 7 月 18 日在南浦装载煤炭, 2019 年 7 月 29 日沿长江航行, 卸下煤炭后停泊在沿江煤码头(见图 11(a))。专家小组注意到, 在 2019 年 7 月航行之前, 该驳船也于 2019 年 6 月沿类似路线驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(见图 11(b)), 这表明该船至少重复了一次交付航行。自 2019 年 7 月 1 日起, 没有收到来自“Xin Da Hai”号的自动识别系统数据传输。¹⁰⁴

图 11(a)


2019 年 7 月至 8 月, “Xin Da Hai”号装载朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭航行



资料来源: 会员国; 制图: 专家小组。

图 11(b)

2019 年 6 月, “Xin Da Hai”号驶向南浦



资料来源: Windward 公司。

2019 年 7 月至 10 月不明驳船交付朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的快照¹⁰⁵

64. 2019 年 7 月 19 日, 就在驳船 A 在天安装载煤炭同日, 在南浦船闸闸门外观察到同样装载煤炭的驳船 B。随后, 驳船 A 和 B 远洋航行前往长江, 并于 2019 年 8 月 3 日载着朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭一起停泊在那里。2019 年 9 月 1 日, 驳船 C 在南浦装煤。之后, 在 2019 年 9 月 9 日, 观察到另一艘身份不明的

¹⁰⁴ 根据 Windward 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 17 日查阅)。

¹⁰⁵ 代号 A、B、C、D 和 E 用于标注不明驳船。

驳船 D 运载煤炭通过南浦船闸闸门。2019 年 9 月 20 日，驳船 C 和 D 在长江上通过船对船移交的方式卸煤。驳船“E”于 2019 年 10 月 3 日在天安装煤，行驶路线类似，并于 2019 年 10 月 9 日卸煤。图 12 说明了第 62 至 64 段所述案例；朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的出口每月都有。

图 12
2019 年 7 月至 10 月，自推型驳船运送朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭航行

驳船 A 和 B



驳船 C 和 D



驳船 E




资料来源：会员国；制图：专家小组。

2019 年 10 月至 11 月，“alpha”号驳船直接交付朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭¹⁰⁶

65. 2019 年 10 月 22 日，空舱的“alpha”号驳船驶向大同船闸闸门进行远洋航行，一周后在南浦附近的位置观察到货舱中可见朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭。从该驳船的特写照片可以看出它的航线、身份和货物(见图 13)。

图 13

2019 年 10 月至 11 月，“alpha”号驳船运载朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的航线



资料来源：会员国；制图：专家小组。

2019 年 11 月，“bravo”号驳船直接交付朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭¹⁰⁷


66. 2019 年 11 月 1 日，在天安观察到装载着朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的“bravo”号驳船。2019 年 11 月 4 日，“Bravo”号通过黄海进行远洋航行，一天后在长江沿线观察到该船(见图 14)。

¹⁰⁶ “Alpha”是不明身份驳船的代号。

¹⁰⁷ “Bravo”是不明身份驳船的代号。

图 14

2019 年 11 月，“bravo”号驳船运载朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的航线



资料来源：会员国；制图：专家小组。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭船对船移交的其他地点

67. 北部湾的船对船移交(见 [S/2019/691](#)，第 20 段)大幅减少，转而向中国宁波-舟山和连云港港区的交付增加。鉴于交付增加，港口和海关当局更有必要加强对船只及其货运单据的检查，并扣押任何涉嫌运输违禁物品的船只。

68. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国使用这些比北部湾更靠近自己港口的地点，可能会缩短煤炭交付的周转时间。这对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国来说有一个优势，那就是，交付更具成本效益，并可能有助于减少该国船只受到审查的风险。受影响港口地区此类活动增加，使得有关当局更加需要对从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口出口的违禁货物进行尽职调查并采取对策。

(一) 在宁波-舟山附近继续与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行船对船移交

69. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只继续在宁波-舟山地区开展船对船活动，根据一个会员国提供的信息，在某个特定时间点，在该地区观察到多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。图 15 显示了 2019 年 10 月 10 日宁波-舟山地区附近停泊了多艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。

图 15
宁波-舟山附近的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只




资料来源：会员国。

(二) 在连云港附近与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行船对船移交


70. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还利用连云港锚地进行船对船煤炭移交。在连云港附近停泊的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只的数量(见图 16(a))反映了在给定地点船对船煤炭移交的数量。图 16(b)还显示了如何使用浮吊来支持这些非法的船对船煤炭移交。

图 16(a)
连云港附近的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只



资料来源：会员国。

图 16(b)
浮吊的使用



资料来源：会员国。

(三) 在北部湾与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行船对船移交

71. 专家小组正在调查一艘悬挂越南国旗的船只“Phuong Linh 269”号(海上移动业务识别码 574005969)，该船涉嫌多次将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭交付中国企沙港。该船在 2018 年 9 月至 2019 年 2 月运营期间没有有效的海事组织编号，也没有通过自动识别系统发送信号。¹⁰⁸ 案件的调查仍在继续(见附件 14)。

使用更大的散装货船

72. 一个令人关切的新情况是，将朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭从悬挂该国国旗的船只移交到悬挂外国国旗的更大的散装货船进行交付，而不是如专家小组上次报告所述，将煤炭移交到较小的驳船进行交付。使用运载能力是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只两到三倍的更大船只，表明每次航行可转运数量多得多的非法煤炭。根据一个会员国提供的信息，2019 年 9 月，有煤炭从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只移交后，运到中国曹妃甸卸货(见附件 15)。

购买准备报废船只进行煤炭非法出口

“Fu Xing 12”号(海事组织编号 8605727；海上移动业务识别码 413621000)

73. 专家小组正在调查一个逃避制裁的案件，涉及一艘散装货船“Fu Xing 12”号的购买，该船原准备报废，却被用于出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭。一个会员国评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购买该船是为了从事非法商业活动。这艘船目前在专业海事数据库¹⁰⁹ 中被列为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“Su Ri Bong”号。此案的重要性在于几个方面：在船只航行过程中，操纵识别信息和多次改变身份；购买一艘准备报废的船只，却转作现役船只运输朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭；该船疑似转变为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只。这是专家小组

¹⁰⁸ 根据 Windward 公司的资料。“Phuong Linh 269”号发送了一个无效的海事组织编号，123456789。

¹⁰⁹ 根据 Windward 公司的资料。

发现的几起船只被新船东购置后直接从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运输受制裁货物的案件之一。

操纵船只识别信息

74. “Fu Xing 12”号通过宁波船务有限公司(Ningbo Shipping Co., Ltd), 在中国商业船舶登记数据库中登出广告, 将于 2019 年 6 月出售, 之后以很低价格售出。尽管该船在海事数据库中记录为已拆解,¹¹⁰ 但该船仍在继续运营, 并在出售后像变色龙一样几易其貌。该船于 2019 年 7 月在宁波附近的一个造船厂干船坞停靠后, 于 8 月 14 日或该日前后启航, 悬挂塞拉利昂国旗, 作为“Pu Zhou”号驶向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(见图 17)。

图 17

“Fu Xing 12”号停泊在宁波附近的造船厂/2019 年 10 月“Fu Xing 12”号停泊在南浦



资料来源：会员国；制图：专家小组。

75. 根据一个专业海事数据库, 这艘船在 2019 年 8 月至 11 月期间更换了身份, 多次更改呼号、海上移动业务识别码和名称。在此期间, 据记录该船已驶入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新仓。该船随后于 2019 年 11 月 9 日从南浦驶出, 载有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭, 身份为悬挂中国国旗的“Hua Hai”号, 但使用了以前记录的属于“Su Tong Hai”号的海上移动业务识别码 413621000。该船于 2019 年 11 月 13 日使用此身份交付煤炭回宁波。总结来看, 该船在从宁波驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以及返回宁波时操纵了其识别信息, 使用了船上的两个自动识别系统, 并使用了四个不同的船名——“Fu Xing 12”, “Puzhou”, “Su Ri Bong”, “Hua Hai” / “Su Tong Hai”¹¹¹ ——并分别悬挂三国旗帜航行(中国国旗、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗和塞拉利昂国旗)¹¹² (见图 18(a)和(b))。专家小组已要求提供信息, 并正在等待塞拉利昂船旗登记处的答复, 据报该船是在塞拉利昂船旗登

¹¹⁰ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 12 日查阅)。


¹¹¹ 专家小组在下文提及的“Fu Xing 12”号可互换地指代该船自 2019 年 6 月以来使用的所有不同身份。

¹¹² 会员国资料。

记处登记的。英属维尔京群岛当局确认，Honor Sail 有限公司(在海事数据库中被列为船只的船东、运营方和管理方)于 2019 年 4 月注册成立。¹¹³ 调查还在继续。

76. 虽然“Fu Xing 12”号在海事数据库中记录的状态为“已拆解”，¹¹⁴ 但该船仍处于现役状态，这一事实表明该船利用其记录的非现役状态逃避制裁。

图 18(a)
“Fu Xing 12”号的身份操控



资料来源：Windward 公司。

¹¹³ 根据 IHS Markit 公司的资料(2019 年 11 月 12 日查阅)。

¹¹⁴ 同上。专家小组注意到 IHS Markit 公司更新了该船的状态，不再记录为已拆解(IHS Markit 公司的资料(2020 年 1 月 29 日查阅))。

图 18(b)

“Fu Xing 12” 号装载朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的航线



资料来源：会员国。

资料来源：Windward 公司/Planet Labs。

非法船只购置

77. 安理会决议禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购新船或旧船。¹¹⁵ “Fu Xing 12” 号公开拍卖的公告显示，该船于 2019 年 6 月以 1 700 万人民币(2 474 167 美元)的价格售出。¹¹⁶ 广告中该船的账面价格是 550 万元人民币(800 466 美元)。专家小组收到的信息显示，在该船出售后，一家总部设在中国台湾省的公司可能与新船东或运营方有关联。调查还在继续。中国回应称，正在协调有关部门对案件进行调查。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的其他装运

供应链网络调查

78. 专家小组继续调查新的和以前报告的转运朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭案件，包括通过“DN5505”号、“Dong Thanh”号和因此类活动而被一个会员国禁止停靠本国港口的船只运输的煤炭。以下陈述和数字详细说明了各种逃避制裁和违反制裁行为。

(一) “DN5505”号上的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭

79. 专家小组检查了一艘以前悬挂多哥国旗的船只“DN5505”号(海事组织编号 8630708)(图 19)，¹¹⁷ 该船据称于 2019 年 2 月 4 日从俄罗斯联邦纳霍德卡港进入大韩民国浦项港，随后该船被大韩民国当局根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 9 段扣押。俄罗斯联邦确认，在煤炭运输调查相关期间，没有该船进入俄罗斯港口的

¹¹⁵ 第 2397(2017)号决议，第 14 段，以及第 2321(2016)号决议，第 30 段。

¹¹⁶ 根据公告，该船卖给了舟山的一位刘女士。

¹¹⁷ 2019 年 7 月该船被列为船旗不明(根据 IHS Markit 的资料(2019 年 11 月 7 日查阅))。

记录。¹¹⁸ 对这艘船 2018 年 10 月和 2019 年 2 月涉嫌出口朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭的航行的调查仍在继续。

图 19

“DN5505”号

左：“DN5505”号；中：甲板上有煤的痕迹；右：货舱



资料来源：专家小组。

(二) 来自智诚的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭

80. 专家小组继续调查“智诚”号(海事组织编号: 8905490)上运输并由悬挂越南国旗的“Dong Thanh”号(海事组织编号: 9180035)转运的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭的供应链(见 S/2019/691, 第 24 至 29 段)。为运往“Dong Thanh”号的煤炭共提供了 3 份原产地证书(见同上, 附加 9)。印度尼西亚向专家小组证实, 买家为便于转运而获签发的标明煤炭为“印度尼西亚煤炭”的原产地证书不是真实的(见附件 16)。专家小组继续调查与非法煤炭运输有关的金融交易。

81. 专家小组追踪了“Dong Thanh”号上的煤炭, 并在该船无法运载货物进港后与该船的定期租船人取得了联系。越南告知专家小组, 越南相关机构对该船只进行了检查和调查, 以确定货物的来源并确定其结果。根据相关适用的越南法律作出终审裁决之前, 该船及其全部货物已被扣押。

(三) 对第三国非法煤炭的调查

82. 2019 年 10 月, 大韩民国大邱区法院认定 4 名个人和 5 家公司有罪, 原因是他们参与了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2017 年通过俄罗斯联邦霍尔姆斯克违禁出口煤炭(见 S/2019/171, 第 37 段)。此外, 大韩民国釜山区检察官办公室正在调查涉

¹¹⁸ 专家小组在检查过程中发现该船在 2018 年 10 月仍用于煤炭运输并继续航行。

嫌在 2017 年 12 月至 2018 年 6 月期间从事类似活动的 6 名个人和 5 家公司。大韩民国分享了由于被确认参与相关决议禁止的活动而被禁入港的船只名单(见表 1)。

表 1

大韩民国自 2018 年 8 月以来实施的国家入港禁令

船只名称	海事组织编号	船旗国	国家入港禁令日期
“Hammer”号(前为“Sky Angel”号)	9168441	瓦努阿图(前为巴拿马)	2018 年 8 月 11 日
“Chen Yang”号(前为“Rich Glory”号)	8649905	塞拉利昂	2018 年 8 月 11 日
“Ga Hong”号(前为“Shinning Rich”号)	9596923	多哥(前为伯利兹)	2018 年 8 月 11 日
“Jin Long”号	8730986	伯利兹	2018 年 8 月 11 日
“Yu Yuan”号 ^a	9358694	多哥	2018 年 8 月 18 日
“An Quan Zhou 66”号	8742240	未知(前为巴拿马)	2018 年 12 月 28 日
“Tan Xin”号	9088598	未知(前为多哥)	2018 年 12 月 28 日
“Xin Yang 688”号	8657809	中国(前为伯利兹)	2018 年 12 月 28 日
“Lucky Star”号	9015278	未知(前为多哥)	2018 年 12 月 28 日
“East River”号	9109952	巴拿马	2019 年 2 月 28 日

资料来源：会员国、专家小组。

^a 在 IHS Markit 公司上的记录为已拆解。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产沙料出口

83. 2017 年 12 月，安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议禁止出口泥土和石料(商品名称及编码协调制度编码 25)，沙料是其中的组成部分，受该决议约束。商品名称及编码协调制度第 25 章包括以下方面：“25.05：各种天然沙料，不论是否有色，但第 26 章的含金属沙料除外”。¹¹⁹ 据一个会员国称，自 2019 年 5 月以来，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对中国开展了大量的沙料出口业务，非法运送了 100 多批朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产沙料。据报，悬挂中国国旗和其他外国国旗的船只一直在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国黄海道海州或附近和咸镜南道普冲郡新仓工人区装载沙料。据该会员国称，这些货物至少有 100 万吨泥沙，价值起码 2 200 万美元。^{120、121} 这些从河道疏浚挖出的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产泥沙已运往中国各港口。¹²²

¹¹⁹ 见世界海关组织，《商品名称及编码协调制度》，2017 年版，“盐；硫磺；泥土和石料；抹灰材料、石灰、水泥”。

¹²⁰ 提供信息的会员国是按每吨 22 美元的估价对泥沙进行计算。

¹²¹ 一些专家认为，该信息不妨予以进一步查证。

¹²² 一些专家认为，该信息不妨予以进一步查证。

获自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海州的泥沙

84. 据一个会员国称, 2019 年 5 月, 超过 92 艘可能悬挂中国国旗的自推型驳船在驶往中国港口之前, 从海州港区的近岸挖泥船上装载泥沙。¹²³、¹²⁴ 专家小组在商业卫星平台上追踪这些驳船的坐标和航行路线(见图 20), 证实了所提供的资料。行使该航行路线的船只数目以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口的泥沙数量表明这些货物运输是有协调、有组织的行动。

¹²³ 专家小组提交了一份载有识别信息(船号和海上移动业务识别码)和航行次数的自推型驳船名单。这些驳船可能参与 2019 年 4 至 6 月从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海州向中国非法出口泥沙子, 专家小组要求协助调查。

¹²⁴ 一些专家认为, 该信息不妨予以进一步查证。

85. 中方回应称高度重视专家小组提供的有关朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产泥沙走私的线索。然而，中方无法追踪相关船只的航程，也无法确认这些泥沙是否运往中国港口。

获自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新仓的泥沙

86. 专家小组调查了悬挂帕劳国旗航行的“Rui Jin”号(海事组织编号: 8919104)，该船涉嫌多次将泥沙从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运往宁波。¹²⁵ 该船最近一次未申报航行是 2019 年 11 月中旬前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，返回时，根据帕劳国际船舶登记处发布的通知，于 2019 年 12 月 3 日在宁波地区被扣留。截至 2020 年 1 月 12 日，“Rui Jin”号仍停泊在宁波港外，等待船旗国检查。¹²⁶

87. “Rui Jin”号的注册船东即行瑞有限公司¹²⁷于 2019 年 6 月 19 日购得该船，务实船务有限公司¹²⁸是船务管理方和营运方。此后，“Rui Jin”号进行了一系列具有共同模式的航行。离开中国港口后，该船的自动识别系统在每次航行中都有相当长一段时间停止传输信息。其中一段时期的卫星图像显示，该船前往新仓装载河沙。一旦回到国际水域，自动识别系统传输就恢复了，该船驶往中国卸货。¹²⁹ 行瑞有限公司¹³⁰和务实船务有限公司¹³¹尚未对专家小组的调查作出答复。调查还在继续。

88. 2019 年 11 月 25 日，帕劳国际船舶登记处试图对“Rui Jin”号进行定位，因为自 2019 年 11 月 18 日以来，该船的自动识别系统和船舶远程识别和跟踪系统一直没有传输信息。该登记处联系了作为该船报告的最后目的地的俄罗斯联邦符拉迪沃斯托克港务局，后者表示该船不在那里。帕劳国际船舶登记处同时联系了“Rui Jin”号的船东和管理方，要求他们提供该船的位置，后者则声称，该船停泊在符拉迪沃斯托克，其自动识别系统和船舶远程识别和跟踪都出现了故障。符拉迪沃斯托克港务局反驳了这一有关定位的信息(附件 17)。2019 年 12 月 2 日，帕劳国际船舶登记处向亚太地区港口国管制谅解备忘录港口国管制委员会这一政府间合作组织发出了禁止航行通知。2019 年 12 月 3 日，帕劳国际船舶登记处认定“Rui Jin”号在宁波，并发出船旗国扣留通知，临时吊销该船的注册证书(见图 21)。2019 年 12 月 18 日，该登记处通知“Rui Jin”号的船东和管理方，鉴于报告称该船的自动识别系统和船舶远程识别和跟踪出现故障，它需要进行安全检

¹²⁵ 有会员国告知专家小组，“Rui Jin”号涉嫌于 2019 年 6、7 和 10 月在中国卸下朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产泥沙。专家小组收到该船 10 月份交货的航行路线和装卸泥沙的图像。

¹²⁶ 船旗国提供的资料。

¹²⁷ 行瑞有限公司，中国香港中环德辅道 99-105 号大新人寿大厦 5 楼。

¹²⁸ 务实船务有限公司，中国香港中环德辅道 84-86 号章记大厦 13 楼 1302 室，于 2019 年 1 月 2 日注册成立(公司注册处(香港)，综合信息系统)。

¹²⁹ 提供这一信息的会员国估计，一艘朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法泥沙的价值约为 595 503 美元。

¹³⁰ 中文：行瑞有限公司。

¹³¹ 中文：务实船务有限公司。

查,并确保该船没有参与任何非法活动。该登记处请求宁波港务局允许该船进港,以便进行检查。¹³²

89. 帕劳向专家小组通报了最新情况,即 2020 年 1 月 21 日,帕劳国际船舶登记处就“Rui Jin”号据称违反制裁的行为举行了听证会,根据收集的证据以及该船船东未能沟通或出庭的情况,帕劳国际船舶登记处根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 12 段规定取消该船的登记,立即生效。祥瑞船舶运输有限公司¹³³以 MIR 的名义登记为该船的新船东(见附件 18),并试图在塞拉利昂船旗下登记“Rui Jin”号。根据帕劳国际船舶登记处提供的关于取消该船登记的资料,塞拉利昂证实该船不再在其船旗下登记。

图 21

“Rui Jin”号在新仓和宁波的图像



资料来源:会员国;制图:专家小组。

捕鱼权转让

90. 在本报告所述期间,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续违反制裁转让捕鱼权。¹³⁴一会员国估计,2018 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国从这一活动中获得的收入为 1.2 亿美元。另外两个会员国向专家小组提供了相关资料,包括 2019 年年中观察到的中国渔船挂有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国捕鱼许可证号码牌或持有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国文件¹³⁵或临时船籍证书的图像(见图 22)。¹³⁶

¹³² 2019 年 12 月 18 日帕劳国际船舶登记处给帕劳公共基础设施、工业和商务部长的信,同时抄送专家小组。

¹³³ 中文:祥瑞船舶运输有限公司。

¹³⁴ 见 S/2019/171, 第 47 至 49 段; S/2019/691, 第 30 和 31 段。

¹³⁵ 有效期为 2019 年 5 至 12 月。

¹³⁶ 接受约谈的渔船以及约谈中所述相关公司包括:福南渔 59798 号、海洋 9 号、鲁文远渔 138 号、冀远渔 51006 号、人豪渔业公司、三亚威龙水产有限公司、舟山渔业公司、海分水产有限公司。

图 22

挂有捕鱼许可证号码牌的渔船(最上); 在一艘船上拍摄到的捕鱼许可文件(下左)和临时船籍证书(下右)



资料来源: 会员国。

91. 一会员国报告说,在接受约谈时,一名船员表示,为期三个月的捕鱼许可证价格约为 400 000 元(约合 57 594 美元)。¹³⁷ 在分析会员国的报告和图像时,专家小组注意到,有关船只试图通过涂抹船名、改换船名以及领取朝鲜民主主义人民共和国渔区的捕鱼许可证等方法来避开邻国的巡逻。该会员国报告说,多艘船只的船员声称已通知本国当局,即他们正驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国渔区。对于专家组的询问,中国答复说,在专家组报告的船只中,有几艘船的编号不完整,因为中国船只必须有五位数编号和船名。尽管如此,中国还是对船只进行了研究,可能包括专家小组报告的船只。中国指出,一些船只只在中国沿海地区作业,另一些船只没有在渔船登记系统中登记。此外,作为逃避策略,从事被禁活动的船只只会使用假身份或伪造身份。因此,很难核实专家小组提供的资料。

建议

92. 专家小组建议委员会指认“Rui Jin”号(海事组织编号: 8919104)违反第 2397(2017)号决议第 6 段规定。

93. 为协助会员国开展工作,专家小组重申其先前的建议,即建立区域合作机制,分享关于船只是否在货物原产地文件所述港口实际停靠并装载煤炭的信息。会员国应为这一目的确定一个联络人。

94. 专家小组建议会员国采取一切必要措施,包括颁布立法,规定针对被发现违反制裁的所有船只采取适当行动。

95. 专家小组建议会员国与其他会员国、委员会和专家小组分享经确认涉入相关决议禁止的活动或物项运输的船只名单。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据

96. 公开提供的贸易统计数据并不能反映朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对外贸易的总量,也不一定能准确显示每年贸易的增减情况。专家小组将继续分析朝鲜民主主义人民共和国违反安全理事会有关决议的进出口情况;期间,专家小组将采用以会员国向国际贸易中心贸易图报告、或通过全球贸易图集等商业全球贸易数据库获得的会员国海关数据为依据的已公布贸易统计数据。¹³⁸ 随着 2017 年通过的四项新决议全面生效,2018 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有记录的出口总趋势是大幅下降。

¹³⁷ 2020 年 1 月 7 日的汇率。

¹³⁸ 产业禁令规定的完整物项清单见 S/2018/171 附件 4(S/2018/171/Corr.1 作了部分修订)。这一分析不包括会员国或是全球数据库或委员会未发现或未报告、或错误报告为与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国以外的第三国进行贸易的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进出口被禁物项。

表 2
2016-2018 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易情况

(千美元)

	2016 年	2017 年	2018 年
出口	2 903 099	1 958 104	330 662
进口	3 137 119	3 431 936	2 321 818
贸易差额	(234 020)	(1 473 832)	(1 991 156)

资料来源：国贸中心贸易图，2019 年 12 月 14 日查阅。

97. 在现有统计数据表明被禁物项贸易的情况下，专家小组写信给会员国，要求提供更多信息和进行核查。附件 19 详列专家小组的调查结果。这些数据意味着，在 2018 年 4 月至 2019 年 9 月期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能通过非法出口赚取了数千万美元，其中不包括数额大得多的未申报贸易。专家小组的调查和会员国提供的资料表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行未列入国际贸易数据库的煤炭等商品非法出口(见第 54 至 56 段和第 78 至 82 段)。这些出口可以解释近几年贸易逆差增加是如何被部分抵消的。

平壤国际贸易博览会及被指认实体的活动

98. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续一年举办两次平壤国际贸易博览会。这一活动的长期组织者系朝鲜国际展览社，隶属于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对外经济省，专家小组建议予以指认后，¹³⁹ 据报，自 2018 年以来，一个名为朝鲜对外经济关系协会的新组织作为新的主办方出现了，而国际展览社也继续参与其中。参展商数量从 2018 年 5 月的 200 多家增加到 2019 年 5 月超过 401 家。2019 年 9 月的贸易展览会共有 360 家公司参加。¹⁴⁰

99. 专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国被指认实体继续参加平壤国际贸易博览会，使自己有机会与国内外参展商互动。根据会员国提供的资料，¹⁴¹ 专家小组评估，以下被指认实体继续参加 2018 年 5 月至 2019 年 9 月期间举行的所有四次或其中几次平壤国际贸易博览会：康邦贸易公司(KPe.043)、普刚贸易会社(KPe.038 的别名)和 Kuryonggang 贸易公司(KPe.008 的别名)。Mirae 贸易公司、平安汽车贸易公司和 Sinhong 信通技术贸易公司等其他实体是作为军需工业部下属公司向专家小组报告的，这些公司至少自 2019 年 5 月以来也参加了博览会。¹⁴²

¹³⁹ 专家小组 2017 年建议对朝鲜国际展览社进行指认，原因是该社通过平壤国际贸易博览会协助被指认实体逃避制裁并为转让、出售或供应被禁物品进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供平台(见 S/2017/150，第 204 段)。

¹⁴⁰ 2018 年 5 月至 2019 年 9 月期间，从 NK Pro 网站和朝中社的文章中收集的数据。

¹⁴¹ 军需工业部(KPe.028)下属贸易公司及其别名的最新名单见附件 30。

¹⁴² 这些贸易公司的朝鲜文名称与会员国提供的信息相匹配。

100. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 2019 年 9 月 2 至 6 日举办了国际高新技术产品贸易展览会。专家小组调查了两家分别展示了三维打印机(协调制度编码 84)和无人机(协调制度编码 85)的公司。¹⁴³ 三维打印机制造商 Weistek 回复专家小组称, 由于该公司拥有众多“代理商和经销商”, 因而无法核实该产品是如何进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。专家小组尚未收到该无人机制造商广东飞翔达公司的答复。

101. 虽然参加朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易展览会本身并不违反安全理事会的制裁, 除非其中涉及违禁物品的越境转移、资金转移或被指认人员/实体的参与, 但专家小组告诫称, 贸易展览会可能被用来扩大与大规模杀伤性武器有关的采购网络。专家小组观察到有两家公司于 2019 年在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国举行的贸易展览会上发布石墨产品¹⁴⁴ 广告。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

三. 禁运、被指认人员和实体以及海外工人

中国

102. 专家小组调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国被指认实体万寿台创作社(下称万寿台)的一些广告和艺术作品展览。今朝美术馆¹⁴⁵ 一直在其网站上宣传万寿台艺术家及其作品(见附件 20)。专家小组尚未收到该美术馆的答复。2019 年 12 月, 集雅斋艺廊在香港举办了万寿台艺术作品展(见附件 21)。¹⁴⁶ 该艺廊答复专家小组说, “我们没有从私人收藏家或万寿台创作社购买任何绘画作品, 而且没有涉及任何交易。展览结束后, 所有的画作都将归还给私人收藏家。我们没有与万寿台创作社或朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的任何人有任何联系。展览协议是与私人收藏家金松虎先生所拥有的一家中国公司(中文名称: 西安荣皇传媒有限公司)签署。”

103. 专家小组注意到 2018 年 11 月的一篇媒体广播报道, 其中显示, 出售万寿台艺术品的展厅继续以万寿台美术馆(朝鲜万寿台创作社美术馆)的名义在北京 798 艺术区内经营, “万寿台画廊业主”吉正太通过出售从万寿台创作社购买的艺术品赚取收入(见附件 21)。中国此前报告称, 这家美术馆于 2018 年 1 月关闭(见 S/2018/171, 第 89 段)。对于专家组的最新询问, 中方答复说: “Beijing Yuan Mansudae 是万寿台美术馆的母公司, 曾经是中朝合资企业。根据安全理事会有关决议, 该公司已于 2018 年初转为中方独资公司, 并已停止与朝方的业务合作[……]”

¹⁴³ 三维打印又称增材制造, 具有大规模杀伤性武器的应用。

¹⁴⁴ 并不是所有石墨产品都受制裁管制。但核供应国集团第一部分准则(经国际原子能机构文件 INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part1 修正)逐项列出了核级石墨。根据第 2087(2013)号决议第 5(b)段, 该文件所载物项须受制于第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)、(b)和(c)段的规定, 按照第 2094 (2013)号决议第 12 段和安理会主席声明 S/PRST/2012/13 编写的委员会报告所列与弹道导弹有关的物项也是如此(见 S/2014/253, 附件)。因此, 禁止向朝鲜供应、销售或转让核级石墨, 也禁止向朝鲜供应、销售或转让可用于火箭喷管和再入飞行器鼻锥的细晶粒石墨。第 2270(2016)号决议第 27 段也可能适用。

¹⁴⁵ 地址: 中国辽宁省丹东市滨江中路 128-5 号 A 座。

¹⁴⁶ 地址: 中国香港皇后大道中 183 号中远大厦 4614 室。

万寿台美术馆在中国已经运营了十多年，享有很高的声誉，因此，为了保持特色和维持业务，万寿台美术馆没有改变招牌”(见附件 22)。

刚果民主共和国

104. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国涉入刚果民主共和国金矿开采以及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向刚果民主共和国总统卫队提供军事训练和出售武器的情况(见 S/2019/171，第 68 段)。专家小组写信给 Fouad Dakhllallah，他涉嫌违反安全理事会决议，与代表被联合国安全理事会指认的实体的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民接触，或与以前被报告涉入非洲和中东与违禁武器有关的活动的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民接触(见 S/2019/171，第 67 段)。专家小组已要求刚果民主共和国提供上述案件的资料。

厄立特里亚

105. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与厄立特里亚之间与武器有关的合作。厄立特里亚计算机组装和通信技术公司(又称 Eritech 或 Etech)“由厄立特里亚国防军经营”，并与“Asha Golgol 军事技术中心”同地办公，被确定为从朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一家提供军事通信设备的全球通讯公司(Glocom)获得军火和有关物资(见 S/2018/171 第 91 段和 S/2019/171 第 70 段)。专家小组还继续调查专家小组先前报告的青松联合会社驻厄立特里亚代表 Kim Kwang Rim(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民)。厄立特里亚在答复专家小组的再三询问时没有提供实质性资料(见附件 23)。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国

106. 专家小组继续调查被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体即朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和胜必公司在伊朗伊斯兰共和国的代表处(见 S/2019/691，第 34 段)。一个会员国告知专家小组，两名与朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司有关的人，Ha Won Mo 和 Kim Hak Chol，目前在伊朗伊斯兰共和国(见附件 24)。此外，该会员国指出，朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司自 2015 年起采用了新名称“221 总局”，取代了自 2000 年代中期以来使用的旧名称“矿业发展指导局”。

107. 对于专家小组的询问，伊朗伊斯兰共和国答复说，“除了外交官外，没有朝鲜国民登记居住在伊朗”，“朝鲜矿业发展贸易公司和胜必公司在伊朗没有办事处或代表”。伊朗伊斯兰共和国进一步表示，它“仔细调查了此事，但到目前为止没有观察到任何非法活动。派驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的朝鲜外交官的活动符合伊朗的国家条例以及朝鲜的国际义务”(见附件 25)。

108. 上述会员国还向专家小组通报，至少自 2009 年以来驻伊朗伊斯兰共和国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官员在迪拜机场和德黑兰机场之间“通过外交渠道”一直在走私黄金和现金(见 S/2019/171 第 72 段)。该会员国评估认为，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻德黑兰大使馆经济商务处的两名朝方人员 Pak Sin Hyok 和 Ri Kuk Myong 是这一走私活动目前的参与者。该会员国还向专家小组通报了多名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人员，包括一名前外交官，参与或曾参与其中(见附件 26)。同一会员国指出了在阿拉伯联合酋长国的三名伊朗公民涉嫌参与这一走私。专家小组尚未收到这三人的答复。

109. 对于专家小组的询问，伊朗伊斯兰共和国答复说：“这封信没有详细说明所指控的行动同与朝鲜相关的制裁……之间的联系……你的信没有为伊朗当局启动调查和确定必要事实提供足够的信息和证据“(见附件 25)。

缅甸

110. 专家小组重申先前提出的要求，即向其提供相关文件和其他资料，说明涉及缅甸与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事合作的事情，包括自 2006 年 10 月以来的弹道导弹合作，并提供缅甸和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国技术人员返回各自国家的证据(见 S/2019/171，第 78 段)。专家小组尚未收到关于这些事项的答复。

瑞典和瑞士

111. 专家小组审查了在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通川鱼类加工厂内由阿西布朗勃法瑞有限公司(下称 ABB)制造的三台白色机器人机械的照片。这些照片于 2019 年 11 月 19 日首次由该国国家媒体发布，据报道是在金正恩委员长最近对该设施进行实地指导访问期间拍摄的(见图 23)。专家小组进一步注意到，朝鲜国家媒体报道该工厂是朝鲜人民军新建的设施。瑞士答复专家小组称，“机械臂的型号是……IRB 660 型，它们必定是在 2017 年 4 月 17 日至 2018 年 11 月期间在中国上海的工厂中生产的”，并指出，在该工厂生产的数百台这种型号的机器中，大多数机器是“由中国方面订购的”。此外，“ABB 无法找出向通川鱼类加工厂或任何其他设在朝鲜的工厂/公司交付 IRB 660 型号机械臂的活动。不过，ABB 指出，(二手)机器人有相当大的二级市场……通常情况下，ABB 不会通过二级市场参与销售和购买”。调查还在继续。

图 23

2019 年 11 月 19 日播出的在通川鱼类加工厂的 ABB 机器人



资料来源：朝鲜中央通讯社。

委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国

112. 专家小组正在调查委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间的军事和技术合作。据媒体报道，委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国全国制宪会议主席在 2019 年 9 月访问朝鲜民主主义人民共和国期间签署了一系列承诺军事和技术合作的协定，这可能违反了安理会决议。专家小组已请委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国提供资料。

也门

113. 专家小组继续调查两起涉及也门的案件。第一起案件涉及也门与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国防工业的合作项目，Zakaria Yahya al-Shami 少将 2016 年 7 月 13 日以总参谋部副总参谋长的身份签署了一封信，邀请朝鲜民主主义人民共和国军事装备部和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国土星贸易公司代表团在大马士革会面，“讨论技术转让和其他共同感兴趣的问题”。第二个案件关系到一个项目交易，涉及 Naif Ahmad al-Qanis 在大马士革与叙利亚军火商 Hussein al-Ali 签署了向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供军事装备的议定书。专家小组要求 Zakaria Yahya al-Shami 少将和 Naif Ahmad al-Qanis 提供信息，但尚未收到任何答复(见 S/2019/171，第 97 段)。专家小组已要求也门当局提供资料。

国防科学院

114. 专家小组从一个会员国获得信息称，2019 年 5 月，中国沈阳悦利装饰装修有限公司¹⁴⁷ 新聘用了 5 名隶属于朝鲜 Nam Dae Cheon 贸易有限公司的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人，据报道该贸易有限公司是由被指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国防科学院(KPe.021)所控制。这两家公司于 2019 年 4 月签订合同，安排 5 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的招聘事宜。其中 3 人是程序开发人员，2 人是硬件开发人员，这份合同的目的是开发人工智能产品，包括软件和硬件。专家小组尚未收到该公司的答复。

侦察总局

115. 专家小组继续调查由被指认的侦察总局控制的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体¹⁴⁸ 进行的借助网络手段逃避制裁的行为。¹⁴⁹ 2019 年 9 月，法国国家网络安全局发布了一份公开报告，¹⁵⁰ 陈述 2019 年 8 月观察到的针对“联合国安

¹⁴⁷ 中国辽宁省沈阳市浑南区天赐街国贸中心 C5 号。

¹⁴⁸ 根据一个会员国的说法，侦察总局控制着朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内几乎所有的网络行为体，包括 Lazarus Group 和 Kimsuky Group。Lazarus Group(又名和平卫士、隐藏眼镜蛇、Whois Team、Zinc 等)至少有两个确定的亚群：Bluenoroff 和 Andariel。Bluenoroff(又名 APT38, Stardust Chollima)专注于通过网络抢劫和逃避联合国制裁来赚取非法收入。Andariel 的主要目标包括外国企业、政府实体和国防工业。Kimsuky Group(又名 Velvet Chollima)至少自 2013 年以来一直活跃，并以袭击包括韩国水电和核电公司在内的大韩国目标而闻名。

¹⁴⁹ 侦察总局的组织和指挥结构见附件 27。

¹⁵⁰ 法国国家网络安全局，“Credentials Gathering Campaign: Large Clusters of Malicious Infrastructure Targeting Government Bodies and Other Strategic Entities”(2019 年 9 月 2 日)。

理会成员国(中国、法国、比利时、秘鲁、南非)”五个常驻代表团的恶意活动(鱼叉式网络钓鱼)的情况,指出该局“在调查过程中发现,这些攻击中使用的一些基础设施与开源报告显示的下述威胁行为体所使用的技术元素之间存在技术联系:Kimsuky and Group 123”。

116. 另一个会员国告知专家小组,“一名与 Kimsuky 网络威胁组织有关联的朝鲜网络行为体冒充外国政府驻联合国代表,以窃取其他外国政府驻联合国代表的 38 个电子邮件地址”,并明确指出,攻击目标包括外国政府驻联合国代表,这些代表在攻击发生时都是联合国安理会成员。¹⁵¹

117. 该会员国告知专家小组,它的评估认为,可能隶属于 Kimsuky Group 的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体是“针对安理会 1718 委员会专家小组的鱼叉式网络钓鱼行动的责任方”,已在 2017 年 10 月行动前于 2016 年和 2017 年准备并测试了针对 1718 委员会的鱼叉式网络钓鱼技术(见 S/2018/171,第 5 段)。专家小组重申其观点,即考虑到攻击的持续性和高度破坏性,过去和目前对专家小组和委员会等负责监测联合国制裁执行情况的联合国机构的攻击等同于逃避制裁。

118. 针对专家小组的恶意活动仍在继续。2020 年 1 月,一个会员国通知专家小组说,至少有 3 名专家成为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体的目标。调查还在继续。

119. 专家小组注意到有报告称,2019 年 9 月和 10 月,印度空间研究组织和印度库丹库拉姆核电站受到网络攻击,所使用的 Lazarus Group 开发的 DTrack 恶意软件。¹⁵² 专家小组调查了这些攻击,将其作为可能是通过网络手段违反武器禁运规定的活动。调查还在继续。

军需工业部与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外信息技术工人

120. 专家小组继续调查被指认的军需工业部(KPe.028)的非法活动,该部是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划和导弹计划的政策和监督机构。正如此前安全理事会第 2270(2016)号和第 2397(2017)号决议所承认,包括信息技术工人在内的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外工人为朝鲜核武器和弹道导弹项目贡献了收入。大多数海外信息技术员工受雇于隶属于军需工业部的公司,与此相对照的是,该国大多数恶意网络行为体隶属于侦察总局(KPe.031)。

¹⁵¹ 在 2019 年 8 月 4 日的一个例子中,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 KimsukyGroup 网络行为体向至少 8 个与联合国会员国和联合国安理会现任或前任代表相关的官方和个人电子邮件地址发送了鱼叉式钓鱼电子邮件,其中包含一个似乎与提交给安理会的简报有关的文件。这封鱼叉式钓鱼电子邮件的附件被描述为安理会定于 2019 年 8 月晚些时候举行的一次简报会的“概念说明”,该简报会的题目是“在维护国际和平与安全过程中增进和加强法治:国际人道主义法”(见附件 28)。

¹⁵² DTrack 是 ATMDTrack 的变体,2018 年 Lazarus Group 曾用它对印度 Cosmos Bank 进行网络攻击(见 Kaspersky,“DTrack: previously unknown spy-tool by Lazarus hits financial institutions and research centers”,2019 年 9 月 23 日)。一个会员国告知专家小组,攻击发生前几个月,Cosmos Bank 的一个因特网协议地址在与五个据信是 Lazarus Group 恶意软件的命令和控制服务器的因特网协议地址通信。

121. 据一个会员国称,截至 2019 年 11 月,军需工业部被怀疑至少派遣了 1 000 名信息技术工人出国创收,通常使用下属实体或幌子公司。然而,由于他们的遮掩方法,海外和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的信息技术工人的真实人数尚不清楚。他们使用几种方法在不透露身份的情况下获得自由职业信息技术工作,其途径是在自由职业开发人员平台上与世界各地的不知情客户建立账户,特别是在加拿大、中国、俄罗斯联邦、塞尔维亚、乌克兰和美国。据一个会员国说,海外信息技术工人的平均月薪约为 5 000 美元,其中约三分之一被输送到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国,其余的用于支付信息技术工人及其运营的费用。这意味着该国每月从每个海外信息技术工人那里获得约 1 700 美元的收入,每年为 2 040 万美元。¹⁵³

122. 根据会员国提供的信息,新近发现隶属于军需工业部的一些贸易公司是被指认实体的别名(见附件 30 和第 99 段)。

朝鲜计算机中心

123. 专家小组调查了两家公司,这两家公司是军需工业部的下属公司,在中国经营。在中国丹东,军需工业部下属的朝鲜计算机中心¹⁵⁴使用的是幌子公司名称丹东浩通商贸有限公司。中国国家企业信用信息公示系统显示,丹东浩通商贸有限公司于 2013 年在丹东注册(见附件 31)。公司注册信息中称,该公司从事金属、化工产品、机械、电子和纺织品等物品的批发和零售交易以及进出口业务。

124. 另一个会员国告知专家小组,朝鲜计算机中心在中国延边的指定代表是 Jong Song Hwa(出生日期:1970 年 2 月 5 日;护照号码 927220230 정성화)。根据第一个会员国的说法,Jong 先生一直担任由军需工业部设立的延边银星网络科技有限公司的首席执行官(见附件 32)。

125. 对于专家小组关于朝鲜计算机中心在中国的存在和活动、Jong 先生的作用以及对他和该中心采取的措施的询问,中国答复说,专家小组没有提供具体的线索和证据,中国不能根据专家小组的零散信息对此案展开任何有针对性的调查。尽管如此,中国仍在协调有关部门对此案进行调查。

在越南的信息技术工人

126. 根据一个会员国的说法,军需工业部为创收目的一直在向越南派遣信息技术工人,包括通过朝鲜小白水贸易会社(又名朝鲜小白水联合会社)等下属实体进行派遣,该公司也参与了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核计划的采购(见 S/2019/691, 第 41 和 42 段)。

¹⁵³ 信息技术员工还必须遵守某些规则,以使他们的收入最大化。例如,任何在较长期间每月收入不超过 3 000 美元的信息技术工人都会被免职(见附件 29)。

¹⁵⁴ 根据另一个会员国的说法,朝鲜计算机中心属于被指认的军需工业部的 313 总局,一直通过派遣信息技术工人到中国多个地方(包括丹东和延边)赚取硬通货。该中心延边办事处的代表是 Jong Song Hwa。

127. 据该会员国说,越南公司“信天翁公司”(又名信天翁有限公司)¹⁵⁵一直在与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术开发人员合作,评估认为,截至2019年11月,他们仍在越南工作。信天翁公司与这些信息技术开发人员合作,并从至少两家与军需工业部关联的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国公司雇佣这些人员,这两家公司是朝鲜国家开发投资公司和朝鲜 Mangyongdae 信息技术公司(以下简称 Mangyongdae)。据评估, Mangyongdae 就信息技术项目与其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国实体合作,也与向军需工业部报告的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体合作。此外,信天翁公司是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Yong Su(此人至少从2014年起就在胡志明市担任船运代理)有正式业务关系的10家越南公司之一,据该会员国称, Kim Yong Su 与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大规模杀伤性武器关联实体有着广泛的联系。¹⁵⁶ 越南回复称,其主管机构没有发现在信天翁公司工作的任何朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人或信息技术专家,而 Kim 先生于2017年进入越南,并于2017年7月离开。

在尼泊尔的信息技术工人

128. 一个会员国告知专家小组,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于2018年末向 Yong Bong Chand 信息技术公司¹⁵⁷派遣了9名信息技术人员,该机构是在尼泊尔由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民运营的9家公司之一。专家小组注意到, Yong Bong Chand 信息技术公司业务目录条目于2019年11月3日直接张贴在一个电子商务网站上(见附件33)。尽管据称有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人参与,但条目中对该国的参与没有任何提及,由于所有商业交易都可以在没有面对面会见的情况下在网上完成,客户可能不知道该国的参与。专家小组认为,这是该国信息技术实体隐瞒身份、导致客户在不知情的情况下与该国信息技术工人签订合同的一个例子。尼泊尔向专家小组提供在 Yong Bong Chand 信息技术公司工作并于2019年7月离开尼泊尔的7名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的资料¹⁵⁸ (见附件34)。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外工人

129. 在本报告所述期间,专家小组继续监测有关海外工人的问题,包括第2397(2017)号决议第8段规定最晚在2019年12月22日遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民以及第2375(2017)号决议第17段禁止提供工作许可的实施情况。下文130至149重点介绍突出的案例。

130. 除了体力工人,一直在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民还包括专业运动员和医务人员。赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民和朝鲜民主

¹⁵⁵ 首席执行官: Tuong Phi Bang, 地址: 131/6B Ton Dan, Ward 14, District 4, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam, 税号/执照: 0313900312。

¹⁵⁶ 出生日期: 1969年2月9日, 护照号: 654435458(到期日: 2019年11月26日), 职务: 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻越南海运办事处首席代表。

¹⁵⁷ House 16-A, Harmony Housing Colony, Tokha District, Nepal。据该会员国称,一名尼泊尔公民是该公司的共同所有人。

¹⁵⁸ 尼泊尔还向专家小组报告了隶属于“Himal Chilbo IT”的3名信息技术工人的情况(见附件34)。

主义人民共和国政府安全监督专员¹⁵⁹ (以下简称工作人员)也持非工作类签证居住在海外。在多个案件中,工人未被遣返朝鲜民主主义人民共和国,而是转移到了第三国。专家小组指出,(除专门豁免外)遣返至朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的要求适用于任何在海外赚取收入的该国国民(见附件 35 和 36)。¹⁶⁰ 而且,在某些案例中,安排海外劳务的公司是被禁止的合资或合作实体。

131. 截至 2019 年 12 月,仅有约 50 个会员国提交了 2019 年 3 月到期的中期报告。在这些报告中,并不是所有报告都载有实质性信息,如遣返工人的实际人数和会员国采取的行动。¹⁶¹

在欧洲的足球运动员

132. 几名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民附属于欧洲的足球队。例如,在意大利,Han Kwang Song 于 2019 年加入尤文图斯足球俱乐部青年队,¹⁶² Choe Son Hyok 从 2018 年开始参加 S.S. Arezzo 队。Pak Kwang Ryong 自 2017 年以来一直参赛于奥地利俱乐部 SKN St. Pölten。据报道,所有这些球员的合同期都超过应遣返的日期。就在专家小组等待意大利对 2019 年 9 月询问的答复时,卡塔尔队 al Duhail 于 2020 年 1 月 8 日宣布,Han 先生从尤文图斯队新加盟该队。关于 Pak 先生,奥地利答复说,其主管当局启动了必要的程序,以吊销居留和工作许可证,并根据相关法律发布返回决定。专家小组尚未收到意大利或卡塔尔的答复。

在亚洲和非洲的医务工作者

133. 据几个会员国称,在安哥拉有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作人员,其中包括大约 20 名根据双边医疗合作安排进入的医务人员。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

134. 在莫桑比克,一家媒体机构报道,派往彭巴省医院进行医疗合作的 6 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医生因设立非法私人诊所而被起诉,据称他们使用了莫桑比克国家卫生系统的材料。¹⁶³

135. 专家小组调查了在尼泊尔 Ne-Koryo 医院工作的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民,该医院于 2019 年关闭。据报道,尼泊尔当局没有续签该医院的执照,因为该医院的 10 名工作人员(包括医生)中有 6 人持旅游签证入境,并在未经许可的情况下工作。尼泊尔提供了关于从 Ne-Koryo 医院遣返 7 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作人员的资料(见附件 34)。

¹⁵⁹ 见第 2397(2017)号决议,第 8 段。

¹⁶⁰ 专家小组正在调查涉嫌在海外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民,无论其签证类别或收入性质。

¹⁶¹ 专家小组还注意到,许多国家只说明工作许可/签证到期情况,而不是实际遣返人数。

¹⁶² 自 2015 年以来,他一直在另外两个意大利球队踢球。

¹⁶³ Club of Mozambique, “Mozambique: North Korean doctors arrested in Pemba on charges of setting up clandestine clinic”, 2019 年 11 月 14 日。

136. 专家小组最近从一个会员国获得了有关在尼日利亚的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医务人员的信息，媒体也报道了这一情况。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

137. 专家小组调查了坦桑尼亚一个与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的医院网络。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民受雇于 **Maibong Sukidar** 医疗有限公司(又称 **Maibong Sukida** 医疗公司)，并可能仍在该公司和 6 家关联诊所工作。¹⁶⁴ 此外，根据总理府劳动、青年、就业和残疾人事务办公室网站上的工作许可证公示，2019 年为 **Maibong Skidar** 医疗有限公司雇用的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人提供或续签了约 40 份工作许可证(包括 2 份可能是使用相同个人姓名的不同拼写提交的重复的工作许可证)(见附件 37)。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

138. 专家小组正在调查 2017 年时在乌干达境内的至少两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国医生。¹⁶⁵ 专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐厅

139. 专家小组继续调查在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外餐厅工作的该国国民。专家小组要求柬埔寨提供柬埔寨境内被提及名字的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐厅的资料。¹⁶⁶ 柬埔寨答复说，这些餐厅已经被关闭，执照被吊销(见附件 38)。它还说，在金边和暹粒省有 115 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人。柬埔寨还表示，2019 年 12 月 22 日，所有朝鲜工人已被遣返。

140. 专家小组调查了尼泊尔境内朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐馆的工人、公司管理结构和转账情况。¹⁶⁷ 尼泊尔向专家小组通报了 2019 年离开尼泊尔的 23 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐厅工人(见附件 34)。

141. 专家小组继续调查在泰国的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国餐厅，包括 **Haemaji** 餐厅和 **Mokran** 朝鲜餐厅(见 S/2019/171，第 154 段)。2019 年 12 月有报道称，泰国当局在 **Haemaji** 餐厅进行了现场调查，逮捕了 7 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工作人员。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

¹⁶⁴ Magomenni Upendo, Maibong Sukida Temeke Municipal Council, Maibong Sukida Kinondoni Municipal Council, Maibong Sukida Ilmela Municipal Council (又称 Maibong Sukida General Dispensary), Star and Maibong Sukida Dispensary。

¹⁶⁵ 在乌干达人民国防军的 Song Ung Hong 和坎帕拉国际大学医学院的 Kim Yu Song。

¹⁶⁶ 如 Pyongyang Restaurant (National Route 6, Krong Siem Reap), Pyongyang (Koryo) Restaurant (300 Preah Monivong Blvd(93), Phnom Penh), Pyongyang Ariang Restaurant (215, 32 Jawaharlal Nehru Blvd(215)Phnom Penh), Pyongyang Unhasu Restaurant (#10A, Street 315, Sangkat Beung Kok I,Khan Toulkork, Phnom Penh)。

¹⁶⁷ Botonggang Restaurant and Bar, Himalayan Soje Restaurant, Minas Restaurant and Bar, Pyongyang Ogryugwan (Akugyan) Nepal and Pyongyang Arirang restaurant。

万寿台海外项目集团、Korea General Corporation for External Construction 和其他与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的实体

142. 专家小组继续调查万寿台新技术有限公司(下称万寿台新技术)及其有关联的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人(包括被列为董事的工人)在柬埔寨的活动。¹⁶⁸ 这家公司参与了大吴哥全景博物馆的建设和运营(见 S/2019/171, 第 64 段)。柬埔寨答复说, 位于暹粒省的吴哥全景博物馆是根据万寿台新技术公司与吴哥和吴哥地区保护和防护局达成的协议而建, 自 2019 年 12 月 4 日起关闭, 该博物馆包括建筑在内的资产在相关当局的控制之下。此外, 万寿台新科技于 2019 年 12 月 30 日注销登记。专家小组还注意到柬埔寨遣返了朝鲜工人(见第 139 段)。

143. 专家小组要求尼日利亚提供资料, 说明媒体报道的可能与 Korea General Corporation for External Construction(KOGEN/GENCO)或朝鲜其他国家组织有关联的 7 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在 2019 年 10 月被驱逐出境的情况。¹⁶⁹ 专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

144. 专家小组继续调查“塞内加尔的万寿台海外开发会社-SUARL”(下称“塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社”)的活动。塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社一直在塞内加尔从事多个建筑项目, 包括一个公共建筑项目和一家大型食品加工公司的工厂。根据调查期间获得的信息, 包括塞内加尔以前提供的信息, 专家小组确认至少有 6 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民曾担任塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社的代表。¹⁷⁰ 塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社可能已经更名为“Corman Construction and Commerce Senegal Sural”。2019 年 1 月和 2 月进入塞内加尔的大约 30 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人目前可能正在为这一实体工作。专家小组尚未收到对其询问的答复。

签证类别

145. 专家小组收到一个会员国的报告, 称最近有 2 000 名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民持旅游签证进入中国赚取收入。对于专家小组的询问, 中国答复说, 它“无法核实 2 000 名朝鲜公民持旅游签证进入中国的目的是为了赚取收入, 外国人利用旅游签证在中国从事旨在赚取收入的活动是非法的。如果任何一方拥有确凿证据并向中方提供信息, 中方都将依法处理。”

¹⁶⁸ 包括 Kim Chol Song、Kim Sok Sam、Ri Chol 和 Ri Kyong Il。

¹⁶⁹ Jo Sun Phil、Jang Sung Chol、Chhe Chun Hyok、Pak Yong Gon、Ri Yong Il、Ri Hak Su、Ri Tong Nam。

¹⁷⁰ So Yong、Choe Song Chol、Sun Song、Kim Yong Su、Choe Song Il 和 Ri Won Chol。So 先生、Choe Song Chol 先生和 Sun 先生是塞内加尔 2017 年 2 月 21 日信函中列出的万寿台海外开发会社代表。在 2013 年 7 月 11 日签署的一个公共建筑项目合同上, 显示 Kim 先生为塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社的总经理。Choe Song Il 先生也出现在同一份合同中, 但没有具体说明他的职位。根据 2016 年 5 月 24 日签署的工厂建造合同, Ri 先生为塞内加尔万寿台海外开发会社的副总裁。

146. 据俄罗斯联邦统计, 2019 年向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民发放的旅游和学生签证大幅增加(见附件 39)。在答复专家小组就此进行的询问时, 俄罗斯表示, 根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段, “将在适当时候提供最后报告”。

147. 另一个会员国向专家小组报告说, 2019 年山东冠诺食品有限公司¹⁷¹ 与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 Chosun Pusong 公司¹⁷² 签署了新的为期三年的合同, 雇用朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人进行食品加工领域的生产和技术合作, 到 2019 年 11 月初, 该项目的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府安全监督专员已抵达生产现场。据会员国称, 根据合同, 经理的报酬为 5 000 元/月, 副经理为 3 500 元/月, 其他工人为 2 500 元/月。这份合同包括为工人定期出境和重新入境而不是寻求获得正式工作签证而重复申请签证的费用。专家小组尚未收到该公司对其询问的答复。

前往第三国的出口

148. 根据一个会员国的信息和新闻报道,¹⁷³ 自 2018 年以来, 数百名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国工人从俄罗斯联邦转移到阿布哈兹, 俄罗斯联邦的个人和实体为转移提供了便利。对于专家小组的询问, 俄罗斯联邦回答说, 它没有关于这一问题的数据, 专家小组可以“直接与其当局接触”。专家小组尚未收到格鲁吉亚的答复。

特邀学者

149. 专家小组注意到 2019 年的几次学术交流, 包括加拿大和中国学术机构主办的长期交流项目。专家小组询问了对这些项目的赞助情况, 特别是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民在这些项目期间在海外赚取的收入。针对专家小组的询问, 一家加拿大研究所答复说, 正在征求加拿大当局的意见。中方回答说, 新被邀请到某研究所的两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国学者是来进行学术交流而不是来工作。

建议

150. 会员国应在审查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民的各类签证申请时保持警惕, 防止有意在海外赚取收入的该国国民入境。

151. 会员国应根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段的规定, 及时提交报告, 提供所有赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民被遣返回国的完整信息。

152. 为提高会员国按要求提交报告的效率, 委员会应考虑发布执行援助通知。

奢侈品禁令执行情况

153. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续规避第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(三)段规定的奢侈品禁令。专家小组注意到, 禁止进口这类货物的措施可能比其货币价值更重

¹⁷¹ 山东冠诺食品有限公司, 中国山东省临沂市莒南县文疃镇草岭前村。

¹⁷² 注册地址: 2 Bulgung Street, Botonggang guyeok, Pyongyang; 代表: Park Young Wook。

¹⁷³ 《华盛顿邮报》, “In breakaway Abkhazia, a loophole for North Korean workers amid beaches and Soviet relics”, 2019 年 10 月 13 日(查阅日期: 2020 年 1 月 10 日)。

要，因为禁令影响到对导致实施制裁的问题的出现负有责任的精英阶层。专家小组继续观察到许多可归类为奢侈品的物品(例如豪华手表)运入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，包括用于零售(见图 24)。专家小组发现，多个实体从事非法进口此类物品，其中一些是被指认实体。

图 24

平壤 Taesong 百货店内可见的豪华手表品牌广告



资料来源：朝鲜中央通讯社。

154. 专家小组调查了几起此类案件，重点是网络和供应链。这些案例表明，尽管大多数制造商制定了意在阻止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易的合规计划，¹⁷⁴ 但该国仍有能力获得包括汽车在内的奢侈品。

梅赛德斯-奔驰

155. 专家小组继续调查非法进口两辆梅赛德斯-奔驰 S 级 600 轿车长轴距防弹 VR9 型车的案件(见 S/2019/691，第 46 段)，并确定这两辆车 2018 年 2 月从德国的工厂运到了意大利装甲公司 European Cars & More, SRL，并在意大利注册(见附件 40)。然而，2018 年 6 月，另一家过去与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有联系的意大利公司 LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL(使用几家货运代理和托运人)将具有相同车辆识别号的汽车从荷兰鹿特丹运出。货物最初运送目的地为中国大连一家公司，但后来收货人两次改变，因为通过货物中转船继续运输车辆的最初计划没有得到大连港当局的批准。因此，这些汽车首先运往大阪(目的地为日本大阪 Zuisyo Co.Ltd.)，¹⁷⁵ 然后于 2018 年 8 月底运往韩国釜山。在那里，它们被装上当时悬挂多哥国旗的 DN5505 号船(船主是 Do Young Shipping Co.)(见第 81 段和第 82 段)。

¹⁷⁴ 这包括被调查车辆的制造商的合规计划。

¹⁷⁵ Jo Seiken 先生答复了小组的询问并提供了文件。

该船于 10 月 1 日离开釜山，指称目的地为纳霍德卡，但在此之后不久，停止发送自动识别系统信号(10 月 19 日才在附近地点恢复)。10 月 1 日至 19 日期间，俄罗斯联邦没有关于 DN5505 号船在其远东任何港口抵达或离开的记录。¹⁷⁶ 调查还在继续。

雷克萨斯

156. 2019 年 11 月，在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国看到有日本制造的第三代雷克萨斯 LX570 型汽车(自 2017 年 8 月以来生产的车型)，现场还能看到金正恩及其随从。在答复专家小组的询问时，制造商确定这些车辆是带有运动套装的 LX570 型车，因为这些车带有空气动力学套件，发动机为 5.7 升排量，并且是四轮驱动。

图 25

2018 年和 2019 年在朝鲜观察到的雷克萨斯汽车



资料来源：朝鲜新闻网。

酒类供应

157. 根据专家小组收到的信息，2019 年，酒精饮料—威士忌、干邑白兰地、白兰地、伏特加、葡萄酒和啤酒—继续运往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。并非所有会员国都将同样的酒精饮料归类为奢侈品(例如，伏特加和啤酒根据欧洲理事会(EU)2017/2062 号条例被认为是奢侈品，但在许多其他供应国不被认为是奢侈品)。

¹⁷⁶ DN5505 号船因涉嫌非法运输朝鲜民主主义人民共和国原产煤炭，于 2019 年 2 月被大韩民国当局扣留。

图 26

平壤 Taesong 百货店的进口烈酒，2019 年 12 月



资料来源：朝鲜新闻网。

158. 专家小组继续调查白俄罗斯明斯克葡萄酒厂出口伏特加一事(见 [S/2019/171](#)，第 105 和 106 段)，这些伏特加于 2018 年在前往中国的途中被一个会员国查获，怀疑最终目的地为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，中间商包括 Hongkong Jiaming Industrial Co.(见 [S/2019/691](#)，附件 14)和一家作为支付人的新加坡公司 Aspen Resources Pte.Ltd.(所有人为 Sai Keong Cheang，又名 Jordan Cheang)。伏特加生产商在答复专家小组时说，根据合同，收货人在目的地(大连)清关，合同规定只限于向中国领土销售，不得转售给其他国家(见附件 41)。进口商尚未回复。

159. 专家小组调查了一批从俄罗斯联邦 Niva Distillery Company Limited 运来的 90 000 瓶 100 毫升伏特加，该批伏特加于 2019 年 2 月 21 日被一个会员国根据货物最终目的地为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的情报查获(见附件 42；[S/2019/691](#)，附件 14)。显示收货人为 Manzhouli Kesheng Trade Co.Ltd.，该公司宣称自己是内蒙古一家俄罗斯食品进口商。俄罗斯联邦答复说，这批货物是根据货交承运人条款运往俄罗斯圣彼得堡港，在 2019 年 1 月 19 日承运人收到货物后所有权转移给承运人。专家小组尚未收到进口商的答复。调查仍在继续。

160. 专家小组调查了来自圣彼得堡 Baltika Breweries Co.的两批啤酒(见附件 43)。第一批 957 箱货物运往 Hunchun Huihe Economic and Trade Co.Ltd.，于 2019 年 4 月发运。第二批 3 100 箱货物于 5 月份运往辽宁自由贸易试验区 Yurong Warehouse Co.Ltd.。这两批货物在途中在鹿特丹港被一个欧洲联盟成员国(在该国啤酒被归类为奢侈品)查获，原因是怀疑朝鲜民主主义人民共和国是最终目的地(见附件 44 和 45)。专家小组与这两条运送链上的所有实体进行了联系，但迄今为止只有俄罗斯联邦作出了回应，解释说，安全理事会对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的制裁制度没有禁止向该国供应酿酒业产品，俄罗斯法律也同样没有禁止向该国供应酿酒业产品。根据这一信息，Baltika Breweries 根据合同条款和条件从未向中国买家提供将其产品运输到境外的授权。

161. 根据来自新加坡的信息, 2019 年 11 月 22 日, 新加坡一个地方法院对 Ng Kheng Wah 和 Wang Zhiguo 处以罚款并判处两人有期徒刑(分别为 36 个月和 12 个月), 并对当地公司 T Specialist International(S)Pte.Ltd.处以 88 万新加坡元罚款。被告被判与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国开展被禁止的贸易, 包括向该国的 Korea Bugsae 商店供应超过 600 万新加坡元(至 2017 年)的奢侈品, 并被判洗钱。¹⁷⁷ 法庭文件进一步披露了涉案的公司和个人, 包括 Pinnacle Offshore Trading Inc.和 Mars-Rock Offshore Trading(都在英属维尔京群岛注册); 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Li Ik 和他的儿子 Li Hyon; T Specialist 的货运经理和采购员印尼国民 Sherly Muliawan(见附件 46)。专家小组对 T Specialist 的调查始于 2018 年。¹⁷⁸

162. 根据来自新加坡的信息, 当地一家公司 Sun Moon Star (SINSMS)Pte.Ltd.是 Dalian Sun Moon Star International Logistics Trading Co.的附属公司, 该公司被控在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Mun Chol Myong 的要求下, 于 2019 年 8 月为价值约 665 000 新元的葡萄酒和烈酒以及其他奢侈品向南浦的转运提供便利。Mun 先生于 2019 年 5 月在马来西亚被捕, 12 月马来西亚法院批准将其引渡至美国¹⁷⁹ (见附件 47)。专家小组要求会员国提供资料。

建议

163. 会员国应鼓励本国出口奢侈品的国民在合同中列入防止转售给受制裁管辖区的合同条款。

164. 委员会应拟制一份更详细的被禁奢侈品清单(如有可能, 须附有具体的协调制度商品编号), 供安理会审议。

165. 会员国应统一出口管制清单, 以反映被禁奢侈品清单。

166. 会员国和有关国际组织应鼓励货运和运输公司在考虑到转运风险的情况下, 建立全面的检查收货人制度。

¹⁷⁷ 有关法庭判决, 见新加坡共和国国家法院, *Public Prosecutor v. Ng Kheng Wah, T Specialist International (S) Pte. Ltd. and Wang Zhiguo*, 案件编号[2019]SGDC 249, 判决, 2019 年 11 月 22 日。T Specialist 设计了一个欺诈性的发票融资骗局, 从当地银行窃取了 9 500 万美元。2014 年 1 月至 2016 年 8 月期间, Ng 先生与 Wang 先生合谋, 向五家银行提交虚构的商业发票, 以获得贷款。这五家银行以为商业发票是真实的, 将发票金额支付给 Pinnacle Offshore Trading Inc.——Wang 先生拥有的英属维尔京群岛注册公司。为了清洗这些非法所得贷款, 第三家公司, Mars-Rock Offshore Trading, 会把钱“返回”到 T Specialist 的账户。

¹⁷⁸ 见 S/2019/171, 第 142 至 144 段和附件 72。

¹⁷⁹ 见《亚洲时报》“KL court: extradition in N. Korea money laundering”, 2019 年 12 月 13 日。

四. 金融

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续逃避金融制裁

167. 尽管会员国在执行安理会决议方面取得了进展，但专家小组的调查表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续通过新的和文件准备充分的方法进入国际金融体系，逃避制裁。这些方法包括大宗现金和黄金走私(见第 109 和 110 段)、利用离岸和合资企业隐藏实际所有人信息，以及继续窃取和使用虚拟货币(例如比特币)以逃避制裁和资助全球网络攻击。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续通过空壳和幌子公司进入全球银行业务

168. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国使用第三方公司为付款打掩护。例如，购买“New Regent”号海船(见第 22 和 23 段)涉及购买协议中没有提及的第三方公司-HK Xiang Long Trading Group Ltd.(见附件 48 和 49)。¹⁸⁰

169. 在一项涉及出口高档伏特加酒的类似调查中，一家人力资源公司 Aspen Resources Pte.Ltd.的所有者代表买方 Hongkong Jiaming Industrial Co 安排向供应商——一家白俄罗斯烈酒制造商支付约 14 000 美元(见附件 41)。¹⁸¹ Aspen Resources 的所有者兼董事在给专家小组的答复中说，该公司不从事商业贸易活动，伏特加的付款是应一位熟人的要求安排的，该熟人“由于货币管制而难以在中国付款”。

170. 专家小组获得的证据表明，通过空壳公司为实际所有人信息打掩护也使朝鲜民主主义人民共和国得以与毫无戒心的外国公司组建合资企业。专家小组在调查过程中发现，Dandong Haotong(怀疑为朝鲜计算机中心的幌子公司(见第 123 至 125 段))与一家在保加利亚注册的公司组建了一家合资企业(见附件 50)。根据保加利亚提供的信息，TH Co.LLC(ТИ ЕЙЧ КО. ООД)是一家 2013 年 10 月注册的保加利亚公司，该公司于 2019 年 4 月注销登记，与 Dandong Haotong 合资经营。¹⁸² 2017 年初，保加利亚当局采取措施，确保 TH Co.OOD 和 Dandong Haotong 有关联的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民已离开保加利亚。调查仍在继续。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交人员和其他人员的金融活动

171. 专家小组继续调查代表受制裁的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构行事以建立非法银行网络并向该国提供进入全球银行系统途径的该国外交/官方人员(见附件 51)。

172. 专家小组就有关 Jo Kwang Chol 代表被指认外贸银行(KPe.047)从事逃避制裁活动的报告进行了调查，此人自 2016 年起担任朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻奥

¹⁸⁰ 购买协议将 Mega Glory 列为卖方，将丰百贸易拓展有限公司列为买方。

¹⁸¹ 专家小组在 2019 年中期报告中着重提及了 Aspen Resources(见 S/2019/691 号文件，附件 14)。

¹⁸² 根据保加利亚的公司登记册，该公司将其业务列为软件开发。保加利亚海关总署指出，TH CO OOD 在过去五年内没有进行任何进出口交易，目前处于清理结束状态。

地利大使馆经认可的行政和技术人员。根据奥地利提供的资料，Jo 先生曾试图进入 Korea ungum 公司在奥地利一家银行的冻结账户(见 S/2019/691，第 56 段和附件 20)。奥地利当局因怀疑这些账户涉嫌洗钱活动，于 2015 年 7 月冻结了这些账户。当时，总余额约为 1 895 633 美元。

173. 2016 年 2 月，Korea Ungum 公司要求从被冻结的账户中提取现金。¹⁸³ 奥地利当局拒绝了这一请求。2017 年 1 月 9 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆要求发放资金，以支付拖欠 Jo 先生的工资。据奥地利当局称，他与该公司的劳动合同是伪造的。因此，银行拒绝了朝鲜大使馆的请求，请求随后被撤回。然而，奥地利当局的结论是，虽然 Jo 先生是预期的受益人，但没有证据表明他直接代表 Korea ungum 公司或外贸银行行事。此案突出表明，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续通过使用可疑文件等方式，努力利用使馆人员以获取资金。

174. 专家小组在 2019 年中期报告中突出说明了包括 Kim Sou Gwang 先生、Kim Su Gyong 女士、Kim Yong Nam 先生及其各自家人在内的侦察总局特工正在进行的金融活动(见 S/2019/691，第 54 至 56 段)。根据一个会员国向专家小组提供的资料，Kim Su Gyong 女士是朝鲜联合开发银行国际关系部主任，负责在整个欧洲建立秘密金融网络，以隐藏特别是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与伊朗伊斯兰共和国之间的交易。

175. 2017 年 4 月，Kim Yong Nam——一个会员国报告称他是侦察总局第五部的特工——关闭了他在法国的银行账户(同上)。剩余资金(约 3 500 欧元)被转移到他妻子 Kim Tcheul Hy 女士名下的海外账户(见 S/2019/171，第 126 段)。该会员国新查出了一家俄罗斯银行的账户。¹⁸⁴ 根据先前的建议，专家小组指出，会员国有义务冻结为侦察总局工作或代表侦察总局工作的所有个人的资产，包括以家庭成员名义设立的账户。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外银行代表

176. 专家小组继续调查在国外开展业务的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金融机构和代表的活动，并指出会员国必须驱逐任何被认定代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国银行或按照该国银行指示工作的个人。

177. 在专家小组对 Han Jang Su 进行调查(见 S/2019/171，第 125 段)之后，俄罗斯联邦通知专家小组，Han 先生已于 2019 年离开了俄罗斯。

¹⁸³ Korea Ungum 公司于 2013 年 8 月被一个会员国指认为外贸银行的幌子公司(见美国财政部，“Treasury targets Russian bank and other facilitators of North Korean United Nations Security Council violations”，新闻稿，2018 年 8 月 3 日)。

¹⁸⁴ 专家小组要求俄罗斯联邦提供关于俄罗斯银行账户状况的进一步资料。俄罗斯联邦回答说，“为了调查 Kim Yong Nam 先生，俄罗斯联邦需要更有力的证据证明他参与了侦察总局的活动”。

178. 阿拉伯联合酋长国通知专家小组，它于 2019 年 4 月 19 日以“违反安全理事会决议”为由关闭了 Kungang General Trading Company。对该公司过去活动的调查仍在继续。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过网络攻击逃避制裁

179. 根据会员国和公开来源信息，专家小组得出结论，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续在全球范围内对金融机构和加密货币交易所进行网络攻击。这些袭击造成了金融损失，并违反金融制裁为该国提供了非法收入。这些攻击都是低风险、高回报、难以发现的，而且其日益复杂的程度可能会有碍找到攻击行为人。¹⁸⁵ 据几个会员国称，管辖权问题和缺乏法律框架可能对调查和起诉构成重大挑战。

180. 2019 年 4 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在平壤主办了国际“加密货币大会”。根据此会的网站(见附件 52)，“区块链和加密行业的国际专家齐聚平壤，分享他们的知识和愿景，建立持久的联系，讨论商机，并签署信息技术领域的合同。“根据一份美国法庭文件，出席会议的美国国民 Virgil Griffith 称，组织者告诉他，“(他)应该在演讲中强调加密货币和区块链技术可能会用于洗钱和逃避制裁。”¹⁸⁶

181. 专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对金融机构和加密货币交易实施攻击的载体越来越先进。根据一家网络安全研究公司的分析，由 Lazarus 支持的对一家加密货币交易所的攻击运用了“植入木马的加密货币交易应用程序，并通过电子邮件向该公司推荐该程序”。¹⁸⁷ 这一模式符合专家小组强调的社会工程策略、技术和程序(见 S/2019/691，第 61 段)。值得注意的是，此次朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的黑客攻击使用了一个看似合法的网站和公司名称(Celas Limited)来发送受恶意软件感染的应用程序。¹⁸⁸ 该网站的一份档案显示，Celas Limited “为企业市场提供有弹性的客户端服务器区块链解决方案”，并将公司位置列为美国密歇根州锡达斯普林斯市(见附件 53)。当用户安装 Celas Trade Pro 这款应用程序时，该程序就执行恶意更新包。该恶意软件包含一个“全功能”后门木马程序，可以完全控制受害者的系统并窃取加密货币。

182. 2019 年的一个新情况是，几家安全公司报告了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与东欧网络犯罪组织 Trickbot Group 之间的联系。Trickbot 是一套攻击银行机构的恶意软件工具，最初于 2016 年开发。Trickbot 人员最近开发了一个一体化攻击框

¹⁸⁵ 利用网络工具创造收入以及通过网络手段打掩护和洗钱的行为构成了逃避制裁。专家小组以前的报告见 S/2019/171 第 109 至 118 段和 S/2019/691 第 57 至 71 段。根据一个会员国的说法，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体将网络空间作为一种非对称手段加以利用，违反军火禁运窃取军事技术、开展创收行动、进行网络勒索和敲诈活动、有偿非法入侵电脑系统、转移资金。

¹⁸⁶ Griffith 先生对违反美国制裁的指控表示不认罪。见纽约南区地方法院，美利坚合众国诉 Virgil Griffith 案，案件号 19MAG10987，申诉，2019 年 11 月 21 日。

¹⁸⁷ 见卡巴斯基，“Operation AppleJeus: Lazarus hits cryptocurrency exchange with fake installer and macOS malware”，2018 年 8 月 23 日。

¹⁸⁸ 卡巴斯基的报告指出，这些应用程序针对 macOS、Windows 和 Linux 等不同操作系统进行了修改。这对 Lazarus Group 来说可能是第一次，标志着它在复杂性和意图上的飞跃。

架，称为“锚定项目”。据网络安全研究公司称，Lazarus Group 使用锚定项目工具部署恶意软件。具体而言，研究人员发现 Lazarus 开发了一套名为 PowerRatankba 的恶意软件工具，并通过锚定项目将此工具发送给受害者。¹⁸⁹ 这次攻击性质严重，因为这是已知第一个与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关联的网络团体与非国家行为体合作的例子。

建议

183. 专家小组重申其建议，即委员会应澄清第 2375(2017)号决议第 18 段所载合资企业和合作实体的定义。

184. 专家小组重申其建议，即如果今后起草更多制裁措施，安全理事会应考虑明确处理朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过网络手段逃避制裁的问题。

185. 专家小组建议所有会员国对可能前往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供利用虚拟货币和相关技术逃避联合国制裁方面培训和咨询的本国国民保持警惕。

186. 专家小组重申其以往建议，即会员国应确保各自国内的法律和监管框架涵盖虚拟资产(如加密货币)和虚拟资产服务提供者(如加密货币交易所)。

187. 专家小组特别强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官及其家属为逃避联合国制裁而开设银行账户这一反复出现的趋势，并建议会员国提高警惕。

188. 专家小组鼓励会员国执行金融行动特别工作组制定的标准，并特别注意与扩散、透明度、法人和法律安排实际所有人有关的定向金融制裁措施(金融行动特别工作组建议 7、24 和 25)。

五. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划相关的近期活动

核

189. 专家小组继续监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国正在进行的核相关活动，如核设施活动和可能的核相关采购。

190. 自 2018 年底以来，专家小组没有观察到宁边 5 兆瓦（电）反应堆运行的任何迹象。虽然这段时间足够排放和补给燃料，但一个会员国告知专家小组，燃料排放的情况没有得到证实。¹⁹⁰ 从卫星图像上没有观察到放射化学实验室的蒸汽工厂从事后处理活动。¹⁹¹ 这表明，这是 2018 年下半年以来与铀生产运动有关的活动之间间隔最长的一次。

¹⁸⁹ 据信，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2018 年 12 月对智利银行间网络 Redbanc 的网络攻击中使用了 PowerRatankba(见 Vitali Kremes, “Disclosure of Chilean Redbanc intrusion leads to Lazarus ties”, Flashpoint, 2019 年 1 月 15 日)。

¹⁹⁰ 据一个会员国称，完全排放需要关闭反应堆约两个月。此外，此前观察到的反应堆运行周期为两年。

¹⁹¹ 2019 年 9 月，观察到放射化学实验室集装箱移动，但目的不明。

191. 几个会员国表示，宁边轻水反应堆的建造正在进行中。从卫星图像中观察到反应堆附近的一座建筑正在施工，库龙河沿岸正在开展疏浚工程¹⁹² (见附件 54)。卫星图像还显示了一些活动，包括拆除废弃的宁边 50 兆瓦（电）反应堆的一座建筑(见附件 55)。

192. 一个会员国通知专家小组，据它评估，2019 年平山黄饼生产厂处于运营状态。专家小组继续监测其他与核有关的地点。没有观察到丰溪里核试验场有作业活动(附件 56)。¹⁹³

193. 专家小组继续监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核计划和海外采购活动(见附件 57)。

弹道导弹

194. 2019 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹发展计划的特点是高强度、多样性和连贯性。这一进展建立在该计划的多年规划进程基础上，2015 年和 2017 年是主要里程碑。¹⁹⁴ 因此，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国如今已显示了生产和发射不同类型新式固体推进剂短程导弹¹⁹⁵ (结合了弹道导弹和制导技术)和新一代潜射弹道导弹—中程弹道导弹的自主能力(见附件 58 和 59)。在 2019 年 5 月 4 日至 11 月 28 日的 13 次系列发射试验中，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射了至少 25 枚导弹(见表 3 和附件 59)，与 2016 年发射 26 枚以上弹道导弹的频率相当(见 S/2017/150)。

¹⁹² 一个会员国认为，这一活动的目的可能是为了解决泥沙堆积问题。

¹⁹³ 2020 年 1 月 29 日，大韩民国气象局宣布，在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国吉州检测到 2.5 级地震。气象局进一步指出，这是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国第六次核试验后发生的自然地震。

¹⁹⁴ 2015 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在短程弹道导弹和潜射弹道导弹领域取得显著进展(见 S/2016/157)。2017 年，该国大规模毁灭性武器计划的战略意图已经显露：2017 年 9 月 3 日对最强大的核装置进行了试验，2017 年 11 月 29 日对最强大的洲际弹道导弹火星-15 号进行了试验(见 S/2018/171，第 1 段和 7 至 17 段)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2019 年 5 月 4 日之前没有进一步发射导弹，但专家小组没有证据表明它已经放慢该计划的速度。

¹⁹⁵ 新型 KN-23 短程弹道导弹发射了 8 次，有低弹道和牵引式低弹道两种弹道。牵引是为了扩大射程。新型 KN-24 短程弹道导弹也发射了 4 次，有低弹道和牵引式低弹道两种弹道。新型 KN-25 短程弹道导弹在 2019 年 8 月至 10 月期间以经典弹道方式发射了至少 6 次，2019 年 11 月发射了两次(见附件 59)。

表 3

2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运用弹道导弹技术发射的弹道导弹或系统
(见附件 58)

	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射距离 (公里)	据报远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
一.	5 月 4 日 8 时 30 分 10 时 50 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(KN-23), 同二、三、六	2	虎岛半岛 北纬 39°24'32.25" 东经 27°31'53.63" (见附件 58.1 和 59)	200-(?) (可能在 240 至 400 之间)	50-(?) (可能在 40 至 60 之间)	-一次发射可能未完 全成功 - 4 轴轮式运输竖起 发射装置类型 1 ^a -发射间隔时间: 2 小时 20 分钟	战术制导武器
	5 月 4 日	多管火箭炮系 统 240 毫米 300 毫米 (KN-09)			70-240		进行了火箭试验	大口径远程多 管火箭炮
二.	5 月 9 日 16 时 30 分 16 时 50 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(KN-23); 同一、三、六	2	龟城地区 北纬 40°01'47" 东经 125°13'38"	420; 270	50; (?) 可能为 40	履带式运输竖起发 射装置, 与 T-72 型 坦克类似 ^b 发射间隔时间: 20 分钟	远程打击手段
三.	7 月 25 日 05 时 30 分 06 时 00 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(KN-23); 同一、二、六	2	虎岛半岛 北纬 39°24'31" 东经 127°32'03"	430; 690	50; 50	轮式运输竖起发射 装置类型 2 ^c 发射间隔时间: 30 分钟	新型战术制导 武器
四.	7 月 31 日 05 时 10 分 05 时 30 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(可能为 KN-23)或新型 多管火箭炮系 统(可能为 400 毫米), 同五	2	元山/葛麻地区	250; 250	30; (?)	履带式运输竖起发 射装置 发射间隔时间: 20 分钟	新型大口径多发 制导火箭系统
五.	8 月 2 日 03 时 00 分 03 时 20 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(可能为 KN-23)或新型 多管火箭炮系 统(可能为 400 毫米), 同四	2	咸兴地区 (可能为永兴地区)	220; (?)	25; (?)	朝鲜中央通讯社图 片显示模糊的多管 火箭炮图像, 但未 经核实, 因为此次 试验可能为履带式 运输竖起发射装置 发射间隔时间: 20 分钟	新型大口径多发 制导火箭系统
六.	8 月 6 日 05 时 20 分 05 时 40 分	新型短程弹道 导弹(KN-23); 同一、二、三	2	瓜铃机场 北纬 38°24'54.98" 东经 125°1'43.00"	450; 450	37; 37	轮式运输竖起发射 装置类型 2; 导弹自 西向东飞越朝鲜领 土上空 发射间隔时间: 20 分钟(见附件 58.2)	新型战术制导 武器

	日期和时间 (当地)	据报类型	数量	据报发射地点	据报发射距离 (公里)	据报远地点 (公里)	备注	朝鲜中央 通讯社分类
七.	8月10日 05时30分和05 时50分	新型战术导 弹, 类似于陆 军战术导弹系 统(KN-24); ^d 同八	2	咸兴/兴南 北纬 39°48'44.32" 东经 127°39'49.68"	400; 400 (可能为 430)	48; 48	履带式运输竖起发 射装置 ^e (见附件 58.3) 发射间隔时间: 20 分钟	新型武器
八.	8月16日 08时00分和08 时20分	新型战术导弹, 类似于陆军战 术导弹(KN- 24), 同七	2	通川地区 北纬 39°03'33" 东经 127°46'44"	230; 230	30; 30	履带式运输竖起发 射装置 ^f 发射间隔时间: 16 分钟 (见附件 58.4)	新型武器
九.	8月24日 06时40分和07 时00分	新型多管火箭 炮系统, ^g 使用 “超大”重型 火箭(600毫米, KN-25); 同十	2	宣德机场 北纬 39°44'37.05" 东经 127°28'23.79"	380; 380	97; 97	8 轴轮式运输竖起 发射装置 ^h 发射间隔时间: 17 分钟 (见附件 58.5)	超大型多管 火箭炮
十.	9月10日 06时50分和07 时10分	新型多管火箭 炮系统, 使用 “超大”重型 火箭(600毫米, KN-25); 同九	2	价川机场 北纬 39°45'8.46" 东经 125°53'59.06"	330; 330	50; 60	一次飞行试验失败 ⁱ 8 轴轮式运输竖起 发射装置; 朝中社 10月31日的发射 照片实际上是9月 10日的照片; 发射间隔时间: 19 分钟 (见附件 58.6)	超大型多管 火箭炮
十一.	10月2日 07时10分	新型潜射弹道 导弹/中程弹道 导弹 ^j 北极星 3 号 估计潜在射程 为 1 700 公里 (见附件 58.7)	1	元山—永兴湾	450	910	潜水驳船	新型潜射弹道导 弹北极星 3 号
十二.	10月31日	新型中程弹道 导弹, ^k 使用 “超大”重型 火箭(600毫米, KN-25)	2	顺川机场 北纬 39°24'48" 东经 125°53'18"	370; 370	90; 90	轮式运输竖起发射 装置 发射间隔时间: 3 分钟	超大型多管 火箭炮
十三.	11月28日	新型中程弹道 导弹, 使用“超 大”重型火箭 (600毫米, KN- 25)	2	宣德机场 Ryonpo 地 区或 Ryonpo 机场	380; (?) (可能为 380)	97; (?) (可能为 50)	轮式运输竖起发射 装置 发射间隔时间: 30 秒	超大型多管 火箭炮

资料来源：会员国，专家小组。

- ^a 据一个会员国称，运输竖起发射装置的灵感可能来自俄罗斯的伊斯坎德尔。这两种运输竖起发射装置都使用了 WS200 型底盘。另一个会员国评估认为，“锥形版本只是一个原型”，“所用轮式底盘是新式的，可能从白俄罗斯或中国的底盘衍生而来。其组织或设计灵感来自伊斯坎德尔运输竖起发射装置”。
- ^b 一个会员国称，这种履带式或锥形版本的运输竖起发射装置可能只是一个原型。
- ^c 一个会员国称，轮式运输竖起发射装置类型 2 可能是未来可操作版本。
- ^d 专家小组指出，该系统类似于陆军战术导弹或神龙 300 型地对地导弹系统(见附件 59)。
- ^e 建在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国设计的类似于 T-62 型的暴风虎战斗坦克底盘上。
- ^f 同上。
- ^g 4 支发射管；弹道导弹的弹道没有运用空气动力学，而是使用附加鸭翼。这枚火箭是一种制导战术导弹。
- ^h 一个会员国称，KN-25 型 8 轴轮式运输竖起发射装置以 KN-23 型底盘(加长底盘)为基础，具有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国特有的装甲舱设计。
- ⁱ 若干会员国指出，一次飞行试验失败，在内陆坠毁，但另一次飞往 Alsom 岛；使用了 4 支发射管中的 3 支。一支发射管可能有缺陷(朝鲜中央通讯社照片显示上盖缺失，但导弹没有发射，因为底盖仍在原处)。
- ^j 潜射弹道导弹是对北极星 2 号中程弹道导弹的海军改装，但具有不同的重返大气层飞行器和有效载荷部分。
- ^k 朝鲜中央通讯社 2019 年 10 月 31 日的发射照片实际上是 2019 年 9 月 10 日的照片。一个会员国称，2019 年 10 月 31 日发射的是新型大口径筒射短程弹道导弹。

195. 除了发射步伐保持不变、发射地点多样以外(见表 3)，2019 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国加强了该计划在工业和操作方面的动态性，新型武器系统几乎可发挥作战效力，导弹类型和发射装置更加多样化，而且直至 2017 年还在测试的中程弹道导弹和洲际弹道导弹的类型都得到加强(见 S/2019/691，第 80 段)。

196. 2019 年 7 月 23 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国展示了一艘正在新浦南方造船厂建造、可能有能力携带弹道导弹的潜艇(美国称其为新浦-C 级，可能源自罗马欧级/033 型潜艇)(见附件 60)。这将使弹道导弹计划的主要多样化目标得以实现。¹⁹⁶

197. 2019 年 10 月 2 日，从元山湾潜水平台试射了一枚新型潜射弹道导弹，已确认其型号为北极星 3 号(见附件 58.7)。据日本称，导弹落入日本专属经济区，这种情况自 2017 年 11 月 29 日以来首次发生。¹⁹⁷ 这次发射再次表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采用相互关联、同时开发的做法，开发新型潜艇(见第 196 段)和新型潜射弹道导弹(见 S/2016/157 和 S/2019/691)。

¹⁹⁶ 2013 至 2014 年期间的特点是开发了实验性的“鲸级”潜艇发射平台，美国将其命名为新浦-B 级(见 S/2016/157，第 41 至 44 段；S/2017/150，第 40 段)，随后连续进行了潜射弹道导弹试验，如 2015 年 5 月 8 日的试验(液体燃料发动机导弹)，之后于 2016 年 4 月 23 日(固体燃料发动机)、7 月 9 日和 8 月 24 日在新浦以东发射，一些导弹从潜水平台发射，另一些从新浦-B 级潜艇发射。

¹⁹⁷ 日本还认为导弹有可能断为两截(见日本内阁秘书处，“Ballistic missile launch by North Korea(2)”，2019 年 10 月 2 日新闻发布会(可访问：https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201910/2_a2.html，日文网页)和查阅 S/2018/171，第 9 段)。

198. 在开发新型武器系统的同时，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续发展弹道导弹计划的基础设施和生产能力。专家小组观察到不同场地的演变或改造情况，包括新浦南方造船厂(见附件 61)、西海卫星发射场(见附件 62)、昌津军事-工业园区(见附件 63)、兴南第 17 号爆炸物工厂(固体推进剂生产)(见附件 64)和平山 3 月 16 日汽车厂(见附件 65 和 [S/2019/171](#))。会员国向专家小组报告了在不同弹道导弹基地观察到的持续活动(见 [S/2019/691](#))。

199. 最近于 2019 年 12 月 7 日和 13 日进行的导弹发动机试验(后一次试验持续 7 分钟，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国声称这是一次“重大试验”)是在西海垂直发动机试验场翻新之后进行的(见附件 62)。测试目的可能是鉴定新的洲际弹道导弹发动机(使用液体推进剂)是否合格或检查现有发动机批次(可能使用固体推进剂)。无论目的为何，都意味着弹道导弹计划进入一个新阶段。¹⁹⁸

200. 弹道导弹计划需要保持高规格的一致性，这就要求朝鲜民主主义人民共和国持续供应被会员国定为瓶颈物项的具体部件(见附件 66)。据会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国将继续从技术角度进一步提高能力，首先是固体推进剂生产(包括混合、批量生产、铸造和固化)，其次是精密和制导系统(包括高精度控制和小型化制导控制装置)。此外，碳纤维或芳纶纤维的生产和成型仍然至关重要。

无形技术转让

201. 与此同时，为了寻找制造零部件的技术解决方案或克服武器系统设计、生产和改装过程中固有的技术挑战，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国寻求其技术人员和科学家缺乏的知识能力和技术能力。该国的长期方案规划为旨在探索无形技术转让的战略提供了指导。会员国查明了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在几个领域的无形技术转让需求。¹⁹⁹

202. 专家小组一直在根据各科研院所和智库编写的报告，调查有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家参与的特定活动领域的国际科学合作(见第 201 段和附件 67)。此外，专家小组认为，为了发展大规模毁灭性武器计划，除了直接的蓝图或数据以外，关于工厂和实验室运作的专门技能也很重要。

203. 除了寻求自外而内的技术转让以外，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国依然是技术、常规武器和大规模毁灭性武器相关供应链物项对外扩散的来源。朝鲜以转让蓝图著称。一个会员国报告说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国仍然非常积极地提供火箭弹系统改进领域的服务。尽管导弹销售受到限制，但它仍在继续寻找出售国防物资以及转让蓝图和数据的机会。例如，2019 年测试的两个短程弹道导弹系统的轮式和卡车运输竖起发射装置被涂成沙色或褐色，这样做可能是出于营销目的。

¹⁹⁸ 一些专家表示，尚不清楚朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2019 年发射的射弹性质和 2019 年 12 月“重大试验”的性质。

¹⁹⁹ 据会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续对以下技术感兴趣：先进复合材料在特殊环境中的行为、航空航天相关技术、火箭和导弹相关技术、发达国家的精密加工技术以及太阳能、风能和其他清洁能源技术。

建议

204. 专家小组建议会员国对通过交流(包括与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国研究人员和机构在敏感领域进行联合研究)违反制裁的风险保持警惕。
205. 专家小组建议会员国在监测无形技术转让、包括专门技能转让方面保持警惕。
206. 专家小组建议会员国对相关决议禁止的物项供应提高警惕, 并进一步强调生产者、中间商和最终用户等所有相关方实施严格出口管制的重要性。

六. 制裁的意外影响

207. 根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段, 联合国制裁措施“无意对朝鲜平民造成不利的人道主义影响”, 或“对在朝鲜为朝鲜平民开展援助和救济活动的国际组织和非政府组织的工作产生不利影响”。

208. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义形势严峻, 而且并未改善。根据人道主义事务协调厅《2020 年全球人道主义概况》, 该国约有 1 040 万人需要人道主义援助, 占总人口 40%以上。长期的粮食不安全和缺乏救生医疗必需品对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国最脆弱的群体, 特别是妇女和儿童, 产生了深远的影响。

209. 毫无疑问, 联合国制裁对人道主义局势和援助行动产生了意想不到的影响, 尽管获得数据和证据的机会有限, 而且没有可靠的方法将联合国制裁与单边制裁制度、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国内社会经济因素等其他因素区分开来。然而, 最近的联合国制裁可能会加剧该国本已困难的局势, 使那些受雇于直接或间接受制裁影响部门的人雪上加霜, 而且有可能扰乱对平民的必需品供应。制裁对平民人道主义需求的意外后果可能包括以下方面:

- 在受联合国制裁影响行业中就业的人和被遣返的海外工人的生计来源消失或减少; 据粗略估计, 这一影响可能高达数亿美元²⁰⁰ (见附件 68)。
- 社会边缘化加剧, 因为精英阶层应对联合国和其他制裁的手段是加强对稀缺资源的控制, 包括控制“新市场经济”, 在某些情况下, 会将这些资源用于民众需求以外的目的。
- 农业设备持续短缺和燃料匮乏使本已很低的农业机械化水平进一步下降, 这可能会限制收成机会, 加剧由不利环境条件和国内资源管理不善造成的粮食不安全(见附件 69)。
- 医疗供应链中断的情况增加, 可能会对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国长期投资不足和不完善的保健体系产生严重影响。

²⁰⁰ 估计数来自韩国央行(见 <https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091>, 韩文网页)。

- 联合国银行渠道崩溃以及随后缺乏一致可靠融资的情况，危及到供应链的运营，导致项目暂停或完全终止。这也使人道主义人员面临危险的局面。
- 金融机构和私营部门实体继续避免与高风险管辖区有关的交易。此外，一些金融机构没有区分联合国制裁和单边制裁。这影响了联合国和其他组织在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义行动，包括增加费用。

210. 专家小组注意到，委员会在缩短批准人道主义豁免请求所需时间方面取得了重大进展。2019 年，委员会批准了 38 项组织豁免，豁免批准时间缩短了 71%(见附件 70)。尽管如此，人道主义援助依然面临相当大的与制裁有关的挑战。复杂的豁免申请程序、审批请求的延误，以及迅速变化的地缘政治环境，可能导致筹备时间改变、供资延迟和对获得豁免的人道主义援助的交付作出修改。

建议

211. 委员会应继续努力从速为人道主义活动恢复稳定的银行业务渠道，包括确定融资渠道和融资机构作为可能的资金转账替代方案。

212. 委员会应继续保持由联合国相关机构每半年通报一次制裁对平民及各机构在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内行动意外影响的做法。

213. 专家小组建议安全理事会继续处理影响减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助行动意外不利影响的问题和进程。

214. 委员会应继续讨论简化朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的联合国人道主义组织的豁免申请和无异议程序。

215. 委员会应努力精简执行援助通知第 7 号各项条款规定的申请豁免程序，并尽可能简化申请流程，包括在计划装运货物的技术规格、所涉各方以及请求和提交频率方面给予更大的灵活性。

216. 为了便利人道主义组织的规划和预算编制进程，委员会应公布关于豁免批准和批准过程的详细季度统计数据。

七. 会员国报告

217. 截至 2020 年 1 月 31 日，77 个会员国提交了本国执行第 2397(2017)号决议的报告；92 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议的报告；89 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议的报告；106 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议的报告；114 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议的报告。²⁰¹ 尽管报告数量总体增加，但专家小组注意到，未提交关于第 2397(2017)号决议报告的国家仍然很多(116 个，其中 4 个在 2019 年担任安全理事会非常任理事国)。

²⁰¹ 见联合国，安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，“执行情况报告”(2020 年 1 月 31 日查阅)。专家小组指出，自第 2371(2017)号决议通过以来，提交国家执行情况报告成为强制性要求。

218. 专家小组回顾指出，根据第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段的要求，会员国应及时提交报告。

八. 建议

219. 关于各项建议综合清单，见附件 73。

Annex 1: US Non-paper dated 8 November 2019 shared with the Panel

NON-PAPER FOR UN PANEL OF EXPERTS

November 8, 2019

- As covered in the recently published UN Panel of Experts Midterm Report on North Korea, the DPRK widely employs illicit means to import refined petroleum products outside of the purview of UN 1718 Committee monitoring. As a result, the DPRK imports volumes of refined petroleum that far exceed the 500,000 barrel per annum limitation imposed under UNSCR 2397, as the Midterm Report indicated.
- The Panel of Experts (POE) also reported information that foreign flagged vessels are contributing to these illicit import volumes of refined petroleum to the DPRK.
- The United States has information to supplement that which the POE reported. We have images and import volume data for vessels that have made deliveries to the DPRK, but which have not been reported to the UN, through the end of October.
- These deliveries have significantly contributed to a gross violation of the 500,000 barrel annual cap under UNSCR 2397. We now estimate that the DPRK has imported more than 3.89 million barrels as of October 31. The ability of the DPRK to import illicit volumes of refined petroleum products that far exceed the annual cap is greatly enhanced by the addition of larger, foreign-flagged tankers to its import regimen.
- The table below provided lists each of the port calls that we have observed and associated delivery volume scenarios, which have grown substantially since our previous submissions and, in all cases, exceed the UNSCR 2397 annual quota by a wide margin.

Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	1-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	4-Jan-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	6-Jan-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	8-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	8-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	11-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	12-Jan-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	12-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25

-2-

Nampo	Chong Ryong San	14-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	14-Jan-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Najin	Song Won	16-Jan-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	7,878.75	14,181.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	17-Jan-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	18-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Kum Un San	19-Jan-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	19-Jan-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Pu Ryong	22-Jan-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	An San 1	23-Jan-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	23-Jan-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	23-Jan-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	24-Jan-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	25-Jan-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Songnim	Yu Phyeong 5	26-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	28-Jan-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Chong Rim 3	30-Jan-19	8665131	DPRK	2,042.00	5,053.95	7,657.50	13,783.50
Songnim	Yu Phyeong 5	30-Jan-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	4-Feb-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Yu Son	4-Feb-19	8691702	DPRK	3,398.00	8,407.50	12,742.50	22,936.50
Nampo	Pu Ryong	5-Feb-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Najin	Song Won	5-Feb-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	1,715.18	2,598.75
Chongjin	Nam San 8	6-Feb-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Najin	Kum Un San	7-Feb-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50

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Nampo	Saebyo1	9-Feb-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	18-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	22-Feb-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	23-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	25-Feb-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Viet Tin 01	25-Feb-19	8508838	VNM	5,453.00	13,496.18	20,448.75	36,807.75
Nampo	Yu Phyeong 5	4-Mar-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Saebyo1	8-Mar-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	10-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	11-Mar-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	11-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yu Phyeong 5	12-Mar-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Chon Ma San	16-Mar-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	19-Mar-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Chongjin	An San 1	20-Mar-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Nam San 8	22-Mar-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	22-Mar-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	23-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Chongjin	Kum Jing Gang 3	25-Mar-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Chongjin	Kum Jing Gang 3	27-Mar-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Yu Son	28-Mar-19	8691702	DPRK	3,398.00	8,407.50	12,742.50	22,936.50

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Nampo	New Regent	29-Mar-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	29-Mar-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Wonsan	Un Pha 2	2-Apr-19	8966535	DPRK	1,205.00	2,985.00	4,518.75	8,133.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	3-Apr-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Kum Un San	3-Apr-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	3-Apr-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-Apr-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Saebjol	8-Apr-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,850.00	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	8-Apr-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	New Regent	10-Apr-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Pu Ryong	10-Apr-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	11-Apr-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Chong Rim 3	12-Apr-19	8665131	DPRK	2,042.00	5,053.95	7,657.50	13,783.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	15-Apr-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Chongjin	Nam San 8	17-Apr-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	17-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	18-Apr-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Kum Jing Gang 3	18-Apr-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	19-Apr-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Najin	Chon Myong 1	27-Apr-19	8712362	DPRK	3,565.00	8,823.38	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	30-Apr-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,800.00	11,812.50	21,262.50
Chongjin	An San 1	2-May-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25

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Nampo	Chon Ma San	2-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	2-May-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	2-May-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,202.50	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	5-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,942.50	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	5-May-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	10-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	12-May-19	8151415	DPRK	600.00	1,500.00	2,250.00	4,050.00
Hungnam	Ma Du San	13-May-19	8021579	DPRK	949.00	2,348.78	3,558.75	6,405.75
Nampo	Hokong	14-May-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	New Regent	15-May-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Paek Ma	15-May-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	15-May-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	15-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	16-May-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Chongjin	An San 1	20-May-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	21-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	21-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,945.05	7,492.50	13,486.50
Nampo	Chon Ma San	24-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	24-May-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	24-May-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Mu Bong 1	25-May-19	8610461	DPRK	1,998.00	4,945.05	7,492.50	13,486.50
Songnim	Chon Ma San	27-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75

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Nampo	Chong Ryong San	28-May-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Saebvol	28-May-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	30-May-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	31-May-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	31-May-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	2-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yu Jong 2	5-Jun-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	6-Jun-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Jun-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	8-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Pu Ryong	9-Jun-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	10-Jun-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokong	12-Jun-19	9006758	SLE	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	12-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Chongjin	Kum Un San	18-Jun-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Najin	Sam Ma 2	20-Jun-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Chon Ma San	21-Jun-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Ji Song 6	21-Jun-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Najin	Song Won	21-Jun-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	1,715.18	2,598.75
Nampo	Subblic	26-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	27-Jun-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	28-Jun-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Kimchaek	Sam Jong 2	2-Jul-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25

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Nampo	Subblic	2-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	3-Jul-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	3-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	3-Jul-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Chongjin	Pu Ryong	5-Jul-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Nampo	Saebvol	5-Jul-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	7-Jul-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	11-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	12-Jul-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	New Regent	13-Jul-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Chongjin	Paek Ma	13-Jul-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Hungnam	Sam Ma 2	14-Jul-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Jul-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Wonsan	Kum Un San	18-Jul-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Tong Hung 5	18-Jul-19	8151415	DPRK	600.00	1,500.00	2,250.00	4,050.00
Nampo	Paek Ma	20-Jul-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	20-Jul-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	23-Jul-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Unica	23-Jul-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Wonsan	Ma Du San	24-Jul-19	8021579	DPRK	949.00	2,348.78	3,558.75	6,405.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	25-Jul-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Rye Song Gang 1	26-Jul-19	7389704	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.50	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	27-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75

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Chongjin	Yu Jong 2	28-Jul-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Chongjin	Kum Un San	30-Jul-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Wonsan	Un Pha 2	30-Jul-19	8966535	DPRK	1,205.00	2,985.00	4,518.75	8,133.75
Nampo	Hokong	1-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	2-Aug-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	2-Aug-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Wonsan	Paek Ma	2-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 2	2-Aug-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Yu Phyoung 5	2-Aug-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Subblic	8-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Unica	8-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Chongjin	Sam Ma 2	13-Aug-19	8106496	DPRK	1,731.00	4,284.23	6,491.25	11,684.25
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	14-Aug-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Wonsan	Kum Un San	15-Aug-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Chongjin	Paek Ma	15-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Chongjin	Yu Jong 2	15-Aug-19	8604917	DPRK	1,180.00	2,920.50	4,425.00	7,965.00
Nampo	Chon Ma San	19-Aug-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	20-Aug-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Unica	20-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Nam San 8	20-Aug-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Saebvol	21-Aug-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Chongjin	An San 1	22-Aug-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Hungnam	Subblic	24-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Songnim	Chil Bo San	26-Aug-19	8711021	DPRK	1,999.00	4,947.53	7,496.25	13,493.25

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
Nampo	Kum Jin Gang 2	26-Aug-19	unknown	DPRK	2,114.00	5,232.15	7,927.50	14,269.50
Nampo	Saebvol	26-Aug-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	26-Aug-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Chongjin	Sam Jong 2	26-Aug-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Nampo	Nam San 8	27-Aug-19	8122347	DPRK	3,150.00	7,796.25	11,812.50	21,262.50
Nampo	Hokong	29-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Paek Ma	31-Aug-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Unica	5-Sep-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Chon Ma San	8-Sep-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Saebvol	14-Sep-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Nampo	Subblic	14-Sep-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	14-Sep-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	15-Sep-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	16-Sep-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Sep-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Hungnam	Kum Un San 2	19-Sep-19	unknown	DPRK	558.00	1,381.05	2,092.50	3,766.50
Nampo	Sam Jong 1	21-Sep-19	8405311	DPRK	1,665.00	4,120.88	6,243.75	11,238.75
Wonsan	Kum Un San 2	23-Sep-19	unknown	DPRK	558.00	1,381.05	2,092.50	3,766.50
Chongjin	Kum Un San	25-Sep-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Paek Ma	25-Sep-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Saebvol	25-Sep-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Najin	Song Won	27-Sep-19	8613360	DPRK	2,101.00	5,197.50	7,878.75	14,181.75
Nampo	Kum Jing Gang 3	27-Sep-19	8791667	DPRK	4,983.00	12,330.00	18,686.25	33,635.25
Chongjin	Kum Un San	30-Sep-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50

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Chongjin	Pu Ryong	30-Sep-19	8705539	DPRK	3,279.00	8,115.00	12,296.25	22,133.25
Kimchaek	Sam Jong 2	1-Oct-19	7408873	DPRK	2,507.00	6,204.83	9,401.25	16,922.25
Chongjin	Chon Ma San	2-Oct-19	8660313	DPRK	3,565.00	8,820.00	13,368.75	24,063.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	2-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblic	3-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Myong Ryu 1	7-Oct-19	8532413	DPRK	817.00	2,025.00	3,063.75	5,514.75
Nampo	Tianyou	7-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	7-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Chong Ryong San	11-Oct-19	unknown	DPRK	1,590.00	3,935.25	5,962.50	10,732.50
Nampo	Hokong	11-Oct-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	11-Oct-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	11-Oct-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Nampo	Ji Song 6	12-Oct-19	8898740	DPRK	1,250.00	3,097.50	4,687.50	8,437.50
Chongjin	Paek Ma	12-Oct-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	An San 1	13-Oct-19	7303803	DPRK	3,003.00	7,432.43	11,261.25	20,270.25
Nampo	Subblic	13-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Saebjol	17-Oct-19	8916293	DPRK	1,150.00	2,846.25	4,312.50	7,762.50
Munchon Up	Paek Ma	20-Oct-19	9066978	DPRK	2,250.00	5,568.75	8,437.50	15,187.50
Nampo	Yu Phyong 5	23-Oct-19	8605026	DPRK	1,966.00	4,867.50	7,372.50	13,270.50
Chongjin	Chil Bo San	24-Oct-19	8711021	DPRK	1,999.00	4,947.53	7,496.25	13,493.25
Wonsan	Kum Un San	24-Oct-19	8720436	DPRK	2,070.00	5,122.50	7,762.50	13,972.50
Nampo	Diamond 8	27-Oct-19	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	22,950.68	34,773.75	62,592.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	29-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblic	31-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75

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Nampo	Tianyou	31-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Totals	Totals (Barrels)					1,436,411.55	2,164,112.85	3,894,426.00



- To emphasize the impact that the foreign flagged vessel deliveries are having on the DPRK's import volumes, we are isolating those deliveries into an independent table. As the table demonstrates, these deliveries began to gain pace in the late spring (May/June), and, as an isolated source of imports also breach the cap in all three projected volume scenarios. Between January 1 and October 31, foreign flagged tankers made 64 deliveries comprising between 560,000 and 1.531 million barrels of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.

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Port	Ship Name	Arrival Date	IMO	Last Known Flag	Dead Weight Tonnage	Delivery Volume if 33% Laden (BBL)	Delivery Volume if 50% Laden	Delivery Volume if 90% Laden
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	1-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	12-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	18-Jan-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	18-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	22-Feb-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	23-Feb-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Viet Tin 01	25-Feb-19	8508838	VNM	5,453.00	13,496.18	20,448.75	36,807.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	11-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Mar-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	New Regent	29-Mar-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	New Regent	10-Apr-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	15-Apr-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	17-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	23-Apr-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	5-May-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	10-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,865.00	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Hokong	14-May-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	New Regent	15-May-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25

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Nampo	Sen Lin 01	15-May-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	16-May-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	1-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	6-Jun-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	8-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	10-Jun-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokong	12-Jun-19	9006758	SLE	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	12-Jun-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Subblic	26-Jun-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Subblic	2-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	3-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	3-Jul-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Sen Lin 01	7-Jul-19	8910378	SLE	1,159.00	2,868.53	4,346.25	7,823.25
Nampo	Subblic	11-Jul-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	12-Jul-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	New Regent	13-Jul-19	8312497	PAN	4,999.00	12,372.53	18,746.25	33,743.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Jul-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	23-Jul-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Vifine (Tealway FV)	27-Jul-19	9045962	SLE	3,685.00	9,120.38	13,818.75	24,873.75
Nampo	Hokong	1-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	2-Aug-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Unica	8-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75

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Nampo	Subblic	8-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	20-Aug-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Unica	20-Aug-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Hungnam	Subblic	24-Aug-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Hokong	29-Aug-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	5-Sep-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Tianyou	14-Sep-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Subblic	14-Sep-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Bonvoy 3	16-Sep-19	8978784	HND	2,855.00	7,066.13	10,706.25	19,271.25
Nampo	Hokong	19-Sep-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	2-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Subblic	3-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Tianyou	7-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	7-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Hokong	11-Oct-19	9006758	SLE	3,995.00	9,887.63	14,981.25	26,966.25
Nampo	Unica	11-Oct-19	8514306	SLE	4,865.00	12,040.88	18,243.75	32,838.75
Nampo	Subblic	13-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Nampo	Diamond 8	27-Oct-19	9132612	SLE	9,273.00	22,950.68	34,773.75	62,592.75
Nampo	Yun Hong 8	29-Oct-19	unknown	unk	2,900.00	7,177.50	10,875.00	19,575.00
Nampo	Tianyou	31-Oct-19	8817007	SLE	2,105.00	5,209.88	7,893.75	14,208.75
Nampo	Subblic	31-Oct-19	8126082	TGO	5,989.00	14,822.78	22,458.75	40,425.75
Totals	Totals (Barrels)					561,401.55	850,672.50	1,531,210.50

Annex 2: Communication dated 5 December 2019 from the Executive Director of Sierra Leone Maritime Administration addressed to the Chair of the Committee

Sierra Leone presents its compliments to the chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) and, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), has the honor to communicate the following:

For the period 1 January 2019 to 31 August 2019, exports of refined petroleum products to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017) by vessels flagged by Sierra Leone totaled 176,493.08 barrels:

- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 (IMO 8910378) to Nampo, DPRK on January 12, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on January 18, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on February 22, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 6, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 11, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on March 23, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 6, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 17, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on April 23, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 6, 2019.

- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 10, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG (IMO: 9006758) to Nampo, DPRK on May 14, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on May 15, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE (IMO 9045932) to Nampo, DPRK on May 16, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on June 2, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on June 6, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on June 12, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on June 12, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on July 3, 2019.
- The supply of 2,865 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged SEN LIN 01 to Nampo, DPRK on July 7, 2019.
- The supply of 5,209.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged TIANYOU (IMO: 8817007) to Nampo, DPRK on July 12, 2019.
- The supply of 5,209.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on July 19, 2019.
- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA (IMO: 8514306) to Nampo, DPRK on July 23, 2019.
- The supply of 9,120.38 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged VIFINE to Nampo, DPRK on July 27, 2019.

- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA to Nampo, DPRK on August 8, 2019.
- The supply of 12,040.88 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged UNICA to Nampo, DPRK on August 20, 2019.
- The supply of 9,887.63 barrels by the Sierra Leone-flagged HOKONG to Nampo, DPRK on July 19, 2019.

Sierra Leone will share any additional information it receives regarding the above exports with the Committee.

Sierra Leone takes this opportunity to convey to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.



.....
Executive Director
Sierra Leone Maritime Administration

Signed in Freetown, on 5th December 2019

Source: Member State

Annex 3: Vessel profiles

Vessel owners, operators and managers

Several vessels involved in direct deliveries to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea share similar corporate ownership and management profiles. The companies involved generally have a single shareholder and frequently change directors. Several of these companies were dissolved within a year or two of being registered. In several cases, the vessels' companies can be traced back to common corporate registry companies in Hong Kong, China. In several cases, the vessels were transferred to new owners and operators a few months before the vessels first conduct of sanctionable activities.

Vessel profiles

Many of the foreign-flagged vessels engaged in sanctionable activity share similar profiles. This consists of coastal, product and general-purpose tankers that operate within waters in East Asia and South-east Asia. The vessels have a deadweight tonnage range of between 1,000 and 10,000 tons. They are generally older ships that score poorly in port state control safety inspections or have not had recent inspections. They have been insured or reinsured by protection and indemnity companies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia and in several cases were recorded on maritime databases with unknown or not updated insurance information. They have been classed by classification societies registered in Europe, North America and East Asia. These vessels have a recorded history of significant gaps in their AIS transmissions.

Source: The Panel

Annex 4: Bill of Sale of previously Sierra Leone-flagged Tianyou (IMO: 8817007) that conducted direct deliveries to Nampo between July and October 2019

Prescribed by the
Commissioners of
Customs & Excise
with the consent of
the Secretary of
State for Trade
and Industry

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
8817007	TIAN YOU	SLR10669, Built 1988, Freetown	Motor ship	1330KW

	Meters	Centimetres	GRT	NRT
Length	69	81		
Breadth	12	00		
Depth	5	55	1009	577

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, **TIAN YOU SHIPPING LIMITED** (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our principal place of business at UNIT 04 7F BRIGHT WAY TOWER 3 MONGKOK ROAD, KOWLOON HONG KONG in consideration of the sum of **USD 200,000.00** (USD one dollar) or other good and valuable consideration paid to us by [REDACTED] Hong Kong (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee(s).

Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from ANY ENCUMBRANCES, ALL MORTGAGES, ENCUMBRANCES, MARITIME LIENS, CLAIMS, CHARTERS, TAXES AND ANY OTHER DEBTS WHATSOEVER.

In witness whereof we have executed this Bill of Sale on 10th May 2019.

For and on Behalf of
TIAN YOU SHIPPING LIMITED
For and on behalf of
Tian You Shipping Limited
天佑有限公司

Name: [REDACTED]
Title: Representative Director *Authorized Signature(s)*

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate, (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her", or "their".
(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".
(e) Description of Witnesses : Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

NOTE:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.
NOTE:- Registered Owners or Mortgages are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.

Sec. F. 2058 (Oct 1971)

1548-934992-12M-7/72-817-NP

Source: The Panel

Annex 5: Bill of Sale of designated New Regent (IMO: 8312497) that conducted direct deliveries to Nampo between March and July 2019

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trades

Form No. 10a

X. S. 79

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number/Official Number	Name of Ship	Year and Port of Registry	Whether a Sailing, Steam or Motor Ship	Horse Power of Engines, (if any)
8312497/46483-15	New Regent	1983, Panama	Motor Ship	3253.35 HP

Length	METERS		Number of Tons (Where dual tonnages are assigned the higher of these should be stated)	
	Gross	Register	Gross	Register
Main breadth	96	00	2998	1600
Depth	15	00		
	7	80		

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book

We, (a) **Mega Glory Holdings Limited** having our registered office at 3rd Floor J & C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola VG1110, British Virgin Islands (hereinafter called "the Transferors") in consideration of the sum of United States Dollars One (US\$1) paid to us by (b) **Fullberg Trading Develop Limited** having our registered office at 3rd Floor, Room 2A, Cheong Sun Tower, 116-118 Wing Lok Street, Sheung Wan, Western District, Hong Kong Island (hereinafter called "the Transferees") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL (100%) of the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats, and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and (c) their assigns, that we have the power to transfer in the manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from (d) encumbrances and maritime liens and any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have caused this Bill of Sale to be executed on 05th April 2018.

Signed and delivered by [Redacted] as Attorney-In-Fact for and on behalf of Mega Glory Holdings Limited

By: [Redacted]
Attorney-In-Fact [Redacted] 05 APR 2018

(a) Name in full of the Body Corporate (b) full name(s) and addresses of transferee(s) with their description in the case of individuals, and adding "as joint owners" where such is the case (c) "his", "their" or "its", (d) if any subsisting encumbrance add "save as appears by the registry of the said ship". (e) Signatures and description of witnesses, i.e. Director, Secretary, etc (as the case may be).
NOTE -A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship: and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences
NOTE -Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British ships informed of any change of residence on their part.

S4544 (23/04/6) Dd.8095571 20m4/80 G.W.B.1d Gp810 F.2058 (August 1975)

Source: The Panel

transferred ①MGO ②1,150 MT to Order NO. 6099 (③Vessel Name : Yun Hong 8)
at 1635LT
1) Bunker Delivery Receipt of Order No.6099

BUNKER DELIVERY RECEIPT (BDR)		
油類供給受領証		BDR No. 7
Order No. (订单序号)	8069	
Tanker's Name (供船船名)		
Delivery Location (供船場所)	33-46.0N / 124-33.0E	
Bunkering Date (供单日期)	21 Aug. 2019	
Commenced Pumping (开始)	14:50 (GMT+08)	
Completed Pumping (结束)	16:35 (GMT+08)	
Gauge Before (供前测量)	KALtar	0.00
Gauge After (供后测量)	KALtar	1380.000
Quantity Gross Supplied (供船总量)	M/Tons	1150.000
② Quantity: 1,150 MT		
Receiver's Confirmation (接收船確認)		
Supplier's Confirmation (供船船確認)		
<p>The Supplier warrants that the product will not be loaded directly or indirectly onto or in any nation, vessel, Cox, OPA's, specially designated vessels or North Korea vessels etc.; entry or destination prohibited by the United Nations and illegal transactions of products such as smuggling trade.</p> <p>买方不允将产品直接或间接地装到或在联合国国家、特别指定力量禁止产品其核通国地区或在任何联合国制裁国家内贸易，并禁止向非法交易(比如朝鲜国新罗江开射船或北朝鲜船等)。此C或卖方目的。斗儿为非法的交易。</p>		
Order No. (订单序号)	4069	
SHIP'S NAME (船名)	YUN HONG 8	
Signature (簽 名)	① Vessel name YUN HONG 8	
Master or Chief Engineer 船長或機師長		
Full Name & Rank (姓名/位置)		
Signature (簽 名)		
Master or Chief Officer 船長或一等航海士		
Remarks:		

received pledge about UN Sanctions and confirmed final destination of Order No.6099 (Yun Hong 8) which is Shandong, China.
1) The pledge of "Yun Hong 8"

The buyer warrants that the product will not be traded directly or indirectly with or to any nation, vessel, entity or destination prohibited by the United Nations and illegal transactions of product, such as smuggling trade.

誓约书

买方不允许产品直接地或间接地买卖到任何被联合国禁止的国家、船舶(比如美国指定惩罚船舶或者北朝鲜船舶)、地区或者目的地, 并且如何非法的贸易。

船名: 云红8号 YUN HONG 8

Vessel name: YUN-HONG 8

船舶国籍: 中国

Nationality: China

签名: 刘平

Signature:

目的地: 山东半岛渔船作业

Destination: Discharging to Fishing boats in Shandong, China

日期: 2019年 08月 31日

1)Communication with vessel before discharging

To : [REDACTED]
FM : [REDACTED]
AUG 31, 2019

GOOD DAY SIRs,

ORDER NO.6069 - 3000MT(3600KL) BEFORE COMMCD DISCH 5 SHTS.
TOTAL ROB : 5107.712 KL

REMARK : Berthed / 1425LT, Ship's Name / YUN HONG-8
(Up Anchored & Drifting STS)

THANKS .

B.RGDS/MASTER

For the ship-to-ship operation with YUN HONG No. 8 and 14: 25LT 31st Aug.2019
The detail of E-mail that reported to the company to check the photo of the ahead, the stern, the top bridge, the pledge of letter and the ship's national certificate

2) Communication with vessel after discharging

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO : [REDACTED]
 FM : [REDACTED]
 AUG 31, 2019

GOOD DAY SIRs,

ORDER NO.6069 - 1150MT (1380KL) COMPLETED DISCH 7 SHTS.
 TOTAL ROB : 3727.712KL

REMARKS : nil

THANKS.

R.RODS/MSTR

The commenced discharging at 14: 50LT, the completed discharging at 16: 35LT, and the partner ship's signature on the cargo volume was reported to the company [REDACTED]

3) Communication with vessel for movement report (anchored)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]
 CC: [REDACTED]
 FM: [REDACTED]
 AUG 31, 2019

Re: [REDACTED] MOVEMENT REPORT / Shifted & Anchoring

31st AUG 2019
 1830LT : S.B.E
 1900LT : Dropped Anchor @ 30-45N 124-50E 1920LT : F.W.E & Preparing EQUIP' for Order
 No. 8758/6069/7795.

[REDACTED]

B.RODS MSTR.

Vessel dropped Anchor at 30-45N 124-50E for next ship-to-ship operation with other vessel after completion of ship-to-ship with YUN HONG 8 and reporting it to the company [REDACTED]

➔ Never turned off the ship's AIS
1) Daily Morning Report on 31 Aug. 2019

To : [REDACTED]
Cc : [REDACTED]
FM : [REDACTED]
AUG 31, 2019

GOOD MORNING SIR,

Pls be Advsd that Daily Morning(0600LT)Report as flws:


1. Ship Name/Date/Time(LT): [REDACTED] 31 AUG2019/0800LT(GMT+8)
2. Position : 30501 N/124300E
3. Present Speed/Course : ANCHORING
4. Daily Sailing /Miles : -
5. Total Sailing /Miles : 102H 15M /1173

6. RPM/Slip(%) : -
7. ROE/Daily cons : HFO/265.45/0.80, MGO/9.10/1.50, MESys/6200/0.0,
MECyl/5770/0.0, GESys/6195/0.0, FW/344/8
8. Distance To Go : -
9. Destination / ETA : -
10. Weather & Sea cond : NE/5,C/5
11. AIS status : GOOD WORKING CONDITION

12. REMARK : Waiting for STS Order.

THANKS,
B. RGDS [REDACTED] MASTER.

Every morning, when the ship's captain sends the Daily Morning Report to the company, he checks the operation of the AIS. On 31st Aug Daily morning report E-MAIL reported to [REDACTED] as a company on 2019 09: 09LT. AIS is reported to be operating normally



Source: The Panel

Annex 7a: Sample of sales and purchase contract from supplier-vessel B to the Yun Hong 8, October 2019

买卖合同书
Sales and Purchase Contract
(CONTRACT REF: NWI-CHT_1910002)

▪ SELLER 卖方:

[REDACTED]

▪ BUYER 买方:

[REDACTED]

After negotiation, the sales contract is confirmed as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. PRODUCT NAME 品名 | : GASOIL 500PPM/10PPM SULPHUR |
| 2. DATE OF DISCHARGING
卸货日期 | : 16 TH OCT 2019 TO 31 ST OCT 2019 (2 ND HALF OF OCTOBER)
: 2019 年 10 月 16 日至 10 月 31 日 (10 月下半月) |
| 3. QUANTITY
数量 | : 3,000.00 MT, ALLOWING PARTIAL DISCHARGE
: 3,000.00 吨, 允许分批卸货 |
| 4. PLACE OF DISCHARGING
卸货地点 | : DES WEST PACIFIC
: DES 西太平洋 |
| 5. PRICING METHOD | : THE DES WEST PACIFIC PRICE SHALL BE THE AVERAGE OF THE MEAN OF PLATTS QUOTATION FOR "10PPM GASOIL" UNDER THE HEADING 'FOB SINGAPORE' AS PUBLISHED IN PLATTS ASIA PACIFIC/ARAB GULF MARKETSCAN FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 2019 WITH A PREMIUM OF USD 4.80 PER BBL. THE CONVERSION FACTOR FROM BBL TO MT OF 7.5 SHALL BE APPLIED. |
| 计价方式 | : 船上交货价应为 PLATTS ASIA PACIFIC/ARAB GULF MARKETSCAN 于 2019 年 10 月发布的“新加坡离岸价”标题下“10ppm 柴油”的 PLATTS 每桶平均价+贴水 4.80 美元。以上价格应于 7.5 桶 : 1 吨的转换率为准。 |
| 6. PAYMENT METHOD | : ONE WORKING DAY BEFORE DISCHARGING, THE BUYER SHALL WIRE THE ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF SHIPMENT TO THE BANK ACCOUNT DESIGNATED BY THE SELLER |
| 付款方式 | : 卸货前一个工作日, 买方需将当船之预估货款电汇至卖方指定银 |

7. ACCOUNT NAME : [REDACTED]
(账号名称)
BANK NAME : [REDACTED]
(银行名称)
SWIFT CODE : [REDACTED]
BANK ADDRESS : [REDACTED]
(银行地址)
USD BANK ACCOUNT NO. : [REDACTED]
(美金银行账号)
8. QUANTITY CONFIRMATION : BASED ON THE QUANTITY OF MOTHER SHIP OIL GAUGE
数量确认 : 以母船油表数量为依据
9. RISK & TITLE : TITLE TO AND RISKS WITH RESPECT THERETO SHALL PASS TO
FROM SELLER TO BUYER WHEN THE PRODUCT PASSES THE
FLANGE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DELIVERY HOSE AND
THE PERMANENT HOSE CONNECTION OF THE VESSEL AT THE
DISCHARGE LOCATION, AT WHICH POINT OF DELIVERY
SELLER'S RESPONSIBILITY SHALL CEASE.
权利及风险 : 当产品在卸货地点通过运输软管和容器永久软管连接之
间的法兰连接时, 相关的所有权和风险应从卖方转移到
买方, 此时, 卖方的责任应终止。
10. BUYER'S CONFIRMATION AND GUARANTEE TERMS
THE PREVIOUS AND NEXT PORT OF THE SHIP DESIGNATED BY THE BUYER FOR DISCHARGING IS
NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OR/AND TERRITORY OF ANY ENTITY OR/AND GOVERNMENT
SANCTION (COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS "SANCTIONED JURISDICTION"), THE ENTITY THAT
IMPOSED THE SANCTIONS OR/AND THE GOVERNMENT INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR THE US TRASURY'S OFFICE OF OVERSEAS ASSET CONTROL;
SANCTIONED JURISDICTIONS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, IRAN AND SYRIA.
买方指派用来卸货的船舶的上一个和下一个港口不在受任何实体或/和政府制裁的管辖
区或/和领土范围内(统称为"受制裁管辖区"), 实施制裁的实体或/和政府包括但不限于
联合国安全理事会和/或美国财政部海外资产控制办公室; 受制裁管辖区包括但不
仅限于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国, 伊朗和叙利亚。
SHIPS DESIGNATED BY THE BUYER FOR DISCHARGING AND THEIR OWN LESSEES, AGENTS
AND RELATED INSURERS (COLLECTIVELY REFERRED TO AS "RELATED PARTIES") ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS AND/OR TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON SHIPS, INDIVIDUALS AND/OR
ENTITIES.
买方指派用来卸货的船舶及其船东, 承租人, 代理, 和与此相关的保险人(统称为"有
关方面")不是受制裁和/或贸易限制的船舶, 个人和/或实体。

GOODS SHALL NOT BE UNLOADED IN THE JURISDICTION UNDER SANCTION. GOODS SHALL NOT BE SOLD/TRANSFERRED/DELIVERED TO ANY SANCTIONED ENTITY, AS WELL AS TO SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, OR ANY OTHER ENTITY ENJOYING COMMON INTERESTS IN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE GOODS, WHICH IS NOT A SANCTIONED ENTITY.

货物不得在被制裁的司法辖区卸载，货物不出售/转让/或交付给任何被制裁的实体货物以及货物的股东，董事，雇员，代理，或者其他任何在股权和控制方面享有共同利益的主体不是被制裁的实体。

11. FORCE MAJEURE

EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF FORCE MAJEURE, SUCH AS FIRE, FLOOD, STRIKE OR MARKET CONTRACTION, THE BUYER AND SELLER SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.

不可抗力



买卖双方除发生不可抗力事件，诸如火灾、水灾、罢工或市场萎缩，否则都应当承担合同条款的责任。

12. OTHERS

THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AND CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. ALL DISPUTES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE FINALLY SETTLED IN LONDON UNDER THE RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BY ONE OR MORE ARBITRATORS APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH RULES. ANY AWARD RESULTING THEREFROM SHALL BE FINAL AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES THERTO.

其它

本协议受英国法律管辖并按照英国法律解释。与本协议有关的所有争议应根据国际商会的调解和仲裁规则，由一名或多名根据该规则指定的仲裁员在伦敦最终解决。由此产生的任何裁决均为最终裁决，对双方均具有约束力。



Source: The Panel

Annex 7b: Falsified Bunker Delivery Receipt for the transfer from supplier vessel-B to the Yun Hong '18' on 23 October 2019

Voyage 02

Bunker Delivery Receipt

Recipient/Vessel :	YUN HONG 18		Flag :	CHINA
Date :	23/10/2019	BDR No :	VOY02-03	
Ticket No :	2717	Location :	30°51' 124°30'	
Supplying Tanker :				
Commenced Hrs :	1248	Completed Hrs :	1612	

Bunker Product		Gas Oil	Remarks
Quantity	Supplied Qty KLs	2,052.000	
	Supplied Qty MTs	1,710.000	
Density @ 15 Celsius, kg/m3		0.8380	

We hereby declare that the fuel oil supplied is in conformity with regulation 14(1) and 18(1) of the Marpol Annex VI

Who require to stop ? ☐ Tanker ☒ Vessel
 Did you carry out watching tanker's flowmeter ? ☒ Yes ☐ No
 Did you observe water content at tanker side ? ☒ Yes ☐ No
 Did you receive sealed IMO Sample ? ☒ Yes ☐ No

BUYER'S DECLARATION NOTICE (买方确认及保证条件)

1. None of my vessel's previous and Next port are in any jurisdictions and/or territories sanctioned by any entity and/or government (collectively, the "sanctioned jurisdictions"), including but not limited to the United Nation Security Council but are not limited to, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran and Syria.
 1. 买方指派用家装货的船舶的上一个和下一个港口不在受任何实体或政府制裁的管辖区域和领土范围（统称为“受制裁管辖区”）。实施制裁的实体或政府包括但不限于联合国安全理事会或美国财政部海外资产控制办公室；受制裁管辖区包括但不限于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、伊朗和叙利亚。

2. Each and all of the interested parties are not vessel(s), individuals and/or entities which are the subject of sanctions and/or trade restrictions imposed by any of the sanctioned jurisdictions (collectively, "sanctioned entities"), including but not limited to OFAC's specially designated nationals and blocked persons list and/or sectoral sanction identifications list, and/or the United Nations Security Council Sanction list.
 The cargo presently laden on board the vessel was not loaded out of, nor bound for, any the sanctioned jurisdictions.
 The cargo presently laden on board the vessel was not shipped by, nor will any of it be discharged and/or delivered to any sanctioned entities.
 2. 买方指派用家装货的船舶及其船东、承租人、代理、和与此相关的保险商（统称为“有关方面”）不是受制裁和或贸易限制的船舶、个人/或实体买方认同货物不得在制裁的司法辖区卸货。货物不得出售、转让、或交付给任何被制裁的实体。货物以及货物的船东、董事、雇员、代理或靠其任何在船权和船期方面享有共同利益的主体不是被制裁的实体。

We certify that the above products were delivered and the measurements are correct.


Master of

We confirm receipt of the above products in good condition and quantity are correct.

Chief Engineer of

Source: The Panel

Annex 8: Examples of DPRK and suspect vessels' sanctions evasion activities moving into waters near Shidao, Ningbo and Sandu Dao, China, 1 July to 30 September 2019



Source: Member State, The Panel

DPRK Vessels designated by the UN Security Council

Vessel name	IMO number	Dates of entry	Date of designation
<i>An San 1</i>	7303803	3 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 07 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
<i>Sam Jong 2</i>	7408873	20 September – 22 Sep- tember 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
<i>Yu Jong 2</i>	8604917	17 July – 19 July 2019 (near Shidao)	30 March 2018
<i>Nam San 8</i>	8122347	12 July – 19 July (near Ningbo); 02 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	30 March 2018
<i>Sam Jong 1</i>	8405311	14 July – 17 July 2019 (near Ningbo)	30 March 2018
<i>Chon Ma San</i>	8660313	25 September – 27 Sep- tember 2019 (near Ningbo)	30 March 2018
<i>Ji Song 6</i>	8898740	25 September – 30 Sep	30 March 2018

		tember 2019 (near Ningbo)	
<i>Kwang Chon</i> aka <i>Yu Phyoung 5</i>	8605026	21 September – 25 September 2019 (near Shidao)	30 March 2018

Vessel designated by the UN Security Council

Vessel name	IMO number	Dates of entry	Date of designation
<i>New Regent</i>	8312497	25 July – 30 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	16 October 2018

Other DPRK Vessels

Vessel Name	IMO number	Dates of entry
<i>Kum Un San</i>	8720436	05 – 06 July 2019 (near Ningbo); 08 July – 11 July 2019 (near Sandu Dao)
<i>Chong Ryong San</i>	[7803389] - Recorded 'unknown' by Member State	as 24 September – 25 September 2019 (near Ningbo)

Non-DPRK flagged vessels

Vessel Name	IMO Number	Dates of entry	Flag state
<i>Hokong</i>	9006758	07 August – 11 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 14 August (near Sandu Dao); 11 September -12 Septem-ber 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 29 September 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone
<i>New Konk</i>	9036387	07 July – 14 July 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 07 August – 11 August 2019 (near Ningbo); 22 August – 27 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao); 04 September – 05 Septem-ber 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone
<i>Vifine</i>	9045962	09 July – 17 July 2019	Sierra Leone

		(near Sandu Dao)	
<i>Unica</i>	8514306	29 September – 01 October 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Sierra Leone

Suspicious vessel of unknown name and flag

Vessel	IMO number	Flag	Dates of entry	Flag State
<i>Rui Hong 916</i>	9058866	Unknown	02 August – 13 August 2019 (near Sandu Dao)	Unknown flagged

Source: Member State; Table: The Panel

Annex 9: Bill of Sale of then-Sierra Leone-flagged Rui Hong 916 (IMO: 9058866) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tanker Kum Un San (IMO: 8720436)

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Form No.10A

BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official Number, year and port of Registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engine (if any)
9058866	TAIYO MARU NO 2	133683, 1993, Waki-gun, Okayama-Pref., Japan	Motor Ship	735KW

	Meters	Centimeters	Number of Tons	
Length	60	04	Gross	Net
Breadth	10	00	498.00	286
Depth	4	50		

and as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

I, **RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED** (hereinafter called "the Transferors") having our registered office at **OFFICE 3A 12/F KAISER CENTRE NO.18 CENTRE STREET SAI YING PUN HK** in consideration of the sum of **USD 1.00 (United States Dollars One Only)** paid to us by **WANG** (hereinafter called "the Transferees") having their registered office at **FUJIAN PROVINCE P.R.CHINA** the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged transfer all (100%) the shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferees.

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferees and their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, mortgages and maritime liens or any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have hereunto executed this Bill of Sale on **20 MARCH 2019**.

For **RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED**

By: _____

Nam _____

Note:- A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

Note:- Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.

Sec. F. 2058 (Oct. 1971)

Source: The Panel

Contract of sales for the then *Taiyo Maru No.2*

(英文船舶売買契約書訳文)

発行 1965 年 12 月 16 日
改定 1971 年 7 月 13 日
改定 1977 年 3 月 16 日
改定 1983 年 9 月 9 日
改定 1999 年 11 月 2 日

社団法人 日本海運集会所書式制定委員会

船舶売買契約書

版権: 社団法人 日本海運集会所

10,000円

契約締結地及び日時
2018 年 10 月 25 日

コードネーム: ニッポンセール 1999 (第 1 部)

1. 売主 (前文) [Redacted]	2. 買主 (前文) RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED の日本国代理人東栄汽船株式会社
3. 本船の名称 (前文) 第二太陽丸	4. 国旗/登録 (前文、第 3 条 (a) (ii)) 日本国/横須市
5. 船級 (前文、第 6 条 (b)) NK	6. 建造 (年及び建造者名) (前文) 1993 年 1 月 山陽造船
7. 登録総トン数 (前文) [Redacted] 00 トン	8. 夏期載貨量トン (前文) 1,198.00 トン
9. 検査の検査の場所及び日時 (前文、第 5 条 (a)、第 10 条) 2018 年 10 月 18 日 堀	10. クラスレコードの検査の場所及び日時 (前文)
11. 売買価格 (第 1 条) 21,000,000 円 (海外売船のため非課税とする)	
12. クローリングの場所 (第 3 条 (c)) 13 項記載の引渡区域	
13. 引渡区域 (第 4 条 (a)、第 6 条 (e) (i)、(f)) 尾道港	
14. 引渡期間 (第 4 条 (a)) 及び キャンセリング・デイト (第 4 条 (a)、(d)、(e)) 2019 年 1 月 7 日 ~ 2019 年 1 月 18 日 (引渡期日については売主買主双方合意の上、決定するものとする。)	
15. 場所 (第 2 条 (a)、第 4 条 (c)) 日本国	
16. 1 日あたりの予定損害賠償額 (第 7 条 (c)) 100,000 円	第 16 条から [23] 条の追加条項は、これがあるときは、そのまま本契約書に添付されたものと看做す。

売主
[Redacted]

買主
RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED の日本国代理人
〒108-0022 東京都港区海岸3-33-17
東京ベイサイドビル
東栄汽船株式会社
[Redacted]

による:
[Redacted]

役職:
[Redacted]

役職:
[Redacted]

10,000円

Source: The Panel

Provisional Certificate of Registration for the 'Taiyo'



REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration hereby grants this certificate of navigation to the vessel whose particulars are described below, in accordance with the Merchant Shipping Act, 2003.



Certificate No.

VHQ-200-18-3394

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Name of Vessel	TAIYO		Official No.	SLR10839
Call Sign	9LU 2852	Port of Registry	IMO No.	9058866
Owner's Name and Address	RUIS (HK) MARINE CO., LIMITED, OFFICE 3A 12/F KAISER CENTRE NO 18 CENTRE STREET SAI YING PUN., Hong Kong			Shares 64 / 64

MAIN PARTICULARS OF THE VESSEL

Length (m) ¹	Breadth (m) ¹	Depth (m) ¹	Gross Tonnage	Net Tonnage
60.04	10.0	4.5	498	280
Power (kW)	Year of Build	Vessel Type		
735	1993	Oil Tanker		
Builders and place of build				
SANYO ZOSEN CO., LTD., JAPAN				
Place and Date of issuance		Valid until		
Piraeus, Greece on 27 December, 2018		28 March, 2019		

Remarks (if any)

THE VESSEL WILL UNDERTAKE A SINGLE DELIVERY VOYAGE FROM ONOMICHI, JAPAN TO NINGDE, FUJIAN, CHINA.

This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.

¹ In accordance with the International Tonnage Certificate.

To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at www.slmarad.com based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.

Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD
info@slmarad.com www.slmarad.com

VHQ-200-18-3394

Page 1 of 1

Source: The Panel

Annex 10: Bill of Sale of formerly Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged Sea Prima (IMO: 8617524) that conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tanker Saebyol (IMO: 8916293)

Form No. 10A BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)				
Official Number	Name of Ship	Number, year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of e.
Call Sign: V4EP2 IMO: 8617524	SEA PRIMA	Year Built: 1987 PORT OF REGISTRY: BASSETERRE	MOTOR TANKER	1765 KW
Registered Length from fore-part of stem, to the aft-side of the head of the stern-post/fore-side of the rudder-stock			Meters	Number of Tons
Registered Main Breadth to outside of plating			85.00	Gross
Registered Depth in hold from tonnage deck to ceiling amidships			18.00	Register
			6.00	2734
				1349
and as described in more detail in the Register Book				
<p>We, (a) [REDACTED] having our principal place of business at [REDACTED] BRITISH VIRGINS ISLANDS in consideration of the sum of USD\$580,000.00 (UNITED STATES DOLLARS FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY THOUSAND ONLY) paid to us by [REDACTED] having its registered address at [REDACTED] XIAMEN, CHINA (b) the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer ALL 100% shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her ship particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances to the said transferee(s).</p> <p>Further, we, the said transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said transferee(s) and (c) <u>their</u> assigns that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from encumbrances (d) <u>mortgages and maritime liens, taxes or any other debts or claims whatsoever.</u></p> <p>In witness whereof we have hereunto affixed our common seal executed this Bill of Sale on 19th day of July 2019</p> <p>Was affixed hereunto in the presence of [REDACTED]</p> <p>THE SELLER: [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] <i>Authorized Signature(s)</i></p> <p>Witnessed by: [REDACTED]</p>				
<p>(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate. (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferee or transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her" or "their".</p> <p>(d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".</p> <p>(b) Description of Witnesses: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).</p> <p>NOTE: - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.</p> <p>NOTE: - Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any case of residence on their part.</p> <p>Sec. F.2058 (April 1965)</p>				

Source: The Panel

Annex 11: Ship-to-ship transfers between DPRK tankers and unidentified vessels

The Panel continues to observe the trend of DPRK tankers conducting illicit transfers with unidentified vessels using subterfuge:

Mu Bong 1 and an unidentified vessel, 13 November 2019

The *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461) conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified smaller vessel on 13 November 2019 in the East China Sea. The smaller vessel had an item draped over part of its stern, likely to prevent identification. The Panel previously recommended designating the *Mu Bong 1*¹ for having conducted another ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified tanker.




Source: Member State

Saebyol and unidentified vessels

11 November 2019

On 11 November 2019, the *Saebyol* (IMO: 8916293) conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with an unidentified vessel in the East China Sea. The Panel featured the designated *Saebyol*, one of the most active DPRK tankers involved in illicit procurement of refined petroleum, disguised as the ‘*Venus*’². Photographs below showed the letter ‘E’ on the ‘*Venus*’ hull was painted over. An unidentified vessel that was supplying the *Saebyol* similarly had its name painted over.



Source: Member State

¹ Paragraph 8(b) of S/2019/691.

² Paragraphs 13 and 14 of S/2019/691.

3 December 2019

On 3 December 2019, the *Saemyol* conducted two ship-to-ship transfers with two separate small vessels in the East China Sea, indicating that DPRK tankers continue to meet with multiple vessels to ensure fuller loads before returning to deliver their illicit cargo. Again, on 11 December 2019, the *Saemyol* was photographed conducting a nighttime transfer with an unidentified vessel in the East China Sea. That vessel appears to resemble the unidentified vessel that conducted transfers with the *Nam San 8* (see below).



Source: Member State

11 December 2019



Source: Member State

Nam San 8 and unidentified vessel

16 and 17 December 2019

The designated *Nam San 8* (IMO: 8122347) conducted ship-to-ship transfers with an unidentified vessel on 16 and 17 December 2019 in the East China Sea. The unidentified vessel involved in the ship-to-ship transfers on consecutive days appear to be identical.



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

Annex 12: Updates on vessels involved in sanctions evasion activities

Viet Tin 01

1. The Panel previously listed the Vietnamese-flagged *Viet Tin 01* (IMO: 8508838) as one of three foreign-flagged vessels that off-loaded refined petroleum at Nampo in late February 2019³. The vessel, which was bareboat chartered to Happy Shipping Co. Ltd based in Fujian⁴, was reported detained⁵ by Malaysian authorities along with one crew member in December 2019 as a result of anchoring without authorization⁶. The Panel has written to Malaysia for assistance. The Panel had informed Viet Nam of the vessel's location when it was intermittently transmitting an AIS signal between July and August 2019 as it transited the South China Sea. Viet Nam responded that since the vessel had turned off its AIS and ceased communicating with its owner, Vietnamese authorities had no further information on the vessel, and that the owner has been a victim of fraudulent and unlawful appropriation of the vessel's use "undertaken by foreign entities". The Panel continues to await responses from Mr Kwek who facilitated the transaction on information relating to the individuals involved in the chartering of the vessel⁷. The Panel has repeated its request for information from T Energy International Co. Ltd, a company located in Taiwan Province of China, as purchaser of the refined petroleum at the *Viet Tin 01*'s last registered port of call and has yet to receive a response. Investigations continue.

Shang Yuan Bao

2. The Panel investigated the designated *Shang Yuan Bao* (IMO: 8126070) that was involved in identity fraud and ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers *Paek Ma* (IMO: 9066978) and the *Myong Ryu 1* (IMO: 8532413) on 18 May and 2 June 2018, respectively⁸. Panel investigations prompted the vessel's removal from its Panamanian flag registry and its subsequent designation in October 2018, along with a Member State's designation of the vessel's owners, operators and managers⁹. Since then, a Member State reported the vessel as having run aground close to Guanling, China¹⁰. Coordinates and imagery recorded by the Panel from commercial data-bases show the *Shang Yuan Bao* transmitted its last AIS signal in July 2019, while satellite imagery showed the vessel remained at the same location in late September 2019. China replied that it is coordinating relevant authorities to investigate the cases.

Shang Yuan Bao run aground



Source: Member State



Source: Windward

Source: The Panel

³ Paragraphs 10 to 12, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

⁴ The company with no accessible information available, did not respond to the Panel's emails.

⁵ According to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, the vessel was detained in waters south of Tanjung Penyusop, Johor.

⁶ "Malaysia seizes Vietnamese tanker that was tracked in North Korea, Reuters, 12 December 2019.

⁷ Paragraph 11, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

⁸ Paragraphs 16 and 17, S/2019/691 of 30 August 2019.

⁹ On 30 August 2019, the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two individuals, three entities and identified the *Shang Yuan Bao* as blocked property in implementing Security Council sanctions, on 30 August 2019, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm762>.



¹⁰ Information from a Member State and by the Panel from open source databases.

Annex 13: Sample of satellite images of cargo vessels docked at coal terminals at Nampo and at Songnim in November and December 2019


Twenty-seven days of usable satellite imagery out of 60 days in November and December of 2019 show that coal vessels, including those of larger dimensions, continue to call at Nampo coal terminal, indicating the on-going trade in coal exports. For these months, at least 16 cargo ships were observed to have docked during these 27 observable days at Nampo, with around 87 ships observed anchored near the port. During 29 days of usable satellite imagery, at least 17 ships were observed at Songnim,¹¹ with around 17 ships observed anchored near the port. These cargo ships are counted on a conservative basis, taking into account the days where satellite images were useless because of cloud cover, avoiding double counts, and counting only cargo ships that had coal visible in the cargo hold. The full count was more than 103 in the Nampo coal terminal area and 34 in Songnim area during the observed days.


Source: The Panel

¹¹ The cargo vessels counted to have docked at Nampo's coal terminal and at Songnim's coal terminal were counted only on days when satellite images were available on Planet Labs. Taking into account the days where satellite photos were not taken due to cloud cover and avoiding double counts, the Panel assesses that the actual number of cargo vessels calling at these ports is higher.

Planet ref. UTC	Summary of the analysis presented below From the 01 November to the 31 December (27 days of IMSAT observable): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> From 1 to 3 coal ships were always berthed at the coal dock (except 3 days 0) more than 16 ships berthed at and left from the coal dock More than 87 ships berthed in and left from the bay The difference between the number of berthed and anchored ships is because <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The chain of ships continues out of <u>ImSAT coverage</u> Several sister ships could be counted only one time Some anchored ships waited for a berth at <u>Songnim</u> Some anchored ships were not dedicated to shipment coal 		site Nampo Coal, dock WEST / 38°43'33.83"N 125°24'53.81"E site Nampo Coal, dock EAST / 38°43'39.74"N 125°25'4.80"E	Length (m)	Width (m)	Observation ships berthed observed: 16 berthed and 16 left	Observation ships waiting observed: 87 berthed and 74 left	Cargo
20191101 02 23 19 UTC			1 Medium 4 holds 3 cranes (right same 2019 11 03)	+100	25	Coal ship: 2 4 holds opened	Coal Ships: 9	Coal
			1 small 2 holds 0 crane (left)	-100	20	2 holds opened		Coal
20191103 02 27 58 UTC			1 Medium 4 holds 3 cranes (right same 2019 11 01)	+100	25	Coal ship: 2 (+0-0) 4 holds opened	Coal Ships: 8 (+1 -2 from Nov 1)	Coal
			1 Medium 2 holds 0 crane (left) new from Nov 1	+100	20	2 holds opened		coal

[illegible]

Planet ref.	Summary of the analysis presented below	site <u>Songnim</u> Coal, doc 38°43'41.71"N 125°37'39.30"E	Length	Width	Observation ships call in. observed: 17 berthed and 15 left	Observation ships waiting. Observed: 17 berthed and 16 left	Cargo
20191103 05 17 26		1 small 2 holds 1 crane (north)	100	20	Coal ships: 3 (+3) 1 hold opened	Coal Ships: 2 (+2) holds opened empty	Coal
		2 small 2 holds 1 crane	100	20	1 hold opened		Coal
		1 large 4 holds 4 cranes (south)	160	25	5 holds closed		Coal



Source: The Panel (Image: Planet)

Annex 14: Ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, *Phuong Linh* 269 (MMSI: 874005969)

The *Phuong Linh* 269 delivered a shipment of DPRK coal to Qisha port in September 2018, exported by a Vietnamese company¹². A Member State provided information that the vessel's owner or operator may have owned or operated the *Tan Phat* 36 that was detained on 12 September 2018 by Viet Nam receiving coal from a DPRK vessel. While shipping documents claimed that the coal's origin was from Viet Nam, satellite imagery provided by a Member State showed the vessel engaging in ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged *Pho Phuong* (IMO: 8417962) on 21 September in the Gulf of Tonkin, with the *Phuong Linh* 269 docked near Qisha port on 24 September 2018. The vessel's docked coordinates closely align with the Panel's previous report of an anchorage area frequented by DPRK-associated vessels¹³. The *Phuong Linh* 269 was also recorded as involved in another ship-to-ship transfers of DPRK coal with the *Pho Phuong* on 24 October 2018¹⁴ in the Gulf of Tonkin and docked near Qi-sha port on 25 October 2018 (see satellite images). According to satellite imagery from a Member State, the *Phuong Linh* 269 was again anchored near Qisha port on 3 March 2019 and on 20 March 2019. Data from a specialized maritime platform corroborated the vessel's location. Viet Nam replied that while a vessel named "*Phuong Linh*" appeared in the Gulf of Tonkin near Qisha port between August 2018 and September 2019, the vessel did not enter or leave ports, or conducted ship-to-ship transfers or unloaded coal in the Gulf of Tonkin. A search on the Vietnamese ship data management also failed to turn up any vessel registered under the provided name, IMO and call sign, and that "it is possible that the vessel used the fake name, IMO number, call sign and Viet Nam flag to operate". Vietnamese authorities have also not found any connection between the *Tan Phat* 36's owner, Tan Phat Limited Company, and the *Phuong Linh*.

Phuong Linh 269 conducting coal transfers with DPRK vessels



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

¹² "Công Ty Trách Nhiệm Hữu Hạn (TNHH) 1 TV Thương Mại Quốc Tế Thuận An"

¹³ Paragraph 20, Figure XI, S/2019/691.

¹⁴ The Panel in paragraph 22(c) of its report S/2019/691 recommended that the Committee designate the *Pho Phuong*.


Annex 15: Use of larger bulk carriers

1. A new development of concern is the use of larger foreign-flagged bulk carriers to deliver DPRK coal from DPRK-flagged vessels as opposed to transferring coal to smaller lighter vessels for delivery as observed in the Panel's previous report. The utilization of larger vessels that have a carrying capacity two or three times that of the DPRK vessels suggests that much larger quantities of illicit coal can be transshipped per voyage. According to information from a Member State, coal was transferred from DPRK vessels and offloaded at Caofeidian in September 2019.

(i) Bulk carrier Lao Chuan Zhang 717

2. Satellite images below shows the unknown-flagged vessel *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* / *Yun Zhou 9* (IMO: 8661123/MMSI 413850000)¹⁵ preparing to conduct a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK vessel *Jin Hung 9* (IMO: 9035967), in tandem with the DPRK vessel *Ever Glory* (IMO: 8909915) on 5 September 2019 near Lian-yungang. According to the Member State, the vessel then proceeded to Caofeidian to offload its coal. *Lao Chuan Zhang 717*'s gross tonnage is roughly three times that of the two DPRK vessels.¹⁶ China informed the Panel that it is claimed the unknown-flagged vessel *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* delivered DPRK coal to Caofeidian on 5 September 2019. According to investigation, this vessel had been operating from one Chinese domestic port to another throughout September 2019 without any record of foreign voyage and there was nothing abnormal in its voyage trace. In particular, this vessel did not enter the sea area near Caofeidian and its AIS stayed turned on. Panel investigations continue into differing information received from Member States¹⁷.


Tandem transfers of coal from DPRK vessels to larger bulk carrier



¹⁵ Vessel name as recorded on IHS Markit. Windward database shows the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* and *Yun Zhou 9* as sharing the same IMO and MMSI. The Member State that provided the information lists the vessel using both names but references the vessel per its path as the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* as per its AIS transmit.

¹⁶ *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* has a recorded gross tonnage of 11,883 on IHS Markit database, while the *Jin Hung* is recorded at 4,290 gross tonnage and the *Ever Glory* at 3,546 gross tonnage.

¹⁷ In its research, the Panel notes that the *Lao Chuan Zhang 717* / *Yun Zhou 9* (IMO: 8661123/MMSI 413850000) was operating on a coastal route. The Panel notes that the mentioned ship-to-ship transfer that took place on 5 September 2019 took place near Lianyun-gang. Panel research on a specialized maritime database show that the vessel, reporting an AIS transmission, was at Caofeidian on 8 September 2019.



Source: Member State, Map: The Panel

(ii) Bulk carrier *Fu Xing 9* (MMSI: 413208740)

3. According to a Member State, a vessel broadcasting an AIS as the *Fu Xing 9* (MMSI: 413208740)¹⁸ was located on 15 September 2019 in the vicinity where several DPRK vessels near Lianyungang were anchored. The *Fu Xing 9* was subsequently observed discharging coal at Caofeidian port on 29 September 2019.



Source: Member State

Source: The Panel

¹⁸ According to a specialized maritime database, a vessel broadcasting the same MMSI 413208740 and listed on the maritime database as Chinese-flagged, displayed an AIS transmission route consistent with the information provided by the Member State.

Annex 16: Indonesia's Note Verbale on a falsified certificate of origin for coal on board the *Dong Thanh*



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

No. 352/POL-202/IX/19

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to its letter No. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.87 of 15 July 2019 has the honor to convey the following:

- The registered Certificate of Origin No. 0001965/SMD/2019 is not issued for PT. Bara Makmur Sadayana;
- The barcode on the top left of the document is not in conformity with the standard format of original certificate of origin; and
- Invoice No. JLHK-ES-190302 IC, dated 12 April 2019, that was mentioned on the document is not registered.

Given the above information, the Certificate of Origin No. 0001965/SMD/2019 as attached to the Panel's letter is not authentic.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 17 September 2019



**Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York**



325 East 38th Street, New York, NY 10016 • Tel.: (212) 972-8333 • Fax: (212) 972-9780
www.indonesiamission-ny.org • email: ptri@indonesiamission-ny.org

Source: Member State

Annex 17: Letter from the Harbour Master of Sea Port Vladivostok, 18 December 2019

Ministry of transport of the Russian Federation
Federal agency of maritime and river transport
FSBI «AMP of Primorsky region and Eastern Arctic»

**HARBOUR MASTER
OF SEA PORT VLADIVOSTOK**

Nizhneportovaya str., 3, Vladivostok,
690003, Russia

Tel: +7 (423) 279-15-21, fax: +7 (423) 249-65-52

E-mail: amp@pma.ru; www.pma.ru

Attention:
Palau International Ship Registry

E-mail:
Ioannis.Kyriakopoulos@palaureg.com

Our ref.: 3-1/6108
Date: 18 December 2019

Dear Sirs,

I would like to advise you that vessel "RUI JIN" IMO No. 8919104 has not been at the port of Vladivostok between November 25th to November 27th 2019.

Best regard's,
Aleksandr Vanukov



Source: Member State

Annex 18: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Palau to the United Nations on updates on the *Rui Jin* (IMO: 8919104), 24 January 2020



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU TO THE UNITED NATIONS

24 January 2020
8-PMUN-20

Coordinator
Panel of Experts Established
Pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters
New York, NY 10017

Re: *M/V Rui Jin* (IMO No. 8919104)

I write to provide an update to The Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to UNSCR 1874 (2009) regarding the Republic of Palau's actions with respect to the vessel *M/V Rui Jin*.

In accordance with the Republic of Palau's Administrative Procedure Act, on January 21, 2020, Palau International Ship Registry (PISR), in its capacity as Administrator of Palau's Open Ship Registry, held a hearing to address the *Rui Jin*'s purported violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). At this hearing, PISR considered the evidence it had collected, including the evidence that the Panel provided. Despite having received notice, no one from the *Rui Jin* participated in the hearing. Furthermore, despite repeated communications, there has been no response from the vessel's owners regarding arrangements for an inspection.

In light of the evidence considered, PISR found that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the *Rui Jin* was involved in activities prohibited by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017). Therefore, in accordance with Paragraph 12 of that Resolution, PISR de-registered the vessel effective immediately. PISR also imposed a fine of \$200,000 for the vessel's violation of the Resolution; certificates of deregistration will be withheld until payment of the fine is received.

Finally, please note that the *Rui Jin*'s AIS device has not transmitted a signal since January 14, 2020, while it was under a flag state detention. As such, the Republic of Palau does not know if the vessel is still located near the port at Ningbo, China, its last reported location. The Republic of Palau has also recently been informed by IHS Markit Maritime & Trade that the *Rui Jin* has obtained conditional

866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 575, New York, NY 10017 Phone: (212) 813-0310 Email: mission@palauun.org

certificates of registration from Sierra Leone under the name *MIR*. According to HIS Markit Maritime & Trade's records, the new owner of the vessel is Xiang Rui Shipping Co Ltd; this company is also listed as the manager and operator.

The Republic of Palau stands ready to provide any further assistance you may require with this matter.

Sincerely,

Ngedjkes Olai Urdong
Ambassador,
Permanent Representative

Source: Member State

Annex 19: Recorded trade between the DPRK and some Member States

1. Methodology

To monitor prohibited exports and imports by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under paragraph 30 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraphs 26 and 28 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 2375 (2017) and paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel analysed Member States' customs data, as reported to the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map or obtained through commercial global trade databases such as the Global Trade Atlas (GTA). The Panel used the list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) in Annex 4 of S/2018/171 (amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1). In this section, the Panel did not cover refined petroleum products and crude oil.

The Panel notes that the DPRK does not release statistics on its external trade and only mirror statistics are available on DPRK exports and imports. The figures listed below are the total of all exports and imports of ostensibly prohibited items by the DPRK between April 2018 and September 2019, as obtained by the Panel prior to its requests for information to the relevant Member States between November and December 2019. In cases where discrepancies were found in the trade records, the Panel asked Member States to explain the statistics.

2. Results of the Panel's Inquiries

Algeria: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Algeria	DPRK	72	160,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles (HS 50-63)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Algeria	DPRK	50-63	43,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Algeria	DPRK	84	16,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Bolivia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Bolivia	DPRK	85	11,000
October 2018			85	10,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Bolivia	DPRK	84	53,000
June 2018			84	64,000
March 2019			84	1,179,000
April 2019			84	228,000
July 2019			84	16,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Botswana: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Botswana	DPRK	72-73	320,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Brazil

The Panel asked Brazil for data on imports of iron and iron ore (HS 72-73), electrical equipment (HS 85), and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$298,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019, and the export of \$1,179,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83) in 2018 and 2019. Brazil replied that the information provided by the Panel “is incorrect, and that none of the trade operations in question originated from or were destined to the DPRK. Such inaccuracies are due to errors committed by customs brokering agents while inserting data in the declarations of import or export submitted through SISCOMEX (Integrated Foreign Trade System).”

China

The Panel asked China for data on import of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72-73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85), and earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia (HS 25) worth \$50,838,800 from the DPRK in 2018, and export of \$2,050,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83), vehicles (HS 86-89) and industrial machinery (HS 84-85) between 2018 and 2019.

China replied that “The Chinese import and export data is worked out by the Chinese Customs according its Customs Law and other Chinese laws and regulations. The data is completely transparent, open and is the most authoritative data that accurately reflects Chinese imports and exports. On trade data involving China, the official data published by the Chinese government shall prevail. China has been strictly implementing the supervision measures on commodities imports from and exports to

the DPRK, and conducting inspections according to relevant laws and regulations,” and provided following specific explanation to the Panel.

[Import]

- 1) Import of \$50,298,000 worth of iron, iron ore and steel products (HS 72-73): China stated its view that UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibited the import of “iron and iron ore”, but not all items under HS Code Chapters 72 and 73, and it considers these imports to be in compliance with UNSCR 2371 (2017).¹⁹

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	China	DPRK	72-73	2,035,000
May 2018			72-73	2,668,000
June 2018			72-73	2,333,000
July 2018			72-73	3,365,000
August 2018			72-73	2,941,000
September 2018			72-73	2,995,000
October 2018			72-73	3,260,000
November 2018			72-73	2,944,000
December 2018			72-73	3,282,000
January 2019			72-73	2,948,000
February 2019			72-73	2,257,000
March 2019			72-73	3,020,000
April 2019			72-73	2,184,000
May 2019			72-73	2,226,000
June 2019			72-73	2,572,000
July 2019			72-73	3,199,000
August 2019			72-73	3,179,000
September 2019			72-73	2,890,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 2) Import of \$44,000 worth of textiles (HS 50-63): China confirmed four cases of imports, which were (i) a case of mis-reporting of the country of origin (ii) a case of import before UNSCR 2375 (2017) entered in force (iii) a case of previous export to the DPRK returned to China for quality reasons, and (iv) imports of textile related materials but not textile products.
- 3) Import of \$15,000 worth of electrical equipment (HS 85): China stated this was a technical error in reporting.
- 4) Import of \$481,000 worth of earth and stone (HS 25): China stated this was a technical error in reporting.

[Export]

¹⁹ The Panel notes that some Member States’ views on HS Code allocation are not same with the Panel’s list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions, which the World Customs Organization (WCO) has recommended to the Panel (see S/2017/150, paragraph 257, S/2018/171 Annex 4 and S/2018/171/Corr.1).

- 5) Export of \$383,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	China	DPRK	72-83	27,000
September 2018			72-83	21,000
October 2018			72-83	10,000
November 2018			72-83	93,000
February 2019			72-83	13,000
March 2019			72-83	24,000
April 2019			72-83	12,000
May 2019			72-83	28,000
June 2019			72-83	60,000
July 2019			72-83	52,000
August 2019			72-83	43,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 6) Export of \$487,000 worth of vehicles (HS 86-89): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

Vehicles (HS 86-89)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	China	DPRK	86-89	68,000
February 2019			86-89	59,000
April 2019			86-89	44,000
June 2019			86-89	107,000
August 2019			86-89	209,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 7) Export of \$1,180,000 worth of industrial machinery (HS 84-85): China clarified that these are exempted items used by NGOs and international organizations conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK.

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	China	DPRK	84-85	71,000
June 2018			84-85	21,000
September 2018			84-85	14,000
October 2018			84-85	44,000
December 2018			84-85	142,000
February 2019			84-85	62,000
March 2019			84-85	64,000

April 2019			84-85	25,000
May 2019			84-85	20,000
June 2019			84-85	87,000
July 2019			84-85	214,000
August 2019			84-85	355,000
September 2019			84-85	61,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Colombia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Colombia	DPRK	73	28,000
February 2019			73	63,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Textiles (HS 50-63)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Colombia	DPRK	54	30,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Colombia	DPRK	85	10,000
September 2018			85	11,000
November 2018			85	61,000
December 2018			85	23,000
February 2019			85	86,000
March 2019			85	38,000
April 2019			85	32,000
July 2019			85	83,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	Colombia	DPRK	84	18,000
July 2018			84	39,000
July 2019			84	38,000
August 2019			84	67,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, GTA

Costa Rica: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
February 2019	Costa Rica	DPRK	85	10,000
June 2019			85	147,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Costa Rica	DPRK	84	25,000
July 2019			84	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Cote d'Ivoire: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	73	18,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Seafood (HS 03, 1603-1605)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	03, 1603-1605	51,000
January 2019			03, 1603-1605	59,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2019	Côte d'Ivoire	DPRK	85	12,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

El Salvador: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	El Salvador	DPRK	72-73	32,000
February 2019			72-73	38,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	El Salvador	DPRK	84	16,000
September 2018			84	54,000
November 2018			84	79,000
May 2019			84	45,000
July 2019			84	264,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Germany

The Panel asked Germany for data on the import of iron and iron ore (HS 72-73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85), and earth and stone including magnesite and magnesite (HS 25) worth of \$2,668,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019, and export of \$811,000 worth of metals (HS 72-83), vehicles (HS 86-89) and industrial machinery (HS 84-85) between 2018 and 2019.²⁰ Germany provided following specific explanation to the Panel.

[Import]

- 1) Import of \$1,071,000 worth of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72-73): Germany stated its view that “HS chapter 73 comprises a wide range of ‘articles of iron and steel’, HS chapter 72 refers to ‘iron and steel’ while UNSCR 2371 (2017) para. 8 refers to inter alia ‘iron’ without giving reference to HS codes, and that, consequently, not all items under HS chapters 72 and 73 fall under UNSCR 2371 (2017) para. 8.”²¹

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Germany	DPRK	72, 73	147,000
May 2018			72, 73	53,000
June 2018			73	109,000
July 2018			72, 73	102,000
August 2018			73	102,000
September 2018			73	16,000
October 2018			73	29,000

²⁰ On the other hand, the Global Trade Atlas showed only exports of industrial machinery (HS 84-85) worth of \$716,494 and metals (HS 72-83) worth of \$95,537 during the same period, with no imports. Such discrepancies were not found in any other Member States’ data the Panel investigated.

²¹ The Panel further notes that some Member States’ views on HS Code allocation are not same with the Panel’s list of HS Codes for all sectoral bans in resolutions, which the World Customs Organization (WCO) has recommended to the Panel (see S/2017/150 paragraph 257, S/2018/171 Annex 4 and S/2018/171/Corr.1). The Panel notes that the EU maintains a different list of HS Codes in implementing relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

November 2018			73	35,000
December 2018			73	13,000
April 2019			73	15,000
August 2019			72, 73	450,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

- 2) On other imports recorded in the ITC Trade Map, Germany replied that its customs authorities are currently reviewing four exports to Germany (by the DPRK) that may have constituted violations of sanctions regime: one audio CD (EUR 42.98, August 2018), one electric engine for a dishwasher (EUR 36.36, August 2018), and two exports under HS 84 (EUR 3,500, January 2019). Germany further stated that the review by its customs authorities “has not yielded any other cases that may constitute a violation of applicable sanctions.”

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Germany	DPRK	84	684,000

December 2018			84, 85	17,000
April 2019			85	15,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[Export]

- 3) On Germany’s exports to the DPRK, it replied that its customs authorities “identified one instance of a possible DPRK import of industrial machinery in 2018 (bottling and brewery equipment) that is subject to investigation [...] For 2019, there is no indication of any DPRK import from Germany in violation of applicable sanctions”. Germany, however, informed that it had found two items under HS chapter 85 with a declared value of EUR 13,334.50 where the DPRK was “erroneously reported declared to be the destination while the destination was, in fact, the Republic of Korea.”

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Germany	DPRK	84	684,000
December 2018			84, 85	17,000
April 2019			85	15,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Ghana: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	72-73	227,000
June 2018			72-73	562,000
July 2018			72-73	110,000
August 2018			72-73	11,000
September 2018			72-73	173,000
October 2018			72-73	23,000
January 2019			72-73	349,000
April 2019			72-73	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles (HS 50-63)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Ghana	DPRK	50-63	16,000
May 2018			50-63	60,000
June 2018			50-63	26,000
July 2018			50-63	14,000
August 2018			50-63	92,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Seafood (HS 03, 1603-1605)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Ghana	DPRK	03, 1603-1605	777,000
November 2018			03, 1603-1605	61,000
December 2018			03, 1603-1605	82,000
January 2019			03, 1603-1605	167,000
February 2019			03, 1603-1605	43,000
March 2019			03, 1603-1605	20,000
April 2019			03, 1603-1605	36,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	85	247,000
July 2018			85	13,000

December 2018			85	34,000
April 2019			85	100,000
May 2019			85	679,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Ghana	DPRK	84	13,000
June 2018			84	38,000
July 2018			84	48,000
August 2018			84	37,000
September 2018			84	16,000
November 2018			84	15,000
January 2019			84	176,000
April 2019			84	22,000
May 2019			84	2,417,000
July 2019			84	20,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Guatemala: Guatemala informed the Panel that its government has ordered an investigation into the case queried by the Panel and is waiting for the results of the investigation.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2019	Guatemala	DPRK	72-73	62,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
March 2019	Guatemala	DPRK	84	36,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Export]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Guatemala	DPRK	72-83	28,000
June 2018			72-83	29,000
February 2019			72-83	22,000
March 2019			72-83	23,000
May 2019			72-83	22,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Honduras: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Honduras	DPRK	72-73	11,000
May 2019			72-73	11,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	85	23,000
May 2018			85	37,000
June 2018			85	6,000
July 2018			85	3,000
August 2018			85	0
September 2018			85	8,000
October 2018			85	9,000
November 2018			85	6,000
December 2018			85	8,000
January 2019			85	2,000
February 2019			85	4,000
March 2019			85	7,000
April 2019			85	28,000
May 2019			85	14,000
June 2019			85	23,000
July 2019			85	2,000
August 2019			85	4,000
September 2019			85	5,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	84	14,000
May 2018			84	21,000
June 2018			84	118,000
July 2018			84	4,000
August 2018			84	1,000
September 2018			84	145,000
October 2018			84	13,000
November 2018			84	22,000
December 2018			84	7,000
January 2019			84	42,000
February 2019			84	18,000
March 2019			84	65,000
April 2019			84	12,000
May 2019			84	59,000
June 2019			84	9,000
July 2019			84	50,000
August 2019			84	12,000
September 2019			84	14,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Export]

Metals (HS 72 – 83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2018	Honduras	DPRK	72-83	22,000
February 2019				98,000
March 2019				49,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Honduras	DPRK	84-85	21,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

India: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	73	24,000
May 2018			73	10,000
September 2018			72	99,000
October 2018			72	115,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Zinc (HS 79)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	79	439,000
May 2018			79	1,833,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	85	449,000
June 2018			85	17,000
September 2018			85	114,000
October 2018			85	10,000
February 2019			85	10,000
August 2019			85	119,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	India	DPRK	84	37,000
June 2018			84	125,000
July 2018			84	61,000
August 2018			84	40,000
October 2018			84	15,000
January 2019			84	26,000
April 2019			84	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

[Export]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	India	DPRK	73	16,000
January 2019			72	38,000
February 2019			73	21,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	India	DPRK	84, 85	36,000
July 2018			84, 85	11,000
August 2018			84	50,000
March 2019			84	70,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Indonesia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	73	20,000
November 2018			73	20,000
January 2019			73	138,000
April 2019			73	147,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Copper (HS 74, 2603)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2019	Indonesia	DPRK	74, 2603	2,388,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Textiles (HS 50-63)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
September 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	54	37,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
November 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	85	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Indonesia	DPRK	84	50,000
June 2018			84	64,000
July 2018			84	65,000
August 2018			84	287,000
October 2018			84	64,000
November 2018			84	68,000
December 2018			84	31,000
February 2019			84	50,000
April 2019			84	18,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Kazakhstan: The Panel asked Kazakhstan for data on the import of iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73), textiles (HS 50-63), electrical equipment (HS 85) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$798,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. Kazakhstan replied that its State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance “has conducted a thorough re-examination and identified gross errors in the filing of customs declaration of 28 goods” because of 28 declarants “mistakenly indicated KP (DPRK) as instead of the code KR (Republic of Korea) [...] After detecting these technical errors in the system, the Kazakh authorities immediately undertook the necessary measures to rectify the codes. All accompanying documents, as well as certificates proving the origin of the goods, confirm that the actual import of the rechecked goods was from the Republic of Korea, not the DPRK.”

Kenya: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Textiles (HS 50-63)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Kenya	DPRK	54, 59	15,000
September 2018			63	21,000
October 2018			50-63	30,000
May 2019			50-63	11,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
August 2018	Kenya	DPRK	85	11,000
February 2019			85	82,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Kenya	DPRK	84	25,000
June 2019			84	31,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Luxembourg: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Export]

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Luxembourg	DPRK	85	11,000
June 2019			84	270,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Russia: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Iron, iron and steel products (HS 72, 73)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	73	12,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Electrical equipment (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
May 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	85	13,000
October 2018			85	24,000
January 2019			85	20,000
August 2019			85	13,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	84	95,000
February 2019			84	49,000
May 2019			84	22,000
July 2019			84	12,000
August 2019			84	21,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

[Export]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	73	56,000
June 2018			73	81,000
July 2018			72,73,83	23,000
August 2018			72,73,83	19,000
July 2019			72,73,76,83	161,000
August 2019			72-83	28,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Vehicles (HS 86-89)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
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July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	86	16,000
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Source: ITC Trade Map

Industrial Machinery (HS 84 – 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
July 2018	Russian Federation	DPRK	84-85	167,000
August 2018			84-85	77,000
September 2018			84-85	22,000
November 2018			84	22,000
December 2018			84-85	55,000
January 2019			84-85	63,000
April 2019			84	11,000
June 2019			84	11,000
July 2019			84-85	977,000
August 2019			84-85	48,000

Source: ITC Trade Map, Global Trade Atlas

Senegal: The Panel has yet to receive a reply.

[Import]

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2019	Senegal	DPRK	84	104,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Export]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2019	Senegal	DPRK	72-83	271,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

South Africa: South Africa informed the Panel that the Panel's inquiry has been forwarded to its capital for action.

[Import]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
January 2019	Senegal	DPRK	72-83	271,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

[Export]

Metals (HS 72-83)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	South Africa	DPRK	73	27,000
August 2019			73	11,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Industrial Machinery (HS 85)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
June 2018	South Africa	DPRK	85	22,000

Source: ITC Trade Map

Spain: The Panel asked Spain for data on the import of electrical equipment (HS 85) worth of \$34,000 from the DPRK in 2018. Spain replied that “the economic actor responsible for this transaction acknowledged that an error had been made [...] and has provided documents confirming the correct origin of the merchandise [...] listing the Republic of Korea, designated by the code KR, as the origin of the goods.”

Ukraine: The Panel asked Ukraine for data on the import of machinery (HS 84) and export of industrial machinery (HS 84-85) worth of \$83,000 from/to the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. Ukraine replied to the Panel that “According to the State Custom Service of Ukraine there is no data on export and import to/from the DPRK of the goods mentioned in [the Panel’s] letter during the period between April 2018 and September 2019.”

United Kingdom: The Panel asked the UK for data on the import of electrical equipment (HS 85) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$324,000 from the DPRK in 2018 and 2019. UK replied that “These were actually shipments from [the ROK], but [...] it was mistakenly given the wrong code.” It further confirmed that both shipments were inspected by its customs service and were confirmed to be legal imports.

Uruguay: The Panel asked Uruguay for data on the import of textiles (HS 50-63) and machinery (HS 84) worth of \$66,000 in 2018. Uruguay explained that the products originated from the DPRK but were brought into Uruguay through third countries. The Panel requested further documentation from Uruguay as the explanation could not be substantiated by trade statistics or original documentation.

Textiles (HS 50-63)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
October 2018	Uruguay	DPRK	50-63	18,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Machinery (HS 84)

Date	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
April 2018	Uruguay	DPRK	84	23,000
June 2018			84	15,000
November 2018			84	10,000

Source: Global Trade Atlas

Annex 20: Mansudae artists advertized at Jinzhao Art Museum website

The image displays two screenshots of the Jinzhao Art Museum website. The top screenshot shows the 'People's Artists' (人民艺术家) section, where '金东焕' (Kim Donghwan) is listed. A red box highlights his name. The bottom screenshot shows the artist's profile page for '金东焕'. A red box highlights the text '1985年起任万寿台创作社画家' (Since 1985, he has been a painter of the Wansu Stage Creative Studio). Another red box highlights the text 'Artist, Mansudae Art Studio, since 1985'.

Source: Jinzhao Art Museum website <http://www.jzmsg.com/> (last viewed on 31 January 2020)

Annex 21: Sign and building of Mansudae Art Museum and interview with its owner





Source: YouTube

Annex 22: China's reply to the Panel**4. OC. 141 (MOP Gallery follow-up)**

According to an in-depth investigation by China, Beijing Yuan Mansudae is the parent company of Mansudae Art Museum, and used to be a joint venture between China and the DPRK. It has been converted to a solely China-owned company in early 2018 in accordance with relevant Security Council resolution, and has ceased its business cooperation with the DPRK side. Currently it has no subordination or cooperation relationship with the DPRK. As Mansudae Art Museum had been running for over 10 years and enjoyed prestige in China, it has not changed its signage in order to keep its features and maintain business.

Source: Member State

Annex 23: Reply from Eritrea to the Panel's inquiry

ቀዋሚ ሚሽን ሃገረ ኤርትራ
አብ ውድብ ሕብራት ሃገራት፡ ኒዩ ዮርክ



البعثة الدائمة لدولة إريتريا
لدى الأمم المتحدة - نيويورك

Permanent Mission of The State of Eritrea
To the United Nations, New York

19 December 2019

I refer to your letter, Ref. N. S/Ac. 49/2019/PE/OC.234, of 2 December this month.

Allow me to avail of the occasion to remind you that the Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the UN has duly responded to all your previous letters; I am specifically referring to the communications of S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.430, AC.49/2017/PE/OC.268, S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.917, and SCA/R/18/ (2), with relevant reference numbers, of all the letters sent.

In our letter of 3 October 2017 in particular, we had expounded in greater detail the deplorable victimization of Eritrea through fallacious reports of “an expert panel” and the imposition of unwarranted sanctions by the UNSC in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Although lifted belatedly last year, these sanctions have nonetheless inflicted considerable damage to the country.

Against this backdrop of inexcusable wrongs meted to a small Member State, we are baffled why the Panel seems intent to hark back to the dark days of injustice against our country. What are the underlying reasons for resuscitating today matters that were addressed fully in previous communications? What are the reasons for this apparent pattern of considering Eritrea as a soft prey and political punch bag for intermittent harassment on the basis of spurious and presumptive allegations?

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations, New York, NY, 10017

800 Second Avenue 18th Floor New York, NY 10017 • Tel : (212) 687-3390 • Fax : (212) 687-3138
e-mail : general@eritrea-unmission.org

This cannot be acceptable by any standards. Indeed, Eritrea merits redress for past wrongs; not incessant harassment by invoking wild accusations.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Amanuel Giorgio', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Amanuel Giorgio
Deputy Permanent Representative of Eritrea
to the United Nations
New York

Source: Member State

Annex 24: Member State's information concerning activity of KOMID

According to a Member State, the following DPRK nationals are in Iran and working as KOMID representatives:

Ha Won Mo

Chief Representative to Iran

DOB: 15/01/1965

Passport: 836310022

Kim Hak Chol

Deputy Chief Representative to Iran

DOB: 13/04/1977

Passport: 836310107

Passport: 108210148

Source: Member States, The Panel

Annex 25: Iran's reply to the Panel



Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 ny.mfa.gov.ir Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: Iran@un.int

In the name of God, the most Compassionate, the most Merciful

No. 113361

15 January 2020

Dear Sir,

I am writing in response to your letter dated 6 December 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.277) with regard to the implementation of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016) and 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) for the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

I would like to inform you that Iranian authorities have meticulously reviewed the information provided in your letter regarding the "alleged illicit activities of DPRK officials in Iran". Accordingly, the following comments are hereby presented:

1. With respect to the claim regarding the "smuggling of gold and cash by DRPK individuals in Iran":
 - a. The letter does not elaborate on the links of the alleged actions (possible transfers of gold and cash from the UAE to Iran) with DRPK-related sanctions (transfer of cash and gold transiting to and from the DRPK). However, such activities in certain conditions could be against the Iranian national legislation, including the law on the fight against the smuggling of goods and foreign currency. Meanwhile, your letter does not provide enough information and evidence for Iranian authorities to initiate an investigation and establish the necessary facts. Therefore, it is kindly requested to advise the Member State that has submitted the information to directly provide us with verifiable information and credible evidence, especially regarding those activities that "are still ongoing".
 - b. Having reviewed the information in the Panel's most recent reports regarding the DPRK diplomats, Iranian authorities have carefully looked into the matter but have not hitherto observed any illicit activity. The activities of the DPRK diplomats accredited to the Islamic Republic of Iran have been in conformity with Iran's national regulations as well as the international obligations of the DPRK.
 - c. With regard to the claim that certain DPRK citizens "in Iran are or have also been involved", I would like to refer to our letters dated 19 December 2018 (No.106192) and 30 July 2019 (No.110731) that there are no nationals of the DPRK registered to be residing in Iran other than their diplomats.



Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017 ny.mfa.gov.ir Tel:+1(212)687-2020 Fax:+1(212)867-7086 E-mail: iran@un.int


- d. The Panel's letter dated 29 November 2018 was duly responded to on 19 December 2018 (No.106192).
2. With respect to the claim regarding "KOMID representatives in Iran":
 - a. I would like to refer to our letters dated 19 December 2018 (No.106192) and 30 July 2019 (No.110731) that there are no nationals of the DPRK registered to be residing in Iran other than their diplomats.
 - b. KOMID and Saeng Pi'l do not have offices or representatives in Iran.
 - c. Since "a Member State" is constantly and continuously challenging this finding with no credible evidence or information that could be appropriately followed, the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot shed more light on this unless and until the concerned State engages in a bilateral cooperation with us.
 - d. Previous letters of the Panel are already replied to, and we consider them concluded.

I would like to reiterate that the inclusion of those baseless claims in your report would damage its credibility, requiring the panel to avoid reporting "on this case in its next report to the Security Council".

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to constructive engagement and full cooperation with the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and would review any viable evidence and credible information with regard to any alleged actions in violation of the relevant Security Council sanctions.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Majid Takht Ravanchi
Ambassador
Permanent Representative


Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Source: Member State

Annex 26: Member State's information concerning gold and cash smuggling

A Member State assessed that the following DPRK nationals are or have been involved in gold and cash smuggling:

Pak Sin Hyok

Economic and Commercial Counselor, DPRK Embassy in Iran,
Dispatched from the Ministry of External Economic Relations (MEER)
DOB: April 06, 1970
Passport: 108110066

Ri Kuk Myong

Economic and Commercial Secretary, DPRK Embassy in Iran
DOB: March 07, 1977
Passport number: 927410035

Mun Chol Yong

Former DPRK Secretary-level diplomat to Tehran

Kim Yong Chol²²

Former Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) chief representative to Tehran

Jang Yong Son

Former KOMID deputy representative to Tehran
DOB: February 20, 1957
Designated by UN Security Council in 2016 (KPi: 017)

Han Chol Ho

Former Saeng Pil Trading Corporation (SPTC) chief representative to Tehran

Yang Thae Ho

Former SPTC deputy representative in Tehran

Source: Member State, The Panel

²² See para 72, Annex 23 of S/2019/171 and table 8 of S/2017/150.

Annex 27: The organizational and commanding structure of the RGB

According to the Member State, the RGB is organized under the General Staff Department, which exercises operational command and control over the Korea People's Army. As the General Staff Department is directly subordinate to the State Affairs Commission, the highest governmental body for military policy and political leadership, the line of control over the RGB stems directly from the top leadership. The RGB's hierarchical proximity to the top leadership of the DPRK demonstrates not only its high degree of strategic importance but also delineates the close bureaucratic oversight by the highest levels of leadership. Notwithstanding the presence of GSD between itself and the SAC, the RGB has historical and operational links directly to the SAC. RGB's overarching role in cyber operations of the DPRK and its proximity to the country's top leadership has been pointed out before.²³

Source: Member State

²³ For example, see Jun, LaFoy and Sohn, *North Korea's Cyber Operations: Strategy and Responses*, A Report of the CSIS Korea Chair, 2015, p.45. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151216_Cha_NorthKoreasCyberOperations_Web.pdf.

Annex 28: Kimsuky Group's cyberattacks to the UN Security Council Members

According to a Member State, DPRK cyber actors have launched “file sharing”-themed spearphishing campaigns against the UN including the Security Council. The spearphishing emails contained a link which would redirect the victim to a malicious domain that is probably used to steal usernames and passwords of victims. Spearphishing emails for UN-affiliated targets included fraudulent requests to download a software update with hidden malware or reset log-in credential. The Member State further stated that Kimsuky sent spearphishing emails spoofing²⁴ a systems administrator to trick victims into downloading malware in August 2017.²⁵

Source: Member State

²⁴ Kimsuky Group often used spoofing, which is a technique in which the cyber actor generates a fake email or social media account to closely resemble or mimic the legitimate account of a real person or organization that the cyber actor is impersonating. This technique allows the cyber actors to take advantage of trusted relationships of the primary target.

²⁵ The ANSSI also pointed out that this hacking campaign can be traced back to 2017.

Annex 29: *Modus Operandi* of DPRK IT workers

According to a Member State, there is a functional difference between DPRK IT workers and malicious cyber actors, and each group has a separate and distinct bureaucratic organization, education, and skill sets. DPRK IT workers focus on generating revenues for designated entities and individuals, and are expressly forbidden from conducting malicious activities and face punishment if they do it. According to the Member State, this DPRK does not want to draw attention to its overseas IT workers through an employee being arrested for hacking, reflecting of their defined role as a revenue-generating operative. However, some workers, anxious to make as much money as they can are tempted to fill requests from clients to hack targets. Some do this in spite of warnings against it. The Member State further stated that nearly all malicious cyber activity for the DPRK now comes from inside the DPRK itself and is conducted by the malicious cyber actors themselves.

Source: Member State

Annex 30: List of DPRK Trading Corporations subordinate to the Munitions Industry Department (KPe.028) and its relations to the designated entities

Kuryonggang Trading Corporation (구룡강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Ryungseng Trading Corporation (룡성무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Tangun Trading Corporation (단군무역회사)	*alias of KPe.008
Hangryon Trading Corporation (항련무역회사)	
Ryonbong General Corporation (련봉총회사)	*alias of KPe.002
5 Trading Corporation (5 무역회사)	
Pugang Trading Corporation (부강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.038
Mirae Trading Corporation (미래무역회사)	
Ryonhap Trading Corporation (련합무역회사)	
Advanced Technology Trading Corporation (첨단기술무역회사)	
Jinhung Joint Production Corporation (진흥합작회사)	
Sobaeksu United Corporation (소백수연합회사)	
Pihosan Trading Corporation (비호산무역회사)	
Sinhung IT Trading Corporation (신흥정보기술무역회사)	
Chonryong Trading General Corporation (천룡무역총회사)	
Taesong Trading Corporation (조선태성무역회사)	
Peace Motors Corporation (평화자동차회사)	
Taeryonggang Trading Corporation (대령강무역회사)	*alias of KPe.004

Source: Member States

*KPe.008: Korea Tangun Trading Corporation (조선단군무역회사)

*KPe.002: Korea Ryonbong General Corporation (조선련봉무역회사)

*KPe.038: Korea Pugang Trading Corporation (조선부강무역회사)

*KPe.004: Namchongang Trading Corporation (남천강무역회사)

Annex 31: Chinese Business Registry Information of Dandong Haotong Commercial-Trade Co. Ltd.

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丹东浩通商贸有限公司

存续 (在营、开业、在册)

统一社会信用代码: 912106000598283394

法定代表人: 李毅

登记机关: 丹东市振兴区市场监督管理局

成立日期: 2013年01月24日

发送报告

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信息打印

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行政许可信息

行政处罚信息

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营业执照信息

统一社会信用代码: 912106000598283394

企业类型: 有限责任公司(自然人投资或控股)

注册资本: 80.000000万人民币

营业期限自: 2013年01月24日

登记机关: 丹东市振兴区市场监督管理局

登记状态: 存续 (在营、开业、在册)

住所: 辽宁省丹东市振兴区青年大街133号2单元704室

经营范围: 批发、零售: 金属材料(不含稀贵)、化工产品(不含危险品)、建筑材料、装饰材料、矿产品、机械设备、五金工具、电子产品、仪器仪表 (不含计量器具)、汽车配件、针织品、服装鞋帽、办公用品; 收购产品收购; 货物及技术进出口 (法律、法规禁止的不得经营; 法律、法规限制的取得许可证后方可经营) (依法须经批准的项目, 经相关部门批准后方可开展经营活动。)

企业名称: 丹东浩通商贸有限公司

法定代表人: 李毅

成立日期: 2013年01月24日

营业期限至: 2033年01月24日

核准日期: 2018年10月26日

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李俊

李毅

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序号	变更事项	变更前内容	变更后内容	变更日期
1	地址变更（住所地址、经营场所、驻在地址等变更）	丹东市滨江中路97号301室	辽宁省丹东市振兴区青年大街133号2单元704室	2018年10月25日
2	高级管理人员备案（董事、监事、经理等）	1李毅监事;2李俊执行董事兼总经理;	1李毅执行董事兼经理;2李俊监事;	2018年6月3日
3	负责人变更（法定代表人、负责人、首席代表、合伙事务执行人等变更）	李俊	李毅	2018年6月3日
4	高级管理人员备案（董事、监事、经理等）	1李俊监事;2李毅执行董事兼总经理;	1李毅监事;2李俊执行董事兼总经理;	2015年3月16日
5	负责人变更（法定代表人、负责人、首席代表、合伙事务执行人等变更）	李毅	李俊	2015年3月16日
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地址：北京市西城区三里河东路八号 邮政编码：100820 备案号：京ICP备16053442号-1
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Source : Chinese National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System(国家企业信用信息公示系统)

Annex 32: Chinese Business Registry Information of Yanbian Silverstar Network Technology Co.

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统一社会信用代码： 91222401MA0Y31E659
 法定代表人： 元吉秀
 登记机关： 延吉市市场和质量监督管理局
 成立日期： 2015年10月13日

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- 类型： 有限责任公司(自然人投资或控股)
- 注册资本： 500.000000万
- 营业期限自： 2015年10月13日
- 登记机关： 延吉市市场和质量监督管理局
- 登记状态： 存续（在营、开业、在册）
- 住所： 延吉市开发区科技工业园2号厂房213-214号
- 经营范围： 软件、硬件开发与销售；信息技术咨询服务、数据处理服务、动漫设计制作（依法须经批准的项目，经相关部门批准后方可开展经营活动）
- 企业名称： 延边银星网络科技有限公司
- 法定代表人： 元吉秀
- 成立日期： 2015年10月13日
- 营业期限至：
- 核准日期： 2017年03月29日

股东及出资信息

序号	股东名称	股东类型	证照/证件类型	证照/证件号码	详情
1	王旭东	自然人股东	非公示项	非公示项	查看
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Annex 33: Business Entry for the Yong Bong Chand IT Company

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District Kathmandu

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Map Satellite


315 hits Print Recommend: Report

Source: <https://www.biskoon.com/business/entry/view/8987-yong-bong-chand-i-t-company> (Last accessed on 28 January 2020)

Annex 34: DPRK workers repatriated from Nepal

INVENTORY OF DPRK CITIZENS IN BUSINESS AND DEPENDENT VISA

S.N.	NAME	COMPANY NAME	STATUS	DEPARTURE	ARRIVAL ON	P.P. NO.
1.	KIM JONG GWAN	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-11-10	2017-12-01	927331463
2.	AN HI HANG	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-11-10	2017-12-01	927432502
3.	RI CHOL RYONG	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2016-12-11	836438059
4.	MRS. SONG HUIRI	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	N/A	308231166
5.	MR. SONG CHOL CHOE	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2016-03-27	836132128
6.	RI YONG MAN	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	Departed before 2014.			
7.	SONG KUK SON	NE-KORYO HOSPITAL	DEPARTED	2019-11-10	2017-10-10	954434704
8.	JONG NAM WON	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-01-18	927330573
9.	JONG SON CHOE	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-01-18	927330576
10.	JIN HYOK PAE	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2019-04-20	346234018
11.	YUN RHYONG	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-19	927330578
12.	PAEK SONG HYOK	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-19	927330581
13.	SUN YONG KIM	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2018-11-05	927330574
14.	MIL YU SONG JON	YONG BONG CHAND IT	DEPARTED	2019-07-06	2017-12-19	927330580
15.	UN HA HWANG	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232867
16.	YONG IM SIN	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232865
17.	CHANG NAM RI	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2019-30-21	308232860
18.	RYONG IL JI	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232813
19.	WON MYONG KIM	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-06-05	308232811
20.	UN JONG KIM	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232870
21.	HYO SON KIM	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232872
22.	YON HUI JI	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232873
23.	HYON HUI CHOE	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232868
24.	MI SONG CHOE	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232869
25.	HO KWANG	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2019-30-07	308331208
26.	HEY SONG KIM	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-10-18	2018-11-22	308130437
27.	YONG GYONG HO	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-10-18	2018-11-22	654432333
28.	UN GYONG KIM	BOYONGANG RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-11-24	2018-07-17	308232848
29.	SON HUI PAK	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308232866
30.	IL RAN HO	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308232871
31.	JONG KUM YONG	MINAS RESTAURANT	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2018-07-17	308232850
32.	MS. RI OK MI	PYONGYANG ARRANG	DEPARTED	2019-03-19	N/A	745130660
33.	MS. JONG SONG MI	PYONGYANG ARRANG	DEPARTED	2019-05-02	2015-01-25	745130659
34.	HO KWANG	PYONGYANG ARRANG	DEPARTED	2019-12-15	2019-30-07	308331208
35.	CHONE OKJU	PYONGYANG ARRANG	Departed before 2014.			
36.	MS. JU OK HWANG	HIMALAYAN SOJE	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-04-03	308230406
37.	MS. ILHYANG KANG	HIMALAYAN SOJE	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-04-03	927337511
38.	JUN MIN KWON	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	308441369
39.	KWANG GUK RI	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	308441370
40.	CHONG RYONG AN	HIMAL CHILBO IT	DEPARTED	2019-08-13	2019-06-25	308441371

41	RI SUN HYONG	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
42	KIM THAE SONG	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
43	KIM JONG SU	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
44	CHOE SONG HUI	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
45	KUM HUI RYU	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
46	YONG JU KIM	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
47	CHANG SUK RYU	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	
48	HAN SON NYO	PYONGYANG OKRUGWAN	

Source: Member State

Annex 35: Joint letter regarding DPRK overseas workers and Member States' obligations under relevant resolutions

Annex to the letter dated 2 January 2020 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We are writing in order to draw your attention to the issue of overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Member States' obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. In paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), the Security Council decided that Member States shall repatriate to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea all the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction, subject to limited exceptions. The Council unanimously agreed this action should be completed by 22 December 2019.

This decision was not taken lightly but reflected the continuous violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of Security Council resolutions with the development of its nuclear and ballistic missile weapons programme. This was a proportionate, targeted and appropriate response to address fundraising by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for such programmes. It was and still is a vital step for international peace and security.

Two years later, the deadline for repatriation has arrived. Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals' earning income within the jurisdiction of a Member State now needs to have been fully repatriated, in a manner consistent with Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), regardless of their occupation (e.g. student, trainee, medical personnel, athlete), employer (including foreign entities), type of visa (e.g. tourism) and date at which they obtained work authorizations, visas or contracts.

Responsible States around the globe have been working to repatriate qualifying Democratic People's Republic of Korea nationals, often in the face of attempts to conceal or obscure their presence or to conduct their business on the black market. We commend the diligence and efforts of so many States to meet their obligations.

We would like to take this opportunity to remind States that, as of this date, the presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea workers' earning income in their jurisdiction, as explained in Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), is a violation of international law. We encourage States to submit any information pertaining to the continued presence of Democratic People's Republic of Korea workers outside the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) for proper investigation and reporting, at dpa-poe1874@un.org.

All States need to provide final reports to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), at sc-1718-committee@un.org, no later than 22 March 2020, to confirm they have completed their checks against these obligations. Those Member States that failed to meet the midterm report deadline in 2019 still have an opportunity to comply with the final reporting requirement of resolution 2397 (2017) by providing their final reports by the 22 March 2020 deadline.

(Signed) Mitchell Fifield
Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

(Signed) Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve
Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations

(Signed) Marc-André Blanchard
Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

(Signed) Marie Chatardová
Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to the United Nations

(Signed) Martin Bille Hermann
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

(Signed) Sven Jürgenson
Permanent Representative of Estonia to the United Nations

(Signed) Jukka Salovaara
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

(Signed) Anne Gueguen
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

(Signed) Christoph Heusgen
Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

(Signed) Antonios Papakostas
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations

(Signed) Katalin Annamária Bogyay
Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations

(Signed) Geraldine Byrne Nason
Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) Ishikane Kimihiro
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

(Signed) Ivars Liepnieks
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations

(Signed) Audra Plepytė
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Lithuania
to the United Nations

(Signed) Christian Braun
Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations

(Signed) Giovanni Battista Buttigieg
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malta to the United Nations

(Signed) Amatlain Elizabeth Kabua
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
to the United Nations

(Signed) Jane J. Chigiyal
Permanent Representative of the Federated States of Micronesia

(Signed) Karel Jan Gustaaf van Oosterom
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to the United Nations

(Signed) Craig John Hawke
Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations

(Signed) Néstor Popolizio
Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations

(Signed) Joanna Wronecka
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations

(Signed) Ondina Blokar Drobič
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargée d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations

(Signed) Agustín Santos Maraver
Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations

(Signed) Yuriy Vitrenko
Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations

(Signed) Karen Pierce
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

(Signed) Kelly Craft
Permanent Representative of the United States of America
to the United Nations

Source: The Panel

**Annex 36: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Press Department Commentary
(English translation)**

Translated from Russian

Comments by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding the letter sent by a group of States to the General Assembly on the issue of overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

146-30-01-2020

We have taken note of the letter, sent by the Permanent Mission of Germany on behalf of 28 States and circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, regarding the implementation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions on the repatriation of nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea working abroad.

It is not entirely clear why a group of countries, most of which are not represented on the Security Council, has decided to impart lessons to others on how to implement the decisions of the principal international body responsible for maintaining international peace and security and taken it upon itself to assess the "diligence" of some and urge others that are "lagging behind" to catch up.

It is interesting to note that the prime mover behind the letter was the Permanent Mission of the State that currently chairs the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). Germany, like any other State, naturally has its own position concerning international political issues. Nonetheless, the role of Chair of a Security Council sanctions committee requires a modicum of restraint and presupposes detachment, impartiality and, in general, a particular sense of responsibility for creating an atmosphere of trust and conditions conducive to reaching consensual solutions.

Unfortunately, the situation regarding Security Council sanctions on North Korea as they apply to overseas workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been distorted in the "letter of the twenty-eight". In particular, students, trainees, athletes and tourists, as well as North Koreans working abroad for employers who are natural or legal persons of third countries,

are included in that category without the slightest justification. Following the logic of the letter's authors, therefore, the restrictions imposed by the Security Council apply to nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea merely by virtue of their presence in the territory of other States, regardless of the nature of their occupation. That is a misreading of paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), which in fact refers to the repatriation within specified periods of North Koreans working and earning income in the jurisdiction of other States.

This broad interpretation by the "group of twenty-eight" of the resolution's provisions is clearly in keeping with the desire of the United States and its allies to exert "maximum pressure" on Pyongyang by whatever means. Whether such a hard line is conducive to making progress on reaching a settlement on the Korean Peninsula is doubtful in the extreme.

Source:

https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4014034

Annex 37: DPRK workers affiliated to Maibong Sukidar Medical Co. Ltd. whose work permit has been granted/renewed

(underlined applications are possibly intentionally duplicated using different spelling)

	Work Permit Number	Title	Name	Type	date permit granted
1	WPB. 9138/17	Dr	Sola Pak	Renewal	2019/11/1
2	WPB.9146/17	Dr	Kyong Il Ju	Renewal	2019/11/1
3	WPB. 9136/17	Dr	Myong Hui Choe	Renewal	2019/11/1
4	WPB. 9137/17	Dr	Kyong Song Kim	Renewal	2019/11/1
5	WPB/2614/19	Mrs	<u>Yon Sim Ryang</u>	New	2019/10/8
6	WPB 2614/19	Mrs	<u>Yon Sin Ryang</u>	New	2019/9/16
7	WPB.3280/19	Ms	Sun Yong Choe	New	2019/9/17
8	WPB 3281/19	Mr	Jong Hui Kim	New	2019/9/13
9	WPB 3279/19	Mr	Son Hui Song	New	2019/9/13
10	WPB3278/19	Mr	Kwang Jin Ho	New	2019/9/13
11	WPB 7427/17	Mr	Un Ju Pak	Renewal	2019/9/6
12	WPB 7432/17	Mr	Sung Chol Kim	Renewal	2019/9/6
13	WPB 7424/17	Mr	Hyon Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/9/3
14	WPB 7428/17	Ms	Song Hwa Pyon	Renewal	2019/9/3
15	WPB 5100/17	Dr	Hyang Ryu	Renewal	2019/8/27
16	WPB 5097/17	Dr	Insu Kim	Renewal	2019/8/15
17	WPB 5096/17	Dr	Ok Slin Kim	Renewal	2019/8/15
18	WPB 5095/17	Dr	Kwon Il Pak	Renewal	2019/8/16
19	WPC 1185/19	Dr	<u>Sin Chol Ho</u>	New	2019/7/10
20	WPB 1185/19	Mr	<u>Chol Ho Sin</u>	New	2019/7/19
21	WPB 4840/17	Mr	Chol Ho Tong	Renewal	2019/5/31
22	WPB 3445/17	Mr	Ok Ju Won	Renewal	2019/5/31
23	WPB3560/17	Mr	Thae Gil Ham	Renewal	2019/5/31
24	WPB 3444/17	Mr	In Hak Pak	Renewal	2019/5/31
25	WPB/1836/17	Ms	Myong suk Ro	Renewal	2019/3/12
26	WPB/5104/17	Mr	Tryong Ju Kwon	Renewal	2019/3/12
27	WPB/1835/17	Mr	Kwang Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
28	WPB/1834/17	Ms	Yong Hui Kang	Renewal	2019/3/12
29	WPB/1839/17	Mr	Myong Sim Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12

30	WPB/1838/17	Mr	Myong Chol Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
31	WPB/1840/17	Mr	Kwang Il Ri	Renewal	2019/3/12
32	WPB1837/17	Mr	Su chol Kim	Renewal	2019/3/15
33	WPB/1397/19	Dr	Ryon Hong Kang	New	2019/4/16
34	WPB/1398/19	Dr	Jong Ae Kim	New	2019/4/16
35	WPB/1426/19	Dr	Song Hui Ri	New	2019/4/16
36	WPB/1401/19	Mr	Hyon Su Ri	New	2019/5/03
37	WPB 3554/17	Mr	Yun sop Sim	Renewal	2019/5/17
38	WPB 3555/17	Mr	Sun Nyo Kim	Renewal	2019/5/17
39	WPB/1186/19	Mr	Ho ILI Mun	New	2019/5/24

Source: Tanzanian Prime Minister's Office of Labour, Youth, Employment and Persons with Disability,
The Panel

Annex 38: Cambodia's Declaration on the deregistration of company from Register of Commerce

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
Nation Religion King
ព្រះ ព្រះ ព្រះ

Ministry of Commerce
No. 317

Declaration on the deregistration of company from Register of Commerce

Reference: -UNSC's resolutions No. 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) on the sanctions against North Korea.
-Letter No. 7824 dated 06 September 2019 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
-Decision made by the interministerial working group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanction against North Korea, at a meeting dated 24 December 2019.
-Joint Declaration No. 1326 dated 25 December 2019 on the formation of the interministerial working group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanctions against North Korea.

Hereby decide

Article 1: To deregister below enterprises/companies from Register of Commerce:

1. PYONGYANG UNHASU CO., LTD. with registration No. 00009590 dated 27 April 2016
2. SUNRISE HORIZON CO., LTD. with registration No. 00021223 dated 03 August 2015
3. UJ IMPORT EXPORT CO., LTD. with registration No. 00027520 dated 24 August 2017
4. THE BRANDS CLASSIC CO., LTD. with registration No. 00029623 dated 27 November 2017
5. MANSUDAE NEW TECH CORPORATION LTD. with registration No. 00030642 dated 29 December 2010
6. JUPIC (CAMBODIA) TRADING CO., LTD. with registration No. 00007363 dated 01 July 2014
7. HAEGEUM RIVER SOFT DRINK SHOP with registration No. 50005582 dated 16 January 2018
8. SACH ANG SING PYONG with registration No. 50007276 dated 04 October 2018
9. HO SERYONG PYONG YANG ARIRANG with registration No. 50005111 dated 18 December 2017
10. PYONG YANG TRADITIONAL NOODLE with registration No. 50004694 dated 12 December 2003
11. PYONG YANG RESTAURANT with registration No. 50005187 dated 04 December 2017


Article 2: The Cabinet Director, Director General of Trade Services, Director of Business Registration and the above-mentioned companies must implement this PRAKAS from the date of signature onward.

CC:

- Members of Interministerial Working Group for national report writing concerning the implementation of UNSC's resolutions on the sanctions against North Korea.
- Phnom Penh Capital Hall
- As in Article 2 "for implementation"
- Documentation-Archives

Done in Phnom Penh,
Monday, 30 December 2019
Minister of Commerce
(Signed & Sealed): PAN SORASAK

No. 00375/2020/GDLCBA
Certified correct translation with the Khmer text.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
General Department of Legal, Consular and Border Affairs,
Phnom Penh, 09 January 2020.



IN DARA
Deputy Director-General
General Department of Legal,
Consular and Border Affairs

Source: <https://www.biskoon.com/business/entry/view/8987-yong-bong-chand-i-t-company> (Last accessed on 28 January 2020)

Annex 39: Visa issued to DPRK nationals in 2019

According to the website of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation issued 7,703 tourist visas to DPRK nationals in the third quarter of 2019, some 12 times more than for the same period in 2017. From first quarter to the third quarter of 2017, 1,326 DPRK nationals received Russian tourist visas. The figure for the same period in 2019 was 12,834, an increase of 868 percent. Also, the Russian Federation issued 3,611 more student visas to DPRK nationals in third quarter 2019 than in the same period in 2017. From first to third quarter 2017, 162 DPRK nationals received Russian student visas. The equivalent figure for the same period in 2019 was 7,162, an increase of 4321 percent.

Several media reports alleged that DPRK nationals entered the Russian Federation in 2019 on student visas or as industrial trainees for the purpose of earning income.²⁶



²⁶ Radio Free Asia, « North Korean Workers Skirt Sanctions to Return to Russia»

29 March 2019, [Daily NK](#), “North Korean laborers reach Russian construction sites despite sanctions” 24 July 2019

Annex 40: The delivery route of Mercedes-Benz S-600 Long Guard sedans

1. The two Mercedes-Benz class WDD222 S 600 Long Guard sedans with Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) WDD222 1761A355444 and WDD2221761A356398 were produced by Daimler AG in Sindelfingen in February 2018 upon a customer's request (discussions started in 2017), and were shipped to EUROPEAN CARS & MORE, S.R.L.²⁷. This company deals, inter alia, with car armoring at customer's request. On 28 February 2018 the vehicles were registered - and still were as of September 2019 - at Pubblico Registro Automobilistico Italiano (Certificato cronologico Targa: FN036CH and FN 046CH) (See Figure 1)

Figure 1 A certificate of registration of one of the Mercedes

 Automobile Club d'Italia		 PUBBLICO REGISTRO AUTOMOBILISTICO	
CERTIFICATO CRONOLOGICO		TARGA: FN046CH	
In base alle risultanze dell'archivio si certifica:			
(01) PRIMA ISCRIZIONE DI VEICOLO NUOVO			
R.P.	A016114S		
del	06/03/2018		
Targa	FN046CH		
Ufficio PRA di Competenza	CHIETI		
Telaio	WDD2221761A355444		
Fabbrica / Tipo	MERCEDES-BENZ 221 P P17BP0 NZSA0404		
Data immatricolazione	15/02/2018		
Data Rilascio Carta Circolazione	15/02/2018		
KW	390.00		
Classe / Uso	AUTOVEICOLO / PRIVATO LOCAZIONE SENZA CONDUCENTE PER USO SPECIALE		
Carrozzeria	FURGONE		
Specialita'	VEICOLO BLINDATO		
Cilindrata	5980		
Alimentazione	BENZINA		
Tara	4160		
Portata	640		
Peso complessivo	4800		
Posti n.ro	4		
Assi n.ro	2		
Tipo atto	SCRITTURA PRIVATA		
Data atto	26/02/2018		
Proprietario	EUROPEAN CARS & MORE		
Sesso / Tipo società	SOCIETA' A RESPONSABILITA' LIMITATA		
Comune di residenza	LANCIANO (CH)		
Indirizzo	VIA DEL MARE 141 - 66034		
Venditore	MERCEDES-BENZ ROMA		
Sesso / Tipo società	SOCIETA' PER AZIONI		
Comune di residenza	ROMA (RM)		
Indirizzo	VIA ZOE FONTANA 220 - 00131		
Prezzo del veicolo	***** 421.926,23 * Euro		
ANNOTAZIONI			
Rilasciato certificato di proprietà			
Certificazione del 08/10/2019 20:45:33			
DIRIGENTE RESPONSABILE		GIORGIO BRANDI	
Importo bollo	16,00 Euro	Non Sogg. Art. 15 DPR 633/72	
Importo emolumenti	9,00 Euro	Fuori campo IVA - D.M. del 21 marzo 2013	
foglio n.ro 1 segue foglio aggiuntivo			

Source: The Panel

²⁷ Address - Via Del Mare, 141 - 66034, Lanciano (CH), Italy

[illegible]

30 Address -People's Republic of China, Liaoning province, Dalian city, Zhongshan district, Gangwan St, 20A, unit 8. The representative of Dalian Shangen, managing this shipment, was Ms. Zhao Fuchao(赵福超), who was also Former CEO (nominal) of Dalian Ocean King Flying International Logistics Co., Ltd (大连海辰名扬国际物流有限公司 (Address: RM. 2902, Mingshi Fortune Center No. 20A, Gangwan Road, Zhongshan District, Dalian, China (in Chinese: 大连市中山区港湾街 20 号名仕财富 A2902), and the customer for this delivery was her business partner, Mr. Yufeng E (鄂玉峰). CEO, (辽宁益森堂生物科技有限公司 (a.k.a. ECO-GINSENG)

4. The cars arrived in Dalian on 31 July 2018 with onward transportation, planned by the “receiving party” (see footnote 32) to what the receiving party called a “Russian customer”, aboard a bulk vessel. Accordingly the shipping company was requested to change the consignee on a new B/L to an entity stipulated as “Flot.DV-LLC, address 4-28 Zhigura St. Vladivostok,” (written with several mistakes: the right spelling would be Vladivostok and the name of the company (in Russian- “ООО Флот .ДВ) in English is not “Flot.DV-LLC”, but “Fleet.DV-LLC) and a new B/L was drafted by the transporting company (Fig 4).

Figure 3 Request for a change of the consignee

From: [REDACTED]@slavenburg-en-huyser.nl> **Sent:** vrijdag 10 augustus 2018 10:48 **To:** [REDACTED]@coscon.nl> **Cc:** [REDACTED]@coscon.nl> **Subject:** RE: COSCO SHIPPING LINES B/L Proforma No.: COSU4513397630 Vessel: COSCO SPAIN SVVD: AEU3-CCS-021 E SHIPPER REF: UE20183528. [From: xiaye]

Goedemorgen

Originele bl's zijn in Dalian ingeleverd.

De losse originele wordt binnen enkele ogenblikken bij jullie ingeleverd. Dan zijn alle drie de b.l.s ingeleverd.

Mochten jullie willen weten van Cosco Dalian of ze daadwerkelijk ingeleverd zijn kunnen jullie: lilm@cosfrel.com contacten, die schijnt er over te gaan.

Kun je regelen dat zodra de bl's er zijn een release wordt opgemaakt met onderstaande consignee / notify?

FLOT.DV-LLC 4-28 ZHIGURA ST. VLADIYOSTOK, RUSSIA TEL +7 984-1540472 EMAIL: flot-dv@bk.ru

Alvast bedankt

Mvg [REDACTED]

Van: cosco shipping [REDACTED]@coscon.com> **Verzonden:** dinsdag 12 juni 2018 8:36 **Aan:** [REDACTED]@slavenburg-en-huyser.nl> **Onderwerp:** COSCO SHIPPING LINES B/L Proforma No.: COSU4513397630 Vessel: COSCO SPAIN SVVD: AEU3-CCS-021 E SHIPPER REF: UE20183528. [From: xiaye]

This is system auto email, please do not reply it directly. Please confirm the attached B/L or inform us about any amendment by mailto: [REDACTED]@coscon.com

Source: The Panel

5. The Dalian port authorities did not, however, approve the transshipment of the vehicles onboard the break bulk vessel.
6. On 16 August 2018, the shipper, Logistica & Spedizioni SRL, supposedly at the request of the “receiving party”, sent to the shipping company an official request for a change to a new consignee, Zuisyo Co., Ltd³¹ (Fig. 6) also using apparently falsified documents, probably without the authorization of Zuisyo. A new B/L was again issued by transporting company (fig.7)

Figure 6. The request for change of consignee to Zuisyo



Source: The Panel

³¹ Address: 1-8-1 Kamisakabe, Amagasaki City, Japan.

Fig.7 B/L with Zuisyo as consignee

Shipper: Insert Name Address and Phone LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL VIALE CHARLES LENORMANT 236 00119 ROMA 82718055		B/L NO. D0RDL05180830095 <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 40px; margin: 5px auto;"></div>	
Consignee: Insert Name Address and Phone ZUISYO CO.LTD RM NO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE,AMAGASAKI CITY JAPAN TEL.06-6567-9845 FAX 06-6567-9846		Port-to-Port or Combined Transport BILL OF LADING	
Notify Party: Insert Name Address and Phone (It is agreed that no responsibility shall attach to the Carrier or his agents for failure to notify) ZUISYO CO.LTD RM NO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE,AMAGASAKI CITY JAPAN TEL.06-6567-9845 FAX 06-6567-9846		RECEIVED is intended to represent apparent good order and condition except as otherwise noted, the total number of packages or units stuffed in the container, the description of the goods and the weight shown in this Bill of Lading are furnished by the Merchants, and which the carrier has no reasonable means of checking and is not a part of this Bill of Lading contract. The carrier has issued the number of Bills of Lading stated below, all of this issue and those one of the original Bills of Lading must be surrendered and endorsed or signed against the delivery of the shipment and whereupon any other original Bills of Lading shall be void. The Merchants agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Bill of Lading as if each had personally signed this Bill of Lading. SEE clause 4 on the back of this Bill of Lading (Terms continued on the back hereof, glosses and conditions) *Applicable Only When Document Used as a Combined Transport Bill of Lading	
Pre-carriage by:	Place of Receipt DALLIAN	Ocean Vessel Voy. No. LANTAU BAY 1835E	Port of Loading DALLIAN
Port of Discharge OSAKA	Place of Delivery		
Marks & Nos. N/M ALLU6320077 BS175553 40 HC ALLU4337574 BS175555 40 HC	No of Containers or Plugs 2PIECES	Description of Goods (If Dangerous Goods, See Clause 20) SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT & SEAL MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD NR 9 CAR SERIENUMBER A001 817 80 22 CAR SERIENUMBER A222 584 28 01 WDD2221761A355444 = WDD2221761A356398 CY-CY FREIGHT PREPAID SHIPPED ON BOARD E-MAIL:dlr-docs@benline.co.jp TEL: +81367180730 CONTRACT Ben Line Agencies(Japan)Ltd. Customer Service Team SERVICE:Japan Service Contract List	
		Gross Weight Kgs 9000KGS	Measurement 40CBM
		SURRENDERED	
Total Number of containers and or packages(in words)		TWO (2) Containers Only	
Subject to Clause 7 Limitation			
Freight & Charges	Revenue Tons	Rate	Per Prepaid Collect
Ex. Rate:	Prepaid at	Payable at	Place and date of Issue DALLIAN 2018-08-26
	Total Prepaid	No. of Original B(s) L	Signed for the Carrier <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 20px; display: inline-block;"></div>

Source: The Panel

7. The drafted documents included a sales contract between Logistica & Spedizioni SRL and Zuisyo but authorized with a seal that was not identical with Zuisyo's official seal. (Fig.8)

Fig 8 Sales Contract

SALES CONTRACT

BUYER: ZUISYO CO.,LTD
RMNO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE,AMAGASAKI CITY ,JAPAN
TEL 06-6567-9845
FAX 06-6567-9846

SELLER: LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL
VIALE CHARLES LENORMANT

NO.: 20180001
DATE: JUL. 01, 2018

This contract is made by and agreed between the BUYER and SELLER , in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated below.

Commodity & Specification	Quantity	Unit Price & Trade Terms	Amount
CIF OSAKA PORT JAPAN			
MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD VR 9			
CAR	2pieces	450000	900,000.00
Total:	2pieces		EUR900,000.00

With More or less of shipment allowed at the sellers' option

5. Total Value EUR900,000.00

6. Packing

7. Time of Shipment & means of Transportation BEFORE 2018.12.31

8. Port of Loading & Destination From : ROTTERDAM,ZUID-HOLLAND
To : OSAKA PORT,JAPAN

9. Insurance To be covered by the buyer.


10. Terms of BY T/T
Payment


11. Quality/Quantity discrepancy :
In case of quality discrepancy, claim should be filed by the Buyer within 30 days after the arrival of the goods at port of destination, while for quantity discrepancy, claim should be filed by the Buyer within 15 days after the arrival of the goods at port of destination. It is understood that the Seller shall not be liable for any discrepancy of the goods shipped due to causes for which the Insurance Company, Shipping Company, other Transportation Organization /or Post Office are liable.

12. The Seller shall not be held responsible for failure or delay in delivery of the entire lot or a portion of the goods under this Sales Contract in consequence of any Force Majeure incidents, which might occur. Force Majeure as referred to in this contract means unforeseeable, unavoidable and insurmountable objective conditions.

13. All disputes in connection with the execution of this Contract shall be settled friendly through negotiation. In case no settlement can be reached, the case then may be submitted for arbitration to the Arbitration Commission of the Council for the Promotion of International Trade in accordance with the Provisional Rules of Procedure promulgated by the said Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration committee shall be final and binding upon both parties. And the Arbitration fee shall be borne by the losing parties.

14. This Contract is in two copies effective since being signed sealed by both parties.



 The Buyer
 ZUISYO CO.,LTD
 (signature)


 The Seller
 LS LOGISTICA & SPEDIZIONI SRL
 (signature)

Source: The Panel

8. On 29 August 2018, the containers were shipped by LS Logistica & Spedizioni SRL from Dalian on board the vessel "Lantau Bay 183E" to Osaka (Japan) in the name of Zuisyo Co., Ltd. The cargo arrived on 31 August.
9. After a delay, caused by typhoon in Osaka and constant change of routing plans (including, at one stage, Shanghai port) by the customers, on 27 September the cargo departed Osaka for Busan; shipping documentation listed Do Young Shipping ³² as consignee. Busan-based company, Hantrade Co., Ltd.³³ was listed as the notify party with a plan of transshipment to Vladivostok. (Fig.9).

Fig 9.B/L with Do Young as consignee and Hantrade as "Notify party"

Shipper ZUISYO CO.,LTD RM NO.140 1-8-1 KAMISAKABE, AMAGASAKI CITY, JAPAN		 BL No. MNEX180893801	
Consignee C/O Captain of M/V DNS505. Do Young Shipping Company, LTD Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Island MH 96960		MINO LOGISTICS JAPAN CO.,LTD <small>RECEIVED by the Carrier from the shipper in apparent good order and condition (unless otherwise noted hereby) the total number or quantity of Containers or other packages or units indicated above stated by the shipper to complete the cargo specified above for transportation subject to all the terms hereof (including the terms on page one) from the place of receipt or the port of loading, whichever applicable, to the port of discharge or the place of delivery, whichever applicable. On presentation of this document (duly endorsed) to the Carrier, by or on behalf of the holder, the rights and liabilities arising in accordance with the terms hereof shall be deemed passed due to any rule of common law or statute governing them, including upon the shipper, the Carrier and the holder, in all respects between the Carrier and the holder as though the contract contained herein or evidenced hereby had been made between them. All claims and disputes arising under or in connection with this bill of lading shall be determined by the courts of MATTHEW (UK) at the exclusion of the courts of any other country. In witness whereof these (3) original bills of lading unless otherwise stated above have been issued, one of which being accomplished, the others to be void. (Terms continued on the back here of)</small>	
Notify Party HAN TRADE CO.,LTD HARBOUR TOWER, RM 1001, KUDEOK-RO 87-1, NAMPODONG, JUNG-GU, BUSAN, KOREA TEL: 82-51-463-8686 FAX: 82-51-463-8775		Party to contact for cargo release MINO LOGISTICS CO.,LTD. RM 322, DONGYANG TRESBELLE BLDG, 394-25, SEOKYO-DONG, MAPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA TEL: 82 2 333-6199 FAX: 82 2 333-0804	
Pre-carriage by Vessel Port of Discharge BUSAN, KOREA	Place of Receipt OSAKA, JAPAN Port of Loading OSAKA, JAPAN Place of Delivery BUSAN, JAPAN	Final Destination (Merchant's reference only)	
Container No. ALLU6320077/40'GP ALLU4337574/40'GP	No. of Containers or Pkgs 2 CONTAINERS 2 PIECES	Kind of Packages; Description of Goods "SHIPPER'S LOAD & COUNT" "SAID TO CONTAIN" MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG GUARD VR 9 CAR SERIENUMBER A0018178022 CAR SERIENUMBER A2225842801 WDD2221761A355444+ WDD2221761A356398 TRANSIT VIA BUSAN TO VLADIVOSTOK BY BULK VESSEL	Gross Weight 9,600.000 KGS Measurement 40.000 M3
Total number of Containers or other Packages or Units (in words) TWO CONTAINERS AND TWO PIECES			
Merchant's Declared Value (See Clauses 18 & 23): Note: The Merchant's attention is called to the fact that according to Clauses 18 & 23 of this Bill of Lading the liability of the Carrier is, in most cases, limited in respect of loss of or damage to the Goods.			
Freight and Charges FREIGHT PREPAID AS ARRANGED		Revenue Tons Rate Per Prepaid Collect	
Exchange Rate Prepaid at OSAKA, JAPAN Total Prepaid in Local Currency		Payable at No. of Original Bill ONE(1)	
Vessel Lantau Bay 183E Date 20180927		Place and Date of Issue OSAKA, JAPAN 20180927 In witness whereof, the undersigned has signed the number of Bills of Lading stated herein, all of this issue and date, one of which being accomplished, the others to be void. As Carrier	
Port of Loading OSAKA, JAPAN		MINO LOGISTICS JAPAN CO.,LTD	

Source: The Panel

³² Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Island MH 96960

³³ Address: Room 1001, Harbour Tower, Nampo-dong 6-ga, Jung-gu, Busan, 600-046.

10. According to a specialized maritime platform, Do Young Shipping, a Marshall Island registered company, is listed as a subsidiary of Jiho Shipping Co Ltd,³⁴ and the registered owner of the vessel *DN5505* (IMO number: 8630708). (Fig 10)

Fig.10. *DN5505* Certificate of Registration

REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE
TRAVAIL - LIBERTE - PATRIE

DIRECTORATE OF MARITIME AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL SHIP REGISTRY

Whereas, the Maritime Administration of the Government of the Togolese Republic, has considered and approved the application which has been submitted to it for the registration of the ship described here below in the International Ship Registry, in accordance to the provisions of the Regulations of the Togolese Merchant Shipping Act. Consequently this Certificate of Registry issued to the said vessel entitling her to engage in International Voyages, under the flag of the Togolese Republic.

PROVISIONAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY
Certificate Number: TGREG/133-38512/119/FE/US-CH

IMO NUMBER: 8630708
PORT OF REGISTRY: LOME
OFFICIAL NUMBER: TG-00870L
CALL SIGN: 6V2E2

This office under the Authority granted by the Togolese Maritime Administration, and according to the requirements of the Togolese Merchant Shipping Act, has provisionally registered the vessel, whose particulars are described here below.

NAME OF SHIP: *DN5505*
PREVIOUS NAME: *YUANG JIN*
PREVIOUS FLAG: *CAMBODIA*
GENERAL CARGO: *NA*

REGISTRATION PARTICULARS

GROSS TONNAGE	1828	NET TONNAGE	1105	NUMBER OF DECKS	ONE
REGISTERED LENGTH	54.00M	BREADTH	13.80M	DEPTH	7.20M

MAIN PARTICULARS OF MAIN ENGINE

NUMBER OF ENGINES	ONE	TYPE OF ENGINE	DIESEL	POWER	1300KW
PLACE / DATE OF BUILT	WANGSHIN DIESEL WORKS CO., LTD				

This certificate is issued on the 23RD day of the month JANUARY of the year 2018 under the authority of the Directorate of Maritime Affairs of the Government of the Togolese Republic and it remains valid until the 25TH day of the month APRIL of the year 2019.



Director Registrar for
Togolese Maritime Affairs

Source: The Panel

³⁴ Address: Daesung Building, 326, Dongdaesin-dong 1-ga, Seo-gu, Busan, ROK.

11. The containers arrived at Busan on September 30 and were listed as transiting via Busan to Vladivostok with Mino Logistics Co., Ltd based in Seoul,³⁵ ROK (business partner of Mino Logistics, Japan, as well as Zuisyo) as the party to contact for the cargo release, and the consignee given as under the care of Do Young Shipping Company. (fig11)

Fig 11. Arrival notice to Busan

ARRIVAL NOTICE

To : Import Dept


입항모선 : [REDACTED]		호출번호 : 3ERC6		Surrender : Yes	
B/L NO. : HASLBB0298002P00 Seawaybill		MRN : 18SNKO4629I		MSN : 2016	
수하인 (CONSIGNEE)		통지처 (NOTIFY PARTY)			
MINO LOGISTICS CO., LTD. RM 322, DONGYANG TRESBELLE BLDG, 394-25, SEOKYO-DONG, MAPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA **		SAME AS CONSIGNEE			
입항일시 (入港日) : 2019년09월29일 04시00분		송화인 (SHIPPER)			
Place of Receipt : OSAKA, JAPAN CY		MINO LOGISTICS JAPAN CO., LTD.			
Port of Loading : OSAKA, JAPAN		9999*2120001170200			
Port of Discharge : BUSAN		3F FUJI BLDG NO.5			
Place of Delivery : BUSAN		1-9-13 NISHIHONMACHI, *			
DESCRIPTION OF GOODS		컨테이너 하선지			
포장개수 : 2 GT		하선지 : Busan Container Terminal Co., Ltd.			
총 중 량 : 9,600.000 KGS 40.000 CBM		(BPT/OLD KBCT)			
품 명 : MERCEDES S600 SEDAN LONG		하선지 코드 : 03077016			
GUARD		하선정보 : MBS01			
		입항횟수 : 47			
Container # TP SEAL #		FREIGHT AMOUNT COLLECT			
ALLU4337574 D4 B8175555		CRG RATED AS RATE PER COLLECT			
ALLU6320077 D4 B8175553					
REMARK					
추석연휴로 인한 누적 딜레이발생 : ETA->29일 예정					
新貨物受入の爲に、乗積予定港は：ETA -> 29日予定					
인바운드 세관신고/배정 담당자 : EBIZ / WEBPDF TEL : FAX : EMAIL :					

Source: The Panel

³⁵ Address: Room 701, Dongyang Han river Travel Officetel, 56 Yanghwa-ro, Mapo-gu. Seoul. 04045. ROK


12. The last documented mention, available to the Panel, of the cargo is dated 2 October 2018, when shipping documents were drawn up reflecting the plan to ship the two containers from Busan to Nakhodka by the *DN5505*. These documents, dated 00:00 2 Oct. 2019 list *DN5505* as the vessel and Nakhodka as destination.
13. AIS data indicate that as the *DN5505* sailed north on 1 October, with vessel's AIS signal stopped transmitting while in ROK waters. Prior to that, the vessel had reported by AIS an intended destination of Nakhodka, Russia with an estimated date of arrival on 5 October (fig.12)

Fig 12 Information of the intended route of *DN5505*



Source: Windward

14. Russia replied to the Panel that no Russian port in the Far East recorded an arrival or departure of the *DN5505* at any time between 1 and 19 October.
15. The *DN5505* resumed transmitting AIS only on 19 October from a location approximately 24 miles south of the location of its last transmission, heading back to Busan Port. (Fig.13).

Figure 13. Activity timeline of *DN5505*

Source: Windward

- On arrival at Busan, the *DN5505* no longer carried containers but was laden with suspected DPRK-origin coal. The vessel was later detained by the ROK authorities.

Annex 41: Reply from the Permanent Mission of Belarus (excerpt)
(Translated from Russian)

Response to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the DPRK

Belarus has considered your letter No. S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.112 of 21 October 2019. On the substance of the issues raised, we wish to communicate the following.

1. Correspondence between CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory and Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. on conditions for the shipment and payment of consignments under contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018 was conducted by e-mail (a copy of the correspondence is attached).

In a letter dated 14 September 2018, the representative of Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. stated that payment for the goods would be made from the current account of another company, as the procedure for payment in United States dollars was very difficult for Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co.

The representative of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory said that if the other company was acting as the payer then the purchaser would need to provide the payer's details and sign a supplementary agreement to the contract.

Following negotiations, the parties signed supplementary agreement No. 1 of 28 September 2018 to contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018, whereby the company Aspen Re-sources Pte Ltd (Singapore) acted as the payer. That company made the payment for the goods to the current account of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory.

According to section 1.3 of contract No. 29/03/18, the purpose of the purchaser acquiring the goods was for wholesale and/or retail trade outside of Belarus and not for subsequent export to other countries.

2. Under contract No. 29/03/18 of 29 March 2018 between CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory (the seller) and Hongkong Jieming Industrial Co. (the buyer), the seller undertakes to transfer its own produced alcoholic beverages to the buyer, while the buyer undertakes to take ownership thereof and provide payment. The variety, quantity and price of the goods

are agreed in the specification documents signed by the parties for each consignment and are an integral part of the contract.

Under the terms of the contract concluded, the parties signed specification document No. 1 of 29 March 2018 on the supply of goods totalling USD \$12,438.40 under FCA terms to the supplier's warehouse in Brest, ul. Katin Bor, 93B (Brest branch of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory) and specification document No. 2 of 29 March 2018 on the supply of goods totalling USD \$12,840.00 under FCA terms to the supplier's warehouse in Minsk, ul. Kazintsa, 52A.

The goods in specification document No. 1 were transferred to the carrier of CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory for delivery to the buyer, as shown in CMR consignment note No. 163 of 25 May 2018, and the goods in specification document No. 2 were handed over to the carrier on 24 May 2018, as shown in CMR consignment note No. 3 of 24 May 2018. Subsequently, the goods were loaded into shipping containers No. MRKU9286516 and No. MSKU7286890 and, according to CJSC Minsk Grape Wines Factory, they were received by the buyer (a copy of an e-mail dated 5 September 2018 from the carrier, dina.kolibaba@quehenberger.by, and a copy of the e-mail from the purchaser, dated 5 September 2018, are attached).

In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the readiness of Belarus to continue its cooperation with the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Annexes:

1. Correspondence with the buyer (three pages);
2. Copy of specification document No. 1 of 14 September 2018 (two pages);
3. Copy of specification document No. 2 of 14 September 2018 (two pages);
4. Copy of CMR consignment notes No. 163 and No. 3 (two pages);
5. Copy of letters from the carrier and the buyer (two pages).

Source: Member State

Annex 42: Niva invoice

NIVA Distillery Company Limited
ООО "Опытный завод "НИВА"
 192102, Russia, Saint-Petersburg, Progonnaya str., 6, lit. A.
 tel. 766-12-88, fax 766-15-10, e-mail: office@nivaspb.ru
 ИНН 7825672172 КПП 781601001 р/с 40702810327360003745
 в ФИЛИАЛЕ N 7806 ВТБ (ПАО) Г. САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГ к/с 30101810240300000707
 БИК 044030707

27.12.2018 Saint-Petersburg, Russia

INVOICE # 2 (amended 21.01.19)/ Инвойс № 2 (в редакции 21.01.19)
 Contract № 15/2018 dated 15/10/2018 / Контракт № 15/2018 от 15.10.2018

Payee / Плательщик: MANZHOU LI KESHENG TRADE CO., LTD
 Address : ROOM1704, NO.17 BUILDING,THE NORTH PORT GEMINI WEST TOWER,MANZHOU LI CITY, CHINA

Consignor of goods / Грузополучатель: NIVA Distillery Company Ltd., 192102, Russia, Saint-Petersburg.
 Address: Progonnaya str., 6, lit. A.

Consignee / Грузополучатель: MANZHOU LI KESHENG TRADE CO., LTD
 Address: ROOM1704, NO.17 BUILDING,THE NORTH PORT GEMINI WEST TOWER,MANZHOU LI CITY, CHINA

	Description of product, etc., ref. code / Наименование товара, артикул №, обозн. или	Q-ty Bottles / Кол-во бутылок	Q-ty liters 100% / Кол-во литров 100%	Net weight, kg / Вес. нетто, кг	Gross weight, kg	Quantity bottles	Q-ty liters / Кол-во литров	Price for bottle, rub / Цена за бутылку, руб	Total Amount/ Векс / RUB/RUB	Country of origin / Страна происхождения
1	VODKA «STOLBOVAYA EXPORT» 40%, 0,1 l.	9000,00	3600,00	21960,00	23175,00	90 000	3 000	19,00	1 710 000,0	Russia/Russia
	ИТОГО	9 000,00	3 600,00	21 960,00	23 175,00	90 000	3 000		1 710 000,00	

ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ/NOTE:
 Kind of package/ Вид упаковки: картон/ картонные коробки
 Basis of delivery / Базис поставки: CIF Port Dalian (Incoterms 2010).
 Payment / Оплата: prepayment 100%/ Предоплата 100%

Генеральный директор/ CEO

Главный бухгалтер



Т.З. Урбан/Timofey Urban

С.Б. Зубкова/Svetlana Zubkova

Source: The Panel

Annex 43: Reply from the Russian Federation

Постоянное представительство
Российской Федерации
при Организации
Объединенных Наций

Phone: (212) 861 4900
Fax: (212) 628 0252



Permanent Mission
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10065

No. 2927/n

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and referring to the inquiry by the Panel dated 28 June 2019 (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.73) has the honour to transmit the following.

LLC "Niva Pilot Plant" (NIVA Distillery Company Limited) and Manzhouli Kesheng Trade Co., Ltd (China) have concluded an international sales contract #15/2018 on 15 October 2018 for the delivery of alcohol products. In accordance with the contract, the shipment was made under FCA (Free Carrier) conditions to the port of Saint-Petersburg. Therefore the ownership of the goods was transferred to the buyer upon their receipt in the port of Saint-Petersburg by the designated carrier. LLC "Niva Pilot Plant", being the producer of the goods, did not conclude any contracts on their shipment or delivery.

Panel of Experts established pursuant
to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

2

On 30 January 2019 LLC “Niva Pilot Plant” shipped and transferred the goods to the designated carrier at the port of Saint-Petersburg for further delivery to “Room 1704, No. 17 Building, the North Port Gemini West Tower, Manzhouli City, China”. Thus, the alcohol products were intended for delivery to a Chinese company. LLC “Niva Pilot Plant” has no information on their delivery to the DPRK and does not maintain any contacts with representatives of this country.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation takes this opportunity to convey to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) the renewed assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, “29” July 2019



Source: Member State

Annex 45: Bill of Lading for beer to Liaoning

SHIPPER/EXPORTER (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS)		BILL OF LADING (Non Negotiable Unless Consigned to Order)	
BALTIKA BREWERY 6-TH VERHNIY PER. 3 SANKT PETERBURG, SANKT PETERBURG - 194292 RUSSIA		BOOKING NO. 2620594640	BILL OF LADING NO. OOLU2620594640
CONSIGNEE (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS) LIAONING PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE YURONG WAREHOUSING CO., LTD H UNIT W2, NO. 13-2 PORT THREE, BONDED PORT AREA, DALIAN FREE TRADE ZONE *		EXPORT REFERENCES	
NOTIFY PARTY (COMPLETE NAME AND ADDRESS) (It is agreed that no responsibility shall be attached to the Carrier or its Agents for failure to notify this party in case of a change of address)		FORWARDING AGENT REFERENCES FMC NO. MAK SHIPPING LLC INN 7814430213 9, BAYKONURSKAYA STR. 197227 SANKT PETERBURG RUSSIA	
LIAONING PILOT FREE TRADE ZONE YURONG WAREHOUSING CO., LTD H UNIT W2, NO. 13-2 PORT THREE, BONDED PORT AREA, DALIAN FREE TRADE ZONE *		POINT AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF GOODS	
PRE-CARRIAGE BY		ALSO NOTIFY PARTY ROUTING & INSTRUCTIONS	
PLACE OF RECEIPT ST. PETERSBURG		*TEL: [REDACTED] FAX: 8 [REDACTED] PERSON IN CHARGE: MR. PAK [REDACTED]	
(INTENDED) VESSEL/VOYAGE/FLAG DELPHIS FINLAND 006 S	HONG KONG PORT OF LOADING ST. PETERSBURG	LOADING PORT/TERMINAL ST. PETERSBURG	ORIGINALS TO BE RELEASED AT ST. PETERSBURG
PORT OF DISCHARGE DALIAN	PLACE OF DELIVERY DALIAN	TYPE OF MOVEMENT (IF MIXED, USE DESCRIPTION OF PACKAGES AND GOODS FIELD) FCL / FCL CY/CY	
(CHECK "H" COLUMN IF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL) PARTICULARS DECLARED BY SHIPPER BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE CARRIER			
CONT. NOS. UNSEAL NOS. MARK & NUMBERS	QUANTITY (FOR CUSTOMS DECLARATION ONLY)	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	GROSS WEIGHT
3100 CASES	2X40'GP CONTAINERS S.T.C.: BEER	49476.002KGS	MEASUREMENT
OCEAN FREIGHT PREPAID TOTAL NO. OF CONTAINERS/PACKAGES RECEIVED & ACKNOWLEDGED BY CARRIER FOR THE PURPOSE OF CALCULATION OF PACKAGE LIMITATION (IF APPLICABLE): 2 CONTAINER(S)/PACKAGE(S) DESTINATION CHARGES COLLECT PER LINE TARIFF, AND TO BE COLLECTED FROM THE PARTY WHO LAWFULLY DEMANDS DELIVERY OF THE CARGO. SHIPPER LOAD AND COUNT, CONTAINER(S) SEALED BY SHIPPER THE SECOND SEAL NO.: OOLU7758659 2ND SEAL: 22274352 OOLU4960762 2ND SEAL: 22274451 OOLU7758659 /0781932 / 1550 CASES /FCL/FCL /40GH/24738.001KGS OOLU4960762 /0781941 / 1550 CASES /FCL/FCL /40GH/24738.001KGS			
NOTICE 1: For cargo to conform to the United States of America (U.S.) Customs and 22 on the reverse side hereof find the Carrier's liability to a maximum of U.S. \$500 per package or customary freight unit by virtue of incorporation of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), unless the Merchant declares a higher cargo value below and pays the Carrier's advance freight charge, and (3) if carried on deck of Merchant's risk as to perils of loss in such carriage but in all other respects subject to the provisions of COGSA. NOTICE 2: See Clause 22 on the reverse side hereof. Notice to Endorser under indorsement Transferee. NOTICE 3: If Goods loaded on deck at Merchant's risk without responsibility for loss or damage howsoever caused.			
Declared Cargo Value US\$ If Merchant enters a value, Carrier's liability of liability shall not apply and the ad valorem rate will be charged.			
FREIGHT & CHARGES PAYABLE AT/STY:		SERVICE CONTRACT NO.	DOC FORM NO.
CODE	TARIFF ITEM	FREIGHTED AS	RATE
PREPAID		COLLECT	
The printed terms and conditions appearing on the face and reverse side of this Bill of Lading are available at www.oocl.com, in OOC's published US tariffs, and in pamphlet form.		Received the Container/Packages or other units indicated in the box identified as "Total No. of Containers/Packages received and acknowledged by Carrier" in approved good order and condition, unless otherwise indicated, to be transported and delivered as herein provided. The receipt, custody, carriage and delivery of the goods are subject to the terms appearing on the face and back hereof and to the Carrier's applicable tariff. In witness whereof 3 original bills of lading have been signed, one of which being authenticated, the others to be void. DATE CARGO RECEIVED: 28 APR 2019	
+ STRIKE OUT FOR ON BOARD VESSEL BILL OF LADING + SEE CLAUSE 1 ON REVERSE SIDE + SEE CLAUSE 2 ON REVERSE SIDE QF01 HQD 01/01			

Source: The Panel

Annex 46: Letter from Singapore on T Specialist



PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

11 December 2019

[REDACTED]

Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874
(2009)

[REDACTED]

I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.79) dated 1 July 2019, requesting information on OCN, T Specialist, SCN and related entities and individuals, and to Singapore's letter to the Panel dated 17 July 2019 wherein we stated that the proceedings against T Specialist Director Ng Kheng Wah ("Ng") and T Specialist were *sub judice*.

We wish to inform the Panel that Ng, T Specialist, and Wang Zhiguo pleaded guilty to the charges below on 22 November 2019. They were sentenced as follows:

- a) Ng: 34 months' imprisonment (for 10 x UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations charges and 10 x cheating charges);
- b) T Specialist: Fine of S\$880,000 (for 10 x UN (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations charges and 2 x money laundering charges); and
- c) Wang Zhiguo: 12 months' imprisonment (for 10 x cheating charges).

During court proceedings, the presiding Senior District Judge noted that the UNSC sanctions regime to combat the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme would only be effective if every UN member state, including Singapore, used their best efforts to ensure full compliance. His oral remarks as well as the Grounds of Decision on sentencing are enclosed for the Panel's reference. Comments in paragraphs 55, 75, and 77 of the Grounds of Decision that reference the work of the Panel may be of particular interest.

A second series of related prosecutions will now be pursued concerning Chong Hock Yen, SCN Singapore Pte Ltd, Laurich International Pte Ltd, Sindok Trading Pte Ltd, and Li Hyon. These five accused individuals/entities were charged on 18 October 2018, as conveyed to the Panel earlier in our letter of 17 July 2019. We will keep the Panel updated on the outcome of the remaining prosecutions in due course.

This outcome is testament to our shared commitment in ensuring the full implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. We look forward to continuing our cooperation and partnership with the Panel.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Burhan Gafoor', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

BURHAN GAFOOR
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

Source: Member State

Annex 47: Letter from Singapore on SINSMS



PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

20 September 2019

██████████
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

██████████
I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2019/PE/OC.102) dated 30 August 2019, requesting information on SINSMS Pte Ltd (“SINSMS”) and related entities and individuals.

In its letter, the Panel referred to a media report that SINSMS, an affiliate of Dalian Sun Moon Star International Logistics Trading Co., had been charged in August 2019 for facilitating shipments of wines and spirits to the DPRK between October 2016 and January 2017. The Panel requested for any information that the Singapore Government could provide, to the extent that we were able to do so without prejudicing court proceedings.

This letter informs the Panel that our authorities uncovered evidence that between 2016 and 2017, Lim Cheng Hwee (“Lim”), a director of SINSMS, engaged in a conspiracy with Liang Ye (another director of SINSMS) to export wines and spirits worth approximately SGD 665,000 to Nampo, the DPRK via transshipment through Dalian, China at the alleged behest of DPRK national Mun Chol Myong (“Mun”). Mun remains at large. Our authorities have charged SINSMS and Lim on four charges of supplying designated luxury items to the DPRK. Our authorities also filed four charges against Lim’s wife, Hong Leng Ooi (“Hong”), for her failure to inform the Police about SINSMS’ supply of these designated items. Our authorities expect to bring additional charges against Lim and SINSMS.

Given that judicial proceedings against SINSMS, Lim, and Hong are ongoing, we seek the Panel's understanding that we are unable to share the full extent of information requested. In the interim, we enclose the charge sheets against SINSMS (4 charges), Lim (4 charges), and Hong (4 charges) at Annex for your reference.

We hope that the information provided will be helpful to the work of the Panel.



BURHAN GAFOOR
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Enc.

THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(CHAPTER 68, REVISED EDITION 2012)
SECTIONS 123-125

2nd CHARGE

You,

HONG LENG OOI (FEMALE [REDACTED])
NRIC No: [REDACTED]
DATE OF BIRTH: [REDACTED]
NATIONALITY: SINGAPORE CITIZEN

are charged that you, on or around 30 October 2016, having information about a transaction prohibited by Regulation 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”)) Regulations 2010, to wit, information regarding the supply of wines and spirits with a total value of SGD 133,632.39 by Sinsms Pte Ltd to a person in the DPRK via Dalian, did fail to immediately inform the Commissioner of Police or any authorised person of this information and you have thereby committed an offence under Regulation 14(1)(c)(i) read with Regulation 16(1) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010, punishable under Section 5(1)(a) of the United Nations Act (Cap. 339, 2002 Rev. Ed.).

**COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
SINGAPORE POLICE FORCE**

Date: 14 August 2019

Regulation 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 states:

5. No person in Singapore or any citizen of Singapore outside Singapore shall –
(a) supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, any designated export item or designated luxury item to any person in the DPRK, whether or not the item originated in Singapore.

Regulation 14(1)(c) of the United Nations (Sanctions – DPRK) Regulations 2010 states:

14. – (1) Every person in Singapore and any citizen of Singapore outside Singapore who –
(c) has information about any transaction prohibited by Regulation 5, 6, 7 or 8, shall –
(i) immediately inform the Commissioner of Police or any authorised person of that fact or information; and
(ii) provide such further information relating to the property, transaction or proposed transaction as the Commissioner of Police or authorised person may require.

Section 5(1)(a) of the United Nations Act (Chapter 339, 2002 Rev. Ed.) states:

5. – Every person who commits, or attempts to commit, or does any act with intent to commit, or counsels, procures, aids, abets, or incites any other person to commit, or conspires with any other person (whether in Singapore or elsewhere) to commit any offence against any regulations made under this Act shall be liable on conviction –
(a) in the case of an individual, to a fine not exceeding \$500,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to both; or
(b) in any other case, to a fine not exceeding \$1 million.

Source: Member State

Annex 48: Corporate registry information for Fullberg Trading Develop Limited and HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited

CR No.:	2395119
Company Name:	FULLBERG TRADING DEVELOP LIMITED 丰百貿易拓展有限公司
Company Type:	Private company limited by shares
Date of Incorporation:	24-JUN-2016
Active Status:	Live
Remarks:	-
Winding Up Mode:	-
Date of Dissolution / Ceasing to Exist:	-
Register of Charges:	Unavailable
Important Note:	-
Name History	
Effective Date	Name Used
24-JUN-2016	FULLBERG TRADING DEVELOP LIMITED 丰百貿易拓展有限公司

CR No.:	2619552
Company Name:	HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司
Company Type:	Private company limited by shares
Date of Incorporation:	06-DEC-2017
Active Status:	Live
Remarks:	-
Winding Up Mode:	-
Date of Dissolution / Ceasing to Exist:	-
Register of Charges:	Unavailable
Important Note:	-
Name History	
Effective Date	Name Used
06-DEC-2017	HK Xiang Long Trading Group Limited 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

Source: Hong Kong Corporate Registry, <https://www.icris.cr.gov.hk/csci/>. Accessed 9 January 2020.

Annex 49: Payments for the *New Regent***付款資料**

付款日期 2018/04/11

付款用戶ID/戶名 HK000411 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

"HK Xiang Long Trading
Group Limited"

付款帳號 1100001642

付款金額 USD 600,000.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款資料

受款帳號 帳號：

受款金額 USD 600,000.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款人姓名/地址

受款人電話

受款行資料

SWIFT CODE

銀行名稱/地址

其他銀行代號

匯款目的

付款資料

付款日期 2018/03/29

付款用戶ID/戶名 HK000411 香港祥龍貿易集團有限公司

"HK Xiang Long Trading
Group Limited"

付款帳號 1100001642

付款金額 USD 156,740.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款資料

受款帳號 帳號：

受款金額 USD 156,740.00 (僅供參考，以實際成交金額為準)

受款人姓名/地址 Oswald Maritime Services Limited

受款人電話

受款行資料

SWIFT CODE

銀行名稱/地址

其他銀行代號

Source: The Panel

Annex 50: Corporate registry information for “TH CO OOD”

Main circumstances				
1. UIC/PIC	202762396	20131004122334	History	Documents
2. Фирма/ Наименование	ТИ ЕЙЧ КО	20131004122334	History	Documents
3. Legal form	Дружество с ограничена отговорност	20131004122334	History	Documents
4. Transcription in a foreign language	ТН СО	20131004122334	History	Documents
5. Head office and registered office	БЪЛГАРИЯ област София (столица), община Столична гр. София 1444 район р-н Витоша ж.к. Симеоново, 83-та No 19, бл. 1, вх. 1, ет. 1, ап. 1 тел.: 0888647226 Електронна поща: [REDACTED]	20131209120928	History	Documents
5a. In-country address that will be used for correspondence with the National revenue agency	БЪЛГАРИЯ област София (столица), община Столична гр. София 1444 район р-н Витоша ж.к. СИМЕОНОВО, 83 No 19, бл. 1, вх. 1, ет. 1, ап. 1	20131209120928	History	Documents
6. Scope of business activity	РАЗРАБОТКА НА РАЗЛИЧНИ ВИДОВЕ СОФТУЕР; ПОДДРЪЖКА И АДМИНИСТРИРАНЕ НА РАЗРАБОТЕНИЯ СОФТУЕР.	20131004122334	History	Documents
7. Ma [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	20170427112054	History	Documents
11. Manner of represe [REDACTED]	Друг начин: [REDACTED]	20190422145027	History	Documents
16. Term of the company	04.10.2018, начинът, по който се определя срокът: 5 /лет/ години, считано от датата на вписването в Търговския регистър.	20131004122334	History	Documents
19. Venturers	ДАНДОНГ ХАОТОНГ КЪМЪРШЪЛ - ТРЕЙД КО ООД, Чуждестранно юридическо лице, държава: КИТАЙ, 16000 лв. ТАНЯ ИМПОРТ ЕКСПОРТ, ЕИК/ПИК 201331021, държава: БЪЛГАРИЯ, 4000 лв.	20170323154042	History	Documents
24. Transfer of a share		20170323154042	History	Documents
26. Termination of commercial activity	Прекратена търговска дейност	20190422145027	History	Documents
Capital				
31. Amount	20000 лв.	20131004122334	History	Documents
32. Paid-in capital	20000 лв.	20131004122334	History	Documents

“Box 19. Venturers DANDONG HAOTONG COMMERCIAL - TRADE CO. OOD, Foreign Legal Entity, Country: CHINA, 16000 BGN.”

Source: Bulgarian Company Registry, available at <http://www.brra.bg/Default.ra>, accessed 27 November 2019.

Annex 51: DPRK bank representatives subject to expulsion under paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016)

Names	Title and activities **	Location **	Passport number / expiry UN Security Council designations where applicable
Jang Bom Su (aka Jang Pom Su, Jang Hyon U) 장범수	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative. Also operates in and travels to Lebanon under various aliases	Syria	22 Feb 1958; Dip PP no. 836110034, exp 1 Jan 2020 UN res 2270 (2016) designated him as “Tanchon Commercial Bank Representa-tive in Syria” on 2 March 2016 (amended 5 Aug. 2017) KPi.016
Jon Myung Guk (a.k.a. Cho’n Myo’ng-kuk, Jon Yong Sang) 전명국 (전영상)	Tanchon Commercial Bank (hereafter TCB) Representative in Syria. Also travels to and operates in Lebanon under various aliases.	Syria	25 Aug. 1976 with dip PP number 836110035, expires 1 January 2020
Ryom Huibong (aka Ryo’M Hu’I-Pong) 럼희봉	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank (aka KKG bank, 금강은행 Kumgang Export and Import Bank, 金刚银行)		18 September 1961 PP No.: 745120026 (expires 20 January 2020); Outside UAE since 28 May 2018.
Ri Sun Chol (Aka Ri Song Chol) 리선철 (리성철)	Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank Transported money of DPRK laborers in the Middle East to the DPRK		28 March 1964 PP No.:836132137 Outside UAE since 15 March 2017.
Kwak Chongchol (Aka Kwak Jong-Chol) 곽정철	Deputy Representative of Korea Kumgang Group Bank		1 January 1975 PP No.: 563220533; Outside UAE since 28 December 2016
Ro Il Gwang 노일광	Korea Kumgang Group Bank		26 May 1983 PP No.: 836434467; Outside UAE since 15 March 2017
Kim Kyong Il (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-il) 김경일	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. The office opened at least 5 accounts at Banque Internationale Arabe Tunisie (BIAT) in Tunisia. Two of them are in the name of a front company, Kartos. Kim Kyong Il has also been involved in transactions undertaken by Daedong Credit Bank in China.	Libya	1 August 1979; PP No. 836210029 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as “FTB deputy chief representative in Libya” on 22 December (KPi.067)
Choe, Un Hyok 최은혁	Unification Development Bank (or Korea Unification Development Bank, UDB or KUDB) representative. Replaced Ri Un’So’ng. Choe Un		19 October 1985 PP No.: 83612287 (expires March 2021)

	<p>Hyok's KUDB business card with his title of "Representative of KUDB, Moscow</p> <p>Russia" with the same address as the Embassy in Moscow is available in the Panel's 2017 Final Report, S/2017/150 p. 251.</p> <p><i>Russia replied to the Panel that the "Bank of Russia has not received any requests regarding the accreditation in Moscow of a representative of the Korea United Development Bank or the appointment of Choe Un Hyok as its representative. We do not have any information about the bank accounts in the name of Choe Un Hyok"</i></p>		
<p>Chu Hyo'k (Aka Ju Hyok)</p> <p>주혁</p>	<p>Foreign Trade Bank Representative</p> <p><i>Russia replied Chu Hyo'k is not currently residing in Russia. (see below)</i></p>		<p>23 Nov. 1986; PP No. 836420186, issued 28 Oct. 2016 (expires 28 Oct 2021)</p> <p>Res 2397 (2017) designated him as an "overseas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.065)</p>
<p>Ri U'n-so'ng (aka Ri Eun Song; Ri Un Song)</p> <p>리은성</p>	<p>Korea Unification Development Bank representative</p> <p><i>Russia replied that Ri U'n-so'ng is not currently residing in Russia.</i></p>		<p>23 July 1969</p> <p>Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Korean Unification Development Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.078)</p>
<p>Han Jang Su (aka Chang-Su Han)</p> <p>한장수</p>	<p>Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank</p> <p><i>Russia replied that Han Jang Su left Russia in 2019</i></p>		<p>8 Nov. 1969; PP No.: 745420176 (expires 19 Oct 2020)</p> <p>Designated by Resolution 2371 (2017) as "Chief Representative of the Foreign Trade Bank"</p>
<p>Ku Ja Hyong (aka Ku Cha-hyo'ng)</p> <p>구자형</p>	<p>Foreign Trade Bank Representative</p>	<p>Libya (also travelled to Tunisia, UAE, and Saudi Arabia 2015-2017)</p>	<p>8 September 1957; PP No.: 563220533; Another PP No.: 654210218 (expires 27 June 2019 - used in July 2016)</p> <p>Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "FTB chief representative in Libya" on 22 December 2017 (Kpi.070)</p>
<p>Ch'oe So'k-min</p> <p>최석민</p>	<p>Foreign Trade Bank Representative. In 2016, Ch'oe So'k-min was the deputy representative at the FTB branch office in Shenyang. He has been associated with cash transfers from that FTB office to banks affiliated with DPRK special organizations and RGB located overseas.</p>	<p>Shenyang China</p>	<p>25 July 1978</p> <p>Res 2397(2017) designated him as "over-seas FTB Representative" on 22 December (KPi.064)</p>

	<i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>		
Kim Tong Chol (aka: Kim Tong-ch'o'l) 김동철	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	28 Jan 1966; PP No.: 381337404 (expires 26 Sept 2016) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas FTB representative" on 22 - (KPi.068)
Ko Chol Man (aka Ko Ch'o'l-man) 고철만	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	30 September 1967; PP No. 472420180 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas FTB representative" on 22 Decem-ber (KPi.069)
Mun Kyong Hwan (aka Mun Kyo'ng-hwan) 문경환	Bank of East Land Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	22 August 1967; PP No. 381120660 exp. 25 March 2016 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas Bank of East Land representative" on 22 December (KPi.071)
Pae Won Uk (aka Pae Wo'n-uk) 배원욱	Korea Daesong Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	22 August 1969; PP No.: 472120208 exp 22 Feb 2017 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Daesong Bank representative" on 22 December (KPi.072)
Pak Bong Nam (aka Lui Wai Ming; Pak Pong Nam; Pak Pong-nam) 박봉남	Ilsim International Bank representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i> According to a Member State, active as of late 2018	Shenyang, China	06 May 1969 Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "overseas Ilsim International Bank representative" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.073)
Pak Mun Il 박문일	Korea Daesong Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Yanji, China	DPRK / 1 January 1965; PP No.: 563335509 (expires 27/8/2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas official of Korea Daesong Bank" on 22 December 2017 (KPi.079)

Ri Chun Hwan (Aka Ri Ch'un-hwan) 리춘환	Foreign Trade Bank Representative <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Zhuhai, China	21 August 1957' PP No: 563233049 (ex-pires 9 May 2018); PP No.: 563233049 (expires 9 May 2018) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas FTB representative" on 22 Decem-ber (KPi.074)
Ri Chun Song (Aka Ri Ch'un-so'ng) 리춘성	Foreign Trade Bank Representative. Opened a Euro account at International Arab Bank of Tunisia (BAIT) on 18 July 2012 in the name of "Secretary's Delegate of the DPRK's Mission to Tripoli" (closed on 22 August 2013). <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	30 October 1965; PP No. 654133553 (ex-pires 11 March 2019) Res 2397 (2017) designated him as "over-seas FTB representative" on 22 Decem-ber (KPi.075)
Ri Song-hyok (Aka Li Cheng He) 리성혁	Representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank. Reportedly established front companies to procure items and conduct financial transactions on behalf of DPRK <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	19 March 1965 PP No. 654234735 (ex-pires 19 May 2019) Res 2397 (2017) des-ignated him as "overseas representative for Koryo Bank and Koryo Credit Development Bank" on 22 December (KPi.077)
Pang Su Nam (Aka Pang So-Nam, Pang Sunam) 방수남	Ilsim (ILSIM) International Bank Representative <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Zhuhai, China	1 October 1964; PP No.: 472110138
Cha Sung Jun (Aka Ch'a Su'ng-chun) 차승준	Korea Kumgang Group Bank Representative. Has held several accounts in his name at Chinese banks and is suspected of operating a cover company. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	4 June 1966; PP No.: 472434355
Kim Kyong Hyok (Aka Kim Kyo'ng-hyo'k)	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Bank	Shanghai, China	5 November 1985; PP No.: 381335989 (expires 14 September 2016)

김경혁	<i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>		
Pak Ch'O'l-Nam 박철남	Representative, Cheil Credit Bank / First Credit Ban. Opened 6 bank accounts in the name "Great Prince Limited (崇王有限公司)" in banks in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, China <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	16 June 1971 PP No.: 745420413 (expires 19 November 2020)
Jo Chol Song (Aka Cho Ch'o'l-So'ng) 조철성	Deputy Representative for the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation (KKBC) Uses false entity names for the KKBC, such as "Good Field Trading Limited (城豐貿易有限公司)" and "Golden Tiger Investment Group (金虎(香港)國際投資集團有限公司)", both registered in Hong Kong. <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	25 September 1984 PP: 654320502 (expires 16 September 2019) Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Rep-resentative for Korea United Develop-ment Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.058)
Ho Young Il (Aka Ho' Yo'ng-il) 허영일	Hana Bank Representative In 2016, Ho Young Il was associated with a high volume of USD transactions for the FTB. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Dandong, China	DPRK/ DOB: 9 September 1968
Kim Mun Chol (Aka Kim Mun-ch'o'l) 김문철	Representative for Korea United Development Bank. Uses false entity names including "Chongryu Technical Company" or "Kyong Un Trading Company" According to a Member State, active as of late 2018.	Dandong, China	DOB 25 March 1957 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Rep-resentative for Korea United Develop-ment Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.060)

	<i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>		
Choe Chun Yong (Aka Ch'oe Ch'un- yo'ng) 최천영	Ilsim International Bank Representative		PP no: 654410078 Res 2371(2017) designated him as "Rep-resentative for Ilsim International Bank" on 5 Aug (KPi.054)
Ko Tae Hun (Aka Kim Myong Gi) 고태훈 (or 고대훈) (aka 김명기)	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative	Transited China, Ethiopia, UAE, visited Sudan ³⁶	25 May 1972; PP 563120630 (expires 20 March 2018) UN Res 2270 (2016) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 2 March (KPi.025)
Kang Min 강민	Daesong Bank representative who, in late 2016, held Chinese bank accounts. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Beijing, China	07 May 1980; PP 563132918 (expires 04 February 2018)
Kim Sang Ho 김상호	Representative, Korea Daesong Bank As of 2015, Kim Sangho was an Office 39 official posted as a Korea Daesong Trading Company representative in Yanji, China. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions."</i>	Yanji, China	16 May 1957 PP No.: 563337601 (expires: 26 September 2018)
Kim Jong Man (Aka Kim Cho'ng Man) 김정만	Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank. In 2015, he was an Office 39 official posted to Hong Kong. <i>China replied, "The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel's</i>	Zhuhai, China	16 July 1956; PP No.: 918320780

³⁶ See S/2017/150, p. 64

	<i>report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>		
Kim Hyok Chol (Aka Kim Hyo’k-Cho’l, Hyok Chol Kim) 김혁철	Deputy Representative, Korea Unification Development Bank <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Zhuhai, China	9 July 1978; PP No.: 472235761 (expires 6 June 2017)
Ri Ho Nam (aka Ri Ho-nam) 리호남	Ryugyong Commercial Bank branch representative (2014 to present) <i>China replied, “The other DPRK individuals mentioned in the Panel’s report are neither included in the sanction list of the Security Council resolutions nor registered in China as the representatives of the DPRK financial institutions. China cannot verify and confirm whether they have relationship with the DPRK financial institutions.”</i>	Beijing, China	DOB: 3 January 1967; PP No.: 654120210 (expires 21 February 2019)
Ms. Kim Su Gyong 김수경	Korea United Development Bank (KUDB) Representative. Since 2011 made multiple trips around Europe, especially in France and Italy, with the assistance of her father, Kim Yong Nam, and brother, Kim Su-Gwang, RGB agents who used their status as staff members of international organizations to help her obtain visas. Kim Su-Gwang (Kim Sou Kwang) recently departed Belarus. See: S/2017/742 para 50 and S/2016/15, para 187.	Europe, also transited UAE and the Russian Federation ³⁷	DOB: 16 Jan 1973; PP 745120374
Jang Myong Chol	Koryo Commercial Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, “China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China.”</i>	Shenyang, China	
Choe Chil Song	Korea Great China People’s Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018	Dalian, China	

³⁷ The Russian Federation informed the Panel that unilateral sanctions were “not an argument for suspicion of unlawful activities on Russian territory”.

	<i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>		
Han Yong Chol	Foreign Trade Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Beijing, China	
Kim Myong Jin	Korea Daesong Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Dandong, China	
Ri Jin Hyok	Foreign Trade Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Zhuhai, China	
Mun Cho'ng-Ch'o'l 문정철	Tanchon Commercial Bank Representative. Has facilitated transactions for TCB.		Res 2094 (2013) designated him as "Tanchon Commercial Bank (TCB) official" on 7 March (KPi.012)
Choe Song Nam CHOE, Song Nam (aka CH'OE, So'ng-nam) 최성남	Representative of Daesong Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	DOB: 07 Jan 1979; Passport 563320192 expires 09 Aug 2018;

Kim Chol KIM, Chol (a.k.a. KIM, Ch'o'l) 김철	Representative of Korea United Development Bank		DOB 27 Sep 1964
Paek Jong Sam PAEK, Jong Sam (a.k.a. PAEK, Chong- sam) 백종삼	Representative of Kungang Bank According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	DOB 17 Jan 1964; nationality Korea, North
Ko Il Hwan KO, Il Hwan (a.k.a. KO, Il-hwan) 고일환	Representative of Korea Daesong Bank. According to a Member State, he engaged in transactions for ship-to-ship transfers in 2018 while acting as representative of Daesong Bank in Shenyang. According to a Member State, active as of late 2018 <i>China stated, "China has closed all the representative offices of the DPRK financial institutions in China, and all the relevant representatives in China have left China."</i>	Shenyang, China	DOB 28 August 1967 Passport 927220424 expires 12 Jun 2022
Ri Myong Hun RI, Myong Hun (a.k.a. RI, Myo'ng- hun) 리명훈	Representative of Foreign Trade Bank		DOB 14 Mar 1969; Gender Male; Passport <u>381420089</u> expires 11 Oct 2016
Kim Nam Ung 김남웅	Representative for Ilsim International Bank, which is affiliated with the DPRK military and has a close relationship with the Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation. Ilsim International Bank has attempted to evade United Nations sanctions.		Passport no.: 654110043 Res 2371(2017) designated him as Rep-resentative for Ilsim International Bank
RI, Jong Won (a.k.a. RI, Cho'ng-Wo'n; a.k.a. RI, Jung Won)	The Russian Federation replied, <i>Mr. Ri Jong Won arrived in Russia on 5 February 2018 as an officially accredited member of the Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation. It is not known what information was used to determine that he is the Moscow-based deputy representative of the Foreign Trade Bank. Moreover, according to the available information, he returned to the DPRK on 8 October 2018.</i>		DOB: 22 Apr 1971; Passport no 654320421 expires 11 Mar 2019

Annex 52: Pyongyang Cryptocurrency Conference 2019, website screenshot

Pyongyang Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Conference - 18th to 25th April 2019

International experts in the Blockchain and Crypto industry will gather for the first time in Pyongyang to share their knowledge and vision, establish connections and discuss business opportunities.



Price:

3,300 euro per person

Price Includes:


- Flight Beijing-Pyongyang-Beijing,
- 7 nights 3*** hotel in individual room
- 3 meals a day (Vegetarian/Vegan meals available),
- Attendance to the conference
- Translators Korean-English
- Transportation with driver
- All entrances included in the program

Does not include: Payment of DPRK visa (Around 80 euro, depending on nationality and to be made directly in the DPRK Embassy in Beijing), flight from your country of origin to Beijing, laundry, extra drinks, rental of sports' equipment.



***** FAQ: *****

- * Are USA passports allowed to apply?
 - Yes, you are welcome to apply.
- * Can I bring my laptop, smartphone or tablet?
 - Yes, but please note that any mass printed propaganda or digital/printed material against the dignity of the Republic is not allowed.
- * Is it safe?
 - The DPRK can be considered the safest country in the world. As long as you have a basic common-sense and respect for the culture and belief of other nations, you'll be always welcome and enjoy like thousands of friends we've been hosting for the past 28 years and engaged in cultural, sports, science or business relations.
- * Who is organizing this?
 - The organizers of the conference are, in the DPRK side, Mr. Alejandro Cao de Benos, Special Delegate for the Committee for Cultural Relations and President of the Korean Friendship Association (KFA), and in the technical side Mr. Chris Emms, Blockchain and Crypto expert.
- * Do you have Internet?
 - Internet is available in the hotel at the price of 5 USD per hour.
- * What about phone calls?
 - There is no roaming service. It's possible to buy a SIM card to be used to receive/make international phone calls, but we do not recommend it for such short time stay. You can make use of the communications' room in the hotel to make international calls.
- * Other questions?
 - Please contact: korea@korea-dpr.info



Who can join?
Any interested person except passports from: South Korea, Japan and Israel. Journalists are not allowed to attend.

How to apply?
For participants:
Send picture/scan of the main page of your passport, together with your full address, telephone and short CV-Resume (Stating studies, position and work/company) to: korea@korea-dpr.info

For lecturers:
Send picture/scan of the main page of your passport, together with your full address, telephone and short CV (Stating position and work/company) to:
korea@korea-dpr.info
We'll get you back with further details.

Application deadline: February 10th, 2019

Source: <https://korea-dpr.info/dprk-blockchain-conference-2019.html>, accessed 30 January 2020

Annex 53: DPRK-linked cryptocurrency trading platforms

According to the cyber security research team, it identified another cryptocurrency trading application infected with malware linked to the Lazarus group in October 2019. Attackers used a fake company and professionally designed website to distribute a free cryptocurrency trading platform, named JMT Trader. Like Celas Trade Pro (below), JMT Trader is a modified version of legitimate trading software, QT Bitcoin Trader. Of particular note is the use of multi-platform infected software (i.e., Windows and Mac), as well as a social media account to promote the software.



JMT
Digital Currency Trading

Bringing World-Class, Institutional Grade Trading Technology to Digital Currency Investors.
Buy, sell, trade and securely store Bitcoin, Ripple, Ethereum and more.

LTCBTC -0.75%	BTCUSD -1.86%	ETHUSD -1.68%	DASHUSD 0.18%	LTCUSD -2.64%	DASHBTC 1.89%
B 0.006730 BTC	\$ 8,388.40 USD	\$ 186.38 USD	\$ 72.00 USD	\$ 56.36 USD	B 0.008559 BTC




JMT
Trading Platform

Innovative Software and Reliable Hardware


[DOWNLOAD FROM GITHUB](#)

Advanced trading functions for cryptocurrency traders that includes: technical and fundamental analysis, automated trading, and many other innovative features to help traders to be successful. The trading Application is available Windows, desktop and Mac versions.

LTCBTC -0.75%	BTCUSD -1.72%	ETHUSD -1.57%	DASHUSD 0.70%	LTCUSD -2.56%	DASHBTC 2.27%
B 0.006730 BTC	\$ 8,398.02 USD	\$ 186.59 USD	\$ 72.35 USD	\$ 56.41 USD	B 0.008590 BTC



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 English

CELAS LLC


Bitcoin | Trading | Cryptocurrency

The use of blockchain technology is expected to expand across new markets. Security breaches have put focus on security in all applications of blockchain technology. CELAS LLC produces resilient client-server blockchain solutions for the enterprise market.

29/04/2018 Celas Trade Pro Launches!


The first layer of Celas Trade Pro has been released, you can download the Celas Trade Pro to trade several cryptocurrencies from various exchanges.

[DOWNLOAD HERE](#)




Secure Trading

Celas Trade Pro is secure client uses latest OpenSSL and best encryption.




Ease of Use

Celas Trade Pro is an easy to use application.









Cross-Platform

Celas Trade Pro is written to be used on any system.



Performance

Celas Trade Pro is very fast and uses very little resources.

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The above screenshots show the landing page for JMT Trading and Ceras, respectively. The highly stylized website featured robust content, which helped facilitate the facade of legitimacy.

WEX Account: \$ 6838.504999999 I. john - Celas Trade Pro v1.00.00

Main View Interface Help

WEX Account: Balance: \$ 0.000000000 Total at Last Price: \$ 0.0 Total at Ask/Bid Price: \$ 0.0

Fee: 0.2% Symbol: BTC/USD

Market: Bid: \$ 6828.03 High: \$ 7000.0 Last Price: \$ 6838.505 Ask: \$ 6848.98 Low: \$ 6600.0 Volume: 598.96794

Network: API Lag: 2.411 sec Speed: 2.6 Kbps

Your Open Orders: Filter: BTC/USD Total: 0.00000000 \$ 0.00000

No Open Orders

Order Book: API Lag: 0.916 sec

Asks				Bids			
Total \$	Amount \$	Price \$	Price \$	Amount \$	Total \$		
0.38016266	0.38016266	6848.98	6828.03	0.00968810	0.00968810		
0.88016266	0.50000000	6854.989	6828.02	0.34852567	0.35821377		
0.95116266	0.07100000	6854.99	6826.0	0.01465000	0.37286377		
1.2754428	0.32428014	6855.0	6825.72	0.00439515	0.37725892		
1.27660819	0.00116539	6860.888	6825.021	0.00147000	0.37872892		
1.28915619	0.01254800	6861.188	6825.0	0.00733520	0.38606412		
1.31568117	0.02652498	6861.205	6824.978	0.00586000	0.39192412		
1.33268117	0.01700000	6862.0	6824.9	0.00147000	0.39339412		
1.59268117	0.26000000	6864.0	6824.0	0.00366000	0.39705412		
1.60434021	0.01165904	6868.0	6823.31	0.00147000	0.39852412		
1.8960809	0.29174788	6868.972	6823.123	0.08900000	0.48752412		
2.41738809	0.52130000	6869.0	6822.56	0.00147000	0.48899412		
2.42138809	0.00400000	6870.0	6822.49	0.00294000	0.49193412		
2.43338809	0.01200000	6871.123	6822.139	0.00147000	0.49340412		

Group by Price: \$ Don't group Auto Resize Columns Rows to Display: 100

Buy Bitcoin: Total to spend: \$ 0.00000000 All In Half In % Price per coin: \$ 6848.999 Ask Bid Last Total to Buy: 0.00000000 = 0.0 Zero profit Price: \$ 0.100 Zero profit Step: \$ 0.000 BUY

Sell Bitcoin: Total to SELL: 0.00000000 All In Half In % Price per coin: \$ 6828.030 Bid Ask Last Amount to receive: \$ 0.00000000 Zero profit Price: \$ 0.100 Zero profit Step: \$ 6827.930 SELL

Generate subsequent sell order: Profit: \$ 0.00000000 0 % 0.000 Apply

Generate subsequent buy order: Profit: 0.00000000 0 % 0.000 Apply

General: New Window Powered By CELAS LIMITED


The above image is a screenshot of Celas Limited's trading platform, which is infected with malware designed to exfiltrate the user's wallet keys.

Source: The Panel

Annex 54: Yongbyon 5 MW (e) Reactor and Light Water Reactor
(39°47'44.53"N 125°45'19.05"E / LWR)



Source: Planet

Annex 55: Abandoned 50 MW (e) Reactor (39°47'20.04"N 125°45'43.87"E)

Source: Planet

Annex 56: Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site in November 2019

(41°16'46.14"N 129° 5'9.74"E / west Portal)



Source: Planet

Annex 57: Nuclear program of the DPRK

1. Lithium-6 production capability

The Panel previously reported³⁸ a 2016 advertisement for sale of Lithium-6 by a DPRK entity.³⁹ A Member State recently shared its assessment, made on the basis of relevant academic publications in a science journal of Kim Il Song University since the late 1990s, that the DPRK had developed capability to produce the Lithium-6, enriched to the degree of $10.8 \pm 3\%$, which was advertised in 2016. Based on an open source report published in 2017, the Member State informed the Panel of the possible location of the facility in a chemical complex.

This suggest the scientific research conducted by the DPRK, which started before the UN sanctions, could have provided the DPRK with knowledge and materials for production of Lithium 6, a vital material for development of a thermonuclear device. Furthermore, a chemical complex which is not specifically identified as a military or nuclear facility, may nevertheless be used directly for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program.

2. Choke point items concerning DPRK's nuclear program

The Panel continues to assess the items for its nuclear program which DPRK could seek to procure overseas, either for economic reasons (lower cost) or technological reasons (inability of domestic production, or to obtain technology and know-how for domestic production): "choke point" items.

Possible items include: autoclaves, basalt fiber, bellows sealed valves, beryllium, boron powder, boron-10, capacitors, carbon fiber, controlled atmosphere furnaces, CNC machine-tools, deuterium, filament winding machines, flash X-ray equipment, flow forming machines, glass fiber, graphite, heavy water, high-speed cameras, high strength materials, inverters, isostatic presses, manipulators, maraging steel, mass spectrometers, neutron detectors, para-aramid fiber, pressure gauges, pressure transducers, pressure vessels, radiation shielding windows, trigger spark gaps, vacuum pumps, zirconium.

³⁸ S/2017/150, paras 24-25.

³⁹ General Precious Metal.

Annex 58.1: Test No.1, 4 May SRBM launched from Hodo peninsula 39°24'32.25"N 127°31'53.63"E (see S/2019/691)

Figure 58.1.1: Two new SRBM (KN-23) were launched on 4 May 08h30 & 10h50 from Hodo peninsula (39°24'32.25"N 127°31'53.63"E) with a 4-axle wheeled-TEL chassis WS200 inspired by Iskander TEL and similar systems. One of the launches was not fully successful according to a Member State.



Source: Panel S/2019/691 from KCNA picture and Planet (May 4, 2019 01:54:39 UTC) - Member State from KCNA picture (Right)

According to another Member State, the positioning of the cable duct reaching far into the warhead compartment suggested a light warhead, in order to reach the maximum distance of around 600 km. The same SRBM which was launched on the 9 May from the Kusong area has a potential range greater than 400 km.

A third Member State added that the cable ducts positioning in the airframe could point to a different organization of the missile's interior in comparison with the Iskander. (see Annex 59.)

Annex 58.2: Test No.6, 5 Aug, SRBM launched from Kwail airfield 38°24'54.98"N 125°1'43.00"E
Figure 58.2.1: Picture analysis of the launch site in Kwail Airfield, after the 5 August launch burnt vegetation is visible which does not reflect Near Infrared (NIR), therefore does not appear red on the processed image.



Source: Picture KCNA & Rodong Sinmun; Planet Aug 5, 2019 02:25:53 UTC (left), Planet Aug 6, 2019 02:04:19 UTC (right) with NIR analyses with QGIS application.

Annex 58.3: Test No.7, 10 Aug, New Tactical Missile launched from Hamhung South East 39°48'44.32"N 127°39'49.68"E:

Figure 58.3.1: the test from an inhabited environment indicates DPRK confidence in the weapon System




Source: Planet Aug 5, 2019 04:56:17 UTC – Picture KCNA

Figure 58.3.2: The SRBM launched on 10 and 16 August 2019 resembles the US MGM-140 ATACMS. The TEL chassis is based on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis (derived from T62 and T72), possibly painted in unusual sand color (DPRK traditionally uses forest green camouflage paint schemes for its own missile systems and TELs). (see Figure 58.4.2)



Source: KCNA

Annex 58.4: Test No.8, 16 Aug, ATCM launched from Tongchan area 39°03'33"N 127°46'44"E
Figure 58.4.1: Picture analysis of the launch site in Tongchan area



Source: Picture: KCNA - Planet Aug 4, 2019 02:16:50 UTC (left before the launch of Aug 16) Planet Aug 23, 2019 04:41:34 UTC (right after the launch of Aug 16) (top right with NIR)

Figure 58.4.2: The two SRBMs launched on 16 August 2019 resemble the US MGM-140 ATACMS and the TEL chassis built on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis derived from T62 and T72 (see Figure 53.3.2)




Source: KCNA


Annex 58.5: Test No.9, 24 Aug, New Heavy Rocket “super large” (600mm) launched from Sondok Airfield 39°44'37.05"N 127°28'23.79"E

The test from an airfield reveals the need for a precise launch location with stable and firm soil and security in case of sudden missile explosion. Near infrared analysis shows the exact location of the launch if the KCNA picture and the official statement are true.

Figure 58.5.1: Picture analyse of the launch site



Source: KCNA (above) - Google Earth 25 March 2019 above (right) - Planet Aug 23, 2019 01:51:37 UTC; Aug 24, 2019 01:58:37 UTC; Aug 25, 2019 02:16:10 UTC



Source: Planet Aug 26, 2019 (left) Aug 23, 2019 (right)

Annex 58.6: Test No.10, 10 Sept, New MLRS “super large” (600mm) launched from Kaechon Airfield 39°45'8.46"N 125°53'59.06"E

Figure VB-1.6.1: Imagery analysis of the launch site in Kaechon Airfield, after the 10 September launch the burnt vegetation is visible (burnt vegetation does not reflect NIR and so does not appear red on the processed image)



Source: Planet Sept 16, 2019 02:22:48 UTC



Source: Planet Sept 11, 2019 00:43:07 UTC (top left) Planet Sept 02, 2019 02:04:15 UTC (bottom left)


For NIR analysis with QGIS Planet Sep 16, 2019 02:22:48 UTC (top right) and Sept 9, 2019 02:22:48

UTC (bottom right) and NIR analysis with QGIS

Annex 58.7: Test No.11, 02 Oct, New SLBM-MRBM launched from a Submersible test barge in the Wonsan area

According to several Member States, the SLBM launched from a submersible test platform on 2 October was the Pukkuksong-3 a naval adaptation of the Pukkuksong-2 (KN-15): same diameter, stage 1 and 2 similar in length but different re-entry vehicle (RV) (see figures below). The Pukkuksong-3 has a hydrodynamic shroud to protect the RV during undersea travel. Before launch, the SLBM is fitted into a transport launch tube with a diameter of around 1.8m. The maximum range was estimated by one Member State at 1,700km and by another Member State as less than 2,500 km.

Figure 58.7.1: Evaluated Pukkuksong-3 dimensions



Source: Member State from KCNA & Rodong Sinmun pictures

Figure 58.7.2: launch of the Pukkuksong-3 on 2 October 2019 (left, middle) and Sinpo shipyard(right)



Source: Member State (raw material: KCNA & Rodong Sinmun pictures)

According to a Member State, two of the submersible test platforms have similar design (one in Sinpo and the second in Nampo - (see Figure below:.4.5), and a third one in Sinpo has a new design (see below -.7). This last was used for the test launch of the Pukkuksong-3. This new launch test platform contains a hollow cylinder with an external diameter of about 5m, an interior diameter of about 2m and 6~6.5m height. (see below:.3.7)

Figure 58.7.3: Activity in the Sinpo Naval South shipyard at the secure boat basin from November 2018 to December 2019 related to the SLBM test of 2 October 2019 and in parallel with the activity at the Nampo Naval Shipyard. Up to 3 submersible test barges were observed.



Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019 04:51:13 UTC



Source: Planet Nov 28, 2018 04:47:36 UTC



3. ~~Sindo~~ secure boat basin: two submersible test barges

Source: Planet Jun 23, 2019 02:06:35 UTC



4. Nampo Naval Shipyard at the secure boat basin: one other submersible test stand barge (38°43'6.44"N 125°23'39.45"E)

Source: Planet Jun 22, 2019 02:50:20 UTC




Source: Planet Oct 1, 2019 05:20:54 UTC



Source: Planet Sept 23, 2019 04:50:25 UTC



Source: Planet **Sept 29**, 2019 01:56:15 UTC (L) **Oct 1**, 2019 02:12:35 UTC (cent) **Oct 8**, 2019 02:11:46 UTC (R)



Source: Planet **Dec 5**, 2019 04:51:13 UTC

Annex 59: Technical specifications and trajectography of missile tests conducted in 2019

All missiles and heavy rockets launched from 4 May to 28 November 2019 used ballistic missile technology augmented by guidance technology and demonstrated a ballistic trajectory during the course of flight. Some experts have referred to this as quasi-ballistic trajectory.

According to several Member States, however, all of these launches conducted by the DPRK are considered to be ballistic missiles regardless of their specific flight profiles as each of the launches used a propulsion system in boost phase only, with a majority of their flight being unpowered. The analysis below is based on assessments and data provided by four Member States (see Tables 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, Figures 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, 59.4 below) and supplemented by others.

After observing foreign missile systems utilizing solid propellant, which offered advantages in the field, the DPRK had the expertise to design, develop, test and deploy its own systems. Although the new missile systems launched on 4 May, 9 May, 25 July and 6 August (US-dubbed KN-23) resembled the Iskander and similar systems in appearance, this does not suggest that the DPRK was supplied with or stole the design.

According to a Member State, the KN-23 is designed to counter air defense systems. It was first demonstrated in February 2018 military parade (see S/2019/171) using a mock-up mounted on a truck.

Table 59.1: Main characteristics of the SRBMs (approximate measurements) (see figure 59.1)

	<i>KN-23</i>	<i>KN-24</i>	<i>KN-25</i>
<i>Length</i>	7.4 m	5.7 m	8.1m
<i>Diameter</i>	0.92 m	0.97 m	0.60 m
<i>Take-off mass</i>	3 800 kg	2 900 kg	3 500 kg
<i>War-head mass</i>	400 kg	400 kg	300 kg
	2	600	
<i>Solid fuel mass</i>	kg	2 000 kg	2 400 kg
<i>Stage number</i>	1	1	1
<i>Separated RV</i>	No	No	No
<i>Trajectory type</i>	Depressed with pull-up	Depressed with pull-up	Ballistic trajectory
<i>Max range without pull-up</i>	450 km	300 km	380 km


Source: Member State

Figure 59.1: Ballistic missiles identified by a Member State



Source: Member State; *Images:* KCNA

Figure 59.2: Trajectory of Ballistic Missile Launches from May to September 2019




Source: Member State

Figure 59.3: Launches by the DPRK in 2019 (May to October 2019)



Source: Member State

Figure 59.4: DPRK's Ballistic Missile Launches in 2019 (04 May to 28 November 2019)



Source: Member State

Table 59.2: Analysis of Missile launches from 05 May to 28 November 2019 (excerpt from Figure VB-2.4)

	(1)19.5.4.	(2)19.5.9.	(3)19.7.25.	(4)19.7.31.	(5)19.8.2.	(6)19.8.6.	(7)19.8.10.	(8)19.8.16.	(9)19.8.24.	(10)19.9.10.	(11)19.10.2.	(12)19.10.31.	(13)19.11.28.
Location	Hodo Peninsula	Pyongan Province, Kusong	Hodo Peninsula	Wonsan Kalma	South Hamgyoung Province, Yeongheung	South Hwanghae Province, Kwail	South Hamgyoung Province, Hamheung	Kangwon Province, Tongcheon	South Hamgyoung Province, Seondeok	South Pyongan Province, Kaechon	Northeastern waters Wonsan	South Pyongan Province, Sunchon	South Hamgyoung Province, Yonpo
Launcher	Wheeled-Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle	Continuous Track Vehicle (Canister)	Continuous Track Vehicle (Canister)	Wheeled-Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle	Submerged Test-Launcher	Wheeled-Vehicle	Wheeled-Vehicle
Projectile (DPRK Announcement)	New SRBM (New tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (Launch drill of large caliber long-range and tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (New tactical guided weapon)	New SRBM (New large-caliber, multiple-launch guided rocket system)	New SRBM (New large-caliber, multiple-launch guided rocket system)	New SRBM (New tactical guided missile)	New SRBM (New Weapon)	New SRBM (New Weapon)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	New SLBM (Pukguksong-3)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)	New SRBM (Super-large multiple rocket)
Rds.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2
Max Altitude	40km	40km	50km	30km	25km	37km	40km	30km	97km	60km	910km	90km	97km
Flight Distance	240km	420km	600km	250km	220km	450km	430km	230km	380km	330km	450km	370km	380km

Source: Member State

Table 59.3: Analysis of recent missile launches (May to October 2019)

Date	Missile Name	Missile Type	Facility Name	Facility Latitude	Facility Longitude	Apogee	Distance Travelled	TEL type / launch type
04/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°31'56"E		200 km	Wheeled TEL type 1
04/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°31'56"E			Wheeled TEL type 1
09/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Baegun	40°01'47"N	125°13'38"E	50 km	420 km	Caterpillar TEL
09/05/19	KN-23	SRBM	Baegun	40°01'47"N	125°13'38"E	?	270 km	Caterpillar TEL
24/07/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°32'03"E	50 km	430 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
24/07/19	KN-23	SRBM	Hodo Peninsula	39°24'31"N	127°32'03"E	50 km	690 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
06/08/19	KN-23	SRBM	Kwail Airbase	38°24'55"N	125°01'43"E	37 km	450 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
06/08/19	KN-23	SRBM	Kwail Airbase	38°24'55"N	125°01'43"E	37 km	450 km	Wheeled TEL type 2
09/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Hungnam	39°48'43"N	127°39'49"E	48 km	400 km	Caterpillar TEL
09/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Hungnam	39°48'43"N	127°39'49"E	48 km	400 km	Caterpillar TEL
15/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Tongchan	39°03'33"N	127°46'44"E	30 km	230 km	Caterpillar TEL
15/08/19	KN-24	ATACMs like	Tongchan	39°03'33"N	127°46'44"E	30 km	230 km	Caterpillar TEL
23/08/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sondok Airbase	39°44'37"N	127°28'24"E	97 km	380 km	Wheeled TEL
23/08/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sondok Airbase	39°44'37"N	127°28'24"E	97 km	380 km	Wheeled TEL
09/09/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Kaechon Air Base	39°45'01"N	125°53'54"E	50 km	330 km	Wheeled TEL
09/09/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Kaechon Air Base	39°45'01"N	125°53'54"E	50 km	330 km	Wheeled TEL
01/10/19	Pukguksong-3	SLBM	Yonghung Bay			910 km	450 km	Imerged Barge
31/10/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sunchon Airbase	39°24'48"N	125°53'18"E	90 km	370 km	Wheeled TEL ?
31/10/19	KN-25	Heavy Rocket	Sunchon Airbase	39°24'48"N	125°53'18"E	90 km	370 km	Wheeled TEL ?

Source: Member State, The Panel

Annex 60: Construction of the new submarine at Sinpo south shipyard

According to several Member States, two submarines could be built concurrently at the new hall (40° 1'22.88"N 128° 9'42.43"E). The Panel assess that given the size of the submarine presented on the 23 July in DPRK images and the estimated space utilisation (see figure below) three submarines could be built concurrently. This assumption is shared by other Member States.

Figure 60.1: Sinpo South shipyards – new hall new berth (40° 1'20.76"N 128° 9'46.55"E) and location of the possible ballistic missile submarine (SSB) presented on the 23 July 2019 by KCNA



Source: Planet Sep 23, 2019 04:50:25 UTC; Picture: KCNA

Annex 61: General development of the Sinpo south shipyard

In the Sinpo south shipyard, DPRK continued infrastructure development from May to Dec 2019, in the Sinpo peninsula (see Figure, red circle $40^{\circ} 0'38.02''\text{N}$ $128^{\circ} 9'21.50''\text{E}$) and a possible new submarine training center (see Figure, orange rectangle - $40^{\circ} 1'37.35''\text{N}$ $128^{\circ} 9'14.79''\text{E}$), whereas the construction of the future underground submarine shelter (see Figure, blue ellipse - $40^{\circ} 0'42.23''\text{N}$ $128^{\circ} 8'51.60''\text{E}$) slowed. Ground activities were observed in Mayang-do base (see Figure, green circle - $39^{\circ}59'36.47''\text{N}$ $128^{\circ}12'45.51''\text{E}$)


Figure 61.1: General view of Sinpo shipyard and Mayang-do base. This area could be used as a naval support base for the future SSB according to several Member States.



Source: Planet Dec 3, 2019 01:54:10 UTC

At the Mayang-do Submarine Base, in parallel with submarine activity, an object resembling a container or cylinder (whose length around 10 m and width 2 m) was observed on 31 May 2018 near the submarine dock in the middle of an open area (see Figure circle green- $39^{\circ}59'36.47''\text{N}$ $128^{\circ}12'45.51''\text{E}$). This may have been an SLBM or SLBM-canister.

Figure 61.2: Activity at the Mayang-do submarine base. The object looked like an SLBM cylinder or container on the 31 May – 1 June 2018



Source: Google Earth May 31, 2018 (left, center); Planet Jun 2, 2018 04 :45 :01 UTC (right)

Figure 61.3: New infrastructure developments from May to Dec 2019 on the Sinpo peninsula (Figure red circle 40° 0'38.02"N 128° 9'21.50"E). Construction of the future underground submarine shelter (40° 0'42.23"N 128° 8'51.60"E) has slowed.



Figure 61.4: The construction of the future underground submarine shelter (Figure blue ellipse 40° 0'42.23"N 128° 8'51.60"E) has slowed. According to a Member State this building could become a maintenance shelter for the new SSB.



Source: Planet Jan 18, 2018 02:45:06 UTC



Source: Planet Mar 18, 2018 04:55:15 UTC



Source: Planet Jan 22, 2018 06:06:40 UTC



Source: Planet Oct 8, 2018 02:07:39 UTC



Source: Planet Dec 04, 2019 02:28:05 UTC

Figure 61.5: A possible new submarine training centre (according to the assessment of several Member States) started in 2017 and almost finished in December 2019 (red rectangle - 40° 1'37.35"N 128° 9'14.79"E)



Source: Planet May 03, 2017 02:11 :37 UTC



Source: Planet Jun 3, 2019 02:06 :25 UTC



Source: Planet May 13, 2018 04:51 :49 UTC



Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019 04:51:13 UTC

Annex 62: Developments at the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground

Figure VB-5.1: Activity on Sohae (Tongchang-ri) Vertical engine test stand (39°39'11.32"N 124°42'51.30"E) from 2 to 8 December 2019 with the arrival of a distinctive container (length > 10m) before the 7 December engine test



Source: Planet Dec 4, 2019, 05:10:51 UTC



Dec 8, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)
Vertical engine test stand activity
(39°39'11.32"N 124°42'51.30"E):
container (length > 10m) after the engine
test on Saturday 7 (PM)

Source: Planet Dec 8, 2019, 02:25:58 UTC



Dec 5, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)
Vertical engine test stand activity: new
container (length > 10m) before the engine
test on Saturday 7 (PM)

Source: Planet Dec 5, 2019, 05:27:04 UTC



Dec 2, 2019 SOHAE (Tongchang-ri)
Vertical engine test stand activity: cars
moving

Source: Planet Dec 2, 2019, 05:29:10 UTC

Annex 63: Developments at the vertical engine test stand in Chamjin Taesong machine factory since February 2019 (38°57'4.75"N 125°34'12.05"E)

Figure 63.1: The engine vertical test stand of the Taesong Machine factory on 20 February 2019 (38°57'4.75"N 125°34'12.05"E)








Source: Google Earth 20 February 2019 (Left) & Planet Dec 2, 2019 02:07:10 UTC (right)

Figure 63.2: Developments at the vertical engine test stand infrastructures between 15 April (left) and 2 December 2019 (right): destruction of two buildings, construction of three buildings (see series of pictures below). The test stand is in the centre of the red circle.



Source: Planet Apr 15, 2019 02:49:57 UTC - Dec 2, 2019 05:06:32 UTC

				
<i>Source: Planet May 2 2019 - 02:22:10 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet May 29 2019 - 02:22:03 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet June 8 2019 - 03:02:31 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet Jul 5 2019 - 02:57:56 UTC</i>	<i>Source: Planet Oct 11 2019 - 05:12:08 UTC</i>
Situation of the engine vertical test stand on 02 May 2019: building (north), building (south)	29 May 2019: ongoing dismantlement of buildings (north and south)	08 June 2019: ongoing dismantlement of buildings (north and south) and ongoing construction of 3 new buildings	05 July 2019: dismantlement of buildings (north and south) completed and the 3 new buildings almost completed	11 October 2019: renovation of the site seems completed:

Annex 64: Signs of regular activity inside the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory


Regular logistic activity was observed 100 m south-eastern of the solid fuel propellant production facility in the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory (39°49'27.00"N 127°35'13.55"E). Railcars with a 12-13m container regularly moved from the same location (39°49'22.13"N 127°35'17.45"E) (see Figure 64.2).

Figure 64.1: Overview of the Hungnam 17 Explosives Factory



Source: Planet Oct 15, 2019 04:56:06 UTC

Figure 64.2: Railcar with a 12-13m container (often white in colour) moved monthly from the same location (39°49'22.13"N 127°35'17.45"E)



Source: Planet Apr 17, 2019 02:27:51 UTC *Source:* Planet May 18, 2019 02:23:38 UTC *Source:* Planet Jun 22, 2019 02:27:14 UTC *Source:* Planet Jul 9, 2019 04:50:13 UTC *Source:* Planet Aug 24, 2019 05:15:00 UTC *Source:* Planet Oct 26, 2019 04:59:41 UTC

In its report S/2019/691 the Panel reported on the regular movement of trucks and trailers from 400 m southeast of production facility (39°49'12.60"N 127°35'19.36"E) (see Figure 64.3). This regular flow of trucks and trailers continues.

Figure 64.3: Trucks and trailers regularly moved from a storage area (39°49'12.60"N 127°35'19.36"E) lo-cated 400 m southeast of production facility



Source: Planet Sept 25, 2019 05:12:54 UTC

Annex 65: Developments at the Pyongsong March 16 Factory Automotive Plant

Figure 65.1: In September 2019, new construction started along the main building of Pyongsong March 16th Factory Automotive Plant (39°16'52.37"N 125°52'15.01"E) where the ICBM Hwasong-15 was assembled before the 29 November 2017 test. Construction appeared almost finished on 19 December 2019.



Source: (From above right to bottom right) Planet Aug 30, 2019 00:44:06 UTC; Sept 16, 2019, 02:22:39 UTC; Nov 11, 2019 02:19:31 UTC; Dec 8, 2019 02:05:15 UTC; (Left) Planet Dec 19, 2019 02:09:00 UTC

Annex 66: DPRK procurement related to specific technologies

According to a Member State, obtaining extra-large TELs remained a constraint for the DPRK. The DPRK had not established a production facility for such vehicles for reasons of cost and technology. The 8-axle TELs (obtained as ‘forestry vehicles’ from China in 2011, S/2016/157 para. 100 and S/2013/337, paras. 52-58) had undergone some modification. A ninth axle had been added for the Hwasong-15 launch in November 2017 to produce a vehicle over 20 meters long and two meters wide. It was not known how many of the extra-large TELs which the DPRK possessed had eight and how many had nine axles.

The Panel’s analysis of satellite imagery (Planet) from September to December 2019 (see Annex 65, March 16 Factory of Pyongsang) showed, however, that a new building has been constructed alongside the one where the Hwasong-15 was assembled in November 2017 (see S/2019/171).

According to the Member State, the DPRK also had difficulty producing the quantity and quality of speciality steels and aluminium required for the BM programme – including speciality materials containing titanium. Moreover, around 10 years after the construction a solid fuel engine, materials would begin to deteriorate with the appearance of cracks.

The DPRK probably needed to import the components for guidance systems, but components that could be used in ballistic missile guidance systems were now widely available.

The need for filament winders and winding equipment was a constraint as well as the requirement for carbon-carbon to manufacture the nozzles for solid propellant rocket motors. From state media images (see S/2019/171 Annex 84 Figure VI) it was apparent that the DPRK were working on carbon fibre for composite motor cases – for which Kevlar and aramid fibre were alternatives.

Other procurement of choke-points items included solid propellant. A typical composite formula involved aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate. Although the DPRK had manufacturing capacity, DPRK plant might not be operating well according to a Member State. It was assessed that the DPRK had difficulty in producing such materials at the right degree of purity and particulate size. To support its flight test programme and production for deployment, the Member State estimated that the DPRK needed 100 tonnes of the aforementioned materials over ten years.

A Member State identified specific DPRK procurement related to high tech devices, from which machinery and certain components could be used in the WMD programme. In particular the DPRK is seeking Specific electronic equipment (like batteries, receiver and recorder), industrial equipment (like bearing crusher, generators, milling and other machinery) and certain elements of vehicles (cars and spare parts).

Annex 67: Specific scientific collaboration identified as possible means of Intangible Trans-fer of Technology (ITT)

The Panel requested information from a Member State on international joint studies, in particular, concerning the role of the DPRK partners in the studies and networks established through the joint studies.⁴⁰ The Member State informed the Panel in respect of one professor who conducted a joint study, that the DPRK researcher in the professor's team had merely participated in "a basic calculation." The Panel views that even a supporting role in research could be used to acquire relevant advanced knowledge and establish networks.

From the studies presented in the CNS Occasional paper #43 December 2018 report⁴¹ and in the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information report⁴² and from its own investigation, the Panel identified nine particular scientific partnerships (among many others) with DPRK institutions which involve DPRK scientists and which could be a means for the DPRK to supplement its technical knowledge gaps in specific fields mentioned below⁴³.

One Member State queried by the Panel replied that seven of the studies were published in public journals before 2017 and the drafting, submission, revision and finalization of the papers were completed before the adoption of Security Council resolutions 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016). All contents in the studies are basic scientific research work and have been publicly published with unclassified bibliographies.

Regarding two papers published in 2018, according to the Member State, they were submitted before the adoption of resolution 2321 (2016). They are basic scientific research work without sensitive contents, and large number of similar research works can be found.

Below are the areas that DPRK students and researchers participated in joint studies which can possibly be applied to the DPRK's prohibited WMD programmes in the future. The following technological expertise has been identified:

Damping technology applicable to space and missile development

Study: A Novel Shear Mode MR Damper and Its Mechanical Performance.

Study: Design and experiments of a novel magneto-rheological damper featuring bifold flow mode

Manufacturing technology for aircraft engines and airframes

Study: Enhanced Ductility of a Bimodal Grain Structure Ti-22Al-25Nb Alloy Fabricated by Spark Plasma Sintering

Study: Microstructure and mechanical properties of a Ti22Al25Nb alloy fabricated from elemental powders by mechanical alloying and spark plasma sintering

Study: Influence of mechanical alloying on the microstructure and mechanical properties of powder metallurgy Ti2AlNb-based alloy

⁴⁰ specialized teaching and training which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems includes, but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.

⁴¹ By the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

⁴² www.kisti.re.kr (covering the publications between 2007-2016)

⁴³ Paragraph 17 of resolution 2270 (2016), which reinforces paragraph 28 of resolution 1874 (2009) and which called for Member State vigilance, states that "all Member States shall prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines".

Study: Experimental comparison of ground surface characteristics for P/M Ti₂AlNb-based alloy using CBN and diamond grinding wheels

Technology used in specialized heavy vehicles

Study: Active steering control strategy for articulated vehicles

The design and implementation of Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) (such as applied in the new DPRK January 18 General Machinery Factory (possibly located 39°33'19.88"N 125°51'20.23"E) which manufactures engines for heavy ground vehicle including tanks and tracked Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) and could be involved in the development of missile weapon systems)

Study: Design and Implementation of Automatic Flexible Manufacture System in Multistage Machining Process Oriented to Information Integrated Control

Technology related to vibration test equipment

Study: Vibration analysis of coupled doubly-curved revolution shell structures using Jacobi-Ritz method

Annex 68: DPRK Sectoral Statistics, Bank of Korea (ROK)

Based on the data provided by Bank of Korea, and subsequent analysis by Panel Members, the estimated effect of UN sectoral sanctions on affected sectors could range between 4.6 and 8.2 billion USD. This estimate assumes DPRK GDP is between 18 and 32 billion USD. This would translate into a rough estimate of a loss of hundreds of millions in revenues which can affect workers and their families' livelihoods.⁴⁴ It is important to note, however, that declines in affected sectors are an intended consequence of UN sanctions and that the panel has no specific information about how income loss may affect humanitarian aid and the civilian population in the DPRK.

North Korea's Population, Nominal GNI, GNI per Capita, Economic Growth Rate

	unit	'18	'17	'16	'15
population	clarification	25,132	25,014	24,897	24,779
Nominal GNI	1 billion won	35,895	36,631	36,373	34,512
	(\$ Billion)	326	324	313	305
GNI per capita	Ten thousand won	142.8	146.4	146	139
	(dollar)	1,298	1,295	1,259	1,231
Economic growth	%	-4.1	-3.5	3.9	-1.1

⁴⁴ This analysis does not include lost wages for overseas laborers. According to diplomats accredited to Pyongyang, overseas workers usually support between 3 and 10 family members (Source: https://lprime.ru/News/20191214/830688796.html?fbclid=IwAR2PUx1EcG9RZekkMXtYPEbmPrjm0rUG903kmbmC145U05LZhL3qGgN7_A). It is important to note, however, that some have estimated between 60 and 75 percent of overseas labourer's wages are deducted by the state.

North Korea's Growth Rate by Industry (Unit:%)

and research

International	'18	'17	'16	
Agriculture, forestry and fishery	-1.8	-1.3	2.5	.
Mining industry	-12.3	-8.5	6.2	.
Mining	-17.8	-11.0	8.4	.
- manufacturing	-9.1	-6.9	4.8	.
-(Light industry)	-2.6	0.1	1.1	.
-(Heavy chemical industry)	-12.4	-10.4	6.7	.
Electric Gas Water Business	5.7	-2.9	22.3	-
Construction	-4.4	-4.4	1.2	.
Service	0.9	0.5	0.6	.
- (government)	0.8	0.8	0.6	.
- (Other)	1.2	-0.3	0.5	.
Gross domestic product	-4.1	-3.5	3.9	.

North Korea's Industrial Structure (Unit: nominal,%)

	'18	'17	'16	'15
Agriculture, forestry and fishery	23.3	22.8	21.7	21.6
Mining industry	29.4	31.8	33.2	32.7
Mining	10.6	11.7	12.6	12.2
- manufacturing	18.8	20.1	20.6	20.4
-(Light industry)	6.8	6.8	6.9	7.0
-(Heavy chemical industry)	12.0	13.3	13.7	13.4
Electric Gas Water Business	5.4	5.0	5.2	4.5
Construction	8.9	8.6	8.8	9.0
Service	33.0	31.7	31.1	32.2
- (government)	24.6	23.2	22.4	23.3
- (Other)	8.5	8.4	8.7	8.9
Gross domestic product	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Bank of Korea website. Available at: <https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091>, accessed 31 January 2020.

Annex 69: DPRK Fuel Supply (2017, 2018 and 5 year average), FAO

The sectoral sanctions limit the amount of fuel, production of fertilizers, and the availability of machinery for agriculture and food production. Spare parts are increasingly in short supply as existing machinery ages. Moreover, according to FAO, “shortages of fuel, electricity and pumping equipment limit the ability to irrigate, reducing yields and making crops susceptible to extreme weather shocks, such as drought and heatwaves.”

Fuel Type	2018	2017	5 yr average	2017-2018 change	2018 change from 5 yr average
	Metric Tones			%	
Diesel	40,502	54,350	57,727	-25	-30
Petrol	4,000	6,000	6,500	-33	-38
TOTAL	44,502	60,350	64,227	-26	-31

Source: FAO website. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/3/ca4447en/ca4447en.pdf>, accessed 31 January 2020

Annex 70: An analysis of exemption request times

The Panel compared exemption request approval times in 2018 and 2019. The table below highlights the average approval time, defined as the number of working days (i.e., Monday to Friday) from the date of the request to the date of the approval.⁴⁵ The data show that the average number of working days for an exemption request approval fell from 59 in 2018 to 17 in 2019— a decrease of approximately 71%.

Table 1: Average time for exemption request approvals

Year	No. of Request Approvals	Average approval time (in workdays)	Std. Dev. (in workdays)
2018	16	59	48
2019	32	17	31

The Panel found no statistically significant difference between the type of organization making the request (i.e., a UN organization or a non-UN organization).⁴⁶

⁴⁵ This analysis excludes requests that were denied, placed on hold, or withdrawn from the committee. In total, these included 4 cases (2018 and 2019 combined). The cases were excluded to ensure consistency in the analysis and because contextual circumstances varied significantly between cases. An alternative analysis of “time-to-decision”, which includes the 4 cases, shows no significant difference from the decrease in exemption request approval times.

⁴⁶ The Panel conducted an independent-sample t-test to compare UN and non-UN exemption request time approvals (2-tailed, $p = 0.118$). This result is for 2018 and 2019 combined, as there were not enough samples to test each year individually.

Annex 71: DPRK Needs and Priorities Report by UN OCHA, 2019 (excerpt)

PART I: NEEDS AND PRIORITIES AT A GLANCE

NEEDS AND PRIORITIES

AT A GLANCE


PEOPLE IN NEED

 **10.9M**

PEOPLE TARGETED

 **3.8M**

REQUIREMENTS (US\$)

 **\$120M**

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1

Improve nutrition of the most vulnerable people using an integrated, multi-sectoral approach that includes improved food security, as well as screening, referral and treatment for malnutrition.


STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2

Reduce preventable mortality and morbidity through access to basic health services, as well as access to improved water, sanitation and hygiene services.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3


Build the resilience of the most vulnerable people in DPRK to recurrent disasters, particularly floods and drought.

PEOPLE TARGETED WITH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE




OPERATIONAL PRESENCE

* does not reflect nationwide activities.



DPRK SEASONAL HAZARD CALENDAR



Source: OCHA

Annex 72: Potential Social Impacts

Theoretical and empirical analyses of sanctions' effects on civilian populations in various countries show that sanctions tend to take a disproportionate toll on the most vulnerable segments of society—e.g., women, children, the elderly, and the disabled. This is especially true in less developed states that lack legal protections for marginalized or underrepresented populations, as well as those states that do not afford women access to education, exclude certain groups from participation in political processes, and limit women's economic rights. Economic shocks—caused by sanctions—can lead to increased violations of women's economic rights, which in turn leads to more violations of women's basic rights.⁴⁷ Although there are no systematic studies that examine the direct consequences of UN sanctions on women's rights or status in the DPRK, it is worth noting that the textile, clothing, seafood and other food processing industries within the DPRK's economy, which are all affected by UN sectoral sanctions, have large proportions of female laborers.

It would be reasonable to assume that UN sanctions' effects on the country's economy may have disproportionate effects on the most vulnerable segments of society. In the DPRK, as in other countries, children of a particular age are often the first to be affected by the absence of adequate nutrition and healthcare. Sanctions may also complicate the ability to provide support for the disabled.⁴⁸ Of course, these effects are compounded by domestic policies that favor elites, who sometimes, paradoxically, benefit from their increased ability to manage shrinking resources, resulting from limiting of external supplies due to sanctions, and capitalize on the “new economy.”

Source: The Panel

⁴⁷ See, for example, Drury, A. Cooper, and Dursun Peksen. 2014. “Women and Economic Statecraft: The Negative Impact International Economic Sanctions Visit on Women.” *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2): 463–90.

⁴⁸ See <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/north-koreans-disabilities-threatened-international-sanctions-aid-groups-say>

Annex 73: Consolidated List of Recommendations

(Maritime and Sectoral)

1. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee agree upon a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for refined petroleum products and specify the ton measurement referred to in the resolution.
2. The Panel recommends that the Committee publish the amounts of refined petroleum deliveries converted into barrels on receipt of any notification.
3. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States should report in a timely manner any known transfers of refined petroleum products to the Committee, as required by the resolution.
4. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the following vessels for violation of paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017):
 - *Bonvoy 3* (IMO: 8978784), unknown-flagged
 - *Diamond 8* (IMO: 9132612), Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Hokong* (IMO: 9006758), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Sen Lin 01* (IMO: 8910378), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Subblic* (IMO: 8126082), formerly Togo-flagged
 - *Tianyou* (IMO: 8817007), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Unica* (IMO: 8514306), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Viet Tin 01* (IMO: 8508838), Viet Nam-flagged
 - *Vifine* also known as *Tealway FV* (IMO: 9045962), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Yun Hong 8* (MMSI: 413459380), Chinese-flagged
5. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the following vessels for conducting ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
 - *Rui Hong 916* (IMO: 9058866), formerly Sierra Leone-flagged
 - *Sea Prima* (IMO: 8617524), formerly Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged
6. The Panel reiterates its recommendations to designate the following DPRK vessels for violation of paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017):
 - *Bok Un 1 / Myong Ryu 1* (IMO: 8532413), DPRK-flagged
 - *Mu Bong 1* (IMO: 8610461), DPRK-flagged

To Member States on best practices with regards to the DPRK activities:

On information sharing:

7. Member States with evidence should share a list of vessels suspected of delivering petroleum products to the DPRK with the relevant Member State authorities in order to conduct their own due diligence and deter vessels that facilitate imports of refined petroleum into the DPRK.
8. Member States should encourage ship owners, operators and charterers to incorporate into due diligence practices available data from organizations that

provide data such as ship location, ship registry information, and ship flagging information, along with available information from the 1718 Committee.

On promoting transparency:

9. Member States should require their relevant competent authorities to disclose beneficial ownership information of all legal entities seeking to register vessels under their ship registry. Member States with open registries should endeavor to collect identifying and contact information for each individual that owns or exerts control over the foreign entity to which each vessel belongs, whether as a controlling shareholder, a financier of the enterprise, or as a senior manager or decisionmaker.

10. Member States with open registries should endeavor to collect identifying and contact information on vessel owners represented by a resident agent national, should there be no legal entity within the Member State's jurisdiction.

On leveraging technology in support of effective implementation of maritime sanctions measures:

11. Flag states and the maritime industry should consider technical solutions to avoid abuse of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) such as a "soft-lock" system to ensure transmission of valid vessel identification data, using a strictly controlled access code.

12. Flag States and the maritime industry to consider developing and adopting electronic document management systems to enable rapid, on-site checks for authenticity, validity or cancellation (for sanctions reasons), using a mobile phone application or by accessing the Flag State website online.

On promoting best practices on end-user certification

13. Member States should consider adopting guidance measures for commodity traders, suppliers and brokering companies that require certificates of ultimate origin and destination for commodities being sold to apply a 'Know your Customer's Customer (KYCC)' due diligence measures.

To the Committee:

14. The Panel recommends to the Committee to designate the *Rui Jin* (IMO: 8919104) for violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 2397 (2017).

15. To assist the efforts of Member State, the Panel reiterates its previous recommendation to establish a regional cooperative mechanism to share information on whether vessels actually docked and loaded coal from the ports claimed in their documents of cargo origin. Member States should establish a point of contact for that purpose.

16. The Panel recommends that Member States take all necessary measures including enacting legislation mandating appropriate action against all vessels found to have violated sanctions.

17. The Panel recommends that Member States share with other Member States, Committee and the Panel the list of vessels confirmed as involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by relevant resolutions.

(Embargoes, designated entities/individuals and workers)

18. Member States should exercise vigilance in screening all categories of visa application by DPRK nationals to prevent the entry of DPRK nationals intending to earn income overseas.
19. Member States, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), should submit in a timely manner reports containing complete information on repatriation to the DPRK of all DPRK nationals earning income.
20. To enhance the efficiency of Member States implementation of reporting requirements, the Committee should consider issuing Implementation Assistance Notices (IANs).

(Luxury Goods)

21. Member States should encourage their nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent re-sale to sanctioned jurisdictions.
22. The Committee should prepare a more detailed list of prohibited luxury goods (where possible, with specific HS commodity codes) for consideration by the Council.
23. Member States should harmonize their export control lists to reflect the list of prohibited luxury goods.
24. Member States and relevant international organizations should encourage shipping and transportation companies to provide a thorough systems for check-ing consignees, bearing in mind the risk of transshipment.

(Finance)

25. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Committee clarify the definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities, contained in paragraph 18 of resolution 2375 (2017).
26. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that the Security Council consider explicitly addressing the DPRK's evasion of sanctions through cyber means if drafting additional sanctions measures in the future.
27. The Panel recommends that all Member States exercise vigilance over their nationals who may be traveling to the DPRK to provide training and/or advice on using virtual currencies and related technologies to evade UN sanctions.
28. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendation that Member States ensure their legal and regulatory frameworks cover virtual assets (e.g., cryptocurrency) and virtual asset service providers (e.g. cryptocurrency exchanges).
29. The Panel specifically highlights a recurring trend whereby DPRK diplomats and their family members establish bank accounts for the purpose

of UN sanctions evasion, and recommends Member States exercise enhanced vigilance.

30. The Panel encourages Member States to implement the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, with special attention given to measures associated with *targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation and transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements* (FATF Recommendations 7, 24, and 25).

(Nuclear and ballistic missiles)

31. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise vigilance over the risk of sanctions violation through exchanges, including joint research with DPRK researchers and institutions in sensitive areas.

32. The Panel recommends that Member States be vigilant in monitoring intangible technology transfer, including the transfer of “know-how”.

33. The Panel recommends that Member States exercise higher vigilance to the supply of items prohibited under relevant resolutions, and further emphasizes the importance of stringent export control by all relevant parties such as the producers, brokers, and the end-users.

(Unintended consequences)

34. The Committee should continue efforts for the prompt resumption of a stable banking channel for humanitarian activities, including the identification of financial channels and institutions as possible alternatives for fund transfers.

35. The Committee should continue the practice of bi-annual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population and on their operations within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

36. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that are consequential to mitigating the unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on DPRK’s civilian population and on humanitarian aid operations.

37. The Committee should continue discuss simplifying the exemption application and no objection procedures for UN humanitarian organizations in the DPRK.

38. The Committee should work toward streamlining the procedure for applying for exemptions under the terms of the Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7 and work to simplify the application process to the extent possible, including by providing greater flexibility regarding the technical specifications of planned shipments, the parties involved and the frequency of requests and submissions.

39. In order to help humanitarian organizations’ planning and budgeting processes, the Committee should publish detailed quarterly statistics on the exemption approvals and the approval process.