



## 安全理事会

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### 2018 年 11 月 7 日安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

我谨代表安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会，并根据安全理事会第 2385(2017)号决议第 48 段的规定，随函转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组关于索马里的报告。

请将此信和本报告提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发给荷。

安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的  
第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议  
所设委员会主席

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2018 年 10 月 2 日索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组给安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会主席的信

谨根据安全理事会第 2385(2017)号决议第 48 段，随信转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组关于索马里的报告。

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## 摘要

1992 年,依照安全理事会第 733(1992)号决议对索马里实行全面彻底武器禁运。自 2013 年部分解除武器禁运以来,向索马里运送了大约 20 000 件武器和 7 500 万发子弹。虽然自最初实施武器禁运以来取得了重大进展,但索马里仍然面临着众多内部政治和安全挑战。在部分解除武器禁运以及有效和负责任地管理武器和弹药之后,遵守通知要求的重要性不容小觑。

然而,遵守力度一直很弱。在执行这项任务期间,没有按照安全理事会的要求准确地通知武器和/或弹药的运送情况。

尽管国家安全顾问办公室于 2017 年初公布了新的标准作业程序,但武器和弹药管理仍然存在不足。哈兰中央军械库(摩加迪沙)管理的运销日志缺乏精确性和一致性以致在执行这项任务的前半期,无法准确确定大多数武器和弹药的运销地点、时间、原因、方式或对象。

联邦政府施加的限制削弱了索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组在任务后半期对武器和弹药管理和运销程序进行有效评估的能力。尽管安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会主席写信给联邦政府,强调必须使监测组能够充分查看和记录中央哈兰军械库的库存,但这些限制仍然存在。

在整个任务期间,监测组收集了有关转移军事装备的证据,已知武器已交付给联邦政府,包括许多来自 2017 年年中收到的货物,这在摩加迪沙和拜多阿军火商拥有的军火中有记录。许多此类武器很可能逐渐被索马里安全部队无薪成员转用。然而,监测组也收到参与大规模武器转移的安全部队高级官员连贯一致的报告。

监测组收到了关于非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)和西南州行政当局从青年党缴获的武器和弹药的宝贵资料,使其能够追踪一些武器,更好地了解该集团采购军事装备的方式。但是,仍有必要更加连贯一致地报告非索特派团、联邦成员州、特别是联邦政府缴获的军事装备。尽管安全理事会专门要求联邦政府在重新分配或销毁军事装备之前,协助监测组检查这些装备,但联邦政府没有提供任何关于联邦政府部队以武力从青年党缴获军事装备的信息。

2017 年 9 月,在邦特兰当局协助下,记录了从也门到索马里途中截获的被扣押的军事设备,这使监测组能够追踪 2015 年和 2016 年向阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯运送的武器和弹药。监测组还追踪了 2017 年 5 月在一博萨索军火商处发现的物资,该物资最初从也门走私,买主是美利坚合众国。

监测组继续调查邦特兰军火贩运人和也门供应商之间的联系,揭示了与美国指认的基地组织调解人 Sayf Abdulrab Salem Al-Hayashi (别名 Al-Baydani)的联系。初步调查结果显示,Al-Hayashi 很可能是也门胡塞当局的主要军火商和国务部长

Fares Mohammed Mana'a 的合伙人，2010 年他被列入依照第 1844(2008)号决议编制的制裁名单。

青年党仍然是对索马里和平、安全和稳定的最直接威胁。尽管国际部队正在努力消灭青年党的领导，特别是通过空袭，但该组织在索马里进行复合式不对称袭击的能力仍未减弱。2017 年 10 月 14 日，青年党的一个大型车载简易爆炸装置在摩加迪沙 Zoobe 交界处引爆，造成近 600 人死亡，这是索马里历史上对平民的最致命袭击。估计梯恩梯当量超过 1 200 公斤，可能是青年党制造的最大爆炸装置。监测组继续调查青年党制造用于其简易爆炸装置的自制爆炸物的可能性。虽然没有关于青年党生产自制爆炸物的确凿证据，但实验室分析表明，青年党继续将军用炸药与自制爆炸物成分(如硝酸钾)混合，可能徒然试图增加其简易爆炸装置的炸药重量。

对青年党国内融资的个案研究表明，该好战团体获得的收入绰绰有余，足以维持其叛乱活动。青年党继续在它不再直接控制的地区充当影子政府，在索马里南部和中部实行集中税收制度。监测组估计，仅在拜州的一个青年党检查站，青年党每年通过对过境车辆和货物征税获得大约 1 000 万美元。国内电信和金融实体监管不力，它们提供的服务便于青年党进行财务经营活动，包括收取收入和向其成员付款。

自 2015 年以来，青年党停止在该区域会员国开展大规模行动。2018 年 2 月 15 日，肯尼亚警察在索马里埃尔阿德的路上截获一个车载简易爆炸装置，旨在用于在内罗毕发起一次复合式袭击。该车载有 AK 型步枪，最初由联邦政府于 2013 年进口，表明此次袭击将会包括“自杀式枪手”，这是青年党在摩加迪沙开展行动的惯用伎俩。

继 2017 年 11 月美国空袭开始后，伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)邦特兰派在本任务期间仍然不太活跃。但是，伊黎伊斯兰国在索马里南部进行了一系列暗杀，共发生 50 起杀人事件，主要在摩加迪沙和阿夫戈伊。监测组的调查证实了伊黎伊斯兰国暗杀网络的存在，但目前还不清楚这些刺客的行动是否与邦特兰派有关。

政治和安全部门的挑战继续对索马里稳定构成重大威胁。海湾外交危机继续影响该区域，索马里成为相互冲突、特别是来自阿拉伯联合酋长国和卡塔尔的利益集团和势力的代理战场。虽然海湾危机继续加剧了联邦政府与联邦成员州之间原已存在的紧张关系，但索马里的政治利益攸关方也日益擅长利用海湾支持者的政治和经济资源。

2017 年底，联邦成员州和联邦政府领导人都感到不满，因此设立了各州间合作委员会，这是联邦成员州在没有联邦政府的情况下召集的论坛。然而，在整个任务期间，联邦成员州之间以及联邦成员州与联邦政府之间的接触和合作不正常。西南部朱巴兰和邦特兰即将进行州领导人选举进程的前景以及推翻希谢贝利和贾穆杜格主席的普遍尝试加剧了联邦成员州面临的内部挑战，而这些挑战进一步加剧了各州复杂动态。

根据国家安全架构，安全部门改革有限。改革进程的要素，包括索马里国民军“重新整编”，带来了新的挑战。这在盖多州尤为明显，总部设在拜多阿的索马里国民军第 60 区指挥下的部队正式转移到总部设在基斯马尤的索马里国民军第 43 区，尽管盖多和朱巴兰行政当局管辖的主要社区之间存在根深蒂固的紧张关系。

在摩加迪沙建立新的安全部队引起了普遍猜测和关切，特别是关于预定目的、指挥和控制以及合宪性。联邦政府明显极大关注和支持这些部队，这也增加了对联邦政府致力于更广泛安全部门改革和巩固国家安全部队的关切。

国家情报与安全机构受到内斗及指控和反指控领导人与青年党关系密切的困扰。内部分裂充其量危险地破坏了该机构在摩加迪沙收集情报和促进安全的能力。最糟糕的是，青年党对该机构的广泛渗透对区域和平与安全构成了重大威胁。

在任务期间，国际金融机构赞扬联邦政府实施金融改革。然而，监测组给联邦政府的信中就挪用资金提出的关切问题被忽略，包括特别指控某些部委内部挪用资金、滥用贝纳迪尔联邦州资金、联邦政府合同和协议持续缺乏透明度以及关于联邦政府大量预算外收入和支出的报告。对索马里国民军问责制的审查也表明安全部门内部继续挪用资金。

2018 年 1 月，索马里兰与邦特兰之间的紧张局势在索勒州图卡拉克镇附近爆发成武装冲突。国际组织报告称，冲突造成双方数十人伤亡，估计约 2 500 名平民流离失所。在编写本报告时，对峙仍在继续，敌对双方部队被大约 2 公里的缓冲区隔开。这一争端为戈利斯山区的青年党分子创造了更多可利用的机会。

青年党再次应对违反国际人道主义法袭击平民次数最多负责，特别是在 2017 年 10 月 14 日袭击摩加迪沙之后。该集团继续对平民实施不人道和有辱人格的惩罚，并在其控制区招募儿童。在政府控制区，青年党继续进行暗杀活动。该集团还继续阻挠在索马里南部和中部提供人道主义援助。在该集团控制区，除了青年党自己的 *Al-Ihsaan* 之外，人道主义组织的活动受到限制或完全禁止。

监测组记录了令人不安的陈述，涉及邦特兰当局对儿童的拘留、酷刑和处决，以及驻扎在下谢贝利州巴拉维的索马里国民军部队对青年党嫌疑人的酷刑和处决。在本任务期间，注意到非索特派团部队造成的平民伤亡人数大幅减少。这可能是由于实行了联合国人权尽职政策框架内建议的措施，也可能是因为在本任务期间非索特派团主要进攻行动持续减少。

2017 年 8 月 25 日，索马里国民军在美国部队支持下，在下谢贝利州 *Barire* 村附近开展行动，造成 2 名儿童死亡，可能还有其他平民死亡。据报道，美国 and 该区域会员国正在进行的空袭导致平民受到伤害，调查新闻局记录了 2017 年 9 月 1 日和 2018 年 8 月 31 日多达 5 人死亡事件。

在整个任务期间，继续袭击人道主义工作者，主要是当地人。2018 年 5 月 2 日，一名德国护士在红十字国际委员会摩加迪沙大院被绑架，这是自 2014 年以来第一次在索马里成功绑架外国人。

最后，监测组估计，索马里的木炭出口减少了四分之一，从每年约 400 万袋减至 300 万袋。木炭贸易继续是青年党的重要收入来源，中朱巴州和下朱巴州地区的检查站至少征税 750 万美元。在布尔加博和基斯马尤港口对木炭出口系统征税也继续为朱巴兰当局带来巨大的非法收入。

设在迪拜和基斯马尤的犯罪网络利用伪造的原产地证书将索马里木炭进口到外国市场，继续赚取大量利润。在阿拉伯联合酋长国等出口市场，索马里非法木炭的批发总值估计为每年 1.5 亿美元。在本任务期间，已确认的接收港包括：阿拉伯联合酋长国哈姆瑞亚港、阿曼杜库姆港和希纳斯港以及伊朗伊斯兰共和国基什自由区和凯什姆自由区。后两个港口曾被用于过境伊朗伊斯兰共和国向阿拉伯联合酋长国转运索马里木炭。

总体而言，会员国执行索马里木炭出口禁令的情况有所改善。阿曼和阿拉伯联合酋长国以会员国在以往任务期间为遏制非法贸易所作的努力为基础没收货物。然而，如果阿曼和阿拉伯联合酋长国更及时地对监测组的信采取行动，执行工作就会更加一致。伊朗伊斯兰共和国一直是执行工作中的薄弱环节，直到提交本报告前一周才回复监测组的信。最后，在索马里境内，非索特派团和朱巴兰当局继续不执行木炭出口禁令。

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## 一. 导言

### A. 任务规定

1. 安全理事会第 2385(2017)号决议第 46 段延长了安理会第 2060(2012)号决议第 13 段规定、第 2093(2013)号决议第 41 段和第 2182(2014)号决议第 15 段更新的索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组任务。
2. 依照第 2385(2017)号决议第 48 段和第 2060(2012)号决议第 13(l)段，监测组 2018 年 4 月 21 日向安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议所设委员会提供了中期最新情况。监测组还在整个任务期间每月向委员会提交最新进度报告。
3. 监测组成员在调查过程中访问了巴林、科特迪瓦、丹麦、吉布提、埃塞俄比亚、法国、加纳、荷兰、阿曼、卡塔尔、塞舌尔、索马里、苏丹、瑞典、土耳其、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国、坦桑尼亚联合共和国和美利坚合众国。监测组成员在索马里境内访问了拜多阿、贝莱德文、博萨索、加罗韦、布尔加博、加罗韦、霍比奥、基斯马尤和摩加迪沙。
4. 监测组设在内罗毕，由下列专家组成：James Smith (协调员)、Mohamed Babiker (人道主义事务)、Jay Bahadur (武装团体)、Charles Cater (自然资源)、Nazine Moshii (武器问题)、Brian O'Sullivan (海事/武装团体)和 Richard Zabot (武器问题)。Robert Dekker (财务)于 2018 年 9 月 1 日从监测组辞职，对本报告的内容没有贡献。

### B. 方法

5. 本报告所述任务期内开展的工作采用了监测组以往报告中概述的证据标准和核查程序。监测组重申根据其以往报告采用的方法，如下：
  - (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和议题的信息；
  - (b) 尽可能从有关事件的第一手资料来源收集信息；
  - (c) 确定信息模式是否一致，将新信息、新趋势同已知信息作对比；
  - (d) 在信息可信度和来源可靠性方面，继续借鉴监测组有关专家的专业知识和判断以及监测组的集体评估意见；
  - (e) 采集实物、照片、视频和(或)书面证据，用以佐证收集到的信息；
  - (f) 酌情分析卫星图像。
6. 监测组再次特意有步骤地做出努力，通过直接了解或认识直接了解违反制裁措施细节的人，接触参与违规行为的人。在某些情况下，监测组能够见证第一手的违规行为。
7. 监测组约谈了掌握有关信息的各种消息来源，包括政府官员及外交使团、民间社会组织和援助机构的代表。监测组还与联邦州官员、政治和武装团体代表以及工商界和索马里民间社会成员进行了会晤和沟通。

8. 依照关于信息敏感性、分类和处理的秘书长公报(ST/SGB/2007/6)，监测组已连同本报告一起向委员会提交了若干份严格保密附件，其中的信息如被披露，可能有损于联合国的正常运作或者联合国工作人员或第三方的福祉和安全，或违反本组织的法律义务。这些附件将不作为安全理事会的文件印发。

## 二. 武器禁运

### A. 联邦政府遵守武器禁运的情况

#### 通知

9. 第 2142(2014)号决议第 3 至 7 段规定了通知要求。<sup>1</sup> 索马里联邦政府主要负责在向其安全部队交付武器、弹药或军事装备或提供咨询、援助或培训之前，至少提前五天通知委员会，即预先交付通知(第 3 段)。<sup>2</sup> 提供援助的会员国或组织可协同联邦政府发出预先交付通知(第 4 段)。联邦政府必须至迟在武器或弹药交付 30 天后，书面向委员会证实交付已经完成，即交付后证实(第 6 段)。<sup>3</sup> 联邦政府必须在分配进口的武器或弹药后五天内，书面通知委员会武器或弹药交给索马里国家安全部队的去向单位或其存放地点，即分配后通知(第 7 段)。

10. 然而，遵守力度一直很弱。在本任务期间，没有按要求准确地通知武器和/或弹药的运送情况：

(a) 2017 年 7 月：中国捐赠的武器和弹药在没有预先交付通知的情况下运达。2018 年 2 月 2 日向秘书处发出交付后确认通知；

(b) 2017 年 8 月：美国捐赠的武器和弹药在 2015 年 9 月 8 日发出预先交付通知后运达。2018 年 8 月 31 日发出不合规的交付后确认通知；

(c) 2017 年 12 月：土耳其共和国捐赠的武器和弹药在没有预先交付通知的情况下运达。2018 年 1 月 10 日发出交付后确认通知；

(d) 2018 年 1 月：沙特阿拉伯在没有预先交付通知的情况下捐赠弹药。2018 年 1 月 17 日发出交付后确认通知；

(e) 2018 年 5 月：沙特阿拉伯捐赠的弹药。2018 年 5 月 2 日发出的预先交付通知未详细说明弹药的数量和类型或储存地点的详细信息。在编写本报告时，仍未发出交付后确认通知；

(f) 2018 年 6 月：吉布提捐赠的武器和弹药在没有预先交付通知的情况下运达。2018 年 7 月 18 日发出交付后确认通知；

<sup>1</sup> 第 2093(2013)号决议第 38 段曾规定必须在运送前发出通知，随后在第 2142(2014)号决议第 3 至 5 段中对此进行了修订。

<sup>2</sup> 根据第 2142(2014)号决议第 5 段，预先交付通知必须包括：“武器和弹药生产商和供应商的详细情况，有关武器和弹药的说明(包括类别、口径和拟议交货日期和地点)和索马里国家安全部队的预定收货单位或预定储存地点等其他所有相关信息。”

<sup>3</sup> 根据第 2142(2014)号决议第 6 段，交付后确认通知必须说明：“所交武器和弹药的编号、货运信息、提单、货物清单或装箱单和具体存放地点。”

(g) 2018 年 8 月：美国捐赠的武器。2018 年 1 月 9 日发出预先交付通知，仍未发出交付后确认通知。

11. 在向委员会发出的交付后确认通知中，，联邦政府将延迟和不完整的通知归因于误传。

12. 自部分解除武器禁运以来所有已通知的武器和弹药运送表见附件 1.1。

#### 武器和弹药的储存

13. 在整个任务期间，国家安全顾问办公室曾三次允许监测组进入哈兰中央军械库；2018 年 2 月 6 日、6 月 11 日和 8 月 27 日。监测组于 4 月 24 日和 5 月 29 日无法进入哈兰中央军械库。<sup>4</sup>

14. 监测组 6 月 11 日的视察受到阻碍，因为实行了新的标准操作程序，禁止在哈兰中央军械库内使用照像机，从而无法用照片记录军械库内的货物和必要的日志。<sup>5</sup> 尽管制裁委员会主席给联邦政府的信重申了让监测组能够全面进入并记录哈兰中央军械库内货物的重要性，但联邦政府继续禁止监测组在 8 月份晚些时候的视察中使用摄影设备。<sup>6</sup>

15. 2 月至 5 月期间，联邦政府在联合国地雷行动处支持下实施了缓解措施，以便安全储存 2018 年 1 月运送的 27 000 发 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹。哈兰中央军械库仓库的屋顶也得到了修复，大院围墙得到加固，这也是在地雷行动处支持下进行的。<sup>7</sup> 然而，哈兰中央军械库仍然不符合《国际弹药技术准则》。

16. 2018 年 5 月运送的 21 箱 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹被转移到了索马里宫。尽管提出了要求，但监测组还是未能视察位于索马里宫及摩加迪沙的国家情报与安全机构总部的其他军械库。

#### 武器和弹药的分发

17. 2018 年 2 月 6 日，监测组保存了 2017 年 6 月至 12 月的武器和弹药分发记录，包括分发订单和分发凭单。所审查的大多数记录都提到了 2017 年 7 月运送的武器和弹药的分发情况(见上文“通知”)。<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> 4 月 24 日无法进入是因为评价了最近运抵的一批武器。不过，索厄问题监测组确认，所提及的一批武器实际上于 2018 年 5 月 8 日运抵。5 月 29 日无法进入是因为哈拉内中央军械库工作人员不在。

<sup>5</sup> 2018 年 5 月 17 日，索厄问题监测组从国家安全顾问办公室收到了哈拉内中央军械库的武器和弹药管理标准作业程序拷贝件。

<sup>6</sup> 2018 年 7 月 24 日委员会主席给索马里联邦政府的信。

<sup>7</sup> 2018 年 6 月，监测组与排雷行动处工作人员在摩加迪沙举行了会议。

<sup>8</sup> 鉴于从 2018 年 6 月 11 日起无法进行拍摄记录，监测组一再要求提供 2018 年 2 月以来编制的相关分发记录的拷贝件。在编写本报告时，尽管联邦政府作出了保证，但监测组还没有收到任何记录。

18. 在 2017 年 8 月提交给委员会的报告中，联邦政府表示承诺实施“与分发后义务、包括与武器最终用户登记水平有关的管理、合规和报告强化程序。”<sup>9</sup> 然而，监测组在哈兰中央军械库所审查的分发订单和分发凭单仍然缺乏准确性和一致性，以至于监测组无法确定向每个区分发的武器数量的大致细目。<sup>10</sup>

19. 监测组还注意到，在向索马里安全部队分配武器和弹药方面缺乏一致的标准。鉴于整个任务期间在联邦政府的军械库储存了大量武器和弹药，特别是 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹，加之指挥和控制能力薄弱，并且索马里国民军内部的高级官员频繁更替，联邦政府进口武器的政治化分发和转移风险仍然很高。关于对 2017 年 6 月至 2017 年 12 月期间武器分发情况的进一步分析，见附件 1.3(严格保密)。

20. 2018 年 7 月 11 日，监测组审查了位于摩加迪沙的哈兰中央军械库向位于拜多阿的索马里国民军第 60 区分发武器和弹药的记录。监测组在比较哈兰中央军械库的官方文件和第 60 区的现有记录时发现了一些差异。监测组还注意到，索马里国民军第 60 区关于武器和弹药的内部记录不一致，并且该区缺乏有效储存和管理其军事装备的能力。这些因素很可能增加了武器弹药从索马里国民军第 60 区被转移到拜多阿军火商手中的风险(见下文“发现军火商拥有联邦政府的武器和弹药”)。

#### 实施武器禁运以来收到的武器和弹药

21. 根据提交给委员会的联邦政府的通知以及联邦政府提供的信息，监测组对 2013 年部分解除武器禁运以来正式进口的武器和弹药总数进行了审查。初步审查结果显示，联邦政府正式收到了约 20 000 件武器和 7 500 万发弹药，其中包括估计 70 000 发 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹。更多信息见附件 1.1(严格保密)。

22. 2017 年 12 月对索马里国民军进行的战备状态评估的结果<sup>11</sup> 显示，索马里国民军士兵中只有 70% 拥有武器，并且索马里国民军士兵持有的许多武器“属于地区安全部队或地方部族等非联邦政府实体所有”。相比之下，监测组的审查显示，联邦政府自部分解除武器禁运以来正式收到的武器数量与分发给索马里国民军的武器数量之间存在巨大差异。<sup>12</sup> 考虑到部分解除武器禁运前在索马里安全部队中已经在流通的武器数量，这些差异就更大。

<sup>9</sup> 2017 年 8 月 18 日索马里常驻联合国代表团的信，对监测组 2017 年 8 月 9 日的的信做出答复。

<sup>10</sup> 接收单位经常不清楚或根本没有列出，弹药分发单据和凭单中时不时提到多少发和多少箱，并且一些分发凭单彻底找不到了。

<sup>11</sup> 联邦政府国防部和国际伙伴于 2017 年 9 月至 12 月进行的战备状态评估，对索马里国民军的能力和资源进行了全面的第一手评估。评估结果已经在秘书处存档。

<sup>12</sup> 根据 2018 年 7 月索马里国民军的文件，索马里国民军有 23 176 名士兵，其中包括 Danab 特种部队等在外国训练的单位，并包括大约 2 000 名在“独立”营服役的士兵。以前曾经报告(见 S/2016/919，附件 2.1)，索厄问题监测组认为，索马里国民军的士兵人数极有可能被夸大，并且索马里国民军中很大一部分士兵是自由职业者。

23. 监测组对联邦政府自部分解除武器禁运以来正式收到的武器的审查摘要见附件 1.1(严格保密)。<sup>13</sup>

#### 发现军火商拥有联邦政府的武器和弹药

24. 在执行任务期间,监测组调查了摩加迪沙、拜多阿和杜萨马雷卜的军火商出售武器的情况。由于研究的敏感性和安全考虑,监测组利用了一个通过监测组对话者进行管理的由近 20 名当地数据收集者组成的网络。2017 年 9 月至 2018 年 8 月期间,监测组的数据收集者记录了军火商拥有的 48 件武器、7.62x39 毫米弹药和一个 RPG-7 型火箭筒,其标识与联邦政府进口的物资一致。<sup>14</sup> 48 件武器中有 37 件可以追溯到 2017 年年中运送的 AK 型突击步枪。<sup>15</sup> 记录在案的 13 件武器曾经分发给拜多阿第 60 区的士兵。<sup>16</sup>

25. 2018 年 7 月,监测组通过当地数据收集者收到了摩加迪沙 10 名军火商的证词。所有这些都提到,军火商的做法是招募人员,将武器存放在市内和郊区的安全房里。他们承认向索马里安全部队的低级成员以及高级指挥官和联邦政府官员购买武器。虽然监测组无法独立核实这一信息,但这些陈述与监测组其他来源提供的信息一致。例如,监测组的多个消息来源报告说,索马里安全部队中没有军饷的成员出售武器来维持生计的现象很普遍。其他人,包括安全部队内的高级官员,特别提到前国防军副首长阿卜杜拉希·阿里·阿诺德参与了大规模转移联邦政府进口的武器。<sup>17</sup>

#### 戈登将军军事基地

26. 2018 年 4 月 23 日,阿拉伯联合酋长国(阿联酋)的培训部队离开以后,摩加迪沙的戈登将军军事基地遭到抢劫(见下文“海湾外交危机的持续影响”)。2018 年 3 月 3 日,监测组数据收集者记录的军火商所拥有的武器中,至少有两件曾经被转移到戈登将军军事基地。<sup>18</sup> 根据曾经与总共 10 名军火商交谈过的监测组对

<sup>13</sup> 关于对 2017 年 6 月至 2017 年 12 月期间武器分发情况的进一步分析,见附件 1.3(严格保密)。

<sup>14</sup> 数据收集者记录了拜多阿、杜萨马雷卜和摩加迪沙的军事装备。49 件武器上有索马里联邦政府标识,2 件武器的特征与 2015 年以来交付给索马里联邦政府的物资一致。

<sup>15</sup> 见 2018 年 2 月 2 日 [S/AC.29/2018/NOTE.010](#)。2018 年 5 月 18 日和 8 月 29 日,索厄问题监测组两次致函索马里联邦政府,请其提供信息,说明索马里联邦政府的武器和弹药可能是如何转移给军火商的。尽管分享了许多武器和弹药的编号和批号及照片,但在编写本报告时,索厄问题监测组尚未收到实质性答复。

<sup>16</sup> 根据索厄问题监测组审查的关于第 60 区武器分发情况的文件,这些文件显示了士兵的姓名和指纹,旁边有他们的武器编号。

<sup>17</sup> 2018 年 4 月至 8 月期间,在内罗毕和摩加迪沙与高级安全官员、联邦州高级官员和索马里联邦政府前官员等进行的访谈。

<sup>18</sup> 根据索厄问题监测组于 2018 年 8 月审查的哈兰中央军械库记录。另见附件 1.4 和 1.4.1(严格保密)。



话者的证词，戈登将军军营的抢劫事件导致摩加迪沙 AK 型突击步枪的一般价格从 1 300-1500 美元下降到了 1 000-1150 美元。<sup>19</sup>

27. 监测组还收到了关于戈登将军营地事件后武器转移的信息。联邦政府进行的一项调查发现，摩加迪沙第 37 营指挥官 Khalif Ahmed Hashi Afloow 上校参与转移和销售 15 至 25 支 AK 型步枪和 2 支 PK 型轻机枪，他后来被解除职务。<sup>20</sup> 这些装备尚未收回，Afloow 后来被任命为第 12 区营的指挥官。

28. 关于记录在案的由军火商拥有的武器和弹药的进一步资料，见附件 1.4 和 1.4.1(严格保密)。关于由青年党以及摩加迪沙和拜多阿的军火商拥有的弹药的资料，另见附件 1.5。

#### 青年党使用索马里安全部队制服的问题

29. 自 2017 年 10 月以来，青年党行动人员在至少五次袭击中穿着可能捐赠给索马里安全部队使用的制服：2017 年 10 月 28 日、2017 年 12 月 14 日、2018 年 2 月 23 日、2018 年 7 月 7 日和 2018 年 7 月 14 日。在 2 月 23 日袭击索马里宫事件中，一名已故枪手的制服似乎与联合国开发计划署(开发署)2017 年 11 月 22 日在摩加迪沙举行的仪式上发给索马里警察部队的新制服一致。<sup>21</sup>

30. 2018 年 6 月，监测组记录了在摩加迪沙出售的索马里警察部队和索马里国民军穿的制服，其中包括至少一件制服和贝雷帽，其特征与开发署交付的索马里警察部队制服一致。<sup>22</sup>

31. 2018 年 8 月 22 日，在中朱巴州 Jilib 和 Sakow 的开斋节上，有人拍摄到青年党战斗人员身穿索马里国民军制服。媒体报道显示，这些制服是联邦政府分发给 10 月 14 日营的(见下文“摩加迪沙安全部队”)。<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> 另见 Abdi Sheikh 和 Feisal Omar, “独家报道：从索马里境内的阿拉伯联合酋长国训练设施偷出的武器，在公开市场上出售”，路透社，2018 年 4 月 25 日。可查阅：[www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-arms/weapons-stolen-from-uae-training-facility-in-somalia-sold-on-open-market-idUSKBN1HW26I](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-arms/weapons-stolen-from-uae-training-facility-in-somalia-sold-on-open-market-idUSKBN1HW26I)。

<sup>20</sup> 2018 年 8 月 28 日在摩加迪沙与索马里国民军指挥官和两个国际军事消息来源进行的访谈。

<sup>21</sup> 联合国开发计划署确认交付了 6 700 套制服。2018 年 7 月，索马里警察部队后勤局与索厄问题监测组分享的文件显示收到了 6 600 套制服。在 2018 年 9 月 20 日的信函中，索马里联邦政府通知索厄问题监测组，负责移交制服的索马里警察部队两名高级后勤军官已经被解除职务。

<sup>22</sup> 包括贝雷帽在内的一套警察制服的价格在 30 至 40 美元之间，配套靴子的售价在 18 至 20 美元之间。信息和照片由一个同摩加迪沙军火商有直接接触的消息来源提供，2018 年 6 月。

<sup>23</sup> 见 BBC 索马里新闻，“Al ShabaabiyotuutahaMilateriga”，2018 年 8 月 22 日。可查阅：[www.bbc.com/somali/war-45273417](http://www.bbc.com/somali/war-45273417)。

32. 尽管联邦政府有义务向委员会通报非致命性装备的交付情况，但自 2015 年 10 月以来，联邦政府一直没有就交付制服情况向会员国或捐助方发出通知，<sup>24</sup> 其中包括 2018 年 7 月 7 日交付的 20 000 套索马里警察部队制服。<sup>25</sup>

33. 关于青年党使用索马里安全部队制服的进一步详情，见附件 1.6。

#### 联邦政府关于从青年党手中缴获的武器和弹药的报告

34. 安全理事会第 2182 (2014)号决议第 6 段请联邦政府记录和登记在进攻行动中缴获的所有军事装备，并协助监测组在重新分配或销毁所有军事事项前对其进行检查。在执行任务期间，监测组了解到，索马里国民军至少三次缴获武器，但监测组没有收到任何相关信息。<sup>26</sup> 2015 年，联邦政府曾有一次向监测组提供了关于缴获军事装备的信息(见 S/2015/801，第 139 段)。

35. 然而，在西南州安全部队于 2018 年 1 月 18 日在拜多阿附近的 DambalCalaan 村从青年党手中缴获弹药后，监测组确实收到了西南州行政当局提供的照片。监测组发现所缴获的几枚炮弹上的盖印标识与监测组在哈兰中央军械库记录的联邦政府的弹药标识相同。关于西南州所缴获弹药的进一步详情，见附件 1.5。

#### 联邦政府给安全理事会的报告

36. 2017 年 10 月和 2018 年 4 月，安全理事会收到了联邦政府根据最近的第 2385(2017)号决议第 8 段提交的报告。<sup>27</sup> 关于“其安全部队的结构、人员组成、兵力和配置，包括州部队和民兵部队的现状”，两份报告都不准确，不符合安全理事会的要求。<sup>28</sup>

37. 例如，关于索马里国民军，监测组注意到，联邦政府提交安理会的报告、战备状态评估、联邦政府/索马里国民军的内部报告和独立分析之间在索马里国民军部队的结构和兵力方面存在重大差异。监测组意识到，自 2017 年末以来，索马里国民军的一个“重新分区”计划一直在进行中。这些报告没有提到索马里国民军结构的这一重大修正，也没有提到所取得的任何进展的细节。

38. 尽管根据 2017 年 4 月商定的《国家安全架构》，必须处理州部队或民兵部队的问题(见下文的“安全部门改革”)，但两份报告都没有提供关于这些部队现状

<sup>24</sup> 委员会仅在本次任务期间收到了有关联合王国和意大利交付制服的通知。

<sup>25</sup> 2018 年 8 月 16 日，监测组要求提供信息，说明自 2017 年 9 月以来向索马里安全部队运送的所有制服的接收、储存和分发情况。2018 年 9 月 20 日，联邦政府确认收到了 20000 套制服，并指出 1210 套已分发给贝纳迪尔警察局，其余制服存放在索马里警察部队仓库，但没有答复监测组的其他询问。

<sup>26</sup> 监测组在 2018 年 6 月 27 日的信函中向联邦政府回顾了第 2182(2014)号决议第 6 段规定的义务。

<sup>27</sup> 联邦政府报告的提交日期在监测组中期最新情况简报和最终报告的提交截止日期之后不久，这使监测组无法在其报告中纳入及时的分析。

<sup>28</sup> 监测组还注意到，2017 年 10 月报告的某些章节被复制并粘贴到 2018 年 4 月的报告中。这些章节包括“军事装备基础设施”、“转移控制”、“实物安保和储存管理”以及“武器标识”。



的信息。这些报告没有提供关于摩加迪沙安全部队现状的信息(见下文的“摩加迪沙安全部队” )。

39. 2018 年 4 月的报告中没有提及索马里国民军和 SKA 国际集团有限公司于 2018 年初谈判达成的协议。在该协议中, SKA 同意除其他外, 向索马里国民军提供后勤支持和能力建设。<sup>29</sup>

## B. 会员国遵守武器禁运的情况

### 在柏培拉建造阿拉伯联合酋长国军事基地

40. 监测组在其 2017 年最后报告中报告称, 在柏培拉设立一个外国军事基地涉及到向该领土转移军用物资, 这将违反对索马里的武器禁运(见 [S/2017/924](#), 第 146-150 段)。2017 年 11 月 22 日, 彭博新闻社报道称, 总部位于阿拉伯联合酋长国的 Divers Marine Contracting LLC 公司已经签约修建该基地。<sup>30</sup> 2018 年 3 月 15 日, 路透社报道称, 阿拉伯联合酋长国将根据该协议训练索马里兰部队。<sup>31</sup>

41. 2018 年 2 月 2 日, 监测组致函索马里兰行政当局, 重申在柏培拉设立外国军事基地将违反对索马里的武器禁运, 并且根据安全理事会第 2111 (2013)号决议第 11(a)段, 任何支持索马里兰安全部门机构的援助都需要得到委员会的通知和批准。监测组还在信中要求提供最新情况, 说明柏培拉军事基地的发展现状, 并询问索马里兰行政当局为确保遵守安全理事会对索马里的武器禁运而采取的步骤。迄今为止, 监测组尚未收到回复。

42. 2018 年 6 月 5 日, 监测组致函阿拉伯联合酋长国, 要求提供有关在柏培拉设立军事基地和扩建港口设施的信息。9 月 7 日, 阿拉伯联合酋长国答复称: “[阿拉伯联合酋长国]已经与索马里兰签订一项开发和管理柏培拉港的协议。[阿拉伯联合酋长国]与索马里各州签订的所有协议都依据赋予这些州领导人的宪法权力, 以期实现索马里共和国及其人民的安全、稳定和繁荣。”

43. 2018 年 9 月 21 日拍摄的卫星图像显示, 柏培拉的设施正在建设中(见附件 1.7)。

<sup>29</sup> 2018 年 2 月 28 日和 2018 年 4 月 10 日索马里国民军和 SKA 公司之间关于该协议的信函, 已在秘书处存档。

<sup>30</sup> Nizar Manek, “Divers group says it’s building U.A.E. naval base in Somaliland”, 彭博社, 2017 年 11 月 22 日。可查阅: [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/divers-group-says-it-s-building-u-a-e-naval-base-in-somaliland](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-22/divers-group-says-it-s-building-u-a-e-naval-base-in-somaliland)。

<sup>31</sup> Alexander Cornwell, “UAE to train Somaliland forces under military base deal: Somaliland president”, 路透社, 2018 年 3 月 15 日。可查阅: [www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-somaliland-president/uae-to-train-somaliland-forces-under-military-base-deal-somaliland-president-idUSKCN1GR2ZH?il=0](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-somaliland-president/uae-to-train-somaliland-forces-under-military-base-deal-somaliland-president-idUSKCN1GR2ZH?il=0)。

## C. 非洲联盟驻索马里特派团遵守武器禁运的情况

### 进攻中缴获的军事装备

44. 在上一个任务期间，无论是非洲联盟委员会主席索马里问题特别代表还是非索特派团前任部队指挥官都向监测组保证，已经向非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)所有区指挥官分发了关于缴获武器管理问题的程序和指令。<sup>32</sup>

45. 2018 年 5 月 9 日，监测组收到了非索特派团乌干达人民国防军特遣队在下谢贝利州 Bulomareer 缴获的武器和弹药照片。这标志着自通过第 2182(2014)号决议以来，<sup>33</sup> 监测组首次获得关于非索特派团缴获的军事装备的详细信息。这些照片证明对监测组调查青年党获取武器的问题很有价值(见下文“乌干达人民国防军缴获青年党的武器和弹药”)。

46. 这是唯一一次非索特派团特遣队与监测组分享关于所缴获武器的信息。例如，埃塞俄比亚国防军没有向监测组通报 2018 年 3 月非索特派团的一个特遣队在拜多阿缴获青年党武器的情况。<sup>34</sup>

### 乌干达人民国防军缴获青年党武器和弹药的情况

47. 乌干达人民国防军在 Bulomareer 从青年党手中缴获的物品中有一枚手榴弹是 2001 年比利时制造。2018 年 7 月 3 日，监测组得到标识牌制造商 Mecer 公司的证实，称该标识牌是 2001 年 10 月 14 日出售给沙特阿拉伯王国国防和航空部的 432 件产品中的一个。<sup>35</sup> 监测组还得到证实，保加利亚制造的两枚 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹于 2005 年出售给了也门共和国国防部。<sup>36</sup> 这次缴获标志着在索马里最南端，监测组记录了经证实源自也门的武器。

48. 缴获中记录的其他装备可能是青年党在以往袭击非索特派团部队后缴获的。<sup>37</sup> 例如，监测组得到证实，印度制造的卡尔·古斯塔夫无后座力步枪 84 毫米高爆反坦克 Förenade Fabriksverken(FFV)651 型射弹于 2008 年 6 月供给肯

<sup>32</sup> 监测组于 2017 年 3 月 27 日和 28 日在内罗毕会见了非洲联盟委员会主席索马里问题特别代表和部队指挥官，以及非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(非索特派团)所有区的负责人。2017 年 4 月 21 日，非索特派团业务主任向所有区发送了一份备忘录，要求他们每月提交关于缴获武器和弹药的报告。

<sup>33</sup> 安全理事会第 2182(2014)号决议第 6 段请索马里国民军和非索特派团记录和登记在进攻行动中或执行任务过程中缴获的所有军事装备，包括记录武器和/或弹药的类型和编号，对所有物项和相关标识进行拍照，协助监测组在重新分配或销毁所有军事物项前对其进行检查。

<sup>34</sup> 埃塞俄比亚国防军在将这些武器移交给西南州内政部长之前，记录了这些武器的编号和类型。2018 年 7 月 9 日，非索特派团第 3 区指挥官告知监测组，他没有收到任何关于缴获武器的指令。

<sup>35</sup> 监测组尚未收到对 2018 年 7 月 10 日向沙特阿拉伯提出的追查请求的答复。

<sup>36</sup> 2018 年 6 月 26 日，保加利亚常驻联合国代表团代表确认这些物品是 Vazovski Mashinostroitelni Zavodi (VMZ) JSCo 公司于 2005 年制造的，由保加利亚 Arcus JSCo 公司出售给也门政府。

<sup>37</sup> 监测组曾报告青年党在袭击非索特派团基地后获取武器的情况(见 S/2017/924，附件 1.1)。

尼亚。然而，向制造其他各种缴获物品的会员国提出的追查请求都未能提供得出确切信息。<sup>38</sup>

49. 乌干达人民国防军缴获的物品中还有三支 AK 型突击步枪和一枚 RPG-7 型火箭榴弹，其标识与 2017 年交付给联邦政府的物品一致。2018 年 5 月 18 日，监测组致函联邦政府，请求协助追查这些物资。截至编写本报告时，监测组尚未收到回复。关于乌干达人民国防军缴获物品的进一步信息，见附件 1.8。

## D. 军事装备非法流入索马里

### 设在邦特兰和也门的走私网络

50. 邦特兰仍然是主要来自也门的非法武器进入索马里的首要入境点。在本任务期间，监测组继续调查其以往报告中详述的以博萨索为基地的几个主要武器进口商，特别是 Mahad Isse Aden(别名 Laboballe)、Abdi Mohamed Omar(别名 Dhofaye) 和 Abshir Mohamed Barre。<sup>39</sup> 监测组获得的财务记录显示，Laboballe、Dhofaye 和 Barre 在 2017 年 9 月至 2018 年 3 月期间向以也门为基地的军火商转移了超过 160 000 美元。<sup>40</sup> 仅仅在 2018 年 1 月，这笔款项中就有 130 000 美元被寄给了一个以前不为人知的人，<sup>41</sup> 他代表美国指认的基地组织协调人 Sayf Abdulrab Salem Al-Hayashi(别名 Sayf Al-Baydani)处理汇款。

51. 此外，监测组在其上一个任务期间获得的财务记录显示，2016 年 10 月至 2017 年 10 月期间，“Dhofaye” 将近 280 000 美元直接转给 Al-Hayashi。2017 年 10 月 25 日，Al-Hayashi 因与阿拉伯半岛基地组织(半岛基地组织)有联系而被美国财政部列为特别指认的全球恐怖分子；<sup>42</sup> 在他被指认之后，为武器交易目的从 Dhofaye 转出的账目开始通过上述财务代理人传送。

52. 初步结果表明，Al-Hayashi 是 Fares Mohammed Mana'a 的同伙，后者是也门胡塞政府的主要军火商和国务部长。2010 年 4 月 12 日，Mana'a(SOi.008) 因违反安全理事会第 1844(2008)号决议第 8 段(其中包括有关违反武器禁运的标准)而被列入根据该决议编制的制裁名单(SOi.008)。<sup>43</sup>

<sup>38</sup> 2018 年 7 月 18 日，俄罗斯联邦政府证实，火箭推进榴弹的推进剂和弹头 2007-2008 年在俄罗斯联邦生产，但由于时间久远，无法提供文件。在编写本报告时，监测组尚未收到对 2018 年 6 月 5 日向中国提出的追查请求的答复。

<sup>39</sup> 见 S/2017/924，第 106 至 110 段和附件 7.1；S/2016/919，附件 8.10。

<sup>40</sup> 对移动电话记录的分析显示，Laboballe 虽然有一个与他的乳香出口公司 Guure Store 相联的电话号码，但却是连接也门武器出口商和以邦特兰为基地的武器进口商的关键节点。见附件 1.9 (严格保密)。

<sup>41</sup> 关于此人的详细信息载于附件 1.9 (严格保密)。

<sup>42</sup> 参见美国财政部新闻稿，“反恐怖主义的指认”，2017 年 10 月 25 日。可查询：[www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20171025.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20171025.aspx)。

<sup>43</sup> 2015 年 1 月，Mana'a 违反联合国对他发布的旅行禁令，持外交护照前往巴西，访问了 Forjas Taurus S.A 兵工厂。关于 Mana'a 购买金牛座左轮手枪和其他手枪(可能会被贩运到索马里)的情形，详见也门问题专家小组的报告(S/2018/193，附件 41)。

53. 附件 1.9(严格保密)介绍了针对邦特兰和也门武器走私网络进行的移动电话联系分析。

#### 2017 年 9 月在邦特兰缉获走私物资

54. 如 S/2017/924(附件 7.1)所述, 2017 年 9 月 23 日, 邦特兰海事警察拦截了一艘从也门开往索马里的船只, 并扣押了船上的武器弹药。2017 年 10 月 2 日, 监测组在邦特兰当局的协助下, 视察了在博萨索缉获的这批物资。

55. 武器中有一款机关枪与中国制造的 W-85 式一致, 11 支 56-2 式冲锋枪也可能是中国制造。2018 年 3 月 7 日和 5 月 14 日, 监测组分别发出信函, 索要有关 W-85 式和 56-2 式枪械、包括它们如何流入非法领域的信息。2018 年 8 月 13 日, 中国答复说, 没有任何中国公司违反对索马里的武器禁运, 但中国无法提供有关武器出口的进一步信息。

56. 在邦特兰缉获的两挺 M-84 式机关枪由塞尔维亚扎斯塔瓦兵工厂制造。2018 年 4 月 12 日, 塞尔维亚当局证实, 2015 年向 Yugoimport SDPR 公司出售了 1 000 挺 M-84 式机枪, 准备 2016 年 5 月转运阿布扎比; 阿拉伯联合酋长国武装部队被列为最终用户。<sup>44</sup>

57. 被查获的弹药包括 2013 年保加利亚制造的几箱 7.62×39 毫米子弹。在 2018 年 3 月 29 日收到的函件中, 保加利亚当局证实制造商(JSCo.兵工厂)2015 年向阿拉伯联合酋长国武装部队出售了这批弹药, 2015 年还向沙特阿拉伯国防部出售了弹药。<sup>45</sup>

58. 2018 年 6 月 28 日和 8 月 15 日, 监测组向阿拉伯联合酋长国发函, 索要关于 7.62×39 毫米弹药和 M-84 式机枪、包括它们如何流入非法领域的任何现有信息。在编写本报告时, 监测组尚未收到答复。2018 年 7 月 31 日, 专家组还向沙特阿拉伯王国发函, 索要关于 7.62×39 毫米弹药的信息。在提交本报告时, 监测组尚未收到答复。

59. 关于 2017 年 9 月邦特兰缉获品的资料, 详见附件 1.10。

#### 博萨索记录到的美国发出的轻机枪和弹药

60. 2017 年 12 月, 监测组收到了有关 5 月最初在博萨索记录到的、源自也门的一批武器弹药的资料。其中有一台轻机枪(PKM 式)和若干罗马尼亚生产的 7.62×39 毫米弹药(照片见附件 1.11)。根据罗马尼亚政府提供的资料, PKM 式轻机枪出口具有 2009 年 11 月 30 日最终用户证书, 写明仅供美国陆军使用。<sup>46</sup> 此外, 2003 年 4 月 24 日, 向美国进口商“联合国际供应公司”交付了与博萨索记录到

<sup>44</sup> 2018 年 8 月 15 日, 监测组致函阿联酋, 要求说明这些武器的预期用途及其流入非法领域的途径。在编写本报告时, 监测组尚未收到答复。

<sup>45</sup> 此笔销售相应的最终用户证书规定, 未经保加利亚当局许可, 这批物资不得再出口或转让。

<sup>46</sup> 从设在英国的咨询公司“冲突军备研究所”的 iTrace 数据库获取的信息([www.conflictarm.com/itrace](http://www.conflictarm.com/itrace))。

的弹药批号相同的 7.62×39 毫米弹药。无论是 PK 式机枪还是 7.62×39 毫米弹药，都不是美国陆军的标准配置。

61. 2018 年 1 月 5 日，监测组致函美国政府，请求协助了解所记录的上述军用物资如何在也门流入非法领域。在编写本报告时，监测组尚未收到其索要的信息。

#### 设在意大利的走私网络

62. 2017 年 10 月 4 日，意大利佛罗伦萨当局逮捕了四名索马里国民和一名意大利人，他们涉嫌参与向索马里非法出口已被弃用、但尚未进行非军事化处理的军用车辆。意大利当局 2018 年 6 月 20 日函告监测组，他们通过调查，发现了一个专门从事二手军事设备贸易的犯罪网络。这五名嫌疑人被指控非法贩运军事装备和违反意大利银行法。在进一步搜查期间，意大利当局查获了准备出口的车辆和其他设备，以及包括财务转账收据在内的文件。<sup>47</sup>

### 三. 威胁索马里和平、安全与稳定的行为

#### A. 青年圣战运动(青年党)

63. 青年党这一极端主义暴力团体仍然是对索马里和平、安全 and 稳定的最直接威胁。尽管自 2017 年 6 月以来加强了针对青年党武装分子和领导人的空袭，但该组织在索马里进行不对称攻击的能力并没有显著下降。自 2017 年 9 月以来，青年党已在摩加迪沙进行了八次严重的简易爆炸装置袭击，<sup>48</sup> 造成至少 700 人死亡；其中，10 月 14 日在祖贝交叉路口发生的致命事件造成多达 582 人丧生。

64. 青年党仍然有能力时不时地对索马里和非索特派团部队发起常规攻击。例如，2018 年 4 月 1 日(复活节星期天)，青年党在下谢贝利州 Bulo Mareer、Golweyn 和 Qoryoley 对非索特派团三个前方作业基地发动协调的复杂袭击。这是自 2017 年 1 月 27 日青年党袭击下朱巴州 Kulbiyow 的肯尼亚国防军基地以来，青年党首次对非索特派团基地发动大规模袭击。

65. 在 2015 年非索特派团停止主要进攻行动之后，青年党仍然直接控制着索马里南部朱巴河谷沿岸的地方，即中朱巴州的吉利布、贾马勒、布阿勒和萨科四镇一带。索马里中部 Harardhere 和 El Dher 周围的大型沿海地区仍然为青年党直接控制。有迹象表明，在邦特兰的戈利斯山区，青年党叛乱势焰日盛；邦特兰和索马里兰围绕图卡拉克镇的敌对行动仍在进行中，青年党随时准备趁机占便宜。

<sup>47</sup> 在向意大利当局提出索要进一步信息的请求后，监测组获悉，他们无法及时分享详细信息，供提交本报告之用。

<sup>48</sup> 重大攻击此处定义为导致至少五人死亡的攻击。青年党还在摩加迪沙以外地方进行了多次重大的简易爆炸装置攻击行动，其中包括 2017 年 9 月 1 日在邦特兰 Afurur 村一个市场发生的车族简易爆炸装置袭击事件，造成至少 12 人丧生。



## 简易爆炸装置

66. 监测组在其 2017 年报告中注意到青年党部署的简易爆炸装置爆炸力也有增加(见 S/2017/924, 第 24 段)。在本任务期间,这一趋势仍在持续;2017 年 10 月 14 日,青年党在摩加迪沙引爆了一个大型车载简易爆炸装置,这可能是该团体有史以来爆炸品净量最大的炸弹(见下文“2017 年 10 月 14 日爆炸”)。

67. 青年党制造简易爆炸装置的主要材料,仍然是取之于战争遗留爆炸物的三硝基甲苯和在袭击非索特派团基地时劫取的弹药。2017 年,监测组调查了青年党使用的简易爆炸装置日益增大是否可以归因于制造自制爆炸物的集团(见 S/2017/924, 第 24 至 26 段和附件 1.2(严格保密))。虽然美国联邦调查局恐怖爆炸装置分析中心尚未找到青年党正在自制爆炸物的确凿证据,但实验室分析表明,该团体继续将梯恩梯和其他军用级爆炸物与自制爆炸物组分结合,即硝酸钾和氯酸钾等<sup>49</sup> 氧化剂。<sup>50</sup> 该中心曾假设 青年党一直在向简易爆炸装置添加氧化剂以“增加”炸药份量,尽管目前尚未就该技术是否具有化学效力达成共识。<sup>51</sup>

68. 该中心还证实,青年党已经自己制造了简易电子雷管,不用再像过去那样一直从国外进口了。该中心在抽查简易爆炸装置时,发现了硝酸甘油<sup>52</sup> 以及铝<sup>53</sup> 的存在。

69. 有关青年党制造简易爆炸装置的情形,详见附件 2.1(严格保密)。

## 国内和州内行动

### 2017 年 10 月 14 日爆炸

70. 2017 年 10 月 14 日,一个大型车载简易爆炸装置在摩加迪沙霍丹区的祖贝十字路口附近爆炸,被炸身亡者多达 582 人。<sup>54</sup> 这是有史以来索马里死亡人数

<sup>49</sup> 在 2017 年 3 月至 7 月期间,索马里境内发生 12 起简易爆炸装置袭击和缉获行动,其中至少 6 起(在肯尼亚有 1 起)被恐怖爆炸装置分析中心通过实验室分析确认了存在氧化剂。但是,恐怖爆炸装置分析中心解释说,他们只能确认在两起情形中,这些化学品被炸弹制造者作为氧化剂添加。在这两起情形中,样本是从缉获的简易爆炸装置中提取的,因此这些装置没有被引爆。在另外四起情形中,样本是爆炸后用拭子取出的,这使分析不太令人信服。2018 年 9 月 12 日恐怖爆炸装置分析中心发来的电子邮件。

<sup>50</sup> 当氧化剂与适当比例的燃料结合时,会为简易爆炸装置提供氧的化学源。

<sup>51</sup> 2018 年 7 月 31 日采访恐怖爆炸装置分析中心。联合国地雷行动处索马里办事处将青年党的军用炸药和氧化剂混合物称为“混合爆炸物”。联合国地雷行动处索马里办事处,“关于 2017 年 10 月 14 日摩加迪沙车载简易爆炸装置袭击事件的报告”。

<sup>52</sup> 2018 年 7 月 31 日,恐怖爆炸装置分析中心告知监测组,没有证据表明青年党正在自行制造硝酸甘油;硝酸甘油是敏感性强的爆炸物,在商业炸药或简易炸药中找到。

<sup>53</sup> 恐怖爆炸装置分析中心还告知监测组,用作涂料添加剂的铝粉可产生热能,因此产生大量热量。在车载简易爆炸装置中,铝粉发出明亮的闪光,可以提高事件的宣传价值。2018 年 9 月 14 日恐怖爆炸装置分析中心发来的电子邮件。

<sup>54</sup> 联合国索马里援助团(联索援助团)人权和保护小组与联合国人权事务高级专员办事处(人权高专办)。根据武装冲突地点和事件数据项目,爆炸造成的死亡人数为 587 人(见 [www.acleddata.com/](http://www.acleddata.com/))。

最多的一次恐怖袭击。该行动可能是以摩加迪沙机场综合体为攻击目标；然而，在检查站遭遇联邦政府安全部队后，大型车载简易爆炸装置在未达目标时就被提前引爆。可能由于众多无辜平民伤亡，青年党从未正式声称对此次袭击负责。

71. 青年党情报局高级官员 Hassan Adan Isaq(又名 Abdinasir Jeeri, 23 岁)因在行动中的作用被起诉、随后被判处死刑。Isaq 的任务是协调部署第二个车载简易爆炸装置，即一辆丰田诺亚小型货车，其意图可能是突破机场综合体外围线，以便为大型车载简易爆炸装置扫清道路。<sup>55</sup>

72. 索马里主要电信提供商“索马里豪穆德电信公司”的两名雇员也因此次袭击事件而被起诉，他们为大型车载简易爆炸装置通过摩加迪沙郊区的 Sinka Dheere 检查站进场提供了便利。<sup>56</sup> 其中一人(Abdiweli Ahmed Diriye)后被判三年徒刑。

73. 监测组于 2018 年 5 月 12 日会晤豪穆德电信公司的代表，但该公司拒绝了监测组关于提供与该阴谋策划者有关的手机数据要求。

74. 对大型车载简易爆炸装置的评估表明梯恩梯当量超过 1 200 公斤，使其成为青年党有史以来最大的爆炸装置。<sup>57</sup> 摩加迪沙的爆炸物处理专家对爆炸物进行了现场试验，结果表明存在军用级炸药和氧化剂硝酸钾。<sup>58</sup> 虽然没有证据表明大型车载简易爆炸装置含有自制爆炸物，但通过传统的收集战争遗留爆炸物方法制造 1 200 公斤炸弹需要进行大规模后勤作业；例如，青年党将不得不收集约 6 000 枚 60 毫米迫击炮弹或 190 枚 TM 57 型反坦克地雷。<sup>59</sup> 有关 2017 年 10 月 14 日袭击的进一步详情载于附件 2.2。

2018 年 2 月在肯尼亚挫败车载简易爆炸装置阴谋

75. 2018 年 2 月 15 日，肯尼亚警察在 Isiolo 县 Merti 分部进行例行巡逻，逮捕了两名青年党特工 Abdimajit Hasan Adan 和 Mohammed Nanne Osman，他们携带了一枚准备用于攻击内罗毕综合体的车载简易爆炸装置。警方还查获了 5 枚 56-2

<sup>55</sup> 监测组两度致函联邦政府，要求与 Hassan Adan Isaq 面谈：第一次请求被拒绝；监测组没有收到对其第二封信的回复。联邦政府向至少一个位于摩加迪沙的私人承包商提供了访谈机会。

<sup>56</sup> 联邦政府处理 10 月 14 日袭击事件的调查员于 2018 年 3 月 20 日在摩加迪沙同监测组进行了面谈；他认为青年党“已渗入豪穆德公司”。

<sup>57</sup> 2018 年 4 月 5 日，一名独立的爆炸物工程师使用爆炸工程软件进行分析，使用的输入参数包括卫星图像显示的破坏半径、路面类型和爆炸弹坑尺寸。同一位专家估计，2017 年 1 月 2 日在摩加迪沙的麦地那门引爆的大型车载简易爆炸装置迄今为止是青年党最大的简易爆炸装置，其梯恩梯当量约为 1200 公斤(见 S/2017/924，第 12 段)。这两项估算都经过同行评审，并得到了联合国王国爆炸分析工程师的同意。联合国地雷行动处索马里办事处估计，2017 年 10 月 14 日大型车载简易爆炸装置的爆炸当量在 600 公斤至 1000 公斤之间，但也得认定，该装置比以前攻击所用装置更大。联合国地雷行动处索马里办事处，“关于 2017 年 10 月 14 日在摩加迪沙发生的车载简易爆炸装置袭击事件的报告”，2017 年 10 月。

<sup>58</sup> 2018 年 2 月 20 日在摩加迪沙同爆炸物处理专家面谈。然而，爆炸物处理团队使用的现场检测试剂盒并不像恐怖爆炸装置分析中心实验室分析那样准确。

<sup>59</sup> 根据每枚 60 毫米迫击炮弹采集到 0.20 公斤梯恩梯和每枚 TM 57 式反坦克地雷采集到 6.34 公斤梯恩梯的估算。联合国地雷行动处索马里办事处“关于 2017 年 10 月 14 日摩加迪沙车载简易爆炸装置袭击事件的报告”，2017 年 10 月。

式冲锋枪、36 个弹匣和 36 枚手榴弹。如果他们的攻击行动成功，那将是自 2015 年 4 月加里萨大学学院大屠杀(见 S/2015/801，附件 4.2)以来青年党在索马里境外发动的最重大的袭击事件。

76. 在肯尼亚反恐警察部队的协助下，监测组对所查获的 56-2 式冲锋枪作了记录，确认五支冲锋枪中至少有两支(几乎肯定是四支)是联邦政府在 2013 年根据安全理事会第 2093(2013)号决议部分取消武器禁运之后进口的(见附件 2.3)。联邦政府进口的武器被用于索马里境外的袭击行动，这还是第一起已知的情形。

77. 监测组所咨询的爆炸物处理专家称，车载简易爆炸装置的形状和设计以及组件似乎与索马里境内未遂攻击中使用的至少三个其他设备有着共同的特点(见附件 2.3.3(严格保密))。<sup>60</sup>

78. 该阴谋由一名情报局特工(仅知其为“Dere”)在索马里境内策划，他安排通过哈瓦拉汇款系统，把共约 30 000 美元(主要来自基斯马尤)汇给 Abdimajit Adan。监测组获得的电话记录还表明，Mohammed Nanne 和使用豪穆德电信公司 SIM 卡的索马里手机之间有多次接触。<sup>61</sup>

79. 该次阴谋恰当地说明了腐败与不安全之间的关系；警方对被捕的青年党人员进行询问后指出，这些人员能够来回穿越管理不严的肯尼亚-索马里边境，几乎不受什么干扰，双方拿贿赂的安全部队官员为其提供了便利。

80. 虽然在肯尼亚共有六人因此次行动被起诉，但几名已知的参与阴谋者却得以逃脱，而攻击小组——根据所查获步枪的数量推断可能由五人组成——可能仍然在肯尼亚境内逍遥法外。

81. 对 2018 年 2 月 Merti 阴谋的个案研究，见附件 2.3。

## 国内融资

82. 青年党的收入来自各种国内来源，主要是对过境车辆和货物征税、商业和农业税以及强征的“札卡特”(救济金)税。青年党的金融体系是系统化和集中化的，把从各州收得的税收转至位于中朱巴州吉利布县的 Qunyo Barrow 金融中心。<sup>62</sup> 这些资金随后由青年党财政部(Maktabka Maaliyada)负责人 Hassan Afgooye 及其理事会(协商委员会)支配，分发给青年党的特定部门。<sup>63</sup>

<sup>60</sup> 另外三个装置是：2017 年 7 月 20 日在 Elasha Biyaha 查获的一个车载简易爆炸装置；2016 年 3 月 9 日在摩加迪沙索马里警察局爆炸物处理总部附近截获的一个车载简易爆炸装置；2016 年 6 月 1 日在摩加迪沙大使酒店外查获的一个车载简易爆炸装置。

<sup>61</sup> 由于缺乏准确的用户注册数据，因此对索马里豪穆德电信公司大多数电话用户无法加以跟踪。见附件 2.3.1(严格保密)。

<sup>62</sup> 2018 年 2 月 6 日在拜多阿同 Mukhtar Robow 面谈，以及 2018 年 2 月 24 日在摩加迪沙同国家情报与安全机构一名官员面谈。

<sup>63</sup> 2018 年 2 月 5 日在摩加迪沙与国家情报与安全机构官员面谈，2018 年 2 月 18 日在基斯马尤约谈一名前青年党财务干事。



83. 青年党尽管自 2011 年以来逐渐放弃领土，但仍然在其不再实际控制、征税和提供伊斯兰法院等服务的地区担任影子政府。该团体采用黑手党式战术，能够通过内地的检查站网络来征税，并通过暴力和恐吓手段征收税款。<sup>64</sup>

84. 监测组的调查显示，尽管对青年党的空袭规模加大，但该党的财务状况依然稳健。实际上，青年党很可能产生大量预算节余；就该团体发动叛乱的能力而言，金钱并非制约因素。监测组仍在调查该团体如何支配超额收入。

#### 青年党的税收制度

85. 在索马里南部和中部，青年党将其税收制度划分为四个不同的收入来源：农场和农产品税收(“dalag”)、过境车辆的登记和征税(“gadiid”)、货运税(“badeeco”)和牲畜销售税(“xoolo”)。检查站由州财务官员管理，他们将税收转给青年党的州财务办公室，然后再转到 Qunyo Barrow 的全国财务办公室。每个级别都对税收都加以严格控制，并进行内部监测和审计。<sup>65</sup>

86. 与联邦政府或联邦成员州相比，青年党的国内税收部门更具有地域多样性和系统性。尽管各州税率存在差异，但在索马里中部和南部，一直采用青年党检查站税收制度。青年党实行了负责任和可预测的税收制度，包括提供收据。与联邦政府或联邦成员州部队控制的检查站相比，青年党不会对已在其他地点缴钱的司机双重征税。因此，商业司机往往宁愿从青年党而非联邦或州部队控制的检查站通过。<sup>66</sup>

87. 青年党最赚钱的检查站位于摩加迪沙西北约 160 公里处、拜州 Jameeco 通往拜多阿的路上。青年党一名级别较高的叛逃者——此人管理 Jameeco 检查站至 2018 年 3 月——称，检查站每天带来约 30 000 美元收入(每年 1 000 万美元)。<sup>67</sup>

#### 青年党在希兰州融资

88. 2018 年 3 月 30 日，非索特派团和索马里国民军在希兰州 Afarirdod 村进行联合行动，导致青年党州财政主管 Mohamed Nuur 死亡。从现场查获的三本分类帐——后由监测组获得，其中包含青年党 2014 年 10 月至 2018 年 3 月期间在希兰州的收支细目。

89. 分类账显示了一个精深的会计系统，青年党收税通过现金(美元和索马里先令)、移动货币、哈瓦拉汇款系统并可能通过银行账户进行内部转账。索马里豪穆

<sup>64</sup> 例如，试图绕过青年党检查站的卡车司机如果被发现就会被处决，其车辆和货物被焚毁。见附件 2.4。

<sup>65</sup> 在下朱巴的至少一个县，来自吉利布、属于一个名为 Dabagal(“后续工作”)的单位的约五名干事，每六个月对收据进行一次审计。Dabagal 干事然后为今后六个月期间发出一系列新收据。2018 年 2 月 2 日和 7 月 25 日，同下朱巴 Badhadhe 县前青年党财务主管的面谈。

<sup>66</sup> 2018 年 4 月至 5 月，同常跑摩加迪沙到 Belet Weyne 线的四名卡车司机进行了面谈；2018 年 2 月 24 日，在摩加迪沙同国家情报与安全机构一名官员面谈；2018 年 2 月 6 日，在拜多阿同 Mukhtar Robow 面谈。

<sup>67</sup> 2018 年 5 月 29 日，在拜多阿同叛逃的青年党指挥官面谈。

德电信公司的 EVC Plus 移动货币服务支持青年党金融系统的有效运作，允许该团体将其相当一部分资金转移到中朱巴州的金融中心，而无需跨越敌对领土实际运送全部现金。<sup>68</sup>

90. 附件 2.4 包括青年党国内融资的若干案例研究：附件 2.4.1 详述 2014-2018 年希兰州的青年党融资情况；附件 2.4.2 介绍了对拜州 Jameeco 检查站的研究；附件 2.4.3 介绍了青年党下朱巴州 Badhadhe 县的前任税务员的访谈情况；附件 2.4.4 详细介绍了中谢贝利州的检查站税收；附件 2.4.5 介绍了拜州 Berdale 县征收“札卡特”(救济金)税的案例研究。

### 穆赫塔尔·罗博夫叛逃

91. 2017 年 8 月，青年党前副领袖穆赫塔尔·罗博夫(别名阿卜曼苏尔)正式叛逃至联邦政府，并出席一系列高度报道的活动。<sup>69</sup> 罗博夫自叛逃以来，表示如果从索马里当局获得足够的支持，他希望返回其当地社区，利用他的民兵打击青年党。<sup>70</sup> 然而，除了罗博夫叛逃引起的最初公共关系成功之外，对于青年党叛逃者及其相关民兵如何得到有效管理的问题，联邦政府和联邦成员州当局提供的资源或指导十分有限。

92. 过去，青年党一些最严重挫折涉及整个部族及其相关民兵转变效忠对象，而不是某些个人的叛逃。<sup>71</sup> 罗博夫的 Leysan 小部族历来坚定地青年党结盟，特别是在拜州和巴科尔州。罗博夫对 Leysan 小部族具有重大的影响力，他鼓励部族成员集体脱离青年党。在编写本报告之际，20 名全部都来自 Leysan 的索马里青年党的成员在罗博夫唆使下叛逃至联邦政府。<sup>72</sup>

## B. 索马里境内的伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国派别

93. 监测组在 2017 年最后报告中详细说明了在邦特兰的巴里州活动的青年党前领导人 Sheikh Abdulqader Mu'min 领导的大约 120 至 200 多名与伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国(伊黎伊斯兰国)结盟的武装派别的行动、征聘和领导层情况(S/2017/924, 第 32-42 段)。

<sup>68</sup> 在一些情形下，按照索马里《反洗钱和处理资助恐怖主义行为法》(2016 年)第 14 条第(2)款的规定，记录在青年党分类账中的 EVC Plus 交易似乎超过 10 000 美元的门槛值，因此，豪穆德电信公司必须向索马里联邦政府财务报告中心申报。该法第 5(2(b))条还要求报告实体在交易等于或超过 10 000 美元的情况下“指明客户并核实其身份”。

<sup>69</sup> 2013 年，继青年党领导人内部斗争和随后清洗持不同政见者之后，罗博夫逃往巴科勒州，仍然在其当地民兵的保护之下。

<sup>70</sup> 2018 年 2 月 6 日在拜多阿与穆赫塔尔·罗博夫的访谈。

<sup>71</sup> 以往的例子包括加尔古杜德州的阿布加尔小部族在与“先知的信徒”组织联合打击青年党，以及组成希兰州 Macaawisleeey 民兵的哈瓦德尔小部族。

<sup>72</sup> 2018 年 5 月 28 日至 31 日与国家情报与安全机构官员的访谈和最近在拜多阿与青年党逃兵的访谈。在 2018 年 7 月的访谈中，罗博夫声称倾其所有，自费在拜多阿保留一个叛逃者安全藏身处。罗博夫说，如果联邦政府不支持 Leysan 叛逃者，他将不参与任何对现有青年党成员的进一步联系。2018 年 7 月 16 日，一名国际组织工作人员在拜多阿采访穆赫塔尔·罗博夫。

94. 2017 年 11 月 3 日，美国部队进行了头两次公开承认的空袭，打击邦特兰与伊黎伊斯兰国结盟的武装派别。据来自邦特兰的消息，其中一次空袭击中了一个山洞，导致大约 20 名武装分子死亡。<sup>73</sup> 根据伊黎伊斯兰国叛逃者提供的信息，索马里和厄立特里亚问题监测组确定了该次空袭的地点为“Buqu”。据一名叛逃者说，这里是沿海城镇周围山区四个伊黎伊斯兰国的“作战中心”之一，也是前伊黎伊斯兰国的甘达拉基地，拥有足够的淡水供应。<sup>74</sup>

95. 自美国空袭开始以来，伊黎伊斯兰国在邦特兰的行动开始陷于低潮，该团体似乎进入了缩减和重组阶段。然而显而易见的是，在伊拉克和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的伊黎伊斯兰国继续将索马里视为今后扩张的重要途径。在 7 月 27 日发表的伊黎伊斯兰国杂志 Naba 第 141 期，伊黎伊斯兰国开始使用索马里“省”的称谓。<sup>75</sup> 之前伊黎伊斯兰国称为“索马里”，而现在则将该国与其他伊黎伊斯兰国自称的省份归作一类，如伊拉克省、霍拉桑省、西奈省和叙利亚省。此外，在本任务期间，与伊黎伊斯兰国结盟的武装分子声称进行了一系列暗杀活动，主要是在摩加迪沙和阿夫戈耶。

#### 暗杀活动

96. 自 2017 年 10 月至 2018 年 8 月，伊黎伊斯兰国通过其附属的 Amaq 通讯社，声称对 50 起暗杀负责，<sup>76</sup> 主要是针对联邦政府的警察、情报官员，以及摩加迪沙和阿夫戈耶的财政官员。<sup>77</sup> 监测组独立证实了其中 13 起暗杀的真实性，尽管在大多数情况下无法证实受害者或罪犯的身份。

97. 尽管如此，有强有力的证据表明在索马里南部存在伊黎伊斯兰国暗杀网络。2018 年 4 月 22 日，贾马·侯赛因·哈桑因放置一枚路边简易爆炸装置在阿夫戈耶被捕，他身上还携带已停业的伊黎伊斯兰国的 Dabiq 杂志电子版。哈桑在审讯时向调查人员承认他与三起暗杀事件有关，两起在阿夫戈耶，一起在摩加迪沙。<sup>78</sup>

<sup>73</sup> 2017 年 11 月 6 日与一名前邦特兰情报干事的访谈，2017 年 11 月 8 日与一名邦特兰高级情报官员的访谈，2017 年 11 月 12 日与邦特兰的一名记者的访谈。2017 年 11 月 27 日，美国部队进行了第三次空袭，据报造成一名伊黎伊斯兰国武装分子死亡。美国非洲司令部，“美国为支持索马里联邦政府而开展空袭”，新闻稿，2017 年 11 月 27 日。可查阅：[www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30119/u-s-conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia](http://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30119/u-s-conducts-airstrike-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia)。

<sup>74</sup> 2018 年 2 月 26 日在博萨索与两名伊黎伊斯兰国叛逃者的访谈。两名叛逃者都报告说，之前他们一直在 Buqu。

<sup>75</sup> 可 查 阅：[https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2018/07/the-islamic-state-al-nabacc84\\_-newsletter-141.pdf](https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2018/07/the-islamic-state-al-nabacc84_-newsletter-141.pdf)。

<sup>76</sup> 此外，伊黎伊斯兰国通过阿马克通讯社，宣布对发生在摩加迪沙、Elasha Biyaha 和博萨索的 5 起简易爆炸装置袭击负责，并声称造成至少 21 名士兵和警察丧生。

<sup>77</sup> 大多数阿马克通讯社声称的暗杀事件的消息是通过私人团体在 Telegram 留言软件发布的。大约三分之一的声称事件伴有录像和(或)照片证据。

<sup>78</sup> 2018 年 7 月 31 日与审讯官的访谈。

98. 目前还不清楚哈桑在多大程度上(如果有的话)与邦特兰伊黎伊斯兰国派别的活动有关联。<sup>79</sup> 在 7 月 19 日军事法庭审判哈桑时,联邦政府检察官称其曾参加了伊黎伊斯兰国派别与邦特兰部队之间的战斗,并作为暗杀小组成员被派往阿夫戈耶。然而,监测组审查了从哈桑那里缴获的移动电话 SIM 卡内联系人名单,却没有发现在戈利斯电信公司登记的任何电话号码。该公司是邦特兰主要的电信公司。

99. 另外两名伊黎伊斯兰国派别的成员阿哈德·马哈茂德·阿卜迪(别名 Abtidoon)和 Mohamud Dahir Warsamow(别名 Rage 博士)也在 2018 年 7 月受到军事法庭审判。阿卜迪被联邦政府检察官指控在索马里南部成立伊黎伊斯兰国的一个分支,独立于邦特兰的派别。Warsamow 被指控为该团体的财务官。两人均于 8 月 2 日被判处 15 年监禁。

100. 附件 3.1 载有一份表格,说明在本任务期间伊黎伊斯兰国声称在索马里的暗杀事件。

#### 美国指认的据称伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国协调人

101. 2 月 9 日,美国财政部外国资产管制处将穆罕默德·米勒·阿里·优素福列为特别指认的全球恐怖分子,称他是一名“金融特工,为美国指认的 Abdulqadir Mumin (Mumin)开展与伊拉克和沙姆伊斯兰国结盟的活动提供资金”。<sup>80</sup> 优素福(别名“Soodareeri”)是一名博萨索商人,在监测组前两份报告中被点名为军火贩运人(见 S/2016/919, 附件 8.10; S/2017/924, 附件 7.1)。然而,监测组的评估认为“Soodareeri”不大可能是伊黎伊斯兰国成员或协调人。<sup>81</sup>

102. 此外,外国资产管制处制裁博萨索的牲畜出口公司 Liibaan 贸易,该公司被不准确地归于 Soodareeri 所有。Liibaan 贸易的所有人是 Liban Yusuf Mohamed(别名 Liban Dheere),他是博萨索的另一名军火贩运人,监察组 2016 年和 2017 年的报告也对其点名。监测组认为,Liban Yusuf Mohamed 可能与伊黎伊斯兰国派别有联系,监测组获得的移动电话记录表明他在 2016 年 11 月和 2018 年 1 月与伊黎伊斯兰国高级领导人 Abdihakim Dhuqub 有接触(见 S/2017/924, 附件 2.2)。附件 3.2(严格保密)提供了 Liban Dheere 的移动电话与 Abdihakim Dhuqub 和其他伊黎伊斯兰国已知成员和有关人员联络的一张联系图。

103. 根据与博萨索各利益攸关方的互动,监测组的评估认为,对于上述个人和实体的指认向当地企业业主发出了强大的威慑信号。因此,监测组建议安全理事会考虑利用定向制裁,以打乱邦特兰的军火贩运人,其中若干人与伊黎伊斯兰国

<sup>79</sup> 为了评估两个部门之间潜在的联系,监测组于 2018 年 7 月 6 日致函联邦政府,请求约谈贾马·侯赛因·哈桑,但没有收到答复。

<sup>80</sup> 美国财政部,“对伊拉克和沙姆伊斯兰国协调人的全球财政制裁”,新闻稿,2018 年 2 月 9 日。可查阅: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-release/sm0284>。

<sup>81</sup> 监测组审查了 Soodareeri 2018 年 2 月 2 日至 5 月 18 日的移动电话记录,没有发现他与 20 名监测组确定的伊黎伊斯兰国派别成员或有关人员的联络。监测组还多次与邦特兰的情报和安全部门的消息来源联络,他们坚持认为 Soodareeri 与伊黎伊斯兰国派别没有任何联系。

派别有联系(见 S/2017/924, 附件 7.1)。监测组打算在提交本报告之后, 向委员会提出相关的案情陈述。

## C. 政治和安全部门面临的挑战

### 海湾外交危机的持续影响

104. 在 2017 年报告中, 监察组突出强调了海湾外交危机对索马里的影响, 以及联邦政府行政当局要求在争端中保持中立之后变得日益孤立(见 S/2017/924, 摘要)。危机的余波在本任务期间持续存在。2017 年底, 一些联邦成员州领导人宣布支持与阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯的联盟。<sup>82</sup> 联邦政府各反对派, 包括一些联邦成员州领导人, 质疑行政当局的中立性。<sup>83</sup> 多个消息来源还指出, 联邦政府在财政上依赖卡塔尔。

105. 在整个任务期间, 总统办公厅前主任法哈德·亚辛经常被一系列广泛来源提及, 说他是联邦政府行政当局和卡塔尔之间的中间人。亚辛曾受雇于卡塔尔国家供资的半岛电视台媒体网络从事研究工作。在整个任务期间, 监测组收到多份报告, 包括来自同一个会员国、总理办公室和接近亚辛的来源, 称卡塔尔定期通过亚辛向联邦政府提供预算外现金付款, 部分用于奖励议会下院顺服的成员和在议会投票之前贿赂反对派议员。监测组无法独力记录卡塔尔给亚辛的任何资金转移, 然而在 2018 年 2 月 18 日、4 月 17 日和 7 月 25 日分别在多哈、纽约和摩加迪沙举行的与监测组的会议上, 卡塔尔官员声称没有向联邦政府提供预算外资金支持。

106. 在本任务期间, 联邦政府与阿拉伯联合酋长国之间的紧张关系在若干场合有所体现。在其 2017 年报告中, 监测组表示关切阿拉伯联合酋长国在索马里兰柏培拉建立军事基地(见上文“在柏培拉建立一个阿拉伯联合酋长国军事基地”), 并可能对联邦政府与索马里兰当局之间关系造成破坏(S/2017/924, 第 146 至 150 段)。2018 年 3 月, 联邦政府在阿拉伯联盟和联合国安全理事会声明反对建立该基地, 表示阿拉伯联合酋长国在伯贝拉的活动是对索马里主权的攻击。

107. 2018 年 4 月 8 日在亚丁·阿德国际机场, 当阿拉伯联合酋长国驻索马里大使穆罕默德·艾哈迈德·奥斯曼·哈马迪乘坐一架从阿布扎比起飞的包机抵达时, 联邦政府安全部队截获了他的行李箱, 内有约 960 万美元现金。在 2018 年 9 月收到的信函中, 阿拉伯联合酋长国当局告知监测组, 该资金转移的通知已预先送达联邦政府, 包括当时的国防部长, 因为这笔资金旨在用于支持索马里国民军。<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> 例如, 见 T. Roble, “Puntland differs with Fed Govt, insists UAE military ‘here to stay’”, 2018 年 4 月 16 日, Goobjoog News。可查阅: <http://goobjoog.com/english/puntlands-gaas-differs-with-fed-govt-insists-uae-military-here-to-stay/>。

<sup>83</sup> 5 月 13 日至 16 日在拜多阿举行的各州间合作委员会第二次会议之后发表的公报第 2.6 条(见下文“中央-外围关系”)包括以下声明: “尽管联邦政府假装对海湾危机表示中立, 已经足够明确地看出联邦政府其实已经有所偏袒。”

<sup>84</sup> 2018 年 9 月 6 日阿拉伯联合酋长国致函监测组。



108. 在现金扣押的前一天，监测组目击了阿拉伯联合酋长国外交使团成员与国家情报与安全机构前高级官员在内罗毕一家餐馆举行的会议。与会者讨论了联邦成员州的领导人、联邦议会议员和索马里国民军指挥官一起削弱联邦政府的情况，包括通过贿赂。<sup>85</sup> 关于该次会议的更多详情，见附件 4.1(严格保密)。

109. 4 月 23 日，阿拉伯联合酋长国部队撤出摩加迪沙的戈登将军训练营，他们已经培训了数百名索马里人，其中包括约 200 名特种部队成员。<sup>86</sup> 阿联酋部队的撤出在该市引发了暴力，驻扎在该基地的部队进行了掳掠并逃离营地(见上文“戈登将军军事基地”)。

### 中央-外围关系

110. 2017 年 10 月，5 个联邦成员州的主席在基斯马尤举行会议，讨论与联邦政府的关系并成立了“各州间合作委员会”。该委员会随后宣布暂时中止与联邦政府的所有合作。这一关系的恶化引起了联合国秘书长的干预，他于 2017 年 10 月 12 日促请联邦政府和联邦成员州稳定其关系。<sup>87</sup>

111. 在整个任务期间，各州间合作委员会成员之间和该委员会各成员与联邦政府之间的接触和合作都不正常。由联邦政府和联邦成员州的代表组成的国家安全委员会<sup>88</sup> 于 2018 年 2 月在摩加迪沙和 6 月再次在拜多阿举行会议，并宣布了各项成就，包括关于自然资源共享的协议。<sup>89</sup> 然而，委员会于 2018 年 9 月初在基斯马尤再次举行会议。在会后发布的公报中，各州间合作委员会列举了一系列不满，并宣布中止与联邦政府合作，直至各项要求得到满足。<sup>90</sup> 联邦政府不久后发出的关于在摩加迪沙召开国家安全委员会会议的邀请被各联邦成员州主席拒绝。

112. 2018 年 6 月至 9 月，监测组接洽了所有 5 个联邦成员州的高级代表和 2 个联邦成员州的主席，讨论了与联邦政府的关系。所有各方对联邦政府行政当局破坏各联邦成员州及其领导人权威的企图表示关切。对于安全部门改革和《国家安

<sup>85</sup> 该次会议的一份录音已在秘书处存档。会议的照片证据载于附件 4.1(严格保密)。

<sup>86</sup> 监测组审查了由联邦政府国防部的一名代表和阿拉伯联合酋长国特遣部队指挥官签署并由一名国际组织高级官员见证的 2018 年 4 月 22 日移交文件。

<sup>87</sup> 发言全文可查阅：[www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-10-12/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-countries-risk-famine](http://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-10-12/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-countries-risk-famine)。

<sup>88</sup> 旧称全国领导人论坛(见 S/2017/924，第 97 段)。截至 2018 年 9 月，仍未设立 2012 年《临时宪法》批准的机构，包括联邦政府和联邦成员州政府行政首长年度会议、为促进和管理政府间互动而通过的法律(第 51 条)以及州际委员会(第 111F 条)。

<sup>89</sup> 2018 年 2 月 6 日至 10 日在摩加迪沙和 2018 年 6 月 5 日在拜多阿举行的国家安全委员会会议上，联邦政府、联邦成员州和贝纳迪尔联邦州政府就分享渔业和采掘业收入达成临时协议。这些协议是分享自然资源收入的高级别政治契约，协议还规定了公共财政管理的重要内容，例如在索马里中央银行设立专门账户。尽管联邦政府、联邦成员州和贝纳迪尔联邦州政府合作共享自然资源收入是一个积极的事态发展，但这两份协议的意义也不应被夸大。这些协议不具有法律约束力，可能不完全符合相关的法律框架，包括《索马里渔业法》(2014)和《石油法》(等待议会批准)。这些协议的有效执行还需要体制能力，例如索马里渔业管理局和索马里石油管理局，而这些机构目前尚不存在。

<sup>90</sup> 各州间合作委员会公报，2018 年 9 月 8 日。

全架构》(见下文“安全部门改革”)以及联邦政府未能给各州分配武器弹药,所有各方还表示了专门关切。

### 安全部门改革

113. 自本届联邦政府行政当局 2017 年初就职以来,安全部门改革一直是国际伙伴的首要优先事项之一。<sup>91</sup> 虽然索马里全面安全部门改革的挑战分量不应被低估,但在本任务期内取得的进展却很有限,至少部分原因是联邦政府和联邦成员州之间关系紧张(见上文“中央-外围关系”)。<sup>92</sup> 联邦政府承诺遵守与联邦成员州和国际伙伴合作商定的安全部门改革并(或)将之作为优先事项,但监测组的各种情报来源也对此表示质疑。<sup>93</sup>

114. 截至 2018 年 9 月,即 2017 年 4 月在伦敦初步批准《国家安全架构》16 个月之后,基本上没有采取《构架》概述的实质性步骤。<sup>94</sup> 《构架》成功的关键是将现有州和部落部队编入索马里国民军,他们换装成为州警察部队,或者解除武装和复员。2017 年 12 月在摩加迪沙举行了会议,与国际合作伙伴讨论《国家安全架构》的进展。在这次会议之前不久,联邦政府宣布,2400 名邦特兰部队已正式编入索马里国民军。截至 2018 年 9 月,这些部队或其他任何州部队被纳入索马里国民军的实际程度仍然有限。<sup>95</sup> 州一级“邦特兰特别治安部队”的未来地位仍然不明朗。

115. 按照联邦成员州的政治边界“重新划分”索马里国民军的观点也构成了挑战。进入总部设在西南州拜多阿的索马里国民军第 60 区的盖多州索马里国民军各部被正式移交给正式总部设在朱巴兰州基斯马的索马里国民军第 43 区。<sup>96</sup> 朱巴兰行政当局 2018 年 7 月 2 日就索马里国民军第 43 区的问题向联邦政府提交了一份“严重关切”清单。<sup>97</sup> 联邦政府随后于 7 月中旬未与朱巴兰行政当局协商更换了第 43 区指挥官,新任指挥官被阻止在基斯马尤机场降落,并被迫绕道盖多州 Garbaharey。

<sup>91</sup> 国家安全架构是国家安全委员会于 2017 年 4 月在 2017 年 5 月伦敦会议之前不久批准的。在伦敦会议上与国际合作伙伴签署通过了《安全契约》。

<sup>92</sup> 2018 年 7 月 16 日至 17 日在布鲁塞尔举行的索马里伙伴关系论坛《公报》承认,对《国家安全架构》的关键部分持续缺乏一致意见,包括对州部队的整编。

<sup>93</sup> 2018 年 6 月至 9 月,监测组约谈了索马里安全部队官员、国际外交人员、国际组织工作人员和独立安保顾问。

<sup>94</sup> 对于制定一项新的“国家安全架构”的讨论可以追溯到 2013 年 5 月在伦敦举行的索马里会议。然而直到 2016 年,才认真开始其筹备工作。2017 年 4 月批准的该协议大纲,可查阅:<https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/london-somalia-conference-2017-security-pact.pdf>。与议会委员会磋商之后,国家安全架构得到修订。

<sup>95</sup> 据报告,最初选定编入索马里国民军的邦特兰特别治安部队参与了在 Tukaraq 与索马里兰的对峙(见下文“索马里兰与邦特兰之间冲突”),也表明了实施全面的安全部门改革继续面对挑战。

<sup>96</sup> 一支原先由 1 350 名士兵组成的部队在 2015 年正式编入基斯马尤的索马里国民军(见 S/2016/919,第 52 段),截至 2018 年 9 月该部队依然处于不活动状态。

<sup>97</sup> 朱巴兰州主席办公室 2018 年 7 月 2 日给联邦政府总统穆罕默德·阿卜杜拉希·穆罕默德的信。

116. 在 2017 年 12 月举行的会议上，联邦政府和国际伙伴商定必须制定“切合实际和基于条件的过渡计划，使索马里能够承担全部安全责任”。2018 年 3 月 22 日发布的《过渡计划》承认有必要在联邦政府、联邦成员州、非索特派团、联合国和国际合作伙伴之间开展密切合作。拟订一项 2018 年 1 月至 2021 年 12 月的全面分阶段过渡计划，这是一个积极的事态发展，然而截至 2018 年 9 月，包括建立各州安全委员会在内的一些初步期限都已经错过。

117. 编写索马里国民军《战备状态评估》并于 2017 年 12 月发布，这是联邦政府对索马里国民军不良状态的前所未有的认识。尽管出现了不利的结果，应当赞扬联邦政府开展战备状态评估活动。

### 摩加迪沙安全部队

118. 监测组在任务期间收到许多关于在摩加迪沙建立新的安全部队的报告。大部分这些报告提到摩加迪沙稳定部队(Xasliinta)或 10 月 14 日营。<sup>98</sup>

119. 摩加迪沙稳定部队最初于 2017 年 5 月作为临时专门部队成立，由索马里国民军、索马里警察部队和国家情报与安全机构各单位组成。<sup>99</sup> 它后来还纳入了看守部队人员。监测组收到了多种不同的说法，无法确认其指挥结构，但不同的消息来源都一致认为其最终权力来自总理办公室(另见附件 4.2 (严格保密))。据媒体报道，摩加迪沙稳定部队于 2018 年 7 月解散。<sup>100</sup>

120. 关于联邦政府已成立一支新的准军事部队的谣言最初出现于 2018 年初，当时在社交媒体上流传可能伪造的文件。根据监测组的消息来源，包括摩加迪沙的现任和前任高级安全官员，估计有 800 名新兵最初在摩加迪沙的警察学院受训，后来在阿拉伯联合酋长国训练部队撤离后转到戈登将军训练中心(见上文“戈登将军训练基地”)。<sup>101</sup> 虽然根据监察组审查的文件，10 月 14 日营于 2018 年 9 月正式并入索马里国民军，但监测组获悉，指挥权和控制权仍然独立于索马里国民军总部。监测组无法确定该营的指挥结构，但消息来源一致认为，这一权力属于总统办公室。

121. 监测组于 2018 年 7 月 11 日致信联邦政府，请求提供有关摩加迪沙所有安全部队结构和兵力的详情，包括部队地点、指挥官和指挥结构，以及关于摩加迪沙所有安全部队训练和招募的信息，包括 2017 年 5 月以来的受训人员人数和部

<sup>98</sup> 10 月 14 日营通常又称民防军(Ciidanka Difaaca Shacabka)。

<sup>99</sup> 索马里联邦政府 2017 年 6 月 15 日给监测组的信。

<sup>100</sup> 例如见 Cabdi Cade, “Ciidanka Xasilinta Muqdisho oo la sheegay in Sharci daro ku dhisan yihiin”, AllBanaadir, 2018 年 7 月 8 日。可查阅: [www.allbanaadir.org/ciidanka-xasilinta-muqdisho-oo-la-sheegay-sharci-daro-ku-dhisan-yihiin/](http://www.allbanaadir.org/ciidanka-xasilinta-muqdisho-oo-la-sheegay-sharci-daro-ku-dhisan-yihiin/)。

<sup>101</sup> 对于 10 月 14 日营的关切特别涉及其招募战斗人员，特别是 10 月 14 日营包括 Al-Ittihad al-Islami 武装团体和青年党的许多前成员。此外，据说 10 月 14 日营的招募还存在地方偏见据报行政部门试图对抗阿布加尔和哈伯·盖迪尔(哈维耶)在摩加迪沙及其周围安全部队的主导地位。监测组审查了未经核实的文件，显示在 2017 年年中，总统办公室设立了一个苏菲派宗教领袖论坛，旨在将更多的苏菲派“先知的信徒”团体编入索马里国民军，同时在安全部队中更广泛地宣传苏菲派的信条，以试图消除青年党和伊黎伊斯兰国的伊斯兰教好战思想。



队地点。9月20日，国家安全顾问办公室回复称“摩加迪沙没有新的部队”，索马里警察部队负责摩加迪沙的安保。<sup>102</sup>

122. 虽然设立摩加迪沙稳定部队、尤其是10月14日营可能是应对摩加迪沙普遍不安全状况的新举措，但是缺乏透明度引发了有关部队意图、其指挥与控制及合宪性的广泛猜测和关切。<sup>103</sup> 联邦政府对这些部队显然给予了过分关注和支持，也引起联邦成员州行政当局和国际伙伴对联邦政府有关更广泛的安全部门改革和巩固国家安全部队承诺的关切。<sup>104</sup>

123. 监测组还收到一些指控，涉及国家情报与安全机构内新成员及其参与在摩加迪沙恐吓政治对手和实施暗杀。关于国家情报与安全机构在摩加迪沙活动的进一步资料见附件4.2(严格保密)。

#### D. 索马里兰与邦特兰之间冲突

124. 监测组对邦特兰和索马里兰在有争议的索勒州的持续武装对峙感到关切。<sup>105</sup> 自2007年起，邦特兰首府加罗韦以西75公里的Tukaraq就由邦特兰当局控制，作为当局重要的安全和税收检查站。2018年1月8日，索马里兰安全部队部署至与邦特兰交界地区并占领了Tukaraq具有战略意义的检查站。<sup>106</sup> 邦特兰在边界地区集结部队予以报复。2018年，双方当局巩固了各自在该州相距大约2公里的军事阵地。<sup>107</sup> 国际组织报告称，对峙造成双方各有数十人伤亡，大约2500名平民流离失所。<sup>108</sup>

125. 2018年4月11日，邦特兰行政当局的一名代表告知监测组，任何有关冲突升级的决定将完全是索马里兰的责任，而且在索马里兰部队单方面从该州撤离之前，邦特兰不愿进行谈判。<sup>109</sup> 2018年5月14日，索马里兰与邦特兰武装部

<sup>102</sup> 2018年9月20日联邦政府给监测组的信。

<sup>103</sup> 监测组还注意到，2018年1月至9月访谈的多个国家和国际利益攸关方和安全伙伴对摩加迪沙安全部队缺乏清晰的了解。

<sup>104</sup> 监测组2018年8月在哈兰中央军械库审查武器分发日志时确认，2018年3月至6月，向10月14日营分发了共计798支AK式突击步枪，部队收到了不同的新制服(另见关于青年党使用索马里安全部队制服的附件1.6)。

<sup>105</sup> 索马里兰和邦特兰自1998年以来争夺对索勒州和萨纳格州的控制，已数次发生冲突。

<sup>106</sup> 索马里兰部队是在索马里兰新总统缪斯·比希·阿卜迪于2017年11月当选之后开始挺进的，总统的宣言包括有关边界安全和索马里兰分离的承诺。索马里兰行政当局还声称，其在该地区的军事集结也是联邦政府最近干预索马里兰事务引发的。2017年12月，国际民用航空组织建议将索马里兰领空移交索马里联邦政府。2018年1月2日，联邦政府计划与经济发展部长贾迈勒·穆罕默德·哈桑访问了有争议的萨纳格州，索马里兰当局暗示，联邦政府正在考虑将有争议的索勒州和萨纳格州组建成一个联邦成员州的可能性。索马里兰部队的部署发生在穆罕默德·阿卜杜拉希·穆罕默德“法马约”总统访问邦特兰期间。

<sup>107</sup> 2018年1月28日，索马里兰和邦特兰行政当局向哈尔格萨的联索援助团确认了向该州大规模部署部队的情况。

<sup>108</sup> 2018年1月24日在博萨索与联合国难民事务高级专员公署工作人员的访谈。

<sup>109</sup> 2018年4月11日在内罗毕与邦特兰总统办公室主任Abdinasir Sofe的访谈。

队之间再次爆发冲突；双方的重型火炮交火以及部队增援一直持续至 5 月底。<sup>110</sup> 据报，双方部队于 6 月 22 日发生进一步冲突，炮火激增。<sup>111</sup>

126. 此次冲突助长了不稳定局势，加剧了当地居民的流离失所，为青年党和伊斯兰国在该州进一步盘踞创造了有利空间。例如，2018 年 6 月 1 日，青年党大举进攻巴里州的邦特兰基地，造成 6 人伤亡以及邦特兰部队撤退。<sup>112</sup>

127. 2018 年 7 月 28 日至 30 日，政府间发展管理局和联合国索马里援助团(联索援助团)对索马里兰和邦特兰开展了联合调解访问，关注重点是立即停止敌对行动和该地区的非军事化。<sup>113</sup> 但在编写本报告之时，对峙尚未得到解决。

## E. 挪用财政资源的情况

128. 在任务期间，联邦政府因实施财政改革受到国际金融机构的赞扬。<sup>114</sup> 但是，联邦政府没有回应监测组在 2018 年 7 月 11 日的信中对挪用财政资源行为提出的关切。

129. 在收到有关港口与海上运输部、交通与民航部和宗教事务部以及贝纳迪尔联邦州有挪用资源行为的具体指控之后，监测组要求提供索马里中央银行保存的相关账户报表以及相应的财务管理信息系统记录副本。

130. 在收到有关不当行为的举报之后，监测组还在其信函中要求提供资料，说明与若干不同私营实体订立的任何合同和协议的状况及其所有权的资料。<sup>115</sup> 监测组还要求提供有关公民登记、国民身份证、签证和护照签发的任何联邦政府合同或协议的具体资料。

131. 最后，监测组要求就有关联邦政府预算外支出的指控作出澄清。例如，监测组收到一些现任议员的举报，称在新议长穆罕默德·穆萨勒·阿卜迪拉赫曼获得任命之后，所有议员在 5 月底收到来自联邦政府的非薪金款项 5 000 美元。

<sup>110</sup> 2018 年 5 月 27 日与一名当地非政府组织工作人员的电话访谈。

<sup>111</sup> 2018 年 6 月 23 日，机密安全报告。

<sup>112</sup> Garowe Online, “Somalia: Al-Shabab reportedly overran Puntland military base”, 2018 年 2 月 6 日。可查阅：[www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-al-shabab-reportedly-overran-puntland-military-base](http://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-al-shabab-reportedly-overran-puntland-military-base)。

<sup>113</sup> 2018 年 8 月 1 日与一个国际组织的一名工作人员面谈。

<sup>114</sup> 例如，见国际货币基金组织，“基金组织管理层完成根据索马里工作人员监测方案进行的第二次审查和最终审查，基金组织总裁核准第三个工作人员监测方案”，新闻稿，2018 年 7 月 6 日。可查阅：[www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/07/06/pr18283-somalia-2nd-and-final-review-under-the-staff-monitored-program](http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/07/06/pr18283-somalia-2nd-and-final-review-under-the-staff-monitored-program)。

<sup>115</sup> 其中包括 Agetco General Trading and Clearance、Bukhari Logistics East Africa、Horn Logistics、Kasram Trading Company、Kulmiye General Services、M&T Solutions、Perkins Logistics、Riverside Holdings、Safari Security Service、Shabeel Group、Shirkadda Sahal、SKA International Group 和 Smart General Services。

132. 2018 年 9 月 20 日，国家安全顾问办公室对监测组作出回复，称将在双方商定的日期和时间安排审查索马里中央银行报表。监测组的具体问询无一得到答复。<sup>116</sup>

#### 索马里国民军问责

133. 监测组收集的证据显示，尽管领导层数次变更，但是索马里国民军高级官员的挪用资金行为依然根深蒂固。在 2017 年 5 月将 Abdullahi Moalim Nur 免职之后，索马里国民军前运输事务负责人 Mohamed Mohamud Hussein “Garabey” 被任命为索马里国民军的新后勤主任。<sup>117</sup> 在 “Garabey” 的领导下，据称核算索马里国民军支出的财务文件增加。但是，提交给监测组文件的真实性令人怀疑。例如，在据称证明士兵领取索马里国民军薪饷的文件上，数千人的姓名旁边的指纹相同。

134. 有关索马里国民军问责的进一步资料见附件 5.1。

#### F. 海上海盗行为

135. 在监测组执行任务期间，索马里海上海盗行为仍相对处于低谷，但是对国际船只的零星攻击继续发生。例如，2017 年 11 月 17 日和 18 日，6 个人乘坐快艇从一艘母船上展开行动，分别在距离摩加迪沙东南大约 530 公里和 630 公里处对 Ever Dynamic 号商船和 Galerna III 号渔船发动袭击，但劫持行动失败。这些海盗随后被欧洲联盟海军特派团逮捕并移交塞舌尔当局进行起诉。

136. 不同寻常的是，海盗发动袭击的地点是下谢贝利州默尔卡港，此地未曾用作海盗行动基地。但是，监测组对此事件的调查，包括与海盗嫌疑人的约谈显示，行动并不复杂，即海盗战术没有任何演变，也未显示出与极端主义组织之间存在关联。<sup>118</sup>

137. 2018 年 2 月 22 日，三艘小帆船在距离索马里中部海岸 165 公里处靠近 Leopard Sun 号化学品油轮并开火。船上的一个私营武装保安队开火还击，海盗中断了袭击。监测组收到的资料显示，海盗头目 Mohamed Osman Mohamed Gafanje 可能参与。<sup>119</sup> 监测组此前的多份报告曾记录了 Gafanje 的活动，<sup>120</sup> 此人目前维持着活跃在穆杜格州霍比奥镇的一队民兵。

<sup>116</sup> 2018 年 9 月 20 日联邦政府给监测组的信。

<sup>117</sup> 监测组曾在 S/2015/801(附件 3.1，严格保密)、S/2016/919(附件 2)和 S/2017/924(第 73-77 段)中报告了 Abdullahi Moalim Nur 和索马里国民军后勤司挪用资金的情况。

<sup>118</sup> 2018 年 1 月 25 日在塞舌尔维多利亚与海盗团伙三名成员的访谈。

<sup>119</sup> 2018 年 5 月 8 日在摩加迪沙与一名驻索马里的私营安保分析员的访谈以及 2018 年 8 月 2 日与一名驻贾穆杜格的安全干事的访谈。

<sup>120</sup> 见 S/2013/413、S/2014/726、S/2015/801 和 S/2016/919 附件 1.4。

### 贾穆杜格海岸警卫队

138. 在 2018 年 5 月 9 日至 14 日访问霍比奥沿海水域期间，监测组亲眼看到对所谓的“贾穆杜格海岸警卫队”进行的一次训练，这是正由一个联合国机构实施的项目。鉴于贾穆杜格行政当局对霍比奥地区的控制极少，而且该地作为海盗活动中心具有突出地位，<sup>121</sup> 因此监测组感到关切的是，对贾穆杜格海岸警卫队的训练可能导致为下一代海盗提供装备。<sup>122</sup>

139. 在监测组目睹的训练期间，除部队指挥官之外，15 名受训者的姓名与联合国机构编制的名册不符，令人质疑该方案的审查程序和问责。监测组感到关切的是，该项目第二阶段的设想是为“现有的贾穆杜格海岸警卫队配备船只和其他必要设备”，并为该部队再训练 200 人。<sup>123</sup>

140. 该联合国机构的一名代表告知监测组，所提供的训练以及该机构打算为贾穆杜格海岸警卫队采购的船只类型并非可立即适用于海盗活动。他概述了该机构在贾穆杜格执行任务环境困难的情况下所履行的应尽职责，并强调指出，海岸警卫队项目在为目前海盗逍遥法外的索马里沿岸不受法律控制地区带来一定程度的安全保障方面发挥重要作用。<sup>124</sup>

## 四. 违反国际人道主义法

### A. 青年圣战运动(青年党)

141. 2017 年 9 月 1 日至 2018 年 8 月 31 日，联索援助团人权和保护小组和联合国人权事务高级专员办事处共同报告，索马里境内所有行为体造成 2 193 例平民伤亡(死亡和受伤)。在任务期间，青年党应负责的袭击平民事件数量仍然最高，伤亡人数中超过 1 500 人(约占 70%)是青年党造成的，其中仅 2017 年 10 月 14 日在摩加迪沙的袭击就造成 989 人伤亡(582 人死亡，407 人受伤)。<sup>125</sup>

142. 青年党还继续对其控制区内平民实施不人道和有辱人格的处罚，包括截肢、鞭打、斩首和公开处决。

<sup>121</sup> 除了 Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” 及其附属民兵持续开展的活动之外，“贾穆杜格渔民协会”主席和副主席都曾经是海盗。

<sup>122</sup> 据记录，海岸警卫队试验失败，助长了近几年索马里境内的海盗行为。例如，见 [S/2015/801](#)，附件 2.3。

<sup>123</sup> 联合国机构对支持各国采取举措打击索马里沿海海盗行为信托基金的供资提议，2017 年 7 月。

<sup>124</sup> 2018 年 9 月 16 日来自该联合国机构的电子邮件。

<sup>125</sup> 武装冲突地点和事件数据项目报告称，2017 年 9 月 31 日至 2018 年 8 月有 1 400 名平民丧生，其中 70%(980 人)是青年党所为。该数字与武装冲突地点和事件数据项目报告的上一年数据(即归咎于青年党的 356 名平民死亡)形成对比(见 [www.acleddata.com/](http://www.acleddata.com/))。

143. 在政府控制区，青年党继续开展暗杀平民的活动，目标尤其针对公务员、工商界、传统长老和宗教领袖<sup>126</sup> 以及被控与非索特派团合作的人。<sup>127</sup>

### 招募儿童

144. 在整个任务期间，青年党还继续在索马里南部和中部其控制区内强行招募儿童。例如，在穆杜格州 Aad，青年党对抵制其强行招募儿童行为的平民发动了袭击。同样，在下谢贝利州阿夫戈耶区，青年党因 Bananey 社区抵制招募儿童的活动而对其实施了袭击，随后还破坏了村庄和周边农田。<sup>128</sup>

145. 2018 年初，索马里安全部队解救了被青年党关押的一些儿童。例如，2018 年 1 月 25 日，被青年党关押在下谢贝利州 Wanlaweyn 区的 36 名儿童获救，并被送至摩加迪沙的一个康复中心。同样，2018 年 4 月，在青年党位于拜多阿区的一所学校就读的 11 名儿童被转移至拜多阿镇的康复设施。

## B. 联邦和州武装力量

### 在邦特兰对儿童实行拘留、酷刑和处决

146. 任务期间，监测组记录了邦特兰部队违反国际人道主义法对儿童实行拘留、酷刑和即决处决的行为。青年党招募的 40 名儿童于 2016 年 3 月对邦特兰发动了一次未遂两栖入侵（见 S/2016/919，附件 1.4），这些儿童于 2016 年 9 月在加罗韦受到州军事法庭审判并被判处不同刑期的监禁，直至终身监禁。<sup>129</sup> 随后，不满 15 岁的儿童被从加罗韦监狱转移至加罗韦的一个康复中心。2018 年 8 月 19 日，邦特兰主席阿布蒂威里·穆罕默德·阿里·“加斯”给予所有 34 名儿童完全赦免，<sup>130</sup> 并允许将仍在监狱关押的儿童转移至康复中心。

147. 2016 年 12 月和 2017 年 1 月，7 名被指控参与谋杀 3 名邦特兰高级官员的儿童在博萨索被拘留，并遭受邦特兰安全部队成员的酷刑。随后，7 名儿童中的 5 人在一个军事法庭受审后于 2017 年 4 月 8 日被行刑队处决；其尸体未交还家人，截至本报告撰写之时遗体仍下落不明。在提交本报告时，另两名儿童正在服无期徒刑。

148. 在编写本报告时，监测组尚未收到 2018 年 9 月 12 日给邦特兰行政当局的信的答复，信中要求确认有关处决这些儿童的事实和情况以及所采取的调查措施。

<sup>126</sup> 特别是参加了 2016/2017 年联邦选举进程的人。

<sup>127</sup> 在本任务期间，监测组还注意到伊黎伊斯兰国的暗杀活动激增(见上文“暗杀活动”)。

<sup>128</sup> 2018 年 4 月 26 日，Bananey 社区代表致信监测组、联索援助团和非索特派团 3 区总部，要求保护免遭青年党袭击。

<sup>129</sup> 2018 年 4 月在加罗韦与国际组织人员和代表这些儿童的律师的访谈。4 月 24 日，索厄问题监测组向邦特兰司法部长 Salah Habib Haaji Jama 转达了其关切的问题。

<sup>130</sup> 2018 年 2 月 25 日，其中 6 名儿童从康复中心逃走。

149. 有关在邦特兰对儿童实行拘留、酷刑和处决的进一步资料，见附件 6.1(严格保密)。

#### 索马里国民军在下谢贝利州巴拉维实施酷刑和处决

150. 2018 年 5 月 5 日，2 名被控在巴拉维安放简易爆炸装置的男子遭酷刑并被处决，据称是索马里国民军的一个指挥官下令，当时有联邦政府高级官员在场。受害者尸体上可见被打断的牙齿，其中一名男子似乎一只眼睛被摘除。<sup>131</sup> 随后对该事件进行调查的巴拉维警察指挥官于 8 月 6 日被索马里国民军拘留，据称遭到酷刑并被软禁，在编写本报告时依然被软禁。

151. 2018 年 8 月 31 日，监测组致信联邦政府，要求提供该事件的相关资料并说明为调查指控采取了哪些措施，但未收到答复。

152. 有关该案的进一步详情见附件 6.2(严格保密)。

#### 索马里兰与邦特兰之间冲突中拘留和处决情况

153. 索马里兰和邦特兰之间的冲突以 Tukaraq 镇为中心(见上文“索马里兰与邦特兰之间冲突”)，导致战斗人员被双方逮捕和拘留。<sup>132</sup> 在提交本报告时，邦特兰拘留了索马里兰安全部队的 3 名战斗人员，索马里兰拘留了邦特兰安全部队的 14 名战斗人员。其中 7 名邦特兰士兵正在哈尔格萨接受治疗，其余 7 人被转移至哈尔格萨监狱；<sup>133</sup> 据索马里兰总统称，这些士兵的家人获准不受限制地进出。<sup>134</sup> 然而，监测组收到的证词显示，2018 年 5 月 24 日，邦特兰的战斗人员遭受索马里兰安全部队的酷刑并被杀害，作为对杀害一名索马里兰指挥官的报复。<sup>135</sup>

154. 在编写本报告时，监测组未收到 2018 年 9 月 6 日给索马里兰行政当局的信的答复，信中要求确认邦特兰 4 名被拘留者据称遭酷刑和处决的情况，以及为调查指控采取步骤(如有)的详情。

#### 强迫迁离和流离失所

155. 在任务期间，监测组记录了以下地点境内流离失所者被强迫迁离的几起事件：摩加迪沙、拜多阿、博萨索、加尔卡约以及索勒州受索马里兰和邦特兰冲突影响的地区。

<sup>131</sup> 2018 年 5 月 15 日国际组织调查报告。

<sup>132</sup> 鉴于索马里兰的立场是此次冲突发生在两个独立国家(索马里兰和索马里)之间，因此索马里兰行政当局将被拘留者界定为战俘。由于索马里兰的国家地位仍未得到承认，关于战俘待遇的《1949 年日内瓦第三公约》不适用，任何被俘战斗人员应被视为“被拘留者”。

<sup>133</sup> 2018 年 7 月 23 日驻哈尔格萨的非政府组织工作人员的电子邮件；2018 年 7 月 24 日加罗韦国际组织工作人员的电子邮件；2018 年 7 月 12 日与加罗韦的国际组织工作人员的电话访谈。

<sup>134</sup> Somaliland Informer, “Somaliland government applauded for treating Somalia’s POW in a humane manner”, 2018 年 754 日。可查阅：<https://somalilandinformer.net/2018/07/05/somaliland-government-applauded-for-treating-somalias-pow-in-a-humane-manner>。

<sup>135</sup> 2018 年 8 月 17 日与加罗韦的国际组织工作人员的电话访谈。监测组得到的加罗韦一家医院编写的医疗报告摘要显示，尸体有遭受酷刑以及受到限制和被近距离射杀的痕迹。



156. 2017 年 12 月和 2018 年 1 月，联邦政府安全部队用推土机清除了摩加迪沙 Kadha 居民区内的一些境内流离失所者营地，造成大约 3 000 个家庭被强迫迁离。<sup>136</sup> 2018 年 7 月，强迫迁离导致 3 名平民在摩加迪沙至阿夫戈耶公路上的 Sinka Dheere 死亡，当时联邦政府安全部队向示威者开枪。

157. 2018 年 2 月 6 日，邦特兰当局强迫博萨索 Farjano 境内流离失所者定居点的 31 个境内流离失所者家庭迁离。据报，进行迁离是为了腾出空间，以便放置将从 2 月 5 日在定居点附近搁浅的一艘商业道船上卸下的货物<sup>137</sup>。

158. 邦特兰与索马里兰之间的武装冲突还导致索勒州 Tukaraq 以及包括 Godgabobe、Falidyale、Higlo、Bocame 和 Gambadhe 在内周边村庄大约 2 500 名平民流离失所。<sup>138</sup>

## C. 国际部队

### 非洲联盟驻索马里特派团

159. 与前几个任务期相比，非索特派团造成的平民伤亡似乎减少。<sup>139</sup> 联索援助团人权和保护小组记录了 2017 年 9 月 1 日至 2018 年 8 月 31 日可能由非索特派团部队造成的 12 起平民伤亡事件。<sup>140</sup> 其中包括非索特派团 2018 年 1 月 6 日在希兰州 Buloburde 附近开炮，导致一名平民死亡，以及 2017 年 11 月 27 日在下朱巴州 Afmadow 镇发生一起事件，据称一名妇女被误认为是青年党战斗人员而遭到射击。<sup>141</sup>

160. 平民伤亡减少的可能原因包括，本任务期间非索特派团的重大进攻行动依然处于低谷，以及实施联合国人权尽职政策(人权尽职政策)框架内建议的措施。<sup>142</sup> 非索特派团保护、人权和性别平等股一名代表告知监测组，特派团根据

<sup>136</sup> 2017 年 12 月 29 日至 2018 年 1 月 19 日获取的卫星图像显示迁离的规模。另见联合国人类住区规划署(人居署)和挪威难民理事会，“迁离趋势分析”，2018 年 8 月 28 日。可查阅：[www.nrc.no/resources/reports/eviction-trend-analysis/](http://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/eviction-trend-analysis/)。

<sup>137</sup> 在博萨索运作的国际组织称，邦特兰当局提出将受影响的境内流离失所者迁移至缺乏安全和卫生设施的偏远地区，遭到境内流离失所者拒绝。

<sup>138</sup> Steadfast Voluntary Organization, “Tukaraq conflict update”, 2018 年 5 月 24 日。

<sup>139</sup> 在其上一份报告中，监测组报告了 2016 年 1 月至 2017 年 6 月之间的 88 例伤亡(S/2017/924, 第 194 段)。

<sup>140</sup> 对于其中一些伤亡，监测组无法确认部队是在非索特派团指挥下开展行动，还是在国家指挥和控制下开展行动。

<sup>141</sup> 联索援助团人权和保护小组和联合国人权事务高级专员办事处月度简报，2017 年 11 月至 2018 年 7 月；2018 年 7 月 15 日和 25 日与非索特派团工作人员之间的电子邮件和电话访谈。

<sup>142</sup> 这些措施包括非索特派团索马里非洲特派团军事部分接战规则、非索特派团在索马里处理在索马里被拘留者的标准作业程序、事件预防政策、关于保护平民和遵守国际人道主义法的部队指挥官指令、部署前培训以及宣传人权和符合国际人道主义法的接战规则。

国际人道主义法和平民伤亡事件跟踪、分析、调查和处理小组程序规定的参与国义务开展调查，加强了对涉及平民事件的问责措施。<sup>143</sup>

### 国际部队的空袭

161. 联合国各机构注意到国际部队的空袭和地面袭击可能导致的一些平民伤亡事件。2017 年 9 月 1 日至 2018 年 8 月 31 日，美国对青年党和伊黎伊斯兰国进行了 31 次空袭并公开予以承认。<sup>144</sup> 新闻调查局是一个监测美国在世界各地空袭情况的组织，该组织记录了这些空袭导致至多 5 名平民丧生；但监测组无法独立核实该数字。<sup>145</sup> 本任务期间，邻近会员国在索马里进行了数目不详的空袭。

### 2017 年 8 月 25 日在 Barire 村开展的行动

162. 2017 年 8 月 25 日，索马里国民军和美国部队在下谢贝利州 Barire 村附近的一个农场展开了联合地面袭击，造成 2 名儿童死亡，可能还涉及其他平民。在行动现场发现了 5.56 x 45 毫米子弹的弹壳，与美国制造的弹药一致。有关该事件的案例研究载于附件 6.3。

## D. 阻碍人道主义援助

### 青年党

163. 在任务期间，青年党继续阻挠在索马里南部和中部提供人道主义援助。在该团体控制的地区，除了青年党自己的慈善机构(Al-Ihsaan)以外，人道主义组织的活动要么受到限制，要么被完全禁止。

164. 提供医疗保健援助的组织尤其受到影响。青年党宣布，保健疫苗无效，也不符合伊斯兰教规，所以接种工作无法在中朱巴社区开展。在该地区内挨家挨户提供保健服务的组织被怀疑收集该团体情报，因而被禁。<sup>146</sup> 青年党发动袭击期间，地方诊所内的医疗用品也遭抢劫。<sup>147</sup>

165. 一个国际组织记录，2017 年 7 月至 2018 年 2 月期间至少发生 5 起事件，其中武装人员——如青年党——抢劫执行伙伴的房舍，抢走净水药品、香皂、治

<sup>143</sup> 2018 年 3 月 27 日在摩加迪沙与非索特派团保护、人权和性别平等股举行的会议。但是鉴于平民伤亡事件跟踪、分析、调查和处理小组的落实持续缺乏透明度，监测组对其作为监测机制的有效性仍然感到关切。

<sup>144</sup> 数字以美国非洲司令部的新闻稿为依据，可查阅：[www.africom.mil/media-room/press-releases](http://www.africom.mil/media-room/press-releases)。

<sup>145</sup> 调查新闻局，“US strikes in Somalia, 2007 to present”，可查阅：[https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMylRj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE\\_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=859698683](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1-LT5TVBMylRj2WH30xQG9nqr8-RXFVvzJE_47NlpeSY/edit#gid=859698683) (2018 年 9 月 23 日查阅)。

<sup>146</sup> 2018 年 3 月 28 日与摩加迪沙的国际组织工作人员的面谈；2018 年 6 月 8 日与内罗毕的国际组织工作人员的面谈。。

<sup>147</sup> 例如，位于下朱巴 Diif 村一家地方医院的物品于 2018 年 1 月 11 日在青年党短暂占领该村时被洗劫一空。一名国际组织工作人员的电子邮件，2018 年 3 月 28 日。



疗性即食食品、水箱及办公设备和家具。<sup>148</sup> 2018 年 1 月，监测组收到各个社区同样的报告，包括在下朱巴州，当时青年党偷走食品，毁坏了 3 台刚刚捐助的水泵。<sup>149</sup>

### 官僚障碍

166. 在联邦一级，索马里缺乏明确的人道主义援助监管框架，加上联邦政府规划、投资和经济发展部对非政府组织采取了一种有争议的方法，这威胁到重要人道主义援助的可持续性。2018 年 8 月 29 日，Gamal Mohamed Hassan 部长通知与索马里非政府组织联合会联合召开的国家主任协商会议与会者，联邦政府已决定，所有国际非政府组织必须在年底之前完全设在索马里境内，否则面临不予登记的风险。<sup>150</sup> 决定如若落实，鉴于所涉费用和安全问题重大，很可能造成许多国际非政府组织撤出索马里，因此影响向索马里平民提供人道主义援助。

167. 索马里兰与联邦政府的争议，影响了其对注册为“地方”非政府组织和(或)被认为与联邦政府保持密切联系的组织的态度。<sup>151</sup> 2018 年 7 月 15 日，索马里兰规划部长撤销了位于哈尔格萨的 6 个人道主义援助组织的执照，阻止他们在索马里兰开展活动。<sup>152</sup>

### 对人道主义工作人员的攻击

168. 在 2018 年 1 月至 8 月期间，国际非政府组织“安全组织”记录了对人道主义工作人员(主要是当地工作人员)进行的 34 次攻击。<sup>153</sup> 例如，2018 年 3 月 28 日，红十字国际委员会(红十字委员会)雇员 Abdulhafid Yusuf Ibrahim 先生在摩加迪沙离开红十字委员会大院时，在简易爆炸装置袭击中丧生。2018 年 5 月 1 日，世界卫生组织(世卫组织)雇员在摩加迪沙 Bakara 市场被身份不明的枪手杀死。2018 年 8 月 4 日，另一名世卫组织雇员在苏勒地区 Las Anod 被身份不明的枪手开枪打伤。

169. 2018 年 5 月 2 日，一名德国护士在红十字委员会摩加迪沙大院遭绑架，绑架者据称是红十字委员会前保安人员，这是自 2014 年以来在索马里外国人首次

<sup>148</sup> 2018 年 8 月 22 日，一个国际组织向监测组提供的青年党抢劫案件报告。

<sup>149</sup> 2018 年 4 月，青年党在巴里州博萨索以南 40 公里的 Yalho 村附近的一个检查站抢劫食品。

<sup>150</sup> 2019 年 9 月 1 日 Gamal M. Hassan 给国际非政府组织的信。

<sup>151</sup> 2018 年 7 月 23 日，在哈尔格萨的非政府组织工作人员发来的电子邮件。

<sup>152</sup> 受影响的六个机构是：索马里兰生命线组织、朱巴基金会、希米洛发展组织、积极参与发展援助组织、索马里救济和发展行动及和平与发展机构。对非政府组织采取的行动表明，索马里兰的人道主义援助越来越政治化，但监测组也了解，其他在索马里兰争取捐助资金的非政府组织已经游说将其取缔。2018 年 7 月 23 日，在哈尔格萨的非政府组织工作人员发来的电子邮件。

<sup>153</sup> 基于国际非政府组织安全组织每月更新的列表。

遭绑架。2018 年 8 月 9 日,据称有 5 名救援人员在拜州拜多阿镇和奥丁勒(Awdinle)镇之间遭青年党绑架,被带到了不为人知的地方。<sup>154</sup>

## 五. 违反木炭禁令

### A. 生产、运输和存储

170. 在本任务期间,在中朱巴州和下朱巴州,大规模木炭生产仍在继续(见附件 7.1, 图 1)。关于索马里木炭生产的最权威估计是由联合国粮食及农业组织-索马里水和土地信息管理项目通过卫星图像分析编制的。他们估计,2017 年生产了 360 万袋木炭,2011-2017 年期间砍伐了 800 万棵金合欢树,生产了 1 600 万袋木炭;在这七年期间,每 30 秒就有一棵树被砍伐,以生产木炭。<sup>155</sup>

171. 木炭通过公路从中朱巴和下朱巴内陆运到博瓜波和基斯马尤仓库和港口。途中,与其他商品一样(见上文“国内融资”),木炭须在青年党的检查站缴税。<sup>156</sup> 在上一个任务期间,监测组估计,每袋收税 2.50 美元,每年通过检查站对 400 万袋木炭征税,使青年党获得 1 000 万美元(S/2017/924, 第 200、204 和 206 段)。根据目前估计,从索马里出口 300 万袋木炭,因此,青年党从木炭的检查站征税中每年至少获得 750 万美元。<sup>157</sup>

172. 位于基斯马尤和博瓜波(基斯马尤西南 125 公里)的库存仍然是非法木炭出口的来源(见附件 7.1, 图 2 和图 4)。库存量根据积存和消耗的速率而波动(见附件 7.1, 图 3 和图 5)。在 2018 年 5 月 21 日至 24 日的直升机飞行期间,监测组通过目视确认,基斯马尤港附近的两个南部库存大部分已经耗尽,原因可能是最近的出口,而博瓜波库存量很大,可能是由于最近木炭从内陆运来所致。监测组试图在 2018 年 7 月 22 日至 26 日对基斯马尤进行正式访问期间视察木炭库存和港口,但非索特派团没有按照安全理事会在第 2385(2017)号决议第 27 段中的呼吁给予协助。<sup>158</sup>

<sup>154</sup> Halbeeg News, “涉嫌的青年党战斗人员在拜州绑架了 5 名援助工作人员”, 2018 年 8 月 9 日。请查阅: <https://en.halbeeg.com/2018/08/09/suspected-al-shabab-militants-abduct-five-aid-workers-in-bay-region/>。

<sup>155</sup> M. Bolognesi 和 U. Leonardi, “分析甚高分辨率卫星图像,生成关于 2011 年至 2017 年索马里南部木炭生产及其动态信息”, 技术报告(内罗毕:联合国粮食及农业组织索马里水和土地信息管理项目, 2018 年)。

<sup>156</sup> 据称,青年党在 2015-2016 年期间继续禁止在其控制区进行木炭贸易,但鉴于仍有大量木炭被运至库存,而且没有关于青年党与烧碳人和贸易商之间冲突的报告,监测组认为这些说法不可信。

<sup>157</sup> 在 2018 年 2 月 16 日给监测组的信中,联邦政府估计,青年党在检查站对木炭征收的税为每袋 5 美元。监测组认为,这一估计过高,因为博瓜波木炭市场价格为每袋 9-10 美元,基斯马尤为每袋 10-11 美元。每袋 5 美元的检查站税后,生产成本、国内运输和利润就只剩每袋 4-6 美元。

<sup>158</sup> 监测组在 2018 年 2 月 22 日给非洲联盟的信以及 2018 年 4 月 26 日和 2018 年 7 月 18 日给非索特派团的信中曾请求协助。

## B. 非法出口，进口和转运

173. 在本任务期间，单桅帆船的装载速度较快，以较大的船队驶离，而非每个月以较小船队频繁驶离博瓜波和基斯马尤。出口总袋数每月波动明显；2018 年 2 月出口量最大，超过 60 万袋，而其他月份出口量不到 30 万袋。本任务期间，单桅帆船的平均载货量也普遍下降。总体而言，监测组估计，目前索马里的木炭出口量为每年 300 万袋，比前一任务期间减少了四分之一。监测组的调查确定，这些非法木炭出口由朱巴兰州政府收税，平均每袋超过 5 美元，每年为朱巴兰州带来 1 500 多万美元的收入(见附件 7.2, (严格保密))。截至 2018 年 8 月，在阿拉伯联合酋长国的每袋批发价格为 50 美元，非法木炭出口的估计总市值为每年 1.5 亿美元。

174. 从 2017 年 11 月到 2018 年 2 月，大多数从索马里出发的单桅帆船装载木炭，在阿曼的杜克姆港和圣地港卸货。在此期间，监测组四次正式致函阿曼，2018 年 2 月 26 日收到答复。<sup>159</sup> “Al Azhar 3”号 2018 年 3 月 4 日停靠在杜克姆港，上载 37 000 袋索马里木炭。此事促使阿曼收紧海关手续，迫使木炭贩子另寻港口。由于阿曼的市场需求相对有限，大量木炭在驶往阿拉伯联合酋长国的卡车中查获，这表明从阿曼把木炭再出口到阿拉伯联合酋长国以及海湾合作委员会其他国家这一较大的模式(见附件 7.7)。

175. 从 2018 年 3 月起——包括上个月索马里出口激增期间离岸的大部分单桅帆船——索马里木炭的主要初始目的港是伊朗伊斯兰共和国的基什自由区和格什姆自由区(见附件 7.4)。<sup>160</sup> 该过程涉及使用伪造的科摩罗、科特迪瓦和加纳原产地证书进口索马里木炭，将木炭从典型的蓝绿色袋子重新包装成标为“伊朗产品”的白色袋子。然后，这些袋子重新装到悬挂伊朗伊斯兰共和国旗帜的小型单桅帆船上，使用虚假原产地证明，谎称木炭“制造国”为伊朗伊斯兰共和国，出口到阿拉伯联合酋长国迪拜的 Hamriyah 港。伊朗伊斯兰共和国和阿拉伯联合酋长国没有与监测组进行实质性接触，尽管监测组曾写信表达对转运索马里木炭的关切。<sup>161</sup>

## C. 伪造原产地证书

176. 伪造的原产地证书是用来方便索马里木炭非法出口到国外市场的最重要文件。监测组已确认，在本任务期间，来自五个国家的伪造原产地证书在流通：科摩罗、科特迪瓦、冈比亚、加纳和伊朗伊斯兰共和国(见附件 7.5)。在本任务期间，

<sup>159</sup> 这些信函的日期分别为 2017 年 12 月 1 日、2018 年 1 月 5 日、2018 年 2 月 9 日和 2018 年 2 月 23 日。

<sup>160</sup> 也许因为预计最终将需要使港口多样化，木炭贩子 2017 年将他们最初的试验货物运经基什自由区。

<sup>161</sup> 监测组分别于 2018 年 1 月 29 日、2018 年 2 月 23 日和 2018 年 8 月 15 日致函伊朗伊斯兰共和国。伊朗伊斯兰共和国直到 2018 年 9 月 17 日才在一封一页的信中作出答复，信中既没有回答监测组提出的具体问题，也没有提供任何佐证文件。阿拉伯联合酋长国没有答复 2018 年 6 月 6 日和 2018 年 8 月 22 日信函中提出的关于木炭通过伊朗伊斯兰共和国转运到阿拉伯联合酋长国的问题。

冈比亚原产地证书首次出现。自前一任务期至本任务期持续使用伪造的科特迪瓦和加纳原产地证书。伪造的科摩罗原产地证书在 2017 年没有使用，此后重新出现。与 2012-2013 年期间首次出现相比，伪造的伊朗伊斯兰共和国原产地证书以新形式重新出现——即转运。<sup>162</sup>

177. 木炭贩子不同程度地使用官方渠道伪造原产地证书。<sup>163</sup> 一方面是木炭贩子伪造证书，没有表面上的签发国的官方参与。另一方面是海外领事馆或大使馆合法证明的伪造原产地证书，但可能是伪造的，没有经过签发国的官方渠道。<sup>164</sup> 其他原产地证书是在领事馆或大使馆进行法律认证之前，通过首都官方渠道经手，但最初的理由是伪造的。最后，有些原产地证明显然是通过官方渠道签发的，但把转运地点改作货物原产国，例如伊朗伊斯兰共和国，而非索马里。

#### D. 犯罪网络

178. 来自索马里的木炭非法贸易继续由连接索马里基斯马尤和迪拜的犯罪网络主导。在伊朗伊斯兰共和国和阿曼的当地收货人等同谋的帮助下，这些犯罪网络从违反木炭禁令中获益匪浅。通过交叉核对行业内来源的信息、港口记录、装运单据、全明星集团的信件以及监测组之前的报告，附件 7.6 列出了设在基斯马尤的 8 个主要供应商和代理商，以及设在迪拜的 8 个主要投资者和代理商。虽然与早年相比有一些变动，但这些人中大约有一半在监测组以前报告中被点过名，因此也说明一定程度的连续性。

179. 在 2017 年关于索马里的最后报告中，监测组提出了有关全明星集团的初步调查结果，该集团企图把在基斯马尤的供应商与迪拜的投资者正式联系起来，纳入一个类似单一公司的结构中(见附件 7.6 和 S/2017/924，第 209 段)。其目标是垄断贩运索马里木炭的非法业务。<sup>165</sup> 虽然全明星集团从未在索马里、阿拉伯联合酋长国或其他地方正式注册成为公司，但从 2017 年中期到 2018 年初，它为非法木炭业务发挥了重要的融资和促销作用。监测组审查了汇款收据，显示在迪拜的全明星集团代表每月给基斯马尤港经理 Ahmed Haji Adan 转去 50 万美元，以抵消未来朱巴兰对木炭出口的纳税义务(见附件 7.2，(严格保密))。

#### E. 实施禁令

180. 安全理事会在第 2385(2017)号决议第 26 段中重申联邦政府和联邦成员州须采取必要措施，防止从索马里出口木炭，并重申申请非索特派团支持和协助联邦政府和联邦成员州实施全面禁止从索马里出口木炭的禁令(第 27 段)；这在非索特

<sup>162</sup> “Energy 3”商船案的信息和贸易数据分析表明，2012-2013 年期间在阿拉伯联合酋长国港口使用了伪造的伊朗伊斯兰共和国原产地证书，相关信息见附件 7.5。

<sup>163</sup> 这四类伪造原产地证书的例子见附件 7.5。

<sup>164</sup> 监测组通过多个业内来源收到了关于木炭贩运者向在迪拜的领事馆和在阿布扎比的大使馆的个人行贿，以便合法证明索马里木炭货物的信息。据称，支付的金额为每份原产地证书 2 000 至 4 000 美元，但由于支付的是现金，很难证实。

<sup>165</sup> 会晤业内消息来源人士，2018 年 7 月 16 日，迪拜。

派团最近的再度授权中得到再次重申(第 2431(2018)号决议, 第 16 段)。联邦政府缺乏实施木炭禁令的能力, 因为它不控制相关领土。虽然朱巴兰政府确实有足够的控制权, 特别是在仓库和港口, 但它继续依赖非法木炭出口税收, 因此没有实施禁令。非索特派团尽管在基斯马尤港口设有两个检查站, 而且还有一个前方行动基地, 俯瞰博瓜波的仓库和港口, 但也没有执行禁令。

181. 与前次任务相比, 会员国全面实施木炭禁令的情况有所改善, 阿曼和阿拉伯联合酋长国缉获索马里木炭货物, 对阻止非法木炭贸易具有重要影响。不过, 实施情况也不一致。阿曼和阿拉伯联合酋长国如对监测组的信函迅速作出答复并采取更及时的行动, 或许会进一步改善执行情况。伊朗伊斯兰共和国在很大程度上未与监测组合作, 这是执行方面的薄弱环节。此外, 科特迪瓦和加纳等国家允许木炭贩子利用其原产地证书签发和法律认证程序中的弱点, 也对执行工作不一致承担一些责任。

## 六. 国家和非国家合作

182. 监测组感谢肯尼亚反恐怖主义警察部队在调查青年党在肯尼亚的未遂汽车炸弹事件方面给予合作。

183. 监测组感谢联邦调查局恐怖爆炸装置分析中心协助监测组调查青年党建造和使用简易爆炸装置情况。

184. 监测组感谢索马里沿海的欧洲联盟海军(欧盟阿塔兰特海上行动)协助调查海盗和木炭贩运, 并协助监测组 2018 年 5 月前往霍比奥、博瓜波和基斯马尤附近海域执行任务。

185. C4ADS 是一个设在华盛顿特区的非政府组织, 它协助监测组进行多项调查, 特别是协助手机网络分析。

### 不合作

186. 监测组证实, 2018 年 4 月, 国家安全顾问办公室收到了其给委员会中期情况更新的泄露副本。此后, 监测组与该办公室之间的关系恶化。该办公室指示监测组, 与联邦政府的所有通信均通过纽约常驻代表团送达其办公室, 这给日常联系构成了重大障碍。在整个任务期间, 该办公室对监测组信函的回复基本上不完整, 没有实质性, 或完全无回复。该办公室的一些回复显然不准确。不过, 联邦政府内其他方面与监测组积极沟通, 部分缓解了这些障碍。

187. 监测组指出, 伊朗伊斯兰共和国在监测组调查索马里木炭进出口禁令方面缺乏合作。

188. 监测组指出, 肯尼亚电信提供商 Safaricom 公共有限公司未就监测组调查青年党在肯尼亚的一起未遂汽车炸弹事件分享信息。

189. Hormuud Telecom 索马里公司也不向监测组提供有关对青年党进行多项调查的协助, 青年党利用该公司的附属服务推进其在索马里的行动。

## 七. 建议

### A. 武器禁运

190. 监测组建议安全理事会：

(a) 在下次要求联邦政府根据第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段和按照第 2244(2015)号决议第 7 段的要求向安全理事会提交报告时确定最后期限，以便按时提交联邦政府的两份报告，从而有足够时间将其中信息纳入监测组关于索马里的中期更新和最后报告；

(b) 关于第 2142(2014)号决议第 7 段规定的五天内发出分配后通知的要求，决定所有分配后通知都将列入联邦政府根据第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段和按照第 2244(2015)号决议第 7 段的要求，每半年向安全理事会提交的报告之中；

(c) 修改第 2182(2014)号决议第 7 段中的要求，以便将联合核查队的检查报告作为附件列入根据第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段和按照第 2244(2015)号决议第 7 段的要求每半年向安理会提交的报告；

(d) 修改第 2111(2013)号决议的附件，将以下武器列入需要委员会逐案核准的清单：肩扛式反坦克火箭发射器，如火箭推进榴弹或轻型反坦克武器；枪榴弹和榴弹发射器，包括所有这些发射器的弹药；

(e) 呼吁联邦政府允许监测组不受限制地进入摩加迪沙的所有军械库，在分配之前检查所有进口武器和弹药，索马里国民军各部门的所有军事储存设施，以及所有缴获的武器，并允许拍照武器和弹药，充分查阅所有日志和分配记录；

(f) 表示注意到秘书长先前的评估(S/2014/243)，请秘书长提供技术评估，包括关于改善武器禁运执行的备选办法和建议，包括：

(一) 第 2142(2014)号决议第 3-7 段规定的委员会通知；

(二) 根据第 2182(2014)号决议第 9 段和按照第 2244(2015)号决议第 7 段的要求向安理会每半年提交报告；

(三) 第 2244(2015)号决议第 6 段要求的军事装备、武器和弹药基线库存盘点；

(四) 最近在第 2385(2017)号决议第 4 至 7 段中提及联邦政府对安全有效的武器和弹药管理的责任。

### B. 对和平与安全的威胁

191. 监测组建议安全理事会：

(a) 确定不遵守《反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为法》(2016 年)和《国家通信法》(2017 年)中反恐和国家安全规定并在索马里开展业务的电信公司和金融实体及其高级管理人员对和平与安全构成威胁，并将此类行为列入第 1844(2008)号决议规定的定向措施列名标准；



(b) 呼吁联邦政府与监测组签订谅解备忘录，概述约谈联邦政府拘留的青年党和伊黎伊斯兰国嫌疑人的适当条件。

### **C. 木炭禁令**

192. 监测组建议安全理事会：授权会员国根据其国家立法并在其领海和海港内，扣押违反索马里木炭出口禁运的船只，并随后通过公开拍卖处置该船只，作为船员国籍国的会员国负责船员的遣返。

### **D. 制裁清单**

193. 监测组建议委员会：考虑利用所有可用的列名标准，包括新的列名(与青年党或伊黎伊斯兰国有关的清单除外)，特别是针对违反武器禁运和木炭禁令的个人和实体。

**Annex 1.1: FGS notifications to the Council since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

**Annex 1.2: Weapons and ammunition notified since the partial lifting of the arms embargo (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

**Annex 1.3: Weapons and ammunition distribution from June 2017 to December 2017 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

**Annex 1.4: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers between April 2018 and August 2018<sup>1</sup>**

Date	Model	FGS marking	Serial no.	Consignment	Location
Apr 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017 <sup>2</sup>	6109942	July 2017 <sup>3</sup>	Baidoa
Apr 2018	9 mm pistol	SO XDS-2015	N/A	Unknown	Dhusamareb
Apr 2018	9 mm pistol	SOCBS-0036-16 <sup>4</sup>	N/A	Unknown	Baidoa
Apr 2018	9 mm pistol	SOGC693/7596 <sup>5</sup>	N/A	Unknown	Mogadishu
Apr 2018	Type 56-2	SOAKMP084/4263 <sup>6</sup>	414263	Unknown	Mogadishu
Apr 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	N/A	Unknown	Mogadishu
Apr 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	4069074 <sup>7</sup>	July 2017	Mogadishu
May 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	4068475	July 2017	Mogadishu
July 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	5032086 <sup>8</sup>	Unknown	Mogadishu
July 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	4055905	July 2017	Mogadishu
July 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	5033490	July 2017	Mogadishu
July 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	4132320	July 2017	Mogadishu
Aug 2018	Type 56-2	SO XDS-2017	4117535	July 2017	Mogadishu

**Images of a sample of weapons and ammunition found in possession of arms dealers**

*Figure 1: Type 56-2, serial 6109942, documented in Baidoa, April 2018.*



<sup>1</sup> Thirty-six additional weapons with FGS markings are provided in annex 1.4.1 (strictly confidential).

<sup>2</sup> Somali National Army registered weapon.

<sup>3</sup> July 2017 delivery of weapons ammunition from the People's Republic of China.

<sup>4</sup> Somali Police Force-registered weapon.

<sup>5</sup> Government official-registered weapon.

<sup>6</sup> Weapon registered to the security detail of a member of Parliament.

<sup>7</sup> Documented by Reuters News Agency on 25 April 2018.

<sup>8</sup> Among 275 weapons transferred from HCA to General Gordon Military Base, on 3 March 2018.

*Figure 2: Pistol, documented in Dhusamareb, April 2018.*



*Figure 3: Pistol, documented in Baidoa, April 2018.*



*Figure 4: Pistol, documented in Mogadishu, April 2018.*





Figure 5: Type 56-2, serial 414263, documented in Mogadishu, April 2018.



Figure 6: Type 56-2, documented in Mogadishu, April 2018.



Figure 7: Type 56-2, serial 4069074, documented in Mogadishu, April 2018.



Figure 8: Type 56-2, serial 4068475, documented in Mogadishu, May 2018.



Figure 9: Type 56-2, serial 5032086, documented in Mogadishu, July 2018.



Figure 10: Type 56-2, serial 4055905, documented in Mogadishu, July 2018.



Figure 11: Type 56-2, serial 5033490, documented in Mogadishu, July 2018.



Figure 12: Type 56-2, serial 4132320, documented in Mogadishu, July 2018.



Figure 13: Type 56-2, serial 4117535, documented in Mogadishu, July 2018.



**Annex 1.4.1: FGS-marked weapons found in possession of arms dealers between September 2017 and May 2018 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***



### Annex 1.5: 16/811 ammunition

On 6 February 2018, the SEMG documented 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition with lot numbers ending in 16/811 at Halane Central Armoury (HCA) in Mogadishu. The SEMG was informed by HCA officials that the ammunition was part of the July 2017 consignment of 4,360,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (see annex 1.2), and that most of the ammunition had already been distributed. On 11 July 2018, the SEMG documented ammunition with the lot numbers also ending in 16/811 at the SNA Sector 60 Headquarters armoury in Baidoa, Bay region. The Baidoa armoury staff confirmed that the ammunition had been delivered from HCA on 26 December 2017.

*Figure 1: Ammunition documented in HCA, Mogadishu, 6 February 2018.*



*Figure 2: Ammunition documented in Sector 60 Headquarters armoury, Baidoa, 11 July 2018.*



On 18 January 2018, ammunition and weapons were seized from Al-Shabaab by South West State security forces in Dambal Calaan village, near Baidoa.<sup>9</sup> The SEMG identified several rounds among the seizure which bore the same head stamp numbers to those documented by the SEMG in HCA.

7.62 x 39 mm ammunition with the same head stamp were also documented by SEMG data collectors in the possession of one arms dealer in Baidoa on 8 April 2018, and another in Mogadishu on 31 July 2018.

*Figures 3: Ammunition seized from Al-Shabaab, 18 January 2018.*



*Figure 4: Ammunition found in possession of an arms dealer, Baidoa, 8 April 2018.*



*Figure 5: Ammunition found in possession of an arms dealer, Mogadishu, 31 July 2018.*



<sup>9</sup> Interview with Somali security source based in Baidoa, 11 July 2018.



While the SEMG cannot rule out that ammunition with the same lot numbers had also arrived via other — illicit — means, these lot numbers had not been documented by the SEMG hitherto.<sup>10</sup> Given that the ammunition was first documented just 23 days after being delivered to Sector 60 Headquarters in Baidoa, it is likely that part of the consignment was diverted upon arrival.

### **Ali “Weydhan”**

The SEMG has received multiple corroborated reports of a prominent arms dealer in Baidoa known as Ali “Weydhan”.<sup>11</sup> An SEMG source reported having bought a PK-pattern machine gun from him in 2016 for \$13,000.<sup>12</sup> SEMG sources have also confirmed that although the majority of “Weydhan’s” business involves selling arms and ammunition to local government officials and businesspeople based in Baidoa, he has also sold materiel to Al-Shabaab.<sup>13</sup> The SEMG has also received information that in mid-2016, “Weydhan” was detained in Afgoye by NISA officers while transporting a consignment of illicit weapons and ammunition from Mogadishu to Baidoa.<sup>14</sup> “Weydhan” was subsequently arrested and imprisoned for several months in Mogadishu, before being released.

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<sup>10</sup> Contributing contingents of AMISOM, have also in the past received supplies of ammunition manufactured in the People’s Republic of China.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Somali intelligence source in Baidoa, 9 July 2018. Interview with international organization staff in Baidoa, 4 July 2017. Interviews with SEMG interlocutor with direct contact with local data collectors in Baidoa, from January to September 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Interview in Baidoa, 10 July 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Somali intelligence source in Baidoa, 9 July 2018; interview with international organization staff in Baidoa, on 4 July 2017; interviews with SEMG interlocutor with direct contact with data collectors in Baidoa, from January to September 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with Somali intelligence source in Baidoa, on 9 July 2018.

### **Annex 1.6: Use of Somali security forces uniforms by Al-Shabaab**


*Figure 1: 22 November 2017 handover ceremony of new uniforms donated by UNDP to the Somali Police Force.*



*Figure 2: Deceased Al-Shabaab operative following attack in Mogadishu, 23 February 2018.*



*Figure 3: Uniform documented on the market in Mogadishu, 7 March 2018.*



*Figure 4: "Manchester Outfitters" beret documented on the market in Mogadishu, 7 March 2018.*




Figure 5: 14 October Battalion, General Gordon Camp, Mogadishu, 23 June 2018.



Figure 6: Deceased Al-Shabaab operative following attack in Mogadishu, 14 July 2018.



Figure 7: Al-Shabaab Eid festival, Lower Juba region, 22 August 2018.



Figure 8: Al-Shabaab Eid festival, Lower Juba region, 22 August 2018.





**Annex 1.7: UAE military base in Berbera, Somaliland**

*Figure 1: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 21 September 2017.*



*Figure 2: Berbera airport and military base under construction, 21 September 2018.*



### Annex 1.8: Seizure of arms and ammunition from Al-Shabaab by Uganda Peoples' Defence Force contingent of AMISOM in April 2018

Table 1: Weapons

Model	Serial no.	Consignment to FGS
Type 56	3301507	May 2015 <sup>15</sup>
Type 56-2	6013300	July 2017

Table 2: Ammunition<sup>16</sup>

Type	Origin	Markings	Comments
82 mm <sup>17</sup>	China	SC 57 15/50, 5-94-35, 2-97-14	Manufactured in 1997; NR <sup>18</sup>
84 mm <sup>19</sup>	India <sup>20</sup>	TPT HEAT OJ 953A 08 Q ↑ C RD84XX	Delivered to Kenya in June 2008
GIP <sup>21</sup>	GDR <sup>22</sup>	DS-62 47-72 06	Manufactured in 1972; NR
Grenade	Belgium	0045 MCR01	432 pieces sold to KSA <sup>23</sup> in 2001
PG-7	Bulgaria	RNDSI-5K (10) -3-05	6,000 rounds sold to Yemen in 2005
PG-7	Bulgaria	RNDS 5K (10) 1-05	4,872 rounds sold to Yemen in 2005
PG-7	China	PF69-40 HEI 9-14-23	No response to tracing requests
PG-7	China	95 4-84 -5203	Manufactured 1984; NR
PG-7	Russia	PHДЦИ-5K 3B-7P	Manufactured 2007; NR
PG-7	Russia	PHДЦИ-5K 3B-7P70-08	Manufactured 2008; NR
PG-7	Russia	ПГ -7BP 59-07	Manufactured 2007; NR
PG-7	USSR <sup>24</sup>	ПГ -7M 7-27-83, 8-27-83	Manufactured in 1983; NR
PG-7	USSR	ПГ -7M 7-24-83 ИПТ Ф -200	Manufactured in 1983; NR

<sup>15</sup> May 2015 delivery of weapons and ammunition from the United Arab Emirates.

<sup>16</sup> Images on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>17</sup> Recoilless Frag 82 mm ammunition HE Type 65.

<sup>18</sup> No records.

<sup>19</sup> 84 mm Heat projectile recoilless Carl Gustav.

<sup>20</sup> Under license from Sweden.

<sup>21</sup> Grenade ignitor pin.

<sup>22</sup> Former German Democratic Republic.

<sup>23</sup> Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

<sup>24</sup> Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

**Annex 1.9: Puntland/Yemen arms smuggling networks (STRICTLY  
CONFIDENTIAL)\***



**Annex 1.10: Puntland arms seizure**

*Figure 1: 2 October 2018, weapons and ammunition seized, held at the headquarters of the Puntland Maritime Police Force.*



*Figure 2: On 2 October 2018, the SEMG documented four of the six boxes of ammunition manufactured in the Republic of Bulgaria in 2013, at the armoury of the Port Police in Bosaso.*



Figure 3: Copy of End User Certificate issued to United Arab Emirates Armed Forces on 13 January 2015.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES  
G. H. Q. ARMED FORCES  
LOGISTICS STAFF  
DTI, GENERAL PURCHASING  
Tel No. +971-2-44133400  
Fax No. +971-2-4413340  
P.O. Box 2501  
Abu Dhabi

القوات المسلحة الإماراتية  
القيد العام للقوات المسلحة  
القيادة العامة للقوات المسلحة  
مستودع المشتريات العامة  
الهاتف: +971-2-44133400  
الفاكس: +971-2-4413340  
ص.ب. 2501  
أبوظبي

Date: 13/01/2015

Our Ref: DPA/2501/2014/129

**END USER CERTIFICATE**

1. Stock Buyer's Name and Address:  
United Arab Emirates  
G.H.Q. Armed Forces  
Logistics Staff, Dti General Purchasing  
P.O. Box 2501, Abu Dhabi

2. Importer's Name and Address:  
United Arab Emirates  
PX TAC Military Equipment Trading Company LLC  
PO Box 47019  
Abu Dhabi

3. Exporter's Name and Address:  
United Arab Emirates  
Abdulla 0933 0029  
MS Yousa Saadoun Road,  
25534, Al-Dhaila

4. Full Description of Goods:  
1. 2,000,000 x 7.62 x 39mm Q&A Beretta pistol

5. Place of Goods Use (Installation):  
Military, United Arab Emirates

6. Purpose of Goods use:  
2500000

7. The End User of the Goods states/declares that the Goods listed in Item No. 4, above, will be used for purposes other than stated in Item 5, and will not be transferred to any other entity in contravention of the terms of the United Arab Emirates or re-exported to any other country without permission of the Exporter and State Service of Export Control.

Title/Position: STAFF BRIGADIER (ING.), DIRECTOR GEN. PURCHASING  
Signature: [Signature]  
Name: WAHEED HASAN IBRAHIM AL ZAMZAM  
Date: 13/01/2015  
Stamp: [Stamp]

Figure 4: Copy of End User Certificate issued to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defence on 20 July 2015.

المملكة العربية السعودية  
وزارة الدفاع  
رئاسة هيئة الأركان العامة  
القوات المسلحة والعمليات  
قسم المشتريات والعمليات

الرجوع إلى: 20/07/2015  
الرجوع إلى: 20/07/2015  
الرجوع إلى: 20/07/2015

**END USER CERTIFICATE**

Reference Contract No. (M9/06/5 AA )  
Signed on 4/10/1435 AH, corresponding to 20/7/2015  
The Ministry of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, MAHSEN AL, relevant to supply the following items:

ITEM	Description	Qty
2.	7.62x39mm cartridge FMJ, LC	3,000,000

1. The Ministry of Defense hereby certifies that the equipment mentioned here for the use of the Royal Saudi Armed Forces and the use of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

2. We certify that the equipment mentioned here will not be re-exported from MAHSEN AL. We also certify that we will not re-export, sell or otherwise dispose of any of them.

3. We certify that we will not permit the re-export, resale or other disposition of the equipment outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia without prior written approval of the concerned Department in the Saudi Government.

This certificate has been issued for the purpose of obtaining the necessary report from:

القائد العام  
Maj. Gen.  
[Signature]  
Ali M. Al-Wabshah  
مدير عام إدارة المشتريات والعمليات  
Dir. Of General Directorate of Armaments & Ammunition

*Figure 5: M-84 machine gun with serial number 10971, manufactured in Republic of Serbia and transferred to the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates in May 2016.*



*Figure 6: M-84 machine gun with serial number 10582, manufactured in Republic of Serbia and transferred to the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates in May 2016.*



*Figure 7: PK machine gun manufactured in Hungary.*



Figure 8: W-85 machine gun manufactured in the People's Republic of China.



Figure 9: Type 56-2 serial number 1408819.



Figure 10: Type 56-2 serial number 1416534



Figure 11: Type 56-2 serial number 1422973.



Figure 12: Type 56-2 serial number 1508558.





Figure 13: Type 56-2 serial number 20002475.



Figure 14: Type 56-2 serial number 2004171.



Figure 15: Type 56-2 serial number 200894.



Figure 16: Type 56-2 serial number 2010893.



Figure 17: Type 56-2 serial number 1502203.



Figure 18: Type 56-2 serial number 2105593.



Figure 19: Type 56-2 serial number 2078372.



**Annex 1.11: US-issued PK machine gun and ammunition documented in Bosaso**

*Figure 1: PK machine gun manufactured in Romania, serial number F-4834, documented by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) in Bosaso, May 2017.*



*Figure 2: Headstamp markings 323 03 for 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition documented by CAR in Bosaso, May 2017.*



*Figures 3 and 4: 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition packaging, lot number A 13-03, documented by CAR in Bosaso, May 2017.*





**Annex 2.1: Al-Shabaab's construction of IEDs (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

## Annex 2.2: 14 October attack

### *Timeline of the attack<sup>1</sup>*

c.08:00: The large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (LVBIED), a Fiat TM truck, departs from Afgoye, Lower Shabelle region.

The vehicle is stopped at Sinka Dheere checkpoint at KM12, on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Mukhtar Mohamed Hassan Roble<sup>2</sup> — a Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. employee responsible for facilitating passage of company vehicles through the Sinka Dheere checkpoint<sup>3</sup> — arranges for FGS security forces to allow the vehicle to pass after paying a toll;

The driver passes through Ex-Control Afgoye checkpoint at KM7 using the toll receipt obtained from Sinka Dheere;

The vehicle is stopped at Benadir checkpoint at KM5. For unknown reasons, security forces become suspicious and call for an explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) team to inspect the truck. The driver speeds off and is pursued by traffic police;

15:24: The LVBIED detonates next to the Safari Hotel at Zoobe junction, approximately 450 m from Benadir checkpoint;

16:10: A Toyota Noah VBIED parked in Wadajir district, approximately 1.5 km south-west of Zoobe junction, arouses the suspicions of a local shop owner and is approached by National Security and Intelligence Agency (NISA) officers. The officers search the vehicle and arrest the driver, Hassan Adan Isaq a.k.a. Abdinasir Jeeri;

16:30: The second VBIED is remotely detonated, killing one civilian and injuring four others.

### *Key members of the plot*

A high-ranking Al-Shabaab *Amniyat* operative, Hassan Adan Isaq a.k.a. Abdinasir Jeeri, aged 23, was prosecuted and subsequently sentenced to death for his role in the operation. Isaq had been tasked with coordinating the deployment of a second VBIED, a Toyota Noah minivan, that was likely intended to breach the perimeter of the airport complex in order to clear a path for the principal LVBIED. According to FGS investigators, Isaq had served as a driver for Al-Shabaab emir Ahmed Diriye, while the latter was governor (*wali*) of Bay and Bakool regions around 2010.<sup>4</sup> Isaq was later a subordinate to “Fanax” (a.k.a. Gardhuub, Ali Dhere, and Gees Adde), a senior *Amniyat* leader specializing in explosives, in Bardera, Gedo region. Adan appeared to have held a relatively senior position in Al-Shabaab given his age of 23; he reported during interrogations that he “grew up with Al-Shabaab”, having been recruited in 2009, at around the age of 14.<sup>5</sup>

Two employees of the principal Somali telecommunications provider Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. were also prosecuted in connection to the attack, for facilitating the entry of the LVBIED through the Sinka Dheere checkpoint. One of these individuals, Abdiweli Ahmed Diriye, had telephoned Mukhtar Roble, the second Hormuud employee, and instructed him to arrange to speak to FGS security forces in order to convince them to allow the LVBIED to pass through Sinka Dheere.<sup>6</sup> Diriye was tried and subsequently sentenced

<sup>1</sup> This timeline has been primarily sourced from UNMAS Somalia’s report on the 14 October incident, “Report on the VBIED attacks in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017,” compiled 14-28 October 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Roble was arrested but later acquitted due to lack of evidence.

<sup>3</sup> FGS military court document, on file with the Secretariat.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with the FGS investigating officer in Mogadishu, 20 March 2018.

<sup>6</sup> FGS military court document.

to a three-year prison term, while Roble was acquitted. Diriye's uncle, Abdullahi Ibrahim Hassan Absuge, the owner of the Fiat TM truck used for the LVBIED, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment.

According to court documents, a man known only by the name "Duale" acted as a logistics officer for Isaq once he had arrived in Mogadishu.<sup>7</sup> "Duale" drove Isaq around Mogadishu in a tuk-tuk in order to conduct reconnaissance. He showed Isaq the NISA checkpoint at KM4, proximate to the Mogadishu airport complex, and explained that Isaq's role would be to conduct the driver of the second VBIED to the checkpoint, where it would subsequently be detonated to clear a path for the LVBIED.<sup>8</sup>

"Duale" told Isaq that he was a member of the FGS, and showed Government ID to pass through the checkpoints;<sup>9</sup> according to the FGS investigating officer, "Duale" was likely a member of NISA, due to his ability to pass through Government checkpoints unchallenged in a tuk-tuk.<sup>10</sup> "Duale" told Isaq that he had coordinated previous major attacks in Mogadishu, including the complex attacks on the Ambassador Hotel (1 June 2016) and the Nasa Hablod Hotel (25 June 2016).<sup>11</sup> As of this writing, "Duale" was still at large.

#### *LVBIED size and composition*

An assessment of the LVBIED suggests a TNT equivalence of upwards of 1,200 kg, making it likely the largest explosive device in Al-Shabaab's history.<sup>12</sup> An independent explosives engineer consulted by the SEMG used a range of explosive engineering formulae and tools to estimate the explosive mass of the VBIED. Explosive engineering software was used to conduct the analysis, using input parameters which included the damage radius from satellite imagery, the type of surface, as well as crater dimensions of the blast. UNMAS Somalia, conversely, concluded that the net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the blast was approximately between 600 kg and 1,000 KG (TNT equivalence).<sup>13</sup> The agency took into account the complexities of all the unknown variables; the exact explosive used, including modifications or adulteration, the construction of the buildings, and anomalies due to blast overpressure. According to UNMAS, a nearby lorry transporting sugar may have acted as a fuel enhancement for the blast, contributing the widespread fires in the vicinity and augmenting the death toll.<sup>14</sup>

Experts in Mogadishu who conducted field tests of the explosive material suggested the presence of both military grade explosives and the oxidizer potassium nitrate, suggesting that Al-Shabaab may have attempted to bulk up the LVBIED using home-made explosives (HME) components.<sup>15</sup> Constructing a 1,200 kg LVBIED by traditional explosive remnants of war (ERW) harvesting would entail a major logistical operation; for example,

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The vehicle was known to FGS security forces, as the driver established a routine by frequently traversing the Sinka Dheere checkpoint, in preparation for the day of the attack. It is not clear why the driver was held up at the checkpoint by FGS security forces on 14 October. Interview with EOD specialists in Mogadishu, 20 February 2018.

<sup>7</sup> FGS military court document.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Interview with the FGS investigating officer in Mogadishu, 20 March 2018. See annex 4.2 (strictly confidential) for additional information regarding the infiltration of NISA by Al-Shabaab.

<sup>11</sup> FGS military court document.

<sup>12</sup> The same expert had estimated the LVIED deployed at the Medina gate in Mogadishu on 2 January 2017, hitherto Al-Shabaab's largest IED, at approximately 1,200 kg (see [S/2017/924](#), para. 12). Both estimates were peer reviewed and agreed by a UK-based blast analysis engineer.

<sup>13</sup> UNMAS Somalia, "Report on the VBIED Attacks in Mogadishu On 14 October 2017", October 2017.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. UNMAS teams deployed to the scene to conduct a post-blast investigation reported the area being covered in a sticky black residue that smelled of caramel.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with an EOD specialist in Mogadishu, 20 February 2018. However, the field test kits used by EOD teams are not as accurate as laboratory analyses.

Al-Shabaab would have had to harvest approximately 6,000 60-mm mortars or 190 TM 57 anti-tank mines.<sup>16</sup>

*Figure 1: CCTV footage of the detonation of the LVBIED.*



*Figure 2: Semi-circular pattern of damage, with buildings destroyed out to 100 m.<sup>17</sup>*



<sup>16</sup> Based on estimates of 0.20 kg of harvested TNT per 60-mm mortar and 6.34 kg per TM 57 anti-tank mine). UNMAS Somalia, "Report on the VBIED Attacks in Mogadishu On 14 October 2017", October 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Source: UNMAS Somalia, "Report on the VBIED Attacks in Mogadishu On 14 October 2017", October 2017.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) imagery analysis of the scene, using United Nations Operational Satellite Programme (UNOSAT), compared imagery from 29 September 2017 to 16 October 2017, in order to ascertain the level of damage. The UNITAR imagery is shown in figures 4 and 5, below, with the buildings marked as destroyed (red dot), severely damaged (orange dot) and moderately damaged (yellow dot). The damage was disproportionately concentrated on the northern side of the blast site; this was partly attributable to the fact that the LVBIED had run up against the road divider and was oriented towards the north at the moment of detonation.<sup>18</sup>

*Figures 3 and 4: Satellite imagery of the blast site on 29 September 2017 and on 16 October 2017, following the attack.<sup>19</sup>*



<sup>18</sup> Interview with an UNMAS operations officer who had reviewed CCTV footage of the detonation, Mogadishu, 27 February 2018.

<sup>19</sup> Source: UNMAS Somalia, "Report on the VBIED Attacks in Mogadishu On 14 October 2017", October 2017.



### Annex 2.3: February 2018 foiled VBIED plot in Kenya

On 15 February 2018, Kenyan police on a routine patrol in Merti Division, Isiolo County, witnessed a vehicle stopped by the side of the road. Upon approach the police were shot at by an occupant of the vehicle and returned fire, killing Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad”. Four individuals attempted to flee the scene and two were arrested, Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne. The two others escaped capture, later identified only as Ahmed a.k.a. “Balaa”, and “Said”.<sup>20</sup>

The vehicle, a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek with Kenyan number plate KBM200D, had been converted into a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) containing approximately 100 kg of explosives.<sup>21</sup> The VBIED was fitted with a canister loaded with explosives concealed under the dashboard, as well as seven High Explosive Projectiles (HEPs), containing roughly 10 kg of explosives each, concealed within the doors. It demonstrated marked similarities in construction to three other VBIEDs detected in both Somalia and Kenya (see “Comparative analysis of the VBIED construction”, below).

Also discovered in the vehicle were 5 Type 56-2 AK-pattern assault rifles, 36 magazines of ammunition, 36 unprimed F1 grenades and their firing pins, 3 knives, and a black Al-Shabaab flag.

The operation appeared to have been patterned after the *modus operandi* of Al-Shabaab complex attacks in Somalia, whereby a VBIED would have been used to breach the perimeter of an unknown target, followed by a wave of ‘suicide gunmen’ — in this case, most likely five individuals, corresponding to the number of rifles recovered from the vehicle.

The plot was in the final stages of its implementation and was only disrupted by the vigilance of local police officers. Had it succeeded, it would have been the most significant attack by Al-Shabaab in a regional Member State since the Garissa University College massacre of April 2015 (see [S/2015/801](#), annex 4.2).

Figure 1: 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, number plate KBM200D, used to construct the VBIED.



<sup>20</sup> Signed statements of Abdimajit Adan and Mohammed Nanne to ATPU, March 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Confirmed in a letter from the Government of Kenya to the SEMG, 26 April 2018.



Figure 2: Material discovered by Kenyan police in the VBIED vehicle, including 5 AK-pattern rifles, 36 grenades, and 7 HEPs (left foreground), and an Al-Shabaab flag (right).



### Condensed timeline of the plot

May 2013:	Mohammed Osman Nanne travels to Somalia from Moyale, Kenya, with seven other youths to join Al-Shabaab.
Oct. 2015:	Abdimajit Adan travels to Somalia from Isiolo, Kenya, and joins Al-Shabaab.
Nov. 2017:	Abdimajit Adan is dispatched to Nairobi by Al-Shabaab <i>Amniyat</i> operative “Dere” in order to procure a vehicle and prepare safehouses.
23 Dec. 2017:	Abdimajit Adan purchases a 2010 Toyota Mark X in Nairobi, number plate KCL621K.
31 Dec. 2018:	Abdimajit Adan crosses into Somalia with vehicle KCL621K at El Wak. The vehicle is converted into a VBIED in El Adde, Somalia.
2 Jan. 2018:	Abdimajit Adan begins the journey back to Kenya with KCL621K, but the vehicle experiences mechanical problems and he is forced to turn back.
3 Jan. 2018:	“Dere” sends Abdimajit Adan back to Nairobi to procure a second vehicle.
5 Jan. 2018:	Mohammed Osman Nanne arrives in Nairobi and is installed in a safehouse by Abdimajit Adan.
12 Jan. 2018:	Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad” arrives in Nairobi and is installed in a safehouse by Adan.
31 Jan. 2018:	Abdimajit Adan purchases a second vehicle, a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek with number plate KBM200D.
1 Feb. 2018:	Abdimajit Adan departs Nairobi for Somalia with vehicle KBM200D, accompanied by Mohammed Nanne and Mbarak Abdi Huka.
5-13 Feb. 2018:	Vehicle KBM200D is converted into a VBIED in El Adde, Somalia.
13 Feb. 2018:	Vehicle KBM200D departs El Adde for Nairobi.
15 Feb. 2018:	Kenyan police on patrol notice a suspicious vehicle by the side of the road near Merti, Isiolo County. Following a brief firefight, Huka is killed, Adan and Nanne are arrested, and two others, Ahmed “Balaa” and “Said”, flee the scene.

### Core members of the plot

#### *Abdimajit Hasan Adan*



Abdimajit Adan, aged 24,<sup>22</sup> is a Kenyan national (ID: 32480689) who served as the plot's chief logistics operative in Nairobi.


In his statement to the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), Adan described how he had joined Al-Shabaab in October 2015 while travelling to Kismayo, Somalia. He received a two-month training course in the use of weapons, first aid, "martial arts", and "tactics of war". Adan was then deployed to Jilib as a radio operator for one year under the command of an

Al-Shabaab leader known as "Jafar".

Upon expressing discontent with Al-Shabaab and "Jafar", including a desire to return to Kenya to marry, Adan was handed over to the *Aminyaat* operative "Dere" (see below). "Dere" informed him that he would be allowed to return to Kenya if he agreed to carry out an undisclosed assignment. He was thereafter dispatched to Nairobi in November 2017 in order to establish safehouses and procure a vehicle to be converted into a VBIED.

As of this writing, Adan was undergoing prosecution in Kenya.

#### *Mohammed Osman Nanne*



Mohammed Nanne, born on 1 January 1995, is a Kenyan national who was sent to Nairobi by "Dere" to assist Abdimajit Adan in a logistics role.

Nanne had travelled to Somalia in May 2013 with seven other youths in order to join Al-Shabaab. He received three months of initial weapons training and was subsequently transferred to a military unit in Jilib composed of 80 militants. However, according to Nanne he never directly participated in any fighting,

as his primary role in the group was as a Koranic teacher.

In early 2016, hostilities broke out between Al-Shabaab and former members of the group who had switched their allegiances to the newly-formed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia. During this conflict Nanne joined the ISIL faction, having decided to leave Al-Shabaab. During Al-Shabaab's subsequent crackdown on the ISIL-aligned militants, Nanne was captured and imprisoned for six months. Given the option of remaining in prison or rejoining Al-Shabaab, Nanne opted for the latter choice and was subsequently transferred to "Dere" in Jilib. "Dere" informed him that he would be given an assignment in Kenya; according to Nanne's statement to ATPU, he was selected for the operation by "Dere" because he was a Kenyan national and was unknown to Kenyan authorities.

As of this writing, Nanne was undergoing prosecution in Kenya.

<sup>22</sup> Abdimajit Adan's date of birth is given alternatively as 6 September 1994 and 16 September 1994.

*Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. "Sa'ad" a.k.a. Jirma Huka Galgalo*



According to Kenyan authorities, Mbarak Abdi Huka, joined Al-Shabaab in Somalia in 2011.<sup>23</sup> With Ahmed "Balaa", Huka was tasked with transporting the VBIED from El Adde to the rendezvous with Abdimajit Adan in Merti, Isiolo County. Upon discovery of the VBIED vehicle by police in Merti Division on 15 February, Huka opened fire on officers and was fatally shot in response. Although Huka was a Kenyan national, a falsified Kenyan national ID bearing the name "Jirma Huka Galgalo" was recovered from the vehicle.

Huka was known to the other members of the plot only by the name "Sa'ad".<sup>24</sup>

*"Dere"*

"Dere" was the head Al-Shabaab orchestrator of the plot based in Somalia (El Adde and Jilib), and likely a senior member of the *Aminyaat*, Al-Shabaab's internal security and intelligence apparatus.

"Dere" had access to significant financial resources, allowing him to arrange for the transfer of a total of at least \$24,000 to Abdimajit Adan (see "Total cost of the operation", below) for the purpose of securing safehouses in Nairobi and purchasing a vehicle to be converted into the VBIED.

*Ahmed "Balaa"*

Ahmed "Balaa" was a motorbike ("boda boda") driver and arms smuggler who facilitated the movements of the plotters on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border.

It is likely that "Balaa" is a dual Kenyan-Somali national. Both Abdimajit Adan and Mohammed Nanne reported in their statements to police that they had been guests at "Balaa's" house in El Wak, Somalia, on multiple occasions. However it is also clear from Adan's statement that "Balaa" had familial connections to Kenya, specifically the town of Kachiuru in Meru County, where he reported that Ahmed picked up and dropped off his son. Adan also made reference in his statement to "Balaa" and his son visiting relatives living in Nairobi. "Balaa" was present when the VBIED vehicle was detected by Merti police, but fled the scene and evaded arrest.<sup>25</sup>

*"Said"*

"Said" was present when the VBIED vehicle was detected by Merti police, but fled the scene and escaped arrest.<sup>26</sup> His broader role in the operation is unknown.

*"Reer Badia" a.k.a. "Ahlal Badia"*

"Reer Badia" (known to Mohammed Nanne as "Ahlal Badia") is an associate of "Dere" likely based in Somalia's Gedo region, and likely also a member of the *Amniyat*. According to the statement of Mohammed Nanne, "Reer Badia" procured the five Type 56-2 assault rifles that were to be used in the operation.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with ATPU in Nairobi, 4 September 2018.

<sup>24</sup> Statements of Abdimajit Hasan Adan and Mohammed Osman Nanne to ATPU, March 2018.

<sup>25</sup> A local media article reported that two additional suspects, identified as Ahmed Issack Ibrahim, 46, and Said Mohammed Salat, 19, were arrested two days after the interception of the VBIED at the nearby town of Garbatula, in Isiolo County. However, in an interview with the SEMG on 4 September 2018, ATPU officials denied that either Ahmed "Balaa" or "Said" had ever been apprehended. Daily Nation, "Shabaab terrorist rented room next to city police base", 20 February 2018. Available from <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/How-city-dodged-big-Shabaab-bomb/1056-4311896-yo4mjhz/index.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

*“Aladi”*

“Aladi” was a motorbike (“boda boda”) driver and arms smuggler who facilitated the movement of the plotters on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border.<sup>27</sup>

*Attacking team (‘suicide gunmen’)*

The five Type 56-2 rifles discovered in the VBIED by Kenyan police strongly indicate that the attacking team was to be composed of five individuals. The role of these individuals would likely have been to storm the intended target of the attack following the detonation of the VBIED at its perimeter. The members of the attacking team are yet to be identified by the ATPU or the SEMG, and may still be at large within Kenya.

### **Secondary members of the plot (non-Al-Shabaab facilitators)**

*Anthony Kitila Makau a.k.a. “Rasta”*



Anthony Makau was the Nairobi-based driver, fixer, and friend of Abdimajit Hasan Adan. The night of 13 February, Makau accompanied Adan on a night out in Nairobi, leading to Adan’s late departure the next day and the subsequent detection of the plot.

*John Maina Kiarie*



Facilitator known to Abdimajit Adan as a procurer of fake Kenyan IDs and insurance stickers to residents of the Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh. On 9 February, Kiarie was paid KES 250,000 (\$2,500) by Adan to arrange for four fake Kenya national ID cards.<sup>28</sup> Presumably, these IDs were intended to be provided to members of the Al-Shabaab attacking team. The ID cards were produced on the same day and three were subsequently sent by Adan to “Dere” via a bus to Mandera. One ID card was retained

by Adan, namely the one intended for Mbarak Abdi Huka, which was recovered by police from the VBIED vehicle following the detection of the plot.

*Lydia Nyawira Mburu*



Lydia Mburu was an employee of a printing house in Nairobi’s Central Business District, tasked by John Kiarie with manufacturing the four fake Kenyan national ID cards.

*Francis Macharia Karishu*



Francis Karishu was Lydia Mburu’s employer at a printing house in Nairobi. Having evaded arrest following the discovery of the plot, Karishu was eventually taken into custody on 20 May 2018, two days after Kenyan police placed a KES 1,000,000 (\$10,000) bounty on his head.

<sup>27</sup> Statement of Abdimajit Adan to ATPU, March 2018.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

As of this writing, all four secondary members of the plot are undergoing prosecution in Kenya. While they have been charged with terrorism offences, all evidence indicates that they were facilitators motivated by financial gain, rather than members of Al-Shabaab.

#### **Failure of first VBIED attempt (KCL621K) due to mechanical difficulties**

On 23 December 2017, Adan received two *hawala* money transfers totalling \$15,000, facilitated by “Dere” (see “Total cost of the operation”, below). The same day, he purchased a 2010 Toyota Mark X vehicle, number plate KCL621K, for KES 1,300,000 (\$13,000) from a dealership in Nairobi’s Parklands neighbourhood.<sup>29</sup>

On 25 December, Adan met Ahmed “Balaa” at a hotel in Nairobi in order to plan transferring the vehicle to Somalia. The following evening, Adan and “Balaa” departed Nairobi with the vehicle. In Kachiuru,<sup>30</sup> Meru County, they picked up an individual known only as “Aladi”, whom Adan described in his statement to ATPU as a motorbike driver and an “arms smuggler”.

On 31 December, Adan and “Balaa” crossed into Somalia at El Wak, from where they proceeded in the direction of El Adde. At the town of Warxoor, Adan and “Balaa” met “Dere” and an individual known as “Reer Badia” and handed the vehicle over to them. The following day, Adan proceeded to El Adde, where he remained until 2 January. During that time the vehicle was fitted with explosives and handed back to “Balaa” and Adan.

According to Adan’s statement to ATPU, “Balaa” was instructed to drive the vehicle as far as Mutuati, in Kenya’s Meru County, before handing it over to Adan for the remainder of the journey to Nairobi. However, shortly after departing from El Adde, Adan noted that the vehicle felt “heavy” and that “lights on the dashboard were on”. The vehicle then began to overheat, so the two pulled over to the side of the road and called “Dere”, who met them the following morning. The vehicle was left with “Dere”, and “Aladi” was summoned to transport Adan and Ahmed “Balaa” on motorbike to Mutuati. “Balaa” subsequently returned to Somalia with Aladi, and Adan hired a taxi to transport him to Nairobi, arriving on 3 January 2018, according to his mobile phone location data.

The explosives that had been fitted in KCL621K were presumably extracted from the vehicle and later installed in the Mitsubishi Airtrek subsequently procured by Adan (KBM200D).

#### **Second attempt (KBM200D)**

Prior to his departure from El Adde, “Dere” informed Abdimajit Adan that he would be contacted by an individual who was to join him in Nairobi. Following Adan’s return to Nairobi, he was contacted for the first time by his current co-defendant, Mohammed Nanne, on 5 January.<sup>31</sup> Adan had already leased a residence for himself in the Nairobi suburb of Ongata Rongai; upon receiving Nanne in Nairobi, he proceeded to arrange for a second safehouse in the neighbourhood of Langata paying KES 16,000 (\$160) in rent per month.<sup>32</sup> He then provided Nanne with KES 32,000 (\$320) to buy a mattress and bedding.

<sup>29</sup> Statement of Abdimajit Adan to ATPU, March 2018.

<sup>30</sup> In the statements of Abdimajit Adan and Mohammed Nanne, Kachiuru is frequently mentioned as a transit point on their journeys from Nairobi to and from Somalia. It appears that Ahmed “Balaa” had familial connections to the town.

<sup>31</sup> Mobile phone records demonstrate that Nanne’s first contact with Adan took place at 18:24 on 5 January 2018.

<sup>32</sup> Both safehouses were selected with a view to avoiding scrutiny from the Kenyan authorities. In his statement to ATPU, Adan recounted how “Dere” had instructed him to avoid neighbourhoods in the eastern parts of Nairobi, where there are a higher concentration of Somali residents and police sweeps are more common.

On 12 January, Mbarak Abdi Huka, who was known to Adan only by the name “Sa’ad”, arrived in Nairobi, having also been dispatched by “Dere”. Adan installed “Sa’ad” in the safehouse in which Nanne was residing.


Adan then turned to purchasing a second vehicle to be converted into a VBIED. “Dere” directed Adan to procure a Nissan X-Trail; Adan informed him that one was not available for sale in Nairobi, leading “Dere” to demand a Mitsubishi vehicle instead. On 31 January, “Dere” arranged for \$9,000 to be sent to Abdimajit Adan via the Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc.-affiliated *hawala* company Taaj Services.

Adan used KES 600,000 (\$6,000) to purchase a 2003 Mitsubishi Airtrek, number plate KBM200D, at Fortis Limited dealership in Nairobi’s Lavington neighbourhood. On 1 February, according to GPS and mobile phone data, Adan departed Nairobi for Somalia with the vehicle, accompanied by Mohammed Nanne and Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. “Sa’ad”. In Merti, Isiolo County, Adan stopped to pick up Ahmed “Balaa” and another Al-Shabaab operative known to the group only by the name “Said”.

### GPS track of the VBIED vehicle (KBM200D)

Kenyan ATPU were able to obtain KBM200D’s GPS track from its origin point in Nairobi, across the Kenya-Somalia border at El Wak, to the VBIED construction site at El Adde,<sup>33</sup> and eventually back to Isiolo County in Kenya, where the vehicle was intercepted. Figure 3, below, presents a geographical representation of KBM200D’s GPS track, highlighting several important dates.

*Figure 3: GPS track of KBM200D’s journey from Kenya to Somalia and back.*



On 4 February, the five Al-Shabaab operatives crossed the Kenya-Somalia border at El Wak, seemingly without interference from police or border officials, reaching El Adde the

<sup>33</sup> El Adde was the site of a major Kenyan military defeat against Al-Shabaab, when on 15 January 2016 Al-Shabaab conducted a complex attack on a KDF base that resulted in the deaths of at least 150 KDF soldiers (see S/2016/919, paras. 15-21).




following day. From 5-13 February, KBM200D remained primarily at two locations on the outskirts of El Adde, where the VBIED was constructed.

On 5 February, the vehicle arrived at “Compound #1” (see figure 5, below), located at coordinates 3.038885 N, 41.860878 E, where it remained for three days. On the afternoon of 8 February, the vehicle was moved to a second compound (“Compound #2”) located at coordinates 3.032785 N, 41.862663 E (see figure 6, below), where it stayed until it was moved back to Compound #1 on 11 February. On the afternoon of 12 February the vehicle was driven to an uninhabited location approximately 300 m northwest of Compound #1. It is plausible that this movement represented a final ‘test drive’ to ensure that the vehicle was in working order, particularly in light of the mechanical problems experienced with the first vehicle (KCL621K) after it was fitted as a VBIED.

On the evening of 13 February KBM200D began its journey back to Kenya, crossing the border between 06:00 and 07:00 the following day.

*Figure 4: Satellite image of El Adde, with KBM200D’s GPS track depicted in red.*



*Figure 5: Compound #1 in El Adde (3.038885 N, 41.860878 E) where KBM200D was located between 5-8 February and 11-13 February.*



*Figure 6: Compound #2 in El Adde (3.032785 N, 41.862663 E), where KBM200D was located between 8 and 11 February.*



Across all of Adan's and Nanne's numerous journeys back and forth across the porous Kenya-Somalia border, little mention is made in their statements to ATPU of encounters with security forces. Where encounters are mentioned, they are in the context of either paying or witnessing bribes to security forces on both sides of the border; for instance, during Adan's first journey to Somalia in October 2015 to join Al-Shabaab, he recalled the lorry on which he was travelling being "stopped by either KDF [Kenyan Defence Forces] or AP [Administrative Police]" and each passenger having to pay KES 2,000 (\$20) to secure its release.<sup>34</sup> Shortly after crossing into Somalia, the lorry was stopped by Somali security forces, who likewise received a bribe for its release.

Notably, no mention is made in Abdimajit Adan's statement to ATPU of being challenged by border security while bringing either vehicle (KBM200D or KCL621K) from Kenya into Somalia and back.

### **Purchase of an airline ticket**

Following the delivery of the KBM200D vehicle to "Dere" in Somalia, Mohammed Nanne, Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. "Sa'ad", Ahmed "Balaa" and "Said" remained in El Adde.

Abdimajit Adan returned from El Wak to Nairobi on a Freedom Airlines flight on 9 February 2018. The airline ticket was purchased via a Safaricom MPESA mobile money transfer of KES 12,000 (\$120) from a phone number registered under the name "Suban Issack". According to Kenyan police, unknown members of the plot had used a stolen ID belonging to Suban Issack to register the mobile phone line for which the funds to purchase the airline ticket were sent.<sup>35</sup>

### **Final rendezvous and arrest**

Adan and his friend and driver Anthony Makau a.k.a. "Rasta" spent the night of 13 February and early the next morning at night clubs in Nairobi. As a result, Adan woke up late in the afternoon of the next day, and departed behind schedule for the rendezvous point in Merti, Isiolo County, where he was to pick up vehicle KBM200D and transport it back to Nairobi. Due to his late departure, Adan was forced to spend the night in Maua, in Meru County, and resume his journey the next day.

Mobile phone records show that Adan and Ahmed "Balaa", who was travelling with the KBM200D vehicle, contacted each other at multiple points throughout 15 February. At 15:51, Adan made his final call to "Balaa", informing him that he had reached Merti. "Balaa" dispatched Nanne and Said, who had accompanied KBM200D from El Adde, to pick up Adan on motorbike and return with him to the site of the vehicle. Upon their arrival the group was confronted by police while on a routine patrol. Mbarak Abdi Huka a.k.a. "Sa'ad" opened fire on police and was shot dead. Adan and Nanne were taken into custody, while Ahmed "Balaa" and "Said" succeeded in evading arrest.

### **Total cost of the operation**

On 23 December "Dere" arranged for two *hawala* transfers to Abdimajit Adan in Nairobi. The two transfers, totalling \$15,000, had been under the name of "Ahmed Abdi Adan", which was likely an alias. The SEMG subsequently determined that "Ahmed Abdi Adan" had sent the funds from Kismayo using mobile phone number 252615766021. The phone number was not active as of this writing.

As noted above (see "Second attempt (KBM200D)"), "Dere" sent another transfer of \$9,000 via Taaj Services, to fund the purchase of the second VBIED vehicle (KBM200D). In his statement to ATPU, Abdimajit Adan also noted that "Dere" had given him \$3,000 in

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with ATPU in Nairobi, 4 September 2018. When contacted by the SEMG on 18 July 2018, the user of the mobile phone identified himself as "Hassan", and claimed that Suban Issack was a relative of his.

cash prior to his initial departure from Somalia in November 2017. In his statement to ATPU, Mohammed Nanne also reported that \$1,000 had been given to him by “Dere” in preparation for his journey to Kenya in January 2018.

Additional costs included the roughly \$6,500 to purchase five Type 56-2 rifles at local markets in Somalia, \$3,000 for the ammunition and the 36 grenades, as well as an unknown cost for the explosives fitted to the VBIED vehicle.<sup>36</sup> Allowing for additional expenses not captured in the ATPU or SEMG investigation into the plot, the operation cost Al-Shabaab less than \$50,000 up to the point that it was disrupted by Kenyan police.

### **Type 56-2 rifles**

At the headquarters of the ATPU in Nairobi on 17 May 2018, the Monitoring Group documented the five Chinese-manufactured Type 56-2 AK-pattern rifles recovered by police from the captured VBIED vehicle. The Group was subsequently able to trace at least two of the weapons to a consignment of 3,500 Type 56-2 rifles purchased by the FGS from the Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia in 2013 following the partial lifting of the arms embargo.<sup>37</sup>

The rifles bearing the serial numbers 407043 and 413662 (see figures 8 and 9, below) could be matched to a partial list of nearly 2,500 serial numbers obtained by the SEMG from the Government of Ethiopia in 2014. Two additional rifles, bearing serial numbers 408187 and 409862, almost certainly formed part of the same consignment based on the immediate proximity of their numbers to others in the partial list.<sup>38</sup> It is less clear whether the fifth Type 56-2 rifle, bearing serial number 2010312, originated from the same shipment.

The discovery of these rifles in the possession of Al-Shabaab operatives in Kenya represents the first known occasion that arms imported by the FGS have been used for a planned terror attack outside of Somalia.

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<sup>36</sup> At local markets in southern Somalia, a 56-2 rifle would have cost approximately \$1,300, an AK-47 ammunition round \$1, and an F1 grenade approximately \$50.

<sup>37</sup> This was the second import of arms by the FGS following the partial lifting of the arms embargo pursuant to Security Council resolution 2093 (2013). The FGS notification of the shipment erroneously described the rifles as Type 56-1s. An SEMG inspection of Halane Central Armoury in 2014 confirmed that the shipment had consisted of Type 56-2 rifles.

<sup>38</sup> For instance, serial numbers 408185 and 409863 are both contained on the partial list provided by the Government of Ethiopia.



*Figure 7: Five Type 56-2 rifles recovered by Kenyan police from the VBIED vehicle.*



*Figure 8: Type 56-2 rifle bearing serial number 407043.*



*Figure 9: Type 56-2 rifle bearing serial number 413662.*



**Annex 2.3.1: Mobile phone analysis (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***



**Annex 2.3.2: Al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment networks in Kenya  
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

**Annex 2.3.3: Comparative analysis of VBIED construction (STRICTLY  
CONFIDENTIAL)\***

#### Annex 2.4: Al-Shabaab domestic financing

Al-Shabaab generates significant revenue from a variety of domestic sources, employing a system of extortion entrenched within local communities across southern and central Somalia. The group is able to levy taxation via a network of checkpoints, with collection enforced through violence and intimidation. A tightly controlled and centralized financial system is complemented by a methodical approach to accounting and financial management.

Al-Shabaab divides its taxation system into four distinct revenue streams: registration and taxation of transiting vehicles (“gadiid”), taxation of transported goods (“badeeco”), taxation of farms and agricultural produce (“dalag”), and taxation of livestock sales (“xoolo”). Receipts are provided to civilians for each of the four revenue streams, examples of which are presented in figure 1, below.

Figure 1: Redacted samples of receipts provided for gadiid and badeeco.

Region: MAKTABKA MAALIYADA WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA EE JUBBOOYINKA

Date: Taariikh: 15.5.1439

Vehicle type: Nuuca Gaariga: 3258 Khidmada: 3258

Receipt no.: No: 114405

Tax type: WARGADDA LASOCODKA DHAQDHAQAQA GAADIIDKA

Qoraal ahaan: Magaca Darawalka: Chwaanklisa: Tel: 06/324490

Magaca Milkiilaha: Chwaanklisa: Tel: 06/324490

Ka yimid: Ku socde: Wedada uu marayo: Qofka soo Raray: Nuuca Rarka: Buuxa: Heaf:

Finance officer: Saxiixa Lacag Qabtaha:

Region: Maktabka Maaliyada Wilaayada Islaamiga Ee Baay & Bakool

Date: Taariikh: 15.5.1439

Receipt no.: No: 11135

Wargadda La Socodka Badeecada

Magaca Darawalka: Magaca Milkiilaha: Tel: 06/324490

Nuucca Gaariga: Khidmada: 280

Qoraal Ahaan: Ku Socdo: Nuucca Badeecada: Goo Raray: Saxiixa Lacag Qabtaha: Xadiif

Figure 2: Redacted samples of receipts provided for dalag and xoolo.

MAKTABKA MAALIYADA  
WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA  
EE BAAY & BAKOOL

مكتب المالي لولاية  
باي و بکول الإسلامية

No: 15048

WARQADDA DALAGYADA BEERAHA

Taariikh: 20.01.2018 - 1439

Magaca: [Redacted]

Lacag Dhan Sh.So: [Redacted] US\$ \$74

Eray ahaan: [Redacted]

Nuqa Dalaga: [Redacted] Tirada: [Redacted]

Magaca Gaariga/Beerta: [Redacted]

Ka yimid: [Redacted] U socdo: [Redacted]

Magaca Darawalka: [Redacted] Tel: [Redacted]

Faah faahin: [Redacted]

Saxiixa L/Qabtaha: [Redacted]

MAKTABKA MAALIYADA  
WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA  
EE BAAY & BAKOOL

مكتب المالي لولاية  
باي و بکول الإسلامية

No: 15048

WARQADDA HUBINTA CAAFIMAADKA XOOLAHA

Taariikh: 20.01.2018 - 1439

Magaca: [Redacted] Deg: [Redacted]

Nuqa Xoolaha: [Redacted] Tirada: [Redacted]

Xaalada Caafimaadka: [Redacted]

Dhaqaal: ☐ Kawaan: ☐ Ganacsi: ☒

Khidmada: [Redacted]

Qoraal ahaan: [Redacted]

Saxiixa Lacag Qabtaha: [Redacted]

F.G: Warqadan waxay shaqeenaysaa Mudo dhan: 25/2

## 93/154

Following registration, a charge is applied (*gadiid*) to each vehicle for every time it transits through Al-Shabaab territory. The duty owed is calculated based on the type of vehicle and the length of the journey, with a receipt provided to the driver. Based on an examination of Al-Shabaab taxation receipts collected by the SEMG throughout the mandate, table 1, below, provides a summary of the taxation applied to each vehicle:

Type of vehicle	Registration fee	Transit taxation applied
Large truck (e.g. Fiat N3 Truck)	\$500	\$400-\$700
Medium truck (e.g. Fiat Iveco 110)	\$300	\$150-\$400
Minibus (e.g. Toyota Noah) / 4x4 vehicle	\$200	\$25-\$200
Passenger car	\$100	\$10-\$50

*Dinwaan Galin Noo Hosiin*

**MAKTABKA MAALIYADA  
WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA  
EE SH/HOOS**

**مكتب المالي لولاية  
شبيلى السفلى الإسلامية**

**WARQADDA LASOCODKA DHAQDHAQAAQA GAADIIDKA**

Taariikh: *1479*

Nuuca Gaariga: *100 \$* Khidmada:

Qoraal ahaan:

Magaca Darawalka:

Ciwaankiisa: Tel:

Magaca Miikillaha:

Ciwaankiisa: Tel:

Ka yimid: Ku socda:

Wadada uu marayo: Qofka soo Raray:

Nuuca Rarka: *Si* Buuxa: Haaf:

**Saxiixa Lacag Qabtaha:**  
*Marka*

<sup>39</sup> The taxation amounts for each vehicle were confirmed by the SEMG through review of registration receipts in Lower Shabelle region and interviews with a former Al-Shabaab checkpoint operator in Middle Shabelle, 11 September 2018. SEMG interviews in other regions in southern and central Somalia revealed some variation in registration rates.



### Taxation on goods transported (*badeeco*)

A separate tax (*badeeco*) is calculated at Al-Shabaab checkpoints based on the type of goods transported by a given vehicle, as well as the size of the consignment (typically calculated by the number of sacks).

### *Dalag* and *Xoolo* taxation

*Dalag* (literally, “harvest” in the Somali language) and *xoolo* (“livestock” in the Somali language) comprise the two remaining revenue pillars of the Al-Shabaab taxation system. However, Al-Shabaab’s method of collection for *dalag* and *xoolo* is not yet fully understood by the SEMG.


As with *gadiid* and *badeeco*, Al-Shabaab issues receipts for payment of *dalag* and *xoolo*. However, it is not clear whether these two taxes are collected at checkpoints or through another method. In the SEMG’s study of Al-Shabaab taxation in Hiran region (see annex 2.4.1 below), *dalag* comprised 67 per cent of Al-Shabaab’s total revenue in Hiran from January 2015 to December 2017. Evidence from this study suggests that *dalag* may be a levy imposed on agricultural estates by Al-Shabaab, rather than solely the taxation of agricultural produce at checkpoints.

*Xoolo* is understood to be a tax placed on individuals selling livestock, primarily camels and goats, at local markets. From the SEMG’s examination of receipts issued for *xoolo*, it appears that the tax is collected in the marketplaces, rather than at checkpoints.

### Principles and enforcement

A brief set of principles, jotted in broken Arabic into a tax ledger by the head of Al-Shabaab finance in Hiran region (see annex 2.4.1), provides an illustrative snapshot of the group’s philosophy of revenue collection:

Figure 4: Principles outlined in an Al-Shabaab financial ledger for Hiran region, 23 March 2018.





*Unofficial translation from Arabic as follows:*

- (a) fight bribery and sins (“*munkarat*”);
- (b) follow up with finance and workers in all locations;
- (c) classify revenues, including private money;
- (d) promote financial streams, work energetically, and motivate workers;
- (e) reduce monthly and yearly budget where possible;
- (f) bring righteous men and work throughout the evening;
- (g) promote donations, achievements, and financial requests.

Al-Shabaab’s tax collection system is reinforced through systematic intimidation and violence. For instance, on 4 June 2018 at Qura’a Jome, Al-Shabaab killed six civilians and destroyed eleven vehicles and their goods, which were *en route* from Belet Weyne to Bakool region, for failing to pay taxation to the group.

*Figure 5: Burning of trucks by Al-Shabaab at in Qura’a Jome, Bakool region, 4 June 2018.<sup>40</sup>*




### **Major Al-Shabaab checkpoints in southern and central Somalia**

The majority of Al-Shabaab checkpoints are not located on the main supply routes (MSRs) in southern and central Somalia, but usually found on minor roads located in rural territories. The checkpoint in Jameeco, Bay region, is a notable exception, which is located on the MSR between Mogadishu and Baidoa. In the following sub-annexes, the SEMG presents its investigations into Al-Shabaab taxation across a series of major checkpoints in central and southern Somalia.

<sup>40</sup> Photographs provided to the SEMG by an international organization security officer.

Figure 6: Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation in southern and central Somalia.



Annex 2.4.1 presents a case study of Al-Shabaab's finances in Hiran region from October 2014 to March 2018, based on three financial ledgers recovered from the deceased head of the Al-Shabaab regional head of finance.

Annex 2.4.2 presents an assessment of Al-Shabaab revenue generated at the group's most lucrative checkpoint at Jameeco, located along the main supply route between Mogadishu and Baidoa.

Annex 2.4.3 provides an overview of taxation in Lower Juba region, drawing on interviews with the former Al-Shabaab head of finance for Badhadhe district, based at the checkpoint of Jorre.

Annex 2.4.4 presents an assessment of checkpoint taxation in Middle Shabelle region, which includes an estimate of taxation collected on a weekly basis from the checkpoints of Waraabaale, and Gambale.

Annex 2.4.5 presents a case study of *zakat* (alms) collection in Berdale district, Bay region. The case study was based on a series of interviews with former *zakat* officials from Berdale — including the previous head of *zakat* collection for the district — who had recently defected to the FGS.

#### Annex 2.4.1: Al-Shabaab financing in Hiran

In late March 2018, a joint AMISOM and SNA operation in Afarirdod, Hiran, resulted in the death of Al-Shabaab's regional head of finance for Hiran, Mohamed Nuur.<sup>41</sup> Recovered from the scene were three ledgers, later obtained by the SEMG, containing detailed accounting of Al-Shabaab's revenue and expenses in Hiran region spanning from October 2014 to March 2018.

During the entirety of 2015, Al-Shabaab recorded a total revenue of \$124,996 in Hiran region. The majority of income was generated from the checkpoints at Tardo, Aboorey and Halgan, in southern Hiran region. Throughout 2016 and 2017, the group shifted its taxation base to locations encircling Hiran's regional capital of Belet Weyne, as shown in figure 1, below. This resulted in a substantial increase in income, with the group recording a total of \$2,519,178 in 2017.

This increase is primarily attributable to Al-Shabaab's commencement of taxation in October 2016 of Luuq Jelow, which rapidly became the group's most profitable revenue source. In 2017, the group earned \$2,236,666 in Luuq Jelow alone, representing 89 per cent of their total earnings from Hiran for that year. By early 2018, Al-Shabaab continued to generate the majority of its monthly income from taxation in Luuq Jelow, but had also expanded its collection to Booco, Maroodile and Afarirdod. This approach reinforced their control of access points surrounding Belet Weyne.


Luuq Jelow was initially recovered from Al-Shabaab by AMISOM forces in early 2015. However, in October 2016, AMISOM retreated from the area due to persistent attacks by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab immediately returned to Luuq Jelow and the surrounding area. Following a negotiated settlement between Al-Shabaab and the traditional clan leadership (Hawiye/Gaaljal) in the region, the area returned to Al-Shabaab administration.<sup>42</sup> By contrast, in April 2016, communities located in southern Hiran commenced a localized resistance to Al-Shabaab in areas including the tax collection points at Tardo and Aboorey. Local clan affiliated militias, known as *Macaawisleey*, actively fought against Al-Shabaab to protect their local communities from systematic extortion and violence from the group.<sup>43</sup> These clan dynamics may provide further context for Al-Shabaab's shift in late 2016 towards Belet Weyne from the southern part of Hiran region.

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with NISA in Belet Weyne and Mogadishu in May and June 2018.

<sup>42</sup> Telephone interview with local Gaaljal elder based in Belet Weyne, Hiran, 6 September 2018.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab revenue collection by location in Hiran region, January 2015 to December 2017.




## Total revenues

From October 2014 to March 2018, Al-Shabaab generated a total revenue of \$4,059,015 in Hiran. Revenues sharply increased after October 2016, following the incorporation of Luuq Jelow as a taxation point.

From the beginning of 2018 until the end of March, when Mohamed Nuur was killed and the ledgers captured, Al-Shabaab had generated a total income of \$689,617, compared to the \$565,436 the group had collected in the first quarter of 2017. If the remaining months in 2018 follow the same trend, Al-Shabaab's projected total revenue in Hiran for 2018 will amount to approximately \$3.1 million, a 22 per cent increase from 2017.

Figure 2: Al-Shabaab's total revenues in Hiran, September 2014-March 2018.



## Revenue sources

Al-Shabaab's approach to income generation is founded upon four revenue streams: "*dalag*", or taxation on farms and agricultural produce; "*gadiid*", or taxation of transiting vehicles; "*badeeco*", or taxation of transported goods; and "*xoolo*", or the taxation of livestock sales.

Over the three-year period from January 2015 to December 2017, *dalag* represented the main source of revenue for Al-Shabaab in Hiran, comprising 67 per cent of their overall earnings of \$3,344,236.

Table 1: Al-Shabaab revenue collection in Hiran delineated by revenue source, January 2015 to December 2017.

Revenue source	Amount collected	Percentage of total
<i>Dalag</i>	\$2,245,536	67%
<i>Gadiid</i>	\$772,228	23%
<i>Badeeco</i>	\$207,818	6%
<i>Xoolo</i>	\$118,654	4%

## Al-Shabaab's revenue collection and accounting system

### Revenue collection and receipts issued

The initial stage of accounting concentrates on the physical collection of revenue and issuance of receipts. Each receipt details information on the type of taxation, date and location, personal information of the vehicle driver and owner, and the identity of the Al-Shabaab issuing officer.

Figure 3: \$100 Gadiid receipt (no. 52227), issued for a Toyota Noah minibus, dated 23 January 2018.

MAKTABKA MAALIYADA  
WILAAAYADA ISLAAMIGA  
EE HIRAAN

مكتب المالية لولاية  
هيران الإسلامية

No: 52227

WARQADDA LASOCODKA DHAQDHAGAAQA GAADIIDKA

Tariikh: 06/05/1439

Khidmada: \$100

Corral chann: [blank]

Magaca Darawalka: [blank]

Clwaankiisa: [blank]

Magaca Kikilifaha: [blank]

Clwaankiisa: [blank]

Ka yimid: [blank]

Wadada uu marayay: [blank]

Nuqra Rarka: [blank]

Ku socda: [blank]

Qofka soc Rarka: [blank]

Hadaf: [blank]

Saxiix Lacag Qabataha: [blank]

Signature: [blank]

#### Ledger 1: data entry

In the first of three financial ledgers obtained by the SEMG (“Ledger 1”), the Al-Shabaab accountant documents revenue collected in Hiran, categorized by a span of dates (as per the Islamic, or *Hijri*, calendar), location, the type of taxation (*gadiid*, *badeeco*, *xoolo*, or *dalag*), and the span of receipt numbers issued, as shown in figure 4, below. Ledger 1 details income generation in Hiran from October 2014 to March 2018.

Receipt no. 52227 (see figure 3, above), which was independently obtained by the SEMG, is accounted for in the penultimate line of the Ledger 1 sample page (figure 4, below). The number of the receipt (52227) and the date it was issued (06/05/1439 in the *Hijri* calendar) correspond to the date range (from 06/05/1439 to 15/05/1439), and the span of receipts issued (no. 50837 to no. 52966) in the penultimate entry.

Figure 4: Ledger 1 sample page.

*Bishni 5 and lung Maroodile*

Month and location

14 / 1 / 1439

Subject

Day

Date

26-4-5-1439 = 52901 = 54095 = \$13762.5

6-5-15-1439 = 54096 = 54323 = \$77029

16-5-25-1439 = 54324 = 57055 = \$15161

*Badeeco lung*

Revenue source and location

26-4-5-1439 = 8818 = \$4417.5

6-5-15-1439 = 8819 = 8835 = \$3240

8836 = 8863 = \$6733

*Dalag lung*

26-4-5-1439 = 19951 = 19571 = \$64055.5

6-5-15-1439 = 19572 = 19688 = \$64883

16-5-25-1439 = 19689 = 19755 = \$37682.5

*Xoolo lung*

26-4-5-1439 = 17101 = 17116 = \$584

6-5-15-1439 = 17116 = 17125 = \$366

16-5-25-1439 = 17126 = 17139 = \$526

*Bishni Maroodile*

27-4-5-1439 = 50801 = 50836 = \$4510

6-5-15-1439 = 50837 = 52966 = \$3090

Receipt range 50837 to 52966



*Ledger 2: summary of income earned per revenue source*

The second ledger recovered from Al-Shabaab (“Ledger 2”) consolidates the data contained in Ledger 1, and delineates them into 10-day periods according to revenue source (*gadiid*, *badeeco*, *xoolo*, and *dalag*) and location. Figure 5, below, provides a sample page from Ledger 2 demonstrating a total revenue of \$77,913.20 generated over a 10-day period from 12-21 February 2018 in Luuq Jelow. Ledger 2 covers the six-month period from September 2017 to March 2018.

According to the ledger notation, revenues generated are subsequently transferred through various channels including cash, EVC Plus mobile money,<sup>44</sup> *hawala*, and possibly bank accounts (recorded ambiguously as “Akoon”, or “account”, in the ledgers). The majority of transfers in Ledger 2 are made to Mohamed Nuur (“M/nuur”), the former regional head of finance, from whom the books were captured.

Figure 5: Ledger 2 sample page, dated 12-21 February 2018.

26-5-5-6-1439- bishu 6aad Tubant d. Hg

Date / 10 day period

Location / Month Luuq Jelow 1yo maroodil

Date: / / الموافق

الموضوع التاريخ

14'916 \$ Gadiid Sub-totals 4370 \$ Gadiid

4'915.5 \$ Badeeco 2400 EVC Plus

332 \$ Xoolo 7'970 \$ Rst

57'749.7 \$ Dalag 1'970 EVC

77'913.2 \$ Tuntal 0000

750 Kaash. maxed sacid M/nuur

77'163.2

18300 \$ EVC aabaxa Ji-M/nuur EVC Plus transfer

58'863.2 \$ Rst

54'070 \$ Kaash. aabaxa Ji-M/nuur Cash transfer

4793.2 \$ Rst

4793.2 \$ EVC aabaxa Ji-M/nuur

00000

*Ledger 3: summary of income by location*

In the third ledger recovered from Al-Shabaab (“Ledger 3”), the data contained in Ledger 2 is consolidated into total revenues by location only. Ledger 3 covers the period from September 2016 to March 2018.

Figure 6, below, provides a sample page from Ledger 3, showing a total revenue of \$86,020.70 generated between 12 and 21 February 2018 from Luuq Jelow, Maroodile,

<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, Al-Shabaab pays its members’ salaries on a monthly basis through EVC mobile money. Interview with Mukhtar Robow in Baidoa on 6 February 2018; interviews with Al-Shabaab finance officers in Baidoa on 28 and 29 May 2018.

Afarirdod and Booco, together referred to as Belet Weyne district. The majority of revenue is distributed through the aforementioned four channels to an unknown individual, “Nuur Bedel”.

Figure 6: Ledger 3, summarizing revenue from Belet Weyne district from 12-21 February 2018.

26.5-5-6-1439-Bishni Band 10 feed Date / 10 day period

Subject: 11'7285 موضوع التبرع

Date: / / الموافق التاريخ

77'913.2 #Lung

4'370 #Maroodile

7'923 #AFarirdood

1'814.5 #BOOCO

86020.7 #Tumta Blwyn

20010 #AKoon-Nuur bdl m/nuur

66010.7

500 #Farar sh. Xubeen Halgen

65'510.7 #Rst

54070 Kersh. m/nuur Nur bdl

11'440.7 #Rst

11'440.7 #AKoon m/nuur

00000

4111'445'24 #9500

Sub-totals by location

Cash transfer

"Account" transfer

### Transfer channels

In a six-month period from September 2017 to March 2018 — the period covered by Ledger 2 — 43 per cent of the income generated by Al-Shabaab was transferred onward in the form of cash. According to Ledger 2, “EVC” and bank accounts (“Akoon”) both represented approximately one-quarter of onward transfer of income, as outlined in table 2, below. *Hawala* accounted for only 6 per cent of onward transfers.

Table 2: Percentage breakdown of financial channels utilized, September 2017 to March 2018.

Distribution channel	Amount distributed	Percentage of total
Cash	\$528,553	43%
Account	\$327,938	26%
EVC	\$305,047	25%
Hawala	\$79,884	6%

Financial transfers recorded in the Al-Shabaab ledgers as “EVC” typically amount to less than \$10,000. However, in several instances, ledger entries appear to indicate that Al-Shabaab “EVC” transfers exceeded the \$10,000 financial threshold necessitating that the

financial entity report the transaction to the FGS Financial Reporting Center, as stipulated in Article 14(2) of Somalia's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016). Article 5(2(b)) of the Act also requires that reporting entities "identify and verify the identity of their customers" in instances where transactions equal or exceed \$10,000.

Figure 7: Example "EVC" payment of \$16,500 made to Mohamed Nuur ("M/Nuur"), between 2 and 11 February 2018.

76-5-25-5-1439 = Bishri Saad Tubanki udhwa

Subject	lunq Jelow	140 baar 140	Muradil
Date	/ /	الموافق	46259#2307.9# Muradil
15161 \$	gandil	3090 \$	gandil
6738 \$	Badeco	1800	EVC
526 \$	Xoodo	1290 \$	Rst
37682.5 \$	Dalay		
60707.5	Total		
17220	Kaash Farax muradil		
42887.5			
16500	EVC muradil udhwa	\$16,500 EVC Plus transfer	
26387.5			
1650	Muradil galbed	150	Muradil galbed
24737.5			
250	Muradil galbed	2226.5 \$	Rst
24587.5		6581	EVC
250	Muradil galbed	75645.5	Rst
24337.5		711905	Kaash
100	Muradil galbed	740.5 \$	
24237.5		740.5	EVC
150	Muradil galbed	0000	

The purported limit on a single EVC Plus transaction is \$300, and a maximum of three transactions are permitted per day. According to multiple statements from Hormuud Telecom representatives to the SEMG, this limit cannot be bypassed. However, the SEMG has received multiple testimonies, including from a former Al-Shabaab district finance officer in Lower Juba (see annex 2.4.3), that EVC limits can be raised by applying to a Hormuud Telecom office.

Conversely, it is also possible that Al-Shabaab's notations of "EVC" transactions may in some cases refer to transfers amongst Salaam Bank accounts linked to Hormuud mobile phone lines, which do not have a transfer limit.<sup>45</sup> The exact modalities by which Al-Shabaab transfers its revenues remains under investigation by the SEMG.

<sup>45</sup> Salaam Bank is a financial institution headquartered in Mogadishu, affiliated with Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc.



*Expenses*

Al-Shabaab documents their expenses (*qarish*), incurred for operating their regional financial department, on a monthly basis. The majority of the expenses pertain to the daily operations of the finance department, including food, water, fuel, rent, and stationary, while also including payments for observation activities (*istilaac*) and incentives (*garaam*).<sup>46</sup>

Al-Shabaab's expenses for the operation of the finance department are negligible compared to the revenue the department generates. For instance, from September 2017 to March 2018, expenses recorded by the regional finance department totalled \$10,052. During the same period, the group generated \$1,477,700. Expenses are subtracted from overall income before onward distribution, as shown in figure 8, below. However, expenses calculated do not include salaries for regional finance officials, which the SEMG understands are paid through the national finance department in Qunyo Barrow.<sup>47</sup>

Figure 8: Expenses of \$384.70 are subtracted from overall earnings of \$110,120 in Luuq Jelow, generated between 27 September and 6 October 2017.

[illegible]

<sup>46</sup> *Istilaac* appears to refer to payments made to local informants to carry out surveillance activities on behalf of Al-Shabaab. *Garaam* is perhaps a food supplement provided to supporters of the group within the local community.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with a former Al-Shabaab finance officer in Baidoa, 29 May 2018.

## Summary

Al-Shabaab's financial system in Hiran demonstrates a systematic and committed approach to record keeping and financial accounting. Furthermore, the group demonstrated an ability to shift from areas of low income generation to areas of high income generation, highlighted by their encirclement of Hiran's capital of Belet Weyne. This change in tactics resulted in substantially higher revenues after October 2016. This increase in revenue coincided with the group's establishment of a tax base in Luuq Jelow, where the majority of their revenues in Hiran are now generated.

The revenue generated in Hiran region is relatively modest compared with other areas in southern and central Somalia; for example, the SEMG estimates that the Al-Shabaab checkpoint at Jameeco, in Bay region, generates an annual revenue of approximately \$10 million per year (see annex 2.4.2). The comparatively low revenues from Hiran can likely be explained by the fact that major commercial trade from Mogadishu is already taxed by Al-Shabaab collectors in Middle Shabelle region before reaching Hiran, and Al-Shabaab does not doubly tax drivers. In addition, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Lower Juba regions are more popular trade routes for commercial traffic into Kenya. Finally, due to the presence of AMISOM and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) forces in northern Hiran, Al-Shabaab has yet to establish permanent taxation checkpoints along the routes linking the region to northern Somalia.

## Raw ledger data

Below the SEMG has reproduced a sample page of the raw data from Ledger 1. Dates are given in the original Islamic calendar (*Hijri*) notation of Al-Shabaab, as well as their Gregorian calendar equivalents. In some instances, the Al-Shabaab accountant made errors regarding the *Hijri* calendar, for example, listing the thirtieth day of an Islamic month that only contains 29 days; in these cases, no Gregorian calendar equivalent exists, and "N/A" (not available) is indicated in the relevant data fields.

In instances where data entries are missing or illegible, this has been indicated in the table with "D/M" (data missing). Where revenue is collected in Somali Shillings (SOS),<sup>48</sup> the equivalent in US Dollars is provided using a conversion of SOS 22,500 per USD, the same rate used by the Al-Shabaab accountant in conducting his own conversions.

The entire data set from Ledger 1 is available from:

<https://1drv.ms/x/s!AsKlxbPSEpvPaehl3Ytno10ZBrA>.

<sup>48</sup> Al-Shabaab ceased collecting revenues in Somali Shillings in Hiran region in May 2016.



Figure 9: Sample data from Ledger 1, showing collection of revenue in Hiran region from 21 October 2014 to 4 June 2015.

Location	Revenue Source	Start Date (Hijri)	Start Date (Gregorian)	End Date (Hijri)	End Date (Gregorian)	Receipt A	Receipt B	Amt (\$)	Amt (SOS)	USD equivalent	Total (\$)
Haligan	Gadiid	26-12-1435	21/10/2014	04-01-1436	28/10/2014	1851	1900	\$1,829.00	SOS 4,070,000	\$180.89	\$2,009.89
Haligan	Gadiid	04-01-1436	28/10/2014	13-01-1436	06/11/2014	1901	1950	\$1,396.00	SOS 2,790,000	\$124.00	\$1,520.00
Haligan	Gadiid	13-01-1436	06/11/2014	21-01-1436	14/11/2014	1951	2000	\$1,306.00	SOS 2,660,000	\$118.22	\$1,424.22
Haligan	Gadiid	21-01-1436	14/11/2014	25-01-1436	18/11/2014	2051	2070	\$43.00	SOS 1,860,000	\$82.67	\$125.67
Haligan	Gadiid	26-01-1436	19/11/2014	03-02-1436	26/11/2014	3071	3100	\$1,009.00	SOS 1,730,000	\$76.89	\$1,085.89
Haligan	Dalag	26-12-1435	21/10/2014	24-01-1436	17/11/2014	11451	11470		SOS 23,283,000	\$1,034.80	\$1,034.80
Haligan	Xoolo	26-12-1435	21/10/2014	06-01-1436	30/10/2014	2201	2250		SOS 13,560,000	\$602.67	\$602.67
Haligan	Xoolo	06-01-1436	30/10/2014	13-01-1436	06/11/2014	2251	2300		SOS 18,040,000	\$801.78	\$801.78
Haligan	Xoolo	13-01-1436	06/11/2014	20-01-1436	13/11/2014	2301	2341		SOS 14,840,000	\$659.56	\$659.56
Tardo	Gadiid	04-01-1436	28/10/2014	24-01-1436	17/11/2014	79301	79318	\$885.00		\$0.00	\$885.00
Tardo	Xoolo	02-01-1436	26/10/2014	20-01-1436	13/11/2014	101501	101521		SOS 14,240,000	\$632.89	\$632.89
Haligan	Gadiid	26-01-1436	19/11/2014	03-02-1436	26/11/2014	3171	3199	\$1,009.00	SOS 1,730,000	\$76.89	\$1,085.89
Haligan	Gadiid	04-02-1436	27/11/2014	12-02-1436	05/12/2014	3101	3150	\$2,229.00	SOS 2,890,000	\$128.44	\$2,357.44
Haligan	Gadiid	12-02-1436	05/12/2014	22-02-1436	15/12/2014	3151	3200	\$1,110.00	SOS 3,720,000	\$165.33	\$1,275.33
Haligan	Gadiid	22-02-1436	15/12/2014	25-02-1436	18/12/2014	3201	3212	\$425.00	SOS 630,000	\$28.00	\$453.00
Haligan	Dalag	01-02-1436	24/11/2014	24-02-1436	17/12/2014	11471	11500		SOS 11,207,000	\$498.09	\$498.09
Haligan	Dalag	25-02-1436	18/12/2014	25-02-1436	18/12/2014	16501	16502		SOS 1,783,000	\$79.24	\$79.24
Haligan	Xoolo	26-01-1436	19/11/2014	27-01-1436	20/11/2014	2342	2350		SOS 2,800,000	\$124.44	\$124.44
Haligan	Xoolo	27-01-1436	20/11/2014	05-02-1436	28/11/2014	2351	2400		SOS 16,480,000	\$732.44	\$732.44
Haligan	Xoolo	05-02-1436	28/11/2014	18-02-1436	11/12/2014	2401	2450		SOS 15,000,000	\$666.67	\$666.67
Haligan	Xoolo	18-02-1436	11/12/2014	25-02-1436	18/12/2014	2451	2489		SOS 11,520,000	\$512.00	\$512.00
Tardo	Xoolo	28-01-1436	21/11/2014	12-02-1436	05/12/2014	101501	101550		SOS 27,200,000	\$1,208.89	\$1,208.89
Haligan	Gadiid	26-02-1436	19/12/2014	03-03-1436	25/12/2014	3213	3250	\$690.00	SOS 2,600,000	\$115.56	\$805.56
Haligan	Gadiid	04-03-1436	26/12/2014	10-03-1436	01/01/2015	3251	3300	\$955.00	SOS 3,080,000	\$136.89	\$1,091.89
Haligan	Gadiid	11-03-1436	02/01/2015	22-03-1436	13/01/2015	3301	3350	\$1,282.00	SOS 3,050,000	\$135.56	\$1,417.56
Haligan	Gadiid	22-03-1436	13/01/2015	25-03-1436	16/01/2015	3351	3380	\$75.00	SOS 2,740,000	\$121.78	\$196.78
Tardo	Xoolo	14-02-1436	07/12/2014	18-03-1436	09/01/2015	101551	101600		SOS 28,580,000	\$1,270.22	\$1,270.22
Haligan	Xoolo	26-02-1436	19/12/2014	26-02-1436	19/12/2014	2490	2500		SOS 4,000,000	\$177.78	\$177.78
Haligan	Xoolo	26-02-1436	19/12/2014	11-03-1436	02/01/2015	100501	100550		SOS 16,100,000	\$715.56	\$715.56
Haligan	Xoolo	11-03-1436	02/01/2015	17-03-1436	08/01/2015	100551	100600		SOS 6,800,000	\$302.22	\$302.22
Haligan	Xoolo	17-03-1436	08/01/2015	24-03-1436	15/01/2015	100601	100650		SOS 11,520,000	\$512.00	\$512.00
Haligan	Xoolo	24-03-1436	15/01/2015	24-03-1436	15/01/2015	100651	100660		SOS 2,800,000	\$124.44	\$124.44
Haligan	Dalag	27-02-1436	20/12/2014	24-03-1436	15/01/2015	16503	16539		SOS 29,781,000	\$1,323.60	\$1,323.60
Haligan	Gadiid	26-03-1436	17/01/2015	02-04-1436	23/01/2015	3381	3400	\$60.00	SOS 1,460,000	\$64.89	\$124.89
Haligan	Gadiid	02-04-1436	23/01/2015	14-04-1436	04/02/2015	3401	3450	\$1,652.00	SOS 4,840,000	\$215.11	\$1,867.11
Haligan	Gadiid	14-04-1436	04/02/2015	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	3451	3500	\$783.00	SOS 5,210,000	\$231.56	\$1,014.56
Haligan	Gadiid	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	26-04-1436	16/02/2015	16501	16523	\$34.00	SOS 2,716,000	\$120.71	\$154.71
Haligan	Dalag	26-03-1436	17/01/2015	25-04-1436	15/02/2015	16540	16546		SOS 1,480,000	\$65.78	\$65.78
Haligan	Xoolo	28-03-1436	19/01/2015	11-03-1436	02/01/2015	100661	100700		SOS 6,320,000	\$280.89	\$280.89
Haligan	Xoolo	11-04-1436	01/02/2015	16-04-1436	06/02/2015	100701	100750		SOS 19,440,000	\$864.00	\$864.00
Haligan	Xoolo	16-04-1436	06/02/2015	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	100751	100800		SOS 7,160,000	\$318.22	\$318.22
Haligan	Xoolo	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	100801	100819		SOS 4,920,000	\$218.67	\$218.67
Tardo	Gadiid	01-04-1436	22/01/2015	04-04/1436	#N/A	79301	79350	\$2,670.00		\$0.00	\$2,670.00
Tardo	Xoolo	18-03-1436	09/01/2015	12-04-1436	02/02/2015	101601	101650		SOS 27,800,000	\$1,235.56	\$1,235.56
Tardo	Xoolo	12-04-1436	02/02/2015	23-04-1436	13/02/2015	101651	101680		SOS 9,240,000	\$410.67	\$410.67
Tardo	Gadiid	06-04-1436	27/01/2015	24-04-1436	14/02/2015	79351	79362	\$785.00		\$0.00	\$785.00
Haligan	Gadiid	26-04-1436	16/02/2015	01-05-1436	20/02/2015	16524	16550	\$17.00	SOS 2,570,000	\$114.22	\$131.22
Haligan	Gadiid	01-05-1436	20/02/2015	13-05-1436	04/03/2015	16551	16600	\$713.00	SOS 46,090,000	\$2,048.44	\$2,761.44
Haligan	Gadiid	13-05-1436	04/03/2015	21-05-1436	12/03/2015	16601	16650	\$585.00	SOS 5,180,000	\$230.22	\$815.22
Haligan	Gadiid	21-05-1436	12/03/2015	25-05-1436	16/03/2015	16651	16669	\$800.00	SOS 1,790,000	\$79.56	\$879.56
Haligan	Xoolo	29-04-1436	19/02/2015	30-04-1436	#N/A	100820	100850		SOS 10,720,000	\$476.44	\$476.44
Haligan	Xoolo	30-04-1436	#N/A	13-05-1436	04/03/2015	100851	100900		SOS 18,000,000	\$800.00	\$800.00
Haligan	Xoolo	13-04-1436	03/02/2015	21-05-1436	12/03/2015	100901	100950		SOS 9,640,000	\$428.44	\$428.44
Haligan	Xoolo	21-05-1436	12/03/2015	21-05-1436	12/03/2015	6001	6027		SOS 26,960,000	\$1,198.22	\$1,198.22
Haligan	Dalag	02-05-1436	21/02/2015	16-05-1436	07/03/2015	16547	16550		SOS 2,580,000	\$114.67	\$114.67
Haligan	Dalag	23-05-1436	14/03/2015	23-05-1436	14/03/2015	16561	16551		SOS 6,000,000	\$266.67	\$266.67
Tardo	Xoolo	29-04-1436	19/02/2015	07-05-1436	26/02/2015	101681	101700		SOS 9,400,000	\$417.78	\$417.78
Tardo	Xoolo	07-05-1436	26/02/2015	23-05-1436	14/03/2015	101701	101738		SOS 15,560,000	\$691.56	\$691.56
Tardo	Gadiid	29-04-1436	19/02/2015	24-05-1436	15/03/2015	79363	79381	\$1,025.00		\$0.00	\$1,025.00
Haligan	Gadiid	26-05-1436	17/03/2015	01-06-1436	22/03/2015	16670	16700	\$749.50	SOS 2,360,000	\$104.89	\$854.39
Haligan	Gadiid	01-06-1436	22/03/2015	12-06-1436	02/04/2015	16701	16750	\$462.00	SOS 3,970,000	\$176.44	\$638.44
Haligan	Gadiid	12-06-1436	02/04/2015	21-06-1436	11/04/2015	16751	16800	\$254.00	SOS 3,450,000	\$153.33	\$407.33
Haligan	Gadiid	21-06-1436	11/04/2015	25-06-1436	15/04/2015	16801	16821	\$719.00	SOS 1,590,000	\$70.67	\$789.67
Haligan	Xoolo	26-05-1436	17/03/2015	28-05-1436	19/03/2015	6028	6050		SOS 8,280,000	\$368.00	\$368.00
Haligan	Xoolo	28-05-1436	19/03/2015	06-06-1436	27/03/2015	6051	6100		SOS 23,480,000	\$1,043.56	\$1,043.56
Haligan	Xoolo	06-06-1436	27/03/2015	18-06-1436	08/04/2015	6101	6150		SOS 19,840,000	\$881.78	\$881.78
Haligan	Xoolo	18-06-1436	08/04/2015	18-06-1436	08/04/2015	6151	6185		SOS 20,320,000	\$902.11	\$902.11
Tardo	Xoolo	26-05-1436	17/03/2015	29-05-1436	20/03/2015	101739	101750		SOS 4,160,000	\$184.89	\$184.89
Tardo	Xoolo	29-05-1436	20/03/2015	23-06-1436	13/04/2015	101751	101783		SOS 8,280,000	\$368.00	\$368.00
Tardo	Gadiid	29-05-1436	20/03/2015	25-06-1436	15/04/2015	79382	79388	\$415.00		\$0.00	\$415.00
Tardo	Dalag	06-06-1436	27/03/2015	22-06-1436	12/04/2015	16552	16562		SOS 2,596,000	\$115.38	\$115.38
Haligan	Gadiid	26-06-1436	16/04/2015	02-07-1436	21/04/2015	16822	16850	\$1,504.00	SOS 820,000	\$36.44	\$1,540.44
Haligan	Gadiid	02-07-1436	21/04/2015	11-07-1436	30/04/2015	16851	16900	\$888.00	SOS 3,070,000	\$136.44	\$1,024.44
Haligan	Gadiid	11-07-1436	30/04/2015	19-07-1436	08/05/2015	16901	16950	\$1,327.00	SOS 2,636,000	\$117.16	\$1,444.16
Haligan	Gadiid	19-07-1436	08/05/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	16951	17000	\$1,733.00	SOS 1,500,000	\$66.67	\$1,799.67
Haligan	Gadiid	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	20501	20503	\$60.00	SOS 100,000	\$4.44	\$64.44
Haligan	Xoolo	26-06-1436	16/04/2015	27-06-1436	17/04/2015	6186	6200		SOS 3,840,000	\$170.67	\$170.67
Haligan	Xoolo	27-06-1436	17/04/2015	03-07-1436	22/04/2015	6201	6250		SOS 12,720,000	\$565.33	\$565.33
Haligan	Xoolo	03-07-1436	22/04/2015	17-07-1436	06/05/2015	6251	6300		SOS 15,320,000	\$680.89	\$680.89
Haligan	Xoolo	17-07-1436	06/05/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	6301	6350		SOS 21,620,000	\$960.89	\$960.89
Haligan	Xoolo	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	6351	6365		SOS 7,140,000	\$317.33	\$317.33
Haligan	Dalag	27-06-1436	17/04/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	16564	16590		SOS 7,952,000	\$353.42	\$353.42
Tardo	Gadiid	27-06-1436	17/04/2015	14-07-1436	03/05/2015	79389	79400	\$547.00		\$0.00	\$547.00
Tardo	Gadiid	14-07-1436	03/05/2015	25-07-1436	14/05/2015	79401	79412	\$464.00		\$0.00	\$464.00
Tardo	Xoolo	29-06-1436	19/04/2015	05-07-1436	24/04/2015	101784	101800		SOS 4,		

#### Annex 2.4.2: Case study: Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation in Bay region

During the mandate, the SEMG investigated Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation on the main supply route linking Mogadishu to Baidoa in Bay region. Two principal checkpoints were identified on this route: Jameeco and Qansax Homane. Jameeco is located approximately 160 km north-west of Mogadishu, while Qansax Homane is found 75 km north-west of Baidoa. On 29 May 2018, the Monitoring Group conducted interviews with former Al-Shabaab finance officers, the former Al-Shabaab commander of the Jameeco area, National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) officers, and regional officials. The SEMG also independently collected Al-Shabaab taxation receipts issued in Bay region.

The importance of Jameeco as a revenue collection point for Al-Shabaab was underscored during an SEMG interview in February 2018 with Mukhtar Robow, a co-founder of Al-Shabaab who had defected to the FGS in August 2017. Robow, who hails from the region, stated: “Al-Shabaab are financially strong despite a decline in funding from external sources such as Al-Qaeda or the Somali diaspora. Instead, they have focused on the development of a tightly controlled, centralized system that is dependent on internal revenue streams such as the taxation of transit, livestock, business and farmlands. Between Mogadishu and Baidoa, they earn up to \$70,000 a day by taxing everything that passes through Jameeco checkpoint. The furniture in this room, the water on the table, the chair you are sitting in, it has all been taxed by Al-Shabaab. Their strategy is founded upon a model of strict enforcement and systematic accounting. Al-Shabaab’s predictable checkpoint taxation system in Bay region is preferred by people due to fear of retribution by the group, while parallel checkpoints controlled by government forces are unpredictable.”<sup>49</sup>

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation points in Bay region.



As outlined above in annex 4.2, levies are applied to vehicles transiting through the checkpoint (*gadiid*), with a second tax applied to goods transported (*badeeco*). Vehicles are taxed at a variable rate dependent on the type of vehicle and the distance of the journey. Goods are assessed based on the type, their market price, and quantity. In Bay, food items such as flour, sugar, and sorghum are taxed at a rate of approximately \$2 per bag. Drivers

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Mukhtar Robow on 6 February 2018 in Baidoa.

make payments in cash or via EVC Plus mobile money. Figure 2, below, details receipts issued by Al-Shabaab to a driver travelling from Qansax Homane to Baidoa in January 2018. A tax of \$400 was applied for the transit (*gadiid*) of a Fiat N3 truck, while a tax of \$700 was separately charged for the goods (*badeeco*) it was transporting (cement). Both receipts identify the same driver, date, and transit route.

Figure 2: *Gadiid* (l) and *badeeco* (r) receipts issued by Al-Shabaab for a Fiat N3 truck carrying cement, 20 January 2018.



Similarly, on 9 May 2018 at Jameeco checkpoint, Al-Shabaab issued two receipts to a driver traveling to Baidoa. \$130 was charged for a Fiat Iveco 110 truck (*gadiid*), while a taxation of \$280 was charged for the goods carried (assorted items and fuel).

On 29 May 2018, the SEMG interviewed Abdullahi Mohamed Ghasan,<sup>50</sup> who served as the commander of Al-Shabaab's checkpoint in Jameeco from 2017 to February 2018, and who defected to the FGS in early March 2018. According to Ghasan, approximately 40-50 vehicles pass through Jameeco checkpoint each day.<sup>51</sup> The majority of taxation is collected in one direction, from Mogadishu to Baidoa, and onwards towards the Somalia-Kenya border.<sup>52</sup>

Every 10 days, taxation collected at Jameeco is delivered to the head regional finance officer, Barkhad Sharif Ahmed, in Bullo Fulay, Al-Shabaab's regional headquarters of Bay and Bakool.<sup>53</sup> Ghasan stated that he sent, on average, \$300,000 every 10 days to Barkhad Ahmed through both EVC mobile money and cash, representing approximately \$10 million annually from Jameeco checkpoint alone.<sup>54</sup> Receipts collected are also sent to the regional headquarters for auditing purposes.<sup>55</sup> The 10-day cycle for the transfer of revenues and receipts for inspection is consistent with the SEMG's investigations in Hiran, where Al-Shabaab's financial ledgers delineated revenue intake into 10-day periods. Thereafter, money collected at regional headquarters is forwarded to Al-Shabaab's head of finance, Hassan Afgooye, in Qunyo Barrow, Middle Juba region.<sup>56</sup>

The Monitoring Group also carried out an independent assessment on the number of vehicles transiting from Mogadishu through Jameeco checkpoint, over a one week period from 21 to 27 February 2018. A rudimentary estimate of revenue generated over the week was calculated based on an average taxation applied to each vehicle, and the average value of the load carried.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Name has been changed to protect the identity of the individual.

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Abdullahi Mohamed Ghasan in Baidoa on 29 May 2018.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. Al-Shabaab administers Bay and Bakool regions jointly as the "Islamic Governate of Bay & Bakool" (*Wilaayada Islaamiga ee Baay & Bakool*).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Corroborated in an interview with Mukhtar Robow in Baidoa, 6 February 2018.

<sup>57</sup> Average vehicle and goods taxation for each vehicle type were calculated using a small sample of Al-Shabaab *gadiid* and *badeeco* receipts obtained by the SEMG in Bay region. Furthermore, the

*Table 1: Assessment of Al-Shabaab earnings from Jameeco checkpoint from 21 to 27 February 2018.*

Type of vehicle	Total number of vehicles	Avg. taxation per vehicle ( <i>gadiid</i> )	Avg. taxation per load ( <i>badeeco</i> )	Revenue
Large truck	78	\$400	\$500	\$70,200
Medium truck	219	\$150	\$400	\$120,450
Minibus / 4x4	84	\$50	N/A	\$4,200
Passenger car	74	\$25	N/A	\$1,850
			<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>\$196,700</b>

As shown above, a basic estimate of Al-Shabaab's checkpoint taxation at Jameeco indicates a weekly income of \$196,700, or approximately \$9.4 million annually. Jameeco checkpoint is a significant earner for Al-Shabaab when compared to other checkpoints they control across southern and central Somalia. Its location along the main supply route linking Mogadishu to Baidoa, is strategically placed to capture significant commercial traffic, transiting from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border.


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weekly study, carried out from 21 to 27 February 2018, may not be entirely representative, as transit flows vary throughout the year.

### Annex 2.4.3: Case study: checkpoint taxation in Badhadhe district, Lower Juba region

On 18 February and 25 July 2018, under the auspices of the Jubbaland Intelligence and Security Agency (JISA), the SEMG interviewed a former senior Al-Shabaab finance officer responsible for the collection of checkpoint taxation in Badhadhe district, Lower Juba region, between 2014 and 2016. Information gathered from this interview, as well as the collection of taxation receipts, allowed the SEMG to establish that checkpoint taxation in Lower and Middle Juba regions — which Al-Shabaab administers jointly as the “Islamic Governate of Jubbaland” (*Wilaayada Islaamiga ee Jubooyinka*) — broadly follows the same systematic and centralized structure as observed in other regions of southern and central Somalia.

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation in Lower Juba region.



As was observed in the SEMG’s case studies of taxation in Hiran and Bay regions, Al-Shabaab taxation at checkpoints in Lower and Middle Juba is levied based on a tax on the transiting vehicle itself (*gadiid*), and a tax on the goods the vehicle is carrying (*badeeco*). Samples of Al-Shabaab receipts issued for *gadiid* and *badeeco* in Lower Juba region are provided in figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Transit receipt (l) and goods receipt (r) totalling \$325 and \$920, for a lorry transiting from the Hagadera refugee camp in Kenya to Kismayo, dated 15 February 2018.

MAKTABKA MAALIYADA WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA EE JUBOOWINKA		مكتب المالي لولاية جوبوا الإسلامية	
No: 10448		No: 10448	
WARQADDA LASOCODKA DHAQDHAAQAQA GAADIIDKA			
Taariikh: 15.02.2018			
Nuuga Gaariga:	5454	Khidmada:	325\$
Qoraal ahaan:	[Signature]		
Magaca Darawalka:	[Signature]		
Chasankilaa:	Tel: 061 732 119		
Magaca Milkiilaha:	Tel: 061 732 119		
Chasankilaa:	Tel: 061 732 119		
Ka yimid:	Ku Socdo: Kismayo		
Wadada uu marayo:	Qofka soo Raray:		
Nuuga Rarka:	Badii:		
Saxiix Lacag Qabtaha:			

MAKTABKA MAALIYADA WILAAYADA ISLAAMIGA EE JUBOOWINKA		مكتب المالي لولاية جوبوا الإسلامية	
No: 10448		No: 10448	
WARQADDA LA SOCODKA BADEE'ADA			
Taariikh: 15.02.2018			
Magaca Darawalka:	15000	Tel:	061 732 119
Magaca Milkiilaha:	15000	Khidmada:	920\$
Iuuga Gaariga:	15000	Tel:	061 732 119
Qoraal Ahaan:	[Signature]		
Ca Yimid:	Xigadhere	Ku Socdo:	Kismayo
Iuuga Badeecada:	[Signature]		
ofka Soo Raray:	[Signature]		
Saxiix Lacag Qabtaha:			



From 2014 until the end of 2016, at which point he defected from Al-Shabaab, Ahmed Mohamed Karid<sup>58</sup> served as the head finance officer (*taliya dhegmo*) for Badhadhe district in Lower Juba, an area partly under direct Al-Shabaab administration. Karid reported to the SEMG that \$150,000 per month (\$1.8 million annually) would typically be collected from checkpoints in Badhadhe district.<sup>59</sup> The primary static Al-Shabaab checkpoint in Badhadhe district was located at Jorre, lying on the route from Badhadhe town to Afmadow (see figure 1, above).

Karid reported that he had received a six-month training course in finance administration in the towns of Sakow and a second location; Al-Shabaab's head of finance, Hassan Afgooye, attended the training in an observational role. As head of finance in Badhadhe district, Karid supervised 10 additional finance officers. He told the SEMG that individual checkpoint operators would submit their revenues to him every 10 days,<sup>60</sup> and in turn he would submit to the regional head of finance on a monthly basis. He described how a man known as Abdirahman "Waqoyi" would collect the cash using a vehicle and physically transport it to Aden "Dhagajun", the regional head of finance for the "Islamic Governate of Jubbaland" (Lower and Middle Juba). At each level, receipt numbers and amounts collected would be noted in a ledger, similar to the ones obtained by the SEMG in Hiran region (see annex 2.4.1).

As was also the case with Al-Shabaab financing in Hiran region, Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc.'s EVC Plus mobile money service played an important role underpinning the collection and transfer of tax revenues. Individuals were able to pay Al-Shabaab taxes using EVC Plus instead of cash, and Karid would transfer the funds up the chain using the same service. "We would go to Hormuud," Karid said, "and tell them to raise the limit on our EVC accounts, and they would do it. I had a SIM that could hold \$10,000".<sup>61</sup> Karid also reported that other Al-Shabaab finance officers had EVC Plus accounts that could hold as much as \$100,000.

One unusual feature of the administration in Badhadhe district, in contrast to other areas investigated by the SEMG, is that Karid would pay the salaries of local Al-Shabaab officials from the revenue collected each month, with the exception of *Jabha* (military) units. He then would send the remaining balance to Aden "Dhagajun".<sup>62</sup> According to Karid, the Al-Shabaab *Shura* Council would decide how to dispose of the excess revenue; the *Shura* rarely sent any money back to the district level unless there were extraordinary circumstances, such as an ongoing military operation in the area.

#### *Taxation rates*

*Vehicle transit (gadiid)*: Karid stated that vehicle transit taxes on large trucks would range from \$450 to \$600, roughly in line with the practice observed by the SEMG in Bay and Hiran regions. Minibuses carrying passengers, typically Toyota Noahs, would be required to pay a transit tax of \$35 per voyage.

The owner of a new personal vehicle would be required to pay a one-time fee of \$300, categorized under "*gadiid*", to register it with Al-Shabaab; the fee for larger vehicles was \$500.

<sup>58</sup> Name has been changed to protect identity of individual.

<sup>59</sup> Karid also estimated that Al-Shabaab generated total revenues of between \$6 and \$10 million per year in the "Islamic Governate of Jubbaland" (Lower and Middle Juba); however, he did not have firsthand knowledge of revenue collection at the regional level.

<sup>60</sup> The SEMG's case studies of Hiran and Bay and Bakool regional financing also found that Al-Shabaab accountants delineated their reporting periods into 10-day segments.

<sup>61</sup> The purported limit on an EVC Plus transaction is \$300; according to multiple statements from Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. representatives to the SEMG, this limit cannot be overridden.

<sup>62</sup> Of the approximately \$150,000 collected each month, Karid estimated that \$80,000 would be allotted to salaries for local officials, who consisted of members of the finance department (*Maktabka Maaliyada*), police (*hisbah*), preaching (*dawa*), and *zakat* (alms collection). The remaining \$70,000 would be sent to "Dhagajun".

*Goods (badeeco):* Karid reported that goods being transported would be taxed at a rate of \$0.80 per 50 kg sack of goods, irrespective of what the sack contained. This was a considerably lower rate than that charged for goods at Al-Shabaab's principle checkpoint at Jameeco, in Bay region (see annex 2.4.2), where \$2 is levied on every 50 kg sack.<sup>63</sup> One exception to this rule was sacks of potatoes, which comprise one of the principal imports from Kenya; \$10 would be levied on a 150 kg bag of potatoes.

*Livestock sales (xoolo):* Karid reported that vehicles transporting animals to the marketplace would pay a tax of \$16 per head for camels, \$8 per head of cattle, and \$2 per head of goat.

*Agricultural production (dalag):* Karid stated that farm owners would pay a flat tax of \$200 every six months.

*Biannual audits*

Every six months, Karid described how five officials, part of a unit known as *Dabagal* ("Follow Up"), would come to his district from Jilib for between five and ten days in order to audit his receipts. "It was the toughest time," Karid said, describing *Dabagal* officers as "people who watch that you are behaving correctly, in a secret way". The *Dabagal* would inspect all receipts to ensure they matched the amounts collected, and would issue new receipt books as needed. At the end of the year, Karid reported, *Dabagal* officers would gather all copies of past receipts in a pile and burn them.

*Salary and bonus incentives*

Karid told the SEMG that he received a base salary of \$300 as a checkpoint operator, and \$400-\$500 per month once he had been promoted to head finance officer for Badhadhe district. However, 5 per cent of all revenues collected on an annual basis would be set aside to pay bonuses to district officials. Karid's bonus would amount to anywhere between \$1,500 and \$3,000, paid at the end of the Islamic year.

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<sup>63</sup> Karid told the SEMG that taxation rates had increased in Badhadhe district since he had defected from Al-Shabaab at the end of 2016.

#### Annex 2.4.4: Case study: checkpoint taxation in Middle Shabelle region

From 5-28 April 2018, the SEMG carried out a series of interviews with drivers who regularly transit from Mogadishu to Belet Weyne, and who pay tax at Al-Shabaab checkpoints in Middle Shabelle region.

Figure 1: Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation in Middle Shabelle.



Similar to other regions of southern and central Somalia, commercial drivers interviewed stated that they often avoid travelling along the main supply route from Mogadishu through Middle Shabelle to Belet Weyne, due to fear of retribution should they attempt to circumvent Al-Shabaab checkpoints. They further expressed concern over insecurity and multiple ad hoc taxation points by government forces on main transit routes.<sup>64</sup> The SEMG's findings in Middle Shabelle correlate with those on Al-Shabaab checkpoint taxation in Bay and Lower Juba regions. Taxation is based on the type of transiting vehicle and distance of the voyage (*gadiid*), as well as the type and value of goods carried (*badeeco*). Figure 2, below, shows a *gadiid* receipt of \$80 for a vehicle transiting from Ceelow, Hiran region, to Mogadishu, dated 29 September 2017. A *badeeco* receipt of \$130 is shown for a vehicle carrying charcoal from Gambole, Middle Shabelle region, to Mogadishu, dated 10 March 2017.

<sup>64</sup> Interviews were conducted with four truck drivers who regularly transit from Mogadishu to Belet Weyne, April-May 2018.

Figure 2: Redacted Gadiid (l) and badeeco (r) receipts issued in Middle Shabelle.



Initial taxation for vehicles transiting from Mogadishu to Belet Weyne is paid at Waraabaale, located between Walanweyn and Jowhar in Middle Shabelle region (see figure 1, above). The majority of drivers pay through EVC Plus mobile money transfer.<sup>65</sup> Drivers are issued a receipt by Al-Shabaab and are expected to show both receipt and evidence of EVC payment at further Al-Shabaab checkpoints, at Gambole, Shaw, and Booco.

The Monitoring Group carried out an independent assessment on the number of vehicles transiting from Mogadishu through Al-Shabaab controlled areas in Middle Shabelle, over a one week period from 1-7 May 2018. A conservative estimate of revenue generated over the week was calculated based on an average taxation applied to each vehicle, and the average value of the load carried.<sup>66</sup>

Table 1: Assessment of Al-Shabaab earnings in Middle Shabelle from checkpoint taxation from 1-7 May 2018.

Type of vehicle	Total number of vehicles	Avg. taxation per vehicle ( <i>gadiid</i> )	Avg. taxation per load ( <i>badeeco</i> )	Revenue
Large truck	34	\$400	\$500	\$30,600
Medium truck	145	\$150	\$400	\$79,750
Minibus / 4x4	79	\$50	N/A	\$3,950
Passenger car	88	\$25	N/A	\$2,220
<b>Total Revenue:</b>				<b>\$116,520</b>

As shown in the table above, a rudimentary estimate of Al-Shabaab earnings from checkpoint taxation in Middle Shabelle indicates a weekly income of \$116,520, or approximately \$5.6 million per year. There are no Al-Shabaab checkpoints located on the main supply route (MSR) linking Mogadishu to Middle Shabelle, which is nominally controlled by Government and AMISOM forces. However, the MSR remains under constant attack by Al-Shabaab. Consequently, most civilian vehicles continue to utilize minor roads located in Al-Shabaab-controlled territory situated to the west of the MSR, further demonstrating that Al-Shabaab does not need to control main access routes in order to generate income.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Interview with vehicle owner in Mogadishu who frequently travels to Belet Weyne, 5 May 2018.

<sup>66</sup> Average vehicle and goods taxation for each vehicle type were calculated using a small sample of Al-Shabaab *gadiid* and *badeeco* receipts collected by the SEMG in Middle Shabelle region. Furthermore, the weekly study carried out from 1-7 May 2018, may not be entirely representative, as transit flows vary throughout the year.

<sup>67</sup> Interview with truck driver who regularly transits from Mogadishu to Belet Weyne, Mogadishu, 22 April 2018.

#### Annex 2.4.5: Case study: *Zakat* collection in Berdale district, Bay region

Al-Shabaab's *zakat* department operates independently from its finance department, representing a separate funding stream for the group. *Zakat* is a levy enforced by Al-Shabaab on communities under the guise of religious duty. *Zakat* is levied nominally once a year based upon a rate of 2.5 percent on the gross value of both monetary and non-monetary assets.<sup>68</sup> Violence underpins the group's approach to *zakat* collection, including targeted assassinations of community leaders who fail to comply with demands. The SEMG investigated Al-Shabaab's method of *zakat* collection in Berdale district of Bay region, interviewing four former Al-Shabaab *zakat* officers.

Al-Shabaab collected on average \$120,000-\$150,000 in annual *zakat* payment from Berdale district from 2014 to 2017.<sup>69</sup> The Al-Shabaab officer in charge of *zakat* collection in Berdale district leads a team of approximately 25 personnel recruited from within the district, thereby benefitting from the *zakat* collectors' local knowledge.<sup>70</sup> The district head for *zakat* receives a salary of \$120 per month, while his subordinates each receive \$50 each per month. Salaries are paid via EVC Plus mobile money between the 25<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> of each Islamic month.<sup>71</sup> *Zakat* officials from Berdale stated that they received both initial and regular refresher training with Al-Shabaab's financial leadership on administration, accounting, and the importance of documentation and the issuance of receipts.<sup>72</sup>

During the months of collection, *zakat* officers contact individuals to assess their annual earnings and overall assets.<sup>73</sup> Al-Shabaab's *zakat* officials in Berdale maintain a registry of all citizens in the district, including detailed assessments on each individual's assets, including annual income from business, agriculture, livestock.<sup>74</sup> Based on these assessments, individuals are ordered to pay *zakat* at of rate of 2.5 percent of the gross value of their assets.

*Zakat* is often received in kind, particularly through the provision of livestock. According to each *zakat* collector interviewed, Al-Shabaab collects one camel for every 25 camels an individual owns. Similarly, for every 40 goats, one goat is provided to the group. The value of livestock may also be subject to the age, sex and condition of the animal. Thereafter, livestock and agricultural produce is auctioned at local markets in Baidoa.<sup>75</sup>

The enforcement of *zakat* collection is conducted through Al-Shabaab's intelligence wing, the *Amniyat*. Operating independently of the *zakat* department in Berdale, the *Amniyat* not only ensures citizens comply with *zakat* demands, but also serves a monitoring function, providing oversight of Al-Shabaab's *zakat* collectors in order to safeguard the revenue collected.<sup>76</sup>

The *zakat* collectors issue receipts to individuals upon receiving payment. Receipts are expected to be presented to Al-Shabaab to verify compliance. Monies received and duplicate receipts are sent to the head of *zakat* in Berdale for accounting purposes.<sup>77</sup> Although both EVC mobile money and cash are utilized, the *zakat* collectors interviewed

<sup>68</sup> Interview with the former head of Al Shabaab *zakat* collection in Berdale district from 2012-2018, in Kismayo, 29 May 2018. This is contrary to Islamic law, which states *zakat* should be assessed at 2.5 percent of net annual profits, not net worth.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with the former head of Al Shabaab *zakat* collection in Berdale district from 2012-2018, in Kismayo, 29 May 2018.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with a second former *zakat* collector in Berdale district, 29 May 2018.

<sup>71</sup> Interview with a third former Al-Shabaab *zakat* collector in Berdale district, 29 May 2018.

<sup>72</sup> Interview with a fourth *zakat* collector from Berdale district, on 30 May 2018 who defected to the FGS in February 2018.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Op. cit. footnote 29.

<sup>75</sup> Op. cit. footnote 32.

<sup>76</sup> Op. cit. footnote 29.

<sup>77</sup> Op. cit. footnote 29.



stated that EVC mobile money transfer was preferred due to the logistical challenges involved with cash.<sup>78</sup>

The district head of *zakat* in Berdale transfers the revenues collected to the regional head of *zakat* for Bay and Bakool, Mohamed Hassan Barqab in Bullo Fulay, along with accounting records and receipts. *Zakat* revenues are subsequently forwarded to Al-Shabaab's national head of *zakat*, Mohamed Mire. Following an audit of revenues and documentation received, the *zakat* ledgers are returned to the district head of *zakat* in Berdale,<sup>79</sup> who is awarded a bonus payment upon successful completion of the annual collection.<sup>80</sup>

While the Monitoring Group's investigations focused on Berdale district, the Group understands that Al-Shabaab collects *zakat* in a similar manner across other regions in southern and central Somalia, including in the districts that they do not physically control.

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<sup>78</sup> Op. cit. footnote 32.

<sup>78</sup> Op. cit. footnote.

<sup>79</sup> Op. cit. footnote 32.

<sup>80</sup> Op. cit. footnote 29.

**Annex 3.1: ISIL assassination campaign***Table 1: Assassinations claimed by ISIL, October 2017-August 2018.<sup>1</sup>*

Date	City	Location	Deaths	Victims	Video/Photo	Corroborated by SEMG?
19/11/17	Afgoye	N/A	1	Police officer	N	N
29/11/17	Afgoye	N/A	1	Solider	Y	N
08/12/17	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
13/12/17	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
14/01/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	Y	N
23/01/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Finance officer	Y	N
27/01/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
08/02/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	Y	N
26/02/18	Afgoye	Hawi Takow	1	Police officer	Y	N
05/03/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	Y	N
14/03/18	Bosaso	N/A	1	Police officer	N	Y
19/03/18	Mogadishu	Tawfiq	1	Police officer	N	Y
21/03/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Police officer	N	N
15/04/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Solider	Y	N
25/04/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Intelligence officer	Y	Y
30/04/18	Mogadishu	Hawl Wadag district	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
03/05/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Police officer	N	N
07/05/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Intelligence officer	Y	N
14/05/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Intelligence officer	Y	Y
22/05/18	Mogadishu	Hodan district	1	Police officer	Y	Y
23/05/18	Mogadishu	Elasha Biyaha	1	Intelligence officer	N	Y
26/05/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Intelligence officer	N	Y
29/05/18	Anjeel	N/A	1	Soldier	N	N
02/06/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Police officer	N	N
05/06/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Police officer	Y	N
08/06/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Policeman	N	N
13/06/18	Bosaso	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
14/06/18	Mogadishu	Hawl Wadag district	1	Finance officer	N	N
24/06/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Policeman	N	N

<sup>1</sup> Table compiled with assistance from Caleb Weiss of the Long War Journal, who has conducted research on ISIL operations in Somalia. See, for example, Caleb Weiss, "Analysis: Islamic State ramps up attack claims in Somalia", Long War Journal, 9 May 2018. Available from <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/05/analysis-islamic-state-ramps-up-attack-claims-in-somalia.php>.

27/06/18	Mogadishu	Sinay intersection	1	Policeman	N	Y
28/06/18	Mogadishu	Sinay intersection	1	Finance officer	N	Y
29/06/18	Mogadishu	Ba'ad Market	2	Finance officers	Y	N
08/07/18	Bosaso	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	Y
09/07/18	Mogadishu	Ba'ad Market	2	Policeman, intel. officer	Y	N
19/07/18	Mogadishu	Sinay intersection	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
21/07/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Finance officer	N	N
21/07/18	Mogadishu	Ba'ad Market	1	Police officer	N	N
27/07/18	Bosaso	N/A	N/A	Police officer	N	N
29/07/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Police officer	N	Y
02/08/18	Mogadishu	Elasha Biyaha	3	Soldiers	N	N
09/08/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Intelligence officer	N	Y
12/08/18	Mogadishu	Ba'ad market	1	Solider	N	Y
23/08/18	Mogadishu	Bakara market	1	Finance officer	N	N
27/08/18	Mogadishu	N/A	1	Intelligence officer	N	N
30/08/18	Mogadishu	N/A	1	Police officer	N	N
20/12/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Soldier	N	N
25/12/18	Afgoye	N/A	1	Soldier	N	N
<b>TOTALS:</b>			<b>50</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>

Figure 1: Still from a video released by 'Amaq News showing the assassinations of a police officer and intelligence agent in Ba'ad market, Mogadishu, 9 July 2018.



Figure 2: 'Amaq's claim of responsibility — distributed via Telegram — for the assassination of an intelligence officer in Mogadishu, 19 July 2018.



**Annex 3.2: Mobile phone links between Liban Yusuf Mohamed a.k.a. Liban Dheere and known ISIL members and affiliates (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***



**Annex 4.1: 7 April 2018 meeting in Nairobi (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***
























**Annex 4.2: NISA infiltration and intimidation (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

## Annex 5.1: SNA accountability

### SNA salaries

On 7 August 2018, the SEMG was presented with a large volume of documentation purporting to demonstrate the receipt of SNA salaries in cash by individual troops. Documents showed an identical finger print alongside the names of thousands of fighters from multiple units (see figure 1). Other documents show multiple signatures all clearly signed by the same hand (see figures 4 to 6). Such documentation represented the extent of accountability for the payment of salaries to a significant proportion of SNA fighters. Meanwhile the SEMG continued to receive testimonies indicating that many SNA troops were not receiving salaries, and indeed that SNA troop figures — on which withdrawals for SNA salaries from the CBS are based — remained inflated.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1: Sample documentation purporting to demonstrate the receipt of SNA salaries by individual troops (names and IDs redacted).

292	D/LE	X/13054	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
293	D/LE	X/25621	Mohamed Mohamed Ali	\$50	
294	D/LE	X/13138	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
295	D/LE	X/13129	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
296	D/LE	X/13225	Mohamed Mohamed Ali	\$50	
297	D/LE	X/13137	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
298	D/LE	X/13132	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
299	S/LE	X/13497	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
300	S/LE	X/13267	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
301	M/LE	X/13868	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
302	M/LE	X/13943	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
303	M/LE	X/13954	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
304	M/LE	X/13955	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
305	M/LE	X/13956	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
306	M/LE	X/13957	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
307	M/LE	X/13958	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
308	M/LE	X/13959	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
309	M/LE	X/13960	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
310	S/LE	X/13961	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
311	S/LE	X/13962	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
312	S/LE	X/13963	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
313	S/LE	X/13964	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
314	S/LE	X/13965	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
315	L/LE	X/13966	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	
316	L/LE	X/13967	Abdullahi Ali Ahmed	\$50	

<sup>1</sup> Interviews with SNA officials and international security sector consultants between June and September, in Nairobi and Mogadishu.

Figures 2-6: Identical finger prints and similar signatures on documentation purporting to demonstrate the receipt of SNA salaries by individual troops.



As of September 2018, approximately 5,000 individuals in or near to Mogadishu had also been biometrically registered by the SNA for electronic payments.<sup>2</sup> The SEMG confirmed that many SNA officers in and around Mogadishu now receive electronic monthly salary payments representing a positive development for SNA accountability.

#### *SNA rations and fuel contracts*

The appointment of Mohamed Mohamud Hussein “Garabey” as Chief of Logistics also represented a transfer of the control of SNA resources from the Abgal/Weyesle clan of former SNA Chief of Logistics and FGS president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, to that of his own Abgal/Harti clan.<sup>3</sup> Lucrative contracts for the provision of rations and fuel were subsequently transferred to Harti-owned businesses.

While the SEMG was presented with extensive documentation purportedly demonstrating SNA expenditure on and distribution of rations, evidence collected by the SEMG indicated that most SNA troops did not receive regular ration support — in cash or kind — from the FGS.<sup>4</sup> The SNA rations contract was transferred to Kasram Group Limited in May 2017.<sup>5</sup> As of September 2018 the SNA contract with Kasram — worth approximately \$8,500,000 per annum — remained in place despite recommendations from the Financial Governance Committee to cancel and retender the bid.<sup>6</sup> Invoices issued by Kasram for the sale of large quantities of dry foodstuff to the SNA — amounting to between \$400,000 to \$500,000 each month — were rudimentary (see figure 7 below). The SEMG also received multiple

<sup>2</sup> The SNA’s new biometric database is the third biometric database of SNA fighters, none of which are compatible with each other. See [S/2016/919](#) for more information on SNA databases and biometric registration.

<sup>3</sup> SEMG sources explained the necessity of the transfer on account of the proportion of Abgal Harti SNA officers and fighters within or near Mogadishu.

<sup>4</sup> A confidential independent assessment of the SNA conducted in 2018 — and on file with the secretariat — also noted that certain units receive rations support from the FGS but that this was an anomaly within the SNA.

<sup>5</sup> For previous reporting on SNA rations see [S/2015/801 \(strictly confidential annex 3.1\)](#), [S/2016/919 \(annex 2\)](#) and [S/2017/924 \(annex 4.2\)](#).

<sup>6</sup> In its 2017 report, the SEMG noted former State Minister of Finance Abdullahi Mohamed Nur’s (Abgal/Harti) part-ownership of Kasram. See [S/2017/924](#), annex 4.3.

testimonies indicating that funds transferred to regional commanders for the purchasing of rations were still routinely largely misappropriated.<sup>7</sup>

Figure 7: Kasram invoice for dry foodstuffs.

**KASRAM GENERAL TRADING COMPANY**  
Tel: +252415249008 / +25241509506  
Email: kasramgeneral@gmail.com  
Mogadishu - Somalia

**INVOICE**  
No: 1663  
Date: 31.2.2018  
Name: Heggan KOS with signature and stamp

No.	Description	Qty	U. Price	Amount
1-	Sokor	1400	\$37.00	\$51,800
2-	Bariti	1700	\$31.00	\$52,700
3-	Bar	1700	\$28.00	\$47,600
4-	Baasto	2900	\$27.70	\$79,400
5-	Qamadi	1425	\$29.00	\$41,325
6-	Salid	2950	\$22.70	\$66,935
7-				
8-				
9-				
10-				
Total Amount				\$432,120.00
Amount paid:				
Rest Amount:				\$432,120

Seller's Signature: [Signature]

**KASRAM**  
SHIRKADDA  
GANACSIGA

The SEMG also considers it likely that a significant proportion of funds allocated to fuel and oil for SNA vehicles is misappropriated.<sup>8</sup> Expenditure on fuel and oil for SNA vehicles from Daljir Trading and General Services allegedly amounted to approximately \$96,000 each month in the first 6 months of 2018, regardless of SNA activity and operations. Daljir Trading and General Services, owned by Yusuf Sheikh Mohamed was previously contracted by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to provide food rations to its security forces (see [S/2912/544](#), paras. 50-51). The SEMG reported Mohamed's close financial ties and clan relations to then president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Abgal/Harti).

Delivery/receipt notes indicate that the SNA purchases 321 200-litre barrels of fuel (petrol and diesel) each month. Tables prepared by Colonel Salad Hassan Jama of the Logistics Department, detailing the monthly distribution of fuel provided to the SEMG indicate that the SNA distributes approximately 64,000 litres of fuel each month. The reports indicate, for example, that 2,000 liters are delivered to the Baledogle training facility managed by United States military personnel. The SEMG confirmed, however, that Baledogle is not supplied with fuel from the SNA or FGS.<sup>9</sup> SEMG sources described how fuel purchased by SNA headquarters was stored at Villa Gashandiga and distributed haphazardly to units in or near to Mogadishu.

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with SNA officials and international security sector consultants between June and September, in Nairobi and Mogadishu. The SNA provided receipts for transfers of bulk sums to regional commanders for the provision of rations but no evidence of their onward dispersal.

<sup>8</sup> In SNA monthly distribution reporting prepared by the Office of the Chief of Logistics and Supply, and shared with international partners, it is claimed that the SNA operates 614 vehicles across all sectors, with fuel support also received from United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) and the United States of America.

<sup>9</sup> WhatsApp call with security sector consultant, 5 September 2018.

*SNA general service expenses*

Receipts purporting to demonstrate SNA “general service” expenses — covering medical expenses, travel, stationery, more fuel, and vehicle maintenance — amounted to exactly \$248,000 each month between January and June 2018:

- (a) Expenditure on medical expenses — from Iftin Pharmacy in Mogadishu — amounted to approximately \$24,000 each month over the first six months of 2018. Receipts indicated expenditure on basic medicines such as paracetamol.
- (b) Expenditure on travel — from the Rixla Travel Agency in Mogadishu — amounted to between \$12,300 and \$17,500 each month over the first six months of 2018. The receipts listed all international tickets as costing \$3,400 and all internal flights costing \$100.<sup>10</sup>
- (c) Expenditure on stationery — from Hilaac Stationery in Mogadishu — ranged from \$5,920 to \$15,422 in the first six months of 2018. Receipts for both June and July 2018 both indicated \$2,800 in expenditure on pens.
- (d) According to the expense table, expenditure on more fuel — from National Petrol, Oil Change and Car Wash in Mogadishu — ranged from \$53,550 to \$56,878 between January and June 2018. However, a receipt issued by National Petrol, Oil Change and Car Wash in Mogadishu for February 2018 matched the total figure spent on fuel via Daljir Trading and General Services, \$95,800.<sup>11</sup>
- (e) According to the expense table, maintenance of SNA vehicles — provided by Farayare Spare Parts in Mogadishu — ranged from \$141,400 and \$146,450 between January and June 2018.<sup>12</sup>

The receipts presented to the SEMG covering such expenditures from the five different companies all appeared to have been written by the same hand.

*Figure 8: SNA general services expenses, January to June 2018, amounting to \$248,000.*

<b>SNA General Services Expenses from January till June 2018</b>								
The Service Exposes includes the following items: Medical Expenses, travel expenses, stationaries, fuel and Maintenance.								
No.	Months	Service Expenses	Medical Expenses	Travel	Stationary	Fuel	Maintenance	Total Expenses
1	January 2018	\$ 248,000	\$22,000	\$ 12,300	\$ 15,422	\$ 56,878	\$141,400	\$ 248,000
2	February 2018	\$ 248,000	\$22,500	\$ 12,000	\$ 10,450	\$ 59,750	\$143,300	\$ 248,000
3	March 2018	\$ 248,000	\$26,000	\$ 16,000	\$ 6,400	\$ 53,550	\$146,050	\$ 248,000
4	April 2018	\$ 248,000	\$25,100	\$ 17,500	\$ 6,540	\$ 54,760	144,100	\$ 248,000
5	May 2018	\$ 248,000	\$23,370	\$ 16,600	\$ 5,580	\$ 56,000	\$146,450	\$ 248,000
6	June 2017	\$ 248,000	\$24,080	\$ 17,000	\$ 5,920	\$ 56,000	\$145,000	\$ 248,000

S/GUUTO  
MADAXA HOGG.M.LACAGTAXI  
YACQUUB MAXAMED SIYAAD



<sup>10</sup> According to sources within the SNA, most internal flights for SNA officers are provided by UNSOS.

<sup>11</sup> The SEMG did not receive a clear explanation as to why fuel expenditure is accounted for independently and separately under “General Services Expense”.

<sup>12</sup> This is despite the fact that both UNSOS and the US Security Support program provides maintenance servicing and parts to SNA vehicles in Mogadishu.



Figures 9-13: SNA General Service Expenses sample receipts, July 2018.

**PHARMACY**  
Tel: 0619877272  
Mogadishu - Somalia

**INVOICE**

Date: 22.7.2018 NO: 0259

Name: Ahmed Sheikh Caran

S/N	Item	Qty	Unit	Amount
1.				
2.	Amphishe	5000	2.5	12500
3.				
4.	Banjo Feman	3700	0.5	1850
5.				
6.	U-B-E	3000	0.5	1000
7.				
8.	New.ri	1940	4.5	8750
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				

SIGNATURE

TOTAL 24080


PAID

REST


MOGADISHU PHARMACY

# RIXLA TRAVEL AGENCY

Tel: 0615121270 / 0612122284  
Mogadishu - Somalia



## INVOICE




Date: 20/7/17      No: 4862

Name: C/Man      Chen

No.	Description	Qty	Kg	U/Price	Amount
1.					
2.	T/Ks F/dimade	4		#3400	#13600
4.	T/Ks Gudaha	30		#100	#3400
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15.					
16.					

Authorized Signature:

ib 

G. Total

Paid

Res

16/07/17

**RIXLA TRAVEL AGENCY**

MOGADISHU - SOMALIA

G. Total #17,000

Paid #17,000

Res

**MAF STATIONERY**  
Tel: 0619855518  
MOGADISHU, SOMALIA

Date: 27/2/18 **INVOICE** NO: 3026

Name: Eng. Naciya Ahmed

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Amount
1.				
2.	Khad (Pen)	10	\$280	\$2800
3.	Khad 1102	20	\$15	\$300
4.				
5.				
6.	Pen four A4	120	\$235	\$28200
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				
16.				
17.				
18.				
19.				
20.				

Authorized Signature  
A/Naciya

**MAF STATIONERY**  
MOGADISHU, SOMALIA

TOTAL PAID \$5,920  
REST \$5,920

# NATIONAL PETROL AND CAR WASH

Mobile: 0617108060, Mogadishu - Somalia

## INVOICE

Date: 20/7/2018      No: 8296

Name: Ibrahim      Colo      Ali

No	Shidaalka	Catalka	Qimaha US\$/S.H.No.	Ingeyn US\$/S.H.No.
1.	<u>Jaarto</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>\$124</u>	<u>\$31,000</u>
2.				
3.	<u>Basay</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>\$125</u>	<u>\$25,000</u>
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

Authorized Signature \_\_\_\_\_


TOTAL \$56,000

PAID \$56,000

REST \_\_\_\_\_

Shidaalka mara \_\_\_\_\_

Saxiixa Mara \_\_\_\_\_



Mogadishu

**SPARE PARTS**

Tel: 0615812004 | Mogadishu, Somalia

**INVOICE**

No: **5875**

Date: **27/08/18**      **16/08/18**      **cal**      **Expire**

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Total Amount
1				
2	key 120/20	80	390	31200
3				
4	key 75/10	680	90	61200
5				
6	Belt 120/130	110	110300	
7				
8	Belt 75/10	340	90	30600
9				
10	Belt 50/140	53	7200	
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				

**SPARE PARTS**

Tel: 0615812004 | Mogadishu, Somalia

**INVOICE**

No: **5875**

Date: **27/08/18**      **16/08/18**      **cal**      **Expire**

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Total Amount
1				
2	key 120/20	80	390	31200
3				
4	key 75/10	680	90	61200
5				
6	Belt 120/130	110	110300	
7				
8	Belt 75/10	340	90	30600
9				
10	Belt 50/140	53	7200	
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				

**SPARE PARTS**

Tel: 0615812004 | Mogadishu, Somalia

**INVOICE**

No: **5875**

Date: **27/08/18**      **16/08/18**      **cal**      **Expire**

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Total Amount
1				
2	key 120/20	80	390	31200
3				
4	key 75/10	680	90	61200
5				
6	Belt 120/130	110	110300	
7				
8	Belt 75/10	340	90	30600
9				
10	Belt 50/140	53	7200	
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				

**SPARE PARTS**

Tel: 0615812004 | Mogadishu, Somalia

**INVOICE**

No: **5875**

Date: **27/08/18**      **16/08/18**      **cal**      **Expire**

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Total Amount
1				
2	key 120/20	80	390	31200
3				
4	key 75/10	680	90	61200
5				
6	Belt 120/130	110	110300	
7				
8	Belt 75/10	340	90	30600
9				
10	Belt 50/140	53	7200	
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				

**SPARE PARTS**

Tel: 0615812004 | Mogadishu, Somalia

**INVOICE**

No: **5875**

Date: **27/08/18**      **16/08/18**      **cal**      **Expire**

No	Description	Qty	U. Price	Total Amount
1				
2	key 120/20	80	390	31200
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10	Belt 50/140	53	7200	
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**Annex 6.1: Detention, torture and execution of children in Bosaso by Puntland authorities (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

**Annex 6.2: Torture and execution of two civilians in Barawe by the SNA  
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***

### Annex 6.3: Alleged killing of civilians in a joint SNA-US operation in Barire village

On 25 August 2017, a Somali National Army (SNA) unit with US forces acting in a supporting role conducted an operation targeting Al-Shabaab at a farm near Barire village, Awdheegle district, Lower Shabelle region. According to SEMG sources within Somalia, the operation resulted in the deaths of 10 individuals, including two children (see annex 6.3.1 (strictly confidential)).<sup>13</sup>

The SEMG investigation is based on documentary evidence recovered from the site of the attack, internal international organization reports, a local NGO report, and official statements issued by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the United States.

The SEMG also conducted interviews with victims' families, representatives of civil society, Somali security personnel with knowledge of the event, international organization staff, and staff members of local NGOs working in Lower Shabelle region. Finally, the Monitoring Group also reviewed photographs of ammunition casings reportedly collected by the relative of an individual killed at the scene.

The Barire incident occurred on a farm located approximately 2 km south-east of Barire village. The SEMG reviewed documentary evidence recovered from the site by US forces, including a land deed<sup>14</sup> (see figure 1, below), that appears to confirm its status as a farm. However, the SEMG could not rule out that the farm was being used as a base of operations for Al-Shabaab at the time of the incident.

*Figure 1: Land deed recovered by US forces from the scene of the Barire attack, indicating the property to be a farm.*



The SEMG confirmed that two children were killed during the incident, Mohamud Talaasow Abdi and Hussein Qamiso Moalim, both aged 13 (see annex 6.3.1 (strictly

<sup>13</sup> According to a confidential international organization document dated 14 September 2017, at least four killed in the Barire incident were civilians. However, the SEMG has been unable to independently confirm the civilian status of any of the individuals killed save for the two children.

<sup>14</sup> Email correspondence between a representative of the families and a US Army officer, in March 2018, confirmed that the land deed and other items reviewed by the SEMG had been taken from the Barire site.

confidential) for photographs). The SEMG received the photographs and names of the deceased, as well as one wounded.<sup>15</sup>

The SEMG has been unable to determine whether these eight deceased were civilians or members of Al-Shabaab. Photographs reviewed by the SEMG indicate that none of the deceased were wearing military uniforms, nor were weapons found in the vicinity. Family members of the victims informed the SEMG that the deceased were not combatants. In addition, an international organization confidential document reported that at least four of those killed were civilians, as did other international organization sources.<sup>16</sup>

On the same day of the incident, a press release from the FGS Ministry of Information stated that an SNA-led attack had taken place in Barire, but the deceased had consisted of Al-Shabaab fighters. A correction appeared one day later, admitting that civilian casualties had actually occurred.

*Figure 2: Conflicting FGS statements regarding the Barire incident, 25 and 26 August 2017.*



On 26 August 2017, the FGS Prime Minister established a committee to investigate the incident, which was given five days to investigate the incident and to submit a report to the offices of the FGS Prime Minister and President by 30 August 2017.

On 28 August 2017, the Upper House of the Federal Parliament appointed a separate finding committee to investigate the incident. On 30 July 2018, the SEMG requested, in a letter to the FGS, copies of the investigations conducted by both committees, but as of this writing had not received a reply.

In September 2017, a report was prepared by the “South West State Human Rights Organization”<sup>17</sup> indicating that those killed in the attack were Al-Shabaab fighters, which the US Mission in Mogadishu shared with the representative of the families on 4 March

<sup>15</sup> Photos and names of the deceased were obtained from their families in Mogadishu, 28 March 2018, and verified via telephone interviews on 24 April, 17 July, and 13 September 2018. The names of those killed and wounded during the Barire incident are as follows: Ali Adan Ahmed, Ali Abdi Ibrahim, Isaq Ali Harun, Abdifitah Yusuf Abdi, Saney Jama Warsame Farah, Abdulqadir Abdullahi Diriye, Mohamed Mahamud Yusuf, Mohamed Abdullahi Ali, and Abdulkadir Abdullahi Yusuf Sahal (wounded).

<sup>16</sup> Confidential international organization document, 14 September 2017; interview with international organization staff members in Mogadishu, 24 March 2018; phone interview with an international organization staff member in Mogadishu, 13 February 2018; email and documentation provided by international organization staff in Baidoa, 24 May 2018.


<sup>17</sup> “Report on the Barire Issue”, South West State Human Rights Organization, 8 September 2017. Report on file with the Secretariat.



2018. The families stated to the SEMG, however, that this organization was created to falsify information about the Barire incident.

On 1 April, the FGS Ministry of Interior responded to correspondence from the victims' families, stating that the South West State Human Rights Organization was not among those legally operating in Somalia. On 4 April, the families requested information about the organization from the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development of South West State. On 24 April, the Ministry responded that it was not aware of the existence of this organization (see figure 3, below).

*Figure 3: Letter from the Director General of the South West State Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, 24 April 2018.*



#### *United States involvement in the incident*

On 25 August 2017, the same day as the Barire incident, a relative of an individual killed recovered hundreds of bullet casings from the scene. While the majority of casings consisted of the 7.62 x 39 mm rounds used by AK- and PK-pattern weapons, some 5.56 x 45 mm bullet casings from the scene bore markings consistent with ammunition manufactured in the United States. To the SEMG's knowledge, 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition is not used by Somali security forces. Figures 4 and 5, below, provides two samples of casings whose markings suggest they were manufactured at the Lake City Army Ammunition plant, Missouri, and the Federal Cartridge Corp. (now Federal Premium Ammunition), in Minnesota. The photographs were provided to the SEMG through a former FGS official, and the Group was not able to independently verify their provenance.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Use of 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition during the Barire incident was first reported by Christina Goldbaum, "Strong Evidence that U.S. Special Operations Forces Massacred Civilians in Somalia," Daily Beast, 29 November 2017. Available from: <https://www.thedailybeast.com/strong-evidence-that-us-special-operations-forces-massacred-civilians-in-somalia>.



*Figure 4: 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition casings recovered from the scene of the Barire incident, with markings consistent with US manufacture.*



*Figure 5: 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition casing recovered from the scene of the Barire incident.*



On 25 August 2017, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledged that US forces had supported the SNA-led operation in the village and stated their commitment to investigate the case.<sup>19</sup> AFRICOM further stated “we are aware of the civilian casualty allegations near Barire, Somalia. We take any allegations of civilian casualties seriously, and per standard, we are conducting an assessment into the situation to determine the facts on the ground”.<sup>20</sup> On 29 November 2017, AFRICOM released a second press statement announcing that a thorough assessment of the incident had been conducted, and that “the only casualties were those of armed enemy combatants”.<sup>21</sup>

In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 6 March 2018, General Thomas D. Waldhauser, Commander of AFRICOM, stated that US forces “were not involved in direct combat”.<sup>22</sup> General Waldhauser’s testimony appears to conflict with an earlier statement by an AFRICOM spokesperson, which suggested that US forces had been actively engaged in combat: “The opposing force maneuvered to flank the SNA, emerging

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, “Civilian casualty allegations in Somalia”, press release, 25 August 2017. Available from <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/29846/civilian-casualty-allegations-in-somalia>.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, “Civilian casualty allegation assessment results released”, press release, August 29 November 2018. Available from <http://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30134/aug-25-civilian-casualty-allegation-assessment-results-released>.

<sup>22</sup> Testimony quoted in United States Africa Command, “Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser at HASC Hearing on National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in Africa”, 7 March 2018. Available from <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/transcript/30469/gen-thomas-d-waldhauser-at-hasc-hearing-on-national-security-challenges-and-u-s-military-activities>.

near U.S. advisors, who had deliberately remained on the periphery. Both U.S. and Somali forces acted in self-defense, resulting in the death of seven opposing forces”.<sup>23</sup>

On 30 July 2018, the SEMG sent correspondence to the US requesting details of the assessment conducted by AFRICOM, as well as an explanation for the 5.56 x 45 mm casings, but as of this writing it had not received a reply.

#### *Implications of US involvement*

The widespread perception in Somalia that US forces were involved in the killings of Somali civilians has also provided an opportunity for Al-Shabaab propaganda, with Al-Shabaab-affiliated websites casting the deceased at Barire as victims of Western invaders.<sup>24</sup> The Barire incident is not the only recent US military operation in Somalia to generate controversy. On 28 September 2016, US forces appeared to have been misled by intelligence provided by Puntland forces into carrying out an airstrike in the vicinity of Galkayo that resulted in the deaths of 10 members of the Galmudug security forces.<sup>25</sup> On 9 May 2018, a joint US-SNA operation was carried out at Ma'alinka village (also known as Bulcida), 10 km north-east from Barire on the road to Afgoye. Five civilians were allegedly killed while four others were injured.<sup>26</sup> Most recently, “bad intelligence” may have been responsible for a botched US-SNA raid on the house of the former President of Somalia, Aden Abdulle Osman Daar, on 7 September 2018.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in John Vandiver, “AFRICOM offers details on controversial Somalia raid”, Stars and Stripes, 1 December 2017. Available from <https://www.stripes.com/news/africom-offers-details-on-controversial-somalia-raid-1.500345>.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Somali Memo, “Al-Shabaab oo Ka Tacsiyeeyay Gumaadkii Uu Mareykanku Ka Geystay Bariire (Dhageyso)”, 26 August 2017. Available from <http://somalimemo.net/articles/7543/Al-Shabaab-oo-Ka-Tacsiyeeyay-Gumaadkii-Uu-%20Mareykanku-Ka-Geystay-Bariire-Dhageyso>.

<sup>25</sup> See United States Africa Command, “U.S. Africa Command Completes Assessment on Galkayo Strike”, press release, 15 November 2016. Available from <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/28493/u-s-africa-command-completes-assessment-on-galcayo-strike>. While the press release referred to those killed as “local militia forces”, the SEMG has received confirmation that they had been affiliated with the Galmudug administration, a traditional rival of Puntland.

<sup>26</sup> International agency confidential report, 10-12 May 2018. AFRICOM has conducted a review of the incident that concluded that no civilian casualties had occurred. See United States Africa Command, “U.S. Statement on Alleged Civilian Casualties in Somalia”, press release, 8 June 2018. Available from <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/pressrelease/30863/u-s-statement-on-alleged-civilian-casualties-in-somalia>.


<sup>27</sup> Jason Burke, “US-assisted raid on Somali ex-leader’s home blamed on bad intelligence”, The Guardian, 13 September 2018. Available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/13/us-special-forces-somalia-raid-al-shabaab>.

**Annex 6.3.1: Photographs of children killed at Barire (STRICTLY  
CONFIDENTIAL)\***

## Annex 7.1: Production sites, stockpiles and ports


### Production sites

Figure 1: Charcoal production sites in Middle and Lower Juba during 2017.<sup>1</sup>



### Stockpiles

Figure 2: Location of Kismayo stockpiles, January 2018.<sup>2</sup>



<sup>1</sup> M. Bolognesi and U. Leonardi, *Analysis of very high-resolution satellite images to generate information on the charcoal production and its dynamics in South Somalia from 2011 to 2017* (Nairobi: FAO-SWALIM, 2018).

<sup>2</sup> M. Bolognesi and U. Leonardi.

Figure 3: Estimated size of Kismayo stockpiles, 2015-2018.<sup>3</sup>



Figure 4: Buur Gaabo stockpile, 21 May 2018.



Figure 5: Estimated size of Buur Gaabo stockpile, 2011-2017.<sup>4</sup>



<sup>3</sup> M. Bolognesi and U. Leonardi. K=1 northern stockpile and K3 = southern stockpile (see figure 2).

<sup>4</sup> M. Bolognesi and U. Leonardi.



### Port of Kismayo

These photos — in combination with information from human sources in Kismayo and Dubai and analysis of satellite imagery which indicated depletion of the nearby southern stockpiles in Kismayo — corroborate a surge in charcoal exports from Somalia during February 2018 (i.e. the seventeen fewer dhows remaining at the Port of Kismayo one month later had most likely loaded and departed with cargoes of charcoal in the interim).

*Figure 6: Twenty-three dhows at the Port of Kismayo, 27 January 2018.*



*Figure 7: Six dhows at the Port of Kismayo, 22 February 2018.*





**Annex 7.2: Jubbaland administration (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)\***


### Annex 7.3: Charcoal trafficking dhows

In its 2016 final report on Somalia, the SEMG identified 29 vessels that had been active during that mandate trafficking charcoal from Somalia. Of these, approximately three-quarters had also been named in previous SEMG reports, and were thus repeat offenders. Twenty-five of the dhows were confirmed as Indian-flagged, while another four dhows were identified as Sri Lankan-flagged.<sup>5</sup> During the following mandate, further investigation revealed that the four dhows previously thought to be Sri-Lankan flagged had actually used forged ship registrations, which became increasingly common practice among charcoal trafficking dhows<sup>6</sup> The use of forged Sri Lanka ship registrations has also been frequently observed during the current mandate, while the Monitoring Group has also recently received information regarding the use of forged Liberia and Sierra Leone ship registrations. This is a deliberate sanctions evasion tactic for preventing accurate identification of dhows and their owners.

Find below a profile of a typical dhow trafficking Somali charcoal:

- a) Sambuq wooden dhow (small = 35 m x 10 m; large = 55 m x 15 m)
- b) cargo of 15,000-45,000 bags weighing 25 kg each (375-1,125 metric tonnes)
- c) cargo mostly covered, but some blue-green charcoal bags may be visible
- d) not transmitting AIS in order to avoid being identified and tracked
- e) name and registration of the dhow likely covered or painted over
- f) missing or false cargo documentation (e.g. certificate of origin)
- g) probably unflagged (not flying flag and/or no valid ship registration)
- h) may possess forged Liberia, Sierra Leone or Sri Lanka ship registration
- i) nationality of crew members most likely India or Pakistan
- j) location along established charcoal trafficking routes.<sup>7</sup>

*Figure 1: Typical dhow trafficking Somali charcoal with blue-green bags visible.*



<sup>5</sup> S/2016/919, annex 9.5.

<sup>6</sup> S/2017/924, para. 208 and annex 12.2.3.

<sup>7</sup> This profile is not intended to apply to the Iran-flagged dhows that have been used during the current mandate to transship Somali charcoal within the Persian Gulf from Iran to the UAE (see annex 7.4), but rather the dhows that have been transporting charcoal from Somalia to the Gulf region since 2012.

#### Annex 7.4: Transshipment from Iran to the UAE

Transshipment through Iran to the UAE has been a prevalent method of trafficking Somali charcoal during the current mandate. According to information received by the SEMG, a “test cargo” of Somali charcoal was first sent to Iran in 2017; however, during the period from November 2017 through February 2018, the majority of cargoes of Somali charcoal were still going to the Port of Duqm and Port of Shinas in Oman.<sup>8</sup> When the Oman authorities seized the cargo of *Al Azhar 3* in early March 2018 (see annex 7.7), the charcoal traffickers diverted their cargoes to ports at Kish and Qeshm in Iran. From March 2018 through August 2018, Somali charcoal from Buur Gaabo and Kismayo has been regularly imported into Kish Free Zone and Qeshm Free Zone, repackaged into bags labelled “Product of Iran”, and exported to Port Al Hamriya in Dubai, UAE.

*Figure 1: Somali charcoal being unloaded at Kaveh Port, Qeshm Free Zone.*



*Figure 2: Truck with license plate “KISH 19489” transporting Somali charcoal.*



<sup>8</sup> Email, industry source, 22 July 2018.

In some respects, the export of charcoal from Somalia to Iran has followed familiar trafficking patterns, such as the wooden Sambuq style dhows with cargoes of typical blue-green bags of Somali charcoal that have docked and unloaded at Kish and Qeshm (figure 1). Likewise, the false certificates of origin that have been used to import Somali charcoal into Iran each have precedents: Comoros (UAE 2014-2016 and Bahrain 2016); Côte d'Ivoire (UAE 2016-2017 and Oman 2017-2018); and Ghana (UAE 2016-2017 and Oman 2017-2018). The Monitoring Group has obtained copies of Comoros and Ghana false certificates of origin that have been used at ports in Iran during 2018; they seem to differ from those used in Gulf Cooperation Council ports as they have not been legally attested by a consulate or an embassy (annex 7.5).

Transshipment of Somali charcoal through the free zones at Kish and Qeshm is a process that has required substantial physical labor, particularly when one considers that a typical incoming cargo from Somalia weighs about 750 metric tonnes while typical outgoing cargoes to UAE weigh 125-375 metric tonnes. The steps are as follows: the cargo of Somali charcoal is unloaded from the dhow onto trucks (figure 2), transferred to a warehouse within the free zone (figure 3), removed from the original blue-green bags, re-packaged into white bags labelled either "Product KFZ of Iran" or "Product QFZ of Iran" (figure 4), loaded back onto trucks for transfer to the port, and then loaded onto smaller, Iran-flagged dhows for export to the UAE (figure 5).



Figure 3: Warehouse with charcoal in original Somalia bags (l) and new Iran bags (r).



Figure 4: Kish Free Zone bag (l), Qeshm Free Zone bag (c), and weighed for export (r).



Figure 5: Re-bagged Somali charcoal being loaded for export from Kaveh Port, Qeshm.



The process of transshipment at the Kish and Qeshm free zones has been organized by Dubai-based clearance agents, such as Basheer Khalif Moosa and Salah Yusuf (annex 7.6), working in collaboration with local consignees. The Monitoring Group has identified four consignees operating at the Qeshm Free Zone which have been active in importing, repackaging, and exporting cargoes of Somali charcoal:

- a) Ahmad Noorbaksh Trading Co., registry number 1411, +98 9173630291
- b) Hemmat Bonyad Qeshm, registry number 2604 and/or 5255, +98 7635228282
- c) Pars Javid Qeshm, registry number 4825, +98 7635243111
- d) Adnan Bazmandegan, registry number 4602, +98 7635228650

This information has been corroborated through review of numerous shipping documents obtained by the SEMG that indicate the import and export of Somali charcoal from Iran — such as bills of lading, manifests, packing lists, and invoices — as well as through sources from within the industry.

Within Iran, the last step in the transshipment process entails obtaining Iran certificates of origin for exporting the Somali charcoal from the Kish Free Zone and Qeshm Free Zone to a port in a third country, in this case Port Al Hamriya in Dubai, UAE (see annex 7.5). The SEMG has obtained copies of multiple Iran certificates of origin as well as more than a dozen copies of port records from Dubai Customs. Collectively, these official documents indicate a pattern of Iran-flagged dhows transporting cargoes in the range of 5,000-15,000 bags of charcoal each from Kish and Qeshm to Port Al Hamriya during May-June 2018. Each of the Iran-issued certificates of origin falsely indicates the “country of manufacture” as Iran, with specific reference to the free zone. The Iran certificates of origin and the Dubai Customs records name the consignee in the UAE as Zuri Coals FZE. The Ajman, UAE-based company also appears on the false Gambia certificate of origin for the confiscated cargo of *Zazel 2* (annex 7.5, figure 3 and annex 7.7). Zuri Coals FZE remains under investigation by the Monitoring Group.

Analysis of official data for Iran’s charcoal production, imports, and exports further corroborates the narrative above regarding transshipment of Somali charcoal (see figure 6). In the most recent year for which data is available, 2016, Iran’s domestic production of wood charcoal was merely 292 metric tonnes while its official exports were only 331 metric tonnes. These are each roughly the equivalent of one small, Iran-flagged dhow loaded with charcoal for the trip from Kish or Qeshm to Port Al Hamriya. Iran’s official imports of wood charcoal in 2016 totaled 6,000 metric tonnes, the equivalent of approximately eight dhows with 30,000 bags each of charcoal exported from Somalia. Without factoring in the large-scale transshipment of Somali charcoal, Iran’s recent trends of charcoal production, imports, and exports are inconsistent with the quantity of charcoal exports from Iran to the UAE observed during the current mandate.

*Figure 6: Iran charcoal production, imports and exports (2012-2016, metric tonnes).<sup>9</sup>*

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
<b>Production</b>	494	494 (est.)	494 (est.)	339	292
<b>Imports</b>	13,000	4,326	5,090	5,531	6,000
<b>Exports</b>	454 (est.)	165	294	30	331

Ultimately, some of the details regarding the transshipment of Somali charcoal during the current mandate can only be fully known through the cooperation of Member States, particularly Iran and the UAE, which has been largely absent on this issue.

In letters dated 29 January 2018, 23 February 2018, and 15 August 2018, the SEMG informed the Government of Iran that false certificates of origin were being used to

<sup>9</sup> FAOSTAT, <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/FO> (accessed 14 August 2018).



transship Somali charcoal through Kish and Qeshm free zones, requested to visit Iran to meet with the relevant authorities and review documentation, provided photographic evidence and copies of Iran certificates of origin for review, identified multiple consignees suspected of transshipping Somali charcoal, requested an update regarding any investigations and sanctions enforcement, and requested copies of documentation.

Iran replied in a letter dated 17 September 2018, which did not substantively address most of the issues raised in the Monitoring Group's correspondence. The letter stated there have been a "few instances of engagement of private companies in QFZ and KFZ in the import of charcoal and its transit abroad" and that these shipments were in partnership with foreign companies. It also states that an investigation of these local companies and their activities is underway, and a suspension of their business has been ordered by the national authorities pending a conclusion of the investigation. According to the letter, the authorities in QFZ and KFZ have also been alerted regarding the import of charcoal with "suspicious origins" and ordered to take precautionary measures.

Meanwhile, in a letter dated 6 June 2018, the SEMG had informed the UAE that Somali charcoal has been transshipped via Iran to other countries in the region, and requested that the UAE provide 2017 aggregate trade data for charcoal imports and exports with Iran, as well as copies of any certificates of origin for charcoal cargoes coming from Iran since December 2017. The UAE replied to several of the Monitoring Group's other charcoal-related enquiries in a letter dated 15 August 2018, but it failed to address the requests regarding Iran trade data and Iran certificates of origin. The SEMG sent another letter to the UAE on 22 August 2018, reiterating its request for copies of Iran certificates of origin, requesting authentication of Dubai Customs documentation indicating charcoal imports from Iran, and requesting further information regarding the consignee Zuri Coals FZE. At the time of writing, the UAE had not yet replied.


## Annex 7.5: False certificates of origin

### Comoros

Previous SEMG investigations revealed that false Comoros certificates of origin were used to import Somali charcoal into the UAE between 2014 and 2016 and into Bahrain during 2016.<sup>10</sup> The certificates of origin were found to be forgeries which had been fabricated by traffickers and then submitted to the Comoros Consulate in Dubai for legal attestation. To the knowledge of the Monitoring Group, they were no longer active during 2017.

However, false Comoros certificates of origin have resurfaced in 2018 for the purpose of importing Somali charcoal into the Islamic Republic of Iran. The certificate of origin in figure 1 below, dated 2 March 2018 and submitted to a consignee at Bahman Port in the Qeshm Free Zone, is a forgery. According to information received by the SEMG, the false Comoros certificates of origin used in Iran during this mandate have been fabricated by the Dubai-based clearance agent Basheer Khalif Moosa (annex 7.6). Unlike the forged Comoros certificates of origin used earlier in the UAE, it does not appear to have been submitted to a Comoros consulate or embassy for legal attestation.

Figure 1: False Comoros certificate of origin.



### Côte d'Ivoire

In a letter dated 3 October 2016, the Monitoring Group first informed the UAE that false Côte d'Ivoire certificate of origins may be being used to import Somali charcoal. The UAE authorities subsequently confiscated the cargo of the dhow *Haseena*, which had a false Côte d'Ivoire certificate of origin, on 26 October 2016. In a letter dated 6 July 2017, the SEMG requested that the UAE provide copies of all Côte d'Ivoire certificates of origin accepted since April 2017. The Monitoring Group reiterated this request in another letter dated 29 August 2017. On 23 May 2018 — nearly a year after the initial request — the UAE replied with copies of letters of attestation from the Côte d'Ivoire consulate; and at a meeting with UAE authorities in Abu Dhabi on 17 July 2018, copies of the corresponding certificates of origin were also provided. The fourteen Côte d'Ivoire certificates of origin,

<sup>10</sup> S/2017/924, annex 12.2.1; S/2016/919, para. 138, annex 9.4.a, and annex 9.7a; and S/2015/801, para. 156, para. 159, and annex 8.3.

dated between 6 April 2017 and 5 August 2017, comprise 357,000 bags of charcoal that were imported into the UAE during the previous mandate.

Despite these certificates of origin having apparently been processed through official channels, including the Ministry of Industry in Abidjan and the Consulate in Dubai, several factors leave little doubt that the 357,000 bags of charcoal from these fourteen dhows originated in Somalia rather than Côte d'Ivoire. The consignee is listed as Salim Alkhattal Group Marine Contracting and Trading, while the “destinataire” (addressee/recipient) is listed as Kismayo General Trading — both companies have been identified in past SEMG reports as Dubai-based traffickers of Somali charcoal.<sup>11</sup> The timing also corresponds with the period just after the UAE ceased to accept false Djibouti certificates of origin as of March 2017, thus the traffickers would need to rely on another form of false paperwork, which has been confirmed by industry sources. Furthermore, according to the authorities in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire has placed restrictions on the export of charcoal for environmental reasons, thus making it an improbable bulk exporter.<sup>12</sup> Finally, there are other confirmed cases of false Côte d'Ivoire certificates of origin, such as *Haseena* in 2016 and *Al Azhar 3* in Oman in 2018.

During the current mandate, false Côte d'Ivoire certificates of origin have been used to import Somali charcoal into Oman and Iran. The document in figure 2, a false Côte d'Ivoire certificate of origin for *Al Azhar 3*, was submitted to import 37,000 bags of Somali charcoal through the Port of Duqm, Oman on 4 March 2018, which resulted in the confiscation of the cargo by Oman authorities (annex 7.7). Meanwhile, the Monitoring Group wrote to Iran on 29 January 2018, 23 February 2018, and 15 August 2018 informing the Government regarding the use of false certificates of origin for cargoes of Somali charcoal, specifically referencing false Côte d'Ivoire paperwork in the latter two letters. Iran replied on 17 September 2018, but did not provide any information clarifying the use of false certificates of origin to import Somali charcoal.





Figure 2: False Côte d'Ivoire certificate of origin.



<sup>11</sup> Regarding Salim Alkhattal Group Marine Contracting and Trading, see [S/2017/924](#), annex 12.2.3; [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.4.b; and [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, para. 45. Regarding Kismayo General Trading, which is owned and operated by Basheer Khalif Moosa, see [S/2017/924](#), para. 208 and annex 12.2.2, para. 6; [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.4, paras. 107 and 113; and [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.2, paras. 12 and 26.

<sup>12</sup> Meeting with senior officials, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Directorate General of Customs, Abidjan, 1 February 2018.

During the current mandate, false Gambia certificates of origin have been used in Oman and the UAE. The SEMG was first made aware of the potential use of false Gambia certificates of origin on 25 March 2018 via an email from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Subsequently, while reviewing port records and customs documentation during an official mission to Oman, 1-5 April 2018, the SEMG discovered that a false Gambia certificate of origin had also been submitted in at least one prior case, that of the *Al Arif 2*, at the Port of Shinas. While the document in figure 3, below, appears to have been processed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Banjul, Gambia and attested at the Embassy of the Republic of the Gambia in Abu Dhabi, UAE, it has nonetheless been confirmed to be false (see annex 7.7).

<p>1. Goods consigned from Exporter's business name, address, country)  <b>JAGRE HARB AGENCY &amp; PROCUREMENT SERVICES</b>  <b>LARIN VILLAGE, B. &amp; C</b>  <b>THE GAMBIA</b></p>		<p>Imported No. <b>000001</b> No <b>000758</b>  <b>Generalised System of Preferences</b>  <b>Certificate of Origin</b>  <b>(Combined declaration and certificate)</b>  <b>Form A</b>          The Gambia          Issued at: _____          Issued on: _____</p>	
<p>2. Goods consigned to Consignee's name, address, country)  <b>12 ZERI COALS LTD PO BOX 11158 ALJMAN L.A.E</b>  <b>TEL: 9716429864 FAX: 9716429885</b></p>		<p>3. Marks and description of goods    <b>HAMBRYA PORT DUBAI(UAE)</b></p>	
<p>4. Name of transporter and means used for the transport</p>		<p>5. Date of departure</p>	
<p>6. Marks and Numbers of Packages          1. 24/21L (quantity)</p>		<p>7. Number and kind of packages, description of goods  <b>MUMBI BAGS OF CHEMICAL</b></p>	
<p>8. Marks and Numbers of Packages          1. 24/21L (quantity)</p>		<p>9. Origin information (see notes opposite)  <b>77L000003</b></p>	
<p>10. Date of issue  <b>16/2/2016</b>  <b>20/02/2016</b></p>		<p>11. Declaration by the exporter          The exporting party declared that the above marks and descriptions are correct and that the goods were produced in  <div style="text-align: center;">   <b>THE GAMBIA</b>          (country)          declared its conformity with the requirements specified for those goods to be imported from the exporting country  <b>DUBAI UAE</b> </div> </p>	
<p>12. Declaration by the importer          The importing party declared that the above marks and descriptions are correct and that the goods were produced in  <div style="text-align: center;">   <b>THE GAMBIA</b>          (country)          declared its conformity with the requirements specified for those goods to be imported from the exporting country  <b>DUBAI UAE</b> </div> </p>		<p>13. Declaration by the transporter          The transporter declared that the above marks and descriptions are correct and that the goods were produced in  <div style="text-align: center;">   <b>THE GAMBIA</b>          (country)          declared its conformity with the requirements specified for those goods to be imported from the exporting country  <b>DUBAI UAE</b> </div> </p>	

Previous SEMG investigations have revealed the use of false Ghana certificates of origin to traffic Somali charcoal during 2016 and 2017. The Monitoring Group has documented the use of false Ghana certificates of origin to import Somali charcoal into the UAE, including the dhow *Al Islami* in 2016 and the dhows *Maha* and *Ola* in 2017.<sup>13</sup> Each of these cases resulted in a confiscation of the cargo and its sale at public auction.

<sup>14</sup> Meeting with Charles Arthur Ntiri, Head of Export Documentation, Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 29 January 2018, Accra.



Marine Services, was not a real company and that no export permits had been issued by the Energy Commission for the cargoes of *Maha* and *Ola*.<sup>15</sup>

During the current mandate, false Ghana certificates of origin have been used to import Somali charcoal into Oman and Iran. The document in figure 4 (below), a false Ghana certificate of origin for the dhow *Hassan*, was used to import 25,000 bags of Somali charcoal into the Port of Shinas, Oman. This occurred despite the SEMG having written letters to Oman on 1 December 2017 and 5 January 2018 informing the Government regarding the use of false Ghana certificates of origin, and then writing again on 9 February 2018 specifically with respect to *Hassan*. This certificate of origin, similar to those for *Maha* and *Ola*, has also been falsely issued by the GNCCI and then processed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Accra and the Consulate General in Dubai. In contrast, the false Ghana certificates of origin submitted to Iran during 2018 that have been reviewed by the SEMG have not been officially processed by Ghana, most likely because the consignees in Kish and Qeshm did not require legal attestation to clear Iran customs.

Figure 4: False Ghana certificate of origin.

## Iran

There is a historical precedent for the use of false Iran certificates of origin to import Somali charcoal into the UAE. The bulk cargo ship *MV Energy 3* transported charcoal from Kismayo, Somalia to Port Rashid, Dubai, UAE in August 2013. Despite the bill of lading indicating 140,859 bags of charcoal had been loaded in Kismayo, the clearance agent for *MV Energy 3* submitted documents to UAE customs claiming that the charcoal had originated in Iran. In the first seizure of Somali charcoal since the export ban was imposed in February 2012, the UAE authorities eventually confiscated the cargo of *MV Energy 3* and sold it at public auction on 12 February 2014.<sup>16</sup>

Analysis of trade data further suggests that false Iran certificates of origin were active during 2012-2013, when the UAE reported imports of wood charcoal from Iran at 8.8 million kilograms in 2012 and 42 million kilograms in 2013. In contrast, during 2014-2016

<sup>15</sup> Meeting with Julius Nkansah-Nyarko, Principal Program Officer, Energy Commission, 30 January 2018, Accra.

<sup>16</sup> S/2014/726, annex 9.2, paras. 43-47, annex 9.2.b and annex 9.2c.



when false Iran certificates of origin were not known to be in circulation, the UAE reported no more than 250,000 kilograms of charcoal imports per year from Iran.<sup>17</sup>

However, there is an important difference with historical precedents as during the current mandate obtaining false Iran certificates of origin has involved transshipment. As outlined in annex 7.4, cargoes of Somali charcoal have been imported into Iran using false Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana certificates of origin, unloaded at free zones on the islands of Kish and Qeshm, repackaged into bags labeled as a product of Iran, loaded onto smaller Iran-flagged dhows, and then exported to Port Al Hamriya, UAE using false Iran certificates of origin. These Iran certificates of origin appear to have been issued through official channels, but are nonetheless “false” as they misrepresent the origin of transshipped Somali charcoal as Iran rather than as Somalia. On 15 August 2018, the Monitoring Group wrote to the Government of Iran regarding the transshipment of Somali charcoal and requested verification of the authenticity of multiple Iran certificates of origin. In a reply dated 17 September 2018, Iran did not respond to the request to verify the authenticity of the Iran certificates of origin.

Figure 5: False Iran certificate of origin.

NO: 8817  
DATE: 1397/04/10  
PAGE:

گواهی مبدا  
**CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN**  
(ORIGINAL)

1. Exporter: شماره کارت: 5255, 2 فصلت بندر آزاد قشم	2. Invoice No: شماره سند فاکتور: 2	3. Invoice Date: تاریخ سند فاکتور: 2018/06/24	4. Invoice Value: ارزش سند فاکتور: 28,419.00 USD	5. Kind of Transport: نوع حمل: دریایی
6. Consignee: ZURI COALS F.Z.E	7. Country of Origin: مبدا: ایران - منطقه آزاد قشم	8. Description of Goods: کالاهای: CHARCOAL وزن ناخالص: 199910 KG تعداد بسته‌بندی: BAGS 9408	9. Destination: مقصد: UAE - MINA HAMRIYA DUBAI	10. Country of Transshipment: کشور ترانزیت کننده: IRAN - QESHM FREE AREA

11. This undersigned authority hereby certifies that the goods described above originate in the country/area of origin shown in box 7.

محل مهر، امضاء، تاریخ و سمت گواهی کننده  
Place and Date, Signature, and Stamp of certifying authority

Commercial Manager

4121

<sup>17</sup> UN Comtrade Database, <https://comtrade.un.org/data/> (accessed 14 August 2018).

## Annex 7.6: Criminal networks

### Kismayo and Dubai

Through cross-referencing information from human sources, cargo paperwork, port records, documents regarding the All Star Group (see figures 1 and 2, below), and previous SEMG reports, the Monitoring Group has identified the principal individuals comprising criminal networks based in Kismayo, Somalia and Dubai, UAE that have been largely responsible for charcoal trafficking during this mandate.

In Kismayo, the following eight people are the main suppliers and agents for the illicit export of charcoal from Somalia:

- a) Ali Ahmed Naaji<sup>18</sup>
- b) Hassan Mohamed Yusuf “Awlibaax”<sup>19</sup>
- c) Farah Jama Awil “Degdeg”<sup>20</sup>
- d) Jama “Dhuxul”<sup>21</sup>
- e) Ahmed Sahal<sup>22</sup>
- f) Saeed Mahamud “Dheere”<sup>23</sup>
- g) Saeed Ciise “Adoon”<sup>24</sup>
- h) Muhammad Abdullahi.<sup>25</sup>

In Dubai, the following eight people are the main investors and agents for the illicit import of charcoal from Somalia:

- a) Basheer Khalif Moosa<sup>26</sup>
- b) Ahmed Mohamed Barre<sup>27</sup>
- c) Abdirahman Mohamed Warsame “Dhaqalayste”, “BBC”<sup>28</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; [S/2017/924](#), para. 209; All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below); [S/2016/919](#), para. 133; [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.4.b, para. 19; [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.a; [S/2015/801](#), para. 152; [S/2014/726](#), paragraphs 141-142; [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, paras. 48 and 63; and [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.2, paras. 11 and 26.

<sup>19</sup> Email, industry source, 22 July 2018; All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below); [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.a; [S/2015/801](#), para. 152; [S/2014/726](#), paras. 141-142; and [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, paras. 44 and 48; and [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.2, paras. 11, 15, and 33.

<sup>20</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below); [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.a; and [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, para. 48.

<sup>21</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below); [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.a; [S/2014/726](#), para. 142; and [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, para. 48.

<sup>22</sup> Email, industry source, 22 July 2018; and All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below).

<sup>23</sup> Email, industry source, 22 July 2018; and All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below).

<sup>24</sup> Email, industry source, 23 July 2018; and All Star Group letter, 15 July 2017, Kismayo (see figure 2 below).

<sup>25</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018.

<sup>26</sup> Email, industry source, 22 July 2018; [S/2017/924](#), para. 208 and annex 12.2.2, para. 6; All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below); [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.4, paras. 107 and 113; and [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.2, paras. 12 and 26.

<sup>27</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; [S/2017/924](#), annex 7.1, para. 7 and figure 5; All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below); [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.b; [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.2, para. 41; [S/2014/726](#) annex 9.4, para. 120; and [S/2014/726](#), annex 9.4.o.

<sup>28</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below); [S/2016/919](#), annex 9.6.b; [S/2014/726](#), paras. 141-143 and annex 9.2, paras. 44 and 76.

- d) Mohamud Ali Osman “Qonof”<sup>29</sup>
- e) Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”<sup>30</sup>
- f) Ahmed Ali Haji<sup>31</sup>
- g) Abdinasir Ali Mahamud “Adoon”<sup>32</sup>
- h) Salah Yusuf.<sup>33</sup>

### All Star Group

Figure 1: “Dubai Committee” of All Star Group, Dubai, 16 February 2017.





Figure 2: “Export Review Committee” of All Star Group, Kismayo, 15 July 2017.



<sup>29</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below); S/2016/919, annex 9.6.b; and S/2014/726, annex 9.2, paras. 48 and 50.

<sup>30</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; S/2016/919, annex 9.6.c; and S/2014/726, annex 9.2, paras. 51, 63-64, 78, 87, and 92.

<sup>31</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; and All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below).

<sup>32</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018; and All Star Group letter, 16 February 2017, Dubai (see figure 1 below).

<sup>33</sup> Emails, industry sources, 22 and 23 July 2018.

## Annex 7.7: Selected cases of sanctions implementation

### *Al Azhar 3* (Oman)

*Al Azhar 3* is a dhow with a false Côte d'Ivoire certificate of origin (annex 7.5, figure 2) whose cargo of 37,000 bags of charcoal was confiscated by the authorities of Oman. According to information provided to the SEMG on 4 April 2018 by the Directorate General of Customs, the timeline of the *Al Azhar 3* case is as follows: 4 March, *Al Azhar 3* docked at the Port of Duqm; 5 March, its customs paperwork was submitted; 6 March, customs clearance was granted to offload; 8 March, the Directorate General of Customs was informed regarding suspected Somalia origin of charcoal and the consignee in Oman was contacted; and then within the following week 6,000 bags of charcoal that had been already offloaded were confiscated in Duqm followed by the confiscation of another 31,000 bags of charcoal from 19 trucks that were *en route* to the UAE border.<sup>34</sup>

The Monitoring Group undertook an official mission to Oman 1-5 April 2018, which included meetings in Muscat with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Directorate General of Customs, trips to the ports of Duqm and Shinas, inspection of *Al Azhar 3* (figure 1) and its confiscated cargo, and an interview with the dhow's captain. In a letter to Oman dated 7 May 2018, the SEMG communicated the findings of its investigation thus far, including the following points:

- a) the shipping documents contain a forged stamp allegedly representing the "Capitaine du port" of the Port autonome d'Abidjan (figure 2);
- b) the Sri Lanka ship registration of *Al Azhar 3* is a forgery;
- c) the owner of the dhow, Hamed Ahmed Bin Fahad, has been previously identified as the owner of multiple dhows trafficking Somali charcoal;<sup>35</sup>
- d) the confiscated bags of charcoal were typical of those exported from Somalia, including logos such as the Saudi Arabia Grain Silo (figure 3).

Further corroborating the above points, the Monitoring Group has also been informed that the owner of the cargo for *Al Azhar 3* is Ahmed Ali Haji, a member of the All Star Group and known Dubai-based charcoal trafficker (annex 7.6).<sup>36</sup> At the time of writing, the outcome of the *Al Azhar 3* case remains pending in Oman's judiciary.

Figure 1: *Al Azhar 3*, Port of Duqm, 3 April 2018.



<sup>34</sup> However, an industry source has disputed the official account: while agreeing that 6,000 bags were confiscated in Duqm, he claimed that the amount of charcoal confiscated from the 19 trucks was only 14,000 bags (about 750 bags per truck) with the balance crossing the border to the UAE market.

<sup>35</sup> S/2016/919, annex 9.5; and S/2013/413, annex 9.3.

<sup>36</sup> Meeting with diplomat, Muscat, Oman, 1 April 2018.

Figure 2: Forged PAA stamp (black) and authentic PAA stamps (blue and red).



Figure 3: Confiscated blue-green bags of Somali charcoal, Duqm, 3 April 2018.



#### **Zazel 2 (UAE)**

On 25 March 2018, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation contacted the SEMG regarding *Zazel 2*, a dhow at Port Al Hamriya which had submitted to the UAE authorities what appeared to be a false Gambia certificate of origin for a cargo of 31,000 bags of charcoal (annex 7.5, figure 3). The UAE requested advice from the SEMG regarding the authenticity of the customs paperwork submitted by *Zazel 2*. The Monitoring Group determined that Gambia has a domestic ban on the production of charcoal, and thus is not a plausible country of origin for the cargo. The SEMG also contacted the Gambia Ports Authority, who replied confirming that *Zazel 2* had not been present or loaded cargo at the Port of Banjul as indicated in the shipping documents.<sup>37</sup> On 26 and 28 March 2018, the SEMG communicated these findings to the UAE, concluding that the certificate of origin and other shipping documentation are false. This was further corroborated when the SEMG was later informed that the owner of the *Zazel 2* cargo is Mohamud Ali Osman “Qonof”, a member of the All Star Group and longtime trafficker of Somali charcoal previously identified in SEMG reports (annex 7.6).<sup>38</sup>

Subsequently, the Monitoring Group was informed through an informal channel that a public auction of confiscated charcoal had been held in Dubai on 15 May 2018. The description of the dhow, including its Liberia ship registration, Gambia certificate of origin, and cargo size corresponded with *Zazel 2*.<sup>39</sup> In a letter to the UAE dated 6 June 2018, the SEMG requested official confirmation of the public auction, including the dhow’s name, date and location of initial cargo confiscation, type of certificate of origin, cargo size, auction price, and purchaser as well as copies of all relevant documentation. The UAE replied in a letter dated 15 August 2018, confirming that the cargo of *Zazel 2* had been confiscated and sold at public auction in Dubai on 15 May 2018. The purchase price was 4.1 million AED (\$1.1 million USD), equivalent to about 132 AED (\$36 USD) per bag while the wholesale market price is 190 AED (\$52 USD) per bag.

<sup>37</sup> Email, Capt. Kulay Manneh, Harbour Master, Gambia Ports Authority, 27 March 2018.

<sup>38</sup> Meeting with diplomat, Muscat, Oman, 1 April 2018.

<sup>39</sup> Whatsapp message, industry source, 16 May 2018.