



2015年12月21日根据安全理事会第2196(2015)号决议延长任期的中非共和国问题专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

根据安全理事会第2196(2015)号决议延长任期的中非共和国问题专家小组成员谨随函附上按照上述决议第17(c)段编写的关于其工作的最后报告。

该报告于2015年11月6日提供给安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议所设委员会，并于11月20日得到委员会的审议。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本函及报告，并将其作为安理会文件分发为荷。

根据安全理事会第2196(2015)号决议  
延长任期的中非共和国问题专家小组

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## 根据安全理事会第2196(2015)号决议延长任期的中非共和国问题专家小组最后报告

### 摘要

在2013年12月5日安全理事会通过第2127(2013)号决议两年后，中非共和国实现和平与安全的前景似乎仍然遥远。当武装团伙于9月底在这个国家引发新一轮暴力时，班吉全国和解论坛在2015年5月创造的势头惨遭中断。

9月26日在班吉开始的暴力升级，也促使前塞雷卡团体向南朝着首都推进，2013年3月他们就这么做过。这一次，国际部队得以在锡布停止其行进，锡布位于班吉东北部，距离只有188公里。然而，前塞雷卡武装分子在部署国际部队地区的自由行动，以及他们的领导不受阻碍地来往于苏丹和乍得，突出了维和人员部署的缺陷，以及邻国在监测本国边境和执行安全理事会各项决议和制裁方面的无能或疏忽。

最近的暴力也停止了迎来新宪法草案和新选举法的政治进程。虽然选举应该在2015年正式结束第二个过渡时期，但是，努尔丁·阿达姆领导的激进的前塞雷卡派别和与前总统弗朗索瓦·博齐泽有联系的“反砍刀”组织之间作为权宜之计建立的联盟现在要求第三次过渡时期。

2015年初在内罗毕举行的平行和平会谈上首次出现延长过渡期的呼吁。该会谈没有得到中非共和国过渡当局的认可，由被制裁的个人努尔丁·阿达姆和弗朗索瓦·博齐泽参加，他们违反旅行禁令，带着其核心集团和主要武装团体的指挥官前往内罗毕。在刚果总统德尼·萨索·恩格索以国际调解人身份的促进下，并在肯尼亚总统的支持下，内罗毕谈判让冲突主要当事方谈判了四个月，但未提出任何拟议的包容性解决办法，并最终破坏了班吉论坛及其解除武装、复员、重返社会和遣返协议。

由于该国的大部分地区国家权力空缺，乍得安全和军事部队的个别成员已侵入中非领土，犯下一系列针对中非国民的侵犯人权行为。苏丹缺乏控制其边界，也使最初来自乌干达的上帝抵抗军得以在凯菲亚金吉飞地找到避风港，该地是苏丹和南苏丹之间一个有争议的地区，是非洲联盟区域特混部队鞭长莫及的地方。从他的藏身之处，约瑟夫·科尼和他的核心集团指示其所剩无几的忠诚军事指挥官在中非共和国境内和远至刚果民主共和国北部的地方进行掠夺和偷猎，带回象牙、黄金和钻石。苏丹偷猎者也同样参与此类活动，有时与上帝抵抗军相互竞争。

在中非共和国西部，马丁·库姆塔马吉(别名阿卜杜拉耶·米斯基内)指挥的中非人民民主阵线构成主要安全威胁。该阵线对从喀麦隆到班吉的主要供应路线的致命袭击使国民经济陷于瘫痪。2014年11月在雅温得释放了被关押的米斯基

内，以换取被中非人民民主阵线抓获的人质。他现在布拉柴维尔享有自由，同时，他的团伙继续扣押 2015 年 3 月被抓走的 16 名喀麦隆国民。

自然资源贸易继续资助全国各地的武装团体。税收、安全安排和平行的行政管理在前塞雷卡地区司空见惯。阿里·达拉萨·默罕默德“将军”领导的中非和平联盟因班巴里一带的黄金生产猖獗和与苏丹的咖啡贸易而兴旺不已。同样，努尔丁·阿达姆领导的中非复兴人民阵线向在卡博和卡加班多罗的牲畜贸易征税，也向恩代莱、布里亚和萨姆万贾的钻石部门征税。

钻石购买商行并未采取行动减少为前塞雷卡派别筹资的风险。除了 8 月 20 日增列至制裁名单中的中非钻石采购公司/Kardiam(Badica)之外，中非钻石协会(Sodiam)和 Sud Azur 也从布里亚和萨姆万贾购买了钻石，因此也同样违反了制裁制度。

“反砍刀”团体对农业资源和普通商品贸易的征税勒索，以及对人道主义车队、国际部队和过渡当局的袭击，集中在通往班吉及其主要入境点的主要公路上，这条公路称为 PK 12。“反砍刀”组织团体也控制中非共和国与刚果民主共和国交界中非一侧乌班吉河岸的大部分地区，对船只和渔业活动征税。

在西南部，“反砍刀”组织成员继续介入少数钻石矿场，也获得了采矿许可证。他们没有在拟议“绿区”有计划地介入，“绿区”是在金伯利进程下恢复出口的条件之一。然而，如果将从此类矿场和个人购买钻石，仍将违反制裁制度。

最近收缴的武器表明存在区域流通，特别是来自邻国武器和弹药流通。来自喀麦隆的跨界贩运继续是中非共和国境内狩猎弹药的一个主要供应来源。

然而，该国国内仍然有很大数量的武器在流通。中非共和国境内武器的不当储存及库存管理失败，是转移武器和“反砍刀”团体袭击中非共和国宪兵总部，并经常袭击警察和宪兵队，这表明需要保证武器储存设施的实体安全。

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## 背景

1. 专家小组设在总部，但在其任务整个调查阶段(2015年4月至10月)，几乎长期驻扎在中非共和国。专家小组通过陆路和空中交通工具到过该国16个省中的14个省。
2. 在区域一级，专家小组三次访问该地区，包括两次通过陆路从中非共和国到喀麦隆(Batouri、Bertoua、Douala、Garoua Boulaï Kenzou 和雅温得)访问，并对安哥拉(罗安达)进行了两次访问，对金沙萨(刚果民主共和国)进行一次访问。
3. 根据第2196(2015)号决议第17(c)和(d)段的规定，专家小组于3月31日向安全理事会第2127(2013)号决议所设委员会主席提交其工作方案，并于5月19日提供了最新进展情况报告，于7月29日提交了其中期最新情况报告。

## 方法

4. 专家小组努力确保遵守安全理事会关于制裁的一般性问题非正式工作组在其2006年12月报告(S/2006/997，附件)中建议的标准。
5. 专家小组打算尽可能以透明方式行事，但如果指明消息来源会使小组成员或其他人面临不可接受的安全风险，专家小组则不会披露身份信息。
6. 专家小组同样致力于最大限度地做到公平，酌情并尽可能地努力向有关各方提供报告中可能提到的涉及他们的任何信息，供他们在规定的时限内审阅、发表意见和作出反应。
7. 根据大会关于控制文件和限制字数的各项决议，尤其是第52/214号、第53/208号和第59/265号决议，专家小组决定将其部分案例研究和调查结果纳入本报告附件。例如，附件7有一节关于人道主义问题，附件8有一节关于与各利益攸关方和各组织的外联与合作，大部分脚注载于附件9。

## 一. 班吉地区<sup>1</sup>

### A. 班吉的暴力升级

8. 2015年9月26日至10月16日，在类似事件(2014年10月8日至17日)发生近一年后，班吉成为了中非共和国最近暴力升级的所在地。<sup>2</sup>
9. 这一激增的暴力行为导致平民79人死亡、512人受伤，联合国场所和工作人员被袭击20次，国际非政府组织和当地非政府组织的办事处和招待所被袭击19次。<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 见附件1的地图。

<sup>2</sup> 详见附件9.1。

<sup>3</sup> 见附件9.2资料来源。

10. 此外，截至 10 月 16 日，这场暴力造成 17 090 人流离失所，2 894 名难民跨过乌班吉河逃往刚果民主共和国境内的宗戈。

11. 9 月 28 日，尽管部署了联合国中非共和国多层面综合稳定团(中非稳定团)部队，677 名被拘留者从班吉的 Ngaragba 监狱越狱。<sup>4</sup> 估计有 203 名逃犯是“反砍刀”组织分子。<sup>5</sup>

12. 在“反砍刀”组织分子袭击无保护的拘留设施时，布阿尔<sup>6</sup> 和锡布大约有 80 名被拘留者也被释放。在大多数情况下，高级指挥官已返回其行动区，至今尚未抓获。只有“反砍刀”组织一个名叫“Andilo 将军”的成员目前被关押在班吉的 Camp de Roux。<sup>7</sup>

13. 关于 9 月和 10 月在班吉所发生事件的详细说明，见附件 1.1。

## B. 对政治过渡的威胁

14. 专家小组认为，10 月 6 日至 11 日席卷班吉和锡布地区的暴力升级，旨在破坏该国的稳定过渡，进一步拖延其选举。<sup>8</sup> 选举被视为对破坏者计划的重大威胁，他们计划武力夺取政权，或在国际社会所设框架之外通过一项新的和平解决方案夺取政权。<sup>9</sup> 这突出反映了主要危机是政治危机。<sup>10</sup>

15. 自 5 月 11 日举行的班吉全国和解论坛以来，和解的政治进程势头更大。这一进程包括 6 月 26 日推出选民登记，<sup>11</sup> 通过了新选举法和宪法草案，确立了定于 2015 年底前举行大选的期限，大选应正式为过渡期划上句号。

16. 专家小组评估认为，过渡机构所做的若干重大政治选择，<sup>12</sup> 已让班吉的很大一部分政治精英感到愤愤不平，并间接导致中非共和国最近的安全局势逐步恶

<sup>4</sup> 专家小组获得了三个不同数字：中非共和国司法当局提供的数字是 677 名囚犯(2015 年 10 月 19 日的电子邮件)；维和部提供的数字是 689 名囚犯；中非稳定团提供的数字是 686 名囚犯，最后向专家小组提供的信息是，尚未获得囚犯的详细名单。

<sup>5</sup> 被关押在该监狱的“反砍刀”组织分子的名单由 Maxime Mokom 提供，在联合国存档。

<sup>6</sup> 据 2015 年 10 月 1 日的一份保密报告所述，在布阿尔，“反砍刀”组织的 19 名被拘留者在 2015 年 9 月 29 日该监狱遭袭时越狱。

<sup>7</sup> 专家小组 2014 年中期报告和最后报告(S/2014/452 和 S/2014/762)中提到 Rodrigue Nga bona。

<sup>8</sup> 2015 年 9 月 15 日至 26 日在班吉与各政治行为体，包括那些参加竞选和反对选举的行为体举行的会议。

<sup>9</sup> 详见附件 9.3。

<sup>10</sup> 详见附件 9.4。

<sup>11</sup> 根据中非稳定团的报告，1 895 252 名选民进行了登记，占总人口的 90.4%，这是中非共和国历次选举的一个历史性数字。

<sup>12</sup> 详见附件 9.5。

化，最终导致 9 月 26 日的暴力事件爆发。这些政治选择包括：过渡政府决定孤立被其视为激进的武装团体成员；任命“反砍刀”组织领导人担任部长；全国过渡委员会通过一系列与选举有关的框架，<sup>13</sup> 这些框架事实上排挤了大量政治行为体。这些决定是因为国际社会尤其是国际部队对于应采取何种正确战略解决武装团体问题时犹豫不决而被迫做出的。

### 有风险的选择战略

17. 班吉论坛期间和之后，专家小组可以观察到过渡政府从武装团体挑选合适代表参加政治谈判的方针。他们的政治选择导致更多地考虑乔诺·阿哈巴领导的中非复兴爱国联盟，而不是前塞雷卡的其他派别，包括努尔丁·阿达姆领导的中非复兴人民阵线和阿里·达拉萨·穆罕默德“将军”领导的争取中非和平联盟。<sup>14</sup>

18. 关于“反砍刀”组织，该国政府的选择战略包括帕特里斯·爱德华·恩加伊松纳的逐步复出，将其重新任命为国家足球协会主席，并任命班吉市 Boeing 社区“反砍刀”组织大本营领导人塞巴斯提恩·韦内祖维担任环境和可持续发展部长。<sup>15</sup> 这也导致这两人的对手 Maxime Mokom 和 Joachim Kokaté 靠边站。<sup>16</sup>

19. 过渡政府认为激进分子是该国危机的幕后支持者，选择对他们进行孤立，而国际调解人则选择了完全不同的方法，将他们重新合法化并为他们关于第三次过渡和推迟选举的要求提供意见。<sup>17</sup> 国际调解人采取的这些行动，包括协助违反旅行禁令(见附件 6)，遭到了大量国际批评，并导致安全理事会主席在 2014 年 12 月 18 日的主席声明中回顾会员国必须执行制裁措施(S/PRST/2014/28)。

20. 专家小组注意到，国际调解人和过渡政府方面缺乏协调，使双方的破坏分子得利。

21. 在处理武装团体激进分子时采取的不一致方针，还表现在中非稳定团代表<sup>18</sup>和八国集团的一个成员国中非国家经济共同体阿道夫·纳阿约大使<sup>19</sup> 10 月在卡加班多罗秘密会见了努尔丁·阿达姆。

<sup>13</sup> 详见附件 9.6。

<sup>14</sup> 详见附件 9.7。

<sup>15</sup> 专家小组在其 2014 年最后报告(S/2014/762)第 75 段得出结论认为，针对班吉穆斯林地区的大多数基于宗教的袭击源自 Boeing 地区。见附件 1.2 中韦内祖维在 Boeing 的照片。

<sup>16</sup> 详见附件 9.8。

<sup>17</sup> 应当指出的是，国际调解人的举措既未与联合国协调，也没有与中非国家经济共同体或非洲联盟协调。见附件 1.3。

<sup>18</sup> 详见附件 9.9。

<sup>19</sup> 详见附件 9.10。

22. 给予被安全理事会制裁的个人这样的特殊待遇，可能会使他确信自己是政治掮客，此人领导的部队在 10 月 10 日和 11 日与国际部队发生暴力冲突。<sup>20</sup>

23. 此外，专家小组认为，任命武装团体的领导人作为过渡政府的成员，加强了他们有罪不罚的感觉，也不会对减少暴力程度产生任何重大影响。

#### 中非复兴人民阵线与“反砍刀”组织 Mokom 派系之间的和解

24. 结果，过渡政府的战略导致出席内罗毕会谈的中非复兴人民阵线和“反砍刀”组织 Mokom 派系变得更加激进。肯尼亚当局和国际调解人在这次会谈中协助被制裁个人阿达姆和博齐泽前往内罗毕，包括提供航空资产，违反了第 2134(2014)号决议第 30 段和 2196(2015)号决议第 4 段。<sup>21</sup> 自签署内罗毕协议以来，中非复兴人民阵线和博齐泽领导的政党劳动党有计划地呼吁在内罗毕通过的宣言中所提到的第三次过渡。<sup>22, 23</sup>

#### 参加内罗毕会谈的中非复兴人民阵线和“反砍刀”组织的代表名单<sup>24</sup>

中非复兴人民阵线	“反砍刀”组织
米歇尔·乔托迪亚(主席)	弗朗索瓦·博齐泽将军 让-弗朗西斯·博齐泽上校 约瑟夫·朗索瓦·博齐泽(又名“Jojo”) Lin Banouk épa (博齐泽的律师)
努尔丁·阿达姆(副主席)	Joachim Kokat é (帕特里斯·爱德华·恩加伊松纳的代表)
Moustapha Sabone(总协调员)	Maxime Mokom (军事协调员)
Abel Balengu é é(副协调员)	C ôme Hyppolyte Azounou(Mokom 的副手兼达马拉的行政长官)
Youssef Ibrahim 将军 (卡加班多罗地区的指挥官)	Baron Clotaire Adramane (劳动党联络人兼 Mokom 的特别顾问-Dekoa)

<sup>20</sup> 为了进行内罗毕会谈，国际调解人给努尔丁·阿达姆提供了特殊待遇，在中非稳定团的支助下，通过刚果总统府提供专机将其送往布拉柴维尔和内罗毕。

<sup>21</sup> 见附件 6 一张 2015 年 4 月 14 日在肯尼亚总统府拍摄的所有参与者的照片，以及有关违反旅行禁令和执行资产冻结的更多详细内容。

<sup>22</sup> 见附件 1.4；机密来文，2015 年 10 月 10 日。

<sup>23</sup> 与 Barret Aboua Moussa Maouloud 分别于 2015 年 1 月 16 日在卡加班多罗，以及 2015 年 5 月 27 日在中锡多举行的会谈；中非稳定团与阿达姆会谈的报告，机密电邮，2015 年 10 月 10 日；另见附件 1.5 中内罗毕协定的副本。

<sup>24</sup> 在内罗毕的秘密消息来源提供给专家小组的信息，班吉，2015 年 4 月 20 日和 6 月 24 日；另见附件 6 中各代表团的一张照片，以及附件 9.11 更多详情。

中非复兴人民阵线	“反砍刀”组织
Mahamat Nour	Sylvain B érofe (Gob é é区指挥官)
Yousouf Idriss	Chrysostome Yap é(别名“Chiki Chiki”) (贝贝拉蒂的协调员)
Mahamat Saleh	Basile Dika (Azounou 的副手兼瓦姆彭代 省区域协调员)
Kader	Arnold Geoffroy Iya (布阿尔的协调员)  Cl ément Bama  Rodrigue (中非共和国武装部队)

25. 专家小组 2015 年 5 月和 10 月在中锡多、卡加班多罗、恩代莱、班吉和巴黎进行的访谈还确定，中非复兴人民阵线和“反砍刀”组织领导人延长在内罗毕停留的时间，已使得这两个团体逐步建立和睦关系。

26. 特别是，中非复兴人民阵线副协调员 Moussa Maouloud 和 Mokom 向专家小组证实，他们定期互通电话。<sup>25</sup> 据来自国际部队的几个情报报告阐述，在班吉的暴力升级期间，Haroun Gaye 和 Mokom 的代表(也许是 Yvon Konaté)在 PK11 和 Boeing 社区举行了业务会议，目的是协调行动打击国际部队和过渡当局，专家小组在恩代莱省会晤努尔丁·阿达姆的参谋长证实了这一点。<sup>24</sup>

#### 班吉的中非复兴人民阵线武装民兵

27. 总部设在班吉的 PK5 居民区 Jama ïque 区得克萨斯街区的主要武装民兵由约 60 名人员组成，受哈伦·盖伊的控制。<sup>26</sup> 盖伊是中非复兴人民阵线的创始成员之一，2014 年 11 月 2 日被努尔丁·阿达姆正式任命为中非复兴人民阵线协调工作的报告员，被阿达姆的参谋长认为是班吉中非复兴人民阵线武装分子的负责人之一。<sup>27</sup>

28. 其他武装团体在该居民区积极开展行动，特别是一个由前塞雷卡将军 Achafi Daoud 指挥的武装团体。较小的团体将加强盖伊民兵的势力，如一个由前将军奥斯曼·穆罕默德·奥斯曼指挥的“Rue poussière”，即阿里·奥斯曼的中非穆斯林组织协调团体。<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> 5 月 26 日与 Moussa Maouloud 在中锡多的会晤；6 月 27 日与 Mokom 在班吉的会晤。

<sup>26</sup> 详见附件 9.12。

<sup>27</sup> 10 月 3 日在恩代莱会见了 Lambert。

<sup>28</sup> PK 5 居民区的主要军事指挥官被确认为前塞雷卡成员：Mahamat Se ïl 上校、Hassan Marega 上校和 Mahamat Fadoul 上校。

29. 但是，盖伊及其副手 Hamit Tidjani<sup>29</sup> 指挥的团体被当地居民和民间社会的代表视为最极端分子。特别是，盖伊的团体正在阻止民众离开该居民区，以加强该社区穆斯林人口的特性，并避免和解。<sup>30</sup>

30. 盖伊的民兵据报告是由一名美国-乍得国民 Mahamat Nour Binyamine<sup>31</sup> 供资的，此人据报负责收取前总统乔托迪亚所有的建筑物和房屋的租金，并为努尔丁·阿达姆支付旅行费用。<sup>32</sup>

31. 专家小组认为，中非稳定团未能在 8 月 2 日逮捕盖伊，是在中非共和国打击有罪不罚和恢复国家权力的一个负面重大事件，在此行动期间，1 名维持和平人员被打死，8 人受伤。这还会影响中非稳定团和武装团体之间的权力平衡的看法。专家小组 2014 年中期报告和最后报告确认的军事团体领袖和成员大部分仍然还活着，<sup>33</sup> 哈伦·盖伊和他的民兵在班吉第三区自由开展行动。<sup>34</sup>

#### 劳动党和“反砍刀”组织 Mokom 派别之间的行动协调

32. 专家小组获得的信息表明，在预计将举办班吉论坛之际，并遵照博齐泽的随从在内罗毕发送的指令，劳动党和 Mokom 的派系之间在班吉协调达成了行动和解。<sup>35</sup>

33. 4 月至 5 月在 Maxime 的父亲和博齐泽继兄 Bernard Mokom 在班吉 Boy-Rabe 居民区的家中举行了多次会议，Didacien Blaise Kossimatchi<sup>36</sup> 和 Baron Clotaire Adramane<sup>37</sup> 在“反砍刀”组织 Mokom 派系的军事指挥官(包括 Olivier Koudémon、Guy Mazimbélet 和 Guy Gervais Mokpem)和劳动党领导人(包括 Bertin Béa)之间的协调方面发挥了重要作用。那些报告还提及 Bertin 的妻子和一个名为 Agence de

<sup>29</sup> 详见附件 9.13。

<sup>30</sup> 机密报告，2015 年 8 月 20 日；2015 年 8 月 28 日在班吉会见了 PK 5 居民区民间社会组织活跃分子；详见附件 9.14。

<sup>31</sup> 详见附件 9.15。

<sup>32</sup> 2015 年 7 月 2 日和 6 月 29 日在班吉会见了前“塞雷卡”成员；2015 年 6 月 25 日和 9 月 4 日分别在班吉和巴黎会见了机密消息来源人士。

<sup>33</sup> 详见附件 9.16。

<sup>34</sup> 2015 年 10 月 26 日，哈伦·盖伊先生亲自参与一次针对受中非稳定团保护的代表团事件。该代表团由 Dieudonné Nzapala nga 率领，当时正前往班吉中央清真寺；此外，2015 年 10 月 27 日，观察到武装分子巡逻 PK 5 居民区；机密报告，2015 年 10 月 28 日。

<sup>35</sup> 2015 年 4 月 27 日及 6 月 26 和 29 日在班吉会见了 3 个十分了解劳动党和“反砍刀”组织活动的秘密消息来源人士。

<sup>36</sup> 详见附件 9.17。

<sup>37</sup> 详见附件 9.18。

Communication Routière et de Transit (ACRT)的进口公司经理 Nadia Béa 提供的财政支持。<sup>38</sup>

34. 基于该情况，中非共和国当局 8 月 15 日在班吉国际机场逮捕了 Bertin Béa，当时他正在登上由摩洛哥皇家航空公司运营的飞机。8 月 20 日，在他临时拘留之前的一次面谈期间，一伙人入侵班吉法院并强行将他释放。这伙人是由劳动党的支持者和“反砍刀”组织人员所组成，司法机关确认其中有一名“反砍刀”组织高级军事指挥官。<sup>39</sup> 10 月 6 日，专家小组见证到 Béa 再次被阻止前往巴黎。

#### 选举：激怒破坏者的因素

35. 激怒内罗毕团伙以外的许多政治行为体的其他决定与选举有关。第一个决定是允许难民投票，第二个决定是与曾在过渡政府任职者的资格有关。

36. 在 7 月 20 日公布的一个影响深远裁决中(见附件 1.7)，过渡宪法法院 6 月 30 日废止了过渡全国委员会先前的使难民无法参加选举的决定。穆斯林组织和前塞雷卡派别领导人认为，这项先前的决定是穆斯林被边缘化的又一证明。法院和国际合作伙伴的双重压力，是迫使过渡全国委员会在 8 月 20 日审查其有关难民投票立场的驱动力。<sup>40</sup>

37. 8 月 28 日，过渡宪法法院阐明了过渡时期宪章有关过渡当局成员选举资格的安排。<sup>41</sup> 法院的裁决防止大量政治行为体参加即将举行的总统选举和立法选举的竞选。<sup>42</sup> 他们后来联合要求第三次过渡。中非共和国政治仍然是在中非共和国积累财富和资本最简单的方法。

38. 要求第三次过渡的政治行为体和武装团体不太可能结盟，它们包括如下：

(a) 内罗毕团伙，包括与 Mokom 和博齐泽有关联的中非复兴人民阵线和“反砍刀”组织人员；

(b) 一批支持第三次过渡的政治平台、党派和独立著名人士；<sup>43</sup> 在数量上这些党派和人士占该国政党和社团的 90%。

<sup>38</sup> 2015 年 3 月 27 日、4 月 10 日和 5 月 8 日机密报告，在与十分了解劳动党和“反砍刀”组织的活动的秘密消息来源人士期间得到确认；也见附件 1.6 中 Bertin 和 Nadia Béa 的一张照片。

<sup>39</sup> 向专家小组提供的信息确定此人是中非士兵，其登记号是 2005-2-1028，Wilfred Ndoutingai；2015 年 8 月 29 日在班吉会见了司法官员。

<sup>40</sup> 详见附件 9.19。

<sup>41</sup> 法院裁决见附件 1.8，附件 9.20 有更多的细节。

<sup>42</sup> 详见附件 9.21。

<sup>43</sup> 详见附件 9.22。

39. 专家小组认为，最近在班吉发生的暴力的一些组织者是上述第二组党派和人士，其中包括目前过渡全国委员会的成员。<sup>44</sup> 9月27日，过渡全国委员会成员及民间社会活动家 Gervais Lakosso 组织了一次示威，呼吁国际部队离开中非共和国。他还在 Ndeke Luka 电台播放了一条消息，其中他呼吁进行非暴力反抗。次日，组织了一次由 Koudémon 领导的示威，呼吁国际部队的撤离。<sup>45</sup>

40. Lakosso 的参与被认为相当严重，因此前司法部长 Aristide Sokambi 在 9月28日发布了一份公报，他在其中指出 Lakosso、Mokom、Koudémon 和 Nga Kosset 对最近暴力升级负责(见附件 1.10)。

41. 过渡全国委员会主席 Alexandre Ferdinand Nguendet 也常常表现出一个内部破坏者的行为。为证明这一点，专家小组指出，他在过渡全国委员会各项决策方面的可疑立场，令人怀疑他是否完全遵守过渡进程和选举程序。此外，他在班吉最近爆发的暴力中的作用也显示了他的个人野心，特别是他声明，一些中非复兴人民阵线高级官员要求他接管权力。<sup>46</sup>

### C. 与武器禁运有关的问题

42. 关于不遵守情况的一节列在附件 1.11 中。在附件 1.12 中，专家小组分析了中非共和国当局在 3 月开始的自愿裁军行动的喜忧参半的结果。

#### 武器检查、趋势和违规事件

43. 自 4 月 7 日以来，专家小组对国际和国家部队截获或收缴的、或属于国家安全部队和武装部队、或曾检查过但仍在武装团体控制下的武器和弹药库存进行了 30 次检查。

44. 检查在西部(Bouar、Baoro、Berbérati)、北部(Kaga-Bandoro、Mbrès、Ndélé)、东部(Bria、Obo)、中部(Mba ki、Bossangoa、Bambari)和班吉进行。专家小组检查的全部武器弹药清单列在附件 1.13 中。

45. 根据专家小组 2014 年最后报告(S/2014/762)和中期报告(S/2014/452)的结果，并根据在执行此任务期间进行的涵盖巨大地理范围的检查和分析的大量材料，专家小组认为：

- (a) 中非共和国武器的流通仍然严重，并导致冲突的激化；
- (b) 相似类型的常规小武器、轻武器和弹药——其中一些拥有相同的序列号<sup>47</sup>——掌握在所有武装团体手中，包括“反砍刀”组织、前塞雷卡、上帝抵抗军、

<sup>44</sup> 详见附件 9.23。

<sup>45</sup> Koudémon 和 Lakosso 的照片见附件 1.1，Lakosso 的传单见附件 1.9，关于 Lakosso 的更多情况见附件 9.24。

<sup>46</sup> 详见附件 9.25。

<sup>47</sup> 详见附件 9.26。

中非人民民主阵线、苏丹偷猎者、犯罪人员以及中非共和国国家安全部队和武装部队(也见附件 1.13);

(c) 检查过的 415 件武器中绝大部分是不同类型的突击步枪: 56 型(81 件)、56-2 型(65 件)、56-1 型(7 件)、Galil 型(9 件)、MPI-KM 型(11 件)、Vektor R4 型(7 件)、KBK-AKMS 型(4 件)和 AKMS 型(23 件)。专家组还检查了 44 支 MAS-36 步枪和 31 支 MAT-49 冲锋枪。手工猎枪在中非共和国流通,特别是在“反砍刀”武装团体控制下的地区(见附件 5.6 和 S/2014/452, 附件 14 和 15);

(d) 武装团体可以获得手榴弹和火箭榴弹;

(e) 从所有省份的武装人员截获了大量来自多个原产国的 7.62x39 口径的弹药。在最近几个月截获并收缴了少量 14.5x114 毫米、12.7x108 毫米、7.62x54 毫米、7.5x54 毫米、7.62x51 毫米、5.56x45 毫米、9x19 毫米和 9x25 毫米的弹药。在一些地点发现了狩猎弹药,特别是在受“反砍刀”武装团体的地区(见同上);

(f) 流通的大多数武器和弹药仍然来自国家库存,并且没有证据显示在实施武器禁运后大量武器和弹药将被携带进入中非共和国;

(g) 违反武器禁运的来自喀麦隆的跨境贩运仍然是狩猎弹药供给来源之一,这些弹药在公开市场上,甚至在中非稳定团基地附近自由销售(见附件 5.3);

(h) 一些从中非共和国武装团体截获的 7.62X39 毫米口径的弹药是最近生产的(最近的生产年份为 2013 年)。<sup>48</sup>

### 库存管理

46. 属于中非安全部队和武装部队的小武器和轻武器的储存和安保仍然是一个重大挑战。

47. 迄今为止,专家组只检查了符合最低安全要求的一个地点。<sup>49</sup> 在检查的其他地点,武器和爆炸物储存在没有适当安保措施的地方,如在班吉研究调查科办公室观察到的情况(见附件 1.14)。

48. 同样,国家安全部队和武装部队的多个单位无法出示适当的武器登记册,<sup>50</sup> 并且有一次,大量狩猎弹药似乎在从布里亚的宪兵队转移到班吉时消失了。<sup>51</sup>

49. 中非稳定团在各个省份截获的武器和弹药的储存和安保也仍然是一个令人关切问题。专家组检查了多个中非稳定团基地,尽管所有安全标准禁止特定物

<sup>48</sup> 在奥博,经核查的弹药分别是 2012 年在中国生产和 2013 年在苏丹生产。

<sup>49</sup> 这一评估是基于 4 月 12 日至 7 月 6 日对设在 Izamo 营宪兵总部军械库的 7 项检查(见附件 1.15)。

<sup>50</sup> 一些单位一直登记军械库进出的武器,例如,附件 1.16 载有一份在 Bouar 的国家军事培训中心的登记册。

<sup>51</sup> 详见附件 9.27。

品的储存，武器、弹药、爆炸物、麻醉品和软性毒品仍然储存在这些基地。<sup>52</sup> 专家小组还遇到一个武器储存在储存设施之外、放在一个维持和平人员的私人房间的情况，据称这是为安保原因。

50. 不适当储存武器和弹药以及失败的库存管理会产生各种问题：

(a) 不安全储存产生实体安保风险，可能导致严重事件；

(b) 最近的暴力升级显示，军械库和保存武器的地点都是袭击者的首要目标。当这种袭击获得成功，可导致更多的暴力；

(c) 不当管理的库存，无论是国家当局还是国际部队控制的库存，是小武器和轻武器分流、非法贩运和流通的主要来源。<sup>53</sup>

51. 因此，库存的正确储存和安保对于加强安保和减少武装暴力至关重要。<sup>54</sup>

## 二. 中部地区以及与刚果民主共和国的边界<sup>55</sup>

52. 专家小组认为，前塞雷卡派别和“反砍刀”组织团体正在为控制中部地区的领土而进行战术争夺。2014年8月以来，该地区充满低强度的冲突和伏击。

53. 塞雷卡和“反砍刀”团体之间的最近一次主要战斗于2014年7月发生在巴丹加弗。由于发动了当地青年，与“反砍刀”组织运动有关的团体如今活跃在中部的大部分地区，远至布里亚。

54. 在这种情况下，当地居民继续成为武装团体的袭击目标，村庄遭到抢劫和焚烧，平民被杀害，<sup>56</sup> 并据报已有多起性暴力和偷牛案件。

55. 尽管 Ben Zambé-布卡-巴丹加弗三角区的紧张程度大幅度降低，班巴里-格里马里-宽果地区的局势依然十分紧张，特别是“反砍刀”组织团体与前塞雷卡的争取中非和平联盟派别之间，以及“反砍刀”组织的对立团体之间的局势依然十分紧张。

56. 10月26日“反砍刀”组织在班吉 Combattants 社区针对争取中非和平联盟高级领导发动的袭击，可能引发该地区新一轮的暴力行为。

57. 附件 2 概述了中部地区争取中非和平联盟和“反砍刀”组织的结构。

<sup>52</sup> 2015年4月26日和8月30日在博桑戈阿和姆拜基进行的检查(见附件 1.17)。

<sup>53</sup> 其他机关也分享了这项评估，详见附件 9.28。

<sup>54</sup> 详见附件 9.29。

<sup>55</sup> 见附件 2 地图。

<sup>56</sup> 据称 2015年7月7日中非稳定团在 Kanga 的宽果和 Ngakobo 之间发现一个乱葬坑。2015年7月9日，保密报告。详见附件 9.30。

58. 武装团体还利用刚果民主共和国进行走私活动。“反砍刀”组织的团体控制乌班吉河中非共和国一侧的大部分地方，以及大部分岛屿，在那里对往来船只征税。在 Satéma(巴科托省)和 Béma(姆博穆省)地区，争取中非和平联盟控制了乌班吉河刚果一侧(赤道省)与刚果民主共和国接壤的主要过境点，包括在 Béma 和 Yakoma 镇之间的主要过境点。从班加苏到南苏丹边界的这一地区，主要处于活跃在刚果民主共和国北部的上帝军团伙的影响下(见第三.D 节)。

#### A. 武装团体对刚果民主共和国边界的控制

59. 乌班吉河上几乎所有划定刚果民主共和国和中非共和国之间边界的过境点，均处于武装团体控制之下或影响之下。

60. 从刚果民主共和国边界到巴科托省，“反砍刀”组织团体已在河上建立几十个检查站，对渔民以及运送货物和乘客的传统机动船征税，这项征税对基本食物的价格和捕鱼活动造成影响。

61. 从 Mongoumba(洛巴伊省)到班吉南边的 Kolongo 港口的地区，仍处于 Alfred Y ékatom(别名“Rombhot 上校”)的“反砍刀”组织团体的影响下。<sup>57</sup> 专家小组还获悉，该团体利用 Kolongo 港走私弹药，包括来自刚果共和国的打猎用弹药。<sup>58</sup>

62. 从班吉北边的 Sao 港口到宽果这一带，“反砍刀”组织团体驻扎在其设在 Ndjoukou 县(凯莫-格里宾吉省)的据点，并把守 12 个检查站，这些检查站在沿岸的村庄设置，或者就是在岛屿上搭建的营地。在宽果和 Mobaye 之间还有一些“海军”检查站，把守它们的是当地“反砍刀”组织中来自宽果的青年。<sup>59</sup> 6 月，“反砍刀”组织分子劫持一艘船索要赎金，Sao 港口的活动瘫痪了一星期。一星期后，该团伙释放了被劫持的乘客(包括刚果国民)及其货物。<sup>60</sup>

63. 在宽果，专家小组获悉，“反砍刀”组织成员抢来的牛和货物大多在刚果民主共和国出售，更具体来说是在赤道省 Bosobolo 区的 Bangi、Buda 和 Dula 村，据报，“反砍刀”组织在这些地方购买猎枪弹药。<sup>61</sup>

64. “反砍刀”组织团体<sup>62</sup> 和至少两个前塞雷卡的派别(争取中非和平联盟和中非复兴爱国联盟)一直垂涎 Bema 这一战略要塞，据说双方甚至为争夺其控制权而

<sup>57</sup> 2015 年 8 月 20 日被委员会列名；详见附件 9.31。

<sup>58</sup> 2015 年 1 月 15 日在班吉会见了一个十分了解武装贩运网络的秘密消息来源人士；2015 年 1 月 22 日在班吉 Ouango 港口会见了几名商人。

<sup>59</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在宽果会见了当地渔民和当局。2015 年 5 月 30 日的一份机密报告提到，在宽果和 Sao 港口之间乌班吉河上设有 7 到 8 个检查。见附件 2 地图。

<sup>60</sup> 2015 年 6 月 22 日，机密报告。

<sup>61</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在宽果会见了当地人。

<sup>62</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在会见一名争取中非和平联盟副区指挥官期间，他表明，有两名前塞雷卡分子和 14 名平民在袭击中丧生，该事件发生在 2014 年年底的某一天。

发生冲突。<sup>63</sup> 在 4 月 16 日电话采访一名前中非复兴人民阵线区指挥官时, Adoum Kamis 上校承认, 他及其副手 Ismael Ayero(争取中非和平联盟)正在对需要通过乌班吉河往返刚果民主共和国的乘客非法征税, 每人征税 700 非洲法郎(合 1.3 美元)。对商品征税时, 则根据商品的数量和价值征收 1 000-2 000 非洲法郎(约合 2 至 4 美元)的税。

65. 前塞雷卡分子还利用 Béma 地区进行往返刚果民主共和国的走私活动。据报道, 前塞雷卡在采购来自刚果民主共和国的武器、弹药和军装。中非稳定团内部的刚果营证实, 争取中非和平联盟的一些成员穿刚果军队的军装。<sup>64</sup> 此外, 专家小组根据从武装团体(包括前塞雷卡和上帝抵抗军)缴获的八支加利尔突击步枪, 追溯检查到刚果民主共和国。<sup>65</sup>

66. 关于中非共和国向刚果民主共和国走私自然资源的报告将使前塞雷卡部队获益。主要由争取中非和平联盟控制的班加苏和 Alindao 之间的地区, 包括 Kembé 县(巴科托省)和 Gambo 县(姆博穆省), 有着丰富的钻石和黄金。<sup>66</sup>

## B. 班巴里-格里马里-宽果热点地区

67. 在这一地区的主要派别是争取中非和平联盟和“反砍刀”组织的两个对立团体。班巴里仍然面临可能发生的暴力升级, 如 8 月 20 日至 24 日, 由于部族间暴力, 有 7 名平民被杀害。<sup>67</sup>

68. 中非复兴爱国联盟由军事参谋长 Joseph Zoundeko 将军以及“Tarzan”将军和 Younouss 中尉领导, 该派别在本地区发挥残余的作用。Zoundeko 将军已谴责富拉尼人, 并指出刚果爱国联盟领导层由“外国人”组成, 所用措辞与“反砍刀”组织和当地穆斯林青年协会的如出一辙, 疑似与位于班巴里的 Bouadé Ga àtan 的“反砍刀”组织团体达成一项协议。<sup>68</sup>

### 争取中非和平联盟的武器

69. 5 月 25 日, 专家小组检查了国际部队从刚果爱国者联盟分子手里收缴 4 件突击步枪(两支 56(-2)、一支 AKM 型、一支 FNFAL 型和一支 M20 型手枪(TT-33 版)。<sup>69</sup> 3 月, 在班巴里北检查站巡逻的国际部队发现 12 名争取中非和平联盟成

<sup>63</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在班加苏会见了中非稳定团; 详见附件 9.32。

<sup>64</sup> 2015 年 10 月 22 日保密报告; 2015 年 4 月 16 日在班加苏会见了中非稳定团。

<sup>65</sup> 详见附件 9.33。

<sup>66</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在班加苏会见了中非稳定团。

<sup>67</sup> 专家小组关于事件数据库, 2015 年 10 月 23 日检索存档; 存在联合国档案。

<sup>68</sup> 详见附件 9.34。

<sup>69</sup> 2015 年 4 月 3 日, 保密报告, 存在联合国档案。

员携带 AK 型突击步枪和 M16 型突击步枪。<sup>70</sup> 2 月 10 日，“红蝴蝶”行动部队与中非稳定团开展行动时，也在布里亚收缴过这后一种突击步枪。

### 开发利用自然资源

70. 专家小组仍然认为，争取中非和平联盟在瓦卡省、上科托省、巴科托和姆博穆省<sup>71</sup> 有军事部署，主要是为了对黄金的开采、糖的走私、咖啡的生产以及面向苏丹的贸易和出口进行控制和征税。专家小组 2014 年的最终报告(S/2014/762，第 144 和 145 段及附件 41 至 44)详细介绍了争取中非和平联盟的商业模式；专家小组在对班巴里、宽果和班加苏实地考察期间核证了争取中非和平联盟的控制范围。<sup>72</sup>

71. 除了控制金矿开采点 Ndassima，争取中非和平联盟分子也在 Dimbi 和 Kembé (姆博穆省)的钻石开采区出现，目的是向手工采矿者和咖啡贸易商勒索钱财。<sup>73</sup> 以班加苏为大本营的反腐特别机构的工作人员没有获得这些采矿区的通行权。来自 Ndassima、Dimbi 和 Kembé 的黄金和钻石通过 Béma 和 Satéma 进行贸易。

72. 争取中非和平联盟的大多数咖啡收入来自班巴里的税收安排，咖啡运输商从班巴里向北前往苏丹。4 月，争取中非和平联盟强迫国家农产品税务局和咖啡主要运输商 Ouaka Café 接受一项协议，根据协议他们将有系统地少报卡车数量，减少纳税，把少缴的税添加到交给争取中非和平联盟的安保款中。这些税费项目合计每卡车 400 000 非洲法郎(800 美元)。<sup>74</sup>

### 在瓦卡的“反砍刀”组织网络

73. 根据 2014 年 12 月 10 日帕特里斯·爱德华·恩加伊松纳的中非团结发展党列举的情况，“反砍刀”组织在班巴里-格里马里-宽果地区的区域架构已经包括大多数参与武装团体活动的个人。在班巴里，“反砍刀”组织截至 4 月 15 日的军事结构由大约 20 人组成，这些人在中非团结发展党的旗下，接受区域协调员 Gr âce à Dieu Endjepou(又名“Empizado”)的指挥(见附件 2.1)。<sup>75</sup>

<sup>70</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在班吉 Camp de Roux 开展的检查。冲突军备研究组织的两名研究员也在场。

<sup>71</sup> 详见附件 9.35。

<sup>72</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日和 5 月 15 日至 18 日前往宽果的特派团；2015 年 4 月 16 日前往班加苏的特派团；2015 年 5 月 25 日前往班巴里的特派团。

<sup>73</sup> 2015 年 4 月 16 日在班加苏会见宪兵和咖啡贸易商；采矿部门的结构如下：挖矿者 (*creuseur* 或 *ouvrier minier* 或“Nagbata”)、手工采矿者 (*artisan minier* 或 *chef de chantier*)、收购者 (*collecteur*) 和收购公司 (*bureau d'achat*)。

<sup>74</sup> 2015 年 4 月 25 日，保密报告；咖啡种植园和苏丹卡车照片见附件 2.14。

<sup>75</sup> 截至 2014 年 12 月 10 日中非团结发展党区域组织结构见附件 2.2，包括班巴里、格里马里和通往宽果的道路。“Empizado”设在班吉，对班巴里的局势影响甚少；2015 年 4 月 23 日来自在班巴里的秘密信息来源人士的电子邮件。

74. Ga ðan Bouadé的正式副区指挥官在当是 Giscard Raskia Ndarata。Ndarata 又名“Cerveau rouge”或“Carrie dentaire”。<sup>76</sup> 这两名领导之间的紧张关系显而易见，Ga ðan 执行地方议程，而 Ndarata 似乎有一个全国议程。2014 年 12 月，Ndarata 与其他 6 名“反砍刀”组织军事指挥官(Thierry Madibo, Séraphin Guébanda, Tonton Mambikpongo, Frédéric Fe ñdironga ì Charlin-Chabardo Momokama(也称“Charly”)和 Guy Vivien) 一起从班吉来到班巴里。争取中非和平联盟政治领导人指责过渡当局支持 Ndarata，把后者当作其在瓦卡省反对前塞雷卡富拉尼人派别的傀儡。<sup>77</sup>

75. 4 月 26 日，Ndarata 的副手“Fally”袭击 Ga ðan 在班巴里的官邸，被 Ga ðan 的团体击退，该事件正式将班巴里的“反砍刀”组织运动分为两个派别。6 月 16 日，Mokom 将 Ndarata 包括在其运动的组成部分。<sup>78</sup> 10 月 15 日，Ndarata 的团体在 Guy Vivien 的带领下袭击 Ga ðan 在 Kidjigera 的大本营，冲突因此进一步升级。Ga ðan 的派别再次击退了袭击，其间，有四人死亡，包括随后被斩首的 Vivien。据报道，在其部下被击败后，Maxime Mokom 在次日向 Yakéché派出由 Rodrigue Yagbanga 指挥的增援部队。<sup>79</sup>

76. 专家小组检查了在该地区缉获的武器，包括 5 月 24 日中非稳定团在 Ndarata 家里收缴的武器。检查显示，他的团体拥有少量常规武器。<sup>80</sup>

77. 宽果地区的当地“反砍刀”组织团体与班巴里的“反砍刀”组织领导人有联系。专家小组通过约谈以前由 Ga ðan 指挥、现已复员的儿童兵，证实了这一信息。复员儿童说，他们在“反砍刀”组织的作用是步行或骑自行车去传达来自 Ga ðan 的信息，或向宽果的地方“反砍刀”组织指挥官提供来自班巴里的指示。<sup>81</sup>

#### “反砍刀”组织在瓦卡对阵争取中非和平联盟

78. 自 2014 年以来，由于瓦卡省的战略位置及其所涉及的经济利益，当地的“反砍刀”组织团体和争取中非和平联盟一直在争夺这一地区的控制权。<sup>82</sup> 在这段时间中，这两个武装团体也犯下了一系列侵犯人权的行为，造成中非人逃到刚果民主共和国难民营。<sup>83</sup>

<sup>76</sup> 登记为中非士兵，身份号码是 2009-2-1983。

<sup>77</sup> 争取中非和平联盟新闻发布稿见附件 2.3(2015 年 8 月 24 日)。

<sup>78</sup> Mokom 运动在班巴里和格里马里的组织结构见附件 2.4。

<sup>79</sup> 2015 年 10 月 18 日保密报告。

<sup>80</sup> 详见附件 9.36。

<sup>81</sup> 2015 年 5 月 20 日至 22 日在班巴里采访了复员儿童兵；详情见附件 7。

<sup>82</sup> 从班巴里旅行到宽果的旅客必须有“反砍刀”组织和争取中非和平联盟的三个军事指挥官签署的任务令(见附件 2.5)。

<sup>83</sup> 详见附件 9.37。

79. 从班巴里和格里马里前往 Liotto 的公路是进入宽果的主要通道。从 Liotto 有二级公路通往东边和西边的偏远村庄。在大部分侵犯人权的行为发生的地区，“反砍刀”组织和争取中非和平联盟对可能支持他们中的任何一方的平民进行袭击，并强行驱逐他们。

80. 专家小组观察到，从格里马里到 Liotto 的公路沿线许多房屋被烧毁，人们流离失所。冲突双方仍在争夺这条公路，以及从班巴里到 Liotto 的公路。<sup>84</sup>

81. 专家小组还调查了一名援助工作者在班巴里被杀害的事件。3月15日晚，在保健中心工作的国家护士 Beno î Kabé 被 3 名“反砍刀”组织分子绑架，保健中心位于被称作“红蝴蝶”的境内流离失所者营地。随后该护士被枪杀并被割喉。(见附件 2.7)。

82. Liotto 西南的道路无法通车(见附件 2.8)，因此，专家小组无法前往该地区访问。然而，证词表明，2014 年 10 月以来，“反砍刀”组织分子在一个名叫“Manda Kara”的人的指挥下已针对平民，特别是富拉尼族社区进行了几次袭击。这些袭击造成数十名平民死亡，数百个家庭流离失所。受害者向专家小组解释说，“Manda Kara”及其团伙偷窃受害者的牛群，并从中大量获利。<sup>85</sup>

83. 5月16日，专家小组考察了 Bolo 一村和 Bolo 二村。2014 年 11 月 10 日，这两个村庄遭到 Mahamat Bandi 上校指挥的一个争取中非和平联盟团体的袭击。在袭击刚开始的时候，约 10 名平民被打死，其中包括 3 名在家中被活活烧死的老年妇女(见附件 2.9 至 2.11)。<sup>86</sup>

84. 在宽果东边、通往 Bianga 道路上的那个地区，<sup>87</sup> 前塞雷卡分子、争取中非和平联盟分子以及“Maguya”和“Samba André”指挥的“反砍刀”组织民兵之间发生了一些对抗。<sup>88</sup>

### C. 反砍刀组织的博桑戈阿-布卡-巴丹加弗大本营

85. “反砍刀”组织在班吉与博阿利之间 1 号主要供应公路上恢复活动。10 月 18 日，在这条公路上，过渡国家委员会副主席和中非稳定团警察人员被 Hubert Sélébondo(别名“Hubert 上校”)绑架。此外，Thierry Lébéné(又名“12 Puissances”)和“Andilo”的兄弟经常在达马拉地区出现，表明班吉北部仍是 Mokom 领导的反砍刀派别的主要据点之一。此外，位于 1 号和 2 号主要补给公路交汇处的 PK12

<sup>84</sup> Liotto 地区被毁房屋的照片见附件 2.6，更多详情见附件 9.38。

<sup>85</sup> 详见附件 9.39。

<sup>86</sup> 详见附件 9.40。

<sup>87</sup> 详见附件里地图 2.12。

<sup>88</sup> 从来自宽果以东 25 公里 Oumba 的受害者收集的证词。2014 年 11 月 20 日，该地区遭到“反砍刀”组织的袭击。详见附件 9.41。

居民区仍然被“大砍刀”组织指挥官 Mokpem 完全控制，进入班吉的主要检查站位于该居民区。这里经常发生对中非稳定团车队的袭击。“反砍刀”组织在瓦姆省的完整组织结构详见附件 2.13。

### 袭击人道主义行为体

86. 专家小组对世界粮食规划署车队 1 月至 3 月在班吉至达马拉公路上连续遭到 5 次袭击进行了调查。<sup>89</sup> 袭击者获得了无护送车队的时间以及货物种类和路线的信息。之后，他们骑摩托车尾随车队，查明载有感兴趣的货物的卡车，把从车队中选出的卡车引到辅路上掠夺货物。

87. 专家小组确认袭击者是来自 Boy-Rabe 的“反砍刀”组织成员。该地区在 PK12 的“反砍刀”组织区指挥官 Teyemebe Ambios(又名“Tex”)的指挥下。Mokom 的副手 Azounou 告诉专家小组说，他从内罗毕返回后获悉这些事件，于 5 月 30 日解除“Tex”的区指挥官职务。不过，Mokom 和 Azounou 告诉专家小组，他们拒绝逮捕“Tex”把他交给司法机关。最近的报告表明，“Tex”仍然活跃于行动区。<sup>90</sup>

## 三. 东部地区及与苏丹和南苏丹的边境地区<sup>91</sup>

88. 与北部一样，中非共和国的东部地区仍是前塞雷卡团体的一个据点，特别是在瓦卡加省和上科托省。在没有国家权力机构的情况下，前塞雷卡派别在所有主要干线上设立了检查站，他们在该地区对主要城镇的陆运和平行行政管理征税。

89. 提供武装护送和定点安保、在检查站征税和勒索当地商人，包括那些参与开采自然资源的商人，是前塞雷卡团体的主要收入来源。据争取中非和平联盟在布里亚向专家小组报告说，当不同派别在一个地方共存时，他们根据非正式协议在当地分享收集的不同资源。<sup>92</sup>

90. 仍然不断有报告表明武装分子在主要公路上的移动，包括往返苏丹，<sup>93</sup> 尽管三方部队在 Am Dafok 边境城镇苏丹一侧驻留(见附件 3.1)。中非稳定团在东部省份的逐步部署尚未影响到前塞雷卡团体自由行动的能力，特别是对努尔丁·阿达姆的中非复兴人民阵线来说。布里亚的情况是例外，2 月 10 日，红蝴蝶队伍-中非稳定团恢复国家权力联合行动迫使 Arda Hakouma 将军<sup>94</sup> 与中非复兴人民

<sup>89</sup> 详见附件 9.42。

<sup>90</sup> 详见附件 9.43。

<sup>91</sup> 地图见附件 3。

<sup>92</sup> 2015 年 4 月 14 日在布里亚会见了争取中非和平联盟的 Maka i 和 Moussa 上校。

<sup>93</sup> 详见附件 9.44。

<sup>94</sup> 2014 年 11 月 2 日，阿达姆任命 Hakouma 为中非复兴人民阵线在 Kaga Bandoro 的总参谋长。

阵线部队北上；在萨姆万贾、科托和恩扎，非盟区域工作队<sup>95</sup>正在对前塞雷卡团体实施严格限制，<sup>96</sup>与红蝴蝶部队在向中非稳定团逐步移交职责之前执行的“建立信任措施”十分相似(见 S/2014/762，附件 56)。

91. 在东北地区经常有知名前塞雷卡领导人移动，有时与大批武装分子一起移动的报告。<sup>97</sup>特别是 Hakouma 将军，中非复兴人民阵线 Oumar Younouss 将军(苏丹富拉尼人)、又名“Oumar Sodiam”，汤姆·亚当、又名“Ben Laden”(古拉人)，Ibrahim Shafadine (古拉人)，Zacharia Damane、又名 Zakaria Damane(古拉人)，Zacharia Samtchago、又名“Santiago”将军，Ali Ousta 上校经常在这个地区旅行，还往返 Kaga Bandoro 和 Ndélé。<sup>98</sup>

92. 有关瓦卡加省前塞雷卡派别情况的更详细概述见附件 3。

93. 上帝抵抗军所属团体和苏丹偷猎者的活动在这个地区持续不断。尽管在上科托省活动的两个上帝军团体被视为分离派别，上帝军的总兵力估计为 119 至 188 人。<sup>99</sup>叛逃者还报告说，另外两个效忠于上帝军领导人约瑟夫·科尼的较小团体从与刚果民主共和国的边界在中非领土过境，前往在 Radom 地区的凯菲亚金吉飞地——一个苏丹和南苏丹之间有争议地区，这里仍是上帝军领导人的基地。<sup>100</sup>此外，专家组收到经证实的资料说明前塞雷卡派别和上帝军团体在上科托省积极合作。

#### A. 在苏丹的前塞雷卡网络

94. 努尔丁·阿达姆在 2015 年全年多次前往苏丹各地。特别是他的办公厅主任 Lambert Lissane Moukove<sup>101</sup>向专家小组证实，他 9 月底因家庭原因在苏丹滞留。<sup>102</sup>专家小组于 4 月 24 日通知苏丹，2014 年 5 月 9 日阿达姆被委员会列入名单后，这些旅行违反安全理事会实施的旅行禁令。

95. Oumar Younouss 将军似乎在苏丹关系很多，他是苏丹国民，出生于离 Am Dafok 约 150 公里的南达尔富尔 Tullus 地区。在一个社交网站上，他出现在一张照片里，

<sup>95</sup> 详见附件 9.45。

<sup>96</sup> 专家小组分别于 2015 年 4 月 14 日和 9 月 27 日访问了布里亚和萨姆万贾，没有观察到任何武装分子。

<sup>97</sup> 2015 年 6 月 22 日、7 月 7 日和 8 日以及 9 月 7 日的联合国报告，2015 年 1 月至 9 月，在班吉会见了军事消息来源人士。

<sup>98</sup> 详见附件 9.46。

<sup>99</sup> 最近的高级别叛逃者在汇报期间提供的数字。

<sup>100</sup> 战斗人员所作的汇报，2015 年 4 月这些人员从在苏丹的科尼团体叛逃，并于 2015 年 6 月 14 日被非洲联盟区域特混部队发现。

<sup>101</sup> 关于 Lambert 情况详见附件 9.47。

<sup>102</sup> 2015 年 10 月 3 日在恩代莱会见了 Lambert。

穿着苏丹中央后备警察部队(又名“Abu Tera”)的制服, 该部队自 2006 年以来整编了一些阿拉伯裔金戈威德民兵。<sup>103</sup>

96. Moussa Suleiman as-Simeh 将军(又名“Abu Qasim”, 阿拉伯人)<sup>104</sup> 据称参与了从苏丹到中非共和国的走私活动, 包括走私武器和弹药。<sup>105</sup> 据报他目前在南达尔富尔 Edd al-Fursan 地区的家乡(离 Am Dafok 约 200 公里)。Hakouma 将军和中非复兴爱国联盟政治顾问 Mahamat Abbas(曾是努尔丁·阿达姆的亲密顾问, 接替前总统米歇尔·乔托迪亚担任中非共和国驻尼亚拉领事)也据报与在苏丹的网络以及在尼亚拉的苏丹官员保持牢固关系。<sup>106</sup>

## B. 前塞雷卡四分五裂

### 与苏丹贸易税收方面的竞争

97. 比劳<sup>107</sup> 是苏丹商人的卡车经瓦卡加省进入中非共和国的入境点。这些商人主要负责向在前塞雷卡控制下的该地区供应商品——远至 Moyen-Sido(瓦姆省, 与乍得接壤)和 Kouango(瓦卡省, 与刚果民主共和国接壤)。瓦卡加的居民主要是在达尔富尔(古拉人、隆加人和 Sara-Kaba 人)和南苏丹(卡拉人)存在的族裔群体。

98. 在 Ouandja、Ouanda Djallé 和 Ouadda 设立了主要检查站, 是苏丹卡车前往布里亚和更远地方的关键休息站。中非复兴人民阵线、刚果爱联和中非复兴爱国联盟之间和内部在征税和提供车队武装护送方面的竞争激烈。<sup>108</sup> 据报告, 在 Délembé 和 Tala 以及万达与布里亚之间还有较小的检查站。

99. 万达还以作为军火市场闻名, 苏丹商人那里向前塞雷卡将军出售弹药。Younouss 据报在向班吉挺进之前于 9 月在那里购买了弹药。据报告, 中非复兴人民阵线布里亚区指挥官 Ousta 上校在这一地区调动资源和人员方面取代了 Younouss。<sup>109</sup>

### 萨姆万贾

100. 虽然萨姆万贾的行政检查站完全处于中非复兴人民阵线的控制之下, 但驻扎在萨姆万贾和科托的非洲联盟区域特混部队对中非复兴人民阵线在该地区的

<sup>103</sup> 2015 年 9 月 4 日在巴黎会见了关于达尔富尔问题的研究员。

<sup>104</sup> 详见附件 9.48。

<sup>105</sup> 2015 年 1 月 15 日在班吉和 1 月 28 日在巴黎会见了两位十分了解武器贩运网络的独立机密消息来源人士。

<sup>106</sup> 2015 年 9 月 3 日会见了苏丹叛军领导人。

<sup>107</sup> 专家小组原本应于 2015 年 9 月 29 日前往比劳, 但由于在班吉的暴力升级而取消航班。

<sup>108</sup> 详见附件 9.49。

<sup>109</sup> 2015 年 10 月 8 日从在布里亚的机密消息来源人士的电子邮件; 2014 年 5 月 15 日专家小组在布里亚会见了 Ousta 上校。

行动实行严格限制，阻止他们在镇上携带武器，控制他们进出该地区的行动。非盟区域特混部队的做法是，市长办公室每周召开一次关于安全会议，交流有关一般安全局势特别是上帝军的存在和活动的情况。

101. 据 Shafadine 说，按正式规定，萨姆万贾是在他本人、Alanta 和“Ben Laden” 协议控制之下。<sup>110</sup> 地区指挥官 Ahmat Maadi Grégoire 据称向三名将军报告。

102. 在萨姆万贾地区的中非复兴人民阵线实际上分裂成 Alanta 和 Shafadine 的派别(由后者指挥)与“Ben Laden”的派别。“Ben Laden”最近抵达该镇。他之前被迫离开班巴里、Alindao、比劳。<sup>111</sup>

103. 不过，在萨姆万贾的商人认为，“Ben Laden”是目前的指挥官，区指挥官实际上直接向他报告。此外，非盟区域特混部队向专家小组报告说，10月25日发生了一起涉及 Alanta 和“Ben Laden”的严重事件，后者威胁要杀死前者。

### 布里亚

104. 前塞雷卡三个派别(中非复兴人民阵线、争取中非和平联盟和中非复兴爱国联盟)共同控制布里亚。中非复兴人民阵线原成员 Yaya Scout 将军，<sup>112</sup> 以及 Damane 将军也驻扎在那里，虽然后者常出差去萨姆万贾和瓦达。

105. 布里亚最初是中非复兴爱国联盟的一个据点，Hakouma 和 Adam Moktar 上校指挥的若干团体根据努尔丁·阿达姆的指令离开卡加班多罗前往接管布里亚后，于2014年11月底被中非复兴人民阵线控制。<sup>113</sup> 与此同时，在班巴里的 Darrassa 也派出一支约50人的分遣队，由 Maka ï 上校及其副手 Moussa 指挥进驻了布里亚。<sup>114</sup>

106. 虽然这些团体间就分享资源达成了协议，但据报中非复兴人民阵线和中非复兴爱国联盟却为争夺控制位于布里亚以北25公里 Bounkou 村里一处检查站发生了数次冲突。<sup>115</sup>

107. 目前，Ousta 在布里亚代表中非复兴人民阵线，此前担任区指挥官的 Bachar Adramen Issène 上校及其副手 Mani Ngombé Kette(又名“Fakimani”)上校被 Shafadine 解职。中非复兴人民阵线的据点在布里亚北部古拉族裔居民为主的 Bornou 社区。中非复兴爱国联盟的区指挥官是 Azor Kalit “上校”，他向中非稳定

<sup>110</sup> 2015年9月27日在 Sam-Ouandja 会见了 Shafadine 和 Alanta 将军。

<sup>111</sup> 2014年7月3日专家小组在班巴里会见了“本·拉丹”将军(见 S/2014/762, 附件9)。

<sup>112</sup> 2014年11月2日，“Scouth”将军(又称为“Scouth”)在卡加-班多罗举行的中非复兴人民阵线大会上被任命为第一副总参谋长。

<sup>113</sup> 2015年1月16日在卡加-班多罗会见了国际部队。

<sup>114</sup> 2015年4月14日在布里亚会见了 Maka ï

<sup>115</sup> 详见附件 9.50。

团和中非当局表示希望回归他驻班吉的原部队。<sup>116</sup> 争取中非和平联盟区指挥官 Maka ÿ 由 Moussa 上校和 Hamadou Tanga 辅佐, 直接与 Darrassa 将军联系。据报, 争取中非和平联盟驻布里亚分遣队牢固地融入了争取中非和平联盟在班巴里的指挥和控制结构。<sup>117</sup>

108. 2月10日“红蝴蝶”部队-中非稳定团联合行动期间收缴的大量武器, 详细表明了中非复兴人民阵线拥有武器的种类和来源。 专家小组记录到了8个火箭榴弹发射器、6挺机枪、2支机枪管、15支突击步枪、1枚SA-7导弹、1个迫击炮筒和3支猎用来复枪。在这次行动中收缴了产自数个国家的约3000发7.62x39毫米、7.62x54毫米、7.62x51毫米、5.56x45毫米和12.7x108毫米弹药以及一批猎用弹药。中非稳定团还在布里亚收缴了一批9x19毫米和40毫米弹药以及大量火箭榴弹和手榴弹(见附件3.3)。<sup>118</sup>

### C. 苏丹偷猎者

109. 向上科托省和姆博穆省南行以及沿乍得边界中非一侧西行的苏丹偷猎者和传统交易者, 经常穿越中非共和国东部地区。<sup>119</sup> 近年来, 出于安全原因, 长期贸易路线上旅行的苏丹商人享受了偷猎者的保护。

110. 5月, 有两批约200名出自苏丹的偷猎者活跃在中非共和国东部, 在萨姆万贾的前塞雷卡领导人还向专家小组报告了其中一批路过的情况。<sup>120</sup> 9月中旬专家小组在恩代莱地区约谈的一些当地人, 他们也看到过一些骑毛驴的较小股苏丹偷猎者(见第四节)。

111. 偷猎者一般会设立一个大本营, 然后再分散为20至30名偷猎者的一些较小团伙。<sup>121</sup> 他们猎杀大象以取得象牙并捕杀其他野生动物, 例如猎豹、狮子、长颈鹿、水牛和羚羊。虽然厚皮动物数目的锐减(中非共和国东部从原来估计的20000头热带草原象减少到约400头)迫使偷猎者在该国逗留比以前更长的时间, 包括雨季期间。据报还有其他一些团体穿越该国前往刚果民主共和国偷猎。

112. 据报苏丹偷猎者经验丰富, 装备精良(主要配备AK-型突击步枪。他们拥有产自数个国家的7.62x51毫米弹药),<sup>122</sup> 当地社区和其他武装团体都害怕他

<sup>116</sup> 登记为中非士兵, 身份号码是2001-2-1397。

<sup>117</sup> 2015年6月14日来自在布里亚的机密消息来源人士的电子邮件。

<sup>118</sup> 全部清单另见附件1.13, 详情见附件9.51。

<sup>119</sup> 2015年4月至9月在奥博、萨姆万贾、恩代莱和班吉会见了地方官员、武装团体领导人、侨民、非政府组织代表和非洲联盟区域特混部队高级军官。

<sup>120</sup> 2015年9月27日在萨姆万贾会见了 Shafadine 将军和 Alanta 将军。

<sup>121</sup> 详见附件9.52。

<sup>122</sup> 详见附件9.53。

们。<sup>123</sup> 偷猎者在有些情况下袭击了上帝军的战斗人员，因为推定这些人员总是在运送象牙、黄金和其他贵重物品。尽管据报偷猎者抢劫并经常骚扰平民，但没有关于杀害或性暴力行为的报告。这可能是由于偷猎者躲避非洲联盟区域特混部队的策略。

## D. 上帝抵抗军

### 行动

113. 在中非共和国东部和东南部，尤其是在与苏丹、南苏丹和刚果民主共和国接壤的上科托省、姆博穆省和上姆博穆省，上帝军仍是主要威胁之一。上帝军的行动仍主要侧重于通过自然资源开采和贸易创收，特别是象牙和黄金。上帝军行动详细地图载于附件 3.5。

114. 根据上帝军前第二指挥官多米尼克·翁古文在他 1 月 21 日被移交国际刑事法院的拘留设施之前提供的数字，上帝军兵力为 188 名战斗人员和 227 名非战斗人员，其中包括刚果民主共和国境内 111 名战斗人员和 164 名非战斗人员、中非共和国境内 38 名战斗人员和 7 名非战斗人员，以及苏丹境内 39 名战斗人员和 56 名非战斗人员。<sup>124</sup>

115. 上帝军人员避免与其他武装团体或国际部队对抗以节省弹药用于狩猎。上帝军继续随着行动范围不断扩大而进行调整，包括非洲联盟区域特混部队于 2014 年长期部署在恩扎科和科托。最近的上帝军叛逃人员一致报告说，由约瑟夫·科尼控制的该团体指挥中心，继续位于南达尔富尔州拉多姆地区的凯菲亚金吉飞地。

116. 专家小组获得信息显示，拉多姆当局容忍了科尼的存在。两个独立消息来源确认，2014 年 12 月，科尼在尼亚拉接受了医疗，而且是乘飞机从位于凯菲亚金吉以北拉多姆的 Songo 附近由苏丹军方控制的一个简易机场出发的。<sup>125</sup> 专家小组还获得证据显示，2015 年上半年，一些苏丹贸易商会见了上帝军在苏丹的领导人，并向其提供了相当于 200 000 美元的苏丹镑，很可能是交换上帝军掠夺或偷猎的货物。

117. 2014 年 12 月，最近被叛逃者确定为与科尼关系密切的一名指挥官 Okot Lukuang，据报会见了在刚果民主共和国东方省北部活动的一批上帝军团体，以传达科尼的直接指令，包括大部分偷猎自加兰巴国家公园(刚果民主共和国)的象牙，以及从该区域手工矿场掠夺的黄金方面的业绩指标。<sup>126</sup> 因此，上帝军袭击

<sup>123</sup> 苏丹偷猎者的照片见附件 3.4。

<sup>124</sup> 高级别叛逃者 Okello David Adilang 在 2015 年 9 月 11 日的汇报期间提到共有 119 个战斗人员和 107 个非战斗人员。

<sup>125</sup> 2015 年 6 月 27 日在班吉会见了秘密消息来源人士；2015 年 9 月 3 日会见了苏丹叛军领导人；Songo 机场和苏丹武装部队营地的图像见附件 3.6。

<sup>126</sup> 详见附件 9.54。

期间掠夺到的大量象牙、黄金和其他货物，都由忠于科尼的指挥官率领小批人员定期运回凯菲亚金吉，然后在 Songo 进行交易。<sup>127</sup>

118. 布里亚周边上帝军团体最近在中非共和国活动的增多，以及向西远至 Morabanda(Mbrès 市)开展的招募活动，<sup>128</sup> 是对中非共和国安全局势有着重要影响的新动态。上帝军团体袭击和掠夺村庄，以及在有些情况下劫持儿童的事件仍是重大关切。在布里亚，7 月份进行调查得出的结论表明，Alfonse Lamola 和“Adam Sam” (可能被认定为 Odong Kidega Murefu) 手下两个上帝军团体正在该省活动，其作案手法显示，他们可能与中央领导人失去了联系。<sup>129</sup>

119. 不过，这两个团体据报都仍与 Scout 将军保持着定期接触，Scout 将军于 4 月 1 日加入 Darrassa 领导的刚果爱国者联盟派。前塞雷卡和上帝军显然缔结了不侵犯协定，并交换了粮食和非粮食物品。瓦达以南地区，特别是在 Mouka 村，据报是 Scout 与“Adam Sam”碰头的地方。据报他们还在位于布里亚-瓦达战略要地的 Mbali 村和 Ibanda 村见过面，那里是争取中非和平联盟保护下的苏丹卡车必经之地。

120. 专家小组检查了 2009 年以来非洲联盟区域特混部队从上帝军缴获的武器和弹药。<sup>130</sup> 起获的武器和弹药类型与中非共和国其他地方武装团体使用的武器类似，如 AK、G3、Galil、Kbk-AKMS、AKM 型突击步枪，56/56-1/56-2 型、MAS 36 型步枪和土造步枪，以及迫击炮弹、手榴弹、猎用弹药和产地不同的其他弹药。非洲联盟区域特混部队六年间在中非共和国境内缴获了 72 件常规武器，其中 30 件为 6 月份在一个单一藏匿点起获。与检查过的相当老旧武器不同的是，一大部分源自苏丹的 7.62X39 毫米弹药制造于 2011 年、2012 年和 2013 年。<sup>131</sup>

#### 上帝抵抗军在中非共和国东部活动的人道主义影响

121. 2015 年，专家小组记录到上帝军人员在上科托省和上姆博穆省袭击及掠夺村庄和以平民为目标的 38 起事件。这 38 起事件中，共有 4 起导致了平民遭到杀害，<sup>132</sup> 即 1 月 1 日至 9 月 30 日，有 11 名平民被上帝军人员杀害。<sup>133</sup>

<sup>127</sup> 2015 年 4 月 20 日至 23 日在奥博会见了非洲联盟区域工作队官员；2015 年 6 月 27 日在班吉会见了重点关注上帝抵抗军问题的国际非政府组织的代表；2014 年底至 2015 年初，上帝抵抗军高级别战斗人员的书面陈述；见附件 3.6。

<sup>128</sup> 2015 年 4 月 22 日在奥博采访了两个上帝抵抗军受害者。

<sup>129</sup> 根据解决上帝抵抗军危机的倡议，2015 年。

<sup>130</sup> 2015 年 4 月 24 日和 9 月 25 日在奥博进行的检查(见附件 3.2 中的照片)。

<sup>131</sup> 详见附件 9.55。

<sup>132</sup> 详见附件 9.56。

<sup>133</sup> 见附件 7 的人道主义部分，详情见附件 9.57。

122. 上帝军和其他武装分子，包括富拉尼人武装和苏丹偷猎者，在中非共和国东部的存在导致了平民被迫流离失所。这些一般属于临时性质的流动，以及提供教育及卫生服务的问题，目前没有得到人道主义界的处理。

## E. 开发利用自然资源

### 跨境偷牛<sup>134</sup>

123. 该国西部安全局势恶化以及中部随之放牧过度后，富拉尼族牧民带着他们的牛群在东部逗留的时间更长。他们通常偷猎野生动物，但避免与苏丹团体或上帝军团体对抗。富拉尼人据报从苏丹商人采购货物，其中包括武器和弹药。

124. 富拉尼人也是出自南苏丹偷牛者的受害者，其中一伙偷牛者 1 月使用了驻 Tamboura(西赤道州)的单位一辆苏丹警用皮卡车。<sup>135</sup>

### 钻石

#### 安全

125. 中非共和国东部产区是金伯利进程的核心关切问题。自 2011 年 9 月以来，该进程向参加国政府和钻石业成员三次发出呼吁，最近一次是 2013 年 4 月 18 日，要求提高警惕，以防东部布里亚和萨姆万地区及北部巴明吉地区的前塞雷卡和关联团体可能在供应链中非法引入毛坯钻石。

126. 该进程描述的可能非法引入冲突钻石的情景收窄了其自身对冲突钻石的通用定义，即“反叛运动或其盟友用于为旨在破坏合法政府的冲突提供资金的毛坯钻石”，<sup>136</sup> 而且并未充分描述专家小组监测的非法钻石生产和贸易可能向武装团体提供支持的各种途径。专家小组在布里亚和萨姆万贾的调查显示，前塞雷卡反叛者很少对贸易行使商业控制，而是从非法征税、安全费和对开采管理部门的渗透中获取利益。

127. 在布里亚，中非复兴人民阵线部队 2014 年 10 月占领了包括地区矿业局在内的政府楼，并任命了 23 人运行该局(见附件 3.7)。这些人员中有 12 人被非法纳入特别反欺诈股，负责执行巡逻。<sup>137</sup> 一名中央任命的宪兵被留用在该股，负责为当地钻石的采购和将钻石转至班吉的授权签单，以保持象征意义的合法性。<sup>138</sup>

<sup>134</sup> 会见了地方官员、侨民、武装团体领导人、非政府组织和非洲联盟区域工作队官员。

<sup>135</sup> 详见附件 9.58。

<sup>136</sup> 见 <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document>。

<sup>137</sup> 2015 年 4 月 13 日在布里亚会见了特别反欺诈股办事处主任。

<sup>138</sup> 附件 3.8 载有转让许可证的照片。根据正常程序，区域采矿主任需共同签署此类许可证，但此人在 2014 年 7 月从布里亚调走，当时尚没有人替代他。

128. 2月10日，国际部队把中非复兴人民阵线 **Hakouma** 将军赶出了布里亚。被赶走人员此后在一些采矿点盘踞，其中包括 **Caréfrée**、**Dawango**、**Kalaka**、**Aigbando**、**Mouka** 和 **Ngbéhidou**，向采矿者征收每天 2 000 非洲法郎(4 美元)的进入费。<sup>139</sup> 至少 10 个在布里亚有执照的手工采矿者活跃在已确定被占领的两个采矿点，从而显示对收购商和收购商行进行的登记销售如何能够间接地资助武装团体。<sup>140</sup> 特别反欺诈股在布里亚已不再能够对采矿点进行巡逻以检查业务合法性和处理非法征税问题。此外，在 2014 年大部分时间里直至 2 月份中非复兴人民阵线被赶出镇中心，驻布里亚的前塞雷卡部队都为收购商守卫其房地，并向他们收取每晚 10 000 非洲法郎(20 美元)的安全费。<sup>141</sup>

129. 在萨姆万贾，中非复兴人民阵线对生产和贸易的控制与布里亚相似。4 名武装人员负责特别反欺诈股的工作，与 1 名官方的次地区矿业主任一道合作(见附件 3.9)。2014 年，该股在那里有两名官员，他们的武器由前塞雷卡提供。在实地检查期间，以该股名义行动的中非复兴人民阵线人员在解决纠纷时向手工采矿者收取了费用。<sup>142</sup> 出于安全原因，他们的巡逻保持在离萨姆万贾中心 15 公里内。在镇上有房子的收购商和手工采矿者为保护其房地要缴纳相同的费率，即每晚 10 000 非洲法郎(20 美元)。<sup>143</sup> 该股在班吉的指挥官否认自危机开始以来该股曾在该国任何地方与非常规部队合作过。<sup>144</sup>

130. 在恩扎科，一次事件后，非洲联盟区域特混部队 2014 年 7 月取消了前塞雷卡部队的权力(见 S/2014/762，第 152 段)。靠近恩扎科的各矿场现已不受武装团体的干扰，但更远处的一些则遭到了上帝军的洗劫。<sup>145</sup> 恩扎科现在没有任何开采管理机构。

#### 记录到的钻石贸易和公司尽职调查

131. 矿产和地质部从未中止过出自东部的国内贸易，但坚持要求收购商行在所谓的“红色”采购单下把产自东部和西部的钻石分开保管，<sup>146</sup> 而且不允许把钻石从东部转至西部(见附件 3.10)。2014 年下半年和 2015 年上半年，中非钻石采购公司/**Kardiam(Badica)**从布里亚采购了 1 779 克拉，而 **Sud Azur** 采购了 534

<sup>139</sup> 2015 年 4 月 13 日在布里亚会见了特别反欺诈股；2015 年 11 月 12 日保密报告。

<sup>140</sup> 根据地质和矿业部的数据，2015 年，在布里亚共有 32 名手工采矿者和 16 名收购商，该数据在联合国存档。

<sup>141</sup> 2015 年 8 月 24 日在布里亚会见了以前驻扎在班吉的钻石收购商。

<sup>142</sup> 2015 年 9 月 27 日在萨姆万贾会见了次区域采矿主任。

<sup>143</sup> 2015 年 9 月 27 日在萨姆万贾会见了钻石收购商和手工采矿者。2015 年，在萨姆万贾的两名收购商在班吉获得许可证，但在班吉的记录并没有表明，萨姆万贾存在着特许手工采矿者。

<sup>144</sup> 附件 3.10 载有该信，作为 **Badica** 关于其采购政策的答复的附件；详情另见附件 9.59。

<sup>145</sup> 2015 年 9 月 21 日电话采访恩扎科地方当局。

<sup>146</sup> 2015 年 4 月 15 日在班吉会见了中非共和国金伯利进程常务秘书。

克拉。<sup>147</sup> 同一期间，当地开采服务处从萨姆万贾登记到的情况是中非钻石协会(Sodiam)采购了 1 338 克拉、Sud Azur 847 克拉和 Badica 108 克拉(见附件 3.11)。Sodiam 还从驻恩扎科的一个有执照收购商采购了 233 克拉。在这些采购中，有一个 152 克拉的包裹在空运抵达班吉国际机场时，因 Sodiam 代理人未将其申报而被中非当局没收。<sup>148</sup>

132. 如附件 3.12 中详述，鉴于有系统的前塞雷卡活动对生产和贸易的影响，专家小组进一步审议了收购商行在中非共和国东部的采购政策。这是通过口头及书面交流和以查阅相关政策文件的方式进行的，包括查阅国际公认的指导文件，例如经济合作与发展组织制定的尽责调查框架，其中建议在有合理理由认定存在风险时中止与上游供应商的互动协作，即认定他们从可能通过对采矿点和对中介商进行非法控制、征税和勒索等方式，向非国家武装团体提供了直接或间接支持的任何方面进货或与之有关联。<sup>149</sup>

#### 钻石走私

133. 收购商行在班吉的正式采购只反映了危机前东部地区总产能估计数 60 000 克拉的一小部分。<sup>150</sup> 据特别反欺诈股介绍，来自苏丹、刚果民主共和国和乍得的贸易商都前往布里亚非法采购钻石。<sup>151</sup>

134. 在萨姆万贾及其紧邻地区，外国买家并不常见，但他们可能常去特别反欺诈股去不了的采矿点。<sup>152</sup> 专家小组掌握的信息显示，刚果民主共和国境内的雅科马和苏丹境内的尼亚拉，是东部地区所产钻石以及黄金的交易中心。

## 四. 北部地区以及与乍得之间的边界地区<sup>153</sup>

135. 中非共和国北部的特点是，除了保瓦、卡加-班多罗和恩代莱之外，其余地方完全没有国家权力机构和国际军队。因此，各武装团体趁机填补安全真空，特别是西北部的革命与正义组织以及北部和东北部的塞雷卡。

<sup>147</sup> 地质和矿业部提供的 2014-2015 年官方采购记录，在联合国存档。

<sup>148</sup> 2014 年 11 月 4 日特别反欺诈股报告，在联合国存档；2015 年 1 月 26 日在班吉会见了 Sodiam；详情见附件 9.60。

<sup>149</sup> 见经合组织《关于受冲突影响地区和高风险地区矿产的负责任供应链的尽责调查准则》，第二版(巴黎，2013 年)，参阅：<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf>。

<sup>150</sup> 布里亚为 40 000 至 50 000 克拉、萨姆万贾为 10 000 克拉，以及恩扎科为 5 000 至 7 500 克拉。见 [www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2012-wgde-footprint-car-final](http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2012-wgde-footprint-car-final)。

<sup>151</sup> 2015 年 4 月 13 日在布里亚会见了特别反欺诈股。

<sup>152</sup> 2015 年 9 月 27 日在萨姆万贾会见了次区域采矿主任。

<sup>153</sup> 见附件 4 的地图。

136. 事实上，中非共和国爱国运动(中非爱国运动)和中非复兴人民阵线派别控制了中非共和国与乍得之间约 800 公里的边界，从瓦姆省北部直到与苏丹的边界。2014 年 5 月乍得当局关闭边界，武装分子的移动因此大幅减少，秘密消息来源报告说，仍有前塞雷卡将领(包括制裁对象努尔丁·阿达姆)在边界地区移动。

137. 专家小组几次前往保瓦和 B émal(瓦姆-彭代省)、马昆达、卡博和 Moyen-Sido(瓦姆省)、卡加-班多罗(纳纳-格里比齐)以及恩代莱和 Akroussoulbak 地区(巴明吉-班戈兰省)。专家小组认定，乍得安全和军事部队的个人成员一再主动违反乍得政府 2014 年 5 月 11 日关于关闭与中非共和国的边界的决定。乍得安全和武装部队人员还洗劫村庄，设立临时检查站，袭击边界中非共和国一侧的平民。

138. 中非共和国难民如想重返家园，必须支付过路费。乍得部队也从通过乍得政府机构发放的人道主义援助中受益。

139. 在 8 月 21 日的委员会会议上，乍得政府否认其安全部队人员参与这些事件，并反驳专家小组的调查结果。乍得从未答复关于提供这些事件相关信息的要求。<sup>154</sup>

## A. 西北部地区的安全真空

### 革命与正义组织

140. 4 月 11 日和 6 月 22 日，革命与正义组织驻马昆达和保瓦的领导人向专家小组表示，他们重新集结成为武装团伙，为的是保护当地居民免受乍得入侵。专家小组约谈过的革命与正义组织的所有军事指挥官(他们是中非过渡时期国家元首亲密顾问 Jean-Jacques Démafouth 的复兴共和与民主军的成员)<sup>155</sup> 证实，他们一直在中非青年和体育部长兼革命与正义组织驻班吉的领导人 Arnel Bedaya Sayo 的指挥和控制之下，并接受持续的财政支助。<sup>156</sup>

141. 专家小组仍然感到非常关切的是，作为活跃在中非共和国西北部的武装团体的军事指挥官，<sup>157</sup> Arnel Sayo 自 2014 年 8 月 22 日以来一直担任青年和体育部长。<sup>158</sup> Sayo 最近以官方部长身份访问欧洲，特别是会晤了西班牙和法国官员，并张贴他自己身穿军装位于部长办公室的照片(见附件 4.2)。

<sup>154</sup> 详见附件 9.61 中的通信。

<sup>155</sup> 复兴共和与民主军的详细情况见附件 9.62 和附件 4.1 中关于革命与正义组织的文件。

<sup>156</sup> 2015 年 6 月 1 日在班吉采访了革命与正义组织的被拘留者；2015 年 6 月 22 日在保瓦会见了革命与正义组织的指挥官。

<sup>157</sup> 详见附件 9.63。

<sup>158</sup> Sayo 的详情见附件 9.64。

142. 4月8日，争取中非和平联盟前塞雷卡派代表接触在马昆达的革命与正义组织领导人，旨在就来自乍得的牛群安全通行问题进行谈判，据称这些牛属于争取中非和平联盟领导人 Darrassa 将军。<sup>159</sup> 一份机密报告显示，Darrassa 最终与中非爱国运动的 Al-Khatim 将军达成了协议。<sup>160</sup>

#### 爱国者团体

143. 从解除武装、复员和重返社会进程中可能牟利的前景，也导致出现了一些投机的武装团体。

144. 在保瓦，专家小组会见了革命与正义组织分化出来的一个名为爱国者团体的代表，<sup>161</sup> 其总部设在保瓦以西 20 公里的 Pougol，其成员包括前复兴共和与民主军成员。该团体 37 名成员装备简陋。<sup>162</sup> 该团体声称，自身没有政治野心，目的是向当地居民提供安全，因为当地没有法治权力机构。它有强大的族裔基础，这类似于前复兴共和与民主军以及革命与正义组织。<sup>163</sup>

### B. 北部和东北部地区的安全真空以及平行行政机构

145. 专家小组观察到，在 Moyen-Sido、卡博、卡加-班多罗、姆布雷 和恩代莱，中非爱国运动和中非复兴人民阵线派别的武装分子身穿军装，公开携带武器，驾驶摩托车和汽车。在所有查访地点，武装团体占据了当局大部分的办公楼，并建立了平行行政机构。

#### Mahamat al-Khatim 领导的前塞雷卡派别

146. 瓦姆省东北部很多区域，包括卡博县和巴丹加弗部分地区，以及纳纳-格里比齐省及其省会卡加-班多罗，都在 Al -Khatim 的行政和安全控制下。<sup>164</sup>

<sup>159</sup> 2015 年 5 月 30 日在班吉秘密会见了政府官员；2015 年 6 月 6 日在马昆达与前地方官员的电话交谈；2015 年 6 月 22 日在保瓦会见了革命与正义组织的代表。争取中非和平联盟的一名政治领导人还于 2015 年 4 月 27 日在班吉会见专家小组期间确认，Ali Darrassa 拥有的牲畜目前在乍得。

<sup>160</sup> 据报该协议是中非和平联盟的政治顾问 Hassan Bouba 与在 Kaga Bandoro 的中非爱国运动区指挥官 Ali Hafis 谈判达成的；2015 年 4 月 17 日机密军事报告。

<sup>161</sup> 2015 年 6 月 22 日在保瓦约谈 Elie Sénapu(又名“Elie 将军”)；专家小组还会见了 Laurent Mandjou(又名“Laurent 上校”)(见附件 4.3)。

<sup>162</sup> 根据 Laurent Mandjou 向联合国解除武装、复员和重返社会方案提供的爱国者团体成员名单。该名单与先前向专家小组提供关于该团体有 1 891 名人员的说法有出入(见附件 4.4 中的名单)。

<sup>163</sup> 前总统安热-费利克斯·帕塔塞的 Sara 族裔群体的成员，大部分居住在瓦姆-彭代省。

<sup>164</sup> 2015 年 5 月 25 日至 29 日及 6 月 29 日至 7 月 3 日前往卡加班多拉、卡博和 Moyen-Sido 的特派团。在这些特派团期间，专家小组于 2015 年 5 月 26 日和 7 月 1 日在 Moyen-Sido 会见了 Al-Khatim、在卡加班多罗和卡博的区指挥官、地方当局、非政府组织、社区代表和联合国工作人员。见附件 4.5 和 4.8 中专家小组摄于 2015 年 5 月 26 日和 7 月 1 日拍摄的 Al-Khatim 照片)。

147. Al-Khatim 如同地方军阀一样开展行动,并具有实际目的。他在不久前还是中非复兴人民阵线领导层成员,<sup>165</sup> 8月1日,他与 Mahamat Bahar 将军<sup>166</sup> 创立了中非爱国运动。<sup>167</sup> 该团体由约 100 名人员组成,<sup>168</sup> 与中非复兴人民阵线共同控制主要城镇和村庄。<sup>169</sup> 该团体在检查站征税,并向途经的牧民提供安全。

148. 6月初,Al-Khatim 调动了约 50 名武装分子,确保在 Kambakota 地区( de B édé县、Batangafo 西部和 Ben Zambé北部)雨季到来之前返回乍得 Mo ïsala 地区的 Mbarara 牧民<sup>170</sup> 能够安全通行。<sup>171</sup>

149. 在卡加-班多罗, Ali Hafis <sup>172</sup>决定仍然忠于 Al-Khatim。尽管中非爱国运动和中非复兴人民阵线已经分裂,双方的区指挥官都在警察局同一大楼内办公,但对各自的上级负责。在 Mbrès,中非爱国运动区指挥官 Abdulaye Oumar 上校于 7 月获得任命。Oumar 证实,他及其副手 Abou Sale 向 Ali Hafis 报告,宣誓效忠 Al-Khatim。<sup>173</sup>

#### 中非复兴人民阵线的结构和活动

150. 自 10 月 8 日努尔丁·阿达姆从乍得返回卡加-班多罗以来,中非复兴人民阵线似乎组织性更强,更加活跃,他指挥和控制 500 多名成员的部队。Moussa Maouloud 自从升任为中非复兴人民阵线副协调员以来,<sup>174</sup> 与努尔丁·阿达姆的参谋长 Lambert Lissane Moukouvé 日益呼吁开展第三次过渡。

151. 8月22日,努尔丁·阿达姆任命来自比劳的 Amalea Jean Chérif 中士担任中非复兴人民阵线新的区指挥官。<sup>175</sup> 在本报告编写之时,依然忠于阿达姆的中

<sup>165</sup> 2014 年 11 月 2 日,努尔丁·阿达姆在卡加-班多罗任命 Al-Khatim 为中非复兴人民阵线 安全问题军事顾问。

<sup>166</sup> 前塞雷卡军事情报负责人(又称 Mahamat Bahar “将军”),他被正式登记为支助服务营的一名上校,身份编号 2013-1-1003。

<sup>167</sup> 详见附件 9.65。

<sup>168</sup> 详见附件 9.66。

<sup>169</sup> 详见附件 9.67 和附件 4.6 中的照片。

<sup>170</sup> 详见附件 9.68 和附件 4.7 中的照片。

<sup>171</sup> 2015 年 6 月 3、5、10 和 12 日的机密报告。

<sup>172</sup> 2015 年 5 月 26 日在 Moyen-Sido 和 2015 年 8 月 19 日和 23 日在卡加-班多罗会见了 Hafis Sido; 见附件 4.5 和 4.8 中的照片。

<sup>173</sup> 2015 年 8 月 22 日在姆布雷会见了 Oumar Abdulaye 上校; 见附件 4.8 中的照片。

<sup>174</sup> 在 2015 年 1 月 16 日和 5 月 27 日专家小组会见 Moussa Maouloud 期间,尽管努尔丁·阿达姆没有在现场,他仍强烈重申对阿达姆的效忠;2014 年 8 月,专家小组已发现 Maouloud 试图质疑 Al-Khatim 对 Batangafo 的管辖权(见 S/2014/762, 第 56 段); Maouloud 和 Lambert 的照片见附件 4.8。

<sup>175</sup> 2015 年 8 月 23 日在卡加班多拉会见了 Amaléa Jean Cherif; 他在支助服务营注册为上士,身份号为 2001-1-21378。

非复兴人民阵线领导人大多数驻在城镇，包括 Kanton 将军和 Baba Hissène 将军。<sup>176</sup> 两人都确认，中非复兴人民阵线正计划将总部设在卡加-班多罗。

152. 相当于比利时国土面积的地区，包括瓦卡加省和上科托省部分地区、巴明吉-班戈兰省以及纳纳-格里比齐省很多地方，都在中非复兴人民阵线的直接行政和安全控制下。在这些地方，除了自身安全依赖与中非复兴人民阵线的良好关系的若干省长和县长以及恩代莱和比劳的苏丹之外，国家安全部队和行政部门完全缺位。

#### 姆布雷地区

153. 据专家小组观察，在姆布雷，中非复兴人民阵线和中非爱国运动联合开展了一次军事训练(见附件 4.9)。在卡加-班多罗和姆布雷之间以及在恩代莱和乍得边界之间的所有线路地区，专家小组观察一直存在武装分子，其中大多数属于中非复兴人民阵线。<sup>177</sup> 虽然卡加-班多罗和姆布雷的前塞雷卡分子都在执行特派任务，但在争取正义与和平爱国者同盟(爱国者同盟)原来的据点恩代莱地区情况并非总是如此。

154. 在姆布雷，中非复兴人民阵线的正式代表是 Ousman Abakae(又名“司机”)，他是富拉尼族裔。尽管他名义上属于中非复兴人民阵线，他表示效忠于 Ali Darrassa(争取中非和平联盟)。<sup>178</sup> 在中非爱国运动成立之前，“司机”是姆布雷和周围地区唯一的区指挥官。由于他拒绝宣誓效忠 Al-Khatim 和 Ali Hafis，后者剥夺了他作为区指挥官的职位，转而任命 Abdulaye Oumar 上校为区指挥官。Ali Hafis 还向专家小组证实，“司机”不服从 Oumar 上校的指令。<sup>179</sup>

155. “司机”作为中非复兴人民阵线的区指挥官，与副手“Djido”留在姆布雷，保护争取中非和平联盟的商业利益。专家小组观察到，“司机”和 Oumar 上校之间关系紧张。<sup>180</sup>

156. 沿着姆布雷-姆布萨路线前往巴卡拉的路上，专家小组在姆布雷南部发现了一个检查站。在姆布雷和卡加-班多罗之间，通过 Blakadja，专家小组观察到有 5 个检查站在“司机”控制之下。<sup>181</sup> 在 Azen 村，在卡加-班多罗-恩代莱和姆布雷-

<sup>176</sup> 2015 年 8 月 24 日在卡加班多拉会见了 Kanton 将军和 Baba Hissène 将军；除了这两位将军外，据报，Issa Ibrahim 将军、Issa Israel 将军、Saleh Zabadi 将军、Kiningar 将军、Kader 将军和 Bordas 将军于 2015 年 10 月中旬也在卡加班多拉。

<sup>177</sup> 见附件 4.10 和 9.69。

<sup>178</sup> 2015 年 8 月 22 日在姆布雷会见专家小组期间，Ousman Abakae 说，他曾为 中非复兴人民阵线(“该阵线给了他一份工作”)，但他仍忠于 Ali Darrassa。

<sup>179</sup> 2015 年 8 月 23 日在卡加班多拉会见了 Ali Hafis。

<sup>180</sup> 尽管 2015 年 8 月 22 日在姆布雷与中非稳定团会见期间，明显可以看出“司机”与 Oumar 之间的矛盾，但两人乘同一辆摩托车离开会场。

<sup>181</sup> 详见附件 9.70。

恩代莱之间的公路交叉口，控制检查站的“司机”士兵宣称，小型和大型车辆必须分别支付 3 000 和 5 000 非洲法郎。专家小组在通过 Azen 的姆布雷-卡加-班多罗沿线也观察到了 5 个检查站。

157. 中非复兴人民阵线、中非爱国运动和争取中非和平联盟派别还组织了武装护卫队，以护送这些线路沿线的卡车。<sup>182</sup> 这些护卫队旨在保护卡车免受“反砍刀”组织团体的反复攻击。<sup>183</sup> 专家小组记录了 8 月 12 日发生在 Sueur 村的这样一次袭击，一辆在争取中非和平联盟保护下的卡车遭到抢劫。<sup>184</sup> “司机”下令实施报复袭击，随后 Lakouetene 和 Ndjangala 村于 8 月 20 日遭到焚烧。在这些地方，专家小组观察到 150 幢房屋被烧，并发现了 5.56 毫米弹壳和一枚火箭榴弹遗留物，并收集了证词，证明前塞雷卡分子每天在穿过村庄时，胡乱地朝平民开枪。当专家小组访问时，大部分村民仍躲在森林。

#### 恩代莱地区

158. 在恩代莱，中非复兴人民阵线的负责人是 9 月 10 日任命以取代 Issa Israel 将军的区指挥官 Senoussi Soumaine。<sup>185</sup> 然而，Abdullaye Mohamed 省长和 Ibrahim Senoussi Kamoun 苏丹(隆加族)将以某种形式与中非复兴人民阵线共同对这一地区进行行政控制和。<sup>186</sup> 苏丹依然是受尊重的、具有司法和调解权力的传统机制，省长事实上受制于中非复兴人民阵线的权力，尤其是在 2014 年 11 月 30 日他受到中非复兴人民阵线分子袭击受伤后。<sup>187</sup>

159. 在该镇所有战略要地都能见到中非复兴人民阵线成员，身着军装的武装男女公开携带武器并自由行动。然而，中非复兴人民阵线部分隆加族战士仍然声称效忠于 Abdoullaye Hissène Ramadane 的争取正义与和平爱国者同盟，Abdoullaye Hissène Ramadane 最近离开了中非复兴爱国联盟，加入了中非复兴人民阵线。

160. 专家小组在 9 月 24 日至 10 月 5 日的实地考察过程中，访问了恩代莱和乍得之间的三条线路。在恩代莱-蒂里线路上，专家小组记录到该线路一直到边界有 9 个检查站。<sup>188</sup> 在恩代莱-Doum/Boul-Kinia 线路上，专家小组记录了 6 个检查站。<sup>189</sup> 不过，在人烟稀少的恩代莱-Manovo 线路上，专家小组没有注意到有检查站。

<sup>182</sup> 详见附件 9.71。

<sup>183</sup> 2015 年 8 月 20 日在姆布雷会见了穆斯林和前“塞雷卡”的代表。

<sup>184</sup> 详见附件 9.72。

<sup>185</sup> 2015 年 9 月 28 日在恩代莱采访了 Senoussi Soumaine；详见附件 9.73。

<sup>186</sup> 详见附件 9.74。

<sup>187</sup> 2015 年 9 月 29 日在恩代莱采访了 Abdullaye Mohamed 和苏丹；详见附件 9.75。

<sup>188</sup> 详见附件 9.76 和附件 4.11 中的照片。

<sup>189</sup> 详见附件 9.77。

161. 这些检查站有二至五名武装分子守卫，他们有时穿军装，仅有一或两支 AK 型突击步枪和很少弹药数量很少，有时口径也跟武器不同。检查站一些武装分子身穿全套军装，另一些。<sup>190</sup> 有一次，专家小组观察到一名儿童兵守备蒂里的中非复兴人民阵线检查站。<sup>191</sup> 民众抱怨这些检查站，提到他们每次经过检查站均被迫交税。<sup>192</sup>

162. 在大多数村庄，有中非复兴人民阵线或争取正义与和平爱国者同盟的正式代表，<sup>193</sup> 当地民众还使用中非生产的手工步枪和狩猎弹药建立了当地自卫团体。<sup>194</sup> 这些武器在恩代莱购买。<sup>195</sup> 在 Manovo-Gounda St Floris 国家公园，据报偷猎者最近使用过一些旧集装箱。偏远的 Dakobo 村与世隔绝是一个主要为基督教的村庄，该村村民报告说，他们经常受到中非复兴人民阵线的骚扰，货物被盗，当地村民遭到捆绑和殴打。然而，除 Dakobo 外，当地居民没有报告中非复兴人民阵线分子进行任何虐待。<sup>196</sup>

#### 中非复兴人民阵线自由行动<sup>197</sup>

163. 专家小组记录了武装人员的重要行动，他们携带 56-2 和 AKM 型突击步枪，骑着摩托车，朝恩代莱和卡加-班多罗行动，特别是在恩代莱和乍得边境之间的公路上。

164. 专家小组在蒂里(恩代莱以北 90 公里)核查了两名骑着摩托车的中非复兴人民阵线武装分子，他们戴着传统的头巾，并携带 56-2 型突击步枪。在 Zoukoutouniala 和 Zobossinda 之间距恩代莱 48 公里处，专家小组注意到有三个骑着摩托车的人，他们携带着一支 AKM 型突击步枪和一支 R4 Vector 型突击步枪。<sup>198</sup> 专家小组约谈的一些武装人员也宣称，中非复兴人民阵线刚刚在沿该路线的不同检查站安置了 37 人。<sup>199</sup>

165. 8 月 25 日，Bangbali 村的村民告知专家小组，几天前，中非复兴人民阵线/争取正义与和平爱国者同盟的成员离开了村庄向南方移动。<sup>200</sup> 他们还告知，7 月，

<sup>190</sup> 在 Koundi 检查站检查每个装有 2 至 8 发子弹的弹盒。

<sup>191</sup> 见附件 7 的照片。

<sup>192</sup> 2015 年 8 月 25 日在 Bangbali(离恩代莱 60 公里)采访地方当局官员；详见附件 9.78。

<sup>193</sup> 详见附件 9.79 和附件 4.12 中前塞雷卡武装分子的照片。

<sup>194</sup> 关于中非生产的猎枪弹药情况，见附件 1.11，第 12 和 13 段。

<sup>195</sup> 见附件 9.80 中的资料来源。

<sup>196</sup> 2015 年 9 月 27 日前往 Monovo 和 Dakobo 的特派团。

<sup>197</sup> 见附件 4.13 中前塞雷卡分子开皮卡车和骑摩托车的照片。

<sup>198</sup> 见附件第 4.13 和 4.14 中前塞雷卡运动的照片。

<sup>199</sup> 2015 年 9 月 25 日前往 Bangbali 的特派团。

<sup>200</sup> 2015 年 9 月 25 日在 Bangbali 会见了村民。

30 名属于中非复兴人民阵线的武装人员离开了 Léména 村，前往卡加-班多罗。<sup>201</sup> 守卫 Akroussoulbak 检查站的武装人员和平民告诉专家小组，自 9 月中旬，50 至 100 名中非复兴人民阵线分子按 Abdoulaye Hissène 的指示向南方移动。<sup>202</sup> Boulkina 村民向专家小组证实了这一信息，在 Boulkina 村，有 40 名武装分子按 Hissène 的指示前往恩代莱。

166. 专家小组在 Bamingui-Bangoran 逗留的 12 天期间，观察到三辆满载武装分子的卡车，以及多达 250 辆摩托车(其中一些是偷来的车辆)，每辆车有二至三名武装人员。他们离开恩代莱前往卡加-班多罗，共有 600 名战斗人员。<sup>203</sup>

### 开发利用自然资源

#### 野生生物

167. 9 月下旬，专家小组在通向乍得边境三条线路上访问的村民报告有武装人员行动，他们被确定为“金戈威德”或偷猎者，他们带着满载物品的驴子，来自苏丹边境或来自乍得边境。目击者说看到由 8 至 12 人组成的团体，他们讲阿拉伯语，戴着传统头巾，并携带 AK 型突击步枪和火箭助推榴弹发射器。<sup>204</sup>

#### 钻石和黄金

168. 在恩代莱，中非复兴人民阵线还建立了并行的采矿管理体系，每年向收购商发放牌照，费用为 250 000 非洲法郎(500 美元)，<sup>205</sup> 并向手工采矿者发放证书，费用为每年 30 000 非洲法郎(60 美元)。<sup>206</sup> 在恩代莱的中非复兴人民阵线采矿大队负责十几个矿区，在恩代莱周围，但一些矿区在东南方向最远至 100 公里外接近伊皮的地方。平均每个矿区大约有 10 个手工采矿者，每个采矿者雇用数十名矿工。<sup>207</sup> 他们在恩代莱卖给 4 个 2015 年已支付牌照费的收购商。

169. 在恩代莱的主要收购商属于一个中非复兴人民阵线税收委员会，委员会自 3 月初以来开始独立于卡加-班多罗的中非复兴人民阵线关税机构运作。<sup>208</sup> 收购

<sup>201</sup> 2015 年 9 月 26 日在 Léména 会见了地方当局官员。

<sup>202</sup> 2015 年 9 月 26 日会见了当地居民和在 Akroussoulbak 和 Koundi 把守检查站的前塞雷卡分子。

<sup>203</sup> 2015 年 9 月 24 日至 10 月 2 日在恩代莱会见了国际部队和当地居民。

<sup>204</sup> 2015 年 9 月 24 日至 10 月 5 日在 Djamassinda、Birbatouma、Bangbali、Manga 1 和 Manga 2 以及 Dakabo Akroussoulbak 会见了村民；2015 年 9 月 29 日在恩代莱采访了苏丹。

<sup>205</sup> 2015 年 9 月 24 日在恩代莱会见了钻石收购商。

<sup>206</sup> 附件 4.15 载有中非复兴人民阵线采矿旅颁发的一份手工采矿证书副本。

<sup>207</sup> 2015 年 9 月 25 日在 Léména 会见了手工采矿人员。

<sup>208</sup> 2015 年 3 月 7 日机密报告。

商告诉专家小组，他把钻石卖给在布里亚的受制裁实体 **Badica**。在旱季，来自恩代莱的钻石也被卖给来自乍得和苏丹的收购商。<sup>209</sup>

#### 牲畜

170. 在卡加-班多罗、卡博和姆布雷，中非共和国爱国运动和中非复兴人民阵线在谈判一项资源共享协议，允许 **Al-Khatim** 在卡加-班多罗检查站收税，中非复兴人民阵线则向经营者、商人和店主强行收费。<sup>210</sup>

171. 专家小组注意到，中非复兴人民阵线区指挥官的顾问 **Adam Moussa** 在卡加-班多罗向一辆运送牛的卡车收钱(见附件 4.16)。他解释说，商人每头牛必须交纳 20 000 非洲法郎，每天有 80 至 100 头牛通过该镇。这些收费每年共计 5.76 亿非洲法郎(相当于 100 万美元)。

172. 在卡博，塞雷卡之前的地方管理当局每月从市场活动就收费 700 000 非洲法郎(1 200 美元)，每头牛的通行证收费 25 000 非洲法郎(40 美元)。<sup>211</sup> 仅依据乍得南部(芒杜尔区)**Mo ĩsala** 地区牛的大致数量，<sup>212</sup> 专家小组估计，中非共和国爱国运动和中非复兴人民阵线控制的牲畜迁徙税收每年可产生 120 万美元收入。**Moussa Maouloud** 代表努尔丁·阿达姆对控制卡博的兴趣，肯定与卡博在牲畜迁徙方面的战略位置有关。<sup>213</sup>

#### 前塞雷卡派系的武器

173. 前塞雷卡武装分子主要配备的是各种来源的 **AK** 型突击步枪，<sup>214</sup> 但专家小组也注意到一些其他类型的突击步枪、手榴弹、火箭推进榴弹发射器和火箭榴弹弹药。<sup>215</sup> 前塞雷卡分子拥有的武器都是旧的，无法辨认序列号。专家小组还检查了一支序列号被故意抹去的 **AKM** 型步枪。

<sup>209</sup> 2015 年 9 月 24 日在恩代莱会见了钻石收购商；在 2015 年 11 月 6 日与另一名钻石收购商的电话交谈中得到证实。

<sup>210</sup> 2015 年 5 月 29 日在卡加-班多罗会见了军事消息来源人士。

<sup>211</sup> 见附件 4.17 所载中非复兴人民阵线在 2015 年对 **Moyen-Sido** 的一个牧民代表的任用书。

<sup>212</sup> 详见附件 9.81。

<sup>213</sup> 忠于阿达姆的前塞雷卡人员在卡博被任命为区指挥官，他们是前乍得军队 **Naha** 上校，以及 **Hassan Salleh**(又名 **Oumar Kafin** “将军”)前乍得副省长和 **Hassan Ginderu**；2015 年 7 月 29 日机密报告。

<sup>214</sup> 见附件 4.18 中的照片。

<sup>215</sup> 详见附件 9.82 和附件 4.12 所载中非复兴人民阵线武装分子的照片，其中一人将手榴弹挂在军服上。

174. 即便武器似乎以个人为单位发放或分配到具体岗位(检查站或法治、海关、水利和林业以及税收等执行平行行政管理职能者),但武器短缺迫使中非复兴人民阵线把武器从检查站调给受命在卡加-班多罗集结的人员。<sup>216</sup>

#### 纳纳-格里比齐省的“反砍刀”组织团体

175. 尽管前塞雷卡(中非共和国爱国运动和中非复兴人民阵线)人员控制了纳纳-格里比齐省大部分地区,“反砍刀”组织团体也在同一地区开展活动。该组织由不同地方指挥官指挥,但隶属于统一的全国协调机构。

176. Max Narbé(别名 Nabbré或 Narqué)属于 Mokom 的“反砍刀”组织,在“Yves”下台后指挥在卡加-班多罗和姆布雷的“反砍刀”派别。在北部的“反砍刀”组织团体的装备,通常为手工制造的猎枪以及手榴弹。除 Blakadja 有一例外情况,专家小组没有观察到其他武装分子公开携带武器。<sup>217</sup>

177. 在卡加-班多罗至姆布雷之间,数个村庄在当地“反砍刀”组织团体控制下。“Gauthier”控制着 Doukouma 村及周边地区,并受 Max 的领导。<sup>218</sup>“Pelé”隶属于 Mokom 的体系,是 Blakadja 的区指挥官,Maroka 村由 Pata “上校”控制。<sup>219</sup>

178. 在姆布雷与巴卡拉之间,专家小组在 Mboussa 会见了 Kouazingo Gomez。Kouazingo 来自锡布,控制着 Mboussa 周边地区,包括 Kagbi 的金矿。<sup>220</sup> Kouazingo 也受 Mokom 的领导。Kouazingo 认识在姆布雷的中非共和国爱国运动区指挥官。<sup>221</sup>在同一线路上,区指挥官“DKZ”(又名“Décabouna”)是来自博桑戈阿的一名中非士兵,<sup>222</sup>8月15日,他在试图抢劫一辆载有货物和武器的卡车时,在 Morabanda 村被杀。<sup>223</sup>

179. 2月1日至9月30月,专家小组记录了4起不同的“反砍刀”组织分子在姆布雷地区攻击平民的事件,导致13名平民被杀害,地方当局受到威胁以及商用车辆被抢掠。<sup>224</sup>

<sup>216</sup> 2015年8月19日和9月28日前往卡加班多拉、姆布雷和恩代莱地区的特派团;详见附件9.83。

<sup>217</sup> 2015年9月26日和10月2日前往 Akroussoulbak 和 Doum 检查站的特派团。

<sup>218</sup> 2015年8月19日采访了 Gauthier Doukouma。

<sup>219</sup> 2015年8月19日在 Blakadja 的采访。

<sup>220</sup> 根据 Kouazingo 所述,黄金曾在姆布雷出售,现在班巴里出售;Ali Hafis 确认 Kouazingo 控制金矿;2015年8月23日在卡加班多拉会见了 Ali Hafis。

<sup>221</sup> 见附件4.19中的照片。

<sup>222</sup> 2015年1月16日在卡加班多拉会见了国际部队、地方当局和中非复兴人民阵线的代表。

<sup>223</sup> 2015年8月23日在卡加班多拉会见了 Ali Hafis。

<sup>224</sup> 专家小组关于事件的数据库,2015年10月23日检索;在联合国归档。

180. 专家小组还在实地访问卡加-班多罗至姆布雷和姆布雷至巴卡拉的地区期间，调查了数起此类攻击事件。

181. 8月12日，在Ndenga村，一个据报来自姆布雷的“反砍刀”组织团体在教堂执事的家门前割下一名妇女的耳朵，并将一名男子打死，然后把他的尸体扔到了学校的厕所(见附件4.20)。同一天，在Sueur村，“反砍刀”组织分子抢掠了一辆抛锚的前塞雷卡运营的卡车。

182. 从7月10至12日，应新任县长的请求，前塞雷卡解除了姆布雷周边地区的检查站。检查站一解除，“反砍刀”组织团体就袭击并抢劫了Marona村和Jafara村，并攻击了一辆属于前塞雷卡的车辆，抢劫了所有物品和430万非洲法郎(7300美元)。

183. 8月15日，“反砍刀”组织分子在Maorka杀害了5名平民(一名儿童、两名男子和两名妇女)。<sup>225</sup> 在Gbakon Bangu，专家小组约谈了3名年轻人，据报他们被12名“反砍刀”组织分子绑架。他们14个小时后获释，其间，他们朝着姆布雷方向走了50公里，以运送在村庄中掠夺的物品。

### C. 乍得安全和军事部队个别成员入侵中非共和国

184. 专家小组在2014年报告了在中非共和国与乍得交界的西北部发生的一些安全事件(见S/2014/762，第42至46段)。自2014年5月11日关闭中非共和国与乍得边界到2015年10月1日，这些事件至少造成86名平民死亡，18人受伤，以及一些人失踪，并迫使居住在边境地区各社区流离失所。<sup>226</sup>

185. 专家小组在调查期间访问了Mia-Pendé、Markounda和Kabo县，以及纳纳·格里比济省和巴明吉-班戈兰省，采访了受害者、证人和施害者，并收集了佐证证据。<sup>227</sup>

186. 专家小组收集的证据证明，乍得安全部队和武装部队个别成员对中非国民犯下侵犯人权行为，包括杀害平民、掠夺和破坏平民财产、强迫流离失所、敲诈、非法拘留和侵犯在乍得的中非难民的重返权利。

187. 自2014年5月以来，乍得安全部队成员经常袭击了Bembéré、Békia、Bépiakassé、马昆达和Dokabi各村(米亚-彭代县和马昆达县)。<sup>228</sup> 以相同的惯技

<sup>225</sup> 2015年8月19日至24日前往卡加班多罗和姆布雷的特派团；见附件4.20中的照片。

<sup>226</sup> 专家小组关于事件的数据库，2015年10月23日检索；在联合国归档。

<sup>227</sup> 2015年4月11日至14日前往马昆达特派团；2015年5月25日至29日和6月29日至7月3日前往Kabo和Moyen-Sido特派团；2015年6月21日至23日前往Paoua和Bémal特派团；2015年8月19日至24日前往Kaga Bandoro和Mbrès特派团；2015年9月24日至10月5日前往Ndélé和乍得边界特派团。

<sup>228</sup> 详见附件9.84和附件4.21中Bépiakassé被毁的照片。

对这一地区进行袭击：在向空中开枪赶走居民后，身穿军装的武装男子于凌晨进入村庄进行掠夺和摧毁。

### 米亚-彭代县

188. 在米亚-彭代县收集的证词一致表明，施害者被认出是驻扎在 **Békoninga** 边界哨所的乍得安全部队成员。经常在边界关闭前越过边界的证人确认这些袭击者，其中包括乍得国内安全局警察局长 **Madjiademngar N’Gamjadjibe**。<sup>229</sup> 此外，袭击者的制服和武器与乍得安全部队和军队的类似。<sup>230</sup>

189. 6月22日，专家组在场时，警察局长 **N’ Gamjadjibe** 请中非稳定团向位于主要道路上的边境哨所以南两公里处 **Bembéré** 村民发出一个信息，指控他们偷窃位于 **Békoninga** 东部7公里处 **Anja** 村(乍得)5头牛。该信息向村民表明，如不立即归还这些牛，乍得安全部队将“毫不留情地”袭击该村。<sup>231</sup> 第二天，上午5时30分，身着军装的乍得武装男子袭击了 **Bépikassé** 村。<sup>232</sup>

### 马昆达县

190. 马昆达县也经历了乍得安全部队和军队成员实施的暴力行为。在最近发生对马昆达和 **Dokabi** 各村袭击事件中，袭击者是驻扎在纳纳河的乍得军队成员。他们是非洲主导的中非共和国国际支助团(中非支助团)乍得特遣队的前士兵，并继续穿着同样的制服，自称是“中非支助团”。<sup>233</sup>

191. 根据4月11日在马昆达收集的证词，4月5日，从边界乍得一侧朝马昆达发射的一枚火箭榴弹，击中小学附近一地点。专家组观察到所造成的破坏(见附件 4.25)。<sup>234</sup> 一周之后，马昆达的革命与正义组织民兵与乍得的武装男子爆发了战斗。据参与该战斗的一名革命与正义组织成员所述，一名乍得士兵被打死，并发现了一件有乍得军队标识的套头衫(见附件 4.26)。<sup>235</sup>

192. 专家组走访了沿乍得边界的马昆达东北部的 **Bdé I**、**Bdé II**、**Békinga**、**Galé II** 和 **Manda** 各地。3月11日和12日，当地村民目睹在沿纳纳巴里亚河乍得河岸的道路上7部有乍得军队标识的小卡车，以及大约20名身穿军装的武装男

<sup>229</sup> 见附件 4.22 中的照片，并详见附件 9.85。

<sup>230</sup> 详见附件 9.86 和附件 4.24 中的照片。

<sup>231</sup> 见附件 4.23 所载 2015 年 5 月 19 日一名乍得官员给 **Bembéré** 的信函。

<sup>232</sup> 2015 年 6 月 24 日与在保瓦的军事消息来源人士的电话交谈；详见附件 9.87。

<sup>233</sup> 2014 年 12 月 7 日前往乍得 **Komra** 和 **Sido** 村庄特派团；2015 年 6 月 22 日在 **Békoninga** 会见了乍得安全部队。在会见期间，内部安全事务专员告诉中非稳定团要非常小心地寻求与乍得军队建立联系，因为有指示对任何接近边界的人开枪。

<sup>234</sup> 2015 年 4 月 7 日机密报告。

<sup>235</sup> 详见附件 9.88。

子。受害者认出同一批人于 3 月 12 日跨过河，朝天上开枪，并在 Dokabi 村进行掠抢和烧毁房子。

193. 专家小组观察到在 Dokabi 至少有 15 座房屋被烧毁，有些墙上有弹孔，地上有发射出来的弹夹(见附件 4.27)。专家小组还收集到证词称，除了所有的牛之外，还有 5 辆自行车和一辆摩托车被偷。

194. 据居住在马昆达和 Dokabi 之间的村民说，在过去 10 年，专家小组听到的此类袭击每年都要发生一、两次。<sup>236</sup>

#### 乍得安全部队和军队违反国际人道主义法

195. 在卡博县，从在乍得的原中非难民收集到的证词突出表明，他们在试图返回中非共和国时遭到乍得的安全部队和军队开枪或殴打。据卡博县和恩代莱省的受害人和证人说，跨越边界的平民不分昼夜地受到不分青红皂白的射击，包括妇女和儿童在内。<sup>237</sup>

196. 在锡多，来自边界乍得一侧 Moyen Sido 对面的村庄中，中非共和国难民向乍得当局表示打算返回，由于边界关闭，他们一直被剥夺重返权利。但负责特定边境哨所的乍得安全部队收款后允许一些难民在特定的日期和时间过境。<sup>238</sup> 然而，据证人和受害者亲属所述，支付这种非法收费也无法防止难民在过境时被杀、受伤或被拘留。<sup>239</sup>

197. 乍得安全部长 Abderahim Bireme Hamid 于 2015 年 5 月 19 日发出一份正式电报，确认边界仍然“严格”关闭，但指示部署乍得安全部队和武装部队停止向靠近边界的平民“故意”开火(见附件 4.28)。

198. 地方消息来源人士和在 Moyen-Sidod 的前塞雷卡分子的记录表明，自 2014 年 5 月 12 日以来，中非共和国难民在乍得出入境时被杀(42 起案件)和受伤(140 起案件)，以及被非法拘留、骚扰和抢劫的案件(见附件 4.29 和 4.30)。

199. 在 2014 年 5 月 11 日关闭边界之后，中非平民在巴明吉-班戈兰省的 Ngarba 和 Massamai Keping 边境哨所被拒绝进入乍得境内。相比之下，只要乍得商人向中非复兴人民阵线付税，便可允许他们进入中非共和国。同时，据报乍得安全部队和军队在中非共和国境内 25 公里处建立了临时检查站。<sup>240</sup>

<sup>236</sup> 2015 年 4 月 11 日专家小组 Bédé 一和 Bédé 二、Békinga, Galé 二, Manda 和 Dokabi 进行的访谈。

<sup>237</sup> 2015 年 7 月 1 日在 Moyen-Sido, 以及 9 月 26 日和 10 月 2 日在 Zobossinda、Akroussoulbak、Boul-Kinia 和 Doum 进行的访谈。

<sup>238</sup> 2015 年 7 月 1 日和 5 月 27 日在 Moyen-Sido 进行的访谈；详见附件 9.89。

<sup>239</sup> 详见附件 9.90。

<sup>240</sup> 2015 年 9 月 25 日在 Manga 和 Tiri, 以及 9 月 26 日和 10 月 2 日在 Zobossinda, Akroussoulbak, Boul-Kinia 和 Doum 会见了前塞雷卡团体成员与当地民众；2015 年 9 月 28 日在恩代莱采访了 Senoussi Soumaine。

## 五. 西部区域和与喀麦隆接壤的边界<sup>241</sup>

200. 米斯基内领导的中非人民民主阵线是中非共和国西部的安全威胁。该团体有多达 70 名武装男子，他们在主要补给路上抢劫车辆，以及在主要补给路喀麦隆北部边界沿线对富拉尼族牧民和偏僻村庄进行抢掠袭击。该团体还对多次劫持人质负责，其中包括两个不同的喀麦隆国民团体。附件 5.1 载有关于中非人民民主阵线的案例研究。

201. 中非稳定团部队和中非共和国安全部队难以保护商业车队免受中非人民民主阵线和其他犯罪团伙的致命袭击，促使卡车司机 6 月、8 月和 10 月在喀麦隆边境城镇 Garoua-Boulaï 举行罢工。5 月以来在首府布阿尔(纳纳-曼贝雷省)西北部的 Niem-Y d é wa-Besson 线路一带部署中非共和国武装部队，提供了某种程度的安全，但仅限于镇中心地区。Ndal é 部族领导的“反砍刀”组织民兵在这一地区的存在，使安全局势进一步复杂化。

202. 西部另一个热点是在偏远但有许多牧场和钻石的 Amada-Gaza 高原(曼贝雷-卡代省)地带。2014 年年中以来，“反砍刀”组织民兵在来自 Berb é rati 的 Nice Demowance 的指挥下控制了这片领土，损害了这一地区富拉尼族牧民的利益(见 S/2014/762，第 147 段)。武装起来的富拉尼人于 5 月进行报复，袭击了喀麦隆边界一带的几个村庄。

203. 西北部的突发暴力事件并没有影响到 Nola、Berb é rati 和 Carnot 镇(曼贝雷-卡代省)西南部的钻石生产地带。但武装团体活动依然存在，包括在一些钻石矿址。“反砍刀”组织协调员 Chrysostome Yap é (又名“Chicki Chicki”)于 6 月 21 日被捕后越狱返回 Berb é rati，可能会进一步危及其中一些矿址的安全。

204. 同样，“Rombhot 上校”8 月与其武装民兵一起从班吉转往 Mba ñ i (Lobaye)，这可能导致其部队再次介入自然资源部门。在同一地区，一个以猎用来复枪武装起来的非正规警卫队在 Ndolobo 一个新发现的金矿成立。

### A. 对中非人民民主阵线扩散的反应

205. Ndal é 部族出现“反砍刀”组织民兵在 2015 年初后限制了中非人民民主阵线的控制地区。部族成员在朝喀麦隆边界的 Niem-Y d é wa-Besson 线路地带的布阿尔首府东北部地区活动，承诺保护富拉尼族牧民不受中非人民民主阵线的袭击。<sup>242</sup> 但该部族还粗暴进行武装抢牛，并对牧民以及经过其控制区的其他游民进行课税。<sup>243</sup>

<sup>241</sup> 见附件 5 中的地图。

<sup>242</sup> 2014 年 4 月 14 日在班吉会见了 Adamou Ndal é。

<sup>243</sup> 2015 年 4 月 12 日在北布阿尔会见了牧民。

206. 由于其军事头目 Marcel Ndalé 被捕, 其政治代表 Adamou Ndalé 和 Michel Belo 在 5 月参加了班吉论坛, Ndalé 民兵的活动在 4 月开始减少。该团体还表示愿意参加解除武装、复员和重返社会方案, 并与部署在该地区的中非军队协作。<sup>244</sup> Marcel Ndalé 在班吉 Ngaragba 监狱越狱后返回该地区, 可能再次引发该团体的暴力活动和复仇暴力行为, 包括对富拉尼族进行报复。

207. 5 月, 中非共和国国防部长在 Kou (20 名)、Besson(20 名)和 Niem-Y d é wa(22 名)共部署了 62 名中非共和国武装部队人员。<sup>245</sup> 虽然中非共和国武装部队的部署有助于确保这些地区免受中非人民民主阵线和其他武装团体的攻击和勒索, 但由于中非共和国武装部队的能力不足, 这些地区之间各区仍不安全。<sup>246</sup> 此外, 士兵的日常生活完全依靠当地居民,<sup>247</sup> 这危害了与当地村民的关系。<sup>248</sup> 中非共和国武装部队人员数次被控滥用权力或行为如同其他武装团体。<sup>249</sup>

## B. 跨界贩运猎用弹药

208. 喀麦隆边界沿线经常出现缉获和逮捕的情况表明, 猎用弹药贩运继续从喀麦隆流入中非共和国, 违反了武器禁运和中非国家法律。中非共和国冲突各方都使用猎用弹药, 有时是以自制形式使其更加致命。<sup>250</sup>

209. 1 月 8 日, 喀麦隆在边境城镇 Kenzou 的当局逮捕了 Roger Nga iloua(又名“Ousmane Roger”), 专家小组确定其是向 Berb é rati 的“反砍刀”组织出售武器的弹药贩运者(S/2014/762, 第 167 段和附件 53)。他拥有从 Dollah Yankam 的 Batouri 分店购买的 4 500 个 12 毫米口径的弹夹。<sup>251</sup> 50 发 12 毫米的弹药是用 7.62 毫米口径的子弹改装的, 与在 Berb é rati 看到的类似。<sup>252</sup> 在开展调查期间, Nga iloua 在 Bertoua 被拘留。

210. 虽然 Dollah Yankam 的 Batouri 分店已取下有其名称的招牌, 并改用一个表明是武器商店的普通招牌, 现仍开门营业。<sup>253</sup> 店主承认, 该商店仍为 Yankam

<sup>244</sup> 2014 年 6 月 20 日在 Niem 会见了 Ibrahim Ndalé。

<sup>245</sup> 见附件 5; 中非稳定团据说不了解这些部署。

<sup>246</sup> 2015 年 6 月 20 日在 Niem 会见了地方政府官员; 详见附件 9.91。

<sup>247</sup> 2015 年 6 月 5 日在 Bouar 会见了中非军官。

<sup>248</sup> 2015 年 5 月 29 日和 6 月 5 日在 Bouar 会见了国际人员。

<sup>249</sup> 2015 年 5 月 28 日在 Bouar 会见了国际人员。

<sup>250</sup> 见附件 5.3 和第二节。

<sup>251</sup> Nga iloua 在被捕时发现的猎枪弹药销售发票见附件 5.4。Nga iloua 和没收的猎枪弹药的照片见附件 5.5。

<sup>252</sup> 2015 年 6 月 16 日在 Kenzou 会见了喀麦隆的陆军上尉, 扣押的弹药照片见附件 5.6。

<sup>253</sup> 2015 年 8 月 17 日会见了武器商店隔壁商店店主。Dollah Yankam 的 Batouri 分店照片见附件 5.7。

所有, 专家小组证实其使用的印章与 Nga iloua 被捕时所持发票上的印章一样。<sup>254</sup> 店主在 8 月 17 日确认, 由于数周前省长指示武器商店向个人客户出售弹夹不要超过 250 个, 销售量减少了。他无法提供有关向 Nga iloua 销售的任何情况, 包括 Nga iloua 在 2014 年 7 次从 Yankam 购买了 3 000 至 4 500 个弹夹(共 24 250 发子弹)的情况,<sup>255</sup> 也无法解释为何该店接受 Nga iloua 已过期的由中非共和国当局 2011 年 9 月 19 日签发的进口授权书。<sup>256</sup>

211. 7 月 8 日, 喀麦隆领土管理和权力下放部一名代表告知专家小组, 由于实施武器禁运, 该部已限制对现有猎用弹药零售商的供应, 并暂停在喀麦隆东部发放新的零售许可证。但专家小组不了解对 Dollah Yankam 或东部地区任何其他零售商的任何法律诉讼情况。该代表还说, 该部正在提高东部地方当局对武器禁运的认识。

212. 应当指出, 安全部门在 Kenzou 检查和截住货物之前, 喀麦隆 Batouri 海关当局已授权 Nga iloua 出口弹药。可以假定, 喀麦隆海关当局还授权 Ngaidoua 先前出口 2014 年从 Yankam 购买的猎用弹药。

213. Nga iloua 被捕以及限制喀麦隆东部销售猎用弹药, 仅仅可能减缓向中非共和国贩运弹药。贩运 200-250 个少量弹夹仍有利可图, 专家小组记录了中非共和国两起缉获的案件(见附件 5.10 和 5.11)。

214. 专家小组还记录了中非共和国其他地区缉获的大量猎用弹药。<sup>257</sup> 中非稳定团 3 月 9 日在布里亚(上科托省)缉获了主要由 MACC 公司在刚果黑角港制造的一大批 12 毫米口径猎枪弹夹, 专家小组 4 月 14 日进行了检查。<sup>258</sup> 来自刚果的猎用弹药大部分是用船沿乌班吉河贩运到中非共和国(见第五节)。

215. 在博桑戈阿(瓦姆-彭代省), 中非稳定团在 1 月至 3 月期间缉获了大量 12 毫米口径猎枪弹夹, 其中有一箱弹夹是法国公司 Nobel Sport 生产的。应专家小组的要求, Nobel Sport 得以追查该箱弹夹是该公司 2014 年 9 月 3 日出口发运给雅温得的零售商 Ane Rouge 的货物。

216. 在桑加河三国保护区中非共和国部分,<sup>259</sup> 公园园警在世界自然基金会的支助下, 几乎每天都能从偷猎者中缉获猎枪及其弹药。最近已缉获和收缴了若干

<sup>254</sup> 进口许可证的副本见附件 5.8。

<sup>255</sup> 销售记录见附件 5.9。

<sup>256</sup> 附件 5.4 中的发票提及 Nga iloua 2011 年的贸易许可证。进口许可证本身可参见 S/2014/762, 附件 52。

<sup>257</sup> 在 Bouar 和 Baoro, 中非稳定团还从“反砍刀”组织分子缴获了一些手工猎枪和猎枪弹药, 但没有说明来源; 检查 2015 年 6 月 4 日在 Baoro, 以及 5 月 28 日和 29 日在 Bouar 进行了检查。

<sup>258</sup> 这些没收的弹药在宪兵将其从布里亚运送班吉过程中失踪(见第一节)。

<sup>259</sup> 见第 2196(2015)决议第 1 段提到桑加河三国保护区; 该地区地图可查阅 [www.dzanga-sangha.org/node/309](http://www.dzanga-sangha.org/node/309)。

产地国的 7.62x39 毫米、7.62x54 毫米、7.62x51 毫米、5.56x45 毫米、7.5x54 毫米和 9 毫米弹药。<sup>260</sup>

#### 查获的其他武器和弹药

217. 自 2014 年 9 月部署以来,中非稳定团在西部查获了少量的常规武器和弹药,并且由专家小组进行了核查。关于这些核查的结果详见附件 5.12。

### C. 自然资源

#### 钻石

##### 部分解除金伯利资格暂停措施

218. 7 月 17 日,金伯利进程通过了一项行政决定,授权恢复中非共和国“合规区”毛坯钻石的出口。<sup>261</sup> 根据决定所附的业务框架,此类合规区包括符合以下条件的县:

(a) 在政府控制之下,特别是领地管理当局、矿业管理当局、反欺诈特勤局、宪兵和警察控制之下;

(b) 没有系统的武装团体活动影响钻石生产和贸易;

(c) 安全状况允许物品和人员自由流动。

219. 由中非共和国当局、民间社会和工业界代表组成的全国委员会将评估拟定各县的安全和合规情况,并在国际上与金伯利进程三方监测组交流其认定结果和具体理由,以供审查。截至编写本报告时,后续工作委员会正在评估涵盖西部 8 个县(Gamboula, Berbérati, Carnot, Nola, Sosso-Nakombo, Dédé-Mokoumba, Bambio and Boda)的所谓的“绿区”的局势。

220. 根据业务框架,在评估合规情况的过程中,后续工作委员会有责任配合中非稳定团和专家小组交流相关信息。9 月,后续工作委员会要求专家小组提供资料,专家小组通过电话和电子邮件通报了 6 月和 8 月在对 5 个拟定县进行实地访问期间收集的相关信息(见下文)。

#### 钻石与安全

221. 武装团体存在于中非共和国西部为数不少的矿区,其中有一些是在拟议的绿区内外。在 Amada-Gaza 县绿区之外,“反砍刀”组织和富拉尼族民兵在争夺矿区的控制权。Carnot 的采矿当局说,他们无法进入该地区,但声称,钻石是通过

<sup>260</sup> 来源于世界自然基金会/Aires protégées de Dzanga Sangha 2015 年 4 月 27 日至 6 月 24 日提供的关于收缴的武器弹药数据表格;在联合国归档。

<sup>261</sup> <http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car>。

喀麦隆边境城镇 Gbiti 被偷运出境的(见 S/2014/762, 第 132 段), 也可以通过 Berbérati 和 Carnot 买卖钻石。

222. Gadzi 县的 Sasélé 是在拟议的绿区之外的另一个此类地区或地点。6 月, 来自 Carnot 的反欺诈特勤局特工注意到, 有 15 名来自 Yaloké、由“Le Bleu”指挥的“反砍刀”组织民兵参与了袭击手工采矿者的行为(见 S/2014/762, 第 140 段)。反欺诈特勤局特工还确认, 手工采矿者组建了被称为“Mama Drogba”的自卫民兵组织(见 S/2014/762, 第 129 段)。

223. 在拟议的绿区, 前下士(又名“General Dalé”)指挥的“反砍刀”组织民兵在 Sosso-Nakombo 县 Balu 矿区参与了钻石开采, 他在那里强行从采掘者手里没收了砾石。<sup>262</sup> 采矿合作社代表称, Dale 的真实姓名是 Crépin Messamba。作为 Sosso-Nakombo 地区指挥官, Messamba 于 7 月 15 日写信给当地一名矿主, 强占了他的一辆摩托车, 供其个人使用(见附件 5.13)。绿区另一个存在问题的采矿区是 Nola 县的 Salo, Ferdinand Nobadji 指挥的武装“反砍刀”组织参与了非法开采钻石行为。<sup>263</sup> 政府对 Salo 和 Sosso-Nakombo 的控制仅限于宪兵。反欺诈特勤局尚未进入该地区巡逻。

224. 若干“反砍刀”组织成员, 包括现役战斗人员, 取得了手工采矿者或挖掘者身份卡。反欺诈特勤局 Berbérati 办事处指出, Démowance、Steve Private Séré gaza 和 Maximais Vobouadé 已经获得了许可证。<sup>264</sup> Démowance 正在参与 Amada Gaza 的行动, 4 月袭击了喀麦隆边境城镇 Gbiti。<sup>265</sup> 虽然 Séré gaza 和 Vobouadé 自称已经复员, 但他们与 Démowance 和逃犯“Chicki Chicki”(于 2015 年 6 月在 Berbérati 被捕)有密切接触。<sup>266</sup> 在 Carnot, 8 名已知的“反砍刀”组织成员获得了许可证, 据反欺诈特勤局称, 这些人已经复员。<sup>267</sup>

225. 穆斯林人口, 包括收购商和手工采矿者往往不让搬到市中心。虽然最近在 Berbérati、Nola 和 Carnot 重新安置境内流离失所者和难民方面取得了显著进展, 但穆斯林收购商强调说, 他们仍然害怕返回家园或进入矿区, 因为会面临当地居

<sup>262</sup> 2015 年 6 月 17 日在 Berbérati 会见了民间社会代表; 2015 年 5 月 1 日在 Berbérati 电话采访了一名采矿合作社代表。

<sup>263</sup> 2015 年 6 月 15 日在 Nola 会见了中非军官; 2015 年 6 月 16 日在 Nola 会见了手工采矿者。

<sup>264</sup> 2015 年 6 月 17 日在 Berbérati 会见了特别反欺诈股地区指挥官; 见附件 5.14 中 Vobouadé 挖掘者卡的副本。

<sup>265</sup> 2015 年 6 月 18 日在 Carnot 会见了特别反欺诈股地区指挥官; 2015 年 8 月 18 日在 Gbiti 会见了居民。

<sup>266</sup> 2015 年 6 月 17 日在 Berbérati 会见了 Vobuade 和 Yapélé。

<sup>267</sup> 2015 年 6 月 18 日在 Carnot 会见了特别反欺诈股地区指挥官。

民的攻击、警察骚扰和“反砍刀”组织民兵的威胁。<sup>268</sup> 2015年专家小组在一些地区记录的安全事件的确与钻石业者被袭击有关。附件 5.15 载有在中非共和国西南部发生的一些安全事件，包括用黄色特别标示的与钻石有关的事件。

226. 在若干地点接触的当地采矿者对所谓“阿拉伯”收购商的反应特别强烈，他们称这些人是乍得和苏丹籍，据称曾与塞雷卡分子勾结。<sup>269</sup> 出于安全原因，Nola 的大多数穆斯林收购商居住在中非稳定团基地附近，Berbérati 的一些穆斯林收购商与新近部署的中非士兵作出了保护安排。<sup>270</sup>

227. 少数西非裔收购商(主要是毛里塔尼亚人)已开始前往边远矿区，进行钻石投资和采购。<sup>271</sup> 在生产方面，专家小组观察到，穆斯林和非穆斯林采掘者只在中非稳定团和当地安全部队的密切监督下在 Boda 外边的一个矿址合作(见附件 5.16)。

228. “反砍刀”组织活动只对拟议绿区各县的钻石生产和贸易有附带影响。但是，如果众所周知的“反砍刀”组织领导人返回其原有的势力范围，2015年9月在班吉发生的事件，尤其是 Ngaragba 越狱事件，确有可能导致更系统地参与钻石生产和贸易。例如，“Chicki Chicki”<sup>272</sup> 曾企图解救仍被拘留的“反砍刀”组织在 Berbérati 的同伙。2014年，他定期前往 Sosso-Nakombo，从当地采矿者手中勒索钱财，并与 Berbérati 的黎巴嫩钻石采购商 Hassan Fawaz 合作过。<sup>273</sup>

有记录的钻石贸易和尽职调查

229. 班吉的采购商行合法购买和储存西部拟议“绿区”生产的大量钻石。虽然没有系统的“反砍刀”组织活动影响生产和贸易，但是从有许可证却在军事上活跃的“反砍刀”组织成员手中，或从武装“反砍刀”组织成员参与非法开采的矿区进行收购，仍将构成违反制裁制度的行为(见附件 5.17)。

通过喀麦隆走私钻石的行为

230. 有记录的钻石贸易只是捕捉在西部地区生产的所有钻石的一小部分，而历史上这一地区占该国钻石总产量的 80%。即使将资格暂停措施实施以来生产放缓

<sup>268</sup> 2015年6月17日和8月20日在 Berbérati 会见了穆斯林收购商；2015年1月20日在 Nola 会见了穆斯林收购商；2015年6月16日在 Kenzou(喀麦隆)会见了穆斯林收购商。

<sup>269</sup> 2015年6月17日在 Mbanza(Nola 县)以及2015年6月12日在 Bomandoro(Boda 县)会见了当地矿主。

<sup>270</sup> 2015年1月20日在 Nola 会见了中非军官和中非稳定团官员；2015年8月20日在 Berbérati 会见了穆斯林收购商。

<sup>271</sup> 2015年6月13日在 Lopo 和 Bania(Nola 县)会见了当地矿主。

<sup>272</sup> 2015年10月2日机密报告。

<sup>273</sup> 2015年6月15日在 Berbérati 会见了民间社会代表；2015年6月17日在 Berbérati 会见了当地安全部队。

因素(估计为 40%)计算在内, 也有 90 000 多克拉的钻石下落不明。一些可能被储存起来了, 但大多数将通过班吉或通过邻国离开该国。<sup>274</sup>

231. 如专家小组 2014 年的报告所述, 经由喀麦隆的贩运网络已经很成熟(见 S/2014/762, 第 132 至 134 段)。按照定义, 这种非法贸易违反了制裁制度, 因为无法确定钻石原产地和保管链, 也就无法排除资助武装团体的可能性。2015 年喀麦隆官方钻石出口下降——2015 年 1 月至 10 月为 2 619 克拉, 而 2014 年为 3 600 克拉, 表明中部非洲的钻石没有大量进入合法贸易。<sup>275</sup>

232. 然而, 专家小组认为, 非洲宝石公司根据金伯利证书出口的部分钻石来自中非共和国(见 S/2014/762, 第 133 段)。其买主 Patrick Ayandho 在 Kenzou 告诉专家小组, 尽管他只能依靠原产地的口头保证, 但采购供应商需要在喀麦隆当地购买钻石, 因为他们再也不能进入中非共和国的钻石产地。<sup>276</sup> 然而, 专家小组从 Kenzou 的采购商得知, 他们确实从 Berbérati 等地得到钻石, 并将其销售给非洲宝石公司(见同上, 第 133 段)。

233. Bertoua 是喀麦隆东部非法钻石贸易的另一个重要中心。2014 年底, 两颗相当大的潜在价值超过 250 000 美元的钻石在那里售出。一颗钻石在 2014 年 11 月被来自 Carnot 的无照收购商 Jean Bassaku 走私。<sup>277</sup> 预定的买主是 Idriss Gaudache, 他在前往 Bertoua 取货的路上死于车祸(见 S/2014/762, 第 125 段)。

234. 2014 年 12 月, 来自 Berbérati 的收购商 Bienvenue Makata 将第二块钻石走私到 Bertoua, 然后在班吉出售给班吉 Primo 收购公司的前采购商 Fawzi Jawad。<sup>278</sup> 矿产和地质部的一名警卫一直在跟踪 Mataka, 在喀麦隆边境的 Gamboula 没收了他的汽车。Mataka 在返回后, 解释说, 他去 Bertoua 是为了缴子女的学费, 警卫对他的回答表示满意, 交还了他的汽车。<sup>279</sup> 2015 年在喀麦隆没有大块钻石报关。<sup>280</sup>

235. 2014 年, 专家小组指认了刚果民主共和国金沙萨的 3 名钻石商, 他们通过三个不同的公司出口钻石, 钻石通过阿拉伯联合酋长国<sup>281</sup> 被运往 Kardiam (Badica 的

<sup>274</sup> 矿业、能源和水利部关于 2015-2020 采矿业战略(2014 年 4 月), 在联合国存档。

<sup>275</sup> 从在喀麦隆的金伯利进程常务秘书收到的钻石出口数据, 在联合国存档。

<sup>276</sup> 2015 年 8 月 19 日在 Kenzou 会见了 Patrick Ayandho。

<sup>277</sup> 2015 年 8 月 16 日在 Bertoua 会见了中非共和国难民; 2015 年 8 月 24 日在班吉会见了采矿专家。

<sup>278</sup> 2015 年 6 月 18 日在 Carnot 会见了钻石收购商; 2015 年 8 月 16 日在 Bertoua 会见了中非共和国难民; 2015 年 8 月 17 日在 Berbérati 会见了收购商。

<sup>279</sup> 2015 年 6 月 17 日在 Berbérati 会见了 Bienvenue Mataka; 2015 年 8 月 25 日在班吉会见了安保人员。

<sup>280</sup> 2015 年 7 月 8 日会见了在喀麦隆的金伯利进程常务秘书。

<sup>281</sup> 详见附件 9.92。

比利时附属公司), 2014 年 5 月在安特卫普被缉获, 因为金伯利进程钻石专家工作组经过审查发现, 来自中非共和国的钻石很可能在包裹之中(见 S/2014/762, 第 118 段)。

236. 四个独立的来源, 包括 Bertoua 的一名目击者证实, 在安特卫普扣押事件发生前, 三名黎巴嫩商人和中非共和国的收购商进行了中非钻石交易。<sup>282</sup> 有一个消息来源将其中一名经销商 Abbas Fakih 与 Idriss Gaudache 联系起来(见 S/2014/762, 第 125 和 238 段)。专家组得以接触其中一名经销商 Ahmad Ibrahim, Ibrahim 否认在喀麦隆购买过中非钻石。<sup>283</sup>

237. 4 月 17 日, 喀麦隆当局没收了两名印度商人——Chetan Balar 和 Rushitkumar Patel 手中 160 克拉没有记录的钻石, 他们曾前往 Bertoua 和 Kenzou。<sup>284</sup> Balar 曾前往班吉, 结识了同样参与钻石贩运的 Ismailia Sylla(见同上, 第 138 段)。Balar 致函专家小组称, 在上述情况下他或他的同伴都没有购买任何钻石。<sup>284</sup> 专家小组约谈了 Balar 称之为当地联络人的第三名印度国民, 他解释说, 他向两名商人出售了来自喀麦隆 Yokadouma 的钻石, 但他们拒绝遵守法律程序。<sup>285</sup> 这两名交易商本应在被逮捕后的第二天上午出现在雅温得的金伯利进程全国常设秘书处, 但是已经逃离该国。从喀麦隆商人没收的钻石是在邻国查获的唯一数量较大的疑似中非共和国钻石。

## 黄金

238. 8 月, 专家小组访问了黄金开采村 Ndolobo(洛巴伊省), 前几个月该村金矿开采突然火爆, 吸引了数百名矿工。采掘者正在为至少 9 个特许手工采矿矿主打工,<sup>286</sup> 但可能还有更多尚未支付许可费的矿主存在。<sup>287</sup> 中非共和国矿务部门的代表不是常驻那里, 而是从 Bangandou(洛巴伊省)察访该地区。反欺诈特勤局没有人员在那里工作。那里驻扎了 11 名宪兵, 但仅呆在市中心。矿区安全由 9 位矿主负责, 他们组织了约由 30 人组成的手持砍刀和狩猎步枪的警卫队。<sup>288</sup> 国家和国际安全部队不得进入矿区, 专家小组也无法进入。

<sup>282</sup> 2015 年 8 月 17 日在 Bertoua 会见了商人; 2014 年 12 月 11 日和 2015 年 6 月 11 日在班吉电话采访和会见了钻石收购商; 2014 年 10 月 10 日来自一名地质和矿业部前官员的电子邮件; 2014 年 12 月 11 日电话采访国家收购公司(Comptoir des minéraux et gemmes)的一个秘密消息来源人士。

<sup>283</sup> 2015 年 10 月 1 日电话采访 Ibrahim。专家小组无法联系上其他两个交易商 Abbas Fakih 和 Louay Charara。

<sup>284</sup> 2015 年 7 月 8 日会见了在喀麦隆的金伯利进程常务秘书。

<sup>285</sup> 2015 年 10 月 24 日电话采访设在 Batouri 的印度钻石交易商。

<sup>286</sup> 2015 年和地质矿产部提供的已支付 2015 年许可费的手工采矿者名单, 在联合国存档。

<sup>287</sup> 2015 年 8 月 30 日在 Ndolobo 会见了手工采矿者和采矿服务部门人员。

<sup>288</sup> 同上。

239. 8月，收购公司 Adamasswiss 通过一个采购商从 Ndolobo 购买了将近 5 公斤黄金(见附件 5.18)，并将其出口到乍得。<sup>289</sup> Adamasswiss 向专家小组提供了所有采购和出口详情。

### 棕榈油和木材

240. 2015 年初，姆拜基周边的棕榈油种植园开始重新运作。种植园允许 Alfred Yékatom 的“反砍刀”组织部队提供安保。<sup>290</sup> 8月20日被增列受制裁个人名单的 Yékatom 2015 年初前往 Palme d'or 公司的开业典礼，并与应邀参加这次活动的外交人员进行了交谈。截至 8 月下旬，Yékatom 仍在为这家公司提供安保，而他在 Centrapalm 的部队已被宪兵取代。<sup>291</sup>

241. 与 2014 年相比，2015 年 Yékatom 在宾博-彼撒-姆拜基间线路上保持了较低姿态，但他打着国防和安全部队(国防军)旗号行动的部队从未消失。<sup>292</sup> 虽然他的部队不再明目张胆地拦截车辆征收过路费，但他们在彼撒镇仍保持了存在，从事犯罪活动。<sup>293</sup> 携带出自 Ndolobo 的黄金等高价值货物的旅行者都化装夜行，以避免被抢。<sup>294</sup> 本次任务期间，专家小组未收到任何信息显示 Yékatom 的部队继续像在 2014 年那样向经过该地区的木材运输卡车征收过路费。

242. 在中非共和国西南部其他地区，“反砍刀”组织对木材部门的影响也同样有所下降。然而，专家小组获得关于 2014 年中非林业公司人员所付安保费的材料，详见附件 5.20。

## 六. 违反旅行禁令的行为和执行资产冻结的情况

243. 根据第 2196(2015)号决议第 6 段，安全理事会强调违反旅行禁令行为会破坏中非共和国和平、稳定和安全。

244. 在执行任务期间，专家小组注意到受制裁的个人努尔丁·阿达姆和弗朗索瓦·博齐泽若干次违反旅行禁令。所获得的信息表明，阿达姆违反了旅行禁令至少六次，博齐泽至少七次。

<sup>289</sup> 出口授权书载于附件 5.18；补充资料见附件 9.93。

<sup>290</sup> 2015 年 4 月 23 日在 Mba ki 会见了中非宪兵。

<sup>291</sup> 2015 年 8 月 30 日 Mba ki 会见了国际部队。

<sup>292</sup> 2015 年 3 月 7 日，在 Pissa，Yékatom 的部队向国家收缴委员会交出了一些武器和弹药；见附件 5.19 的清单。

<sup>293</sup> 2015 年 8 月 30 日在 Mba ki 会见了国际部队、地方当局和宪兵。

<sup>294</sup> 2015 年 8 月 30 日在 Mba ki 的 Ndolobo 采访金矿矿工。

245. 此外，努尔丁·阿达姆的一些违反行为得到刚果和肯尼亚政府的协助，博齐泽的违反行为则得到了肯尼亚、南非和乌干达政府的协助。博齐泽已在 2014 年 9 月和 2015 年 10 月两次前往南非。

246. 根据第 2196(2015)号决议第 4 和第 7 段的规定，关于违反旅行禁令和执行资产冻结情况的详细资料载于附件 6。

## 七. 建议

247. 专家小组建议：

### 区域

(a) 安全理事会在其关于中非共和国制裁制度问题的下一份决议中，请该区域各国与专家小组合作，对受制裁个人实施旅行禁令和资产冻结；

(b) 委员会请各邻国及区域各国以及大湖区问题国际会议等区域组织将其政治举措与基于中非共和国的过渡机构和八国集团的政治举措加以协调；

(c) 委员会敦促中非共和国政府、乍得政府和苏丹政府执行 2011 年 5 月 23 日在喀土穆签署的三方协定，与中非稳定团合作，通过联合巡逻加强它们共同边界地区的安全；

(d) 安全理事会考虑在其关于中非共和国制裁制度问题的下一份决议中，不将第 2196(2015)号决议第 1 段中所定措施适用于完全为了支持与中非稳定团合作的三方部队或由三方部队使用的物资，而且建议安理会请三方部队向委员会报告在这方面采取的措施；

### 武装团体

(e) 委员会敦促中非共和国过渡当局向委员会和专家小组递交过渡当局认为从事或支持了破坏中非共和国和平、稳定或安全的行为的个人和实体的名字；

(f) 安全理事会再次呼吁中非共和国过渡当局确保从中非共和国安全及武装部队中排除违反和践踏适用国际法的犯罪分子，尤其是那些侵害儿童和妇女的犯罪分子；

(g) 安全理事会请驻中非共和国的国际部队，包括中非稳定团和法国部队，每六个月向委员会和专家小组提供关于对联合国特派任务或国际安全部队进行袭击的详细资料，包括已知的犯罪分子身份细节和责任实体的名称；

### 武器

(h) 委员会鼓励中非稳定团与国家当局合作，由联合国地雷行动处着手为在班吉和在中非共和国各省的中非共和国安全及武装部队建造和修复存放小武器和轻武器储备的安全及有效设施；

(i) 委员会鼓励中非稳定团和欧盟驻中非共和国军事顾问团与国家当局合作，向国家安全及武装部队提供库存管理培训，确保武器弹药识别、登记和追踪以及销毁多余及老旧武器方面的能力建设；

(j) 安全理事会在其关于中非共和国制裁制度问题的下一份决议中，决定第 2196(2015)号决议第 1 段所定措施，将不适用于完全意在支持中非共和国安全部门改革进程，或在该进程中使用的给中非共和国安全部队的非致命装备补给，或向其提供的业务培训；

### 自然资源

(k) 委员会再次呼吁中非共和国过渡当局暂时吊销那些从武装团体直接或间接控制地区采购钻石的收购商行的经营资格；

(l) 委员会敦促中非共和国过渡当局冻结受委员会制裁个人和实体的资产；

(m) 委员会敦促中非稳定团指定一名协调人与负责落实金伯利进程关于恢复中非共和国毛坯钻石出口的行政决定所附行动框架的后续行动委员会开展协调和交流相关信息；

(n) 安全理事会请委员会在确定是否根据第 2196(2015)号决议第 12(d)段指认以非法开采和买卖自然资源方式为武装团体或犯罪网络提供支持的一名个人或一个实体时，除其他外应考虑到该个人或实体是否根据经合组织《关于受冲突影响地区和高风险地区矿产的负责任供应链的尽责调查准则》或相关准则进行了尽责调查；

### 人道主义

(o) 安全理事会重申需要过渡当局在中非稳定团警察、司法和惩教人员支持下，加强中非共和国司法当局的能力，尤其是逮捕和起诉犯罪分子的能力，以及增强惩教和感化系统，从而保证囚犯在适当保安条件中关押和服刑；

(p) 委员会敦促联合国人权事务高级专员办事处、联合国儿童基金会和参加中非共和国监测和报告机制的所有国际组织与专家小组合作，以查明侵犯人权和违反国际人道主义法的犯罪分子，包括那些参与了在武装冲突中使用儿童和参与了性别暴力的犯罪分子。

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
**Annexes to the Final Report of the Panel of Experts  
on the Central African Republic extended pursuant  
to Security Council resolution 2196 (2015)**

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Annex 1: Bangui

Map



### Annex 1.1: Chronology of events related to September-October 2015 escalation of violence in Bangui

From 26 September to 3 October 2015 Bangui was the scenario of a new escalation of violence. This surge of violence resulted in the killing in a week-time of 42 civilians, 335 injured, 20 attacks against UN premises and staff, and attacks against 12 INGOs' and seven local NGOs' guesthouses and offices.<sup>1</sup>

Isolated incidents have still affected the capital since 3 October 2015, while a new escalation of violence was taking place at the time of writing, end of October, following the assassination by an anti-balaka group in Combattant of two representatives of the UPC, Captain Ahmad Nadjat and Hassan Bouba.

On 16 October 2015, the total count was of 79 dead and 512 wounded.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, OCHA reported on the same date that the escalation of violence caused the displacement of 17,090 persons in Bangui and surroundings as well as 2,894 new refugees in Zongo, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>3</sup>

1. **25 September 2015** – During the night of 25-26 September, a young Muslim man who worked as a Moto-taxi driver was killed in the fifth district of Bangui.<sup>4</sup>

*Photograph of the moto-taxi driver killed on 26 September 2015*



*Source: "La Centrafrique connaît un nouvel accès de violences interreligieuses", Le Monde, 29 September 2015*

<sup>1</sup> Confidential source, 6 October 2015. INGO confidential document – compilation of incidents suffered by INGOs in Bangui, received by the Panel on 20 October 2015. OCHA Central African Republic. Flash Update 5. 2 October 2015. Accessed on 23 October 2015 at [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/OCHA\\_CAR\\_Flash\\_Update\\_5\\_Bangui\\_FINAL.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/OCHA_CAR_Flash_Update_5_Bangui_FINAL.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> OCHA Central African Republic. Flash Update 8. 2 October 2015. Accessed on 24 October 2015 at [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

## 2. 26 September 2015

- 09:00 hours – The body of the Muslim Moto-taxi driver (killed during the previous night) was left in front of Arbabolo mosque, in PK5, 3<sup>rd</sup> district. This set off an escalation of violence most notably in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> districts with hotspots in Combattant, Miskine, PK5, and Boy-Rabe neighbourhoods. Preliminary information indicated an unconfirmed number of 20 dead and an estimated 100 injured resulting from sectarian violence.<sup>5</sup> According to INGO sources as retaliation for the killing of the young Moto-taxi driver, several Muslims from PK5 regrouped and fired several times around the Koudoukou avenue. This caused panic among people from surrounding areas who fled to the 5<sup>th</sup> district, via the avenue de France. Movements of civilian population continued throughout the day. Several anti-balaka elements started to group at Boy-Rabe on their way to Miskine, in the 8<sup>th</sup> district.<sup>6</sup>
- 09:30 hours – Two UN vehicles were stoned in Combattant Market, 8<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui and near Corail Market, 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui.<sup>7</sup>

*Photograph of UN vehicle stoned at Combattant market*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- 10:00 hours – MINUSCA patrol in the PK5 area confirmed the existence of at least 23-armed elements in motorcycles carrying AK-47s and one motorcycle passenger carrying an RPG. Roadblocks were being placed using stones and different types of obstacles in different parts of the city including avenue des Martyrs by protestors and insurgents.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>6</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

- 12:00 hours – Five armed men broke into the residence of two MINUSCA peacekeepers in the 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui, beat them, and stole all their personal belongings. The two officers managed to escape and were treated at MINUSCA hospital.<sup>9</sup>
- 12:50 hours – INGO sources reported that the Police station in the 5<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui and a health centre in the Malimaka area were set on fire by a Muslim mob. Around the same time market stands in the 8<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui were burned by anti-balaka elements.<sup>10</sup>

*Roadblock with burnt market stands*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- 14:30 hours – Barricades were erected at avenue Combattant blocking access to the airport.<sup>11</sup> International flights were cancelled from 26 September to 5 October.

*Roadblock on the airport access road in the Combattant neighbourhood*



*Source: MINUSCA*

<sup>9</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>10</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

- 15:30 hours – The residence of a MINUSCA UNPOL personnel was attacked at 36 Villas.<sup>12</sup>
- 18:30 hours – Armed men in motorbikes and vehicles circulated throughout the city, mainly in the districts of Combattant, PK5, Miskine and Boy-Rabe. Premises of the radio station AMA were looted and partially destroyed.<sup>13</sup>

*PK5 self-defence militia patrolling by car marked with "PARACHOCK" signs*



*Source: MINUSCA*

### 3. 27 September 2015

- During the night a call for "civil disobedience" was launched on the local radio Ndeke Luka.<sup>14</sup>
- INGOs were advised to remove any signs that indicated their identity as INGOs from guest houses and offices, this was a response to the fact that the UN, INGOs and expatriates were being intentionally targeted by mobs, anti-balaka elements and criminals in Bangui.<sup>15</sup>
- Several INGO offices and guesthouses were attacked and looted. UNDSS undertook an operation to extract all personnel in danger and relocate them to MINUSCA headquarters and Leger Hotel.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>13</sup> INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Telephone conversation with UN Security, 27 September 2015, and INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>16</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

*INGO compound looted**Source: MINUSCA*

- 09:00 hours – Barricades and roadblocks were erected in most of the main axis in Bangui (Martyrs Roundabout, PK12, Gobongo, CNS and Lycée Boganda) and protected by crowds of young people; some of whom were armed with machetes, AK-47s, grenades, and RPGs.<sup>17</sup> MINUSCA forces intervened to dismantle some of the barricades but reports indicated that they were raised somewhere else immediately after.<sup>18</sup>
- 09:30 hours – About one hundred (100) protesters erected a barricade in front of MINUSCA's JTF on avenue Boganda. They showed signs of hostility against MINUSCA by throwing stones.<sup>19</sup>
- 11:00 hours – Local population at the United Nations roundabout attacked one INGO vehicle with stones. The driver, a local staff member was slightly injured.<sup>20</sup>
- 12:15 hours – Armed elements, aboard two pickup vehicles, opened fire on a static MINUSCA forces position at the Marabena Roundabout. Several bullets hit MINUSCA armored vehicle with no casualties.<sup>21</sup>
- In the course of the afternoon a Sangaris convoy was shot at resulting in one soldier wounded.<sup>22</sup>
- 14:00 hours – Three MINUSCA military officers were attacked by protesters on the avenue de France, near the National Center for Safety in the 1<sup>st</sup> district while travelling in a MINUSCA vehicle. The officers suffered from minor injuries.<sup>23</sup>
- 23:30 hours – Several criminals broke into the office of the IOM in Bangui and looted its entire contents. The perpetrators also sabotaged five vehicles present at the compound at the time of incident.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 26 September 2015.

<sup>21</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>22</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>23</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

*IOM compound after the looting and destruction of the fleet of vehicles*



*Source: MINUSCA*

- Late hours of the night – Gendarmerie headquarters at Camp Izamo attacked by anti-balaka elements led by Guy Mazimbélet (killed during the attack).<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. 28 September 2015

- 01:00 hours – Around 15 armed men with knives attacked and looted the guest house of an INGO few hours after UNDSS had relocated the personnel.<sup>26</sup>
- 01:00 hours – Armed groups raided and looted an INGO office. Nine motorbikes, all office equipment and furniture were stolen.<sup>27</sup>
- 05:00 hours – Armed groups raided and looted an INGO office in SICA I. Two vehicles and all office equipment were stolen.<sup>28</sup> A grenade was thrown at MINUSCA patrol in 1<sup>st</sup> district, no casualties or injuries reported.<sup>29</sup>
- 10:15 hours – A demonstration was reported around PK0 moving towards the United Nations roundabout in the *avenue de l'Indépendance*, shooting in the air was heard, at the same time several barricades were erected at the United Nations roundabout. Around 1,000 protesters arrived at the UN roundabout before MINUSCA forces dispersed the demonstration.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>25</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>30</sup> INGO confidential report, 28 September 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

*Gervais Lakosso leading gatherings and demonstrations in Bangui*



Source: Social network website, accessed by the Panel on 27 October 2015 at <https://www.facebook.com/hervecyriaque.serefio/posts/10205147773270752>

*Anti-balaka military commander and gendarmerie officer Olivier Koudeon leading Lakosso's demonstration in Bangui on 28 September 2015*



*Source: Social network website accessed by the Panel on 27 October 2015, op.cit.*

- 11:00 hours – La Kouanga mosque in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district vandalized by unidentified armed men.<sup>31</sup>

*Lakouanga mosque in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district has been destroyed twice since December 2013*



*Source: MINUSCA*

<sup>31</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 28 September 2015.

- 12:00 hours – Several criminals broke into an empty INGO office located at SICA I neighborhood and looted all the valuables and contents.<sup>32</sup>
- 12:00 hours – In the course of the day an INGO relocated their staff through the Oubangui River to Zongo, DRC.
- 17:00 hours – All prisoners at the Ngaragba prison in Bangui escaped.<sup>33</sup> According to the information collected by the Panel, there was a first attempt of escape earlier that day, at this time the prisoners obtained the key of the main entrance. Given the fragility of the situation the FACA elements guarding the prison called for reinforcements, the reinforcement, consisting of 45 FACA elements arrived at the prison, the commander addressed the prisoners (from outside) in Sango and after that the door was opened and all the prisoners left the prison in a straight line.<sup>34</sup>
- 17:45 hours – An armed group fired at MINUSCA Formed Police Unit (FPU) convoy on the road to M'Poko airport. MINUSCA and Sangaris forces returned fire and repelled the attackers. No casualties reported.<sup>35</sup>
- 22:00 hours – The guesthouse and office of an INGO were looted by armed men in SICA I neighbourhood. Staff had been relocated earlier.<sup>36</sup>
- 22:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the guesthouse of the INGO where expatriates were still present. The INGO staff managed to escape using a vehicle. However, one international staff was wounded while escaping. The guesthouse was totally looted afterwards. UNDSS extraction Team and Sangaris could not extract the INGO staff before due to roadblocks.<sup>37</sup>

## 5. 29 September 2015

- 03:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the empty office of an INGO located in SICA I neighborhood and totally looted its contents.<sup>38</sup>
- 10:00 hours – Several criminals broke into the empty guesthouse of an INGO located at SICA I neighbourhood and totally looted its contents.<sup>39</sup>
- 12:00 hours – Two INGO vehicles were victims of an attempted hijacking by armed men in front of the Cathedral; one of the drivers lost control of the vehicle due to nervousness and caused an accident that threw the vehicle into a ditch at the side of the road. The perpetrators left the scene at the moment of the accident without being able to take anything. No injuries were reported.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>33</sup> The Panel obtained two different figures on the number of prisoners escaped from Ngaragba prison. One from CAR judicial authorities (email communication on 19 October 2015) indicating 677 prisoners and the figure of 686 from MINUSCA Justice and Corrections Section. The Panel also requested the name of escaped prisoners but it has not been yet possible to obtain such a list, which was unavailable at the time of writing.

<sup>34</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015. INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>35</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>36</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015.

<sup>37</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>40</sup> INGO confidential report, 29 September 2015.

- 13:00 hours – A MINUSCA Force patrol was fired upon by armed elements near Gobongo Market, 4<sup>th</sup> district. Two peacekeepers were severely injured and a third suffered from minor injuries.<sup>41</sup>
- 15:00 hours – Armed men clashed with FACA elements close to the Ministry of Interior (PK0 area), resulting in three FACA elements wounded.<sup>42</sup>
- 22:50 hours – MINUSCA FPU was fired upon at the Martyrs roundabout, 2<sup>nd</sup> district of Bangui, by unknown armed elements.<sup>43</sup>
- 23:00 hours – Unidentified armed men attempted to break into the health centre of a local NGO in the Benz VI. The national security forces intervened forcing the perpetrators to flee.<sup>44</sup>

#### 6. 30 September 2015

- 03:00 hours – Unidentified men attacked the office of a national NGO located in Benz VI and stole all its contents including the safe.<sup>45</sup>
- 14:00 hours – Unknown individuals attempted to attack the water reserve of Bangui and loot the office of an INGO as well as a WFP depot near the CNT. MINUSCA Force and Sangaris deployed to the three locations before they could be damaged and the assailants fled.<sup>46</sup>
- 15:00 hours – Total fuel station in the 4<sup>th</sup> district was looted. MINUSCA troops were deployed to the scene and exchanged fire with assailants. Assailants retreated from the area.<sup>47</sup>
- 16:50 hours – Unidentified individuals fired at the MINUSCA static position in front of the transitional Council (TNC) in the 1<sup>st</sup> district of Bangui. MINUSCA forces returned fire forcing the attackers to flee.<sup>48</sup>

#### 7. 1 October 2015

- 09:00 hours – 11:00 hours – Gathering of people at the round point Marabena towards Koudoukou. MINUSCA dispersed the crowd.<sup>49</sup>
- 13:00 hours – Looters approached the Lycee Boganda but no crime took place.<sup>50</sup>
- 16:00 hours – Unidentified armed men looted the commissariat and the Mairie in the 4<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui.<sup>51</sup>
- In the late hours of the night, unidentified armed men attacked and looted

<sup>41</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Confidential source, 30 September 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>43</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>44</sup> INGO confidential report, 30 September 2015. Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>45</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>46</sup> Confidential source Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>47</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015. INGO confidential report, 30 September 2015.

<sup>48</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015.

<sup>49</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

buildings close by Camp Izamo, Gendarmerie headquarters.<sup>52</sup>

#### 8. 2 October 2015

- 14:00 hours – Armed men looted the office of a local NGO in Benz VI neighborhood. MINUSCA forces arrived to the scene after the assailants had left.<sup>53</sup>
- 16:10 hours – Two armed individuals riding a motorcycle fired two rounds of ammunition at the MINUSCA static guard post in the 4<sup>th</sup> district of Bangui (close to Lycée Boganda).<sup>54</sup>
- 23:05 hours – Unidentified armed individuals opened fire on MINUSCA force elements guarding MINUSCA headquarters. They fired back forcing the assailants to flee riding motorbikes.<sup>55</sup>
- In SICA 1 (2<sup>nd</sup> district) and Castors (3<sup>rd</sup> district) of Bangui, UN Staff and NGOs reported that unidentified individuals extorted money for “protection of residences” in the neighborhood. A UN staff had to pay CFA 40,000 (USD 67) to a self-proclaimed security group.<sup>56</sup>

#### 9. 3 October 2015

- 08:00 hours – Attempted prison escape at Camp de Roux.<sup>57</sup>
- 14:30 hours – A group of Muslims were allegedly attacked, one of the individuals was killed and the body was left in front of MINUSCA logistics base.<sup>58</sup> The incident was not confirmed.

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential document, 7 October 2015.

<sup>54</sup> Confidential source, Bangui Incidents Chronology, obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2015. Confidential document, 7 October 2015. Confidential source, 5 October 2015.

<sup>55</sup> Confidential source, 2 October 2015.

<sup>56</sup> Confidential source, 2 October 2015.

<sup>57</sup> Confidential source, 7 October 2015.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

**Annex 1.2: Photographs of anti-balaka leaders Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona and Sébastien Wénézoui**

*Ngaïssona at the VIP lounge of Bangui international airport, discussing with ex-Séléka General Mohamed-Moussa Dhaffane, on 29 August 2015*



*Source: Photograph taken by the Panel*

*Wénézoui (centre – wearing a blue jacket from the Belgian or Dutch Police) poses on 17 January 2014 with his men at his base, in the Boeing district of Bangui*



*Source: Reuters, accessed on 27 October 2015 at <http://news.yahoo.com/photos/wenezoui-poses-men-boeing-district-central-african-republic-photo-104901016.html>*

**Annex 1.3: Letter sent by the Co-mediator in the Central African crisis, Abdoulaye Bathily, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Central Africa, to the International Mediator on 8 February 2015**

**UNITED NATIONS**  
United Nations Regional Office  
for Central Africa

**NATIONS UNIES**  
Bureau Régional des Nations Unies  
pour l'Afrique Centrale

**UNOCA**

Ref: SRSR-UNOCA/FO/2015/02-08-1EX-BT

Libreville, le 8 février 2015

Monsieur le Président,

Les discussions qui ont cours en ce moment à Nairobi à votre initiative et sous la facilitation d'autorités kényanes sont presque hors de contrôle, si l'on en croit la presse kenyane, qui s'est fait l'écho d'une cérémonie de signature d'un accord de cessez-le-feu la semaine prochaine.

Le texte proposé par les acteurs de Nairobi viole les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition de la République Centrafricaine et l'esprit de Brazzaville.

La Communauté économique des Etats d'Afrique centrale, l'Union Africaine et les Nations Unies se sont maintes fois inquiétées des conséquences de cette initiative sur le processus en cours en République Centrafricaine.

Malgré les rappels à l'ordre contenus dans votre communiqué du 17 janvier 2015 et dans votre récente lettre, les acteurs engagés dans l'initiative de Nairobi persistent à poursuivre leur démarche qui, dans les faits, conduit aujourd'hui à saper tout le processus de paix en cours en République centrafricaine et les gains enregistrés par la Médiation et la communauté internationales. Des chefs militaires de l'ex-Séléka se prévalent des discussions de Nairobi pour entraver les consultations populaires à la base en cours dans certaines préfectures de la RCA. Des éléments Anti-Balakas profitent de la confusion ainsi créée pour procéder à des enlèvements de personnes, accentuant ainsi le climat d'insécurité pour les personnes et les biens à Bangui et dans d'autres localités.

**Son Excellence**

Monsieur Denis Sassou Nguesso  
Président de la République du Congo  
République du Congo  
Brazzaville

La continuation de cette initiative est manifestement de plus en plus en contradiction avec les décisions pertinentes du GIC-RCA du 7 novembre et de la position qu'ont prise les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la CEEAC lors de leur concertation du 31 janvier 2015 à Addis Ababa. Elle est aussi de nature à compromettre les résultats obtenus par les efforts conjugués de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale pour une sortie de crise en RCA selon le chronogramme retenu pour la suite de la Transition, comme vous l'avez-vous-même indiqué dans votre lettre aux autorités de la Transition.

C'est pour les raisons qui précèdent que j'ai l'honneur de vous demander, Monsieur le Président, de mettre fin, de manière à la fois formelle et publique, aux consultations en cours dans la capitale du Kenya, et à inviter tous les acteurs à s'insérer dans le processus de Brazzaville. La crédibilité de la Médiation Internationale et le déroulement apaisé de la Transition en République Centrafricaine en dépendent.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma très haute <sup>et fr. amable</sup> considération.



Abdoulaye Bathily,  
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire général  
des Nations Unies, Représentant les Nations  
Unies au sein de la Médiation Internationale

Annex I.4: KnK press communiqué dated 4 October 2015

Kwa Na Kwa

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Bureau Politique

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Secrétariat Général

République Centrafricaine

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*Unité – Dignité – Travail*

N° \_\_\_\_/KNK/BP/SG.15

**Déclaration relative à la recrudescence des violences à Bangui**

A quelques mois du terme de la décision n°76/CEEAC/CCEG/XVI/15 du Président en exercice de la CEEAC portant « *ultime prorogation de la Transition* » en République Centrafricaine, une crise, d'une violence inouïe, a éclaté en date du 26 Septembre 2015 provoquant plus d'une quarantaine de victimes, une centaine de blessés graves, des milliers de déplacés internes, des dégâts matériels et des pillages.

A l'origine de cette crise qui a émaillé la capitale centrafricaine, la découverte du cadavre d'un individu de religion musulmane. Cet engrenage infernal fait rappeler l'avertissement prémonitoire lancé par S.E Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO, Président de la République du CONGO et Médiateur International dans la crise Centrafricaine dans son allocution à l'ouverture du Forum National de Réconciliation de Bangui : « *Faites bien attention, car c'est souvent au port que les navires chavirent* ».

Rentrée précipitamment à Bangui alors qu'elle participait à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies à New York, Mme le Chef d'Etat de Transition a adressé un message à la Nation en date du 30 Septembre 2015. Outre les accusations de tentative de Coup d'Etat lancées à l'endroit de nombreux leaders politiques, elle a mis l'accent sur les points suivants :

1. Le désarmement forcé des groupes armés non conventionnels ;
2. L'ouverture imminente d'un dialogue avec l'ensemble des forces vives de la Nation.

Le Bureau Politique du KNK rappelle que dans le document intitulé « *SCHEMA CENTRAFRICAIN INCLUSIF DE SORTIE DE CRISE* », l'ensemble des plateformes, Partis, Associations et Personnalités Politiques Indépendantes représentant 90% de la classe politique centrafricaine réunis en concertation élargie les 04 et 05 Septembre 2015 a fait l'amer constat qu'aucune des missions assignées aux Autorités de Transition et prescrites à l'Article 44 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition n'a été réalisée avec succès. Toutefois, il y'a bien lieu de noter que l'annonce faite par Mme le Chef d'Etat de Transition au double sujet du désarmement et de la tenue d'un dialogue inter-centrafricain rejoint le contenu du document susmentionné.

Par ailleurs, tout le monde, mis à part les partenaires internationaux, s'accorde à reconnaître que ni les conditions technique, de soutenabilité financière et de sécurité ne sont réunies pour la tenue d'élections législatives et présidentielle libres, démocratiques, transparentes, régulières et incontestées avant la fin de l'année 2015 au regard des récents événements qui ont considérablement impacté le chronogramme électoral qualifié de "*chimérique et dangereux*" voire de "*bombe politique*" par Thierry VERCOULON, Directeur du Projet Afrique Centrale de l'International Crisis Group.

Dans un article publié en date du 22 Septembre 2015, ce dernier vient de dresser le constat suivant : « *Bien que la feuille de route de sortie de crise qui prévoyait le désarmement des milices et un minimum de réconciliation ait déraillé, les partenaires internationaux maintiennent pourtant un calendrier électoral chimérique et dangereux. L'entêtement des partenaires internationaux à appliquer une feuille de route obsolète est politiquement contre-productif.* »

A l'entêtement des partenaires internationaux à vouloir organiser, coûte que coûte, ces élections avant la fin de l'année 2015, s'ajoutent leur détermination avérée ainsi que celle des Autorités de Transition de mettre à l'écart les principaux acteurs de la crise centrafricaine, à savoir les anciens Chefs d'Etat François BOZIZE YANGOUVONDA et Michel DJOTODIA.

Cette position tout aussi contreproductive vient d'être contrebalancée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies qui a souligné « *l'importance de la tenue d'élections présidentielles et législatives libres, justes, transparentes et inclusives, conformément à la charte constitutionnelle de transition...* ». Le Conseil de Sécurité a également souligné la nécessité « *qu'un dialogue national inclusif, comme celui initié au Forum de Bangui en mai 2015, est la seule voie possible vers la réconciliation et une paix durable* ».

S'agissant de la nécessité d'un dialogue national inclusif, c'est-à-dire ouvert à tous les acteurs politiques, est-il besoin de rappeler la sage préconisation lancée par le Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO à l'ouverture du Forum de Bangui : « *Je voudrais rappeler que la recherche du consensus inclusif à laquelle j'appelle l'ensemble des acteurs politiques et de la société civile, n'est pas incompatible avec la justice. Ce n'est pas un appel à l'impunité. Dans cette démarche, je le dis pour la Centrafrique comme je l'ai dit pour mon pays, nous devons veiller pour que tous ceux qui sont en mesure d'apporter leur pierre à la construction de la maison commune soient associés. A travers le monde et l'histoire, des exemples ne manquent pour soutenir cette sage prudence* ».

Devant la gravité de la crise que vient de connaître la capitale centrafricaine et de ses conséquences sur les plans politique, sécuritaire, humanitaire et socio-économique, le Bureau Politique du KNK :

1. Présente ses profondes condoléances aux parents des victimes de ces actes ignobles et barbares;
2. Condamne avec fermeté les violences perpétrées par des Musulmans et des Non-musulmans, les pillages et les destructions des biens meubles et immeubles ;
3. Exige l'ouverture d'une enquête internationale pour identifier les commanditaires, auteurs et co-auteurs de ces violences ;
4. Réitère sa pleine et totale adhésion au "*SCHEMA CENTRAFRICAIN INCLUSIF DE SORTIE DE CRISE*".

Afin d'éviter de reproduire le type de "*Dialogue Exclusif*" organisé en mai 2015, le Bureau Politique du KNK réclame la tenue, dans la capitale congolaise (Brazzaville) sous les auspices du Médiateur International, S.E. *Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO*, d'un *Dialogue Inclusif* pour débattre de l'avenir de la Transition en cours.

Fait à Bangui le 04 Octobre 2015

Pour le Bureau Politique

Bertin BEA,

*Ancien Ministre,*

*Ancien Député*

**Annex 1.5: Copy of the signed pages of the Nairobi agreement**

EN FOI DE QUOI, les représentants dûment mandatés des Parties ont adopté le présent Accord à NAIROBI, KENYA, le 22 janvier 2015 en 10 Originaux en Anglais et en Français.

Signé par les Parties:

Pour les EX-SELEKA:

(a) NOUR ALDINE ADAM 

M. Adame Nouraldine

(b) 

M. Moustapha Saboune

(c) 

Mme. Batoul Achta

Pour les ANTI-BALAKA:

(a) 

M. Joachim Kokate

(b) PABmmf!

M. Maxime Mokom

(c) 

M. Come Hippolyte Azounou



En présence de:

Représentants de la Société civile de la RCA:

(a)   
.....  
M. Alexis Ngoya

(b)   
.....  
M. Ali Mahamat Issa


(c)   
.....  
M. Mahamat Ibrahim

(d)   
.....  
M. El Mackine Mansour Ben

En présence de:

(a)   
.....

**Le Médiateur en Chef: Honorable Kenneth Otieno Marende, EGH**

(b)   
.....

**Le Médiateur en Chef Adjoint: Lt. Général (Retraité) Njuki Mw  
MGH, CBS, OGW, 'ndc' (K) 'psc' (K).**

(c)   
.....

**Ambassadeur Zaddock M. Syong'oh, HSC  
(Pour le Gouvernement de la République du Kenya)**

En présence de :




**Annex 1.6:** Photograph of Bertin and Nadia Béa during electoral campaign in the anti-balaka stronghold of Bégoua (Ombella-Mpoko province) on 2 May 2015



Source: "Bea Nadia: La reine de Bimbo 2", *Centrafrique Libre*, 5 May 2015  
Accessed on 29 October 2015 at <http://news.abangui.com/h/26301.html>

**Annex I.7: Extract of the Constitutional Court decision number 008/15/CCT on 20 July 2015**



**Annex I.8: Decision number 010/15/CCT of the transitional Constitutional Court dated 28 August 2015**

COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE TRANSITION  
\*\*\*\*\*

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail  
\*\*\*\*

**DECISION N° 010/15/CCT DU 28 AOÛT 2015**

**Sur la demande du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

AU NOM DE PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAÏN  
LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE TRANSITION

Vu la loi N° 13.001 du 18 juillet 2013 portant Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Vu la loi N° 13.002 du 14 Août 2013 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Vu la lettre de saisine du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition en date du 23 juillet 2015 relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Le Rapporteur ayant été entendu ;

APRÈS EN AVOIR DÉLIBÉRÉ CONFORMÉMENT À LA LOI

Considérant que par requête en date du 23 juillet 2015 enregistrée au greffe de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition le 28 juillet 2015 à 13h30 minutes sous le n° 123, le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a saisi la Haute Juridiction pour solliciter l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition relatif aux inéligibilités ;

Que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition justifie sa saisine en se fondant sur les articles 76 tiret 8 de la Charte et 10 tiret 8 de la loi n° 13.002 du 14 Août 2013 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition expose qu'à l'approche des élections présidentielle et législatives, les dispositions de l'article 106 font l'objet de deux courants d'interprétation : que pour certains, l'application des dispositions de l'article 106 concerne uniquement les seuls acteurs en fonction et pour d'autres, l'application inclut l'ensemble des dirigeants de la Transition depuis le commencement.

**I- SUR LA FORME**

**1. Sur la compétence**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 76 tiret 8 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition est chargée d'interpréter la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition :



Que l'objet de la demande étant relative à l'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte ;

Il y a lieu de déclarer la Cour compétente ;

### **2. Sur la recevabilité**

Considérant que l'article 76 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition donne compétence à la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition pour interpréter la Charte ;

Considérant qu'en cette matière ni la Charte ni la loi n'ont déterminé les personnes ayant qualité pour saisir la Cour ;

Considérant le caractère fondamental de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, toute personne intéressée doit pouvoir saisir la Cour Constitutionnelle en vue de son interprétation ;

Considérant que la demande émane du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ;

Il y a lieu de la déclarer recevable ;

### **3. Sur les délais**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 79 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, le délai imparti à la Cour pour statuer est de un mois, en cas d'urgence, il est ramené à huit(8) jours ;

Considérant que dans sa requête le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a sollicité l'examen selon la procédure d'urgence ;

Considérant que la requête du Chef de l'Etat a été enregistrée par le greffe le 28 juillet 2015 mais que la densité des activités de la Cour ne lui a pas permis de statuer suivant la procédure d'urgence ;

Que de ce fait, la Cour ne peut rendre sa décision selon la procédure d'urgence ;

## **II- SUR LE FOND**

Considérant que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition a sollicité de la Haute Juridiction l'interprétation des dispositions de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition relatif aux inéligibilités ;

Qu'il y a donc lieu pour la Cour d'explicitier le sens de l'article 106 et d'en déterminer la portée ;

### **1. Sur le sens de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

Considérant que la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition dispose en son article 106 : le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, le Premier Ministre de Transition, les membres du Gouvernement de Transition et les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition sont inéligibles aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition : Qu'en outre, les Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication de



Transition ne peuvent être candidats aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition :

Considérant que l'inéligibilité est la condition des personnes à qui il est interdit d'être candidates aux élections et résulte en une incapacité à briguer un mandat électoral déterminé, en l'occurrence le mandat présidentiel d'une part et le mandat législatif d'autre part :

Considérant que pour répondre à la demande d'interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle présentée par le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, il y a lieu de déterminer si les inéligibilités telles que fixées s'appliquent aux personnalités qui ont cessé d'exercer leurs fonctions avant la fin de la Transition au même titre qu'à celles qui demeurent en fonction à la date d'échéance de la Transition :

Considérant que pour répondre à cette question, il convient d'une part de rappeler la période et l'unicité de la Transition et d'autre part, le principe du caractère général et impersonnel de la loi, en particulier de la Loi Fondamentale qu'est la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

#### **1.1 Sur la période et l'unicité de la Transition**

Considérant qu'aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition la durée de la Transition est de dix huit mois, portée à vingt quatre mois sur avis conforme du Médiateur International. En cas de nécessité, la durée de la Transition peut être examinée par la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) sur proposition conjointe et motivée du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, du Président du Conseil National de Transition et du Premier Ministre de Transition :

La période de Transition débute par une cérémonie officielle après l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Considérant qu'en application des dispositions de l'article précité, la période de Transition a débuté par l'investiture du Chef de l'Etat par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition au cours d'une cérémonie officielle qui s'est déroulée au palais du Conseil National de Transition le 18 Août 2013, après l'entrée en vigueur de la Charte et devait prendre fin le 17 février 2015;

Que conformément à l'article 102, la Transition a été prolongée une première fois de six(6) mois sur avis conforme du Médiateur International de la crise centrafricaine en date du 22 décembre 2014, Avis dont la conformité a été constatée par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition dans sa décision n° 003/15/CCT du 16 janvier 2015, la fin de la Transition étant ainsi reportée au 17 Août 2015 ;

Que par décision des Chefs d'Etat de la CEEAC du 30 juillet 2015, dont la conformité à la Charte a été constatée par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition dans sa décision N° 009 du 14 Août 2015, la Transition a été à nouveau prorogée jusqu'au 30 décembre 2015 ;

Que ces différentes prorogations ont été faites en conformité avec la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition du 18 juillet 2013, qu'elles n'ont pas eu pour conséquence l'instauration de transitions successives mais la prolongation de la Transition ayant démarré le 18 Août 2013 et devant s'achever désormais le 30 décembre 2015 ;



Qu'ainsi, la démission des fonctions de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition par le premier Chef de l'Etat de la Transition Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDROKO, la vacance de la fonction de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition assurée par le Président du Conseil National de Transition Alexandre Ferdinand N'GUENDET conformément à l'article 23 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, et la fonction actuelle de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition assurée par Catherine SAMBA PANZA, n'ont pas eu pour effet d'instaurer plusieurs Transitions :

Qu'il en résulte que les différentes personnalités ayant accédé aux fonctions visées par l'article 106 de la Charte les ont exercées dans le cadre d'une seule et même Transition conformément aux dispositions de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition du 18 juillet 2013 :

Que de ce fait, la Transition est unique et indivisible :

### **1.2 Sur le caractère général et impersonnel de la Loi Fondamentale**

Considérant qu'il est de principe en droit que la loi est générale et impersonnelle, que de ce fait, elle ne vise nommément aucune des personnalités ayant exercé ou exerçant les fonctions visées par l'article 106 pendant la Transition : celles de Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, de Premier Ministre de Transition, de membre du Gouvernement de Transition, de membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, de Juge Constitutionnel de Transition ou encore de membre du Haut Conseil de Communication de Transition;

Qu'ainsi, les personnalités désignées aux postes se succèdent aux fonctions sans qu'il y ait lieu pour la Loi Fondamentale de les distinguer les unes des autres, ceci quelles que soient les personnalités ayant exercé ces fonctions et quelle qu'ait été la durée d'exercice de leurs fonctions :

Que de même, il n'y a pas lieu pour la Loi Fondamentale de faire référence, le cas échéant, aux anciens Chefs d'Etat de la Transition, aux anciens Premiers Ministres de Transition, aux anciens membres du Gouvernement de Transition ou encore aux anciens membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, chaque fonction demeurant régie de façon impersonnelle par les articles concernés de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Qu'il résulte de ce qui précède, que la Loi Fondamentale vise les titres et décrit les fonctions de façon générale et impersonnelle ;

## **2. Sur la portée de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition**

Considérant que pour rechercher la portée de l'article 106 de la Charte, il y a lieu de faire des rapprochements entre les dispositions des différents articles pour établir la volonté du Constituant ;

### **2.1 Sur le caractère permanent et irrévocable des inéligibilités prévues à l'article 106 de la Charte**

Considérant que par l'article 101 tirets 2, 3 et 7 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, le Pouvoir Constituant a inscrit les inéligibilités des Autorités ayant géré la Transition de façon irrévocable en excluant expressément de la révision de la Charte :

- l'inéligibilité du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, du Premier Ministre de Transition, des membres du Gouvernement de Transition et des membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées durant la Transition :



- l'inéligibilité des Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et des membres du Haut Conseil de Communication aux élections présidentielle et législatives ;

- l'article 101 lui-même ;

Qu'il en résulte que le Pouvoir Constituant a institué un verrou constitutionnel prohibant toute velléité de révision de la Charte en ce qui concerne les inéligibilités et exprimant ainsi clairement sa volonté de voir scrupuleusement ces inéligibilités être respectées par les acteurs de la Transition et par toutes les personnalités ayant exercé les fonctions faisant l'objet desdites inéligibilités;

Qu'en outre, le législateur a tenu à insérer ces inéligibilités dans la loi n° 13.003 du 13 novembre 2013 portant Code Electoral de la République Centrafricaine en ses articles 110 en ce qui concerne les candidatures à l'élection présidentielle et 151 en ce qui concerne les candidatures aux élections législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition ;

Que de ce fait, le Constituant, dans le cadre spécifique de la période de Transition, a expressément dérogé au principe d'égalité de tous les citoyens à pouvoir se porter candidats aux élections présidentielle et législatives organisées à l'issue de la Transition en ce qui concerne les personnalités ayant occupé et occupant les fonctions visées à l'article 106 de la Charte ;

## **2.2 Sur la distinction entre les inéligibilités et la durée d'exercice des fonctions par les différentes personnalités**

Considérant que les conditions de désignation aux fonctions sont prévues par la Charte notamment en son article 23 en ce qui concerne le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ; à l'article 29 en ce qui concerne le Premier Ministre de Transition et la nomination des membres du Gouvernement, à l'article 51 en ce qui concerne les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, à l'article 80 en ce qui concerne les Juges Constitutionnels de Transition et à l'article 93 en ce qui concerne les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication de Transition ;

Considérant que si l'article 23 alinéa 1 de la Charte précise que le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition est élu pour la durée de la Transition, l'article 23 alinéa 2 prévoit également les cas où celui-ci serait amené à être remplacé, en cas de décès, de démission ou d'incapacité définitive médicalement constatée, et organise la vacance du pouvoir ;

Que si l'article 36 alinéa 2 précise que le Premier Ministre ne peut être révoqué par le Chef de l'Etat de la Transition ni par le Conseil National de Transition pendant la durée de la Transition, et si l'article 101 tiret 4 de la Charte exclut de la révision l'irrévocabilité et la diminution des attributions du Premier Ministre de Transition, l'article 36 alinéa 3 quant à lui liste expressément les cas de remplacement de ce dernier en cas de décès, de démission ou d'incapacité définitive médicalement constatée ;

Que l'article 29 de la Charte prévoit expressément que le Chef de l'Etat nomme les membres du Gouvernement et met fin à leur fonction, qu'il s'agit donc là d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire dévolu au Chef de l'Etat de la Transition:



Que si l'article 51 alinéa 2 précise que les membres du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition sont élus par leurs pairs pour la durée de la Transition, l'alinéa 3 et 4 prévoient les causes de cessation de leurs fonctions et les modalités de leur remplacement :

Qu'il en est de même pour les Juges Constitutionnels à l'article 80 et les membres du Haut Conseil de Communication à l'article 93 ;

Qu'ainsi les fonctions de ces personnalités, désignées pour la durée de la Transition, peuvent être interrompues en cours de Transition, la Charte ayant prévu également les modalités de leur remplacement ;

Que par contre, les inéligibilités telles que fixées par l'article 106 sont énoncées de façon définitive, irrévocable et pour toute la durée de la Transition par le Constituant et concernent les fonctions expressément listées et par voie de conséquence, les personnalités ayant exercé ces fonctions pendant la période de Transition telle que déterminée plus haut;

Considérant que l'interprétation faite par le Juge Constitutionnel, gardien de la Charte, ne peut aboutir à une violation de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition ;

Que toute interprétation de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition tendant à supprimer les inéligibilités pour les personnalités ayant cessé d'exercer les fonctions avant la fin de la Transition conduirait inexorablement à une négation de ces mêmes inéligibilités, les personnalités visées et encore en fonction pouvant alors démissionner au moment du déclenchement du processus électoral pour pouvoir briguer les mandats présidentiel ou législatifs qui leur sont interdits ;

Qu'une telle compréhension conduirait de fait à la suppression du verrou constitutionnel institué et donc à une violation de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition et serait contraire à la volonté du Constituant;

Que cette interprétation doit donc être écartée ;

Qu'il en résulte que toute personnalité ayant porté le titre et exercé les fonctions visées pendant la période de Transition est frappée par les inéligibilités ;

Considérant enfin, qu'il y a lieu de rappeler les dispositions du préambule de la Charte par lesquelles les Représentants des forces vives de la Nation réunis au sein du Conseil National de Transition réitérent leur pleine adhésion aux Accords de Libreville du 11 janvier 2013, aux Décisions des troisième et quatrième sommets extraordinaires élargis des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la CEEAC des 03 et 18 avril 2013 et engagent l'Etat et les parties prenantes à les respecter scrupuleusement, ces différentes assises, de façon consensuelle, constituant le socle de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition.

En conséquence de tout ce qui précède :

#### DECIDE

**Article 1<sup>er</sup>** : La Cour est compétente.

**Article 2** : La requête est recevable.



**Article 3 :** En application de l'article 106 de la Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition, toute personnalité ayant porté le titre et ayant exercé les fonctions de Chef d'Etat de la Transition, de Premier Ministre de Transition, de membre du Gouvernement de Transition, de membre du Bureau du Conseil National de Transition, de Juge Constitutionnel ou de membre du Haut Conseil de Communication est frappée par les inéligibilités prévues à l'article 106 de la Charte quelle que soit la durée pendant laquelle elle a exercé ces fonctions pendant la Transition et quelles que soient les causes de la cessation des fonctions ainsi exercées.

**Article 4 :** La présente décision sera notifiée au Chef de l'Etat de la Transition, au Président du Conseil National de Transition, au Premier Ministre de Transition et publiée au Journal Officiel de la République Centrafricaine.


Ainsi délibéré et décidé par la Cour Constitutionnelle de Transition en sa séance du **28 Août 2015**.

Où siégeaient :

- Zacharie NDOUBA, Président
- Danièle DARLAN, Vice-président, Rapporteur
- Emile NDJAPOU, Membre
- Jean-Pierre WABOE, Membre
- Clémentine FANGA NAPALA, Membre
- Alain OUABY-BEKAI, Membre
- Marie SERRA Membre

Assistés de Maître **Florentin DARRE**, Greffier en Chef.

LE GREFFIER  
  
 Florentin  


LE PRESIDENT  
  
 Zacharie NDOUBA  


Annex 1.9: Flyers of Gervais Lakosso's civil society platform "*Le temps de Béafrika*"

# ***Le Temps De Béafrika***

Mouvement Citoyen pour l'appropriation de la destinée du pays

## **NOTE DE MOTIVATION**

Nous sommes le peuple de Centrafrique,  
Toujours vivant et décidé à nous autodéterminer.

Chaque chose à son temps et chaque peuple a ses besoins particuliers et ses aspirations profondes.

Aujourd'hui le moment est venu pour que les Centrafricains s'approprient leur destinée.

On ne peut pas manipuler éternellement un peuple contre ses propres intérêts et soulever les uns contre les autres tous les jours.

Ce mouvement est une invitation à une prise de conscience nationale car :

La Paix n'est pas un fruit qu'on peut manger sans effort. Mais c'est une graine que chacun doit planter dans son cœur et l'arroser par les eaux de l'amour du prochain, du pardon, de l'unité dans la diversité...

Le développement n'est pas un produit que les développés peuvent livrer aux sous développés. Mais un processus dont les initiateurs et acteurs principaux doivent être ceux là mêmes qui sont concernés par le développement qui est en fait une aspiration naturelle de chaque être humain.

Aussi longtemps que nous ne prendrons pas les choses en main sur tous les plans, notre pays sombrera dans les crises à répétition et son peuple ne tirera jamais profit de ses nombreuses ressources.

Nous invitons donc les Centrafricains à se lever comme un seul Homme et de s'approprier la destinée du pays. On ne fait pas le développement avec l'argent, ni avec la solidarité. Mais avec un engagement citoyen ferme et une détermination à trouver des solutions à tous nos problèmes. Nous ne sommes pas un sous peuple.

Le Temps de Béafrika est arrivé. Soyons des dignes descendants de nos vaillants ancêtres. Levons nous dans le calme pour revendiquer de manière pacifique et ferme notre droit à la sécurité et au bien être.

# ~~Le Temps De Réafrica~~

Mouvement Citoyen pour l'appropriation de la destinée du pays

## LISTE DES REVENDICATIONS A SATISFAIRE AVANT LA LEVEE DU MOT D'ORDRE DE DESOBEISSANCE CIVIQUE NATIONALE


1	Le respect de la volonté du peuple souverain de Centrafrique par tous les organismes et organisations internationales dans leur relation avec le pays et leur implication dans la résolution de la crise ;
2	Le redéploiement sans conditions et immédiat des Forces Armées Centrafricaines sur toute l'étendue du territoire pour procéder au désarmement des forces illégales et le rétablissement de la sécurité. ;
3	Le retrait des militaires français de l'opération sangaris du territoire centrafricain ;
4	L'application du mandat des casques bleus présents en Centrafrique. A défaut leur retrait du territoire centrafricain ;
5	Le désarmement volontaire ou forcé dans le 3 <sup>ème</sup> , le 4 <sup>ème</sup> , le 5 <sup>ème</sup> et le 8 <sup>ème</sup> arrondissement de Bangui. ;
6	Le désarmement volontaire ou forcé de tous les groupes armés dans le centre -est ainsi que dans le centre nord. du pays ;
7	L'arrestation de Ali DARASSA et la dissolution du mouvement criminel UPC ;
8	L'arrestation de Haroun GAYE et ses acolytes ;
9	La mise en route sans délai de la cour pénale spéciale pour juger les auteurs des crimes durant cette crise et les autres ;
10	La redéfinition d'un nouveau calendrier électoral réaliste par l'ANE et l'engagement des tous les acteurs politiques à respecter ce calendrier
11	L'organisation dans un meilleur délai par la Cheffe d' Etat de transition d'un dialogue citoyen pour la validation du nouveau calendrier électoral et pour faire consensus national autour du processus électoral

Fait à Bangui, le 27 septembre 2015

Pour le Mouvement Citoyen,

Le Coordonateur

Gervais LAKOSSO



## Annex I.10: Minister of Justice Aristide Sokambi's statement dated 28 September 2015 on the escalation of violence and potential instigators

### DECLARATION DU MINISTRE D'ETAT A LA JUSTICE, GARDE DES SCEAUX, CHARGE DE LA REFORME JUDICIAIRE ET DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

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Le Samedi 26 Septembre 2015, suite à l'assassinat odieux d'un sujet musulman dont le corps a été jeté dans la concession de la FNEC au quartier Combattant dans le 8<sup>ème</sup> arrondissement, des violences inouïes ont éclaté à Bangui dans la matinée, au niveau du 5<sup>ème</sup> arrondissement et de ses environs qui se sont poursuivies dans la nuit.

En date du 27 Septembre 2015, face à cette situation, le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement de Transition, en l'absence du Chef de l'Etat en mission aux Etats Unis, appelait au calme, à la retenue et à l'apaisement quelle que soit la situation en cause, conformément aux différents engagements pris lors du forum de Bangui.

Alors que le Gouvernement recherchait une issue pacifique à cette situation, voilà que les 27 et 28 Septembre 2015, trois événements majeurs viennent donner une signification à ces violences :

- D'abord, la déclaration de M. **LAKOSSO Gervais**, Conseiller National de Transition, se disant coordonnateur d'une plate-forme de la société civile dénommée « **Temps de Béa Africa** », appelle la population à la désobéissance civile et demande à l'armée de se joindre à son mouvement pour s'emparer des destinées de la nation. En outre, il a incité la population à s'en prendre à la SANGARIS, à la MINUSCA et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui « **se pavent** », selon ses propres termes, dans notre pays ;

Ensuite, la marche organisée sans autorisation préalable en compagnie des hommes armés, pour demander la démission du Chef de l'Etat de la Transition et du Gouvernement, dont l'objectif était de prendre le Palais de la Renaissance.

Enfin, l'attaque coordonnée dans la nuit du 27 au 28 Septembre 2015 visant la gendarmerie, le Palais de la Renaissance et la Radio Nationale.

Il y a lieu de rappeler que la déclaration faite par M. **LAKOSSO Gervais** a été immédiatement suivie d'effet, car dans la même soirée des barricades ont été érigées et le lendemain, plusieurs ONGs internationales ont été systématiquement attaquées et pillées, notamment l'**Organisation Internationale pour la Migration (OIM)**, la **Croix Rouge Française**, **Première Urgence-Aide Médicale Internationale**, **Action contre la faim**, **Médecins du Monde**, **CORDAID**, **PAM**, etc.

Certains responsables de partis politiques se sont également réunis pour réclamer une troisième transition et soutenir publiquement ces violences, alors que le moment était à la recherche de solutions pacifiques.

Des Officiers de l'armée, comme le Capitaine **NGAIKOISSET Eugène**, le lieutenant **NGBANGOUA Olivier**, le nommé **MOKOM** et autres, recherchés par la justice centrafricaine pour divers crimes commis dans notre pays, se sont impliqués ouvertement dans tous les différents mouvements pour attenter à l'ordre établi.

En dépit des différents appels à la reprise et au dialogue de la majorité des partis politiques, des Associations, des leaders religieux et communautaires, M. **LAKOSSO Gervais** et ses complices persistent dans la voie de la désobéissance civile au mépris des instructions gouvernementales.

Devant de tels comportements flagrants qui sont constitutifs d'atteinte à la sûreté intérieure de l'Etat, de complot, d'incitation à la guerre civile, à la désobéissance civile, à la haine et de complicité, le Gouvernement a instruit les autorités judiciaires compétentes, aux fins d'ouverture d'une enquête à l'effet de rechercher et d'arrêter les présumés auteurs et complices pour qu'ils répondent de leurs actes.

Je voudrais saisir cette occasion, pour rappeler à tous, que le Forum national a recommandé la lutte contre l'impunité des auteurs des crimes et autres violations des droits humains.

De même, depuis le déclenchement de ces violences, la communauté nationale et internationale réclame toutes, la poursuite des auteurs et instigateurs de ces événements.

A cet effet, je lance un appel à témoins à tous, pour contribuer à l'identification des autres auteurs et complices qui ont volontairement endeuillé de nouveau notre pays.

Appel est également lancé à tous les citoyens pour dénoncer sans délai aux autorités judiciaires les lieux de refuge ou de retraite de ces personnes.

Le Gouvernement prendra toutes les dispositions nécessaires, avec l'appui des forces internationales pour traduire devant la Justice nationale et internationale les principaux auteurs des différents actes répréhensibles survenus ces derniers jours.

Je vous remercie.

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**Annex I.11: Incidents of non-compliance****Case study: MINUSCA**

1. The Panel documented three cases of weapons and ammunition seized by MINUSCA and transferred to the *Section Recherche et Investigation* (SRI) of the CAR gendarmerie to be sealed as evidence, as per judicial practices in the CAR,<sup>59</sup> that were actually diverted from the judicial procedure to equip gendarmerie forces in Bangui. As stressed earlier, in view of the absence of safe storage place at the latter's office, all seized arms are kept at the SRI.
2. According to a high-ranking official within the gendarmerie,<sup>60</sup> breaches of seals to equip the gendarmerie are almost systematic, even in the context of serious criminal investigations. As a matter of fact, none of the weapons listed as having been transferred by MINUSCA to the SRI were present at the SRI during the inspection conducted by the Panel in July 2015.<sup>61</sup>
3. In the first case, MINUSCA handed over an AK-type weapon – to be used in evidence in a legal case concerning Samuel Ndoumbélé to the SRI. This weapon was subsequently made available to the head of the gendarmerie, according to an SRI internal document obtained by the Panel.

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<sup>59</sup> Interview with Mr. Kossy, Head of SRI Section, Bangui, 5 July 2015; Interview with investigating judges, Court of Appeals, Bangui, 1 July 2015.

<sup>60</sup> Meeting with a gendarmerie high-ranking official, Bangui, 5 July 2015.

<sup>61</sup> Inspections conducted at SRI on 4 and 6 July 2015.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
 UNITE DIGNITE TRAVAIL  
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MINISTERE DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
 IMMIGRATION - EMIGRATION  
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 LE GENDARME DE GENDARMERIE  
 TERRITORIALE  
 SECTION DE RECHERCHES ET  
 D'INVESTIGATIONS

A Bangui, le 02 Juin 2015

N° / 4.SRI

**ETAT D'ARMEMENT DECHARGE PAR LA MINUSCA A LA SECTION DE RECHERCHES ET D'INVESTIGATIONS**

TYPE	N° ARME	AFFAIRE	OBSERVATIONS
AK 47	1113	DOMONGUERE-TOMORO, Achille	
AK47	03873	LI BETI-BANGUI-DEYOMBO,	
PA	15857	Sylvain	
AK 47	7149	NAMBATE, Gildas et Autres.	
AK 47	35038990	GREKAMBA, Yohann	
PM MAT 49	112359	IDOROFIO, Didier et Autres.	
AK 47	17688	NDOUMBELE, Samuel	
PM MAT 49	087.802	MBOZOOMSE, Evuariste et Autres.	
AK 47	TRIPOTE	BEATEM, Grâce à Dieu	
AK 47	56-2-2804173	Detation aide camp Ministre T.P	
AK 47	461592	NDALET-YABENDJI, Bernard et	
AK 47	15197	Autres.	

Lieutenant KOSSI, Serge - Stanislas  
 Commandant la Section de Recherches  
 et d'Investigations à..... **BANGUI**

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Source: Document from the SRI on arms transfers from MINUSCA to the gendarmerie, obtained by the Panel on 3 June 2015 from a confidential source.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE DIGNITE TRAVAIL  
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MINISTERE DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
DIMIGRATION - EMIGRATION  
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LE G I O N DE GENDARMERIE.  
TERRITORIALE  
SECTION DE RECHERCHES ET  
D'INVESTIGATIONS

A Bangui, le 02 Juin 2015

N° / 4 SRL

ARMEMENT MIS A LA DISPOSITION DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL GENDARMERIE  
NATIONALE

TYPE	N° ARME	OBSERVATIONS
AK 47	9553	
AK 47	3255	
AK 47	8242	
AK 47	17638	
AK 47	04219	
AK 47	01074	
PM MAT 49	7802	
PM MAT 49	7795	
PM MAT 49	TRIPOTE	
PM MAT 49	TRIPOTE	

Lieutenant **KOSSI, Serge - Stanislas**  
Commandant la Section de Recherches  
et d'Investigations à.....**BANGUI**.

Source: Ibid.

4. In the second case, in legal procedures against Evariste Mbozoumbe and Bernard Ndalet-Yabendji, MINUSCA handed over three weapons to the *Section Recherche et Investigation*. The Panel noted during an inspection at the *Légion de la gendarmerie mobile* on 6 July 2015 that those three weapons were now equipping national forces
5. The Panel expressed concerns regarding this matter during a meeting on 2 June 2015 with MINUSCA.<sup>62</sup> MINUSCA representatives noted that both the Force and the Police components of MINUSCA were not systematically documenting the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the CAR judicial system, such as the number and type of weapons, circumstances of seizure, and date of transfer. MINUSCA also admitted lack of capacity in terms of follow-up on judicial procedures, in particular with regard to the integrity of the chain of custody of sealed evidence, even in cases initiated by MINUSCA.
6. The Panel retrieved several documents with details of MINUSCA transfers, but it seems that not all arms transfers are documented. For instance, while in the case of “Ousman Mahamat Ousman and others”, if MINUSCA kept records of the transfer of weapons dated 9 March 2015, it did not keep any records of the transfer of weapons in the case of “Marcel Ndalé and others” dated 25 April 2015.

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<sup>62</sup> MINUSCA was represented by: Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Deputy Police Commissioner, UNPOL Legal Adviser, UNPOL/JTF Chief Investigation Section, Chief Political Affairs, Chief Justice and Correction, Chief JMAC, Legal Affairs, UNMAS, and a Senior Adviser of the SRS; the Panel and MINUSCA agreed that a follow-up meeting should be organized within a reasonable timeframe.





DECHARGE

Le sous-officier LTN Serji Kessi  
Commandant la SRI de la  
Gendarmerie Nationale, reconnait  
avoir reçu du Bataillon Gabonais  
de la MINUSCA quatre (04)  
Fusils d'assaut de type AK47  
N° HT 21331 - 36546 - HT 5617  
et 265539.  
A Bangui le 09/03/2015 à 19h12


LTN Serji Kessi  
Cdt SRI

(L) TSOUMOU  
Combat GABON

Source: Investigation file on General Ousman Mahamat Ousman with record of arms transfer from MINUSCA to the SRI, obtained by the Panel on 5 July 2015 from a confidential source.





Source : Ibid; the documents does not indicate that the transfer of weapons was made by MINUSCA.

7. It was also noted by MINUSCA that no guidelines under which arms can or cannot be transferred to the national authorities are currently implemented. While some arms seized by MINUSCA are transferred to the gendarmerie, others are under UNMAS' custody, and it is unclear on what basis such decisions were taken. For example, in the case of "Yousouf Ahmat and others" the seized weapons are still under UNMAS' custody.<sup>63</sup>
8. However, MINUSCA informed the Panel that since 24 November 2014, they have been working on guidelines for the safe transfer and storage of arms and ammunition.<sup>64</sup>

#### **Other potential cases of non-compliance**

9. The Panel documented one case of non-compliance with paragraph 1 of resolution 2196 (2015) in which a French company exported to the Central African Republic non-lethal military equipment on 31 March 2015 in accordance with French and European Union export regulations, but without having received prior approval of the Committee in pursuance of paragraph 1(c) of resolution 2196 (2015).
10. Another potential case of non-compliance involved another French company, which signed a 20-million euros contract on 4 February 2015 with CAR Security Minister Niçaise Samedi Karnou regarding the provision of security equipment to the CAR security forces. The contract was terminated in June 2015 by the Prime Minister of the CAR transitional government, Mahamat Kamoun, and no equipment was actually delivered to the CAR.
11. In the two above cases, the Panel sent official correspondences to the companies involved, which cooperated fully by providing the Panel with all the requested documents and information.
12. On 1 June 2015, in Bossangoa, the Panel prevented MINUSCA to hand over to the CAR police and gendarmerie units weapons seized by international forces during disarmament operations. MINUSCA personnel informed the Panel that they were not aware of the arms embargo and of the exemptions procedures.

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<sup>63</sup> Meetings with MINUSCA personnel, 26 May 2015, 5 July 2015, 31 August 2015, 23 September 2015.

<sup>64</sup> Meeting between MINUSCA and the Panel on sharing of information on monitoring the arms embargo, Bangui, 24 November 2015 and 2 June 2015, and meetings with MINUSCA personnel, 26 May 2015, 5 July 2015, 31 August 2015 and 23 September 2015.

*Production of hunting ammunition in Bangui*

13. In March 2015, the company *Manufacture des Munitions de Chasse* (MMC) addressed a letter to MINUSCA requesting authorization to import raw materials from France and Portugal needed to produce the hunting ammunition. Both Member-States suspended all exports of weapons, ammunition and related materiel to the CAR following the imposition of the arms embargo on 5 December 2013.<sup>65</sup>
  
14. MMC production facilities, visited by the Panel on 23 September 2015, were still closed at the time of writing.<sup>66</sup> However, the Panel has on several locations seen cartridges produced by MMC, at occasions seized by MINUSCA in Bossangoa and Berbérati.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Letter from MMC to the SRSG of MINUSCA, Bangui, 5 March 2015.

<sup>66</sup> Visit of MMC production facilities and meeting with MMC manager Luis Morais, Bangui, 23 September 2015.

<sup>67</sup> Inspections in Bossangoa on 26 April 2015 and Berbérati on 27 August 2015.

### Annex 1.12: Voluntary disarmament operation

1. The voluntary disarmament operation launched in March 2015 by the former Minister of Defence, Marie-Noëlle Koyara, has witnessed a decreasing rate of success:
  - From 23 March to 25 April, FACA handed over 96 arms, 9600 rounds of ammunition, 69 hand grenades, 29 mortar bombs and 26 rockets
  - From 26 April to 8 June 2015, members of the FACA handed over 14 arms, 873 rounds of ammunition and 30 hand grenades.
  - From 9 June to 7 July 2015, no weapons and ammunition were turned over to the collection Committee.
  - From 8 July to 5 October 2015, only 9 weapons were reportedly handed over to the ad-hoc *Comité de collecte* (collection committee).<sup>68</sup>
  
2. In total, the Panel inspected 114 weapons, 10,500 rounds of ammunition, 88 hand grenades, 29 mortar bombs and 26 rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) launchers voluntarily handed over by mainly FACA elements.<sup>69</sup> The Panel also inspected 21 weapons, 12,253 rounds of ammunition, 18 hand grenades and 33 RPG launchers reportedly handed over by elements of the gendarmerie.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Due to the recent escalation of violence, these weapons could not be inspected.

<sup>69</sup> Inspections at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 25 April, 22 May, 5 June and 8 June 2015. On 5 July 2015, the Panel inspected four out of the 16 arms reportedly returned by 16 FACA soldiers active in the National Instruction Centre in Bouar; see annex 1.13 below for the full list of weapons and ammunition inspected by the Panel.

<sup>70</sup> Inspection at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 8 June 2015. At different time periods, the explanation regarding the origin and destination of these arms and ammunition has changed. Whereas at first it was reported that they arms and ammunition belonged to the CAR gendarmerie, later it was reported that they were part of the voluntary collection programme. Due to the recent escalation of violence, this could not be verified; see again annex 1.13 below for the full list.

*Photograph taken by the Panel at Camp Izamo during an inspection on 8 June 2015*



3. The relative failure of the voluntary disarmament programme is a matter of concern, considering the important amount of arms and ammunition known to be in the possession of elements of the national security and armed forces.<sup>71</sup> Collected weapons – including RPG launchers – were distributed by transitional authorities to FACA elements patrolling the capital or in charge of static security of official buildings.<sup>72</sup>
4. Upon request, the collection committee transmitted to the Panel the list of arms and ammunition in the possession of senior FACA officers.<sup>73</sup> The document indicates that 25 officers declared that they were in possession of several types of weapons, including 30 assault-rifles and 4 rifles, 4 MAT-49 submachine guns as well as a total of 2,585 rounds of ammunition, two grenades and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher.<sup>74</sup> While most senior officers declared to be in possession of between one and three weapons, two officers possessed eight weapons with 1,000 rounds of ammunition and six weapons with 531 rounds of ammunition, respectively.

<sup>71</sup> High ranking FACA officers declared to the Panel that they keep undeclared weapons at home, to be able to defend themselves in case of a new upsurge of violence; interviews with high ranking FACA officers, Bangui, 5 July 2015 and 25 August 2015.

<sup>72</sup> Interviews with FACA and gendarmerie officers, Bangui, 20 May, 4 and 5 July 2015; from mid-May onwards, the Panel has not been able to inspect weapons carried by FACA elements during patrols in Bangui.

<sup>73</sup> FACA officers were instructed to declare their weapons only, while non-commissioned officers and soldiers had to return all weapons and ammunition in their custody.

<sup>74</sup> Document archived with the United Nations.

### Annex 1.13: Inspections of weapons and ammunition by the Panel from 14 April 2015 to 5 October 2015

#### *Arms inspections at the CAR gendarmerie*

1. During inspections conducted by the Panel at different brigades and units of the gendarmerie, the quantity of ammunition available to CAR security and armed forces appears disproportional to the number of weapons, although some units – namely the *Légion de la Gendarmerie Mobile* (LGM) – seem better equipped than others.
2. The Panel inspected a total of 72 weapons, 128 rounds of ammunition and 20 explosives. On 4 July 2015, the Panel inspected PK 12, Sûreté aéroportuaire, PK 9, Brigade fluviale and Brigade territoriale landja. On 6 July 2015, the Panel inspected Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, Brigade territoriale and the Section recherche et investigations. The Panel inspected weapons at the Sûreté aéroportuaire, one weapon at PK 12, eight weapons at PK 9, two weapons at Brigade fluviale, four weapons at Brigade territorial Landja, 33 weapons at Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, 17 weapons at the SRI and seven weapons at the Brigade territoriale. This phenomenon of the gendarmerie units having very few weapons and ammunition at their disposal is also apparent in the different provinces visited by the Panel. To illustrate, the gendarmerie in Bouar only possesses two functioning weapons and two loaders; they have no vehicle at their disposal.<sup>75</sup>
3. Of the 72 weapons inspected, 17 were stored at the *Section Recherche et Investigation* (SRI) of the gendarmerie after having been seized at criminal investigation sites.<sup>76</sup> According to national rules and regulations, all evidence of judicial procedures must be sealed and retained either at the SRI or at the Prosecutor's Office.<sup>77</sup> In practice, even though these arms are part of judicial procedures, those which are functional are used by different units of

<sup>75</sup> Panel's inspection, Bouar, 29 May 2015.

<sup>76</sup> The number of 72 does not take into account the weapons inspected at Camp Izamo on 8 June 2015 since it remains unclear who these weapons belong to.

<sup>77</sup> In view of the absence of safe storage place at the latter's office, all seized arms are kept at the SRI.

the gendarmerie. On 23 September 2015, the newly appointed deputy director general of the gendarmerie affirmed to the Panel that the gendarmerie was willing to stop this practice.<sup>78</sup>

4. The Panel notes with concern that the SRI does not have safe storage facilities for weapons and ammunition, with arms subsequently deposited in the various offices which are easily accessible even to the public.<sup>79</sup> The Panel also considers that neither the CAR security nor its armed forces have proper procedures for weapons management. Moreover, the Panel received detailed information on one case of diversion of ammunition by a warrant officer from the gendarmerie to anti-balaka.
5. On 28 August, the Panel has seen several boxes of inspected ammunition at the Etat-Major, where they were transferred to for security reasons.<sup>80</sup> For example, out of the 33 weapons inspected at the Légion de la gendarmerie mobile, at least four had reportedly been seized at criminal sites and used by the gendarmerie; the head of the SRI justified this practice as a consequence of lack of weapons and argued that official registers are filled in to track all inputs and outputs. The Panel could not confirm the latter because registries were not made available.
6. The Panel came across several cases of deficient chain of custody of ammunition seized by the gendarmerie. As a result, either nobody is able to tell where seized ammunition ended up, or seized ammunition is only recovered after a lengthy process of investigation among recipient gendarmerie elements.
7. A confidential report dated 15 June 2015 obtained by the Panel on 3 July 2015, mentions that ammunition seized by the gendarmerie was supplied to a Bangui-based anti-balaka military commander with FACA background;<sup>81</sup> a national military source confirmed such cases of diversion to the Panel during a meeting in Bangui on 3 July 2015.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with Bruno Ouaholo, 23 September 2015.

<sup>79</sup> See photographs of seized weapons stored at the SRI in **annex 1.14**.

<sup>80</sup> Inspection at Camp Izamo, Bangui, 8 June 2015. Interview with collection committee focal point, Bangui, 29 August 2015.

<sup>81</sup> Archived with the United Nations.

8. The Panel inspected two MAT-49 submachine guns, three Type 56(-2) assault rifles, one MPI-KM assault rifle, one Kbk-AKMS assault rifle and a dozen rounds of ammunition at Customs and six Type 56(-1) assault rifles, one MAS-36 rifle and one grenade launcher at Water and forestry. However, in June 2015 the Panel inspected large stocks of ammunition reportedly belonging to the gendarmerie at Camp Izamo.
9. Several high-ranking security officials informed the Panel that part of the armament of the gendarmerie was bought from individuals (FACA elements, gendarmes, politicians and civilians) and armed groups. The gendarmerie reportedly pays FCFA 50,000 (USD 100) for one arm with one or two magazines.<sup>82</sup>

*Arms inspections at CAR customs and water and forestry*

10. On 28 August, the Panel inspected the arms and ammunition of the custom authorities and water and forestry services in Bangui. Custom authorities only presented seven weapons and a dozen rounds of ammunition of calibre 7.62x39mm.
11. Water and forestry presented eight weapons and six rounds of ammunition of calibre 7.62x39mm. Government officials admitted to the Panel that both departments buy weapons from both anti-balaka and ex-Séléka elements.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Interviews with confidential sources in the gendarmerie, Bangui, 25 August 2015. This was confirmed by a confidential FACA source, 25 August 2015.

<sup>83</sup> Interviews with Government officials, Bangui, 25 August 2015.

*List of locations where inspections were conducted by the Panel*

12. One inspection in Bria (14 April 2015), two inspections in Camp de Roux Bangui (16 April and 27 May 2015), two inspection in Sangaris Bangui (17 April and 22 May 2015), two inspections in Mbaiki (23 April and 30 August 2015), two inspections in Obo (24 April and 25 September 2015), three inspections for the Collecte volontaire in Bangui (25 April, 22 May, 8 June 2015), two inspections in Bossangoa (26 April 2015 and 1 June 2015), one inspection in Bambari (25 May 2015), two inspections in Kaga Bandoro (25 May and 23 August 2015), four inspections in Bouar (28-29 May and 4-5 June 2015), two inspections in Baoro (4 and 5 June 2015), one three-day inspection of the units and brigades of the Gendarmerie in Bangui (8 June, 4 July, 6 July 2015), one inspection in Berberati (27 August 2015), one inspection at custom services (28 August 2015), one inspection at water and forestry (28 August 2015), one inspection of Chinko seizures in Bangui (1 September 2015), inspection on the Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès axes (20-24 August 2015) and inspection on the Ndélé-Chadian border axes (24 September-5 October 2015). As background information, the Panel also included some weapons inspected under previous mandate in this list.
13. During several arms inspections conducted in Bangui and Bria, two researchers of Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a private research institute working on an EU-funded project, and UNMAS/THE HALO TRUST staff inspected the armament at the same time as the Panel.

## List of Arms

Date documented	Location documented	Type	Serial/Markings	Origin
25 May 2015	Bambari	Crosman 2200 Magnum Pneumatic Rifle		USA
25 May 2015	Bambari	MAT-49 submachine gun	D66290	France
25 May 2015	Bambari	MAT-49 submachine gun	G23168	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60mm mortar tube	1329TH	USA
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	100076	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	102764	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AA52 machine gun	A25472	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AIM-AKM Model 63 (AK pattern)	1975 GI 1418	Romania
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AIM-AKM Model 63 (AK pattern)	UE 3250 1998	Romania
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AK 47 rifle (AK pattern)	K 82255	Russia
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	AK 47 rifle (AK pattern)	BE 25 3?30	Bulgaria
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AK55 assault rifle (AKM pattern)	457865	Hungary
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	IOH 521	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	G3 assault rifle	231924	Portugal
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Galil assault rifle	701333	Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Galil assault rifle	G-2087182	Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	FF 249900	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA 0167	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA 0168	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0019	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0145	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0153	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0153	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0186	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0204	UK

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0211	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0234	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0320	UK
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Lee Enfield rifle	RCA0465	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	AB 59103	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	AD22021	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Chatellerault rifle	BE 88955	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Continsouza rifle	27200	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M-16 Tulle rifle	BC 68067	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	M70 B1 assault rifle	369413	Serbia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	M80 machine-gun	324690	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	277471	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	?17233	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH45732	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FH78437	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78442	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FH78453	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78485	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	FJ10136	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L12845	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L24822	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	L96827	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	M22920	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	M69924	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	M75276	France

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N13660	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N16866	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N18379	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	N18582	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle	N22432	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N27938	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N28024	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N35257	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAS-36 rifle	N52204	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	MAS-36 rifle mod51	G19873	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A10051	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A54486	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A60398	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A75413	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	A83376	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	B4962	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	C.A4	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E18977	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F51829	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F53266	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F5641	France
05 June 2015	Bangui (SRI)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F69445	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87465	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87880	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MAT-49 submachine gun		France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	74 ?A 6967	East Germany

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GU 4406	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	88 34 7739	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0534	East Germany
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	R4 Vector assault rifle	791860A1	South Africa
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	RPD-type machine gun	69-61894	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SAR 80 assault rifle	SER 019651	Singapore
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SIG 542 assault rifle	32804/46595	Switzerland
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	SOLTAM 81mm mortar tube (type N°1 MKB type)	1615	Finland/Israel
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Sten MK type submachine gun	4372-04	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Sten MK type submachine gun	4439-04	UK
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Steyr AUG assault rifle	913SA327	Austria
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2801668	China
22 May 2015	Camp Henry Izamo (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	2802972	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2803568	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	2803685	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	3718854	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	3720804	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	3725636	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	3728850	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	5036543	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12005026	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	T56-2 assault rifle	12007070	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12011130	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12015360	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12019950	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12019950	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3808549	China

24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3819695	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3835215	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3903387	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	3903676	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	9402161	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	9405253	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35046486	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35058091	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	35062863	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	37000427	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Type 56 Rifle	3564662	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	21000784	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	Type 56 Rifle	35064459	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	UZI submachine gun	3427	Belgium
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Vz.52 machine gun	CD4884	Czechoslovakia
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK12)	MAS-36 rifle	N3129	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	3725413	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	61625	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	3680094	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	35059820	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	2006895	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle	76220	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	Type 56 Rifle		China
4 July 2015	Bangui (Brigade fluviale)	Type 56 Rifle	5009	China
4 July 2015	Bangui (Brigade fluviale)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ0547	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	MAT-49 submachine gun	85929	France

4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	MAS-36 rifle	N25818	France
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	Galil assault rifle	800805A1	Israel
4 July 2015	Bangui (Landja)	Type 56 Rifle	35068774	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87802	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F30546	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	F/P56163	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E018171	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	D15618	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87795	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	erased	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G10750	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7493	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7487	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7488	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7490	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7491	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Grenade launcher (Cougar)	7494	
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	unreadable	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	N14409	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	N13647	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	FH78441	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ0126	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	T56-2 assault rifle	3706020	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	367232	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	35073191	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	35070465	China

6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Type 56 assault rifle	380856	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	36061449	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-1 assault rifle	28168193	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	AKM pattern	Br8093	
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	12003487	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	3745467	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007247	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	T56-2 assault rifle	3710646	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (SRI)	Type 56 assault rifle	3644550	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	N18000	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	N34891	France
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	Type 56 assault rifle	3805674	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	T56-2 assault rifle	5066282	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	Type 56 assault rifle	3658976	China
6 July 2015	Bangui (brigade territoriale)	MAS-36 rifle	FJ05418	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MAT-49 submachine gun	G53361	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MAT-49 submachine gun	E012539	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)		East Germany
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1978 LK15537	Poland
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	T56-2 assault rifle	3728035	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007732	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Douane)	Type 56 assault rifle	3907078	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	MAS-36 rifle	D90899	France
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	37010595	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	RPG7 launcher (Sinnar model)	NZ-08-311	Sudan
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	59063	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	35065236	China

28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	T56-1 assault rifle	3607445	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	3809041	China
28 August 2015	Bangui (Water and Forestry)	Type 56 assault rifle	35062414	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1965 CT733	Russia
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1976 C?4294	Romania
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	35049932	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Type 56 Rifle	3801478	China
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	AKM rifle (Karabinek)	1976 KP 10140	Poland
1 September 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	67-2 machine-gun	251147	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	12010480	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	12017254	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	5050632	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1964 M07857	Russia
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 assault rifle	unreadable	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	2806091	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	3842020	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	37018743	China
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1972 HE6743	Russia
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	A897484	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	B473822	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	BD8614	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	Lee Enfield rifle	D43680	France
27 August 2015	Berberati (Minusca)	MAS-36 rifle	?91232	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	67-2 machine-gun	251453	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	HC 1715	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	T56-2 assault rifle	12002315	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	274514	Russia

26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MAC semi-automatic pistol	K5732	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MAC semi-automatic pistol	S3689	France
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0093	East Germany
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 1208	East Germany
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	R4 Vector assault rifle	781182A1	South Africa
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Type 56 Rifle	3903521	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1977 PP 01802	Poland
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	Type 56 Rifle	3800149	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	67-2 machine-gun	251785	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51564	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51589	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	90273	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	101595	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	295067	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Browning Hunting Rifle	370908	Belgium
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	DShK (?) Machine gun barrel	240219-2	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	G3 assault rifle	172872 Zh-3 6531 (all in Farsi)	Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	2070357	Israel
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	10000946	Israel
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Hunting shotgun		
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	KPVT machine-gun barrel	9398	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	M16-A1 assault rifle	5631996	USA
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	M80 machine-gun	275549	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Model 60 Marlin Hunting Rifle	95440683	USA
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Mortier (tube)	WA12 16000	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Mousqueton d'artillerie Modèle M16 (shotgun)	BC 11100	France
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GA ??10	East Germany

16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	QLZ-87 (35mm grenade launcher)	161308	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	711282A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	792539A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	R4 Vector assault rifle	796167A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	61672	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	2201089	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	??-293	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPD-type machine gun	Fully unmarked	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG-7B launcher	AB-21-88	Bulgaria
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG-7B launcher	KT-19-497	Bulgaria
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG7 launcher	SY890051	Possibly Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	RPG7 launcher	SY890069	Possibly Iran
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	SA-7 (battery missing)	Serial number cancelled	Russia
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Shotgun	B 61718	
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	2805798	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	3729769	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	T56-2 assault rifle	12011863	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 assault rifle	3678132	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 assault rifle	360?????	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Type 56 Rifle	22001532	China
16 April 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Verney-Carron Hunting Rifle	F04088	France
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	AKS-74 assault rifle (AKM pattern)	125935	Hungary
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	88 36 2551	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KMS assault rifle (AKM pattern)	89 11 0039	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	RPD-type machine gun	69-61499	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-1 assault rifle	3604304	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2805133	China

07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2806865	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	2806905	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	3704979	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	5071083	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12003685	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12011586	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12011854	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12019313	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	16187731	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	35070485	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	37002923	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	MAB semi-automatic pistol	159 XT 02054	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	T56-2 assault rifle	3710972	China
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	Erased	Russia
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	FN-FAL assault rifle	1020320	Belgium
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	M20 type (TT-33 copy) pistol	n°00179	China
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	3721102	China
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	Type 56 Rifle	35064236	China
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	hunting shotgun		
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	?	61498	Russia
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1000973	Russia
23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	T56-2 assault rifle	3701069	China

23 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro (Minusca)	Type 56 assault rifle	3821927	China
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	MAT-49 submachine gun	E11911	France
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	R4 Vector assault rifle		South Africa
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	M70AB2 assault rifle (AK pattern)	A43843	Yugoslavia
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	Type 56 assault rifle	19631	China
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
22 August 2015	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	? (AK pattern)	Unreadable	
B	Kaga Bandoro/Mbres area	RPG-7B launcher	By-661	Bulgaria
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Galil assault rifle	2093804	Israel
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	T56-2 assault rifle	3717862	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	MAS-36 rifle	P28064	France
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	MAT-49 submachine gun	B815	France
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Type 56 assault rifle	3907502	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	Vz.58 V assault rifle	D57809	Czechoslovakia
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	84 MQ 0656	East Germany
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	T56-2 assault rifle	12016891	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	14009895	China
07 April 2015	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Type 56 assault rifle	20066588	China
29 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
25 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
25 September 2015	N'dele area	T56-2 assault rifle	5047661	China
25 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	HE1729	Russia
25 September 2015	N'dele area	T56-2 assault rifle	3704012	China

25 September 2015	N'dele area	hunting shotgun		
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	erased	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1974 ???752	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	R4 Vector assault rifle		South Africa
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	erased	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1969 yH1116	Russia
26 September 2015	N'dele area	AMD 65M	E06088	Hungary
29 September 2015	N'dele area	MAT-49 submachine gun	G87891	France
28 September 2015	N'dele area	Type 56 assault rifle	471125	China
2 October 2015	N'dele area	MAS-36 rifle (bolt action)	L64065	France
23 April 2015	Obo	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	101173	
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	CT 9919	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	EB 3691	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	AJI 7757	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	AP 5991	China
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	ГТ 6138	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	НЭ 3312	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	AK pattern	49008212	?
23 April 2015	Obo	G3 assault rifle	2468	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Galil assault rifle	G-2087859	Israel
23 April 2015	Obo	Galil assault rifle	G-2088061	Israel
23 April 2015	Obo	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1976 HT 19508	Poland
23 April 2015	Obo	MAS-36 rifle	7682	France
23 April 2015	Obo	MAS-36 rifle	37665	France
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	4501293	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	18176298	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	2806086	China

23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3711122	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3725797	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	12009401	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	12011395	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	37?0842	China
23 April 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	37?0872	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	17217401	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35044836	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35061669	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	1808332?	China
23 April 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	3?05602	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	2862	China
25 September 2015	Obo		3?E1?	
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1967 ME 5241	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	T56-1 assault rifle	17010773	China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1969 OK767	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	68??016	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35??3305	China
25 September 2015	Obo	T56-2 assault rifle	3706819	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1977 SS00950	Poland
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	196? B07847	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle		China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1966 ??	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	Unreadable	China
25 September 2015	Obo	AKM rifle (AK pattern) (probably)	1966???	Russia
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	35053606	China

25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	12???	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle	37?758?	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	79028	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	40380	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	?7386	China
25 September 2015	Obo	Type 56 assault rifle (probably)	Unreadable	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	69 type launcher (PG7 pattern)	51612	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	AKM rifle (AK pattern)	1985 PN 3109	Romania
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	FN-MaG machine-gun	1107	Belgium
07 November 2014	M'Poko Sangaris Camp	Galil assault rifle	2065145	Israel
19 January 2015	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Galil assault rifle	2090779	Israel
05 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	Galil assault rifle	778616A	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	782307A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	795902A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	796193A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	796520A1	Israel
/	/	Galil assault rifle	799107A1	Israel
/	/	Kbk-AKMS (AK pattern)	1976 HT 13860	Poland
/	/	M70AB2 assault rifle (AK pattern)	1989-M70-AB2 564287	Former Yugoslavia
05 June 2015	Bouar	M79 grenade launcher (40mm)	61510	USA
/	/	MPI-KM assault rifle (AKM pattern)	78 GA 4271	East Germany
07 November 2014	M'POKO	R4 Vector assault rifle	222	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	250475	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	701083	South Africa
12 November 2014	M'POKO	R4 Vector assault rifle	19000301	South Africa
30 October 2014	RDOT	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa
30 October 2014	RDOT	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa

03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	791959A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	792299A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	797297A1	South Africa
06 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	KK3871	South Africa
04 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
04 November 2014	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
/	/	RPG7 launcher	SY890122	Possibly Iran
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	SAR 80 assault rifle	16519	Singapore
/	/	SAR 80 assault rifle	SER 020800	Singapore
05 June 2015	Bouar	T56-1 assault rifle	3608976	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	3706020	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3708339	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	3710646	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	3711369	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3712546	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	3714547	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	3715968	China
05 July 2015	Bangui-Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	5066282	China
08 June 2015	Bangui - HQ of the Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	12003487	China
/	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	T56-2 assault rifle	12007070	China
05 July 2015	Bangui - HQ of the Gendarmerie Nationale	T56-2 assault rifle	12007247	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12010345	China
19 January 2015	Camp De Roux	T56-2 assault rifle	12010470	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12010930	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12011695	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12012154	China

/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12013024	China
/	/	T56-2 assault rifle	12014008	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	T56-2 assault rifle	12014472	China

### List of ammunition

Date documented	Location documented	Calibre	Type	Headstamp	Possible Origin
25 May 2015	Bambari	40mm	PG-7L HEAT rocket		?
25 May 2015	Bambari	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C. 12 Pte Noire 12	Congo (Brazzaville)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	55 023	?
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	12.7 x 99 mm	Small caliber	SF-1-82 12.7 S	France
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	188 * 70 *	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	?
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	Russia
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	40mm RHE-F type grenades	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	Bulgaria
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	2 TZZ 4 88	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	20 Z 82 T	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	22 Z 82 T	Israel (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	85 13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86 13	South Africa
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds (M83A-type)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds (M83A-type)	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar round (smoke)	/	?
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar round (illuminating model M802A4)	/	South Africa
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)

14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	LM 3.60 B 7.5	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	7.62x39 / 01	Iran
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121 86	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	84-SF	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	91 13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92 13	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92 23	South Africa
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	LM 10	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD 51 98	Sudan
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	188 74	Russia
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351 78	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351 78	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61 90	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71 01	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71 75	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945 07	China
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	9811 77	China
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn 65	Czechoslovakia
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	norma 7.62 russ	Sweden
24 April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	82mm	Mortar rounds	/	?
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S PS * 9mm LUGER	Spain (?)
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S&B 10 9x19	Czech Republic
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 82 9 mm	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 72 1 9mm	France
14 June 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	9 x 25 mm	Small caliber	71 11	China

July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)		China
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7,5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	SUD_98_51	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54_01	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	my 1986	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber		
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	80_118	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (LGM)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	80_118	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (PK12)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	unreadable	
4-6 July 2015	Bangui (PK9)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	unreadable	
04 June 2015	Baoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	MANUCAM_7.62 N	Cameroun
04 June 2015	Baoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	٧٠.س.س.س.س.	Iran ?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	17 * 74 *	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	21_76	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	13_Z_82_T	Israel (?)
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM_84-13	Portugal
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM_84-19	Portugal
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	IMI_07	Israel
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	S&B_222 REM	Czech Republic
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	60 mm	Mortar rounds	201-63-22 (engraved on the body of the round)	?
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	352	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_74	Russia(?)/China(?)
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	539_74	Russia
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_77	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71_01	China

01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
01 June 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_73	Czechoslovakia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	188_74	Russia
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_07	China
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	12 * 12 * 12 * 12 *	?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	CLEVER_12 MIRAGE_12	?
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C. 12 Pte Noire 12	Congo (Brazzaville)
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	NOBEL 12 SPORT 12	France
26 April 2015	Bossangoa	cal. 12	Small caliber	TRUST 12 EIBAR 12	Spain
05 June 2015	Bouar	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	41_95	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_74	Ukraine
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	60_74	Russia
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_65	Czechoslovakia
05 June 2015	Bouar	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_72	Czechoslovakia
04 June 2014	Bouar	cal. 12	Small caliber	CLEVER_12 MIRAGE_12	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	11_10	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	3_73	Russia
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	9631_06	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	21_77	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	14.5 x 114 mm	Small caliber	3 * 74 *	Russia
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	23mm	Meduim calibre	606_76	Russia

08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	37mm	Rocket	/	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	PG-rocket (Type 69-II HEAT)	/	China
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	?
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	40mm RHE-F type grenades	Grenade for underbarrel launchers	/	Bulgaria
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86 13	South Africa
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	96 93	South Africa (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM84-13	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	W C C 9 2	USA
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	57 mm	Air to Ground attack rockets (S5-MO type)	/	USSR (?)
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	7,5 x 54 mm	Small caliber	SF 81 1 7,5	France
08 June 2015	Camp Henri Izamo, Bangui	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU 1 51 01	Sudan
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90 12	?
25 May 2015	Kaga Bandoro	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90 22	?
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86 13	South Africa
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	FNM 84 18	Portugal
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	HH 5.56	Singapore
23 April 2015	Mbaiki	cal. 12	Small caliber	12 * 12 * 12 * 12 *	?
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU 51 99 1	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD 51 97	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD 51 98	Sudan
14 April 2015	MINUSCA Spanish Camp in Bria	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351 78	China
23 April 2015	Obo	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86 13	South Africa
23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)

23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar rounds	/	China (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	60 mm	Mortar fuze	/	China (?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	04_17 (inverted 04 and 17)	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_71	Ukraine
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_73	Ukraine
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_74	Russia(?)/China(?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_97	China(?)/Russia(?)
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_01	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_04	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71_11	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	711_72	Russia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_06	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_12	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	90_17	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_72	Czechoslovakia
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	SU_1_39_01	Sudan
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	82-SF	France
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_12	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_22	?
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_97	Sudan
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
23 April 2015	Obo	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	7.62x54 / 01	Iran
23 April 2015	Obo	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	13-MEN-10_9 X 19	Germany

23 April 2015	Obo	cal .223	Small caliber	WINCHESTER 223 REM	?
23 April 2015	Obo	cal. 12	Small caliber	12*12*12*12	
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_75	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	311_06	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_91	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_92	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_95	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_98	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_02	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_04	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_07	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	611_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	81_97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_02	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_06	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_07	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_12	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	blank	Ethiopia (probable)

25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270 70	Former USSR (Lugansk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270 71	Former USSR (Lugansk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17 73	Former USSR (Barnaul)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17 75	Former USSR (Barnaul)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	60 75	Former USSR (Frunze)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	711 72	Former USSR (Podolsk)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	539 70	Former USSR (Tula)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	7,62x39 03	Iran
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	SUD 39 98	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1 39 01 SU	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1 39 09	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2 39 09	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1 39 011	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2 39011	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1 39 012	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2 39 12	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1 13 39	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI 02	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	8?? 93	
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	31 75	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61 04	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61 08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61 91	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61 97	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	71 98	China


25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_93	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_08	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	811_11	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	(blank)	Ethiopia (probable)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_71	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	270_73	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Former USSR
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	17_73	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	2_39_08	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	1_39_12	Sudan
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI_04	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
25 September 2015	Obo	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	LI_06	Uganda (Luwer Industries)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket	/	China
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket (type F7)	/	North Korea
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG7-rocket (HEAT)	/	China(?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	VP-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 type rocket	/	?
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	40mm	Propellant charge for RPG rockets	/	/
29 May 2015	PK5, Bangui	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_71	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	12.7 x 108 mm	Small caliber	9631_06	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	40 mm	PG-7 rocket	/	USSR (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	5.56 x 45 mm	Small caliber	86_13	South Africa
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_74	China

14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	61_97	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	9121_86	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 39 mm	Small caliber	bxn_64	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	82-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	83-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	84-SF	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_12	?
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	90_22	?
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	92_13	South Africa
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	Arabic characters including 'sin'	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SU_1_51_01	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_97	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	SUD_51_98	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 51 mm	Small caliber	Triple entry (Arabic characters)	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	351_78	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	3611_77	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	54_011_2	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	54_03_4	Sudan
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_71	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	61_90	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_01	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_73	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	71_90	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_10	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_11	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	945_12	China

14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	9611_77	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn_66	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	7.62 x 54R mm	Small caliber	bxn_87	Czechoslovakia
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	15-MEN-05_9 X 19	Germany
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	311_09	China
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	NIM_9mm LUGER	
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	S PS * 9mm LUGER	Spain (?)
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF 82_9 mm	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	9 x 19 mm	Small caliber	SF86_9mm	France
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	cal. 12	Small caliber	12*12*12*12	
14 April 2015	Bria (Airport Camp)	cal. 12	Small caliber	M.A.C.C. 12_Pte Noire_12	Congo (Brazzaville)

**Annex 1.14:** Seized weapons and ammunition stored at the SRI unit of the CAR gendarmerie

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangui on 3 June 2015*



**Annex 1.15:** Weaponry stored at the CAR gendarmerie headquarters at Camp Izamo

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bangui on 8 June 2015*



## Annex 1.16: Arms registry of the FACA National Instruction Center in Bouar

GRADE	NOMS	TYPE	NUMERO	DATE SCOTTÉ	DATE RELITTE	MISSION	SIGNATURE
SGT	DANBARECO	AK47	89 110430	20-05-15		NIEN-YELWA	[Signature]
Col	DANGALE	AK47	562806900	-11-11-		NIEN-YELWA	[Signature]
Col	YAMAKANA	AK47	89 110567	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	KINDA	AK47	35056066	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	NGATCHIATERO	AK47	MON 1973	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
2 <sup>ed</sup>	BISSI-BERO	MAS 36	14414	-11-11-		-11-11-	[Signature]
SGT	BIANDJO	AK47	CP 4088336	20-05-15		Kouï	[Signature]
Clch	OUAKOUOUCU	AK47	20896	-11-11-		Kouï	[Signature]
Col	NOE	AK47	85489	-11-11-		Kouï	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	YASSARA	AK47	1388456150	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	TEMPOIN	AK47	66031	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
2 <sup>ed</sup>	SOUNGONDO	MAS 36	14893	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]
1 <sup>er</sup>	Guinbi	A 152	85922	-11-11-		-11-	[Signature]

Source: Document consulted and photographed by the Panel on 5 June 2015

**Annex 1.17: Storage of arms and ammunition at MINUSCA bases**

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbaiki on 30 August 2015*




*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bossangoa on 26 April 2015*



Annex 2: Central region – border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Map



## Overview

### *Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) parallel administration*

1. General Ali Darrassa Mahamat (UPC), also known as ‘Ali Daras’, commands the UPC faction of the ex-Séléka. General Darassa is the former military chief of staff of rebel leader of Peuhl origin, Mahamat Abdelkadr, aliases Mahamat Abdoul Kadre, and ‘Baba Ladé’ (‘Babba Laddé’). Mahamat Abdelkadr is the commander of the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR).
2. After Baba Ladé’s return to Chad in December 2012, Ali Darrassa joined the Séléka with most of former FPR fighters, including the Peuhl as of one of its main ethnic component, together with the Goula, Rounga and Arab.<sup>84</sup>
3. Based in Bambari, the UPC retains a strong grip on a large part of the centre-south and centre-east of the CAR. General Darrassa, general coordinator of the UPC, is still officially the regional commander of the fifth military region of the CAR army, and commands one of the most structured, organised and respected factions of the ex-Séléka, still mostly composed of Peuhl.
4. The political leadership of the UPC was composed of six individuals, some of whom are divided over the approach that the UPC should adopt with regard to the DDRR process, as well as what type of relationship the UPC should maintain with the international community.
5. Habyalah Awal,<sup>85</sup> political coordinator, Souleymane Daouda, political counsellor who signed the DDRR agreement on 10 May 2015 in Bangui on behalf of the UPC,<sup>86</sup> Hassan Bouba Ali, deputy political coordinator, Aboubakar Siddick Ali, UPC coordinator for Haute-Kotto, Youssoufa Bouba, UPC coordinator for Basse-Kotto, and Captain Ahmat Nadjat Ibrahim, spokesperson.<sup>87</sup> The last two, who were on the same moderate line led by Awal in terms of cooperation with the international

<sup>84</sup> Written notes of an interview conducted with Baba Ladé by a researcher on Chad, 10 and 16 September 2014.

<sup>85</sup> Awal, a banker by profession, was arrested on 9 May 2015 in a vehicle at the Bangui PK12 checkpoint, together with ‘General’ Haroun Mahamat, a FACA/BSS Colonel registered 2013-1-1004, and his bodyguards for illegal possession of weapons, a month after a similar operation was conducted on General Ousmane Mahamat Ousmane.

<sup>86</sup> Daouda used to introduce himself also as political coordinator of the UPC, and signed the DDRR in this capacity; Awal is reportedly challenging Daouda’s capacity to handle political issues (Confidential reports, 10 June 2015 and 12 June 2015).

<sup>87</sup> Former spokesperson of General Zoundeko when the new military structure of the ex-Séléka was established in Ndélé on 10 May 2014; Nadjat joined Darrassa when Zoundeko, Damane and ‘Ben Laden’ arrived end of May 2014 to try to take over Bambari; see section on Bambari in paragraphs 58 to 65 of the Panel’s 2014 Final report, and interview with Nadjat, Bambari, 3 July 2014.

community,<sup>88</sup> were killed during an attack on the UPC delegation in Bangui on 26 October 2015.

6. On the military side, the main UPC Generals are Mahamat Garba, military secretary general, Ahmat Ali, Hassan Ouattara (who replaced on 3 November 2014 General Mahamat Bandi in Kouango)<sup>89</sup> and Ousmane Abakar Daouda, deputy chief of staff for operations. General Yaya Scout, formerly FPRC in Bria, announced officially in Bria on 31 March 2015 that he proposed General Darrassa to join the UPC. The latter reportedly accepted the next day.<sup>90</sup>

*Anti-balaka structure in Ouaka*

7. At the time of drafting, the structures of the two anti-balaka opposing groups were as follows:
  - a) The faction of Ndarata and his deputies Thierry Madibo, also known as 'General Madibo', and René Pazou, also known as 'Fally', is recognized by Mokom as part of his movement.<sup>91</sup> The group also includes Maximin Ngbanga, also known as 'John l'Américain' and 'Homère' in Ngakobo (SUCAF area).<sup>92</sup>

Ndarata was arrested by FACA in Bangui on 24 June 2015, after several failed attempts by MINUSCA in Bambari,<sup>93</sup> and subsequently jailed at Ngaragba prison in Bangui after being convicted to a three-month sentence.

He was then legally released on 25 September 2015, the day when the escalation of violence started in Bangui. Ndarata's strongholds are located in Sabalet, a small village south of Bambari (7 kilometres on the road to Kouango) and Yakétché (40 kilometres west of Bambari, road to Grimari).

'Fally' is particularly active on the Bambari-Kouango axis, together with 'John l'Américain', 'Atakoli' and 'Manda Kara', and was also identified by the Panel as a perpetrator of exactions against Peuhl population in the Mendé area.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Confidential source, 30 July 2015. Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>89</sup> Meeting with UPC deputy zone commander Colonel Abdourahmane Mahmat alias 'Sirongo', Kouango, on 16 April 2015.

<sup>90</sup> Confidential military report, 3 April 2015. Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>91</sup> See **annex 2.4**, for the structure of Mokom's movement in Bambari and Grimari.

<sup>92</sup> 'Homère' was reportedly arrested on 20 May 2015 by MINUSCA; meeting with MINUSCA, Bambari, 25 May 2015.

<sup>93</sup> Meeting with MINUSCA, Bambari, 25 May 2015.

<sup>94</sup> 'Atakoli', John l'Américain and 'Manda Kara' were arrested by MINUSCA but fled from Ngaragba jail and regrouped, at the time of drafting, in Yakétché.

*Photograph of Giscard Ndarata dated 13 April 2015*



*Source: Provided by a confidential source on 27 September 2015*

- b) After the split, the main part of the anti-balaka remained under Gaëtan Bouadé, based in the Kidjigera neighbourhood, who accepted to join the table of discussions on pre-DDR.

Bouadé reportedly is back with Ngaïssona and his political party, the PCUD.<sup>95</sup> Bouadé's deputies are Marcellin Alix Orogbo and Gervais Pally. Victor Baba and 'Tombeau ouvert', active in Grimari and on the road to Liotto, are under Gaëtan's command.

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<sup>95</sup> Marcellin reportedly travelled to Bangui to discuss with Ngaïssona on 1 May 2015.

**Annex 2.1:** List of anti-balaka PCUD leadership active in Bambari on 15 April 2015**LISTE NOMINATIVE DES CADRES DU PCUD DE BAMBARI**

N°	Noms et Prénoms	Grades
01	BOADE Gaétan	Général Chef de zone
02	NDARATA Giscard	Chef des Opérations Militaires
03	GALLY-BASSI Yves	Commandant
04	MODIBO Thierry	Commandant
05	PALLY Gervais	Commandant
06	GRAKOUSOU Wenceslas	Capitaine
07	MALEMASSI Michel	Capitaine
08	OUAGO Elisée	Capitaine
09	POUMARDO Rufin	Capitaine
10	OROGBO Alix Marcellin	Adjudant-chef (Secrétaire Général)
11	PADOUNDJI Boniface	Adjudant
12	NDOUMENDE Michelin	Lieutenant
13	DEPARA Salomon	Lieutenant
14	SELEKELA Placide	Lieutenant
15	MOMOKAMA Charlin-Chabardo	Sergent Chef
16	ENDJIOUGBIA Bruno	Sergent Chef
17	MANIVELE Dieu-bénie Sonia	Sergent Chef
18	BOADE Emmanuel	Sergent
19	MAMBIKONGO Tonton	Sergent
20	FEINDIRONGAI Frédéric	Sergent
21	ENDJEZAPOU Grâce à Dieu	Coordonnateur préfectoral

**Annex 2.2:** Regional structure of anti-balaka PCUD in Bambari, Grimari and Grimari-Kouango axis on 10 December 2014

- BATA Simplicie

**Préfecture de la Ouaka (Bambari)**

- ENDJIDJAPOU Grâce à Dieu
- BOUADE Gaétan
- BALELOMA Albert
- YANGBANGA Claude
- PALI Gervais
- MALEMASSI Michel
- YAN Saint Cyr
- BOUGUEYE Ramces
- GRAKOUZOU Wenceslas
- MANIVELE Dieu béni
- BISSEKOUA Vivien

**Sous préfecture de Grimari**

**Grimari 1 :**

- KPANOU Sébastien
- AYOLMA Dimitri Placide
- MBILLAUME Serge
- NGOABADA Legrand


**Grimari 2 (Axe Kouango):**

- BABA Victor
- NDEMA BROTO Hugues
- POUMARDOU Innocent

Fait à Bangui, le


10 DÉC 2014

Le Président



Patrice Édouard NGAÏSSONA

**Annex 2.3: UPC press communiqué signed by Captain Ahmat Nadjat, alias 'Capitaine Ahamat Nedjad Ibrahim'**



Ce sont les Anti Balaka et certains membres du gouvernement qui sont à l'origine de l'instabilité quotidienne en République Centrafricaine

- cas de MALEBASSA du 02/08/2015
- cas de l'assassinat du jeune de la communauté musulmane de PK7 axe Chimbolo survenu vendredi le 20/08/2015.
- l'attaque du village Ouarago commune de Yabongo dans la Sous-préfecture de Zangba le 22/08/2015.

L'UPC constate le renforcement en effectif et en armement du mouvement des Anti Balaka venant des différents horizons basé à Grimari, ayant pour objectif de déstabiliser l'Est de la République Centrafricaine plus particulièrement la Ouaka et la Basse-koto qui n'ont jamais connus ces phénomènes

Après plusieurs investigations, l'UPC constate que l'assassinat du jeune musulman de PK7 sur axe Chimbolo n'est qu'un prétexte en outre, un complot pour occasionner la reprise des hostilités afin de compromettre le processus électoral en cours.

Pour conclure, l'UPC demande à la communauté internationale d'être témoin ainsi qu'au gouvernement d'assumer ses responsabilités pour le retour à la normale.

Fait à Bangui le 24/08/2015



Le porte-parole général du Mouvement de l'Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique



**Annex 2.4:** List of anti-balaka commanders under Maxime Mokom, including the zones of Bambari and Grimari, on 16 June 2015



**ANTI BALAKA**

COORDINATION NATIONALE DES  
Patriotes ANTI BALAKA  
\*\*\*\*\*

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unite – Dignite - Travail

COORDINATION NATIONALE DES  
OPERATIONS  
\*\*\*\*\*  
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

N° \_\_\_\_\_ /CN/CNO/SG

**LISTE DES COM -ZONES**


N.	NOMS	PRENOMS	FONCTIONS	ZONES
001	MAHANI	CONSTANT	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA
002	KOLO	OLIVIER	COORDONATEUR	SANGA MB.
003	NDOBADI	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	NOLA
004	GODONAM	ACHILLE	COORDONATEUR	BOUCA
005	NAMKOESSE	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	DEKOA
006	ZALO	JACQUES	COORDONATEUR	BOSSANGOA
007	BASSALA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	SIBUT
008	KOMBO	NARCISSE	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA
009	ZAHORO	SAMUEL	COORDONATEUR	BOZOOM
010	MBAINA	FLORENTIN	COM - ZONE	BOZOOM
011	BAGAZA	RODRIGUE	COORDONATEUR	MALA
012	DALIWANE	ALAIN	COM – ZONE	YALOKE
013	YABANDA	DIEUDONNE	ADJOINT COM – ZONE	YALOKE
014	WABILO	GUY	COORDONATEUR	GADZI
015	SINAKOLO	SYLVESTRE	COORDONATEUR	CARNOT
016	DEMOWANSSE	NICE	COORDONATEUR	AMADAGAZA
017	YERE	GUY	COORDONATEUR	BOGANGOLO
018	OUABIRO DANA	JO BRICE	COM - ZONE	DAMARA
019	BELLA	LOZACK	COM - ZONE	GAGA
020	YANGOUMALE	STANIE	CEMA	GRIMARI
021	FEIGANAZOUI	GUY	COM - ZONE	PK 42
022	OUAPOUTOU	BENJAMIN	COM - ZONE	BOSSEMBELE
023	KPANOU	SEBASTIEN	COORDONATEUR	GRIMARI
024	SEREMANDJI	AIME SERGE	COORDONATEUR	NDJO
025	YAPELE	CHRISOSTOME	COORDONATEUR	BERBERATI
026	NAMNENDOLA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	COROMPOKO
027	DIKA	BASILE	COORDONATEUR	OUEHAM PENDE

028	OCTINAM	THIERRY	COM - ZONE	MBOUROUBA
029	AZOUNOU	HIPPOLYTE PACOME	CHARGE D'ADMINISTRATION	DAMARA
030	YANGUE	BAUDOIN	S. G NATIONAL	BOGANGOLO
031	IYA	ARNAULD	COORDONATEUR	BOUAR
032	BARON	ADRAMANE	CONSEILLER SPECIAL	DEKOA
033	ZOKOUE	MAHAMAT HISSENE	MEDIATEUR INTERNE	NATIONAL
034	YAPENDE	GERVAIS	COM - ZONE	BOSSEMPTELE
035	DIMANCHE	ANSELM	COORDONATEUR ADJOINT	YALOE
036	BANDA	VINCENT	CHEF DE SECTION	ZAWA
037	BANAFEI	RODRIGUE	COORDONATEUR	BOSSEMPTELE
038	NARENA	VALENTIN	COM - ZONE GALAFONDO	OUMBA
039	MAKANZE	JEAN JACQUES	COM - ZONE BODA	BODA CENTRE
040	DANGBA PISSIDI	THEOPHILE	REPRESENTANT OUHAM	BOSSANGO
041	ANGA	CHARLES	COM - ZONE	BOUCA
042	NAMSSENE	HENRY LUNDI	REPRESENTANT	BOSSEMBELE
043	GAZAMODO	BERTRAND	COORDONATEUR	BANDORO
044	YANGBANGA	RODRIGUE	SECRETAIRE GENERAL	BAMBARI
045	SOUMALEKRA	RICHARD	PORTE PAROLE	BAMBARI
046	MAZIMBELE	GUY	COM - ZONE	BATANGAFO
047	GOTHAS	PATRICK	COM - ZONE	BOEING
048	NOUIDEMONA	MARIEN	COM - ZONE	NDJO
049	KOTAOKO	RICHARD	COM - ZONE	YALOE
050	GOPORO	NESTOR	COM - ZONE	BOULI
051	BEOROFEI	SYLVAIN	COM - ZONE	MAMBERE

116 JUN 2015



**Annex 2.5:** Visa stamped by anti-balaka (Sergent-Chef Charlin-Chabardo Momokama in Bambari) and UPC (probably Colonel Ibrahim Yahya in Liotto and Captain Ouattara in Kouango) commanders on the same *ordre de mission* of a member of a political party travelling from Bambari to Kouango on 11 April 2015



Source: Document obtained by the Panel from a Bambari-based confidential source on 22 April 2015

**Annex 2.6: Destroyed houses in the area of Liotto**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Liotto and surrounding villages on 18 May 2015*



**Annex 2.7: Investigation of the killing of an aid worker in Bambari on 15 March 2015**

1. During the evening of 15 March 2015, Benoît Kabé, a state nurse who was working in the health centre at the IDP site 'Sangaris' in Bambari was kidnapped at his residence by three anti-balaka elements. He was then killed by shotgun and a cut in his throat; his body was left six kilometres from Bambari on the road to Kouango.<sup>96</sup>
2. Benoît Kabé was born in the village of Liwa (south-east from Bambari on the route to Alindao) but resided in the village of Bokolobo (60 kilometres south-east from Bambari on the route to Alindao). He left his village in December 2014 for a training and registered himself as an IDP in Bambari since then. His family remained in Bokolobo.
3. According to investigations conducted by the Panel in Bambari, the local gendarmerie initiated an investigation to identify the perpetrators of the crime a few days after the incident. The information collected indicates that the group of anti-balaka executed Benoît Kabé because they suspected he had provided information to international forces on movements of anti-balaka elements in the village of Ngaluwa and a possible attack. The route from Bambari to Alindao has been scenario of multiple acts of violence in the past year, although the Panel has not recorded in its database any incident in this village.
4. On 18 March 2015, seven anti-balaka elements, all under the control of 'Gaëtan'<sup>97</sup> were identified by the Gendarmerie as suspects, four of them were arrested and three allegedly fled before they could be detained:<sup>98</sup>
  - Ghiovanie Manda, arrested on 19 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015 (see photograph below);
  - Crépin Kosséré, also known as 'Ngarobo', arrested on 23 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015 (see photograph below);
  - Ulrich Rékoama, arrested on 16 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 12 May 2015; and,
  - Victorien Ngoundomatichi, arrested on 23 March 2015, transferred to Bangui on 4 June 2015.

<sup>96</sup> The Panel conducted an investigation on this case during a mission to Bambari on 21 May 2015. Several interviews and meetings were conducted with local Gendarmerie, NGOs and other confidential sources.

<sup>97</sup> Gaëtan is the anti-balaka commander in Bambari; see list in **annex 4.3.**; the Panel has various records of child soldiers who were recently demobilized and were under his command.

<sup>98</sup> The Panel could not obtain the complete names of the other three fugitives.

5. Ghiovanie Manda, Crépin Kosséré and Ulrich Rékoama were jailed on 26 May 2015 awaiting for their trial for abduction and murder at Ngaragba prison in Bangui, while Victorien Ngoundomatichi was jailed on 8 June 2015 for abduction only.
6. However, the four perpetrators escaped from prison on 31 July 2015, amongst a group of 17 prisoners, most of them belonging to anti-balaka groups in Bambari.<sup>99</sup>

*Photograph of the dead body of health worker Benoît Kabé*




*Photograph of Ghiovanie Manda (right) and Crépin Kosséré, handcuffed at the Gendarmerie in Bambari*




*Source: Photographs obtained by the Panel from the gendarmerie officer in Bambari on 21 May 2015*

<sup>99</sup> A list of the 17 detainees who escaped from Ngaragba jail in Bangui on 31 July 2015 was provided to the Panel by a confidential source.

**Annex 2.8:** Western road from Liotto to Kouango



**Annex 2.9:** Map of the area of Bolo I and II, located five kilometers east of the main road from Kouango to Liotto



**Annex 2.10:** Attack on Bolo I and Bolo II (according to the Panel, 178 buildings were destroyed)

*Screenshot of a video taken by the Panel from a MINUSCA helicopter on 16 April 2015*



**Annex 2.11: Photographs of destructions and of a dead body in the villages of Bolo I and II**

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 16 May 2015*






*A dead body of a civilian allegedly killed by ex-Séléka attackers was found by villagers in a borehole in Bolo I*



Annex 2.12: Map of east of Kouango-Bianga area



**Annex 2.13: Anti-balaka structure in the Ouham province**

1. Ouham province, and more specifically the triangle Bossangoa-Bouca-Batangafu, remains the main stronghold of the “fourth group” of anti-balaka in the country. Populated mainly by the Gbaya ethnic group, this area includes the *sous-préfecture* of Ben Zambé, birthplace of the anti-balaka movement and region of origin of former President François Bozizé.
2. The fourth group, as per the Panel’s classification outlined in its 2014 interim report, is mainly composed at the senior level of FACA and Gendarmes of Gbaya origin, and was the backbone of the original military insurgency against Séléka; see also page 42 of the Panel’s 2014 interim report. In its update on 19 May 2015, the Panel recalled that this group is neither directly concerned nor involved in the political discussions with the transitional government. The first group is Ngaïssona’s PCUD; the second group is the ‘anti-balaka from the South’ of Alfred Yekatom; the third group is composed of local self-defense groups with none or loose organizational ties with the national level.
3. If the presence of MINUSCA in Bossangoa and Batangafu prevents anti-balaka members of regional coordinator Florient Daniel Kéma, a FACA sub-commissioned officer, and Romain Finiri, zone commander in Ben Zambé, from carrying weapons in public areas, there are recurrent reports of the presence of large groups of anti-balaka where MINUSCA has no presence in the areas of Ben Zambé, Nana-Bakassa and Kouki, as well as of recruitment and training.

*Photograph of Florent Kéma and Romain Finidiri  
taken by the Panel in Bangui on 18 April 2015*



4. This faction of the anti-balaka has extended its operations to Nana Grébizi, and more specifically to the area of Kaga Bandoro and south (road to Dékoa), and Mbrès.<sup>100</sup> The faction's *modus operandi* remains identical to that already identified by the Panel; i.e., anti-balaka military commanders, most of whom are former FACA, were sent to the area to mobilize Christian youth or to assume command of existing local self-defence militia groups.
5. According to a confidential report on 27 May 2015, the Imam of Dékoa was attacked on 25 May 2015 while walking in the street and was seriously wounded during an attack conducted by anti-balaka members of the group of Andilo's brother, in a context of local reconciliation efforts by both communities.
6. Several senior anti-balaka military commanders are still active in this region, which is closely connected to the leadership in Bangui, namely: Dieudonné Ngaibona, Andilo's<sup>101</sup> brother, also known as 'Dié', who is particularly active in the region of Batangafo-Bouca but also Bogangolo (Ombella-Mpoko),<sup>102</sup> and FACA officers Teddy

<sup>100</sup> Meeting with FPRC General al-Khatim, Moyen-Sido, 26 May 2015.

<sup>101</sup> Rodrigue Ngaibona, also known as 'Andjilou' ou 'General Andilo', has been first identified by the Panel as one of the most important anti-balaka leader in its 2014 interim report.

<sup>102</sup> List of 'Andilo' elements and area of operations, which includes also Ndoungbou and Boubou (Bouca area) is archived with the United Nations.

Bozizé,<sup>103</sup> the adopted son of François Bozizé, reported in Ben Zambé area, and Eugène Ngaïkosset,<sup>104</sup> former head of Bozizé's presidential guard, also known as the *Paoua butcher*, who escaped from jail on 17 May 2015 following his extradition from Brazzaville, and who created since his own anti-balaka faction of former FACA under Mokom's coordination.<sup>105</sup>

7. An anti-balaka regional leader and former FACA non-commissioned officer informed the Panel that the objective of Ngaïkosset's group was still to expel all Muslims from Ouham.<sup>106</sup> The appointment of Yvon Konaté – a FACA lieutenant – as national coordinator for military operations and Guy Mazimbélet – a FACA Corporal – as zone commander for Batangafo, can be interpreted as another sign of the reinforcement of the anti-balaka's military capacities in the north of Bangui.<sup>107</sup>
8. Yvon Konaté and Guy Mazimbélet are historical military leaders of the anti-balaka; see paragraphs 76 and 77 of the Panel's 2014 final report and paragraphs 7 and 8 of annex 5 of the Panel's 2014 interim report. Members of Mazimbélet anti-balaka group in Boy-Rabe have been identified in a confidential report as perpetrators of an attack on Rwandan MINUSCA police unit taking part in a joint operation with CAR gendarmerie to recover a stolen vehicle on 3 June 2015. During that operation two Rwandan police officers were wounded, including one seriously. Mazimbélet was reportedly killed on 26 September 2015 during the escalation of violence in Bangui.

<sup>103</sup> Teddy Bozizé's real name is Teddy Gbenengaina, born on 27 May 1984 in Bangui; Teddy is registered as a *sous-lieutenant* of the FACA with military identification number 2003-1-1125.

<sup>104</sup> Eugène Ngaïkosset, alias Ngakosset, is registered as a Captain of the FACA with military identification number 911-10-77.

<sup>105</sup> Missions to Bossangoa on 10 April, 30 April and 1 June 2015; interview with an anti-balaka leader, Bangui, 24 June 2015; Confidential reports, 8 and 16 July 2015; meeting with Mokom on 27 June 2015.

<sup>106</sup> Meeting with Florent Daniel Kéma, anti-balaka regional coordinator for the Ouham province, and Romain Findiri, zone commander for Ben Zambé, Bangui, 18 April 2015; see photographs in **annex 2.13**.

<sup>107</sup> Meeting with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 27 June 2015; meeting with Mokom's deputy, Côme Hyppolyte Azoumou, Bangui, 6 July 2015.


**Annex 2.14:** Sudanese truck in Kouango; trucks bring commercial goods from Sudan and return with coffee from Kouango to Sudan

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 16 April 2015*



Coffee plantations north of Kouango; coffee trees are usually cultivated underneath higher forest trees

*Photographs taken by the Panel from a MINUSCA helicopter on 16 April 2015*



Annex 3: Eastern region – border with Sudan and South Sudan

Map



## Overview

### *Birao*

1. Due to its privileged location, the control of Birao has always been particularly strategic for the different factions of the ex-Séléka. The recent designation of a new mayor by transitional authorities in Bangui, in the person of the Sultan of Birao, Ahmad Moustapha Am-Gabo, was immediately challenged by the *Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice* (MLCJ), which appointed its own mayor, named Mustapha Bourma Léon. The previous mayor, Mahamat Kachmir, was accused by ex-Séléka factions of cooperating with central authorities in Bangui and was subsequently abducted and severely beaten by ex-Séléka armed elements on 21 September 2015.<sup>108</sup>

2. Similarly, the military control of Birao zone is contested by two commanders, Abdel Majid Moustapha from the MLCJ and Adam Souleimane from the FPRC, falling respectively under the commands of General Ali Abdulrahman and General Arda Hakouma. The latter reportedly arrived in Birao from Ouadda on 24 May 2015 with two pick-up vehicles,<sup>109</sup> after having left Bria following the attack on FPRC positions in occupied buildings by international forces.

*From left to right: Ali Abdulrahman, Abdel Majid Moustapha, Arda Hakouma and Adam Souleimane*



*Source: Confidential reports, 26 May and 3 August 2015*

3. Created by Abakar Sabone, alias Abakar Saboune or Saboun, who is the brother of FPRC general coordinator Moustapha Saboun,<sup>110</sup> the MLCJ was initially one of the components of the *Union des forces*

<sup>108</sup> Confidential source, 22 September 2015.

<sup>109</sup> Confidential report, 29 May 2015; his deputy would be Colonel Abel Aziz Mahamat Abakar.

<sup>110</sup> Moustapha Saboune, currently in N'Djamena (Chad), is a Chadian/Canadian national who acquired the CAR citizenship during Séléka regime, after he was appointed by President Djotodia head of the telecom regulation agency (ART).

*démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR).<sup>111</sup> The movement is now headed by one Gilbert Hamza Toumou-Deya (Goula), a former FPRC Colonel.<sup>112</sup>

4. Competition is, therefore, high between factions of the ex-Séléka for the control of checkpoints along commercial routes, taxation of markets in the main towns, and the provision of armed escorts riding on commercial trucks from Sudan. Ex-Séléka in Birao are also armed with a variety of conventional weapons which are mostly consistent with those inspected by the Panel in other ex-Séléka areas.<sup>113</sup> The failed redeployment of the Tripartite force in Birao has reinforced the perception that this part of the country is outside the sphere of control of the central government in Bangui.

*Ouandja, Ounda-Djallé and Ouadda*

5. Ouandja is the birthplace of Nourredine Adam (Rounga). The town of Ouanda-Djallé is reportedly controlled by FPRC General Emile Bézo, while the *sous-prefecture* of Ouadda is reportedly under the control of General Aubin Issa Issaka (Goula), of the RPRC, with around 40 armed elements.

6. Issa Issaka, along with Arda Hakouma (Goula) and Abdoukarim Moussa (Goula),<sup>114</sup> is a historical military commander of the UFDR component of the ex-Séléka. He also used to be in charge of the cantoned ex-Séléka elements at the *Régiment de Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire* (RDOT) Camp, in Bangui.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>111</sup> Abakar Saboume signed the Brazzaville agreement on 23 July 2014 on behalf of the MLCJ; however the new leadership of the MLCJ in Birao considers that he resigned from the MLCJ in 2011.

<sup>112</sup> Gilbert Toumou Deya was appointed *Premier commissaire aux comptes* by Nourredine Adam when the FPRC was established in Birao on 10 July 2014. He was then under Mahamat Taïb Yacoub, appointed at the same occasion *Troisième vice-président chargé des questions économiques et financières*.

<sup>113</sup> Panel's inspection, Obo, 24 April 2015; see a photograph of material seized on 30 June 2014 in annex 3.2.; for the complete list of items seized from ex-Séléka by Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) component of the AU/RTF in Nzako, see paragraph 152 and annex 54 of the 2014 Panel's final report.

<sup>114</sup> Registered as a Brigadier General of BSS with military identification number 2004-1-1220.

<sup>115</sup> The Panel met three times with General Issa Issaka in April and May 2014 when the latter was at 36 villas and then RDOT camp in Bangui; at one occasion, the Panel also met at RDOT camp with General Harouma, whom criticized openly Issa Issaka while the latter was sitting few meters away from him. The representation of the cantoned ex-Séléka elements in Bangui has been at the centre of a political struggle amongst ex-Séléka political leaders as they represent an important leverage on the international community in terms of possible threat of destabilization.

*Sikikédé, Tiringoulou, Gordil and Mamou lake area*

7. The area bordering the Vakaga and the Bamingui-Bangoran provinces, where the towns of Sikikédé, Tiringoulou and Gordil are located, and the Mamou lake/Boromata area, bordering Chad, have been used as a rear base and a hideout by FPRC Generals of Goula origin. The PCA of Gordil is also the birthplace of former President Michel Djotodia, while N'diffa, located next to Gordil airfield, is the home village of Lambert Lissane Moukouvé, Nourredine Adam's chief of staff.

8. Boromata is the birthplace of Arda Hakouma, and Generals Tom Adam and Shafadine are also from the lake Mamou area.<sup>116</sup> Military sources reported movements of armed groups from Chad in this region,<sup>117</sup> which were not confirmed due to the absence of international forces in the area. However, road conditions, in particular during the rainy season, did not prevent General Hakouma in Birao, Generals Shafadine and 'Ben Laden' in Sam Ouandja, as well as Colonel Ousta in Bria, to reach Kaga Bandoro in mid-October 2015 to attend the general gathering of the FPRC organised by Nourredine Adam.<sup>118</sup>

*Photographs of Generals Shafadine (left) and Alanta (right) taken by the Panel in Sam Ouandja on 27 September 2015*



<sup>116</sup> Meeting with local officials, Sam Ouandja, 27 September 2015.

<sup>117</sup> Confidential reports, 22 June 2015.

<sup>118</sup> Confidential source, 15 October 2015; General Hakouma and Colonel Ousta arrived in Kaga-Bandoro respectively on 6 and 10 October 2015.

9. Sikikédé is reportedly under the command of FPRC zone Commander Tidjani Karan. General Adoum Kanton (Goula)<sup>119</sup> reportedly left Ndélé on 14 February 2015 to Sikikédé, after Sangaris instructed FPRC in Ndélé to vacate governmental buildings, anticipating a similar operation as the one conducted in Bria four days before.<sup>120</sup> He would have then mobilized armed men in the area and led the FPRC march on Bangui, together with General Oumar Younouss and Harouna. Sangaris and MINUSCA stopped this march to Sibut on 8 October 2015.

#### *Bria*

10. In Bria, the local dynamics within ex-Séléka were impacted by the operation led by international forces on the FPRC on 10 February 2015. Now, FPRC elements previously based in Bria were dispersed in mining area, in particular in Aigbando where former zone commander Bachar is now based with 56 elements.<sup>121</sup>

11. In Bria, the main general remains Yaya Scout, despite its change from FPRC to UPC, and colonels Makaï and Moussa.

*From left to right, photographs of General Yaya Scout, Colonels Makaï and Moussa, taken by the Panel in Bria on 14 April 2015*



<sup>119</sup> General Adoum Kanton was appointed "Deuxième Chef d'Etat-major Général Adjoint" of the FPRC during its general assembly in Kaga-Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

<sup>120</sup> The Panel observed early October 2015 that these buildings are still occupied by the FPRC; see chapter IV.

<sup>121</sup> Confidential report, 12 June 2015.

**Annex 3.1: Failed attempt of redeployment of the tripartite force CAR-Sudan-Chad in Birao on 15 June 2015**

1. On 15 June 2015, the transitional authorities, with their Sudanese and Chadian partners, initiated a re-deployment of the tripartite force in the town of Birao. A group of 25 FACA, accompanied by a 25-man strong Sudanese unit and one Chadian officer, departed Am Dafok towards Birao.

*Photograph taken by MINUSCA of Sudanese Armed Forces Military attaché Colonel Jamal Al Shaheed (seated, on the right)*



*Source: MINUSCA*

2. As a result, the local population of Birao violently demonstrated against the FACA detachment of the tripartite force, which eventually returned to Am Dafok under MINUSCA protection.
3. Although the Panel recommended the redeployment of the tripartite force in its 2014 final report as a way of curbing the absence of State authority in the north-east and empowering CAR national sovereignty and regional cooperation frameworks, it should be noted that such deployment of armed personnel and equipment from Sudan and Chad without prior approval of the Committee represents a violation of the sanctions regime on the CAR.
4. To avoid such a scenario, the Panel's recommendation on the redeployment of the regional force was followed by a related recommendation to the Security Council to grant a permanent exemption to the tripartite force (see paragraphs 223 (b) and (c) of the Panel's 2014 final report).



**Annex 3.2: Arms seized by the AU/RTF from ex-Séléka, LRA and Sudanese poachers in Nzako**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Obo on 24 April 2015 –  
Ex-Séléka, LRA and Sudanese poachers seizures*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Obo on 25 September 2015 –  
returned weapons and ammunition by LRA defectors and arms cache*



### Annex 3.3: List of seizures of joint operation Sangaris - MINUSCA in Bria on 10 February 2015



## RAPPORT DE LA MISSION DE BRIA

Ce rapport fait état des armes et des munitions saisies par la MINUSCA lors de la conduite d'une opération le 10 Février 2015.

- 1- Etat des armes inspectées le 11 Février à Bria
- 2-

Nr	Type	Numéro de série	Pays d'origine	Etat
1	Tube de Mortier PP 93 60 mm	16000	CHINE	NF
2	Canon de Mitrailleur KPV	240219-2	RUSSIE	NF
3	Canon de Mitrailleur KPV	H9398	RUSSIE	NF
4	M16A2	5631996	USA	F
5	Fusil à air comprimé	NA	FRANCE	NF
6	Vektor R4	796167A1	AFRIQUE du SUD	F
7	Vektor R4	7925539A1	AFRIQUE du SUD	F
8	Type 56	3678132	CHINE	F
9	Type 56	36059590	CHINE	F
10	Type 56 Carabine	22001532	CHINE	F
11	Type 56-2	212011863	CHINE	F
12	Type 56-2	2805798	CHINE	F
14	AKM	78 GA1810	RUSSIE	F
15	Galil	2070357	ISRAEL	F
16	Galil	1000946	ISRAEL	F
17	PKM	275549	RUSSIE	F
18	FN HERSTAL	250583/250970	BELGIQUE	F
19	RPD	2201089	RUSSIE	F
20	RPD	61627	RUSSIE	NF
21	RPD	PG203	RUSSIE	F
22	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	588 /AB-21-88	RUSSIE	F
23	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	101595	RUSSIE	F
24	Lance Roquette RPG-7V	90273	RUSSIE	F
25	TYPE 69	51564	CHINE	F
26	TYPE 69	51589	CHINE	F
27	Lance Roquette RPG7-V	NA	RUSSIE	F
28	QLZ - 87	161308	CHINE	F

NF : non fonctionnelle

F : fonctionnelle

NA : non accessible


**UNMAS**

OFFICIAL ANALYST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
**2-Etat des munitions inspectées**

Nr	Type	Quantité	Origine	Nro Série Observations
1	Gr. à Fusil 35mm Type DFS 87 HE	07	CHINE	1-11-948 3-11-9624 (Fusée)
2	Gr à Fusil 40mm VOG25	23	RUSSIE / BULGARIE	FSQSD1 09-09
3	Roquettes Frag 40mm OG7	17	BULGARIE/ RUSSIE	1 a un impact de balle
4	Roquettes antichar de 40mm RPG7 G	36	RUSSIE	2 ont des impacts de balles
5	Roquettes antichar de 40mm RPG7 L	1	RUSSIE	8-553-72
6	Roquettes antichar de 40mm Type 69 HEI bondissante	2	CHINE	3-7-23 MJ7 2-07-9324 (Fusée)
7	Obus antichar de 82mm BK 881 m (sans recul)	1	RUSSIE	383-15-83-G 218-83-2403
8	Obus de Mortier de 60 mm DPS/PP93	21	CHINE	1-08-9613
9	Gr. Ma Type 82-2	1	CHINE	
10	Gr. Ma RG4	4	RUSSIE	
11	Charges propulsives de RPG	53	RUSSIE	
12	Munitions de petit calibre	3 000		En vrac
13	Fusées mortier DRP11J – DRP11 C	18	CHINE	5-11-9624

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Photographs of weapons and ammunition seized in Bria during the joint operation Sangaris-MINUSCA on 10 February 2015, taken by the Panel on 14 April 2015






**Annex 3.4: Group of Sudanese poachers, some of them in military attire**

*Photograph taken by the informant of a confidential source of the Panel  
in the Mbomou province in 2014*



Annex 3.5: Map of the Lord's Resistance Army area of operations



Source: The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative

**Annex 3.6: Satellite imagery of Songo airstrip, Sudanese Armed Forces camps and Songo town**

*Coordinates of Songo airstrip and Sudanese Armed Forces base:  
9°46'28.09"N 24°18'23.05"E*



*Source: Google earth, imagery date: 12 April 2014*

**Annex 3.7: Copy of *Note de Service* appointing FPRC elements in key government services in Bria, obtained by the Panel in Bria on 17 April 2015**

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONAL  
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS VICTIMES DE GUERRES  
DE LA RESTRICTION DES ARMEES ET DU DOR  
ETATA MAJOR DES FORCES REPUBLICAINES  
DETACHEMENT MILITAIRE DE HAUTE KOTTO  
EMER/DMHC/S6  
NOTE DE SERVICE N° *003 2014*

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
UNITE-DROITE-TRAVAIL

Pour compter de la date de signature de la présente note de service le chef de corps commandant de la zone de Haute Kotto sous préfecture de Bria sera nommé aux postes de responsabilité les officiers et non officiers dans le rang des forces républicaine ci-après :

Article 1 : les personnalités dont les non suivent sont nommés au poste de :

**DIRECTION DOUANE :**

chef de service : TADIL AMHAT adjoint : AMHAT TADISON ESENE POWA EKO S  
DIDO ABAKAR ,KADER KLACHE

**DIRECTION IMPOT**

Chef ou DG : ABDEL FATMA  
Adjoint : MAMAT OUSMANE PARACHIN NGOI, TIDIANE YINGAR, IDRIS SELTMANE, KACHEJE


**DIRECTION DES MINES**

DR : ISSA CHERIF adjoint : MOUSTAPHA MOCTAR ABDEL AZIZ ABASS DAMANE ABAKAR AMANI  
DUMAR ARDRAMANE ADAM IDRIS OUMAR MATHIEUX OUAQID NORDROBA OSKAR ATAHIE  
MOHAMED ABAKAR FATACA adjoint : ALI DA ALI EL-DINE - DAWANE - ROGO - DIMA NERE - PHIMAT

**SERVICE CAISSE CAPE**



Chef de service : ZAKARIA DAMANE  
Adjoint : KADER OUARBE, ABDOLLAÏE ABAKAR AMIT IDRIS, ABAKAR OUMAR

Fait à Bria le *15* / 10 / 2014



Le colonel ADAM MOCTAR

Annex 3.8: Photographs of evacuation authorizations of diamonds from Bria, taken by the Panel on 17 April 2015



**Annex 3.9:** Photographs of USAF building in Sam-Ouandja with FPRC elements occupying the building posing in front, taken by the Panel on 27 September 2015



**Annex 3.10:** Letter from USAF central commander in Bangui to the Panel, and a letter from the Director General of the division of Mines to the Panel, received on 23 October 2015 and 12 September 2014 respectively in response to the Panel's requests for information to Badica/Kardiam

MINISTÈRE DES MINES  
ET DE LA GÉOLOGIE

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DIRECTION DE CABINET

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DIRECTION DE L'UNITÉ  
SPECIALÉ ANTI-FRAUDE

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE  
Unité – Dignité – Travail

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A Bangui le, 20 Octobre 2015.

N° 097/2-DIR-USAF.BG

Le Capitaine *KONGA Alphonse Stanislas*,  
Commandant l'Unité Spéciale Anti Fraude  
à..... Bangui

A

Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Mines  
et de la Géologie à..... Bangui.

Objet : Réponse à la Note de Monsieur *Aurélien LLORCA*

Référence : Correspondance N° *S/AC 55/2015/PE/OC.072* du 16 Octobre 2015

En réponse à la note de référence portant vos annotations relatives aux accusations portées à l'encontre du *BAÏE BADICA* contenues dans la correspondance de Monsieur *Aurélien LLORCA*, Coordonnateur Panel of Experts on the car extended pursuant to security council resolution 2196 (2015) en date du *16 Octobre 2015*.

Selon lesquelles les Forces non conventionnelles (*Ex-seleka*) ont régulièrement infiltré ou absorbé de manière permanente les *Unités Opérationnelles Régionales de Bria, Sam-Ouandja et Ndele*, relevant de la Direction de l'Unité Spéciale Anti-fraude (*USAF*).

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte que l'*USAF* est un *organisme public* placé sous l'autorité du *Ministre en charge des Mines et de la Géologie*.

Les éléments qui opèrent tant à la *Direction USAF* comme dans les *Unités Opérationnelles Centrales et Régionales*, sont des *Gendarmes et Policiers*, mis à la disposition du *Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie* par la *Gendarmerie Nationale et la Police Centrafricaine*, toutes les deux (02) *Institutions de l'Etat*.

Les *Agents de l'USAF* qui sont des *Officiers et Agents de Police judiciaire* donc investis des pouvoirs judiciaires ne peuvent accepter travailler de commun accord ou au solde des forces non conventionnelles au regard des textes portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de dite entité (*USAF*).

A ce titre, les allégations distillées par le nommé *Aurélien LLORCA* sont de nature à ternir l'image de cette *Unité de Police Minière* qui à sa mission clairement définie par les textes en vigueur.


D'après cette correspondance, les *Unités Opérationnelles Régionales de Bria, Sam-Ouandja et Ndele* sont infiltrées ou absorbées de manière permanente par les forces non conventionnelles *Ex-seleka*. Cela signifie militairement que les éléments de l'*Ex-seleka* opèrent avec les *Agents de l'USAF* ou ont pris en otage les *éléments de l'USAF* qui travaillent pour leur compte dans les zones précitées.

Ces informations sans fondement n'ont de valeur que pour le rédacteur qui a délibérément l'intention de salir et de porter préjudice au Bureau d'Achat Import-export (*BAÏE*) *BADICA*, Société Commerciale de la Place et l'*USAF* qui est une institution de l'Etat.

Depuis la date (*10 Décembre 2012*), du déclenchement des événements ayant porté la coalition *seleka* au pouvoir jusqu'à ce jour, il n'a été noté nulle part, les activités communes en matière minière des éléments de l'*USAF* et ceux des forces non conventionnelles (*SELEKA ou Anti-balaka*) dans une des régions de la République Centrafricaine.

En somme, les allégations formulées par le nommé *Aurélien LLORCA* figurant dans la note citée en référence sont dénuées de tous fondements lesquelles constituent des entorses graves aux bonnes actions de traçabilité entreprises par le département des Mines et de la Géologie.





**Annex 3.11:** Copy of Registry of diamond purchases kept by the sub-regional director of mines in Sam-Ouandja, obtained by the Panel on 27 September 2015

2014

N° D'ORDRE	DATES	BUREAU OU NRMS ET PRENOMS	N° Carnet de Cahier de Travaux collectifs	CARATAGES			
				Poids	CHANTIER	PROVINCE	DISTRICT
001	07-02-2014	MAHAMAT NOUR KOUÏTOU	N°2014/190	154,30	SAM-OUANJA	SAM-OUANJA	Bangui
002	07-02-2014	SODIAM		552,00	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
003	18-03-2014	GARBA ABAKAR	HK13/041	17,89	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
004	18-03-2014	DEMBA ALI		309,06	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Poungui
005	07-04-2014	SODIAM		231,44	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
006	07-04-2014	GARBA ABAKAR	HK13/041	03,92	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
007	05-04-2014	BADICA		68,34	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Bangui
009	12-05-2014	SODIAM		226,44	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
010	14-05-2014	MAHAMAT NOUR KOUÏTOU	N°2014/190	146,88	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
011	03-06-2014	DEMBA ALI		240,00	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
012	22-06-2014	BADICA		000,34	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Bangui
013	12-07-2014	SODIAM		202,80	-11-11-	-11-11-	-11-11-
014	25-07-2014	DEMBA ALI (SUR-ARUNJ)		110,00	SAM-OUANJA	SAM-OUANJA	Bria
015	15-08-2014	BADICA		109,23	-11-11-	-11-11-	Bangui
016	19-08-2014	SODIAM		219,99	-11-11-	-11-11-	Bangui
017	06-10-14	SODIAM		172,63	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Bangui
018	06-11-14	SUD-AZUR		100,00	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Poungui
019	07-11-14	SODIAM		229,80	-11-11-	SAM-OUANJA	Poungui
020	27-11-14	SODIAM		83,49	P. BANZOUAN	P. BANZOUAN	Poungui

021	05-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR					
022	08-02-2014	SUD D'AZUR					
023	05-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR					
024	24-12-2014	SODIAM					
025	31-12-2014	SUD D'AZUR					
				60 Carnet			
				30,68			
				73,68			
				128,03			
				142,00			
				3687,59 gms			
2015							
001	17-03-2015	SUD D'AZUR	BG14/013	130,00	SAM-OUANJA	-11-11-	Bangui
002	18-04-2015	SUD D'AZUR	6614/013	131,00	SAM-OUANJA	-11-11-	Poungui
003	28-05-2015	SUD D'AZUR	BG14/013	100,00	SAM-OUANJA	-11-11-	Bangui
004	09-07-2015	SODIAM	MK 151047	258,00	SAM-OUANJA	-11-11-	Bangui

### Annex 3.12: Buying houses' purchasing policies regarding the east

#### *SODIAM*

1. SODIAM's procedures manual of June 2015 states that the company will neither purchase diamonds from mines under control of rebel groups, nor from collectors known to associate with these groups.<sup>122</sup> The manual does not specify how the company rules out any purchases of diamonds from such mines or collectors, other than by following regular chain of custody procedures. SODIAM's procedures manual refers to the sanctions regime insofar as to maintain the highest vigilance regarding the involvement in the diamond sector of sanctioned individuals.
  
2. According to an audit it published in September 2015, SODIAM closed its office in Bria in December 2013 and Sam-Ouandja late 2014 for political and security reasons, declaring both zones "red".<sup>123</sup> Indeed, the Company recorded no purchases from Bria after this date; however, it continued purchases from Sam Ouandja in 2015 up until July, as it had all through 2014.<sup>124</sup> In September 2015 SODIAM's General Director told the Panel that the company will ban purchases from the entire east, including Sam Ouandja.<sup>125</sup> He argued that SODIAM's ongoing purchases from Sam-Ouandja were not commercially interesting but rather served to preserve some legitimate trade in the area. A written response to the Panels request for information about SODIAM's purchasing policy states that the company does not have any information about suppliers from the east being racketed by armed groups.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Accessed on 23 October 2015 at <http://sodiam.cf/sodiam-c-a-r-company-principles-and-procedures>.

<sup>123</sup> See page 3 at <http://sodiam.cf/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/sodiam.pdf>, accessed on 18 October 2015.

<sup>124</sup> SODIAM purchased 1187 carats from Sam Ouandja in the first half of 2014. These purchases did not appear in the list of payslips for the first half of 2014 provided to the panel by the Division of Mines at the time of writing its 2014 final report and were therefore not included in the report.

<sup>125</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's General director, Bangui, 22 September 2015.

<sup>126</sup> Written response by SODIAM's legal representative to a Panel's information request, received on 22 October 2015 in **annex 3.12.1**.

*BADICA*

3. BADICA's ethical code of January 2015 specifies regular chain of custody procedures, and reiterates principles of self-regulation defined by the World Diamond Council (WDC) to exclude the purchase of conflict diamonds.<sup>127</sup> The ethical code does not repeat the central clause in WDC's guiding document that spells out that diamonds should be purchased, *inter alia*, in compliance with the sanctions regime. It makes no further reference to Security Council sanctions. A company memo on the company's initial steps to implement due diligence, dated 22 October, shared with the Panel, does refer to the OECD due diligence framework, and the Panel's recommendation in its final report of 2014 to the diamond industry to apply due diligence in order to mitigate the risk of armed group financing.<sup>128</sup>
4. OECD's due diligence framework recommends to suspend engagement with upstream suppliers where a reasonable risk is identified that they are sourcing from, or linked to, any party providing direct or indirect support to non-state armed groups, e.g. through their illegal control, taxation and extortion at mine sites and of intermediaries.<sup>129</sup>
5. Notwithstanding periodic illegal takeover by the FPRC of mining services in Bria and Sam-Ouandja, BADICA has at no point in time suspended diamond purchases from these locations. Its management, during a meeting in January 2015, admitted to the Panel that it was aware of payment of fees to ex-Séléka forces by its suppliers in Bria.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, one of BADICA's supplying collectors in 2014 told the Panel that he was forced to make regular financial contributions to ex-Séléka, like all collectors in Bria.<sup>131</sup> A non-licensed collector

<sup>127</sup> Accessed on 20 October 2015 at <https://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/download/resources/documents/System%20of%20Warranties%20WDC%202014.pdf>.

<sup>128</sup> 'Démarches entreprises par BADICA pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives', 22 October 2015, Archived with the United Nations. The OECD due diligence framework has been developed in tandem and is compatible with due diligence guidelines formulated by the Group of Experts concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2010, which is mandated to monitor a UN sanctions regime based on similar criteria as this Panel, including as it relates to support to armed groups through illicit trade of natural resources. See [http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/due\\_diligence\\_guidelines.pdf](http://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/due_diligence_guidelines.pdf).

<sup>129</sup> See pages 21 and 22 at <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf>, accessed on 10 October 2015.

<sup>130</sup> Meeting with BADICA's legal representative and BADICA's deputy director general and buyer, Bangui, 23 January

<sup>131</sup> Meeting with one of BADICA's supplying collectors in Bria, Bangui, 24 August 2015.

from Ndélé, closely associated with FPRC<sup>132</sup>, told the Panel that he sold diamonds to BADICA in Bria up until the company was sanctioned in August 2015.<sup>133</sup> BADICA management argued that the Panel's attention on BADICA in its 2014 final report was disproportionate considering the limited purchases from collectors and, therefore, small amount of indirect financial support to armed groups.<sup>134</sup> BADICA's management also argued that the Panel's focus on the company was selective; claiming that ex-Séléka in Bria equally derives financial benefits from other sectors.

6. Contrary to statements made in January 2015, in a response to the Panel's request for information about BADICA's purchasing policies, dated 23 October, BADICA's legal representative stated that BADICA does not know about and cannot be held responsible for the behavior of collectors and artisanal miners, since, by the Central African mining code, they are independent operators.<sup>135</sup> The latter statement does not bode with OECD due diligence which asks companies to take responsibility for the behavior of their upstream suppliers, not reject it.
7. BADICA's legal representative drafted a counter report, dated 11 March 2015, to the Panel's 2014 final report. The counter report was addressed to the President and Members of the Security Council and was forwarded to the Committee. The counter report was also published online without annexes on 8 September 2015 on a website.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>132</sup> Confidential military report, 7 March 2015.

<sup>133</sup> Meeting with diamond collector, Ndélé, 24 September 2015; confirmed during a telephone conversation with a diamond collector, 6 November 2015; see chapter IV for additional information about FPRC control over diamonds in the Ndélé area.

<sup>134</sup> Meeting with the BADICA's Deputy Director General and Financial Manager, and BADICA's legal representative, Bangui, 23 January 2015.

<sup>135</sup> The letter from BADICA's legal representative in response to a Panel's information request, received on 23 October 2015 is in **annex 3.12.2**. The letter, *inter alia*, alleges that the Panel in April 2015 visited the office of the *Bureau d'Évaluation et de Contrôle de Diamant et d'Or* (BECDOR) in Bangui with an NGO representative, and implies the Panel shared trade data obtained. BADICA's legal representative on 27 April 2015 forwarded to the Panel a *compte rendu*, dated 20 April 2015, of the alleged joint meeting – drafted by BECDOR's chief of statistics and addressed to the director General of the division of Mines – as proof, see **annex 3.12.3**. The NGO in question addressed a letter, dated 17 June 2015 to the Director General of the Division of Mines to clarify that its' researcher visited BECDOR in February 2015, not in April, as stated in the *compte rendu*, and received a letter in return, dated 30 June 2015, from the Director General that he was not aware of any such *compte rendu*, see **annex 3.12.4**. In a letter to the Panel dated 20 August 2015, the director of cabinet of the Ministry of Mines and Geology corrected and apologised for the wrong information contained in the *compte-rendu*, see **annex 3.12.5**. As it has done repeatedly prior to the letter of 23 October 2015, the Panel reiterates it never visited BECDOR or shared trade data with the NGO in question.

<sup>136</sup> Accessed at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Diamants-de-sang-en-RCA-Le-contre-rapport-de-BADICA-au-comite-de-sanctions-de-l-ONU\\_a22801.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Diamants-de-sang-en-RCA-Le-contre-rapport-de-BADICA-au-comite-de-sanctions-de-l-ONU_a22801.html) on 29 November 2015.

*Sud-Azur*

8. Sud-Azur has not published any guiding document regarding its purchasing policies. A related letter, dated 22 October 2015, sent by the company's General Director to the Panel states that the company has received alarming complaints from collectors and artisanal miners in the east about ex-Séléka elements imposing security payments of FCFA 150,000 (USD 300) to FCFA 250,000 (USD 500), despite having already paid for their licenses in Bangui.<sup>137</sup>
9. The company intends to reorient its activities to pacified zones, once considered Kimberley Process compliant.

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<sup>137</sup> Written response by the General Director of *Sud Azur* to the Panel's request for information, received on 22 October 2015 in **annex 3.12.6**.

**Annex 3.12.1:** Letter from SODIAM's legal representative to the Panel, received on 22 October 2015



Marc De Block  
Dominique Claes  
Ilse Renders  
  
Advocaten

Antwerp, 22 October 2015

UN  
[REDACTED]

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

UN  
Mr. David BIGGS

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

UN  
[REDACTED]

E-MAIL: [REDACTED]

Concerns: ARSLANIAN FRERES / UN  
Y.ref.: S/AC55/2015/PE/O.C.073  
O. Ref: 2015/0559

Dear Members of the Panel of Experts,

I am Attorney at Law in Belgium, together with Mr. Cameron Doley of the Law Office of CARTER-RUCK, London, United Kingdom, representing Mr. Viken Arslanian as well as SODIAM CAR.

My clients took note of your letter dated 16 October 2015, noted on the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 2015, giving them time to reply to you before 23 October 2015.

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My clients can reply to your questions in time, namely as follows:

1. Information about security payments or other fees transferred by Sodiam to former Seleka forces, whether or not as part of USAF, in Bria, Sam Ouandja or Ndélé, if any; **The answer to this question is no, my clients do not have any such information for the simple reason they never transferred any security payments or other fees to former Seleka forces, whether or not as part of USAF, in Bria, Sam Ouandja or Ndélé.**
2. Sodiam's management's awareness of taxation and security payments being paid to former Seleka by collectors and artisanal miners supplying diamonds to Sodiam; **The answer to this question is equally no, my clients do not have any information and/or awareness of taxation and/or security payments being paid to former Seleka by collectors and artisanal miners supplying diamonds to Sodiam.**
3. Information about Sodiam's purchases from above mentioned locations or sites in the west of the Central African Republic, if any; **All purchases in CAR are recorded in the company invoices which were audited by a third party, Martello Risk, showing strict adherence to the red and green zone division whereby the purchasing policy is outlined in the company procedures document, based squarely on KP and UN directives and both were published on the website of the company.**
4. and Sodiam's purchasing policies in view of Security Council resolutions 2196 (2015), as well as in view of the Kimberly Process vigilance notice of 18 April 2013 concerning diamond producing areas around Sam Ouandja, Bria and Bamingui. **As already stated under question 3, the company procedures document, based squarely on KP and UN directives is published on the website of the company. This info is attached for your convenience but is also publicly available on the website <http://sodiam.cf>.**

Sodiam C.A.R. has worked closely with the Government of the CAR since the Kimberley Process was suspended. It has conducted itself at all times in accordance with the Kimberley Process and has stocked its purchases securely, as demonstrated to the joint KP/ and UN- Experts visit that took place in October 2014 and then again to the KP Review Mission in April/May 2015. On specific request of the C.A.R. Government SODIAM CAR made samples available to the Kimberley Process to enable the latter to develop a geochemical fingerprint for the CAR.

SODIAM CAR also arranged for an independent audit of the stock it purchased during the period of the suspension to be carried out by Martello Risk (a company owned by Alexander Yearsley, formerly Head of Special Projects at the prominent ngo Global Witness). This audit, which demonstrated the provenance of all purchases made by Sodiam C.A.R. during the period in question and established that the company had always made traceable and lawful purchases, was and is in the public domain (it appears on Sodiam C.A.R.'s website at <http://sodiam.cf>) and was drawn specifically to Amnesty's attention before Amnesty published its report. Sodiam C.A.R. is content for a further counter-audit to be conducted in order to demonstrate the validity of this first audit.

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My clients hereby request to be enabled to exercise their right to answer and to receive the courtesy to be heard in person by the Panel of Experts. My clients hereby express their willingness to come to New York for a meeting in person and are available to travel as of October 30, 2015.

We await your soonest answer including your availability to meet with clients.

Yours sincerely,

Marc De Block

Attachments:

1. SODIAM C.A.R. COMPANY PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
2. MARTELLO RISK INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY FORENSIC AUDIT AND VERIFICATION

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**Annex 3.12.2:** Letter from BADICA's legal representative to the Panel, received on 23 October 2015



Monsieur Aurélien Llorca  
Coordonnateur des experts pour la RCA

C/O Le Secrétaire du Comité du Conseil de Sécurité  
Établi par la Résolution 2127 (2013) relative à la RCA  
Monsieur David Biggs  
United Nations Plaza  
DC2-2042, New York, NY 10017

Bruxelles, le 23 octobre 2015

**PAR COURRIER ET E-MAIL :** [biggs@un.org](mailto:biggs@un.org)

Cher Monsieur Llorca,

**Concerne: Résolution des Nations Unies 2196 (2015)  
Ma cliente Badica**

Comme vous le savez, nous agissons comme avocats des sociétés Badica et Kardiam.

Notre cliente accuse réception de votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015. Elle nous a communiqué les réponses à vos questions et nous a demandé de vous les transmettre.

Cependant, avant répondre à vos questions, nous souhaiterions formuler quelques remarques préalables.

Votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015 est surprenante à plus d'un titre :

1° Elle est envoyée un vendredi à 21h, heure de Bangui, à Badica, demandant des réponses à des questions importantes pour le vendredi 23 octobre 2015, soit dans les cinq jours ouvrables.

Or, vous n'ignorez pas que Badica est représentée dans ce dossier de sanctions par des avocats, qui doivent pouvoir être contactés et exercer le droit à la défense de Badica dans des conditions normales. L'envoi direct à Badica, dans une langue qui n'est pas la sienne, et le délai de cinq jours ouvrables ne sont conformes ni aux usages, ni au respect qui est dû à l'exercice du droit à la défense.

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Votre empressement est d'autant plus étonnant que pendant plus de dix mois, depuis votre rencontre du 23 janvier 2015 avec Me Luff, vous n'avez pas donné signe de vie, alors que la société Badica vous a signifié, ainsi qu'au Comité 2127, sa volonté de coopérer à votre enquête et a transmis un contre rapport circonstancié au Comité 2127. Le moins que vous auriez dû faire était de communiquer vos pièces et de procéder aux vérifications qui s'imposaient suite à la remise du contre rapport de Badica.

2° Au lieu d'enquêter de bonne foi directement auprès des responsables de la société Badica, vous les avez ignorés. Les éléments de notre dossier, décrits dans le contre-rapport de Badica, montrent que vous avez écouté des rumeurs au sujet de Badica, colportées par des personnes dont le nom reste inconnu et dont on a tout lieu de penser qu'elles ne sont pas des observateurs objectifs et neutres du marché du diamant en RCA. Pire, votre équipe a mené une soi-disant enquête en compagnie de personnes tierces, qui se sont présentées à des autorités officielles comme membres d'ONG, mais dont l'identité véritable reste encore inconnue. A ce titre, nous souhaitons que vous confirmiez l'identité de la personne qui a accompagné votre collègue expert M. De Koning au bureau du BECDOR en avril 2015 et qui s'est présentée sous l'identité de M. Kasper Agger de l'ONG Enough.

3° Votre lettre du 16 octobre 2015, la première depuis le renouvellement de votre mandat en vertu de la Résolution 2196 (2015), est envoyée à notre cliente après que les sanctions soient prises et après que Badica, par notre intermédiaire, ait attiré l'attention des membres du Comité 2127, ainsi que des gouvernements centrafricains et belge, au sujet des défaillances graves de votre enquête. Nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de penser que votre lettre est la conséquence maladroite de ces démarches. Il eut été plus judicieux, normal et professionnel d'effectuer des démarches d'enquête auprès de Badica peu après la remise du contre rapport, avant la prise des sanctions. C'est donc la crédibilité de votre initiative à ce stade, outre celle de l'ensemble de votre enquête relative à notre cliente, qui peut ainsi être mise en doute.

4° Toutes vos investigations au sujet de notre cliente ont porté uniquement sur des éléments à charge – vos questions dans votre lettre du 16 octobre en sont encore le reflet. Elles ont ignoré les contributions positives de Badica à l'économie et au trésor centrafricains, à la cohésion sociale et à la formation professionnelle et éthique des collecteurs, décrites dans le contre-rapport de notre cliente. Votre mandat du Conseil de sécurité vous demande pourtant de rapporter aux membres du Comité 2127 l'ensemble des renseignements pertinents relatifs aux personnes sanctionnées.

5° Notre cliente réserve ses droits par rapport aux défaillances fautive de l'enquête qui a été menée par le Groupe des experts à son encontre et qui a contribué à l'imposition de sanctions très dommageables pour notre cliente.

Venons-en à la substance de votre lettre et à vos questions.

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## APPLETON LUFF

INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS

Votre lettre, au même titre que votre rapport initial du 28 octobre 2014, contient des affirmations graves qui ne sont étayées par aucun élément de preuve qui soit communiqué à Badica et que celle-ci pourrait commenter. Cela concerne en particulier les affirmations suivantes, que vous formulez, « d'après les informations reçues par le Panel » :

- Les forces de l'ex Séléka ont, [dans les zones de Bria, Sam Ouandja et Ndélé dans l'est de la RCA] obtenu paiement de taxes et de services de sécurité de la part d'agents de bureaux d'achat, collecteurs et artisans miniers.
- Les forces de l'ex Séléka ont, [dans les mêmes zones], régulièrement infiltré ou absorbé de manière permanente les unités anti-fraude spéciales locales [USAF].
- Il existe une implication armée anti-balaka dans les mines de diamant dans l'Ouest de la RCA, plus spécifiquement dans la sous-préfecture de Amada Gaza, Salo (sous-préfecture de Nola), le site de Balu (sous-préfecture de Sosso-Nakombo) et à Sassélé (sous-préfecture de Gadzi).

Comme indiqué ci-dessous, Badica n'a offert aucun paiement direct ou indirect aux forces de l'ex-Séléka dans les zones concernées et ne dispose d'aucune information quant aux pratiques dénoncées (à part le paiement de taxes d'aéroport comprises entre 75 et 100 dollars US par atterrissage dans les zones concernées). Quant aux autres affirmations, celles-ci ne visant pas Badica, ou les zones dans lesquelles Badica est active, il n'y a pas lieu de les commenter. Nous supposons qu'en ce qui concerne les accusations graves faites aux services de l'USAF, vous avez communiqué les éléments de preuve en votre possession aux autorités officielles de la République centrafricaine afin que celles-ci puissent faire diligenter une enquête pour leur propre compte et dénoncer les fonctionnaires impliqués. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avons pris connaissance d'un démenti écrit formel de la part du commandant de la direction de l'Unité spéciale anti-fraude du Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie. Ce démenti est joint à la présente (**annexe 1**).

Vous trouverez ci-dessous les réponses à chacune des quatre questions posées dans votre lettre, au nom de Badica, sur base des informations que notre cliente nous a fournies. Nous tenons cependant à préciser par avance que le principe général et universel des droits à la défense interdit aux autorités d'enquête de demander aux personnes accusées d'apporter des preuves négatives d'actes qu'elle n'ont pas commis.

1\*) BADICA ne bénéficie d'aucun service de sécurité dans les zones de Bria, Sam Ouandja et Ndélé. Donc la société BADICA ne paye personne, ni les éléments de l'ex-Séléka ni de l'USAF. Les seuls versements qui ont été effectués aux autorités qui contrôlent les aéroports de Bria et de Sam-Ouandja sont des taxes d'atterrissage par la société Minair, distincte de Badica, à concurrence de 75 dollars des Etats-Unis à Bria et 100 dollars des Etats-Unis à Sam-Ouandja. Ces sommes sont peu importantes, mais indispensables pour arriver dans ces régions. Ces taxes ont été payées par toutes les entreprises qui ont affrété des vols dans ces régions, quel que soit leur secteur d'activité. Elles n'ont cependant plus été payées dès la deuxième moitié de 2014. En vertu des principes de proportionnalité et de non-discrimination, la petitesse des sommes concernées ne peut justifier

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l'adoption de sanctions graves réservées à notre cliente, et à elle seule uniquement, alors que tous les opérateurs économiques des régions concernées ont été soumis à la même obligation.

La réponse ci-dessus ne concerne pas les services de gardiennage des services réguliers de l'armée dont ont bénéficié les locaux de Badica à Bangui entre le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2010 et le 5 octobre 2013, en vertu d'un Protocole d'Accord conclu entre Badica et le Ministère de la Défense le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 2010. Ce Protocole d'accord est disponible à votre première demande. Badica n'a eu recours qu'à des services officiels de l'armée régulière, mandatée par les autorités formelles du pays, à l'exclusion de tout autre service.

2<sup>e</sup>) BADICA ne paye aucune taxe ou autre imposition aux anciennes forces de Séléka. Comme vous le savez, les collecteurs et artisans miniers qui opèrent dans le secteur formel sont, en vertu du Code minier centrafricain, des personnes physiques indépendantes. Par conséquent, Badica ignore leur comportement comme personnes physiques et ne peut être tenue pour responsable de ce dernier. Par ailleurs Badica, en tant que bureau d'achat, traite uniquement avec des fournisseurs de confiance établis depuis plusieurs années, parfois de père en fils. Dès la suspension de la RCA au Processus de Kimberley, Badica a prié ses fournisseurs de doubler de vigilance dans l'exercice de leur métier. Il est important de rappeler que Badica a élaboré un Code éthique, qui vous a été remis en mains propres le 23 janvier 2015 et que vous semblez ignorer. Ce Code éthique contient des exigences élevées en matière de réduction des risques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement et reflète les normes de prudence et de transparence les plus rigoureuses dans le secteur du diamant. Il énonce spécifiquement en son article II.3 les règles suivantes que Badica impose à l'ensemble de ses collaborateurs :

- ne commercer qu'avec des entreprises faisant figurer la déclaration de garantie sur leurs factures;
- ne pas acheter de diamants auprès de sources suspectes ou de fournisseurs inconnus;
- ne pas acheter de diamants auprès d'une source quelconque qui, à l'issue d'une procédure en bonne et due forme et juridiquement contraignante, s'avère avoir enfreint les réglementations gouvernementales limitant le commerce des diamants de la guerre;
- ne pas acheter de diamants dans, ou provenant d'une quelconque région à propos de laquelle une instance gouvernementale a lancé un avertissement selon lequel des diamants de la guerre émanent de cette région ou y sont disponibles à la vente, à moins que les diamants ont été exportés de cette région dans le respect du Système de Certification du Processus de Kimberley;
- ne pas acheter ou vendre sciemment, ou aider à acheter ou à vendre des diamants de la guerre ;
- s'assurer que tout le personnel de l'entreprise qui achète ou vend des diamants est pleinement informé des résolutions commerciales et des réglementations gouvernementales limitant le commerce des diamants de la guerre.

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Ainsi, en ce qui la concerne, Badica met en œuvre de bonne foi tous les moyens qui sont à sa disposition pour s'assurer que sa chaîne d'approvisionnement des diamants soit saine.

3\*) Comme longuement expliqué dans le contre-rapport de Badica précité, toutes les informations concernant les achats limités de BADICA et les stocks correspondants sont disponibles au BECDOR, à la direction générale des mines avec les bordereaux y afférents, lesquels révèlent les noms des fournisseurs, qui sont bien connus de Badica. Celle-ci a continué de travailler avec ses fournisseurs historiques dans le but de récupérer les avances de fonds qui leur avaient été octroyées avant la suspension du processus de Kimberley.

Nous relevons que les stocks de Badica et des autres bureaux d'achat, répertoriés en avril 2015, qui sont des données en principe confidentielles, sont à présent publiés suite à un rapport de l'ONG Enough, rédigé par Monsieur Kasper Agger, qui est de toute évidence la personne qui s'est présentée avec M. De Koning au bureau du BECDOR en avril 2015. Comme nous l'avons relevé dans des courriers officiels au Secrétaire du Comité 2127, ceci constitue une violation grave des devoirs éthiques et de prudence des experts des Nations Unies et ma cliente réserve ses droits par rapport à cette faute.

Un examen attentif des bordereaux d'achats de notre cliente montre que ses achats sont restés stables en 2015 par rapport à 2014, mais que, comme indiqué dans le contre-rapport, ils ont fortement décliné depuis 2013 et les années antérieures. Comme dans la deuxième moitié de 2013 et en 2014, il y a une concordance totale entre les relevés des achats et l'accroissement des stocks détenus par Badica en 2015.

Il est important de souligner que les bureaux secondaires de Badica à Berberati, Nola, Carnot et Boda ne sont plus fonctionnels depuis près de 2 ans. Ceux de Berberati et Nola ont été pillés et saccagés.

BADICA ne dispose d'aucun agent acheteur dans toute la zone Ouest de la République Centrafricaine et ce, depuis le mois de janvier 2014. En revanche, pour la première fois depuis la suspension du processus de Kimberley, Badica a procédé à des achats de pierres provenant de l'Ouest du pays, en particulier Boda, Nola et Yaloké en juillet et août 2015, dans le but de bénéficier de la levée partielle de la suspension du processus de Kimberley pour les diamants originaires de l'ouest du pays. Ces achats, effectués par le bureau de Bangui, concernent un poids total de moins de 300 carats.

4\*) Badica exerce la plus grande prudence et vigilance dans ses achats de diamants, conformément aux instructions données à ses collaborateurs et à son Code éthique (v. point 3\* ci-dessus). Ses fournisseurs sont des fournisseurs historiques, souvent depuis plusieurs générations, qui étaient en place bien avant l'émergence des groupes armés. Depuis la reprise partielle du processus de Kimberley, Badica a souhaité reprendre ses activités dans l'Ouest du pays. Elle a complété son Code éthique par un addendum pour s'assurer la traçabilité totale des diamants qu'elle aurait exportés. Une copie du Code éthique complété est jointe en annexe à la présente (**annexe 2**). Cependant, les sanctions de l'ONU sont tombées avant que Badica ait pu effectuer la moindre vente de diamants.

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Badica compte à présent prendre des mesures complémentaires pour se conformer aux standards internationaux de traçabilité (v. ci-dessous).

Il résulte de ce qui précède que toute accusation générale que les experts des Nations Unies ont pu récolter auprès de dénonciateurs et de sources non-vérifiées sur ce qui semble se passer dans des zones contrôlées par des groupes armés ne s'appliquent pas à Badica. Il serait contraire aux principes les plus élémentaires des droits fondamentaux de développer une présomption de culpabilité à charge de Badica sur base de ces informations aussi peu étayées que non-spécifiques.

En revanche, votre rapport du 28 octobre 2014, votre enquête et vos affirmations sont clairement entachés de vices de procédure et de fond ainsi que d'erreurs manifestes d'appréciation des faits qui nuisent à la crédibilité de l'entièreté de votre travail sur le diamant et pèsent sur votre démarche actuelle.

C'est la raison pour laquelle, sans plus attendre, notre cliente nous a donné pour instruction d'utiliser les voies de recours à sa disposition pour obtenir la mainlevée totale des sanctions et leur annulation devant les instances internationales compétentes, sans préjudice d'autres actions possibles pour obtenir réparation des dommages subis.

Nous tenons à rappeler que Badica est la seule société détenue par des capitaux centrafricains qui opère depuis plus de trente ans dans le secteur formel du diamant et ce de manière efficace et concurrentielle. La rébellion Séléka a, comme tout opérateur économique pouvait s'y attendre, fortement endommagé tout commerce formel en RCA, réduisant ainsi à court terme toute perspective de développement économique durable dans le pays. Badica n'a de toute évidence aucun intérêt à soutenir une telle rébellion, encore moins des agissements qui exacerbent les conflits et compromettent le retour de la paix en République centrafricaine.

Badica est déterminée à présent, au-delà du Code éthique, à contribuer à assainir et à régler, en coopération avec toute autorité compétente, le secteur du diamant en RCA, conformément aux standards internationaux. Les sanctions imposées à l'encontre de Badica sont de toute évidence contraires à cet objectif. Nous joignons à la présente un document qui expose dans le détail les démarches déjà entreprises par Badica pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'ITIE (Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives) (**Annexe 3**).

L'assainissement du secteur du diamant, comme les autres secteurs clés de la République centrafricaine, requiert une approche participative multi-acteur, impliquant l'Etat, la société civile, les groupements professionnels, les organismes de régulation nationaux et internationaux, ainsi que les opérateurs centraux et périphériques de la chaîne d'approvisionnement des diamants. Badica souhaite, dans la limite de ses moyens humains et financiers, contribuer activement aux travaux qui seront engagés dans ce contexte.

Cette lettre est officiellement envoyée en copie à la Présidente du Comité 2127 et aux Représentantes permanentes de la Belgique et de la RCA auprès des Nations Unies. Nous nous


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réserve la possibilité de la communiquer pour information aux autres membres du Comité des sanctions des Nations Unies.

Nous vous prions de croire, cher Monsieur Llorca, en l'expression de nos sentiments distingués.



P.P.

David Luff,  
Avocat au Barreau de Bruxelles

Lucette Defalque  
Avocat au Barreau de Bruxelles

**Annexes :**

1. Lettre du commandant de la direction de l'Unité spéciale anti-fraude du Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie, du 20 octobre 2015
2. Code éthique complété de Badica et accusés de réception du ministère des mines et du syndicat des collecteurs
3. Document interne exposant les démarches entreprises par Badica pour se conformer aux standards contenus dans le Guide OCDE sur le devoir de diligence pour des chaînes d'approvisionnement responsables en minerais provenant de zones de conflit ou à haut risque et aux normes de l'ITIE (Initiative pour la transparence des industries extractives)

**Cc : (par e-mail)**

- Her Excellency, Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė, Chair, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic
- Son Excellence, Madame Ambroisine Kpongo, Représentante permanente de la République centrafricaine auprès des Nations Unies, New York
- Son Excellence, Madame Bénédicte Frankinet, Représentante permanente de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies, New York


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**Annex 3.12.3:** Erroneous *compte-rendu* claiming a joint visit by the Panel and Enough Project researcher to BECDOR in April 2015 (confidential information blacked out)



A leur demande, nous les avons confiés aux collaborateurs de notre Service pour les conduire auprès du Service du Fichier Minier en vue de vérifier si les collecteurs inscrits sur une liste en leur possession travaillent pour le compte de la société BADICA.



Haute considération.

Fait à Bangui, le 20 avril 2015

**Chef de service des statistiques**



**YANGUERE FRANCK**

**Annex 3.12.4:** Letter of clarification by the Enough project regarding the alleged joint visit of one of its researchers with the Panel to BECDOR in April 2015, and the response letter it received from the Director General of the Division of Mines



Bureau d'Evaluation et de Controle de Diamants et Or (BECDOR)  
Bangui, République centrafricaine

17 juin 2015

À qui de droit :

Il a été porté à la connaissance de Enough Project d'un "compte rendu" établi à Bangui en date du 20 avril 2015 par le Bureau d'Evaluation et de Contrôle de Diamants et Or (BECDOR) en sigle. Ce compte-rendu atteste d'une visite, en avril, de l'expert des Nations Unis Ruben de Koning accompagné de Kasper Agger, Chercheur pour Enough Project. Nous aimerions, au nom de notre organisation, éclairer votre lanterne en précisant que contrairement à l'affirmation de ce "compte-rendu", Kasper Agger était à Bangui en février 2015 et a eu, à l'occasion, une réunion avec BECDOR. Kasper Agger n'a pas été à Bangui en avril et par conséquent, il n'a pas accompagné Ruben de Koning.

Enough Project reste ouverte à tout éclaircissement supplémentaire sur la question et souhaite poursuivre des relations de travail fructueuses et positives avec des entreprises privées, des représentants de la société civile et du gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine.

Cordialement,

Sasha Lezhnev  
Associate Director of Policy

CC:  
Ministere des Mines et de la Geologie  
Director de Cabinet  
Directeur General des Mines et de la Geologie  
Directeur des donnees, de la regulation et du suivi de la commercialisation  
The U.N. Panel of Experts on CAR

24/06/15  
0266 19645

MINISTERE DES MINES ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

\*\*\*\*

DIRECTION DE CABINET

\*\*\*\*

DIRECTION GENERALE DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

\*\*\*\*

DIRECTION DES DONNEES, DE LA REGULATION  
ET DU SUIVI DE LA COMMERCIALISATION

\*\*\*\*

N° 213 /15/MMG/DIRCAB/DGMG/DDRSC.-

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité – Dignité – Travail

\*\*\*\*

BANGUI, LE 30 JUIN 2015

LE DIRECTEUR GENERAL DES MINES  
ET DE LA GEOLOGIE

A

MONSIEUR SASHA LEZHNEV

**Objet** : Réponse à votre lettre  
du 17 juin 2015

Monsieur,

Nous accusons réception de votre correspondance en date du 17 juin 2015 et vous en remercions.

Pour nous permettre de faire la lumière sur ce compte rendu dont vous faites mention, nous souhaiterions avoir une copie de ce document par version électronique afin d'identifier les participants à cette réunion de travail.

Par ailleurs nous tenons à vous signaler que nous ignorons l'existence d'un tel compte rendu.

En attendant cette clarification, nous nous excusons du désagrément causé à votre structure.

Cordialement.

  
Sylvain Masius N'GBATOUKA


**Ampliation :**

-MMG-----ATCR

-DIRCAB-----1

-CHRONO-----1

**Annex 3.12.5:** Letter from the Ministry of Mines and Geology to the Panel correcting information contained in an erroneous *compte-rendu*, received on 24 August 2015



**Annex 3.12.6:** Letter from the General Director of Sud Azur to the Panel, received on 22 October 2015



Bangui, le 22 Octobre 2015

**A**

**Monsieur David Biggs**

**Secrétaire du Conseil de Sécurité**

**Comité institué conformément à la résolution 2127 (2013) relative à la RCA**

Monsieur,

Suite au courrier (S/AC. 55/2015/PE/OC.74) en date du 16 octobre 2015, que nous avons reçu de Madame Aurélien LLOrca Coordonateur Panel des Experts sur la République Centrafricaine Prorogé conformément à la résolution 2196 (2015) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies, veuillez recevoir la réponse à vos questions.

Le Directeur Général



**MAHAMAT M. Oumarou**

Le BUREAU D'ACHAT SUD AZUR est une société qui venait à peine de commencer ses activités, quelques mois après que les EX-SELEKA ont pris le pouvoir en CENTRAFRIQUE.

Le changement de régime a ralenti et voir même stopper nos projets d'installation de nos centres secondaires a l'EST et à L'OUEST. Sauf le centre secondaire de BERBERATI à l'OUEST qui d'ailleurs a été pilé pendant les événements.

- 1- N'ayant pas de bureau en provinces, le contact avec les éléments d'EX-SELEKA est impossible.

Toutes fois, les informations et les plaintes que nous recevons des collecteurs et coopératives des artisans miniers dans l'EST, sont alarmants du fait que des éléments d'EX-SELEKA, imposaient des montants qui varient de 150.000 à 250.000 F.CFA pour tous les opérateurs afin de garantir la sécurité de ces derniers pendant leurs circulations dans des chantiers miniers, surtout des collecteurs, malgré les patentes officiellement payés à BANGUI.

Faire la différence entre les éléments de l'EX-SELEKA et USAF, nous sera impossible pour la simple et bonne raison que nous ne disposons pas de bureau dans ces zones cités.

- 2- La direction de SUD AZUR se trouve à BANGUI donc nous ne sommes pas en contact avec les éléments de l'EX-SELEKA se trouvant dans les zones minières.
- 3- Nos achats se font à partir de BANGUI seulement auprès des collecteurs ou artisans miniers reconnu par le service de mine qui viennent de l'EST ou de l'OUEST.
- 4- La SOCIETE SUD AZUR va reprendre sa politique d'appui aux collecteurs et artisans miniers déjà identifiés par le département des mines et dans des zones pacifiées et approuvées par l'équipe de la mission de revue du Processus de Kimberly (P.K), ceci à la reprise des activités.



La déclaration de vigilance est devenue monnaie courante dans chaque réunion du comité de suivi, mis en place par le MINISTRE des MINES, dont la société SUD AZUR en fait partie.



Annex 4: Northern region – border with Chad

Map



**Annex 4.1:** Documents sent by RJ Commander Raymond Bélanga to MINUSCA in Paoua on 10 June 2015

*Composition and structure of RJ in Paoua.*

Site Regroupement RJ  
 sous-prefecture Marbouna

- Bodjomo
- Béle
- Maïtilladeu.

sous-prefecture Boguila. site Boguila

sous-prefecture Paoua. NORD

- ~~Betokou~~ Betokou
- Beboura
- Beboy 1

PAOUA SUD

- Lé Hourou
- Talot
- Kotto-ne

sous-prefecture de Ngaoundaie


- Kossé

sous-prefecture Bocaranga.

- site Bocaranga
- Loura
- ~~Zoli~~ Zoli

Totale 160. 12 Personnes

Belanga Raymond  
 Etat Major RJ



WAFIO ABDEL NOUR 72 79 78 55  
+ SENAPOU ELIE 75 62 91 11  
FETIBAYA MARCELIN 72 62 27 71

GRUPE ANNE R.J

+ BELANGA RAYMOND 72 28 65 36  
+ ALLATOH JEAN BERNARD 72 60 42 88/75 67  
BUETEL ESTHER 72 79 64 39 74 99

PARTICIPANTS AU FORUM DE BANGAI  
du 4 au 7 mai 2015

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source in Paoua on 22 June 2015

**Annex 4.2:** Photograph of Armel Sayo in his Minister's office in military uniform, including with the logo of *Révolution et Justice* on his left arm



Source: CAR Ministry of youth website, accessed on 29 October 2015 at <http://minjeunescentrafrique.over-blog.com/2015/10/discours-d-appel-de-paix-et-de-cohesion-a-l-endroit-du-peuple-centrafricain-en-general-et-plus-particulierement-la-jeunesse-de-centr>

**Annex 4.3:** Former APRD and RJ 'Colonel' Laurent Mandjou (left), leader of the *Groupe des Patriotes* (GP) and former RJ 'Général' Elie Sénapu (right)

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Paoua on 22 June 2015*



Annex 4.4: List of combatants of the *Groupe des Patriotes*

ÉTAT-MAJOR  
COMPAGNIE  
INDIGÈNE

FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENTS  
( CIVILS )

N° page : .....

SECTION N° ..... NOM DU CHEF MANDJOU LAURANT PACUA 3

Nom	Prénom		
YIMBATA	DIEU-BENI	KAPITAIN	PENDE
ZIMIVAN	BRIGITE	COMMANANT	COMMANANT
BEBO	KANSTAN	KAPITAIN	TRULAKA
NGUENGE	ELIZE	CC	TRULAKA
NGUISOU	GAMARE MARC	AJIDAN	VAMBERG
MAINGADI	PAULIN	LIEUTENANT	KARANDAS
YANCAI	VANESSA	KAPITAIN	PENDE
HERGUERC	BLAISE	KAPITAIN	BRIGITE
KCF	BLANDINE	AJIDAN	LOUISE
HOUKENAYA	CHRISTIAN	KAPITAIN	BELGE
ZAYLÉ	ARISTID	KAPITAIN	LOUISE
DCUMANA	GERARD	COMMANANT	TRULAKA
MERANDIN	JEAN DAKOSTA	KAPITAIN	LOUISE
YANON	FERDINAND	LIEUTENANT	LOUISE
YAMERE	SIMON	AJIDAN	TALEY
HABDOULAV	YAYA	LIEUTENANT	PENDE
VANONI	LAURENT	COMMANANT	COMMANANT
VASSARANDI	JEAN	LIEUTENANT	DEGE
YAMERE	LAURENT	LIEUTENANT	LOUISE
KEITE	JOACHIN	AJIDAN	VOULO
MBOZARA	URBIN	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
NGANAKANCOLE	PAULIN	KAPITAIN	KARANDAS
VANCAI	MARC	LIEUTENANT	PENDE
HOUANTOU	PALASSE	LIEUTENANT	KEREGUELE
RAMANDI	JULE	LIEUTENANT	PENDE
HOUANTOU	JONAPHER	KAPITAIN	PENDE
VANCAI	GERARD	AJIDAN	SICCICA
CHEREGUEZI	BISSI	SERGEANT-CHIEF	PENDE
LEBACHA	MATHURIN	SOUS-LIEUTENANT	COMMANANT
VANAAA	FABRIS	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
NGOUDU	JEREMIE	AJIDAN	BELGE
SOULEY	ISSA	LIEUTENANT	PACUA
YAPELE	BOBO	SERGEANT	PENDE
KAMBA	DIEU-DENNE	LIEUTENANT	COMMANANT
YANCAI	BRIGITE	LIEUTENANT	PENDE
NGOURAHOU	DELPHINE	SERGEANT-CHIEF	SICCICA
NAYKOESE	LYDIE	AJIDAN	PACUA

Source: Provided to the Panel by Laurent Mandjou on 22 June 2015 in Paoua

**Annex 4.5:** Photograph of meeting in Moyen-Sido on 26 May 2015 between the Panel and General al-Khatim and FPRC representatives

*Photograph taken for the Panel by Ali Hafis of the meeting between the Panel (right) and al-Khatim (left), Moussa Maouloud (second from left), Abdoul Bassit Hissène (al-Khatim's personal assistant, third from left) and Colonel Bourma (in the back), and another FPRC representative who did not introduce himself (centre), in Moyen-Sido on 26 May 2015*



**Annex 4.6:** al-Khatim's parallel administration

*Photograph of a ex-Séléka fighter riding on a commercial vehicle taken by the Panel on the road Kabo-Moyen-Sido on 25 May 2015*



*Photograph of two ex-Séléka elements manning the checkpoint at the entrance of Moyen-Sido, taken by Panel on 25 May 2015*



*Photograph of a ex-Séléka acting as Police in Kabo, taken by the Panel on 28 May 2015*



**Annex 4.7: Mbarara herders and their cattle**

*Photographs of a Mbarara herder on a horse and his cattle taken by the Panel on the road from Kabo to Moyen-Sido on 26 May 2015*



*Photograph of a Mbarara herder and his daughter taken by the Panel on the road from Kabo to Kaga Bandoro on 28 May 2015*



**Annex 4.8:** Photographs of armed groups (FPRC, MPC and anti-balaka) political and military leadership taken by the Panel – except the ones of Ali Hafis, Kanton and Baba Issène – during field missions in the Sido-Kabo-Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès-Ndélé areas on 27 May, 1 July, 22 and 23 August, and from 24 September to 5 October 2015

*Maouloud Moussa (left) and Lambert Lissane (right)*



*Photographs taken in Moyen-Sido on 27 May (left) and in Ndélé on 4 October 2015 (right)*

*From left to right, photographs of Ali Hafis, Kanton, Baba Issène and Max Narbé*



*Photographs taken in Kaga Bandoro on 12 July 2015 provided by a confidential source*

*Photographs of Gauthier (left) and Kouazingo (right)*




*Photographs taken by the Panel in Doukouma on 20 August (left) and in Boussa on 21 August 2015 (right)*

*From left to right, photographs of 'Chauffeur', Abdoulaye Oumar and Jean Chérif*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015 (left and centre) and in Kaga Bandoro on 23 August 2015 (right)*

*General al-Khatim Mahamat*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Moyen Sido on 1 July 2015*

**Annex 4.9:** Military training of ex-Séléka elements of FPRC and MPC in Mbrès

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbrès on 22 August 2015*



**Annex 4.10: Sample of FPRC *ordres de mission* photographed by the Panel during field missions in Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 (FPRC) and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015*



**Annex 4.11: FPRC checkpoints in the Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas**

*Checkpoint in Tiri manned by armed elements without military uniforms  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 25 September 2015*



*Checkpoint between Koubou and Djamassinda – axis between Ndélé and Bangbali  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 25 September 2015*



*Checkpoint in Batélé – axis between Ndélé and the Chadian border  
Photograph taken by the Panel on 26 September 2015*



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**Annex 4.12:** FPRC armed elements in Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès and Ndélé areas

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Azène, between Mbrès and Kaga Bandoro, on 22 August 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangbali, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 25 September 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Akkroussoulbak (alias Akroussoulback),  
between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.13:** Movements of armed men observed by the Panel in Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Azène,  
Kaga Bandoro and Mbrès area, 22 August 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Tiri, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 25 September 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*




**Annex 4.14:** Armed elements on motorcycles carrying one AKM assault rifle and one Vector R4 type assault rifle

*Photograph taken by the Panel near Zobossinda, between Ndélé and the Chadian border, on 26 September 2015*



**Annex 4.15:** FPRC mining brigade receipt issued of payment for an artisanal mining certificate

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Léména on 26 September 2015*




**Annex 4.16: Taxation of cattle trade by FPRC in Kaga Bandoro**

*The photograph was taken by the Panel in Kaga Bandoro on 23 August 2015 while Adam Moussa, FPRC adviser to the zone commander, was collecting money from the truck transporting cattle*



**Annex 4.17:** Laissez-passer for representatives of cattle herders appointed by al-Khatim in Moyen-Sido on 10 June 2015.



Source: Document photographed by the Panel while shown by al-Khatim in Moyen-Sido on 1 July 2015

**Annex 4.18:** Ex-Séléka elements with AK-type assault rifles, grenade launcher and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) round and launcher

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès area on 22 and 23 August 2015 and Ndélé area from 24 September to 5 October 2015*



*Some armed elements of the ex-Séléka wear full military attire, including the FACA insign and red beret*



**Annex 4.19:** Anti-balaka commander Kouazingo and MPC zone commander of Mbrès, Oumar

*The Panel observed that two zone commanders are well acquainted  
Photograph taken by the Panel in Mbrès area, 22 August 2015*



**Annex 4.20:** Former school's latrine in Ndenga where the dead body of a man killed on 12 August 2015 by an anti-balaka group from Mbrès was buried

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Ndenga on 19 August 2015*



**Annex 4.21: Houses destroyed in Bépikassé**

*Photographs taken by the Panel on 22 June 2015*



**Annex 4.22:** Police Commissioner of the Chadian *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (internal security) Madjiademngar N’Gamjadjibe at the border post of Békoninga

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 22 June 2015*



*Official stamp with his signature on an official correspondence*

Fait à Goré le 29 juin 2015

LE CHEF DE BRIGADE DE SUEVEILLANCE DU TERRITOIRE.

  
  
N’gamjadjibe Madjiademngar  
Commissaire de Police

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source*

**Annex 4.23:** Letter from Chadian *Chef d'Antenne* in Békoninga to the Chief of village of Bembéré in the CAR threatening that next time "there will be no mercy"

BERONINGA Le 04-05-015

A

Honorable chef du village Bembéré.

Avant tout je vous salue beaucoup.  
 je vous écrit en quelques lignes pour vous  
 tenir informé que nous ne dormons pas,  
 et ce n'est pas une menace mais ce dans  
 votre intérêt que je vous tiens à jour.  
 je vous demande encore de bien préciser  
 les complices qui st a kaba et a soh et  
 nous donne leur nom au complet.  
 Nous savons beaucoup des choses dans  
~~votre~~ vos villages donc faite beaucoup,  
 attention.

vous avez intérêt d'arrêter les voleurs  
 de nos bœufs et nous livrés dans bonne  
 collaboration et bonne voisinage.  
 et je tiens a vous dire à l'idée de venir  
 attaquer le Tchad sa vous arrange pas.  
 et nous sommes informez nuit comme  
 jour.

ci nous serions encore victime de vol  
 nos bœuf, vous etes responsable et  
 cette fois ci il y aura pas de pardon.

le chef d'ANTENNE  
 Békoninga

**Annex 4.24:** Remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade found in the village of Bembéré

*Photographs taken by a confidential source on 3 May 2015*



*Source: Confidential report dated 4 May 2015 obtained by the Panel*

**Annex 4.25:** Remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade found in the village of Markounda by MINUSCA on 6 April 2015

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Bossangoa on 27 April 2015*



**Annex 4.26:** Pullover with the insigne of the *Armée Nationale Tchadienne* (ANT)

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Markounda on 11 April 2015*



**Annex 4.27: Houses burnt and destructions in Dokabi**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Dokabi on 11 April 2015*





**Annex 4.28:** Message from the Minister of Security and Territorial administration in N'Djamena to all regional governors dated 19 May 2015

REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 PRIMATURE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 MINISTERE DE L'ADMINISTRATION DU TERRITOIRE  
 ET DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 COMMISSION NATIONALE D'ACCUEIL, DE REINSERTION  
 DES REFUGIES ET DES RAPATRIES  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 SECRETARIAT PERMANENT  
 \*\*\*\*\*  
 N° \_\_\_\_\_/PR/PM/MATSP/CNARR/SP/2015

UNITE - TRAVAIL - PROGRES  
 \*\*\*\*\*



19 MAI 2015

**MESSAGE OFFICIEL RADIO/URGENT**

FROM: MATSP/P.CNARR..... N'DJAMENA  
 TO : Gouverneurs Régions Moyen-Chari/Logone Oriental/Logone Occidental..... Sahr-Doba-Moundou  
 Gouverneur Région Salamat..... Am-Timan  
 INFO : SGP (à titre de CR)..... N'Djamena  
 PM (à titre d'info)..... N'Djamena  
 MAEIA..... N'Djamena  
 Préfets /Départements/Grande-Slô-Nya-Pendé..... Maro-Goré  
 DGPN..... N'Djamena  
 Bureaux/CNARR..... N'Djamena-Goré-Marô-Haraze  
 HCR..... N'Djamena/Sud  
 OIM..... N'Djamena  
 PNUD..... N'Djamena  
 OCHA..... N'Djaména

N° \_\_\_\_\_/PR/PM/MATSP/CNARR/SP/2015 DU 18/05/2015 STOP HVI STOP SUITE AUX DIFFICULTES AUXQUELLES SONT CONFRONTEES AGENCES NATIONS UNIES AU SUD/TCHAD STOP EU EGARD APPLICATION STRICTE DECISION FERMETURE FRONTIERE STOP TCHAD-RCA STOP PAR PRESENTE TO STOP GOUVERNEMENT CONFIRME FERMETURE FRONTIERE TCHAD-CENTRAFRIQUE STOP PAR CONTRE STOP AUCUNE INSTRUCTION N'A ETE DONNEE POUR TIRER SYSTEMATIQUEMENT STOP SUR TOUS CEUX QUI APPROCHENT FRONTIERE STOP VO STOP PRENDRE TOUTES DISPOSITIONS NECESSAIRES STOP EN VUE STOP APPLICATION ET RESPECT INSTRUCTION DONNEES STOP ET NOUS RENDRE COMPTE STOP ET FIN I.-

Le Ministre de l'Administration du Territoire  
 et de la Sécurité Publique



ABDERAHIM BIREME HAMID

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 25 May 2015*

## Annex 4.29: List of victims recorded by National Red Cross in Moyen-Sido in June 2015

## List of CAR nationals killed in June 2015

Recensement de la population centrafricaine qui ont perdu leur vie en traversant la frontière. Quartier

N°	NOM	Prénom	Sexe	Age	Quartier
1	NABRADINE	BRAHIM	M	14 ans	Sido I
2	ALIMA	SALE	F	17 ans	Sido I
3	MAGBAYE	GASTON	M	35 ans	Sido I
4	Voi'guidi	CELESTIN	M	28 ans	KRAMATA I
5	DEBY	FABIEN	M	27 ans	KRAMATA I
6	MOUSSA	BERAGE	M	32 ans	KOUTSABA
7	MARIAH	HAMADOU	F	45 ans	deplacé
8	ACHETOUN	YAOU	F	28 ans	deplacé
9	NAFISSA	HAMADOU	F	18 ans	deplacée
10	SALEH	Koutssouti	F	1 ans	deplacé
11	AOUNRA	EVARICE	M	19 ans	Sido I

## List of CAR nationals detained in Chad in June 2015

Recompte de la population centrafricaine qui sont devenus au Tchad.

N°	Nom	Prénom	Sexe	Âge	Provenance
1-	ADJIM	OUMAR	M	35 ans	Moyenne-nido
2-	BISSAFO	POUL	M	45 ans	Sido RCA
3-	BISSAFO	RODRIGUE	M	26 ans	Sido RCA
4-	BIZERIENE	DAMBETI	F	30 ans	Sido RCA
5-	DJIMAGRA	SALEMON	M	30 ans	Kelle-nido RCA
6-	MOUSSALA	MATHURIN	M	40 ans	KABO RCA
7-	MAKA	SIMACO	M	30 ans	Sido RCA
8-	MAKA	GABIN	M	27 ans	Sido RCA
9-	YAMIDI	PROSPERE	M	29 ans	Sido RCA
10-	NAHDESSAN	MEDARD	M	30 ans	Sido RCA
11-	SADA	MERCI	M	32 ans	Sido RCA
12-	MAYAN	PHILEMENE	F	36 ans	Sido RCA
13-	NGAUMBELE	DEBIRE	M	34 ans	Sido RCA

## List of CAR nationals robbed in June 2015

Recensement de la population centrafricaine avec qui les FORD armés tchadiens les ont arrachés les bagages et argent.

N°	NOM	Prénom	Sexe	Age	Provenance
1.	ZAMBA	Lydie	F	45 ans	sido RCA
2.	NGOFIO	PHILOMENE	F	38 ans	sido RCA
3.	NGANFIO	PAULINE	M	25 ans	sido RCA
4.	BENAYA	ALINE	F	35 ans	sido RCA
5.	PARAGO	TOUSSAINE	M	25 ans	sido RCA
6.	SIRIGA	PATRICE	M	33 ans	sido BOUCA
7.	MAZE	ELYSEE	M	40 ans	sido RCA
8.	TOUADERE	DIMANCHE	M	25 ans	sido RCA
9.	NATOIALLA	FREDERIC	M	35 ans	sido RCA
10.	NAMDESSON	ALPHONCINE	F	25 ans	sido RCA
11.	TARAGUIDI	ADEL	F	25 ans	sido RCA
12.	PISSET	ROGER	M	43 ans	sido RCA
13.	MAMDOU	ARCILA	M	25 ans	sido RCA
14.	MOYO	ALPHONSE	M	25 ans	sido RCA
15.	TECNA	CLAVIERE	M	22 ans	sido RCA
16.	BABA	GERMINE	F	26 ans	sido RCA
17.	ADJALIL	ATAHIR	M	17 ans	{Déplacé?}
18.	IRADINE	SALEH	M	18 ans	{sido RCA}

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 July 2015

**Annex 4.30:** Extract of Local Red Cross registry in Moyen-Sido of civilians killed while trying to cross the Chadian-CAR border from May 2014 to May 2015

SIDO le 29/10/2014  
 Le procès-verbal de la mort Monsieur  
 IBKOUA BERNANZE.  
 Age de : 27  
 Provenance Moyenne Sido  
 Cause suite par les TEHADIENS.  
 Il a reçu un coup de balles vers  
 derrière, et la balle était sortie  
 au niveau de la poitrine droite.  
 C'est père de 3 enfant 1 de 2x M et 1  
 de 2x Féminin. La seconde femme est  
 en suite de 6 mois.  
 Une distance de 15 KM  
 Nombre des personnes assistées.  
 femme : 39  
 Homme : 46 82  
 TOTAL : 121

Vendredi le 19/09/2014  
 Le procès-verbal de la Mort de Monsieur  
 MASTOUBANA GASTON - Age de 36 ans  
 Provenance : Moyenne Sido.  
 Cause : suite et libéré par les TEHADIENS.

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 1 July 2015.

Annex 5: Western region – border with Cameroon

Map



**Annex 5.1:** Case study on the *Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain* (FDPC)

1. Martin Koumtamadji (alias Abdoulaye Miskine),<sup>138</sup> originally from Moyen Chari, Chad, and leading auxiliary forces loyal to former president Ange Félix Patassé, created the FDPC in 2005 in Kabo (Ouham province) in opposition to Bozizé's government. The FDPC shortly associated with the ex-Séléka, but forces clashed along the Cameroonian border near Gbiti (Mambéré Kadeï) in April 2013, and moved north to Nana Mambéré province. On 16 September 2013 the police in Bertoua in the east of Cameroon arrested Koumtamadji and transferred him to Yaoundé, where he was detained without being charged.
2. On 27 November 2014, Cameroonian authorities released Koumtamadji from custody in exchange for FDPC's liberation of a Polish priest and twenty-six other hostages (including fifteen Cameroonians). He was subsequently flown to Brazzaville on the presidential plane of Denis Sassou Nguesso, who as mediator of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the CAR crisis facilitated the exchange. Koumtamadji remains in Brazzaville, in liberty.
3. From Brazzaville, Koumtamadji has attempted, in vain, to engage in political negotiations with transitional authorities in Bangui. The FDPC participated in pre Bangui Forum discussions with the government,<sup>139</sup> but did not take part in the actual Forum and did not sign the resulting DDRR agreement.<sup>140</sup> FDPC representatives stated to the Panel that transitional authorities had not officially invited the group to the Forum.<sup>141</sup> In a press communiqué dated 11 May 2015 Koumtamadji announced to no longer recognize the legitimacy of the transitional Head of State of the CAR.<sup>142</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Photographs of Koumtamadji prior to, during and after his detention in Cameroon in 2013 and 2014 are contained in **annex 5.1.1**.

<sup>139</sup> Discussions were led by Marcel Bagaza, FDPC political representative in Bangui, who was dismissed by Koumtamadji on 16 July 2015.

<sup>140</sup> On the DDRR agreement (*Démobilisation, Désarmement, Réintégration et Rapatriement*), see page 6 of the Panel's update on 19 May 2015. MINUSCA reported that "as a follow up on the signing of the Bangui forum DDRR agreement on 10 May, MINUSCA had facilitated the signing by the Front Démocratique pour le Progrès de la Centrafrique", which "had not initially signed due to logistical problems"; Confidential source, 12 May 2015.

<sup>141</sup> Meeting with FDPC representatives, Yaoundé, 7 and 8 July 2015; see a similar statement in a letter in **annex 5.1.2**.

<sup>142</sup> See copy of the press communiqué in **annex 5.1.3**.

*Organisation and military strength*

4. The Panel's interviews with FDPC representatives and analysis of documents, commander notebooks and other items retrieved by MINUSCA on 21 July from FDPCs base camp near Zoukombo, provide insight into the group's command structure, military strength, and operations.
5. Koumtamadji is and has during his detention in Yaoundé and stay in Brazzaville remained in full command and control of FDPC troops on the ground in the CAR, communicating via satellite phone.<sup>143</sup> A Thuraya simcard was recovered from FDPC's base camp, and commander notebooks indicated decisions and actions taken by the "General" or "Boss",<sup>144</sup> referring to Koumtamadji, including the transfer of money.<sup>145</sup> Koumtamadji's business cards were also retrieved from the camp.<sup>146</sup>
6. According to commander notes, the FDPC counts 92 men in possession of 38 conventional weapons.<sup>147</sup> Apart from G9 – potentially G3-type assault rifles – the profile of the FDPC arms is consistent with the arms seized from other armed elements in the CAR. Considering the size of the FDPC<sup>148</sup>, and the number of arms and ammunition the group possesses, the FDPC is the best equipped armed group operating in western CAR.
7. FDPC leadership on the ground is shared between three persons. Edouard Bossian signed mission orders as chief of staff from May 2014 onwards, including for taking the hostages that were released in November 2014.<sup>149</sup> He was baptized in Nigeria but of Central African nationality, and a former Deacon of the

<sup>143</sup> Meeting FDPC representatives, Yaoundé, 7 July 2015

<sup>144</sup> Copies of commanders' notes and Thuraya simcard are Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>145</sup> See commander's note in **annex 5.1.4**.

<sup>146</sup> See photograph of business cards in **annex 5.1.5**.

<sup>147</sup> Notebook with a list combatants retrieved by MINUSCA, archived with the United Nations; see notebook with a list of weapons retrieved by MINUSCA in **annex 5.1.6**; archived with the United Nations. The following weapons and ammunition in possession of FDPC are listed in the hand-over report: 27 AK-47, four RPG launchers, 12 RPG rounds, three PM, one DKM, one FAL, one pistol, one RPK, 207 G9 rounds of ammunition. Other FDPC internal documents refer to one PKM with 500 rounds of ammunition, 60 rounds of ammunition for PM, one MAS 36 with four rounds of ammunition, 20 rounds of ammunition of FAL, 17 G9 with seven boxes of ammunition, 106 rounds of ammunition for Galil, 1,234 rounds of ammunition for AK-47, two grenades, one artisanal weapon, 28 rounds of hunting ammunition and one machine gun.

<sup>148</sup> The complete list of soldiers included in FDPC notebooks retrieved by MINUSCA is archived with the United Nations.

<sup>149</sup> See FDPC *ordre de mission* in **annex 5.1.7**; archived with the United Nations.

Catholic Church in Berbérati.<sup>150</sup> He was replaced as chief of staff on 4 January 2015 most likely by either Francois Bernard Kemrangar who is also referred to as chief of staff in commander notes, or Leonard Kormadji.<sup>151</sup> Kemrangar is listed as contact point on school identity cards of Chadian soldiers – all adults – suggesting a role in recruitment.<sup>152</sup> On 16 March 2015, Kemrangar was in Yaoundé from where he transferred a sum of USD 1,000 to Brazzaville<sup>153</sup> and then returned on 18 March 2015 to the camp near Zoukombo. Kormadji was in charge of the mission on 12 October 2014 during which the Polish priest from Baboua was taken hostage.<sup>154</sup>

8. In Yaoundé, Lucien Assalbaye, of Chadian nationality but with permanent residence status in Norway,<sup>155</sup> acts as liaison officer for the FDPC in Cameroon. While characterizing himself as a mediator<sup>156</sup> – he facilitated contact between MINUSCA and the FDPC military leaders during the hostage crisis in November 2015<sup>157</sup> – commander notes show a more operational capacity.<sup>158</sup>

*Human rights violations and financing*

9. Between 1 January 2015 and 30 September 2015, FDPC elements committed a large number (95) of criminal incidents resulting in the death of 39 civilians.<sup>159</sup> Incidents included attacks against vehicles on the main supply route connecting Bangui to Cameroon, attacks against Peuhl herdsman and isolated villages, targeting of civilians, ransoming local population and nomads, stealing cattle and lootings goods. Incidents also included ten (10) instances where MINUSCA

<sup>150</sup> See Bossian's Church ID card and Central African ID card in **annex 5.1.8**; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>151</sup> Meeting with FDPC representatives in Yaoundé, 7 July 2015.

<sup>152</sup> See one sample of Chadian school ID card in **annex 5.1.9**; copies of all ID documents recovered at the FDPC camp are archived with the United Nations.

<sup>153</sup> See money transfer receipt in **annex 5.2.0**; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>154</sup> See FDPC *ordre de mission* in **annex 5.2.1**; archived with the United Nations. On 19 July 2015, in the village of Boré located on the main supply road 25 kilometres east from Baboua, the *sous-préfet* and the mayor of the *sous-préfecture* of Baboua (Nana-Mambéré) were abducted by armed elements, reportedly belonging to the FDPC; telephone conversation with a MINUSCA staff in Bouar, 20 July 2015.

<sup>155</sup> See Lucien Assalbaye's ID card in **annex 5.2.2**.

<sup>156</sup> Meeting with Lucien Assalbaye, Yaoundé, 7 July 2015.

<sup>157</sup> See photograph of Lucien Assalbaye with MINUSCA peacekeepers in the CAR in November 2014 in **annex 5.2.3**.

<sup>158</sup> For example, Assalbaye has ordered a transfer of three weapons from the base camp to Cameroon; see Commander's note in **annex 5.2.4**.

<sup>159</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

peacekeepers were attacked and one attack against trucks of the World Food Program escorted by MINUSCA peacekeepers.<sup>160</sup>

10. On 19 March 2015, the FDPC again took Cameroonian citizens hostage. The hostages included 16 people from the town of Lagdo in northern Cameroon, who were ambushed near the border town of Garoua-Boulai while travelling on a bus from Bertoua, and two local bystanders. On 17 May 2015, two Cameroonian hostages escaped with the help of a member of the FDPC, Patrice Bissi, in return for a promised sum of money.<sup>161</sup> Patrice Bissi's name is on a list of FDPC combatants, retrieved by MINUSCA from FDPCs base camp.<sup>162</sup> The 16 hostages from Lagdo remain in captivity.<sup>163</sup>
11. In the press Martin Koumtamadji denied that FDPC was responsible for the hostage taking on 19 March 2015.<sup>164</sup> FDPC representatives in Cameroon shared with the Panel a press communication signed by an FDPC Colonel, claiming his forces captured two armed men from Cameroon who supposedly admitted to have taken hostages to demand the release of their leader, Aboubacar, detained in Cameroon.<sup>165</sup> The name of the Colonel is not on the above mentioned list of FDPC elements, and the Panel could not confirm the detention of a militia leader called Aboubacar in Cameroon.
12. FDPC goes at length to disassociate itself from the latest hostage taking, considering likely political fall-out. The real motive is most probably economic. Cameroonian press articles, and confidential military reports have made reference to ransom demands.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> After their escape the two Cameroonian hostages stated to MINUSCA that that 16 Cameroonians remained in captivity; meetings with MINUSCA civilian staff in Bouar, 18 and 19 May 2015.

<sup>162</sup> An extract of the list of FDPC combatants including Patrice Bissi is in **annex 5.2.5**.

<sup>163</sup> "Est: Le mairie de Lagdo toujours otage de ses ravisseurs (gouverneur)", 23 September 2015, see <http://www.journalducameroun.com/article.php?aid=21595>, accessed on 25 October 2015; confidential military report, 2 May 2015.

<sup>164</sup> "Cameroun / RCA (Interview Exclusive) - Le Général Abdoulaye Miskine: «Les ravisseurs du maire de Lagdo sont des camerounais du Grand Nord et non des centrafricains", Cameroon Infonet, see <http://www.cameroon-info.net/stories/0,67314,@.cameroun-rca-interview-exclusive-nbsp-le-general-abdoulaye-miskine-laquo-les-rav.html>, accessed on 25 October 2015.

<sup>165</sup> Press communication in **annex 5.2.6**.

<sup>166</sup> Le Jour, "Rapt du maire de Lagdo: le gouvernement ne veut pas payer la rançon", accessed on 21 July 2015 at <http://www.camer.be/42774/11:1/cameroun-rapt-du-maire-de-lagdo-le-gouvernement-ne-veut-pas-payer-la-rancon-cameroun.html>; confidential military report, 2 May 2015.

13. Economic motives also drive most of FDPC's day-to-day military operations. Commander notes and Panel interviews with victims make frequent reference to confiscated cattle, currency and gold.<sup>167</sup> The abduction and intimidation of civilians and local authorities are part and parcel of FDPC's efforts to raise funds. For example, in Koundé, the Panel interviewed a resident who was abducted on 16 June 2015 and subsequently released after his family paid a ransom of USD 1,600. On 10 June 2015, FDPC elements also burned a car belonging to a merchant from Koundé after he was unable to pay a sum of USD 3,300 requested by the same fighters several days earlier.<sup>168</sup> FDPC fighters frequently ransack a gold mining area near Koundé.<sup>169</sup> In a letter to the mayor of Besson, the FDPC Secretary-General demanded USD 8,300 to be paid on the same day.<sup>170</sup> FDPC cash entries, presumably from looting and extortion, amounted to USD 13,000 for the months of April and May 2015.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>167</sup> See Commander's notes in **annex 5.2.7**.

<sup>168</sup> See photograph of the burnt vehicle in **annex 5.2.8**.

<sup>169</sup> Meetings with villagers and artisanal miners, Koundé, 19 June 2015.

<sup>170</sup> See the letter in **annex 5.2.9**.

<sup>171</sup> FDPC account book, archived with the United Nations.

**Annex 5.1.1: Photographs of Martin Koumtamadji**

*Photograph posted on 25 July 2015 in Brazzaville<sup>172</sup>*



*Photograph posted on 11 December 2014 in Brazzaville<sup>173</sup>*




*Photograph posted on 2 July 2014, while in detention in Cameroon<sup>174</sup>*

<sup>172</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Je-n-ai-pas-peur--l-entretien-exclusif-avec-le-chef-rebelle-Abdoulaye-Miskine\\_a20938.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-Je-n-ai-pas-peur--l-entretien-exclusif-avec-le-chef-rebelle-Abdoulaye-Miskine_a20938.html)

<sup>173</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Interview-du-General-Abdoulaye-Miskine-chef-du-FDPC\\_a13898.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/Centrafrique-Interview-du-General-Abdoulaye-Miskine-chef-du-FDPC_a13898.html)



*Photograph reportedly taken in March 2013<sup>175</sup>*



<sup>174</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at <https://www.facebook.com/pages/G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-Abdoulaye-Miskine/164727260257773>

<sup>175</sup> Accessed on 26 October 2015 at <http://www.journaldebangui.com/article.php?aid=530>

**Annex 5.1.2:** FDPC vice president's letter to Congolese interior minister stating that Central African authorities did not approach the group in relation to the Bangui forum

**FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN (FDPC)**

A

Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre de  
L'Intérieur de la République du Congo

**Objet :** Audience à propos du Forum de Bangui du 04 au 12 Mai 2015

Excellence,

En Novembre 2014 en sa qualité de Médiateur International pour la crise en République Centrafricaine, le **Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO** a dépêché une importante délégation auprès de son homologue camerounais le **Président Paul BIYA** qui a permis la libération du Prêtre Polonais ainsi que celui du **Président** de notre mouvement (FDPC) à savoir le **Général de Division Abdoulaye Miskine** détenu illégalement et abusivement au Cameroun pendant 14 mois et 02 semaines.

Et le 27 Novembre de la même année, le **Général** est conduit ici à **Brazzaville**. Pour les démarches entreprises concernant la libération du **Général** et notre prise en charge ici au Congo, nous voulons à travers cette audience remercier son Excellence le **Président Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO**, les autorités de ce très beau pays ainsi que ce magnifique peuple congolais pour leur légendaire hospitalité qui n'est plus à démontrer.

Aussi Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, le Forum de **Bangui**, un rendez-vous capital durant lequel les centrafricaines et centrafricains de tout bord doivent se réunir pour s'entendre sur l'avenir de leur pays se tiendront du 04 au 12 Mai 2015.

Mouvement Politico-militaire, le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC)** est appelé à prendre part à ces assises afin d'apporter sa contribution quant à la recherche collective des solutions aux problèmes qui sont causes de la désintégration de notre pays.

Cependant, nous constatons avec beaucoup de regret que ni les autorités de transition en **Centrafrique** ni ceux de notre pays d'accueil ne nous ont pas approchés pour la circonstance et pourtant les autres entités sont à la page.

C'est pour cette raison que nous voulons vous rencontrer afin de comprendre précisément l'origine du blocage et se faire une idée sur la place du **FDPC** dans ce meeting qui s'annonce.

Fait à **Brazzaville** 23 Avril 2015

Le Vice-président du **FDPC**



**Ferdinand MBOKOTO-MADJI**

Annex 5.1.3: FDPC press communiqué on the Bangui forum<sup>176</sup>**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°03/FDPC/11/05/2015****FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN (FDPC)**

Le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain** (FDPC) vient par la présente marquer son indignation et sa désapprobation face au déroulement des travaux du Forum de **Bangui** tenu courant Mai 2015. Toute attitude qui ne milite guère pour un retour rapide, calme et favorable à la quiétude à la concorde et à l'unité nationale car dénué de tout caractère inclusif.

En effet, depuis le début du chaos en **République Centrafricaine** (Mars 2013), le FDPC a toujours pratiqué la politique de la « main tendue » pour le retour sans condition de la **PAIX** sur toute l'étendue du territoire. Malgré notre bonne volonté manifeste et notre ambition de voir le pays pacifié dans son entièreté, les dirigeants actuels de la transition nous ont toujours servi une fin de non-recevoir. Nous en voulons pour preuve, la multitude des correspondances envoyées au **Médiateur International** pour la crise centrafricaine le **Président** de la **République du Congo son Excellence Denis SASSOU N'GUESSO** ainsi qu'à la **Présidente de Transition** et dont les objets ont toujours indiqué notre position qui est celle de la promotion de la **PAIX** et le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel. Hélas, ces correspondances sont quasiment et toujours restées sans réponse de leur part.

Ce silence complice de la Très Haute Institution du pays, de nature à mettre en hibernation tout projet et concept sur la **PAIX**, nous pousse à croire qu'il s'agit là d'une attitude consciente et souhaitée ; et dont le principal but inavoué est basé sur les calculs électoraux à venir. Bien plus, la désinvolture avec laquelle certains ministres et hauts dignitaires gèrent les questions publiques est criarde.

Car comment comprendre que pour la tenue et l'organisation d'un tel Forum, hautement stratégique pour la **Centrafrique** et les Centrafricains, que le **Conseil National de Transition**, les acteurs emblématiques, les mouvements politico - militaires combattantes et non combattantes en soient à la fois ignorés et minorés par la **Présidente de Transition** ? Ceci témoigne comme nous l'avons relevé précédemment, qu'il s'agit à la fois d'un jeu de positionnement politique des uns à la solde du système ou des soient disant « potentiels candidats » et d'une épuration systémique des autres artisans de la démocratie.

Ce jeu, s'il fait les affaires de certaines personnes tapies dans l'environnement de **Madame la Présidente de Transition**, est loin de ramener une **PAIX** future aux Centrafricains. Car il s'agit là d'une POLITIQUE DISCRIMINATOIRE pratiquée par le système politique actuel. Or la crise politico-sociale qui traverse le pays actuellement ne nous permet pas de construire notre avenir politique sur la discrimination. Ceci est une autre porte ouverte à l'impasse.

<sup>176</sup> Accessed on 5 November 2015 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2015/05/communique-de-presse-n-03-fdpc-11-05-2015.html>

Toute attitude et lassitude d'une classe politique que le **FDPC** déplore pour la simple raison qu'il s'agit là des germes prémonitoires d'une future crise qui peut s'avérer plus cruelles que les précédentes.

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que c'est exclusivement un tel qui a le monopole de la gestion de sortie de crise ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que pour une pacifique et réussie transition, il faut exclure voire écarter certaines tendances ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que vous les prenez en considération alors que jour après jour, leur quotidien est fait de pleurs, de viols, de famine, de discrimination, de deuils, de rapt, d'emprisonnements illégitimes, d'appauvrissement croissant et de tribalisations exaspérées ?

Comment allez-vous expliquer aux Centrafricains que la transition a réussis alors que rien n'a évolué, surtout dans le domaine politico-économique- social du pays à cause de l'hypocrisie manifeste et de la mauvaise gestion des fonds alloués au pays ?

Convaincu que la **République Centrafricaine** a besoin, pour le redécollage de tous ses secteurs d'activités d'une révolution idéologique, le **Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain** réaffirme son engagement de voir éclore une nouvelle classe politique dont le leitmotiv sera basé uniquement et exclusivement sur la modernisation inconditionnelle et la promotion irréversible de la **PAIX en RCA**.

A ce titre ; le **FDPC** décide :

1. Ne pas reconnaître les résolutions du dernier Forum de **Bangui** car présentant des caractères de non inclusion ;
- 2.
3. Ne plus reconnaître la légitimité de la **Présidente de Transition** et de son gouvernement transitoire dans l'état actuel de sa gestion ;
- 4.
5. Soutenir la reconfiguration du **Conseil National de Transition** pour le rendre plus représentatif à l'échelle nationale ;

Toutefois, nous mettons en garde les autorités actuelles Centrafricaines sur les risques sécuritaires que peuvent entraîner leurs calculs électoraux et leurs jeux d'intérêts égoïstes après ce forum de **Bangui** de Mai 2015. Le peuple sera seul juge au temps convenable.


Fait à **Brazzaville**, le 11 mai 2015

**Le Président du FDPC**

**Le Général de Division**

**Martin KOUMTA MADJI (Abdoulaye MISKINE)**

**Annex 5.1.4:** Commander's note dated 3 March 2014 referring to the "General" who will send money, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015




A photograph of a handwritten note on lined paper. The text is written in French and describes a meeting with a captain named MATE on 03-03-2014 at 8H45. The note mentions a general who assigned ZACHO to guard the children and that the general sent money for their food.

MATE du 03-03-2014 à 8H45 mn  
Le Capitaine MATE avait nous dit  
à la réunion que le général lui a  
désigné avec ZACHO de garder les  
les enfants et le général va leur  
envoyer de l'argent pour leur vivre.


**Annex 5.1.5:** Koumtamadji's business cards retrieved by MINUSCA from FDPC base camp near Zoukombo, CAR, on 21 June 2015




**Annex 5.1.6:** Hand-over report referring to weapons transferred to the newly appointed Chief of staff on 4 January 2015, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015.



**Annex 5.1.7:** *Ordre de mission* signed by Edouard Bossian referring to hostages taken in Cameroon, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015




**Annex 5.1.8:** Church ID card and Central African ID card of Edouard Bossian, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.9:** Chadian school ID card referring to Francois (Bernard) Kemrangar as contact person, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

Nom: Madjintona  
 Prénom: Alice  
 Date et Lieu De naissance: 16/12/93  
a Kobdogué  
 Fils/Fille de: Kemrangar  
 Et de: Barmkam naricline  
 Domicile: Barnou  
 N° Matricule: 6091/15  
 Délivrée le: 05 FEV 2015

Classe de: 3<sup>e</sup>  
 En cas d'accident veuillez prévenir  
 Mr: Kemrangar François  
 B.P. \_\_\_\_\_ Tél: 6235990  
 Lien de parenté: Cousin

Signature de l'élève  





**Annex 5.1.10:** Money transfer receipt referring to Francois Bernard Kemrangar as sender, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

Anne Messudom Changer mot de passe - Déconnexion - Accueil

**DETAILS DE LA TRANSACTION**

**0914274473**  
**Cash à cash**

Transaction non autorisée. Veuillez contacter le Chef d'agence ou l'Administrateur


CLIENT EMETTEUR	
Code :	0637395742
Nom :	KEMRANGAR
Prénom :	FRANCOIS BERNARD
Téléphone :	
Fax :	
Adresse :	
Email :	
Ville :	YDE
Pays :	Cameroun

TRANSACTION	
Montant :	600 000,00 XAF
Commissions :	11 992,00 XAF
Question secrète :	
Réponse secrète :	
Raison du transfert :	
Agent émetteur :	Voir détails
Date/dépôt :	2015-03-26 12:11:58
Date Payement :	0000-00-00 00:00:00
Pays d'émission :	Cameroun
Pays d'origine :	Congo
CBU/Reference	
Finet	
CBU/Reference	
Payement :	

CLIENT RECEPTEUR	
Nom :	MOKEMGA
Prénom :	GABIN CLOTARE
Téléphone :	+242066835285
Fax :	
Adresse :	
Ville :	
Pays :	Republique du Congo
Type de pièce :	Carte d'identité
Numéro pièce :	
Date de naissance (jj/mm/aaaa) :	/ /
Date de délivrance (jj/mm/aaaa) :	/ /
Date d'expiration (jj/mm/aaaa) :	/ /
Lieu d'émission :	Cameroun


© 2001 Groupe Chiqui. Tous droits réservés.

**Annex 5.1.11:** *Ordre de mission* referring to Leonard Kormandji as chief of mission, and to a "white" hostage being taken, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015



**Annex 5.1.12: Lucien Assalbaye's Norwegian residence permit**

*Photograph taken by the Panel in Yaoundé on 9 July 2015*



**Annex 5.1.13:** Photograph provided to the Panel by Lucien Assalbaye showing himself with MINUSCA peacekeepers in the CAR in November 2014 in relation to the hostage situation



**Annex 5.1.14:** Commander's note making reference to Lucien (Assalbaye) ordering weapons to be brought to Bertoua (Cameroon), retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

<sup>93</sup>  
 DATE Du 02 - 03 - 2014  
 08h24mn BERTOUA - Base par le Sgt  
 Leonard.  
 Motif de son arrivée à la base  
 - Faire de vidéos des elts  
 - Récupération de 3 ARMES pour elles  
 à Bertoua sur l'ordre de Lucien.  
 Sans le refus, sans l'ordre du Général  
 rien ne va aboutir.  
 DATE Du 02 - 03 - 2014 à 18h00 retour  
 de S. particulier sur BERTOUA.

Annex 5.1.15: Extract of the list of FDPC combatants including Patrice Bessi, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

56	BEMADJI HONI ALFRED
57	NDIRANDJIM MATTHIAS
58	BOMI MARCHEL
59	ABBLOULAYE IDRIS
60	ALLARAMADJI JEAN
61	NOITOUROU ZEKEMAN
62	KORMADJE ISMAEL
63	GOGALTAN DEBONHEUR
64	GIOLTE TUBO
65	DUPIN STEVE JUVENAL
66	PIANGUE TUBO
67	ALLASRA JULIUS
68	NGA-BOU ALAIN
69	ADMOTAN MAXIME
70	BISSI PATRICE
71	NANKRE HENRI
72	MASRABAYE PASCAL
73	ABOUMVOITI ALEXI
74	GLABE JEUN CHARLE
75	MIANMADIAN PHILIPPE
76	YAMTA DIMANCHE FREDERIC
77	NBITAO GUINGUI RENE GUSTAVE

**Annex 5.1.16: Press communiqué by FDPC Colonel concerning the capture of two armed elements**

**FRONT DEMOCRATIQUE DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAÏN (F D P C)**

**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N° 2**

Ce matin à 06 heures 15 minutes à 32 kilomètres de **Garoua-Boulai** sur l'axe **Bouar (RCA)** ; les hommes de notre poste avancé ont intercepté 05 hommes armés en provenance du territoire camerounais.

Les 05 assaillants ont 03 ânes transportant du riz, de l'huile, du sucre, 547 munitions de kalachnikov et 02 kalachnikovs.

Avec leur refus de s'arrêter, une fusillade éclate.

**Bilan :**

-02 des assaillants abattus sur le champ pendant les échanges de tirs et un blessé puis maîtrisé par nos soldats.

-De notre côté ; 01 soldat blessé.

**NB :** les deux assaillants neutralisés portaient des armes d'assaut (kalachnikov) ainsi que les deux autres en fuites activement recherché par nos hommes. Le blessé quant à lui un bâton d'éleveur.

Tous sont de nationalité camerounaise car détenteurs de cartes nationales d'identité de ce pays.

Après audition du blessé, il en ressort ce qui suit :

-Il s'exprime en **foulbó**, **haoussa** et en **arabe chouar** mais ne parle ni ne comprend la langue nationale centrafricaine : **Sango**.

-Il déclare venir du **Cameroun** et entrain de rejoindre leurs frères qui sont sur le sol centrafricain.

-Ils sont entrain de lutter pour la libération de leur Chef **Aboubacar** détenu au **Cameroun**. Et s'est même pour cette raison qu'ils ont pris les otages.

**Conclusion :**

A cause de manque de confiance vis-à-vis des autorités camerounaises, nous sommes présentement dans l'impossibilité de leur remettre le blessé pour investigation. Car en en Avril 2013, un policier (gardien de paix) camerounais nommé **Djezet Doumtio Gerard Thomas** avait eu la vie sauve grâce à notre Chef le **Général Abdoulaye Miskine** qui a tout mis en œuvre pour le libérer et le remettre aux autorités de son pays. Mais le remerciement de ses derniers n'est autre que l'arrestation puis séquestration de notre Chef susmentionné pour une durée de 14 mois 02 semaines alors que blessé, il était dans ce pays rien que pour se faire soigner.

Fait à Baboua (RCA) le 31 Mars 2015

Le Ministre de la Défense du FDPC



**Le Colonel Pierre YAKOUA**

*Source: Obtained by the Panel from FDPC representatives in Yaoundé on 8 July 2015*

Annex 5.1.17: Commander notes making reference to cattle, gold, money, telephones and arms brought back from missions, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

Renseignements

- 1 Job une moto - au mois de janvier
- 2 Tibo une moto - enivo
- 3 Aire des boeufs 53.
- 4 - Ndirandjiri une moto.
- 5 - un peu d'or.
- 6 - Ordinateur.

DATE DU 21-06-2014

Patrouille effectuée par le Commandant ZACKO et le Capitaine MOUNGUMBOU ABDEL avec les elts. Ils ont amené à la base avec une somme de 500.000 Fcs 10 appareils Téléphonique en mauvais état, une mitrailleuse composée de 8 munitions.

RHS

Annex 5.1.18: Photograph of a car burned by FDPC on 10 June 2015 on main supply road, taken by the panel on 19 June 2015



Annex 5.1.19: Letter from FDPC Secretary General to the mayor of Besson requesting payment, retrieved by MINUSCA at FDPC base camp on 21 June 2015

SG de FDPC      République Centrafricaine  
Unité Dignité Bravoure

Monneur le Maire de  
la Ville de Besson

Juste vous rappeler que c'est moi  
le SG qui est arrivé le premier ici  
à Besson. Donc la population ~~est~~  
~~est~~ <sup>chrétienne</sup> a beaucoup parlé du témoignage de  
Sarkou qui <sup>est</sup> a beaucoup défendu  
x ~~quel~~ ~~chrétien~~ qui a défendu les  
chrétien pendant les périodes de  
crises <sup>ici à Besson</sup> et on a beaucoup félicité ses  
actes et beaucoup plus on ~~est~~ fait  
confiance mais je suis arrivé  
ici l'an dernier et j'ai eu  
votre chercher pour ~~vous~~ sauver des ~~ex~~  
refuser ~~de~~ ~~partir~~ l'instant on a  
pas de problèmes avec ~~elles~~  
Monsieur le Maire nous sommes  
des étrangers et nous avons comme  
d'habitude d'exiger les choses donc  
nous avons besoin 5000000 fcs CFA  
avant 10H jusqu'on a beaucoup à  
faire.



**Annex 5.3: Hunting ammunition sold on the markets in Nola, Obo and Baoro**

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Nola on 19 January 2015*



*Photographs taken by the Panel in Baoro on 4 June 2015*



*Photograph taken by the Panel in Obo on 25 September 2015*



Annex 5.4: Invoice from Cameroonian ammunition retailer "Armukad", also known as DOLLAH YANKAM, and export authorization provided to 'Ousmane Roger' by Cameroonian customs authorities in Batouri on 8 January 2015

ARMIKAD  
AGENCE DE BATOURI  
TEL: 79 86 98 00  
CONT: P107600571684K  
Date 08-1-2015  
FACTURE C N° 001/151  
Doit OUSMANE ROGER

Quantité	Désignation	P.U.	Prix Total
4500	4,50 cartouches de calibre 7,62 mm de chasse Maroon	300	
<b>PAYÉ COMPTANT</b>			
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>300.000</b>

Les marchandises vendues ne sont ni reprises ni contrôlées  
Signature: [Signature]

Vu passé à l'exportation  
08 JAN 2015

LE MINISTRE DES FINANCES  
Bureau des Douanes  
Batouri

Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source

Annex 5.5: Photograph of Roger Ngaïdoua alias 'Ousmane Roger' and seized hunting ammunitions taken on 8 January 2015



*Source: Obtained by the Panel from MINUSCA*

Annex 5.6: Hunting ammunition, weapons and hand grenades seized by MINUSCA in Berbérati

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Berbérati on 27 August 2015*





**Annex 5.7: Batouri branch of Dollah Yankam arms shop**

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 17 August 2015*



**Annex 5.8: Authorization dated 19 September 2011 signed by Pastor Josué Binoua, former Minister of territorial administration of the CAR, authorizing Roger Ngaidoua, alias 'Ousmane Roger', to import 200,000 cartridges from Cameroon for his ammunition shops in Berbérati, Bouar and Nola**

**MINISTÈRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION**

**DIRECTION DE CADRE**

**DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION**

**DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES  
ET ADMINISTRATIVES**

**SERVICE DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES**

**DECISION N° 050/MTAT/DPH/AG/11**

**LE MINISTRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA DÉCENTRALISATION**

Vu La constitution du 27 Décembre 2004,

Vu La loi n°10.005 du 11 Mai 2010, modifiant et complétant Certaines dispositions de la constitution du 27 Décembre 2004;

Vu La loi n°61.213 du 01 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine;

Vu L'ordonnance n° 04.021 du 27 mars 1961, modifiant et complétant la loi n° 61.213 du 01 Mai 1961, réglementant l'introduction et l'usage des armes à feu en République Centrafricaine;

Vu Le décret n°11.032 du 18 mai 2011, portant nomination du 1<sup>er</sup> ministre chef du gouvernement;

Vu Le décret n°11.034 du 22 Juin 2011, portant nomination des ministres du gouvernement et ses modifications subséquentes;

Vu Le décret n° 10.208 du 17 Septembre 2010, portant réorganisation et renouvellement de Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation et ses attributions de Ministère;

Vu La demande formelle par Monsieur OUSMAN Roger en date du 20 Juillet 2011.

**DECIDE**

**Art 1<sup>er</sup>**: Est autorisé le transfert de la République du Cameroun en Centrafrique en faveur de Monsieur OUSMAN Roger dans ses dépôts situés à Berbérati, Bouar et Nola.

**200.000 DEUX CENT MILLE CARTOUCHES DE CHASSE CALIBRE 12 SOIT 400 CARTON DE 500 CARTOUCHES.**

**Art 2**: L'introduction, le transfert, l'armement et la vente de ces munitions s'effectueront conformément aux conditions fixées par la réglementation en vigueur.

**Art 3**: La présente décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée et communiquée par le 09 sept 2011.

EMPLACEMENTS

RECHECHES

PROCES

NOTES

ARCHIVES

NATIONALE DE LA SÉCURITÉ

MINISTRE ATTI

CE MINISTRE ATTI

L'ÉTAT CIVIL

à Bangui, le

19 SEPT 2011

PASTOR JOSUÉ BINOUA

Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation - 515 Avenue des Martyrs - Immeuble Ex-Pérouca - 3<sup>ème</sup> Etage - Tel : 21611984

**Annex 5.9: Purchasing history of Roger Ngaidoua at Dollah Yankam arms shop in Ngaidoua's possession during his arrest on 8 January 2015**

25-11-14  
Quantité servie 1500 cartouches

13-11-14  
Quantité servie 2000 cartouches

22-11-14  
Quantité servie 3000 cartouches

26-11-14  
Quantité servie 3000 cartouches

03-12-14  
Quantité servie 3000 cartouches

10-12-14  
Quantité servie 4500 cartouches

19-12-14  
Quantité servie 3750

21-12-14  
Quantité servie 4500



Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source

**Annex 5.10:** Case of 12-gauge hunting cartridges seized on the road between Nola and Yanti border post

1. The first case dates back to 24 May 2015 when a local defence militia seized 250 12-gauge hunting cartridges from a FACA Chief-Corporal on the road between Nola and the border town of Yanti.
2. He told the local defence militia that he had purchased the ammunition from small dealers coming from across the border in Mboy, Cameroon.<sup>177</sup>
3. MINUSCA and FACA sources in Nola informed the Panel that the ammunition was intended for a planned anti-balaka attack on the town, which, lacking ammunition, eventually did not take place.<sup>178</sup>

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 15 June 2015*



<sup>177</sup> Meeting with local defence militia, Nyamachoke, 15 July 2015.

<sup>178</sup> Meetings with MINUSCA and FACA military staff, Nola, 14-15 June 2015.

**Annex 5.11:** Case of seized ammunition at Béloko border by CAR authorities on 31 May 2015

1. Regarding this second case, in Béloko (Mambéré Kadeï), along the main border crossing with Cameroon, the Panel received information from the CAR police regarding a seizure on 31 May 2015 of 200 12-gauge hunting cartridges.
2. The trafficker, while in custody in Bouar, never specified the origin of the ammunition as coming from Cameroon, and no receipt was found on him.<sup>179</sup>

*Photograph obtained by the Panel from Police authorities in Béloko on 21 June 2015*



<sup>179</sup> Meeting with judicial authorities in Bouar, 22 June 2015; see photograph of the seizure in **annex 5.11**.

**Annex 5.12: Cases of weapons and ammunition seized in Berbérati and Baoro**

1. In Berbérati, MINUSCA seized fifteen arms of three different types, i.e. type 56(-2) and AKM-type assault rifles and MAS 36 and Lee Enfield rifles. Two type 56(-2) were seized from former-Séléka element. The identity of the owners of the other assault rifles remains unclear. MINUSCA also seized twelve hand grenades of different types but these could not be properly inspected due to their advanced decomposition and risk of explosion.
2. In Baoro, MINUSCA on 19 May 2015 seized 483 rounds of AK-47 ammunition that were found in two bags of charcoal dropped in a tailor shop in Baoro town (see photograph below). The bags had been deposited by a trucker on his way from Bangui to Bouar.
3. The above seizures appear to indicate that anti-balaka groups rely on different types of arms. Indeed, anti-balaka elements in and around Baoro, on the main supply road, possess AK-type arms.<sup>180</sup> In Berbérati, several eyewitnesses and victims claim that anti-balaka in town carry automatic pistols.<sup>181</sup>

*Photographs taken by the Panel in Bouar on 4 June 2015*




<sup>180</sup> Interview with Henri Jean-Christophe Béthom, anti-balaka coordinator in Baoro, Baoro, 4 June 2015; MINUSCA military and civilian sources, Bouar, 29 May and 5 June 2015.

<sup>181</sup> Interviews with victims of Peuhl origin of anti-balaka attacks, Berbérati, 27 August 2015.




Annex 5.13 : Copy of a letter sent by Crepin Messamba as zone commander of Sosso-Nakombo



Source: Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source in Berberati on 20 August 2015

Annex 5.14: Maximin Vobouadé's artisanal miner card

Photograph taken by the Panel in Berbérati on 17 June 2015



**Annex 5.15:** Security incidents for Nola, Berbérati and Carnot *sous-préfectures* drawn from the Panel of Experts database <sup>182</sup>

	DATE	VILLAGE / TOWN	SUB-PREFECTURE	KILLINGS AVERAGE	SUMMARY
1	20/Dec/14	NGOULO	NOLA	1	On 20 December 2015, a Muslim mine operator called Ramadané was killed at a mine site near Ngoulo by an anti-balaka from Yaloké called Francis Zamane.
2	05/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 5 January 2015, MINUSCA Force reported an attack by unknown men on a Muslim family in Poto Poto neighbourhood in Berberati. A woman was reportedly injured and rescued by MINUSCA along with her three daughters. A seven-year-old boy is believed to be kept hostage.
3	16/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	1	On 16 January 2015, in Berbérati, MINUSCA elements who had left Berbérati to help some gendarme 8 kilometres from Berbérati, fell into an ambush set up by anti-balaka elements. One of the anti-balaka was shot dead. Two hunting rifles were recovered. The next morning, the body of the perpetrator was transported to the town hall to be exposed but the situation remained tense.
4	16/Jan/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	1	On 16 of January 2015, in Berbérati, the Gendarmerie arrested two anti-balaka elements with the support of MINUSCA Congo Brazzaville Peacekeepers. Later the same day, anti-balaka elements opened fire on MINUSCA Peacekeepers to free the detainees. During the exchange of fire, one anti-balaka was killed and three weapons were recovered. No MINUSCA Peacekeepers were wounded.
5	19/Mar/15	AMADA GAZA	AMADA GAZA	1	On 19 March 2015, eight (8) alleged anti-balaka crossed the border to extort money from Peuhl refugees in Cameroon. Since the victims could not pay the requested amount, one refugee was reportedly shot dead and buried on the spot. The anti-balaka leader in Amada Gaza confirmed that he had sent a group of his elements in Cameroon territory to get money and cattle from refugees. When informed, local anti-balaka leader refuted the responsibility but managed to arrest six of his elements and handed them over to the local gendarmerie in Gamboula, 84 kilometres from Berbérati.

<sup>182</sup> Diamond related incidents are highlighted in yellow.

6	25/Sep/15	PAMA	BODA	0	On 25 March 2015, a 12-year old girl who was going to the farm with her parents at 10 kilometres from the village Pama was kidnapped by SONGOLE, an Anti-balaka comzone, who forced her into his house and raped her. The parents quickly informed the gendarmerie, who arrested him and transferred him to Bangui where he is in pre-detention pending trial. The girl has been referred for medical treatment.
7	29/Mar/15	NOUFOU	GAMBOULA	7	On 29 March 2015, in Noufou village, 85 kilometres of Gamboula, southwest of Berbérati, prefectural authorities informed that alleged armed Peuhl from Cameroon reportedly killed up to seven people, wounded another and burnt down four houses. According to local authorities, the motive of the attack would be retaliation for the assassination of a Peuhl refugee in Cameroon on 19 March 2015. MINUSCA has dispatched a patrol to the area.
8	11/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 April 2015, in Berbérati, a thief attempted to rob the House of a Muslim diamond dealer was arrested and beaten up by Muslims and later taken to the hospital. The non-Muslims attempted to retaliate but were prevented of doing so by the Congolese contingent. No casualties were reported.
9	14/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 14 April 2015, in Berbérati, an anti-balaka element shot in the legs of an 18 year-old individual who refused to rent his house. The victim was taken to the hospital.
10	15/Apr/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 15 April 2015, in Berbérati, an anti-balaka elements and his group destroyed the doors of houses belonging to Muslims in Poto Poto neighbourhood. The perpetrator was seen by the Mayor who ordered his arrest.
11	04/May/15	GADZI	GADZI	1	On 4 May 2015, following up reported of a stranded Peuhl community in Gadzi, MINUSCA received additional information that up to 140 Peuhl are stranded in Gadzi, while 50 to 100 children are reportedly detained against their will by anti-balaka elements in Gbanabozoum village, Carnot sub-prefecture. Anti-balaka elements reportedly killed the Peuhl leader of Fadzi on 8 February 2015.
12	04/May/15	GAMBOULA	GAMBOULA	0	On 4 May 2015, the Mayor of Gamboula, 86 kilometres West of Berbérati, confirmed reports by UNHCR of extortion by armed elements on the local population in 11 villages in the area bordering Cameroon. The Mayor said attackers were a mix of well-armed men from FDPC, ex-Séléka and Peuhl. UNHCR reported that due to the

					activity of these criminal elements, 87 families had arrived to Gamboula from throughout the Gamboula and Amada Gaza sous-prefectures since April 2015, while others had fled to Cameroon.
13	07/May/15	NZAERI	GAMBOULA	0	On 7 May 2015, in Nzaeri village, the mayor of Gamboula informed MINUSCA of an attack. Two civilians arrived in Gamboula with AK47 wounds on 8 May, while other wounded civilians continued to reach Gamboula village. According to the mayor, the attackers were a mix of well-armed men from FDPC, ex-Séléka and Peuhl, while other sources suspected former FACA.
14	11/May/15	GODAWA	GAMBOULA	5	On 11 May 2015, in Godawa village, 100 kilometres north of Gamboula, three men and one woman were reportedly killed by unidentified individuals. A local self-defence group killed one suspect the following day. According to the information, the individual killed the following day was the mayor of Gamboula, this was not confirmed.
15	20/May/15	NOUFOU	GAMBOULA	0	On 20 May 2015, one day after the passage of a MINUSCA patrol, Noufou village was reportedly attacked once more by some 100-armed elements.
16	27/May/15	BAMBO-MBOKO	GAMBOULA	0	On 27 May 2015, in Bambo-Mboko village, 18 kilometres from Gbambia, anti-balaka elements launched reprisals attacks on Peuhl herders. This caused Peuhl to flee the area leaving behind two teenagers, 12 and 14 years old. The children were handed over to the village chief for further transfer to a humanitarian organization based in Berbérati.
17	17/Jun/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 17 June 2015, in Berbérati, a young Muslim IDP chased by presumed anti-balaka elements, sought refuge at the MINUSCA FO.
18	01/Jul/15	MBOULA	CARNOT	0	On 1 July 2015, in Mboula, the local Gendarmerie intercepted a group of anti-balaka elements who were armed with two AK-47s. The two suspects were released at the conclusion of the investigation. One of the MSF ( <i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> ) workers based at the Mboula Hospital asked a local person to transfer a medical patient to Carnot Hospital by motorbike belonging to the Gendarmerie. Anti-balaka combatants robbed the person when he was returning from Carnot and the attackers fled with the motorbike to SOUKPE village.

19	11/Jul/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 July 2015, in Berbérati, a 25-year old disabled woman was physically attacked by alleged anti-balaka elements.
20	11/Jul/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 11 July 2015, in Longote 1 neighborhood, in Berbérati, a 23-year-old was arrested at an illegal check point by 11 alleged anti-balaka elements and detained and ill-treated. He was released the following day after payment of a ransom.
21	20/Jul/15	GBANBIA	AMADA GAZA	0	Around 25 July 2015, over the past days, hundreds of anti-balaka elements are reported to have been converging in the area to repel an imminent Peuhl attack. Tensions have been rising since two Peuhl minors, aged 8 and 9 years, were taken hostage by anti-balaka elements two months ago. According to the Amada Gaza sub-prefect, the anti-balaka have requested 15,000,000 CFA as a ransom to release the two minors. MINUSCA will continue facilitating negotiations between the Peuhl and anti-balaka representatives in order to ease tension and secure the release of the hostages. The two children were rescued by MINUSCA patrol on 26 August 2015.
22	29/Jul/15	CARNOT	CARNOT	0	On 29 July 2015, the Gendarmerie in Berbérati informed MINUSCA of the arrest of an anti-balaka element the same day in Carnot, Mambere-Kadei prefecture. Allegedly, the suspect was involved in illicit activities and death threats against the Berbérati Mayor in the night of 17 July. Local authorities are considering the suspect's transfer to Bangui or Berbérati, however the local police fear retaliation from the anti-balaka. MINUSCA Force is ready to provide security.
23	05/Aug/15	NANDOBO	BERBERATI	0	On 5 August 2015, in Nandobo, a Muslim, who had returned from Cameroon, where he had been a refugee since 2014, was threatened by local anti-balaka elements and consequently saved by MINUSCA and the national gendarmerie. Local authorities asked MINUSCA to help transferring the man to Berbérati.
24	15/Aug/15	CARNOT/BAORO	CARNOT	0	On 15 August 2015, a Muslim diamond dealer, returning from Cameroon by car, was attacked by anti-balaka militia in Baoro, but managed to escape. On arrival to Carnot local police apprehended him

					and tore his identity card apart.
25	20/Aug/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 20 August 2015, in Berbérati, six Muslims, alleged ex-Séléka elements, returned from CAR refugee camps in Cameroon. A crowd of several hundred people in reaction surrounded them but MINUSCA Forces intervened, saving the six from mob justice and subsequently handing them over to the Gendarmerie.
26	23/Aug/15	KATAGBA, WOTORO	BERBERATI	0	On 23 August 2015, in Katagba and Wotor villages, 6 and 8 kilometres from Berbérati respectively, seven presumed anti-balaka elements, including one former FACA, attacked the villages. The attackers were arrested on 25 August.
27	23/Aug/15	ZINGA	MBAIKI	3	On 23 August 2015, in Zinga village, located approximately 20 kilometres east of Batalimo, an unknown person killed three local residents. The local people wanted the suspect killed but the suspect was taken by the Gendarmerie for safety as they proceed with the investigation.
28	27/Aug/15	AMADA GAZA	AMADA GAZA	0	On 27 August 2015, in Amada-Gaza, a self-defence militia group under the leadership of 'Colonel' Nice, allegedly based in Bangui, has been identified. The group is mostly comprised of anti-balaka members are seen carrying shotguns while conducting their "duties". They are often involved in the adjudication of both criminal and civil cases.
29	02/Sep/15	BAYANGA, BILOLO	NOLA	0	On 2 September 2015, The COGBAT detachment in NOLA is following two suspected armed groups, one led by Ferdinand Ndombi based in Bayanga village, 120 kilometres south of Nola and another located between Salo and Bilolo led by Eric Ekemo. Both groups are suspected to be involved in various criminal activities and aligned with the anti-balaka.
30	05/Sep/15	NOLA	NOLA		On 5 September 2015, in Nola, presence of anti-balaka coordinator Olivier Bienvenu Kolo (who lives in Bayanga) with a group of anti-balaka is reported. It appears that he had set up a group of anti-balaka

					in QRF (Quick reaction Force) 60 kilometres from Nola IOT to intervene at the appropriate time to try to deny Muslims to come back there or to attack them and their properties.
31	05/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 5 September 2015, in Berbérati, the illegal presence of an anti-balaka criminal escaped from Ngaragba prison in Bangui on 7 July 2015 is reported. His name Aaron Wilibona aka Aron Ouilibona accompanied by a group of about 8 anti-balaka combatants. He fled to Garoua-Boulaye in Cameroon after his escape, and now he could destabilize the precarious security situation of Berbérati.
32	07/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 7 September 2015, in Berbérati, Imam Nandobo was attacked at his home by armed individuals. He confronted the perpetrators and wounded one of them. One weapon was abandoned on the scene. An investigation was opened by the gendarmerie.
33	09/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 9 September 2015, in Berbérati, the sub Prefect of Berbérati informed that Muslims who abandoned their homes at the crisis time, are still being threatened by some unruly residents of their localities. He gave a reference of one, Mr Adam Abah (diamond dealer) a resident of Baniya village, who stayed as refugee in Cameroon during the crisis. He returned to Balego village on 8 September 2015 but he faced bitter anger of the residents, but he was saved by the timely intervention of the Baniya Gendarmerie. He is currently in the custody of Gendarmerie of Berbérati for safety. In Soso Nakombo, similar treatment is reported to have been experienced by a number of Muslim businessmen who also attempted this week to go back and commence their various businesses.
34	14/Sep/15	NOGOTTO	BODA		On 14 September 2015, in Ngotto, a number of unidentified armed groups who are believed to be hiding in the Ngotto forest for rebel training and other criminal purposes. Though no clear identification, these said groups are alleged to be mostly former President Bozizé supporters with a likely intention of disrupting the election in those areas.

35	17/Sep/15	CARNOT	CARNOT		On 17 September 2015, in Carnot, anti-balaka elements attempted to attack the Carnot gendarmerie post to free a comrade who had been arrested for killing a diamond dealer. The local gendarmerie requested MINUSCA to transfer him to Bangui. The next day, a gendarme shot the escaped anti-balaka causing protests of the unhappy population. The victim was taken to the hospital.
36	23/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 23 September 2015, in Berbérati, Mambere-Kadei, anti-balaka elements reportedly started harassing the group of 70 Peuhl transiting from Boda to Cameroon. Tensions rose due to a rumour of an upcoming attack by Muslims. The local gendarmerie now guard the Peuhl camp. The same day, anti-balaka elements reportedly tried to prevent the return from Cameroon of the Peuhl chief of Gbabaza, 30 kilometres from Berbérati.
37	30/Sep/15	CARNOT	CARNOT	1	On 30 September 2015, in Carnot, alleged anti-balaka elements attempted to loot the house of a Muslim family. One of the victims succumbed to his injuries in the night of 30 September 2015.
38	30/Sep/15	BERBERATI	BERBERATI	0	On 30 September 2015, in Berbérati, anti-balaka group was reinforcing its elements, with the intention of going to Bangui to support their partners in the escalation of violence. Anti-balaka also continues blocking the MSR 1 between Bossembélé and Bangui, while armed anti-balaka members are continuously arriving in Boali for the same purpose. They are arriving by trucks and motorbikes since 29 September. They are putting barricades and threatening to the population on the MSR 1.

**Annex 5.16: Mining site in Boda**

*Photograph taken by the Panel on 12 June 2015*



### Annex 5.17: Purchasing policies of buying houses for the west of the CAR

1. SODIAM is the main buyer of diamonds from the western production zone, purchasing 21,043 carats between 1 July 2014 and 5 September 2015, bringing its total stock to 70,036 carats.<sup>183</sup> SODIAM's buyer and supplying collectors in Carnot explained to the Panel that they do not purchase from anti-balaka members and have not received any signals among their suppliers in the field of interference by armed groups in the Carnot *sous-préfecture*.<sup>184</sup>
2. They were not aware of the situation in Sasélé, from where a supplying collector of SODIAM previously purchased diamonds.<sup>185</sup> SODIAM's General Director further told the Panel that the company no longer purchases diamonds from Hassan Fawaz, on grounds of links he apparently developed with anti-balaka elements.<sup>186</sup> SODIAM's last purchase from Fawaz was recorded on 2 February 2015.<sup>187</sup>
3. The second largest buyer of diamonds from the west is Sud-Azur, with 2,936 carats purchased between June 2014 and September 2015, followed by BADICA (listed on 20 August by the 2127 Sanctions Committee) with 186 carats from Carnot between May and September 2014, and 500 carats purchased in July and August 2015 from Boda, Nola and Yaloké.<sup>188</sup>
4. In a written response to a query by the Panel about buying houses' purchasing policies, BADICA's legal representatives communicated that recent purchases from the west were meant to benefit from the partial lifting of the Kimberley suspension.<sup>189</sup> Sud Azur's Director General emphasised in his response that purchases from the west made in Bangui derive exclusively from collectors and artisanal operators recognised by mining authorities.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>183</sup> Official purchasing records provided by the Ministry of Mines, 2014-2015, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>184</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's buyer and supplying collectors, Carnot, 18 June 2015.

<sup>185</sup> See paragraphs 129-131 of the 2014 Panel's final report.

<sup>186</sup> Meeting with SODIAM's General Director, Bangui, 21 September 2015.

<sup>187</sup> Official purchasing records provided by the Ministry of Mines, 2014-2015, archived with the United Nations.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>189</sup> The letter from BADICA's legal representative is in [annex 3.12.2](#).

<sup>190</sup> The letter from Sud Azur Director General in annex is in [annex 3.12.6](#)

**Annex 5.18: Case of gold purchased by the buying house Adamas-Swiss**

1. The General Director of the company explained to the Panel that he was assured by state mining authorities and security services that Ndolobo was not under armed group control. The company had not gone to mine site itself to verify the situation.
2. A guard unit like the one active in Ndolobo constitutes *per se* a private security force, for which the same supply chain due diligence approach applies as for armed groups.<sup>191</sup> OECD due diligence guidance, *inter alia*, recommends companies to require that private security forces contracted by any party in the supply chain will be engaged in accordance with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.
3. The guidance further recommends that companies adopt and implement a plan to mitigate the risk of direct or indirect support to private security forces, and suspend engagement with upstream suppliers if after six months of adopting the plan conditions are not met.<sup>192</sup>
4. In the present case, it is unlikely that the guard unit can fulfil conditions, not in the least because, according to the voluntary principles, private security should not be engaged in activities exclusively the responsibility of state military or law enforcement authorities<sup>193</sup>, which is the case in Ndolobo, since it is not covered by any privately held mining title.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>191</sup> See the section on "Diamonds and security" in chapter III about due diligence *vis-à-vis* ex-Séléka-controlled areas.


<sup>192</sup> See for full recommendations with regard to private and public security companies, see OECD, 2013, *op. cit.*, pages 22 and 23.

<sup>193</sup> See The Voluntary Principles, 2000, "The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights", p. 6, last accessed in October 2015 at: [http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/voluntary\\_principles\\_english.pdf](http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/voluntary_principles_english.pdf)

<sup>194</sup> For web map, including mining titles, see Filip Hilgert, Lotte Hoex, Steven Spittaels, Yannick Weyns, 2014, "Mapping Conflict Motives: the CAR", International Peace Information Service (IPIS), accessed on 23 October 2015 at <http://ipisresearch.be/publication/mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/>.



Annex 5.19: List of arms and ammunition handed in by Alfred Yékatom alias 'Rhombot'



Source: Photograph of the document taken by the Panel

**Annex 5.20: Security payments to anti-balaka related to exploitation of timber**

1. Personnel of the *Société d'Exploitation Forestière Centrafricaine* (SEFCA) in its main concession in Mambélé told the Panel in August 2015 that they had not faced any disturbances since the height of anti-balaka insurrection in the first half of 2014; however, they admitted to having made payments to avoid anti-balaka sabotaging operations during this time.<sup>195</sup>
2. Anti-balaka coordinator in Berbérati, 'Chiki Chiki', told the Panel that prior to his departure to Nairobi in December 2014, his group had provided protection to SEFCA premises in Berbérati, at a rate of FCFA 150,000 (USD 300) per week.<sup>196</sup>
3. Two other confidential sources to the Panel confirmed the arrangement and amount.<sup>197</sup> One of the sources was present during an anti-balaka meeting in Berbérati on 18 June 2014 on the subject.
4. SEFCA's Deputy Director told the Panel he would investigate the matter, but already explained that at the time anti-balaka forces were posing a serious threat to company personnel and assets in the company's area of operation.<sup>198</sup> In early 2015, police authorities in Berbérati put a stop to protection arrangements between anti-balaka and business operators.<sup>199</sup>

<sup>195</sup> Meeting with SEFCA personnel, Mambélé, 20 August 2015.

<sup>196</sup> Meeting with Yapélé, Berbérati 17 June 2015.

<sup>197</sup> Meeting with a civil society source present during the meeting, Berbérati, 15 June 2015; telephone interview with religious authority in Berbérati, 6 April 2015.

<sup>198</sup> Telephone conversation with SEFCA Deputy Director to follow up on the Panel's request for information, 2 November 2015.

<sup>199</sup> Meeting with Yapélé, Berbérati, 17 June 2015; Meeting with deputy police commander, Berbérati, 17 June 2015.

**Annex 6: Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze****Implementation of the assets freeze**

1. Following the listing on 9 May 2014 and on 20 August 2015 of six individuals and one associated entities subject to the travel ban and assets freeze established and maintained by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 2127 (2013), the Panel requested information about the accounts and transfers of those individuals and of known family members and associates from financial institutions operating in the Central African Republic and the region to ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources be prevented from being made available to or for the benefit of the designated individuals.
2. One financial institution, the *Banque Populaire Maroco-Centrafricaine* (BPMC), has not responded to two requests for information sent by the Panel. The lack of cooperation is reason for the Panel to put BPMC under close scrutiny in the future.
3. On 26 July 2014, a financial institution informed the Panel that François Bozizé received in Kampala USD 300 that sent by his son, Socrate Bozizé, from the French island of *La Réunion*, in the Indian Ocean. Bozizé's bank account at one financial institution in Bangui is under "no debit" instruction, as is the one of Nouredine Adam. The accounts were not credited since both individuals were listed.
4. BADICA holds accounts at three different banks in the Central African Republic. One informed the Panel that BADICA took several loans in 2010 of FCFA 2,308,548,637 (USD 4,617,274) to purchase real estate and diamonds, of which FCFA 1,596,167,726 (USD 3,192,335) is still outstanding. The real estate consists of two properties, one valued at FCFA 2,046,675,082 (USD 4,093,350) and one at FCFA 400,000,000 (USD 800,000), with a note that associated rental income should service the loan debt.
5. The Panel notes that in accordance with Security Council resolution 2196 (2015), the guidelines of the Committee, section 12 (g.ii), provide for exemption to the asset freeze in case of payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the assets freeze. However, such exemption requests have to be submitted through the State of residence or registration in case of entities.

### Violations of the travel ban

6. By paragraph 4 of resolution 2196 (2015), the Security Council decided that “all Member States shall continue to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee.” By paragraph 6 of resolution 2196 (2015), the Security Council emphasized “that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of the Central African Republic”, and observed “that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution”.
7. The majority of violations by both listed individuals took place around the organisation of the Nairobi talks from December 2014 to April 2015 at the initiative of the International Mediator with the support of the government of Kenya, thereby setting the scene for the violations.

*Photograph of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta with sanctioned individuals François Bozizé (first rank – second left) and Nourredine Adam (first rank – third right), surrounded by anti-balaka and ex-Séléka political and military commanders*



*Source: Posted on the Kenyan Presidency twitter account @StateHouseKenya on 14 April 2015 at 8:38 am.*

8. The Panel also believes that Albino Mathiem Ayuel Aboug, a South-Sudanese and US national, played a key role in the organisation of the Nairobi talks, in his capacity as Special Adviser of the Congolese President Sassou N'Guesso.<sup>200</sup> He facilitated the travels of sanctioned individuals Adam and Bozizé, which represent a designation criteria pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2196 (2015), and he was also in charge of some logistical aspects, including hotel bookings and *per diem*. Some participants also mentioned that he was suspected of having diverted part of the money for the organisation of the event.

*Albino Aboug and its appointment decree*



9. While attending the Nairobi Forum, Nourredine Adam travelled to Addis Ababa on 5 February 2015 and returned on 17 February 2015 onboard Ethiopian Airways (ET305 and ET302). The governments of Ethiopia and Kenya each received a letter from the Panel on 11 March 2015 requesting more information about Adam's trips.

<sup>200</sup> "Presidential decree number 2014-633 of 26 November 2014 appointing Albino M. Ayuel Aboug as Special Adviser of the President of the Republic of the Congo".

*Photograph of Nourredine Adam at Nairobi airport on 5 February 2015*



DOB : 01/01/1970  
 Birth Place :  
 Height :  
 Gender : Male  
 Weight :  
 Marital Status :  
 Nationality : CAF Central African Republic  
 Ethnicity :  
 Hair Color :  
 Eye Color :

**Documents**

Document Type	Document Number	Country	Issue Date	Expiration Date	Issued
	00001104	CAF Central African		09/04/2018	

*Source: Interpol*

10. Since his listing Nourredine Adam went to Chad in October 2014, (letter sent 11 December 2014), and on 21 April 2015 (letter sent 24 April 2015). He is reported to have entered the Central African territory from Chad on 8 October 2015, a few days before his troops started their march from Kaga Bandoro to Sibut where they were stopped by international forces. While travelling from Nairobi to N'Djamena, Adam transited in Cameroon on 21 April 2015. A letter was sent to the Cameroonian authorities in this regard on 28 April 2015.
11. On 28 November 2014, the Panel informed the government of South Africa about a potential travel of Bozizé to South Africa on or around 13 September 2014. On 15 October 2015 the Panel sent another letter to the government of South Africa indicating travel of Francois Bozizé to South Africa on 14 October 2015, again in violation of the travel ban.
12. On 28 November 2014, the Panel also informed the government of the DRC that Francois Bozizé was reported to have travelled to Kinshasa earlier that month. On 1 December 2014, the Panel informed the government of the Republic of Congo about the entry of Francois Bozizé in Brazzaville on 30 November 2014. On 11 December 2014, the Panel informed the government of Kenya of a reported travel of Francois Bozizé, as well as Nourredine Adam to Nairobi on or around 13 September. On 11 December 2014, the Ugandan government was informed by the

- Panel about the use of their country by Francois Bozizé as a hub for travels in the region in violation of the travel ban.
13. Between September 2014 and October 2015 the Panel sent 22 letters to a total of 10 countries and 3 entities requesting details about possible travel ban violations. One Member State provided an answer, three only acknowledged receipt, and six failed to reply at all. One entity provided an answer, while one did not reply. The lack of cooperation with the Panel reduces Member States' ability to implement the travel ban. Warnings from the Panel that Nourredine Adam was most likely traveling under a different identity, Adam Mahamat or Mahamat Adam, were not acknowledged in any response by relevant Member States.
  14. On 3 March 2015, the CAR Head of State of the transition sent a letter to the Sanctions Committee in which she called for a thorough implementation of the sanctions measures. This letter should be understood in the context of security risks linked to Member States' trivialisation of the sanctions regime, and of the credibility of sanctions and threats of sanctions to political spoilers. The Security Council Committee reacted by inviting the concerned States to a meeting with the Committee during which it solicited explanations, and released a press communiqué.
  15. Security Council resolution 2196 (2015) further enhanced the travel ban mechanism by observing that that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria. A Security Council's Presidential Statement of 20 October 2015 and the conclusions of the March 2015 meeting of the International Contact Group of the CAR, mention the intention to further apply sanctions to political spoilers and implement those on already designated individuals.

## Annex 7: Humanitarian section

1. The humanitarian situation in the CAR can be described as complex and in much need of attention. Despite all the efforts undertaken by the humanitarian community the situation remains at a critical emergency level, as witnessed by the Panel on different occasions throughout the mandate. This section will provide information on some of the key elements, as follows: acts involving sexual violence, the targeting of civilians, attacks on schools, attacks on hospitals, the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid.

### Acts involving sexual violence

2. In the course of 2015, UNFPA and humanitarian partners participating in the sub-cluster, registered 23,361 cases of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in 47 Sub-Prefectures of the Central African Republic. The data registered does not specify the type of violation, but according to the sub-cluster they include rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery and sexual exploitation.<sup>201</sup> In 2014, 6,700 cases were reported to the GBV Sub-Cluster (Gender Based Violence Sub-Cluster) in 14 Sub-Prefectures in the country. From 5 December 2013 to 31 July 2014, three of the five main partners (INGOs) that provide data to the sub cluster reported a total of 784 cases of sexual violence in the Central African Republic.<sup>202</sup> The increase in the number of reported cases, as reported by UNFPA, is explained by the fact that sub-cluster partners had more access to information and more operational capacity in 2015 as compared to 2014.<sup>203</sup> Perpetrators were not frequently recorded in the Information Management tool, but according to the information provided by UNFPA perpetrators include: unknown armed men, family members, neighbours, and unknown individuals. See below the disaggregated data provided by the sub-cluster.

*Data collected by GBVIMS members (12 international and national NGOs working in 47 sous-préfectures in the CAR) and consolidated by UNFPA between 1 January and 30 October 2015*

<sup>201</sup> Email communication from UNFPA, 22 October 2015. UNFPA also informed the Panel that this information should be published before the end of 2015.

<sup>202</sup> See Panel's 2014 final report.

<sup>203</sup> Email communication from UNFPA, *op.cit.*

	Number of incidents of sexual violence segregated by sex and age of survivors				Total						
	Men	Women	Girls	Boys							
Bangui	123	10810	6431	394	17758						
Bamingui- Bangoram	0	51	55	1	107						
Basse Kotto	0	56	41	0	97						
Haut Mbomou	0	67	44	0	111						
Haute Kotto	16	170	139	43	368						
Kemo	0	163	110	38	311						
Lobaye	0	101	73	0	174						
Mambere-Kadei	0	116	95	0	211						
Mboumou	0	126	91	0	217						
Nana Gebrizi	10	292	148	32	482						
Nana Mamabere	2	238	150	3	393						
Ombrella Mpoko	5	286	170	2	463						
Ouaka	68	552	422	167	1209						
Ouham	0	365	229	2	596						
Ouham Pende	0	145	93	0	238						
Sanga Mbaere	0	0	0	0	0						
Vakaga	28	284	226	88	626						
<b>Total</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>13822</b>	<b>8517</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>23361</b>						
Number of incidents of sexual violence segregated by number and kind of perpetrators											
ALLEGGED PERPETATORS	Armed med (this category includes: parties to the conflict, non-identified armed youth, state security forces and peacekeepers)					Civilians					Tot
	PREFECTURES	1	2	3	More than 3	Total	1	2	3	3	
Bangui	7925	21 02	10 47	1535	12609	48 13	148	93	95	514 9	17758
Bamingui Bangoran	54	12	9	7	82	14	4	3	4	25	107
Basse Kotto	21	14	18	16	69	23	2	3	0	28	97
Haut Mbomou	41	10	15	19	85	16	4	6	0	26	111
Haute Kotto	123	28	66	90	307	31	0	21	9	61	368
Kémo	52	50	57	68	227	34	22	15	13	84	311
Lobaye	46	18	33	26	123	23	16	12	0	51	174
Mambéré Kadéï	54	24	27	45	150	36	16	9	0	61	211
Mboumou	38	26	33	54	151	42	18	6	0	66	217
Nana Grébizi	119	32	51	79	281	10 6	74	21	0	201	482
Nana Mambéré	102	62	45	69	278	81	26	3	5	115	393
Ombella M'Poko	86	16	54	91	247	99	58	33	26	216	463
Ouaka	327	88	13 2	237	784	16 2	142	72	49	425	1209
Ouham	124	64	42	51	281	16 5	56	87	7	315	596
Ouham Pendé	93	8	27	21	149	74	12	3	0	89	238
Sangha Mbaéré	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vakaga	273	72	36	61	442	14 2	24	12	6	184	626
<b>TOTAL/TYPES AUTEURS</b>	<b>9478</b>	<b>26 26</b>	<b>16 92</b>	<b>2469</b>	<b>16265</b>	<b>58 61</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>39 9</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>709 6</b>	<b>23361</b>

3. In the course of 2015, confidential sources reported a total of 23 cases in which minors were victims of sexual violence that resulted in 26 victims of rape, namely, 25 females and one male.<sup>204</sup> Out of the 23 cases, anti-balaka elements were responsible for 12 of the incidents reported; two were committed by LRA elements; six by ex-Séléka – UPC faction elements, and three by unidentified individuals. These 23 cases are to be considered as a small sample of the GBV situation in the country but not as a representative sample of what is happening in the entire country. The cases were investigated in detail, and this is not the case for all sexual and gender based violence in the CAR. Illustrated below are details of cases where perpetrators were identified.

*Details of anti-balaka cases where perpetrators were identified*<sup>205</sup>

4. On 25 March 2015, a 12-year-old girl who was going to the farm with her parents at 10 kilometres from the village Pama was kidnapped by “Songole”, an anti-balaka element from Boda in Lobaye province who forced her into his house and raped her. The parents informed the gendarmerie who arrested him and transferred him to Bangui for trial, he escaped on 28 September 2015 from Ngaragba prison in Bangui. The girl was referred for medical treatment.<sup>206</sup>
5. On 15 May 2015, a 14-year-old girl was raped by an anti-balaka element known as Salomon Depara, affiliated to the Comzone Gaetan Boade, in Kidjigra area, Bambari. The incident happened at around 20:00 hours, while the girl was returning home from her brother’s place. She was forced to follow five men to the house of the alleged perpetrator who held her by force and raped her. He reportedly tried to give the victim FCFA 5,000 afterwards, which she refused. The victim received medical support on 22 May 2015 and psychosocial assistance on 29 May 2015. No complaint was filed to judicial authorities.<sup>207</sup>

*Details of LRA cases where perpetrators were identified:*

6. On 8 February, a 15-year-old girl was kidnapped by an LRA group in the village of Morabanda, along with other children. The girl was used to carry goods, conduct domestic work, and she was raped on numerous occasions by an LRA element called Samuel. The perpetrator apparently told her several times that the sexual intercourse was to prepare her for her future wedding. The girl managed to

<sup>204</sup> Confidential report, 22 September 2015.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*

escape in July 2015. The victim received medical treatment and had returned to her family at the time of writing of this report.<sup>208</sup>

7. On February 2015, a 14-year-old girl was abducted along with two of her brothers by armed men suspected to be members of the LRA in the village of Wago, 70 kilometres from Bria on the Bria-Yalinga axis. She reported that on several occasions, she was repeatedly raped by one of the armed group leaders called Moufoulanga. The victim received medical attention after her escape.<sup>209</sup>

*Details of UPC cases where perpetrators were identified*

8. Six of the 23 reported cases of rape were allegedly committed by UPC elements in the Ouaka province.<sup>210</sup> In three cases the perpetrators were not identified. The following cases have identified perpetrators:
  9. On 3 March 2015, a 13-year-old girl resident in Boubala, situated 23 kilometres on the Kouango-Lioto axis was raped by Colonel Abdourahmane Mahmat alias "Sirongo" of the ex-Séléka faction of UPC. The perpetrator claimed to confidential sources that he wanted to marry the victim, but later abandoned her. Later in April 2015 the same Colonel "Sirongo" was accused of raping a 16-year-old girl in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district of Kouango. No judicial action has been taken against the perpetrator for any of the cases at the time of writing.<sup>211</sup>
  10. On 15 April 2015, a 13-year-old girl from the village of Ngakabo, approximately 60 kilometres on the Bambari-Bangassou axis, was raped by the local zone commander of the ex-Séléka UPC faction of Ngakobo. The victim is a fruit vendor and the local zone commander under the pretext of wanting to buy her fruits, lured and raped her. The incident was not reported to the police and the name of the perpetrator was not available at the time of writing. The victim received medical attention.<sup>212</sup>
  11. On 19 April 2015, a 12-year-old girl was raped in the village of Gandjia by Aroune Agoudji, the local commander of the ex-Séléka, UPC faction. The perpetrator forced the victim into marriage and is currently living with her in Lioto village located 45 kilometres on the Kouango-Grimari axis. No judicial action has been taken against the perpetrator at the time of writing.<sup>213</sup>

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*; Panel of Experts Database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>209</sup> Confidential report, *op.cit.*; Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>210</sup> Confidential report, *op.cit.*

<sup>211</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>212</sup> Confidential source, obtained by the Panel on 22 September 2015; Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>213</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

### Targeting of civilians

12. In the course of 2015 the Panel continued to monitor the killings of civilians throughout the country based on credible reports from different sources that include UN, NGOs, civil society and investigations undertaken by Panel members in the field. Since 5 December 2013 until 15 November 2015, a total of 4,278 civilians have been killed in the context of the conflict. The grand majority of these took place in 2013 during the peak of violence in Bangui where more than 1,200 civilians were reported to be killed in the month of December.<sup>214</sup> The Panel has registered 723 civilians killed since 1 January 2015 until 15 November 2015.<sup>215</sup> This does not include the killings reported during the recent escalation of violence in Bangui, which started on 26 September.
13. According to the Panel's database, the escalation of violence in Bangui from 26 September 2015 until 16 October 2015 resulted in the death of 79 people and 512 wounded.<sup>216</sup>

### Attacks on schools and misuse of education facilities<sup>217</sup>

14. In the course of 2015 the Panel has been monitoring incidents where unlawful activities have taken place in schools in the Central African Republic or where schools and students were victims of violence.<sup>218</sup> Additionally, this section will also touch on information concerning MINUSCA's occupation of two schools. The Panel and other organizations continue to point out that MINUSCA forces have been occupying one school since 2014 and no solution to move these forces from these schools has been agreed on.
15. On 13 February 2015, around 19:00 hours, in Bangui, an IOM national staff on his way to his residence in Gobongo was stopped by 10 anti-balaka elements. One of them forced the staff onto a motorbike with two other anti-balaka elements. The perpetrators took the victim to a school in Gobongo where they stole a VHF radio, one laptop and a camera. The individual was released unharmed at 20:00 hours.<sup>219</sup>
16. On 6 March 2015 in Bobazi village (east of Batangafo, Ouham Province), a group

<sup>214</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> OCHA Central African Republic, Flash Update 8, 16 October 2015. Accessed on 23 October 2015 at [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65f95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65f95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)

<sup>217</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> Confidential source, 17 February 2015.

of anti-balaka elements from Batangafo pillaged the Bobazi primary school. An INGO had provided support to this school since 2013. On the day of the incident, armed anti-balaka elements robbed the zinc sheets from the school's roof leaving the building exposed to the elements. No further damages or casualties were reported. It should be noted that most of the population in the village had been displaced to Batangafo IDP sites due to the fragile security situation in the area.<sup>220</sup>

17. On 13 May 2015, around 14:30 hours, in Batangafo, six staff of an INGO were attacked by anti-balaka elements and an angry mob during a food distribution at the IDPs school Bagga. Despite the fact that the INGO staff tried to explain that they were conducting humanitarian assistance activities, the attackers wounded two of the staff present prompting the INGO to stop its activities.<sup>221</sup>
18. On 14 May 2015, in Bambari, an attempted murder of a student by a group of armed men created panic among the other students of a mixed high school. The armed elements were identified as relatives of ex-Séléka UPC elements.<sup>222</sup>
19. On 3 June 2015, around 10:00 hours, in the 4<sup>th</sup> arrondissement of the Boy-Rabe area of Bangui, MINUSCA elements were attempting to arrest an anti-balaka who had stolen two vehicles in the past weeks. MINUSCA recovered one of the stolen vehicles and on the way back, around Lycée Barthelemy Boganda the patrol fell into an ambush set up by anti-balaka armed elements. In violation of international law, anti-balaka elements from the Maxime Mokom faction,<sup>223</sup> led by Guy Mazimbélet<sup>224</sup> used the school as a theatre of operations to attack peacekeepers putting in danger the life of students who were attending school at the time of events. Guy Mazimbélet was killed on 28 September 2015 during the escalation of violence in Bangui.<sup>225</sup> According to Watchlist International "anti-balaka members allegedly used students as human shields during fighting with MINUSCA troops".<sup>226</sup> During the incident two peacekeepers were wounded. The gunshots caused panic among the students who fled the scene. 85 children were transferred to four different hospitals for medical attention. Most of them sustained minor injuries from the scuffles that ensued. Some witnesses stated that

<sup>220</sup> Email communication with CAR Education Sub-Cluster on 22 August 2015. Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived with the United Nations. Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>221</sup> Confidential source, 20 May 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>222</sup> Confidential report 16 May 2015.

<sup>223</sup> List of AB Zone Commanders of Maxime Mokom faction provided by Military Chief of Staff on 6 July 2015 in Bangui; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>224</sup> Telephone interview on 22 September 2015 with an eyewitness present at the time of the event and confidential source, 22 September 2015, Bangui.

<sup>225</sup> Confidential source, 28 September 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>226</sup> Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report "Vulnerable Students, Unsafe Schools: Attacks and Military Use of Schools in the Central African Republic", September 10, 2015, on 24 October 2015, at: <http://watchlist.org/vulnerable-students-unsafe-schools-attacks-and-military-use-of-schools-in-the-central-african-republic/>

the anti-balaka deliberately put the children in danger by choosing the site across from the schoolyard for their ambush. The number of casualties on the anti-balaka side remains unknown.<sup>227</sup>

20. On 5 June 2015, around 22:00 hours, in Bria, five individuals, two armed with AK47s and three with machetes, assaulted a garage's guard. The attackers put a mask on his face and took him to the Mbramake schoolyard, where the victim was beaten and sustained a wound on the arm. The attackers then left the scene and the local population took the victim to the hospital. The local police opened an investigation, however, at the time of writing no results have been reported from the investigation.<sup>228</sup>
21. On 25 June 2015, around 20:00 hours, in Bangui, the headmaster of the Boganda high school reported a robbery in his office by a group of six armed individuals. They stole some education and teaching materials. No casualties were reported.<sup>229</sup>
22. On 8 July 2015, in Bongbagalo and Mbagolo (east of Bambari, Ouaka Province) UPC elements continued to raise barriers in front of two Health Centres. The barriers dissuade the community from receiving health care. Moreover, UPC elements have also occupied a nursery school and a youth centre in Ngadza (Bambari-Kouango axis) preventing humanitarian actors and the local community from using these buildings.<sup>230</sup>

*Occupied school by MINUSCA forces:*

23. In Bangui's 3<sup>rd</sup> district, MINUSCA police officers have been based in the primary public school of Koudoukou since 2014.<sup>231</sup> The education sub-cluster last update was on 31 August 2015 and at the time of writing of the report the school in Bangui was still being used by MINUSCA Police Officers.<sup>232</sup> It is important that the mission ceases the occupation of these schools and finds other locations as bases without ceasing to provide protection in the area.

<sup>227</sup> Confidential source, 3 June 2015; confidential source, 4 June 2015; Confidential report, 5 June 2015; confidential source, 5 June 2015; confidential source, 1 to 5 June 2015; confidential source, 2-8 June 2015. MINUSCA Press Release, "La MINUSCA condamne fermement l'attaque contre les casques bleus à Bangui", June 5, 2015, accessed on 23 October 2015 at: <http://minusca.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=aktXwA:9mmk%3D&tabid=5620&mid=9622&language=fr-FR> ; Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report "Vulnerable Students, Unsafe Schools: Attacks and Military Use of Schools in the Central African Republic". September 10, 2015; accessed on 24 October 2015 at: <http://watchlist.org/vulnerable-students-unsafe-schools-attacks-and-military-use-of-schools-in-the-central-african-republic/>

<sup>228</sup> Confidential source, 8 June 2015; confidential source, 5 to 12 June 2015. Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>229</sup> Confidential source, 29 June 2015. Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>230</sup> Confidential report 9 July 2015; confidential source, 9 July 2015. Archived with the United Nations.

<sup>231</sup> Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived with the United Nations. Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict 2015 Report, *op. cit.*

<sup>232</sup> Email communication with CAR Education Sub-Cluster in August 2015. Sub-Cluster Education RCA - Attaques contre l'éducation - Database - Document archived with the United Nations. Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations. Email communication with Bangui UN staff who confirmed that Bangui school was still being used at the time of writing of this report.

### Attacks on hospitals

24. Between 1 February and 30 September 2015 the Panel recorded six (6) incidents in which medical staff, operations or facilities were affected by violence in the Central African Republic.<sup>233</sup> They are as follows:
- a. On 17 February 2015, in Bambari, UPC elements forcefully entered Bambari hospital and fired several shots in the air. The possible reasons for the assault include the intimidation of local anti-balaka elements and of wounded Christians from the previous day's inter-communal violence. No casualties were reported.<sup>234</sup>
  - b. On 26 February 2015, around 20:00 hours, in the village of Bomo, 6 kilometres east of Bria two unidentified armed men forcefully entered the INGO run hospital and stole medication and money.<sup>235</sup>
  - c. On 5 March 2015, in Bouar, the WHO Bouar office chief noticed the theft of all the WFP items that were stored in a shop at the Bouar's hospital. An investigation has been opened by the gendarmerie but no results had been rendered by the time of writing this report.<sup>236</sup>
  - d. On 15 March 2015, during the night, in Bambari, the manager of Bambari's provincial hospital was kidnapped by three anti-balaka elements. His body was found the next day. The perpetrators are on the run. The incident led to a 48 hours strike by the hospital staff.<sup>237</sup>
  - e. On 3 July 2015, on the Baboua-Beloko axis, unidentified individuals attacked an ambulance transporting two Cameroonian peacekeepers wounded on 1 July in Yagbet village. No casualties were reported. The victims were transported to MINUSCA's hospital in Bangui on 4 July.<sup>238</sup>
  - f. On 12 July 2015, in Ndélé, during the night, family members of a patient who died in a hospital run by an INGO attacked the hospital staff. No major injuries were reported. The incident was apparently linked to the break-in the same night in the compound of the INGO that runs the hospital.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>233</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>234</sup> Confidential source, 17 February 2015; confidential source, 18 February 2015.

<sup>235</sup> Confidential source, 27 February 2015; confidential source, 2 March 2015.

<sup>236</sup> Confidential source, 2 to 9 March 2015.

<sup>237</sup> Confidential source, 17 March 2015.

<sup>238</sup> Confidential source, 6 July 2015; UN Report, 8 July 2015; confidential source, 3 to 10 July 2015.

<sup>239</sup> Confidential source, 14 July 2015; confidential source, 10 to 17 July 2015.

### Recruiting or use of children in armed conflict in the CAR

25. The use of children in armed conflict in the Central African Republic remains a serious violation of international law by all parties to the conflict. Although the Panel did not receive any reliable and credible information of new recruitment of children by any of the armed groups in the country, the Panel found that the use of children is widespread throughout the country. Progress has been made in terms of identification, demobilization and reintegration into civilian life of many children, but much more has to be done.
26. In 2014, UNICEF announced that they had identified around 6,000 children in the Central African Republic associated with armed groups.<sup>240</sup> Since then, two public events of demobilization of children associated with armed groups, led by UNICEF, have taken place in the Central African Republic, one in May 2015 in Bambari, Ouaka Province and the second and most recent in Batangafo, Ouham Province, in August 2015.<sup>241</sup> Demobilized children belong to both ex-Séléka factions and anti-balaka groups.
27. In May 2015, the Panel visited Bambari and conducted extensive interviews with demobilized children and with different stakeholders related to the identification, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers.<sup>242</sup> The Panel found that at least 50% of the minors demobilized were former combatants<sup>243</sup> (according to information obtained from the UNICEF implementing partners' database and interviews conducted by the Panel in Bambari), the other 50% were involved in other activities that include messengers, manning checkpoints, personal assistants, cleaning, cooking, and general support services for the troops. The Panel did not register sexual violence cases during interviews however it is plausible that there were such cases.
28. In the course of its investigations the Panel has identified military commanders of different armed groups, who continue to be active in different parts of the country, who also released children from their ranks for demobilization. These include: anti-balaka commanders in Bambari, Gaëtan Bouadé (see chapter IV Central

<sup>240</sup> UN News Centre, "Central African Republic: over 6,000 child soldiers may have been involved in fighting, UN says", 17 January 2014. Accessed on 27 October 2015 at <https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46954&Cr=central+african+republic&Cr1=#>

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.* and UNICEF Press Centre, "New release of children by armed group in the Central African Republic brings total to more than 600 since May", 28 August 2015. Accessed on 27 October 2015 at: [http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_83024.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_83024.html)

<sup>242</sup> Mission to Bambari from 20-23 May 2015.

<sup>243</sup> For this report the Panel considers that child combatants are those children who are / were armed and took part in combats, not those who undertake "support" functions.

Region) and “Tchenenguere”<sup>244</sup> and Séléka commanders: General Ali Darrassa Mahamat (see chapter IV Central Region), Colonel “Zakaria”, Colonel Bourma (see chapter II Northern region and border with Chad), General “Tarzan” (see chapter IV Central Region), Ahamat Mahadi Grégoire (see chapter II Northern region and border with Chad), Tidjani Karan, Issa Issaka Oubin (see chapter III Eastern region and border with Sudan and South Sudan), Amos Nadre, Deya Issaka and Sallet Djouma.<sup>245</sup>

29. According to information collected by the Panel, one of the main problems that the demobilization process of children is facing is the lack of medium and long-term strategies for re-integration. Some of the demobilized children have families and want to go back to school but the grand majority (especially those who have lost all their family and are closer to the age of 18) want to work, and be trained to undertake activities that can bring them some income. At the moment of writing of this report the Panel had not received any information from UNICEF in relation to programmes set in place for such projects.
30. Additionally, the Panel throughout the missions undertaken in the course of the 2015 mandate had seen minors on three different occasions within the ranks of different Séléka factions, particularly FPRC and UPC.

*Photograph of FPRC camp in Ndjamassinda  
taken by the Panel on 24 September 2015*



<sup>244</sup> Anti-balaka zone commander in Mandayeba, north of Bambari, Ouaka Province, information obtained by the Panel indicated that he is under command of Gaétan Bouadé.

<sup>245</sup> Mission to Bambari from 20 to 23 May 2015; interviews conducted with demobilized children in different transit sites and with NGOs and INGOs providing support and assistance to these children.

*Photograph of FPRC child soldier named Djamal Seyssil taken by the Panel in Tiri on 24 September 2015*





*Photograph of UPC child soldier under command of General Colonel Abdourahmane Mahmat alias "Sirongo" taken by the Panel in Kouango on 16 April 2015*



31. According to the last update that the Panel received from UNICEF, on 27 October 2015 "the total number of children released in 2015 is 2,209 (1,719 boys and 490 girls, or 22%). This figure includes 148 children who had release ceremonies on 26 October 2015. In 2014, 2,807 children were released (including 646 girls, or

23%). Thus, the total combined number of children released thus far is 5,016 children, or 83% of the estimate of 6,000 children, or 50% of the estimate of 10,000 children. With the 2,209 children released thus far this year, we have reached 63% of our target of 3,500 children for 2015. With another 1,479 children already identified for release of which 250 are in Lobaye, 1,000 in Ouham and Ouham Pende, 150 in Bangui and 79 in Ex-Seleka groups, we are on track to reach our target by 31 December".<sup>246</sup>



<sup>246</sup> Email communication with UNICEF CAR on 27 October 2015.

**Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to CAR, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in CAR**

32. From 5 December 2013 until 30 September 2015, the Panel has registered 482 incidents against humanitarian operations, workers and organizations.<sup>247</sup> This count does not include the incidents registered during the escalation of violence in Bangui from September-October 2015 (this will be addressed separately). The 482 incidents resulted in a total of 27 aid workers killed, 74 injured and an undetermined amount of money and goods looted (humanitarian aid material, office and personal properties).<sup>248</sup>
33. Since 1 February 2015 until 30 September 2015, 142 incidents were reported. The grand majority of incidents were reported to have taken place in Bangui (42) followed by incidents reported in the province of Ouham (35), this tendency of high levels of incidents in Bangui and in the above-mentioned province is normal due to the fact that this is where the majority of humanitarian workers and organizations are present. During the same period, two aid workers (CAR nationals) and one contracted driver have been killed in three different incidents.<sup>249</sup>

*Attacks against humanitarians that resulted in the death of aid workers or civilians associated with humanitarian operations*

34. A case study on the killing of an aid worker in Bambari on 15 March 2015 is included in **annex 2.7**.
35. On 18 July 2015, in Lokoti village, BANBAT reported that armed elements, allegedly FDPC, fired on two WFP trucks within a commercial convoy on MSR 1 travelling from Béloko to Bouar at Lokoti Bangui village, located at 28 kilometres from Baboua. The WFP truck with license plate LTTR 285AJ rolled off the road killing the driver and injuring the passenger. The BANBAT escort conducted a search operation but did not locate the criminals. MINUSCA also assisted the injured with first aid before transporting him to the hospital.<sup>250</sup>
36. On 23 July 2015, in Korakouri village, the Regional Protection Cluster reported the killing of a national INGO staff by alleged anti-balaka elements. MINUSCA Force confirmed the incident on 28 July 2015. The victim was robbed on his way

<sup>247</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

<sup>248</sup> As per practice of the Panel killings of aid workers have been counted without consideration whether targeted individuals were on duty or not. In the incidents documented in this report drivers and assistants who were carrying humanitarian aid goods have been considered as humanitarian victims since they were part of a humanitarian operation.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*

to Bossangoa, then killed and beheaded. According to available reports the murder might have been triggered by the fact that the deceased had reported a robbery by the same anti-balaka elements to the group's hierarchy on 21 July 2015, following which the perpetrators had been punished. At the moment of writing no judicial action had been taken.<sup>251</sup>

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<sup>251</sup> Panel of Experts database, accessed on 23 October 2015; archived with the United Nations.

**Annex 8: Outreach and cooperation with stakeholders and organizations**

1. The Chair of the Committee, Her Excellency Ms. Raimonda Murmokaitė, undertook a visit to the CAR from 25 to 28 August 2015, where she met the transitional authorities, including the Head of State, the Prime Minister and some key ministers, including those of Defence and National Security, MINUSCA senior management, members of the diplomatic community and of the civil society. The Chair also undertook a field mission to Berbérati (Mambéré-Kadeï), to visit a diamond mine site and meet with local authorities, representatives of civil society and the mining sector.
2. The Panel would like to highlight again the excellent level of cooperation with the transitional authorities of the CAR, and more particularly with the Presidency and the former Defence Ministry, Her Excellency Marie-Noëlle Koyara. In addition, the Panel would like to express gratitude for the cooperation of the newly appointed permanent secretary of the Kimberley Process in the CAR.
3. The Panel receives valuable support from MINUSCA, which provided logistics (air and road transportation) and security, including armed escorts and armoured vehicles when required. The Panel had also an excellent cooperation with Sangaris, EUMAM, and the AU/RTF, the last of which also provided valuable information and logistical support in its area of operations. In general, the Panel has continued to develop and maintain effective cooperation with a large range of international actors, companies, individuals and organisations.
4. The Panel transmitted a total of 81 official correspondences to States, organisations and private entities, and has received 35 replies to date that provided the information requested, while 14 requests are still pending. However, the absence of reply from most of CAR neighbouring States or regional institutions, such as the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), is of particular concern to the Panel.
5. See the table below for more details:

Country/ Other Entity	Number of letters sent	Requested information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending *
Angola	2	2			
Asky Airlines cc PM Togo	2	1		1	
ARMSCOR	1				1
AZUR	1	1			
BADICA	1	1			
BCBA	1				1
BEAC	2			2	
Bénin	1				1
BIA	1	1			
BPMC	2			2	
BVI	1				1
BSIC	1				1
Cameroon	4		1	2	1
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority	1			1	
CBCA	2	2			
Central African Republic	1	1			
Chad	3		1	2	
China	2				2
COFREXPORT	1	1			
Dominican Republic	1			1	
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3	1		2	
Ecobank	2	2			
Ethiopia	1			1	
Ethiopian Airlines	1			1	
EUROFOR	1	1			
Eurodistribution	1				1
France	2	2			
Groupe Marck	1	1			
Guermesey	1	1			
Israel	1	1			
IWI	2	2			
Jersey	1	1			
Kenya Airways	2			2	
Kenya	2			2	

Luxembourg	1	1			
MagForce	1	1			
MINUSCA	2			2	
MIXJET	1	1			
Nobel Sport	1	1			
Panama	1			1	
Poland	1			1	
Reya	1	1			
Republic of the Congo	2	1		1	
Singapore	1	1			
SODIAM	1	1			
South Africa	4	1	1		2
SUD-AZUR	1	1			
Sudan	1			1	
Switzerland	2	1			1
Tanzania	1			1	
TELECEL	1				1
UAE	2	1			1
UBAF	1				1
Uganda	2			2	
Western Union	1	1			
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>14</b>

\* A request pending indicates that the Member State or the entity indicated in a communication to the Secretariat of the Committee that a response to the Panel's request of information is forthcoming.

**Annex 9: Additional information and references**

1. The previous significant escalation of violence in the CAR also took place predominantly in Bangui from 8 to 17 October 2014.
2. Confidential report, 6 October 2015; INGO confidential document compiling incidents suffered by INGOs in Bangui, 20 October 2015, archived with the United Nations; OCHA, 2015, "CAR, Flash Update 8", accessed on 24 October 2015 at [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash\\_update\\_8.pdf](https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ec65ff95b00a3e0f330508b82/files/flash_update_8.pdf)
3. In its 2014 interim report, the Panel described the political culture of the CAR as characterized by violence utilized as a means to access power. With very few exceptions, this culture shapes the behaviour of most of the political elite and non-state armed groups' leaders. The Panel also noted that every time the Transition Government political actors put a political offer on the table, armed groups' leaders engaged in a fierce fight for representation. This was the case with the Brazzaville and Bangui Forums and is the case with the on-going perspective of elections.
4. Despite their tight control of vast parts of the territory, in which some of them have set up parallel administrations, armed groups still consider the control of Bangui as the last stage of political domination.
5. Transitional institutions are comprised of all organs of the political transition, including: the transitional Government, the Transitional National Council (TNC) and the transitional Constitutional Court. Divergences between the Executive and the Legislative branches have sometimes been expressed publicly, exposing personal rivalries between individuals of the two organs.
6. This includes the electoral law, the draft constitution as well as the decision by the transitional Constitutional Court about the conditions for eligibility in upcoming elections.
7. This was reflected among others in the share of delegates allocated to each delegation to the Forum. The RPRC got 11 out of 25 seats assigned to the ex-Séléka, yet the RPRC does not represent the biggest military threat posed by the ex-Séléka. As a consequence, Ngaïssona and Djono Ahaba were appointed as sole representatives of armed groups within the Follow-up Committee of the Forum. This structure has since its inception on 23 May 2015 hardly been operational.

8. Armed groups considered by the government as radical are: Nourredine Adam's FPRC, Abdoulaye Miskine's FDPC, Ali Darrassa Mahamat's UPC, al-Khatim's MPC and Abakar Sabone's MLJC, and some specific factions of the anti-balaka, in particular the group of Eugène Ngaïkosset. This information is based on meetings in Bangui with government Ministers and Minister-Counsellors at the presidency between July and September 2015.
9. On 9 October 2015, a MINUSCA delegation met with Nourredine Adam in Kaga Bandoro. Nourredine Adam reiterated his call for a third transition and explained why the country's partition should still be considered as a last resort to ensure the security of Muslims in the CAR; Confidential communication, 10 October 2015.
10. Meeting between ECCAS' envoy and Nourredine Adam happened on 14 October 2015; email communication from two confidential sources, 14 and 16 October 2015; according to media sources members of the Group of Eight discreetly met with Nourredine Adam on 14 October 2015. RFI, 2015, "En RCA, l'ex-Seleka Nouredine Adam revient dans le jeu", accessed on 25 October 2015 at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151015-rca-ex-seleka-noureddine-adam-revient-le-jeu>; and Vincent Duhem, 2015, « Nouredine Adam, le seigneur de guerre de l'ex-Séléka, est de retour en Centrafrique », Jeune Afrique, 14 October 2015, accessed on 25 October 2015 at : <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/271737/politique/centrafrique-faut-craindre-retour-seigneur-de-guerre-noureddine-adam/>
11. The information included in the table was provided to the Panel by a confidential source who was in Nairobi, during two meetings in Bangui on 20 April and 24 June 2015.  
A photograph of the two delegations with President Kenyatta is included in annex 6.  
The Panel also met with the following Nairobi participants:
  - The Panel met with former President Bozizé, 'Jojo' and his lawyer in Entebbe, Uganda, on 6 June 2014; during the meeting, General Bozizé denied commanding the anti-balaka in the CAR, stating that the fact that a number of anti-balaka leaders are family-related – including his son Teddy – or closed to him does not imply that he is coordinating anti-balaka operations. This position was reiterated to the Panel during meetings with Bozizé's lawyer in Paris on 30 June 2014 and 4 September 2015.
  - The Panel met with Abel Balenguélé in Bangui on 5 May 2015.
  - The Panel met with Azounou in Bangui on 6 July 2015.

- The Panel met with Sylvain Béorofei, Michel Bello and Adamou Ndalé in Bangui on 15 April 2015; Gobéré is a small village located between Bozoum and Bossangoa.

- The Panel met with 'Chiki Chiki' in Berbérati on 17 June 2015; he admitted being part of Mokom's organisation.

Based on its listing of names of anti-balaka, the Panel considers that Rodrigue could be identified most likely as Rodrigue Yangbanga alias Yagbanga (Mokom's Secretary-General, now in Yakéché area, between Grimari and Bambari). Another three people named 'Rodrigue' are in the Panel's listing: Rodrigue Bagaza, zone Commander from the *sous-préfecture* of Mala (Kémo province), Rodrigue Banafeï, zone Commander from Bossemptélé and Rodrigue Feïkoumon (anti-balaka Bangui).

12. Born on 30 January 1968, Haroun Gaye presents himself as a businessman, who would own two trucks transporting commercial goods to Bangui, and as a diamond dealer, who had to flee the west following anti-balaka attacks. He has been involved directly or indirectly in most of the incidents in the PK5 neighbourhood since the beginning of the Panel's mandate on 5 December 2013.
13. Born on 4 March 1979, appointed as FPRC *Chargé de Mission Logistique* by Nouredine Adam in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2015; his brother's name is Moussa. The Panel met with the Tidjani's brothers on 20 August 2014.
14. In a particular incident, Ahmadou Roufaï, Second Counselor of the Mayor of Bangui 3<sup>rd</sup> district, reported to local media that he had been beaten by Haroun Gaye during the opening ceremony of the electoral registration office on 26 June 2015, in presence of the head of MINUSCA, General Gaye, and the French Ambassador to the CAR, Charles Malinas. Radio Ndeke Luka, 2015, "Boycott du lancement officiel des opérations électorales à Bangui", 26 June 2015, accessed 28 October 2015 at <http://www.radiondekeluka.org/politique/item/22347-boycott-du-lancement-officiel-des-op%C3%A9rations-%C3%A9lectorales-%C3%A0-bangui.html>
15. Born on 11 March 1974; according to an US-based research organization, Mahamat Nour Binyamine is a resident of Philadelphia. He was in Bangui at the time of writing.
16. At the same of writing, only anti-balaka military commander 'Andjilo' is jailed at Camp de Roux, although his brother took over his group and operations in

Bangui-Damara axis, as well as Bouca and Batangafo area; see below chapter II on central region for more details.

17. Didacien Blaise Kossimatchi is the former President of the *Mouvement pour l'Unité, la Paix et la Sécurité* (MUPS) which was established to mobilize youth to support Bozizé's political campaign during his regime; he also presented himself as an anti-balaka leader, together with Yvon Konaté, to foreign journalist on 11 January 2014; Xinhua, 2015, "Centrafrique: les anti-Balakas "soulagés" par la démission de Djotodia et Tiangaye", 11 January 2014, accessed on 27 October 2015 at [http://french.xinhuanet.com/2014-01/11/c\\_133037088.htm](http://french.xinhuanet.com/2014-01/11/c_133037088.htm)
18. Baron Clotaire Adramane was part of the anti-balaka delegation conducted by Joachim Kokaté and Maxime Mokom during the discussions in Nairobi; Adramane has been also associated since 2003 with Kossimatchi in youth movement in support of Bozizé.
19. Several National Councillors told the Panel in August 2015 that this was an unacceptable interference in national affairs of CAR by the international community, which they suspect of favouring some presidential candidates by pressing for a refugees' vote. UNHCR estimated the number of CAR refugees scattered between Cameroon, Chad, the DRC and the Republic of Congo at about 460,000 out of which 120,000 are of voting age. A substantial amount of these refugees are said to be Muslims.
20. During the Bangui Forum, former Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye requested the delegates to make a recommendation allowing former members of transition governments to run for presidential and legislative elections. The call was rejected by the Forum but has sparked a debate, which only ended with the Court's decision recalling Article 106 of the Transition National Charter.
21. Among these actors are important political figures like former Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye but also rather electorally less relevant personalities like Joseph Bendouga and Crépin Mboli-Ngoumba, both former ministers under Djotodia.
22. The *Concertation élargie des plateformes, partis et associations politiques et personnalités politiques indépendantes* has been the most vocal advocate of a third transition and among the most virulent voices against elections and the role of international forces.

23. The Panel has often reported on the rivalry between the President of the TNC and the Executive. In official statements and media interviews the TNC President often behaved like an opposition leader whose role was to expose the government's weaknesses: see for example the statement in an interview with Jeune Afrique "*La transition n'a que trop duré. Elle a été menée avec inexpérience, c'est un fait*", Dorothee Thienot, 2015, « Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet : « La Centrafrique ne dispose même pas d'un fichier électoral! » ; Jeune Afrique, 10 September 2015, accessed on 26 October 2015 at : <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/262343/politique/alexandre-ferdinand-nguendet-la-centrafrique-ne-dispose-meme-pas-dun-fichier-electoral/>.
24. Gervais Lakosso is a well-known figure, i.e. a singer who was appointed to the TNC as a civil-society representative. His newly-created civil-society platform, *Le temps de Béafrîka*, aims to find internal solutions to the crisis in the CAR. He led a campaign last year against Chadian troops deployed in the CAR and believes that only the FACA can restore order in the country.
25. Several TNC sources told the Panel that the TNC President lobbied various TNC members to vote against the refugees' vote while he was publicly advocating for their participation in the elections. The TNC President was one of the candidates to the succession of former Transition President Michel Djotodia in January 2014.
26. The Panel has requested for the support of the Chinese authorities for the identification of type 56-2 assault rifles belonging to two particular production lots – Factory 66 lot marked with serial number "120XXXXXX" (120 followed by five digits) and the Factory 313 lot marked with serial number "37XXXXXX" (37 followed with five additional digits). Type 56-2 assault rifles belonging to both production lots circulate in high number in the CAR (request for 38 arms belonging to serial number 37XXXXXX and 51 arms belonging to serial number 120XXXXXX, even if they are not part of the authorized exports to the CAR, as documented in annexe 45 of the Panel's 2014 final report. The Panel has requested for the support of ARMSCOR (South Africa) for the identification of nine Vector R4 assault rifles - seven marked with serial number "79XXXXA1" (79 followed by 4 digits and closing with A1) and two marked with serial number "71XXXXX1" (71 followed by 5 digits and closing with 1).
27. A large amount of seized hunting ammunition in Bria was seized on 9 March 2015 and sealed in bags to be sent to the SRI in Bangui for the judicial procedure. On 6 July 2015, the Panel was informed at the SRI that the bags never arrived.

28. This analysis is shared by The Halo Trust, as mentioned on its website: The Halo Trust, 2015, "Physical Security & Stockpile Management (PSSM) is the organization of ammunition and weapons into safe and secure storage areas." Accessed on 28 October 2015 at: <http://www.halotrust.org/what-we-do/physical-security-and-stockpile-management>; and by Cédric Poitevin, 2015, « Contrôle des transferts d'armes en Afrique Subsaharienne », GRIP, 24 August 2015, accessed on 28 October 2015 at <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1811>, and Claudio Gramizzi, 2014 « Le traçage des armes sur les lieux de conflits », Rapport du GRIP, 20 October 2014, accessed on 28 October 2015 at <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1391>; see also recommendations "h" and "i" in paragraph 256
29. For the information on the identification, recording, tracing of weapons and arms management, see Conflict Armament Research website at <http://www.conflictarm.com/>, and the Small Arms Survey website at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/>
30. If the same report indicates that "several mass grave sites" were also located in the region of Bossangoa, further investigations conducted by MINUSCA from Bossangoa found out that the sites were actually traditional burying sites.
31. Rombhot's forces tax river transport on the Ubangi towards the Republic of Congo. Between Mongoumba, located at the Congolese border, and Bangui, Rombhot's elements force engine boats and dugout canoes carrying agricultural goods and passengers to come to shore to perceive taxes. His forces are also present at the port of Kolongo on the south end of the capital, where river traffic into Bangui from the south generally arrives; annex 5.4. of 2014 Panel's interim report. During the Panel's mission to Mbaiki on 30 August 2015, it was confirmed to the Panel that Rombhot forces were still active on the bank of the river.
32. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, "two rival factions of ex-Séléka rebels battled for control of a customs post in Béma, 900 kilometres east of Bangui, leading residents to take refuge in the DRC", Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2015, "Africa Data", accessed on 27 October 2015 at <http://www.acleddata.com/data/>
33. Replies received to letters 49 and 75 sent by the Panel on 31 August and 16 October 2015. The exporter reported that Galil rifles No. 2093715, 2093804, G2087182, G2087859, G2087867, G2088061, G2088680 and G2088766 were

sold to the government of the Republic of Zaire (now DRC), by Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI), prior to 1995. Two SAR 80 rifles (serial numbers 015162 and 019651) were also traced back to the Republic of Zaire.

34. The agreement was reportedly reached on 8 April 2015; confidential military report, 17 April 2015; General 'Tarzan' and Marcellin, deputy of 'Gaëtan', congratulated each other on their fruitful cooperation during a security meeting; Confidential report, 12 October 2015.
35. In Ouaka: Bambari (capital), Grimari, Ippy, Bakala, Ngakobo (SUCAF sugar factory), Kouango and Liotto; in Haute-Kotto: Bria (capital); in Basse Kotto province: Mobaye (capital) and Alindao; in Mbomou: Ouango.
36. On 25 May 2015, the Panel inspected in Bambari 40 artisanal rifles, three hunting rifles (Robust brand), 30 knives, bows and arrows, two MAT-49 submachine guns, one pistol Crosman Magnum 2200.22, eight hand grenades, one RPG round and hunting ammunition; however, MINUSCA was not able to provide contextual information on the seizure of the RPG round, which could have confirmed previous reports of anti-balaka carrying a RPG launcher in Bambari (see paragraph 171 of the Panel's 2014 final report).
37. During missions to Kouango on 16 April 2015 and from 15 to 18 May 2015, the Panel could interview several victims and witnesses as well as corroborate destruction of villages and civilian property in different areas around Kouango. **Annex 7** also reports on crimes committed by UPC deputy zone commander in Kouango, named Colonel Abdourahmane Mahamat, also known as 'Sirongo'.
38. The presence of international forces in Grimari has significantly reduced criminal activities and clashes between the two groups, but since patrols are less frequent in the south, on the road from Grimari to Liotto, criminal activity by armed groups remain high. MINUSCA has a base in Bambari and they operate in Grimari and its surroundings. MINUSCA also established a temporary base in Kouango in May 2015.  
From Lakadja to Liotto, the area is controlled by UPC Colonel Ibrahim Yahyia. Ibrahim Yahyia is the ex-Séléka Zone Commander in Bambala, a few kilometres south from Liotto. He has around 40 elements under his command and his commanding officer is Colonel Mahamat Bandi, based in Kouango. Both are UPC elements. The Panel verified that attacks had been committed by UPC from January to July 2014, causing significant displacement of population and destruction and burning of villages. However, the Panel observed during its visit

in mid-May 2015 that the population had started to return and there was a certain sense of stability in the area.

Due to the volatile security situation on the road from Bambari to Liotto, the Panel was unable to conduct a field mission to the area. However, the Panel received reports indicating that several targeted killings of civilians in retaliation attacks had been committed by both anti-balaka and UPC elements. Attacks in this area also involved the burning of villages and extortion of merchants.

39. Most of the victims have taken refuge in Kouango permitting the Panel to obtain the information from eyewitnesses and victims. Manda Kara has been identified by various victims and witnesses as main anti-balaka leader on that road. His base is located in the village of Pendé. Manda Kara is originally from Ngula – south of Toko-Ippy. He is the grandson of Inbandi Béyamé, *chef de village* of Ngula, and the other grandfather is *chef de groupe* of the zone of the same area. Manda Kara used to be a merchant, about two years ago he was contacted by the anti-balaka from the north, he went to Pousser (route Nduku) to buy arms and ammunition and recruit men, and subsequently returned to Pendé to become head of the anti-balaka. He is active in Liotto, Pendé, Gbama. Manda Kara is still fighting ex-Séléka, he has more or less 40 elements, but his operations are carried out by only 12 elements. Information collected during several meetings and interviews in the *sous-préfecture* of Kouango from 15 to 18 May 2015.

Due to poor road conditions, the Panel was unable to visit the route that goes from Kouango to Liotto, but on 16 and 17 May 2015, the Panel interviewed ten different displaced persons who had recently arrived to Kouango seeking refuge and security

40. The Panel also took testimonies of victims from the villages of Moalango I and II (around eight kilometres east from Bolo) who were in Bolo I and II at the time of visit of the Panel and that were also attacked by ex-Séléka elements at the end of November 2014.

In Bolo, witnesses reported that around 40 armed ex-Séléka elements under the command of Colonel Mahamat Bandi arrived in the village carrying assault rifles at around 14:00 hours on 10 November 2014. They arrived shooting in the air and at people, burned houses and looted all valuables from the villagers.

During visit to Bolo I and II on 17 May 2015, the Panel was able to interview witnesses and victims who reported that the names of the victims as Marie Issaké, Henriette Hiékato and Catherine Yasi.

Some anti-balaka elements were also killed during the attack, but the population could not tell how many anti-balaka were killed because the anti-balaka themselves collected the corpses a few hours after.

41. Attacks against civilians, killings, destruction of villages and displacement of population have been reported in the area east of Kouango by different humanitarian and human rights organisations and by the Panel in the course of 2015, according to Interviews conducted with displaced victims and witnesses in the village of Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015 and to the Panel's Database, which include reports from UN Agencies and INGOs that have conducted at least five missions to the area in the course of 2015.

The interviews were conducted by the Panel with *chef de chefs de village* from the *commune* of Oumba and three additional victims; all interviews were conducted in Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015. The victims are currently IDPs in Kouango. Oumba was attacked by a group of anti-balaka led by 'Maguya' and 'Samba André'. The perpetrators recognized the witnesses as originating from the same region.

According to the same witnesses, on 20 November 2014, in early hours of the morning, some 70 armed anti-balaka entered the village from three different sides, shooting in the air and forcing the population to flee to the forest. After looting the village – food, bicycles, furniture, animals and other items were stolen – they burned several houses. The Panel also obtained information from witnesses in Kouango that the village of Kanga, located east of Kouango, was attacked on 7 December 2014 by a group of ex-Séléka. According to the testimonies collected during Interviews conducted with displaced victims and witnesses in the village of Kouango on 16 and 17 May 2015, 14 men from the same family were executed during the attack.

42. On 20 January 2015, at 15:10 hours, on the Damara-Bouca axis, about ten kilometres north of Damara, a convoy of 15 WFP trucks was intercepted by armed anti-balaka. One of the vehicles carrying food was taken by the armed individuals and driven towards Bouca with its driver. On 21 January 2015, the truck and driver were found few kilometres away from where the incident happened by MINUSCA forces. The driver was unharmed but all the contents of the truck were robbed. On 30 January 2015, at around 13:20 hours, at PK30, armed anti-balaka elements stole a WFP truck transporting foods on its way to Damara. The anti-balaka used three motorbikes and was armed with AK-47. The anti-balaka again kidnapped the driver and headed to Bogangolo where they robbed 12 tons of food and then fled the scene. The driver was released unharmed. On 8 February 2015, on the Bangui-Damara axis, a WFP truck was stopped and ambushed by anti-balaka elements who stole 43 bags of rice. On 23 February 2015, in Damara, a convoy of WFP trucks fell in an ambush set by anti-balaka elements. The three first vehicles were re-routed to Bogangolo village

before being looted. On 27 March 2015, at 08:30 hours, at PK55 of the Bangui-Damara axis, armed anti-balaka attacked a convoy of WFP trucks, of which five were looted and one shot at.

43. The responsibility of 'Tex' was confirmed by Azounou during an interview with the Panel on 6 July 2015; the information was later corroborated by a confidential source within the anti-balaka during a meeting on 28 June 2015 and an independent confidential source during a meeting on 20 June 2015. Côme is officially "Peace Ambassador" for the anti-balaka under Mokom, and also *Chargé de Administration des Patriotes Antibalaka* and *Guide Formateur à l'analyse de Conflit et Dialogue*; Côme was in Nairobi with Mokom for the whole Nairobi forum, from December 2014 until 29 May 2015. On 31 October 2015, a confidential report from a local NGO mentioned that Captain 'Tex', former FACA, anti-balaka commander from Féré village and now in charge of the road between Damara and Bangui, threatened the *sous-Préfet* of Damara while she was traveling from Damara to Bangui.
44. On 15 May 2015, military sources observed a convoy of a dozen of vehicles, including two "technicals" (pick-up truck vehicles mounted with machine-guns), coming from Am-Dafok area to resupply (water) at 35 kilometres from Birao, leaving then towards the Chadian border. The source suspects that the convoy may belong to a Sudanese armed group unrelated to the CAR conflict.
45. MINUSCA regional command for eastern CAR is based in Bria; deployment of MINUSCA in Birao took place in May 2015. Deployment in 2009 in eastern CAR of the Regional Task Force of the African Union (AU/RTF) to combat the LRA prevented the Séléka to establish a parallel administration in Obo and Zémio in the Haut-Mbomou province, and in Rafaï in the Mbomou province; in Nzako, AU/RTF (UPDF contingent) confronted ex-Séléka forces on 29 and 30 June 2014, where it does not exist as an armed group anymore; see also annex 3.1 and paragraph 152 of the Panel's 2014 final report.
46. - Oumar Younouss, listed by the Committee on 20 August 2015, was reportedly killed alongside General Harouna during an airstrike on 8 October 2015. Conflicting reports mention that General Sylvain Oumar Bordas was also killed during the same attack, although unconfirmed information indicate that he was back in Kaga Bandoro.  
- Registered as a Brigadier General of BSS with military identification number 2013-1-1001, General Shafadine was appointed as *Sous-Chef d'Etat-major*

*Chargé des opérations* of the FPRC during its general assemble in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

- According to a Human Rights Watch report, Zacharia Damane real name would be Moustapha Maloum; “State of Anarchy”, HRW, September 2007.

- General Samtchago was appointed as *Premier Sous-Chef d’Etat-major Adjoint chargé des opérations* of the FPRC during its general assemble in Kaga Bandoro on 2 November 2014.

47. Born on 6 February 1973 in N’diffa, Lambert Lissane Moukové, alias Mokové, known as Lambert, graduated in 2007 from the *Ecole Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature* (ENAM) in Bangui. He was appointed General Secretary at the Carnot *prefecture* and then *sous-préfet* of Carnot from 2011 to 2013. He was appointed chief of staff of the Djotodia’s Water and Forestry Minister, Rizzigala Ramadan.
48. Moussa As-Simeh, known in the CAR as a Janjawid commander, left Bangui with a dozen of his men in October 2013 after receiving the medal of *Commandeur de l’ordre national de la reconnaissance centrafricaine* from Djotodia. See also Conflict Armament Research, 2015, available at: [http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/nonstate\\_armed\\_groups\\_in\\_central\\_african\\_republic2.pdf](http://www.conflictarm.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/nonstate_armed_groups_in_central_african_republic2.pdf); Akshaya Kumar, Omer Ismail, 2015; “Janjaweed Reincarnate - Sudan’s New Army of War Criminals”, The Enough Project, June 2014, available at: <http://enoughproject.org/reports/janjaweed-reincarnate-sudan%E2%80%99s-new-army-war-criminals>; International Crisis Group, 2015, “The Chaos in Darfur”, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°110, Nairobi/Brussels, 22 April 2015 available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/b110-the-chaos-in-darfur.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/b110-the-chaos-in-darfur.pdf); RFI, 2013, “Centrafrique: retour au Soudan du général Moussa Assimeh ex-Seleka”, 21 October 2013, assessed on 25 October 2015 at <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131021-rca-centrafrique-general-moussa-assimeh-ex-seleka-retour-soudan/>
49. The level of taxation depends on the type of goods, size of the truck, and acquaintance between the Sudanese trader and ex-Séléka leadership; it can go up to FCFA 300,000 (USD 500); multiple taxation of the same truck is frequent considering the fragmentation of the ex-Séléka, however the Panel understands that compensation mechanisms exist in order to avoid an increase of market prices of basic goods coming from Sudan.

50. Meeting with humanitarian actors, Bria, 13 April 2015; a confidential report dated 9 March 2015 mention a serious incident on 6 March during which 10 ex-Séléka were killed, including 8 FPRC and 2 RPRC, while a media report from RJDH says that several ex-Séléka combatants were wounded at a checkpoint by a rival group led by General Yaya Scout, see, RJDH, 2015, “Une opération de désarmement tourne au drame”, 7 March 2015; accessed on 24 October 2015 at <http://centrafrique-presse.over-blog.com/2015/03/centrafrique-nde-le-une-operation-de-desarmement-tourne-au-drame.html>.
51. Inspections in Bria and at Camp de Roux, Bangui, on 7, 14 and 16 April 2015. Two researchers of Conflict Armament Research inspected the armament at the same time. The seized armament was also documented by UNMAS at the Camp de Roux, Bangui.  
The Panel documented four RPG-7B launchers and four 69 type launchers (PG7 pattern), four RPD-type machine guns, one 67-2 machine gun and one M80 machine gun, KPVT machine gun barrel and probable DShK machine gun barrel, six Type 56(-2) assault rifles, one AKM type assault rifle, one MPI-KM assault rifle, two Galil type assault rifles, one G3 assault rifle, three R4 Vector type assault rifles and one M16-A1 type assault rifle.
52. One group of around 50 poachers has been camping in the area of Derbissaka (Mbomou province), a small town located 100 kilometers north of Zémio (Haut-Mbomou province), since 14 March 2015, at that time the village was looted and population (2,934 inhabitants) were forcibly displaced and returned a few weeks later. AU/RTF and local authorities also reported presence of merchants selling ammunition and weapons inside the camp.
53. In February 2015, the AU/RTF seized weapons – all type 56 assault rifles – from Sudanese poachers operating in the region of Koto. The Panel notes that these weapons are similar to those seized from other armed groups operating in the CAR. In July 2015, the Chinko project discovered an arms cache in which poachers had left six weapons (no ammunition), i.e. five AK type assault rifles of various origin and one 67-2 type machine gun.  
Inspection on weapons and ammunition seized incidentally by AU/RTF on Sudanese poachers since 2009, Obo, 23 April 2015. The Enough Project also inspected ammunition seized on Sudanese poachers: “Tusk Wars. Inside the LRA and the Bloody Business of Ivory”, October 2015; the researchers of the Enough Project qualify Sudanese poachers as “Janjawid”.

54. Looting and trade of diamonds by LRA have been reported over the past years, in particular in the region of Nzako and Sam Ouandja, but does not appear as systematic but more opportunistic.
55. Various origins include China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Iran, South Africa, Sudan, Russia, Ukraine, USSR and Uganda. Data on Sudanese ammunition was compiled by the Panel and analysed by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), in a correspondence dated 27 October 2015 which is archived at the UN.
56. On 2 July 2015, LRA elements entered Malatca village, 115 kilometres from Bria on the Yalinga axis, Haute Kotto prefecture killing eight civilians, setting houses on fire and looting property. Confidential reports. Panel of experts Database, archived with the United Nations.
57. A total of 17 persons were able to escape, seven were young men (under the age of 18) who had been held by the LRA from 2012 to 2014; two young females (under the age of 18) who were captured in different incidents during 2015, and eight were male adults. Seven of these young adults defected in Obo and according to the information obtained by the Panel they had been in recent contact with Joseph Kony. The Panel also documented 10 incidents where civilians were able to escape from LRA groups following capture and three instances where LRA combatants defected. Two cases of sexual violence against children were also reportedly committed by LRA elements in the CAR during 2015.
58. The FACA contingent based in Obo and Bambouti, at the border post between the CAR and South Sudan, reported this incident which happened on 12 January 2015 in a village located 15 kilometres in the CAR territory. 30 out of the 70 heads of cattle stolen during the raid were recovered following the intervention of a joint UPDF/FACA patrol.
59. The same annex contains a letter from the Director General of the Division of Mines that the Panel received in response to an earlier request for information to BADICA on 8 September 2014, which BADICA's legal representative regards as exonerating evidence in his counter report of 11 March 2015. The Panel considered the letter an attempt to exonerate the mining administration from being considered as the government source of incriminating information mentioned in the Panel's request for information

60. The case was wrongly reported in the media as an attempt to smuggle 152 kilograms of diamond out of the country. See Davy kpenouwen, 2014, "RCA: Importante saisie des diamants de la société Sodiam a Bangui-Mpoko", Alwihdainfo, 9 November 2015, accessed on 23 October 2015 at [http://www.alwihdainfo.com/rca-importante-saisie-des-diamants-de-la-societe-sodiam-a-bangui-mpoko\\_a13523.html](http://www.alwihdainfo.com/rca-importante-saisie-des-diamants-de-la-societe-sodiam-a-bangui-mpoko_a13523.html)
61. The Panel has sent three official correspondences to the Chadian mission in New York, in relation to the Human Rights and security situation in the border with CAR; furthermore, during the official mission conducted by the Panel in Chad in December 2014, this matter was closely followed up and addressed; the topic has been also addressed during all the bilateral meetings organized by the Secretariat in New York between the Panel and representatives of the Chadian mission to the United Nations. The reference of the Panel's correspondences and subject matter are as follows: (1) S/AC.55/2014/PE/OC.27 dated 3 June 2014: the Panel informed Chad of the mandate of the Panel and requested a visit to Chad from 18 to 25 June 2014, and requested information from the Chadian government concerning armed groups operating along the CAR/Chadian border. (2) S/AC.55/2014/PE/OC.30 dated 5 June 2014: the Panel informed Chad that in the context of its investigations, the Panel had come across information that arms sold to Chad were found in CAR, and requested information on some of the arms from Chad in CAR. (3) S/AC.55/2015/PE/OC.77 dated 16 October 2015: the Panel requested information on armed groups from CAR entering illegally into Chadian territory to commit criminal acts, and further requested information concerning Chadian security forces activities in CAR to conduct retaliatory attacks.
62. The *Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie* (APRD) of Démafouth signed a DDR agreement with the CAR government of Bozizé on 9 May 2007 and benefited from significant international funding through UNDP for its demobilization. Nevertheless, the backbone of Armel Sayo's group, *Révolution et Justice*, is composed of demobilized APRD military commanders. Information obtained indicated that Sayo inflated the number of members of RJ to 14,000 – instead of 60, as reported by the Panel in paragraph 103 of its 2014 final report – in order to benefit from DDR the same way as Démafouth did in the past. This also contradicts a document provided by RJ commander Belanga to MINUSCA in Paoua on 10 June 2015 mentioning only 172 elements.

63. Sayo's deputies within RJ, Raymond Belanga and Luther Betuban, also known as 'Colonel Luther', former APRD, Sergeant in the FACA, identified in paragraph 101 of the Panel's 2014 final report, are also still active. According to a confidential report dated 22 June 2015, Colonel Luther and his RJ elements attacked and looted the market of Kowone on 19 June 2015.
64. Armel Bedaya Sayo, alias Armel Ningatoloum Sayo, has served as the Minister of Youth and Sports of the transitional Government since 22 August 2014. He is also one of the ten signatories of the DDRR agreement signed on 11 May 2015 in his capacity as commander of *Révolution et Justice*. See also the executive summary and annex 18 of the 2014 final report; annexes 4, 4.1 and 4.2 of the 2014 interim report, and the Panel's updates to the Committee dated 28 January and 20 May 2015.
65. During meetings with the Panel in Bangui on 26 and 28 June 2015, one senior military commander of international forces in the CAR who met al-Khatim commented that he believes that al-Khatim does not have a national agenda and does not share the political views of Nourredine Adam. However, confidential reports in October 2015 mention the fact that al-Khatim might be forcibly convinced by Nourredine Adam to reintegrate the FPRC, and that he fell out with the political leadership of the movement in Bangui, Mahamat Bahar and Abel Balenguélé.
66. Including a strike force of around 90 armed men travelling on 30 motorcycles; part of this strike force was spotted by the Panel in Farazala on 30 June 2015 and 2 July 2015; a confidential military report based on aerial surveillance observed around 400 armed elements gathered on 2 June 2015 in Kabo. However, the split from the FPRC had an impact on the size of al-Khatim's force: former al-Khatim military commanders of Goula origin chose to stay with the FPRC, based on ethnical consideration, since al-Khatim is of Arab/Salamat origin.
67. The Panel observed constant presence on the road of armed elements protecting trucks – see photograph in annex 4.6. – and riding motorcycles, and of checkpoints manned by al-Khatim armed elements at the following locations:
- on the road from Kaga Bandoro to Kabo: Patcho, Ouandago, Farazala, Ouaki, Zoumanga;
  - on the road from Kabo to Moyen-Sido (see photograph of Sido's checkpoint in annex 4.6.): Petit Sido and Mbo.

68. The Mbarara community lives mostly in the Sarh and Moundoul provinces of southern Chad, from where they drive their cattle down to the CAR provinces of Ouham and Nana-Grébizi for the short transhumance, during the dry season; meeting with a Mbarara representative, Kabo, 28 May 2015; Mbarara are of Arab origin, different from Mbororo of Peuhl origin, and some of them have settled in Kabo – around 700 families and 1,000 heads of cattle – and Kaga Bandoro, from where they also trade cattle with Bangui-based businessmen. See a photograph taken by the Panel of a Mbarara herder riding his horse and Mbarara's cattle – which is red instead of black and white for Peuhl cattle.
69. Out of the 11 *ordres de mission* collected, 9 referred to FPRC, one to UPC and one to *Forces Républicaines*. The latter is most likely used by General Baba Hissène who still considers himself as military chief of staff of the *Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix* (CPJP) and wants therefore to distinguish his forces from FPRC. Baba Hissène is also the brother of Abdoullaye Hissène, former leader of the CPJP.
70. The Panel observed and inspected checkpoints at the following locations: (1) the gendarmerie controlled by ex-Séléka in Mbrès; (2) Azen; (3) at the entrance of Mbrès coming from the axis towards Bambari; (4) at the entrance of Mbrès coming from the northern Mbrès-Kaga Bandoro axis.
71. The Panel observed a vehicle operated by the UPC in the village of Gbakon Bangu on 22 August 2015; according to witnesses, the vehicle that got stuck in Sueur was also operated by UPC elements which regularly use the Mbrès-Bambari axis.
72. According to the information collected by the Panel, the anti-balaka robbed all the merchandise transported by the truck, including a box of weapons.
73. On 28 September 2015, the Panel met with the following representatives of the FPRC faction in Ndélé: (a) Abdelaziz Mahamat, Chef d'état major des armées de la terre; (b) Zararia Yaya, Conseiller militaire; (c) Abdel Kani, Adjoint Comzone; (d) Mahamat Saleh, deuxième adjoint; (e) Abdalla Zibert, Secrétaire de la région militaire; (f) Adam Nwat, Directeur de renseignement militaire; (g) Assan Assabala, Conseiller du Comzone. The Panel also visited the customs, police station, taxes, and forestry department.
74. The deputy Mayor is Madam Aziza; the *sous-préfet* of Ndélé is Tébéfra Dieu Béni Sénesta. The national government has tried to install in Ndélé 15 elements

from the Water and Forestry administration as well as gendarmerie elements, yet they have been forced out by FPRC as soon as they arrived; meeting with MINUSCA human rights officer, Ndélé, 24 September 2015.

75. The Sultan declared to the Panel that important divergences exist between the FPRC and the Sultanate, including, amongst others taxes. Today, only the FPRC is levying taxes and the Sultan abstains from doing so even if he could do so theoretically. In Birao, the situation between the Sultan and ex-Séléka factions is also very tense.
76. On 25 August 2015, the Panel observed checkpoints at the following locations: (1) Koubou (15 km from Ndélé); (2) between Koubou and Djamassinda (20 km from Ndélé); (3) Tiri entrance (90 km from Ndélé); (4) Tiri exit (90 km from Ndélé). According to primary sources, there were additional checkpoints in (5) Gouzama; (6) Miamere; (7) Miamami; (8) Ngolongozo; and (9) Shari.
77. On 26 August, the Panel observed checkpoints at the following locations: (1) Batélé entrance (3 km from Ndélé); (2) Batélé exit (3 km from Ndélé); (3) Koundi (60 km from Ndélé); (4) Akroussoulbak (80 km from Ndélé). According to primary sources interviewed by the Panel, there were additional checkpoints in (5) Ngarba (120 km from Ndélé) and (6) Massamai Kebing.
78. According to the villagers of Birbatouma, every time a civilian crosses a checkpoint he/she has to pay between 1500 and 2000 CFA. For large vehicles, the taxes can rise up to 10 000 CFA. Meeting with villagers, Birbatouma, 25 August 2015. Interview with villagers of Birbatouma, in Birbatouma, 25 August 2015.
79. In Djamassinda, the Panel documented a 10 man strong FPRC delegation. On 25 August 2015, the armed men of Djamassinda affirmed to the Panel that they formerly belonged to the CPJP but that presently, they respond to the FPRC zone commander Soumaine Senoussi. On 25 August 2015, in Birbatouma (25 kilometres from Ndélé), the Panel documented the presence of five CPJP elements. On 25 August 2015, in Bangbali (60 kilometres from Ndélé), the Panel was informed that several young men of the village joined the FPRC/CPJP. On 26 August, the Panel was informed that in the village of Léména there was a 45-man strong FPRC delegation. In July, 30 armed men left the village in order to go to Kaga Bandoro. On 26 August, the Panel was informed that FPRC elements of the village of Koundi left the village to go to Ndélé for a mission.

80. Meeting with the village chief of Djamassinda, Djamassinda, 25 August 2015; meeting with villagers of Birbatouma, 25 August 2015; meeting with the village chief of Bangbali, Bangbali, 25 August 2015; meetings with the two village chiefs of Manga 1 and 2, Manga 1 and 2, 25 August 2015; meeting with the village chief of Léména, Léména, 26 September 2015; meeting with villagers of Doum, Doum, 26 August 2015.
81. A March 2014 evaluation mission to the area of Moïssala estimated the number of heads of cattle at 31,000; the evaluation of the aggregated number of heads of cattle in Chad impacted by the crisis in the CAR is 1,804,901, which could represent a potential income for CAR of USD 75 million. *Diagnostic et propositions opérationnelles pour le soutien à l'élevage pastoral perturbé par la crise centrafricaine*, Mission d'étude au Logone Orientale, Mandoul/Moyen Chari du 04 au 14 mars 2014, Plateforme des Acteurs du Développement Pastoral au Tchad.
82. During its missions in the Ndélé and Kaga Bandoro-Mbrès axis, the Panel inspected six AKM type rifles, two MAT 49 assault rifle, one MAS 36 rifle, two Vector R4 assault rifle, one M70 AB2 assault rifle, four type 56 assault rifle, three type 56-2 assault rifles, one AMD 65M assault rifle, four unidentified AK-47 type assault rifles, one RPG-7B launcher, and nine hunting rifles. The Panel also inspected remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), two RPG rounds, fifty-two rounds of hunting ammunition manufactured by the company MACC, and little amounts of ammunition of calibers 7.62x54mm, 7.5X54 mm, 14.7 mm and 9 mm.
83. During both visits the Panel saw the same FPRC armed element carrying the same Vector R4 assault rifle on different axes, first in Mbrès area in August 19 2015 and after in Ndélé area in September 28 2015. Demonstrating that weapons are assigned to a specific member of an armed group.
84. During a mission conducted on 21 and 22 June 2015, the Panel was able to collect testimonies of victims, witnesses and communities in the above-mentioned villages; moreover, the Panel has been monitoring UN and INGO reports on the situation of the area since 5 December 2013 until the time of writing, and included them in the database of the Panel.
85. The Panel visited the border post of Békoninga twice, on 23 June 2014 and 22 June 2015. Forces at the border are from the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST – Police), *Armée Nationale Tchadienne*, *Gendarmerie*, and

*Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad*. During the second visit to the border post on 22 June 2015, the DST Police Commissioner of Goré, Madjiademngar N'Gamjadjibe, who illegally detained two Experts of the Panel on 23 June 2014, was still present, despite claims to the Panel by officials in N'Djamena on 3 December 2014 that he had been disciplined and discharged from his position after the incident.

86. A confidential report dated 4 May 2015 on the attack of 2 May 2015 on Bembéré indicated that remnants of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired by the perpetrators of the attack were found on the location of the impact. According to information obtained by the Panel, there is currently no armed group in this area in possession of this kind of weaponry other than Chadian security and armed forces.
87. A confidential report from 27 May 2015 indicates that a MINUSCA fact finding mission to the village of Békayé established that the village was already attacked on 19 May 2015, when 30 heads of cattle and FCFA 450,000 (USD 745) were stolen, and two houses burnt. The team also found fired cartridges on the ground.
88. According to an RJ member interviewed by the Panel in Markounda on 11 April 2015, who took part in the fighting, one Chadian soldier was killed and a pullover marked with Chadian army "ANT" insigne was recovered.
89. The amount paid – between FCFA 5,000 to 100,000 (USD 8 to 165) – depends on the type and social category of the refugee (trader, farmer, housewife, children, etc.), on the crossing point (river, bridge, etc.), and time of the day (day crossing being more expensive than night crossing, which is more dangerous).
90. The Panel collected one specific testimony from an individual whose sister and nephew were both killed by shotgun while trying to cross the border after having made illegal payments to a border Chadian official in Sido, Chad; during interviews conducted by the Panel in Moyen-Sido, witnesses and relatives of victims have also mentioned cases where civilians who made illegal payments to Chadian officials were either killed, wounded or detained while crossing the border.
91. The Panel conducted a mission to Bouar to inspect 16 arms reportedly returned by 16 FACA soldiers active in the national instruction centre in Bouar, where between 30 and 50 FACA elements are on duty, out of the total of 340 FACA officially registered. The Panel was able to physically inspect only four weapons.

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The other arms were reportedly being used by FACA recently deployed in three communities north-west of Bouar.

92. The trading companies in UAE, Reya Diam and Ditrex Diamonds, which had shipped confiscated parcels to Kardiam provided the Panel with details regarding the origin of shipments. Ditrex declared not to have any indication to believe that Congolese shipments had not originated in DRC, adding a letter with corresponding message from Afrogem, one of the supplying exporting companies in DRC.
  93. Apart from Adamas-Swiss the buying houses Sud Azur (5421.60 grams purchased in Bangui) and Sodiam (2121.45 grams purchased in Bangui and Berbérati) and the national union of mining cooperatives (520 grams from Yaloké and 654 grams from Bangandou) exported gold during the last half of 2014 and until September 2015, according to data provided by the Ministry of Mines and Geology in October 2015, archived with the United Nations. The Panel did not receive information about the destination of exports and has not inspected the respective mines of origin.
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