



安全理事会

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2012 年 7 月 11 日安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751 (1992) 号和第 1907 (2009) 号决议委员会主席给安全理事会主席的信

谨代表安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751 (1992) 号和第 1907 (2009) 号决议委员会，并依照安全理事会第 2002 (2011) 号决议第 6 (m) 段，随信转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组以厄立特里亚为侧重点的报告。

请将本信及其附文提请安全理事会成员注意并作为安理会文件分发给荷。

安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的
第 751 (1992) 号和第 1907 (2009) 号决议
委员会主席

H. S. 普里



2012 年 6 月 27 日索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组成员给安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751 (1992) 号和第 1907 (2009) 号决议委员会主席的信

谨依照安全理事会第 2002 (2011) 号决议第 6 (m) 段随函转递索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组以厄立特里亚为侧重点的报告。

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索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组依照安全理事会第 2002 (2011) 号决议提交的报告

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摘要

自安全理事会两年多前通过第 1907(2009) 号决议以来，厄立特里亚当局对国际压力似乎有所反应，抑制其对威胁国际和平与安全的活动的参与，特别是其对青年圣战运动(俗称青年党)这一索马里极端团体的支持。然而，在大多数其他方面，厄立特里亚未能遵守安全理事会的决议，仍是该区域大部分地区的一个不稳定势力。

监察组没有发现任何证据可支持关于在本任务期间厄立特里亚直接支持青年党的指控。这部分显示出阿斯马拉当局与青年党领导层之间的摩擦日益严重，也部分反映出青年党在战场上的时运日益欠佳：自 2011 年 8 月以来，这一好战团体在非洲联盟、肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚部队连同其索马里同盟的军事攻势面前持续失去地盘。但这也是加大国际监督力度的结果，此举使对索马里武装反对派团体的支持比过去风险更高。

然而，监察组已证实，厄立特里亚继续违反第 1844(2008)和 1907(2009) 号决议，借道索马里领土部署埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体。2011 年 10 月，一个由欧加登民族解放阵线(欧阵)和奥罗莫解放阵线(奥阵)的战斗人员组成的联合团体在前往埃塞俄比亚途中于索马里中部被当地的索马里民兵拦截。两个团体于部署之前均得到厄立特里亚的收容并在那里受训，其高级领导人依然驻扎在阿斯马拉。此外，参与协助他们的运动并为他们提供武器的索马里调解者为此目的而长期受雇于厄立特里亚和奥阵，已知为青年党提供了武器和其他支持。

厄立特里亚对埃塞俄比亚反对派武装团体的支持并非新闻，但却发生在两国间紧张气氛日益严重之际。2011 年 3 月，国际媒体援引了埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯·泽纳维的话，他指出埃塞俄比亚将施展“外交和军事能力”，推翻阿斯马拉政府。2012 年 1 月，阿法尔革命民主联合阵线(阿法尔联阵)的成员在埃塞俄比亚东部攻击一群欧洲游客。监察组虽然没有发现证据显示厄立特里亚直接参与这一行动，但已经证实阿法尔联阵的战斗人员近期于 2011 年 12 月在厄立特里亚得到收容和培训，而对杀戮负有责任者中的一些人最近驻扎在厄立特里亚阿萨布附近的培训营地。

对厄立特里亚实施的全面和彻底的武器禁运给厄立特里亚空军的作战准备造成不利影响。监察组估计，只有四分之一到三分之一的厄立特里亚空军飞机可全面投入使用，原因是缺乏必要的备件和技术援助以满足维修标准。然而，监察组评估认为，即使目前已经降低的厄立特里亚空军准备状态仍显示一直有备件进口和外部援助，违反了武器禁运。监察组尚无法评估禁运对厄立特里亚武装部队其他部分的影响。

厄立特里亚当局还继续通过苏丹走私武器和弹药以作商业销售，违反了武器禁运。这种秘密的行动由包括 Tekle Kifle “Manjus” 将军在内的高级军官监督，他们每年至少获得 360 万美元的收益。与此密切结合的另一个更有利可图的活动则是向苏丹和西奈半岛贩运人口。同是这些犯罪网络常常使用同一批车辆走私厄立特里亚移民者和厄立特里亚武器。厄立特里亚移民者到达苏丹或西奈半岛后，通常变成人质，遭到折磨、强奸或杀害，而其绑架者则索要平均 30 000 到 40 000 美元的赎金——经常通过谈判后经由厄立特里亚调解者支付。

厄立特里亚当局继续主要依靠对厄立特里亚散居国外的侨民社群的域外征税而获得硬通货。监察组证实，这种税款的收取常常涉及对有关个人或在厄立特里亚的亲属的威胁、骚扰和恐吓。税款往往由非官方的代理人或由执政的人民民主和正义阵线(人阵)的活动分子收取，对居住在国外的厄立特里亚国民和具有厄立特里亚血统的外籍国民不做任何区分。付款是获得任何其他政府服务的先决条件，但很少开具收据。在一些国家，除了标准的 2% 的“侨民税”，还强制要求支付厄立特里亚国防预算“捐款”。

人阵通过音乐会和“民俗节庆”等侨民文化活动筹集到的资金的比例越来越高。这些活动极少正式登记为政治活动，而是为慈善事业的募捐，在某些司法管辖范围内这种伎俩可能被作为欺诈行为而遭到起诉。

另一种越来越重要的收入来源是厄立特里亚西部的金矿生产。2011 年，外国采矿利益集团向欧洲和北美的黄金出口超过 10 吨，市值约为 6.14 亿美元。此外，2011 年估计有 7.1 吨转给厄立特里亚政府，销售值可能超过 4 亿美元。在未来几年，生产和收入预计将会增加。由于厄立特里亚的预算和支出不向公众公布而接受监督，故要采取“恪尽职守”的措施来确保采矿收入不会用于资助违反武器禁运或在整个地区支持反对派武装团体的行为等违反第 1907(2009)号决议的行动，这一可能性是非常有限的。因此，监察组建议，或者是厄立特里亚自愿采纳管理其收入的透明框架，或由各国政府对矿业公司和在本国领土上经管厄立特里亚收入的代理银行实施强制措施。

自 2008 年 6 月与吉布提之间的边界冲突以来，厄立特里亚始终否认关押有任何吉布提战犯。2011 年 9 月，两名吉布提战犯在被拘留 3 年多后得以逃离，戳穿了厄立特里亚的谎言。已知至少还有 5 名吉布提战犯在 2011 年 9 月时仍然活着，尽管生存条件非常恶劣。厄立特里亚当局在此方面的行为严重违反了安全理事会第 1862(2009)号和第 1907(2007)号决议，令人严重怀疑厄立特里亚对由卡塔尔主导的旨在使厄立特里亚与吉布提关系正常化的调解进程的承诺。监察组建议，考虑对那些应对这些违反行为负责的厄立特里亚文官和军官实施定向制裁。

一. 导言

A. 任务规定

1. 索马里和厄立特里亚问题监察组(监察组)的任务规定见安全理事会第 2002(2011)号决议第 6 段。第 2023(2011)和 2036(2012)号决议为监察组规定了其他的任务。
2. 根据第 2002(2011)号决议第 6(1)段, 监察组在整个任务期限内随时向安全理事会及其关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议委员会通报活动情况, 通过联合国秘书处提交每月进度报告, 并于 2012 年 2 月 3 日提交中期简报。
3. 监察组成员在调查过程中曾前往比利时、加拿大、吉布提、埃塞俄比亚、芬兰、法国、德国、希腊、印度、印度尼西亚、意大利、马来西亚、荷兰、尼日利亚、沙特阿拉伯、塞舌尔、新加坡、索马里、南非、瑞典、瑞士、土耳其、乌干达、乌克兰、阿拉伯联合酋长国、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国、坦桑尼亚联合共和国和美利坚合众国。
4. 厄立特里亚政府未答复监察组的任何函件, 并拒绝同意监察组一再提出的访问厄立特里亚要求。这表示厄立特里亚当局的合作态度恶化, 他们过去曾准许监察组派团访问厄立特里亚, 但始终未能提供所要求的信息且拒绝了监察组会晤有关官员的要求。
5. 监察组设在内罗毕, 由下列专家组成: 马特·布赖登(协调员)、埃马纽埃尔·戴塞尔(武器专家)、奥雷利安·略尔卡(航空专家)、约尔格·鲁夫托福特(海事专家)、加桑·施博雷(财务专家)、巴巴通德·塔伊沃(武装团体问题专家)和克里斯特莱·优尼斯(人道主义事务专家)。

B. 方法

6. 监察组前几份报告中概述的证据标准和核查程序适用于本次任务期间开展的工作。监察组根据它以前的报告(最近一份是 S/2011/433 号文件)重申其方法。本报告采用的方法如下:
 - (a) 尽可能从多个来源收集关于事件和议题的信息;
 - (b) 尽可能从有关事件的第一手资料来源收集信息;
 - (c) 确定信息模式是否一致, 将已经了解的情况与新信息和新趋势进行比较;
 - (d) 在信息可信度和信息来源可靠性方面始终把监察组有关专家的专业知识和判断以及全组成员的集体评估意见考虑在内;

(e) 收集实物、照片、录像和/或书面证据来证明收集到的信息。

7. 监察组特意做出一系列努力，接触参与违反行为者、直接了解违反行为者或知道有谁直接了解违反行为详情者。监察组在任何时候都没有表示以付款或其他诱惑来换取证词或证据。

8. 依照委员会多次向监察组提供的指导，监察组努力把尽可能多的证词和证据纳入最后报告中。不过，鉴于大会关于控制和限制文件篇幅的决定，尤其是第 52/214 号、第 53/208 号和第 59/265 号决议中的决定，许多实质性内容都被列入了附件，而附件是不翻译的。

二. 区域背景

9. 在整个区域的形势和动态背景下，能够对监察组任务期内厄立特里亚遵守安全理事会有关决议的程度做出最佳评价。

10. 在索马里，附属基地组织的武装反对派团体青年党在非洲联盟、肯尼亚、埃塞俄比亚和索马里过渡联邦政府部队军事进攻的综合压力下，节节败退，可能很快就会丧失其最赚钱的资产——基斯马尤港口。该团体领导层开始出现紧张迹象，由青年党“埃米尔”Ahmed Abdi Godane领导的极端派与Hassan Dahir Aweys带领的更加务实、注重政治的派别出现明显分歧，后者对Aweys现已不存在的伊斯兰党反对派成员有吸引力。自 2006 年以来，厄立特里亚一直与这两派保持关系，但自 2009 年以来与Aweys及其伊斯兰党同伙的关系比与Godane的关系更加密切。¹

11. 厄立特里亚情报官员阴谋在亚的斯亚贝巴实施爆炸活动以破坏 2011 年 1 月在那里举行的非洲联盟首脑会议，此事被披露后，厄立特里亚与埃塞俄比亚之间的紧张关系加剧。2011 年 3 月，媒体援引埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯·泽纳维的话说，埃塞俄比亚收留了一些厄立特里亚反对派团体，将努力以外交和军事能力推翻阿斯马拉政府。² 2012 年 1 月，被厄立特里亚收留并在该国受训的武装团体阿法尔联阵战士在埃塞俄比亚东部袭击了一群欧洲游客，其中五人遇害(见下文第三.B. 节)。埃塞俄比亚指控厄立特里亚应对这一事件负责，并于 2012 年 3 月和 4 月发起报复性跨界袭击。

12. 二名关押在厄立特里亚三年多的吉布提战俘于 2011 年 9 月逃离之后，阿斯马拉同吉布提的关系也受到挫折(见下文第七节和附件 4)。由于厄立特里亚一贯

¹ 例如，见监察组报告 S/2010/91 和 S/2011/433。

² 美国之音，“埃塞俄比亚鼓吹推翻厄立特里亚政府”，2011 年 3 月 19 日，可查阅 <http://www.voanews.com/content/ethiopia-advocates-overthrow-of-eritrean-government-118333254/157712.html>。

否认在 2008 年 6 月边界冲突之后扣押任何吉布提战俘，这一披露使人严重怀疑厄立特里亚对由卡塔尔牵头、旨在实现厄立特里亚与吉布提两国关系正常化的调解进程的承诺。

13. 第 2023(2011)号决议的通过使厄立特里亚当局面临更多压力，要求它遵守国际规范，把域外征税和采矿收入的使用置于监督之下。这一决定得到加强，因为联合王国和德国政府为防止厄立特里亚在这两国境内征税采取了措施。厄立特里亚侨民中有些也日益表示反对 2%侨民税的各个方面，特别是采取更胁迫性办法强征税款，而且税收支出缺乏透明度。

14. 显然为了应对这些压力，厄立特里亚政府设法在各个层面重新与国际社会接触。2011 年 1 月，厄立特里亚在间隔五年之后重新向非洲联盟派驻代表团，而且自 2011 年年底以来，一直努力恢复参加区域组织伊加特。尽管如此，必须把这些积极步骤与厄立特里亚继续无视安全理事会第 1844(2008)号、1862(2009)号和 1907(2009)号决议的行为对照考虑。

三. 对该区域内武装团体的支持

15. 监察组上次报告(S/2011/433)记录了厄立特里亚对非洲之角区域一些武装反对派团体的支持，特别是在索马里和厄立特里亚。

16. 第 1907(2009)号决议禁止这种援助，该决议切实禁止从厄立特里亚向旨在破坏区域稳定的武装反对派团体提供支持，禁止庇护、资助、协助、支持、组织、训练或者煽动个人或团体对该区域其他国家或其公民实施暴力或恐怖行为。

17. 监察组确认，在当前任务期内，厄立特里亚继续违反第 1907(2009)号决议，庇护、训练和装备邻国、特别是埃塞俄比亚的武装反对派团体。如同在监察组上一任务期内发生的情况，这些武装团体的一些成员是从厄立特里亚经由索马里部署的，违反了普遍、彻底的军火禁运和第 1844(2008)号决议。

A. 索马里

18. 监察组在其任务期内，没有得到有关厄立特里亚援助索马里武装反对派团体的可靠报告或证据。虽然厄立特里亚当局可能继续向索马里武装反对派团体提供财政和其他形式的援助，他们的活动未被查出，但监察组认为任何此种援助无足轻重，而且厄立特里亚目前在索马里是很不起眼的角色，对事态发展进程的影响极小，无论是正面还是负面影响。

19. 然而，监察组感到关切的是，厄立特里亚继续与索马里军火商和服务商交往，已知这些人曾向青年党提供服务和支(见附件 1.1.)。

向青年党空运武器的指控

20. 2011 年 10 月 29 日，过渡联邦议会成员 Mohamud Abdullahi Waliye “Waq” 对 Gaalkacyo 广播电台宣称，来自厄立特里亚的一架载有武器的飞机同日降落在拜多阿国际机场。

21. 军方一份情报报告也提出了与 “Waq” 一样的指控，称已确认，2011 年 10 月 29 日星期六晚大约 17 时至 17 时 45 分，确实有载有供给拜多阿青年党的防空武器的飞机降落，而且青年党拜多阿区域办事处二辆车的乘客登上了返程航班。

22. 一个与安全有关的组织编写的另一份报告称，2011 年 10 月 30 日当地时间下午 2 时 30 分，一架载有军需品的中型民用货运飞机降落在拜多阿简易跑道。该编者称，该架飞机在地面停留 130 个小时，许多青年党民兵迅速地卸下许多防空炮。

23. 其后几天，一些专门研究索马里媒体内容的网站还报道，青年党已下令住在简易跑道周围的境内流离失所者离家数日。³

24. 11 月 1 日，肯尼亚国防军发言人埃马纽埃尔·奇尔奇尔发表声明，其中指出：“2011 年 11 月 1 日，我们可靠地确认，有两架飞机降落在拜多阿，机上载有打算提供给青年党的武器货物”。⁴ 第二天，他发表了第二个声明，其中指出：“我们可以肯定地确认，另一架载有武器的飞机降落在索马里”。⁵ 2011 年 11 月 8 日，肯尼亚政府写信给安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992) 号和第 1907(2009) 号决议委员会主席，提及这些报道并声称，现有资料表明，这些军火来自厄立特里亚。厄立特里亚政府和青年党均否认这些指控。⁶

25. 在拜多阿，一个与当地有联系的国际组织向监察组证实，上述日子前后，住在机场周围的人的确被迫流离失所，但该组织否认有任何飞机降落。可查阅本国内部情报报告的三个国家政府的官员也分别与监察组交流他们的看法，认为那几天没有飞机飞往拜多阿。

³ 例如，见 Bar-kulan，“青年党驱赶拜多阿机场跑道周围的民众”，2011 年 11 月 1 日，可查阅 <http://www.bar-kulan.com>；“索马里报告”，Aweys Cadde，“厄立特里亚被控提供武器”，2011 年 10 月 31 日，可查阅 <http://www.somaliareport.com>。

⁴ 2011 年 11 月 1 日 Josh Kron 在《纽约时报》报道，“肯尼亚说，提供给好战分子的军火空运至索马里”；2011 年 11 月 1 日《民族日报》报道，“两架飞机向青年党空运武器”。

⁵ 2011 年 11 月 2 日，《民族日报》Peter Leftie 报道，“青年党获得第三批空运军火”。

⁶ 2011 年 11 月 2 日，半岛电视台报道，“厄立特里亚否认向青年党运送军火”；同前，《纽约时报》Josh Kron 报道，青年党发言人 Ali Mohamud Rage 称，青年党与厄立特里亚没关系，并补充说，“我们的武器来自非洲联盟”。

26. 根据获得的资料，监察组认为，青年党拜多阿管理层的确曾指示境内流离失所者离开机场附近地区，表明预期有航班起降。但监察组未找到证据证实下列指控：2011 年 10 月 29 日至 11 月 3 日，一架或多架飞机降落在拜多阿国际机场，或是厄立特里亚在这段时间里向拜多阿青年党空运武器弹药。

27. 监察组已多次要求肯尼亚政府向监察组提供证据，证实其说法，即 2011 年 11 月第一周，三架飞机降落在索马里拜多阿镇。⁷ 但迄今为止尚无回复。

B. 埃塞俄比亚

28. 监察组得到了关于厄立特里亚向以下埃塞俄比亚武装反对派团体提供支持的可靠信息，而且在某些情况下是确凿证据：欧阵、奥阵、Tigrayan 人民民主运动、Gimbot Sabat 运动和阿法尔联军。

29. 厄立特里亚还收留了埃塞俄比亚其他反对派团体残余人员，如Arbengnoch、Debub-Hizboch和Beni Shangul等，但如今已人数不多，而且在监察组任务期内，几乎没有行动能力。⁸

欧加登民族解放阵线/奥罗莫解放阵线

30. 2011 年 10 月 31 日，索马里民团Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama'a的成员在索马里-埃塞俄比亚边界索马里一侧截击欧阵和奥阵战士的一个合并团体。该团体最近从厄立特里亚部署，经不同路线进入索马里，然后在Gaalkacyo会合，进行跨界之旅。⁹ 据报，另一组人数较多的欧阵战士大约同一时间从厄立特里亚抵达索马里，在Boosaaso附近的Mareero登岸。

31. 被关押在埃塞俄比亚的该部队 4 名幸存者称，他们是 2007 年年底派往厄立特里亚受训的一支欧阵部队成员，先后驻扎在 Kiloma 和 Een。其中一名战士 Abdi Baruud Hassan 与 60 名男子一同受训，最后部署到索马里，就是倒霉的 Alanside 部队（见 S/2011/433）。

32. 该部队幸存者向监察组提供的有关厄立特里亚训练设施和指导员的详细信息与已知曾在那里受训的其他欧阵战士所述一致。此外，监察组能够核实该团体行程内容，证实他们的陈述。事件详情见附件 1.1。

33. 监察组估计，继 2010 年部署 Alanside 部队之后，仍留在厄立特里亚的欧阵战士不足 100 名。如果关于 2011 年年底一支欧阵大股部队在 Boosaaso 附近登岸

⁷ 2011 年 12 月 3 日和 22 日与肯尼亚官员的会晤，以及公文往来。

⁸ 2012 年 1 月 14 日和 4 月 20 日，与厄立特里亚前军事教官和一名高级官员的访谈；2012 年 5 月 18 日，约访一个情报机构。

⁹ 2011 年 11 月 22 日和 23 日，在埃塞俄比亚 Jigjiga 与被关押在埃塞俄比亚的该部队 5 名幸存者的访谈。

的报道属实，则仍留在厄立特里亚的战士可能很少。未收到招募新兵的报告，表明这些人可能是最后剩下的仍留在该国的欧阵战士。这与有关报告相符，即过去一年，阿斯马拉与欧阵的关系日益紧张，既因为战略问题，也因为埃塞俄比亚政府与欧阵一些领导人就对话前景进行试探性接触。

阿法尔革命民主统一阵线

34. 2012 年 1 月 17 日晚 23 时至 18 日凌晨 1 时，一伙枪手袭击了位于埃塞俄比亚东部阿法尔地区Erta'Ale火山山顶的游客营地。¹⁰ 当时，营地有 20 名外国游客。

35. 两名德国人、两名匈牙利人和一名奥地利人被枪杀；一名比利时人和一名英国人遭受严重枪伤；四名德国人和两名埃塞俄比亚国民（一名司机和一名当地警察）最初被俘。¹¹ 用临时担架把受伤者从火山山顶运送到大本营，而后于 2012 年 1 月 18 日用直升机把他们后送到Meqelee医院。阿法尔联阵绑架者当晚释放了两名年长的德国人，原因是其中一人拒绝继续行走。两人回到位于Erta'Ale的营地。

36. 阿法尔联阵在 2012 年 1 月 21 日发表一份公报，声称对这次袭击负责，并表示阿法尔联阵部队杀死了 16 名埃塞俄比亚士兵。这份声明承认，两名德国人和两名埃塞俄比亚人遭到阿法尔联阵关押，但又声称，5 名死亡游客是被陪同他们的埃塞俄比亚部队杀害。公报还声称，厄立特里亚政府与这次事件毫无关系。¹²

37. 2012 年 1 月 24 日，埃塞俄比亚外交部发表一份新闻稿，指控厄立特里亚政府应对这次袭击负责，并指控该政府利用阿法尔联阵作为可抵赖的替罪羊。¹³

38. 阿法尔联阵在 3 月 5 日宣布，两名德国人质在阿法尔长老的主持下获释，两名埃塞俄比亚人质也在 2012 年 6 月 11 日被释放。

39. 鉴于厄立特里亚与阿法尔联阵之间存在历史渊源，监察组进行了调查，以确定厄立特里亚是否对这次事件承担任何直接或间接责任。监察组约谈了在 Erta'Ale 营地发生袭击时在场的人员、一名受伤游客、有关国家政府的官员、负责调查该事件的各执法机构，其中包括德国联邦刑事警察局。¹⁴

阿法尔联阵与厄立特里亚的关系

¹⁰ 2012 年 2 月 29 日与一名欧洲政府官员的约谈，此人在袭击发生前一天就在 Erta'Ale 火山。

¹¹ 2012 年 3 月 21 日，在柏林与德国联邦刑事警察局约谈。

¹² 阿法尔联阵的军事公报，MCC Ref: 001/2012，2012 年 1 月 21 日。该公报将这起事件错误地说成是发生在 2012 年 1 月 16 日。

¹³ 见 <http://www.mfa.gov.et/PressMore.php?pg=34>。

¹⁴ 2012 年 5 月 9 日在内罗毕德国大使馆与德国联邦刑事警察局一名联络官的约谈。

40. 阿法尔联阵(又称Uguugumo)成立于 1993 年,最初是一个由反对埃塞俄比亚政府的三个阿法尔组织组成的联盟。阿法尔联阵为扩大阿法尔地区的自主权而战。¹⁵ 该运动反对厄立特里亚分离,最初拒绝承认厄立特里亚是一个独立国家。

41. 阿法尔联阵内部分裂,其行动方式并不像一个单一的统一阵线,而是更像一个松散的派系联盟。阿法尔联阵成员有时联合埃塞俄比亚反对厄立特里亚(尤其是在 1998-2000 年战争期间)。但阿法尔联阵的大多数军事活动历来以埃塞俄比亚为目标。阿法尔联阵的新闻稿和公报不再质疑厄立特里亚的生存权。

42. 阿法尔联阵劫持外国人的做法由来已久:在 1995 年 3 月劫持 3 名意大利人;在 1996 年劫持两名联合国咨询人;在 2007 年 3 月劫持五名英国人和八名埃塞俄比亚人。后一批人经厄立特里亚政府斡旋,在厄立特里亚获释。阿法尔联阵从无故意杀害外国国民的记录。

43. 根据监察组上次报告(S/2011/433),一名来自吉布提的阿法尔叛乱分子表示,他知道阿法尔联阵部队正在厄立特里亚红海省 Kiloma 附近接受训练。2012 年 7 月 4 日和 5 日与其他前厄立特里亚军方人士和阿法尔联阵成员的访谈印证了这一信息。在 7 月 5 日的访谈中,阿法尔联阵人士也向监察组确认,截至 2012 年 7 月,阿法尔联阵在阿萨布留有人员,并接受厄立特里亚政府的后勤支持,包括弹药。

44. 最近,监察组获得可信信息和证据指称,一些阿法尔联阵部队最近在厄立特里亚得到了东区军情局主管“Hatsaynet”中校(见 S/2011/433,第 262(e)段和第 274 段)和在红海南部地区活动的一名厄立特里亚军事情报官“Debesay”少校支持下的收容和训练。据称,“Debesay”少校负责与阿法尔联阵主席 Mussa Ibrahim 以及阿法尔联阵的首席情报官兼与厄立特里亚军方之间的联络员 Ali Yalele 联络。“Hatsaynet”中校和“Debesay”少校均向 Te'ame Goitom(又称为 Wedi Meqelet)准将报告。

45. 直至 2011 年下半年前,阿法尔联阵战斗员也在红海省北部的Ghelaalo地区接受训练。训练指挥官据称是Daoud • Suleiman上尉,这名军官拥有布雷和扫雷行动方面的专长。厄立特里亚与埃塞俄比亚战争后的那些年,Suleiman上尉与来自联合国驻埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚特派团的国际人员密切合作。¹⁶

¹⁵ 阿法尔联阵成立于 1993 年 3 月,是阿法尔革命民主统一联盟、Afar Ummatah Demokrasiyyoh Focca 和阿法尔革命军合并的产物。

¹⁶ 2012 年 3 月 12 日与曾在埃厄特派团工作的维持和平行动部一名官员的约谈。

46. Suleiman 上尉的助手是阿尔法联阵的 Mohamed Omar Hashim 和 Temesgen Haile 上尉，后者是一名作战工程和后勤专家，曾在达尔富尔担任军事观察员（2009 年 3 月）。

47. 监察组获得了由两个消息来源独立核实的一份不完全名单，其中列有 2011 年下半年在 Wandede 和 We'ema 接受训练的阿法尔联阵人员。2012 年初负责调查 Erta' Ale 事件的执法官员证实，其中五个人的名字与他们调查的嫌疑人的名字吻合。

48. 2012 年 3 月 16 日，埃塞俄比亚部队袭击了三个厄立特里亚军事基地，对阿法尔联阵的袭击进行报复。埃塞俄比亚对厄立特里亚西部的入侵显然只有有限的军事目的，仅持续到 2012 年 6 月。¹⁷

分析和结论

49. 监察组没有发现任何证据可以表明，厄立特里亚政府对 Erta' Ale 事件的行动规划或实施或对发生在 Erta' Ale 的屠杀事件负有直接责任。然而，对事件幸存者的约谈明确驳斥了阿法尔联阵的指控，即游客为埃塞俄比亚部队所杀害，因为除一名阿法尔警察外无人到场。

50. 然而，监察组已证实，厄立特里亚继续收容、训练和支持阿法尔联阵人员，最近接受训练的一些阿法尔联阵人员可能参与了 Erta' Ale 事件（见 S/2011/433，第 275 段和附件 8.1）。因此，厄立特里亚的行为不仅违反了第 1907(2009)号决议，而且对 2012 年 1 月 17 日发生在 Erta' Ale 的杀害事件负有间接责任。

提格雷人民民主运动

51. 厄立特里亚继续在 2011 年和 2012 年向提格雷人民民主运动（普遍称为 Demhit）提供支持。一位前厄立特里亚军事教官曾亲自参与训练该团体所属人员，他向监察组表示，提格雷人民民主运动的主要根据地是 Harena，但也从 Een 等一些较小的营地以及沿埃塞俄比亚边境的临时阵地发起行动。厄立特里亚陆军突击队前成员还向监察组表示，在萨瓦和 Me' atr 营地训练期间曾遇到提格雷人民民主运动成员（Harena 和萨瓦的鸟瞰图分别见附件 1.1. b 和 1.1. c）。¹⁸

52. 此外，数名前厄立特里亚军方人士分别告知监察组，在 2012 年年初，提格雷人民民主运动自己的教官队伍转移到 Harena 东南方约 25 公里、更靠近埃塞俄比亚边界的一个较小营地。监察组约谈了厄立特里亚军方前教官和负责军官，他

¹⁷ 2012 年 3 月 20 日与一名前厄立特里亚军官的约谈；2012 年 5 月 3 日与一名埃塞俄比亚官员的约谈。

¹⁸ 2011 年 11 月 29 日和 2012 年 1 月 15 日与前厄立特里亚部队突击队员的约谈。

们证实说，埃塞俄比亚部队在 2012 年 4 月中袭击厄立特里亚若干地点时，其具体目标是包括Harena在内的主要提格雷人民民主运动基地。¹⁹

金波特 7 号

53. 埃塞俄比亚当局允许监察组接触三名被羁押者，这些人被指称是遭取缔的反对派组织金波特 7 号的成员。监察组的两个小组在三个不同日子里单独约谈了这些人。²⁰

54. 这三个被羁押者均宣称，他们是金波特 7 号一个小组的成员，于 2011 年 11 月 1 日被抓获。三人还均表示，他们曾取道苏丹前往厄立特里亚，当时以为他们之后将获得在欧洲或北美就学的机会。他们声称，结果却是被派往厄立特里亚西部的军事边境地带接受训练。

55. 这些被羁押者告知监察组，他们接受了金波特 7 号副主席 Andargachew Tsige 的政治灌输，之后被介绍给厄立特里亚的 Fitsum Yishak “Lenin” 上校，接受使用手枪、爆炸物和反侦察的训练。他们表示，训练持续了两个月（见 S/2011/433，第 262(b) 段）。

56. 被羁押者都表现出对阿斯马拉及其标志性建筑物很熟悉，三人中的一人对武器和爆炸物了如指掌。一名嫌疑人还能够正确指认 Fitsum 上校。但一名嫌疑人无法识别基本爆炸材料、辨别手榴弹组件或正确持握手枪，尽管他声称曾接受使用所有这些武器的训练。

57. 根据这些陈述，监察组确信，所有三名嫌疑人拥有关于阿斯马拉及其周围环境的第一手知识，而且有可能与 Fitsum 上校有过直接接触。然而，鉴于这些人的陈述存在出入，监察组无法对其所属组织或接受的军事或准军事训练作出结论。

四. 违反全面彻底军火禁运的情况

58. 对厄立特里亚实施的全面彻底军火禁运似乎总体上受到尊重，但监察组认为，厄立特里亚国政府继续采购军事物资和获得外部援助，以维持其部分空军力量。

59. 厄立特里亚高级官员，主要是西区指挥官 Teklai Kifle “Manjus” 将军，继续参与向苏丹贩运军火的活动——这种贸易对区域安全的影响最远波及到以色列和巴勒斯坦被占领土。

¹⁹ 2012 年 1 月 14 日和 2012 年 4 月 20 日与厄立特里亚前军事教官和一名高级军官的约谈；2012 年 5 月 18 日对一个情报机构的约谈。

²⁰ 2011 年 11 月 21 日、22 日和 23 日与被拘留的金波特 7 号成员的约谈。

A. 厄立特里亚空军

60. 厄立特里亚空军是厄武装部队最小的分支，由 Teklai Habteselassie 少将指挥，其主要行动基地设在阿斯马拉。马萨瓦、阿萨布或萨瓦没有长期驻扎军机。空军最先进的战斗机是米格-29“支点”战斗机、苏-27“侧卫”战斗机和米-24“雌鹿”武装直升机。

61. 保持这一小规模但又比较先进的机队的作战能力，需要高水平的专业知识、严格的维修保养时间表和源源不断的备件和润滑油。在每一轮起降之后都必须进行基本的飞行服务，包括根据情况进行的维修保养和校正性维修保养。但不包括偶发故障或事故维修。这个服务时间表的最低要求包括定期可靠地提供以下备件：起落架轮胎、轮毂轴承、火花塞、灯泡、灯、电池、过滤器、刹车片、机油和氧气。此外，还需补充液压制动系统使用的液体、更换有问题的航空电子系统，更新机载软件。这项工作历来都需要可靠的国外供应来源及聘请外国技术人员。

62. 依照对厄立特里亚实施的全面和彻底军火禁运，禁止向厄立特里亚出售或供应军火以及各类相关物资，包括上述物项的备件，以及提供技术援助、培训、财政及其他援助”。在理论上，这意味着厄立特里亚空军无法获得其长期以来依赖的技术援助和备件，因此其作战准备情况应该受到影响。

63. 因此，监察组试图确定厄立特里亚空军是否一直能够坚持执行维修时间表，以此作为确定外国技术人员和进口备件是否依然违反军火禁运进入厄立特里亚的一个标示。但厄立特里亚政府不让监察组有机会访问厄立特里亚，监察组因而无法亲自核实其调查结果。

64. 根据这一非正式评估，监察组认为，禁运确实影响了维修时间表，对厄立特里亚空军的作战准备状态造成不利影响。然而，如果没有在一定程度上获得这些受禁物品，厄立特里亚空军甚至连目前这种低水平活动也很可能无法维持，因此，这表明厄立特里亚能够在友好国家的援助下或借助国际黑市满足其某些需求。

厄立特里亚军用飞机的维修

65. 监察组证实，厄立特里亚空军以前曾聘用与米格雷蒙公司有关联的乌克兰人员，米格雷蒙公司是乌克兰境内米格和苏霍伊喷气战斗机的主要维修厂（见图一）。

图一

2002 年前后，米格雷蒙公司高级技师与厄立特里亚空军人员在阿斯马拉



66. 米格雷蒙公司位于乌克兰 Zaporizhyya，原先是设在一个空军基地的军用修理厂，但在 1996 年成为国有企业。2011 年，国防部将该公司的所有权转给新的国防控股公司 Ukroboronprom。

67. Zaporizhyya 作为前苏维埃时代军事和工业生产的航空基地，仍然是俄制飞机保养、备件和维修海外订单的经纪枢纽，其中许多经纪人都是前米格雷蒙公司人员。监察组从一名乌克兰官员那里获悉，2011 年，Zaporizhyya 区域对外经济贸易局作为这些经纪公司之一，与厄立特里亚政府讨论了提供直升机备件事宜。据说，区域对外经济贸易局还因被控违反制裁伊朗制度而受到美国政府的制裁。

68. 根据对 Zaporizhyya 航空业有直接了解的一个渠道提供的情况，区域对外经济贸易局是航空业众所周知的向非洲国家提供航空备件和维修服务的地下供应商，而且该局仍与米格雷蒙公司密切合作。区域对外经济贸易局还与电子空间软件贸易有限公司有关联，该英国公司成立于 1998 年，专门制造金属结构和零件。²¹ 监察组获得的信息显示，电子空间软件贸易有限公司自 2001 年以来一直向卢旺达和乌干达定期出口军用物资。

²¹ 1998 年 8 月 6 日注册；2009 年 6 月 17 日，区域对外经济贸易局局长 Vitalii Krasnoselskyi 的儿子 Oleg Krasnoselskyi 被任命为公司董事。

69. 监察组收到一些可信资料，显示有人违反第 1907 (2009) 号决议，向厄立特里亚空军提供后勤和技术支持，包括有报告显示空军负责人本人与电子空间软件交易有限公司等有可能向厄立特里亚空军机队提供备件和专门服务的外国公司有接触。

厄立特里亚空军现状

70. 监察组已能确定，厄立特里亚空军机队目前包括 22 架固定翼飞机和 7 架旋转翼飞机。目前已知其中仅有 7 架飞机可以使用(见下表)。监察组认为，其余飞机目前均无法使用。

机型	数量	2012 年 5 月		注册号码	说明
		可使用			
MiG-29 “Fulcrum”	7	2	ERAF 501		单座机
			ERAF 502		
			ERAF 504		
			ERAF 505		
			ERAF 508		
Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker	2	1	ERAF 608		1 架苏霍伊单座机
			ERAF 609		1 架双座巨型轰炸机
Aermacchi MB-339C	4	—	ERAF 408		
Harbin Y-12	2	2	ERAF 801		
Aero L-39 Albatross	1	—			至少 1 架双座先进教练机；可能是前埃塞俄比亚空军飞机
L-90TP Redigo	6	—			
Augusta Bell-412	2	—	ERAF 702		
Mil Mi-17 Hip	3	2	ERAF 301		
			ERAF 306		
Mil Mi-35 Hind E	2	—			据报至少有一架是从埃塞俄比亚空军缴获而得

71. 监察组根据这些信息估算，厄立特里亚空军只能维持其机队大约 30%的全期维修业务。

72. 这个评估得到一名厄立特里亚叛逃者的证实，这名叛逃者了解厄立特里亚空军的结构和行动详情，并仍保持实地联系，他告诉监察组，2009 年 12 月实行的军火禁运严重破坏了备件供应链，导致部分双边维修合同终止。²²

73. 此外，据这名叛逃者说，几名负责维修厄立特里亚空军飞机的高级技师已逃离该国，从而进一步削弱了空军履行法定维修时间表和遵守维修标准的能力。

²² 2012 年 3 月 9 日、4 月 9 日、5 月 4 日和 5 日的约谈。

74. 来自阿斯马拉的外交人士证实，厄立特里亚空军喷气式战斗机的活动大为减少，2012 年 2 月底至 5 月期间只看到 1 架飞机飞越厄立特里亚首都。²³

75. 对谷歌地图图像中阿斯马拉机场军用停机坪的调度情况进行了认真观察，显示存在一些活动，包括飞机加油和 2011 年建造一个 875 平方米的机库。不过，该机库的空间至少能容纳 9 架飞机，因此，不清楚为什么高性能飞机仍全年留在停机坪(包括雨季)，除非是出于展示而非使用的目的。

图二

阿斯马拉机场军用停机坪，2012 年 3 月 1 日



76. 监察组认为，厄立特里亚空军的活动水平即便已经减少，仅靠国内资源还是基本不可能得以维持。总之，监察组的评估意见是，虽然军火禁运部分有效，但厄立特里亚空军违反第 1907 (2009) 号决议，仍在获得一些外部技术援助，并继续进口备件。

B. 贩运军火和人口

77. 监察组在其 2011 年 7 月的报告中说明，厄立特里亚安全部队的高级成员、特别是 Teklai Kifle “Manjus” 将军参与了贩运行为，通过苏丹并借道以色列将武器和人员从厄立特里亚运到埃及(西奈)。军火和人口贩运活动由同一网络管理，使用相同的车辆，并牵涉到同一批厄立特里亚官员。

²³ 电子通讯，2012 年 5 月 18 日。

78. 监察组此后了解到，这一项活动的规模比以前所认为的规模大得多。根据以色列人口、移民和边境事务管理局的资料，2006 年至 2012 年 2 月，有 58 088 名寻求庇护者通过以色列-埃及边境进入以色列；其中 56.5%(即 32 082 人)来自厄立特里亚。²⁴ 联合国难民事务高级专员办事处(难民署)统计资料所显示的数字要高得多，2009 年至 2011 年，有 59 969 名厄立特里亚人通过埃及进入以色列。²⁵

79. 这些寻求庇护者的经历都有据可查。以色列境内的非政府组织记录了非洲寻求庇护者的 1 300 多份证词，其中一半以上都来自厄立特里亚。²⁶ 其中 61 人点名指认Rashaida族和贝都因族贩运分子，常说在被俘期间遭受身心折磨。

80. 以色列和西奈半岛的多个独立消息来源都指认 Teklai Kifle Manjus 将军和 Fitsum Yishak 上校(见 S/2011/433，第 262(b)段)以及一系列中介人对从厄立特里亚跨界走私人口和武器负有直接责任。

81. 与厄立特里亚移民的约谈记录样本载于附件 2.2.

贩运网络

82. 贩运行动在 Manjus 将军的操控下从厄立特里亚西部开始，据西奈一个走私网络的一名前翻译所述，2011 年，两名叫 Borhame 和 Yesef Hadegu 的军事参谋在 Manjus 指挥下组织了出口武器货源。这位前翻译陈述如下：“Manjus 拿走了所有的钱。他们没有得到任何东西。他们在军队服役，只能按命令行事”(见附件 2.2)。

83. 这批武器一般被称为卡拉什尼科夫型突击步枪和火箭榴弹。许多武器都带有他们以前隶属的厄立特里亚军事部队的标识。²⁷ 武器均通过Teseney跨界运往 Wadi Sharifay，交给Rashaida族贩运网络手中，据说每只步枪的成本为 250 美元左右，在埃及以高出许多的价格卖给巴勒斯坦经纪人。

84. Rashaida 族走私分子虽说也从苏丹东部的营地劫持难民，但他们往往从苏丹向厄立特里亚移民兜售卡车席位，每个席位的平均费用为 3 000 美元。卡车往往装满武器和弹药，乘客及其货物则被安置在上面掩护货物。

85. 为了从埃及过境，Rashaida 族走私分子往往将移民交给贝都因族贩运分子。不过，例行做法是，贩运分子并不将乘客运往目的地，而是扣押乘客，向其家人

²⁴ 见 <http://www.piba.gov.il/>。

²⁵ 难民署经常要求的统计数据(见 <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a0174156.html>)和难民署在线人口统计数据库(见 <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase>)。

²⁶ 2011 年 9 月，有 1 304 个寻求庇护者从埃及进入以色列；2011 年 10 月，有 1 998 人；2011 年 11 月，2 698 人；2011 年 12 月，2 869 人；2012 年 1 月，2 176 人；2012 年 2 月，1 531 人。见 <http://www.piba.gov.il/PublicationAndTender/ForeignWorkersStat/Documents/אפריל202012.pdf>。

²⁷ 与监察组一起进行的秘密约谈，2012 年 6 月 6 日、7 日和 9 日，以色列特拉维夫。

勒索巨额赎金，然后才予释放：赎金通常为 30 000 至 50 000 美元。如果不支付赎金，人质会受到残酷折磨或被杀害。Bedouin 族一些走私分子告诉被扣押者，如果付款没来，他们的人体器官会被摘除和出售。

86. 据报道，西奈半岛有一位叫 Abu Ahmed 的著名贩运分子曾经每月至少交付 1 200 件小武器及大量弹药。因此，仅武器一项(不包括弹药)与 Manjus 将军所辖网络的交易量价值就高达每月至少 300 000 美元，即每年 360 万美元。

五. 厄立特里亚境外征税

87. 安全理事会在第 2023(2011)号决议中谴责厄立特里亚政府利用侨民税破坏非洲之角的稳定或违反相关决议，包括用于采购武器和相关物资，转交给武装反对派团体，或直接或间接地向这些团体提供服务或资金。安理会还决定，厄立特里亚应停止使用敲诈勒索、暴力威胁、欺诈和其他非法手段在厄立特里亚境外对其国民或其他厄立特里亚裔人征税。

88. 因此，监察组进行了调查，以确定厄立特里亚当局是否实际使用了敲诈勒索、暴力威胁、欺诈和其他非法手段在厄立特里亚境外征税，并确定此类税收的用途。调查结论详情载于附件 3.1。

关于厄立特里亚域外征税的一般性意见

89. 厄立特里亚政府和执政的人阵对居住在国外的厄立特里亚公民和厄立特里亚裔外国国民实行各种域外征税规定。此外，还鼓励厄立特里亚侨民为各类事业“自愿”捐款，但实际上，如不遵守，就会受到惩罚。

90. 厄立特里亚域外税赋的支付程序因地制宜。在有大使馆或领事馆的地方，通常是直接支付给大使馆。在没有官方代表处的地方，则由当地人阵代理人或活动者担当收税员。例如，在华盛顿州西雅图，税款可通过厄立特里亚拥有的一家旅行社缴纳。²⁸ 他们采用的方法是否具有敲诈或非法性质往往要视所在国或所在州法律而定，并取决于收税人是外交官还是外国其他注册代理商、收税人的国籍以及收税人利用了哪类法律和行政漏洞。

91. 厄立特里亚官员和政党代理人经常采取威胁、恐吓和胁迫措施索取付款。最常用的手法是在缴纳税款前拒不提供与此毫无关联的服务。其他措施包括骚扰、恐吓和威胁在厄立特里亚境内进行报复：拒不纳税款者可能被剥夺继承权，家人可能受到惩罚；本人如果返回厄立特里亚可能被拘留或拒发出境签证。

92. 自第 1907(2009)和 2023(2011)号决议通过以来，厄立特里亚域外征税办法受到更严格的审查，面临更艰巨的挑战。2011 年 5 月 20 日，联合王国政府通知

²⁸ 约谈，2012 年 3 月 28 日，美国华盛顿州西雅图。

厄立特里亚当局，鉴于 2% 税率款征收的某些方面可能触犯法律，并违反了《维也纳外交关系公约》，因此在提出相反证明前，厄立特里亚大使馆应立即完全停止与此征税有关的一切活动。²⁹ 德国政府也要求厄立特里亚停止利用德国领土上的厄立特里亚外交使团征收 2% 税率款。³⁰ 厄立特里亚侨民越来越多地开始根据东道国法律对该税的合法性提出质疑。³¹

93. 因此，征税办法越来越多地旨在避免与东道国调查人员和检察官发生直接对抗，与厄立特里亚人民解放阵线(解阵)在争取解放斗争中使用的秘密筹资办法也越来越像——但没有达到解阵曾经享有的同等民众支持度。³² 目前越来越强调“自愿”捐款，通过人阵代理人和活动者举办的音乐会和“文化活动”筹款，但在某些情况下，即使这样的捐款也属非法(见下文文化活动一节和附件 3.1)。

“2%发展和复兴税”

94. 安全理事会第 2023(2011) 号决议中所说的侨民税，厄立特里亚当局称之为 2% 发展和复兴税，“1994 年由国民议会颁布，以缓解政府为支助战争致残者和烈士遗属迄今继续承担的巨额年度预算开支”。³³ 在 2012 年 4 月 18 日给委员会的一封信中，厄立特里亚政府否认该税属于法外，并提到在 1994 年一份政府公报上发布的一项具体法律，但未作进一步说明。该信还提到“对那些逃避或拒绝服从者适用的一些行政条例”，包括“没收某些权利，例如房地产所有权和商业特权”，但申明“这些措施不会，也不能，域外执行”。

95. 监察组从散居国外的厄立特里亚人和东道国当局那里收集到了很多证词，其中描述了厄立特里亚使馆人员和人阵代表征讨付款时采用的各种办法。³⁴ 据与监

²⁹ 外交部声明，“外交部对领事官员要求会见厄立特里亚境内被拘留者被拒绝一事表示关切”，2011 年 5 月 26 日。据厄立特里亚人权活动者 Elsa Chyrum 说，厄立特里亚政府和政党代理人此后又在联合王国境内征税。驻联合王国的厄立特里亚官员要求检查 P60 表格(英国官方纳税和税赋简表)；并按 2% 税率计征厄立特里亚税赋。

³⁰ 德国外交渠道消息，2012 年 4 月 22 日。

³¹ 仅在加拿大，2010 至 2012 年，厄立特里亚侨民已就人阵筹资活动分别投诉四次：一次在 Calgary，一次在 Winnipeg，两次在 Ottawa。

³² 在埃塞俄比亚内战(1975 至 1991 年)期间，解阵采用了秘密程序，为秘密支持其针对门格斯图政权的战争努力提供资金。与前厄立特里亚外交官的约谈，2011 年 9 月 11 日，伦敦。

³³ 厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表阿拉亚·德斯塔先生在安全理事会关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992) 号和第 1907(2009) 号决议委员会非正式磋商时的发言，2012 年 4 月 18 日，纽约。

³⁴ 与可信的厄立特里亚侨民和前高级官员的多次约谈，时间和地点分别是：2011 年 9 月在瑞典、荷兰和联合王国；2012 年 3 月 27 日和 28 日在美国加利福尼亚州亚奥克兰和华盛顿州西雅图；2012 年 1 月和 4 月期间在美国哥伦比亚特区华盛顿。

察组本身调查结果一致的加拿大皇家骑警最近的一项评估介绍，拒绝缴税往往会导致仍居住在厄立特里亚的家庭成员被拒绝服务或受到威胁或骚扰，而被指欠税的个人如果前往厄立特里亚，则可能遭到逮捕。

96. 对于散居国外的厄立特里亚人而言，支付 2% 的所得税是取得任何政府服务的一个先决条件，而且要追溯到上一次缴税的日期。³⁵ 与厄立特里亚大使馆或领事馆的任何接触，无论是换领护照、申办签证、家庭团聚或继承事宜，都会自动触发追溯缴税的要求。

97. 申请人也可能被要求签署一份移民和民事服务申请表，又称 B4 表或遗憾信。该表格要求申请人签署一份声明，“对未完成国民服务而犯法表示遗憾”，并表示“愿在适当时接受相应处罚”（见附件 3.1. b）。

98. 居住在厄立特里亚的亲属请求服务也可触发对侨民的缴税要求。如果侨居国外的某个家庭成员未缴税，年度营业执照的续期或授权委托书的请求可能会被拒绝。如果缴款要求被拒，居住在厄立特里亚的亲属往往会被要求与侨居国外的家庭成员正式断绝关系，否则就要承担后果。³⁶

99. 最后，散居国外的厄立特里亚人如果没有缴纳那 2% 的税，在回国访问时就可能遭到延误或拘留。厄立特里亚当局并不区分居住在国外的厄立特里亚国民和厄立特里亚裔的外国国民。因此，在有关事项未解决之前，持外国护照的人在前往其国籍国领事馆寻求服务时，也可能遭到拦截。

向厄立特里亚国防军捐款

100. 在一些国家，散居国外的厄立特里亚人可能被要求在 2% 的税之外再为厄立特里亚国防预算捐款。例如，在加拿大，2% 的税表中规定要为国防作贡献，并说明是“为巩固国防抵御埃塞俄比亚侵略而捐款”（见附件 3.1. c.）。³⁷

101. 不过，这种“捐款”并不一定是自愿的。对这一要求有亲身体会的多个消息来源告诉监察组，如果一个厄立特里亚人同意支付 2% 的税，但拒绝为厄立特里亚国防预算捐款，就可能受到如同拒绝缴纳“侨民税”一样的惩罚。³⁸

102. 监察组认为，要求为厄立特里亚军事开支捐款可以说违反了安全理事会第 1907(2009) 号决议第 5 段，其中要求会员国采取必要措施，除其他外防止与军火禁运涵盖的厄立特里亚军事活动有关的财政援助。

³⁵ 对于从未缴纳过侨民税的厄立特里亚人而言，人阵表格及代理人在计算拖欠的所得税款时要追溯到 1992 年。

³⁶ 2012 年 3 月 27 日在美国华盛顿州西雅图和 2012 年 3 月 28 日在美国加利福尼亚州奥克兰的约谈。

³⁷ Aaron Berhane, “Eritrean Repression follows emigrants to Canada”, 《星报》(The Star), 2012 年 5 月 14 日。

³⁸ 2012 年 1 月 18 日和 2012 年 6 月 3 日的约谈。

文化活动

103. 人阵征集“自愿”捐款的措施包括越来越多地依赖在欧洲、北美以及其他禁止政治集会的国家举办的“民俗节日”上和其他文化活动中筹款。³⁹ 这些活动的第二个目的通常是使人阵的代理人和活动者能在散居国外的社区中衡量对该党的忠诚。⁴⁰ 据监视此类活动的西方执法人员介绍，人阵在这种节日和音乐会上的筹款正迅速成为厄立特里亚当局硬通货的一个主要来源。⁴¹

104. 此类活动的组织可能并不总是透明或合法。人阵的许多活动被形容为厄立特里亚社区的活动，而不是政治活动，而人阵主导的一批厄立特里亚社区中心为了从东道国政府获得财政援助可能会隐瞒其政治性质。2012 年初人阵在加拿大开展的一次筹款活动被谎报为一场援助厄立特里亚孤儿和儿童的运动，这种做法可能违反了加拿大法律(见附件 3.1)。

厄立特里亚政府和人阵对第 2023(2011)号决议的反应

105. 对于国际监督的扩大和安全理事会第 2023(2011)号决议的通过，厄立特里亚当局的反应是使域外征税程序更加非正式和不透明。

106. 这种非正式征税系统的一个主要特点是该程序本身就缺少文字记录。除大使馆和领事馆官员外，厄立特里亚税收人员一般既不是外交官，也不是外国政府或政治组织宣布的代理人。例如在美国，监察组了解到，目前人阵没有任何代表或代理人根据《外国代理人登记法》向美国司法部登记。

107. 厄立特里亚大使馆和领事馆不再提供缴税收据。遗憾信由大使馆保留，不向签署人提供副本。资金的流动进一步脱离官方银行账户，改为由人阵代理人和活动者处理的硬通货现金支付，通过指定的厄立特里亚境外私人银行账户办理。⁴² 开罗和迪拜仍然常被指为人阵的重要金融枢纽，但坎帕拉和朱巴的重要性也都在迅速增加。⁴³

³⁹ 2012 年 4 月、5 月和 6 月的约谈和与加拿大皇家骑警的电邮通信。

⁴⁰ 在纳沙特尔大学工作的厄立特里亚问题专家 David Bozzini 说，厄立特里亚政府特别热衷于掌控那些通过在国外寻求庇护而逃避本国常设兵役的人，见“Eritreans complain of intimidation”，2012 年 2 月 1 日。另有与侨民线人和执法消息来源的多次约谈。

⁴¹ 2012 年 1 月 31 日和 4 月 3 日的约谈。

⁴² 2011 年 9 月与一名厄立特里亚前外交官的约谈和 2012 年 3 月 27 日在美国华盛顿州西雅图与一名人阵前税收人员的约谈；另见 S/2011/433，第 372-414 段。

⁴³ 2012 年 1 月 13 日与欧洲某国官员的约谈；2012 年 3 月 27 日在美国华盛顿州西雅图与一名厄立特里亚社区领袖的约谈。

六. 采矿部门收入和尽职调查

108. 安全理事会在第 2023(2011)号决议中呼吁厄立特里亚表明其公共财政是透明的，包括为此与监察组合作，并要求委员会在监察组协助下起草供会员国选用的准则，防止厄立特里亚采矿部门资金被转用于资助违反第 1844(2008)号、第 1862(2009)号、第 1907(2009)号或第 2023(2011)号决议的活动。

109. 厄立特里亚政府对第 2023(2011)号决议的反应是指责推出尽职调查准则“不合理”，“会妨碍一个发展中国家的投资机会和经济增长”。⁴⁴ 厄立特里亚当局没有实际地具体说明，提高自然资源财富管理透明度如何会破坏厄立特里亚境内的投资或经济增长。

110. 在安全理事会关于黄金出口收入使用透明度的要求方面(见安理会第 2023(2011)号决议第 12 段)，厄立特里亚当局也拒绝与监察组合作。

采金收入

111. 厄立特里亚采矿业，尤其是黄金开采业，目前仍处于发展阶段。在厄立特里亚境内，外国投资者必须同国营的厄立特里亚国家矿业公司合资开办企业。投资和收入通过在厄立特里亚设立的多种且处于不同发展阶段、常常是企业化的机构输送，而晦涩的合同安排进一步使全面评价的进行变得更为复杂。

112. 据总部设在加拿大、经营Bisha矿的矿业公司Nevsun公布的数字，2011 年生产的厄立特里亚金矿为 10.7 吨，每盎司平均市值为 1 620 美元(为现金生产成本的 5 倍多)。监察组了解到，这些金矿已通过空运出口到欧洲和北美，⁴⁵ 此外还向中东和南亚空运了一定吨位的金矿产品。⁴⁶ 虽然Nevsun记录的 2011 年其在厄立特里亚的业务收入为 5.48 亿美元，但厄立特里亚政府累积的总收入却未知。不过，根据Nevsun的合同条款，2011 年估计有 7.1 吨矿石转交厄立特里亚当局，其销售额可能超过 4 亿美元。⁴⁷

采矿部门收入管理方面的尽职调查⁴⁸

113. 厄立特里亚的公共财政管理被普遍认为是透明的。国家预算不公开。非洲开发银行关于厄立特里亚 2009-2011 年临时国家战略文件指出，厄立特里亚公共

⁴⁴ 2012 年 3 月 28 日厄立特里亚常驻联合国代表给关于索马里和厄立特里亚的第 751(1992)号和第 1907(2009)号决议委员会主席的信。

⁴⁵ 2011 年 11 月和 2012 年 1 月同政府官员的约谈；2011 年 9 月在日内瓦与专攻采金部门的研究员 Gilles Labarthe 的约谈。

⁴⁶ 2012 年 5 月同了解厄立特里亚飞往国外航班的航空货运专家的约谈。

⁴⁷ 见 <http://www.nevsun.com/news/2012/march21>。

⁴⁸ 厄立特里亚当局经常质疑本节提到的外部评估和全球调查的有效性。但厄立特里亚政府公布的金融数据很少，其公布的数据一般无法得到独立核实。鉴于厄立特里亚当局拒绝与监察组合作，监察组别无选择，只能依靠可公开获得的厄立特里亚经济的数据和分析资料。

财政管理的透明度依然有限，使评估公共财政管理质量的任务变得很困难。厄立特里亚在莫·易卜拉欣基金会 2011 年非洲治理指数排名的 53 个非洲国家中列在第 48 位，在透明国际 2011 年清廉指数排名的 182 个国家中排在第 134 位。⁴⁹ 在世界银行“经商便利度”排名的全球 183 个国家中，厄立特里亚被排在第 180 位。⁵⁰ 国际贸易服务网络“全球贸易网”在关于厄立特里亚的国情简介中写到，没有来自该国中央银行的外国直接投资官方数据。”⁵¹

114. 在这样的背景下，追踪采矿部门收入以确保这些收入没有被用于违反相关的安全理事会决议便具有很大的挑战性。因此，监察组拟订了三个备选方案，供委员会审议。

备选方案 1：自愿披露和指定资金用途

115. 按照备选方案 1，提议厄立特里亚国政府自愿参加管理自然资源收入的国际框架，例如《采掘业透明度倡议》，这将使厄立特里亚当局及其私营部门伙伴有义务遵循以下原则：⁵²

(a) 以公众可获取、可理解的全面方式，向广泛受众定期发表企业向政府支付的所有采矿款项（“付款”）以及政府从采矿企业收到的所有重大收入（“收入”）；

(b) 如果还没有经过可信和独立的审计，则应采用国际审计准则，对付款和收入进行可信和独立的审计；

(c) 在安全理事会决定终止第 2023(2011)号决议规定的各项措施前，应指定收入用于非军事支出；

(d) 由可信和独立的管理者采用国际审计准则对付款、收入和相关支出进行审核，并发表管理者的查核意见，包括发现的任何差异；

(e) 上述办法适用于包括国有企业在内的所有企业；

(f) 民间社会作为参与方积极参加进程的设计、监测和评价，并对公开辩论做出贡献；

(g) 东道国政府制订有关所有上述内容的公开、财政上可持续的工作计划，包括可计量的目标、执行时间表以及对潜在的能力制约因素的评估，国际金融机构在必要时提供援助。

⁴⁹ 见 <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org> 和 <http://www.transparency.org>。

⁵⁰ 见 <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/eritrea/>。

⁵¹ 见 <http://www.globaltrade.net/international-trade-import-exports/m/c/Eritrea.html>。

⁵² 改编自《采掘业透明度倡议》原则和标准，可查阅 <http://eiti.org/eiti/principles>。

116. 监察组提议，应在第 2023(2011) 号决议框架下，向委员会提供付款和收入的报表，并由监察组和为此目的聘用的任何独立审计员对报表进行审查。

备选方案 2: 联合监督

117. 备选方案 2 是备选方案 1 的细化，包括设立存放采矿部门的所有付款和收入的代管账户，直至安全理事会决定终止第 2023(2011) 号决议规定的各项措施。

118. 厄立特里亚政府将与有待确定的商定第三方一道管理账户，并联合授权支出。

备选方案 3: 强制披露

119. 按照备选方案 3，提议在厄立特里亚有采矿利益的各企业的东道国政府要求企业应请求披露以现金或实物方式向厄立特里亚政府支付的所有款项的细目。这将使各东道国政府履行自己对安全理事会的义务，确保向厄立特里亚当局支付的款项不被用于违反相关的决议。

120. 披露要求将包括指明付款账户，以便国家当局和(或)监察组视情况进行追踪。

121. 监察组又提议，对持有以厄立特里亚国政府、人阵或二者的可疑掩护实体名义开设的账户的代理银行，银行的东道国政府也应为相同目的强制要求其披露信息。

七. 阻碍执行第 1862(2009) 号决议的行为

122. 监察组在 2011 年 7 月的报告中表示注意到厄立特里亚拒绝讨论 19 名吉布提军事人员一事，这些军事人员据报在作战中失踪，吉布提当局认为他们被作为战俘扣押在厄立特里亚。

123. 安全理事会在第 1907(2009) 号决议第 4 段中要求厄立特里亚提供关于 2008 年 6 月 10 日至 12 日冲突以来在作战中失踪的吉布提战斗人员的信息，以便有关方面确定吉布提战俘的存在和状况。

124. 监察组认为，把厄立特里亚的沉默视为破坏安全理事会第 1862(2009) 号决议，做出这样的结论为时过早。监察组倒是建议给予卡塔尔国政府的调停更多时间，并扩大其范围，以解决争端的所有方面问题(见 S/2011/433，第 430 段)。

125. 2011 年 10 月 6 日，吉布提常驻联合国代表致函秘书长，通知秘书长两名吉布提战俘逃离了厄立特里亚监狱，同时指出厄立特里亚政府迄今一直否认羁押任何吉布提战俘(S/2011/617)。

吉布提战俘逃离厄立特里亚

126. 2011 年 9 月 16 日，两名吉布提战俘，即上等兵 Ahmed Eeleeye Yaabe 和 Khadir Sumbul Ali 逃离了厄立特里亚，并在卡鲁拉的边境哨所向苏丹警察说明了自己的身份。⁵³ 他们的身份与 2008 年 6 月 10 日在作战中失踪的吉布提军事人员的名单相吻合。2012 年 1 月 8 日，监察组在吉布提约谈了这两名前战俘。

127. Yaabe 和 Ali 于 2008 年 6 月 10 日在杜梅伊拉角附近与其他五名吉布提士兵一起被俘。七人中有五人在战斗中受伤，他们在得到草草急救后被转移到阿萨布的一处羁押设施，他们在那里受到讯问并被羁押了近两个月。

128. 然后，他们从阿萨布经由阿斯马拉被转移到 Shabay-Mandar 的军事监狱营地，营地在 Afabet 市附近，在接下来的三年零一个月中他们一直呆在那里。尽管他们没有受到身体虐待，但羁押条件很恶劣。所有七名战俘都营养不良，两人失明。伤者得不到医疗治疗，体内有弹头和弹片的伤员没有得到处理，一人丧失了手臂功能。至 2011 年 9 月 5 日越狱时，只有 Yaabe 和 Ali 足够强壮和健康来进行这一尝试。

129. 2011 年 10 月 6 日吉布提常驻联合国代表给秘书长的信(S/2011/617)以及本报告附件 4.1 更详细地记述了两人被羁押和逃离的情况。

评估

130. 2011 年 11 月 29 日，厄立特里亚外交部长奥斯曼·萨利赫·穆罕默德在给非洲联盟委员会主席的一封信中称，战俘问题依据在卡塔尔主持下吉布提与厄立特里亚签署的《全面协议》第 3 条解决，并称“不存在也不应设立其他的平行调解模式或机制。”外交部长的信还指出，联合国和非洲联盟都已认可卡塔尔协议。

131. 尽管有外交部长的信，但安全理事会第 2023(2011)号决议要求厄立特里亚提供自 2008 年 6 月 10 日至 12 日发生冲突后在战场上失踪的吉布提作战人员的信息，以便有关方面能确定吉布提战俘的下落和情况。监察组认为，安全理事会该决议的日期在卡塔尔协议之后，决议应取代协议。

132. 揭示的情况表明，厄立特里亚当局确实羁押着吉布提军事人员，而且尽管生存条件恶劣，但已知在 2011 年 9 月至少仍有 5 名战俘幸存，这就使厄立特里亚执行安全理事会第 1862(2009)号决议和其后各项决议成为当务之急。

133. 因此监察组的评估意见是，厄立特里亚继续否认扣留吉布提战俘，并拒绝提供资料，这构成妨碍第 1862(2009)号决议的行为，应考虑根据第 1907(2009)号决议对责任者采取定向措施。

⁵³ 自那以后两人被提升为中士。

八. 建议

军火禁运

134. 监察组建议安全理事会考虑请埃及、厄立特里亚、以色列和苏丹各国政府就四国之间的军火和人口贩运问题通报情况，并请有相关专门知识的非政府组织通过“阿里亚方法”通报情况。

域外征收税入

135. 监察组建议，鉴于监察组在本报告中提供的新资料，安全理事会考虑重申其决定，即厄立特里亚应停止使用敲诈勒索、暴力威胁、欺诈和其他非法手段在厄立特里亚境外对其国民或其他厄立特里亚裔人征税，并提醒会员国根据第 2023 (2011) 号决议第 11 段承担的义务。

采矿收入

136. 监察组建议，或是厄立特里亚政府自愿采纳管理其采矿收入的透明框架，或是会员国对采矿公司和处理厄立特里亚收入的代理银行实行披露信息规定。

执行第 1862 (2009) 号决议

137. 监察组建议，厄立特里亚政府应立即向卡塔尔政府或红十字国际委员会提供一切可获得的资料，说明其羁押的吉布提战俘或 2008 年 6 月敌对行动后报告在作战中失踪的吉布提军事人员的情况。

Annex 1

Support for armed groups in the region

Annex 1.1

Support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front

Background

1. On 31 October 2011, a combined group of fighters from the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) clashed near Seejo, in central Somalia with local militia from Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ), a group nominally aligned with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and supported by Ethiopia in its efforts to combat the Islamist extremist organization, Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin. The ONLF/OLF fighters were intercepted as they attempted to cross the border from Somalia into Ethiopia where they would join the ranks of their respective movements.¹

2. After a brief series of skirmishes, 25 members of the ONLF/OLF group (5 ONLF and 18 OLF) were taken prisoner, while the remainder scattered into the bush. The Monitoring Group has the opportunity to interview the detainees over the course of several days in Jigjiga, eastern Ethiopia, in November 2011, as well as senior officials from both wings of the ONLF, ASWJ, and confidential Somali sources with direct knowledge of ONLF operations in Somalia. The Monitoring Group also inspected arms and ammunition carried by the ONLF/OLF fighters.

3. Both groups had been trained in Eritrea over extended periods and were familiar with various training camps and Eritrean training officers. The information they provided was consistent with testimonies of other members of armed groups trained in Eritrea interviewed by the Monitoring Group over the course of successive mandates.

Training in Eritrea

4. The ONLF group consisted of five fighters trained in Eritrea as unit commanders headed by Abdirahman Ahmed Olaad, an ONLF operation commander well known to other ONLF leaders and fighters interviewed by the Monitoring Group on separate occasions. Olaad told the Monitoring Group that he is a member of the Ogaden/Maxamed Subeer/Reer Isaaq clan who had joined the ONLF in 1998 at Dhagaxbuur. He was sent for training in Eritrea in 2007, together with approximately 100 other fighters, upon the instructions of the ONLF central Committee. Olaad travelled to Eritrea via Djibouti.

Kiloma training camp

5. At the Djibouti-Eritrea border, Olaad's cohort was received by Sheikh Deeq, a senior ONLF official, and placed under control over the Eritrean military. They were

¹ The clashes were reported in Somali media, for example: <http://kismaayo24.com/?p=19592>; http://www.camaloow.com/print.php?type=N&item_id=3984; <http://shabelle.net/wararka/42-new-in-somali-content/2710-dagaal-culus-oo-ka-qarxay-degmada-cadaado-ee-gobolka-galgaduud>.

initially taken to Kiloma (near Asab) for training, where they encountered members of other armed groups including some from Djibouti (see Annex 1.1.a.).²

6. The ONLF had a separate camp at Kiloma where the cohort was divided into two groups. The initial instruction, consisting of basic combat training and leadership skills lasted almost three months and was conducted by Eritrean officers only, not ONLF. The Eritrean officers included:

- Colonel “Samuun”: Camp Commander, who spoke and wrote notes in Amharic, so trainees required a translator;
- “Mengiste”: Deputy Commander prepared and organized the training programme;
- Yosef: conducted practical training;
- Mehari: conducted practical training.

7. Other officers not directly responsible for the training course included:

- Colonel “Hasanaad”: attended the ONLF graduation ceremony at Asab. He was described by the interviews as “a political commissar”, but has also been previously identified to the Monitoring Group as a military intelligence officer named “Hatsaynet”;³
- Colonel “Musa”: ONLF trainees heard him spoken about, but did not see him. “Musa” has previously been identified to the Monitoring Group as Tewelde Habte Negash (a.k.a. Amanuel Kidane and Wadi Kidane);
- “Shifew” and “Abdikarim”: ranks and responsibilities unknown.

‘Een Training Camp

8. From Kiloma, selected ONLF trainees were taken to ‘Een training camp (near the village of Shi’ib to the northwest of Massawa), where several hundred trainees from various armed groups were hosted in different clusters around the camp.⁴ One of the other groups in the camp was an earlier cohort of 204 trainees from the ONLF, who subsequently deployed, via Somalia, as the *‘Alanside* force.⁵ The new ONLF trainees also encountered OLF fighters and heard the Tigrayan opposition group “Demhit” mentioned, but did not encounter them. They also learned that the Somali opposition groups Hisb’ul Islam and Al-Shabaab had previously trained at ‘Een, but that this was no longer the case.

9. Training lasted roughly 7 months, and was conducted by a combination of Eritrean and ONLF officers, including:

- Colonel “Jamal”: Camp Commander and reportedly a former Ethiopian military officer. Some Eritrean military defectors have identified him as Colonel Jamal Mohamed Ahmed, a senior instructor specialized in commando and Special Forces training, but the Monitoring Group has been unable to confirm this information.

² The Kiloma training facility is referred to extensively in the July 2011 Monitoring Group report (S/2011/433).

³ S/2011/433, p. 72.

⁴ Een is extensively referred to in the July 2011 Monitoring Group report (S/2011/433).

⁵ See S/2011/433 Annex 8.3.

- “Ramadan”: Deputy Commander.

10. Training at ‘Een was focused on small unit leadership and included the following subjects:

- Operational planning;
- Civil affairs;
- Anti-tank weapons, including FAGOT;
- Mortars, including their use at night and in defensive roles;
- Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

11. There was not training on the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). According to Olaad, the ONLF used to have its own IED expert, named “Hamzi”, who had been trained in Pakistan. “Hamzi” was reportedly killed fighting in Somalia against Ethiopian forces.

Deployment to Somalia

12. According to the five ONLF detainees, they left Eritrea in early September 2011, travelling by land to Khartoum. At the time of their departure from Eritrea, they identified the following senior ONLF leaders as being present in Eritrea:

- Mohamed Hassan Yusuf: responsible for training;
- Abdillahi Mohamed Osman: deputy for training. He had been part of a group of ONLF flown from Eritrea to Dhuusomareeb (Somalia) in 2005, and returned to Eritrea in 2007 as a trainer;⁶
- Abdillahi Mohamed Dhuule: member of the ONLF Central Committee; joined the ONLF in 1999 and travelled to Eritrea in 2007;
- Mohamed Hassan Yusuf: joined the ONLF in 2005 and travelled to Eritrea in 2007;
- Abdi Ahmed Abdi: travelled to Eritrea in 2007; member of the ONLF Central Committee.

13. From Khartoum, their onward travel was arranged by two ONLF facilitators, Mohamed Dayiib and Muhumed Xasan, whose contacts had been provided by the ONLF representative in Asmara, Feysal Dahir. The facilitators arranged for “go home” papers (repatriation letters in lieu of passport) to be issued in order for them to be permitted to fly to Mogadishu, transiting in Nairobi, Kenya. From Mogadishu, the five claim to have taken a minibus to Gaalka’yo, where they linked up with the OLF fighters.

14. However, an independent and reliable source with direct knowledge of ONLF logistical arrangements in Somalia, claims that a group of ONLF fighters deployed from Eritrea entered Somalia via Mareero, near Boosaaso, and travelled by land to Gaalka’yo, before clashing with ASWJ.⁷

15. The Commander of the OLF force, Asad Jamal, confirmed to the Monitoring Group that his force had linked up with the ONLF in Gaalka’yo, having entered Somali by sea via Hobyo. He could not confirm, however, the route the ONLF fighters had taken.

⁶ Abdillahi has reportedly since left Eritrea and is in Jigjiga, Ethiopia.

⁷ Interview with Boosaaso businessman, 23 February 2012.

16. Feysal Dahir had given the group the phone number to they should call upon arrival in Gaalka'yo. According to Olaad:

The number belonged to Abdirahman, an ONLF member told us he was Bah Geeri, but we later learned he was Reer Isaaq. He was the same man who had organized the movements of the '*Alanside* force and had rented the vehicles in which they had travelled from the coast to Booraame.

17. A senior ONLF figure has separately identified the ONLF representative in Gaalka'yo to the Monitoring Group as Abdirahman Mohamed Hassan, a member of the Reer Isaaq sub clan of the Ogaden. Abdirahman Mohamed Hassan is a close associate and business partner of Mohamed Aydiid Jaama', the Deputy Chairman of the Boosaaso Chamber of Commerce. Aydiid has been identified by multiple sources as an arms dealer and facilitator who has long managed ONLF logistics from Boosaaso and was responsible, together with Abdirahman, for the transport of the '*Alanside* force.⁸ The Monitoring Group has separately identified Mohamed Aydiid as the principal arms broker for Al-Shabaab forces in northeastern Somalia, and a former supplier of *Hisb'ul Islaam* as well.⁹

18. Abdirahman reportedly arranged for weapons and ammunition to be provided to the group in Gaalka'yo, and for transportation to take them to Godinlaabe, near Adaado, in central Somalia, which is Adaado is the capital of the "Himan iyo Heeb" regional authority.

Assault rifles and mines recovered from the ONLF/OLF fighters



⁸ Interview with elder from Boosaaso, 11 November 2011; interviews with former ONLF leader 14-15 December 2011; interview with ONLF leader, 19 December 2011.

⁹ Interview with mixed group of former ONLF leaders, operational commanders and fighters, 23 November 2011.

19. After one night at Godinlaabe, they departed in two vehicles for the Ethiopian border, but one of the vehicles was in bad condition and broke down soon after leaving the tarmac road, near a settlement named Balliga'ad. Some of the group then took the other vehicles to seek new transport from Guuri'eel, a town controlled by ASWJ.

20. En route to Guuri'eel, they were stopped by three 'technical' vehicles manned by ASWJ fighters from the Habar Gidir/Ayr clan, who detained them for questioning. When they did not return, the remainder of the group realised that there was a problem and started to head for the border, but were intercepted by ASWJ militia near Garasle. After an all-night pursuit, the ASWJ fighters eventually succeeded in cutting them off: four ONLF/OLF fighters were reportedly killed in the action, and the remainder captured.¹⁰

21. On 7 November 2011, the Vice Executive Chairman of ASWJ, Sheikh Ahmed Abdullahi "Ilka'ase" issued a statement condemning the "Himan iyo Heeb" administration for allowing the ONLF fighters to transit their territory into ASWJ controlled areas.¹¹


¹⁰ ASWJ leaders confirmed this incident in an interview with the Monitoring Group on 11 January 2012.

¹¹ Confidential agency security report, 9 November 2011.


Annex 1.1.a**Aerial view of Kiloma training camp and adjacent airstrip (17 April 2006)**

Annex 1.1.b

Aerial view of Harena training camp (17 November 2006)



Annex 1.1.c
Aerial view of Sawa training camp and military base
(11 February 2006)



Annex 2

Violations of the general and complete arms embargo

Annex 2.1

Aerial view of the military apron of Asmara airport

On 10 September 2009




On 11 April 2010



1. Sukhoi Su-27
2. Mig-29
3. Mi-17
4. Mi-35

5. Yak Y-12
6. Augusta-Bell 412
7. Aermacchi MB-339C
8. L-90TP Redigo

On 31 July 2010



On 31 January 2011



1. Sukhoi Su-27

2. Mig-29

3. Mi-17

4. Mi-35

5. Yak Y-12

6. Augusta-Bell 412

7. Aermacchi MB-339C

8. L-90TP Redigo

On 1 March 2012



1. Sukhoi Su-27
2. Mig-29
3. Mi-17
4. Mi-35
5. Yak Y-12

6. Augusta-Bell 412
7. Aermacchi MB-339C
8. L-90TP Redigo
9. Aero L-39 Albatros
10. Fleet of unidentified 1-2 seater, possibly Zlin Z 42 or similar model

Source: Google Earth Pro version 6.2.2.6613, accessed on 7 May 2012 at <http://kh.google.com>; GPS coordinates of Asmara military apron according to Google Earth Pro: Latitude: 15°17'38.99"N / Longitude: 38°55'10.50"E; information compiled with the kind assistance of Siemon Wezeman, Senior Resercher at the Arms Transfers Programme of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Annex 2.2

Trafficking of arms and people — testimonies

1. Of 1,300 testimonies, 61 were from Eritreans who identified the names of Rashaida smugglers. The following are sample testimonies that illustrate either links to Eritrean officials, arms trafficking and/or abuse at the hands of traffickers.

May 2012: Combined arms and human trafficking

2. I left the Israeli prison two weeks ago after spending two weeks in a camp in the Sinai. I was held there by two Bedouin smugglers called Mohamed and Mustafa.

3. I was in Shegara refugee camp in Sudan when they kidnapped me. I had only been in the refugee camp for two weeks. The ones who have been there longer don't fall for the trap.

4. Some Rashaida came into the camp saying: "Come quickly, come with us, there is work ...". A few of us followed them and suddenly they jumped on us and forced us into cars. There are Rashaida in both Eritrea and Sudan — there's really no border for them — and there are words the Rashaida speak that we all understand.

5. I was taken to a place in Kassala and held there. There were four guards — different ones every day. There was one guy controlling everything, the big boss, but I only saw him once and I didn't catch his name.

6. From there, we were taken to the border with Egypt. We were two cars with 15 people in each — we were stuff in together. There were Kalashnikovs, RPGs and grenades in both cars.

7. They put in as many weapons as they could fit around us and some in the boot [trunk] of the car. These weapons came with us all the way to Sinai. I don't know where they were from but they were very new. The Bedouin were armed with Kalashnikovs — sometimes they would fire them in the air while they were driving.

8. It was impossible to know how many weapons there are but I knew there were at least two RPGs because I saw the heads of them.

9. We switched cars two times on the way to Sinai. The first switch was a handover from the Rashaida to the Bedouin, after a two-day drive from Kassala. The second time we were delivered to Mustafa and Mohamed.

10. Then we were put in a big truck and the weapons followed us in another smaller car. We drove for two days and two nights then we met up again with the smaller car with the weapons and drove down a hill directly into Sinai.

11. We were held in the camp in the middle of a big open area in the desert. There was a compound of a few houses spread out that belonged to the smugglers.

12. Mustafa holds people in two places — I was in a camp with 60 others. I don't know how many people were in the other place but I know that 17 people who arrived at our camp were sent on there. All of us were from Eritrea. There was a house that we

would call “the weapons house”. We could see from our building men would walk into this house empty handed and leave with weapons.

13. I had to pay a fee to leave but only the regular smuggling fee \$3,100. I was lucky. I heard that the people who were taken from our group were sold for a lot of money so they could be ransomed.

14. Mustafa is about 45 and Mohamed more like 40. They are very rich and have a lot of very new cars; Toyota pick-up trucks.

15. Mohamed only spoke Arabic but Mustafa could stutter a few words of Tigrinya. All of the rest of them only spoke Arabic. Except every two to three days a man called Abu Mohamed would come and try to buy people for around \$20,000-\$30,000. I think he would buy them for about that much and then hold them to ransom for \$50,000. If they couldn't pay, they would take their organs.

16. The Eritreans who were there before us told us that the Bedouin had threatened them that they would be killed for their organs and that is what was happening to the others.

17. Abu Mohamed speaks Tigrinya. Sometimes he would speak to Mustafa in Tigrinya just so that we could understand the horrible things they were intending to do to us.

18. I left Sudan on 1 April 2012 and arrived in Israel on 1 May 2012.

March 2012: Abuse of hostages (1)

19. I am 22 years old and I am from the village of Digesa in Eritrea. I arrived to Israel on March 3, 2012 and was put in the Israeli prison. I was released from the Israeli prison on March 22, 2012.

20. I left Eritrea on April 2, 2011 to Adi Harish Refugee Camp (near May Aini Refugee Camp) in Ethiopia. In Eritrea, I was forcibly recruited to Sawa military training base against my will. I left the country illegally to escape these harsh conditions. If I am returned to Eritrea, they will imprison me, torture me, and maybe even kill me.

21. I stayed in Adi Harish for two months and then I went to Shagarab Refugee Camp in Sudan. I stayed in Shagarab for approximately 3 days and then I moved to Khartoum, Sudan. My plan was to stay and live in Khartoum in Sudan. Unfortunately, I only stayed in Khartoum for 2 months.

22. In August 2011, when I was working in cleaning in Khartoum, Sudanese of the Rashaida tribe kidnapped me from my workplace and brought me to Kassala in Sudan. I spent 2 weeks in Kassala, locked up and guarded. We were a group of 28 people, including 4 women. After two weeks, we were put in 2 pickup trucks. They told us that we had to pay 120,000 Nakfa (Eritrean currency) which equals 3,000 US dollars. They told me I had to pay this money in order to be taken to Israel and that this was the only option to be released from the kidnappers. Before this point, I had never even thought of going to Israel.

23. We were forced to travel 3 days with the Sudanese (Rashaida) smugglers. After 3 days, we were told to get out of the cars. One Rashaida smuggler with a weapon walked with us 20 minutes at night (to the other side of a hill) and we were met by Bedouin smugglers that took control of us from the Rashaida smugglers. We walked a few minutes and then we were forced to board 2 small boats, we travelled on the water for 3 hours. Each boat was guarded by one Bedouin smuggler and they had one weapon. After 3 hours, we got off the boats and walked for a bit. We were told to wait under a mountain until cars came to get us. No cars came and we spent the night and the next day in this place guarded by the armed Bedouin smugglers.

24. During the evening hours of the next day, 2 pickup trucks picked us up and we drove for 3 hours. We were then transferred to one large truck that had a canvas back. We travelled for one day and one night and then were transferred to 2 pickup trucks. We were in the 2 pickup trucks for several hours and then we were transferred again to another large truck with a canvas back. We were on this truck for one day and one night.

25. After we came down from this truck, we were put in a room made from wood from trees. At 4 in the morning, 2 pickup trucks came and drove us for four hours. Each time we switched vehicles, the smugglers (who had weapons each time) changed. After four hours, we found ourselves in the house of the armed Bedouin who had been with the group in one of the pickup trucks for the last four hours.

26. We were held in a room with a garage door that came down and locked us inside. We stayed in this place for one night and in the morning they took us out of the house. We walked 50 meters from the house and they put us in a room that was underground. When I was walking, I saw many very nice houses around me, but this was the nicest house and it was the only one with two floors. We were that same group of 28 people (including 4 women) that had left Kassala, Sudan.

27. We were followed into the room by the armed smuggler as well as several armed men that were holding a big chain. They were 6 men all together that were guarding us. They shackled each of us and they covered our eyes. Each of the 6 smugglers had a plastic pipe filled with wood and iron. Since our eyes were covered, we never knew when we would be the one to be beaten. When they were beating us, they began to demand that we pay 30,000 US dollars.

28. Every day they would come to beat us with the plastic pipe with wood and iron inside it during the evening hours. During this time, I thought about that plastic pipe. It seemed that they wanted a way to hurt us very bad without killing us with one blow. By putting the wood or iron inside the plastic pipe they were more likely to keep us in serious pain, but still alive. However, we knew that repeated beatings with this special stick could kill us. During these 2 weeks, it was the same 6 men that would beat us. I heard the names Abu Abdallah, Yousef, John Sinai, Ahmed, Khaled, and Taleb. Abu Abdallah was the leader.

29. Abu Abdallah seems to be around 60 years old. He is skinny, has a noticeable gap between his two front teeth, and his back is a bit hunched.

30. During the day, we had one telephone that we were supposed to use in order to call and beg our friends and family for the money that would set us free. They would

beat us while we were on the phone so that our families would hear us scream. After 2 weeks of this situation, Abu Abdallah came and told us about a discount. If we paid quickly, we could pay 25,000 dollars. But if we did not pay quickly, he would re-raise the price to 30,000 dollars.

31. They continued to beat us and with such a difficult situation, people began to pay the 25,000 dollars. Three of the women as well as four men were able to pay. After they paid, they were taken from the underground room. One of the men later called us in Sinai from the Israeli prison. He told us that one of the women had been shot at the border. She was then caught along with another women by the Egyptian military. The other woman and the four men had made it into Israel and they were being held in the Israeli prison.

32. There was a two-week period of the beatings that no one else was able to pay. It was during these two weeks that they started to electrocute us in addition to the beatings. They would also burn plastic onto our bodies. Following this, five more people were able to pay and they were taken from the room.

33. And then another five came up with the money. I was one of these five that was able to pay. However, Abu Abdallah told us that he would not take us from the room until ten people had come up with the money. We were only five that had organized the money and the other eleven people did not have the money. Then one of the eleven people, a man in his early 20s by the name of Ukbankiel, died from the beatings and hunger.

34. The beatings of the 10 people that had not paid (or been killed) intensified to twice a day. After 2 months of these conditions, three more people were able to come up with the money, 2 men and the 1 remaining woman.

35. Abu Abdallah told us that he would take the 8 of us out of the house to Israel. The five of us that had paid initially were put in one car and the three that had just paid were put in a second car. I later found out that those in the second car were sold to another group of smugglers. To date, two have paid it into Israel (including the woman) and one is still in Sinai.

36. John Sinai drove the second car and we were guarded by another man with a weapon. After driving for five minutes, we were told to exit the car and we were forced into another underground room. There were already 2 Eritreans in the room that I had never seen before. They told us that they had been in this room for the past 7 months and were expected to pay 33,000 dollars. The two Eritreans were named Weldu and Eyob, they had already paid some money but not the full amount. The group of 5 included Awet (myself), Robiel, Goytom, Daniel, and Ahferom.

37. When we arrived, John Sinai entered the room and told us to forget that we had already paid 25,000 dollars and that we must pay an additional 15,000 dollars. After one month, another 11 men (9 Eritreans and 2 Ethiopians) joined us. These 11 were told to pay 33,000 dollars, the ransom for the 5 of us was lowered to 10,000 dollars, and the two that had been there when we arrived still had to complete their initial payment.

38. John Sinai seems to be in his 30s. He is a bit fat and medium height. He is also about 1 meter 70 cm.

39. Later that night, another Eritrean entered the room, by the name of Welday Solomon. The smugglers called him Abdu and he was the translator for the smugglers. While he slept in the room with us, he would often sit with the smugglers and eat with them. He would beat us when the smugglers were there and even after the smugglers would leave, he would continue to beat us with the special stick.
40. Welday Solomon seems to be 27 years old, he is thick although not fat and not skinny. His hair is receding a bit and he is about 1 meter 70 cm. He usually has a full beard.
41. Welday Solomon was in charge of giving us the phone to call our families. He would tell our families that if we did not pay, he would kill us. The families began to stop answering the phone. He would also eat all the food given to the group and drink all of the water that was meant to be for everyone. He would bring the group his urine for them to drink. I have many scars on my hands and my head from this man.
42. While Welday Solomon was beating us, the Bedouin smugglers would continue to torture us as well. I was severely beaten, burned with plastic, and electrocuted. I was also cut up with a knife and have scars on my face and back from the wounds. During the last several weeks, John Sinai would taunt our group of five by saying that it did not matter if he killed us because he already made so much money from us.
43. There was one week where we were not given any food or water. We were only allowed to drink Welday Solomon's urine. During this week, Welday Solomon and John Sinai saw that three people, Robiel, Goytom, and Tsegay, were a bit stronger than the rest. These were three people from my group of five. In order to weaken them, they would hang them from the ceiling of the room and beat them. They would bring them down, give them some water, and hang them back up from the ceiling.
44. After three days of this treatment, Robiel died from his wounds. He was 21 years old. Two hours after he died, John Sinai and Welday Solomon removed his body from the room. We do not know what they did with the body.
45. One day later, after more beatings, Goytom died. Goytom was about 24 years old. They wrapped Goytom's body in a blanket and took him from the room.
46. After three more days of beatings, Tsegay, one of the Eritreans from the group of 11, died. As people kept dying, Welday Solomon would threaten that we would be next.
47. Two days later, Ahferom from my group died from the beatings.
48. After Ahferom died, Welday Solomon disappeared. He did not return. We were now able to eat the food that they brought us and we could drink some water.
49. When John Sinai would come to beat us, he would tell us that he had killed Welday Solomon. It was at this point that John Sinai hung me from the ceiling and increased the beatings against me.
50. After 3 months of being in this second underground room, experiencing this torture and watching my people die, I was able to put together 10,000 dollars and I paid this ransom.
51. I was taken with one other person from the group who had also paid to the Israeli border. We crossed into Israel.
52. The total ransom I paid in Sinai was 35,000 dollars and I spent 7 months in Sinai.

53. I left behind 9 people in that room. I still speak with them on the phone to give them encouragement. They told me that an additional 7 people have joined them. I also heard that Welday Solomon was not killed by John Sinai; but that he had escaped to Cairo, Egypt.

54. Below are pictures of the scars on my body from the torture that I endured in Sinai.



April 2012: Abuse of hostages (2)

55. I lived in Sudan for two years. A human trafficker promised to take me to Sinai for 3,000 dollars. We were 210 people who paid 3,000 dollars.

56. All of us were sold. We were divided into different houses. They told us that we were going to Israel and took us in groups of 10. 50 people were held in each house. We were divided in two rooms. We were taken by car and reached a house. As soon as we left the car, guards with guns started beating us. We were chained by our hands and legs. When we went to the place everybody thought that we were going to Israel, but instead we were put in houses.

57. At the beginning, we were forced to pay 40,000 dollars. We were burned. I was electrocuted. My back is burned. They tortured us because we said that we could not pay the 40,000 dollars. They told us that if we would not pay they would kill us. My hands are swollen. It took time until all of us paid. They were beating us every minute, it took time for our families to pay the money, the beatings continued.

58. I found it very difficult because I have no one in Israel. They were demanding a phone card to call my family. All the Bedouin guards were beating me, torturing me with electricity because I did not have money to pay for the telephone cards to call my family.

59. I never went out. I did not see the sun for 10 months. Sometimes they would blindfold us. I was beaten on my head and my face. They tried to give us drugs to smoke, but we refused. I was whipped, I have lashes all over my back. I was burned with plastic on my back. I have burn wounds all over my arm. My fingers are swollen, my nails are black because of the repeated beatings.

60. Five people died of the 29 people that stayed with us. 10 of us were girls. The five people that died were all boys. The other 24 left after 3 months or 6 months, I was the last one to leave. In the other part I think that there are people who are still left behind. There were new people brought every time. Some paid 40,000 dollars. Others paid 28,000 or 26,000, we paid different amounts of money. The five people died because of the beatings and the torture with electric. They were all young, except two that I think were my age. From the people who died some paid 12,000, 15,000 or 18,000.

61. The name of the trafficker is Abu Musa and his brother is called John Sinai. The children of the traffickers were beating us. Children from 10 to 17 years old were coming and they were beating us. Children were burning my legs. I was beaten in order to be a lesson for others.

62. Three people were hanged. They were hanged for ten days for the new people to see what they would do to him if they would not pay. Two people that were hanged with me died. My hands were almost to be separated. We were tortured while we were hanged from the ceiling.

63. After six days the others died. For ten days in a row I hanged there, no sleep, no food. When we were beaten they took drugs and went to sleep. The people that were with me raised me while they were sleeping so that I could sleep. We were tied up with iron. The chain was tied out of the roof so that they chain could not be opened or I could be released. The tip of my feet were near to the ground.

64. In order to give a lesson to new ones we were hanged like that. The two that were hanged with me were too young to bear all the hardship. I was in the army so I was able to survive the torture. I was beaten on the sole of my feet. I have trouble walking. Even now I cannot stand because of the hanging. I was not able to cross the border on my own. The people carried me across the border.

Photograph of informant's body and scars:



March 2012: Abuse of hostages (3)

65. “I was kidnapped when I was in Sudan in Hamdeid while I was crossing from Ethiopia. The people who helped me to cross the river handed me and 9 other people over to the Rashaida. We were kept in the forest for a week. From there we were sent straight to the Sinai.

66. When we reached in Sinai they asked us to pay US\$ 3,000. After three weeks we paid. We were 27 people. When we paid we were changed to another room, there we were chained and blindfolded and asked another US\$ 33,000. I do not know how many people were with me then. They told us that we were sold.

67. I was beaten on my ears. Pulse was coming from my ears. We were beaten with a piece of wood from a table. We were also tortured with electricity. They put the wire in my mouth, we had to hold it with our teeth. We were blindfolded all the time, I could only hear them.

68. We were hungry most of the time. Because of the beatings I have swollen legs. There were only two that were allowed to go and cross the border. It was difficult for me to cross the border. They told us that they were calling the doctor to take our kidneys.

69. There were women with children, I only heard their voices, I never saw them. I heard that people died, but I never saw them. In the beginning when they blindfolded us they told us that they would take off the blindfold, but they never did. For 60 days I was blindfolded.

70. They were beating us while we were talking with our relatives. The traffickers had different names. Sometimes he called himself Mohammed, at other times Khalid. He told us to tell the people that you are in the house of Mohammed, but his name is Khalid.

71. We were given little water, the little water that was given to us was with diesel. I do not know who paid for me, I know my parents cannot pay. We were taken by car for ten minutes to the border, in fifteen minutes walking we reached the border. I heard a plane moving. It looked like a forest, but not a city.”

March 2011: Abuse of hostages (4)

72. “We were five people together from Eritrea. We were kidnapped as soon as we entered Sudan. We were taken to the desert. We were kept in Sudan and asked to pay more than US\$ 2000 in order to be released to Khartoum. After we told the Rashaida that we don’t have such amount of money we were taken to Sinai and immediately they asked us to pay US\$ 33,000.

73. I was hanged upside down from the ceiling and was beaten. I was chained and we were tortured with electric. I was beaten on my productive organ. I was blindfolded for six months until I paid US\$ 25,000. We were chained five by five persons. If you opened the blindfold they beat you. I only heard voices and the cries of the other people but I do not know who were with me. From the moment we entered we were blindfolded. The smugglers told us that people have died because they did not pay. I did not see them, but we were told. They were also torturing us with fire. The traffickers told me: Either you pay money or your body will be taken away. You will not go out alive if you do not pay. We were with Abu Ahmed and with the brother of Abu Musa, his name is John Sinai. We were beaten on our ears; it is very difficult to

concentrate and to remember what happened. I was beaten on my genitals. I cannot sleep during the night. My hand and feet pain me.

74. I do not know how my family paid. They begged everyone to pay. When I asked my family in Eritrea to pay 22000 they were in shock, they never thought they could pay that amount of money, they begged people to collect the ransom. I was carried across the border, I could not walk. Someone carried me across the border. I am staying with people. There was a shooting at the border, but everyone crossed.”

2011: Involvement of Eritrean officials, including General “Manjus”

75. I have been in Israel for one year. I left Eritrea in 2003. In between, I was in Libya and Sudan. On my way to Israel in 2011, I spent 20 days in the Sinai. I worked as a translator for the smuggler Abu Ahmed.

76. Abu Ahmed is the boss of his family of smugglers. He brings people from Libya and Sudan to Israel and charges them \$15,000 each, no more, no less.

77. He also smuggles weapons. The way he brings them is through Sudan but their journey starts in a place called Allai, in the highlands of Eritrea. From Allai they are taken to Tesseney, which is the exit town of Eritrea.

78. From Tesseney they go to Wadi Sharifay in Sudan, which used to be a refugee camp. From Wadi Sharifay to Sitau Ashrin; which is also a refugee camp.

79. There are two high ranking Eritrean soldiers involved in this, I know them well. Their names are Borhame and Yesef Hadege. The main man who is in charge of all of this is Manjus. The other two are the ones working. They bring the weapons in their cars to Wadi Sharifay. Then Manjus calls the Rashaida and they come and there is a handover — the smugglers take the weapons. These are the same gangs that smuggle people. I know the name of one of them is Abed. They are very tight with the military.

80. Manjus gets all the money. They don’t get anything. They are in the military so they just do what they are told.

81. Their money doesn’t stop with Manjus, it goes all the way up — to the president. The weapons are taken to Sinai. I saw with my own naked eyes, Abu Ahmed buy \$250 each for these weapons. They are mostly Russian, originally. He then sells them to Palestinians for more. All the weapons are old, mostly Kalashnikovs and RPGs.

82. The weapons are taken in a big truck from Eritrea to Sudan. But when they are transported from Sudan to Sinai, they are covered with people so they are not exposed to the satellites.

83. The routes into Egypt come from all different directions but they all cross at exactly the same point on the Suez Canal. They carry the weapons in ships covered with cartons and bags so as not to be detected and people sit on them.

84. Abu Ahmed would receive deliveries of weapons three times a week. In every two deliveries, there would be say 300 weapons; and countless bullets.

85. I also met Abu Abdullah. He used to buy bullets from Abu Ahmed, so I suppose it’s likely that he wasn’t smuggling weapons himself. I think there were a few others who are.

86. Abu Ahmed’s base is obvious. Really, I think those people [in the area] must not have any brains if they don’t know it is there. He has four big houses.

87. There is also a deep underground grave. One day, Abu Ahmed's son Mohamed took us to that grave and said, "Many of your brothers are here. We will put you here too". If you took me in a helicopter, I could show you were this is easily. It's about 200 metres away from the houses and has a big wide opening.

2008: Alleged involvement of Eritrean General "Manjus"

88. I left Sudan in December 2007. Rashaida Arabs brought us through Sudan and then another tribe of Bedouin took us into the Sinai.

89. They drove white Toyota pickup trucks covered in mud to camouflage them, like soldiers. There were 22 of us per truck. They didn't speak in any Eritrean dialects just Arabic. But they have a big connection to Eritrea — the Rashaida in both countries speak the same language. I forgot the name of ours, but there is always a connection man who translates for the smugglers from Arabic into Tigrinya.

90. The connection man in our group told me they had brought weapons from Eritrea. He didn't tell me any of the details about where they were from exactly and how the Rashaida had got hold of them.

91. I don't know how many weapons there were in the car with me but it was full. They covered the weaponry with tent material and made us sit on them. There were RPGs, Kalashnikovs, machineguns.

92. We could only see what was on the top level of the weapons, it was difficult to see how many there were but there were a lot. There was Tigrinya script on the weapons that I saw. The initials of the soldier whose gun it was or of the battalion.

93. There were 17 cars in our convoy. Nine of the cars were travelling ahead of us carrying about 100 people. They reached the border with Egypt, they were stopped by Egyptian soldiers. The Rashaida took out the weapons, gave them to the Eritreans and made them fight the soldiers. Three Eritreans were killed and two Egyptian soldiers. The rest of the Eritreans were captured.

94. The smugglers keep in constant contact with each other and the first group called back to say what had happened. We were lucky. We didn't see any soldiers when we crossed. I'm not sure where we were on the border but there was a huge mountain.

95. There was no highway to drive along in Sudan, we just drove on the sand through the desert all the way from Khartoum to Egypt. When we got into Egypt, we drove on a highway all the way to the Suez Canal.

96. We were smuggled onto a boat with the weapons and with the help of a very senior Egyptian general. I saw him but didn't speak to him and never found out his name but he was very high ranking. The smuggler's agent was the only man who would speak with me.

97. I understand a bit of Arabic though and I overheard the Bedouin saying that the weapons were going to the Palestinians. The last time I saw the weapons was after the channel crossing. We went onto Cairo and I don't know where the weapons went next.

98. I don't know how the process works exactly but I know that one of the senior military officials in Eritrea, Teklai Manjus, gathered all the Rashaida together and told them that wherever they are in the world, they will be Eritreans. The Rashaida have very good contacts with the military but they don't care about nationality or patriotism. They only care about making money.

Annex 3

Revenue collection outside Eritrea

Annex 3.1

Eritrean extraterritorial revenue collection

Overview

1. In order to assess the methods employed by the Eritrean government and PFDJ to collect extraterritorial revenue, the Monitoring Group conducted forty-two interviews with members of the Eritrean diaspora in East Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America. However, because of fear of retribution by the Eritrean authorities, nearly all requested anonymity. Since neither the Government of Eritrea nor the PFDJ distinguish between Eritrean nationals resident abroad and foreign nationals of Eritrean descent, the terms “Eritrean” and “Eritrean diaspora” in the context of this annex refer to both categories.

Enforcement measures

2. The most common of enforcement is for Eritrean tax collectors to demand retroactive payment in full as a precondition for the provision of any consular service. Other enforcement measures vary from country to country. The cases studies below are not limited exclusively to those countries from which the examples have been drawn:

Power of attorney (United States)

3. In the United States, for example, Eritrean tax collectors have long required individuals to provide a copy of a completed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Tax Return Form in order to estimate level and period of income, with retroactive effect. However, many Eritreans either resent the tax or resist it because of their dual tax obligations and therefore underreported their income. When tax agents realized that many declarations were untrue or forged, they adapted their approach, taking the extraordinary step of demanding signed release statements (the equivalent of a power of attorney) in order to allow them to directly access personal tax returns form from the IRS.¹

Denial of service (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

4. Saudi Arabia is a key centre of tax revenue for Eritrea. The number of Eritrean workers in Saudi Arabia is estimated at 300,000; if only 200,000 of these workers paid USD\$ 200 in diaspora taxes (a conservative estimate), the total revenue would be US\$ 40 million per year.

5. The Saudi authorities strictly control residence permits, providing them only if the applicant possesses a valid passport with a minimum of six months validity. Prior to 2010, the Eritrean embassy in Saudi Arabia would deliver passports valid for three years. In 2011, passport validity was reduced to every two years, meaning that Eritrean must visit their Embassy every other year and pay taxes, or they will not legally be able to remain in the Kingdom.

¹ Interview, 1 March 2012.

6. An Eritrean formerly resident in Saudi Arabia, “O”, told the Monitoring Group how he had returned there to marry an Eritrean national. After the wedding, O took his new spouse to the Eritrean Embassy in Riyadh to receive her new passport and was required to pay 2 per cent of his income, which amounted to 700 Riyals (approximately US\$ 200).

7. Whilst in Saudi Arabia, “O” wanted to send a parcel of food and gifts to his relatives in Eritrea, a common custom among members of the Eritrean diaspora. The private shipping company he paid to deliver the package would not accept to place his order unless he first presented proof of payment of the 2 per cent tax. They explained that this obligation was imposed upon them by the Eritrean authorities.

“Regret Letters” (Sweden)

8. In May 2011, two Eritrean opposition activists resident in Sweden, Ms. Meron Estefanos and Mr. Ephraim Tewelde visited the Eritrean Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden in order to document the process of applying for a new passport and national identity card.² Using a concealed camera and microphone, Ephraim recorded their exchanges with the Embassy staff of Eritrea. Extracts from this video footage were aired on Swedish television programme focusing on a number of contentious Swedish-Eritrean issues.³

9. As a first step, Ephraim was instructed to complete an “Immigration and Citizenship Services Request Form”, also known as a “regret letter” (see Annex 3.1.a.). Ephraim initially refused to sign, arguing that he had in fact left Eritrea legally, having declared himself as a student in South Africa for seven years. However, the Embassy official told him that since he did not return to Eritrea upon completion of his studies, Ephraim was now considered “illegal”, and as a result was required to complete and sign the “regret letter”.

10. Ephraim was also told that payment of the 2 per cent tax was a precondition for the provision of any other service, and that he would only be issued with his documents after the Embassy had first verified his tax declaration with the Swedish tax agency.

11. Ephraim was then introduced to an individual known as “Jemal” or “Jimmy” — reportedly a well-known figure within the Eritrean diaspora in Sweden for his role in collection of the 2 per cent tax. When Ephraim expressed concern over the amount of tax he would be required to pay, “Jimmy” replied: “We will make it like a Gurage deal [...] The important thing is the ‘B4’ [form] so you can’t hide from us.”⁴

² Interview with Ms. Meron Estefanos and Ephraim Tewelde, Stockholm, Sweden, 17 January 2012.

³ Documentary film “Fången”, trailer aired on SVT, Swedish state television, 18 September 2011. http://svt.se/2.149941/1.2531035/fangen_-_dawit_isaak_och_tystnaden. For a complete part 4 of the programme, see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rnu2dhngCkI>.

⁴ Ms. Estefanos told the Monitoring Group that the term ‘Gurage’ referred to Ethiopian community reputed for their bargaining skills, meaning that the amount of tax to be paid was negotiable.

Denial of family reunion: case 1

12. In 1995, Ms. “N”, the mother of three children, left Eritrea for Sudan, alone and for personal reasons.⁵ She then travelled to Ethiopia and arrived in Europe in 2006. In 2008, “N” sought to bring in her three sons to join her in Europe and initiated the reunion process via the Eritrean Embassy in her new home country.

13. Although “N” was a beneficiary of social welfare, the Eritrean embassy official nevertheless insisted that she pay 2 per cent of her income in taxes retroactively: approximately US\$ 680. He added that reunification with her children was not a valid argument for waiver of the tax; in paying she was only fulfilling her duties as an Eritrean and should not expect special treatment. According to “N”, another Embassy employee added: “It is you who is in need of us. If you don’t like it, you can leave.” Since “N” could not afford to pay the tax, she left.

14. In June 2010, one of “N’s” sons decided to depart Eritrea using a smuggler’s network, which took him across the border into Sudan. On the road the vehicle was stopped and passengers were robbed. When “N’s” son tried to escape, he was fatally shot.

15. Several weeks later, the mother of “N” passed away in Eritrea and her relatives put her house up for sale. “N” was told by the Embassy that since her remaining son was still a minor, she needed to establish a “Power of Attorney” in the name of a family member, in order for her last child to receive his share of the proceeds (see Annex 3.1.b.). To obtain the “Power of Attorney” she was obliged to pay the 2 per cent tax, now verbally estimated by the Embassy official at over US\$ 800. “N” negotiated and eventually paid about US\$ 500. When she complained, she was told: “All other Eritreans on welfare are paying without complaint.”

Denial of family reunion: case 2

16. In 2003, Mr. S., a former EPLF combatant and teacher in the Eritrean administration, left Eritrea alone for Sudan where he registered as a refugee.⁶ He subsequently travelled to Italy and then onward to a final country in Europe, where he was granted asylum. In 2006, ‘S’ requested the Eritrean Embassy to allow a family reunion with his wife and their only child. He was told to pay the diaspora tax with an eight-year retroactive effect, but refused.

17. In 2007, “S” was granted permanent residence and renewed his request that his wife and child be allowed to rejoin him. Eritrean embassy officials then demanded that, in addition to the 2 per cent tax, he also sign a “regret letter”, which he refused to do.

18. In mid-2011, “S” managed for his wife and child to travel to Sudan, and from there to Europe where they joined at the end of the same year.

Denial of family reunion: case 3

19. After a long career of key posts within EPLF and PFDJ, Mr. Z. Mr. Z. was among those high-ranking EPLF and PFDJ members who objected to President Issaias Aferworki’s plans to stay in power without the implementation of the proposed

⁵ Interviews, 18 January and 12 May 2012.

⁶ Interview, 2 May 2012.

Eritrean Constitution. Facing probable arrest and detention, “Z” fled to Europe, leaving behind his wife and child.

20. When “Z” own status in Europe had stabilized, he informally approached Eritrean officials who told him that they could do nothing for his family unless he was willing to publicly declare that he had illegally left the country, sign the regret letter, and pay 2 per cent tax. “Z” refused.

21. Z’s wife subsequently fled with her child to Sudan at considerable risk. The family was reunited in late 2011.

Private enterprise and the repudiation of relatives: case 1

22. Mr. “K” left Eritrea in 2000 and established himself in the UK.⁷ In 2007, the business licence of his parents’ import-export company in Asmara expired. When the family applied to renew their business licence, the authorities in Asmara stipulated that in order to obtain approval, their son needed to acquit himself of the 2 per cent diaspora tax payment.

23. When his family contacted Mr. K. he replied that he did not want to pay and his parents renounced him as a member of his family in order to obtain the license, creating a longstanding rift in the family.

Private enterprise and the repudiation of relatives: case 2

24. Ms. E fled Eritrea in January 2010 and became a resident in the United Kingdom.⁸ On 22 November 2011, family members still residing in Asmara called and asked her to contact the Eritrean Embassy in her new home country and voluntarily offer to pay the 2 per cent tax on her current income. They made clear that, should she refuse, they would be denied the authorisation to exploit a very profitable business closely associated with government enterprises.

25. “E” refused to pay, citing her new status in the host country and the challenges she faced in starting a new life. In order to obtain government approval for the family business, her mother in Asmara was required to sign a document repudiating her daughter. Since that date they have not been in contact.

Denial of exit from Eritrea (dual nationals)

26. In October 2011, Ms. “E”, a US citizen of Eritrean descent, travelled to Asmara to visit her relatives, although she had refused to pay the diaspora tax to a PFDJ agent in her country.⁹ Shortly before her return flight to Europe, Eritrean officials informed “E” that she would have to pay her outstanding diaspora tax in order to obtain an exit visa. Multiple bureaucratic obstacles in determining the amount to be paid and the payment procedure resulted in such lengthy delays that Ms. E. missed her return flight to the U.S. and had to purchase new air tickets.

27. In 2011, an elderly woman resident in Europe, Mrs. “B” “wanted to visit Eritrea one last time.” Because ‘B’ survives on a state welfare programme, a PFDJ tax

⁷ Interview, 22 April 2012.

⁸ Interview, Zurich, Switzerland, 20 March 2012.

⁹ Interview, Seattle, Wa., U.S., 28 March 2012.

collector agreed that she could travel to Eritrea if she paid just 1 per cent tax on her monthly welfare allowance. Since the tax requirement was retroactive, this represented a significant unplanned expenditure, but she agreed and was permitted to travel.

28. Months later, as “B” prepared to return from Eritrea to her country of residence, government officials who refused to identify themselves stopped her at the airport and demanded payment of what they claimed was the remaining 1 per cent tax due. When she convinced them that she was nearly completely destitute of any financial means, she was told to leave behind Eritrean goods — offered to her by her relatives — she had been planning to bring back with her.

Mandatory contributions to the Eritrean defence budget

Canada

29. In Canada, UN Security Council resolution 1907 (2009) was translated into domestic legislation as “Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Eritrea”, 22 April 2010. The law prohibits any person to knowingly provide or transfer, directly or indirectly, technical or financial assistance related to military activities in Eritrea.¹⁰

30. Nevertheless, the 2 per cent tax form, provided by the Eritrean Consulate in Toronto, includes a distinct column for “donations to national defence against Ethiopian invasion” are expected (see Annex 3.1.c.). The column is divided into several sections corresponding to a time line indicating for which period of the Eritrean conflicts with Ethiopia the applicant is expected to pay.

31. Testimonies recorded by the Monitoring Group describe tax collectors calculating the total 2 per cent tax due, before adding “donations” to the Defence budget. If applicants agree to pay the 2 per cent tax, but refuse a contribution to the Eritrean defence budget, they can be still denied consular services.

32. In 2011, Mr. “W” was required to present a valid passport in order to obtain permanent residence status in Canada. He therefore approached the Eritrean Consulate in Toronto for renewal of his passport. According to a statement, provided by ‘W’ to an Eritrean ‘community leader’ whom he subsequently approached for assistance:

The Eritrean tax collector calculated the amount the person had to pay, including a “donation for the Eritrean defence fund”. Although “W” was willing to pay the 2 per cent, but not the money for defence budget, the Consulate official declared that he would not renew the passport. When “W” asked the Consulate official to provide him with a written notice confirming this Eritrean obligation, the official replied: “it is not in our culture”.¹¹

33. “W” pleaded with Canadian Immigration officials that fundraising for the benefit of Eritrean defence forces violates UN Security Council resolutions and Canadian laws, but they insisted that ‘W’ provide a valid passport in order to obtain permanent resident status in Canada. ‘W’ had no choice but to pay the entire sum requested by the Eritrean Consulate in order to secure his stay in Canada.

¹⁰ <http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2010/2010-05-12/html/sor-dors84-eng.html>.

¹¹ Interviews, May and 11 June 2012.

Sweden/Italy

34. In 2011, since “N” wished to obtain a Power of Attorney document from the Eritrean Embassy to Sweden, and was referred to “Jimmy” (see para 11 above). Since “N” was unemployed, he attempted to convince “Jimmy” that he could not afford to pay over US\$ 5,000 in tax arrears plus US\$ 75 for Power of Attorney documents (see Annex 3.1.d.).

35. After some deliberation on the issue, ‘N’ was eventually informed by another Eritrean diplomat that because he had never contributed to the “National Defence Pledge”, he would be obliged to do so. “The 2% tax is always negotiable, but not the ‘Defence Pledge.’ It’s a national matter, and all nationals should pay.” He eventually paid the total amount in order to obtain the Power of Attorney documents we required.

Illicit means and fraud

36. A PFDJ fundraising drive in Canada in early 2012 falsely presented itself as a campaign to assist Eritreans orphans and children, in potential violation of Canadian law. An RCMP report notes:


On 18 February 2012 in Calgary, PFDJ agents organised a concert with a musical group whose members are alleged by the complainant to be members of the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front). The group is also alleged to have been organized and sponsored by Eritrean diplomats based in Washington, D.C., and Ottawa, Canada. The group came to Canada ostensibly to fund-raise for orphans and other children in Eritrea, and the organizers admit that the funds raised were to be turned over to representatives of the Eritrean government. PFDJ organizations that reportedly host fund raising events are not registered organizations/charities.

37. In Seattle, Washington (U.S.A.), multiples sources have told the Monitoring Group that the “Eritrean Association” community centre in is totally controlled by members of the PFDJ, and serves as the main venue for PFDJ fund raising. Non-PFDJ members, including some former members of the Eritrean Association have been excluded from the centre, which is reportedly financed in large part by the Seattle City Council.¹²

¹² Interviews of Eritrean community members in Seattle, 27 March 2012.

Annex 3.1.a

Power of attorney form and certified translation¹


 ጠቅላላ ቆንስል ሃገረ ኤርትራ
 ቶሮንቶ - ካናዳ
 القنصلية العامة للدولة إريتريا
 تورنتو، كندا
 CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
 TORONTO, CANADA

ዕለት: _____ / _____ / _____
 ቁጽረ መዝገብ: _____

ሰነድ ውክልና

ስም: _____ ስም: _____
 ስም አብ ፓስፖርት: _____ ቁጽ ፓስፖርት: _____
 ዓይነት ፓስፖርት: _____ ዝተዋህበሉ ዕለት: _____ ዝወድቀሉ ዕለት: _____
 ቁጽ ኢር/መንነት: _____ ዕለት ልደት: _____ ሃገር: _____
 አውራጃ: _____ ን.አውራጃ: _____ ከተማ/ዓይ: _____ ስልክ (ገቢ): _____
 ሁሉው እድራሻይ: _____

ዝኾነ ብድልደቱን ምሉእ እስምርቱን አብ ቅድሚ ሓሳፊ/ት ወይ ተጽዋሂ/ት ቤት ጽሕፈት ተገቢላ ሃገረ
 ኤርትራ አብ ካናዳ ተሰባ ገላቶ/ወይዘሮ/ወይዘሪት: _____

ከተማ: _____ ዕለት: _____ ከታም: _____

ቤት ጽሕፈት ኤምባሲ ኤርትራ አብ ካናዳ
 እዚ አብ ሓሳፊ ተጠቅሱ ዘሉ ውክልና ስልጣን፣ ወኪሊ/ት አብ ቤት
 ጽሕፈት ተሰባ/ት ከም ዝፈረመ/ት የረጋገጽ፣ ትሕዝቶ ናይ ውክልና
 ሓሳፍነት፣ ወኪሊ/ት እያ።
 ስምን ከታምን በዓል መዘ: _____

ሓበረቷ
 1. ንኹህ ምድሃል ወይ ምቕደር ቅበል ከምዘባህ ገልጸርህ
 2. እዚ ውክልናዚ አብ ውሽጢ 6 አየርሕ አብ ግዚጽ ግዚሳት 7-9ያት ወይኢ ከፈገጽ እሉም

317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, ON M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 306-2865; Fax: (416) 306-2866


¹ Document translated provided by Elsa Chylum, Human Rights activist, phone and e-mail communications, 5 June 2012.

Emblem of the State of Eritrea
 Consul General of the State of Eritrea
 Toronto - Canada
 (in Tigrinya and Arabic on either side)

.....
 Date

Document No.

Legal Representation Form



I Nationality

Name on Passport Passport No.

Type of Passport Date Issued Expiration Date

Eritrean ID No. Date of Birth Country

Province District City/Village Home Phone
 No.

Current Address

Being of sound mind and in the presence of an official representative of the Consular of the State of
 Eritrea in Canada, it is my desire to appoint

Mr/Mrs/Miss

City Date

Signature

Embassy of the State of Eritrea in Canada

The above mentioned has, with their signature, confirmed the legal representation of the
 representative. The authority now remains with the representative.

Information:

1. It is not permissible to delete or change
2. This representation has to be confirmed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within 6 months.

.....
317-120 Carlton St., Toronto, ON M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 306-2865; Fax: (416) 306-2866

Annex 3.1.b

Immigration and Citizenship Services request form

B4/4.2

ፎርም መልካት ሊግገረሽኛውን ዜግነታውን አገልግሎት

1. ምሉእ ስም _____ ጾታ _____
2. ምሉእ ስም ከም ፓስፖርት _____
3. መበቀል ዓዲ _____ 4. ዕለት ልደት _____
5. ቁጽሪ ኤርትራዊ ወ. መንነት _____ ዘተዋህበሉ ቦታ _____
6. ስም እደ _____
7. ካብ ሃገር ቅድሚ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝነበርካሉ አሃዱ/ሰራሕ _____
8. ካብ ሃገር ዘወጸእካሉ/ካሉ ምዝንያት _____
9. ካብ ሃገር ንምውጻእ ዘተጠቐምካሉ/ካሉ ቦታ/ደብ _____
10. ዘወጸእካሉ/ካሉ ዕለት _____
11. ድሕሪ ካብ ኤርትራ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝነበርካሉ/ኪ ሃገራት ብብዕለቱ _____
12. ናብ ዘተጠቐሰ ሃገር ንዝትእቱ/ትዊ ዘተጠቐምካሉ/ካሉ ሰነድ መገሺ እንተልዩ ናይ መን ሃገር'ዩ? _____
13. ሕጂ እብ ዘለኹ/ኹል ሃገር ዘለካ/ኪ ሰራሕ _____
14. ሀልው እድራሻ: ሃገር _____ ከተማ _____
15. ካብ ሃገር ድሕሪ ምውጻእካ/ኪ ዝፈጸምካሉ/ኪ ሃገራዊ ጉቡኣት _____

እነ ስመይ እብ ላዕሊ ተጠቐሱ ዘሉ ዚጋ ኩሉ እቐዲመ ዝሃብኩዎ ሓበረታ ቅኑስ ምዃኑን ሃገራዊ ጉቡኣይ ብዘይምምላእ ብዘፈጸምኩዎ በደል ተግዲሰ ገቡእ መቅጸዕቲ እብ ዘተወሰነለይ ከቕበል ፍቓደኛ ምዃነይ ብከታመይ የረጋገጽ።

ከታም _____ ዕለት _____

ንበዓል መዚ ዝምልከት

ርእይቶ ዝምልከቶ በዓል መዚ _____

ስምን ከታምን ብዓል መዚ _____ ዕለት _____

ቆንሰላዊ ቢ/ጽ:ሃገር _____ ከተማ _____

NE. ምድምሳብ/ ምስራዝ ቅቡል እይኩንን።

Immigration and Citizenship Services Request Form

1. Full Name Gender
2. Full Name as shown in Passport
3. Village of origin 4. Date of Birth
5. Eritrean ID No. Issued at
6. Mother's Name
7. Unit/Work you had before you left the country
8. Reason you left the country
.....
9. Place/Border used to leave the country
10. Date you left
11. Countries you have been after you left the country and the dates you entered these countries
.....
12. Whose country entry documents did you use to enter these countries?
.....
13. Your job in the current country of
residence
14. Current address: Country City
15. National obligations fulfilled after you left the country
.....

I, whose name is written above, confirm that previously given personal information is true; and that I regret having committed an offence by not completing the national service and am ready to accept appropriate punishment in due course.

Signature Date

For Official Use

Officer's Comment

.....

.....

.....

.....


Name and Signature of Official Date

Consular Office/Country City

NB. Deleting or striking through not permitted.

Annex 3.1.c

Two per cent form with defence contribution¹



ጠቐላሊ ቆንሰል ሃገረ ኤርትራ
 ቶራንቶ - ካናዳ

القنصلية العامة لدولة إريتريا
 تورنتو، كندا

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
TORONTO, CANADA.
 317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, Ontario, M5A 4K2 Tel: (416) 416-306-2865, Fax: (416) 306-2866

Date / ዕለት 2010 ቁ. መዝገብ Ottawa 2010

መረጋገጫ ናይ ዝተሸፍነ ግቡአት (Clearance)

መረጋገጫ እቶት:-	ተረጋገጹ	ተረጋገጹ	<input type="checkbox"/>
ምስሊ ስም (ምስ ናይ ኣብሓት)			
ስም (እብ ፓስፖርት/ ካልእ ደክመንት)	ዱ. ኤ/መንት		
ኣድራሻ	ዱ. ኤ/ፓስፖርት		
	ዱ. ሰልኪ		

መስወደ ግብሪ 2 % ብመሰረት		ወፊድ ምክልኻል ሃገር	
ኣዋጅ ቁ. 17/1991 ኣዋጅ ቁ. 67/1195		እንጻር ወራር ወያኒ	
ዓ.ም.	ብላሃዝ	ብፊደል	1ይ መድረሻ
1992	000	ዓሰርተ ሸምተን ሽሕ ጂኔ	(ብላሃዝ) 00.00
1993	000	ዕስራን ኣርባዕተን ሽሕ ጂኔ	(ብፊደል) = = = =
1994	000	ሰላሳን ሽድሹተን ሽሕ ጂኔ	
1995	00	= = = =	2ይ መድረሻ
1996	00	= = = =	(ብላሃዝ) 00.00
1997	00	= = = =	(ብፊደል) = = = =
1998	00	= = = =	
1999	00	= = = =	3ይ መድረሻ
2000	000	ኣርጓን ሸምተን ሽሕ ጂኔ	(ብላሃዝ) 00.00
2001	00	ሰለስተ ሚእቲ ሽሕ ጂኔ	(ብፊደል) = = = =
2002	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	
2003	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	
2004	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	(ብላሃዝ) 00
2005	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	(ብፊደል) = = = =
2006	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	
2007	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	
2008	00	ሱሳ ዶላር ካናዳ	
2009	00	ሓደ ሚእትን ዕስራን ዶላር ካናዳ	
2010			
ተወሳኺ ኣብፊታ:-		ካብ ሱዳን ናብ ካናዳ	

መተሓሰቢ:-

- ዝኾነ ምድምሳሽ ነዚ ሰነድ ዘይቅቡል ይገብር።
- ነዚ ሰነድ ዘይሓዘ ዜጋ ኣብ ኤርትራ ዝኾነ ዓይነት ኣገልግሎት ክረከብ ኣይክእልን።

ስምን ክታምን 4ይኛንስ
 Amareesh Ate...
 Financial Officer

ክታምን ስምን
 Ahmed Iman
 Head, Consular Affairs

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
 TORONTO

¹ Document received from Eritrean Community Center (Canada); via third party.

**CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ERITREA
TORONTO, CANADA**

2% TAX FORM

317-120 Carlton St. Toronto, Ontario, M5A 4K2 tel: (416) 306-2865 Fax: 416-306-2866

Date: [REDACTED]/2010 **File Number:** Ottawa-[REDACTED]/2010

CLEARANCE

Proof of Income

Full Name along with grandfather's:

Name as in passport and other document Eritrean ID Card:

Address: _____ **Phone Number:** _____

Recovery tax 2% according to Proc.17/1991, Proc.67/1195

Year	In Numbers	In Alphabets	Donation to national Defense against Ethiopian invasion
1992	[REDACTED].000	[REDACTED] thousand [REDACTED]	1 st Stage 00.00
1993	[REDACTED].000	[REDACTED] thousand [REDACTED]	
1994	[REDACTED].000	[REDACTED] thousand [REDACTED]	
1995	00		
1996	00		2 nd Stage 00.00
1997	00		
1998	00		
1999	00		
2000	[REDACTED].00	[REDACTED] thousand [REDACTED]	3rd Stage 00.00
2001	[REDACTED].00	[REDACTED] thousand [REDACTED]	
2002	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2003	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2004	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2005	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2006	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2007	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2008	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	
2009	[REDACTED].00 \$	[REDACTED] Canadian dollars	For Defense (donation)
2010	--		[REDACTED].00 ([REDACTED] hundred [REDACTED] dollars Canadian dollars.)

Additional information: He came to Canada from Sudan in [REDACTED]
given by Eritrean embassy in Khartoum [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


Notification :-

1. We notify you any kind of erasure is not acceptable.
2. We inform you beforehand that no services will be rendered for a person who enters without this document.

Name AND Signature of the Finance	_____	Name and signature of the Head
Amaresh Mebrahtu	_____	Ahmed Iman, Head of Consular Affairs
Financial Officer	_____	Stamp (Office of the Embassy of Eritrea)

Annex 3.1.d
Tax and duties payment receipt

ሃገረ ኢርትራ
ግንቦት ፋይናንስ



دولة إرتريا
وزارة المالية

Customer Copy

THE STATE OF ERITREA
Ministry of Finance

Customer Copy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Mission - Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 441 71 70

Tax and Duties Payment Receipt

Receipt No.: 0 [redacted] Date: -nov-20 [redacted]

ID Number: 0 [redacted] Payment Method: Bank

Name: [redacted]


Description: [redacted] / /20 [redacted]

Item Code	Description	Amount ([redacted])
[redacted]	[redacted]	,00
220114	Charges for official copies of document	,00
260199	Other miscellaneous receipts not classi	,00
		[redacted] ,00

Amount in Words: [redacted] hundred [redacted] and Zero [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Signature: [redacted]



ሃገረ ኤርትራ
ግንቦት ፋይናንስ

دولة ارتريا
وزارة المالية

Customer Copy

THE STATE OF ERITREA
Ministry of Finance

Customer Copy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Foreign Mission - Sweden
 Telephone: +46 8 441 71 70

Tax and Duties Payment Receipt

Receipt No.: 0 [redacted] Date: 0 -okt-20

ID Number: 0 [redacted] Payment Method: **Bank**

Name: [redacted]

Description: [redacted] 0 / 0 / 20

Item Code	Description	Amount
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted],00
220112	Charges for clearance and other police	[redacted],00
260199	Other miscellaneous receipts not classi	[redacted],00
		[redacted],00

Amount in Words: [redacted] **thousand** [redacted] **hundred** [redacted]
 [redacted] **and Zero** [redacted]

Name: [redacted]

Signature: [redacted]

Note: The receipt is prepared in coloured three copies. The first copy to the payee, the second copy to the accounts and the third copy remains in the computer.
 To use white paper as a receipt is forbidden.

Annex 4

Acts that obstruct the implementation of resolution 1862 (2009)

Annex 4.1

Escape from Eritrea of Djiboutian prisoners of war

Background

1. On 10 June 2008, fighting broke out at Ras Doumeira, on the border between Djibouti and Eritrea, between the armed forces of the two states. According to the Government of Djibouti, the border clashes left 30 Djiboutian soldiers dead, 39 injured and 49 handicapped. Nineteen Djiboutian military personnel, including one officer, were reported missing in action and are presumed by the Djiboutian authorities to have been taken as prisoners of war (POWs) by the Eritrean authorities.
2. To date, the Government of Eritrea has denied holding any Djiboutian POWs, and has refused to provide information to any third party that could clarify the status of those Djiboutian military personnel missing in action.
3. On 16 September 2011, two men approached Sudanese police at the town of Karuurah on the Eritrean-Sudanese border and announced themselves as Privates First Class Ahmed 'Eeleeye Yabeh and Kadir Soumboul Ali of the Djiboutian Armed Forces. They claimed to have been held prisoner in Eritrea for more than three years and three months, and to have escaped from detention 11 days before.
4. The Monitoring Group interviewed the two men on 8 January 2012, and had the opportunity to obtain additional information concerning their case from the Djiboutian authorities.¹ Their identities, their disappearance on 10 June 2008 and their three-year absence are matters of historical fact and public record (see Annexes 4.1.a. and 4.1.b.).

Capture and initial treatment

5. On 10 June 2008, Yabeh and Ali's unit was surprised by the Eritrean assault: 7 of its members were captured, of whom 5 were wounded. The other five Djiboutian soldiers taken prisoner were:
 - 1) PFC Mohamoud Hildid Sougueh²
 - 2) PFC Djama Ahmed Abrar
 - 3) PFC Osman Mahamoud Ahmed
 - 4) PFC Ali Abdallah Lubak
 - 5) PFC Cheiko Borito Ali
6. The group was immediately transferred to Rahayta, where they spent the night. The Eritrean military commander at Rahayta was nicknamed "Wedi Haile". The

¹ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale, "Lourdes Pertes Subies par l'Armée Djiboutiennes", juillet 2010 (See Annex 4.1.a. and 4.1.b.).

² PFC stands for Private First Class.

Djiboutian believed him to be from military intelligence and the chief of security for Assab zone. They described him as short, fat and balding in his late-40s.

Assab

7. The following day the prisoners were transferred to Assab, where they were held in a military camp near the port. Through the window of their cell they could see a radar terminal and hear the sound of waves. The injured prisoners had their wounds cleaned and dressed, but bullets and shrapnel were not removed. They received a meal of injera (flat bread). That night, under interrogation, was the first and only times in Eritrean custody to which they were subjected to physical abuse (see Annex 4.1.c. for the suspected location of the camp).

8. The Assab detention centre was guarded by a unit of approximately 20 men who watched the prisoners in 2-3 man shifts. The unit commander was an Sergeant named Mohamed who spoke the Afar language and could therefore communicate with some of the Djiboutian soldiers directly. Wedi Haile used to visit from time to time, communicating through Sergeant Mohamed.

Asmara

9. After 1 month and 20 days in Assab, the POWs were driven in the back of a Toyota pick-up truck to Asmara, where they were detained in another military facility. All the prisoners were kept in one barracks-like structure with a guard outside. They could communicate with a group of Ethiopian civilian detainees held in a neighbouring compound, separated only by a fence. The Djiboutians remained in Asmara for only three days.

Af'abet/Shabay Mandar

10. From Asmara the POWs were driven to in a covered truck to Shabay Mandar, a training camp for Ethiopian armed opposition groups. The prisoners were held across a dirt track from the training school at another, disused military camp. Although there were other prisoners at the camp — mainly members of Eritrean opposition groups — the Djiboutians were generally kept apart from them (see Annex 4.1.d. for an aerial view of the facility).

11. The commander of Shabay Mandar training school, a colonel nicknamed “Wedi Mooye”, also supervised the prison. The prison commander was Second Lieutenant Fekare. At one point in 2010, Wedi Haile from Assab was brought to the jail as a prisoner for three months. We didn’t speak to him, because we were kept isolated from other prisoners, but we heard he was there and could see him.

12. Although they were not abused at the prison, the diet was poor and all seven suffered malnutrition. Bouts of severe diarrhoea and other diseases were common, but the prisoners received medical care only if they were too sick to stand. The five wounded POWs received no medical attention for their injuries, which grew progressively worse. According to Yabeh and Ali, two prisoners, Osman Mohamoud Ahmed and Mohamoud Hildid Sougueh, went blind. Djama Ahmed Abrar, who had been shot in the shoulder, lost the use of his arm.

Escape

13. Five of the POWs had never fully recovered from their injuries and became so sick and weak that escape was not possible. They therefore agreed that if escape

became possible, only Yabeh and Ali would make the attempt, in order to bring news to their families and the Djiboutian authorities.

14. On 5 September 2011, an opportunity to escape presented itself when the prison guards permitted the Djiboutians to sleep outside because of exceptionally hot weather. With only one guard on watch, Yabeh and Ali were able to slip away under cover of darkness and crawl under the eastern perimeter of chain link fence.


15. The two POWs walked for 11 days in the direction of Sudan, telling any Eritreans they met that they were Somalis who had fled troubles at home. They found many people to be sympathetic, offering them water and advising them how to avoid the security forces on their way to the border.

16. On 16 September 2011, they arrived at Karuurah, where they placed themselves in Sudanese custody, and were repatriated to Djibouti.

Annex 4.1.a

Information files of escaped Djiboutian prisoners of war

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES



FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : KADIR SOUMBOUL ALI
- GRADE : CAL
- DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1975
- DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
- DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
- CIN N° : 123319..... DELIVREE LE ...1997
- NOM DE LA MERE : FATOUMA ABAKARI
- ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
- SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
- NOM DE L'EPOUSE : LAGAH MOHAMED ABDO
- PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

MLE : 02/2098/T
CORPS : 1°RAR
LIEU : YOBOKI
NBRE D'ENFANTS : 00

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REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES




FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : AHMED ELEYEH YABEH
 - GRADE : CAL
 - DATE DE NAISSANCE : 20/02/1971
 - DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
 - DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
 - CIN N° : 102619..... DELIVREE LE ...1996
 - NOM DE LA MERE : ROHO YABEH
 - ADRESSE : BALBALA, Q.5
 - SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
 - NOM DE L'EPOUSE : SAADA MOHAMED KAMIL
 - PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES
- MLE : 02/0665/T
CORPS : 1°RAR
LIEU : OUBOULEY
NBRE D'ENFANTS : 03

Annex 4.1.b

Information files of Djiboutian military personnel missing in action

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES




FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : ALI ABDALLAH LOUBAK MLE : 02/1479/T
- GRADE : CAL CORPS : 1°RAR
- DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1968 LIEU : HANIEH
- DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
- DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
- CIN N° : 133599..... DELIVREE LE ... 1999
- NOM DE LA MERE : HASNA ALI
- ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
- SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
- NOM DE L'EPOUSE : NEIMA MOHAMED AHMED NBRE D'ENFANTS : 00
- PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

1/1

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES



FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : OSMAN MOHAMOUD AHMED
- GRADE : CAL
- DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1964
- DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
- DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
- CIN N° : 103932..... DELIVREE LE ...1993
- NOM DE LA MERE : SAIDA HERSI
- ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
- SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
- NOM DE L'EPOUSE : AMINA OMAR AMARREH
- PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

MLE : 02/0859/T
CORPS : 1°RAR
LIEU : DIKHIL
NBRE D'ENFANTS : 00

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REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES



FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : CHEIKO BORITO ALI
 - GRADE : CAL
 - DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1957
 - DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
 - DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
 - CIN N° : 052346..... DELIVREE LE ...1988
 - NOM DE LA MERE : AHADI SEIKO
 - ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
 - SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
 - NOM DE L'EPOUSE : /
 - PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES
- MLE : 02/1233/T
CORPS : 1°RAR
LIEU : HILLOU
NBRE D'ENFANTS : 01

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES



FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : MOHAMOUD HILDID SOUGUEH MLE : 02/0725/T
- GRADE : CAL CORPS : 1°RAR
- DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1971 LIEU : SANKAL
- DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
- DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
- CIN N° : 082349..... DELIVREE LE ... 1990
- NOM DE LA MERE : GOUMAN HERSI
- ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
- SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
- NOM DE L'EPOUSE : OUBAH YOUSOUF ABDI NBRE D'ENFANTS : 00
- PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES

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REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE
ETAT-MAJOR DES FORCES ARMEES



FICHE DE RENSEIGNEMENT

- NOM : DJAMA AHMED ABRAR
 - GRADE : CAL
 - DATE DE NAISSANCE : 1972
 - DATE ENTREE EN SERVICE : 01/01/02
 - DATE DE NOMINATION : 01/06/09
 - CIN N° : 103998..... DELIVREE LE ...1990
 - NOM DE LA MERE : HAWA HACHI
 - ADRESSE : CITE DOUMEIRA
 - SITUATION FAMILLE : MARIE
 - NOM DE L'EPOUSE : MALYOUN HAROUR GARANDI
 - PERSONNE A PREVENIR : FORCES ARMEES DJIBOUTIENNES
- MLE : 02/0879/T
CORPS : 1°RAR
LIEU : DIKHIL
NBRE D'ENFANTS : 00

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Annex 4.1.c

Aerial view of suspected Assab holding facilities (23 December 2007)



Annex 4.1.d

**Aerial view of Shabay-Mandar training camp and adjacent prison facility
(17 March 2007)**



Suspected
PoWs holding
facility



