



人权理事会

强迫或非自愿失踪问题工作组

强迫或非自愿失踪问题工作组转交的来文、审查的案件、 提出的意见及开展的其他活动*

第一百二十二届会议** (2020 年 9 月 21 日至 30 日)

一. 来文

1. 2020 年 5 月 16 日至 9 月 30 日，工作组在紧急程序下向下列国家转交了 35 起案件：白俄罗斯(1)、喀麦隆(1)、中国(1)、埃及(8)、伊朗伊斯兰共和国(2)、老挝人民民主共和国(4)、利比亚(1)、巴基斯坦(12)、卡塔尔(1)、卢旺达(1)、委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国(2)和也门(1)。
2. 在 2020 年 9 月 21 日至 30 日举行的会议上，工作组决定将 224 起新报告的强迫失踪案件转交 15 个国家：阿富汗(9)、孟加拉国(2)、中国(52)、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(12)、埃及(6)、印度(9)、伊朗伊斯兰共和国(4)、伊拉克(1)、黎巴嫩(1)、巴基斯坦(37)、俄罗斯联邦(23)、沙特阿拉伯(3)、塞尔维亚(1)、斯里兰卡(56)和阿拉伯叙利亚共和国(8)。
3. 工作组还决定转交 5 起新报告的相当于强迫失踪的侵权案件，这些案件据称为非国家行为体在利比亚(1)和也门(4)实施。
4. 工作组还澄清了 223 起案件，涉及以下国家：中国(6)、埃及(37)、巴基斯坦(174)、菲律宾(1)、俄罗斯联邦(1)、阿拉伯叙利亚共和国(1)、土耳其(2)和阿拉伯联合酋长国(1)。根据政府提供的资料澄清了 206 起案件，根据来文方提供的资料澄清了 19 起案件。

* 本文件附件不译，原文照发。

** 鉴于冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行造成的旅行限制，工作组决定于 2020 年 9 月 21 日至 30 日通过视频会议远程开会，以完成第一百二十二届会议的部分活动方案。工作组在这些会议期间继续审查收到的关于据称强迫失踪案件的资料，以及各国和案件来文方提交的资料。



5. 2020 年 5 月 16 日至 9 月 30 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了 43 份来文。来文包括 14 项联合紧急呼吁，分别发给：巴林(1)、柬埔寨(2)、喀麦隆(2)、埃及(1)、洪都拉斯(1)、伊朗伊斯兰共和国(1)、肯尼亚(1)、巴基斯坦(1)、泰国(2)、阿拉伯联合酋长国(1)和美利坚合众国(1)；29 封联合指控函，分别发给：安哥拉(1)、孟加拉国(1)、白俄罗斯(2)、巴西(1)、中国(2)、哥伦比亚(1)、朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(1)、吉布提(1)、埃及(2)、印度(1)、伊朗伊斯兰共和国(1)、老挝人民民主共和国(1)、毛里塔尼亚(1)、巴基斯坦(1)、卢旺达(1)、斯里兰卡(1)、土耳其(1)、阿拉伯联合酋长国(2)、大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国(1)、美国(2)、委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国(1)、也门(1)、津巴布韦(1)和一个“其他行为方”(Keenie Meenie Services)(1)。¹

6. 2020 年 9 月 18 日，工作组与强迫失踪问题委员会联合发布了关于冠状病毒病(COVID-19)与强迫失踪的八项关键准则。准则旨在协助和指导各国在 COVID-19 大流行期间履行与强迫失踪有关的国际义务(见附件四)。

7. 本届会议期间，工作组审查并通过了一项涉及哥伦比亚的一般性指控(见附件二)。

8. 工作组在本报告所述期间发布的新闻稿和声明完整清单载于附件五。

二. 其他活动

9. 工作组在本届会议期间与失踪者亲属和就这一问题开展工作的非政府组织举行了虚拟会议。2020 年 9 月 22 日，工作组还与强迫失踪问题委员会成员举行了一次虚拟协调会议。

10. 也在本届会议期间，工作组与日本政府代表举行了虚拟会议，并与其他政府的代表举行了非正式双边会议。工作组在本届会议期间与哥伦比亚政府代表进行交流后，请求于 2021 年访问哥伦比亚。

11. 2020 年 9 月 23 日和 25 日，作为工作组成立 40 周年的纪念活动，工作组与强迫失踪问题委员会联合举行了两次关于搜寻失踪人员和调查强迫失踪事件的公开网络研讨会。2020 年 9 月 24 日，工作组还与 T.M.C.阿赛尔研究所一起举办了失踪人员和记忆治理问题在线专家小组讨论。

12. 第一百二十一届至第一百二十二届会议期间，工作组继续与各国接触，提供援助和技术合作。2020 年 7 月 27 日和 28 日，工作组为土库曼斯坦政府代表举办了网上研讨会，重点介绍工作组的任务、做法和工作方法。

13. 工作组还继续与世界各地的专门搜寻机制接触，并欢迎哥伦比亚、萨尔瓦多、墨西哥和秘鲁的搜寻机构相互进行富有成效的交流。

¹ 此类来文连同政府的答复(如果有)在转交有关国家 60 天后公布，可在以下网址查阅：<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/Tmsearch/TMDocuments>。

三. 工作组在届会期间审查的关于在各国发生的强迫或非自愿失踪的资料

阿富汗

标准程序

14. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 9 起案件(见附件一)。

适用六个月规则

15. 2020 年 8 月 31 日, 该国政府就一起未决案件提供了资料, 工作组据此决定对该案件适用六个月规则。

政府提供的资料

16. 2020 年 8 月 31 日, 阿富汗政府转交了两起未决案件的资料, 但这些资料被认为不足以澄清案件。

安哥拉

联合指控函

17. 2020 年 6 月 2 日, 工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函, 事关据称为非政府组织 Missão de Beneficência Agropecuária do Kubango, Inclusão, Tecnologias e Ambiente (MBAKITA)工作的人权维护者遭受的恐吓和骚扰行为。

巴林

适用六个月规则

18. 2019 年 12 月 23 日, 该国政府提供了关于 Mohamed Ramadhan Issa Ali Hussein 案件的资料, 工作组据此决定对此案适用六个月规则。

联合紧急呼吁

19. 2020 年 7 月 29 日, 工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封关于 Mohamed Ramadhan Issa Ali Hassan 和 Hussain Ali Moosa Hassan Mohamed 的指控函, 这两名巴林国民在最高上诉法院于 2020 年 7 月 13 日确认死刑判决后即将被处决。

孟加拉国

标准程序

20. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了两起案件(见附件一)。

联合指控函

21. 2020 年 9 月 1 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Asaduzzaman Noor 受到威胁和恐吓及法律起诉，以及他在孟加拉国的家人受到持续骚扰。

意见

22. 工作组关切地指出，几年来一直在就孟加拉国的强迫失踪情况提出类似报告。工作组感到震惊的是，仍在继续收到案件，其中许多案件涉及与反对派政党有关联的个人，而且强迫失踪在该国显然不受惩罚。工作组还对该国没有与之接触深表遗憾。在这方面，工作组指出，今年它没有收到对任何未决案件的答复，自 1996 年工作组向政府转交第一起案件以来，只有一起案件得到澄清。工作组希望尽快收到有关未决案件的资料。

23. 工作组还重申有意访问孟加拉国，自 2013 年以来转发的若干来文中都表达了这种意向。

白俄罗斯

紧急程序

24. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起关于 Maria Kalesnikava 的案件，据称她于 2020 年 9 月 7 日在明斯克国家美术馆附近被可能与白俄罗斯安全部门有关联的不明人员绑架。

适用六个月规则

25. 2020 年 10 月 5 日，该国政府提供了资料，工作组据此决定对 Kalesnikava 女士的案件适用六个月规则。

联合指控函和答复

26. 2020 年 8 月 27 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关酷刑和虐待被拘留示威者的报告以及至少 7 起报告的强迫失踪案件。

27. 2020 年 8 月 31 日，白俄罗斯政府对联合指控函作出答复。

28. 2020 年 9 月 16 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Kalesnikava 女士据报被强迫失踪，以及安全部队似乎专门针对和迫害与协调理事会有关联的反对派成员。据收到的报告显示，大多数反对派成员也遭到强迫失踪。

29. 2020 年 10 月 5 日，白俄罗斯政府对联合指控函作出答复。

来文方提供的资料

30. 来文方提供了三起未决案件的最新资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

意见

31. 工作组对关于白俄罗斯安全部门对和平示威者和反对派领导人实施短期强迫失踪，以镇压抗议、压制异见和散布恐惧的指控表示关切。同样令人震惊的是，报告显示，国内法和国际法中规定的防止侵犯人权的基本法律保障措施未得到遵守。这些措施包括立即登记、对拘留进行司法监督、在个人被剥夺自由时立即通知其家人、聘请自行选择的辩护律师的权利。在这方面，工作组要求白俄罗斯政府充分遵守这些保障措施，对有关强迫失踪的严重指控进行有效、独立和公正的调查，并向受害者及其家属提供有效补救。

32. 工作组还对已存在数十年之久的有罪不罚氛围感到关切。工作组因此回顾指出，终止或暂停对据称强迫失踪的刑事调查并不能免除所涉国家在适当尊重文化习俗的情况下查找和确定失踪人员或其遗体下落的义务，包括确认遗体身份并将其归还亲属。在这方面，工作组再次要求白俄罗斯政府采取必要步骤，制定并实施规定时限的战略，开展搜寻工作。

巴西

联合指控函和答复

33. 2020 年 6 月 29 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关巴西总统和政府成员发表公开言论，否认巴西在 1964 年至 1985 年实行过军事独裁，对这一时期发生的事件给予正面评价，淡化侵犯人权行为。指控函还事关据称总统和政府成员对现有过渡期正义机制的工作进行干预。

34. 2020 年 8 月 26 日，该国政府转交了对上述联合指控函的答复。

柬埔寨

联合紧急呼吁和答复

35. 2020 年 6 月 12 日和 2020 年 7 月 15 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合发出紧急呼吁，事关据称泰国国民 Wanchalearm Satsaksit 在柬埔寨被绑架和强迫失踪且调查毫无进展。

36. 2020 年 6 月 19 日和 2020 年 8 月 13 日，柬埔寨政府对紧急呼吁作出答复。

喀麦隆

紧急程序

37. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 1975 年 3 月 26 日出生的喀麦隆公民 Njoka Kingsley Fomomyuy，据称他于 2020 年 5 月 15 日在居住地被国家安全人员绑架。

联合紧急呼吁和答复

38. 2020 年 7 月 7 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一项紧急呼吁，事关 Samuel Ajiekah Abuwe(别名 Samuel Wazizi)据称被强迫失踪、在拘留期间遭受酷刑及遇害，以及 Njoka Kingsley Fomonyuy 据称被任意拘留和强迫失踪。

39. 2020 年 8 月 14 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一项紧急呼吁，事关喀麦隆西北和西南地区 13 名讲英语的少数群体的权利受到侵犯，包括任意拘留、长期审前拘留、强迫失踪、酷刑和虐待以及法外处决。

40. 2020 年 9 月 7 日，该国政府转交了对 2020 年 7 月 7 日发出的联合紧急呼吁的答复。

中国

紧急程序

41. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 Aikebaier Aisaiti (又称 Ekpar Asat)，2020 年 5 月据报告称，此人被关押在新疆维吾尔自治区阿克苏地区阿克苏市的一所监狱内。

标准程序

42. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 52 起案件(见附件一)。

根据来文方提供的资料作出的澄清

43. 根据来文方提供的资料，工作组决定澄清 6 起案件。据报道，两人已被释放，不再拘留，三人仍被拘留，一人获得保释。

来文方提供的资料

44. 来文方提供了另外 5 起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

适用六个月规则

45. 2020 年 6 月 12 日，该国政府提供了 10 起未决案件的资料，工作组据此决定对这些案件适用六个月规则。据报告，这些案件的当事人已获得自由。

政府提供的资料

46. 2020 年 6 月 12 日，中国政府转交了 6 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

联合指控函和答复

47. 2020 年 6 月 2 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据报告 Gedhun Cheokyi Nyima 依然被强迫失踪，对藏传活佛转世的规定违背藏传佛教少数群体的宗教传统和习俗。

48. 2020 年 7 月 13 日，该国政府对上述信函做出答复。工作组仍然感到关切的是，Gedhun Cheokyi Nyima 的命运和下落仍未得到证实。

49. 2020 年 7 月 13 日，该国政府对 2020 年 5 月 7 日发出的联合指控函做出答复，本届会议召开时答复函仍有待翻译。

50. 2020 年 8 月 13 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关对余文生进行闭门审判和量刑，余文生的拘留地点仍未披露。

对联合紧急呼吁的答复

51. 2020 年 5 月 18 日，工作组收到两份答复的译文，这两份答复由该国政府于 2020 年 4 月 3 日转交，涉及 2020 年 3 月 9 日和 2020 年 3 月 12 日发出的两项联合紧急呼吁。

对一般性指控的答复

52. 2020 年 6 月 12 日，该国政府就第一百一十九届会议之后转交的一般性指控(A/HRC/WGEID/119/1, 附件一)做出答复。答复载于本报告附件三。

53. 关于这一答复，工作组欢迎其中介绍了现有保障措施。然而，虽然所提供的资料表明留置措施必须向家属通报，但没有说明通报内容是否包括当事人被拘留的地点、被拘留者获得家人探视或法律顾问的权利。工作组重申，必须迅速通知当事人的家人其被拘留的确切地点，包括关于所有移送的准确信息；不这样做，便可能构成强迫失踪。

意见

54. 工作组收到该国政府提供的资料，说明了被关押在新疆拘留中心的被拘留者家属的通知程序。资料表明，将拘留中心的位置通知家属，当事人可以回家并接受探视。

55. 然而，工作组对所收到案件的模式感到关切，特别是有大量指控表明，与失踪者有关的人员前往中国驻不同国家的使领馆，或得不到答复，或被告知须返回中国查询亲属的信息。工作组还极为关切的是，据称有人因在国外有亲属或因曾前往国外而被拘留，新疆维吾尔自治区的居民因为可能招致报复而不敢与国外的亲属联系。

56. 工作组强调，被强迫失踪人员的家属也是这一罪行的受害者，家属承受的痛苦和悲伤可能构成对不受酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚之权利的侵犯。了解真相权是一项不能受到限制的绝对权利，采取一切必要步骤寻找失踪者是一项绝对义务(A/HRC/16/48)。工作组还强调，家属应得到保护，免遭虐待或恐吓(《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》，第 13 条)。无论有关家庭成员与失踪者居住在同一国家还是身居国外，这一规定都同样适用。

57. 工作组进一步强调，为防止被强迫失踪，必须行使采取迅速而有效的司法补救措施的权利，以确定被剥夺自由的人的下落或健康状况和(或)查明下令或执行剥夺自由行为的当局。各国应在任何知情或具有合法利益关系的人指称有人遭受强迫失踪时，确保前者有权向主管和独立的国家当局提出申诉并获得该当局对此申诉进行迅速、彻底和公正的调查。这些权利也适用于身居国外的被强迫失踪者家属，使领馆应在这方面向这些家属提供帮助。

58. 工作组希望该国政府尽快对 2013 年 2 月 19 日提出的国别访问请求和随后发出的提醒函作出肯定答复。

哥伦比亚

联合指控函

59. 2020 年 9 月 25 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关破坏和质疑寻求真相、正义、赔偿和防止重陷冲突综合系统机制，以及批评和攻击这些机构成员的名誉。

一般性指控

60. 工作组从可靠来源收到资料，指称在哥伦比亚执行《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》方面遇到困难。附件二所载一般性指控主要涉及圣安东尼奥河口疏浚工程对强迫失踪受害者获得真相和伸张正义之权利的影响，该工程会使葬身于该地区的失踪人员的遗骸更难查找。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国

标准程序

61. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 12 起案件(见附件一)。

来文方提供的资料

62. 来文方提供了一起未决案件的最新资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

联合指控函

63. 2020 年 6 月 23 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 1950 年 6 月 25 日朝鲜战争爆发后据报告大韩民国的平民和战俘被强迫失踪，以及战后被绑架的大韩民国、日本和其他国家国民被强迫失踪。

64. 2020 年 6 月 30 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府对联合指控函作出答复。

意见

65. 工作组再次对政府缺乏合作表示严重关切，包括工作组继续收到对转交案件的相同答复。工作组强调，必须进行调查并开展搜寻，以澄清失踪者的命运或下落，并向工作组提供关于所作努力和调查结果的准确信息。

吉布提

联合指控函和答复

66. 2020 年 7 月 27 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据称 Mohammed Abdullah Saleh al-Asad 在美利坚合众国实施的特别引渡方案框架内，先后在坦桑尼亚联合共和国、吉布提、阿富汗和也门被单独监禁、遭受酷刑和虐待。该指控函还事关他的妻子 Zahra Ahmed Mohamed，据称她因为不知道丈夫的命运和下落，在心理上受到不良影响。

67. 2020 年 9 月 24 日，吉布提政府对联合指控函作出答复。

埃及

紧急程序

68. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了 8 起案件，事关：

(a) Ahmed Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha Shawky, 埃及公民，生于 1962 年 6 月 3 日，据称于 2020 年 6 月 17 日在家中被警察逮捕，并被带到不明地点。工作组于 2017 年转交并澄清了关于 Ahmed Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha Shawky 的第一次紧急呼吁；

(b) Ibrahim Ahmad, 埃及公民，生于 1984 年 2 月 5 日，据称最后一次被看到是在 2020 年 6 月，地点是开罗省 Al Abbassiya 的国家安全机构；

(c) Osama Saad Mohamed Emara, 埃及公民，生于 1989 年 8 月 7 日，据称于 2020 年 7 月 29 日与其父亲和兄弟在家中被国家安全人员和警察逮捕；

(d) Ahmed Saad Mohamed Emara, 埃及公民，生于 1993 年 12 月 8 日，据称于 2020 年 7 月 29 日与其父亲和兄弟在家中被国家安全人员和警察逮捕；

(e) Saad Mohamed Mohamed Emara, 埃及公民，生于 1951 年 12 月 29 日，据称于 2020 年 7 月 29 日与两个儿子在家中被国家安全人员和警察逮捕；

(f) Ahmed Mohmed Ahmed El-Sayed Ahmed Ayoub, 埃及公民，生于 1994 年 2 月 4 日，据称于 2020 年 7 月 6 日在家中被身着便衣的国家安全部队成员绑架；

(g) Hasan Gouda, 埃及公民，生于 1995 年 4 月 12 日，据称最后所知下落是 2020 年 4 月 16 日，当时被拘留在 Bandar Aswan 警察局；

(h) Sara Fathi Ibrahim Ahmad, 埃及公民，生于 1989 年 12 月 8 日，据称于 2020 年 4 月 15 日在开罗被国家安全人员从家中绑架。

标准程序

69. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 6 起案件(见附件一)。

根据来文方提供的资料作出的澄清

70. 根据来文方提供的资料，工作组决定澄清 9 起案件，事关被拘留的 Abdulrahman Ali Mahmoud Ali Fatih al-bab、Hasan Mahmoud Ragab al-Kabbani、Ahmed Mosbah Abu Sati Tantawy、Naji Mohammad Naji Mohammad Salim、Hadi Refaat Abdulwahed Mostafa、Ashraf Zahran、Mohamed Ahmed Hassan Ahmed 和 Mohamaden Gouda，以及已经获释的 Abdulrahman Mohamed Yasin Ali。

适用六个月规则

71. 2020 年 9 月 3 日，该国政府提供了资料，工作组据此决定对 Sara Fathi Ibrahim Ahmed 的案件适用六个月规则，此人已获得保释。

来文方提供的资料

72. 来文方提供了三起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。根据一个来文方提供的新资料，工作组决定暂停在第一百二十一届会议上对埃及一名未成年人案件适用的六个月规则。

澄清

73. 根据来文方先前提供的资料，工作组决定澄清 28 起案件。在 21 起案件中，下列人员据报告处于被拘留状态：Abdelrahman Mohamed、Omar Khaled Taha Ahmed、Mohamed Gamal Ahmed Abdulmaguid Ali、Islam Raafat Abdel Mohsen Mohane、Abdurrahman Karim Fattouh Hamed、Mosaab Kamal Tawfik Mosaab Kamal Tawfik、Jamal Abdelwahab Awad Allam、Ahmed Adel Abdo El Zraa、Moatasem Ballah Adel Abdo El Zraa、Abdel Rahman Saad Saad Eid Noser、Mohamed Ezzeddin Youssef Malek、Islam Ali Abd El-aal Mohammed、Mohamed Abdel Malek Hussein Abdel Malek、Alaa El Sayed Ali Ibrahim、Hesham Abdelmaksoud Ahmed Ghobashi、Shrief El-Sayed El-Mohamady El-Sayed、Mohamed Ali Hassan Seoudy、Mohamed Magdi Mohamed Hussien、Magdi Mohamed Mohamed Abdeldayem、Ahmed Adel Sultan Abd al-Halim 和 Mustafa Hussein Mohamed Omar。在 7 起案件中，下列人员据报告已经获释：Mohamed Ahmed Abdelhamid Antar、El Sayed Qasem Saleh Ali El Gezawy、Eslam Atya Ali Atya Sarhan、Ahmed Kamal Ragab Soliman Frag、Salah Hussin Mohamed Ali Ghoneim、Moaaz Ahmed Mohamed El Farmawy 和 Mohamed El-Sherif。

联合紧急呼吁和答复

74. 2020 年 8 月 19 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一项紧急呼吁，事关工程学院机电系学生 Mohammad Awsam Abdulaziz Ali Rashed 和他的父亲 Awsam Abdulaziz Ali Rashed，据称他们在未经适当程序被军事法院和刑事法院定罪后分别被单独关押在 Burj Al Arab 监狱。截至 2020 年 3 月 1 日，他们的命运仍不得而知。

75. 2020 年 9 月 9 日，该国政府转交了对上述联合紧急呼吁的答复。

联合指控函

76. 2020 年 6 月 2 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Haytham Mohamadein、Hassan Barbary、Alla Essam 和 Khalil Rizk 等知名劳工权利活动人士和工会领袖被逮捕且至今仍被审前拘留。

77. 2020 年 7 月 29 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据报告人权维护者和其他人员仍然被拘留者埃及监狱中，自 COVID-19 大流行暴发以来，他们与外界的联系受到严格限制，审前拘留的时间在缺席情况下被延长，而且面临感染病毒的严重风险。

意见

78. 工作组继续收到报告称，警察和国家安全人员不出示逮捕令便实施逮捕，向主管部门就强迫失踪事件提出申诉持续受到阻碍。

79. 工作组感到遗憾的是，不得不在 2020 年 6 月 23 日重新审理 Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha 的案件。在 2017 年转交并澄清了第一起强迫失踪报告后，又收到了新的指控。鉴于 Ahmed Shawky Abdelsattar Mohamed Amasha 的案件已列入秘书长 2017、2018、2019 和 2020 年关于与联合国及其代表和人权领域机制合作的报告，工作组对新的指控感到更加遗憾。工作组关切地注意到记者

Osama Saad Mohamed Emara 及其两名家庭成员，其父亲 Saad Mohamed Mohamed Emara 和兄弟 Ahmed Saad Mohamed Emara 被强迫失踪的报道。工作组指出，仍继续收到在释放过程中失踪的报告，Hasan Gouda 的案件就是这种情况。工作组回顾指出，被剥夺自由的人的释放方式必须允许可靠的核查，以证实他们确已被释放，并证实他们获释时的情况可以保证他们身体健康并能充分行使他们的权利。在这方面，工作组要求提供资料，说明埃及政府为执行《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》第 11 条的规定所采取的措施。

80. 工作组暂停此前对涉及一名未成年人的案件实施的六个月规则，并对该儿童可能在拘留期间死于酷刑的指控极为关切。

萨尔瓦多

政府提供的资料

81. 2019 年 8 月 21 日，萨尔瓦多政府转交了四起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

洪都拉斯

联合紧急呼吁

82. 2020 年 9 月 25 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合发出一项紧急呼吁，事关洪都拉斯几名人权维护者被暴力致死和失踪，受到威胁和骚扰，人权维护者似乎面临巨大风险。

印度

标准程序

83. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 9 起案件(见附件一)。

联合指控函

84. 2020 年 7 月 1 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据称查谟和克什米尔邦人权委员会于 2019 年 10 月突然关闭，使该地区人民仅能通过有限的法律途径就可能侵犯人权的行为寻求正义。

意见

85. 工作组感到关切的是，它继续收到据称在查谟和克什米尔发生的与强迫失踪有关的案件，包括 1990 年代和 2000 年代发生的案件。工作组注意到，在许多案件中尽管已诉诸法律手段，从案件发生至今也已过去几十年之久，但在查明失踪人员的命运和下落方面依然进展甚微。

86. 工作组谨此重申，各国应采取有效的立法、行政、司法或其他措施，防止和制止强迫失踪行为，不得援引任何情况为强迫失踪辩护，只要强迫失踪受害者的命运尚未澄清，就应对所有案件进行调查，只要犯罪人继续隐瞒失踪者的命运

和下落，这些事实仍未澄清，就应将构成强迫失踪的行为视为持续犯罪（《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》第 3 条、第 7 条、第 13 条和第 17 条）。

87. 工作组深感遗憾的是，几年来没有收到该国政府对其中任何案件的答复。工作组希望尽快收到资料。工作组还希望该国政府尽快对 2010 年 8 月 16 日提出的国别访问请求和随后发出的提醒函作出肯定答复。

伊朗伊斯兰共和国

紧急程序

88. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了两起案件，事关：

(a) Manuchehr Bakhtiari, 2020 年 7 月 20 日有报告称，他于 2020 年 7 月 13 日在基什岛机场被情报部人员绑架；

(b) Hedayat Abdollahpour, 2020 年 6 月 16 日有报告称，他从西阿塞拜疆省 Urumieh 中央监狱的死囚牢房被转移到不明地点。

标准程序

89. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 4 起案件(见附件一)。

适用六个月规则

90. 2020 年 8 月 7 日和 27 日，该国政府就两起未决案件提供了资料，工作组据此决定对这些案件适用六个月规则。

政府提供的资料

91. 2020 年 8 月 11 日，伊朗伊斯兰共和国政府转交了一起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

联合指控函

92. 2020 年 9 月 3 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 1988 年 7 月至 9 月初，数千名持不同政见者被强迫失踪后据称被法外处决，当局一直拒绝披露死亡的具体情况和遗体下落，也不向家属提供准确和完整的死亡证明。

联合紧急呼吁和答复

93. 2020 年 6 月 17 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一份紧急呼吁，事关库尔德少数族裔成员 Hedayat Abdollahpour 据称被强迫失踪及据报道被秘密处决。

94. 2020 年 8 月 12 日，该国政府转交了对上述联合来文的答复。政府在答复中对特别程序机制的指控提出异议，并就事件作出自己的陈述，表示 Abdollahpour 先生已被处决。

意见

95. 针对上述指控，工作组回顾《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》第 10 条，其中规定任何被剥夺自由者应被关押在官方认可的拘留场所，并且根据国家法律，在拘留后立即被带至司法机关。第 10 条第 2 款要求各国迅速提供关于此类人员遭到拘留的情况及其拘留地点、包括转移的准确情况，除非有关人员表示与此相反的愿望。此外，第 10 条第 3 款要求各国保有对每一拘留地点所有被剥夺自由的人的最新正式登记册。

96. 收到的资料显示，被强迫失踪后又据称被处决者的埋葬地点一直受到隐瞒，工作组就此回顾指出，强迫失踪一直持续到查明有关人员的命运和下落，无论事发多久，家属有权了解真相，这意味着有权了解调查的进展和结果、失踪者的命运或下落、失踪时的情形以及肇事者的身份(A/HRC/16/48)。拒绝交出被处决个人的遗体进行安葬相当于对相关家庭的不人道待遇(见 A/67/279, 第 52 段和 CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011)。正如工作组在关于在强迫失踪方面了解真相权的一般性意见中强调的那样，死者家属有权被归还亲属的遗骸，并根据自身的传统、宗教或文化处理遗骸(A/HRC/16/48, 第二部分 G 节, 第 6 段)。

伊拉克

标准程序

97. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 1978 年 8 月 17 日出生的伊拉克公民 Abdel-Wahhab Allawi Aboud Latif Al Najdi, 他最后为人所知的行踪是 2007 年 6 月 6 日乘坐连接费卢杰和巴格达的公共汽车。据信马赫迪军对他的失踪负有责任。

肯尼亚

联合紧急呼吁

98. 2020 年 5 月 20 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关妇女人权维护者 Ruth Mumbi 受到的威胁，她因维护被驱逐者的住房权而面临强迫失踪风险。

老挝人民民主共和国

紧急程序

99. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了四起案件，事关 Vacher Her、Zoua Her、Kia Vang 和一名儿童，据称他们都在通过 Paksan 检查站后失踪。

政府提供的资料

100. 2020 年 8 月 21 日，老挝人民民主共和国政府转交了两起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

联合指控函

101. 2020 年 8 月 31 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据报告位于 Phou Bia 地区的赫蒙族土著社区(称为 ChaoFa 赫蒙族)令人震惊的状况，包括受到无差别攻击、被强迫失踪、无法获得食物、安全饮用水和医疗保健的机会。

黎巴嫩

标准程序

102. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关拥有黎巴嫩难民身份的阿拉伯叙利亚共和国公民 Khaled Alwies，据称他于 2012 年 11 月 22 日在贝鲁特安全总局居留续签分局被捕。

利比亚

紧急程序

103. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关利比亚国民、利比亚国家反腐败委员会代理主席 Usama Edawi A. Aburas，据报告他在 2020 年 6 月 15 日中午被据称隶属于内政部的特别威慑部队的武装人员绑架。

标准程序

104. 工作组宣布，将从 2019 年 9 月起开始记录非国家行为体实施的相当于强迫失踪的侵权行为(A/HRC/42/40, 第 94 段)。因此，工作组在会议期间审议了一起相当于强迫失踪的案件，据称是在利比亚国民军控制的利比亚领土上实施的。² 工作组根据标准程序将此案转交利比亚政府和利比亚国民军。此案事关利比亚公民 Omar Al Mukhtar Ahmed Al Daguel，据称他最后一次露面是在 2020 年 12 月，地点是在班加西由利比亚国民军管辖的 Al Kouifya 监狱。

适用六个月规则

105. 2020 年 1 月 22 日，政府提供了资料，工作组据此决定对事关下列人员的 6 起案件适用六个月规则：Ayman Salim Muhammad Dababash, Abdelatif Al Raqoubi Salem Muhammad, Salem Saeed Salem Awad Jadran al-Mughrabi, Ali al-Dabea Saleh al-Talhi, Almanafi Ahmed Abdessalam Hassane 和 Majdi Faraj Hamad Salah Al Hawat。据称，这六名男子均已从拘留中获释。

政府提供的资料

106. 2020 年 1 月 22 日，利比亚政府转交了 8 起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

² 工作组强调，转交利比亚国民军的案件绝不意味着对任何领土、城市、地区、或其当局的法律地位表示任何意见。

马尔代夫

政府提供的资料

107. 2020 年 6 月 11 日，马尔代夫政府转交了一起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

意见

108. 工作组欣见马尔代夫议会已经同意批准《保护所有人免遭强迫失踪国际公约》，并希望能够迅速完成批准进程。

毛里塔尼亚

联合指控函

109. 2020 年 6 月 11 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关与所谓的“人道主义遗留问题”时期有关的侵犯人权行为受害者得不到有效补救，还事关已提交议会的过渡期正义法案。

墨西哥

来文方提供的资料

110. 来文方提供了另外 4 起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

摩洛哥

对一般性指控的答复

111. 2020 年 6 月 17 日，摩洛哥政府对工作组于 2020 年 4 月 17 日转交的一般性指控作出答复(A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, 第 99 段和附件一)。摩洛哥政府在答复中指出，一般性指控故意无视摩洛哥过渡期正义进程的可取之处。政府回顾了整个进程中在真相权、记忆、补偿和保证不重犯方面取得的进展。摩洛哥政府的完整答复载于本报告附件三。

尼泊尔

对联合指控函的答复

112. 2020 年 6 月 15 日，该国政府转交了对 2020 年 3 月 16 日发出的联合指控函的答复，该指控函事关据报告没有就修订 2014 年(尼历 2071 年)《失踪人员调查、真相与和解委员会法》与受害者进行有效协商。

巴基斯坦

紧急程序

113. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了 12 起案件，事关：

(a) Zubair Ahmed, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 5 月 15 日被边防部队从 Soro Mand 军营绑架；

(b) Sana Ullah Baloch, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 5 月 11 日在返回俾路支省喀兰市 Muhalla Thana 路的家中时被身着便衣的安全人员绑架；

(c) Muhammad Azum, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 6 月 13 日在俾路支省 Khuzdar Nal Gresha 地区 Zabad 村被巴基斯坦军队在突袭其住所时逮捕；

(d) 一名未成年人，据称于 2020 年 5 月 1 日被军队和安全部队从俾路支省 Nazrabad 的住所绑架；

(e) Muzawar Khan, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 5 月 10 日在开伯尔-普什图赫瓦省北瓦济里斯坦 Shewah 的 Miami Kabul Khel 被军事特勤局特工逮捕；

(f) Aurang Zaib, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 6 月 2 日晚 8 时许在卡拉奇 Baldia 镇 Gulshan Mazdoor Hub River 路 14 号，15/16 区 5342 号，被便衣武装人员绑架；

(g) Mina Jan, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 8 月 5 日在其家乡——毗邻南瓦济里斯坦联邦直辖部落地区的 Tank 区，被巴基斯坦反恐部警察和巴基斯坦军事特勤局特工绑架；

(h) Ghullam Mahdi Chandio, 别名 Ghullam Mahdi, 巴基斯坦国民，据称在 2020 年 7 月 7 日包括便衣警察和别动队在内的武装人员突袭其位于卡拉奇 Gulistan-e-Johar 的 Iqra 大楼 407 号公寓时被捕；

(i) Mahfooz Ismail Notkani, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 6 月 24 日凌晨 3 时 10 分左右，在位于 Badin 区 Shaheed Fazil Rahoo(Golarchi)一男子高中附近 Notkani Muhalla 04 号的住所，被包括警察在内的身着制服的国家武装人员和便衣人员逮捕；

(j) Shafqat Hussain Malik, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 6 月 22 日上午 12 时 45 分左右，在位于信德省 Colony Ghotki 民用医院 B-2 号的住所，被身着军装的巴基斯坦别动队蒙面武装人员和两名便衣人员逮捕；

(k) Waqar Manzoor, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 6 月 20 日晚 8 时 45 分左右，在位于 Tazi Abad, Pedrak, Turbat, Kech Makran 的住所前被据信是国家特工的不明身份人员绑架；

(l) Ejaz Khan, 巴基斯坦国民，据称于 2020 年 8 月 22 日在伊斯兰堡首都地区 Madrassa Darul Huda 被巴基斯坦军事特勤局特工绑架。

标准程序

114. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 37 起案件(见附件一)。

适用六个月规则

115. 2020 年 8 月 31 日，该国政府就 77 起未决案件提供了资料，工作组据此决定对这些案件适用六个月规则。

政府提供的资料

116. 2020 年 8 月 31 日，巴基斯坦政府转交了 29 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

澄清

117. 根据该国政府先前提供的资料，工作组决定澄清 174 起第一百二十届会议已决定适用六个月规则的案件(A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, 第 108 段)，事关：Shahab Ikram、Shahab Ikram、Allah Ditto、Zakir Bangulzai、Mir Sohrab Khan Marri、Sharif Ahmad Baloch、Bukhsh Muhammad、Murtaza Chandio、Zubirahmed Baloch、Hameed Baloch、Karim Uddin Syed、Muhammad Rehan Muhammad Haroon、Tanveer Ahmed Zameer Ahmed、Syed Aashiq Elahi、Muhammad Rehan Akram、Faisal Khurshid、Mansoor Muhammad、Mirza Zeeshan Baig、Muhammad Ali Muhammad Yousuf、Muhammad Ghayas Ahmed Muhammad Muhammd Shabir Ahmed、Muhammad Shafiq Muhammad Rafiq、Naveed Ahmed Syed、Syed Akhtar Hussain Ather Hussain、Aamir Ali Ashiq Ali、Muhammad Kashif Muhammad Yousuf、Farhan Farooq Muhammad Farooq、Muhammad Shakeel Fateh Muhammad Khan、Ali Mehmood、Syed Farhan Hashmi Syed Maqbool Ahmed、Syed Saleem Ali Syed Faraz Ali、Ali Lodhi Nasarullah、Shah Nawaz Gayasuddin、Zafar Ali Khan Zahid Ali Khan、Faisal Nadeem Jameel Ahmed、Waseem Qamar Ali、Zeeshan Zaki、Muhammad Imran Muhammad Yameen、Nasir Shah Ali、Muhammad Aamir Saeed、Waseem Ahmed Abdul Ghani、Muhammad Sohail、Riyaz Ahmed、Raheel Abdul、Muhammad Siddiq、Shabbir Ali Abid Ali、Rizwan Akram Niazi、Shahnawaz Muhammad Iftikhar、Muhammad Iftikhar Muhammad Wali、Haider Ali Khursheed Haider、Faheem Andah Rajput、Muhummad Ejaz、Zeeshan Saleem Durrani、Farhan Mitha Umer Deen、Abdul Sattar Khan Sher Afghan、Zahid Ali Khan Nasir Ali Shah、Ali Syed Murad Ali Syed Muhammad、Barkat Ali Rehmatuddah、Rayaz Ahmed Mushtaq Ahmed、Muhammed Yaseen Muhammad Yameen、Shakeel Ahmed Ghaffar、Imran Khan、Aziz Ali Ali、Hammad Sharif、Jan Muhammad、Jahanzib Jahanzib、Hafiz Mohammad Tabish Qazi Mohammad Safdar、Abdul Hameed Muhammad Aslam、Aziz Uddin Assif Aziz、Waheed Ullah Ubaid Ullah Habib、Qureshi Niaz Hussain Mohammad Imram、Naveed Anwar Siddque Khursheed Anwar Siddque、Khushi Muhammad Salahuddin、Iqbal Ali Liaquat Ali、Safeer Rehman Shafique Rehman、Muhammad Majid Khan Junaid Muhammad Mufeez Khan、Muhammad Nizam Abdul Jalil、Syed Rehan Uddin Misbah Uddin、Raheel Mansoori Abdul Sattar、Muhammad Nazar Mukarram Abdul Razzaq、Muhammad Tariq Siddiqui Masood Ilahi Siddiqui、Majid Ali Khan Kakir Ali Khan、Muhammad Irfan Khan Muhamad Abrar Khan、Sharif Ikramuddin、Usama Junaid、Jawad Ali、Bahadur Sher Syed、Fazal Raheem、Luqman、Sagheer Ahmad Shah、Muhammad Amir Baloch、Hafiz Hassan Akbar Hafiz Hassan Akbar、Hasnain Afzal Raza Hasnain Afzal Raza、Saleem Shazad Mehboob Elahi、Mohammad Ashraf Noor Mohammad、

Nafees Ahmed Siddiqui Zaheer Ahmed Siddiqui、Kashif Kashif、Khamadan Khan、Hafiz Basheer Ahmad、Huzaifa、Molana Shalim、Adeem Sartaj、Naeem Muhammad、Akhtar Naveed、Abid Hussain、Kashif Khan、Zabit Khan、Mohammed Azeem、Muhammad Farooq Muhammad Ashraf、Syed Shiraz Ali Syed Zahid Ali Hashmi、Gul Mohammad、Ghulum Raza Raza Jarwar、Ijaz Ullah、Alamgir Qambrani、Muhammad Farhan Muhammad Hassan、Abdul Aziz Ansari Abdul Sattar Ansari、Muneer Ali Khan、Amir Panhar Masroor Ahmed、Farman Ali Mst Fehmida Khanam、Inam Ullah Abassi、Abdullah Shah、Munir Ahmed Haqani、Muhammad Islam、Riaz Ul Iqbal、Imran Mumtaz、Ahmed Khan、Muhammad Yousaf、Muhammad Yasir、Mehran、Khalil Ahmad Baloch、Mehboob、Tehseen Askari、Nasir Aziz、Umer Yaar、Abdul Rasheed、Shehzad Qayyum、Hidayatullah Lohar、Gul Wahab、Muhammad Farooq、Shoukat Khan、Muhammad Ismail、Ali Muhammad、Zia-ur-Mustafa Channa、Syed Ameer Faisal、Mudasir Hassan、Fareed Ghulam、Syed Sheeraz Haider Ali Sheeraz、Abdul Rehman、Shakoor Abdul、Tahir Mehmood、Molana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani、Mihadullah、Hussain Ahmed、Saleem Shah、Azhar Haroon、Muhammad Sher Ali Khan、Shakirullah、Muhammad Siddique、Abdul Qadeer Khan、Bakht Sher、Rasool Nawaz、Sabir Khan、Sumiullah、Khan Laali、Rasheed Iqbal、Fahad Mehmood、Israr Ahmad、Sohail Ahmad Khan、Asad Abbas、Safdar Muavia、Zakirullah、Ajab Khan、Imtiaz、Ali Murad Rind Baloch 和 Muhammad Aqib Shahid。其中 89 起案件中，有关人员据报告已经获得自由；另外 85 起案件中，有关人员据报告仍被拘留。

联合紧急呼吁

118. 2020 年 6 月 11 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合发出紧急呼吁，事关人权维护者 Idris Khattak 继续失踪及其面临的酷刑和虐待风险。

联合指控函

119. 2020 年 8 月 31 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Khattak 先生继续被单独监禁及其面临的酷刑和虐待风险。

巴拉圭

对联合指控函的答复

120. 2020 年 8 月 14 日，该国政府转交了对 2019 年 8 月 7 日发出的联合指控函的答复。来函中详细介绍了巴拉圭上诉法院 2019 年 5 月 22 日的判决，判决结束了对被控在 1976 年 4 月至 1979 年 5 月犯下任意拘留、任意处决和酷刑罪行的被告 Camilo Almada Morel 和 Eusebio Torres Romero 的刑事诉讼，并下令将其释放，据称这一判决导致危害人类罪不受处罚。

菲律宾

根据来文方提供的资料作出的澄清

121. 根据来文方提供的资料，工作组决定澄清一起案件。据报告当事人已经死亡。

来文方提供的资料

122. 来文方提供了另外 3 起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

政府提供的资料

123. 工作组已对菲律宾政府 2019 年 9 月 11 日提供的资料完成审查。有关 17 起案件的所余资料被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

意见

124. 工作组希望该国政府尽快对 2008 年 4 月 3 日提出的国别访问请求和随后发出的提醒函作出肯定答复。

卡塔尔

紧急程序

125. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 1985 年 5 月 4 日出生的阿拉伯叙利亚共和国公民 Abdul Razzak Ahmad Erzaik，据称他于 2020 年 5 月 27 日在位于多哈的住所附近被国家安全部门绑架。

俄罗斯联邦

标准程序

126. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 23 起案件(见附件一)。

来文方提供的资料

127. 来文方提供了 15 起未决案件的最新资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

政府提供的资料

128. 2020 年 7 月 22 日，该国政府转交了 10 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清这些案件。

澄清

129. 根据政府先前提供的资料，工作组决定澄清一起案件，事关 Alvi Lechievich Khaiderkhanov，据报告他已被拘留。

意见

130. 关于有关北高加索的未决案件，工作组提醒俄罗斯联邦政府，它承担着人道主义义务，需在适当尊重文化习俗的情况下，搜寻和找到失踪者或其遗体，包括辨认遗体并将遗体归还亲属。在这方面，俄罗斯联邦有关部门采取必要步骤，制定并实施规定时限的战略，开展搜寻工作。

131. 关于库页岛朝鲜族人失踪的未决案件，工作组敦促俄罗斯联邦地方和联邦当局确定库页岛的安葬地点，确认这些人的遗骸，并将其归还给他们在韩民国的亲属。

132. 在这方面，工作组认为了解真相权既是一项集体权利，也是一项个人权利。每个受害者都有权知道影响到本人的侵权行为的真相，但真相也必须向社会公开，以此作为防止再次发生侵权行为的重要保障。因此，必须开启包括军事档案在内的所有档案，并向公众全面开放，包括向失踪者亲属开放。

133. 工作组希望该国政府尽快对 2006 年 11 月 2 日提出的国别访问请求和随后发出的提醒函作出肯定答复。

卢旺达

紧急程序

134. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关卢旺达公民 Venant Abayisenga，据称于 2020 年 5 月 6 日下午 4 时许在住所附近被绑架。

联合指控函

135. 2020 年 9 月 30 日，工作组与酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚问题特别报告员联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Paul Rusesabagina，据报告他在不明情况下从迪拜被强行转移到基加利，目前被拘留在卢旺达，面临与恐怖主义有关的指控。

沙特阿拉伯

标准程序

136. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 3 起案件(见附件一)。

塞尔维亚

标准程序

137. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 Šimun Marojević，据称他于 1992 年 6 月 20 日在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那冲突期间被隶属于南斯拉夫联盟共和国安全情报部门的武装民兵绑架并处决。据报告，其遗体迄今下落不明。

138. 工作组依照其工作方法，向波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那政府和克罗地亚政府转交了案件的副本。

斯里兰卡

标准程序

139. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 56 起案件(见附件一)。

政府提供的资料

140. 2020 年 7 月 20 日，斯里兰卡政府转交了 32 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

联合指控函

141. 2020 年 6 月 4 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Keenie Meenie Services 和该公司正式雇用和(或)临时聘用的大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国国民据称在 1984 年至 1988 年斯里兰卡武装冲突期间犯下的违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为中起到的作用，以及缺乏问责和对受害者的补救。

阿拉伯叙利亚共和国

标准程序

142. 工作组根据标准程序向该国政府转交了 8 起案件(见附件一)。

根据来文方提供的资料作出的澄清

143. 根据来文方先前提供的资料，工作组决定澄清一起案件，事关 Hadi Al Zuhuri，据报告 he 已从狱中获释。

意见

144. 工作组继续收到令人震惊的报告，事关失踪者亲属出于正当理由询问失踪者的命运和下落而遭到恐吓和报复。阿拉伯叙利亚共和国政府必须确保所有参与调查强迫失踪案件的人员，包括申诉人、其亲属、律师和证人，按照《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》第 13 条的规定，受到保护，免遭虐待、恐吓和报复。在这方面，工作组请该国政府采取必要措施，保护失踪者亲属免受针对性的报复，并维护他们了解真相、获得正义、赔偿和纪念的基本权利。

145. 工作组再次要求阿拉伯叙利亚共和国当局立即停止和防止强迫失踪行为；搜寻受害者并确定其下落；对这些侵权行为进行透明、独立和有效的调查，并特别重视据报告在羁押中死亡的情况；追究犯罪人的责任；并向失踪者家属提供赔偿。

泰国

联合紧急呼吁和答复

146. 2020 年 6 月 12 日和 2020 年 7 月 15 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合发出紧急呼吁，事关泰国国民 Wanchalearm Satsaksit 据称在柬埔寨被绑架和强迫失踪且调查毫无进展。

147. 2020 年 8 月 11 日，泰国政府对紧急呼吁作出答复。

土耳其

政府提供的资料

148. 2020 年 7 月 20 日，土耳其政府转交了 7 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

澄清

149. 工作组根据该国政府先前提供的资料决定澄清两起案件，事关据报告被拘留的 Turgut Capan 和据报告已经死亡的 Birlik Abdulkaki。

联合指控函

150. 2010 年 7 月 10 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关一名人权维护者被逮捕且将被引渡至伊朗伊斯兰共和国，他在伊朗可能面临被强迫失踪的风险。

意见

151. 工作组呼吁土耳其政府迅速落实工作组访问土耳其后提出的建议，工作组最近的后继报告(A/HRC/45/13/Add.4)对这些建议的执行情况进行了评估。土耳其应遵守人道义务，与失踪者亲属密切协调，建立一个专门和独立的搜寻机制。工作组建议当局在这一过程中考虑由民间社会主导的独立举措，例如对土耳其各地的埋葬地点进行调查。

152. 工作组重申，终止或暂停对据称强迫失踪的刑事调查并不能免除土耳其政府在适当尊重文化习俗的情况下查找和确定和查明失踪人员或其遗体下落的义务，包括将遗体归还亲属。

153. 工作组继续致力于向该国政府提供技术援助，以履行其在消除强迫失踪和保护了解真相、获得正义、记忆和赔偿权利方面的人权和人道义务。

乌克兰

政府提供的资料

154. 2020 年 7 月 20 日，乌克兰政府转交了 5 起案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

适用六个月规则

155. 2020 年 9 月 22 日，该国政府提供了关于 4 起未决案件的资料，工作组据此决定对这些案件适用六个月规则。

一个非国家行为体提供的资料

156. 2020 年 7 月 13 日，自称“顿涅茨克人民共和国”的代表提供了关于 4 起未决案件的资料，但被视为不足以澄清这些案件。³

³ 工作组于 2019 年 9 月宣布将开始记录非国家行为体实施的相当于强迫失踪的侵权行为(A/HRC/42/40, 第 94 段)后，这些案件被转交。

阿拉伯联合酋长国

根据来文方提供的资料作出的澄清

157. 根据来文方提供的资料，工作组决定澄清 Sheikha Latifa Mohammed Al Maktoum 的案件，据报道，她被单独监禁在迪拜的家中。

停止审议

158. 工作组决定，作为例外，并根据工作方法第 28 段的规定，停止审议两起未决案件，事关 Eliana Massiel Domingues Cid 和一名儿童。然而，这些案件可能随时重启审理。

联合紧急呼吁

159. 2020 年 7 月 15 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一项紧急呼吁，事关 20 名曾被拘留在关塔那摩湾的人，他们于 2015 年 11 月至 2017 年 1 月被送到阿拉伯联合酋长国，未经审判或指控而被拘留。

联合指控函

160. 2020 年 7 月 14 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关一名居住在沙特阿拉伯的也门国民，他在也门一个检查站被捕，被拘留在非官方拘留设施中，据称受到也门及其盟友部队的酷刑和恐吓。

161. 2020 年 9 月 30 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Paul Rusesabagina，据报告他在不明情况下从迪拜被强行转移到基加利，目前被拘留在卢旺达，面临与恐怖主义有关的指控。

意见

162. 工作组收到报告称，位于也门由阿拉伯联合酋长国当局管理的秘密拘留中心里发生了任意拘留和强迫失踪，工作组对此深感关切。在也门自 2015 年起持续至今的武装冲突和人道主义危机背景下，据报告，人们未被告知逮捕原因便遭任意拘留，不得接触律师或法官，并被长期或无限期单独监禁，这些做法构成强迫失踪。据称阿拉伯联合酋长国和也门两国官员以反恐行动为借口，合作实施了这些侵犯人权行为。

163. 在这方面，工作组回顾《保护所有人不遭受强迫失踪宣言》的规定：每个国家应采取有效的立法、行政、司法或其他措施，以防止和终止在其管辖下的任何领土内造成被强迫失踪的行为(第 3 条)；将强迫失踪定为刑事犯罪的义务(第 4 条)；不得援引任何特殊情况，包括战争威胁或战争状态，作为造成被强迫失踪的理由(第 7 条)；应将任何被剥夺自由的人安置在官方认可的拘留地点，并遵照国家法律，在拘留后立即交由司法当局处理(第 10 条)；向主管和独立的国家当局提出申诉并获得该当局对此申诉进行迅速、彻底和公正调查的权利(第 13 条)；对于犯有或参与实施强迫失踪的人，不应适用任何赦免法律或其他可能使他们免受任何刑事诉讼或制裁的类似措施(第 18 条)。

大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国

联合指控函和答复

164. 2020 年 6 月 4 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关 Keenie Meenie Services 和该公司正式雇用和(或)临时聘用的大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国国民据称在 1984 年至 1988 年斯里兰卡武装冲突期间犯下的违反国际人道法和国际人权法行为中起到的作用，以及缺乏问责和对受害者的补救。

165. 2020 年 8 月 2 日，该国政府对联合指控函作出答复。

美利坚合众国

联合紧急呼吁

166. 2020 年 7 月 15 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一项紧急呼吁，事关 20 名曾被拘留在关塔那摩湾的人，他们于 2015 年 11 月至 2017 年 1 月被送到阿拉伯联合酋长国，未经审判或指控而被拘留。

联合指控函

167. 2020 年 7 月 14 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关居住在沙特阿拉伯的一名也门国民，他在也门一个检查站被捕，2018 年 5 月 19 日至 6 月 25 日在非官方拘留设施中被强迫失踪，据称受到也门和阿拉伯联合酋长国军队的酷刑和恐吓。据称，美国情报人员参与了境外审讯。

168. 2020 年 7 月 27 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关据称 Mohammed Abdullah Saleh al-Asad 在美利坚合众国实施的特别引渡方案框架内，先后在坦桑尼亚联合共和国、吉布提、阿富汗和也门被单独监禁、遭受酷刑和虐待。该指控函还事关他的妻子 Zahra Ahmed Mohamed, 据称她因为不知道丈夫的命运和下落，在心理上受到不良影响。

越南

对联合指控函的答复

169. 2020 年 5 月 26 日，该国政府转交了对 2020 年 3 月 31 日发出的联合指控函的答复，指控函事关 Truong Thi Ha 在入境越南时被任意逮捕及可能被强迫失踪，这似乎是对她倡导人权的一种报复行为。

委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国

紧急程序

170. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了两起案件，事关：

(a) Leonardo David Chirinos Parra, 据报告于 2020 年 4 月 21 日在苏利亚州马拉开波市失踪，失踪前被派往博利塔总部的军事反情报总局特工拘留；

(b) José Antonio Zamora Urian, 据报告于 2020 年 5 月 7 日在法尔孔州 Punto Fijo 市的胡安·克里斯托莫·法尔孔海军基地被绑架。

来文方提供的资料

171. 来文方提供了一起未决案件的资料，但被认为不足以澄清案件。

联合指控函

172. 2020 年 9 月 14 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关至少 73 名移民失踪，其中包括可能遭受人口贩运的受害者，他们在 2019 年 4 月至 7 月间乘坐三艘不同船只从委内瑞拉玻利瓦尔共和国前往库拉索岛和特立尼达和多巴哥。

也门

紧急程序

173. 工作组根据紧急程序向该国政府转交了一起案件，事关 Redwan Al Hashidi，据称他在被埃及驱逐出境后于 2020 年 7 月 8 日在 Say'un Hadramawt 机场被也门安全部门逮捕。

174. 工作组依照其工作方法，向埃及政府转交了案件的副本。

标准程序

175. 工作组宣布，将从 2019 年 9 月起开始记录非国家行为体实施的相当于强迫失踪的侵权行为(A/HRC/42/40, 第 94 段)。因此，在本届会议期间，工作组审议了 4 起据称在萨那事实当局控制的领土上犯下的相当于强迫失踪的案件。⁴ 工作组根据标准程序向萨那事实当局转交了下列案件：

(a) Abkr Barakhli, 据称于 2016 年 3 月 16 日在荷台达被据称与萨那事实当局有关联的武装团体绑架；

(b) Ghazali Mahdabi, 据称于 2015 年 10 月 15 日在荷台达街头被据称与萨那事实当局有关联的武装团体绑架；

(c) Tariq Khalaf, 据称于 2016 年 3 月 18 日在位于 Al-Qamaria 的家中被与萨那事实当局有关联的武装团体绑架；

(d) Omar al-Shareef, 据称于 2016 年 1 月 2 日在位于 Ahmed Sagheer 村的家中被与萨那事实当局有关联的武装团体绑架。

联合指控函

176. 2020 年 7 月 14 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关一名居住在沙特阿拉伯的也门国民，他在也门一个检查站被捕，2018 年 5 月 19 日至 6 月 25 日被拘留在非官方拘留设施中，据称受到也门及其盟友部队的酷刑。

⁴ 工作组强调，向萨那事实当局转交的案件绝不意味着对任何领土、城市、地区、或其当局的法律地位表示任何意见。

津巴布韦

联合指控函和答复

177. 2020 年 6 月 2 日，工作组与其他特别程序机制联合转交了一封指控函，事关民革运青年大会成员 Joannah Mamombe、Cecelia Chimbiri 和 Netsai Marowa 在 2020 年 5 月 13 日至 15 日期间被任意逮捕、失踪、遭受酷刑和虐待。

178. 2020 年 6 月 16 日，政府转交了对联合指控函的答复。

Annex I

Standard procedure cases

Afghanistan

1. The Working Group transmitted 9 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Ezzatullah, allegedly arrested in November 2017 by police officers from his residence in Kandahar city;
 - (b) Aminullah Rafiqi allegedly arrested on 16 March 2019 from his residence in Kandahar city, by members of the special unit of the National Directorate of Security (NDS03);
 - (c) Shafiullah allegedly abducted on 24 October 2016 from his shop in Kandahar city by two armed men believed to be plainclothes police officers;
 - (d) Sayed Mohamad, allegedly arrested on 26 September 2016 from his residence in Kandahar city by police officers;
 - (e) Ahmad Khan, allegedly arrested on 4 September 2017 from his shop in Kandahar city by armed men believed to be members of a police special unit;
 - (f) Sayed Ibrahim Hashimi allegedly disappeared on 12 June 2016 from Rig detention facility in Dan District, Kandahar;
 - (g) Gulalai, allegedly arrested on 8 December 2015 from his shop in Kandahar, by the police;
 - (h) Fazel Rahman, allegedly arrested on 28 June 2015 from his shop in Kandahar City by police officers;
 - (i) Mohibullah, allegedly arrested on 15 March 2014 from his shop in Kandahar city by police officers.

Bangladesh

2. The Working Group transmitted 2 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Ansar Ali Ali, allegedly abducted on 18 April 2012, from Dhaka by armed men believed to be state agents;
 - (b) Saidur Rahman Kazi, allegedly arrested from Jessore Municipality Park on 5 April 2017 by police officers.

China

3. The Working Group transmitted 52 cases to the Government, concerning:
 - (a) Tajiguli Wufuer, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
 - (b) Reyihanguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
 - (c) Mieradili Abulaiti allegedly arrested in August 2017, from Kashgar city, Xinjiang, by Chinese police officers wearing uniforms;
 - (d) Tueroxun Suliye disappeared in 201. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;

- (e) Lhadar, allegedly arrested on 8 October 2019 in his village in Nagchu (Naqu) County, Nagchu Prefecture by local police;
- (f) Norsang allegedly arrested at the end of September in 2019 in Nagchu (Naqu) County, Nagchu Prefecture by local police;
- (g) Imamu Tuoheti allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (h) Nur Maimaiti Imamu allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (i) Nur Amina Imamu, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (j) Rukeya Imamu, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (k) Saidula Tuoheti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (l) Reziwanguli Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (m) Haisiteli Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (n) Yidiresi Ahon, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (o) Denaguli Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (p) Kasimujiang Ahong, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (q) Yiheya Bawudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (r) Zuorigul Bwaudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (s) Ayixiamuguli Bwaudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (t) Wufuerjiang Bawudung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (u) Omarjiang Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (v) Najibula Abulaiti, allegedly disappeared on 20 February 2018 after being summoned to a police station in Kashgar;
- (w) Maimaitiming Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (x) Abuduwaili Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (y) Alimujiang Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (z) Ayinuer Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (aa) Areziguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (bb) Maihemutijiang Kunahung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;

- (cc) Guoyaguli Reman, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (dd) Nurmaimaiti Aizizi, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ee) Rusitaimujiang Aizizi, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ff) Wusimanjiang Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (gg) Buheliqiemu Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (hh) Aihemaitijiang Kunahung, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ii) Aini Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (jj) Reyihanguli Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (kk) Busala Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ll) Abudourezake Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (mm) Maimaitiming Maimaittuersun, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (nn) Haisiteli Abudurexiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (oo) Alimu Hashani, allegedly was arrested in August 2018 in Beijing by the police;
- (pp) Mamat Abdullah arrested on 29 April 2017 from Urumqi City, Xinjiang, by Security Administration Police;
- (qq) Nuerbiya Mamutijiang, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed she was taken to a re-education facility;
- (rr) Kunahung Maimaiti, allegedly disappeared in 2017 or 2018. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (ss) Hushtar Eysa, allegedly disappeared in 2017. It is believed he was taken to a re-education facility;
- (tt) Yalkun Isa, allegedly disappeared in 2017;
- (uu) Ailijiang Mamuti, allegedly arrested in May 2017;
- (vv) Ametjan Abdurashid, allegedly last seen in late 2016 at Kashgar City People's Court;
- (ww) Abdukahar Ebeydulla, allegedly detained in 2016 by the Police;
- (xx) Yakefu Niyazi, allegedly arrested in June 2017 in arrested in Xinhe (Toqsu) Country, Akesu (Aqsu) Prefecture, Xinjiang;
- (yy) Hairiguli Niyazi, arrested in August 2017 in Urumqi;
- (zz) Yusufu Niyazi, seen in August 2016 in detention in Tumshuq, Xinjiang.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

4. The Working Group transmitted 12 cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Ki-Yeong Jang, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (b) Gyeong-Suk Jeong, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (c) Hyuk-geun Kwon, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (d) Jong-soon Kim, allegedly abducted on 11 December 1969 after Korean Air Lines flight YS-11 was hijacked by an agent associated with the security services of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
- (e) Ki-Ha Lee, allegedly abducted on 8 August 1975 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (f) Ki-sik Min, allegedly abducted on 8 August 1975 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (g) Kyung-soo Kim, allegedly abducted on 20 November 1965 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea authorities when arriving by accident to Chanjon Port;
- (h) Sang-won Lee, allegedly abducted on 29 May 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (i) Soon-chul Ko, allegedly abducted on 7 November 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (j) Sung-ryong Lee, allegedly abducted on 15 February 1974 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (k) Yi-deuk Kim, allegedly abducted on 30 October 1968 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat;
- (l) Young-chun Hwang, allegedly abducted on 25 December 1971 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea forces while on board a fishing boat.

Egypt

5. The Working Group transmitted 6 cases to the Government, concerning:

- (a) Mr. Mohamed Salah Ahmed Mohamed Bayoumi, an Egyptian citizen born on 1 July 1987, allegedly abducted on 3 January 2020 in front of his home by security forces in plainclothes and uniforms;
- (b) Mahmoud Ali, an Egyptian citizen born on 12 October 1998, allegedly arrested on 22 March 2020 from his home located in El-Iraqy village, Abo-Hammad centre, Sharqia governorate, Egypt by Police officers in uniform and National Security agents in civilian clothes;
- (c) Mr. Mohamed Hadeya, an Egyptian teacher born on 13 July 1988, allegedly arrested on 22 December 2019 at his home located in Cairo Governorate by masked State Security agents;
- (d) Assem Ahmed Abdul Hameed Amin, a 25 years old Egyptian citizen, allegedly arrested on 5 March 2018 from Al-Sarraj Mall by security forces both in uniform and plainclothes;
- (e) Yousif Mohamed Mahmoud Amin, an Egyptian citizen born on 15 June 1998, allegedly arrested on 3 November 2019 from his home in Cairo by police forces in uniforms and plainclothes;

(f) Darwish Abd El-Hafiz, an Egyptian citizen born on 3 February 1988, allegedly arrested on 27 October 2018 in front of his home, in 6th of October City, by National Security Agents.

India

6. The Working Group transmitted 9 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Abdul Khaliq Mir, allegedly last seen on 16 October 2000 in Yatipora Headquarters of the army;

(b) Ghulam Mohammad Thachoo, allegedly last seen on 24 November 2005 in Mahu camp, Mirpur, Jammu and Kashmir;

(c) Ghulam Nabi Butt, allegedly disappeared on 20 August 2002 while on his way to Khadi, Adpinchla, Banihal. It is believed that the Army was responsible for his disappearance;

(d) Irshad Amin Khan, allegedly disappeared on 17 December 2004 after going to the Army headquarters in Srinagar;

(e) Jalaluddin Hajam, allegedly disappeared on 15 August 2000 near Naidiki village. It is believed the Army was responsible for his disappearance;

(f) Mehraj-ud Din, allegedly abducted on 20 August 1999 from Baramulla District by members of the Indian army;

(g) Mohammad Akbar Rather, allegedly abducted on 28 November 1996 from his residence in Baramulla District by members of the Indian army;

(h) Mohammad Sharief Wani, allegedly abducted in 2000 by the personnel of 12 Rashtriya Rifles;

(i) Nazir Ahmad Gojjar, allegedly abducted near his residence in Bandipora District, on 26 January 1992 by the Dogra Regiment of the Army.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

7. The Working Group transmitted 4 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Mansouri Abdollah, allegedly arrested in Nezam Abad Street in Tehran in June-July 1981 by state security forces, imprisoned since then, and last seen on 16 October 2000 in Yatipora Headquarters of the army;

(b) Nafiseh Rouhani, allegedly arrested at Falake Khomeini (aka Khomeini Square) in Mashhad on 18 August 1988 by agents of Iranian Security services;

(c) Ahmad Behtash, allegedly arrested at the home of a person associated with him in Dowlat Avenue in Tehran on the evening of 23 or 26 July 1986 by agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) dressed in uniform;

(d) Abbas-Ali Monshi Roudsari, allegedly arrested in his home on 31 July 1986 by security forces from the Revolutionary Committees or the Ministry of Intelligence.

Pakistan

8. The Working Group transmitted 37 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Noor Dad Nil, allegedly abducted on 29 November 2019 in Ormara, district Gwadar, Balochistan by Pakistani Navy while returning home;

(b) Usman Usman, allegedly abducted on 16 August 2012 from the Inayat Kalay Bazar (Market) in Tehsil Khar by the Pakistani Army and military secret service;

(c) Muhammad Maqsood Kiyani Nill, allegedly abducted on 22 September 2017 in Doli Tehsil Bagh by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while returning home from Muzaffarabad;

(d) Umar Safdar Nill, allegedly abducted on 28 January 2016 by three men of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who broke into his house at 5:30 p.m.;

(e) Muhammad Waseem, allegedly abducted in his temporal residence at Street no 11, Golra Railway station, Islamabad, on 10 March 2018 by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(f) Ansar Ahmad Khan Nill, allegedly abducted at 6:00 a.m. on 20 June 2014 from his residence at PO Malot, Chanut, Bagh District, Dhirkot, Azad Kashmir, by seven members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(g) Nazir ul Islam Khan Nill, allegedly abducted in April 2011 by fifteen members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while traveling from Rawalpindi to Gujarat in Punjab;

(h) Ibrahim Shah Syed, allegedly abducted on 16 April 2015 at lunchtime by Pakistani Police. It is believed that Mr. Ibrahim Shah Syed is detained in an internment centre run by the Pakistani Army;

(i) Insaf Ali Dayo, allegedly abducted on 29 May 2019 at 11 a.m. from his tailoring shop at Maghani Shopping Centre, Larkana, District Larkana, Sindh by police team from Police Station Rehmatpur, along with agents from the intelligence agency dressed in uniforms and in plainclothes in white Vigo vehicle and reportedly taken to Rahmarpur Police Station;

(j) Mohammad Hassaan, allegedly abducted on 14 February 2020 at Qili Qambarani, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan, by agents of the Inter-Service Intelligence ISI when buying household items;

(k) Salman Ali Saleem, allegedly abducted in the early morning of 7 May 2019 during a raid by agents of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) while offloading diesel from his car in Bolo town of Mand, Balochistan;

(l) Zakir Balochzahi, an Iranian national, allegedly abducted in October 2019 in Panjgur, district Panjgur, Balochistan, by agents of the Inter Service Intelligence ISI and reportedly taken into custody by intelligence officials from Chetkan town in Panjgur;

(m) Irfan Khan, allegedly arrested on 15 July 2017 at a checkpoint between Dera Ismail Khan District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab Province by agents of the police and secret services dressed in plainclothes and taken to an unknown location;

(n) Ali Bakhtiyar, allegedly abducted on 13 February 2015 near Peer Umar Jan area of Panjgoor, Balochistan, by personnel of Frontier Corps (FC) and secret agencies of Pakistan;

(o) Zia Ul Islam, allegedly arrested on 6 March 2015 in Islamabad by personnel of the Pakistani Secret Services dressed in plainclothes and driven to an unknown location;

(p) Sheraz Khan allegedly abducted on 17 December 2018 in Khyber Agency, Peshawar, by agents of Pakistani Security agencies and military personnel;

(q) A minor, allegedly arrested on 14 April 2013 at the Student Welfare Hostel Danish Abad, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by agents of the Pakistani Military Service and reportedly driven to Sadda District Kurram Prison. It is believed that he is being held in an internment centre at Lakki Marwat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa run by Pakistan Army since 16 March 2019;

(r) Hassan Ali, allegedly abducted on 28 January 2010 from his residence at Mohala Kowz Plow Postoffice Zirakhaila Chungi Swat by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(s) Mohabat Shah, allegedly abducted on 2 February 2014 from Korangi Industrial Area Bilal Kaloni Karachi by two members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in plainclothes with Ranger vehicles while returning to his carriage;

(t) Arbistan, allegedly abducted on 2 October 2014 from Ashraf Road Balahasar Hashat Naghri Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after exiting the mosque following the conclusion of Fajr prayers;

(u) Sarzameen Khan, allegedly abducted on 4 October 2014 from Ishrangri Pull Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while working at Ashangari Bridge;

(v) Rehman Ullah, allegedly arrested on 25 April 2017 in his residence at Alingar, Tehsil Lakray, District Mohammed Agency by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(w) Muhammad Shahbaz, allegedly abducted on 19 December 2014 from his residence near Fire Brigade Line No. 2 Mohala Sunare Town Faisalabad by 15 members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in black uniforms;

(x) Muhammad Imran Khan, allegedly abducted on 7 October 2016 near his residence at PO Abbaspur, Polas, Tehsil Abbaspur, District Poonch Azad, Kashmir, by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(y) Ali Khan, allegedly abducted on 5 September 2011 around 6:00 a.m. from room No. 6, 2nd floor of Amir Plaza, Dalazak road, Peshawar, by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(z) Baloch Khan, allegedly arrested on 17 January 2019 around 5:00 a.m. in the house of a person associated with him in Balochabad Mand, District Kech, Balochistan, by Frontier Corps while he was sleeping when the house was raided by Pakistani military;

(aa) Nill Muslim, allegedly abducted on 4 May 2013 from a hospital in Turbat city, Kech, Balochistan, Pakistan by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence;

(bb) Hizbullah Nill, allegedly abducted on 14 February 2020 while walking along the main road in Qili Qambarani, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan, along with a person associated with him by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence in two vehicles while they were buying groceries;

(cc) Jahanzaib Nill, allegedly abducted on 3 May 2016 from his residence in Qili Qambarani, Qambarani Road Quetta, Balochistan by agents of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence accompanied by Frontier Corps;

(dd) Fazil Rehman, allegedly abducted on 20 May 2010 from his residence at Alankinar, Shinwari Bahadur Kaly Tehsil Apar Mohmand District Mohmand Agency by two members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(ee) Talha Talha, allegedly arrested in 2014 in Peshawar City, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, by agents of the secret service dressed in plainclothes and taken away in a car to an unknown destination;

(ff) Imran Satti, allegedly abducted on 28 August 2016 at 6:30 a.m. from Sanch Dak Khana Khas, Tehsil Muree, District Rawalpindi by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(gg) Sadam Khan, allegedly abducted on 24 February 2017 at 06:30 p.m. from his residence at Dilazakh Road, Fatuabul Rahima, Peshawar by members of a secret agency, possibly from the Military Intelligence (MI), the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

(hh) Arshad Ahmad, allegedly abducted on 21 May 2014 from Hanna Vally, near staff college, Quetta, Balochistan, by agents of the Pakistani military secret service;

(ii) Abdul Qadir, allegedly abducted on 5 May 2014 in front of Saleem Hotel at Kuchlagh Bazaar, Balochistan, by masked individuals suspected to belong to the Pakistani military intelligence;

(jj) Insaaf Ali Dabo, allegedly abducted on 28 May 2017 from Mulghai Centre, Nazar Muhalla Main Road, Centennial Hall, Larkana by three police officers in uniform and three individuals in plainclothes in a white Vigo car with a blue siren;

(kk) Hafiz Hassaan Akbar, allegedly abducted on 19 October 2015 from Faizan Plaza, Committee Chowk, Marri Road, Rawalpindi, by agents of the Counter-Terrorism Department connected with the Pakistani military secret service.

Russian Federation

9. The Working Group transmitted 23 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Yong-In Woo, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(b) I-Geun Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(c) Yun-Gap Si, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(d) Ok-Dong Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(e) Young-Sul Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(f) Byeong-Seon Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(g) Seong-Hak Park, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(h) Man-Dong Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(i) Gui-Yong Yoo, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(j) Seong-I Baek, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(k) Seok-Nam Yoon, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(l) Gyu-Bong Kim, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(m) Sang-Mun Choi, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(n) Ok-Seong Bae, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(o) Yun-Ok Do, was last heard from in a letter from South Sakhalin, located in the present day Russian Federation, in June 1950, just before the outbreak of the Korean War;

(p) Sergei Remenyuk, allegedly abducted on 15 June 2016 by armed groups associated with the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' in the area of Mnogopolye, Donetsk. It is reported that he was transferred to the city of Rostov in the territory of the Russian Federation shortly after the abduction¹;

(q) Adam Medov, allegedly arrested on 15 June 2004 by a group of armed men associated with the Federal Security Service in Karabulak;

(r) Sayd-Salekh Ibragimov, allegedly arrested on 20 October 2009 by special agents of the Ministry of the Interior during a raid on his house in Goyty village;

(s) Khizir Tepsurkayev, allegedly arrested on 27 August 2001 by a group of Russian servicemen from military unit no. 6779 that was participating in a special operation in Urus-Martan;

(t) Aindi Dzhabayev, allegedly arrested on 8 September 2002 by armed military officers in a raid on his home in Urus Martan;

(u) Dzhamalayl Yanayev, allegedly arrested on 28 December 2004 at Beslan Airport by two armed men wearing camouflage uniforms allegedly affiliated with the Regional Department for Combating Organized Crime;

(v) Adam Didayev, allegedly arrested on 6 December 2001 by approximately 20 armed masked men in camouflage uniforms in a raid on his house in Gekhi;

(w) Moul Usumov, allegedly arrested on 30 June 2001 by around 20 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms with dogs during a raid on his house in Kurchaloy.

Saudi Arabia

10. The Working Group transmitted three cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Mohammad Ali Saghir Manea, a Yemeni citizen, allegedly abducted from the streets of Jizan in Saudi Arabia on 21 December 2015 by the military police;

(b) Suleiman Ali Hussein Salim Suleiman, a Yemeni citizen, allegedly abducted from the streets of Jizan in Saudi Arabia on 21 December 2015 by the military police;

(c) Mohd Monzer Al Imam, a Syrian citizen, allegedly arrested between his place of residence and his workplace at Hashem contracting & trading in 3225 Turki Ibn Abdullah Al Saud, Sulaimaniyah, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 14 August 2018 by Homeland Security agents.

¹ In accordance with its methods of work, the Working Group transmitted a copy of the case to the Government of Ukraine and the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' as a non-State actor. The Working Group stresses that the case addressed to the self-proclaimed 'Donetsk people's republic' does not in any way imply the expression of any opinion concerning the legal status of any territory, city or area, or of its authorities.

Sri Lanka

11. The Working Group transmitted 56 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Puniyamoorthi Palanimuthu, allegedly abducted on 5 September 1990 from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka, by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(b) Vincent Mersiyaas, allegedly disappeared on 26 November 2006 near Vavuniya Town and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(c) Vikneshvaran Suntharam, allegedly abducted on 25 December 2007 from his residence in Batticaloe District by individuals believed to be members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(d) Yogendran Siluvaimuthu, allegedly disappeared on 17 May 2009 after being brought from Mullaithevu to the Omanthai Camp by the Sri Lankan Army;

(e) Umunithambi Chinathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(f) Valipillai Chinathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(g) Thilaiyamma Ilayathambi, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(h) Vijayakumar Kanahaiya, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(i) Rameshkaran Kanapathipillai, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(j) Sureshkaran Kanapathipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(k) Thanapalan Kanapathipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(l) Thangamma Kandhapan allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(m) Savundaram Kirubaratnam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(n) Seenithambi Kumarvelu, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(o) Suthaharan Rathnaiya allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(p) Kanapathipillai Thambipillai allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(q) Supulaxmi Thangavel, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(r) Shanthimathi Vadivel, allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;

(s) Karunairasa Seyanthan, allegedly last seen on the Vadduvakal Bridge, Vadduvakal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province being taken away by the Sri Lankan Army;

(t) Navaratnam Navendran, allegedly last seen on 10 March 2009 in Matthalan, Mullivaikyal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province, Sri Lanka and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

- (u) Sritharan Pararasasingham, allegedly last seen on 13 April 2009 in Pokkunai, Matthalan Mullivaikal in the Mullaitivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (v) Nitharjini Rasamohan allegedly seen in April 2009 in Mullivaikal, in the Mullaitivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (w) Rasendram Gajendran allegedly disappeared on 10 May 2009 in Mullivaikal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (x) Prasath Upulkumara Thupahi, allegedly abducted on 4 September 1989 from river in Rathgama, Poogoda, Olunagoda, Rathgama, Galle, Southern Province, by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (y) Muthaiah Muthukumar allegedly last seen on 5 September 1990 being taken away from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, by the Army;
- (z) Vikneshwaran Nahaiya allegedly last seen on 5 September 1990 being taken away from Vantharamoolai Eastern University Refugee Camp, Batticaloe, Eastern Province, by the Army;
- (aa) Gunarathinam Nawaratnam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (bb) Mohansundari Paramakutty allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (cc) Vinothini Perinbam allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (dd) Ponammah Periyathambi allegedly abducted on 9 September 1990 in the village of Saturukondan by members of the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ee) Dathees Mahendran allegedly disappeared 13 March 2009 in the village of Vellamullivaikal, Mullaitivu District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ff) Chandrakumar Dharmarasi allegedly disappeared on 28 August 1993 from Vantharamoolai, Batticaloe, Eastern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (gg) Balasubramainiyam Naheshwaran allegedly disappeared on 20 May 1996 from Chenkaladi, Batticaloe district, Eastern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (hh) Prakalathan Srikaneshamoorthi, allegedly disappeared on 10 June 1993 in Batticaloe, Eastern Province, and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ii) Sivanlavan Seevarathinam allegedly disappeared on 6 October 2009 in Batticaloe District, Eastern Province, and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (jj) Sooriyakumar Dharmarasi allegedly disappeared on 6 March 2001 and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (kk) Nirosan Joseph, allegedly abducted on 18 January 2009 from Velam Mullivaikal, Mullaitivu district, by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (ll) Thiyananth Yogendran allegedly abducted on 21 March 2009, in Pudukuduirippu, in the Mullaitivu District and Northern Province by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (mm) Joyal Sivachandru allegedly abducted on 21 April 2009, in the Mullaitivu District, Northern Province of Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;
- (nn) Sivaranjan Sinnarasa allegedly abducted in August 2008, when leaving his residence in Paranthan, Killinochi District, Northern Province, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(oo) Shantha Saundra Hennadige allegedly abducted on 15 November 1989 from Kotagoda, Hungandeniya, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(pp) Thivanesan Santhirakumar allegedly abducted on 14 October 2008 from his residence in Kovil Puliyankulam, Velankulam, Vanuniya, Northern Province, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(qq) Priyantha Vijesinghe Ranepura Hevage allegedly abducted on 15 March 1989 from Weliketiya, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;

(rr) Nagaratnam Subatheepan allegedly last seen on 1 March 2009 and is believed to have later been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(ss) Upali Lawransuhewage allegedly abducted on 30 November 1989 from Madamwella, Dewinuwara, Mathara District, Southern Province, Sri Lanka, by the Sri Lankan Army;

(tt) Anton Kovinthisamy allegedly abducted on 6 October 2008 in Vavuniya, between Poovarasankulam and Thalikulam, Northern Province, Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan Army;

(uu) Parameswaran Kirushnan allegedly last seen in 2009 in Iranaipalai, Puthukudiuppuppu (Mullaithivu District) and believed to have later been abducted by the Army;

(vv) Piratheepan Kanagaratnam allegedly disappeared on 23 February 2009 from Pokkunai, Mullaithivu District and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(ww) Kajatheepan Kanagaratnam allegedly disappeared on 1 March 2009 from Matthalan, Mullaithivu District and is believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(xx) Jeevananthini Kanakarathnam allegedly abducted on 12 May 2009, from Mullivaikkal, Mullaithivu District, Northern Province by the Sri Lankan Army;

(yy) Arutsan Muthulingam allegedly disappeared on 24 February 2009 from Ambalavan, Pokkanai, Mullaithivu District, Northern Province and is believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(zz) Jeyamani Thushyanthan allegedly last seen in Mullikulam Mannar District, Northern Province and believed to have been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(aaa) Jeyamani Sasiharan, allegedly last seen on 10 April 2009 and believed to have later been abducted by the Sri Lankan Army;

(bbb) Chandrasena Charlis Silva allegedly abducted on 2 November 1990 near the Beruwala Buddhist Centre, Kalutara District, Western Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be members of the Army;

(ccc) Navaraththinam Aarumugam, allegedly abducted on 24 June 2009 from Manatchchenai, Poththuvil, Ampara district, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be linked to the government;

(ddd) Manogaran Aarumugam, allegedly abducted on 24 June 2009 from Manatchchenai, Poththuvil, Ampara district, Eastern Province, Sri Lanka by unidentified individuals believed to be linked to the government.

Syrian Arab Republic

12. The Working Group transmitted 8 cases to the Government, concerning:

(a) Abdulhamid Alsaloum, allegedly arrested on 27 October 2012 by Air Force Security agents in a raid on his home;

(b) Aiman Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 29 August 2014 when he turned himself in at the Political Security branch in Hama town;

- (c) Hussein Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 21 February 2014 by the Syrian security forces in a raid on his home;
- (d) Ahmad Dahhan, allegedly arrested on 7 March 2012 by agents affiliated with the Palestine Branch in al Salehiya area of Damascus;
- (e) Wardan Alnemr, allegedly arrested on 1 May 2013 by three agents of the Military Security Branch in a raid on Al-Dahra neighborhood;
- (f) Moussa Al Allawi, allegedly arrested on 12 July 2012 by Military Police units in Qaboun;
- (g) Imad Al Ammar, allegedly abducted on 11 March 2012 by agents of the Syrian Military Intelligence Services following a raid on his village;
- (h) Alaa Al Ammar, allegedly abducted on 27 November 2012 by the Syrian Military Intelligence at a checkpoint near the train station of Mheen town.

Annex II

[Spanish only]

General allegations

Colombia

1. El Grupo de Trabajo recibió información de fuentes fidedignas sobre obstáculos encontrados en la aplicación de la Declaración sobre la Protección de Todas las Personas contra las Desapariciones Forzadas en Colombia. La presente alegación general se enfoca en el riesgo que el inicio de obras de dragado del estero de San Antonio puede generar en las posibilidades de hallar a personas desaparecidas, cuyos cuerpos habrían sido dispuestos en esa zona.
2. De acuerdo a la información recibida, las obras se enmarcan en un proyecto suscrito entre el Distrito de Buenaventura y el Instituto Nacional de Vías –INVIAS-, y consisten en ampliar la profundidad en el estero para que la zona de marea baja sea navegable para los barcos de cabotaje. Aunque la obra mejora las condiciones de movilidad para las comunidades, de acuerdo a la alegación también puede ocasionar daño en los lugares de disposición de los cuerpos que fueron arrojados u ocultos en la zona del estero, en lugares conocidos por la comunidad como acuafosas y, en consecuencia, destruir los cuerpos allí ocultos.
3. Según información suministrada por las fuentes, desde el año 2000 se ha documentado la práctica de ocultamiento en las acuafosas de los cuerpos de personas desaparecidas forzosamente por acción de organizaciones armadas ilegales. Es así que se advierte que habría indicios fuertes para afirmar que en el Estero de San Antonio yacen cuerpos de personas desaparecidas a las que sus familias están buscando.
4. De acuerdo a la información recibida, es conocida la existencia de lugares de disposición de cuerpos en el estero San Antonio y, debido a sus dimensiones de recorrido es una zona compleja y extensa para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas. La zona, de seis kilómetros, va desde el barrio Muro Yusti, Puente Nayero, la Playita, Alfonso López, Alberto Lleras Camargo, Palo seco, Cocal, Kennedy, San Luis, San Francisco, Juan XXIII, Pampa linda, Olímpico, el Cristal, Colón hasta Antonio Nariño.
5. Según las fuentes, en caso de adelantarse las operaciones del proyecto sin realizar previamente la búsqueda de los cuerpos arrojados al estero, se teme la inminente pérdida de los cuerpos y la evidencia, con lo cual se destruye cualquier posibilidad de hallazgo y cese de la incertidumbre. Las operaciones de dragado, se sostiene, ocasionan por sí mismas un deterioro en los cuerpos que puede conducir a la pérdida de estructuras óseas que contienen material genético que permitiría su identificación así como otras evidencias del hecho que pueda encontrarse en el lugar.
6. De acuerdo a la información recibida por el Grupo de Trabajo, las condiciones del suelo y el clima del estero San Antonio, al igual que los fenómenos ocasionados por los flujos de las mareas podría haber hecho que las evidencias se hayan perdido o deteriorado, así que cualquier acción externa, como la del dragado, sería perjudicial para obtener respuesta y garantizar los derechos a la verdad, la justicia, la reparación y la no repetición para los familiares de los desaparecidos.
7. Las fuentes sostienen que no se han llevado adelante evaluaciones del riesgo que genera el dragado en las búsquedas ni se han adoptado medidas urgentes para mitigarlo y, de esta manera, proteger los derechos de las personas desaparecidas y sus familias. Asimismo reclaman el establecimiento de un plan de acción que garantice el derecho de los familiares de los desaparecidos a la búsqueda de sus seres queridos en el estero de San Antonio.

Annex III

[French and English only]

Replies to general allegations

China

1. On 12 June 2020, the Government replied to the general allegation transmitted after the 119th session (A/HRC/WGEID/119/1, annex I).

Legislation and practice regarding the *liuzhi* (supervision) system

Legislation regarding the *liuzhi* supervision system

2. First, there are conditions for the use of *liuzhi* supervision. According to article 22 of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, the conditions specify that if a person under investigation is suspected of corruption, bribery, dereliction of duty, malfeasance in office, or any other serious duty-related violation or crime, and a supervision body has obtained some facts and evidence on the violation or crime but needs to conduct further investigation of important issues, the person may be detained at a specific place in any of the following circumstances: 1. if the case in question is particularly important or complex; 2. if there is a risk of flight or suicide; 3. if there is a risk of collusion of suspects' confessions or of falsifications, cover-ups or destruction of evidence; or 4. if there is the possibility of other acts that may obstruct the investigation. In addition, the supervision body may apply *liuzhi* supervision in accordance with the above provisions in the case of persons suspected of crimes involving bribery or actions taken in collusion in the performance of work duties.

3. Secondly, there is the examination and approval procedure, and also the department responsible for the *liuzhi* supervision measure. Under the first paragraph of article 43 of the Supervision Law, when supervision bodies adopt measures of *liuzhi* supervision, the measures must be the subject of joint consideration and a decision taken collectively by the body's directors. *Liuzhi* supervision measures adopted by supervision bodies below the level of multiple-district cities must be reported for approval to the supervision body at the next higher level. The provincial supervision body reports the measures for the record to the National Supervisory Commission.

4. Thirdly, there are procedural requirements for taking *liuzhi* supervision measures. Article 41 of the Supervision Law specifies that investigators who take such investigative measures must, in accordance with the regulations, produce certificates adopted by at least two persons, issued in writing and sealed and signed by the relevant persons.

5. Fourthly, there is a legal obligation of notification. Article 44 (1) of the Supervision Law stipulates that the employers and family members of persons under investigation for whom *liuzhi* supervision measures have been adopted must be notified within 24 hours, unless there is the possibility of the destruction or falsification of evidence, witness tampering, collusion of suspects' confessions or other circumstances involving obstruction of the investigation. Once circumstances of obstruction of an investigation no longer exist, the person's employer and family must be notified immediately.

6. Fifth, there is a limit on the length of *liuzhi* supervision. Article 43 (2) of the Supervision Law specifies that the period of *liuzhi* supervision must not exceed three months. In exceptional circumstances, it may be extended once, and the extension must not exceed three months. If the measure is taken by a supervision body below the provincial level, then the extension must be reported for approval to the next higher level. If a supervision body finds that a supervision measure has been taken improperly, it must promptly rescind it.

7. Sixth, there are the guarantees of the rights of persons placed under *liuzhi* supervision. Articles 40, 41 and 44 of the Supervision Law stipulate that the supervision body must

provide guarantees for the diet, rest and safety of persons placed under *liuzhi* supervision and provide them with medical services. When they are interrogated, interrogation must take place at reasonable time and for a reasonable duration and the record of the interrogation must be read and signed by the person who is interrogated. It is strictly prohibited to use threats, lures, cheating or other illegal means to collect evidence or to insult, beat, scold or abuse persons under investigation or others involved in a case, or to use corporal punishment, or hidden forms of corporal punishment, against them. Investigators, when questioning, searching, sealing or impounding evidence and otherwise conducting important work to collect evidence, must make audio and video recordings of the entire process and keep them for reference. These provisions all help to protect the legal rights of persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision.

8. Seventh, in the event of illegal *liuzhi* supervision, there are ways to remedy the situation and establish responsibilities. Articles 60, 65 and 67 of the Supervision Law establish that if the legal period of *liuzhi* supervision is exceeded and the supervision body and its staff members fail to remove the *liuzhi* supervision measure, the persons under investigation and their close relatives have the right to appeal to the supervision body or even to apply for review by a supervision body at a higher level, and if the supervision body and its staff members take *liuzhi* supervision measures in violation of the regulations, the leaders who bear responsibility and the staff members who are directly responsible must be dealt with according to the law. At the same time, if the supervision body, its staff and the staff members directly responsible, in the course of their duties, violate the rights and interests of citizens, legal entities or other organizations or cause damages, the latter are entitled to compensation from the State, in accordance with the law.

9. Eighth, there is an organic connection between the supervision system and the criminal procedure system. Article 170 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China makes provision for a conversion between *liuzhi* supervision measures and criminal coercive measures. For cases that have been transferred for prosecution by a supervision body when *liuzhi* supervision measures have already been taken, the people's procuratorate must first detain the criminal suspect, at which time the *liuzhi* supervision measures are automatically lifted. The people's procuratorate then must make a decision within 10 days whether to proceed with the person's arrest, place the person on bail or assign the person to residential surveillance. Article 44 (3) of the Supervision Law establishes that the period under *liuzhi* supervision is to be deducted from the sentence. Once persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision are transferred as suspects to a judicial body, if they are sentenced, in accordance with the law, to public surveillance, criminal detention or fixed-term imprisonment, one day of supervision is considered equivalent to two days of public surveillance, or to one day of criminal detention or fixed-term imprisonment.

10. After the adoption of the Supervision Law, the National Supervisory Commission issued a series of regulations to strengthen the supervision and administration of the use of *liuzhi* supervision.

The *liuzhi* supervision system in practice

11. Since the reform of the national supervision system, the supervision bodies at all levels have made use, in accordance with the law, of *liuzhi* supervision measures, with strict compliance with the Supervision Law and the relevant supporting regulations. First, they have fully understood the conditions for the implementation of such measures and have strictly abided by the legal limits on the length of *liuzhi* supervision. Secondly, they have acted strictly in accordance with the examination and approval mandates in implementing, extending and ending supervision measures and they have reported such measures to the higher authorities for the purposes of approval or record-keeping, and they have rigorously carried out the approval and filing procedures when required. Third, they have strictly implemented the relevant procedures, for example informing persons subjected to the *liuzhi* supervision measures of their rights and obligations, keeping their employers and family members informed and issuing the relevant legal documents, in accordance with the law, to protect their right to be informed. Fourth, in implementing the *liuzhi* supervision measures, they have guaranteed the legal rights of the persons subjected to supervision, with the relevant departments within the supervision bodies monitoring the entire process. Fifth, the

interrogation of persons subjected to *liuzhi* supervision measures has taken place with strict application of the relevant rules, with video and audio recordings of the entire interrogation process.

12. Zhejiang Province, as a pilot area for the reform of the national supervision system, attaches great importance to adopting, in accordance with the law and legal standards, various investigation measures, including *liuzhi* supervision. The Zhejiang Province Supervisory Commission drew up and adopted the Rules for the Operation of Supervision in Zhejiang Province (for trial implementation), the Code of Conduct for the Staff of Discipline Inspection and Supervision Bodies in Zhejiang Province and the Operational Guidelines for Supervision Measures in Zhejiang Province (for trial implementation), providing guidance for the supervision bodies in the whole province to adopt investigation measures, in accordance with the law, including *liuzhi* supervision measures. In practice, the supervision bodies of the entire province strictly follow the relevant provisions of the *liuzhi* supervision measures in this system and explore the possibility of establishing a supervision mechanism in which the supervision bodies issue decisions on *liuzhi* supervision stays while the public security bodies are responsible for management and security, thus ensuring that they have clearly defined responsibilities and the departments responsible for case supervision and management oversee the whole supervision process. At the same time, a special department has been set up to receive complaints and accusations of excessive periods of *liuzhi* supervision or infringement of the legal rights of persons subjected to supervision, so as to fully protect their legal rights.

13. During the pilot period, from January 2017 to the end of March 2018, the supervision bodies of the whole province took *liuzhi* supervision measures for 343 persons under investigation, with an average length of stay of 44.67 days, the longest being 181 days and the shortest being 2 days. The length of the measures did not exceed the statutory time limit of 6 months, and in all cases the families of the persons subjected to the *liuzhi* supervision were informed. There was no ill-treatment of the persons in question.

14. The reform of the national supervision system in China has undergone a sound pilot phase and has been the subject of a rigorous legislative process. Supervision bodies at all levels, in strict accordance with the Supervision Law and the mandate given by the legislature, have overseen all public officials exercising public power, have investigated violations and crimes in the performance of their duties and have carried out work to build up good governance and to combat corruption, with good results. *Liuzhi* supervised stays are one of the statutory supervision measures provided by the Supervision Law and do not constitute secret detention. Their applicable conditions, examination and approval procedures, time limits and the protection of the rights of the persons subjected to such supervision are all openly and clearly stipulated by law.

Morocco

15. On 17 June 2020, The Government of Morocco provided the following response to the general allegation transmitted by the Working Group on 17 April 2020 (A/HRC/WGEID/120/1, annex I).

Observations concernant l'allégation générale du Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaires

16. Faisant suite à la Note verbale du 17 avril 2020 du Groupe de travail sur les disparitions forcées ou involontaires (GTDFI) concernant une allégation générale relative aux disparitions forcées ou involontaires au Maroc, les autorités marocaines font part de leurs observations à cet égard et demandent leur publication en intégralité dans le rapport de la 122ème session du Groupe (du 21 au 30 septembre 2020) et qu'il y soit fait référence dans le prochain rapport annuel du Groupe de travail qui sera présenté au Conseil des droits de l'homme lors de sa 45ème session.

17. Les autorités marocaines rappellent préalablement qu'elles ont toujours veillé à entretenir un cadre d'interaction positive et constructive avec le Groupe de travail depuis de très nombreuses années, ce qui lui a d'ailleurs permis de suivre de près tous les développements liés au traitement du dossier des violations graves du passé au Maroc. Les autorités marocaines se félicitaient que la démarche du Groupe de travail s'inscrivait initialement dans une démarche d'accompagnement des autorités dans leurs efforts dans le cadre du processus de justice transitionnelle engagé courageusement et avec clairvoyance au Maroc et porté au plus haut niveau de l'Etat.

18. Durant plusieurs années, les autorités ont eu la certitude que le Groupe de travail mesurait l'ampleur de ce processus et se réjouissait du cadre d'interaction basé sur la bonne foi et une véritable volonté de compréhension des spécificités de l'expérience marocaine comme l'ont démontré différentes rencontres entre le Groupe de travail et des délégations officielles de haut niveau. Dans ce contexte, les autorités avaient invité le Groupe de travail à effectuer une visite au Royaume en 2009 et pour rappel, elles avaient accueilli favorablement ses recommandations formulées à l'issue de cette visite considérant que ces recommandations soutenaient le travail des autorités et des autres parties prenantes. Une interaction qui s'est poursuivie dans le cadre du rapport de suivi de la visite en 2013.

19. Dans cet esprit de coopération, des délégations officielles de haut-niveau ont rencontré le Groupe en marge des 114^{ème}, 115^{ème}, 116^{ème} et 119^{ème} sessions. L'engagement stratégique et irréversible du Royaume en matière de droits de l'homme a été réitéré à chaque fois.

20. Des discussions franches et constructives se sont également tenues en marge de ces rencontres qui ont porté sur les cas toujours en instance devant le Groupe. A ce propos, les autorités marocaines rappellent qu'aucune expérience dans le monde ne s'est révélée parfaite au regard des grands principes sous-jacents à la justice transitionnelle et que les différentes expériences connues à travers le monde, ont toutes fait face à des difficultés objectives et ne dépendant pas de la volonté de l'Etat.

21. Dans ce contexte, les autorités marocaines s'interrogent sur le bienfondé de cette allégation générale. En effet, l'allégation générale fait délibérément abstraction des mérites du processus de justice transitionnelle marocain. Celle-ci contredit l'appréciation du Groupe de travail lui-même auparavant qui avait, à maintes reprises, expressément salué l'expérience marocaine et considéré qu'elle « devait servir de modèle à d'autres Etats ... » (Para 87 du Rapport de Mission du GTDFI au Maroc en 2009). L'expérience marocaine de justice transitionnelle avait également été appréciée par plusieurs autres mécanismes onusiens ou experts internationaux reconnus dans le monde entier sur les questions de justice transitionnelle.

22. En outre, au niveau national, il convient de souligner que le processus a été accueilli favorablement par l'ensemble des parties prenantes. En effet, l'une des spécificités réside dans le consensus social et politique national qui a pris forme entre les différentes parties prenantes, y compris et surtout les organisations non gouvernementales, les organisations syndicales, les partis politiques de tous bords qui a permis de garantir la réussite du processus initié dans un contexte d'ouverture politique et de transition démocratique.

23. Aussi, il convient également de souligner que l'ensemble du processus a été porté par des représentants des victimes et des défenseurs des droits de l'homme, lesquels étaient parties prenantes à part entière au processus et n'ont jamais cessé d'être impliqués directement. La plupart des membres de l'Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER) étaient d'anciennes victimes des violations graves des droits de l'homme. Ce processus appuyé par Sa Majesté le Roi et l'ensemble des forces sociales et politiques, a été conçu et mené de manière souveraine, volontaire et indépendante.

24. Il convient de relever que l'expérience marocaine s'est inspirée d'autres expériences établissant des Commissions de vérité constituées sur les principes et standards internationaux en matière de justice transitionnelle, sachant que l'expérience marocaine a intégré des dimensions inédites. L'expérience marocaine en matière de justice transitionnelle, est la première dans son genre dans la région. C'est aussi la première à être menée à la faveur d'une transition pacifique.

Le droit à la vérité dans le processus de justice transitionnelle

25. De par sa nature, ses missions et ses attributions, l'IER relève incontestablement des commissions communément appelées commissions de vérité et créées dans un contexte de justice transitionnelle. Elle a été mandatée pour élucider les cas de violations graves des droits de l'homme commises au Maroc durant la période allant de 1956 à 1999.

26. Aussi, les autorités marocaines par les présentes observations rejettent catégoriquement toute tentative visant à discréditer son processus de justice transitionnelle ou visant à dénaturer les faits, les acquis et les résultats tangibles obtenus dans le cadre de la recherche de la Vérité et dans le cadre de la réparation et des compensations.

27. En particulier, les autorités marocaines déplorent le fait que le Groupe de travail relaie dans ses termes la revendication de la source à créer un « mécanisme national chargé du parachèvement de la vérité ». Les autorités expriment leur étonnement au regard du fait que le Groupe de travail ait cru devoir préciser que ces « revendications sont appuyées par (ses) recommandations » alors que ni son rapport de mission de 2009, ni dans son rapport de suivi de 2013 relatif à l'évaluation de la mise en oeuvre de ses recommandations ne font mention à cette revendication.

28. Aussi, au-delà de cette appréciation générale, les allégations rapportées dans l'allégation générale adressée aux autorités sont contestables à différents égards. L'Allégation générale nie la réussite de l'expérience marocaine de justice transitionnelle et a fortiori l'ère nouvelle qu'elle a générée et les implications concrètes en matière de protection des droits de l'homme qu'elle a suscitées, notamment au regard des différents processus de réformes législatives et institutionnelles du début des années deux mille, puis dans le cadre de la Constitution du 1er juillet 2011.

29. L'IER a disposé de 23 mois pour examiner une période de 43 ans s'étalant du début de l'indépendance jusqu'à la création de la Commission Indépendante d'Arbitrage. Son mandat a couvert l'ensemble des violations graves, massives et/ou systématiques des droits humains : les disparitions forcées, la détention arbitraire, l'atteinte au droit à la vie, la torture, l'exil forcé, et l'usage disproportionné et excessif de la force publique lors de mouvements sociaux de protestation.

30. Parmi les particularités de l'expérience marocaine, l'Instance elle-même a élaboré ses statuts, approuvés par Dahir du 10 avril 2004, qui ont précisé et détaillé les missions dont elle est investie, les violations objet de son mandat et les modalités d'organisation de son travail. Elle a eu également le pouvoir d'accorder directement des réparations aux victimes et leurs ayants droit.

31. L'approche genre a été retenue par l'IER comme une option méthodologique transversale à tous ses domaines d'intervention. Cela a impliqué l'examen minutieux des violations subies par les femmes dans leur spécificité, des préjudices qui en ont découlé, de leur expérience particulière et de leur rôle dans la lutte contre les violations. Il s'agissait en outre de qualifier ces violations, de déterminer leurs séquelles et des mesures susceptibles de garantir la non-répétition.

32. Dans ce cadre, le Maroc a oeuvré pour la reconnaissance des violations graves et systématique du passé, l'élucidation du sort des victimes, la réparation des préjudices subis, puis la réhabilitation médicale et psychologique, la réinsertion sociale tout en prenant de véritables mesures de protection et de non-répétition.

33. Les autorités marocaines tiennent par ailleurs à rappeler que le dispositif institutionnel de justice transitionnelle mis en place a été conçu comme un mécanisme extrajudiciaire pour déterminer la responsabilité de l'État et de ses organes, et non les responsabilités individuelles, et ce, dans une logique de consolidation des réformes et de réconciliation.

34. Ce processus n'a pour autant nullement exclu le droit des victimes, de leurs familles ou ayants de leur droit de recourir à la justice. Il convient de relever d'ailleurs qu'il n'a pas été question d'adopter des lois d'amnistie de nature à favoriser l'impunité des agents publics impliqués à cette époque, ni chercher à instituer de prescription des violations.

35. Le choix d'écarter les responsabilités individuelles s'est basé non pas sur une volonté de soustraire les responsables des violations à leur responsabilité pénale, mais s'est basé sur

une approche réaliste découlant d'ailleurs d'une approche comparée avec d'autres expériences de justice transitionnelle dans le monde qui ont montré leur limites sur ce sujet notamment au regard des preuves (soit de l'absence de preuve ou leur destruction).

36. L'établissement de la vérité est l'une des attributions essentielles de l'IER qui en constitue à la fois la base et l'objectif. Le droit à la vérité a en effet structuré le processus intégral de l'IER et du Comité de suivi, constituant une des dimensions ajoutées à la Commission Indépendante d'Arbitrage.

37. L'IER s'est employée à fournir les informations sur les causes des événements qui ont conduit aux violations graves de droits de l'homme, les raisons, les circonstances et les conditions de ces violations, les responsabilités de l'Etat et de ses organes et, en cas de décès ou de disparition forcées, le sort des victimes. Aussi bien dans ses dimensions individuelles que collectives, le droit à la vérité n'a fait l'objet d'aucune restriction dans le travail de l'IER ni celui du Comité de suivi (installé par le CNDH pour suivre la mise en oeuvre des recommandations de l'IER).

38. L'IER a tout mis en oeuvre pour garantir pleinement et effectivement le droit à la vérité, à la fois dans sa dimension individuelle et collective. En révélant le sort des victimes de la disparition forcée et en identifiant les raisons des violations graves des droits de l'homme. L'IER s'était appliquée à mettre en oeuvre le droit à la vérité.

39. Les autorités marocaines soulignent également que le droit à la vérité dans le processus marocain de justice transitionnelle s'est notamment distingué par :

- l'indépendance totale des deux Instances mises en place dans ce cadre ;
- le fait que l'établissement des faits par ces mécanismes s'est basé sur la collecte des preuves provenant de différentes sources : les témoignages des victimes, les informations des ONG, les auditions et les informations émanant des autorités publiques, les visites effectuées dans les lieux de détention secrets, l'exhumation de restes humains, des analyses médico-légales ;
- la combinaison d'audition à huis clos et auditions publiques des victimes et des familles ;
- Le fait que le partage de ces données avec les familles et les ayants droit et la diffusion de l'ensemble de ces données a été largement permis en posant ainsi les bases pour la préservation de la mémoire et de la réhabilitation ;
- La place et le rôle des victimes elles-mêmes et/ou des familles dans les différentes étapes du processus de justice transitionnelle.

40. L'IER a rassemblé plus de 20000 témoignages personnels de victimes et de leurs familles. Ces témoignages constituent des archives précieuses et des ressources inestimables pour l'établissement de la vérité et la préservation de la mémoire.

41. L'IER a organisé un nombre important de conférences, de séminaires et d'auditions sur une multitude de questions essentielles pour comprendre le contexte des violations des droits de l'Homme au Maroc. Elle a tenu des audiences publiques afin de donner aux victimes une tribune pour partager leurs récits.

42. Concernant spécifiquement la disparition forcée, à l'issue du processus d'investigation conduit par l'IER, 742 cas ont été élucidés et clarifiés, à travers tous les moyens disponibles et reconnus, notamment les études contextuelles, les témoignages, les enquêtes et investigations, les registres institutionnels, les archives privées et publiques, les auditions et les analyses médico-légales. Ce nombre de cas dépasse largement les listes établies par les ONG et d'autres acteurs concernés.

43. Dans ce contexte les exhumations et les analyses médico-légales ont été réalisées dans le respect des garanties juridiques et judiciaires. Les jugements déclaratifs de décès ont été rendus par les tribunaux.

44. L'ensemble de ces données a été rendu public dans le cadre de la publication du rapport final de l'IER.

45. Le Comité de suivi, avec les mêmes moyens de procédure que l'IER, continue sa mission de parachèvement de la vérité concernant le sort des cas de disparition forcée restant non élucidés. Des éléments supplémentaires relatifs à l'ensemble des travaux du Comité de suivi, feront l'objet de communications ultérieures par le Conseil national des droits de l'homme.

Réparation des dommages individuels et collectifs

46. Dans le cadre de son mandat, l'IER a ouvert des dossiers individuels qui ont tous été instruits. Les cas relevant de la compétence matérielle et temporelle de l'Instance ont fait l'objet de décisions arbitrales d'indemnisation et de recommandations relatives à d'autres modalités de réparation, à savoir la réhabilitation médicale et psychologique, la réinsertion sociale et le règlement de la situation administrative et financière des victimes.

47. Aussi, dans le cadre de l'indemnisation financière, l'IER a établi des critères et des unités de compte, sur la base du type de violation subie, du principe d'égalité et de solidarité entre les victimes ayant souffert des mêmes violations, et de l'approche genre.

48. En ce qui concerne la réparation individuelle, le nombre total de victimes des violations graves des droits de l'Homme et des ayants droit, bénéficiaires de l'indemnisation financière, depuis la création de l'Instance d'arbitrage indépendante (IAI) en 1999 et de l'Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER), s'élève à ce jour à 27763 personnes, ayant bénéficié d'un montant de 1.929.778.728,80 de dirhams (soit 196.877.000 USD).

49. De plus, l'IER a recommandé que les victimes et les ayants droit bénéficient d'un système de couverture médicale. Le nombre global de cartes remis aux bénéficiaires, est de l'ordre de 8744 victimes et ayants droit.

50. Concernant la réinsertion sociale, l'IER a recommandé la réinsertion sociale pour certaines victimes et ayants droit ayant été incarcérés pendant de longues durées, et pour les enfants qui ont perdu leurs parents alors qu'ils étaient mineurs. A ce titre 1475 victimes et ayants droit ont bénéficié de la réinsertion sociale selon des différentes formes telles que l'intégration à la fonction publique, logement sociale, appui financier pour activité économique.

51. Concernant la régularisation de la situation administrative et financière, l'IER avait également recommandé la régularisation de la situation administrative et financière de certaines victimes licenciées de la fonction publique, en raison de leurs engagements politiques ou syndicaux. La situation administrative et financière de 393 victimes, a été réglée par les administrations concernées.

52. La réparation communautaire s'est basée sur l'approche droits humains et participative en consolidant l'implication effective des concernés et à tous les niveaux sur le genre en garantissant les intérêts des femmes et des groupes vulnérables, et le volet culturel en prenant en considération les spécificités culturelles régionales. Les projets de réparation communautaire ont été mise en oeuvre dans les régions où existaient des centres de détention irréguliers, ou ayant connu des événements sociaux suivis d'une marginalisation socio-économique. Le budget alloué aux programmes mis en place s'élève à ce jour à 159.799.892.00 DHS (soit 1.630.290.000 USD). Ces données ont été rendues publiques.

53. Le programme de réparation individuelle a été exécuté. Quant au programme de réparation communautaire, il est à ce jour très largement mis en oeuvre. Le Groupe de travail avait lui-même reconnu l'approche novatrice de l'IER en ce qui concerne la réparation communautaire dans son rapport de mission de 2009.

54. 39. Le Comité de suivi continue d'entretenir des relations étroites avec les victimes, les ayants droits pour les actions d'appui aussi bien à titre personnel que dans le cadre d'appui en raison de santé.

Mémoire, Histoire et Archives

55. La préservation de la mémoire, et son corollaire de garantie de non répétition, figurent clairement dans le mandat de l'IER. En effet, le Dahir établissant le mandat stipule que l'IER doit « recommander des mesures destinées à préserver la mémoire et garantir la non répétition

des violations, remédier aux effets des violations et restaurer la confiance dans la primauté de la loi, et le respect des droits de l'homme » (article 9.6).

56. Tous les documents de référence encadrant le travail de l'IER (Recommandation du CCDH de 2003, Discours Royal d'installation, statuts publiés par Dahir) lui ont assigné, entre autres missions, celle de préserver la mémoire, cette préservation étant considérée comme une des composantes de la réparation mais aussi comme une des garanties de prévention de la répétition.

57. Au-delà du devoir de mémoire, l'IER a également contribué de manière importante à l'écriture de l'histoire du temps présent du Maroc, tout en s'interdisant de produire un récit unilatéral ni livrer une lecture définitive de l'histoire du Maroc récent.

58. L'IER a émis des recommandations portant sur la mémoire et l'histoire. Elle a notamment préconisé l'adoption d'une loi moderne sur les archives et la création d'un institut de recherches sur l'histoire du Maroc.

59. En partenariat avec des organismes publics et la société civile, le Comité de suivi (CNDH) poursuit le processus de préservation de la mémoire à travers la rénovation, la réhabilitation de certains anciens lieux de détention (notamment sous forme de musées), l'aménagement des cimetières à travers l'établissement de stèles commémoratives.

60. Dans le cadre de la préservation des archives, ont été remis à l'Institution nationale « Archives du Maroc » les archives de l'IER et de l'Instance Indépendante d'Arbitrage, comme il a été apporté l'appui nécessaire à cette même Institution notamment en vue de la promotion de l'archivage public relatif aux violations des droits de l'homme dans le passé.

61. Par ailleurs, toujours dans le contexte de la préservation de la mémoire, il y a lieu de souligner que 33 ouvrages relatifs aux dites violations du passé ont été publiés autour de différents thèmes, et de même ont été produits plusieurs films sur l'histoire contemporaine du Maroc. De surcroît, le CNDH a créé en son sein une unité chargée des études et recherches sur le thème « Histoire et Mémoire » au Maroc.

Réformes et garanties de non répétition

62. L'IER prévoyait dans son statut de proposer des recommandations en matière de réformes et de garanties de non répétition des violations graves des droits de l'homme. A ce titre dans son rapport final, elle a formulé des recommandations pertinentes au regard de la réforme de la Constitution, du renforcement du cadre juridique et institutionnel, de la ratification des principaux instruments internationaux pertinents, de la situation des personnes vulnérables tel que les femmes et les personnes privées de liberté, de l'incrimination des violations graves des droits de l'homme, de la gouvernance sécuritaire, de la planification stratégique en matière des droits de l'homme...

63. Ces recommandations ont eu un impact positif sur la réforme constitutionnelle en 2011 à travers la constitutionnalisation même de celles-ci. La Constitution a retenu toutes les recommandations pertinentes de l'IER à travers la primauté des Conventions internationales en matière des droits de l'homme sur le droit interne et l'harmonisation des dispositions pertinentes de la législation nationale, la criminalisation des violations graves des droits de l'homme, la consécration des droits et libertés fondamentales, la séparation des pouvoirs, le renforcement des garanties du procès équitable et la constitutionnalisation des Institutions nationales des droits de l'homme (INDH).

64. Ces recommandations ont eu par ailleurs, un impact positif sur les réformes juridiques et institutionnelles et notamment :

- La réforme de la justice ;
- Le renforcement de l'indépendance et du rôle des INDH ;
- L'intégration de la dimension droits de l'homme dans les politiques publiques ;
- L'élaboration du Plan d'Action National en matière de Démocratie et des droits de l'homme ;

- L'élaboration de la Plateforme citoyenne de la Promotion de la Culture des droits de l'homme.

65. Les autorités marocaines réitérent leur ferme engagement dans leur interaction positive et constructive avec l'ensemble des mécanismes onusiens des droits de l'homme, et leur action continue en faveur de la protection et la promotion des droits de l'homme au niveau national et international.

Annex IV

Key guidelines on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and enforced disappearances

1. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances recall that enforced disappearance is prohibited in all circumstances, and call on member States to continue, during the COVID-19 pandemic, to respect their international obligations.
2. In the context of COVID-19, it is of concern that related measures have reduced the capacity of all actors to take the necessary action to search for disappeared persons and to investigate their alleged enforced disappearance. The measures adopted to fight against the pandemic such as confinement, or the redeployment of security forces to control their implementation, obviously affect the capacity for action and reaction by the relatives of disappeared persons and the organizations that accompany them, but also of the State authorities in charge of search and investigation. In that context, it is of utmost importance that all actors involved follow best practices in relation to the search for disappeared person and the investigation of enforced disappearances
3. The current circumstances are particularly concerning in relation to recent disappearances in which the immediate intervention of State authorities is required to search for the disappeared person. These circumstances also amount to an additional factor of victimization for the relatives of persons who have been disappeared for years, as authorities de facto suspend all measures to search for them and investigate their disappearance. Particular attention is also necessary to ensure that COVID-19 does not become an excuse for committing enforced disappearances.
4. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances wish to call the attention of States to eight key guidelines to be taken into account by States in the COVID-19 context.

Guideline 1.

Enforced disappearances remain strictly prohibited in all circumstances

5. Enforced disappearances are continuing to occur and there is an additional risk of States using the pandemic and associated states of emergency as cover for enforced disappearances.
6. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ([the Convention](#), article 1) and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ([the Declaration](#), articles 2 and 7) are clear to the effect that enforced disappearance is strictly prohibited in all circumstances. States thus should not practise, permit or tolerate enforced disappearances at any time, including during the pandemic.

Guideline 2.

Search and investigation into enforced disappearances cannot be discontinued and must be carried out without delay

7. The COVID-19 context poses additional challenges to the abilities of State authorities to take action immediately and to visit relevant sites. In particular specific health protection measures need to be taken for State agents as well as for victims and civil society

organizations who should be able to take part to the search and investigation.¹ However, the COVID-19 context cannot justify the authorities' failure to take immediate action to search for disappeared persons: every day that passes puts the victim at further risk of mistreatment and death.

8. In compliance with articles 12 and 24 of the Convention and article 13 of the Declaration, the search for disappeared persons and the investigation of cases of enforced disappearances are continuing obligations that cannot be suspended, even in the context of the pandemic. In all activities developed, States are urged to follow the **Guiding principles for the search for disappeared persons** produced by the Committee.

9. As soon as the competent authorities become aware, through any means, or have any indications that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance, they should begin the search immediately and promptly, even when no formal complaint or request has been made (article 9(1) of the Declaration, article 12(1) and 2 of the Convention).² Whenever necessary, adapted health precautions must be taken for all actors involved to enable them to carry out all required search and investigation activities, such as visits to the relevant sites (article 9(2) of the Declaration, art. 12(3)b of the Convention).³

10. Throughout the process of search and investigation, channels to report cases and to follow-up on any developments should remain accessible to relatives and the organizations supporting them. They should be kept periodically informed of the activities being undertaken in their respective cases.

Guideline 3.

Information on individuals deprived of their liberty including those subjected to compulsory quarantine should be provided to their families and monitoring should continue

11. The COVID-19 pandemic has created new contexts where enforced disappearances may occur. This includes during compulsory quarantine in places of deprivation of liberty such as quarantine centres or medical facilities where individuals may, intentionally or unintentionally, be deprived of contact with their relatives.

12. At the same time, the suspension of visits to regular places of detention has, in some cases, led to a complete absence of contact between detainees and the outside world. This is conducive to incommunicado detention and may lead to enforced disappearances.

13. Procedural guarantees contained in articles 12, 17 to 21 of the Convention and 9 to 13 of the Declaration apply at all times and to all places in which persons are deprived of their liberty, including compulsory quarantine centres. Whatever the circumstances, all individuals deprived of their liberty must be held only in officially recognized and supervised places of deprivation of liberty, and any form of secret detention must be excluded. State should also proactively ensure that the authorities in charge of the search for the disappeared person have access to all places of detention. States must also take all necessary measures to ensure that persons deprived of liberty are able to communicate with their relatives, counsel or any other person of their choice, and with consular authorities,⁴ including when visits have to be limited.

14. Releases from places of deprivation of liberty should be done in a manner permitting verification of the release and States should take necessary measures to assure the physical

¹ Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Guiding principles for the search for disappeared persons (CED/C/7), "Principle 14. The search should be carried out safely".

² CED, Concluding observations on Colombia, CED/C/COL/CO/1 (2016), paras. 20 (a) and 26 (a); Iraq, CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), para. 20; Mexico CED/C/MEX/CO/1Vi (2015), paras. 28 (a) and 41 (a); Bolivia CED/C/BOL/CO/1 (2019), para. 21.

³ CED, Guiding Principles for the Search for Disappeared Persons, CED/C/7, Principle 6: "The Search should begin without Delay", and Principle 10: "The Search should be organized efficiently", paras. 2 and 3.

⁴ CED, Concluding observations on Colombia CED/C/COL/CO/1 (2016), paras. 29–31, Iraq CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), paras. 28–29; Tunisia CED/C/TUN/CO/1 (2016), para.30.

integrity and ability of individuals to exercise fully their rights at the time of release. Monitoring of places of detention, which is an important tool to prevent enforced disappearances, should also continue with health precautions taken as appropriate.

Guideline 4.

Bodies of the deceased should be dealt with in a manner permitting identification by relatives and remains should be treated in line with their tradition, religion and culture

15. In some contexts, the treatment of the bodies of individuals deceased through COVID-19 has led to a risk of disappearances. This includes the lack of proper registration of remains, and the loss of bodies before relatives can identify them. In countries where enforced disappearances are prevalent, specific situations have been brought to the attention of the Committee and Working Group demonstrating a risk that such practices are being used to conceal cases.

16. States have the obligation to ensure that the recovery, identification, reporting and return of the remains of deceased persons to their families is carried out in a scientifically rigorous, dignified and respectful manner, in conformity with the highest standards (articles 15, 17(3) and 24(3) of the Convention, article 19 of the Declaration).⁵ Dead bodies must be consistently registered and stored in a way permitting identification and the performance of autopsies. The relatives of persons who have died as a result of COVID-19 or other causes, must systematically be given the opportunity to identify the remains, and all remains must be dealt with in line with their tradition, religion or culture, despite the various challenges that may be raised by the COVID-19 context (such as, for example, the lack of access to bodies for health reasons; the lack of capacity of the competent authorities to reply to requests for the return of remains; the unavailability of forensic experts as a consequence of the COVID-19 confinement measures, etc.).

Guideline 5.

Access to information should be assured

17. For many victims of enforced disappearances, access to information on the progress of the search or investigation is only possible through physical visits to the premises of the competent authorities. Such visits may be significantly limited in the current circumstances. Even when contact is possible through other means such as telephone or the internet, victims have indicated that, in many instances, no replies are being received.

18. Any person with a legitimate interest should have access to the information related to an individual's deprivation of liberty (articles 18 and 19 of the Convention and 10 of the Declaration).⁶ Where access to that information is denied, any persons with a legitimate interest, is entitled to take proceedings before a court as a means of obtaining without delay this information. This right may not be suspended or restricted in any circumstances (article 20(2) of the Convention).⁷ The COVID-19 context should not extend the delays in terms of access to such remedies, which remain particularly urgent in cases of unlawful detention and disappearance.

⁵ WGEID, General Comment on the Right to the truth, A/HRC/16/48, para. 6, CED, Follow up to Concluding observations on Mexico, CED/C/MEX/CO/1/Add.1 (2019), para.21; Concluding Observations on Ecuador CED/C/ECU/CO/1 (2017), para. 10 (b).

⁶ CED, Concluding observations on Iraq CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015), para. 29; Mexico CED/C/MEX/CO/1 (2015), para. 35; Honduras, CED/C/HND/CO/1 (2018), para. 33; Slovakia CED/C/SVK/CO/1 (2019), paras. 16–17.

⁷ CED, Concluding observations on Iraq (2015), CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 para. 30; Burkina Faso CED/C/BFA/CO/1 (2016), para. 32; Japan CED/C/JPN/CO/1 (2018), para. 34; Slovakia CED/C/SVK/CO/1 (2019), para. 21.

Guideline 6.**Relatives of disappeared persons, their representatives and surviving victims of enforced disappearances should be supported and empowered, and protected from harassment or reprisals**

19. The relatives of forcibly disappeared persons, their representatives, and surviving victims of enforced disappearances may be in an additionally precarious position during this period of crisis. Enforced disappearances always put relatives in very challenging position. Their victimization becomes even greater when the head of household is disappeared. As the family structure is disrupted, spouses and children are affected economically, socially and psychologically and have specific needs. Taking into account that men are usually the main target of enforced disappearances, the Committee and the Working Group underline the particular gravity of the situation for women in that context.⁸ The COVID-19 pandemic has often led to additional difficulties for victims to find interlocutors and support for their needs.

20. In some contexts, relatives, human rights defenders and organizations working on disappearances have also continued to face harassment and intimidation.

21. States must take appropriate steps to support disappeared persons and their relatives in fields such as social welfare, financial matters, family law and property rights (article 24(6) of the Convention), even more so in the context of the economic crisis resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. In this connection, the specific position of relatives and victims of enforced disappearance should be considered in any programmes to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. This is in addition to States obligations to ensure the right of victims to obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation (article 24(4) of the Convention and article 19 of the Declaration).

22. States must also ensure that all those involved in the search and investigation of enforced disappearances are protected from reprisals, and that all acts of intimidation or reprisals are investigated and punished without delay (articles 12 and 24(7) of the Convention and 13 of the Declaration).

Guideline 7.**Enforced disappearance of migrants should be prevented and terminated**

23. COVID-19 has created additional risks for migrants. Those who may have decided to migrate due to a risk of enforced disappearance, face the closure of borders and the suspension of asylum procedures. Migrants also continue to risk enforced disappearance during their journey or upon arrival in their country of destination and forced returns have continued despite the pandemic, in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.

24. States remain strictly prohibited from expelling, returning or extraditing a person to another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance (article 16 of the Convention and article 8 of the Declaration). The search and investigation into disappearances of migrants should continue without delay, with appropriate health precautions taken as required. Where migrants are deprived of their liberty, they should be registered and be able to communicate with their relatives, lawyers or representatives as well as be informed about their right to communicate with the consular authorities of their country of origin. States are urged to implement the recommendations contained in the Working Group's report on [enforced disappearances in the context of migration](#). States should also continue to cooperate with each other to assist victims of enforced disappearance to search for, locate and release disappeared persons, and to return remains in case of death (article 15 of the Convention and article 2 of the Declaration).

⁸ WGEID, General comment on women affected by enforced disappearances, A/HRC/WGEID/98/2, para. 12.

Guideline 8.**Enforced disappearance of women and of children born in detention should be prevented and terminated**

25. In the context of the pandemic, women are at a heightened risk of suffering gender-based violence, as well as being subjected to enforced disappearance, especially when deprived of their liberty for health reasons. The enforced disappearance of women is a form of gender-based violence when women are specifically targeted because of their sex or gender.⁹ In certain countries, women from minority groups and women affected by poverty and social inequalities are particularly exposed to enforced disappearances.¹⁰ These pre-existing vulnerabilities may be exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 also heightens the risk that children born to mothers who are deprived of liberty will not be registered or recognised by the law and may be subjected to appropriation.

26. No gender-based violence, including as related to cases of enforced disappearance, can be justified. States should ensure that the pandemic does not result in a limitation to the measures taken to prevent such violations. In this context, strict compliance with international standards in relation to detained women is essential to the prevention of enforced disappearances. Holding women in detention in unofficial or secret places of detention is strictly prohibited in all circumstances.¹¹

27. States that have not already done so should establish specific protection measures for pregnant women who are detained.¹² In particular, the birth of their children should be immediately registered, guaranteeing their true identity, and information should be provided to the relatives or other persons with a legitimate interest.¹³

⁹ Ibid, para. 4.

¹⁰ Ibid para. 7.

¹¹ Ibid, paras. 3, 20.

¹² Ibid. paras. 9 and 10, WGEID, General comment on children and enforced disappearances, A/HRC/WGEID/98/1, para. 15.

¹³ Ibid.

Annex V

Press releases and statements

1. On 10 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Zimbabwe to end a reported pattern of disappearances and torture aimed at suppressing protests and dissent.¹
2. On 25 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release lamenting the decision by the United States Government to target and sanction individual staff of the International Criminal Court (ICC).²
3. On 25 June 2020, on the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to repatriate hundreds of people abducted during and after the Korean War, and end decades of anguish for the families of those taken.³
4. On 26 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release expressing alarm at the repression of fundamental freedoms in China.⁴
5. On 29 June 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release welcoming the disclosure by the Pakistani Government of the whereabouts of Idris Khattak, a leading human rights defender, yet strongly condemning his enforced disappearance.⁵
6. On 3 July 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release expressing outrage at reports of the secret execution by the Islamic Republic of Iran of Hedayat Abdollahpour, a member of the Kurdish minority in the country.⁶
7. On 9 July 2020, ahead of the 25th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Memorial Day on 11 July, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a statement urging governments to honour victims of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide by building peaceful, inclusive and just societies to prevent a repetition of such an atrocity.⁷
8. On 16 July 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release strongly condemning the decision in the Islamic Republic of Iran to uphold death sentences against three men for participating in protests in November 2019.⁸
9. On 4 August 2020, a year after India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling for urgent action to remedy "alarming" human rights situation.⁹
10. On 29 August 2020, ahead of the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances on 30 August, the Working Group, together with the Committee on Enforced Disappearances issued a statement calling on States to continue the search for people who have been forcibly disappeared, despite the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰

¹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25944&LangID=E.

² See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25997&LangID=E.

³ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26248&LangID=E.

⁴ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E.

⁵ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26010&LangID=E.

⁶ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26036&LangID=E.

⁷ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26060&LangID=E.

⁸ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26106&LangID=E.

⁹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26148&LangID=E.

¹⁰ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26189&LangID=E.

11. On 1 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Belarus to stop torturing detainees and bring to justice police officers humiliating and beating protesters in their custody with impunity.¹¹

12. On 4 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on the Pakistani authorities to end the secret detention of human rights defender Idris Khattak.¹²

13. On 21 September, on the occasion of the Working Group's annual reporting to the Human Rights Council, the Working Group issued a press release calling on the international community to strengthen cooperation to enable timely and effective investigations and prosecutions of enforced disappearances.¹³

14. On 25 September 2020, the Working Group, together with other special procedure mechanisms, issued a press release calling on Belarus to release prominent opposition leader Maria Kalesnikava, and to bring to justice those responsible for her enforced disappearance.¹⁴

¹¹ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26199&LangID=E.

¹² See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26207&LangID=E.

¹³ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26268&LangID=E.

¹⁴ See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26296&LangID=E.