

Конференция по разоружению

20 September 2017

Russian

Original: English

Вербальная нота Постоянного представительства Республики Корея от 15 сентября 2017 года на имя Генерального секретаря Конференции по разоружению

Постоянное представительство Республики Корея при Отделении Организации Объединенных Наций и других международных организациях в Женеве свидетельствует свое уважение Генеральному секретарю Конференции по разоружению г-ну Майклу Мёллеру и имеет честь препроводить в секретариат ознакомительный документ по теме «Ядерная и ракетная угроза с Севера и позиция военного противодействия Республики Корея», который был представлен представителем Республики Корея на Конференции по разоружению 30 августа.

Постоянное представительство Республики Корея было бы признательно за содействие секретариата в издании и распространении этого документа в качестве официального документа Конференции по разоружению.

Постоянное представительство Республики Корея при Отделении Организации Объединенных Наций и других международных организациях в Женеве пользуется этой возможностью, чтобы вновь заверить Генерального секретаря Конференции в своем глубочайшем уважении.



Nuclear and Missile Threat from the North and ROK Military Countering Posture

2017.08.30



대한민국 국방부
Ministry of National Defense



Agenda

- I . nK's Provocations**
- II . nK Nuclear Threat Assessments**
- III. nK Missile Threat Assessments**
- IV. ROK Military Countering Posture**

InK Provocations

nK Provocations (1950s)



nK's Invasion; Korean War (1950.6.25.)



Occupation of Seoul in 3 days since the beginning of the war (1950.6.28.)



nK Tanks in Seoul (1950.6.28.)



Destroyed Han-gang bridge and displaced civilians

nK Provocations (1960s~1980s)



**President Assassination Attempt
(1968.1.21.)**



**Digging tunnels for Invasion
(1974.11.15.)**



**Axe-murder incident in Panmunjom
(1976.8.18.)**



**Terror Attack in Burma Killing Cabinet
members(1983.10.9.)**

nK Provocations (1990s~2010s)



**Infiltration of Armed Spy in Gangneung
(1996.9.18.)**



**Torpedoing of ROKN Corvette Cheonan
(2010.3.26.)**



Shelling of YP-do (2010.11.23.)



Residents of YP-do evacuated via ships

II . nK Nuclear Threat Assessment

- **Development Progression**
- **Threat Assessment**
- **Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine**

Development Progression



1950s~1960s

1954, Established "Nuclear Weapons Division" under MPAF
 1959.09, nK-USSR Nuclear Power Agreement
 1965, Introduced Research-purpose nuclear reactor;
established basis for the nuclear development

1970s~1980s

1970, Nuclear Physics Department made in University of Kim Il-sung
 1980.07, Began Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor(25MWt) Construction
 1986.10, Yongbyon Reactor Operational, **Plutonium Production**

1990~2005

1992.01, Signed IAEA Nuclear Safeguard Agreement
 1993.03, NPT Withdrawal Claim / '94.10., Geneva Agreement
 2002.10., US Special Envoy visit to nK, nK admitted **the Highly Enriched Uranium Program (HEU)**
 2005.05., Yongbyon Nuclear Reactor withdrew 8,000 spent fuel rods

2006 ~

2006.10.9, **1st Nuclear Test**
 2009.5.25, **2nd Nuclear Test**
 2013.2.12, **3rd Nuclear Test**
 2016.1.6. / 9.9, **4th / 5th Nuclear Test**

YONHAP NEWS

Threat Assessment



1st Nuclear test

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

Yield : 1kt>

Several kt

6~7kt

~6kt

~10kt

Nuclear Material

- **Plutonium (Pu) : Suspected of in possession of ~50kg**
 - * Considering their nuclear development progress, ~6kg or less is enough to produce a nuclear weapon
- **Highly Enriched Uranium program has also made a substantial progress**

Miniaturization

- **Considering precedent of other nuclear powers' miniaturization timing (2~7 years) and nK's 1st Nuclear test in 2006, nK's miniaturization technology should be considerably matured**

※ **nK is expected to attempt at securing 'de-facto nuclear state' status through nuclear capability sophistication via additional nuclear tests and increase in its nuclear arsenal**

nK Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine



「Solidification of Nuclear State Status Act ('13.4.1.)」

- Defined nuclear use by 'Nuclear weapon can only be employed by the final order from the supreme commander';
Created legal basis for KJU' s nuclear control (Article 4)
- Article 2 and 5 of the same act defines the purpose and conditions of nuclear weapons and its use – it also includes the possibility of nuclear use against non-nuclear states
 - * Clearly state the possibility of nuclear attack against ROKUS Alliance through the premise of: 'Nuclear weapons will not be used as long as there are no participation to invasion or act of aggression against the North Korea'

III. nK Missile Threat Assessment

- **Program Development**
- **Threat Assessment**

Program Development



1970s~1980s

1976~1981, Introduced USSR SCUD-B and Reverse Engineering
 1984.04, First ever nK SCUD-B Missile Test Launch
 1988, **Fielded SCUB-B/C Missile**

1990s

1990, First ever Nodong Missile test launch
 1998, **Fielded Nodong Missile**
 1998.08, Test launch of Daepodong 1

2000s

2006.07, Daepodong 2 Test Launch
 2007, **Fielded Musudan Missiles**
 2009.04, Long Range Missile(Improved Daepodong 2) Test Launch


2010 ~

2012.12, Long-range Missile Test Launch
 2016.02, Long-range Missile Test Launch
 2016.04~10, Musudan Missile Test Launches (8 times)
 2016.08. / 09, Nodong Missile Test Launch
 2017.04 / 07, **ICBM Range Ballistic Missile(Hwasung-14) Launch**

Threat Assessment (1 / 2)



■ **nK** is in possession of ~1,000 Ballistic Missiles



Threat Assessment (2 / 2)



- Under KJU control, nK conducted total of 38 test launches with 58 ballistic missiles fired
 - * 12 launches with 17 projectiles in this year alone, 6 launches since the new administration (05.10.)
- Latest Hwasung-14 launch in July 28th showed Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missile that is capable of reaching the continental US
- Since 2014, nK conducted ground and under-water ejection test of SLBM; also in development of Gorae-class submarines
 - * nK is expected to field SLBM within 1 to 3 years through additional testing of missiles and long-range submarine operations capabilities
- ※ nK is also expected to focus national effort to secure re-entry vehicle and terminal guidance technology to complete its ICBM development

IV. ROK Military Countering Posture

- **Basic Concept**
- **ROK-US Alliance Capabilities**
- **ROK's Independent capabilities**

Deterrence and Response Concept against the North



Basic Concept

Effective deterrence and response to nK nuclear and missile threats through the ROK-US alliance capabilities and ROK's independent capabilities

① Alliance Capabilities

- Utilization of all factors of DIME under the Tailored Deterrence Strategy
- Concept of ROK-US Alliance Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)


② ROK's Independent Capabilities

'Korean Conventional Triad' of deterrence including Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR

ROK-US Alliance Capabilities (1 / 2)



● Alliance Tailored Deterrence Strategy(TDS)




- ROK-US Combined deterrence and response strategy most optimized to the KORPEN situation in consideration of characteristic of nK regime and nK nuclear and WMD threats
- Military factors such as US nuclear umbrella, ROK-US conventional strike forces, and MD combined with ROK-US DIE factors to deter and respond to North Korea's nuclear and WMD threats

ROK-US Alliance Capabilities (2 / 2)



● Concept of ROK-US Alliance Comprehensive Counter Missile Operations (4D)




- 4D concept is applied to the Alliance decision making, planning, command and control, exercise and training, and capability development
 - * THAAD deployment to USFK is a part of capability development measures for the ROK-US alliance missile defense capability

ROK's Independent Capabilities (1 / 3)



Kill Chain




- System to quickly detect and identify crucial HPT within the nK missile area of operations such as TEL and command post in order to make timely decision and to strike
- Improve detection, identification, and strike capabilities in and against entire area of North Korea

ROK's Independent Capabilities (2 / 3)



KAMD




- **Missile Defense focused on terminal-phase lower atmosphere with overlapping capabilities in consideration of strategic environment on KORPEN**
- **Continue to improve detection, defense, and intercept capabilities**

ROK's Independent Capabilities (3 / 3)



KMPR



- Delivering punishment and retaliation to nK leaderships via focused strike in case of nK nuclear use
- Maximize punishment and retaliation capabilities via development of high-powered warhead and organizing specialized elite forces

