

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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**LETTER DATED 14 AUGUST 2008 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON BEHALF OF THE 2008  
PRESIDENTS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF  
THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE REPORTS OF THE  
SEVEN COORDINATORS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF  
THE CONFERENCE ON THE WORK DONE DURING THE 2008  
SESSION ON AGENDA ITEMS 1 TO 7**

On 5 February of this year, the six 2008 Presidents of the Conference had appointed the following as Co-ordinators to work under the auspices of the 2008 Presidents:

Ambassador Martabit of Chile for agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Tarui of Japan for agenda items 1 and 2 with a focus on a fissile material cut-off treaty, Ambassador Grinius of Canada for agenda item 3 entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space," Ambassador Mbaye of Senegal for agenda item 4 entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons," Ambassador Draganov of Bulgaria for agenda item 5 entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons," Ambassador Jayatilleka of Sri Lanka for agenda item 6 entitled "Comprehensive program of disarmament," and Ambassador Puja of Indonesia for agenda item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments."

In my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament and through you, Mr. Secretary-General, and on behalf of all six 2008 Presidents, I would like to warmly thank all the seven Co-ordinators for the important work done under their professional guidance. The seven Co-ordinators' reports on the first round of discussions between 5 February 2008 and 29 February 2008, submitted to the President, and attached to this letter in annexes I-VII, capture their most valued work and should be one important point of reference for future activities of our Conference. In response to requests from Conference members, the Co-ordinators held another round of informal consultations on the seven agenda items between 31 July 2008 and 12 August 2008. The seven Co-ordinators presented oral reports on their findings on 13 August 2008, which reaffirmed the conclusions reached in the attached reports.

Consequently, I should be grateful if *this letter together with its seven annexed documents* could be issued as *one* official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member states of the Conference and non-member states participating in its work.

(Signed):           The President of the Conference on Disarmament

Christina Rocca  
Ambassador

Annexes: I to VII

The seven Co-ordinators' written Reports to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on work done during the 2008 session on agenda items 1 to 7

## Annex I

### **Report on the informal discussions on CD agenda item 1 “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and 2 “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament**

I have the pleasure of presenting to you my Report on the informal plenary meetings coordinated by Chile on agenda item 1 of the CD Agenda on “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and agenda item 2 on “Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”, with a general focus on nuclear disarmament.

This exercise was meant to provide an opportunity for all members of the Conference to share their views on these matters, to validate items identified previously, suggest new elements, if any, and determine what aspects would deserve special attention, all this with a view to facilitating the adoption of a Program of Work which will allow the CD to appropriately resume the work incumbent upon it.

Consequently, at the first meeting, which was held on the 5<sup>th</sup> of last February, the Coordination presented a working plan, in which due regard was paid to past efforts made in this respect, in particular by Ambassador Park, in his capacity of “friend of the Presidents” and by Ambassador Strommen, in his capacity of “coordinator” of item 1 of the Agenda under the P-6 format.

At the first meeting, the subject was introduced by the Head of UNIDIR, Mrs. Patricia Lewis, who, among other things, mentioned some practical steps that could be taken in the near future with a view to reducing the nuclear threat and how we can face the problem here in the CD and at the United Nations. Her useful remarks and suggestions, we are sure, will be carefully considered by the delegations. Her statement was followed by national and joint statements of a general nature.

The second meeting, that took place at 19 February 2008, was structured according to the listing of the items mentioned in the working plan, i.e.:

- convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer;
- threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination;
- ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- the establishment of a subsidiary body to take up this matter;
- principles on transparency, irreversibility and verification; role of this type of arms and the political concepts of security;
- and, finally, the de-alerting and de-creasing of the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems.

At this second meeting statements were made by a number of delegations and groups of delegations.

On this occasion valuable information was provided, important reflections were shared and interesting proposals were presented, which confirm the members' interest in a wide range of topics related to Nuclear Disarmament.

The proposals were collected by the Coordination and will be presented to you, Mr. President and to the P-6 in an updated version of the summary elaborated by Ambassador Strommen last year. The said summary maintains its structure, which consists of five main headings:

- convention prohibiting nuclear weapons;
- other legal instruments;
- ad hoc committee-phased programme nuclear disarmament;
- transparency and confidence building measures; and
- other specific measures.

It may be noted that the various conventions/legal instruments listed in the summary of proposal generally reflect a certain degree of overlapping, or perhaps even duplication. In this regard, delegations may wish to consider whether it would be possible, or desirable, to perhaps streamline or narrow the list during future informal discussions with a view to further focussing our deliberations on nuclear disarmament.

Delegations, except for a few, did not seem ready to enter into an interactive debate on contrasting positions with a view to progressing towards an eventual negotiation. Although all States consider Nuclear Disarmament to be an objective of primary importance, this does not imply that they have a clear idea on how to tackle this matter. This situation, which has to do with timing, priorities, linkage, resources, interests, definitions, among others, keeps on dividing delegations and confirms the "deadlock" we are facing.

It was considered worthwhile to adopt a pragmatic step-by step approach, even if progress may be slow. It was recognized that this does not mean abandoning more substantive and comprehensive options.

We consider that in spite of the present circumstances there exists a margin of support or convergence in favour of transparency and confidence building measures. These dimensions could pave the way towards future work. We admit, however, that not everybody agrees on this approach. The possibility of having a space where positions can be expressed and interactively debated, as well as the continuity of the debate, definitely constitute a contribution in this respect.

Delegations appreciate the sharing of information concerning Nuclear Disarmament, particularly if this information stems from nuclear weapon States. Their openness to dialogue and to answering questions is highly valued. Delegations recognize the importance of visits of personalities and of the information the latter convey on those occasions.

By way of conclusion, I would like to mention that the Chilean Coordination, without delving deeply into the different topics, has limited itself to highlighting the main elements of the different statements that were made in the two February sessions. We are open to listen to your comments and to collect your eventual suggestions.

Geneva, 6 March 2008

## **Appendix**

Informal discussions on CD agenda item 1 “Cessation of the Nuclear Arms race and Nuclear Disarmament” and 2 “prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters”,  
**with a general focus on nuclear disarmament**

**Summary of proposals made during the informal plenary meetings.**

**Co-ordinator, Ambassador Juan Martabit of Chile**

### **Convention prohibiting nuclear weapons**

- a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat of use or actual use of nuclear weapons and their elimination (as expressed in the SSOD1 final declaration and action plan)
- negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe
- establish a subsidiary body, preferably under item 2 of the agenda, to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
- negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
- comprehensive overview over the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons free world, including:
  - prohibition to acquire, develop, test, produce, stockpile, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons
  - control of nuclear weapons and fissile material holdings
  - steps for destruction of all nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles
  - mechanisms for verifying destruction and ensuring compliance
  - international organisation to coordinate verification, implementation and enforcement under international control
  - disarmament and non-proliferation education

**Other legal instruments**

- negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons
- negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States
- negotiate an FMCT/FMT
- agreement on specific and legally binding measures to achieve the universalization of the NPT
- multilateral agreement to reduce the operational readiness of deployed nuclear systems.

**Ad hoc committee - phased programme nuclear disarmament**

- an ad hoc committee to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention.
- nuclear weapon states must fulfil disarmament obligations under the NPT
- multilateral agreement to reduce nuclear arsenals by a certain number or percentage
- reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons

**Transparency and Confidence Building Measures**

- principles on transparency, irreversibility, verification of nuclear disarmament, including data sharing, international monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures, on-site inspections, registry
- NWS to provide information on number and types of nuclear weapons in current arsenals and projected levels in five years. Provide status on weapons and delivery systems removed from active service or dismantled, and conversion efforts
- regular (formalised) briefings to CD members by declared nuclear weapon states
- decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems (General Assembly Resolution 62/36)
- de-alerting and de-activation of nuclear weapon systems
- compliance mechanism that could consist of technical assistance in destruction, procedures for national implementation, dispute resolution procedure, penalties for non-compliance, recourse to the UN Security Council, GA and ICJ for further action
- reduction/elimination of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines

### **Other specific measures**

- entry into force of the CTBT, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear test explosions
- implementation of NTP Review Conferences' agreements (1995 and 2000), in particular the 13 practical steps and seize the opportunity of the 2010 Conference
- Dialogue between nuclear weapon states
- nuclear-weapon free zones
- establish a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East
- negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument
- the link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
- consideration by an ad hoc committee of: simultaneous pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; prominence of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; asymmetric possession of WMD; terrorists and WMD; cooperation in the field of nuclear energy
- adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the CD, and to establish subsidiary bodies to negotiate the four core issues
- reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons

## Annex II

### **Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on the informal meetings during the first part of the 2008 session by the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Sumio TARUI, Coordinator on Agenda Items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Geneva, 10 March 2008)**

- The informal meetings took place on 6 and 20 February 2008. Preliminary remarks were made by the Coordinator on 6 February (Appendix I). The deliberations were based on the “Proposed Outline for the discussions on agenda items 1 and 2 with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Appendix II). General discussions took place both on 6 and 20 February 2008. Substantive discussions on each sub-issue were preceded by an introductory overview of the previous discussions in 2006 and 2007 (Appendix III).
- The President of the CD invited the IAEA to send an official to make a presentation on this subject including the aspect of verification, but the IAEA replied that due to time constraints it was impossible at that time for any relevant IAEA staff to travel to Geneva.
- The Coordinator’s personal summary and assessment of the substantive deliberations are as follows:
  - (a) In the general discussions on 6 and 20 February 2008, no delegation expressed opposition to negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Most delegations called for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT, many of them stressing the need to commence at the earliest possible time or without delay. Delegations stressed the importance of an FMCT that would contribute to nuclear disarmament, as well as the need to include verification and stocks. While the need for clarity regarding the mandate on negotiations before its commencement was expressed, it was noted that the negotiations should be started without any preconditions on the outcome of the negotiations and that the differences over issues such as verifiability and the scope would be resolved in the negotiations. A reference was made by two delegations to the 1995 report (CD/1299). The need to agree on a comprehensive and balanced program of work was mentioned. One delegation explicitly indicated a preference to the abbreviation FMT, instead of FMCT.
  - (b) With regard to the consideration of sub-issues on 20 February 2008, no new positions were put forward except for some comments on the introductory remarks by the Coordinator (Annex 3). It was stressed that an FMCT would not require any additional burden beyond what the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States already subscribed to. The positions of delegations on the sub-issues were reiterated also in their general discussions. At the end of the consideration of the sub-issues, it was emphasized that since the key ingredients of any FMCT have been made quite clear, the question now is how to put those ingredients together to form an enduring treaty in the negotiations.

- (c) In view of the work done in the two informal meetings as summarized above, the objective of the informal meetings, which was to revalidate the previous discussions, was overall achieved, without prejudice to the national positions in the actual negotiations. The overall atmosphere of the discussions was cordial and constructive. The Coordinator also has the impression that delegations are not keen on repeating their already well-known positions, but see merit in the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT itself, notwithstanding differences over the modality and the scope of such negotiations.
  
- (d) Other than the issue of an FMCT, a few delegations in the two informal meetings touched upon issues such as nuclear disarmament in general, the early entry into force of the CTBT, the post-START treaty, missile defense, the 2010 NPT review process, the globalization of the INF Treaty, negative security assurances, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

## **Appendix I**

**Preliminary Remarks by the Coordinator for agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**  
**Ambassador Sumio TARUI (Geneva, 6 February 2008)**

- Today is the first informal meeting for 2008 under agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I would like to thank the six Presidents (P6) for appointing me as the coordinator for these Agenda Items.
- As I was appointed the coordinator for these Agenda Items with a general focus on an FMCT on the 5 February 2008, I presented a proposed outline for the discussions to the President. The President directed the Secretariat to circulate it to all the CD Member States yesterday so that they could be prepared in advance to participate in the substantive discussions. Every delegation should now have a copy.
- As can be seen from the proposed outline, I basically followed last year's structure for our discussions. The objectives of the sessions would be to revalidate the substantive discussions held in 2006 and 2007 and to refresh issues and sub-issues. Drawing from last year's coordinator report on agenda item 2 to the President, as contained in CD/1827, Annex II, the proposed outline enumerates some major sub-issues.

## Appendix II

**Proposed Outline for the discussions on Agenda Items 1 and 2,  
with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for  
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices  
Coordinator Ambassador Sumio TARUI (Japan)**

Note- The objectives of these sessions would be to revalidate the substantive discussions of last year, as reported to the President of the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador Carlo Trezza of Italy, the Coordinator on agenda item 2 of 2007 (CD/1827, AnnexII), and to refresh issues and sub-issues within agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device (FMCT). The following is a proposed outline for the discussions on agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on an FMCT.

### **Week 3**

6 February, 2008 (Wednesday):

- (1) General discussions on an FMCT

### **Week 5**

20 February, 2008 (Wednesday):

- [(1) General discussions on an FMCT (if necessary)]

- (2) Consideration of major sub-issues to be dealt within an FMCT

- (i) Definition
- (ii) Scope
- (iii) Production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes
- (iv) Transparency
- (v) Stocks
- (vi) Compliance and Verification
- (vii) Other sub-issues

- (3) Discussions on possible other issues under agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on an FMCT

### Appendix III

Introductory remarks on each sub-issue by the Coordinator

(i) Definition

- With regard to the definition of fissile material, at the broadest level, there were two major groups of positions. One group of countries sought terminology close to that used by the IAEA, and the other group sought to formulate a new definition for an FMCT. It seemed that the definition by the former group tended to be broader than the one by the latter group.
- In the group that sought terminology close to that used by the IAEA, there was a difference in opinion on what terms should be referenced in a treaty. One side supported the term “direct use material”, as used in the IAEA safeguards, and the other side supported the term “special fissionable material”, as stipulated in Article 20 of the IAEA Statute. The rationale behind a broad definition was that an FMCT should contain the broadest definition possible in order to be meaningful as a nuclear disarmament treaty.
- Furthermore, under “direct use material”, a view was expressed that both irradiated and un-irradiated direct use material should be included, whereas another view was expressed that irradiated plutonium should be excluded from “direct use material” and its scope should be limited to separated plutonium.
- The group that sought to come up with a new definition for an FMCT indicated that the definition of fissile material should be limited to purely weapon-grade fissile material. It was pointed out that the broader the definition is, the more difficult verification will be.

(ii) Scope  
(Overview)

- The issue of scope is multifaceted. In 2006, for example, some delegations touched upon the scope of definitions for fissile material or the scope of safeguards, while others discussed the scope of core obligations within an FMCT. In 2007, the Coordinator, focusing on the scope of core obligations, summarized the views expressed by delegations as follows: (1) whether to ban only “future production”; (2) whether a possible prohibition of production should include an obligation to close-down or decommission facilities producing fissile material or to convert them to non-nuclear-weapon use; (3) whether the “reversion” of closed-down or decommissioned facilities back to production should be prohibited; and (4) whether the “diversion” of fissile material from non-nuclear weapon purposes to nuclear weapon purposes after the entry into force of an FMCT should be subject to a ban.

- A view was added to the Coordinator's remark that a ban should also extend to: (1) the "reversion" back to nuclear weapon purposes of fissile material voluntarily declared as excess for national security needs by states possessing nuclear weapons; (2) the receipt of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes from another state; and (3) the assistance to another state in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. Furthermore, from the perspective of strengthening nuclear security, it was pointed out that it would be beneficial to examine newly introducing systems of state accounting and control and physical protection obligations on stocks of fissile material for nuclear-weapon purposes.

(iii) Production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes

- A view was put forward in last year's discussions that an FMCT should not interfere with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy since, among other things, some states might use HEU in the future for their nuclear power plants and research reactors. Also, in addition to naval vessels, commercial ships and spacecraft may also use HEU for future propulsion. Moreover, because such uses would come under the scope of IAEA safeguards, some countries indicated that the input of the IAEA would be valuable. There was no delegation that stated the production of fissile material for naval nuclear propulsion should be banned.
- As HEU can be used in both commercial and naval propulsion, a view was expressed that this point should be adequately considered when examining definitions.

(iv) Transparency

- A view was expressed that the issues of transparency, stocks and verification are connected and that since effective verification cannot be achieved, there is no need for a transparency provision.
- Another view was put forward that transparency for stocks would compromise physical security due to proliferation-sensitive information. A question was raised regarding this view on how a declaration of the aggregate amount of fissile material would compromise physical security.
- It was also stated that a great deal of old past records on fissile material production are lost, and it would be difficult to accurately and comprehensively track down past production. On this point, it was argued that such records must have remained within military organizations via regulations on handling classified information.
- Apart from the verification issue, some delegations stated that it is necessary to at least report the aggregate amount of fissile material in order to provide a baseline for assessing treaty compliance.

(v) Stocks

- On the issue of stocks, traditionally, there has been the position that fissile material stocks should be comprehensively included in an FMCT and that a plan to force the future reduction of stocks is necessary.
- Another view is that stocks in some form should be included in the scope of an FMCT (e.g., ban the reversion of declared excess stocks back to nuclear weapon use; ban the conversion of civil stocks to weapon use; ban the transfer of stocks to a third country; state accounting and control obligations; reporting of aggregate stocks,” etc.). This closely relates to the issues of scope and transparency.
- The view that the scope of an FMCT should be limited to the future production and that the existing stocks should not be covered by such a treaty was reiterated.
- An explanation was given that stocks are not necessarily stored according to their intended purposes, and that it is possible for stocks to be completely inter-changed between nuclear weapon use and naval propulsion use. Many states gave a negative view that such a situation could lead to an actual future increase of production in nuclear weapons.

(vi) Compliance and Verification

- In relation to verification, most states take the position that the introduction of a verification mechanism is desirable, based on the principle of non-discrimination and irreversibility. A two-stage approach, similar to the NPT, was proposed to explore an agreement on verification arrangements separately and subsequent to agreement on the basic norm of an FMCT.
- One delegation explained how it reached its conclusion that “effective verification” is impossible. They demonstrated the level required for effective verification, and cited the difficulty of detecting undeclared activities due to the difficulty of monitoring nuclear weapon production facilities in a manner that would not compromise proliferation sensitive information. Additionally, the delegation noted that given that fissile material for naval propulsion purposes would be exempt from the scope of verification, it will be impossible to verify the non-diversion to nuclear weapon purposes of material produced after the entry into force of an FMCT. It was made clear that in its process of reaching such a conclusion, the delegation examined the issue from the presumption that FMCT verification should be possible.

(vii) Other sub-issues

Purposes and possible preamble

- The purposes of the treaty are, among other things, to contribute to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to decrease the discriminatory nature of the NPT. An opinion was expressed that discussions on the preamble should take place after the content of the treaty was crystallized. The draft treaty (CD/1777) does not contain any preamble, but the drafter stated that they would welcome the insertion of a preamble and they are open to suggestions on its content.

### The role of existing organizations (especially the IAEA)

- Many delegations expressed positive views regarding the role of the IAEA and requested input by IAEA experts. Nonetheless, a view was expressed that, while also indicating the positive side, an intense examination of the key issues of definitions, scope, verification and stockpiles is required more than exploring organizational matters such as the role of the IAEA.

### Consultation mechanism

- Opinions were heard that as a preliminary stage to Security Council notification there needs to be a detailed consultation mechanism, technical input from IAEA experts would also be useful, and a consultation mechanism would be explored from an open standpoint.

### National Implementation

- A position was put forward that national legislation to prevent illegal enrichment and reprocessing activities within states parties is necessary, as well as examining the establishment of points of contact (POC) in the event that an international verification system is introduced.

### Settlement of disputes

- Regarding the meeting of states parties referred to in Article III paragraph 3 of the draft treaty (CD/1777), a question was raised as to its nature, the numbers required for a quorum and the status of its decisions. It was pointed out that Article III, paragraphs. 3 to 5 of the draft treaty is a compliance mechanism and that they are not a mechanism for dispute settlement, which is originally meant to deal with the problems surrounding the interpretation of the treaty text.

### Entry into force

- Many delegations took the position that a careful examination is required on whether the ratification or accession of the non-NPT states parties should be a condition of the entry into force. This position was taken from the point of view of maintaining a balance between treaty credibility and entry into force achievability, and thus avoiding the mistakes of the CTBT. The draft treaty (CD/1777) requires only the ratification by the five nuclear weapons states for entry into force, but the drafter was open to discussion on this issue.

### Duration

- It was pointed out that the duration of 15 years is too short from the perspective of irreversibility. A view was expressed that further discussions are required and this is an area of the draft treaty (CD/1777) that could potentially be revised in future negotiations.

### Withdrawal

- An opinion was voiced that the discussions within the NPT on withdrawal should be referenced. Furthermore, the importance was stressed of creating a new standard to only recognize the right of withdrawal in the situation where a state party is in compliance with its treaty obligations. It was also stressed that a mechanism is necessary to judge whether withdrawal is illegal or not in the event of a violation.

#### Review

- Since new fissile material might emerge in the future through scientific progress, delegations called for the convening of a review conference every five years. In this connection, a view was expressed that the possibility of new fissile materials appearing cannot be ruled out, nonetheless, the current definitions pertain to fissile materials in actual use, and there is no need to incorporate a formal process for the examination of potential new fissile material.

#### Amendment

- A view was put forward that it is necessary to examine a simple amendment process that can decide changes through consensus among the states parties like in the CWC. In relation to this, it was pointed out that in the case of an FMCT, the possibility of utilizing such a simple amendment process is extremely low because there is a limitation from the perspective of the laws of physics. The position was expressed that the amendment of fissile material definitions is related to transparency and verification, and since it could influence the balance of the treaty, we should be exceedingly cautious.

### **Annex III**

#### **Report on the 2008 informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 3 “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” (PAROS) Ambassador Marius Grinius (CANADA)**

Two informal meetings were held on 7 February and 21 February 2008. The objective of these sessions was to revalidate and refresh proposals identified as relevant to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), in the context of the 2007 report by my predecessor. A proposed outline of work was distributed to all members (see attached), which identified issues for discussion during the informal meetings and provided a list of recent CD documents that addressed the principal topics on PAROS. There was one amendment to the proposed agenda for 21 February 2008, to include a presentation by the Chair of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), Mr. Gerard Brachet, which was followed by a Questions and Answers session.

Based on the discussions from the informal meetings, I would make the following observations:

- There was strong recognition of the extent to which space activities impact many aspects of our daily lives. The preservation of the peaceful use and access to outer space now and for future generations was described as a collective responsibility of all.
- There was broad consensus that there are some deficiencies in the existing outer space architecture which could be strengthened through a number of means, such as: improving or enhancing the implementation and universalisation of existing agreements on outer space; developing transparency and confidence-building measures, including codes of conduct; and, possibly negotiating potential new legal measures.
- Some delegations made detailed suggestions for transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). Such TCBMs could be complementary to a potential future legal instrument on PAROS, or in the view of some, be sufficient on their own. Others suggested that TCBMs could be taken up in the context of the draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). Work being done by the EU on a possible code of conduct could serve as a useful basis for further discussions.<sup>1</sup>
- Following from the 2007 report of my predecessor, Ambassador Paul Meyer, which noted that there was wide support for establishing a dialogue between the CD and COPUOS on matters of common interest, an invitation on behalf of the CD President was extended to the Chair of COPUOS (Mr. Gerard Brachet) to brief CD members during the 2<sup>nd</sup> informal meeting. The presentation by the UN COPUOS Chair clarified the mandate, roles and responsibilities of COPUOS in relation to the CD's responsibility to prevent an arms race in outer space. COPUOS has technical and legal expertise from which the CD can draw if

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<sup>1</sup> While codes of conduct was the terminology used during the informal discussions, a plenary statement delivered by Slovenia on behalf of the EU indicated that the EU is working on a set of transparency and confidence building measures rather than a code of conduct.

there is agreement to pursue work on PAROS in the CD. Future collaboration will also ensure that there is complementarity and no duplication or overlap between the two organizations in their work.

- Many delegations welcomed the 12 February 2008 tabling, by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, of the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Several delegations expressed interest in continuing more substantive discussions on the draft treaty. At least one other delegation made clear its opposition to new binding space arms control agreements.

As Coordinator, I would observe that there is interest in continuing work on PAROS in two areas:

- (a) On TCBMs, delegations are anticipating the ongoing work of the EU which may serve as a useful basis to focus discussions and identify which specific areas related to TCBMs on which the CD could usefully work; and,
- (b) On substantive discussions/exchanges of views on the specific articles of the Russian-Chinese draft PPWT.

Views were expressed, however, that such substantive discussions should take place within the context of an agreed program of work in the CD. That is also my conclusion.

Marius R. Grinius  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to  
the Conference on Disarmament Coordinator  
for CD agenda item 3 on PAROS  
10 March 2008

Outline for informal meetings at the Conference on Disarmament  
agenda item 3 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)

Coordinator: Ambassador Marius GRINIUS (Canada)

| <b><u>Thursday 7 February 3-6 p.m.</u></b>                     | <b><u>Thursday 21 February 10 a.m.-1 p.m.</u></b>              |
|--|--|
| - Adequacy of existing regime, means of enhancement            | - Transparency and confidence-building measures                |
| - Transparency and confidence-building measures                | - Elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer space |
| - Elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer-space | - Assessment and next steps                                    |

The objective of these sessions would be to build upon and refresh proposals that have been identified as relevant to PAROS, and that continue to have the potential to become eventual multilateral agreements of the CD. The CD documents cited are recent working papers addressing the principal topics identified and are meant as an aid to delegations and do not represent an exhaustive listing of previous inputs (e.g. statements) to the CD on the subject of PAROS.

**Thursday 7 February (3 to 6 p.m.)**

- Consideration of the adequacy of the existing international legal regime providing for security in outer space and possible means of enhancing it (CD/1780, CD/1784 and CD/1829),
- Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs):
  - o Information-based measures: information exchange, notification, observation
  - o Behavioural Guidelines: debris mitigation, no first deployment pledges, ASAT test moratoria, traffic management, codes of conduct (CD/ 1778, CD/1786 and CD/1815)
- Elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer space:
- scope, definitions, verification, key provisions (CD/1679, CD/1769, CD/1779, CD/1781, CD/1785, CD/1818)

**Thursday 21 February (10 a.m. to 1 p.m.)**

- Further consideration of TCBMs
- Further consideration of elements of a treaty on the non-weaponisation of outer space
- Assessment of work to-date, identification of updates to be made to the report of last year's PAROS coordinator (CD/1827), and next steps.

#### **Annex IV**

### **Report to the President of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the work of informal meetings devoted to consideration of agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”**

**by**

**H.E. Mr. Babacar Carlos MBAYE, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Senegal, responsible for coordination of the work in question**

In accordance with the organizational framework for work during the first part of the 2008 session of the Conference on Disarmament, two informal meetings were held to consider agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. These meetings took place on Tuesday 12 February 2008 and Thursday 21 February 2008, with the Coordinator in the chair.

For the purpose of organizing these meetings, the Coordinator prepared a work plan. A preliminary draft was submitted to the team of six Presidents (P-6) during the Presidential consultations held on 11 February 2008. The plan itself, a copy of which is annexed to this report, was subsequently presented to delegations at the start of the first informal plenary meeting on 12 February 2008.

In preparing this work plan, the Coordinator drew principally on the work carried out in 2007, under the guidance of Ambassador Carlos Antonio Da Rocha Paranhos, of Brazil, with the aim of building on the areas of consensus already achieved, so as to move forward towards consensus proposals on the other items on which divergences persisted.

In this way, bearing in mind the highly relevant recommendations drawn up by Ambassador Paranhos, the Coordinator proposed an approach based on the following points:

- General exchange of views;
- Examination/Evaluation of the existing legal framework relating to negative security assurances;
- Elements which might be selected with a view to strengthening negative security assurances;
- The question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament;
- Possible elements of a treaty on negative security assurances, including:

- Scope and form of the treaty;
  - Potential beneficiaries and providers of assurances;
  - Most suitable body for negotiation of the treaty; and
- Other matters.

Additionally, with the aim of gaining a clearer idea of what progress might be made during the present session, the Coordinator invited the members of the Conference on Disarmament to give their views on more specific issues, namely:

- Scope of Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995;
- Adoption of a legally binding international instrument to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and
- Which body would be most suitable for the negotiation of this instrument.

The Coordinator also contacted UNIDIR with a view to inviting one of the experts who cooperate with it, namely Mr. Jozef Goldblat, to give a presentation during one of the meetings devoted to consideration of item 4. The Coordinator took this decision bearing in mind the very useful information Mr. Goldblat had supplied to the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 and 2007 on the same issue. At the same time he wished to respond to the suggestion to this effect which he had received from one delegation.

Mr. Goldblat agreed to share his knowledge and his views. However, time constraints prevented the Coordinator from working with UNIDIR to see how to make use of the time he had available.

During the two meetings, many delegations took part in a broad and open discussion, which enabled the various viewpoints to be expressed. The Coordinator drew the following conclusions from this exchange of views:

1) The discussions revealed continuing diverging assessments of the effectiveness of the various existing instruments in the field of negative security assurances, including the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States, the conclusions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, their additional protocols and corresponding interpretative declarations.

Several delegations considered these assurances ineffective and hence unsatisfactory. It was emphasized, from this viewpoint, that the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, of which the Security Council took note in its resolution No. 984 of 11 April 1995, do not constitute adequate assurances, inter alia because of their non-binding and unilateral character.

In that regard, some delegations considered that negative security assurances should not be regarded as a favour conferred by the nuclear-weapon States on non-nuclear-weapon States, as a matter of goodwill, but as the fulfilment of a legal obligation stemming from the United Nations Charter and a quid pro quo for States which have opted to renounce nuclear weapons.

It was also emphasized that the granting of such assurances, in the framework of a legally binding international instrument, would be a welcome transitional measure to enable the imbalance arising out of the NPT to be remedied, pending the achievement of general nuclear disarmament, which those delegations considered to be the only satisfactory assurance.

Conversely, other delegations viewed the existing assurances as satisfactory - in particular one delegation which reaffirmed its attachment to the unilateral declarations and its opposition to any negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an international legal instrument relating to negative security assurances.

Another delegation considered that its unilateral declaration, of which the Security Council had taken note in its resolution 984 of 11 April 1995, offered a comprehensive, collective and concrete response to the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States in relation to negative security assurances, and that it preferred the granting of assurances within a regional framework, through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

2) In relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones, delegations unanimously considered that progress has been made with their establishment. In that context, delegations called for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to combat instability in that region. Others welcomed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

However, it was emphasized that nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties do not on their own constitute adequate assurances, notably owing to their limited geographical scope and the fact that they are accompanied by interpretative declarations which have sometimes restricted their scope.

3) Concerning the negotiation of a legally binding international instrument on security assurances, with the exception of the delegations whose positions have been set out below, most of the speakers said that they were in favour.

Most of the delegations indicated that the adoption of such an instrument would be useful both for the nuclear-weapon States and for the non-nuclear-weapon States, insofar as it would make it possible to build trust and reduce the nuclear threat and the risk of proliferation.

4) The discussions once again highlighted the links between the issue of negative security assurances and other items on the CD agenda. Several speakers said that the opening of negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement on security assurances could help to prepare the ground for negotiations on the three (3) other fundamental issues on the agenda, namely the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for the production of weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) and general nuclear disarmament.

5) Nevertheless, the States that favour the conclusion of such a treaty do not all agree as to the most suitable body for undertaking the negotiations. Whereas some held that the negotiation of this instrument should take place within the Conference on Disarmament, others considered that it should take place in the NPT context.

6) Concerning the establishment of an ad hoc committee on assurances within the Conference on Disarmament, several delegations expressed support for this proposal or placed on record their agreement in principle in this regard.

Overall, it was clear, following the two informal meetings devoted to item 4, that progress remains to be made in order to achieve consensus on key aspects of negative security assurances.

While taking note of the fact that no objections were raised to the principle of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on assurances within the CD, the Coordinator wishes to underline the importance of offering the member States every opportunity to express their views. With that in mind, priority in future discussions could be focused on specific points, including:

- (i) The true scope of existing assurances and
- (ii) Ways and means of making existing security assurances at the global level legally binding.

The organization of comprehensive discussions, on these two key issues among others, could help in identifying possible ways of achieving consensus on the best way to address the issue of negative security assurances.

Similarly, the clarifications provided by Mr. Jozef Goldblat lead the Coordinator to believe that the organization of a meeting with that expert, before the end of the 2008 session, might help to bring positions closer together.

Geneva, 10 March 2008

**H.E. Mr. Babacar Carlos MBAYE**  
**Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Senegal**  
**to the United Nations Office at Geneva**  
**and the other International Organizations in Switzerland**

## **Appendix**

### **Informal meetings on agenda item 4, entitled “Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”**

**Coordinator: Ambassador Babacar Carlos M’BAYE (Senegal)**

#### **PROPOSED WORK PLAN**

The aim is to draw on the work accomplished last year and in preceding years to undertake a thorough and more closely targeted examination of how the Conference on Disarmament might best address the issue of effective international arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

For this purpose, the following points might be examined in succession:

#### **TUESDAY 12 FEBRUARY 2008 : 3 p.m.-6 p.m.**

- General exchange of views;
- Examination/Evaluation of the existing legal framework relating to negative security assurances;
- Elements which might be selected with a view to strengthening negative security assurances;
- The question of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances in the CD; and
- Other matters.

#### **THURSDAY 21 FEBRUARY 2008: 3 p.m.-6 p.m.**

- Possible elements of a treaty on negative security assurances;
- Scope and form of the treaty;
- Potential beneficiaries and providers of assurances;
- Most suitable body for negotiation of the treaty and
- Other matters.

## **Annex V**

### **Report of the informal debate on agenda item 5: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons**

In my capacity as coordinator on CD agenda item 5, entitled “New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons” I have the honour to report on the work done during the first part of the 2008 CD session.

Delegations held two informal meetings under my chairmanship on 13 February 2008 and 29 February 2008 respectively, to discuss item 5 on the agenda, as per the provided schedule.

In all of the 2008 consultations so far delegations have validated the outcome of the CD previous proceedings under agenda item 5 in 2007. A number of further comments and observations on the topics already identified during the 2007 discussions were made.

Delegations wished to re-emphasize the relevance of three main themes:

- Radiological weapons;
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
- Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

No specific proposals were submitted for consideration under agenda item 5 during these consultations.

The input offered by delegations clearly demonstrates that agenda item 5 merits further discussion since it is generally viewed as a vital component of the CD future work.

In conclusion, I would recommend that the CD keep item 5 under active consideration without prejudice to the discussions and/or negotiations on priority issues under agenda items 1 to 4 of the Conference on Disarmament.

*(Signed):* Petko Dragahov  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative  
of Bulgaria

## **Annex VI**

### **Report of the informal debate on Agenda Item 6: Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament**

**Coordinator:**  
**Ambassador Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka,**  
**Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva**

1. Two sessions of the informal debate on agenda item 6 were held on 14 and 27 February 2008.
2. During these informal debates, the delegations expressed their views on a wide range of issues, including possible ways to move forward.
3. During these informal debates, there were two broad approaches in dealing with agenda item 6. They were:
  - The holistic or philosophical approach.
  - The approach based on developing of an objective criterion.
4. The proponents of the holistic or philosophical approach were of the view that agenda item 6 should deal with any issue that the delegations wish to address in the context of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, ranging from nuclear to conventional weapons in order to achieve its final objective, which is general and complete disarmament.
5. They argued that such an approach would also contribute to achieve universality of instruments that have already been negotiated. Therefore, they were of the view that the issue of duplication should not prevent the Conference from considering any issue.
6. Some also argued that the philosophical or holistic approach would also contribute to the larger debate within and outside the Conference in identifying emerging global challenges to international peace and security and promoting interrelationships between disarmament and development, environment etc.
7. Those who believed in the approach based on developing of an objective criterion under which relevant issues could be identified mainly to avoid duplication, seemed to be less enthusiastic in taking a holistic or philosophical approach.
8. In this regard, they identified the following benchmarks, among others, that would help to develop such an objective criterion:
  - The relevance to the mandate of the CD.
  - Need to avoid duplication.
  - The rule of consensus.

- The end-result of the consideration of any issue should be to negotiate a legally-binding instrument in accordance with the CD mandate. However, this end-result should not prevent any delegation from considering other aspects such as Confidence-Building Measures, transparency etc., which would also contribute eventually for the negotiation of legally-binding instruments.
- The relevance of a particular issue in the context of disarmament and arms control.

9. A summary of some views expressed by various delegations during the informal debate on agenda item 6 is appended as an annex to this report.

10. The Coordinator made an open invitation to interested delegations to consider preparing road-maps under the two broad approaches for consideration by the delegations in future discussions on the subject.

## Appendix

1. The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament must:
  - Address the root causes of insecurity emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions.
  - Seek to promote balance among States at regional level.
2. General and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the ultimate objective of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, with verification and irreversibility as the two basic principles. The elimination of the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, should be the immediate objective.
3. The following initiatives could be undertaken under the comprehensive programme of disarmament:
  - Legally binding instrument under which States would accept the legal commitment to implement a series of disarmament measures within a specific time period.
  - The issue of missiles, in all its aspects.
  - Development of confidence-building measures.
  - Increasing public support for disarmament.
  - Promoting interrelationship between disarmament and international security and disarmament and development.
4. A detailed and full list of all measures to be included in the comprehensive programme should be drawn out and they should be implemented on a step-by-step basis.
5. There is a need to evolve a new global security consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation. The new security consensus should;
  - Address existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security.
  - Ensure equal rights of all countries to participate in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation on the basis of undiminished security for all.
  - Protect the legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of technologies of all countries.
6. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been on the agenda of the CD for a long time. The intent has been to elaborate a programme which would place measures of disarmament into a carefully considered plan, setting out objectives, priorities, and time frames, with a view to the achievement of disarmament on a progressive basis.

7. A comprehensive programme would consider not only nuclear disarmament, which remains the highest priority, but also other weapons and weapons systems which are crucial for maintaining peace and security and enhancing social and economic development in the world.

8. Agenda item 6 provides room for discussions on conventional arms and the CD has a role to play on that issue.

9. Agenda item 6 provides room for all delegations to raise any issue that they think appropriate for the CD to consider.

10. For practical reasons, the CD should narrow down the list by leaving the issues that are being dealt with under other processes. Eventually, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should achieve general and complete disarmament.

11. Issues such as the interrelationship between disarmament and development, multilateralism, and environment could also be discussed under the item 6.

12. Some of the issues identified are difficult to put into practice and therefore there should be more regional group level consultations to identify specific issues.

13. The CD needs to be both realistic and pragmatic in dealing with agenda item 6. One issue is not too important than the other but there is a need to find a way out to identify specific issues. In view of the above, there is a need to identify an objective criterion on the selection of issues under this agenda item.

14. Elements of any objective criteria could also include the following:

- Duplication
- Mandate of the CD
- Consensus

15. The end result of the consideration of any particular issue should be to negotiate a legally-binding instrument in accordance with the CD mandate.

16. Disarmament means physical elimination of weapons. While the biological and chemical weapons have been addressed through legally-binding instruments, the CD has to continue to address the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the instruments of arms regulation and disarmament have to be dealt with under the CD mandate and it could well be one of the objective criteria.

17. Some of the issues such as anti-personnel mines have a humanitarian dimension and not an arms control/disarmament dimension. Therefore, this too could be taken into consideration when an objective criteria is being developed for the selection/narrowing down of issues under agenda item 6. Any issue taken into consideration under this item should be relevant to the CD's mandate.

18. Exclusion of some issues runs contrary to the basic premise of agenda item 6. Since some legally-binding instruments have not yet attained the status of universality, there is a need to continue to address these issues under agenda item 6.

19. Comprehensive programme of work means a comprehensive approach towards achieving general and complete disarmament. A holistic approach would facilitate the consideration of issues such as confidence-building measures and transparency, which would facilitate to achieve general and complete disarmament on step-by-step basis.

20. New types of weapons in the categories of both nuclear and conventional weapons should also be dealt with under agenda item 6.

## **Annex VII**

### **Report of the Coordinator for Agenda Item 7: “Transparency in Armaments” to the Presidency of the 2008 Conference on Disarmament under the coordinatorship of Ambassador of Indonesia, I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja**

Based on the Organizational Framework for the 2008 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, two informal debates on agenda item 7: Transparency in Armaments (TIA) were held on Friday, 15 February 2008 and on Thursday, 28 February 2008.

To facilitate the discussions, the Coordinator circulated a “Proposed Outline for the Informal Debate”, which sets out the main objectives of this exercise which is to revalidate the issues under agenda item 7 that were previously raised during the substantive discussions at the 2007 Session contained in Annex VII of document CD/1827. The proposed outline is also attached with document CD/INF.54, which lists all the basic documents of the CD relating to the issue of Transparency in Armaments.

The first informal debate was dedicated to seeking delegates’ general views on whether the list of issues contained in Annex VII of CD/1827 would still be relevant and whether delegates felt the need to raise new issues of concern.

One delegation stressed that revalidating the achievements attained last year, would not be sufficient for this year’s work, since the CD works on an annual basis. It was also stated that transparency must not restrict the right of a State to acquire arms for self-defence and that measures to promote transparency in armaments should be voluntary and mutually agreed upon by all States. At least two delegations expressed their views on the appointment of a special coordinator for Transparency in Armaments.

During the second informal debate, several issues were raised. One delegation referred to its previous proposal on the “Transfer Ban on Arms to Terrorists” and expressed its intention to propose a new document. Some delegations, however, reaffirmed their reservations and discounted the appropriateness of dealing with such an issue within the CD while also disputing the interpretation of such a reference.

Issues such as Arms Trade Treaty, Cluster Munitions, MANPADS, Regional Measures to Improve Transparency in Armaments, Transparency in Nuclear Weapons were also raised.

One Member State expressed the opinion that transparency was a tool which could be used to have a picture of the destabilizing effects of conventional armaments build-ups and as an early-warning system for global armament trends. It was further mentioned that in global terms, military expenditure had risen over the years and that the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and the United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting on Military Expenditures need to improve their respective roles and capacity, among others, in order to prevent the transfer of sophisticated technologies to conflict-prone regions. The issue of the universalization of the United Nations Register continues to be a challenge.

A proposal to establish objective criteria for issues to be discussed under agenda item 7, such as those set up under agenda item 6 on Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, were also suggested. It was considered to be useful for future work under this agenda item. In this regard, it was recommended that the Coordinator discusses this matter with the Coordinator of agenda item 6.

Many delegations considered that agenda item 7 on Transparency in Armaments remains relevant as an agenda item for the Membership to put forward information regarding their own policy and development on certain weapons, initiatives to increase the transparency in armaments and general information sharing to enhancing confidence among Member States.

The Coordinator recommends that the list of issues raised under this agenda item during the 2007 session, as stipulated in Annex VII of document CD/1827 remain on the table for future deliberations. The proposed outline and the list of issues are attached to this report.

## **Appendix**

### **Proposed outline for discussions at the Conference on Disarmament on agenda item 7: Transparency in Armaments**

**Coordinator: Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja (Indonesia)**

#### **Objective**

The objective of the discussions would be to revalidate issues under agenda item 7 raised during the substantive discussions of CD 2007 as reported to the President of CD 2007 by Ambassador John Duncan of the United Kingdom (Coordinator of agenda item 7 of CD 2007). The discussions would build on issues put forward previously by CD members as contained in Annex VII of CD 1827 and to identify new issues that delegations may wish to raise.

#### **Plan**

As indicated in the organizational framework, the discussions on agenda item 7 (Transparency in Armaments) will be conducted on Friday, 15 February 2008 and Thursday, 28 February 2008.

#### **Week 4**

##### **Friday, 15 February 2008 (10 a.m.-1 p.m.)**

General discussion

Issues raised during 2007 session as contained in Annex VII of CD 1827:

- An Arms Trade Treaty
- Cluster Munitions
- Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)
- Phosphorus munitions
- Regional measures to improve TIA
- Scope of United Nations Arms Register
- The principal focus of agenda item 7

- The role of a Special Coordinator for this agenda item
- Transfer Ban on Arms to Terrorists
- Transparency in nuclear weapons
- Universalization and implementation of existing agreements and arrangements

**Week 6**

**Thursday, 28 February 2008 (3-6 p.m.)**

Further discussion  
Report

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