Enhancing national reporting as a key transparency and confidence-building measure

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The present working paper builds on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 2018 working paper on transparency (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26) by making concrete proposals to enhance national reporting on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for consideration both by the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and by the 2020 Review Conference. Improving this key transparency measure would contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and also to the ongoing efforts of parties to the Treaty to strengthen the Treaty review process.

Significance of transparency – especially national reporting

2. As the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has stressed in previous working papers, that the principle of transparency – like those of irreversibility and verifiability – is indispensable for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the principle of transparency underpins the other two principles.

3. Transparency is important in relation to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and also in relation to implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by all States parties to the Treaty. By building confidence and trust, increased transparency helps establish the common ground for dialogue and negotiation that can facilitate further reductions in nuclear weapons towards their total elimination. In addition, increased transparency also provides additional reassurance of the

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commitment of parties to the Treaty to implementing their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.

4. The importance of transparency is apparent from the emphasis placed on it in the outcomes documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences and in working papers submitted by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, the New Agenda Coalition and others for the 2015 and 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycles.

5. The enhancement of the reporting mechanism, the submission of national reports and discussion of these reports will promote mutual understanding among States. In this regard, efforts to enhance transparency, including explanation and exchange of information about nuclear doctrine, strategy and capability, contribute to confidence-building and thereby enable further reductions in nuclear weapons.

6. In addition, noting that most non-nuclear-weapon States already implement non-proliferation and safeguards measures, enhancement of transparency measures shall further contribute to better functioning of the accountability mechanism of responsibility, especially by nuclear-weapon States in demonstrating their implementation of all articles of the Treaty, in particular article VI.

Benefits of standardized reporting forms

7. Although the adoption of a standard reporting form by nuclear-weapon States is especially important, widespread adoption by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of a standardized reporting form can pay dividends by ensuring baselines and establishing a common frame of reference, thereby helping to meet the difficult challenge of measuring progress on implementation of the Treaty. Some attempt at such measurement is an important element of the Treaty review mechanism, including for accountability purposes.

8. We note the need for the nuclear-weapon States to report on a wider range of issues than non-nuclear-weapon States, as certain actions of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference are applicable only to nuclear-weapon States. There may also be value in having different approaches for two categories of non-nuclear-weapon State: those with, and those without, advanced nuclear capabilities. This more calibrated approach would make it clearer that States are not expected to report on items inapplicable to them.

National reporting on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: experience to date and areas for improvement

9. To date, relatively few States have tended to report on their national progress in implementing the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan. However, nuclear-weapon States submitted their national reports in 2014 and 2015 – although they have yet to agree on the “standard reporting form” called for in action 21 of the 2010 action plan.

10. There is room for improvement in substantive reporting by individual States and our collective efforts to ensure that data provided is collated and indexed in a readily

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2 The New Agenda Coalition working paper “Strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.13 (2017)) also refers to the concept of “measurability”.

3 For present purposes, “advanced nuclear capabilities” is understood to mean that a State has a nuclear fuel cycle and/or uranium enrichment capabilities.
accessible form. It would be useful for States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to systematize reporting and develop a common frame of reference and to use such forms in practice, on the basis of a clear collective understanding of its importance.

**Practical proposals to enhance future national reporting on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty**

11. Taking into account helpful feedback from a broad range of States on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative transparency working paper submitted to the 2018 Preparatory Committee session, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative makes the following practical proposals to enhance future national reporting on the implementation of the Treaty.

**Prior to the 2020 Review Conference**

12. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative makes the following proposals for the lead-up to the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty review process:

   (a) All States parties should report to the 2020 Review Conference on their undertakings under the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan, using the standard reporting form proposed in 2017 and 2018 by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative for use by both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States.

   (b) All nuclear-weapon States are strongly encouraged to:

      (i) Agree upon a “standard reporting form” as soon as possible in accordance with action 21 of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan, taking into account the standard reporting form reproduced in the annex to the present paper and building on the “common framework” under which nuclear-weapon States made their national reports during the 2015 Treaty review cycle.

      (ii) Report to the 2020 Review Conference on their 2010 action plan undertakings along the lines of action 5 of the 2010 action plan, mutatis mutandis.

      (iii) Use the opportunity of the 2019 Preparatory Committee session and other available forums and channels to further explain and share information regarding issues covered in their reports, including nuclear doctrine and security assurances.

**At the 2020 Review Conference**

13. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative suggests that sufficient dedicated time be allocated at the 2020 Review Conference for States parties to focus specifically on the issue of national reporting on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with a view to:

   (a) Reviewing the proportion of States parties issuing regular reporting;

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4 “Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26), dated 11 April 2018, submitted to the 2018 Preparatory Committee session.

5 Working paper on “transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17) of 19 April 2017, submitted to the 2017 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee session. For the 2018 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working paper, see footnote 4.

6 Action 5 provided for reporting to the 2014 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee.
(b) Encouraging States parties to identify and remove any barriers to optimal reporting;

(c) Having an interactive discussion on their reports, including discussion on the nuclear doctrine and security assurances of nuclear-weapon States;

(d) Recommending regular action by the Office for Disarmament Affairs (or other suitable entity) to collate, index and report on national reporting practice on the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(e) Agreeing to make future regular national reports at specified frequencies. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative suggests that an appropriate reporting schedule would be for all States parties to submit two reports per review cycle, one in advance of each of the following meetings:

(i) The second Preparatory Committee session of each cycle;

(ii) Every review conference;

(f) Agreeing on reporting form(s) to be used by States parties in future. Such forms should ensure that national reports provide “accurate, up-to-date, complete and comparable information”. They should also be updated to reflect the latest outcome of review conferences. To be appropriately targeted and avoid inapplicable reporting burdens on States, such forms could contain reporting items in the following format:

(i) Nuclear-weapon States;

(ii) Non-nuclear-weapon States with advanced nuclear capabilities;\(^7\)

(iii) Non-nuclear-weapon States without advanced nuclear capabilities;

The annex contains an indicative matrix of which items these different categories of States would be expected to report upon;

(g) (In the event of lack of agreement by 2020 among nuclear-weapon States on a standard reporting form:) Reaffirming the 2010 (action 21) commitment in this respect;

(h) Agreeing that reporting intervals for nuclear-weapon States should be no longer, and preferably shorter, than those for non-nuclear-weapon States;

(i) Agreeing that in future (commencing with the 2022–2025 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle):

(i) Preparatory Committee sessions will allocate dedicated time to discuss the practice of reporting by all States parties and challenges faced by States parties in reporting;

(ii) At least one Preparatory Committee session per review cycle will allocate specific time to discuss the reporting practice of nuclear-weapon States;

(iii) Preparatory Committee session chairs will forward a summary of outcomes of discussion on reporting practice and related challenges to the presiding officer of the next Preparatory Committee or (as applicable) review conference;

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\(^7\) This language is borrowed from the New Agenda Coalition’s working paper to the 2017 NPT PrepCom, “Strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.1/WP.13) of 24 March 2017.

\(^8\) For present purposes, “advanced nuclear capabilities” is understood to mean that a State has a nuclear fuel cycle and/or uranium enrichment capabilities.
(j) Agreeing that the 2025 Review Conference will be clearly mandated to:

(i) Review progress made up until 2025 in implementing the reporting mechanism;

(ii) Decide on next steps in the elaboration and further improvement of the reporting mechanism;

(k) Further entrenching and improving the reporting mechanism within the framework of wider efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process by such means as States parties to the Treaty may decide at the 2020 Review Conference.
## Annex

**Future national reporting templates on implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: suggested coverage of topics for different categories of States parties to the Treaty – indicative matrix**

*Note: The present document proposes only the topics to be addressed by three categories of States in a future reporting template. The full version of such a reporting template would contain much more detail than appears here.

In the final three columns: Yes denotes that reporting is expected, No denotes that reporting is not expected, Optional denotes reporting preferred, if applicable.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty action No.</th>
<th>Nuclear disarmament</th>
<th>Non-nuclear-weapon States</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) Nuclear-weapon States</td>
<td>(ii) With &quot;advanced nuclear capabilities&quot;™</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Topic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Principles and objectives</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New START</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disarmament of nuclear weapons</td>
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</tbody>
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### Nuclear disarmament

1. National policy on nuclear disarmament
   - Membership in regional/multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament

2. National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency
   - Support for General Assembly resolutions supporting irreversibility, verifiability and transparency

3. Measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons

4. New START

5. Reductions in national stockpiles in each of the post-1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycles
   - Current stockpiles of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles: specified details
   - Current stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons: specified details
   - Measures to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in doctrine
   - Policy reviews on nuclear weapon stockpiles, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture
   - Measures to reduce the operational readiness of the nuclear arsenal and efforts to engage non-nuclear-weapon States on this
   - Measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons
• Confidence and-security-building measures to enhance transparency

• Support for a Conference on Disarmament subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament

• Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament

Yes Yes Yes

Support for a Conference on Disarmament subsidiary body to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Yes Yes Yes

Security assurances

Negative security assurances

Yes No No

Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties: efforts to ratify relevant protocols or review reservations

Yes No No

Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties: support for establishment; name of treaty to which party

Yes Yes Yes

Status; efforts to ratify; efforts encouraging Annex 2 States to sign/ratify

Yes Yes Yes

Date of signature and ratification; status of reporting policy on moratorium

Yes Yes Yes

Summary of reports made since 2011 to the biennial conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV conferences)

Yes Yes Yes

National implementation activities and activities promoting entry into force

Yes Yes Yes

• Efforts to construct/complete/certify International Monitoring System stations

• Efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime

• National efforts to help develop the on-site inspection capabilities of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Yes Yes Yes

Fissile materials cut-off treaty: support for launching negotiations; summary of contributions to the group of governmental experts and the Group of Eminent Persons

Yes Yes Yes

Specific details on current status and future plans

Yes No No

Fissile materials

• Status of development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile materials

Yes No No

• Proposals/statements supporting development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile materials from military stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States
18 Any current or future plans to dismantle, or convert to peaceful uses, facilities that produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes
   Yes  No  No
   Confirmation that domestic nuclear facilities do not produce fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

19 Nuclear disarmament verification
   • Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament
   Yes  Yes  Yes
   • Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament

20 Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of:
   Yes  Yes  Yes
   • Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
   • Paragraph 4 (c) of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed in 1995
   • The 13 practical steps agreed in 2000

21 Transparency and reporting (by nuclear-weapon States):
   Yes  No  No
   • Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals
   • Efforts toward such agreement/determination

22 Education
   Efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education
   Yes  Yes  Yes

Nuclear non-proliferation

23 Efforts to promote universalization of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
   Yes  Yes  Yes

24 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards
   Safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA (e.g., comprehensive safeguards agreement; Additional Protocol; and/or modified small quantities protocol))
   Yes  Yes  Yes

25 Efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement or to encourage other States to do so
   Yes  Yes  Yes

26 • National efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations
   Yes  Yes  Yes
   • Initiatives (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers) promoting high compliance standards
   • IAEA conclusions: non-diversion and absence of undeclared material/activities
| 27 | National steps to address cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty (e.g., implementing Security Council sanctions regimes and statements in international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 28 | • Dates of signature and entry into force of the Additional Protocol | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 29 | • Efforts to implement the Additional Protocol | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 29 | Efforts to encourage others to implement the Additional Protocol | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 29 | IAEA safeguards | Efforts to promote/assist conclusion/implementation by other States of a comprehensive safeguards agreement | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 30 | Support for wider application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 31 | Efforts to amend or rescind an existing small quantities protocol | No | No | Yes |
| 32 | Efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 32 | • Status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 33 | • Extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 33 | Contributions to an international technology base to improve IAEA safeguards | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 34 | Efforts in export control regimes, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other arrangements (e.g., legislation or bilateral arrangements) to help ensure that nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 35 | Export control | Implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic legislation/regulations | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 36 | Efforts to show that a recipient State’s safeguard/compliance record is considered in making nuclear export decisions | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 37 | Support for States’ legitimate right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (e.g., list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements concluded) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 38 | Key policy criteria considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 39 | • Efforts to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 40 | • Efforts to implement commitments made in Nuclear Security Summit process | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 41 | • Summary of efforts to apply IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 41 | • National reviews of physical protection policies and practices | Yes | Yes | Yes |

43. Efforts to promote ratification/implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment

44. Steps taken to implement:
   - Revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
   - Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources
   - Efforts to strengthen national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material – or to assist other States to do so
   - Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative
   - Participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
   - Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)
   - Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database
   - Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of INTERPOL

45. Progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

46. Activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

47. Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural)

48. National policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls

49. Technical cooperation
   - Efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries

50. International efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA technical cooperation programme
51  • List of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38)
    • List of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation

52  Efforts to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA technical cooperation programme (e.g., by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency’s Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.)

53  • Efforts in IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee
    • Efforts to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions

54  Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund

55  Any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA

56  Efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy

57  Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy

58  Efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle

59  • Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
    • Status vis-à-vis the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45)

60  • How international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally
• Any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security

61  • Any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium
• Any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes

62  National regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, particularly the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012)

63  • Date of signatures and ratifications of:
  – Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage;
  – Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; and/or
  – Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
• Title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability

64  Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit [and prevent] armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction

*a For present purposes, “advanced nuclear capabilities” is understood to mean that a State has nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and/or uranium enrichment capabilities.