
Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. Canada submits the present report to further fulfil these commitments. This report updates the information provided in the reports submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee at its sessions held in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10), 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9) and 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/8 and 9) and to the Review Conference in 2015 (NPT/CONF.2015/34).

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
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Nuclear disarmament

- 1 Canada’s international security policy continues to promote a step-by-step process towards the non-proliferation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons consistent with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations and in a manner that promotes strategic stability for all.

Canada promotes this policy with its allies and partners in NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, among others.

* Reissued for technical reasons on 10 May 2017.



<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
2	<p>Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations, most notably through co-sponsorship of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17).</p> <p>Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/49, entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”, which emphasized the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.</p> <p>Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/67, entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”, which calls for the development of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures as key for ensuring compliance with disarmament obligations and building confidence between States with and without nuclear weapons.</p>
3	Not applicable
4	Not applicable
5	Not applicable
6	<p>Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work.</p> <p>In 2016, Canada supported the proposal to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material treaty.</p> <p>Canada also participated in the 2016 meetings of the Open-ended Working Group on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.</p> <p>Canada joined the consensus on the proposal by Romania in the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2090) to create a working group on the “way ahead” to advance discussions on disarmament issues in 2017, including nuclear disarmament.</p>
7	<p>Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work.</p> <p>Canada joined the consensus on the working group on the “way ahead” (CD/2090) to address multiple disarmament issues, including general nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances in 2017.</p>
8	Not applicable
9	<p>Canada supports the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at.</p> <p>Canada joined the consensus on General Assembly resolution 71/29, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”; resolution 71/26, entitled “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty”; resolution 71/65, entitled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”; and resolution 71/43, entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free status”.</p> <p>Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/51, entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas”.</p>

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
10	Not applicable
11	<p>Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 2 December 1998.</p> <p>Canada's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Implementation Act is being implemented provisionally pending the Treaty's entry into force.</p>
12	<p>Canada provides annual contributions on its efforts to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.</p>
13	<p>Canada co-hosted the eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York on 21 September 2016. The meeting produced a Joint Ministerial Statement that, inter alia, called on the remaining States listed in annex 2 of the Treaty that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.</p> <p>Canada co-sponsored and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 71/86, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".</p> <p>Canada also co-sponsored Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), which, inter alia, called for the Treaty's early entry into force and for all States to maintain voluntary moratoriums on nuclear test explosions.</p> <p>Canada continues to support the ongoing G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.</p>
14	<p>All of the 16 stations and laboratories hosted by Canada as a part of the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have been completed and certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.</p> <p>In September 2015, representatives from Natural Resources Canada participated in an airborne field test in Langenlebern, Austria, that involved the use of the airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in September 2013.</p> <p>In February 2017, Canada hosted a cold-weather airborne field test in Ottawa that also involved the use of the aforementioned equipment.</p>
15	<p>Canada has actively called for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament or in another international forum.</p> <p>Canada supported the proposal for a fissile material treaty negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament in 2016.</p> <p>In 2016, Canada also submitted a report to the United Nations Secretary-General containing views on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty as contained in A/70/81.</p> <p>At the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored resolution 71/259 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and was nominated to chair the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group in 2017-2018 to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. As part of this process, in March 2017, Canada chaired an informal consultative meeting, open to all Member States, to share views on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts.</p>
16	Not applicable

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
17	Canada continues to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that surplus fissile material no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed (applicable only to nuclear-weapon States).
18	In conformity with its legal obligations through its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as verified by regular IAEA inspections, Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
19	<p>Canada participates actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, including all four plenaries to date, and is represented in each of the three working groups. Canada also engages in the intersessional meetings of the working groups and is contributing to discussion papers on the assessment of verification requirements.</p> <p>Canada supported resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification, adopted by the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, to create in 2018-2019 a Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification.</p> <p>Canada hosted consultations with Canadian civil society on the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification on 22 February 2017.</p> <p>Canada will be providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to support the efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to serve as the secretariat of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.</p>
20	Canada co-sponsored the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working paper on transparency by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17), which included an updated reporting template to provide greater transparency about steps that have been taken to implement the 2010 action plan.
21	<p>In partnership with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, detailed comments and feedback were provided to each of the nuclear-weapon States on their Non-Proliferation Treaty implementation reports that were submitted at the 2015 Review Conference with a view to strengthening the quantity, quality and frequency of such reports.</p> <p>Canada endorses the draft reporting form of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative for all States parties to the Treaty as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon States. This form was submitted at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee as a part of working paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17.</p>
22	<p>Continuing a long-standing partnership with a Canadian non-governmental organization (The Simons Foundation), on 26 February 2016 and 9 February 2017, the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of Global Affairs Canada awarded a total of eight scholarships to postgraduate students at Canadian universities who produced research papers on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.</p> <p>Canada co-sponsored General Assembly resolution 71/57, entitled “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education”.</p> <p>On 10 April 2017, Global Affairs Canada held consultations with experts from Canadian civil society organizations to promote transparency, openness and education on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.</p>

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- 23 Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Nuclear non-proliferation

- 24 Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA has been in place since 21 February 1972.
Canada's additional protocol with IAEA has been in place since 8 September 2000.
- 25 Canada continues to urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA, which we consider is the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Within the context of IAEA, during negotiations of the resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards, Canada, in cooperation with other countries, resisted attempts to revise language that would eliminate the call for universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements.
- 26 Since 2005, IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Canada remains in peaceful purposes. This broader conclusion pursuant to Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- 27 Canada welcomes the ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides a framework to establish confidence that the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are peaceful in nature. To date, Canada has contributed \$10 million to support IAEA efforts to monitor and verify the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its predecessor, the Joint Plan of Action.

At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and 2016, Canada reiterated its condemnation of the illicit nuclear weapons development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including nuclear testing, the production of fissile material, both enriched uranium enrichment and separated plutonium, and ballistic missile testing. Canada continues to call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions, return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and to fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and 2016, Canada also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues regarding its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, particularly with regard to the Dayr al-Zawr site and other functionally-related sites identified by IAEA.
- 28 Canada's additional protocol with IAEA was signed on 24 September 1998 and entered into force on 8 September 2000.
- 29 Canada continues to support the ongoing G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the additional protocol.
- 30 Not applicable
- 31 Not applicable

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
32	Canada welcomes IAEA efforts to apply the State-level concept to all States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation necessary to increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. We look forward to the next report by the IAEA Director General, which will outline the Agency's experience in implementing updated State-level approaches.
33	Canada paid its 2017 assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full.
34	Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.
35	<p>Canada is a member of and an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement.</p> <p>On 16 March 2016, Canada submitted an updated national implementation action plan to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the only country to have submitted two plans. In 2016, Canada also updated its national point of contact information with the Committee.</p> <p>At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada co-led with Spain and the Republic of Korea a gift basket on promoting full and universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was co-sponsored by 37 States and the European Union, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United Nations.</p>
36	<p>Canada actively participated in the comprehensive review process of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). On 15 December 2016, Canada participated in the Security Council open debate on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, called for the full and universal implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and co-sponsored resolution 2325 (2016), which endorsed the comprehensive review and its recommendations.</p>
36	Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates.
37	Canada's national export control system ensures that exports of controlled goods and technology, including nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, are not authorized where the proposed export would be inconsistent with Canada's foreign and defence policy (including where there is deemed to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or to an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations).
38	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place with 48 States, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
39	Cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country, as well as their implementation of nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance and recommendations.

- 40 Canada maintains the highest level of effective physical protection at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework that integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign Governments and international organizations.
- At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced over Can\$42 million for new projects over the next two years (2016/18) through Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide. These projects include funding for bilateral projects to combat illicit trafficking, improve physical protection of nuclear facilities, promote safe management and disposal of radioactive sources and improve transportation security. The projects also include funding for international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
- Canada also made domestic commitments at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. Canada is in the process of establishing a national nuclear forensics capability with a national nuclear forensics library, which will further enhance Canada's ability to prosecute acts of nuclear terrorism and the criminal use of nuclear materials. Please see section 61 for more details on Canada's Nuclear Security Summit commitments to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium.
- An additional highlight for Canada in the implementation of previous Summit commitments was the hosting of our first IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in October 2015, for the purpose of evaluating our domestic nuclear security regime. The mission report concluded that Canada's nuclear security regime is robust, strong and sustainable.
- 41 Canada maintains strong physical protection measures for its nuclear materials, including armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.
- 42 Canada ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in December 2013 and welcomed its entry into force on 8 May 2016. Canada also supported a series of workshops aimed at promoting the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment to countries that had not yet signed up. Through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Canada is also working on enhancing legislative frameworks to help countries with the implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment (see section 44 below for more details).
- 43 Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. Canada also strongly supports efforts by IAEA to develop internationally harmonized guidance for implementing the recommendations of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in relation to the long-term management of disused radioactive sources.

- Canada provided funding to IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fourth international conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that took place in Vienna in May-June 2016.
- Canada is providing further funding to the IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fifth international conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that will take place in Vienna in June 2017.
- 44 See action 40 regarding assistance to States parties with a view to strengthening national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material.
- At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada co-sponsored a joint statement with the Republic of Korea on concrete initiatives in support of the full and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which was supported by over 30 countries, as well as the United Nations.
- Canada is an endorser of the Proliferation Security Initiative, is a member of its Operational Experts Group and is leading the Critical Capabilities and Practices Review Team in 2016-2017.
- In October, 2016, Canada successfully advocated the inclusion of text in the Declaration of Port of Spain at the twelfth Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, which committed endorsers to pursue universal implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and encourage endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- In January 2017, Canada co-organized with Slovakia and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime a workshop under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to address challenges in adopting or updating national legal frameworks for nuclear security, highlight obligations under international legal instruments against nuclear terrorism and consider practical models for implementing those obligations. The workshop brought together 88 experts from 23 partner countries and five international organizations.
- Canada also provided assistance through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to remove high activity disused sealed radioactive sources from South America; to enhance regulatory frameworks for nuclear security in African States; to strengthen nuclear security in Ukraine; to support the INTERPOL subdirectorates for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and capacity-building activities in Latin America and South-East Asia; and to strengthen border security, counter nuclear smuggling and build critical incident response capacity in Jordan.
- 45 Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in November 2013.
- 46 The technical capabilities of a country's system and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that system and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. Canada continues to work with IAEA to further develop the State-level safeguards concept.

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
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Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

- 47 Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.
- 48 See action 39.
- 49 Canada provides experts, equipment and technology to many developing States parties through technical cooperation. Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements in place with many developing countries. Cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment. Canada provided \$2.3 million to support the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) project in 2016. We also provide expertise to support technical cooperation activities and host related events in Canada.
- 50 See action 49 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation with developing countries.
- 51 See action 38 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation agreements.
- 52 In the context of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, the Board of Governors and General Conference, Canada regularly proposes initiatives to improve the governance and management of the Technical Cooperation Programme, including: greater strategic management of the Programme; encouraging IAEA member States to pay their full voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund; encouraging countries in a position to do so to contribute to funding their own technical cooperation projects through the government cost-sharing mechanism rather than drawing from the Technical Cooperation Fund; and encouraging the implementation of outcome monitoring for all technical cooperation projects.
- 53 Canada is continuing long-standing efforts to improve governance and management of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund through the IAEA policymaking organs and relevant working groups. Despite some progress in recent years, additional work remains to be done in the areas of strategic management, outcome monitoring, which countries draw on the Fund and member State payment of contributions to the Fund. Canada will continue to engage IAEA member States to push for positive changes in these areas.
- 54 See action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
- 55 Canada contributed almost \$2.5 million via the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in 2016-2017 and provided in-kind resources to Peaceful Uses Initiative projects.
- 56 Canada is an active and regular contributor of support and expertise to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada has hosted fellowship participants and scientific visitors from the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe and hosted Technical Cooperation Programme meetings in the areas of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Canadian lecturers and experts have contributed technical training in the areas of human health, agriculture and food security, water and the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
57	<p>See actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on the comprehensive safeguards agreement, the additional protocol and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.</p> <p>The Nuclear Energy Act of 1985 (amended in 1997) relates to the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Canada.</p> <p>The Nuclear Safety and Control Act came into force in May 2000, replacing the Atomic Energy Control Act. It established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission as the national regulator and set out its mandate, responsibilities and powers. These include domestically regulating the development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information.</p>
58	<p>Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium bank, welcomes the progress made to date in establishing the fuel bank and bringing it towards operation, and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.</p>
59	<p>Canada ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in December 1995.</p> <p>Canada ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in January 1990.</p> <p>Canada ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in August 2002.</p> <p>Canada ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 1998.</p> <p>See actions 42 and 45 for more information on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Canada had ratified both instruments as of December 2013.</p>
60	<p>Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to the World Institute for Nuclear Security to develop a nuclear security support centre in Mexico that will provide the Central American region with additional support in enhancing nuclear security, including through the provision of certified training.</p> <p>Canada continues to provide in-kind support to IAEA for the development of IAEA safety standards and IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Canada actively participates in the review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and presided over the most recent Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting.</p>
61	<p>Canada is making good progress on its initiatives to reduce stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), including through repatriating HEU to the United States of America, in accordance with previous Nuclear Security Summit commitments to repatriate HEU spent fuel originating from the United States in 2010 and HEU liquid in 2012.</p> <p>At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2014, leaders agreed to continue minimizing the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes, and in October 2016 Canada ceased routine production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) at the National Research Universal reactor. From November 2016 to March 2018, the reactor will remain in “hot standby” mode to produce isotopes as an “international supplier of last resort” in the event of a prolonged and unforecasted global shortage that cannot otherwise be mitigated.</p>

<i>Action</i>	<i>Steps taken to implement commitments since April 2015</i>
62	Canadian transport regulations for radioactive materials are based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.
63	Canada signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in December 2013. On 26 February 2015, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act was enacted.
64	Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA Statute.
