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**SPECIFIC GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS**

**MASS EXODUSES AND DISPLACED PERSONS**

**Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally  
displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to  
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/53**

**Addendum**

**Profiles in displacement: Angola\***

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\* The executive summary of this mission report is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself is contained in the annex to the executive summary and is being circulated in the language of submission and Spanish only.

### **Executive summary**

At the invitation of the Government, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, undertook an official mission to Angola from 31 October to 9 November 2000.

The Representative's mission should be seen in the context of other international missions to Angola, in particular that of the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, in December 1999, which drew international attention to the critical situation facing the internally displaced in Angola and raised serious concerns as to the extent to which their needs were being met by the Government and the international community. This was followed by an inter-agency mission in March 2000, led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i., Carolyn McAskie, which made a series of recommendations for improving the plight of the internally displaced, a number of which have since been taken up by the Government and the international community, such as a rapid assessment of critical needs, followed by the formulation of plans of emergency action at the national and provincial levels. As such, the Representative's mission was undertaken at a significant point in time, providing an opportunity to assess the progress which had been made in the seven months since the inter-agency mission, the extent to which the needs of the displaced were being addressed, what gaps remained and how these might be filled.

Overall, the Representative noted a number of distinct and encouraging developments in the situation of the internally displaced in terms of the national and international response to their plight. Such developments notwithstanding, it was clear that there remained a number of serious humanitarian and, in particular, protection concerns which needed to be addressed. A number of recommendations aimed at addressing these concerns are detailed in the report.

This report consists of five parts. Part I provides an overview of the displacement crisis, as reflected by the inter-agency mission of March 2000 and the subsequent rapid assessment of critical needs. It focuses on the numbers of the displaced, their conditions, including their protection needs, and the national and international response. Part II outlines the measures which have been taken since April 2000 to ameliorate the situation, focusing on the rapid assessment, the development of Plans of Emergency Action and minimum standards for the return and resettlement of displaced persons. Part III details the findings of the mission which are considered in terms of the positive effects of measures taken by the Government and the international community; ongoing humanitarian and protection concerns, the problem of landmines, and possible future scenarios with regard to the conflict. Part IV contains the conclusions and recommendations.

**Annex**

**PROFILES IN DISPLACEMENT: ANGOLA**

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## Introduction

1. Over one quarter of the population of Angola has been internally displaced by armed conflict which has persisted in a state of virtual perpetuity since independence from Portugal in 1975. Although the signing in 1991 of the Bicesse Accords was seen as marking the end of 16 years of post-independence conflict between rival political movements and their cold war sponsors, the rejection by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of the results of the 1992 Bicesse-sanctioned elections, which it lost to the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), resulted in a further two years of armed conflict during which 1.3 to 2 million Angolans fled, or were forced from, their homes, mostly to provincial centres or the capital, Luanda. While the relative stability following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 enabled some of the displaced to return to their homes, by the end of 1997 over 1 million persons could not return due to continuing insecurity in rural areas. The eventual collapse of the Lusaka Protocol and resumption of armed conflict in December 1998 has resulted in the internal displacement of a further 2.6 million persons, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons in Angola to over 3.8 million.

2. At the invitation of the Government, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, undertook an official mission to Angola from 31 October to 9 November 2000. With the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2) as a point of reference, the objectives of the mission were to study the situation of internal displacement in the country and to undertake a dialogue with the Government, international agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other relevant actors with a view to ensuring effective responses to the current conditions of the internally displaced.

3. During the mission, the Representative engaged in constructive and candid dialogue with the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Defence, the Minister for Planning, the Vice-Minister for Justice, the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Attorney-General, the Minister and Vice-Minister for Social Assistance and Reintegration, and the Minister for Health. He also met with the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Angola, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, representatives of United Nations and other international humanitarian, human rights and development agencies, the diplomatic and donor community and civil society, including representatives of church groups. The programme included visits to the provinces of Moxico, Huambo, Bié, as well as to settlements of displaced persons in Viana, located outside the capital Luanda, and other settlements on the outskirts of Luanda. In the course of the visits to the provinces, meetings were held with provincial and municipal authorities, international agencies and NGOs, representatives of civil society and internally displaced persons themselves. The Representative was accompanied throughout the mission by Mr. Sivanka Dhanapala, who represents the mandate in New York, and Mr. Simon Bagshaw, research assistant to the Representative, based in Geneva.

4. The Representative's mission should be seen in the context of other international missions to Angola, in particular that of the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, in December 1999, which drew international attention to the critical situation facing the internally displaced in Angola and raised serious concerns as to the extent to which their needs were being met by the Government and the international community. This was

followed by an inter-agency mission in March 2000, led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i., Carolyn McAskie, which made a series of recommendations for improving the plight of the internally displaced, a number of which have since been taken up by the Government and the international community, such as a rapid assessment of critical needs, followed by the formulation of plans of emergency action at the national and provincial levels. As such, the Representative's mission was undertaken at a significant point in time, providing an opportunity to assess the progress which had been made in the seven months since the inter-agency mission, the extent to which the needs of the displaced were being addressed, what gaps remained and how these might be filled.

5. Overall, the Representative noted a number of distinct and encouraging developments in the situation of the internally displaced in terms of the national and international response to their plight. Such developments notwithstanding, it was clear that there remained a number of serious humanitarian and, in particular, protection concerns which needed to be addressed.

6. This report consists of five parts. Part I provides an overview of the displacement crisis, as reflected by the inter-agency mission of March 2000 and the subsequent rapid assessment of critical needs. It focuses on the numbers of the displaced, their conditions, including their protection needs, and the national and international response. Part II outlines the measures which have been taken since April 2000 to ameliorate the situation, focusing on the rapid assessment, the development of plans of emergency action and minimum standards for the return and resettlement of displaced persons. Part III details the findings of the mission, which are considered in terms of the positive effects of measures taken by the Government and the international community; ongoing humanitarian and protection concerns, the problem of landmines, and possible future scenarios with regard to the conflict. Part IV contains the conclusions and recommendations.

## **I. OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS**

7. "With inadequate financial aid from the donor community", declared Ambassador Holbrooke in March 2000, "the international assistance network in Angola is ill-organized and unable to provide adequate support [to the internally displaced]. There is no clear lead-agency with overall responsibility for every aspect of this complicated problem, particularly regarding protection, and there is inadequate coordination. And there are real consequences: innocent people, without support, are left as the debris of conflict and government neglect."<sup>1</sup> This and earlier statements became the focal point of inter-agency and broader United Nations discussions on Angola and international coordination arrangements more generally. Indeed, it was in the context of these discussions that the Secretary-General requested the Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i. to lead an inter-agency mission to Angola, "where situations of internal displacement are particularly widespread and complex".

### **A. Magnitude of the displacement crisis**

8. Out of a total population of around 12 million, there are an estimated 3.8 million internally displaced persons, of whom 2.6 million have become displaced since January 1998.<sup>2</sup> The displaced are dispersed throughout all 18 provinces of this vast country of over 1.2 million square kilometres, with the largest concentrations of the displaced found in the provinces of Malanje (131,931), Huambo (126,566), Huila (125,309) and Bié (123,041).

9. Of those 2.6 million displaced since January 1998, approximately 1.1 million have been registered by humanitarian agencies and therefore receive some form of humanitarian assistance. Of these, 393,000 are currently living in camps and transit centres where they depend on international assistance in order to survive. Approximately 187,000 are resettled temporarily in peri-urban areas and receive assistance aimed at helping them achieve self-sufficiency. The remaining 520,000 are integrated into urban or peri-urban areas and for the most part receive some form of assistance. The additional 1 million displaced persons are integrated with resident populations in Luanda and other provincial capitals.

10. Between January and November 2000, an estimated 338,000 persons became displaced, a large number of whom have not been registered by the Government nor verified by international agencies or NGOs and are therefore not receiving humanitarian assistance. In addition, an estimated 525,000 people are believed to be displaced in areas inaccessible to international agencies. It should be noted that, while the Government claims to have control of over 92 per cent of the country, in many cases this means that either the police or military have control of the provincial capitals and major towns and their environs only, but not the rural areas from which most of the displaced originate. During 2001, United Nations agencies estimate that a further 100,000 people will be displaced from insecure areas.

11. The different waves of displacement in Angola have resulted in the categorization of the displaced into the "very old" displaced - those displaced during the post-independence (1975-1991) and post-election (1992-1994) wars; the "old" or "long-term" displaced - those displaced after the signing and gradual demise of the Lusaka Protocol between 1994 and 1997; and finally, the "new" displaced - those displaced after January 1998 with the continued demise and eventual collapse of the Lusaka Protocol in December 1998. These categories have implications for the humanitarian response. Generally, the "very old" and "old" displaced are excluded from assistance since they are considered to have integrated into their new communities and to have established coping mechanisms and thus are no longer considered vulnerable.

12. While recognizing that the internally displaced have specific needs, the inter-agency mission of March 2000 noted that the situation of the internally displaced cannot be analysed in isolation from the plight of other war-affected populations: "Internal displacement in Angola takes place within a context of war, compounded by limited national capacities and structural weaknesses ... exacerbated by the collapse of basic services, whereby [internally displaced persons] and residents compete for the same dwindling resources."<sup>3</sup> The 2001 Inter-agency Consolidated Appeal for Angola (CAP) notes that populations hosting internally displaced persons are becoming seriously affected as newcomers compete for diminishing resources and pressure increases on infrastructures already weakened by 25 years of war. Displaced persons living within resident communities are usually hosted by members of the same kinship network. However, with a majority of the entire population living either at or below the poverty line, resources in most households are limited and can be stretched very little before further hardship is created. International agencies estimate that during the past eight years the majority of host households have become destitute. Although international assistance is provided to the registered internally displaced, most host families do not qualify for aid and are, therefore, cut off from services that would help sustain their households.

13. Although the Representative was primarily examining the situation of the internally displaced, he emphasized during the mission that the internally displaced, while possessing very specific needs, were not to be regarded in isolation but as a microcosm of the population at large. The Representative noted that Angolan society had been torn apart by decades of war and there was a need to reactivate communities. Indeed, attention must be paid also to host communities whose hospitality might easily wear thin as a result of the burden of hosting the displaced.

### **B. Conditions of the displaced**

14. The inter-agency mission bore witness to the dramatic conditions in which some of the displaced were living, observing “extreme levels of deprivation” and “inhumane shelter conditions”. The mission noted that the protection needs of the displaced “go largely unaddressed”, in part because of the limited international capacity to monitor, report and follow-up on violations. The mission reported problems of access to the displaced and war-affected population in UNITA-held areas which prevents the provision of life-sustaining assistance and protection to these groups. It also affects the ability of the humanitarian community to provide assistance in an impartial and neutral manner. As assistance is provided in government-held areas only, humanitarian personnel are viewed as aligned with the Government and, therefore, as potential targets.

15. On the basis of recommendations made by the inter-agency mission, a rapid assessment of critical needs was undertaken at the beginning of April in 31 accessible locations in 10 provinces, the findings of which provide a useful overview of the conditions of the displaced at that time.<sup>4</sup>

16. Overall, large numbers of displaced people were found to be suffering acute distress, either because they were living in a poorly managed transit centre, were newly displaced and had no resources or because their resources had been depleted. Some of the most distressed populations were newly displaced persons in Cuito Cuanavale, Menongue and Chipipa. Other highly distressed populations were found in Longonjo and Ukuma, which only became accessible to humanitarian agencies in the month of the assessment. However, displaced populations had arrived in these areas more than a year before and the absence of humanitarian support had inhibited their coping mechanisms, resulting in constant deterioration of their situation.

17. Elsewhere, throughout the country, large numbers of displaced persons were coping, though their survival mechanisms were over-stretched. In many communities, the displaced, particularly those who fled during earlier periods of conflict, had integrated, though acute distress was found among some segments of the long-term displaced, particularly the elderly, widows, separated children and the handicapped. The needs of the weakest members of displaced communities were not being met and these groups were considered to be on the “brink of disaster”.

18. With few exceptions, those displaced in areas to which humanitarian agencies had continued access benefited from food assistance. The exceptions included areas that had only recently come under government administration, for example Maquela do Zombo, and areas where ongoing insecurity hampered regular access, for example, Caluquembe and Caiundo.

19. The assessment confirmed that the health system in Angola was unable to meet the needs of at-risk populations, including the displaced. None of the hospitals visited during the assessment had

sufficient essential medicines. All were found to be understaffed, underfunded and in need of basic equipment. Throughout the country, there were shortages of both general and trained medical personnel and in several locations staff had not received salaries for a number of months. The conditions of hospitals and health posts varied. In some cases, buildings were adequate, while in others, roofs were in need of repair. More than 50 per cent of the buildings lacked a regular supply of potable water and many had inadequate sanitary facilities.

20. Malaria, diarrhoea, tuberculosis and upper respiratory track infections were reported in the majority of locations visited. Measles and polio were reported in a few locations. Other diseases include meningitis and sleeping sickness. Suspected cases of HIV have been recorded, though it is suggested that this disease is significantly underreported. Tuberculosis and diarrhoea were prevalent in transit centres where severe overcrowding, appalling sanitation and extreme destitution had put the displaced at acute risk of infection. Skin diseases were also widespread.

21. Vaccinations were incomplete in many locations. Large numbers of children under five had received only one dose of a multi-dose vaccine or none at all. Coverage for children over five was even more limited. In all locations visited, delivery practices were rudimentary. Although problems with birthing are common, there were virtually no delivery or post-delivery facilities in either hospitals or health posts.

22. In some areas with a high concentration of mine victims, for example Andulo, Negage and Maquela do Zombo, the medical services were found to be inadequate. There were no appropriate evacuation methods and local health facilities lacked the necessary blood and surgical equipment to treat mine victims. Prostheses are available at only five centres in the country.

23. Newly displaced populations were particularly affected by critical shortages of non-food items. In insecure areas, for example Cuando Cubango, the displaced were arriving in relatively safer parts with few, or no possessions. In none of the locations receiving new arrivals were adequate contingency stocks of non-food items available. Populations displaced either in 1999 or at earlier stages of the conflict were found to require basic survival items, including blankets, soap, buckets, plastic sheeting, kitchen sets and clothing. Tens of thousands of displaced families were urgently in need of these items throughout the country.

24. Displaced persons residing in poorly managed transit centres and camps were facing acute shelter needs. In the worst transit centres, thousands of displaced persons were crowded together in abandoned, poorly ventilated, roofless warehouses with no access to water and sanitary systems. In virtually all of the locations visited, the displaced were in need of appropriate materials to construct adequate shelters. In many camps, the displaced were living in damaged and poorly ventilated tents or in shelters made out of cardboard scraps, torn fabric and other inadequate materials.

25. In the majority of the locations, displaced persons lacked land and agricultural inputs and were thus unable to even attempt to become self-reliant. In some locations where the displaced had received land, for example Malanje, the amount was less than the half hectare considered by United Nations agencies - and reflected in the norms on resettlement - to represent the minimum amount on which a family can be expected to provide for itself. In other cases, the land which had been provided was unproductive. In 20 of the locations, displaced populations had received no land

from the provincial authorities. In any event, most of the displaced lacked adequate seeds or tools for the forthcoming planting seasons, having consumed many of the seeds distributed during 1999 because they were delivered late or because of food insecurity. Most of the displaced who were able to farm achieved low yields owing to poor quality soil. It was a matter of particular concern that displaced populations who had not received land were reportedly forced to work on latifundios (estates) where they received no wages and had only limited access to extremely small plots of land.

26. The majority of the displaced lacked access to potable water. Water distribution points were few or non-existent in most camps and transit centres. In areas where water supplies were an acute problem, for example, Huambo and Negage, high levels of morbidity were found among the displaced. In these and other areas, such as Caala and Luena, construction or rehabilitation of water systems was likely to be problematic owing to poor roads, damaged air strips, insecurity and landmines. Sanitation systems in the majority of sites were unacceptable, especially in the transit centres. In camps and settlements, latrines were limited or non-existent.

### C. Protection

27. The rapid assessment confirmed that protection problems are widespread in Angola, though it should be noted that the lack of access to areas affected by persistent insecurity prevents agencies from gaining a complete picture of the difficulties faced by displaced populations.

28. While possibly outside the remit of the rapid assessment, it is important to note, as did the inter-agency mission, that the responsibility for displacement falls on both the government Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and UNITA. The Government and the FAA are reported to displace forcibly the civilian population as a counter-insurgency strategy or as a short-term security measure to protect civilians. Other reports indicate that indiscriminate shelling by the FAA<sup>5</sup> and the circulation of false information have resulted in the displacement of civilians. Allegations of similar practices have been levied against UNITA.<sup>6</sup> There are also reports that UNITA forcibly displaces civilians to Government-controlled areas in order to increase pressure on government resources.<sup>7</sup>

29. The rapid assessment found that the most widely observed protection problems concerned the delivery of humanitarian assistance and freedom of movement.<sup>8</sup> In certain areas, the displaced were forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists or were expected to hand over a portion of their assistance to such authorities. Theft of food and non-food items by combatants was common, particularly in areas where troops were not regularly paid. Other reports suggest that extortion and theft by government forces had on occasion involved or resulted in forced displacement.<sup>9</sup> Harassment by armed troops appeared to be targeted towards populations from areas formerly under UNITA control, for example Andulo, Bailundo and Malanje. There were reports that displaced persons who had ventured past the security perimeters of towns to collect food or firewood had been beaten and robbed by armed UNITA groups or bandits, or had fallen victim to landmines. There were also reports of forced recruitment of displaced persons, including of children, by both sides.<sup>10</sup>

30. The assessment found that internally displaced women, particularly those living near military encampments were subject to sexual harassment and some had been forced into prostitution in order to procure basic necessities. There were also reports of women and girls being abducted from camps

for the displaced by UNITA. In addition, there are large numbers of unaccompanied and orphaned children among the displaced. The assessment notes that although many of these children have been integrated into kinship networks or community structures, many of their needs are not met. Unaccompanied children are vulnerable to forced recruitment and abuse. Furthermore, the poverty, disease, domestic violence and child abuse associated with displacement prompt many children to leave their homes voluntarily. In so doing, they become increasingly vulnerable to disease and abuse.<sup>11</sup>

31. The assessment found that displaced populations had been prevented from entering the provincial capitals of Huambo, Malanje and Kuito and, in several cases, were involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities. In Cambondo, approximately 800 displaced persons were transferred in January to a site near a local military camp and in Luena, local authorities had established a resettlement site in an area with mines. Similar concerns were noted by the inter-agency mission of March, which reported that in various instances the Government had forcibly relocated displaced populations, usually to areas outside the national or provincial capital security perimeter. In most cases, such movements were implemented without planning or coordination and imposed on both the displaced and the humanitarian community, resulting in human suffering. The Government justified these moves by the need to free up the facilities where the displaced had settled, i.e., factories or military camps. However, the relocation is regarded by many as part of the Government's attempt to consolidate its presence and control in newly liberated areas. The inter-agency mission was informed of cases of forced return where the Government had "strongly encouraged" the displaced population to regain their areas of origin, without ensuring adequate safety and living conditions. In some cases, the areas of return were attacked and the displaced forced to flee once more.

#### **D. Security, access and constraints on humanitarian operations**

32. The rapid assessment confirmed that the humanitarian agencies had access only to populations living in government areas. The conditions of the displaced and war-affected populations in UNITA-held areas were unknown, but were assumed to be problematic based on the status of people recently displaced from those areas and of people residing in areas newly under government control. Even in government-controlled areas access to some parts remained problematic owing to ongoing insecurity and the presence of landmines.

33. As a result of the general situation of insecurity throughout the country, humanitarian operations were logistically dependent on air support. However, many airstrips were reported to be badly damaged as a result of overuse and poor maintenance, in particular in Kuito. Also, the air support network provided by the World Food Programme (WFP), on which humanitarian agencies rely heavily, was close to full capacity. Repeated requests to increase the number of aircraft had been denied. It was noted that further expansion of humanitarian operations to meet the needs identified during the assessment would be difficult to accommodate using the existing network.

34. Humanitarian operations are of course dependent upon donor support. The assessment noted that in certain priority areas with acute needs, for example Cuando Cubango, lack of funding from donors had forced agencies to close programmes. Further expansion of humanitarian operations to meet the needs identified during the assessment would require increased donor support. In this

regard, substantial contributions to the Emergency Relief Fund of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which supports the programmes of NGOs and United Nations agencies with grants, are urgently required.

### **E. National and international response**

35. As emphasized in the Guiding Principles, the primary responsibility for meeting the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced rests with the national authorities (Principle 3). In Angola, however, the Government's attitude to the displaced has, in the past, been described as one of neglect: "The Government does very little for those people under its control, and most of the time it asks very little of them. They are left alone to sink or swim without the benefit of any social safety net ... Government structures such as MINARS [Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration], and the Ministries of Health and Education exist, but are so chronically underfunded as to be almost entirely ineffectual." However, "most Angolans have tended to prefer this form of neglect to UNITA's form of draconian social control".<sup>12</sup> Such an assessment gives particular cause for concern when one considers Angola's endowments of natural resources, in particular its oil reserves. Angola is the second largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, with the oil sector accounting for an estimated 53 per cent of gross domestic product between 1994 and 1998, and around 95 per cent of export receipts. In 1997, Angola exported crude oil to the value of over US\$ 4 billion.<sup>13</sup>

36. MINARS is the principal government coordinating body and chairs, together with the Humanitarian Coordinator, the Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG), comprising also the Ministries of Health (MINSa), Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) and Education (MINED), as well as heads of United Nations agencies and donors. The HCG was established in February 1995 to monitor the overall humanitarian programme in Angola, to define policies for effective implementation of humanitarian activities and to provide timely solutions to problems arising therein. In addition to the HCG, there are four technical sub-groups, including a Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees, chaired by MINARS and composed of United Nations agencies and NGOs. The Sub-Group was established to improve coordination of the tracking of internally displaced persons and assistance provided to them. The HCG and Sub-Group structure is reflected at the provincial level.

37. In July 1999, in a belated governmental effort to address the humanitarian situation, the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was established, comprising MINARS, MINADER, MINSa and also the Ministries of Planning, Territorial Administration, and Commerce. In October 2000, the Commission launched a US\$ 55 million National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) to be implemented in two phases. During the first phase (August 1999-March 2000), emergency assistance was to be provided to "at-risk populations" in the provinces of Bengo, Malanje, Moxico, Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Uige and Luan. The second phase (April 2000-January 2001) was to focus on resettlement in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Kwanza Norte and Huila.

38. At the international level, the United Nations Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Angola (UCAH) (as it was known until March 2000 after which it became part of OCHA) is the main coordinating body for humanitarian assistance. It operates at the national and

provincial levels with a number of field advisers in the provinces. UCAH was initially established in 1993 as a temporary mechanism. Its mandate was repeatedly extended as a result of the prolongation of the emergency situation and also the limited capacity of MINARS to take charge of coordination responsibilities.

39. According to one report, a major impediment to coordination in Angola has been the minor role central government institutions have played in the coordination of humanitarian assistance.<sup>14</sup> While MINARS should in principle have led the coordination process in conjunction with UCAH, in practice the Government tended to rely on the international community for relief assistance and consequently UCAH assumed the lead coordinating role. At the same time, it was reported that MINARS opposed the lead role of UCAH, partly because it was deliberately established outside government institutions in order to remain neutral and thus be able to dialogue with UNITA on humanitarian issues. A review of United Nations strategic coordination, undertaken in November 1999, found that, at the national level, the HCG “has never been firmly established, has met only irregularly, and some of its sub-groups have not met at all”.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, recommendations emanating from the HCG have not been followed up by concrete measures on the ground; and competition between different government ministries and a lack of clear agreement on the role of UCAH has prevented coherent coordination by the co-chairs of the HCG. Overall, the HCG “has proven ineffective”.

40. Coordination problems between the Government and United Nations agencies have been further compounded by problems of coordination and leadership on the part of United Nations agencies themselves. According to the review of strategic coordination, agencies readily conceded that they were not fulfilling their lead roles in their respective sectors of competence and mandate. This resulted in NGO implementing partners undertaking assistance activities on the basis of a range of diverse standards and without strategic guidance from the United Nations, in particular in the nutrition, food security and health sectors. NGO representatives, both in Luanda and in the field, reportedly insisted on the need for guidance from the United Nations on cross-sectoral issues. In the absence of clear and concrete guidelines provided by the United Nations, it was noted that instances would increase of NGOs being drawn into activities that violate humanitarian standards, such as the concentration of displaced persons in transit centres under unacceptable conditions, and the resettlement of displaced persons without their consent and with inadequate preparation. Part of the problem in this regard was the lack of sufficient numbers of United Nations personnel on the ground, making it difficult for agencies to ensure adequate information gathering and monitoring and to establish effective and coherent United Nations leadership in the field.

41. The inter-agency mission of March 2000 recognized a need to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian activities within the United Nations, as well as with other organizations and the Government. The mission recommended that coordination mechanisms be established and/or strengthened in order to discharge coordination functions effectively at the national and provincial levels. Noting the existence of the national and provincial HCGs and Sub-Groups on Displaced Persons and Refugees, the mission recommended that United Nations agencies and other participating organizations “commit to dynamic participation” in these bodies as a way to engage the Government in the humanitarian response.

## **II. MEASURES TAKEN TO AMELIORATE THE SITUATION**

42. While acknowledging the “serious efforts” undertaken by the humanitarian community to address the needs of the displaced and war-affected populations in Angola, the inter-agency mission noted that serious gaps existed in the planning, delivery and monitoring of the humanitarian response, which, in turn, were compounded by objective constraints such as the nature of the crisis, the vast territory and the lack of safe and unhindered access to affected populations. In order to address these gaps and enhance the humanitarian response, the inter-agency mission recommended, *inter alia*, that an OCHA-led rapid assessment of critical needs be undertaken in accessible areas throughout the country to promote the execution of an immediate focused response, on the basis of existing capacity.

### **A. Rapid assessment of critical needs**

43. For populations in acute distress, the rapid assessment recommended that very specific emergency interventions be taken immediately so as to bring the affected groups “back from the brink of disaster”. For populations whose coping mechanisms are stretched, the assessment recommended emergency interventions aimed at stabilizing their conditions and preventing further deterioration. In addition, the assessment compiled a list of 17 overriding recommendations for interventions in regard to agriculture and food security, health and nutrition, resettlement and shelter, water and sanitation, mine action, protection and education, and facilitation of humanitarian assistance.

### **B. Plans of emergency action**

44. Following the rapid assessment, a technical working group composed of seven ministries and departments, United Nations agencies and NGOs was formed in May under the leadership of MINARS to develop a national plan of emergency action, which was finalized in July 2000. The purpose of the plan was to agree on the concrete actions that would be taken to implement the 17 recommendations of the rapid assessment.

45. The national Plan formed the basis for provincial Plans of Emergency Action, developed in September following a provincial planning workshop, convened by the Technical Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) - a department within MINARS - and which brought over 90 government delegates and representatives of United Nations agencies and NGOs from all 18 provinces to Luanda for training in emergency planning. The provincial Plans of Emergency Action outline steps for each sector in accordance with humanitarian needs and local circumstances. The priorities outlined in the provincial plans have been used in developing sectoral strategies and projects for the 2001 CAP. The provincial plans will also act as a conduit for government funds provided under the National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance.

### **C. Minimum Operational Standards for Resettlement**

46. Among the 17 recommendations of the rapid assessment was the need for agreement between international agencies and the Government on minimum operational standards for the

resettlement of displaced persons to ensure that relocation was undertaken in an appropriate manner which fully respected their rights and dignity, which had not always been the case in the past. To this end, MINARS, in cooperation with OCHA, drafted minimum operational standards (MINOPS), based on the relevant provisions of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The draft standards were discussed by United Nations agencies, NGOs, donors and government representatives and were formally adopted by the Council of Ministers in mid-October 2000 as norms on the resettlement of internally displaced persons.

47. Pursuant to the norms, responsibility for resettlement and return is invested in provincial governments, which will oversee the process through the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group (PHCG) and the reactivated Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees. The norms specify preconditions for resettlement and targets for post-relocation assistance and as such address issues concerning the identification of resettlement sites, including the participation of the displaced community therein; and the security of sites, in terms of being verified as mine free, responsibility for which rests with the National Institute for the Removal of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (INAROOE), and verified by the relevant defence and security organs as secure. The norms also provide for the voluntary nature of the resettlement process, involving all interested parties and beneficiaries in the planning and management of the relocation. State administration must be extended to resettlement or return sites, and health and education personnel will be supported, including through the provision of appropriate medical and teaching supplies, by the relevant government ministries. The authorities will work with humanitarian agencies to ensure the availability of water points in sufficient quantity and quality and to provide adequate sanitation. The displaced will be provided with seeds and tools and with food rations for a period to be determined. Preparation of resettlement sites will be supported through food-for-work projects. Finally, the PHCG will carry out regular assessments of the resettlement process.

### **III. THE MISSION AND ITS FINDINGS**

48. Overall, the Representative found a definite improvement in the situation of the internally displaced in terms of the national and international response to their plight. At the same time, it was apparent that a number of serious ongoing humanitarian and, in particular, protection concerns needed to be addressed.

#### **A. Positive results of the post-April response**

49. The rapid assessment appears to have been something of a watershed for facilitating a more coordinated response to the displacement crisis in Angola. The assessment itself was coordinated under the leadership of the Government and the Humanitarian Coordinator and conducted by 14 joint government, United Nations and NGO teams. The resulting Plan of Action is said by the Government to signal its intention to channel more resources into humanitarian assistance and to play a leading role in coordination. Under the provincial Plans of Emergency Action, provincial governors are to assign sectoral responsibility. It is to be hoped that improved coordination will be facilitated by the reactivation of the Sub-Group on Refugees and Displaced Persons, which, as indicated, has been assigned a key role in the implementation of the norms on resettlement.

50. The norms themselves are a particularly welcome and timely development in view of the Government's increasing emphasis on the resettlement of displaced populations, though problems persist, as discussed below. With the onset of the dry season in April 2000, the Government proposed wide-scale resettlement of displaced populations. The Ministry of Territorial Administration requested provincial governments in Bengo, Huila, Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Malanje, Moxico, Bié, Lunda Sul and Luanda to develop plans for the temporary resettlement and return of displaced populations. In some provinces, however, the sites proposed for resettlement were located outside security perimeters or next to minefields. In addition, international agencies and organizations were excluded from the planning process in many provinces and there were concerns that displaced populations were being used by the Government as part of its political and military strategy.

51. The development of the norms was a fundamental component of a more appropriate response, to respect the safety and dignity of the displaced. Even before their formal adoption by the Council of Ministers in October 2000, the draft minimum standards were reportedly used as the de facto frame of reference by government officials and humanitarian organizations at the provincial level. They were also widely used in the preparation of the provincial Plans of Emergency Action in September. During 2001, the Government plans to relocate large numbers of displaced persons on the basis of the new norms. Estimates of the numbers involved range from 500,000 to up to 1 million. Whatever the eventual figure, effective implementation of the norms on resettlement, and monitoring, will be key to the whole process.

52. In this connection, the Representative strongly supports the suggestion of OCHA that the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies and NGOs, develop standard operating procedures in regard to the technical aspects of resettlement, so as to ensure uniform implementation of the norms throughout the country. The draft MINOPS contained quite specific technical provisions concerning, for example, the maximum number of displaced persons to be served by a given water point, health post and the like. Apparently, as a result of formal drafting requirements, such technical details were eliminated from the norms as adopted by the Council of Ministers. However, pursuant to article 2 of the decree by which the norms were adopted, doubts and omissions resulting from the interpretation and enforcement of the norms are to be resolved through ministerial proclamations issued by MINARS. Within the context of this provision, MINARS is encouraged, in cooperation with international agencies, to draft operating procedures reflecting the technical aspects provided for in the draft MINOPS. It would also be useful if article 2 of the decree could be resorted to in the event of conflicting security assessments of specific sites by the authorities and humanitarian organizations. In this connection, it is regrettable that the norms provide only that humanitarian organizations "may" rather than "shall" be invited to assess security conditions at resettlement sites.

53. Possibly the most visible result of the efforts taken to ameliorate the situation of the internally displaced was the closure of 22 of the infamous transit centres in Huambo, Uige, Zaire and Cuando Cubango provinces and the relocation of the residents to improved sites with access to agricultural land. The process, however, raised various concerns. In some areas, such as Huambo and Huila, provincial governments took unilateral steps without notifying

United Nations agencies, NGOs or the displaced, resulting in problems during the relocation and at the resettlement sites, where inadequate preparations resulted in the displaced being without shelter, sanitation or water.

54. According to the United Nations, problems in closing remaining centres revolve around the need to ensure that resettlement is undertaken on the basis of the norms and the availability of land. In a number of locations, the absence of land within security perimeters has prompted some provincial governors to consider resettlement options outside the security perimeters where agricultural land is available. The Representative stresses the fundamental need to ensure the safety and security of the displaced and that, to the extent that resettlement is essential, it must be undertaken within security perimeters and in full accordance with the norms on resettlement.

55. According to the 2001 CAP, the most notable success during 2000 was achieved in the food sector, with around 10 per cent of the population, the majority of whom were internally displaced persons, receiving food assistance from humanitarian organizations. As a direct result of this assistance, hunger was significantly reduced and hundreds of thousands of lives were saved among people who had no other access to food. Also, high rates of severe and moderate malnutrition among the displaced and other war-affected groups were significantly reduced as a result of coordinated interventions, good harvests and improved access to markets and land. In this connection, a nationwide agricultural campaign was launched by international and national NGOs under the leadership of MINADER and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Approximately 368,000 families were scheduled to receive seeds and tools and some 175,000 to benefit from land redistributions.

56. Significant efforts have also been undertaken to eradicate polio and childhood diseases. The Government and humanitarian agencies worked together to reach an estimated 3 million children from displaced and resident populations during three rounds of national immunization days. These days were restricted to government controlled territory only and in this regard the Representative suggests that the Government consider the possibility of allowing international agencies to extend vaccination coverage to UNITA-held areas, assuming that adequate security guarantees can be obtained. The Government also launched a roll back malaria campaign in an attempt to reduce the incidence of this disease.

## **B. Ongoing humanitarian concerns**

57. While a number of positive measures have been taken to improve the humanitarian response and the situation of the displaced, the Representative's visits to the field revealed that coordination often is not effective on the ground and that the prevailing climate of insecurity, characterized by armed attacks on civilians, acts of banditry, and the extensive presence and continued use of landmines, further constrain humanitarian action, which for all intents and purposes is limited to provincial capitals and certain towns.

58. Although the view was expressed by a senior government official and a representative of the donor community that humanitarian organizations should take more risks in order to increase their access to those in need, this is not a view with which the Representative concurs. Rather, given the problems of access in insecure areas, the Representative recommends that international

agencies and NGOs cooperate more fully with church groups and national and local NGOs which are able to operate in insecure areas and which have access to the displaced. It should be noted that the 2001 CAP acknowledges that resources should be channelled to national groups capable of reaching populations which are otherwise inaccessible to the international agencies and NGOs. During a meeting with local NGOs and church groups, the Representative was informed of their willingness to assume a greater role in the humanitarian response, with the support of the international community.

59. At the time of the Representative's mission and in the light of the extension of State administration throughout the country, United Nations agencies had identified 51 sites for future assessment. The majority of these sites have small security perimeters, limiting free movement, trade, agriculture and resettlement options. Logistical and security constraints in these areas are expected to limit operations to 20 per cent of the assessed sites.

60. Humanitarian access and assistance are also severely constrained by logistical problems. Although, during the course of 2000, six major road corridors were opened, elsewhere throughout the country much of the infrastructure is destroyed or in a state of disrepair and road access is severely limited by insecurity. In addition, UNITA has been deliberately destroying bridges and targeting main surface routes with landmines.

61. In the absence of effective surface routes, there is a continued reliance on air transport for humanitarian personnel and assistance, as currently provided by WFP. Although the Government waives airport charges and provides subsidized fuel for WFP aircraft, as well as those of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), air transportation remains expensive and limited in capacity. As noted earlier, the Representative was informed that requests for additional aircraft have been made in the 2001 CAP, though such requests have been denied in the past.

62. An additional problem is that airstrips in places such as Kuito, which is almost entirely dependent on air support, remain in urgent need of repair. The rapid assessment recommended the immediate repair of the airstrip at Kuito but, at the time of the Representative's visit, it was quite apparent that no repair work had been undertaken. The responsibility for such work rests with the Ministry of Public Works, which, at the time of the Representative's mission, had failed to release the necessary funds. Indeed, there were concerns that it might be too late as it was critical that repair work be undertaken before the onset of the rainy season in November.

63. Humanitarian operations in Angola are also constrained by reductions in donor support. The Representative was informed that owing to the protracted security situation throughout the country and in order to discourage the Government's reliance on the international community to provide the bulk of the assistance to the displaced, donor countries were reducing funding for humanitarian operations. The 2000 CAP included 29 projects totalling US\$ 258,515,854. In June 2000, during the preparation of the mid-term review of the CAP, agencies agreed to streamline their funding requests, resulting in 14 projects being dropped and a revised total for the mid-term review of US\$ 148,993,632. At the time of the Representative's mission, approximately 50 per cent of these revised requirements had been funded. Three of the 15 projects in the mid-term review received no funding. Projects relating to security,

coordination and support services received 70.4 per cent of requirements. Projects addressing nutrition, health, water, sanitation, relief, survival and resettlement received 39 per cent; and education and protection remained the most underfunded sectors, with only 37 per cent of requirements met.

64. Because of insufficient funding for food aid programmes, WFP has been forced to reduce the number of beneficiaries receiving direct food assistance, some of the potential consequences of which are discussed below. Insufficient funding for the OCHA Emergency Relief Fund has inhibited the Organization's capacity to support implementing partners in meeting the acute emergency needs identified in the rapid assessment; and lack of adequate funding threatened the UNICEF supply pipeline for vaccines and hampered the extension of its mother and child health-care services and its roll back malaria campaign. With regard to the latter, it should be noted that malaria is the leading cause of child mortality in Angola.

65. Yet, the donors' desire to reduce the Government's reliance on the international community is understandable. The Government has in the past, and for reasons related to the collapse of consecutive peace agreements, tended to consider the responsibility of providing assistance to its displaced and war-affected population as resting with the United Nations. It has since shown an increased commitment to emergency assistance, starting with the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation in July 1999 and the elaboration by that Commission of the National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. However, the inter-agency mission of March 2000 noted that the scale and scope of assistance delivered under the National Programme was yet to be clearly determined. More recent sources indicate that the US\$ 55 million allocated under the first phase of the National Programme was not spent and that in excess of US\$ 34 million remains, though only US\$ 17 million of this was rolled into the budget for 2000, making overall expenditure less than originally claimed.

66. Donors are said to feel strongly that the international community should not be expected to provide unlimited assistance and that the Government must assume greater responsibility by reallocating funds towards the social and emergency sectors. Such a view is increasingly convincing given high oil prices, from which the Government gains a substantial proportion of its revenues. Also, the changing military situation in the country, with a move away from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency strategies, should allow for reduced military spending and the redirection of funds to the humanitarian effort - though the Representative was informed by one senior government official that funds freed by any reductions in military spending would be used to expedite payments on debts accrued through government investment in the oil industry. The need to repay such debts notwithstanding, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on its part may prompt a similar response from donors.

67. Another aspect of the funding situation which should be considered is the tendency of some donors to fund projects in certain provinces and not others, resulting in disparities in humanitarian programming. For example, there appears to be a preference on the part of donors to fund programmes in the provinces of Huambo and Bié. The reasoning behind this was not

entirely clear, although some suggested that donors favour activities in areas where the security situation is relatively stable and programmes will have a chance of succeeding. Others argued that it may reflect broader political motives - an effort to win the hearts and minds of the population in areas that were formerly UNITA strongholds. Irrespective of the reasoning, the problem inherent in this approach is that the acute needs of displaced populations in areas which are accessible to humanitarian agencies, such as in the provinces of Moxico and Lunda Sul, where immediate humanitarian needs are extensive, are not addressed in a comprehensive manner.

68. For example, during a visit to Luena, in Moxico province, the Representative was informed that due to lack of funding there were insufficient NGOs working in the area despite the complexity of the humanitarian situation and the number of displaced and war-affected persons. There was no water supply system in Luena and no plans to install one. There was at the time of the visit a serious shortage of non-food items in the province, thus limiting the assistance which could be offered to newly arrived displaced persons. There was a serious lack of adequate shelter due to limited building materials and the presence of minefields. In this connection, the Representative noted the urgent need to reinforce demining activities in the city and its outskirts to create space for resettlement and agricultural activities. Despite all these pressing needs, however, the Representative was informed that there were inadequate financial resources to deal with the current emergency. Moreover, two major donors had reduced their funding in this region.

69. While coordination mechanisms exist at the national and provincial levels, there appear to be problems with their effective implementation which may have direct and indirect repercussions for the internally displaced. At the national level, concerns were raised pertaining to coordination problems within the Government. Although the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was a welcome step demonstrating increased governmental commitment to addressing the humanitarian situation, it has not been without its problems. Concerns were expressed over the increasingly unclear role of MINARS, which should be the focal point for the coordination of the humanitarian response. The Representative was informed that MINARS had been increasingly marginalized, receiving fewer funds and forced to send all emergency legislation through the Inter-Ministerial Commission. This is further complicated by the appointment of the Minister of Planning as the chair of the Inter-Ministerial Commission and the apparent reluctance of her Ministry to assume full responsibility for emergency assistance. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Territorial Administration is seeking an increased role in resettlement, given the role of the provincial governors in the process. Coordination between these three ministries has been described as complicated and uneven and as giving rise to problems for the United Nations in being able to advocate policies effectively with the Government. There is an obvious need for effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs. To this end, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is supposed to bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis but which has seemingly met only once since April 2000.

70. The Representative's visits to the field revealed a number of problems in terms of the effective implementation of coordination arrangements at the provincial level. While the

examples given below may appear rather insignificant against the backdrop of the magnitude of problems facing the humanitarian operation in Angola, it must be underscored that for the individuals affected, the difference between having and not having access to essential medicines or to receiving and not receiving needed food assistance can have a significant impact on the quality of their lives.

71. During the visit to the Sacassange resettlement site in Moxico province, which consists of three separate sites - Bundas, Lutume and Luchazes - the Representative found that the health post at Luchazes was not functioning because it lacked a door and windows and was therefore not considered suitably secure to receive supplies of essential medicines which were otherwise available from an international NGO, the International Medical Corps (IMC). Further inquiries revealed that the windows and doors were missing not because of a lack of money to pay for them but simply because a carpenter was unavailable. While not seeking to underestimate the problems involved in achieving what might otherwise be a straightforward task, the case was of particular note because a mobile clinic operated by a local church group and supported by UNICEF and IMC which, according to OCHA and UNICEF, visited all three sites at Sacassange three times a week, was in fact found to be visiting Lutume only. Thus, over 2,700 displaced persons at Luchazes had no access to health facilities. In addition, almost 4,000 displaced persons at Bundas also lacked access to health facilities as the health post there was under construction. The Representative was subsequently informed that steps would be taken by UNICEF and IMC to remedy the situation and OCHA has been following up with the local administration to ensure the completion of the health posts.

72. In a camp at Catabola, in the province of Bié, the Representative found that the failure of the local authorities and United Nations agencies to facilitate the registration of the internally displaced on arrival at the camp had resulted in their going without food assistance as well as shelter materials and other non-food items for several months. The registration system operates along the following lines. The local administration informs the provincial representative of MINARS that newly displaced persons have arrived. MINARS then travels to the area to register the displaced. The registration list is passed to humanitarian organizations (usually WFP or OCHA) for inclusion of the displaced persons concerned on beneficiary lists. Also, a joint team consisting of MINARS and a United Nations agency verifies that the persons on the list are genuinely newly displaced.

73. In the case of Catabola the whole process had foundered from the very beginning because MINARS had not undertaken the initial registration of displaced persons at the time of their arrival. The reason given for this was that the MINARS representative lacked the means to travel to the camp to undertake the registration. While this clearly raises questions in regard to the logistical capacity of MINARS at the provincial level, as well as the resolve of the provincial and/or national authorities to enhance that capacity, it also raises serious questions as to the extent of cooperation and coordination between the provincial authorities and United Nations agencies in the province. A provincial coordination structure exists which provides forums for the exchange of information on the humanitarian situation between MINARS and United Nations agencies, for example, the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is supposed to identify gaps in humanitarian coverage and take appropriate decisions to respond thereto. There is also a Technical Working Group on Internally Displaced Persons which meets

weekly under the co-chairmanship of MINARS and OCHA to discuss the situation of internally displaced persons in the camps in the province. Despite these structures, WFP informed the Representative that although the displaced arrived at Catabola in the summer, it did not receive information on their arrival until 24 October. Verification was completed by 27 October and food distributed three days later. But having gone without food assistance as well as shelter materials and other non-food items for several months the displaced became increasingly impoverished and vulnerable.

74. Also in connection with coordination, the Representative was informed during the visit to Bié province that owing to insufficient funding from donors, WFP had been forced to adopt a new food aid strategy (to take effect from April/May 2001) and to move from general food distributions to targeted distributions and increased reliance on food-for-work projects and an expanded system of safety nets such as supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres for malnourished people. While it is important to ensure that the displaced do not become dependent on food distributions when viable alternatives are available, concerns were expressed by other humanitarian organizations as to the criteria on which targeting would be based, the fear being that vulnerable persons may not receive food distributions on which they depend. It is to be hoped that the existence of the Luanda based Vulnerability Assessment and Monitoring Working Group, composed of the Government, United Nations agencies and NGOs, will serve to alleviate such concerns.

75. The Representative also noted concerns that these reductions were forced on WFP by donors at a time when significant increases in admissions of moderately malnourished displaced and resident children to supplementary feeding centres were being recorded in the provinces of Bié and Huambo and possibly elsewhere. In this regard, the Representative was concerned at the results of a survey undertaken in Huambo by Save the Children (UK) in October in the light of the proposals to replace general food distributions with food-for-work and an expanded system of safety nets.<sup>16</sup> In short, the survey raises concerns over the practical effect of developing food-for-work projects for any more than a small proportion of the population of Huambo (displaced and resident alike) who are vulnerable to food insecurity. The survey found that reductions in general food distributions were expected to increase the market price of staple foods, meaning that displaced and resident populations would be able to afford less food, which in turn was expected to result in an increase in already high malnutrition rates. Moreover, difficulties are foreseen by Save the Children (UK) in adequately managing a potentially large increase in the caseload of malnourished children.

76. The Representative's visit to the province of Huambo in many respects provided a cross-section of the problems and prospects facing the internally displaced. In the transit centre at Caminhos de Ferro de Benguela (CFB), in the town of Caala, the remaining internally displaced were living in appalling conditions, in a derelict building and in and underneath two train carriages. The Representative was struck by the overriding sense of despair and depression amongst the displaced. Although health and food assistance was being provided by Médecins Sans Frontières and ICRC, the displaced lacked non-food items and there were inadequate water, sanitation and shelter facilities. While most of the displaced at this site had been resettled in August 2000, those remaining were reluctant to resettle as they had established coping mechanisms in the area and did not want to return to their place of origin, Cuima, because

of ongoing insecurity there. The Representative was informed that they subsequently expressed the desire to be resettled and on two occasions international agencies identified suitable relocation sites only to have them withdrawn at the last moment and without explanation by the provincial governor. In view of the urgent need to resettle those displaced at CFB, the authorities should provide adequate and public justification for their retraction of previous resettlement options and should find a suitable alternative resettlement site.

77. The Representative raised the case of CFB with the Minister for Social Assistance and Reintegration, who agreed to have the population there resettled within 30 days. Since returning from Angola, the Representative has written to the Minister requesting information as to the progress which has been made in this regard. The Representative underlines the importance of ensuring that the resettlement of this group and indeed of all displaced populations be undertaken in full conformity with the norms on resettlement, including full consultations with displaced communities and the allocation of sufficient and safe agricultural land within security perimeters.

78. The situation at CFB stood in contrast to that witnessed by the Representative at the resettlement area of Cantao Pahula. The displaced there were part of the population which had been resettled from the 15 transit centres in Caala in August. Although the provincial authorities failed to coordinate the relocation with United Nations agencies, it has nonetheless dramatically improved the conditions of the displaced. Indeed, whereas the Representative had been struck by the appalling conditions and despair exhibited at CFB, by contrast he was struck by the welcome he received at Cantao Pahula, where the displaced articulated their needs for non-food items and seeds, in time for the planting season.

79. This in turn stood in contrast to the Representative's visit to the resettlement area at Lepi, where the displaced were in the process of completing the construction of dwellings which were decent, where there were integrated health, water and sanitation services, a school and health facilities and where the displaced went about their business with little or no concern for the Representative's visit. The project at Lepi was funded from the OCHA Emergency Relief Fund, with assistance provided by WFP through food-for-work, and was implemented by a national NGO, OIKOS. Given the relatively modest cost of the project (US\$ 67,000), projects such as this should be replicated elsewhere. However, in so doing, it is essential that attention be paid in particular to the security of resettlement sites.

### **C. Ongoing protection concerns**

80. The Representative was seriously concerned at the lack of effective protection accorded to the physical security and human rights of the displaced, as well as the civilian population which is prone to becoming displaced through the actions of both UNITA and government forces.

81. Although the Government is said to control over 90 per cent of the country, UNITA is still able to operate effectively as a guerrilla force and is exacting a heavy price on the civilian population. The Representative was informed that UNITA retains de facto control of rural areas by forcibly displacing the civilian population through attacks on, and destruction of, villages, looting foodstuffs and possessions, and killing, abducting and raping civilians, including

children. There are also disturbing reports of UNITA resorting to increasingly cruel measures against the civilian population, for example hacking off limbs with machetes so as to remind the victims of their experience and to prevent them from joining the ranks of government troops.<sup>17</sup> Accounts from displaced persons suggest that FAA troops lack the training, discipline and capacity to prevent such attacks.

82. Displacement results from civilians fleeing their villages as a result of, or in order to avoid, such practices as those above. Often the displaced will spend several days hiding in the bush before attempting to move to safer locations such as major towns or provincial capitals. Displacement also results from civilians being deliberately forced from their homes and having to carry the very items which have been looted from them. It also results from families fleeing or sending their children to government controlled areas in an effort to protect them from forced recruitment by UNITA. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA to work as forced labour in salt mines in Malanje province. Local NGOs and church groups who may have access to salt mines are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

83. Displacement of the civilian population is also reported to result from the FAA “mopping up” and counter-insurgency operations, which are expected to increase in intensity. Reports indicate that FAA troops employ many of the same tactics as UNITA, such as looting villages and forcing the inhabitants to carry the food and other possessions which have been looted from them. Accounts from internally displaced persons suggest that villagers who refuse to comply with such demands risk being beaten or killed. The Representative was informed on a number of occasions that part of the problem in this regard is that the FAA troops often receive neither their salaries nor sufficient supplies and are thus inclined to prey on the local population. A senior government official readily conceded to the Representative that this was a problem. In an effort to prevent such practices, the Government needs to ensure that its military personnel receive regular salary payments and supplies of food and basic equipment.

84. The Representative was informed of incidents of harassment of displaced persons, in particular of those who have been displaced from UNITA-controlled areas, largely because they lack formal identity documents. It was noted that lack of such documents also limits access to education, health facilities and employment. The Government should take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, the authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement.

85. Reports were also received concerning the theft from internally displaced persons of food and non-food items by UNITA, as well as the FAA and national police. It was reported that such thefts are systematic, typically occurring after food distributions by international agencies and NGOs. The Representative was informed of incidents of rape and violence against displaced persons in camps, perpetrated by members of the national police, as well as incidents of forced recruitment, including of children. Serious concerns were noted in regard to the relocation of

camps for the displaced by the provincial authorities in inappropriate areas, including in mined areas and outside security perimeters and along strategic routes, raising concerns as to the possible use of the displaced as human shields.

86. During his visits to the provinces, the Representative was struck by the fact that there were few adolescents among the displaced. He was informed that for the most part adolescents have left the camps in rural areas in search of a better life in the provincial or national capital. Indeed, in Luanda the Representative saw large numbers of displaced adolescents eking out a precarious existence by selling all manner of goods in the streets or by begging. The Representative was informed that many adolescent girls in the capital have had to resort to prostitution in order to survive, putting themselves at grave risk of abuse and disease. The Representative was also concerned about the level of education offered to displaced children. While some efforts have been made to provide schooling to displaced children in camps, these did not extend past primary level education. The lack of secondary education may in part account for the propensity of displaced adolescents to head to urban centres to join the ever-increasing ranks of street children.

87. The magnitude of protection problems in Angola is seriously compounded by the absence of effective remedies to address such problems. Less than 5 per cent of Angolan municipalities have a fully functioning justice system. A senior government official readily conceded to the Representative that, to the extent that justice existed, it was only in Luanda. By the same token, the Representative was informed by the Attorney-General that his office is operational in all provinces throughout Angola and, indeed, provincial courts are occasionally known to solve problems. However, rural areas and camps for the displaced are underserved, leaving the resident and displaced populations in these areas outside the scope of State protection structures and with little recourse against the military and police personnel who are supposed to be protecting them. The Representative was informed that where international organizations and NGOs bring protection concerns to the attention of the military and provincial authorities, little or no remedy is provided.

88. The Representative strongly emphasizes the urgent and compelling need for a more focused and active approach to protection by both the Government and the international community. Greater efforts should be taken to train the military and police on the human rights of the internally displaced, as well as of the civilian population in general. The Representative welcomes the efforts which are being taken to this end by the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) and by ICRC and recommends that such efforts be expanded in terms of the numbers of military and police personnel reached. The Representative also requests that the Human Rights Division and ICRC consider expanding training programmes to include training on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. In this regard, the Representative welcomes the convening in August 2000 by the Norwegian Refugee Council of a training workshop on the Guiding Principles aimed at police and military personnel, amongst others; and a similar initiative undertaken by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

89. To enhance the protection accorded to the displaced, the Government is encouraged, in cooperation with the international community, to develop and adopt national legislation which

clearly articulates the rights of the displaced and the obligations towards them of the national authorities, including the police and military, and other actors such as UNITA. As in the case of the norms for resettlement, the Guiding Principles would be instructive for the development of such legislation, which should also include provision for monitoring machinery. In the meantime, efforts need to be undertaken to raise awareness among the displaced of their human rights, as restated in the Guiding Principles. To this end, wide dissemination of the Principles among local NGOs, church groups and displaced communities is essential. In this regard, while the Guiding Principles are available in Portuguese, it may also be useful to facilitate their translation into local languages such as Umbundu and Kimbundu. Local NGOs and church groups are encouraged to undertake such efforts, with the assistance of the national authorities and/or international agencies and NGOs.

90. Serious efforts need to be undertaken to build the national and provincial capacity to prevent and address protection problems. There is an urgent need for effective disciplinary and criminal proceedings against those military and police personnel who perpetrate violations against the displaced, both to offer redress to those whose rights have been violated and to ensure accountability and thereby prevent a sense of impunity among military and police personnel. The Representative was informed by a representative of the Ministry of Justice that it was formulating a policy to ensure the accountability of military and police personnel for their actions. The Representative urged that this policy be finalized as soon as possible and that the requisite human and financial resources be provided to make it effective on the ground. The Representative also suggested to the Attorney-General that the staff of his office based in the provinces visit settlements of displaced persons, collect testimony and information on human rights violations and instigate criminal proceedings against those responsible.

91. Conscious of the lack of judicial capacity at the provincial and municipal levels, the Representative considers it unfortunate that a project to provide much-needed support to the municipal justice system was excluded from the final submission of the 2001 CAP. Formulated by the UNOA Human Rights Division, UNICEF and, in its earlier stages, UNDP, the project was intended to make 10 municipal courts operational within a 12-month period and would likely have made a significant contribution to addressing some of the above-mentioned concerns. The Representative proposes that the UNOA Human Rights Division and UNICEF, in cooperation with the Government, consider seeking funds for the project from outside the CAP, for example within the framework of a technical cooperation project with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

92. In the absence of effective national and provincial capacity to address and prevent protection problems, it is imperative that the international community enhance its role. In particular, the Representative notes the need for strong and clear leadership in protection and in this regard recalls the Supplementary Guidance to Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators, adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in April 2000, which ascribes to the Humanitarian Coordinator responsibility for the strategic coordination of the United Nations response to the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced and, taking into account the contribution of all relevant partners on the ground, ensuring that gaps in the response to internally displaced persons are systematically addressed.

93. As a possible first step the Humanitarian Coordinator is encouraged to convene a brainstorming session on protection, to be attended by all relevant members of the humanitarian community, using the IASC policy paper on protection of internally displaced persons as the basis for initial discussions and strategy formulation.

94. It is also recommended that serious consideration be given to the despatch of an inter-agency mission to Angola to assist the Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country team to undertake a thorough assessment of protection issues and identify appropriate protection and prevention strategies. Given the gravity of the situation, it is imperative that the mission be composed of persons specialized in protection issues, including, if necessary, expert consultants from outside the United Nations system. The Representative notes that the above-mentioned Supplementary Guidance provides that in addressing gaps in the response to the internally displaced and in developing the country team's response to internal displacement, the Humanitarian Coordinator may call upon the Emergency Relief Coordinator and IASC to make available expertise in the form of specialized inter-agency missions. The Representative strongly encourages the Humanitarian Coordinator to request such a mission.

95. To supplement this, the Representative strongly recommends that the forthcoming mission to Angola by the Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement give due focus to protection issues and strategies for response and prevention, including by ensuring that members of the mission have sufficient expertise in protection work.

96. The Representative recommends that particular emphasis be given to enhancing the international protection presence in the provinces to ensure effective monitoring, reporting and follow-up on violations of the rights of the internally displaced. It is submitted that an enhanced international presence, especially in and around camps for the displaced, may also exercise a deterrent effect, in particular with regard to abuses committed by the FAA or police.

97. A number of steps could be taken to enhance the international protection presence. Where necessary, training of field-based staff of international agencies and NGOs in identifying and raising protection issues should be undertaken. The Guiding Principles would provide a useful frame of reference and additional guidance could be sought from the Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles and the Manual on Field Practice in Internal Displacement, both published by OCHA in 1999. Agencies and NGOs should also consider revising, if necessary, the design, placement and content of relief activities so as to deter human rights abuses. As noted above, theft of food and non-food items reportedly occurs after the distribution of such items by the United Nations agencies and NGOs. Consideration might be given to ways in which distribution of relief supplies could be coupled with a concerted international presence in the camps and settlements for the displaced in the days following distribution, when such thefts occur.

98. As well as receiving training in protection issues, field-based staff should be encouraged to raise protection concerns with the authorities. In those instances where there are reasonable grounds for believing that such efforts will compromise staff security or operations, the relevant information should be brought without delay to the attention of actors in the national capital, in particular the Humanitarian Coordinator or heads of agencies who may have more freedom to act or to actors at the international level, such as the Emergency Relief Coordinator, IASC, the Representative and/or,

depending on the nature of the protection problem, the other thematic special procedures of the Commission on Human Rights, as well as the relevant United Nations human rights treaty bodies.

99. The Representative was encouraged by the intention of the Human Rights Division of UNOA to create partnerships with NGOs in the provinces in an effort to enhance protection activities, as well as the initiative to assign some of the UNOA national administrative staff to substantive work for which they would be able to travel outside of Luanda. Although the Representative is aware of resource constraints, he nonetheless recommends that serious consideration be given to expanding the Human Rights Division's capacity and presence throughout the country.

100. In view of its comparative advantage in protection, UNHCR is encouraged to further examine possibilities for an enhanced presence and to contribute to the development of nationwide inter-agency protection strategies in regard to internally displaced persons.

101. Given the need for protection in the provinces in particular, the Representative suggests that consideration be given to the establishment of a protection working group within each province which should meet on a regular - weekly - basis and focus on the specific protection problems in the province and identify solutions thereto, including preventive measures.<sup>18</sup> Composed of representatives of organizations with protection mandates, such as UNHCR, ICRC and the Human Rights Division of UNOA, operational United Nations agencies, area field security officers, representatives of local and international human rights organizations and humanitarian NGOs, the group could formulate an approach so as to identify and anticipate problems, develop specific strategies to avert them and consider contingency plans. The group should raise protection concerns with the provincial authorities, both civil and military. In view of the possible need for discretion on the part of some of its members, agreement could be reached within the group to channel such concerns through particular members of the group, unless a united front is considered more effective.

102. The provincial groups should be linked to a unit in Luanda consisting of a small protection strategy team composed of persons with extensive field experience and a strong protection orientation. This may be a particularly important aspect of the strategy, given that the organizations with a comparative advantage in protection, namely UNHCR and ICRC, are present only in a minority of Angola's provinces. The team could visit the provinces on a continuing basis, providing advice on and support to practical approaches to specific protection challenges in the field, drawing on knowledge of previous efforts elsewhere and discussing with field staff the possible adaptation of those strategies.

103. Finally, given the ever-increasing emphasis on resettlement of displaced populations, the Representative again stresses the importance of ensuring protection and security in the context of resettlement and, in this regard, the need for full and effective implementation of the norms on resettlement and applicable human rights standards. During the mission, the Representative was informed of a tension within the humanitarian community between the urgent need to resettle displaced populations, especially those who continue to reside in appalling conditions in transit centres, and the difficulties of guaranteeing the security of resettlement sites in the prevailing climate of guerrilla-style attacks and banditry. In particular, the Representative was alarmed to hear of a potential correlation between the resettlement of displaced populations and the location of guerrilla

attacks. On the night of the Representative's visit to Lepi, the town was attacked by a 20-strong group of UNITA combatants. The attack was put down in under two hours by the security forces, though not before one civilian was killed and five injured. This was the first reported security incident in Lepi in over six months.

104. Such incidents, as well as the view among agencies that the shift to guerrilla tactics will likely be stepped up in 2001, underline the overriding need for the Government and the international community to strike the right balance between the urgent "need" to resettle the displaced and the equally pressing need to accomplish this in a way that protects their security and human rights. In transit centres such as CFB at Caala there is clearly an urgent need to relocate the displaced from the appalling and inhuman conditions in which they currently reside. Indeed, it is important that the displaced be given land and the opportunity to provide for themselves; that they become self-reliant; that general food distributions be reduced and increasingly scarce funds allocated elsewhere; and that an atmosphere of stability and normality return to Angola. But the stability and normality should be real and must not come at the expense of the physical integrity and dignity of the displaced. Monitoring of the conditions in resettlement sites prior to and after resettlement, by the provincial authorities in collaboration with the aforementioned protection team could help to ensure the security of sites.

#### **D. Landmines**

105. Linked to the issue of protection is that of landmines. According to INAROOE there are between 6 and 7 million landmines spread throughout Angola, though other estimates are as high as 15 million. The provincial capitals of Huambo and Bié, as well as locations in the provinces of Benguela, Malanje, Moxico and Uíge have the dubious distinction of being the most contaminated areas. From mid-1998 to January 2000, over 1,100 Angolans were killed or maimed by landmines or unexploded ordnance. The Representative was seriously concerned at the landmine situation throughout the country, which, in addition to posing an obvious danger to displaced and resident populations, gives rise to problems regarding access to displaced populations by international agencies and NGOs, as well as access of the internally displaced to land for resettlement and agricultural activities.

106. During the visit to the province of Bié, the Representative visited a displaced persons' camp at Cambandua, located in an area suspected of being contaminated with mines. HALO Trust, an NGO involved in mine action around the camp, informed the Representative that attempts had been made to discourage the displaced from settling in the area, but they had done so regardless, effectively demining the camp themselves through their day-to-day activities. It was fortunate that no mine incidents had occurred at the camp (though a mine had been found inside one of the dwellings), but the Representative was concerned that the displaced might be lulled into complacency with regard to warnings issued by mine action groups in regard to areas outside the camp.

107. While there are reports that both UNITA and the FAA continue to use landmines, it is estimated that some 75 per cent of mine accidents result from landmines laid during earlier phases of

the war, rather than since the resumption of hostilities in 1998. Nonetheless, the Representative recalls that in July 2000 the Angolan Parliament ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention). During the mission there appeared to be some confusion over the precise date on which the treaty would enter into force in Angola. Suffice to say that the Representative strongly encourages the Government to complete the ratification process and to begin implementing the treaty without delay.

108. As well as increasing the dangers to the displaced and the population at large and posing problems for the future development of agricultural production throughout the country, the continued use of landmines is compounded by the absence of a systematic approach to mine action which needs to be addressed urgently. Part of the problem to date has been dispute over the role of INAROOE, which was established within MINARS to accommodate the preference of donors to fund civilian rather than military mine action. Difficulties have arisen, however, over the distinction between coordination of mine clearance activities and the actual demining, with donors preferring that INAROOE focus on coordination. Another problem is that landmine clearance and verification activities have not been fully coordinated with the planning and implementation of humanitarian programmes. Although INAROOE maintains a national landmine database, the data are shared primarily with mine action NGOs and have not been made sufficiently available to other humanitarian actors - despite the value of such information in planning and implementing humanitarian programmes.

109. The Representative was informed by members of the donor community that the landmine problem in Angola requires a comprehensive approach with an emphasis on educating the population on how to live with landmines, on the basis that widespread demining in Angola is not considered financially viable. According to one estimate, it can cost up to US\$ 1,500 to clear one mine. Assuming that lasting peace is established, it is estimated that it would still take five years to bring the landmine situation under control.

110. A comprehensive approach to mine action is reflected in the 2001 CAP, although the extent to which the individual projects will achieve this will of course depend on donor response. The main goal is to ensure that mine action programmes are integrated into humanitarian operations. To this end, a number of government/United Nations/NGO projects are proposed, based on: information analysis and dissemination to provincial authorities, United Nations agencies and NGOs; mine clearance and demarcation; and mine awareness programmes to sensitize rural and urban populations to the danger of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

#### **E. Possible scenarios with regard to the conflict**

111. Throughout the mission it was apparent that there are two possible scenarios with regard to the future of the conflict and, therefore, the humanitarian and development situation in the country. On the one hand, there is the view that the Government controls over 90 per cent of the country and that its forces are close to overall victory. Consequently, the Government would be in a position to direct increased resources towards humanitarian and development efforts. Even assuming this to be

the situation, a decisive military victory is not likely to win the “hearts and minds” of UNITA supporters and thus national reconciliation will be slow in coming and may constitute a future source of instability.

112. The other, more likely scenario is that the current military situation will continue with the FAA maintaining military supremacy but engaged in a protracted guerrilla war with UNITA which will continue to have a destabilizing effect throughout the country, and in particular in the rural areas from which most of the displaced originate. Under such conditions, many of the humanitarian and protection problems outlined above are likely to continue. The quest for a comprehensive peace and national reconciliation, with which the Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola is clearly engaged, remains a matter of urgency.

#### **IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

113. Some tangible improvements have been made in regard to the situation of the internally displaced and in the national and international response to the problem. The Representative is encouraged by the steps taken by the Government to improve institutional arrangements at the national and provincial levels and its coordination with the international community, in particular United Nations agencies. The Representative notes with appreciation the development by the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies, of the norms for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, based on the Guiding Principles. The Representative also welcomes the progress made by the Humanitarian Coordinator, the United Nations Country Team and NGOs in improving the international humanitarian response, which has resulted in the stabilization of displaced populations, demonstrated most visibly by the resettlement of the majority of vulnerable displaced populations previously residing in deplorable conditions in transit centres.

114. Such developments notwithstanding, the Representative’s visits to the field revealed that coordination often is not effective on the ground and that a number of serious humanitarian and protection concerns remain which must be addressed. In particular, the Representative is concerned at the lack of effective protection accorded to the physical security and human rights of the displaced and the civilian population. In the light of such concerns, a number of recommendations, already introduced in appropriate contexts in the previous sections, are summarized in this concluding section.

#### **Development of standard operational procedures to ensure the uniform implementation of the norms on resettlement and the involvement of humanitarian organizations in security assessments**

115. Given the increasing emphasis on resettlement of displaced populations, the Representative encourages MINARS, in cooperation with international agencies, to draft standard operating procedures to ensure implementation of the technical provisions provided in the MINOPS. The Representative also encourages MINARS to ensure the involvement of humanitarian agencies in security assessments of prospective resettlement sites and to provide mechanisms for resolving conflicting security assessments of specific sites between the authorities and humanitarian organizations.

### **Full implementation of the norms on resettlement within security perimeters**

116. The Representative stresses the fundamental need to ensure the safety and security of the displaced. To the extent to which resettlement is required, it must be undertaken within the security perimeters of towns and cities and in full accordance with the norms on resettlement and applicable human rights standards.

### **Increased engagement of the Government and donors in the humanitarian response**

117. While acknowledging the increasing efforts of the Government to respond to the humanitarian situation, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on the part of the Government might prompt a similar response from donors. Angola is one of the richest countries in Africa in oil and other resources and should be able to shoulder a larger part of the humanitarian burden.

### **More effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs, and reinvigoration of the Humanitarian Coordination Group**

118. While some improvements have been noted, problems remain at the national level between different ministries which impede the efforts of the United Nations to advocate policies effectively with the Government. In an effort to address these problems, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which should bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis. Similarly, emphasis should be placed on ensuring more effective coordination at the field level through the active participation of all relevant actors in provincial coordination structures, including monitoring the implementation of humanitarian assistance.

### **Agreed criteria for targeting food distributions**

119. The Representative, noting the existence of the Vulnerability and Assessment Working Group, underlines the importance of ensuring that there is a consensus among humanitarian partners on the criteria on which targeted food distributions are based, so as to ensure that all vulnerable groups receive food distributions on which, for lack of alternatives, they depend. In this connection, the Representative reiterates his concerns that reductions in general food distributions have been forced on WFP by donors at a time of significant increases in admissions of moderately malnourished displaced and resident children to supplementary feeding centres.

### **Increased access to populations in need**

120. Given the security constraints in areas that are not under government control, the Representative recommends that international agencies and NGOs cooperate more fully with church groups and national and local NGOs which are able to operate in insecure areas and have access to the displaced.

### **Adequate maintenance and repair of airstrips and provision of logistical capacity**

121. Given the humanitarian operation's continued dependency on air transportation, the relevant authorities should ensure that airstrips such as that at Kuito are repaired as soon as possible and adequately maintained thereafter. Requests by WFP for additional aircraft should be responded to positively, so as to ensure that existing levels of access are maintained if not increased.

### **Extension of vaccination coverage**

122. In view of the prevalence of polio and other diseases amongst displaced populations, especially children, the Representative suggests that the Government consider the possibility of allowing international agencies to extend vaccination coverage to UNITA-held areas, assuming that adequate security guarantees can be obtained.

### **Provision of primary and also secondary education**

123. The Government should take steps, beginning with an increase in the allocation of resources to the Ministry of Education, to ensure that displaced children and children in general have access to primary and secondary education. Failure to invest sufficiently in education may have serious consequences for the future development of the country.

### **Increased awareness of abuses against children**

124. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA for use as forced labour. Local NGOs and church groups which may have access to the areas concerned are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information, which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

### **A more focused and active approach to protection by the Government in particular and also by the international community**

125. Given that the primary responsibility for the protection of the displaced rests with the Government, the Representative suggests a number of courses of action which could be taken by the authorities:

(a) National legislation on internally displaced persons. The Government is encouraged, in cooperation with the international community, to develop and adopt national legislation which clearly articulates the rights of the displaced and the obligations towards them of the national authorities and other actors, such as UNITA.

(b) Dissemination of the Guiding Principles. Efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness among the displaced of their human rights as restated in the Guiding Principles. To this end, wide dissemination of the Principles among local NGOs, church groups and displaced communities is essential.

(c) Training of military and police personnel. Greater efforts should be taken to train the military and police on the human rights of the internally displaced and the civilian population, so as to enhance protection and help prevent arbitrary displacement. The Representative welcomes the efforts which are being taken to this end by the Human Rights Division of UNOA and by ICRC and recommends that such efforts be expanded.

(d) Timely receipt of salaries and supplies by military personnel. In an effort to prevent looting by government troops and the harassment, violence and displacement associated with it, the Representative suggests that the Government take the necessary measures to ensure that military personnel receive salaries and supplies in a timely manner.

(e) Accountability of police and military personnel. The Government must take suitable measures to ensure that its military and police personnel are held accountable for human rights violations against the displaced and civilian population. The Ministry of Justice's proposed policy to ensure accountability of police and military personnel should be finalized as soon as possible and the requisite human and financial resources provided to make it effective on the ground. The Attorney-General is requested to instruct his provincial-level staff to visit the displaced, collect testimony and information on human rights violations, and instigate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.

(f) Issuance of personal documentation. Given the problems of harassment experienced by the displaced, the Representative recommends that the Government take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, the authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement.

(g) Judicial capacity building and accountability. Serious efforts need to be undertaken to build the national and provincial capacity to prevent and address protection problems. The Representative proposes that the Human Rights Division of UNOA and UNICEF, in cooperation with the Government, consider seeking funds for the proposed project on strengthening the judiciary at the municipal level within the framework of a technical cooperation project with OHCHR.

(h) Enhanced protection role for the international community. In the absence of effective national and provincial capacity to address and prevent protection problems, it is imperative that the international community enhances its role in regard to protection. A number of measures are suggested in this regard:

- (i) Convening of a brainstorming session on protection, for all relevant members of the humanitarian community, using the IASC protection policy paper as the basis for discussions and strategy formulation;
- (ii) Despatch of an inter-agency mission to the country to assist in a thorough review of protection issues and to identify appropriate response and preventive strategies; in this regard, the Representative strongly recommends that the forthcoming

mission to Angola by the Senior Inter-Agency Network give due focus to protection issues and strategies for response and prevention, including by ensuring that members of the mission have sufficient expertise in protection work;

- (iii) Enhancement of the international protection presence in the provinces to ensure effective monitoring, reporting and follow-up on violations of the rights of the internally displaced, including training of field-based staff in identifying and raising protection concerns, either directly or through other actors at the national, regional or international levels; revision, if necessary, of the design, placement and content of relief activities, so as to deter human rights abuses; expansion of the UNOA Human Rights Division's capacity and presence throughout the country; establishment of a protection working group within each province; and the establishment of a small protection strategy team in Luanda to support the provincial-level protection working groups. In addition, given its comparative advantage in protection, UNHCR is encouraged to examine further possibilities for an enhanced presence and the development of nationwide inter-agency protection strategies in regard to internally displaced persons.

### **Landmines**

126. Given the catastrophic landmine situation throughout the country and the problems it gives rise to in terms of security, access and resettlement, the Government is strongly encouraged to implement the Ottawa Convention without delay. Adequate donor response to the 2001 CAP is necessary to ensure a comprehensive approach to mine action, which the donors themselves favour.

### **Comprehensive peace and national reconciliation**

127. Although the Government claims to control over 90 per cent of the country, UNITA is still able to effectively employ guerrilla tactics which are exacting a heavy price on the displaced and civilian population. Moreover, the ongoing state of insecurity is a major constraint on the humanitarian response and undermines the long-term development prospects for the country and the possibility of durable solutions for the internally displaced. As such, vigorous efforts must be pursued by all relevant actors towards the achievement of a sustainable political solution to the conflict, and national reconciliation.

128. In the space of seven months, from April to November 2000, the Government and the international community have taken significant steps to improve the conditions of the internally displaced in Angola. And they have done so in very difficult circumstances, characterized by ongoing insecurity, problems of access, logistical difficulties and reduced donor support. Such developments and constraints notwithstanding, further substantial efforts are required to address effectively the ongoing humanitarian and, especially, protection problems identified in this report. The international community has a clear role to play in addressing these problems. However, its efforts should not be substituted for those of the Government but should support the Government, which, in turn, should seek to consolidate its leadership role and fully assume its responsibility for the displaced, including by providing increased financial resources to the humanitarian effort.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Statement by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Cardozo Law School, New York, 28 March 2000. USUN Press Release 44(00).
- <sup>2</sup> OCHA, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, January-December 2001, November 2000.
- <sup>3</sup> OCHA, United Nations Inter-Agency Mission to Angola, 18-23 March 2000. Findings and Recommendations.
- <sup>4</sup> OCHA, Angola: Report on Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs, April 2000.
- <sup>5</sup> Amnesty International, Angola: Human Rights - The Gateway to Peace, AFR 12 January 1999, February 1999.
- <sup>6</sup> Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, September 1999.
- <sup>7</sup> United States Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000.
- <sup>8</sup> As indicated in section III.C of the present report, the Representative found protection problems to be more extensive in scope than as noted in the rapid assessment.
- <sup>9</sup> Human Rights Watch, note 6 above.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup> Save the Children (UK), War Brought Us Here - Protecting Children Displaced in Their Own Countries by Conflict, 2000, p. 41.
- <sup>12</sup> Anna Richardson, Internal Displacement in Southern Africa: Focus Angola, Writenet Country Paper, April 1999.
- <sup>13</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Angola 1999-2000, 1999.
- <sup>14</sup> WFP, WFP Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons: Country Case Study on Internal Displacement - Internal Displacement in Angola, November 1999.
- <sup>15</sup> OCHA, Internal Displacement in Angola - A Review of UN Strategic Coordination, November 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Save the Children (UK), Survey to Assess the Food Needs of the Population of Huambo, Angola, August 18-29 2000, October 2000.

<sup>17</sup> MSF, Angola: Pretence of Normality, 9 November 1999.

<sup>18</sup> See further, Diane Paul, “An integrated, strategic approach to the protection of internally displaced persons”, Jacob Blaustein Institute for Human Rights, 14 November 2000. See also, Mark Frohardt, Diane Paul and Larry Minear, Protecting Human Rights: The Challenge to Humanitarian Organisations, Occasional Paper No. 35, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1999.

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