Which has now reported to the Assembly the results of the fact-finding mission of the five-member Sub-Committee established by General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) (continued).

1. Mr. AHMED (United Arab Republic): In the course of 1961 both the Security Council and the General Assembly were seized of the deteriorating situation in Angola. In January 1961, in the cotton growing district of Malange, several thousand contract labourers had attempted to protest against the conditions under which they were obliged to work and were literally bombed into submission. On 4 February an abortive uprising of some 300 armed men in the capital city of Luanda was crushed with an officially admitted toll of sixteen dead, and on 15 March a full-fledged Angolan revolt against Portuguese rule broke out in the north.

2. The outside world, meanwhile, received word of Portugal's excessive repressive measures and of the bombing and the burning of towns, and the number of Angolans who fled for their lives into the safety of the two independent Congo republics was estimated at 200,000.

3. Liberia first brought the reports of brutality in Angola to the attention of the Security Council [934th meeting] on 15 February 1961. When the Security Council met to discuss this complaint in March the joint draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic,1 which called for the appointment of an investigative sub-committee, received five favourable votes. The General Assembly, however, passed in April—this time by an overwhelming vote of 73 to 2, with 9 abstentions—its resolution 1603 (XV), which, after taking note of the fact that the continuance of the disturbances was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, called upon Portugal to consider the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola for the purpose of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The same resolution created the five-member Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola which has now reported to the Assembly the results of its inquiries and findings.

4. Meanwhile, the Security Council, in June 1961, adopted a resolution reaffirming the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, recalling that Angola had been declared a Non-Self-Governing Territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, and as well as General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). The Council also called upon Portugal to desist from repressive measures and to extend every facility to the Sub-Committee to enable it to perform its task and to report to the Council and the General Assembly.

5. The Sub-Committee's fact-finding mission was altogether called forth and warranted, despite Portugal's previous contention that these disturbances of public order in Luanda occurred without any previous unrest, commotion or demonstration of any sort and that complete calm had been restored. Portugal had claimed, furthermore, that they involved only small groups of hooligans and hirelings who were not representative of the population of Luanda, that certain non-Angolans were involved in instigating the attack—they accused communist organizations—that weapons had been smuggled in from outside, serving the interests of international subversive forces [see A/4975, para. 80].

6. Last Monday, the representative of Portugal told the Assembly [1088th meeting] that no less than 3,000 were killed on Portugal's side, with more than 1,000 casualties on the nationalist side.

7. Certainly, all these accusations and grave happenings warranted investigation. Unfortunately, the report of the Sub-Committee brings out the fact that it "was not able to make an on-the-spot inquiry into the situation because of the unwillingness of Portugal to agree to the visit of the Sub-Committee to Angola..." [A/4975, para. 57]. The Sub-Committee therefore had to visit neighbouring countries; it listened to Angolan refugees and nationalist elements and based its report "exclusively on information which could be obtained outside the territory and from documents made available to it" [ibid.].

8. We share the Sub-Committee's regret that "as a result of the lack of co-operation from the Government of Portugal, it was not in a position to verify directly the information provided to it concerning Angola" [ibid.].

9. The Sub-Committee's report [A/4975], however—given Portugal's lack of co-operation—represents the United Nations best effort and the sincerest approximation to a factual first-hand inquiry, and thus provides a solid basis for constructive and ample discussion. The Sub-Committee's report has been approved unanimously by its five members—the representatives of Bolivia, Dahomey, Malaya, Finland and Sudan. We are grateful to the Member States which accepted the onerous task of serving on the Sub-Committee...
Committee. We have been impressed by the Sub-
Committee's earnest and impartial approach and the
triumphant effort it put into the collection of data—
listening to and evaluating petitions and complaints
from many Angolans. Despite the fact that it was denied
access to Angola, its report offers the Assembly the
surest and most reliable data yet available which can
add meaning to our discussion.

10. It is regrettable also that the representative of
Portugal, after having fully expressed his views on
the question last Monday, has decided to absent himself
from the rest of the discussion. The Portuguese
representative's presence and co-operation with this
"free Assembly" of ours, as he called it, might have
gotten us off to an early start on the road towards a
peaceful settlement.

11. We are hopeful that Portugal's traditional good
sense and the realization of its real interest will
ultimately triumph and that Portugal will honour its
obligations under the Charter.

12. Our delegation listened carefully to the speech
given on Monday by the representative of Portugal and
has given it all the consideration it deserves. The
representative of Portugal has branded this discussion
as illegal; he sees in it a "sinister move" to disinte-
grate his country. He asks why we should concern our-
selves about Angola and not about Berlin, Laos or
Viet-Nam.

13. We want to assure the representative of Portugal
that our political support of the right of the Angolan
people to self-determination, as well as the support
given by many other States that are concerned about
the plight of the Angolan people, is altogether legiti-
mate, legal, justified, and even enjoined upon us by the
Charter of the United Nations. The second paragraph
of the Preamble to the Charter reaffirms "fundamental
human rights, ... the dignity and worth of the human
person, ... the equal rights of men and women ...".

14. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter affirms as
one of the purposes of the United Nations the develop-
ment of "respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples". If so many African-
Asian countries have brought the plight of the Angolan
people to the attention of this Organization, that was
no sinister or illegal move against the Portuguese
people, it was in fulfillment of a basic United Nations
principle, namely, the affirmation of the right to self-
determination of a people considered by this Organi-
tation to be ethnically and geographically independent
of Portugal.

15. We are no less concerned, meanwhile, about
Berlin, Laos or Viet-Nam. But these are situations
involving independent States, which can bring their
disputes to the United Nations if and when they see
fit. The Charter contains no specific obligation to
dispute Berlin, Laos or Viet-Nam, but it does contain
such a specific obligation in regard to self-deter-
nmination.

16. Disintegrate the Portuguese Empire? Yes, that we
do wish—peacefully, and in an orderly way, and in
accordance with United Nations resolutions. But it
certainly is not our wish to destroy Portugal itself.

17. This is no age of empire. The United Nations has
overwhelmingly passed resolution 1514 (XV) on the
liquidation of colonialism, and it established, by its
resolution 1542 (XV), that Angola was no part of Portu-
gal, geographically or ethnically.

18. In 1951, Portugal unilaterally declared Angola
a Portuguese overseas province, without the Angolan
people's consent. From the collection of data—
listening to and evaluating petitions and complaints
from many Angolans, despite the fact that it was denied
access to Angola, its report offers the Assembly the
surest and most reliable data yet available which can
add meaning to our discussion.

19. The Security Council proved, in the cases of
Indonesia, Czechoslovakia, Spain and South Africa,
that those problems were not problems of "domestic
jurisdiction" if the continuance of those situations
endangered the peace and security of the world, as
they did.

20. When Portugal became a Member of the United
Nations in 1955 it agreed to honour the Charter.
According to resolutions 1541 (XV) and 1542 (XV) of
the General Assembly, Angola has been considered as
one of the Non-Self-Governing Territories for which
the United Nations bears a special responsibility under
Article 73 of the Charter. Resolutions 1514 (XV),
1541 (XV), 1542 (XV) and 1603 (XV) have established the
direct responsibility of the United Nations for Angola
and any similar situation affecting human rights and the
right of self-determination the continuance of which is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and
cooperation.

21. The contents of the representative of Portugal's
contrary, the Sub-Committee reports the follow-
ing:

"...the information available to the Sub-Com-
mittee leaves little doubt that the disturbances and
conflicts in Angola are mainly the consequences of
genuine grievances of the indigenous population
against the administration of the territory, including
dissatisfaction with economic conditions, the impact
of African nationalism, the rise of political groups
seeking redress of grievances and the right of self-
determination, and the severe repression to which
these groups had been subjected" (Ibid. para. 436).

22. As far back as 1952, a group of more than
500 Angolans had in fact addressed a petition to the
United Nations complaining of the mistreatment of the
indigenous inhabitants by the Portuguese authorities
and asking the United Nations to take steps to end
Portuguese rule in Angola. The Sub-Committee's
findings corroborate this long standing complaint. Its
report confirms the statements of many speakers
during the discussions in the General Assembly and the
Security Council.

23. The Sub-Committee was informed that the Portu-
guese District Governor of Malange reported to the
authorities that some of the grievances of the Angolans
were well-founded and that he had recommended
changes. He was later transferred. The Portuguese
responded to the Angolan protests and demonstrations
by severe reprisals, bombings and mopping-up opera-
tions. The situation continued to deteriorate despite
the General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April
1961 and the Security Council resolution of 9 June
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1961, to which the Government of Portugal failed to respond.

24. The Sub-Committee has also found that the vast majority of the indigenous population have had no opportunity to participate in the management of the affairs of their territory. Many Angolans, according to the report, have developed a feeling that they are treated as strangers in their own land. The Sub-Committee has heard complaints of arbitrary arrests, long periods of imprisonment without trial, physical ill-treatment and even disappearance of prisoners.

25. The indigenous inhabitants have come to feel that they are victims of economic exploitation. The Sub-Committee states that they have complained particularly of the system of taxation and the compulsory cotton programme which makes them little better than slave-workers. The Sub-Committee has described the acquisition of lands for Portuguese settlers at the expense of the dispossession of African cultivators. The Sub-Committee also reports complaints concerning the use of force to recruit contract labour for Portuguese plantations and the physical ill-treatment of Angolan labour.

26. In the political field, the Sub-Committee has found that demands for self-government, self-determination and independence were regarded by Portugal as subversive, and they were repressed with severity. Since opportunities for political activity and the expression of Angolan nationalism were closed, and since there was no possibility of entering into discussions or negotiations with the authorities, who denied the existence of a colonial problem and the validity of the right to self-determination, and since there was severe suppression of peaceful political manifestations, all political movements favouring autonomy or self-determination were forced into clandestine activity or exile—and some of them subsequently into "direct action" as the only possible means to independence.

27. Although some of those involved in the fighting may have crossed international frontiers, the Sub-Committee did not receive any concrete evidence that non-Angolans had been involved or that neighbouring Governments had assisted in the military operations or had in any way violated international law or their obligations under the Charter. The Sub-Committee found, on the contrary, that, despite the fact that the Angolan nationalist organisations were forced to operate from exile, the situation was not caused by foreign intervention as alleged by Portugal.

28. Far from having its roots in foreign intervention or in the instigation of international subversive elements—as Portugal would have us believe—the rebellion in Angola testifies to the bankruptcy of colonial rule in Angola. The failure of the so-called policy of assimilation is self-evident. After 500 years of such a policy no more than 70,000 persons of mixed or native ancestry out of a population of 5 million had become "assimilados", enjoying equal status with European Portuguese citizens. The Sub-Committee indicates that it has found that there existed a gulf between the stated aims of Portuguese policy and the practices in the territory. In practice, there are various distinctions in the social status of the people of Angola. Five categories exist, according to the report of the Sub-Committee: first, the Portugal-born Portuguese; second, the Portuguese born actually in Angola; third, the mestizos or mulatto; fourth, the African "assimilados"; fifth, the majority of Angolans.

29. According to the report of the Sub-Committee, the political unrest in Angola was due to the denial of human rights, abuse of authority, high-handedness, economic exploitation, inadequate health services, lack of educational facilities, inadequate social and economic development. The Sub-Committee reports that, despite Portuguese repression of nationalist aspirations, the situation in Angola was mainly the consequence of genuine grievances of the indigenous population against Portuguese misrule, including dissatisfaction with economic conditions, the impact of nationalism and the rise of political groups seeking the right to self-determination.

30. The Sub-Committee's findings—according to part four of its report regarding international concern as to the situation in Angola—corroborate the resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the Assembly's previous discussions. Reports concerning the cause of the disturbances, repressive measures by Portugal, the military show-down in Angola, the flight of nearly 150,000 refugees from Angola and the creation of a veritable atmosphere of war in that territory have led to world-wide concern. Continuance of the situation is likely to have international repercussions and especially to jeopardize Portugal's friendly relations with other States. Many States have already expressed their grave concern.

31. The participants of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in September 1961 stated in their declaration of 6 September: "The participating countries drew attention with great concern to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly Member States of the United Nations, to establish their free and independent State without delay."

32. The repressive measures taken by Portugal against the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan independence fighters are not only contrary to the recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but they cannot, in the judgement of the Sub-Committee, solve the basic problems in Angola, and cannot lead to peace and stability. The Sub-Committee finds that the Angolan rebels are determined to continue guerrilla warfare as a means of achieving the recognition of their rights and aspirations.

33. The Sub-Committee reiterates the majority opinion in the United Nations that the means of solving the present difficulties is to be sought mainly within Angola through drastic reorientation of policy, in conformity with the obligations of Portugal under the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant recommendations and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

34. Some members of the United Nations may find comfort in the limited response to the Sub-Committee's approaches for Portugal's co-operation with the United Nations. Others may find still some comfort in the latest Portuguese so-called reforms in Angola, or
legislative measures, promulgated on 8 September 1961, the most important of which was the repeal of the Statute of 1954. With this act, the legal distinctions between the indigenous status and others as regards political rights is supposed to end. The Sub-Committee feels, however, that before an Angolan can qualify for political rights, there remain the other educational, financial and social hurdles established by other laws which have not yet been affected by the latest so-called reforms.

35. The Sub-Committee sums up the situation in these words:

"In short, the recent reforms would seem to have been designed mainly, as indicated by Portuguese officials, to offset alleged misunderstandings abroad and to rationalize procedures. Their immediate effect on ameliorating the conditions in the territory... appears to be limited." [A/4978, para. 467]

36. Our delegation finds some hope in the fact that the Sub-Committee is of the opinion that these measures:

"... would seem to reflect some awareness by the Government of Portugal of the need to adjust its policies to the realities of the situation and the opinion of the international community" [ibid., para. 451].

37. This awareness of the need to adjust to the realities of the situation has saved many other metropolitan Powers when there was enough awareness, and when it was put to use early enough. It has been at the root of many compromises and situations establishing a modus vivendi which have met the legitimate interests of the former colonizers and the colonized and enlisted the approval of both sides. When there was not enough of this awareness, or when it was found too late, the world was confronted with the Congo tragedy.

38. The choice is Portugal's. It has begun, according to the Sub-Committee, to show some awareness of the need to adjust. Will it move fast enough? Will it make use of the tremendous possibilities of co-operation with the United Nations and its organs, on the way toward the required adjustment, toward turning the Angolans, in some not far distant future, into equal collaborators in peace and honour? Or will Portugal stand in vain, alone in the wilderness of obstinacy, blinded by the blight of hatred, engrossed, as The New York Times of 17 January put it, "in its dream world" until finally it is swept under the torrent of nationalism and modern change? Luckily for Portugal, as the Sub-Committee reports, many nationalist movements, such as the UPA, which claimed to be the main party fighting in Angola, indicated to the Sub-Committee that they were not against Portugal or the Portuguese, but were simply opposed to oppression. They stated that they were prepared to collaborate with a democratic Portuguese Government if it recognized the right of Angola to self-determination.

39. Another party, the NGWIZAKO, claimed that it favoured independence of Angola by negotiation and non-violent means. A third nationalist group—the Mouvement pour la libération de l'enclave de Cabinda (MLC)—described its objective as being the establishment of a democratic independent State following a nation-wide popular referendum held under United Nations supervision.

40. Still another nationalist group, the Movement for the Defence of the Interests of Angola (MDIA), favoured negotiations with Portugal and the setting up of a time-table leading to independence. It claimed to have approached the Portuguese Government for negotiations or reforms leading to independence.

41. Finally, on the other side of the ledger there were other more militant groups—such as the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)—which declared their objective to be the immediate and total independence of Angola and the establishment of a democratic government in line with the world movement for political liberation and economic independence.

42. The Sub-Committee reports:

"Not only the groups opposed to violence but also the groups such as the UPA and the MPLA, which have claimed responsibility for 'direct action' have expressed their desire and willingness to seek a peaceful settlement if the attitude of the Government of Portugal were to make that possible." [A/4978, para. 409.]

The Sub-Committee warns, however, that:

"The existence of fluid frontiers, the strength of feeling among the refugees and their fellow tribesmen in the vicinity of the northern border, and the feelings aroused by Portuguese actions in the past few months would appear to lead to the conclusion that though the area of military activity may be reduced or strategic points recovered, the end of the conflict cannot be assured by military measures alone." [Ibid., para. 411.]

43. If Portugal shows enough imagination and wisdom, as we hope Portugal will, to move in the right direction, the direction already indicated by worldwide events during the last two decades, the direction which has been tried and found satisfactory by other former metropolitan Powers, then Portugal will have acted in accordance with its own interests, and will have prepared the ground for peaceful change.

44. The alternative, which we hope will not take place, is further bloodshed in Angola, more needless troubles and headaches for Portugal, as well as an increase in worldwide tension, and a marked deterioration in Portugal's relations with many friends.

45. Thus the dreams of "perpetuating Portuguese sovereignty" which the Sub-Committee brings to our attention, as evidenced by recent Portuguese official statements, should rapidly give place to courageous and genuine progressive measures. Among them, the Sub-Committee strongly urges the recognition by Portugal of the personality of Angola, the primacy of the interests of the inhabitants of that territory, the acceptance of the principle of self-determination and initiation of immediate steps to prepare Angola for self-government. These courageous and beneficial steps, the Sub-Committee feels, are not inconsistent with "the vital interests or the historic mission of Portugal". These measures, we feel, are the only guarantee to the safeguarding of Portuguese legitimate interests in its former overseas empire. They alone can constitute the link that can bind the Portuguese people to a future independent friendly and co-operative Angola.

46. The United Nations, its competent organs such as the Special Committee of seventeen members established by General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI), and
47. The whole world meanwhile will keep a watchful and hopeful eye on Angola and Portugal. The work begun 500 years ago by Portugal, so rich in history, traditions, conquest, discovery, and glory, merits a final chapter; one conceived in wisdom, and forthrightness, imagination and justice, a final chapter marked by a sense of achievement and fulfillment. It would be a sad day for Portugal if the heirs to such historical grandeur and glory chose to close that book in short-sightedness and selfishness, in frustration and self-destruction. For history will remember the Portuguese endeavor for its earlier as well as for its closing chapters.

48. Mr. TCHOBANOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): On 15 January my delegation, together with that of Poland, submitted a draft resolution [A/4978]. In our opinion, this draft resolution is based, first of all, on indisputable facts, and secondly on an appreciation which we believe to be just and objective of the situation which has arisen in Angola and of the consequences which it might entail for world peace. Finally, in our view it offers the only solution to the Angolan problem which is in keeping with the principles of the United Nations, the decisions it has already taken, the interests of the people of Angola and the interests of peace in Africa and throughout the world.

49. I shall not dwell particularly upon the material facts, for these have been abundantly established and proved, and the delegations present here are amply informed of them.

50. Both at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, in April 1961, and in the Security Council in March and June of that year, the United Nations had already received sufficient information about the conditions of savage colonial oppressions in which the Angola people were living and about the brutal repression by the Portuguese colonial authorities of the insurrection movement which broke out in that country at the beginning of 1961. The Members of the Assembly will recall that in its resolution of 9 June 1961, the Security Council deeply deplored the large-scale killings and the severely repressive measures in Angola and expressly called upon "the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures".

51. In its report, which is before us all [A/4978], the Sub-Committee established by the General Assembly on 20 April 1961, at its fifteenth session, resolution 1960 (XV), categorically confirms the essential facts of the evidence placed before the United Nations last year. The speakers who have taken the floor during the last few days have supplied some new and disturbing facts.

52. It therefore seems to us that the second and third preambular paragraphs of our draft resolution say only what has been known for a long time and that it is no exaggeration to speak, as we do, of a "mass extermination of the native population of Angola and other

serious repressive measures being pursued by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the people of Angola".

53. Next, there is certainly reason to condemn these procedures resolutely, as we do, and to take note of the deep indignation throughout Africa and the world caused by these actions which are outraging the conscience of mankind. Nor do I think that there can be any doubt in the mind of anyone here about the justness of the description of the Portuguese Government's attitude in the fourth preambular paragraph, which states that it "constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and is inconsistent with the obligations of a Member state under the Charter".

54. No later than last Monday, 15 January [1088th meeting], the representative of Portugal once again declared, with an unusual lack of deference, that his Government would again refuse to comply with the decisions that the General Assembly might adopt on the question of Angola if those decisions were not to its liking.

55. Having said this, I shall draw the attention of delegations to the fifth preambular paragraph of our draft resolution, which says that:

"...the continuing supply to Portugal of weapons and other war material used for conducting colonial war in Angola is intolerable and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter".

56. We attach special importance to this point, for what would be the good of more or less platonic professions of disapproval of the conduct of the Portuguese colonizers and sympathy with the oppressed people of Angola if this organization and its Members did not find within themselves the necessary courage to disapprove of and to prohibit active complicity in the crimes of the Lisbon colonialists? There are many eminent jurists in this hall and any of them will tell you without the least hesitation that if a murderer is guilty of the crime he has committed, the person who knowingly supplies him with the weapon with which to commit the murder is equally guilty.

Portugal which is not very highly developed technically and scientifically, does not itself manufacture the modern weapons and war material which it uses in the colonial war it is waging in Angola. Are we expected to believe, for example, that the bomber aircraft, the warships, the troop transports and the many bases are of Portuguese manufacture? This question has already been raised at previous meetings, particularly in the Fourth Committee last November, and some delegations asserted that the principal Atlantic Powers, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom, were supplying the Portuguese Government with the arms it is using to exterminate the Angolan people. What did the delegations in question say to this?

57. I recall that at the 1201st meeting of the Fourth Committee on 8 November 1961, Mr. Bingham, the United States representative, tried to exonerate his Government. He stated that the NATO weapons and war material supplied by the United States had not been employed in the colonial war in Angola. What did the United States representative in the Fourth Committee say in this regard? First of all, as might be expected, he attributed what he called "misunderstood charges" to the Soviet bloc. He then declared that his Government had "advised" the Government of Portugal not to employ this material in Angola. The
United States representative did not seem to have many illusions about the effect of this advice, since he did not even tell the Committee whether he thought that the advice had been followed by the Portuguese Government. Aware, I suppose, of the example of Algeria, where day after day for more than seven years American material from the NATO arsenals has been used to exterminate the Algerian people, Mr. Bingham must be more no more optimistic than we are about the magical efficacy of more or less platonic advice of this sort. He also omitted to say whether Mr. Salazar had given some sort of assurance that he would comply with the advice and recommendations given him.

58. As regards the United Kingdom, I recall that Mr. Macmillan, its Prime Minister, replying to a question in the House of Commons, stated that his Government had taken the following decision: supplies of war material destined for Portugal would henceforth be sent only to that country's metropolitan territory and not to its overseas possessions.

59. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, however, omitted to tell the members of Parliament how his Government proposed to prevent the Portuguese Government from transporting the weapons thus supplied from the metropolitan territory to Africa. Unlike the United States representative in the Fourth Committee, Mr. Macmillan did not even attempt to give the British legislators the poor consolation which Mr. Bingham gave the Fourth Committee by telling them, for example, that in one way or another the United Kingdom had advised Portugal not to use the material supplied to massacre its colonial subjects.

60. Accordingly, knowing that a certain person is a murderer who has already committed many murders and is preparing to commit more, I place a deadly weapon in his hands and I am later accused of being an accomplice in the murders he commits with that weapon, I state in the most ingenious manner: "Yes, I did give him that weapon, but I did not fail to advise him expressly not to use it to kill but simply to have his photograph taken in a martial pose, or something of that sort". In so saying, I am acting like Mr. Bingham, the United States representative in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

61. Or else, to vary things somewhat, when accused of complicity I state: "Yes, I did supply so-and-so with the deadly weapon, knowing that he is a confirmed murderer and that he had clearly manifested his intention of committing a new series of murders; but please note that I flatly refused to deliver the weapon to the place where he proposed to commit the murders and that I left it at his house, leaving it to him to find how best to transport it to the scene of action". In submitting this second version I am acting like Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

62. I apologize to the President for having resorted to such childish hypotheses. I did so in order to try to show the stupidity and childishness of the means to which the representatives of these two great Powers have had recourse in an attempt to conceal their complicity in the atrocities committed in Angola. To call things by their proper name we are compelled to say that the verments of the United States and the United Kingdom are truly accomplices in the abominable crimes which for nearly a year now have been unremittingly perpetrated against the Angolan people. They bear full and entire responsibility for them to the same extent as the Government of Portugal.

63. Deprived of its supplies of modern war material and of material aid from abroad, Portugal would be unable to carry on the war of extermination in Angola much longer. It is therefore essential that these supplies and this aid should be stopped, so that the sufferings of the Angolan people may be more speedily brought to an end. It is for this reason that the sponsors of the draft resolution attach particular importance to the fifth preambular paragraph.

64. I must now say a few words about the sixth and last preambular paragraph. In this passage, we stress the international repercussions of the Angolan tragedy, the menace to world peace and security that it represents and the necessity for applying sanctions against Portugal under the provisions of the Charter. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 9 June 1961 already stated (fourth preambular paragraph):

"... that the continuance of the situation in Angola is an actual and potential cause of international friction and is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." General Assembly resolution 1093 (XV), adopted on 20 April 1961, similarly noted (third preambular paragraph):

"...that failure to act speedily, effectively and in time for ameliorating the disabilities of the African people of Angola is likely to endanger international peace and security."

Our sixth preambular paragraph, therefore, repeats in substance in the light of the new facts mentioned in the Sub-Committee's report, what the United Nations has already admitted. It seems to us that this paragraph should obtain the support of all delegations.

65. The operative part of our draft resolution follows logically from the findings in the preamble. It seems to us that there can be no objection on the part of delegations to a solemn reaffirmation of the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence—as is done in paragraph 1—or a condemnation of the colonial war pursued by Portugal—as is done in paragraph 2—or to the General Assembly's repeating the Security Council's injunction to Portugal of 9 June last—as is done in paragraph 3.

66. I now come to paragraphs 4 and 5 of our draft resolution in which the Special Committee of seventeen members established by General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 is given the very important tasks specified in these paragraphs. We feel that this Committee is called upon to play a very important part in the implementation of the historic Declaration of the General Assembly at its fifteenth session [see resolution 1514 (XV)] regarding the liquidation of the last traces of colonialism and, moreover, that the case of Angola is precisely one of those to which that Declaration relates. That being so, the competence of that Committee seems to us to derive logically from the very nature of things, especially if we consider the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs of resolution 1654 (XVI) and its operative paragraphs 4 to 7.

67. I shall not dwell particularly on paragraph 6, since the main points in connexion with this subject were outlined when I spoke of the fifth preambular paragraph. Indeed, anything that the Assembly might decide with regard to Angola could remain a dead
letter unless Member States were forbidden to aid the Portuguese colonialists in their sinister work by supplying weapons and war material.

68. We are well aware that the United States delegation is inclined to react with excessive and unjustified nervousness whenever the attitude—often too pro-colonialist—of its Government is mentioned. We recall, in particular, a document couched in needlessly acrimonious terms in which Mr. Stevenson, the United States representative, reacted to criticisms addressed to his Government in this regard: I mean the letter addressed by this representative to the President of the General Assembly on 25 November 1961 [A/4985], which was accompanied by remarks aimed at what Mr. Stevenson calls "Soviet colonialism".

69. It seems to me that everything Mr. Stevenson says, in the first part of these remarks, about the attitude of the United States towards colonialism will remain devoid of any value so long as the Washington Government continues to aid the colonizers by providing weapons and war material to deepen the national emancipation movements of the colonial peoples in blood, perhaps in the belief that it can vindicate itself by means of statements unconvincing as those made by Mr. Bingham before the Fourth Committee which I mentioned a few moments ago.

70. I shall say nothing about the second part of this document, devoted to so-called "Soviet colonialism", but I shall comment on it later should the occasion arise, particularly in regard to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. May I say, however, that these remarks give a version and an interpretation of the historical facts which resemble the actual facts about as much as a surrealist or dadaist painting resembles a very simple way in which the United States delegation and Government could put an end to the suspicions and accusations of complicity in the crimes of the Portuguese colonialists: would be to vote together with the Sub-Committee which stands out among Committees of the United Nations for the personal competence of its total lack of realism, its total inability to respond to reason. It must be compared to observe international law by the means provided in the Charter. My delegation asks this Assembly, in the interests of world peace and security, to support the draft resolution submitted by the Polish delegation and ourselves.

Mr. Ortiz Martín (Costa Rica), Vice-President, took the Chair.

75. Mr. FLIMSOLL (Australia): The General Assembly is greatly assisted in its consideration of this question by the report [A/4978] which has been presented to us by the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola. The composition of this Sub-Committee was one which from the outset gave us every confidence that the work would be approached in a responsible and capable manner. The Sub-Committee had as its Chairman a representative from Latin America who had served for two years as a representative on the Trusteeship Council and whom he believed to be Head of a Visiting Mission to a Trust Territory. He therefore had some personal experience in these questions. The Rapporteur, Dato' Kamil, of the Federation of Malaya, who is well known in Australia where he was his country's representative, is a man who has had experience in administration and who has also had experience in the constitutional development of a country from the stage of a Non-Self-Governing Territory to an independent nation. The Sub-Committee had two representatives from Africa, both with records not only in the United Nations but also in African development—one in territories that were formerly British and one in territories that were formerly French. The fifth member of this Sub-Committee, the permanent representative of Finland, was a man whom we all respected both for his personal qualities and for his country. This is a Sub-Committee which stands out among Committees of the United Nations for the personal competence of those who served on it, and the report is one which I think has advanced our work considerably.

76. Now it may be, and it is almost certainly so, that some of the details of this report will be shown to be inaccurate. But that is true of virtually all reports on current situations. Later statistics and later facts that come to light show that there have been inaccuracies. In Angola there have been more than the normal number of hazards, because Angola is a large territory where the statistics are naturally rather limited and based sometimes on flimsy foundations. The Sub-Committee, furthermore, did not have access to Angola, and so the report was compiled under certain difficulties. The permanent representative of Portugal in his statement here on the opening day of this
debate [1088th meeting] criticized some of the details of the report and stated that he would circulate a document containing further criticisms. He feels sure that even if the report is shown to be wrong in some of its details, the general impression created by the report is an accurate one—accurate having regard to the various limitations which the authors of the report themselves have set forth in it. They have at various stages pointed to the limitations on the information available to them. But the general picture, I believe, is one that represents the state of affairs in Angola today, and draws our attention very clearly to the fact that the representatives of the people taking part in this debate will have to take account in trying to work out a solution to the question of Angola.

77. I should like to make this further comment. On many points where details might be open to question, it is not really material whether the exact figures quoted are correct. I do not think it is going to be very profitable or necessary for us in this debate to go into a detailed discussion of whether the report accurately reflects the number of schools, the number of hospitals, the amount of electric power or the length of roads in Angola. Nor is it really necessary to go into a detailed examination of the nature and extent of terrorist activity in Angola or its localities. The representative of Portugal maintained in this debate that the number of terrorists was quite small and that the area in which they were operating was a limited one. Now whether this is true or not, I believe that the size or the extent of terrorist activity or of insurgency is not a basic factor in determining the general principles that should apply to the Angolan question.

78. Surely, the principle that should underlie any development of the factors that will be the people taking into account in trying to work out a solution to the question of Angola, is that the number of terrorists is quite small and that the area in which they are operating is a limited one. Now whether this is true or not, I believe that the extent of terrorist activity or of insurgency is not a basic factor in determining the general principles that should apply to the Angolan question.

79. From what I have already said, I believe that the general attitude of the Australian Government will have emerged. The Government of Portugal has hitherto declined to treat the territory of Angola as a Self-Governing Territory. It has maintained that it is a part of metropolitan Portugal and that therefore it is not necessary for the Government of Portugal to render reports, in accordance with Chapter XI of the Charter, on constitutional principles. It seems to me that it would be profitable to go into the legal considerations. When we embark on legal discussions we often find ourselves in the position of having to lay down principles that govern a wide range of situations differing perhaps in so many respects from the one that is under consideration that it is difficult to get agreement. But in a case like the present one, which we can all regard in the light of common sense and our general knowledge of the conditions of the territory and its people, it seems to me that the Government of Portugal may take account of the constitutional status of its territories, it would be, to say the least, wise for them to regard Angola as a territory falling within Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, with all that that implies, and that implies, in the first place, regular reporting to the United Nations in accordance with the Charter.

80. It appears also to the Australian Government that the Government of Portugal should recognize, irrespective of any legal or constitutional principles that it regards as applying in this situation, that the people of Angola are entitled to exercise freely and genuinely the right of self-determination, to a genuine exercise of the right to self-determination.

81. These views have been conveyed by my Government to the Government of Portugal, last October, when the United Nations Sub-Committee was well embarked upon its work, the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Menzies, sent a message to the Prime Minister of Portugal, Mr. Salazar, and indicated to him that it was Australia's view that the Government of Portugal should base its approach on these considerations, that is to say, that it should regard Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory under Chapter XI of the Charter, that it should report on Angola to the United Nations, and that it should recognize that the people of Angola are entitled to exercise freely and genuinely the right of self-determination.

82. These are the policies that Australia has followed at this session of the Assembly. We voted for the resolution [1899 (XVI)] adopted during the first part of this session, on the transmission of information by the United Nations to the Governments concerned. We felt on conditions in that territory.

83. We all know that at this moment Portugal feels itself in a rather lonely position: it feels that its friends are not giving it the support it believes itself entitled to. On this I would like to make two observations. The first is this: that in order for the friends of Portugal to give it their full support, it is necessary for Portugal itself to pursue policies that make it possible for that support to be given, that is, the policy of the vast majority of the Members of this Assembly, that are Administrating Members as well as those that are not, that the principles of the Charter in regard to self-determination should be applied. As to what has happened in the past, we see that the United Kingdom has given and is giving the right of self-determination to British colonies; the Government of France has done it, the Governments of the Netherlands, of Belgium, of New Zealand and of Australia have done it. Can we, therefore, say, and can the Government of Portugal expect us to say, that although this is done by all the other countries, that it is only by the offensive and compliant policy of Portugal that it can really take a place in Africa's future. I believe that its self-determination is the only way the interests of its people may be given the full attention to which they are entitled.

The Subject of the partition of the territory of Angola and the interests of the Portuguese and the representatives of Portugal, the Portuguese have had a long history of association with Angola. On the other hand, fully
to depend on the unquestioning support of its friends in that attitude?

84. I submit for the consideration of the Government of Portugal that it should, after listening to what is said in this debate and hearing the views of so many countries, consider whether it might adjust its policies so that it can receive the support, not only of fellow Administrating Members, but also of other Members of the Assembly.

85. The second comment I would make on this evident belief by Portugal that it should receive more support from its friends is this—that it would not be accurate for Portugal to judge who are its friends and who are its enemies on the basis of the attitude they are adopting on the question of Angola. In point of fact, many countries which now find that they cannot go all the way with the Government of Portugal are nevertheless friendly to Portugal and desirous of the advancement and prosperity and continued status and prestige of Portugal. Take the countries of Western Europe, the countries of Latin America—in particular I would mention Brazil. I am sure we were all greatly influenced by the moving speech that was made on the first day of this debate by the representative of Brazil, a speech which was imbued throughout with love of Portugal and of Portuguese culture and a desire to preserve Portugal as a force in the world, and not only in Africa.

86. But apart from those countries that might be regarded as obvious friends of Portugal, there are many others in Asia and in Africa. In talking in the lobbies here to representatives of many Asian countries and many African countries, I have been very impressed with their desire that the Angola question should be settled in a way that is consonant with the dignity of Portugal, that preserves for Portugal some role in the region not only of Angola but of Africa as a whole. I do not think it is correct or statesmanlike of Portugal to feel that if it does not receive unquestioned support on this matter in this debate those who are lacking in this whole-hearted support are inimical to Portugal or desirous of striking Portugal down.

87. In fact, looking at the realities of the situation and the path that Portuguese policies are following at this moment, it is an act of friendship to say quite bluntly that Portuguese policies are leading to a deadlock, that it is only by breaking out of that deadlock that it is possible for Portugal to recover the peaceful and voluntary way, and in a timely way, that Portugal can really preserve its essential interests and its place in Africa and in the world. I believe that Portugal's future lies in the acceptance of the principle of self-determination for the people of Angola; if it accepted that, Portugal could maintain its historical, its cultural and its economic and social links with Angola and with Africa.

88. The Sub-Committee has a great many of things to say on this in its report. It says for example—and the representative of the United Arab Republic drew attention to this paragraph earlier this afternoon—

"The Sub-Committee believes that the recognition of the personality of Angola, the primacy of the interests of the inhabitants of the territory, the acceptance of the principle of self-determination to Angola and the need for immediate steps to prepare Angola for self-government are not antithetical to the vital interests or the historic mission of the Portuguese people. Such steps are, on the other hand, fully consistent with the recognition of racial equality and the proclaimed philosophy of Portugal." [A/4978, para. 469.]

89. The Australian Government agrees with that observation by the Sub-Committee. And, further on, the Sub-Committee says that it is

"... convinced that constructive co-operation between the Government of Portugal and the United Nations is the best means of bringing about a prompt end to the conflict and a peaceful evolution towards the objectives stated in the United Nations resolutions. It feels that rapid measures by the Government of Portugal can still preserve the positive elements of past policies and achievements" [ibid., para. 475].

And there are other remarks in the report. It says, for example:

"The Sub-Committee notes that the representatives of the Angolan groups heard by it, including those accused by the Government of Portugal of responsibility for the recent disturbances, stressed their desire for a peaceful solution of the problem and for co-operation among racial groups within Angola on the basis of equality." [ibid., para. 475].

90. I could read many other extracts from this report. They present a picture of the possibilities of Portugal's taking steps which will open the way to the preservation of Portugal's continued association with the territories where it has formerly been. We therefore urge that Portugal regard Angola as non-self-governing, that it report under Chapter XI of the Charter, and that it recognize that the principle of self-determination shall apply. If this session of the General Assembly can make it plain that there is a general, broadly-based view of United Nations Members to this effect it will be a constructive step. I think if we can indicate some broadly-based view—not one that comes from one group of the Assembly only, not one that does not represent some of those countries which Portugal regards as more traditionally its friends than others, but a broadly-based consensus—then we shall have taken a step forward.

91. Perhaps Portugal cannot at this session indicate its concurrence. I think that if we all look at this question in practical terms we can see that there are difficulties in the way of the Government of Portugal's saying at this session, after this debate, that it will vote, that it will accept a view, even if it represents the view of the vast majority of us. But we can hope that, after the debate and after the session adjourns, the Government of Portugal will weigh carefully in the balance all that is said, and that it will take due account of the composition of those who are voting for whatever resolution emerges because in a situation such as this it is often more important to have a broad, widely based composition in favour of a resolution than simply to have a large number. If Portugal can accept that, regardless of whatever constitutional arrangements it has for Angola and other overseas territories, the right of self-determination shall apply, then there will be a basis for future co-operation between Portugal and the United Nations and a basis for the peaceful development of Angola and for a peaceful emergence in relation to the whole of this question in the areas surrounding Angola.

92. It is not, of course, denied—and least of all does Australia deny—that Portugal has achievements to its credit. Portugal has been in Angola for centuries. There is much that it has done, and no one would deny
it. Nor do we wish to exclude Portugal from a future role in Angola. In the immediate future, even if the principle of self-determination is accepted, there is still much to be done. Portugal, above all, will have a task in preparing the conditions for independence because, as I think the Sub-Committee makes very clear, this is not a simple question of development. Even after the principle of self-determination is accepted, there is still much to be done—much to be done in ensuring that a genuine right of self-determination will be exercised and that conditions exist for a truly independent State. It is complicated and it will take time.

93. I think it is reasonable to expect that Portugal will weigh what we have said. We must hope that, after doing so, it will come some way toward meeting the General Assembly. It did co-operate, to some extent, with the Sub-Committee. It invited the Chairman of the Sub-Committee to visit Lisbon. It did make available some information. It did not do as much as many of us would have hoped. For example, it is a pity that it did not allow the Sub-Committee to visit Angola. But it did not adopt as rigid an attitude as it had originally adopted. We must hope that now it will be prepared to look at the situation again.

94. We do not want to cut Portugal off from the rest of the Members of this Organization, and we do not want Portugal itself to take steps that would cut it off from this Organization. On the contrary, we want to see Portugal along on the whole stream of mankind in its approach to the problems of our twentieth century. So far from wanting to ostracize Portugal, we want to associate it more closely, just as other Administrating Powers have been associated, in our common endeavour to raise standards of living throughout the world and to promote self-government in all those regions of the world that are not independent at present.

95. Thus, I do not speak in any spirit of hostility to Portugal. On the contrary, I hope that, if we have a practical approach, if we have a practical resolution designed to bring Portugal along rather than to drive it away or to ostracize it or to deny it recognition of its problems and recognition of what it has done—if, as I hope, we try to bring Portugal along with us, then the General Assembly will have made a constructive and, I hope, a productive approach at this session.

Mr. Slim (Tunisia) resumed the Chair.

96. Mr. MALALASEKERA (Ceylon): We feel that we cannot embark on the question of Angola without taking some notice of the strange interlude between the two parts of this session of the General Assembly in which the United Nations received, as a misguided Christmas present, one of the most violent attacks in its sixteen-year-old history. Nor is this assault on the world Organization irrelevant to the issue before us, since the assault came largely from colonialist sources at the eve of the resumed session, which has been summoned to deal almost entirely with the problems of colonialism. Indeed, the sharpest words about the United Nations were uttered in a major statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Portugal, whose colony, Angola, has become a major problem for the world Organization.

97. The campaign, however, was opened not in Lisbon but in London, where the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, also in a major public statement, expressed his annoyance with the United Nations, chiefly, it should be noted, on colonialist grounds, and possibly on grounds not unrelated to Angola as well as to the British colonies. As we sit in this hall, one of the most unforgettable experiences we enjoy is the series of impressions that pass before us in a seemingly endless procession. To me, one of the most striking of these impressions has been the concern which some of our British fellow members of the Commonwealth have shown in putting up, on behalf of the Belgian and Portuguese colonies, a defence even more stubborn than they have done for those territories still under British control. It makes one wonder just how many British Empires there really are and have been. Could it be that we have vastly underestimated British colonial interest?

98. Representatives may perhaps recall that mine was a lone voice when I issued a warning from this platform, on 20 December 1961 [1961-62th meeting] when the clouds of this anti-United Nations campaign were gathering, pressing the thunder and lightning which followed. It was a source of deep gratification to me, therefore, when the Chairman of the United Nations. Security Council subsequently injected this attack in a number of public statements made by him. I am sure we who cherish the United Nations are all deeply beholden to him for this.

99. But, in the words of the poet Byron, "persecution's rage" continued in a campaign which hystically and methodically struck out variously at the Organization, at the decisions of the General Assembly, at the so-called "new nations" and at the alleged abuse of their majority vote. It is surely surprising that prominent members of the free world who find the yoke of a majority decision so heavy upon them. Much of the criticism was levelled against what has been described as the small nations, who were accused of making irresponsible decisions. Well, what can we say about these small nations whose numbers some big Powers seem to resent? Perhaps we may repeat what that great American, Abraham Lincoln, once said of the common people: "God must have loved them, because he made so many of them." As far as the small nations are concerned, their numbers are going to increase.

100. The objection has been raised that there are now too many of these small nations in the Organization. This objection is a strange argument when the small Powers which are at present frantically engaged in partitioning their colonial areas into small, province-size, real estate pal ces which they can dominate as politically puny and economically unviable States, even at the price of augmenting the United Nations membership to numbers which now annoy them. It would appear, however, that they begrudge even this small price which they have been called upon to pay for their hegemony.

101. Surely they cannot have it both ways. They cannot chop up areas into midsize-sized independent States and then complain of a soaring membership in this world Organization. But over and above these pettifogging arguments has been the overriding and growing fear that the United Nations was moving too vigorously and too decisively towards the liquidation of the remaining colonial areas. Certain members of the free world mustered every device of modern propaganda to put the brake on the United Nations movement to free colonial peoples from oppression, from exploitation, from colonial wars and, at times, even from genocide. On the eve of this resumed session, the campaign was obviously designed to intimidate the Assembly, to threaten the very last.
threaten walk-outs and resignations and to menace the very life of this Organization.

102. But I do not think that this Assembly will allow itself to be intimidated. I do not believe that it will allow itself to be threatened and deterred from pursuing its duty under the Charter. When critics of the United Nations argue that its high purposes cannot be achieved, we might agree and say, yes, with the failure of many attempts to browbeat and to intimidate this world Assembly from doing its duty.

103. Like other campaigns in the past, this one too has sustained an ignominious defeat. In the United Kingdom only one newspaper supported the critics. The blast from Lisbon failed in its impact; in this country it enjoyed some press support but none that aroused anything except the seeming disdain of the vast majority of the great American people.

104. In this connexion, my delegation would wish to pay tribute to President Kennedy for the position which he took in this storm, with courage to reject the criticism even at the risk of offending some of America's closest allies. His wise words on this episode are worth repeating from this universal rostrum. Said President Kennedy:

"Our instrument and our hope is the United Nations, and I see little merit in the impatience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instrument because they dislike our imperfect world.

Referring to a world of troubles, President Kennedy stated:

"And if the Organization is weakened, these troubles can only increase."

105. These, if I may say so, are wise words and they assume special significance because they formed part of the President's message to Congress, with all the prestige which a major policy declaration has in the eyes of the American people and the eyes of the world. And if this Assembly needs a guiding rule by which to approach the question before us—"the situation in Angola"—these words could give us guidance. If the Assembly permits itself to be intimidated, the United Nations will be weakened, and if it is weakened our troubles in Africa will increase, and not in Africa only, but throughout the world.

106. My delegation regrets to note that the representative of Portugal has chosen to take an opposite course, a course of reviling the General Assembly, and even the Security Council, and of denying the United Nations and the decisions taken by both bodies of the United Nations. His whole speech can be reduced—as indeed, the representative of Portugal has reduced it—to the unmitigated expression of a huge persecution complex. Sovereignty is upheld here, he says, "except when Portugal is concerned" [108th meeting, para. 63]. The Charter, he says, is upheld "except when it is a question of accusing Portugal" [ibid., para. 64] and so on. This sense of persecution runs like a pathological refrain throughout his statement.

107. Medically speaking, we all know how dangerous a persecution complex can be in an individual; and history, very recent history, teaches us how much more dangerous to peace such a persecution complex can be when it becomes the neurosis of an entire State which has at its disposal military forces in occupation and has dominion over another people.

108. My delegation has no hesitation whatsoever in adding its own voice to the condemnation which has already been so unmistakably expressed both in the General Assembly and in the Fourth Committee about the perpetration by the Government of Portugal of its acts of physical violence in Angola and its obstinacy and relentlessness in defending a cause which the world has condemned as dangerous to peace and security. This is not the time to theorize or to enter into further legal matters which have been exhaustively debated here and in the Security Council before. Nor is it our wish, with due deference to the efforts of the Sub-Committee on Angola, to ask its members why the Security Council or the Assembly has not been interminably kept informed of the events in that unfortunate country. We know that the state of war between Portugal and Angola is being perpetuated; and in saying this I am only quoting the words of Dr. Adriano Moreira, the Minister for Overseas Portugal, who described the situation in Angola in these very words, in his statement before the Legislative Council of Angola on 2 May 1961. In spite of certain claims and pronouncements by the Government of Portugal since, we know only too well that the fighting goes on relentlessly even now, at this very moment, as we are debating this matter. The Sub-Committee confirms this view in no uncertain terms in paragraph 438 of its report.

109. There is never anything moral or legal in any war and there is but one paramount principle that will guide my delegation in its attitude towards the situation in Angola: we must check the aggressor and offer our undivided sympathy and help to the victims of the aggression. And I wonder if there is one single member in this hall who has any doubt as to who in this case is the aggressor and who is the victim.

110. We have heard for the last five years, since Portugal's admission to the United Nations in 1955, all the legal and constitutional arguments and reasons as to why Portugal cannot inform the United Nations of developments and conditions in Angola, why Portugal cannot contemplate the granting of independence to Angola, and why Portugal must defy the almost unanimous international opinion. We heard individually by Members and globally through decisions taken in this Organization by the Security Council, the General Assembly and some of its subsidiary bodies. We have heard these arguments ad nauseam and more, and if anything we are even less convinced of their validity now than we were before.

111. On previous occasions my own delegation, along with others, has rejected the Portuguese theses and has proved that not only were they incorrect, but that they were morally untenable and militated against the reality of our times. My delegation is not willing to be dragged into any further legalistic or constitutional discussions, since these will be a mere digression from the subject under our consideration. But we do want to say, categorically, that it is unethical and hypocritical to talk about laws and provisions and constitutions when thousands of people die for the rights that are naturally due to them. If the Portuguese Constitution contains clauses obstructing Angola's aspirations for independence and compelling Portugal to wage war against it, then we say, delete these clauses. If the United Nations has any laws or provisions allowing or tolerating Portugal's claims and its
defiance, then we say, do they with such laws and such provisions, since they do not serve the purposes, aspirations and objectives of the United Nations.

112. But we know that the United Nations has no such laws, no such provisions, and that it is only the interpretation given by Portugal to the Charter, and we also know that such interpretation leaves Portugal isolated and roaming outside the boundaries of international law and international public opinion.

113. The context of the Sub-Committee's report [A/4978 and Corr.2] is known to Members, and so is the situation prevailing in Angola. Even if all the facts of this situation could not be depicted in detail in the report and properly evaluated, the picture which emerges from it is grim enough to cause sadness and great anxiety. I have no doubt that had the Sub-Committee received even a minimum of co-operation from the Portuguese Government, the report would have left little to desire from the viewpoint of completeness, accuracy and impartiality, that is, from all those assets already potentially perceptible in the report as we have it before us. There was just a faint glimmer of co-operation when, after the Portuguese Government had refused to recognise the Sub-Committee, the Prime Minister of that Government, Mr. Salazar, did extend to its Chairman, Mr. Salamanca of Chile, the courtesy of an interview. But it was astonishing that soon afterwards the scholarly Head of the Portuguese State, himself a historian, threatened to take his country out of the United Nations.

114. At this stage of our debate it is superfluous to discuss either the legal and constitutional elements surrounding the situation in Angola, or the details of the situation in Angola itself. We have already discussed these matters and know them well. Let us, rather, concentrate now on what steps this Assembly can take and what action is open to it to avert the dangers presented to the idea of the Angolan situation, to free the people of Angola from the scourges of war and of colonialism and to restore the prestige of the United Nations which has suffered as a result of the Intransigence of the Portuguese Government when it refused to look into the eyes of reality.

115. But, before I venture to mention the suggestions which my delegation would offer to the Assembly for the achievement of these objectives, may I draw attention to one point of which, I feel, we should be aware when considering the situation in Angola in its entirety. In the section of the Sub-Committee's report dealing with Portugal's reactions to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, a few references are made to the promulgation of legislation by the Portuguese Government on 8 September 1961, including a set of reforms in Portugal's overseas policy. The principal measure repeals the 1944 statute, and thus abolishes the legal distinction in Angola between the indigenous persons and the others.

116. While this basic reform would be appreciated as a step forward in the administration of the Territory, the circumstances under which it was introduced call for restraint and caution. This discrimination had gone on for several centuries, it had enjoyed legal sanction and its repeal now may therefore have come a little too late. Resentment and bitterness accumulated in Angola as a result of this discrimination and its aftermath, cannot be erased by a stroke of the pen, especially as the reform comes to the territory when it is at war with its oppressor, and when this war is for higher stakes than the removal of discrimination, that is, when it is for independence itself.

117. Granted, however, that such a reform could in principle be considered by the people as a desirable and possible basis for improvements in conditions, then there are two fundamental factors which decrease the value of this reform.

118. First, the Angolan people are not invited, it would seem, to compromise on make-shifts, they are intent on independence, and a few reforms are not likely to bring them closer to the metropolitan country. The people's attitude since September 1961 has given ample evidence of this fact.

119. Secondly, a reform is an act which, when introduced, must be workable, practicable and effective. It is the basic principle underlying any law, that an administration, when issuing that law, must be sure, in the light of common sense and practice, that such law has every possibility of being properly executed and enforced. In other words, the promulgation of any law, order or decree must be accompanied or preceded by the creation of circumstances which will make it efficacious and meaningful.

120. It is our contention that the September 1961 reform introduced by the Portuguese Government does not meet these requirements and therefore does not have the meaning which it purported to have. The reform, while professing to put an end to the distinction between the indigenous population and the fully privileged Portuguese citizen, does not at the same time provide for changes in those conditions which by Portuguese law had prevented the indigenous people from attaining the full status of citizenship. The labour laws which make it compulsory for an Africano to work at a certain age are still retained; the educational test for the acquisition of citizenship is also retained and we have the vicious circle: if you have to obtain citizenship you need some education; but how can you get education if you are subjected to laws which make it compulsory for you to work at a time when you should be at school?

121. Consequently, the reforms of which there is cautious mention in the report do not seem to prefigure any significant improvements for many years to come. Besides, even if this were not so, the Angolan people have unequivocally pronounced their desire for self-determination and independence, for the denial of which there is no reason. The people of Angola have evidenced their persistence and their determination to achieve independence by sacrificing their most valuable possession, that is, their own lives.

122. I have dealt at some length on this point, so that in formulating our proposals, we need not be led into the belief that things have changed for the better or that there is less reason for international concern. As does the report, we maintain that the emergency situation must be considered and re-presented, euphemistically referred to as "protective measures", and that, it is ready and willing to meet with the Angolan leaders around the
table and negotiate terms for self-determination and independence; if, in other words, it would heed the moving appeal made a little while ago by the representative of Australia.

124. My delegation noted with some relief that after his address to the Assembly, the Portuguese representative inaugurated only a half-boycott of this discussion. He took time to state his own case in all its fulness and, while he will not be in his seat to hear the views of the Assembly, he has reserved his right to come back and to comment on what we say. I must state that at this juncture it is not the Assembly which is striking a ludicrous attitude. Yet, it is an admission of a sort, an admission of the insecurity which Portugal feels in its defiant position, in spite of all the bravado and the threats expressed by its spokesmen.

125. We have taken note of these gestures, however minor and inconclusive, to dispel the Portuguese impression of a persecution complex, but even more so to be in line with the policy of my Government, which is to explore and exploit even the smallest possibility of bringing about a peaceful solution to a controversial issue, especially an issue involving war and peace. We would earnestly hope that the Government of Portugal may expand these tiny gestures into positive steps of major co-operation. We would appeal again and again to the Portuguese Government to see the realities of the situation and the dangers with which the situation is fraught. But, if the Portuguese Government persists in its defiance of the United Nations, if it continues to challenge the resolution [1603 (XV)] of the General Assembly, adopted on 20 April 1961 by an overwhelming majority, and if it challenges the supreme authority of the Security Council and its resolution of 9 June 1961, my delegation must take into account the responsibility which this Organization has, first and foremost, to the people of Angola who, under the Charter, are a trust of this world Organization. It is the people of Angola, their plight, their suffering and their martyrdom which challenge the United Nations either to assert itself or to renounce its moral responsibility at this historic juncture of the world-wide liberation of all peoples.

126. As far as my delegation is concerned, the two resolutions referred to above are no longer adequate. They sit on the side of appeasement. They suffer from an inadequate emphasis on the paramount principle of self-determination and eventual independence. These resolutions have in fact become dated in the light of the Sub-Committee's report. What does this report tell us? It tells us that the disturbances in Angola are, among other factors, due to:

"...the impact of African nationalism, the rise of political groups seeking redress of grievances and the right of self-determination..." [A/4978, para. 430].

In another passage, the report states:

"The rapid spread of the conflict show that the rebellion has as its main cause genuine and widespread discontent and a growing spirit of nationalism..." [Ibid., para. 441.]

But even more significant is this statement:

"It is too much to hope that the nationalist sentiments aroused in the Angolan population and the desire for change will subside and that the status quo can be re-established." [Ibid., para. 442.]

127. In these statements the Sub-Committee gives us the broad background of the Angolan issue—that is, the background of the supreme principle of self-determination leading to independence.

128. This point is emphasized in the Sub-Committee's observations on what has to be done. It urges drastic reforms, and I quote—"...also the formulation of plans to prepare the territory for self-government and the exercise of self-determination..." [Ibid., para 47].

The report ends with these wise, imaginative and constructive words:

"Much time has been lost in a critical situation, with the casualties and the bitterness mounting in Angola. What is needed is readiness to understand the new forces in the world, courage to accept change, and wisdom to formulate and pursue viable means towards an enduring peaceful solution." [Ibid., para. 480.]

129. The report also points out how much benefit would be derived in the solution of this whole problem, from Portugal's co-operation with the United Nations—a co-operation which we sincerely believe would strengthen, not weaken, Portugal's own best interests. We would heartily favour this course, if Portugal accepted the United Nations decision. But, if it will not, it seems to us that this Assembly has no alternative but to take certain positive steps. It must then condemn Portugal's defiance as it has already done with regard to the failure of Portugal to supply information concerning its colonial territories. It must assert strongly the principle of self-determination and eventual independence in conformity with the general principles laid down in the historic resolution on colonialism of 1960. It must alert the Security Council to invoke sanctions if that step should ultimately become necessary in order to secure compliance with the decisions of the Council and of the Assembly.

130. My delegation is aware that some countries—for example, the United States—are opposed to sanctions, and we appreciate their reluctance. We mention this because the United States is one of the five permanent members of the Council. We understand that the United States position is based on the general repugnance we all have for invoking sanctions and we must agree that sanctions should most certainly be only a last resort, as indeed they are, under the Charter. But let me state first that the Charter is very strong in its provision for invoking sanctions against a recalcitrant Member State. If we eliminate these provisions from the Charter, we shall then have indeed a toothless Charter and a spineless Organization. When the United States called on this Assembly to deny the seating of Communist China on the grounds of Peking's alleged defiance of the United Nations, was it not invoking more sanctions upon already applied sanctions? Furthermore, is not the United States at this very moment engaged in a sustained effort to persuade the Organization of American States to apply the principle of sanctions in the case of Cuba?

131. As I have said, we must not think of sanctions, except as a very last resort. But, at the same time, we feel it would be dangerous to oppose sanctions as a principle and an operative procedure in the world Organization which having at its disposal military
force of its own, has only these powers with which to assert its authority at a stage in its evolution when its authority is being augmented to universal proportions.

132. If the great Western Powers want to deny the Assembly the use of this power, then it is their responsibility to give it a substitute. Portugal is a member of NATO. The strength and resources, including the weapons, which it enjoys and which it is using against the people of Angola so mercilessly, are largely derived from the benefits which accrue to it from this mighty alliance. If its allies decline to resort to sanctions even where necessary, they can do so only by a clear commitment to use their influence and powers of persuasion with the Portuguese Government to get it to cease this senseless defiance and to cooperate with the world organization even as they—the great Western Powers themselves— cooperate with it so significantly.

133. These are some of the views of my delegation on the situation in Angola. I have tried to present them as impartially as I can. They are not directed against Portugal, but they are addressed to Portugal, which regrettably enough, is not present here to participate in these discussions as it should. I trust, however, that, even if only to satisfy his curiosity, the representative of Portugal will read my statement. Equally, I hope and trust that the wind of change will, in its path, touch the Portuguese Government's heart and good sense. My own country's association with Portugal goes as far back as 1605. The Portuguese who came to us at the beginning of the sixteenth century brought with them to Ceylon the noble teachings of Christianity and the vast culture associated with that great religion. For this we are deeply grateful. Even today, the most popular dance-form in Ceylon is that introduced there by the Portuguese. The many thousands of people who to this day carry Portuguese names bear witness to the closeness of our relationship. We are very sincere, therefore, in our desire to maintain friendship with Portugal and its people, but we cannot, we must not, forget our duty to humanity and to the ideals which we profess and hold dear.

134. I should be failing in my duty if I did not express my delegation's appreciation of the Sub-Committee's effort, under the distinguished guidance of Mr. Salamanca of Bolivia, in the preparation of the report which is both revealing of much of what goes on in Angola and has been presented to us in a very readable form. Whether or not the Assembly should decide that this Sub-Committee should continue its efforts or that its activities should be taken over by another competent body of the United Nations, such as, for instance, the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, will probably be a matter of some deliberation in the Assembly. Whatever the outcome of the decision, a vote of thanks to the Sub-Committee should be included in any resolution that the Assembly may care to adopt on the situation in Angola.

135. In conclusion, my delegation would repeat its conviction that it is the duty of this Assembly to meet the challenge that is presented to it, the challenge of its critics and the challenge of history. The United Nations has been accused by critics of being weak. Our reply should be to increase our strength. Let the Assembly answer intimidation with courage and with constructive and fruitful decisions, unswayed by the fear of offending others. We are being called upon to slow down the pace of colonial liberation. Our unequivocal reply should be to stand fast by our historic resolutions, to quicken the pace, not to slow it; otherwise we shall be left dragging like an impotent tail on the kite of history and the new winds that should blow us to the sunny lands of the future will instead blow us only into the dustbins of the past. The United Nations is and must remain the voice of humanity—the hope of mankind and, especially at this critical moment, the hope of the valiant people of Angola who look to this vast universal conscience of nations to vindicate their unrelenting struggle for human rights. Let us not fail them in the hour of their agony.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.