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1. Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic):  
Before I begin my statement I should like, on behalf of my  
delegation, to congratulate very heartily the representatives  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Byelorussian  
Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist  
Republic on the occasion of the fifty-sixth anniversary of  
the great socialist October Revolution. It is a great honour  
for me to speak on this date which, 56 years ago, opened a  
new chapter of human history, an event which paved the  
way to come to peace and understanding amongst peoples  
and to general and complete disarmament.

2. In its statement at the 1941st meeting on agenda item  
32, on the World Disarmament Conference, the delegation  
of the German Democratic Republic has already expressed  
its view that agreement on practical measures of disarma-  
ment is indispensable in order to consolidate the results  
achieved so far on the road to détente. Today we should  
like to comment on such concrete disarmament questions  
as are on the agenda of this Committee.

3. Many of the disarmament questions have for long been  
the subject of thorough discussions. In the first resolution  
of the General Assembly, the States Members of the United  
Nations in 1946 came out unanimously in favour of the  
elimination of nuclear weapons and all other kinds of  
weapons of mass destruction. They thus expressed their  
conviction that disarmament and especially the elimination  
of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most  
prominent tasks of the United Nations, which was created  
for the maintenance of world peace and international  
security.

4. The decisions of the anti-Hitler coalition made at the  
same time, in particular the Potsdam Agreement, contained  
stipulations prohibiting especially the possession of any  
kind of weapons of mass destruction, with binding force for  
the successor States of the former German Reich: the  
German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of  
Germany.

5. The German Democratic Republic has come into being on an anti-fascist and democratic basis and has always recognized the legally binding force of those stipulations and has acted accordingly. The continuous efforts of the German Democratic Republic for disarmament, in particular for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, correspond to the conviction which is deeply rooted in the people of the German Democratic Republic that a secure, peaceful order and the elimination of the danger of wars provide the necessary conditions for the development of the creative forces of the people in the social system which they have chosen for themselves. Accordingly, the German Democratic Republic has advocated concrete steps towards disarmament in the framework of the possibilities it has had so far in connexion with sessions of the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and it has immediately acceded to existing agreements.

6. In the discussions in this Committee it has been pointed out that the aggravation of international tension has given birth to the arms race and has accelerated it. That statement is correct, but it does not contain the whole truth. Relaxation does not automatically start the process of disarmament. One has to take into consideration that in certain countries there are active influential economic circles which have profited from the arms race and use a variety of means at their disposal to keep the arms race alive and to aggravate political tension. In view of that situation, then, steps towards disarmament are possible to the extent that and in so far as Governments, in keeping with their international responsibility—which is, at the same time, the responsibility to their own people—assume and implement disarmament obligations which will increasingly restrict the activities of special interests hostile to peace and to mankind.

7. The broad support which the Soviet initiative on the reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council has found so far proves that strong forces are in favour of changing the over-all situation in the field of disarmament.

8. In the field of nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII) annex*] constitutes the most important result of the efforts made so far with a view to restricting the arms race. The report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows clearly that that Treaty has found world-wide support. The German Democratic Republic is a party to that Treaty.

9. Our delegation also shares the concern that has been expressed—for instance, in the statements of the representative of Sweden—that, so far, only a few of the so-called near-nuclear-weapon States are represented among the States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. Now that the control Agreement has been concluded between IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)—to which other near-nuclear-weapon States have subscribed—we hope that those States will soon ratify the non-proliferation Treaty. This will, without doubt, have a favourable influence on the ratification of the Treaty by other States.

10. So long as stockpiles of nuclear weapons exist, efforts must be increased to prevent the use of those weapons. In this connexion, the solemn declaration made by the United Nations at its twenty-seventh session on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons [*resolution 2936 (XXVII)*] deserves to be especially stressed. In our opinion, no more time should be lost and the Security Council should, according to the recommendations in that declaration, take a decision on its full implementation.

11. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as the strongest form of the use of force would essentially speed up the process of disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons. The agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments concluded last year between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America prove that it is possible in general, today to come to an agreement on measures for nuclear disarmament.

12. Of equal importance is the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War [*see A/9293*] which was concluded this year between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This Agreement, while reducing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war between those two Powers and thus restricting the danger of the outbreak or extension of military conflicts altogether, creates also a stronger basis for disarmament measures in the nuclear field. But at the same time it becomes more and more obvious that all nuclear Powers must assume a constructive attitude towards disarmament in order to achieve further progress.

13. It is particularly necessary that all nuclear States stop all nuclear tests in all environments. A comprehensive test ban would mean that all nuclear States would assume the obligations contained in the Moscow Treaty of 1963 Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,<sup>1</sup> and that an agreement on the cessation of all underground nuclear tests would be concluded.

14. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic shares the view long held by a great number of States that the observance of a ban on underground nuclear tests can be sufficiently controlled by national means. This in our opinion has been corroborated by the results of the discussions that were held this year in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. No State can at present carry out nuclear tests however small without the risk of discovery. The advantages that a possible violator of a test ban agreement strives for, would not be worth the disadvantages with which he would have to reckon in the case of a discovery of his violation of a treaty.

15. The scientific and technical discussions of experts held in Geneva this year on these questions may have yielded interesting details. But they are not a substitute for a political decision on the cessation of nuclear tests.

16. The German Democratic Republic is a signatory of the Moscow Treaty of 1963. Long ago it declared its readiness to accede to an agreement on the prohibition of under-

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 696, p. 43.

ground nuclear tests, an agreement guaranteed by national means of detection and verification. It is further prepared to take part in an international exchange of seismic data within the framework of such an agreement.

17. Another important task is the comprehensive prohibition of all chemical and biological weapons. The report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the consequences of chemical and bacteriological warfare<sup>2</sup> clearly demonstrated the tremendous dangers inherent in these weapons of mass destruction.

18. The German Democratic Republic has for a long time taken a share in the initiatives aimed at the prohibition of those weapons and their complete removal from the armaments arsenals of all States. It considers the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and on measures for their destruction submitted by the socialist States to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session<sup>3</sup> as an appropriate solution and has supported it. As it is known, an agreement on a simultaneous prohibition of both the chemical and bacteriological weapons failed because of the opposition of some Western States.

19. The German Democratic Republic considers the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI) annex*] as a first measure for the complete elimination of a weapon of mass destruction and at the same time as an important step on the road to its comprehensive prohibition on all chemical and bacteriological weapons. It acceded to this Convention and ratified it. We express the hope that this Convention will soon enter into force by the ratification of all depository States.

20. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction submitted by the socialist States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in March 1972<sup>4</sup> provides a good basis for concrete negotiations. Unfortunately no such negotiations were started last year or this year, because several members of the Committee rejected the draft convention without submitting concrete proposals.

21. In view of the significance which is attached to the questions of controlling the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist States have submitted a working paper [*A/9141, annex II, sect. 11*] containing explanations on the stipulations in the relevant draft. We should like to draw attention in particular to the remarks made in the working paper with regard to the establishment of national control commissions. The co-operation of representatives of

governmental bodies and social organizations as well as of experts, as for instance, chemists and economists, on these commissions would essentially strengthen the guarantees for the observance of the convention. The authority and effectiveness of these commissions could be increased even more, if the Member States would, through relevant legal regulations, attribute to these commissions the authority necessary for the discharge of their tasks.

22. The question of how to increase the guarantees for the observance of disarmament agreements is of general importance. Our epoch is characterized by détente and growing confidence in international relations. Many peoples and Governments are interested in making the process of détente irreversible by disarmament agreements. We have to make use of this interest in order to strengthen the guarantees of disarmament agreements. The working paper of the socialist States shows such possibilities. Those ways are more efficient and easier to implement than highly sophisticated methods of technical control.

23. It is true that the exchange of opinions that took place in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the prohibition of chemical weapons, has not yet yielded a draft convention, but it was of use for the elaboration of such a draft convention.

24. Of special interest in that connexion is the working paper of the 10 non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons [*ibid., sect. 8*]. The working paper of the Japanese delegation [*ibid., sect. 21*] also deserves careful examination.

25. The German Democratic Republic has attached great importance to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since it was convened. The multilateral measures of arms limitation and disarmament were a result of the work of that Conference. The German Democratic Republic participated in many initiatives of the socialist members of that body, and has supported its activity in many ways. That is an expression of our appreciation of the Conference as an important and proven international organ for the bringing about of disarmament agreements. If during the last two years the Conference has not succeeded in submitting concrete results, the fault lies not in the organizational form but rather in the lack of readiness to co-operate of a number of Member States which resulted in no consensus on problems concerning the contents being reached. It would be welcomed if at this session the General Assembly gave new impetus for the increased effectiveness of that body.

26. International efforts in the field of disarmament have now reached a stage at which the constructive co-operation of all nuclear Powers has become an important condition for further success. The States concerned should recognize their responsibility towards the peoples and act accordingly.

27. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): The interaction between disarmament and détente has been dwelt upon at length both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee by the preceding speakers. In fact we are at present witnessing concrete examples of that

<sup>2</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972*, document DC/235, annex B, section 5.

interaction—for instance, strategic arms limitation talks, on the one hand, and the talks on force reductions in central Europe, on the other.

28. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms have now moved into their second phase, which we hope will be fruitful in effectively curbing the spiral of the arms race through qualitative restrictions.

29. The talks on force reductions in central Europe, which started in Vienna on 30 October of this year, are another evidence of the close relationship between détente and disarmament. They are, in fact, interdependent with and complementary to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. One is aimed at establishing a permanent basis for political security and co-operation and the other at military security on the European continent. They represent two facets of the same problem; neither can exist without the other.

30. In contrast with those positive developments, it is unfortunate to observe that the atmosphere of détente is not reflected in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as much as in other disarmament forums. If we accept a close relationship between détente and disarmament, we should ask ourselves, if not the Conference, why in spite of favourable developments in the international atmosphere the Conference has not been able to achieve any tangible results. Is it because détente was not able to penetrate the somewhat calcified texture of the Conference? It would perhaps be more realistic to say that, although relaxation of tensions is no doubt a prerequisite of disarmament, disarmament is not an automatic corollary of détente and needs something more than mere relaxation of tensions.

31. We fully realize the positive role played by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the field of disarmament since its establishment. We are also convinced of the importance of preserving that forum. But it is a fact that its work has been stagnant for the last two years. That state of stagnation in the Conference, the only multilateral disarmament forum of a truly international character, is a source of concern for us. We note from the report [A/9141] that that sense of concern is shared by its members. However, mere acceptance of the fact is not enough. The lack of progress in the Conference inevitably damages the prestige of the Committee and consequently affects the role it can play in the disarmament field. With that in mind, my delegation finds it useful to give thought to ways and means of enhancing its effectiveness rather than idly observing the Committee gradually vanishing into the bulky annals of disarmament history.

32. The need for new impetus in the field of disarmament has been felt more emphatically by the international community, particularly in the last two years. The fact that the idea of convening a world disarmament conference has received general support from the international community is an expression of that need. We have on earlier occasions stated that the success of a world disarmament conference would constitute a major achievement in the field of disarmament. In that connexion we have also stressed that two prerequisites for the success of such a conference would be adequate preparation and universal participation,

including all nuclear Powers. In fact, those two conditions are closely related to one another. A preparatory body that does not ensure the co-operation of the nuclear States cannot be expected to fulfil its task.

33. The Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference established last year by General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII) was born with congenital defects which gave way to substantial differences and consequently rendered its task impossible. However, if, in spite of all those difficulties, the unofficial work of the Special Committee has produced some positive results and cleared the ground for further improvement, credit must go to Mr. Hoveyda of Iran, who, with his wisdom and skill, has turned his “Mission Impossible” not only into a “mission possible” but also into a successful mission. Due to the arduous efforts of Mr. Hoveyda we have now reached a stage where we can clearly identify the difficulties lying ahead of us and the alternatives that exist for our future work.

34. The first important problem we shall have to deal with in this General Assembly is to enlarge the present Special Committee or form a new preparatory body that will be able to carry out the mandate with which it is entrusted. In this connexion I wish to express the readiness of my delegation to participate in the enlarged Special Committee or in any new preparatory body with the aim of making a positive contribution to the preparation of the World Disarmament Conference.

35. Our second important problem is to ensure the co-operation of the nuclear States in one way or another. On this matter, we believe in the merits of proceeding carefully and slowly, and at the same time, seeking flexible solutions that would be acceptable to all nuclear States.

36. After forming a preparatory body that would achieve those two basic conditions, we can then ponder seriously the most propitious methods of preparing the conference.

37. This year is the tenth anniversary of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. This Treaty, besides its other important aspects, illustrates how a disarmament measure can contribute to an atmosphere of détente. We think the Treaty, being one of the most significant collateral measures aimed at curbing the vertical as well as the horizontal arms race, deserves our full attention. The experience we can draw from the preparation of this Treaty is interesting not only for reasons of history but also for our present efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

38. First of all, the Treaty, which was the result of five years of intensive negotiations, demonstrates the need for patience and flexibility, as far as the security requirements of the States allow, in the disarmament negotiations as well as the importance of political will and determination to achieve an agreement.

39. Then, if we recall that on several occasions during the negotiations the parties were on the brink of achieving an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, the Treaty can be seen as a missed opportunity. For example, by the end of 1960, agreement had been reached on a preamble, 17

articles and two annexes of a draft treaty for a comprehensive test ban, including one article which recognized the principle of international inspection. However, this agreement was not realized, because of the deterioration of the international atmosphere in 1960.

40. Then the idea of a threshold treaty, mentioned so often in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at a certain stage, formed a basis for a possible agreement on a comprehensive test ban. In early 1960 the countries mainly concerned were about to reach an understanding regarding the minimum threshold of detection.

41. These facts show that the area of disagreement on a comprehensive test ban was in fact very narrow during several stages of the negotiations. They may also call for a comparison between the present positions of the original parties to the Treaty on the same issues. I fear that such a comparison between present and past may not result very much in favour of the present, although technological advances have brought the thresholds of detection and identification to much lower levels. It is this contradiction between the political attitudes of the nuclear Powers and the technological advances that causes many States and also, if I may say so, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to speak about the lack of political will. This is even more justified in view of the fact that these two nuclear Powers have until now failed to submit any concrete proposals on a comprehensive test ban.

42. The partial test ban Treaty of 1963 has helped to reduce the radioactive fall-out in the atmosphere. It has contributed to détente and it has paved the way to further disarmament measures. However, it has not curbed the technological race in nuclear weapons except perhaps for some very large thermonuclear weapons. Underground nuclear tests have been continuing without any serious effort to stop them, which makes the pledge of the original parties to the partial test ban Treaty to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, questionable. What diminishes the effectiveness of the Treaty is that it has failed to gain the adherence of two nuclear Powers. While it is essential to have the co-operation of all the nuclear States to cease nuclear tests in all environments, it can also be argued that an agreement on a comprehensive test ban will produce discouraging effects on the remaining nuclear Powers with regard to continuing their tests by increasing international pressure on them.

43. My delegation also attaches importance to the work that is being carried out on seismic measures of detection and identification for the purposes of verification of a comprehensive test ban, although we are aware that the scientific advances in this field will be of limited value unless they are coupled with political negotiations. We have studied with interest the United States working papers submitted in 1972<sup>5</sup> and this year [A/9141, annex II, sect. 12] and the observations in the Netherlands working paper [ibid., sect. 24], particularly its related paragraphs on the evasion techniques. We believe the Committee on Disarmament has now a good deal of technical material that may justify a conference of experts on the seismic

capabilities for verification of a comprehensive test ban. We note that some informal meetings were held between 10 and 13 July of this year on this question and we cannot help asking whether it would not be appropriate to inform the General Assembly or the First Committee in an informal manner about the outcome of these meetings.

44. Another question of importance and urgency before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to prepare a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The report of the Conference reveals, regrettably, that the Committee has not yet passed from the stage of exploration to the stage of negotiation. The difficulties of achieving an agreement on chemical weapons stem from the very nature of the chemical agents. Chemical agents, while they are not under the monopoly of the big Powers, at the same time pose a great danger, since adequate protection against any kind of chemical weapon is not yet available. It is exactly for these reasons that this problem requires urgent and effective measures.

45. The negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament have once more emphasized the differences on two categories of problem: the scope and the verification of a treaty.

46. Regarding the question of finding a criterion to determine the scope of a prohibition, there now seems to be a broad agreement on the general purpose criterion. At the same time, a majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament tend to accept that a general purpose criterion is too subjective to be adopted as the only criterion and should be supplemented by more objective and technical criteria. The working papers of Japan [ibid., sect. 21] and of Canada [ibid., sect. 22] provide a useful basis for future work on this question.

47. The problem of verification, on the other hand, seems to be a more complicated one. On this question too there seems to be a consensus that the verification procedures should not be too intrusive, and that the interests of the chemical industry should be safeguarded. If we are determined to have a comprehensive agreement on chemical weapons, it is difficult to see how effective control—if effective control is sought—can be achieved without some degree of on-site inspection.

48. Our endeavours to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are in fact complementary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,<sup>6</sup> which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We believe that this relationship must be properly reflected in the Treaty prohibiting chemical weapons.

49. It is equally important to devote some of our attention to the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and this can be achieved, we think, both through ensuring universal participation in the Protocol and through withdrawal of the reservations made by the parties to the Protocol.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., sect. 31.

<sup>6</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, No. 2138, p. 65.

50. It would not be erroneous to say that as far as biological weapons are concerned most of these reservations are already obsolete, and they will become so for chemical weapons when the treaty prohibiting chemical weapons is achieved and enters into force. A step in this direction will undoubtedly promote the cause of a comprehensive ban.

51. All our efforts to prohibit existing weapons and to create a world where security is not based on an arms race will be similar to the efforts of Sisyphus if we cannot prevent the production of more deadly weapons in the future. Since the Second World War science and technology have made great advances. It is an unfortunate fact that military research is the largest single objective of world research and development efforts. This technological race results in stepping up the arms race either by improving already existing weapons or by developing new ones. We have read in *The New York Times* of 13 September 1973, for example, that intensive research is under way both in the United States and in the Soviet Union on laser weapons and that these weapons will be operational within 10 years. The same article states :

“Expenditure by military and aerospace agencies in the laser field are expected to average about \$317 million annually in the next five years.”

52. We cannot stop the advance of science and technology, but we must seriously consider the possibilities of directing the benefits of science and technology to peaceful purposes and to the welfare of all mankind.

53. May I end my statement with a quotation from Mr. Kissinger :

“In Greek mythology the gods sometimes punished man by fulfilling his wishes too completely. It has remained for the nuclear age to experience the full irony of this penalty.”

54. Mr. NANDAN (Fiji): My delegation intervenes in this general debate on disarmament because, remote and isolated as Fiji is from the major continents of the world, it has, together with other States and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Pacific region, fallen victim to the arms race.

55. As long as the arms race, based as it is on nuclear weapons superiority, continues, nations other than those possessing such superior weapons will be tempted to join the nuclear club of super-Powers. There is no doubt that the nuclear arms race is the greatest single threat to mankind. The enormity of this threat increases year by year. The halting of the nuclear arms race is proving to be as difficult as reversing it. If the elimination of nuclear weapons is to be achieved, then it is imperative that all the five nuclear-weapon Powers become seriously involved in international negotiations aimed towards an agreement on a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a concrete disarmament programme.

56. With the prevailing impasse and the failure to arrive at any agreement on a concrete programme for disarmament, my country can only voice its deep concern at the lack of progress in this field. Given the destructive capabilities of

nuclear weapons, no nation, however small or remote, can be expected to be spared in the event of a nuclear holocaust. A situation based on the existing equilibrium of terror and the fear of co-extirmination rather than co-existence does not constitute true peace in which all nations, big and small, can live in harmony with their environment and pursue their peaceful aspirations.

57. It is 10 years now since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, prohibiting the carrying out of a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, including outer space and under water or the high seas or in any other environment, if such an explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control the explosion is conducted. Ever since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, the international community has waited in vain for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It must be recorded with despair that a comprehensive test ban treaty today appears to be as remote as it was 10 years ago. In the meantime, constant and open flouting of the spirit of the partial test-ban Treaty, which has been ratified by some 106 States, continues. This is indeed a backward step.

58. More distressing and alarming, however, is the practice of one State in conducting its atmospheric nuclear tests deliberately in a region far removed from its metropolitan territory and at the hazardous risk to the peoples of the Pacific region. This is further compounded by that State's attempts to justify such conduct by the dubious argument that possession of nuclear weapons is “necessary for its security and independence” and that “possession of the atomic weapon would be the sole guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of the nation”.

59. It is no secret that during the period 1959 to 1963 strong protests were made by the African States already independent at that time against nuclear testing by France on the African continent. These protests included those of Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, and a unanimous condemnation of the tests in the Sahara by the League of Arab States. In the face of these protests, and with the liberation of Algeria from French domination, France moved its test site to the Pacific on Muroroa Atoll in the Tuamotu Archipelago, which is part of what is now known as French Polynesia.

60. When in 1963 it was officially announced that the test site was to be moved to the Pacific, there was widespread indignation and opposition from the Pacific people. This included the protests of leaders of the indigenous population of French Polynesia, among whom were the President of the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly and the Deputy representing Tahiti in the French National Assembly.

61. Since 1953, and especially since 1966, when the series of French nuclear tests in the Pacific began, countries in and around the Pacific region have consistently sought to end the continuation of these tests. Individual citizens, private organizations, trade unions and Governments in the region, individually and collectively, have made their pleas to France to refrain from further wanton contamination of their environment with man-made nuclear radiation. These

tests are of no benefit to the people of the region. On the contrary, they pose potential health hazards to them.

62. The most recent example of such an appeal was made by the Thirteenth South Pacific Conference in a resolution adopted on 18 September 1973 in Guam, which has been distributed to this Committee on document A/C.1/1039. The voting membership of the South Pacific Conference, I might mention, consists of all independent or self-governing States and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the West Pacific. These include Territories that are under the administration of Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. May I be permitted to quote that resolution, which reads:

*"The Thirteenth South Pacific Conference*

*"Recognizes that marine resources constitute one of the major exploitable resources of the Pacific Ocean and is of equal significance to all countries in the region, and being aware that the progress of civilization and industrialization is placing this resource in serious jeopardy because of pollution in all its forms and more particularly to air pollution due to radio-activity fall-out;*

*"Notes with considerable alarm the absolute unwillingness of France to accept the strong and continuous protest against atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific made by several countries in the region;*

*"Strongly condemns tests and urges France to reconsider her policy so as to enable the South Pacific to continue to be a healthy environment for its peoples, and further condemns all nuclear tests in the future, wherever they may be carried out;*

*"Directs the Chairman of the Thirteenth South Pacific Conference to communicate the feelings of this Conference to the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the request that the views of this Conference be made known to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council."*

63. All these protestations have fallen on deaf ears, and nuclear atmospheric testing in the region has continued, year after year, with unknown hazards to health and the environment being imposed upon the Pacific people. Such arrogant and defiant disregard of the pleas of the inhabitants of the region, particularly those of the small States and Non-Self-Governing Territories that are within the nuclear fall-out range can only be likened to the attitude of an international bully showering its nuclear waste over one region after another.

64. It is not only the pleas of the Pacific community that have been ignored but also the pleas of the international community, as contained in resolution 2934 A (XXVII) of last year's Assembly session, which stressed: "the urgency of bringing to a halt all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world". All these pleas, together with the interim injunction of the highest international judicial body, the International Court of Justice, were defiantly thrown into the bonfire over Muroroa Atoll during July and August of this year.

65. To say that these tests are safe for the Pacific population, and at the same time, to say that they cannot be conducted in France because of lack of unpopulated areas is not only a contradiction in terms but an admission that these tests pose actual or potential dangers to health and the human environment.

66. The dangers of atomic radiation are well known. A very useful review of the health hazards from environmental radiation is to be found in the last report of United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.<sup>7</sup> It is equally well known that the explosion of nuclear devices in the atmosphere generates large quantities of radioactive isotopes in the human environment. These isotopes, when absorbed in the human body, lead to a measurable increase in the radiation dosage to the organs of the body, particularly the thyroid gland—the intake being highest in infants, mostly through milk. Paragraph 14 of the Scientific Committee's report unequivocally records a significant increase in radioactive iodine levels in milk in the Southern Hemisphere after each series of French tests in the Pacific.

67. My delegation submits that it must be recognized that there is a risk of induced disease or disability from even the lowest levels of exposure to radiation.

68. Yet we are told by France that these tests are safe, that it has been proved that the risks of fall-out are quite negligible and that these tests do not cause a significant increase in the level of radioactivity. We are further told that the effects on human beings of low doses of radiation have never been observed. Indeed, there is so far no reliable information on the long-term effects of extremely low doses of radiation, because there has not yet been enough time to them to appear. In the meantime, however, it is intended that the peoples of the Pacific, not those of France, must continue to be the guinea pigs and accept the potential hazards.

69. There are no such things as "clean" nuclear weapons, and as long as testing continues, there will be increasingly dangerous pollution of the atmosphere and the water. Those who assert that these tests are "clean" or are harmless should test them in their own metropolitan territory. For France to say that it is conducting the tests on its own "national territory" in the Pacific is an attempt to integrate into its metropolitan territory small and far flung Non-Self-Governing Territories in different regions of the world. Such claims are like those of Portugal, which considers its African Territories to be a province of Portugal in order that it may continue to exploit them. That assertion is an act of grave injustice and discrimination against the people of French Polynesia, whose territory is preferred as a dumping ground for French nuclear waste in order to provide for the alleged security of Frenchmen in distant France.

70. By no stretch of the imagination can it be suggested that these tests are of benefit to the inhabitants of French Polynesia or their Pacific neighbours. If there is any doubt about it, let me quote from the statement made in this

<sup>7</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25.

Committee last week on 1 November 1973, by the representative of France when he said that by signing Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco<sup>8</sup> France: “demonstrated that it understood the desire of some regions of the world to protect themselves against the use, however hypothetical it might seem, of weapons which we believe we must possess in Europe.” [1943rd meeting, para. 74.]—“of weapons”—I repeat—“which we believe we must possess in Europe”.

71. The thesis of the Government of France that those tests are being conducted on French “national territory” itself is of doubtful legal content. As we all know, French Polynesia has been a Non-Self-Governing Territory. My delegation considers that no administering Power by sheer unilateral action alone can alter the status of such a Territory, especially in the context of the United Nations rules on decolonization and self-determination, including the relevant provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter. Whatever France might claim to have done through municipal legislation, the fact remains that there is no record of the United Nations having approved a change in the status of that Territory. Therefore, one may enquire whether such tests are in conformity with the obligations imposed by Article 73 of the Charter concerning the responsibilities of States administering Non-Self-Governing Territories, which, *inter alia*, are: “to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories and [also], to this end, to ensure . . . their economic, social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses”.

72. Article 73 also emphasizes that the Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of such territories recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote that interest to the utmost. It requires little elaboration on my part to state that some if not all of these sacred obligations are being contravened by the exploitation of these people and their territory for the purpose of French nuclear tests. I will of course not elaborate in this Committee as to the question of the proper implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) as that is a matter for another Committee of this Assembly.

73. In this connexion it is worth noting, however, that the most recent announcement, only last week, by the French Government to continue its programme of nuclear testing, including the construction of underground test sites, in French Polynesia is clear evidence that France intends to continue to dominate and exploit the territory and its people for a long time to come.

74. In this statement my delegation has quite naturally emphasized the immediate problem posed to us by the continuation of nuclear tests in the Pacific. It is inappropriate for us to talk of general and complete disarmament when our fate and that of the future generations in our region is immediately at stake. However, we do want to state that in the context of general and complete disarmament my country is opposed to nuclear testing by any State in any environment and we would support any measures

designed effectively to contribute towards the goal of complete disarmament and international peace. We would view any resolutions that may be submitted on the items under our consideration in this light and reserve our right to comment on them should we deem that to be necessary.

75. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): With the advent of the Soviet Union—the first socialist country in the world, which is marking its fifty-sixth anniversary, the anniversary of the great socialist October Revolution—upon the international arena, a genuine struggle for the solution of the problems of disarmament was engaged. Socialism was that force which, in relying upon the support of all peace-loving countries, first countered militarism, aggression, national and social oppression, by the noble ideas of the elimination of war from the life of peoples, disarmament, national and social liberation, and the establishment of a solid peace and international security. The Soviet Union and the other States of the socialist community are doing everything within their power to see to it that the course of disarmament should resolutely and firmly proceed forward. The struggle for disarmament is a component of the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence of States with different social structures.

76. Implementation of disarmament is organically in accord with the class interests of the proletariat and of all toilers, as well as the cause of peace on earth. This is what governs the fact that around the idea of disarmament there have united extensive masses of the peoples of all countries and the whole of progressive mankind. Their joint efforts have ensured the adoption and implementation of a number of important treaties, agreements and conventions which limit the arms race. The joint efforts of peace-loving forces have frequently frustrated the attempts of imperialism and colonialism to repress by force of arms the struggle of peoples for their national and social liberation.

77. The great achievement of the USSR and of other States of the socialist community, as well as of all peace-loving forces, is that for more than 28 years now the world has been spared a world war; that imperialist Powers have been unable to apply nuclear weapons in so-called local conflicts; that effective steps are being taken towards the elimination of existing conflicts; that colonial empires have crumbled; that there is a move away from the cold war towards détente, from military confrontation towards the strengthening of security and peaceful co-operation.

78. Definite results are achieved also in regard to the limitation and halting of the arms race. No assertions or actions on the part of those who are against international détente and disarmament can minimize the significance of treaties and conventions concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their testing and their emplacement in outer space, upon celestial bodies, upon the sea-bed or ocean floor or the subsoil thereof, the liquidation of bacteriological, biological and toxin weapons, as well as the treaties and agreements between the USSR and the United States concerning the prevention of nuclear war, limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and offensive strategic weapons. We are convinced that at present genuine possibilities exist for the attainment of further agreements in this general direction, as well as for fruitful work at the

<sup>8</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068.



talks entered into concerning the limitation of armaments and armed forces in central Europe.

79. At the same time, the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic considers it essential quite definitely to emphasize the fact that slanderous anti-Soviet statements in the United Nations on the part of the representatives of the present Chinese leadership cannot hold up the process of détente in the international sphere and the search for ways towards disarmament. Those statements in the United Nations are a time-worn record of anti-Sovietism which is turned on without taking into account at all what is taking place in the world and in the United Nations. One truly marvels: do not the Chinese speakers see or hear or feel that in practically every statement of representatives of States Members of the United Nations there is an appeal to China to take an active part in talks on disarmament, to adhere to existing treaties on the limitation of the arms race and to observe them, to take part in the World Disarmament Conference, to support constructive proposals which are being discussed at the present time? They ignore the will of practically all Members of the United Nations and the decisions of the non-aligned and developing countries, and are speaking in favour of compelling the developing countries to assume upon their economies the burden of the arms race. Here China is making no proposals concerning disarmament, but is merely rejecting all the proposals that are being discussed, proposals which are supported by the overwhelming majority of States of all continents of the world.

80. The representatives from Peking are constantly emphasizing that it is necessary to adopt decisions not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In that case, the question arises: why then last year did they, together with the Portuguese colonialists and the racists from South Africa, vote against a resolution on the non-use of force in international relations and the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons—a resolution which goes further than the Chinese proposal? Why is it that China, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, is not doing anything to impart to this decision of the United Nations which prohibits the use of force both with the assistance of conventional as well as with nuclear weapons, the compulsory character recommended in General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII).

81. At the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the delegation of China attempted to demonstrate that the existing proposals and decisions of the United Nations on questions of disarmament allegedly give nothing to the developing countries. And this year that same delegation, which represents itself as the champion of the interests of developing countries, became unwilling to support a concrete proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the limitation of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations by 10 per cent and the use of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. There the Chinese delegation completely ignored the view of the developing countries which, in their own statements, actively support this new Soviet initiative which combines measures of a political and military détente with possibilities for increasing many times over the funds available for international assistance to developing countries.

82. In the present situation it is necessary to consolidate the efforts of all peace-loving forces of the world in their unity of action, before which the opponents of détente in international relations and disarmament will have to retreat. We must all constantly and fully reject the anti-scientific thesis concerning "super-Powers" to the exposure of which the Byelorussian SSR devoted its statement in the general debate of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and all States—nuclear and non-nuclear, large and small, developing and developed—must strive jointly to achieve the adoption of concrete measures which would ensure disarmament and would strengthen international security.

83. Unity of action is a mighty force which has been demonstrated on many occasions, in the United Nations as well, in particular in regard to the convening of the World Disarmament Conference.

84. The proposal concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference was introduced by the Soviet Union and subsequently it was recognized throughout the world. Different international forums—the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers, a World Congress of peace-loving forces in Moscow, the World Congress of Trade Unions in Bulgaria—have declared themselves in favour of the convening of the Conference. The provisions concerning its support are included in international bilateral and multi-lateral communiqués, statements and other documents. The idea of the holding of the World Conference has gripped the minds of the whole of progressive mankind.

85. Yet, in spite of growing support for the World Disarmament Conference, we are obliged to note with regret that during the past year desirable results have not been achieved towards the convening of the Conference and General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII) has remained unfulfilled, and this in spite of the fact that General Assembly resolution 2833 (XXVI) on this subject, which all delegations had voted for—including the delegation of China—expressed the conviction that "it is most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States". At the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, that organ set up a Special Committee consisting of 35 States on the unanimous understanding that its composition would include all nuclear Powers for the discussion of all points of view and considerations expressed by Governments concerning the convening of a World Disarmament Conference and relating to all problems associated with it. That resolution was also voted for by all delegations except for one, the United States. As is known, the Committee held a number of informal meetings for the purpose of discharging the duties entrusted to it. However, it was unable to settle down to normal work because serious obstacles were deliberately raised through the fault of China and a number of other States. We might recall that on 22 November 1972, at the 1899th meeting of the First Committee, the representative of China stated that "... although China will not participate in the special committee ... the Chinese delegation can agree to maintain contact with the special committee and exchange views on the question of disarmament." [1899th meeting, para. 52.] The delegation of

China did not carry out that promise and some members of the Special Committee did not have courage enough to be persistent in continuing their work, in attempting to achieve results and thereby establishing conditions whereby the opponents of the convening of the Conference would find themselves faced with a single united view of an authoritative organ of the United Nations.

86. It is perfectly clear that China, which voted for the General Assembly resolution on the World Disarmament Conference, is trying, through various pretexts, to block its implementation and to frustrate the positive solution of the question of the holding of the Conference, making its convening conditional upon the implementation of such measures in the field of disarmament as are precisely within that list of problems which, together with other questions, could be considered by the Conference itself. It is obvious that when it is convened each State will have the right to raise any questions for discussion at the Conference for the purpose of finding ways to solve them.

87. As is known, in 1971 China also rejected a Soviet proposal concerning the convening of a conference of five nuclear Powers for the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament, and explained its position by stating that such important questions must be discussed with the participation of all non-nuclear States. Now the delegation of that country is speaking against the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all States, at which, among other questions, it may be possible to discuss questions of nuclear disarmament as well. Hence the inconsistency of attempts to make the convening of the World Conference conditional upon demands whose purpose is deliberately to frustrate such a gathering, are obvious.

88. Nor can we approve the position of those who are swimming against the current and are abusing their role as nuclear Powers in the solution to the problem of disarmament, by raising obstacles to the convening of a World Disarmament Conference at a time when the overwhelming majority of States are trying to have it take place. In advancing absurd "arguments" against the convening of the Conference, its opponents are endeavouring to thwart the endeavours of all those, including their own peoples, who wish to participate in the consideration of vitally important problems of disarmament, and also the urgent desire to make a contribution, through their representatives at the Conference, to this common noble task.

89. As is well known, in the course of consultations in connexion with the holding of meetings of the Special Committee, two diametrically opposed points of view were expressed concerning the participation in it of nuclear Powers. The first proposition was that the Special Committee could carry out its work provided only that all five nuclear Powers took part. The other was that, under existing conditions, the Committee could carry out the task entrusted to it allegedly only if not a single nuclear Power were to take part in it.

90. We do not agree with such extreme approaches to the question of the World Disarmament Conference and of the convening of the Special Committee. We consider that the Committee can begin normal work on the preparation for

the Conference with the absence of those nuclear Powers which, at the present stage, are unable or unwilling to take part in its activities. However, we believe that at a later stage when the Committee comes up to the solution of the question of convening the World Disarmament Conference and the elaboration of specific documents, the nuclear Powers might wish to or see the need to take part in the work of the Committee and to state their positions concerning specific questions that relate to the preparation for the Conference and might even subscribe to recommendations and decisions that have been jointly agreed. Experience in the work on matters of disarmament indicates that frequently countries that initially were unwilling to take part in the solution of a given question, subsequently not only took part in the work but also assumed constructive positions. In our opinion, the Special Committee can and must, without any delay whatsoever, begin to carry out the task entrusted to it so that, as soon as possible, it can proceed to the actual preparation for the World Disarmament Conference.

91. After the establishment of the Special Committee, a number of wishes were expressed concerning its expansion and the inclusion in its membership of additional representatives from regional groups. We do not consider that this question is insoluble. In our opinion, it is possible at this session of the General Assembly to consider this question for the purpose of satisfying the wishes of specific regional groups.

92. Thus, in the view of the Byelorussian SSR, all conditions have been met so that at the present session it may be possible to take further action on the question of convening the World Disarmament Conference. The General Assembly must adopt measures forthwith to implement the possibilities of convening the World Disarmament Conference to its direct preparation. If there are still certain difficulties that hamper the normal course of preparation for the Conference, these can and must be eliminated through the willingness and readiness of States to contribute to the cause of disarmament, the limitation and cessation of the arms race. We are convinced that, in the present conditions of détente in international relations and consolidation of peace-loving forces, there are real possibilities for eliminating obstacles obstructing this important forum of peoples on questions of disarmament. The World Disarmament Conference, if appropriately prepared, will, of course, be an important forum and will contribute to the activation of efforts by countries in the field of disarmament and to the further normalization of international relations. It is necessary, therefore, to exert all efforts to implement the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the States to convene the World Disarmament Conference and thus promote the cause of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race.

93. One of the important questions on the agenda of the General Assembly and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, one which has been on the agenda for a number of years, is the prohibition and liquidation of chemical weapons. The Committee on Disarmament has had before it since 28 March 1972, on the initiative of the socialist countries, including the Byelorussian SSR, a draft convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons

that provides for a comprehensive approach to the solution of the problem;<sup>9</sup> in other words, the prohibition, development, production, stockpiling and destruction of all chemical substances designed for military purposes, on the basis of a combination of national forms of control with certain international procedures ensuring the implementation of the agreement.

94. In the development of their position this year, the socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament presented a working document entitled "Ways of implementing control over compliance with the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction" [A/9141, annex II, sect. 11].

95. Many delegations have justly shown interest in the fact that the basis for such talks should be the draft of the socialist countries; however, the Committee on Disarmament did not make any progress towards the solution of this problem. The cause of such an unsatisfactory state of affairs was the unreadiness of the Western Powers to take a political decision concerning the prohibition of chemical substances for making war. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is convinced that many delegations in the First Committee have taken note of the statement of the representative of the United States to the effect that "the United States has not produced any lethal chemical weapons since 1968 and in fact has been phasing out part of its chemical weapon stockpiles." [1934th meeting, para. 63.]

96. In this connexion, we should like to recall that in the course of recent debates in the United States Congress concerning chemical weapons, as reported in *The New York Times* of 4 October 1973, a representative of the Pentagon stated before the Members of Congress that at present preparations are being made to go into production with a new type of nerve gas known as a binary gas which is composed of two nonlethal components that are kept apart in an artillery shell and only after the shell is fired are the components combined to form a lethal nerve gas. The representative of the Pentagon further stated that binary gases constitute a major advance in safety that will represent a significant improvement in modernizing "our"—that is, American—chemical retaliatory capability. The representative of the Pentagon further stated in the Congress of the United States that in contrast to the present nerve gases, which require relatively sophisticated technology to produce, the binary gases are composed of chemical compounds obtainable through commercial channels. One of the components that the Army plans to produce . . . closely resembles insecticides used in the home and the other component is a commercial chemical that the Army plans to buy from industry.

97. The following conclusions may be drawn from this. First, the simplicity of production of these chemical substances does not call for complex technology and the widespread availability of them makes this dangerous form of chemical weapon readily available to all States, including small ones, as well as to terrorist groups and other persons

for criminal purposes—and this can lead to highly dangerous consequences.

98. Secondly, the fact that these chemical components in themselves, separately, have nothing to do with chemical weapons and are manufactured in conventional chemical factories and civilian laboratories confirms once again the primary significance of national control over the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

99. The Byelorussian SSR considers it essential to exert every effort possible to promote the cause of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is necessary to strive for the harmonization of the position of States in order to solve this timely question. The General Assembly must make an urgent appeal to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to all States to exert all efforts to elaborate an agreement on the effective prohibition of chemical weapons and their elimination and present a draft of such an agreement to the next session of the General Assembly.

100. Together with the elaboration of a draft agreement on the total prohibition of chemical substances for waging war, the question of the total adherence of States to the Geneva Protocol remains concerning the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Its adherents are all militarily significant States, except the United States which did not sign the Geneva Protocol. We hope that appropriate measures will be adopted for the speedy ratification of the Geneva Protocol by those which have not yet done so so that this agreement might be converted into a more universal international act.

101. In the statements of representatives of States, considerable attention has been devoted to the problem of the prohibition and the liquidation of nuclear weapons. This has been brought about by the fact that nuclear weapons are a great threat to all countries and peoples. Ten years have elapsed since the opening for the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; five years since the opening for signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and three years since the adoption by the General Assembly of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [resolution 2660 (XXV)].

102. It is possible to say with confidence that these agreements are landmarks on the road towards the solution of problems of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and its liquidation, although there are certain unresolved problems and difficulties on the way towards the total realization and achievement of the goals contemplated in these agreements.

103. First, it is necessary to ensure an increase in the range of countries adhering to these treaties and bring about universality. Adherence to these treaties by all States without exception is dictated by the need for their total implementation and is motivated by the strengthening of peace and general security and the development of peaceful co-operation between States.

<sup>9</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex B, sect. 5.

104. Of course, a logical development of the process begun by the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water would be the extension of the prohibition to underground tests. The Byelorussian SSR has firmly and consistently supported the cessation everywhere and by all States of all nuclear tests, including underground tests. In this respect prohibition must be on the basis of national means of control for the implementation of such an agreement.

105. The Byelorussian SSR considers that, together with the problems discussed here at the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is necessary to come to grips with the consideration of other problems of disarmament and also to the ultimate purpose of all these talks, namely, general and complete disarmament.

106. As to the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons, the position of the Byelorussian SSR has been stated in our answer published in document A/9207. Unfortunately, our position was not taken into account in the draft resolution on the subject that was presented [A/C.1/L.650/Rev.2] and instead of a further consideration of this question in the competent organ—which is the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—it is proposed to hand over this question to the diplomatic conference which is being convened for an entirely different set of purposes. Such an approach, as far as we are concerned, is rather doubtful, especially since it is not customary to transfer for the consideration of diplomatic conferences questions that have not been properly prepared.

107. In spite of a certain slowness in the solution of questions of disarmament which are discussed by us, in the view of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR there is no reason for pessimistic conclusions concerning the prospects of the talks on disarmament. The attainment of new concrete measures in the field of disarmament is entirely realistic. The conclusion of existing agreements concerning the limitation of the arms race is evidence of the fact that genuine possibilities exist for achieving a solution of the problems of disarmament. Of course, there is still a long way to go, but this way must be gone through in the interests of the strengthening of the peace and security of peoples.

108. In conclusion, I should like to read out that section of the communiqué of the World Conference of Peace-loving Forces in Moscow which relates to disarmament:

“The atmosphere of détente must be utilized for the practical solution of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The processes of strengthening international détente and disarmament by developing simultaneously must stimulate one another. The idea is that from the measures to hold up and limit the arms race we should proceed to practical steps to achieve the limitation of it and in the first instance the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction with the prospect of general and complete disarmament ultimately in view. For this purpose it is necessary to comply strictly with already existing treaties and agreements on disarmament whose

significance is obvious and to have adhered to them those countries which have not yet signed or ratified them; it is necessary for all the five nuclear Powers to conclude a pact on the non-use of force which contains an obligation to prohibit for all time the use of nuclear weapons, to reduce their military budgets, converting part of the liberated funds to provide assistance to the peoples of the developing countries, to ensure the cessation of nuclear weapons in all environments, to take further steps towards the cessation of the arms race in nuclear weapons and improvements on them; to put into practice the establishment of non-nuclear zones, the elimination of foreign military bases, the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on foreign territories; to convene a conference on disarmament as soon as possible, to promote success for the talks that have been entered into concerning the limitation of arms and armed forces in Europe.”

109. We call upon all delegations to exert maximum efforts to achieve the above-mentioned aims of the peoples of the whole world.

110. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): At a time when the Committee is dealing with questions of disarmament the world is going through most disquieting upheavals that threaten international security and even risk seriously jeopardizing the process of détente which so auspiciously began with the entry of China into the United Nations and continued with the Peking, Moscow and Washington meetings. The hotbeds of armed conflict have not been eliminated. In Africa, Portugal, with the help of the material and political assistance provided by its allies, is carrying out a colonial war against the movements of national liberation in Mozambique and Angola as well as the new State of Guinea-Bissau. In the Middle East the détente between the two super-Powers has been and continues to be submitted to harsh tests. The alert of 24 October was a serious warning. Enormous quantities of conventional weapons are used, leading one to expect the atomic hecatomb. Never have we heard so much about tanks, missiles, MIGs, Mirages. Enormous amounts are thus squandered in the course of short battles, and we tend to wonder whether resort to such means can possibly assure one side or the other of any supremacy and whether the use of weapons can lead to peace or security for either side. Furthermore, today it is no longer necessary to have gun factories since airlifts assure combatants anywhere, of any ideology, aggressors or victims of aggression, of all the weapons they might need.

111. It is, to put it mildly, surprising to have to stress that vast experiments are carried out through intermediaries, those human guinea-pigs, in order to verify the quality of a weapon and its effectiveness. Israel, which occupies the territory of Arab States, benefits from massive aid to the detriment of the Arab nations which are trying to liberate their territories from foreign occupation and exercise their right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Those countries would surely have preferred a political solution, barring the use of weapons, to the course they were forced to take.

112. In Africa as in Asia, in the Middle East as in the Far East, and in other regions, from time to time the world is

shaken by armed conflicts. This is because the tension persists here and there, despite efforts and signs of détente. This unfortunately shows that the efforts of the international community are insufficient and that a long road is still to be travelled before we arrive at a lasting peace. The present international system is one of disquieting fragility. The interdependence of international phenomena has reached such a level that the breaking out of the slightest conflict in any part of the world is sufficient to endanger all mankind. In the meantime the arms factories are working overtime, and tens of thousands of research workers have stepped up their efforts to perfect the most lethal weapons. Military budgets become larger and larger, while an enormous part of mankind does not have enough to eat. Do the means of death have today the very sad privilege of taking precedence over the means of sustaining life?

113. But those unfortunate realities should not cast a pall of gloom, for we are convinced that a solution is possible if all members of the international community unite their efforts forthwith in an attempt to eliminate all causes of conflict.

114. But in order to do so we must work with each other, think together, sincerely exchange views, and meet to seek out those means most likely to protect the world from further catastrophes.

115. As far as my delegation is concerned, the way in which one speaks of disarmament depends mainly upon one's state of mind. From which angle should we approach the problem? It is not solely a technical problem. It rests mainly on how one sees the world and life and on what one does to solve these problems. Some resort to violence, seeing it as a rapid and effective remedy. Others, on the contrary, bank on the effectiveness of discussion and compromise.

116. My delegation entirely agrees with the representatives of Yugoslavia and other countries who have stressed the fact that the problem of disarmament is intimately linked with that of international security. For how can we validly speak of limiting arms when fires are smouldering in the Middle East, in South Africa, in Portugal and in Rhodesia, when violence and repression are commonly resorted to in an attempt to impose the will of a minority thirsting for domination.

117. While it is true that the production and stockpiling of arms represent a clear danger, the persistence of conflict and sources of conflict bring that danger even closer.

118. Therefore, it is imperative that we act in order to ensure that a climate of tension and conflict is replaced by an atmosphere of peace based on justice, by the creation of zones of peace and by stopping military rivalry, particularly in that crucial area, the Mediterranean.

119. We therefore consider that the best solution to the problem lies in the removal of its true causes. Technical measures are also serious factors of the problem, but they are much easier to solve.

120. The World Disarmament Conference is one means of helping to create the climate of peace to which we aspire.

The present situation compels us to profit from any chance we are given, even if the results are only partial. Is it necessary to recall that that conference, because of its importance and the acute nature of the problems that will be debated in it, should be prepared with the greatest care in order that it may have every possible chance of success? We should spare no effort or hesitate before any initiative that might ensure the holding of the conference and its success. Here, it is imperative that we show imagination and, I would even say, boldness.

121. It is obvious that the preparatory Committee set up by the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly was unable to function despite the many attempts made to salvage it. The unflagging efforts of Ambassador Hoveyda, his diplomatic skill and the spirit of conciliation he brought to bear did in fact save that Committee from foundering completely. That leads us to hope that, with some changes the Committee will be able to tackle the arduous tasks awaiting it. But for it to do so it must be remoulded as regards both its thinking and its composition. It must be fully representative of the international community. We must also assure it of geographical and political balance. The Committee should also be given a measure of freedom of action which will enable it to act with a view to reconciling the views of the nuclear Powers.

122. None of us is unaware that one of the major problems with which the Committee is faced is that of the participation of the nuclear Powers. My delegation considers their participation to be desirable, but we believe that matter should not hamper our final action—namely, the convening of the World Disarmament Conference. We therefore believe that the Committee should begin its work either with the participation of the nuclear Powers or as a liaison committee, with none of the nuclear Powers included in its membership. It is only a desire for effectiveness that leads us to envisage such a possibility, but this should never be understood as a position adopted against one or another of the nuclear Powers.

123. We believe that the leaders of those countries must understand and realize the importance and gravity of the nuclear facts, particularly if they consider the danger that mankind is running and the damage that this can do to the efforts of all to ensure economic and social development for the peoples of the entire world.

124. In the course of the debates at the present session, all delegations, or at least most of them, that have spoken have said that the basic task of the United Nations is to strengthen international peace and security. The World Disarmament Conference will, we are sure, contribute to the achievement of that ultimate objective, because it constitutes the proper place where representatives of all countries, great or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, may participate on an equal footing in the discussion of basic problems that affect the vital interests of all peoples.

125. Until the World Disarmament Conference is convened, we must continue to act in this field, since we have to face this scourge that threatens all of us.

126. Therefore my delegation feels that we should accelerate the process of prohibiting the production and use of

napalm and other chemical and bacteriological weapons. Each passing day adds to the list of the victims of these weapons which are called modern ones but are the most incredible existing examples of the aberrant squandering of human genius.

127. The Tunisian delegation has studied with great interest the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*<sup>10</sup> as well as the study prepared by an international group of experts of the Red Cross on non-selective weapons and those that cause useless suffering.<sup>11</sup> We believe it is urgent that Members of our Organization enter into negotiations on this subject. We would take this opportunity on behalf of Tunisia to welcome the efforts made by the Swiss Government to convene the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and we trust that the work of that conference will be successful. My delegation also wishes to express its appreciation for the considerable contribution made by the International Red Cross in this field.

128. My delegation will support the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of Cyprus, Egypt, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia and other countries in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1, and we pay a tribute particularly to Mrs. Myrdal, the Minister of State of Sweden, for her unflagging efforts to achieve disarmament for the sake of mankind. As proof of our interest, I wish to announce that Tunisia wishes to be a co-sponsor of that draft resolution.

129. With regard to the prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, my delegation is happy to note that China and France have signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America. Their action, which is highly appreciated by my delegation, constitutes an encouraging element and a sign of goodwill which we welcome, since it proves to us that, despite all else, our efforts are not in vain and that sooner or later wisdom will prevail.

130. On this point, my delegation has already expressed its views and its position. I shall confine myself today to repeating the ideas advanced by President Bourguiba of the Tunisian Republic, when he spoke at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers. The fact is that in the field of nuclear disarmament we note that the arms race has never been as close and as implacable as at present. After the undertaking by the great Powers no longer to carry out certain types of nuclear tests, can we truly say that no nuclear tests have been carried out in one form or another? That a certain country wishes to have its own bomb in order to maintain its status as a great Power and therefore carries out a test is its own business. What is essential, however, is that that test should not have harmful effects on the area concerned.

131. Peace, after all, is very often the result of a given balance, and we must admit this, but peace, however

<sup>10</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.L3.

<sup>11</sup> *Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects*, Geneva, 1973.

precarious, rests on dissuasion and on fearing the worst. Many are in fact convinced that by pressing the button of the infernal device these objectives will not be achieved but that they and their opponents will be destroyed.

132. Therefore it is not a question merely of opposing nuclear tests; it is the whole problem of disarmament that will have to be studied from the ground up.

133. To destroy all the stocks of nuclear devices, to prohibit their manufacture and testing in any manner whatsoever, to reserve part of the funds allocated to atomic weapons to fight against the scourges of mankind and to aid the development of the needy—this is what President Bourguiba recommended as measures that might lead us effectively to disarmament.

134. Only a world disarmament conference for these purposes and under the auspices of the United Nations can carry out a useful debate on the matter and arrive at a consensus that will meet the requirements of reason and morality.

135. Mr. BRUNO (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At the beginning of my statement, which will apply to the agenda item concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the Uruguayan delegation wishes to take this opportunity to recall the happy coincidence that the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Benites, was the first Secretary-General of OPANAL, that is, the organ created for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, and he there began work of enormous importance to disarmament, peace and security in Latin America which today is being continued with great dedication by our compatriot, the present Secretary-General, Mr. Gros Espiell.

136. There can be no doubt that the Latin American States have, with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, desired to contribute towards ending the arms race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness. That is the statement contained in the second paragraph of the preamble of the Treaty.

137. For this purpose the countries of Latin America, convinced that the legal proscription of war should be strictly observed in practice; that nuclear weapons constitute an attack on the integrity of the human species; that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is a vital matter; and that the establishment of militarily denuclearized zones contributes to the maintenance of peace and security, have decided by their sovereign will to establish a system for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in their region.

138. We believe that the international system created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its two Additional Protocols on the military denuclearization of Latin America is intended to serve as a truly universal instrument placed at the disposal of international peace and security in accord-

ance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is a Latin American contribution to the demilitarization of an area of the earth, serving as a model for the establishment of similar zones elsewhere and as a contribution to the process of general and complete disarmament.

139. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was also conceived on the basis of the fact that in Latin America nuclear energy must only and exclusively be used for peaceful purposes, in order to further the economic and social development of our peoples.

140. All these objectives, as I said earlier, are fully in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and, as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, are also contained in resolution 2734 (XXV) of the General Assembly.

141. The thirteenth paragraph of the preamble of the Treaty affirms that the Treaty is intended as a model for the military denuclearization of other geographical areas where similar conditions may prevail.

142. As the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, pointed out in his message of 12 February 1967, this affirmation must be stressed particularly, since the Treaty of Tlatelolco was an important step in the long and arduous search for disarmament. The case for the Latin American nations is the only one in which, thus far, the idea has culminated in an international and multilateral treaty.

143. Resolution 1911 (XVIII) expressed the hope that the Latin American States would arrive at a formula that would allow the denuclearization of Latin America. The General Assembly had already referred to this same question of denuclearization in resolution 1652 (XVI).

144. In turn, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held at Geneva in 1968 recommended that the non-nuclear States not included in the Tlatelolco Treaty should study the possibility of establishing militarily denuclearized zones in their respective regions.

145. In the Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General for 1969, speaking of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, U Thant stated:

“They have successfully taken a first important step towards disarmament and the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and have given the world some novel ideas in the field of control. I am hopeful that the system established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco will provide a model for other nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as for additional measures of global disarmament.”<sup>12</sup>

146. Resolution 2286 (XXII), paragraph 1, states that the General Assembly:

“Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which

constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples;”.

147. And it is interesting to recall resolution 2666 (XXV), which states:

“Noting that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the only one it has been possible to conclude for the establishment of such a zone in a densely populated area and that, as a result of the Treaty, there already exists a statute of total absence of nuclear weapons covering an area of 6.6 million square kilometres with a population of approximately 117 million inhabitants.”

Today the zone obviously has widened to 8 million square kilometres and the population is close to 180 million inhabitants.

148. At the Security Council session held in Panama in March 1973, the President, summarizing the very positive and interesting debate on the Treaty of Tlatelolco stated:

“Special emphasis was placed on the important contribution of the Latin American States to the strengthening of international peace and security through the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Some delegations noted that for its broadest and most effective implementation this Treaty should enjoy the support of all States which are or may become parties to it or to its two Additional Protocols. In this connexion views were also expressed to the effect that all States should make further efforts to achieve the aim of the effective prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.”<sup>13</sup>

149. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, in his statement, pointed to the contribution made by Latin America to the cause of peace as a direct consequence of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

150. The General Conference of OPANAL, held in August of this year, adopted resolution 47 (III), paragraph (b) of which reads as follows:

“Reiterates its interest in the fact that the two States which *de jure* or *de facto* possess international responsibilities for territories lying within the zone of application of the Treaty shall proceed to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I, so that that zone shall be fully integrated and protected against the vicissitudes which the presence of nuclear weapons implies”.

151. We trust that, in answer to this appeal, France and the United States will soon become signatories to that Additional Protocol I. Surely, there is no legal or political reason that can be adduced against their being parties to the Protocol, and we would hope that negotiations will begin

<sup>12</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 39.

<sup>13</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, 1704th meeting*, para. 154.

promptly between the Latin American countries and the secretariat of OPANAL with the United States and France in order to attain positive results.

152. With regard to Additional Protocol II, when the General Assembly last year adopted resolution 2935 (XXVII), it expressed the hope that China, France and the Soviet Union would speedily sign that document. This hope, which underlay intensive negotiations at the beginning of this year, yielded positive results which today are a reason for gratification on the part of the Latin American States. In fact, in June of this year, France did sign Additional Protocol II, and on 21 August the People's Republic of China did likewise. We trust that the ratification of these two countries will speedily follow. The only signature still lacking is that of the Soviet Union.

153. To the appeal addressed by the General Conference of OPANAL in resolution 47 (III) of 22 August 1973, the Soviet Union replied on 2 October 1973, in a note to the Secretary-General of OPANAL:

“the Soviet Union had always been and still is in favour of the creation of denuclearized zones in different regions of the world, considering them to be one of the roads to effective limitation of the arms race and to the relief of international tensions. The Soviet Government again confirmed its intention to assume the obligation of respecting the status of militarily denuclearized zones covering not only entire continents or wide geographical regions, but also more limited groups of countries, or individual countries, in cases where such obligations are assumed also by other nuclear Powers. The transformation of the territories of Latin America into zones completely free of nuclear weapons would doubtless be an important factor in the strengthening of international peace and security, both in Latin America and all over the world.”

154. Although no promise of a speedy signature is given the language of this reply suggests the possibility of

negotiations within the next few months that might lead to a formula which would make it possible for the Soviet Union to place its signature on this Protocol.

155. We hope so and trust therefore that at the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, when this item and Additional Protocol I come up again for consideration, a point stating this fact will be included in the agenda.

156. In conclusion, the delegation of Uruguay wishes to endorse the views expressed by the Secretary-General of OPANAL in the statement he made on 21 August 1973 at the General Conference of OPANAL, when speaking about the signature of the Soviet Union on Additional Protocol II. He said:

“Only the signature of the Soviet Union is missing, but we look with optimism at the possible adherence to Additional Protocol II. The problems that existed in the past because of certain discrepancies on concrete points have not affected the support of the Soviet Union of the principle of military denuclearization of Latin America. It is for this reason that, sure of being understood by them and trusting in the favourable evolution of the international reality as a whole, we feel that the negotiations under way will conclude with positive results.”

157. The CHAIRMAN: For the sake of the record, may I draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the announcement made by Ambassador Driss of Tunisia to the effect that Tunisia has become a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1.

158. Finally, I wish to announce that Guatemala has become a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.645, relating to the Korean question.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*