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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 103: The strengthening of international security (<i>continued</i>) . . .	1

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

AGENDA ITEM 103

**The strengthening of international security
(*continued*) (A/7654; A/C.1/L.468)**

1. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I wish to express the satisfaction of the Brazilian delegation at seeing you entrusted with the chairmanship of the First Committee, which is seized of matters of paramount importance to international peace and security. Your proven ability, competence and experience are a sure pledge of impartiality, efficiency and statesmanship in the orderly and fruitful conduct of our business. I hope, Sir, that this will be the only occasion on which the Brazilian delegation will be reluctant to follow your instructions and recommendations, as you have imposed a ban on complimentary remarks.

2. May I also extend my warmest congratulations to Ambassador Kolo of Nigeria, with whom I have worked closely in Geneva, on his election as Vice-Chairman. I wish likewise to express my satisfaction at the election of a very distinguished member of the Latin American group, Mr. Lloyd Barnett, as Rapporteur of the First Committee.

3. The delegation of Brazil welcomes the opportunity for a political debate of wide scope within the framework of the First Committee of the General Assembly and wishes to show its appreciation for this rather unusual and highly important occasion. In our statement in the general debate [1755th plenary meeting] we deplored the prevalent trend to sidetrack and ignore some international matters, to deprive the General Assembly of the opportunity to discuss them and thus to leave them to the specific field of negotiations among the major Powers. We ventured to assert that this trend, should it persist, would condemn the United Nations to silence, inaction and utter inoperativeness. And maybe it is later than we think. The argument has been adduced that debates on certain issues would exacerbate tensions and, furthermore, poison the world atmosphere to such an extent as to make them insoluble. Fears have been expressed regarding the dangers of political pollution which would add to the hazards of physical pollution in our already overburdened and contaminated environment. We cannot subscribe to that view, which

would prove self-defeating for the purposes and principles of the Organization. In the course of our 1968 session we concentrated our attention upon the problems of outer space and the ocean floor.

4. Without in the least disregarding those matters, of the utmost importance for the shaping of the future, it is high time we gave some attention to the problems of the surface. And no one can deny that the going has been pretty rough on the surface and in the present. Never in the course of human events have the small nations felt so helpless and so insecure. We might even say that, power being a quite relative concept, fear and insecurity now plague all nations, including the super-Powers. Crime and violence, aggression and piracy, subversion and terrorism are rife and widespread at the crossroads of the world.

5. A philosophy of sheer power now prevails everywhere and, what is more ominous, never have power and violence enjoyed such a degree of respectability, inasmuch as theories and doctrines are advanced and adduced to justify them. Political scientists and philosophers have proved extremely fertile and prolific in those ancillary rites and speculations related to the new cult of force. The very concept of a special category of super-Powers, as distinct from the common run of major Powers, is indicative of a new mood, a new psychological attitude and a new set of political values.

6. "Overkill", a term which has become commonplace in the works and treatises on international affairs, is the most sinister word ever to emerge from the lexicon of mankind in the whole history of the great human adventure in language and semantics. Death is no longer the absolute end of everything. Death now admits of gradations and superlatives. There are some who are not content with annihilation; there are some spirits who indulge in and appear to thrive on a nightmare of over-death and super-annihilation.

7. The cult of power and the worship of force have become so respectable that they now inspire some of the basic documents of human behaviour. Take as an example the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [see resolution 2373 (XXII)] which is based on a theory of differentiating between adult, responsible and powerful nations and non-powerful and consequently non-responsible, non-adult nations. The general assumption behind the document is that, contrary to historical evidence, power brings moderation and power goes along with responsibility.

8. A philosophy of success, based on power and achievement, now transcends the field of individuals to assert itself in the realm of nations and peoples. The general assumption is that danger now lies in the ways of the unarmed nations,

not in the vast mushrooming arsenals of the super-Powers. Danger is now the attribute of weakness, not the attribute of force. By conferring special powers and prerogatives upon the nations which have achieved an adult status in the nuclear age, this Treaty may yet prove to be a stimulus to, rather than a deterrent from, power. In the world of nations, as well as in the world of men, all may henceforth strive, in spite of all difficulties, to become powerful, strong and successful. The Treaty puts a premium on power and is an undisguised institutionalization of inequality among States. On the other hand, it is curious to see that continental China has been placed by the Treaty in the "adult" and "responsible" category, notwithstanding some reasonable doubt on the part of both super-Powers as to its peaceful intentions.

9. We have said in another forum that the Charter was a post-war document aimed at immobilizing the political and strategical framework of 1945. It aimed at establishing the five major nations of the victorious coalition of 1945 as the major Powers to the end of time, since any amendment to, or revision of, the Charter would be dependent upon the concurring affirmative vote of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and since it is highly improbable that any of those nations would either voluntarily part with the powers and prerogative inherent in this special category of nations or be willing to share those powers and prerogatives with any would-be new permanent members of the Security Council.

10. Nineteen forty-five, the year of the signing of the Charter, and 1967, the deadline for nations to qualify as nuclear-weapon nations, now represent the two foundations for the construction and consolidation of the new world power structure. The race for power is thus anti-historically and arbitrarily considered closed and irreversible. Powers and prerogatives which the Charter had conferred on the permanent members in matters of peace and security have now been stretched and extended to cover the whole field of economics, science and technology. Power is now assumed to be frozen for ever on the basis of the two arbitrary moments of history, 26 June 1945 and 1 January 1967. A mere glance at world history will show how fallacious previous attempts have been at freezing on the basis of dates and deadlines.

11. The Charter was based on the idea of peace rather than that of justice among nations. It is a document of political realism and it reflected, as we have said, the political will of the nations victorious in 1945. However, in spite of its concessions to the realities of power, it contained some basic principles and it enunciated some fundamental purposes which are of the utmost relevance to our proceedings under this item of our agenda. The principles enunciated under Article 2 should have the value of a true "Declaration of Rights" and should, in our view, be the very *raison d'être* of the Organization. They are the hard core of the Charter and the principles to be preserved and safeguarded in any eventual revision of the Charter; but they should be strengthened and revitalized by observance and not compromised, as they are today, by continuous violation and disregard.

12. The most fundamental principle is of course the one contained in paragraph 4, which demands that all Members

shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This is the principle upon which, to a large extent, all other principles depend. The uniform observance, by large and small States alike, of this simple but all-important principle of renunciation of the threat or use of force would have the magical effect of removing fear and anxiety from the tense world situation, of restoring faith and mutual confidence, of paving the way for disarmament and, consequently, for progress and development. The uniform observance of this principle would make naked power useless, senseless and purposeless; swords would finally be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks; youth would no longer learn the trades of war. The basic question before us is therefore: "Are nations prepared or not prepared to forsake the threat or use of force for the furtherance of their political aims and objectives?" There is no circumventing that question, which is the really important one and the question to be addressed not only to the super-Powers of today but to all the nations of the world. The situation is as simple as that: if all nations do not exclude the possibility of recourse to the threat or use of force, the hope for progress in international relations is a waste of energy and a waste of time.

13. We insist upon addressing our question to all nations and not only to the super-Powers, for, although the super-Powers have invented many things, they did not invent force and violence, which clearly preceded them in history. There are small nations being threatened now by not-quite-so-small nations, and recent experience has shown that many medium-sized and small nations are not averse to using force and violence when the occasion seems fit and when impunity is ensured. We cannot lay all the sins and all the faults at the doorsteps of the major Powers. Power is a relative concept, and force is an intimidating factor, even without the necessity of any superlatives. An effective system of collective security should protect nations from aggression both by the strong and by the weak. Furthermore, the principle of non-use of force should always be paralleled by the all-important principles of non-interference and non-intervention, which are even wider in scope. Aggression takes many forms and it is undertaken with a great variety of means. Quite often it is not made manifest by any invasion or crossing of boundaries but erupts through foreign inspiration and foreign guidance within the boundaries of national States.

14. It is almost unbelievable, but nevertheless a fact, that, on requesting all other nations to forgo for ever the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers adamantly refused to insert into the non-proliferation Treaty a simple clause whereby they would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear nations. Such a non-aggression pledge is the very minimum one would reasonably expect on being requested to disarm.

15. On the other hand, the "security assurances" offered unilaterally in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) are entirely inadequate and fall short of the very terms of the United Nations Charter. All of us are interested in the success of the process of *détente* among the major Powers.

However, it would not be inappropriate to ask what efforts are being made to foster a *détente* in the present tensions between the major nuclear and industrialized nations on the one hand and the non-nuclear non-developed nations on the other.

16. Despite its frustrations and shortcomings, the United Nations has occasionally succeeded in serving the cause of peace and has occasionally succeeded in stopping or preventing bloodshed. We have some cease-fires, truces and armistices to our credit but very few, if any, permanent and enduring political settlements. All efforts aimed at preventing bloodshed are of course laudable and worthy of unrestricted praise, but it should be said that political settlements should follow and, furthermore, that they should be fully consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. A permanent peace which would consecrate and legitimize a situation brought about by the threat or use of naked force would be a clear disservice to the cause of the United Nations. It would be a reward bestowed on force and violence and on violations and breaches of world peace. Peace is much more than the antonym of war. Peace is a daily effort of understanding and creative behaviour. No permanent settlement is possible on the moving sands of power and violence. The United Nations is called upon to settle problems, not just to freeze them.

17. The Security Council cannot continue, as happens in many instances, to exercise the functions of a police precinct, for the registration of charges, counter-charges, complaints and counter-complaints. The Security Council should reassert its authority and explore, to the fullest extent possible, the diplomatic avenues open to it in Chapter VI of the Charter. It should endeavour to escape from its present dilemma of inaction and inoperativeness under Chapter VI and its ever-present reluctance to resort to the coercive measures contemplated in Chapter VII.

18. There is no doubt that the Security Council is confronted with a serious institutional crisis. If formerly it was blocked by the veto, there is no denying that it is now blocked by consensus or unanimity. This apparent unanimity is sometimes reached at the cost of near-meaninglessness of the texts approved, which often do not go beyond the reiteration of some of the general principles already contained in the Charter. Let it likewise be remembered that in the case of resolution 242 (1967) on the question of the Middle East the Security Council responded unanimously, and that unanimously it has failed. This derives partially from the fact that, although the resolution was adopted unanimously, its provisions and principles were interpreted quite differently by each of the major Powers. Unanimity in enunciation and diversity in interpretation appear now to be the course open to the Security Council for the discharge of its functions. The General Assembly, on the other hand, is thwarted in its action and operation by a hidden veto, still exercised by the major Powers. This hidden veto not only prevents the adoption of a certain number of resolutions, but also, as is more often the case, pre-empts the implementation of resolutions approved by an overwhelming majority of Member States.

19. The simple fact is that no small nation is satisfied that the United Nations is a guarantee of its territorial integrity

or political independence; and this accounts for the new preoccupations, on the part of the small States, with armaments and defence within the limits of their capabilities. This is, of course, the source of new strains and hardships on their already precarious economies.

20. The major Powers have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security, and all the nations that participate in this debate look forward to new, imaginative, creative efforts on their part towards discharging those responsibilities. But we certainly do not believe in the permanence of solutions based on the freezing of some world situations, on the arbitrary dates of 1945 and 1967, and on the related immobilization of history. Neither do we believe that the concepts of “spheres of influence” and “balance of power” are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter, which exclude the possibility and negate the legitimacy of the threat or use of force.

21. Furthermore, we certainly do not believe that a solution to basic world problems can be reached or dictated by a directorate of super-Powers. Neither do we believe that we can establish a clear dividing-line between “small conflicts”, in relation to which the United Nations would be competent, and “major problems”, in relation to which the United Nations would recognize its utter impotence. If we cease to apply the Charter to the major issues, the issues of war and peace, disarmament and collective security, we shall soon be confronted with the certainty that the Organization and the Charter are irrelevant and of no avail in tackling the so-called “small conflicts”, which, by the way, show a marked trend towards inserting themselves into the pattern of bigger and wider confrontations of power.

22. For all these reasons, the delegation of Brazil objected to the procedure followed by the two co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, when they thought it necessary to enlarge the membership of that Committee without any endorsement or action by the United Nations General Assembly. As we have said, we did not question the legality of the action, inasmuch as the General Assembly had merely endorsed the terms of the Zorin-Stevenson agreement of 1961.¹ What we did question was the political advisability of a procedure which appeared to place a problem of universal dimensions and significance like disarmament within the exclusive field of negotiations and understandings of the two super-Powers. Security is not the exclusive concern and responsibility of the super-Powers, which have subscribed to the terms of a Charter proclaiming the sovereign equality of all nations. Respect for this principle of “sovereign equality of all nations” and the renunciation of the threat or use of force are clear and specific obligations assumed by the major Powers under the Charter. The common danger of war and annihilation should correlate to a joint responsibility.

23. In the general debate of the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the delegation of Brazil [*1756th plenary meeting*] has likewise noted with regret that the Geneva Disarmament Committee appears virtually to have

¹ Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879).

abandoned all efforts towards the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and that, in the lexicon of the great Powers, the word "disarmament" is being gradually and slowly superseded by the expression "arms control" or "limitation of armaments", which means the continued overwhelming military superiority of the major Powers. The delegation of Brazil likewise pointed out that, by establishing a minimum initial period for the duration and validity of the Treaty on non-proliferation, the super-Powers appeared to admit that by the end of that term the world would still be confronted with the existence of nuclear-weapon Powers. This is tantamount to saying that the problem of nuclear disarmament will not, in all that period of twenty-five years, receive a final and satisfactory solution. Thus we cannot escape the conclusion that all efforts being exerted by the super-Powers in the field of security are based on the assumption of the permanence of power and on the ever-present possibility of the use of force.

24. It is a sad reflection on the work and proceedings of the Geneva Disarmament Committee to notice that that Committee, which did not go beyond the drafting of two vague paragraphs of an eventual preamble to a hypothetical treaty on general and complete disarmament, was efficacious and operative in one single instance. That was, when it endeavoured, through the Treaty on non-proliferation, to disarm nations which were already disarmed, in the field of nuclear development. Now the idea appears to crop up that in the field of conventional armaments efforts should concentrate on the disarmament of small nations in accordance with some regional or subregional formulas. Again the idea crops up that dangers to world peace arise from small, non-adult nations and not from the adult and responsible major Powers. The philosophy of power is in full swing.

25. At the time the General Assembly was debating the terms of the non-proliferation Treaty we were told that as soon as the Treaty was concluded and open to signature the nuclear Powers would initiate negotiations in good faith on a whole range of nuclear disarmament issues. We have likewise been told that the nuclear Powers would be receptive to any new initiatives on the all-important question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We have been disappointed on both counts: the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and even the negotiations of limited scope on arms control have failed to materialize. Last year, in this same Committee, the nuclear Powers strongly opposed the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee for the purpose of accompanying the implementation of the recommendations and conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968. It is a curious situation indeed where all sacrifices and gestures for peace are demanded from the medium and small nations, while the major Powers show no disposition at all to part with any of the privileges and prerogatives of power.

26. Power is, by all standards, the most persistent and enduring of human passions. If this is true of individuals, it is still more true of societies, of nations and of States. It should likewise be noted that the limits of national ethics are considerably more flexible and elastic than the limits of individual ethics. The *raison d'Etat* has very frequently

been invoked to justify crimes and aggressions and it is a fact that history tends to look with benevolence and even with admiration upon soldiers and statesmen who have aggrandized their nations even at the expense of the legitimate interests of other nations. For the benefit and greatness of their countries, statesmen and leaders commit many acts that they would not commit for themselves and for their families. Power, prestige and success justify many things in the world of today. For all those reasons, power is not something men and nations are very prone to part with. This is regrettable, but none the less true.

27. And yet, the road to security cannot be spanned without efforts towards restraining or disciplining the exercise of power. The arms race and the race for power are determined and encouraged by the feeling that someday, somehow, the principles contained in Article 2 of the Charter will be disregarded and slighted by the powerful of the day. No one would accumulate weapons and war materials if not with the idea of some day using them, albeit in the exercise of self-defence. Confidence in the principles of the non-use of force and non-intervention must be restored if we are to make any progress towards peace and security. Security will not come from spheres of influence, from balance of power, from super-Power arrangements or agreements, from threats or from pressure. It will come one day, which we hope is not far distant, when nations, big and small, when peoples, developed and developing, will forsake the use of force for the attainment of political objectives.

28. This idea of the utter illegitimacy of the use of force and a common pledge to that effect on the part of all nations of the world should be the guiding idea behind any revision of the Charter of the United Nations. This revision is necessary and should not be indefinitely postponed. When the Charter was conceived only fifty nations participated in its drafting, which means that the overwhelming majority of the Members here present had no say in the elaboration of the norms and principles which govern and regulate their activities in international life. This consideration alone is an imperative factor pointing towards revision. As we have stated before, the Charter was a document forecasting the close of a world war. It is now incumbent upon us to bring forth a document heralding the beginning of peace and security among men, States and nations. Furthermore, it is indispensable that a really efficacious system of collective security in the political field be accompanied by an adequate system of collective security in the economic field.

29. It is a sad fact today that science and technology, with all their progress and development, are widening, not narrowing, the ominous gap between developed and developing nations. Science and technology are now at the service of power and pressure, as has been evidenced in the case of the non-proliferation Treaty. The concept of power today far from encompassing the merely military aspects of power, embraces the whole range of economics, science and technology. A new Charter should be based on the concept that all men are created equal and that all States are entitled to an equal opportunity of enjoying freedom and sovereignty and to an equal protection and immunity from the use of force. This is not a Utopian dream or idle speculation. The very fact of today is that our present

concept of unlimited power and force has put us on the brink of general and complete annihilation before we can reach the goal of general and complete disarmament. No nation is secure today. Power has not brought about complete security for any nation, however powerful or super-powerful. If force and power have failed to bring about the desired goal of security, there is no reason why we should not explore other paths and avenues, the avenues of justice and equality. Realism has been a failure and has made imminent the possibility of destruction. There is no reason why we should not try idealism instead, however Utopian it may seem.

30. In San Francisco we forgot that in justice, not in power, lies the surest way to peace and harmony among nations. Let us not make the same mistake at our next endeavour, when the Charter will be revised, as it ought to be, at the very earliest opportunity.

31. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Brazil for the kind words that he has said about me personally.

32. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I cannot, of course, fail to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of this important Committee. We hope that under your wise guidance we will proceed with success in our deliberations.

33. I should also like to congratulate our Vice-Chairman, Mr. Kolo, the Ambassador of Nigeria, and our Rapporteur, Mr. Barnett, the representative of Jamaica.

34. We pledge you, Mr. Chairman, and the Bureau our close co-operation in the tasks which are before us. I intended to say that we are also ready to pledge to keep our speeches short, but having seen the copious notes in front of me, I am pledging to cut short the speeches of my colleagues in the Polish delegation but not my own.

35. Next year the United Nations will celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary. Created at a time when many armies of the world were still fighting the nazi onslaught, in an atmosphere of united action by the anti-nazi coalition, the United Nations has since passed through many difficult periods and has had to face many dangers. Although its activities have not fulfilled all expectations the Organization may nevertheless pride itself on its important accomplishments. Its composition too has changed. From an international Organization of 51 States at its inception, it has gradually grown into a body of 126 States. That growth, fully reflecting the great process of the emancipation of peoples and their liberation from colonial bondage, has thus mirrored the changes in the political set-up in the world.

36. May I be permitted to recall that during this very period the strength of the socialist countries was being consolidated. They were consolidating their new system in a part of the world which had suffered the greatest destruction during the last war and which was covered by the largest number of graves of those who had been killed in battle or executed, of those who had fallen in the armed struggle against the invader as well as of those who had perished defenceless in the gas chambers of the nazi death camps. Poland alone lost as many as 6 million people or 22

per cent of its population and 40 per cent of its national wealth. Eight hundred thousand inhabitants of Warsaw alone lost their lives—twice as many as the total number of casualties suffered by the United States during the Second World War.

37. It is, of course, not my intention to engage in a kind of historic auction to prove who suffered more. That would be out of place. But the magnitude of our sacrifices determines the extent of our devotion to the cause of peace. It is not for the purpose of propaganda that we stress, again and again, that there can be no recurrence of the tragic experiences of the years 1939-1945.

38. One more reason for saying this is that, parallel to the growth of the socialist forces in the world, we witnessed the disintegration of the anti-nazi coalition. Former comrades-in-arms, the socialist countries were attacked as opponents while former enemies were increasingly treated—with due respect and apologies, I would even say pampered—as potential allies. How greatly this obstructed the consolidation of peace at the very time when peace became the paramount need!

39. There has been no end to the action of forces which are neither able nor willing to reconcile themselves with the new reality—with the increased importance of the community of socialist States, with the aspirations of colonial peoples to national liberation, with the strengthening of the political independence of new countries entering the arena of international relations.

40. It is the action of those forces that we have to blame for the present international situation, characterized as it is by a lack of stability or constructive tranquillity, by the continuing armaments race, by open armed conflicts, by continued occupation of territories conquered by force. We should not delude ourselves that since conflicts sometimes take place far from our own boundaries, we can remain secure. Until the existing hot-beds of armed struggle are extinguished, until the real causes of the outbreak of local conflicts are eliminated and until the security of nations in every corner of the world is ensured, policy-makers and diplomats cannot acquiesce—that is, if we really desire peace.

41. Peaceful relations among nations and international security are the most essential conditions of economic and social advancement, of the liquidation of the enormous disparities in living standards and of overcoming backwardness among millions of peoples. It was not only the experience of the past world war that made the authors of the United Nations Charter recognize the maintenance of international peace and security as the main purpose of the Organization. In retrospect, according the highest place to that objective in the hierarchy of the legal norms of the Charter was most far-sighted.

42. That objective, however, has not proved an easy one to obtain. It is true that humanity has managed to avoid the outbreak of a new world war. One can assume that that was largely due to the insistently peaceful policy of the socialist States, a policy which has gained support among many of the newly liberated countries. But we did not succeed in avoiding local armed conflicts heavy with losses and human

suffering. Neither have all threats to international security yet been eliminated.

43. Let us ask a question: Why did that happen? Why do certain States continue to apply the argument of force instead of using and restricting themselves to the force of argument? Experience shows that the argument of force is expediently applied always and wherever the force of argument fails. What arguments can be made against the natural aspirations of peoples to live in peace, to political and economic independence and to social liberation? None whatsoever. Should, therefore, the argument of force be the last recourse of those who try to negate those aspirations? The international community now has the necessary means to compel anyone to abandon that way of arguing, should he wish to use it for the preservation of his political and economic advantages or, even more, for the enlarging of his possessions.

44. Faced with negative development in the international situation, our Organization has not remained idle. In an atmosphere of discussion, naturally often characterized by the clashing of opposing views, the United Nations has endeavoured to formulate measures to prevent many dangerous developments and has attempted to provide a guarantee for the stabilization of the situation or to facilitate processes deserving to be promoted.

45. The historical Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 1514 (XV)*] was of such a character. One should also not fail to mention the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty [*resolution 2131 (XX)*] as well as the 1966 resolution [*2160 (XXI)*] on the strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination.

46. These are but the most important of the many resolutions adopted only during the last few years. It is also worthwhile mentioning the conclusions of the General Assembly on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, a question the paramount importance of which was recognized in the General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI).

47. One of the consecutive resolutions, to quote resolution 2465 (XXIII), clearly called upon the colonial Powers:

“... to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones and from using those that still exist to interfere with the liberation of the peoples in colonial Territories in the exercise of their legitimate rights to freedom and independence”.

48. The colonial Powers have not shown any willingness to implement these decisions of the United Nations. In defiance of our Organization, they continue to use their military bases to suppress national liberation struggles. This attitude results in the creation of a state of constant tension in those areas. As the Chairman of our delegation stated in the general debate, referring to the struggle for the

maintenance and the strengthening of international peace and security:

“When we feel that there has been a lack of achievement in this field and when day by day we witness bloodshed and casualties on battlefields, we realize that the cause lies not in any lack of efforts to preserve peace, including the efforts of the United Nations, but in the defiance of peace and of the United Nations by those who violate binding international agreements and refuse to implement unanimously adopted resolutions.”
[1767th plenary meeting, para. 87.]

49. A close examination of the substance of the initiative contained in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Gromyko, to the Secretary-General [*A/7654*], leads the Polish delegation to the conclusion that each of the proposals included therein is inseparably connected with the contents of the United Nations Charter. It also derives from the achievements of the political thought in the Organization over many years.

50. The very text of the draft [*A/C.1/L.468*], as we analyse it, directly refers to various provisions of the Charter as well as to many undertakings of the United Nations. It also coincides with many appraisals and corresponding requirements formulated in the introduction to this year's report of the Secretary-General.² If we add that the Soviet initiative recalls the main principles of international law and calls for accelerating the United Nations work on their future codification we have a clear picture of the main trends of this document.

51. As we of Poland understand it, it tends to sum up United Nations efforts over many years in one document to serve as a directive for action in accordance with the principle of peaceful co-existence of nations, aimed at the strengthening of international confidence and *détente*, with a view to consolidating co-operation of nations and to ensuring, particularly to newly emerging States, conditions for their full, sovereign development. That is what world public opinion expects from us.

52. It seems to us that the Soviet proposal, not merely by accident, puts a great deal of emphasis on the needs and interests of new States. More than once our debates here have emphasized that it does not suffice only to have one's own flag and national anthem. Poland experienced this after regaining independence in 1918, and in September 1939, when we carried on a lonely struggle against the invader. Thus, our own experience inspires our conclusions.

53. Political liberation does not bring an automatic solution to all problems. It is but the beginning of a long and arduous road which, through the strengthening of full independence, has to lead to the reduction of enormous discrepancies in economic, social and educational standards. At the same time there remains for the newly-emerged States the task of overcoming traditional tribal prejudices, of fortifying territorial integrity and the bonds of state unity, and of creating conditions for regional links among the countries concerned. All these are tasks for more than

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1 A.

one generation and all require the protective shield of security and peace.

54. Although the external forces are not able to reverse the process of full emancipation, they can delay and contain it by various means. Hence, the importance of the liquidation of foreign bases. Their existence always poses the threat that wherever the carrot of neo-colonialism or international intrigues fails the stick might be used with more effect—and of course the metaphor has not been coined by me.

55. The liquidation of foreign bases is particularly important in the Territories that are just gaining or are about to achieve independence. But, coming back to our analysis of the Soviet proposal, it not only renews the demand—so well known in the legislative practice of the United Nations—to withdraw troops from the territory of the States defending their independence attained in the aftermath of the breakdown of the colonial system, it postulates desisting from all methods of suppressing freedom movements of nations that are in the process of liberating themselves, as well as the granting of independence to those who have not yet attained it.

56. The legitimacy of those claims needs no elaboration here. Their realization would strengthen the sense of security in large areas of continents now called upon to play an independent role in international relations which will no longer carry on as passive components of crumbling imperial structures.

57. While discussing these problems, one has to be mindful of the role of the Security Council—the organ of the United Nations on which the Charter confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Poland has always attached particular importance to the position of the Security Council. The Soviet paper rightly devotes much attention to the operation of that organ. This is especially appropriate since the key position of the Security Council and the main principle of its functioning, that of the unanimity of the great Powers, have recently been questioned by a number of States.

58. But what matters here is not only the structure of the Security Council but the fact that not all the constitutional possibilities of the Security Council have been used. Despite almost twenty-five years of United Nations activities, a careful scrutiny of the Charter confirms that there are still many unrealized opportunities within its provisions concerning the Security Council, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and other questions pertaining to the preservation of peace and security.

59. We read in the Soviet proposal, in section V, some points concerning paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Charter, which envisages periodic meetings of the Council with the participation of members of Governments or of specially designated representatives. The potential advantages of such meetings do not need a long explanation. Their possible usefulness has also been indicated by the Secretary-General.

60. However, not even once has the Security Council availed itself of this opportunity although informal meetings held by ministers for foreign affairs during General

Assembly sessions have indeed proved useful. Those meetings, though their results have not always been reflected in specific decisions of the United Nations, certainly do help to improve the climate of international relations, thus paving the way towards solutions.

61. In the context of the work of the Committee of Thirty-Three on United Nations peace-keeping operations mention can be made of Article 43 of the Charter, which provides for the conclusion of special agreements by virtue of which United Nations Members would make available to the Security Council armed forces to extend assistance and other facilities. In spite of repeated efforts and appeals on the part of several States, my own not excluded, those provisions have not been put into practice.

62. Likewise, the provisions of the Charter concerning the Military Staff Committee largely remain a dead letter. Meanwhile, with the participation of the representatives of various geographic regions and of some regional organizations—for example, the Organization of African Unity—the Committee could assist the Security Council in ensuring proper guidance of the United Nations military operations. Through the application of the means provided in the Charter a guarantee could be achieved to the effect that these operations, in the past more than once used in the interest of a small group of Powers, would be conducted in the interest of all.

63. Closely connected with the system of collective security provided in the Charter is the question of the definition of aggression, to which section VI of the Soviet draft refers. As is well known, the Charter provides for setting in motion a mechanism of international action in case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. A clear definition of what is to be understood as an act of aggression has indeed great importance for the effectiveness of actions to be taken.

64. In accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, the Security Council should determine “the existence of any . . . act of aggression” and then should take measures provided for in the Charter. We can therefore say that it is the task of the Council to apply certain objective criteria to a concrete, factual situation.

65. One of the most decisive criteria is: what is aggression? Now, I can understand why we here in the United Nations have little confidence in finding a definition. It is because of the lack of success experienced during the many years of the United Nations work on the definition of aggression. I should like to oppose such an attitude. The search for proper solutions for many international problems often requires much time. And no failures can diminish the importance of these undertakings.

66. A problem does not disappear because no favourable circumstances for its solution have hitherto occurred. Nor does it disappear because of a lack of a solution acceptable to all. It has been said that failure should always be an incentive to the initiation of new efforts, and this, I submit, should be the only directive guiding us.

67. The formulation of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among

States, probably better known as the principle of peaceful coexistence, was entered upon some years ago. I venture to say that the Special Committee³ entrusted with this task has achieved considerable progress. Indeed, we believe that the process of codification might soon be crowned with the adoption of a declaration constituting an important legal and political cornerstone of our Organization and of a system of international security.

68. In its third and sixth sections the Soviet proposal calls for the elaboration and implementation of the fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence of peoples; it also refers to such concepts as sovereignty, equality, territorial inviolability and non-interference. Of course it is unnecessary to analyse here the meaning of all those concepts. I should like, however, to deal briefly with what we consider to be fundamental to the rights of peoples still fighting for their liberation from colonial dependence.

69. All nations, both large and small, have equal rights, including the right to self-determination and freedom of action, the right to full sovereignty and inviolability of their territories. This premise led us, together with certain other delegations, to advance a number of suggestions during the discussions on this topic in the Committee which I mentioned a moment ago. The most important principles we emphasized were: First, each nation has the right to determine rules of conduct in its economic, social and cultural development, including the right to dispose freely of its natural resources.

70. Second, the subordination of peoples to foreign domination, including the practices of racial discrimination, exploitation and other forms of colonialism, contradicts these rights and is therefore inadmissible; peoples under colonial domination have the right to continue their struggle, including armed struggle, for national liberation and to obtain assistance from other States.

71. Third, all States are duty bound to co-operate with the United Nations in order to put an end, without delay, to colonial domination and, unconditionally, to grant full independence, all essential powers included, to peoples which are still the prisoners of colonialism.

72. The adoption of such obligatory norms would conform with the historical requirements of the epoch in which we live—and it is a great epoch. The Soviet proposal which is the subject of our present discussion seems to aim not only at the strengthening of security on a world scale but also at the elaboration of some arrangements ensuring the security of individual regions of our globe.

73. May I be permitted to recall once again that my Government devotes particular attention to the problem of European security, not because we easily underestimate the importance of security on other continents, but simply because we are living on that continent. Our special interest results from the fundamental directive of the foreign policy of my Government—that of ensuring the security and continued peaceful development of our own nation. We have more than once indicated our constructive approach

to these problems; we have submitted many initiatives aimed at the limitation and elimination of the danger of a renewed military confrontation in Europe, for nowadays such a confrontation would involve a conflict between two military groupings, each possessing the most destructive means of warfare. Do you require a vivid imagination to visualize the aftermath of such a war? It would be much more horrifying than the ruins of Warsaw, Stalingrad or Rotterdam during the last war.

74. In his statement in the general debate [*1767th plenary meeting*] our Minister for Foreign Affairs dwelt extensively on the reasons for our preoccupation and concern, for our involvement and endeavours. There is no need for me to be repetitious. If I recall the Polish initiative for the creation of an atom-free zone or for a freeze of nuclear armaments in Central Europe, if I recall our proposal for the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation made as early as 1964, I do so in order to stress even more strongly the obligation of each State to render its own constructive contribution to the shaping of international relations. Poland tries to fulfil that obligation.

75. The world should not be divided into countries taking initiatives, countries contriving various obstacles in the implementation of these initiatives and, finally, countries which act as passive observers of the international scene in a part of the world where they live and work and where, if we are not careful, they may perish.

76. The Warsaw Treaty Powers have submitted a common initiative, formulated in Budapest, concerning the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation. As we understand it, they do not aim at monopolizing either this initiative or subjects to be dealt with at such a conference. Each country is entitled to make its own concrete contribution. Thus we follow the discussion on this subject with great attention, highly appreciating every suggestion which might advance the cause of peace and security in Europe.

77. It is with grateful satisfaction that we have accepted the proposal of the Government of Finland. We are also studying with deep interest the statement made in the general debate of our session by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Hamel [*1765th plenary meeting*], who touched, among other things, upon the question of regional organizations referred to in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet proposal equally stresses the importance of that Chapter of the Charter. We continue to look forward to the elaboration of a more concrete position by other European countries.

78. The convening of the European conference and the preparation and adoption of documents determining rules governing relations between European States could to a great extent act as a stabilizing factor on our continent and would bring us nearer to the possibility of replacing the existing military groupings in Europe by an over-all European system of collective security. We, for our part, will not spare any effort aimed at the creation of such a system. It is in that spirit that we have welcomed the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, [*1652nd meeting*] on this very problem and also on the necessity to give consideration to a system of collective security in Asia.

³ Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

79. Abusing the privilege of being one of the first speakers in our debate, I have taken the liberty, for which I apologize, to present in a somewhat detailed manner our reasoning concerning the Soviet draft, which we do venture to call momentous. The Polish delegation accepts and supports its contents. The form in which the Soviet delegation would like to see the appeal to all States of the world adopted is, in our opinion, the right one indeed. And this really should be a document addressed to all the States of the world, for we think that it is necessary to depart finally from the practice hitherto applied under the pressure of the selfish approaches of some Powers.

80. Fighting for the universal observation of the norms of international conduct, we cannot and should not divide the world into those States which are bound by United Nations decisions and those States which are somehow compulsorily excluded from applying them, even though they themselves very much wish to conform to them.

81. Does it mean that we do not want the latter countries to abide by the commonly recognized norms of international law? How could we apply such practice in the life of individual States? Could someone be forcibly exempted from observing the laws of a country? Let these three questions oblige us to answer that all should be equal under the law. Let us once again recall Article 2, paragraph 6, of the United Nations Charter:

“The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

82. Indeed this provision has been too often forgotten. The appeal should be directed to all States, and the United Nations should return to this subject in the next year.

83. The times we live in are characterized by constant, often violent and radical, transformations. The world has entered the era of the atom and outer space, even reaching to the moon, and, at the same time, the era of national and social liberation. Most unfortunately, the shaping of social and political institutions and the process of elaborating rules of international co-operation and international law do not keep pace with this rapid development. In the sphere of international relations, the problems of peace and security, should not remain an anachronistic oasis of uncontrolled, even chaotic, events.

84. In our opinion, the adoption of the Soviet proposal would enable us to renew, adjust and make more up-to-date decisions, or sets of rules, which have already been the subject, and sometimes the result, of the deliberations of the United Nations in the past, or which should be dealt with in the not too distant future. We can also create an opportunity to stress, by issuing the appeal, a strict correlation and interdependence between global and regional security, important as it is in the interdependent world today. We can enhance the authority and prestige of our Organization on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. By the adoption of the appeal we

can further vitalize our Organization, thus fulfilling the demands of the majority of its Members, who are only too often made impatient and discouraged by inactivity or lack of progress, though, I have to admit, with due respect, that the speaker who preceded me did really sound too pessimistic.

85. One should not ignore the powerful movements against war and in favour of peace which are gaining ground not only among the youth, but in many countries of the world and on many continents. No one will grant a moratorium to the United Nations on its duty to do everything possible under the Charter and under existing circumstances to pursue unrelentingly the quest for peace, instead of withdrawing from the main currents of the world behind a glass wall, seeing but not hearing and, what is worse, not being heard. We of Poland are convinced that the United Nations is able and willing to fulfil those tasks; it is its duty towards mankind.

86. The CHAIRMAN: There are no other names on the list of speakers for this afternoon. There is only one name on the list for tomorrow, and three for the next day. In the circumstances I wonder whether it is the wish of the Committee not to meet tomorrow afternoon and to have two meetings on Wednesday, 15 October. If the Committee would prefer to meet tomorrow to hear the speaker whose name is on the list, I shall of course convene a meeting for tomorrow afternoon.

87. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. Chairman, will you kindly read out to us the names of the speakers scheduled for tomorrow and any other days; this might determine our turn to speak.

88. The CHAIRMAN: For tomorrow the representative of Malta, if I have his permission to say so, has inscribed his name on the list of speakers. The delegations of Iraq, Sweden and Finland wish to speak on Wednesday.

89. Mr. AKWEI (Ghana): I think that the idea of meeting tomorrow afternoon to hear only one speaker might not commend itself to many delegations. If it is agreeable to the delegation concerned, and provided that by the end of today there is no further indication that we are going to have more than one speaker tomorrow afternoon, I think that it would be advisable to dispense with a meeting tomorrow and schedule one for the day after instead, assuming that the two conditions I have mentioned obtain.

90. Mr. VELLA (Malta): There is no objection on our part to speaking on Wednesday.

91. The CHAIRMAN: Since the representative of Malta has no objection to speaking on Wednesday instead of tomorrow afternoon, and since no other delegation has indicated its desire to speak tomorrow afternoon, the next meeting of the Committee will be held on Wednesday morning, 15 October.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.