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Sixtieth session

First Committee

13th meeting

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Official Records

President: Mr. Choi (Republic of Korea)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 85 to 105 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: Before we start our thematic discussion, on the issue of regional disarmament and security, together with other disarmament measures and international security, I would like first to give the floor to Mr. Vicente Berasategui, Chairman of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, as our guest speaker for today.

Mr. Berasategui: First, allow me to say that it is a pleasure for me to work under your guidance, Mr. Chairman, knowing your experience and diplomatic ability.

(*spoke in Spanish*)

I should like today to present the 2005 reports of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, which have been issued as reports of the Secretary-General in documents A/60/285 and A/60/135.

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions from 23 to 25 February 2005 and from 29 June to 1 July 2005 in New York and Geneva, respectively. A complete summary of the Advisory Board's work during 2005

has been annexed to the documents to which I have just referred. For my part, I would simply like to highlight some of the observations and recommendations made by the Board. Allow me first to take up the general comments made by the Board.

Mindful of the current international situation, the Advisory Board took up recent developments in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. It expressed its deep concern about the lack of progress on a number of critical issues. Many members specifically deplored the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) resulting from the lack of consensus on the important issues before the Conference. The Board underscored the urgent need to make progress with regard to disarmament measures and related matters, including the issue of non-State actors, in order to prevent a weakening of the current system of legal norms relating to disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Board took up four substantive items as part of its 2005 agenda, the first of which was gaining control of the nuclear fuel cycle and fissionable materials cycle. In its deliberations on that issue, the Board took into account the report on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, published this year by the Expert Group set up by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was acknowledged that creating multilateral nuclear approaches might offer multiple advantages in the area of non-proliferation. It was said, however, that

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this was no panacea for dealing with existing failures to comply or for lack of universality, nor could it guarantee full participation on the part of States that are not Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Notwithstanding all that, the Board's view was that achieving a multilateral agreement on guarantees regarding nuclear fuel was not out of the question. The Board put forward a number of recommendations for dealing with the matter. First of all, it felt that the opportunities most at hand for applying multilateral nuclear approaches on a voluntary basis should be considered. Secondly, it felt that continued thought should be given to the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change with regard to a voluntary moratorium on the building of facilities in exchange for guarantees with regard to the supply of fissionable material.

Thirdly, it felt that the existing approaches and tools should be used fully, including export controls, steps taken by the Security Council, including those under resolution 1540 (2004), the broadest possible accession to the model Additional Protocol for IAEA safeguards and intensification of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

The second item was regional security and global standards for small arms and light weapons. The Board made the point that the United Nations had, in a relatively short time, had taken some initial but major steps in devising global norms. By the same token, it acknowledged its satisfaction with the role played by regional and subregional organizations alike, as well as that played by civil society, in combating the scourge of small arms and light weapons. The Board recommended that the second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, already held in July of this year here in New York, as well as the conference of the parties to review progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action to be held next year, should be expanded and should go in greater depth into the matter of global norms in this regard.

Secondly, there should be stronger coordination and greater cooperation, including between the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as between the United Nations and the relevant financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the regional

development banks, in order to come to grips with the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects using a broad and holistic approach. The third item involved regional challenges and opportunities with regard to weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms.

The Board noted that, in the period following the cold war, opportunities for adopting more dynamic regional and subregional approaches both to disarmament and non-proliferation had come to the fore. These approaches, it was felt, should be prompting simultaneous negotiations to deal with more extensive and more generalized measures to lead to general and complete disarmament. The Board recommended that regional disarmament agreements should contribute to enhancing security and stability region-wide, at the lowest possible level of arms and armed forces, and this without diminishing security for all participating States.

The Board also looked at this issue in the context of the specifically regional dimension, considering the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the praiseworthy cycle of democracy, multilateralism and peace developed in Latin America, and the threat of small arms and light weapons in Africa.

The fourth item considered was disarmament machinery. In reviewing this machinery specifically, the Board recommended that the Conference on Disarmament, as the sole multilateral negotiating body available to the international community, be kept intact and indeed strengthened, without closing the door on the possibility of adjusting its procedural provisions in such a way as to facilitate progress in reviewing disarmament measures.

A number of ideas were advanced, such as creating groups and the adoption of decisions, including the need to avoid any abuse of the standard of consensus, along with establishment of subsidiary bodies.

As to the Disarmament Commission, while certain members advocated extending the current mandate, others took the view that its functions could be absorbed by the First Committee or a body subsidiary to this Committee. Acting as the Board of Trustees for UNIDIR, the Advisory Board adopted the report of the Institute's Director covering UNIDIR

activities for the period from August 2004 to July 2005 for submission to the General Assembly, together with the programme of work and the budget for 2006 (A/60/135).

This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of UNIDIR. During its twenty-five years in existence, the Institute has done an impressive job, accomplishing extremely impressive work with limited resources. UNIDIR's work has been acclaimed in the most diverse forums. The Board, once again, appeals to Member States for greater support for UNIDIR's invaluable work.

The First Committee has a draft resolution on UNIDIR before it for adoption (A/C.1/60/L.2). Given the signal job done by the Institute for so many years, and in my capacity as the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, I would like to invite the First Committee to give its determined support to UNIDIR, as well as to the Board's recommendations embodied in the draft resolution, with a view to facilitating the management and financial functioning of the Institute.

Turning to future work, the Board decided to include the following items on its agenda for its forty-sixth session, to be held in New York in February 2006: first, consideration of the situation in the disarmament arena, taking into account the decisions adopted at the summit that opened the sixtieth session of the General Assembly; and, secondly, measures to prevent acquisition of arms systems by non-State actors.

On the first of those agenda items, I should like to point out that it was introduced in the hope that the summit would take up issues crucial to disarmament and non-proliferation. While the sections on values and principles and on peace and collective security in the 2005 Summit Outcome are directly linked with those matters, I profoundly regret that the world summit outcome document failed to include a section on disarmament and non-proliferation — issues that for decades have been considered among the most urgent problems facing the international community. A number of the members of the Advisory Board have shared with me their concerns at that astonishing omission. Fortunately, the Board's recommendations have been circulated and are well known to the United Nations membership, and there are grounds for hoping that they will be taken into account in the Organization's future work.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Nobuyasu Abe, for the efficacious assistance he provided to the Advisory Board in general and to me personally, as well as for his outstanding input on matters of substance, which facilitated the orientation of our work. I would also like to thank the staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in particular, the Secretary of the Board, Mr. Wang, and his assistant, Ms. O'Sullivan-Gurz, for their cooperation during my chairmanship of the Advisory Board.

The Chairman: I would now like to invite our second guest speaker for this morning, Mr. Andrei Krutskikh, Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, to take the floor.

Mr. Krutskikh (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to share with members my impressions on the first discussion of experts, held under United Nations auspices, on one of the most important issues affecting international security today, one whose roots lie in the global information revolution.

In its resolution 58/32, adopted by consensus in December 2003, entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General, with the help of a group of governmental experts to be appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to consider existing and potential threats in the area of information security and possible joint measures to eliminate such threats, to examine relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session. The Group is composed of experts from 15 States, including Belarus, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Group has held three meetings: the first, for five days in July 2004 at United Nations Headquarters in New York; the second, for five days at the end of March and beginning of April 2005 in Geneva; and a third and final 10-day session in July 2005 here in New York. In their work, the Group considered the replies received from Member States on their implementation of

General Assembly resolutions related to international information security, as well as many substantive contributions of Government experts, including national contributions, on issues in international information security. The work of the Group appointed by the General Assembly was the first attempt to consider the issue of information security in the context of international security. The Group itself provided a unique mechanism for research into that issue. The Group conducted an in-depth and systematic analysis of the issues included in its mandate. Overall, the discussion was constructive and balanced. The experts showed keen interest and strong determination with regard to undertaking an in-depth study of the whole range of substantive issues.

The Group fully agreed with the preambular part of the draft report, as well as with the chapter relating to the survey of the current status in the area of ensuring international information security. All of the experts emphasized that, at present, States and individual citizens depend increasingly on information and communication technologies (ICT) for economic development, security and social prosperity. It was recognized that such technologies could have a significant impact on national and international security. Indeed, information is becoming a very valuable element of national property and a very important resource.

The Group noted that issues of confidentiality, integrity and the accessibility of information are a cause for growing concern as a result of the increasing dependence of States, organizations and citizens on information and communication technologies at the national and local levels. The increasing number of security breaches has already caused significant financial damage and undermined confidence among users. The interconnection between electronic and physical infrastructures means that, in the event of accident, error or attack, problems will arise in critically important information systems that provide vitally important services.

Such linkages make ICT extremely attractive to those who wish to have a negative impact on society and its interests and on the integrity of the infrastructure of States and to those who wish to disrupt security, in both civilian and military spheres, as the General Assembly has noted on many occasions.

The Group focused attention on the need to counter challenges to security by means of threat reduction and risk-management activities. The vulnerabilities of information systems could be exploited by many individuals, and it is not always easy to identify those individuals. It is thus important to assess, manage and reduce risks by analysing threats and vulnerabilities. The Group noted that attacks against ICT and critically important infrastructure could be carried out not only by hackers and criminals, but also by terrorists and hostile States. Such actions could have extremely serious consequences.

The Group recognized that terrorists use ICT for the purposes of recruitment, training, information-gathering, money-laundering and the coordination of activities. A small but highly motivated group of non-State actors could, in a short period of time, disrupt the work of networks and information assets. We cannot rule out the possibility that hostile States might hire cyber-criminals and wage an information war using new forms and new methods.

Increased attention is being paid to the potential threat to information security posed by hostile States. The Group agreed that preventing attacks and identifying and prosecuting the individuals who conduct such attacks remains a priority. In this connection, the Group recognized that threats reduction and confidence-building measures can help to strengthen information security. In this regard, the Group also noted that information security is a national responsibility, and that international cooperation could significantly strengthen national efforts.

The Group circulated the reports submitted by countries on national practices with regard to strengthening information security. On the basis of the results of the work carried out, the Group came to the conclusion that, although there are many national approaches to promoting information security — and the great variety of approaches is a response to specific conditions in various States — there are a number of common elements in terms of an effective approach to strengthening information security at both the national and global levels.

These elements include strengthening coordination, adopting preventive measures, reacting to disruptions, including by bringing prosecutions, in the area of information technology. The Group analysed measures already adopted for the purpose of

strengthening information cyber-security on a regional level, in particular among the countries of the Group of Eight, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Organization of American States, as well as at the international level, including in the United Nations, in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society and the International Telecommunication Union.

We researched efforts carried out to that end by standard-setting organizations and groups that react to emergency situations in the area of information technology, computers and computer security. We analysed initiatives carried out by private-sector organizations, such as Internet Alliance, the Global Information Infrastructure Commission and the World Information Technology and Service Alliance. In that context, the Group noted that, although individual Member States must take measures to ensure their own information security, the global nature of ICT and the threats, vulnerabilities and linkages in that area mean that international actions in that context are equally important. The Group of Experts have proposed a number of steps and measures that could be adopted jointly by members of the international community for the purpose of strengthening international information security, including in the long term.

The Group agreed on a significant number of sections of substantive importance in its final report. However, the elaboration of a full text that could be adopted by consensus was not possible, at least at this stage. I attribute that to a number of factors. We had very limited time in which to consider a whole range of comprehensive issues that are confronting the international community with fundamentally new and sensitive problems to which we must find joint responses. It is clear that the process of doing that will not be brief.

There were other objective reasons as well, often related to the substance of the issues. Even with the use of translation, the members of the Group of Governmental Experts spoke different languages with respect to essential issues related to international information security, because the international community has still not developed unified and generally accepted definitions of key terms and concepts in that area. To a significant extent, moreover,

various States have different laws regulating issues related to ensuring information security and cyber-security. Many countries are only in the initial phase of bringing their domestic statutes and regulations into conformity with the relevant norms and principles. There are also differing interpretations of current international law in the area of international information security.

There is no longer any doubt that, given the potential and credible threats to international information security posed by criminals, terrorists and States, more time and greater efforts will be needed if the international community is to develop common approaches aimed at reducing the number of such threats and diminishing the vulnerabilities and risks related to information and communication technology. I believe it is important that such efforts continue. It is only through the joint consideration of these issues, under the auspices of the most influential international organization, the United Nations, that this problem can be swiftly resolved so that humanity will not repeat the mistakes already made with respect to other technologies, which, like genies, became monsters that were not put back into the bottle in time.

The Chairman: The Committee will now have an interactive discussion with our guest speakers by way of an informal question-and-answer session. Before we do so, I shall suspend the meeting so that we can continue our discussions in an informal mode.

The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 11 a.m.

The Chairman: I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing to comment on the thematic subjects of, first, regional disarmament and security and, secondly, other disarmament measures and international security.

Mr. El Hadj Ali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is seen as an effective way to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and to substantively support nuclear disarmament efforts. Indeed, nuclear-weapon-free zones have been universally recognized as both an important instrument in attaining the fundamental objective of strengthening peace and security at the regional, and, by extension, the international, level, as well as an important regional confidence-building measure.

The establishment of denuclearized zones should be understood as falling within the article VII prerogatives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — which recognizes the right of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories — as well as a measure that will help us to advance towards a nuclear-weapons-free world.

The adoption by many countries of a strategic approach that rejects the nuclear element as a guarantor of their national security has created a conducive climate for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In fact, nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, in the South Pacific, in South-East Asia, and in Africa — established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba — have considerably reduced the risks of nuclear proliferation and have contributed to strengthening international peace and security.

Our continent, Africa, made a decisive advance towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone with the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which was the product of the collective political will of African States.

Algeria, which has opted for promoting nuclear technologies for peaceful uses and for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime as a fundamental pillar of nuclear disarmament, is fully invested in the work that resulted in the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba — building an Africa free of nuclear weapons. We were the third African State to ratify that Treaty.

At the same time, given its proximity and the close ties between Africa and the Middle East, Algeria remains deeply concerned by the absence of progress regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that difficult region, where Israel, alone, continues to refuse to join the NPT and to submit all of its facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As a result, we feel that it is essential to take specific measures to implement the goals and objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference.

In order to attain our ultimate goal, namely, freeing the world of the threat of nuclear weapons, the international community must make a decisive declaration and a steadfast commitment to establish such zones throughout the world. At the same time, my

delegation would like to note that the only real safeguard for security is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Ms. Al Owais (United Arab Emirates) (*spoke in Arabic*): Notwithstanding confidence-building measures adopted by the Arab States, including the United Arab Emirates, with regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament, the security situation in the Middle East continues to pose a major threat to international peace, security and stability. This is due to the fact that Israel continues to possess a nuclear weapons arsenal and their means of delivery. The United Arab Emirates — while voicing its concern that Israel is the only State in our part of the world not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and that it is unwilling to place its nuclear facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — feels that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been prevented because of inequality of treatment and of double standards applied in the realm of disarmament in general. That, in turn, has encouraged Israel, in various ways, to pursue its irresponsible policy of developing its own nuclear weapons arsenal, and has encouraged other States to revive their push for acquiring nuclear weapons in the framework of their own conception of security deterrence.

We therefore call upon the international community to assume its full responsibility regarding peace and security in the Middle East by undertaking the following commitments. First, effective measures should be taken to force Israel to dismantle its nuclear facilities and to subject them to the comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and safeguards regime. Secondly, the international community should exert more effective and serious pressure on the Israeli Government, including economic pressure, to prompt it without reserve to heed the call to join the NPT and the IAEA and its two protocols designed to enhance that Agency's mandate. Thirdly, we call upon all States, notably the nuclear-weapon States, to abide by the commitments they have made under relevant international resolutions proscribing the provision of financial, technical or scientific support for the development of Israel's nuclear weapons programme.

Those measures are designed to enhance confidence and build a positive environment, and once

they are taken they will give a fresh impetus to the peace process in our part of the world. They would also strengthen efforts to contain violence and forestall any nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists and other irresponsible elements. Finally, we hope that delegations in this Committee will lend their support to the two draft resolutions concerning the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and addressing the danger of nuclear proliferation in that part of the world (A/C.1/60/L.3 and A/C.1/60/L.6). Those draft resolutions accurately reflect the concerns of the States of the region and dovetail with the efforts of the international community to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament, with a view to ridding all of our peoples of the horrors of nuclear war.

Mr. Al-Kubaisi (Qatar) (*spoke in Arabic*): As this is the first time I take the floor, I am pleased to join my colleagues in congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish you every success in your endeavours. Also, I would be remiss if I failed to extend my congratulations to the Vice-Chairmen, as well as to the entire Bureau, on their well-deserved election to their posts. Under your able leadership and with the cooperation of the members of the Bureau, we are certain that our work will have a successful outcome.

The General Assembly, in a number of resolutions, the latest being 59/63, has urged all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that same resolution, the General Assembly urged the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In that connection, the Assembly has also urged all States that had not yet done so to submit their nuclear facilities and activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime. Until the day when a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is a reality, we must work for the acceptance of the principles on which it is based; we must help generate the political will among the parties involved to take the steps designed to bring it about and to refrain from producing, acquiring or testing nuclear weapons and from placing such weapons on their territories or on lands under their control.

The delegation of Qatar would like to emphasize that States in our part of the world generally agree with the provisions of that and other relevant resolutions. With a view to achieving general and complete disarmament, Qatar welcomes all initiatives aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as all weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, my country signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on 10 December 1996. Qatar has reaffirmed at the international level its determination and sincere commitment to making the Middle East a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

We believe that, if all the States in the region were to become parties to disarmament arrangements, peace, security and stability would be strengthened throughout the region, which would result in more confidence among the countries concerned. In order for that to occur, Israel must also submit itself to the NPT process and place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It must also implement the relevant resolutions that it has been called upon to accept in order to bring its nuclear facilities under those safeguards. We call upon all States to exert pressure on Israel to get it to yield to the will of the international community and implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. Israel is the only State in our region not to have signed the NPT or placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That fact breeds insecurity in the region and poses a threat to our part of the world as a result of the existence of these deadly weapons. Were Israel to do so, other States might be prompted to follow its example; conversely, they might emulate it and act with impunity.

Relevant conventions on disarmament must be fully implemented in order to maintain international security. We welcome all initiatives aimed at bringing about general and complete disarmament, especially in the Middle East. We emphasize that the Middle East must become a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. We also reaffirm the role played by the United Nations in that regard.

Miss Majali (Jordan): Jordan is party to all international disarmament-related treaties prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and adheres fully to its obligations under them. As such, Jordan welcomes all initiatives that can lead to general and complete disarmament and has

continuously supported all related efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional, subregional and international levels. It has also welcomed all efforts aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, as it believes that such efforts constitute positive steps towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

In that connection, Jordan continues to view as vital efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including nuclear weapons. Currently, however, Israel remains the only State in the region that has not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also refuses to subject its nuclear facilities and weapons to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and inspections. As a result, the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in our region remains real. This is therefore a matter of concern, as it threatens regional security and stability.

In that context, Jordan would like to recall that since 1974 the General Assembly has adopted more than 32 resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and has called upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of that proposal. Among other things, the Assembly has also called for States to affirm that they refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, and declare their support for the establishment of such a zone. To date, however, that remains to be realized.

Furthermore, Jordan would like to recall that, under both the 1995 resolution and the 2000 conclusions on the Middle East, which were adopted at the respective Review Conferences of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as under numerous resolutions, including those of the General Assembly, the international community is required to urge Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Ways and means should therefore be instituted to bring about such implementation.

Jordan stresses that Israel's accession to the NPT remains of the utmost importance. On the international level, such an undertaking would bring the world closer towards attaining the universality of the NPT and would further consolidate the global non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Israel's accession to the Treaty would defuse existing tensions, bring about tangible progress in other bilateral tracks of the peace process, enhance confidence-building measures among all parties, mitigate the regional arms race, which would allow for huge financial resources to be redirected towards economic and social development, and have an overall positive impact on regional peace and security. The implementation of IAEA safety measures on its un-safeguarded nuclear facilities would also prevent the occurrence of potential nuclear accidents and the risk of radiological contamination, sparing the region in general, and Jordan in particular, of their disastrous effects.

Finally, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones is pivotal for maintaining the international non-proliferation regime and for consolidating international peace and security. Jordan welcomes the zones that have already been established throughout the world and reiterates that establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East is of the utmost importance. Jordan therefore takes this opportunity to reiterate once again the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT, as we believe that that would bring us closer to security, stability and, ultimately, the long-awaited and desired peace in our region.

Ms. Mourabit (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): The radical changes taking place in the world today call for international cooperation in the area of security. Moreover, the traditional way of viewing national defence in the Mediterranean region has evolved towards an awareness of the existence of a common security interest and a need to react collectively to common threats.

The Mediterranean region requires common commitment and solidarity from the international community and the countries of the region in order to overcome the many common security challenges resulting from the continued existence of regions of tension that undoubtedly provide a fertile breeding ground for the rise in all sorts of extremism, which can be exploited by terrorist networks.

The development gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean is constantly widening. That results in frustration and is a potential source of tension for the security of the Mediterranean region. Closing that gap requires both active cooperation between both sides of the Mediterranean and the establishment of true economic integration for the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The international community has an obligation to ensure that the Mediterranean remains a haven of peace, security and prosperity and a forum for interaction — and even an alliance of civilizations.

Morocco reaffirms its steadfast adherence to the various commitments it has entered into on the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. We also reaffirm our active support for the international community's efforts to maintain international peace and security. We urge peace-loving Powers to work with the necessary determination to find peaceful and fair ways to resolve tensions throughout the world, especially in the region of the Middle East. The situation in the Middle East is still fraught with threats and tensions that pose a major obstacle for the political and economic development of the Mediterranean region.

The 1995 Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, which officially launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which Morocco joined, made ensuring peace and stability throughout the Mediterranean region its main priority. The Partnership aims at integrating the economies of the southern Mediterranean into the European Union before 2010. It is our hope that the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona process, which will be commemorated on 27 and 28 November 2005, will energize the programmes of action established to achieve various goals, especially to strengthen peace and stability, to promote economic development, to strengthen democracy and to launch efforts to achieve security throughout the region. In that regard, the colloquium held in Rabat from 1 to 3 October 2005 on political pluralism and the electoral process will certainly give further impetus to the Barcelona process and serve to revitalize the Partnership.

Morocco's participation in a variety of Mediterranean forums — whether in the context of the Five plus Five dialogue, its partnership with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or NATO's Mediterranean dialogue — points to our

commitment to security and cooperation in the region. Those various initiatives and efforts would be more effective if they were carried out in a joint and coordinated manner while making optimal use of ways and means.

Other efforts, such as the 2001 conclusion of the four-party agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone by 2007 between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, constitute a promising step to the building of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and shared prosperity.

The collective determination of the States of the Mediterranean Basin to make our region one of peace, security and cooperation can be made a reality only through the strengthening of the Arab Maghreb Union. The building of a united Maghreb where solidarity prevails can only contribute to strengthening security throughout the Mediterranean region. The concept of the indivisibility of security, which makes the two shores of the Mediterranean a single space, makes it necessary to expand Mediterranean solidarity to other regions, including Africa.

Morocco believes that a regional approach to security should also include an African dimension, in order to help the continent cope with the economic and social difficulties it faces, including the conflicts that generate insecurity, famine, disease and migration flows to countries of the northern Mediterranean. Drug trafficking, money laundering, the trade in human beings, smuggling and illegal migration are some of the other scourges dangerously impacting the Euro-Mediterranean region.

It is for all those reasons that Morocco believes that strengthening security and cooperation between the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership requires committed and effective solidarity at the regional and international levels. A tripartite discussion on the national, regional and international levels will make it possible to better adapt the approach to security in the Mediterranean region on the basis of socio-economic development, the strengthening of democracy, the establishment of lasting peace and the promotion of harmonious relations between peoples and civilizations.

Mr. El-Anbaki (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I should like to refer to article 9 of Iraq's draft Constitution, on which a referendum was held on Friday, 15 October. Subparagraph (e) states that,

“The Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq’s international commitments regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Associated equipment, material, technologies and communications systems for use in the development, manufacture, production and use of such weapons shall be banned.”

It is our hope that the Constitution will be approved, once the results of the referendum are announced in the next few days.

The item under discussion, namely, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, has been, as you all know, on the agenda of the First Committee since 1974. This is an item of particular importance, especially for the members of the Group of Arab States.

As members are well aware, three decisions were adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including one to extend the NPT indefinitely. The Conference also adopted a resolution on the Middle East, calling upon all States of the region that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so without exception and as soon as possible, as well as to place their nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards regime.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the results of the 1995 Conference and emphasized the importance of Israel’s adherence to the NPT. All Arab States of the Middle East are parties to the NPT. That also includes parties to other regional arrangements, given that Arab African States belong to the Treaty of Pelindaba on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, all States parties underscored the importance of bringing about the universality of the Treaty. As a State of the Middle East, Israel’s adherence would be a step towards that goal.

Most speakers at the NPT Review Conference in May 2005 emphasized the importance of establishing in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Israel was specifically called upon to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State and to implement the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards regime.

As members are also well aware, the Security Council has adopted resolutions, including resolution 487 (1981), calling upon the States of the region, including Israel, to place all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards regime. Paragraph 14 of Council resolution 687 (1991) also referred to the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the first preambular paragraph of Council resolution 1284 (1999) recalled resolution 687 (1991).

Iraq calls for the implementation of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, so as to speed up the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. We also call for the establishment of an appropriate and effective mechanism to ensure that Israel adheres to the NPT and places its nuclear facilities under the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards regime.

Mr. Atieh (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): At a time when we aspire to the complete eradication of nuclear weapons and the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we continue to ignore the fact that Israel, which has acquired nuclear weapons, continues to remain outside the NPT regime. Israel actually continues to receive support, while States parties to the NPT are being deprived of the use of nuclear technology for development and peaceful purposes.

Israel continues to pursue its hostile expansionist policies in the Middle East relying on its possession of a huge arsenal of conventional and non-conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. Israel is running a dangerous military nuclear programme that threatens the security of the region and the world. That programme is not under any effective international safeguards regime, and there has not been any international response to this serious situation. The Middle East is, therefore, the region of the world most exposed to military and security threats.

Syria was among the first countries to call for the designation of the Middle East as a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and has worked seriously towards that goal. The draft resolution presented by Syria to the Security Council on 29 December 2003 on behalf of the Group of Arab States was among the latest initiatives in that regard. It called for ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear

weapons, in the context of collective international supervision and the United Nations. The goal of the draft resolution was to promote multilateral international agreements in the area of disarmament. The fact that that Arab initiative has, to date, not been adopted serves to encourage Israel to remain outside the NPT and to keep its nuclear facilities and activities outside the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In that regard, we look forward to the international community's support in the form of clearly calling on Israel to adhere to the NPT and of finding an effective mechanism to bring about that goal, so as to contribute to the stability of the region and the establishment of a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Meyer (Canada): My apologies, Mr. Chairman, I did not realize that we had not yet exhausted the subject of regional security. I was to speak on the issue of disarmament machinery. I would specifically like to address the issue of verification and compliance, to which we have already referred under this cluster.

I am very pleased to return to a subject that is of great importance to my delegation, namely, the issue of verification in international arms control and disarmament agreements. As we noted in our opening statement, the current challenges to the integrity of those regimes have underscored the central role that verification plays in assuring States parties that these instruments are in fact producing the security they promise.

Verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements provides significant security benefits to the international community. We must continue to "trust but verify", precisely because non-compliance with arms control and disarmament commitments can seriously erode the trust that is so vital to their success. While verification mechanisms require significant resources, they represent wise investments, considering the costs of alternative approaches such as the maintenance of large military forces. Furthermore, the continued potential threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — in particular to international peace and security — means that questions of potential non-compliance will remain front and centre.

Like military equipment, verification requires an active research and development programme, if it is to be kept up to date. Canada is continuing its tradition of funding advanced verification research through the International Security Research and Outreach Programme at Canada's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. We also recently established the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, in conjunction with Carleton University in Ottawa. Launched in March of this year, the Centre's initial focus has been on arms control and disarmament treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

One of the Centre's first projects, undertaken with funding from the Government of New Zealand, was the production of a study for the International Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is chaired by Hans Blix of Sweden, on the future of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and options for preserving its capacities and experience. That study, entitled "A standing United Nations WMD verification body: necessary and feasible", was presented at the United Nations this spring during the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

At the United Nations as well, verification has a long and distinguished history. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, noted that adequate verification created confidence that arms control and disarmament agreements were being observed by all parties. In 1985, Canada initiated resolution 40/152, which was adopted by consensus and called on all States to communicate their views on the subject. In 1987 and 1988, Canada chaired a working group that developed the Sixteen Verification Principles, which were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly and remain key expressions of international consensus. In 1990 and 1995, separate groups of governmental experts charged with studying the role of the United Nations in the field of verification reported their recommendations. I would note that some of those recommendations have yet to be fully considered or acted upon. Following the 1995 report, Canada took the lead on the First Committee resolution reaffirming the Sixteen Principles.

But, in the spirit of reform, the draft resolution introduced last year — which was adopted as resolution 59/60 — took a more activist role and

decided to establish a panel of government experts in 2006 to examine the issue and report to the First Committee. The panel will begin work in January and will explore all aspects of verification, as well as the role for the United Nations in that area.

I would like to lay out four possible areas of consideration for the panel. First among them would be a review of the conclusions of the 1990 and 1995 Groups of Government Experts. That would be consistent with the approach of earlier expert groups and would allow for the identification of areas of analysis that could be usefully updated to provide a longer-term vision of verification trends. Such analysis could also be made broader by including results from some of the many studies in this area by the United Nations and other bodies over the past decade. I would also note that a number of the reports of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters have contained suggestions regarding verification.

A second area would be analysis of the lessons drawn from recent verification experiences. Institutions, techniques and technologies for the verification of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have evolved dramatically in the past few years, and the growing technical competence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is widely recognized. At the same time, conventional-arms-sector approaches can provide valuable and often innovative experience, such as the roles played by civil society and the Landmine Monitor in the verification of the Ottawa Convention.

Thirdly, the panel could look at how to improve existing mechanisms, whether through their universalization or simply through their enhanced or fuller implementation. An examination of emerging technologies would also be important. New technologies and scientific developments may help the verification process, but they may also be used to circumvent it. Both possibilities should be considered. In addition, most verification systems were set up with State-to-State relationships in mind and may need to be revisited, given the growth in the importance of non-State actors.

A fourth area would be the role of the United Nations in verification. The experience of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection

Commission demonstrated the capacity of the United Nations to develop and maintain a highly professional, impartial and effective verification organization capable of operating in the most difficult geopolitical environments. It also shows the efficiencies that can be realized through cooperation and complementarity between the United Nations and specialized agencies, such as the IAEA and the OPCW. The issue of a standing multilateral verification capability has been actively considered by previous verification expert groups, and the 2006 panel may wish to examine whether it is an idea whose time has come.

The issue of verification raises challenges in many other contexts as well — the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, most prominently, but also the issue of national submissions under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the consideration of WMD delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles, recognizing that they are not currently subject to a multilateral legally binding control regime.

Naturally, we welcome further discussion on this topic. In that regard, I would especially like to commend those countries that have already expressed their views to the Secretary-General on the topic of verification in response to the note verbale of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of 25 February. We would encourage others to do so prior to January so that the panel of government experts can consider those views as it begins its deliberations.

Mr. Loedel (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the countries members of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and its associated States: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, to discuss the subject of confidence-building measures.

MERCOSUR and its associated States believe that confidence-building measures are a basic tool for achieving peace and security at the global level. That belief was expressed through the Declaration of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace, signed at Ushuaia in 1998. That instrument, in addition to declaring the subregion free of nuclear weapons, calls for, among other things, the strengthening and progressive coordination of consultation and cooperation mechanisms on security and defence issues among its member States and the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

Our region has been a pioneer in the implementation of such measures, and we have witnessed the benefits that they have yielded in terms of safeguarding peace and strengthening democracy in the Americas, making possible greater transparency and dialogue among countries. That has helped to create a favourable environment for the control and limitation of conventional weapons, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, which would enable us to allocate greater resources for the economic and social development of peoples.

Likewise, we have recognized that it is necessary to develop and implement new confidence-building measures to overcome traditional threats to security as well as the other challenges of the twenty-first century and to tackle the new security realities. Indeed, we believe that non-military measures must be developed to supplement activities and initiatives undertaken to help build confidence among States.

For MERCOSUR and its associated States, confidence- and security-building measures are a substantial and irreplaceable component of the network of bilateral, subregional and regional cooperative agreements that have been developed to supplement security institutions established over many years. We made progress in identifying and implementing confidence- and security-building measures during the first Forum on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, held in April 2005.

Moreover, we are participating in the information system of the Organization of American States in the belief that exchanging information promotes the strengthening of confidence-building measures at the hemispheric level. We are a party to the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions and to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials.

In addition, the countries of MERCOSUR and its associated States have created the Consultative and Political Coordination Forum, which receives reports from a series of working groups responsible for tackling security-related issues, including the working group on firearms. The working group recently adopted a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of information on the manufacturing of and illicit

trafficking in firearms, not only to facilitate tracing, but also to implement concrete measures related to complementary policies implemented by countries in the region.

At the same time, MERCOSUR and its associated States are benefiting from related bilateral and subregional experiences, including, inter alia, the adoption of standardized methodologies for quantifying military expenditures, the publication and exchange of defence white papers and the carrying out of joint demining activities, military exercises, meetings of border commissions and early-warning activities to prevent natural disasters. In parallel, we wish to highlight the holding of high-level regional meetings participated in by ministers for foreign affairs and defence and meetings aimed at consultation and agreement on common bilateral, subregional and regional positions, so that we can begin frank and direct dialogue on joint assessments of various security and defence aspects and can exchange ideas and views on national defence policy objectives and on means to address common problems in this area.

In the global arena, MERCOSUR members and associated States have a high degree of compliance with the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms requests for information and have been regularly submitting our standardized reports on defence expenditures. At the same time, the countries of the region believe that confidence-building measures are a dynamic tool and are modified by the particular States involved. That is why we feel it is indispensable to exchange information on experiences in this area at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels, so that we can contribute to the design of analogous projects in other regions.

During the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Member States adopted resolution 59/92, whose objective, among others, is to strengthen the exchange of information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. In implementation of that resolution, informal meetings have been held to exchange experience and to build on it. However, it is necessary to fine tune that machinery by creating a computerized database to facilitate periodic consultation of advances in the design and implementation of such global measures. We hope that the database will be ready in the next three months and that we will thus have complementary machinery that

builds on that which already exists within the United Nations system.

Ms. Tan (Singapore): The swiftly evolving security environment of the new millennium has brought into sharp focus new global security challenges that are immediate and critical. Today, the concept of proliferation does not only refer to the nuclear arsenals kept by States. The threat of proliferation has widened to include all actors at the international, regional and subregional levels. The materials being proliferated include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, all of which have the potential to cause staggering harm and destruction.

The possibility of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction is not only dangerous, that threat can also all too easily slip through the gaps in the existing framework of non-proliferation controls. The global terrorist network has the resources to acquire weapons of mass destruction and it would have no qualms about using them. Indiscriminate terrorist attacks on innocent civilians have demonstrated our collective inability to respond to this new security challenge effectively.

In this dynamic and complex security environment, united and inclusive action on the multilateral, regional and national fronts are essential to preserving our continued security. The traditional security architecture of the cold war era and the argument that nuclear weapons protect States' security are no longer credible solutions to the problem. For collective action to be effective, however, States need to demonstrate firm political will.

First, the international community must recognize the need to move forward on the twin fronts of disarmament and non-proliferation. Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation remain at the heart of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and are mutually reinforcing. Compliance with the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament treaties remains a key priority for Singapore. The failures of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the world summit outcome document to produce any concrete achievements this year are symptomatic of the narrow lens with which some States view the problems of disarmament and non-proliferation. However, that should not be used as an excuse to block further progress, nor should we hold

either disarmament or non-proliferation hostage to one another.

Secondly, all States should fully support and contribute to the vibrancy of multilateral non-proliferation regimes. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are the basic instruments in the international effort to fight the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, the time when such instruments were adequate on their own belongs to an earlier age, when the realities of proliferation were different.

To fully address the current proliferation threat by non-State actors, States must proactively contribute to the effectiveness of national controls. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which calls on Member States to enhance domestic controls and step up cooperation against WMD proliferation, fills a gap in other non-proliferation regimes that do not account for non-State actors. However, its effectiveness can only be complete when individual States enact, implement and enforce export control legislation with rigour. Illicit nuclear supply networks have slipped past States that have inadequate controls, but even countries with stringent export control systems could unknowingly provide subcomponents and materials to proliferators.

Singapore has taken a multi-pronged approach to ameliorate the potential dangers of the new, interlinked challenge of terrorism and WMD proliferation. Our approach centres on multilateral, multi-State and national measures, to create a tiered network of closely coordinated controls.

Let me now elaborate on our efforts in three areas: implementation of the CWC; our export control systems; and our participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Singapore places great emphasis on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Through the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act, we have incorporated the Convention's requirements into Singapore's legal system. The Act makes it an offence for any person to engage in activities involving the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of chemical weapons. We have also supported the verification exercises of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by contributing scientific

expertise. In April 2003, Singapore's Defence Science Organisation's chemical verification laboratory was accredited as an OPCW certified laboratory. In line with article XI of the CWC, the Singapore International Symposium for Protection Against Toxic Substances has been held biennially since 1998.

Singapore's export control system complements and strengthens the CWC. In January 2003, Singapore enacted a strategic goods control act. That legislation covers the export, re-export, trans-shipment, transit, brokering, and intangible technology transfer of strategic goods. It includes a control list of sensitive items drawn from the international regimes, as well as a catch-all provision to include all other items suspected of WMD end use. At the port level, we also participate in the Container Security Initiative and the radiation detection Megaports Initiative.

Singapore also participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to build capacity for inter-State cooperation to disrupt the clandestine supply of WMD and related material to illegitimate non-State actors. The maritime interdiction exercise that we hosted this August brought together 13 other States, encompassing authorities from military, enforcement, port and civil aviation authorities, as well as members of industry. When PSI first started, there was uncertainty about the legality of some of its aspects. However, PSI's foundational principles give unequivocal assurance that all actions taken under the Initiative will be consistent with national and international law and frameworks. The United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change emphasized that all States should be encouraged to join the PSI. In that respect, Singapore urges PSI countries to support participation by more States, with a view to forming an effective global network of non-proliferation control.

The involvement of many different agencies and types of expertise in a given PSI exercise underscores the varied types and levels of action that States can, and should, take to counter proliferation threats. As a small country that is highly dependent on our port and aviation hub for our livelihood, Singapore is cognizant of the need to balance security and economic interests. Nonetheless, we recognize that it is in our immediate and long-term interest to have robust domestic controls and vigilant enforcement of those measures.

At the same time, the universalization of non-proliferation efforts is crucial to achieving effective international commitment. In that regard, Singapore fully supports the various non-proliferation regimes, and is fully committed to the United Nations leadership of the international community. Singapore is proud to be a sponsor of this year's draft resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

It is only when national authorities act wholeheartedly and in concert with multilateral structures that a truly robust international non-proliferation regime can flourish. My delegation encourages all States to actively support the international non-proliferation agenda, in both word and spirit, at home and abroad.

Mr. MacLachlan (Australia): This morning, I wish to speak on non-proliferation and disarmament education.

The Australian Government considers it one of its fundamental responsibilities to safeguard Australians from the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There can be no doubt that that is among the gravest threats confronting not just Australia but the entire international community. Too often, however, international security affairs can seem remote from the day-to-day lives of citizens, merely the subject of discourse among academics and experts. But the reality, especially with regard to WMD proliferation, is very different. For that reason, non-proliferation education is an important element of the Australian Government's efforts to safeguard Australians from the threat of WMD proliferation.

Last week, Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, launched a publication entitled "Weapons of mass destruction: Australia's role in fighting proliferation", copies of which can be found in boxes at the table at the back of the room. It describes the nature of the WMD threat and what the Australian Government is doing to confront it. It seeks to contribute to debate within Australia on non-proliferation issues, although delegations here, I am sure, will find it useful and informative.

The need for such a publication is underscored by the complexity of the themes within it. The global security environment has changed markedly since the end of the cold war. Globalization has increased the opportunities for States to acquire or develop WMD. Moreover, with the rise of transnational terrorism, we

confront the menace of terrorists fulfilling their desire to obtain and use WMD. In that complex global environment, Government strategies must be multidimensional and must involve the entire Government. That is precisely the approach taken by the Australian Government, as is explained in the publication.

Internationally, Australia is working to strengthen the implementation and durability of the international system of non-proliferation treaties. We support practical initiatives — such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and export control regimes — which further support those treaties.

Domestically, the Australian Government has strengthened controls against the risk of WMD terrorism. Critically, the Government is stepping up its engagement with Australian business and universities to improve their awareness of proliferation risks associated with the export of sensitive materials and the transfer of know-how through person-to-person contacts.

The international community can ill afford the perils of WMD proliferation. In tackling that threat, we must ensure greater understanding about its nature, the importance of making full use of the range of tools developed to curb the spread of WMD and the need for strengthened international cooperation through a concerted educative effort.

Mr. Mine (Japan): I would like to commend the efforts of the Government of Australia in strengthening education about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Building on previous working papers, Japan, together with seven other countries — namely, Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden — submitted to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education that stressed that the successful implementation of the recommendations of the United Nations study would require an active partnership among national Governments, regional and international organizations, academic institutions and civil society. While it is extremely regrettable that the Review Conference was unable to agree on a final document on substantial matters, including on disarmament and non-

proliferation education, we nevertheless believe our working paper and its concrete recommendations can serve as a useful reference for Member States.

Japan attaches great importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education. Among other things, we are making the following efforts in that field.

First, under the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, Japan has been inviting various Government officials to visit Japan each year since 1983, amounting to a total of around 580 participants to date. This year, participants recently completed a visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which I hope helped to provide an insight into the reality of atomic bombing. They are with us here at this session of the First Committee.

Secondly, Japan has sponsored a United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in a different local city every year since 1989, providing a valuable opportunity for disarmament experts from around the world to exchange views and enhancing awareness of the importance of disarmament at the regional level. This year's Conference was held in Kyoto from 17 to 19 August and included a session on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Thirdly, on the basis of the recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan has invited disarmament and non-proliferation experts to give lectures on disarmament and non-proliferation, working with high school students, civic leaders, and atomic bomb survivors, known by the Japanese name *hibakusha*. *Hibakusha* share their experiences first-hand, in order to educate students and the public about a culture of peace by creating awareness of the devastation caused by nuclear weapons.

This year marks the sixtieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons continue to exist. The voice of the citizens of Japan and the international community calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons is stronger than ever. I feel that one of the main reasons for the continued existence of nuclear weapons is that the true nature of the nuclear devastation they cause is not well understood. I believe the true terror of nuclear weapons lies in the fact that the vast majority of casualties are unavoidably innocent civilians, regardless of whether or not the intention was to attack civilians. It also lies in the fact that the use of those

weapons leads to the most horrific, long-lasting, complex and inter-generational effects.

There is a pressing need to correctly convey the inhumane effects caused by nuclear weapons. To that end, it is essential to further promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. It is encouraging to learn that various efforts have already begun around the world, both at the national and international levels, with the aim of raising public awareness of the dangers of such weapons and of the need to further strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation measures. We will continue to work towards that end. As an active advocate of disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan would like to work with interested countries and the community of non-governmental organizations to consider and propose concrete measures to implement the recommendations of the United Nations study.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We would like to speak on other matters of disarmament in our national statement on international information security. At the same time, since we are concluding the second segment of today's work — with your permission and in order to increase effectiveness and not duplicate our work, we would also like to submit our draft resolution on the topic of international information security.

First, I would like to thank my colleague Mr. Andrei Krutskikh, who was the Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts, for his very useful and important information.

Since 1998, the Russian Federation has submitted each year to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution on achievements in the area of computerization and telecommunications in the context of international security.

Considering the scope of the influence of information and communications technologies in all areas of the activities of society and the State, Russia looks at the issue of international information security as one of the foremost priorities, requiring extremely serious international consideration — in particular under the auspices of the United Nations.

As the discussions have shown — including at the current session of the General Assembly — the opportunities for hostile use of information and communications technologies by criminals, terrorists

or States constitute a credible threat to security on the regional, national and international levels.

We need a clear understanding of the character of those threats and challenges confronting mankind resulting from the global spread of information technology, so that we can develop unified mutually acceptable approaches to their neutralization in order to strengthen international information security. That is the only way we can guarantee maximum use of the advantages that we derive from information and communications technologies and form a global information society for the well-being of all countries in the world.

We are in the initial phases of the consideration of those topical and sensitive problems. Useful work in that regard was conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 58/32. At the current stage, it did not prove possible to agree on wording for the final report, given the novelty and complexity of the range of issues. Nevertheless, the discussion was constructive and promoted a better understanding of the range of issues involving international information security, as well as the positions of individual countries.

The experts of the Group showed significant interest in their consideration of the range of issues relating to international information security in all its facets. The discussion in the Group was substantive, systematic and enlightened. On a number of aspects, there were converging or similar assessments.

Naturally, as in any policy discussion — in particular one discussed for the first time on a new theme — there were disagreements as well. In our view, they related to the prioritization of various threats in the area of international information security. However, the presence of those threats, in this day and age, is not disputed by anyone. It is clear that, in order to develop common approaches for threat reduction in that area, we would need more time. It is to be noted that the Group held only three short sessions in two years.

The Russian Federation believes that global computerization has opened up extensive prospects for the progressive development of nations and mankind overall. However, in conjunction with that, the achievements in information and communications technologies could be used to promote goals that are incompatible with the need to maintain international

stability and security and to comply with the principles of the sovereign equality of States, peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-use of force or threat of force, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and respect for human rights and freedoms.

Of particular danger, in our view, are threats of the hostile use of information and communications technologies for military, political, criminal or terrorist purposes. The distinguishing features of information and communications technologies tools, when applied destructively, are their general accessibility and, in many cases, their indiscriminate impact, as well as the possibility of their being used anonymously and their being camouflaged by peaceful activities, their potential for wide-ranging trans-boundary use and their low cost and general effectiveness. Information and communications technologies can be used not only by individual lawbreakers and criminal groups, but also by terrorists and extremist organizations, as well as States, for hostile, political, military, economic and other purposes. It is exceedingly dangerous to have new information and communications technologies included in the arsenals of terrorist organizations.

In United Nations Security Council resolution 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999, we emphasized that a growing number of acts of international terrorism, using communications technologies for their preparation and conduct,

“endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and security of all States”.

We believe that the vulnerability of information space and the specific features of information and communications technologies that we have mentioned make them an attractive means for negatively impacting society, its interests, the security of States, organizations and citizens. The global nature of today’s threats — including threats to information and communications security — has proven that security in today’s world is indivisible, and consequently, combating the threats must occur through collective effort.

We are convinced that we must work to alert people to avoid repeating the errors of the past. We have precedent for that. This year, upon the initiative of the Russian Federation, the General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which is

already being signed. That universal Convention was developed as an alert — before the perpetration of terrorist acts using nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. We believe it is critically important, useful and a timely step.

The international community would be well-advised to stick with that sort of approach — aimed at adopting preventive measures — in combating the entire range of threats to international information security. Bearing in mind the interests of States in further consideration of the range of issues concerning international information security in all its aspects, we believe it would be advisable to continue the discussion in the First Committee and to resume, as previously in a research format, the work of the Group of Governmental Experts. That has been suggested at meetings of the Group and at the current session of the General Assembly. I would emphasize we are speaking of an activity aimed at research. We all need to do better in getting to the bottom of the phenomenon, so that the development of information technologies will not draw mankind into yet another, new sort of arms race, as happened with nuclear weapons, and so that we may save money and resources for purposes of development, and so as to prevent the use of advanced technologies in communications and computerization by international terrorists.

We would hope that within the new Group of Governmental Experts we would find representatives of States that previously expressed the wish to participate in the Group, but did not have that opportunity during the period from 2004 to 2005. That would allow the Group to make maximum use of the experience accumulated in various countries throughout the world in the area of international information security. We are in favour of enlarging the membership of the Group, in order to make it more representative.

Russia has submitted for the First Committee’s consideration a draft resolution entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” (A/C.1/60/L.29). The draft resolution is based on previous resolutions on the subject, which were adopted by consensus in past years. It also takes into account the results of the work done by the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.

Given the importance of continuing to address the range of issues associated with international information security with minimal interruption, we had initially suggested that the Group of Governmental Experts should resume its work in 2007. However, given the budgetary complications in ensuring financing for the Group's work beginning in 2007 and in order to accommodate requests made by our partners, we have deferred the resumption of the Group's work until 2009. That is the only change we have made to the original draft resolution that was circulated to capitals.

We are prepared to work closely with all delegations. Informal consultations to discuss our draft resolution will take place on Wednesday, 19 October at 3 p.m. in Conference Room A. We call on all delegations to support the Russian draft resolution. As in past years, we look forward to its adoption by consensus.

Ms. Darlow (New Zealand): I would like to take this opportunity to support, and elaborate on, the statements made earlier by the representatives of Australia and Japan on the subject of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Education in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation is essential for maintaining and strengthening the links between multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and the international community that they serve. Civil society plays a vital role in that process, instigating progress and engagement within individual Governments. Among other contributions, the continuing involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGO) on technical issues in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education is particularly valuable. It is imperative that effective partnerships are maintained between academic institutions, think tanks and Governments in order to ensure that institutional memory and technical expertise are employed to full effect in ongoing negotiations.

In 2002, New Zealand was honoured to participate in the Secretary-General's group of governmental experts on disarmament and non-proliferation education. We support the recommendations of the United Nations study, and urge all States to take effective measures to ensure their full implementation at the national and international levels.

In terms of taking effective measures at the national level to improve systems for disarmament and non-proliferation education, there may be merit in more direct engagement with educational agencies and authorities in order to facilitate the permeation of disarmament and non-proliferation topics into domestic curriculums.

New Zealand has found the inclusion of NGO representatives on delegations a valuable way to strengthen links between Government and civil society perspectives, enhancing educational opportunities on all sides. We will continue that practice, and we look forward to engaging with other delegations on ways to seek improvement in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to speak on the topic of regional disarmament and security.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a recognized regional instrument to strengthen regional and international peace and security. More importantly, that idea plays an instrumental role in preventing the threat of nuclear war. Such an arrangement is in conformity with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which was the Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament.

Three decades have elapsed since the first introduction — by Iran in 1974 — of the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that have been adopted without a vote by the General Assembly since 1980 represent the significance of realizing that noble idea in the wider region of the Middle East.

By renouncing the nuclear option and placing its nuclear facilities under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown its determination to achieve the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular. Such an act underscores the undiminished support of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the ultimate objective of securing a world free of nuclear weapons.

Iran ratified the IAEA's Statute in 1958, and subsequently signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1969, which its Parliament ratified in 1970. That process was furthered by the ratification of IAEA safeguards agreements in 1973, and ultimately further accomplished by the signature of an additional protocol to our safeguards agreement in 2003.

In implementing its obligations under the NPT — specifically articles II and III thereof — all of the nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, in order to contribute to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has also acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Owing to Israel's non-adherence to the NPT and, more importantly, that regime's refusal to place its un-safeguarded nuclear facilities under the IAEA's verification system, the realization of such a zone — a lofty and long-sought-after aspiration of countries in the region — has yet to materialize. Under General Assembly resolution 59/63 of 3 December 2004, the Secretary-General was asked to inform the Assembly of the results of his consultations with the countries of the region on the realization of that idea. It is our conviction that the Secretary-General should dispatch a special envoy to the countries of the region in order to carry out the required consultations with countries to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. At present, Israel is the only non-party to the NPT in the region.

Despite repeated calls by the international community, demonstrated in the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, related resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, the decisions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and those of the IAEA and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Israel — confident of the political and military support of the United States — has neither acceded to the NPT nor placed its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Israel has not even declared its intention to accede to the NPT. Israel's clandestine nuclear activities seriously threaten both regional peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the NPT in the Middle East should be a top priority on the agenda of all States parties to the Treaty, especially nuclear-weapon States. There needs to be enough pressure on Israel to get it to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, in order to pave the way for the long-sought-after goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The Chairman: As there does not seem to be any further request for the floor on today's thematic issues, let us now proceed to the introduction of draft resolutions and decisions.

I call on the representative of Germany to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.42.

Mr. Brasack (Germany): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time that Germany is taking the floor in a formal meeting, I would like to take the opportunity to welcome you in the Chair and to pledge the continued full support of the German delegation.

I have the pleasure of introducing the biennial resolution A/C.1/60/L.42, entitled "Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures". I would like to take this opportunity to thank those nations that have co-sponsored our consensus draft resolution this year for the first time, which has brought the number of sponsors up to 70 nations so far. Let me encourage those delegations that are still considering sponsorship to do so.

Mr. Chairman, the German-Romanian biennial draft resolution, which you have before you, is a follow-up to the 2003 version. It again encourages Member States that have no information to provide to submit nil returns. Thus, participation could further be increased towards the goal of universalization.

I appeal to all countries that have so far not yet participated to join the two global arms transparency instrument, by submitting information next year.

Let me continue with some general remarks on the operational side of the draft resolution. Significant progress was recorded this year in the level of participation by Governments in the two global arms transparency instruments maintained and operated by the United Nations Secretariat, the Register of Conventional Arms and the Standardized Instrument

for Reporting Military Expenditures, based on their respective resolutions, one sponsored by the Netherlands and the other by Germany and Romania. It is encouraging that the number of new participants in the two arms transparency instruments continues to grow, registering significant increases over past years.

A promising upturn and a record number of submissions by Governments have been recorded for the United Nations system for the standardized reporting on military expenditures. In 2004, we note 79 reports, and this year the United Nations Secretariat has so far received submissions from 70 Governments. I wish to mention the Governments of Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel, Republic of Korea and Solomon Islands, who have participated in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting on military expenditures for the first time by making a submission this past year. The standardized reporting format covers expenditures on personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and construction and research and development. So far, more than 115 Governments have participated in the reporting instrument at least once, and in recent years the data provided by an increased number of participating Governments constitute collectively more than 80 per cent of global military expenditure.

A sustained effort is being made by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs — and here I would like to express my gratitude to the Department — to increase familiarity with the procedures of these instruments, with a view to encouraging greater and more consistent participation. With the assistance of interested Governments, a series of regional and subregional workshops was conducted in 2004 and early 2005 that focused on the signatory States of the Nairobi Declaration, covering the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as on the States belonging to the Southern African Development Community, meeting with representatives of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The United Nations Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures was also discussed at a regional workshop covering Member States belonging to the Pacific Islands Forum, held in Nadi, Fiji, from 18 to 20 August 2004, which was organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. It was also discussed in a presentation by the Department in the plenary session of the Committee on

Hemispheric Security of the Organization of American States, held in Washington, D.C., on 25 April 2005.

In addition to raising funds to hold workshops, the Department for Disarmament Affairs has also made efforts to promote the United Nations reporting instrument by publishing booklets and through other activities. It has recently issued a booklet containing guidelines for making submissions to the United Nations reporting Instrument, and it has collaborated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean on a report to promote the transparency of military expenditures in that region.

Although it is focused on Latin America, many aspects of that report are relevant for all regions of the world. I have been informed that both of these publications, as well as an information sheet containing the latest data on the United Nations reporting Instrument, have been distributed to all Member States today.

Additionally, I would like to draw delegates' attention to a report of the Secretary-General (document A/60/159) dated 25 July 2005; this report contains information from Member States on their military expenditures. In my opinion, it is worth looking at this informative document.

These efforts help to enhance and sustain the progress of the global transparency instruments towards fulfilling their respective confidence-building and arms-restraint objectives. We, therefore, would welcome support from other interested Governments through sponsorship of these activities to advance the objectives of arms transparency.

Also, I appeal to those who have participated only once, or just a few times, to do so on a consistent basis. Consistency alone will significantly raise the level of participation each year, thereby contributing to our common goal of transparency.

I express the hope that this draft resolution will be adopted again this year without a vote.

Mr. Costea (Romania): Romania is honoured to be the co-author of draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.42. In this capacity, allow me to add several remarks to the most eloquent introduction just made by my German colleague.

First, it was in 1999 that we decided to bestow a biennial character to this draft resolution. One could say that that is solid proof that we do believe in the streamlining and rationalization of resolutions. Secondly, the importance of transparency in military expenditures cannot be overstated; hence, the very decision of tabling this draft resolution again this year.

On 12 December 2005, 25 years will have passed since the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/142 B on the reduction of military budgets, which set up the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures.

Together with the United Nations Register for Conventional Arms, these two global arms inventories are truly valuable sources of data for both the military and the civil societies.

Thirdly, more needs to be done to develop a real culture of reporting, which would lead, at the end of the day, to increased openness and transparency. Both are needed, mainly in regions where tension still rules, including in Romania's neighbourhood, because of uncontrolled — not to mention unauthorized — conventional arsenals.

Like my German colleague, we hope that the draft resolution will again be adopted without a vote.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of the United States to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.1.

Ms. DeSutter (United States of America): As the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, I am grateful for the opportunity to address this body on a subject of great professional interest to me. As some may recall, I spoke on this matter last year, and I believe it is critical that we continue our dialogue in the light of progress made and challenges remaining since that time.

The United States this year is sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.1, entitled "Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements". This is not the first time that we have introduced such a draft resolution. We hope, however, that delegations will view our draft resolution as an opportunity for the international community to reflect upon the changing face of global arms control and non-proliferation challenges that we all face. The draft resolution is intended not only to bring the issue of

compliance to the attention of the international community, but also to emphasize that compliance with international treaties and obligations is critical to international peace and security, and to exhort Governments to seek common cause in pursuit of diplomatic means to bring intentional violators back into compliance.

Just this past August, Secretary of State Rice, on behalf of President Bush, submitted to the United States Congress the most recent non-compliance report prepared by my bureau in full coordination with all the relevant departments and agencies of the United States Government. This report, the unclassified version of which is available to all interested persons on the State Department's website, lays out the findings of the United States regarding questions of non-compliance by other nations. It provides, in as much detail as possible in an unclassified document, the evidence and the reasoning behind our compliance judgments. The non-compliance report, which I believe is the only document of its type produced in the world, seeks to alert the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government and the public to both existing non-compliance and potentially emerging violations.

The United States and most of the other nations represented here today have sought to supplement our national efforts at strengthening security with multilateral tools. These tools have included arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. The United States, however, generally does not join regimes or sign international agreements that constrain our freedom to exercise our national right to pursue our security when United States compliance is not going to be reciprocated. This is just common sense. Few of you sitting here today would be likely to enter into any agreement — be it multilateral or bilateral — if you believed that other parties were unlikely to comply with its terms.

Therefore, when the United States adheres to a treaty, we want to know whether the other parties are also complying, and we want to discover non-compliance early enough to be able to deny violators any benefit from such non-compliance. Thus, the United States views verification, compliance and compliance enforcement as critically interrelated. For example, verification has two purposes: detection and deterrence. If detection has no consequences for the

violation, then verification has no meaning, and deterrence is unachievable.

The cases of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran illustrate vividly the importance of two concepts that are inherently part of compliance: compliance assessment and compliance enforcement. The United States process of reaching non-compliance judgments is defined in United States law, based on international obligations. Our Congress has established specific institutions — my bureau, most notably — to ensure that the compliance assessment process is rigorous, systematic and objective. While the United States experience is in many ways unique, the methods we use are available to all.

While all nations have sources of valid or corroborating information for reaching their own non-compliance judgments, some States have expressed concern that they lack the technical capabilities that commonly have been associated with verification — satellites, for example — to watch the activities of their treaty partners. The United States believes that the means by which States parties can acquire relevant information for reaching non-compliance judgments are far more extensive than has been generally acknowledged or than was true in the past. The old verification concept — national technical means of verification — fails to capture the totality of resources available to States parties. The modern concept of national means and methods recognizes that every State has access to information that can be relevant to reaching compliance judgments — whether from its diplomats overseas, reports from dissident groups that reveal the non-compliance of their Governments, reports from international inspectorates, commercial satellites or other means.

While all information, whatever its source, warrants evaluation, information that can be independently confirmed is considered to be the most reliable, especially when it can be confirmed from multiple sources. When the information available to us suggests that there may be a compliance question, one of the first steps we take is to study the international agreement or other commitment in question to see what States parties are obligated to do.

It is always important — and sometimes decisive — to establish clearly what the precise obligation is in the case under review. While the

review of obligations and commitments is under way, we seek all possible additional information regarding the activities of concern. Multiple sources of information are especially important when the matter is grave.

In cases where the information is troubling, but insufficient to reach a firm finding of violation, we will attach a “caveat” or warning to it by explicitly noting uncertainties or ambiguities in the evidence. Whenever we can, we distinguish between inadvertent and deliberate violations, because this distinction can have an important bearing on what action will need to be taken in order to address the problem. We also endeavour to communicate the degree of seriousness of a violation and to identify the steps that might be needed to bring the party back into compliance or respond in other ways to rectify the situation.

Let me underscore that making a determination as to whether another State is in violation of its international obligations is not a simple matter. The process is time-consuming, rigorous and systematic. However, as a State party to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments, we rest our safety and security in part upon other countries' compliance with those agreements and commitments. Therefore, the compliance assessment process is, for us, a key component of our national security and a necessary early warning call to action.

Along with compliance assessments and compliance enforcement we consider verification to be an essential part of what we call the “compliance process”. It is impossible to consider any of these three elements except as part of a whole.

I am often asked if the United States demands “perfect” verification. Let me be clear, there is no such thing as perfect verification. The term “effectively verifiable” does not mean, and should not be taken to mean, that there is, or can ever be, certainty that every violation will be detected. This phrase indicates the aspiration to achieve reasonable confidence that, under the circumstances, detection of non-compliance will occur in sufficient time for appropriate remedial responses to be undertaken.

The United States considers an arrangement or treaty to be effectively verifiable if the degree of verifiability is judged sufficient, given the compliance history of the parties involved, the risks associated

with non-compliance, the difficulty of response to deny violators the benefits of their violations, the language and measures incorporated into the agreement and our own national means and methods of verification. The degree of verifiability must be high enough to enable the United States to detect non-compliance in sufficient time to reduce the threat presented by the violation and deny the violator the benefits of his wrongdoing.

It is a common misperception that a combination of international data declarations, international cooperative measures (including technical measures) and on-site inspection regimes can, by themselves, be sufficient for detecting non-compliance. In fact, data declarations, cooperative measures and on-site inspections can provide useful and often invaluable information. They are useful tools for investigating indications of non-compliance — as we have seen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) do in Iran, for example — and for detecting inadvertent violations. However, inspections provide information according to the agreed access and collection capabilities negotiated by the parties, and provide only such information as is available at the specific time and place of the inspection. They provide, at best, a snapshot in time. Even cooperative measures, such as remote cameras and seals for continuous monitoring — while quite powerful — are limited to the locations where they are employed.

The degree of verifiability is not judged solely on the basis of whether or not the agreement contains detailed provisions for data exchanges, on-site inspections or other types of cooperative arrangements. Such measures are tools that may help to increase our confidence that other States are complying, but may or may not facilitate detection of non-compliance — their efficacy is thus limited. Verifiability assessments are also informed by a much broader array of factors. These include, but are not limited to, the proven reliability of our negotiating partners in adhering to agreements, the incentives given parties may have to cheat on a given agreement, and the relative significance of cheating pursuant to the obligations.

The United States considered all these factors, for example, when we conducted our verification assessment of the proposed fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). After two years of concerted effort and study of the problem, we concluded that an “internationally and effectively verifiable treaty” was not achievable, even with a highly intrusive inspection regime. Having

come to such a conclusion, we believe that attempts to negotiate “good enough” verification, as some have suggested, are not only futile but also harmful and delay completion of the treaty. Furthermore, an ineffective regime could lull the international community into a false sense of confidence that obligations were being adhered to.

It is for this reason that the United States urges our colleagues at the Conference on Disarmament to join us in concluding a normative treaty that relies on each State using its own resources to verify compliance. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, we call on all nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to make a public commitment not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Four of the five nuclear-weapon States — including, of course, the United States — have made such a commitment.

Why do I mention the fissile material cut-off treaty in a discussion of compliance? Simply to make the point that there is a need for international acceptance of the fact that not all agreements need to take the form of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements of the twentieth century. For example, the Moscow Treaty model and our experiences with Libya — which reflect less detailed and extensive negotiated regimes — offer other models for consideration in situations in which the relationship is one of partnership and/or where there is a genuine accepted strategic commitment.

The international community is facing significant proliferation challenges, none of which are more dangerous than non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. It is well known that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has a nuclear-weapons programme and that it concealed that programme while it was a party to the NPT. I would note that the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did its duty in reporting to the Security Council the non-compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with its nuclear safeguards agreement to the Security Council on several occasions. The agreed framework, signed in 1994, froze plutonium production; however, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea embarked on a covert uranium enrichment programme. The country then expelled the IAEA inspectors in late December 2002.

Reinforced by the concern of the international community, the last round of the Six-Party Talks concluded with a public commitment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to give up all its nuclear weapons and all its existing nuclear programmes and to return to the NPT and its nuclear safeguards agreement. Obviously, there is much work yet to be done. And again obviously, given the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's past record of disregard for its international commitments, the international community will expect a sufficiently strong verification regime to ensure that North Korea is meeting its obligations. As Ambassador Hill stated in Beijing following the adoption of the Joint Statement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must promptly eliminate all nuclear weapons and all nuclear programmes, and that must be verified to the satisfaction of all parties by credible international means, including the IAEA.

Iran's nuclear programme marks another area of concern. Last month, the Board of Governors of the IAEA formally declared what many of us had known for some time - that is, that Iran's breaches and failures with respect to its obligations to comply with its safeguards agreement constituted non-compliance in the context of article XII (C) of the IAEA Statute. As members are aware, by a simple reading of the IAEA Statute, such a finding requires a report to the Security Council. The Board will discuss the timing and content of that report at its next session. In that regard, it is important to note that such a report in and of itself will not resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Resolution requires Iran's rulers to make the strategic decision to comply with their international obligations, not to flout them.

In both of these cases, parties to international agreements undertook actions over years and even decades to cheat. Their non-compliance is not what is sometimes called technical. These were not accidents or oversights. If they had been, it would be reasonable to expect that expressions of concern would result in timely resolution. We have seen this work numerous times, including in cases described in the non-compliance report to which I referred earlier. In Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we are dealing with cases of intentional non-compliance. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran made strategic decisions to pursue programmes and undertake activities that they knew full well violated

their obligations. They invested vast national resources in pursuing these covert programmes — resources that their people may well have wished were being invested in other ways. These programmes were pursued covertly. The two regimes took advantage of the period before discovery to reap benefits — such as technical cooperation and assistance — that flowed from being parties to the NPT.

There is some good news in that regard, however. The international community is addressing in various forums the problem of proliferation and the abuse of peaceful cooperation. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has developed new guidelines that support the suspension of transfers of trigger-list items to States that have been found to be in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations. In those circumstances, a special plenary meeting of the Group would be called to review the situation and to consider an appropriate response. In Iran's case, we look forward to participating in the extraordinary NSG plenary meeting to be held this Wednesday, 19 October, in Vienna.

What is to be done now? How can the international community use its collective diplomatic resources to bring those countries back into compliance? How can we address these cases, and others that may still be undiscovered, in a way that strengthens the deterrence of future and further non-compliance? If these countries benefit from their non-compliance, what lessons will other nations learn, and which of our other regimes will come under assault next? We cannot allow violators to benefit from their violations. Doing so undermines the regimes and our faith in them, and reduces security for us all.

In conclusion, I believe that each of our countries will need to consider these questions. The challenge posed by non-compliance is great. There are no easy answers. The question is, are we up to the challenge? The United States believes that we are. I thank the members of the Committee for their attention to this matter.

The Chairman: I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.47.

Mr. El Hadj Ali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): It is an honour and a pleasure for the Algerian delegation to introduce to the First Committee, once again this year, draft resolution A/C.1/60/L.47, entitled "Strengthening

of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”, on behalf of the sponsors: Albania, Andorra, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Jordan, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Algeria.

By introducing this draft resolution on a regular basis, the group of sponsors is showing its tireless commitment to making the Mediterranean region a zone of peace and stability. At the same time, the sponsors reaffirm their will to promote cooperation and solidarity in an area rich in terms of both its potential and its cultures — a part of the world that has benefited from exchanges among people since early times. Moreover, the shared destiny of the region’s peoples has made necessary and appropriate the increasingly in-depth negotiations on the various joint initiatives establishing frameworks for dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean: the Mediterranean Forum, the Five plus Five Dialogue and the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior of the Western Mediterranean. Those initiatives attest to the growing awareness of the close link between security in Europe and security and stability in the Mediterranean.

Over the past 10 years, the countries of the European Union and the countries surrounding the Mediterranean have engaged in a process of dialogue and partnership by intensifying their joint efforts to promote and consolidate peace and security in the region and to lay the groundwork for various forms of cooperation and a partnership with the ultimate objective of shared prosperity and stability. Thus, the Barcelona Conference established the basis for new relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean, reflecting both a recognition of the special nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the need for collective action with a view to eliminating misunderstandings and reducing the inequalities and imbalances in the Mediterranean Basin.

We therefore welcomed the Barcelona Declaration, whose tenth anniversary we are getting ready to celebrate on 21 November. That Declaration represented a historic transformation of our common perception of the Mediterranean. That document marked a recognition of the historically significant nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations and of the need to work together to eliminate prejudice and

misunderstanding and to draw on the large reservoir of complementary interests that can be used in a mutually beneficial, equitable way.

The draft text that the sponsors are submitting for consideration by members of the First Committee repeats the content of the resolution adopted at the previous session and covers a wide range of themes having to do with the strengthening of Mediterranean security and cooperation. It underscores the indivisible nature of security in the Mediterranean region, and it recalls all the initiatives undertaken by Mediterranean countries with a view to consolidating peace, security and cooperation.

The draft resolution reaffirms the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean area and their commitment to respecting the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The draft resolution goes on to emphasize the fundamental principles that are the basis for the efforts being made by Mediterranean countries in order to eliminate all causes of tension in the region and to achieve a peaceful, just and lasting resolution of the problems there. It also stresses that the elimination of economic and social disparities linked to unequal levels of development, as well as the promotion of mutual respect and a better understanding among cultures of countries in the Mediterranean basin, will strengthen peace, security and cooperation among the countries of the region.

In terms of disarmament, the text calls on all States in the region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and it encourages all States to promote the establishment of confidence-building measures and to promote candor and transparency.

The States in the region are also encouraged to do more to strengthen their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, bearing in mind the relevant United Nations resolutions, as well as in combating organized crime, illegal arms transfers and the production and trafficking of drugs, which pose a threat to peace and stability.

Like at previous sessions, the sponsors of this draft resolution remain confident that it will have the valued support of all members of this Committee and that it will be adopted without being put to a vote.

The Chairman: I now, have more than four delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions and draft decisions, and one delegation is requesting the right of reply. However, time is up, so I propose that we adjourn for the day.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.