



# General Assembly

Fifty-fifth session

## First Committee

**27**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Wednesday, 1 November 2000, 10.00 a.m.  
New York

Official Records

*President:* U Mya Than ..... (Myanmar)

*The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.*

### Agenda items 65 to 81 (continued)

#### Action on all draft resolutions submitted under all items

**The Chairman:** Before proceeding with our deliberations, I should like to remind delegations again that this meeting will be adjourned at 12.30 p.m. so that the ceremony of presenting the 2000 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Certificates may take place.

As I mentioned at the meeting yesterday, the Committee will proceed to take decisions on the remaining draft resolutions as indicated in informal working paper No. 6. I propose that the Committee take action on the draft resolutions in the sequence indicated in that paper, and that at this morning's meeting, if time permits, the Committee will take action on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, L.4/Rev.1, L.29/Rev.1, L.39/Rev.1 and L.49/Rev.1. If there is not enough time, then draft resolution L.49/Rev.1 will be considered this afternoon. Action will be taken on all remaining draft resolutions at this afternoon's meeting.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with that proposal.

*It was so decided.*

**The Chairman:** I call now on those delegations wishing to introduce revised draft resolutions, if any.

**Mr. Keita** (Mali) (*spoke in French*): The adjustments made to draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.11 within the framework of revisions 1 and 2 deal essentially with form. They have contributed to bringing more clarity and precision to some provisions, in particular the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 8. We thought it a good idea to insert, in the last preambular paragraph, mention of the document that was adopted in document A/53/681, paragraph 4 of the annex. Changes to operative paragraphs 3, 7 and 8, are primarily clarifications.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank the delegation of Egypt for its positive contribution. I will not go back over the importance of this draft resolution for our subregion, since that was covered during the introduction of the draft resolution to the Committee. My colleague from Sierra Leone last week outlined very well the impact of the illicit circulation of light weapons on the subregion in general and on Sierra Leone in particular. In addition to the countries of the subregion, I pay tribute to the following countries: Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, the Congo, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Japan and Madagascar; and to the countries of the European Union, which have kindly become sponsors of the draft resolution.

As in past years we hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

**The Chairman:** I now open the floor to delegations wishing to make general statements or

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comments on draft resolutions contained in cluster 1: nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Khan** (Pakistan): Pakistan is committed to the realization of nuclear disarmament and the early elimination of nuclear weapons. For several years the General Assembly endorsed the fair and equitable position adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement to promote general and complete disarmament under effective international control as an ultimate objective to be attained within a specified time-frame through the elimination of all nuclear arsenals and all other weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, during the past five years, since the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the momentum of international endeavours towards nuclear disarmament has, in our opinion, visibly dissipated. Some nuclear-weapon States have stated their intention to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. The threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is held out openly. Meanwhile, the process of nuclear disarmament is completely stalled. The Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) is yet to be implemented. The danger of a new arms race is ever present and could be sparked by a decision on or movement towards deployment of ballistic missile defence globally and regionally. The rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not been reversed.

Under these circumstances we believe that there is no cause for the euphoria generated by the consensus arrived at during the NPT Review Conference. We are not convinced that a credible process of step-by-step nuclear disarmament is likely to be initiated in the near future, and the prospects for the elimination of nuclear weapons remain remote, if not Utopian. These harsh realities may not be very palatable to delegations sponsoring draft resolutions on nuclear disarmament and the NPT Review Conference at this year's session, but the suspension of disbelief in the context of nuclear weapons can be costly. NPT States parties, in any case, cannot seek to impose the provisions of that Treaty on States that are not parties to it.

In the eighteenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 and operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution L.39/Rev.1, a call is made for efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and various

steps envisaged therein. It is obvious that efforts to implement article VI of the NPT can be made only by States parties to the NPT. States that are not parties to a treaty cannot be expected to implement provisions of that treaty. We would be grateful to receive confirmation of that understanding from the sponsors of the draft resolutions.

**Mr. Noboru** (Japan): In the statement just made, the representative of Pakistan referred to operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.39/Rev.1. I believe that he also referred to other draft resolutions. Draft resolution L.39/Rev.1 was introduced by my delegation the day before yesterday. My delegation understands that the representative of Pakistan made a general point on the legal obligation of States parties to a treaty and as such my delegation takes note of it as a statement of a fact.

**Mr. De la Fortelle** (France) (*spoke in French*): It is my honour to take the floor on behalf of the European Union. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the European Union C Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia C and the associated countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, associate themselves with this statement.

The First Committee today will be taking a stand on the draft resolution dealing with the negotiations on the treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, that is, the fissile material cut-off treaty.

The European Union would like to take advantage of this opportunity to recall the importance it attaches to negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on that treaty, which, in its view, remains a high-priority objective. These negotiations, as well as the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, must be another essential stage in non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. That has already been recommended by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed that need. We fully support the relevant provisions of the Final Document of that Review Conference.

The European Union deplores the fact that until now it has not been possible to reach consensus at the Conference on Disarmament to authorize the commencement of those negotiations. We call upon

States parties to do everything possible to achieve that objective as quickly as possible. We hope that the adoption today by consensus of this important draft resolution will contribute to the effective launching of work in Geneva at the beginning of the 2001 session and its conclusion as soon as possible.

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1. I call first on those delegations wishing to explain their position or vote before a decision is taken.

**Mr. Benítez Versón (Cuba)** (*spoke in Spanish*): For the second consecutive year the First Committee will take a decision on a draft resolution that is of great interest to the international community, given the importance and magnitude of respect for the preservation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. For a few countries the ABM Treaty is a matter of strictly bilateral interest, of concern only to those countries that have adhered to it. However, the Treaty, as is indicated by the sponsors of the draft resolution, is of historical importance and is a cornerstone for guaranteeing global peace and security. Therefore Cuba associates itself with those who have reaffirmed its validity and continuing importance, especially in the current international situation, at a time which highlights the importance of full and strict compliance with the Treaty by the parties.

Cuba has taken due note of the decision by President Clinton, who declared on 1 September that he would postpone taking a decision on the establishment of a national anti-missile defence system. The deferment of that initiative does not mean that the idea of creating an anti-missile shield has been abandoned. Studies and development of this system are even continuing. Therefore, the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1 is relevant. There is still time here to continue an appeal for respect for the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty. The text of the draft resolution before the Committee is not confrontational and limits itself to calling for relevant actions to strengthen and reinforce the ABM Treaty.

For the reasons I have just explained, Cuba will be voting in favour of draft resolution L.2/Rev.1 and urges other delegations to firmly support it also.

**Mr. Cordeiro de Pinto Andrade (Brazil):** Brazil would like to explain its views on the draft resolution on which we are about to vote, as well as on the issue of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic

Missile Systems in general. We acknowledge the bilateral nature of the ABM Treaty. Given the Treaty's role as a cornerstone of strategic stability, however, the international community has a legitimate interest in the possibility of changes to it. It is also legitimate for delegations to consider the ABM Treaty to be so important to existing disarmament arrangements that certain changes to its content may have negative repercussions on the whole disarmament architecture. In this sense we recall the principle of irreversibility of arms control and reduction measures, and we underline the ABM Treaty's key role in the present dynamics of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Brazil is concerned at any initiative that may impact negatively on nuclear disarmament, lead to a new arms race or be inconsistent with the commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In line with the communiqué of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition Countries, Brazil reiterates the call on the parties to the ABM Treaty to preserve the Treaty's integrity and validity and to refrain from the implementation of measures that would undermine its purpose.

The First Committee is attentive to the impact of changes to the ABM Treaty on strategic stability, because nuclear arsenals are still robust enough to support the mutually-assured-destruction rationale. As an advocate of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, Brazil looks forward to the day the ABM Treaty will no longer be necessary.

Brazil shares many of the substantive concerns contained in draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1. From a legal point of view, however, we cannot support the concept of Member States invoking for themselves the responsibility of "safeguarding the inviolability and integrity" of a bilateral treaty. Without precluding the legitimacy of the international community's interest in the issue, the responsibility belongs to the parties to the Treaty. In this regard we stress that it is important that the parties to the Treaty, when exercising the right to propose amendments, as foreseen in the Treaty, bear in mind the concerns expressed by the international community during the debate on this agenda item. Because of those legal considerations Brazil will have to maintain its abstention.

**Mr. Khan (Pakistan):** I have asked for the floor to explain my delegation's position before the vote on

the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, document A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1.

During the cold war the question of nuclear deterrence was perhaps far simpler than it is today. The military and nuclear confrontation was largely between the two super Powers and their alliance systems. There were no additional nuclear-weapon States. There was no ballistic missile defence. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, by prohibiting the deployment of national missile defences, served to stabilize the balance of terror between the Eastern and Western alliances. It was presumed, if not legally prescribed, that this rationale for strategic nuclear stability would also be applied at the regional level. Unfortunately, instead of the prospects for stability through the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems being enhanced by the end of the cold war, we have witnessed a growing asymmetry at the strategic level in numbers of nuclear weapons and operational delivery systems, as well as in technological and financial capabilities. These systemic factors for destabilization at the strategic level are being aggravated by the political trend in the leading world Power in favour of the development and deployment of national missile defence systems as well as theatre missile defence systems.

We believe that if a decision on national missile defence deployment is taken or seems inevitable, it could have a cascading effect on international strategic stability. It could unravel several important disarmament agreements, especially the ABM Treaty. The deployment of theatre missile defence systems in certain sensitive regions would also adversely affect stability and arms control in those regions and accelerate and expand the production and deployment of missiles. That issue has serious security implications for Pakistan.

Pakistan thus shares the concerns expressed in the sixth preambular paragraph that undermining the ABM Treaty will affect international peace and stability. We endorse the call in operative paragraph 1 for steps to strengthen the ABM Treaty and preserve its integrity and validity, and in operative paragraph 2 for renewed efforts to preserve and strengthen the Treaty through full compliance. Furthermore, Pakistan strongly supports the call in operative paragraph 3 to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and would

have wished that the call had been universal and had envisaged the total non-deployment of all anti-ballistic missile systems, as did the Sino-Russian statement of 18 July 2000, which stated that non-strategic missile defence cooperation in this field, though not prohibited under the ABM Treaty, should nevertheless not be permitted to prejudice the security interests of other countries or undermine global and regional stability and security. As we have said, strategic stability should not be preserved at the cost of regional stability and security. That will be the consequence if theatre missile defence systems are supplied, developed or deployed in certain regions of the world, including South Asia.

The development and deployment of ballistic missile defence systems, both national and theatre, are being justified by portraying them as a response to missile proliferation in the developing countries. That premise is both unacceptable and unjustifiable. It is unacceptable because it is discriminatory; double standards should not be imposed in the missile field as they have been in the nuclear field. It is unjustified because the missile capabilities of the developing countries are nowhere near the point where they could pose even a remote security threat to the advanced nuclear and other militarily significant States. In fact, concerns about missile proliferation are being raised precisely to justify the imposition of inequality on the developing countries and to justify the development and deployment of national missile defence and theatre missile defence systems. Therefore the delegation of Pakistan is disappointed that the sponsors of draft resolution L.2/Rev.1 have included a preambular paragraph that gives voice to this so-called concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Pakistan shares the central objective of the draft resolution, that is, to maintain global and regional peace and stability by avoiding the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems, both national and theatre. We will therefore vote in favour of draft resolution L.2/Rev.1.

**Mr. Mukul (India):** As it did last year, India will vote for the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, as the issues it emphasizes remain fully valid today. Our position on the subject has already been spelled out in the general statement by the Indian delegation in the First Committee. We wish to reaffirm the

importance of full implementation, in good faith, of all existing bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties, including the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the ABM Treaty.

**Mr. Grey** (United States): Recently a new version was issued of the draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”. I have asked for the floor to make clear why my country cannot support that draft resolution as revised.

A new paragraph was added welcoming President Clinton’s 1 September decision not to deploy a national missile defence at this time. That change only makes the draft resolution worse. The sponsors have essentially ignored the President’s decision by failing to make any other changes to the draft resolution to take into account how the President’s decision has changed the landscape on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issues. Moreover, the change that was made does not remedy the basic flaws that caused the United States to oppose this initiative from the beginning. The draft resolution remains based on the premise that preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty is incompatible with amending it. That is a peculiar view to take of a Treaty that specifically provides a mechanism — the Standing Consultative Commission — for considering proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty, including proposals for amendments. As is well known, the ABM Treaty has already been amended.

Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1 continues to place the United Nations General Assembly in the position of taking sides in ongoing discussions between the United States and Russia and making judgements about substantive issues in these discussions. Let me repeat, questions about the ABM Treaty are for the Treaty parties to resolve. That process will only be hindered by having the General Assembly take sides. The United States strongly urges other delegations not to support draft resolution L.2/Rev.1.

**Mr. Ogunbanwo** (Nigeria): My delegation has taken the floor to explain its vote before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1. I should like to begin by highlighting the factors that underline the fundamental significance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the ABM Treaty. Those factors include the following. First, although the ABM Treaty is a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation,

its implementation has implications for existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts. Secondly, it is the global cornerstone of strategic stability. Thirdly, it remains the basis for promoting further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, and fourthly, it has for 28 years stood the test of time and has preserved the confidence of both parties in the Treaty itself. My delegation therefore hopes that these weighty factors will be paramount in the minds of the States concerned as they try to resolve the differences that have arisen between the United States and the Russian Federation regarding the bilateral ABM Treaty.

In this connection, my delegation welcomes the recent decision of the United States to postpone the deployment of a national missile defence system. We consider that decision to be a positive step. In fact, my delegation thinks that it has opened a window of opportunity to address the concerns of the international community. Let us seize this opportunity to urge the United States and the Russian Federation to resume their dialogue, taking into account the need to preserve the ABM Treaty. The future of the ABM Treaty, which is the foundation of strategic stability, should not continue to be called into question. My delegation continues to believe that the way forward is for a negotiated settlement of problems related to the ABM Treaty.

Nigeria shares some of the objectives contained in draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1. However, we believe that the Committee should be offering words of encouragement to the parties concerned so that they can get together to resolve outstanding questions. Consistent with our view that dialogue and cooperation, especially between the two major nuclear Powers, are critical elements for achieving disarmament agreement, my delegation will abstain.

On a related development, my delegation is concerned about the issue of ballistic missiles whose technology has been acquired by an increasing number of countries. In this connection my delegation supports the view that recent developments in the field of ballistic missiles and missile defences have underscored the urgent need for multilaterally negotiated norms. A first step towards such multilaterally negotiated norms is the comprehensive study on missiles which the Secretary-General is exhorted to prepare with the assistance of governmental experts.

**Mr. Mekdad** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): In common with all other countries in the United Nations concerned about the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the ABM Treaty, because it maintains stability and a global strategic balance and represents an important part of both bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements, Syria calls for full and strict compliance with the provisions of that important Treaty. The language used in the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1 is far removed from the main objective of the draft resolution and takes away from the desired objective. We think that the language in these two paragraphs encourages violation of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, in practice it contradicts the objective of the draft resolution under discussion. This prompts my delegation to register its strong reservation about the contents of those two paragraphs.

However, despite the strong reservations to which we have already referred, because of our keen interest in a global strategic balance and stability and the importance of respecting international treaties concluded at different levels, we will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

**Mr. Aliyev** (Azerbaijan): Our delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, given the significance of the ABM Treaty, in particular its article IX which provides that each participating State shall not deploy outside its national territory ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty.

**Mr. Maquieira** (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems — the ABM Treaty — is recognized as being the cornerstone of the maintenance of strategic stability and the basis for the future reduction of offensive nuclear weapons. It has been playing a fundamental role in guaranteeing international peace and security, in which its clear universal objective has been evident. That being the case, it is our belief that any measure that may well weaken the integrity and validity of the Treaty would affect the stability and security of the entire international community.

We therefore express our concern at the danger of the development and installation of an anti-ballistic missile system and the search for military technology that can be used in outer space. That, among other

aspects, would contribute to the erosion of a world climate favourable to disarmament and international security. We issue an alert as to the negative consequences that could result if this situation endures. Its destabilizing effects could give impetus to a new arms race, thereby endangering non-proliferation and weakening arms control regimes. Nevertheless, we shall abstain in the voting on this draft resolution in the hope that the parties to the Treaty can reach an understanding on its preservation and observance.

**Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines): Although the Philippines values the importance the sponsors and other delegations give to the preservation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, we shall abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. Like many other delegations, the Philippines believes that the ABM Treaty has served to secure the critical strategic balance that kept the world intact during the cold war and even after. The Philippines also believes that the draft resolution before the Committee contains many elements that reflect other important concerns. We welcome in particular the recognition in the draft resolution of the decision taken by the United States Government to postpone the decision on deploying a national missile defence system, a decision which was announced shortly before the Millennium Summit and which caused several delegations to frantically re-draft statements and talking points.

The Philippines agrees that the ABM Treaty is an issue of urgent concern for us all. However, the Philippines also believes that it may not yet be the time to be actively involved in this issue, one which the Philippines believes can better be settled among the States parties to the Treaty. The Philippines does not agree, either, with the proposition that the General Assembly can tell States parties not to amend the Treaty when the Treaty itself allows for amendments. That is a basic concern that has certain implications in terms of general treaty relations for the Philippines and perhaps for others as well.

It is also possible that keeping dialogue open on the issue of the ABM Treaty and national missile defence can have welcome dividends. States that might be thinking of proliferating weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems might actually have thought twice about expending effort and resources when it could all prove futile. That may be too speculative and difficult to prove with certainty, but there have been some dramatic and positive

developments in our region that we hope, through our common diplomatic and political efforts, as well as the goodwill of all parties concerned, will further decrease the possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In strengthening our own efforts at addressing these issues at a political and diplomatic level, we hope that the issue of missile defence systems will eventually become a moot one.

I should like to reiterate that the Philippines supports the ABM Treaty and all that it has done for us and that the action taken today by my delegation should not in any way reflect any derogation from this consistent national position.

**Ms. Tohtohodjaeva** (Kyrgyzstan) (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to make a small correction. The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is aware of the historic significance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 as a cornerstone for the maintenance of global peace and security and strategic stability. The Government reaffirms that under current international conditions this Treaty is as significant as it has always been. In that connection, on behalf of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, allow me to declare the decision of my country to associate itself with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems".

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Mr. Lin Kuo-chung** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems", was introduced by the representative of the Russian Federation at the Committee's 25th meeting, on 30 October 2000. The sponsors are listed in the draft resolution itself.

A recorded vote was taken.

*In favour:*

Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,

Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

Israel, Micronesia (Federated States of), United States of America

*Abstaining:*

Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela

*Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1 was adopted by 78 votes to 3, with 65 abstentions.*

[The delegation of Turkmenistan subsequently informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Chairman:** I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their votes or positions on the draft resolution just adopted.

**Mr. Seibert** (Germany): I have the honour to speak on behalf of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and would like to explain why we decided to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems".

We believe that the way in which this matter is dealt with in the First Committee should have the support of the parties to the Treaty. This year, as last year, we have underlined the need for consensus on this resolution. We regret that it was not possible for the parties to reach an agreement, and we encourage them to continue their discussions on the issue. We attach great importance to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability contributing to the broader disarmament and arms control process. Both the Russian Federation and the United States have reaffirmed in their statements their commitment to the ABM Treaty and to the continuation of their efforts to strengthen it in order to enhance its viability and effectiveness in the future. We welcome these commitments and urge the parties to continue their cooperation on this basis.

We welcome the decision by the President of the United States of America not to authorize at this stage the deployment of a limited national missile defence. We also welcome the agreement recently reached in New York by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation on a strategic stability cooperation agreement, as well as the intensified discussions on further reductions in strategic offensive forces within the framework of a future START III treaty. We underline the importance of further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament efforts also in view of advancing wider multilateral efforts in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We urge the parties to continue with the bilateral process in this field, including the early entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the early commencement of START III negotiations on further significant reductions of nuclear arsenals and their conclusion as soon as possible.

As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides the global framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, we strongly welcome the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference. We underline the importance of the implementation of the practical steps agreed in the Final Document of the Review Conference, including the continuation of the START process and the urgency of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as the necessity of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We recognize the increasing security challenges caused by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and the need to prevent and curb such proliferation through international endeavours.

**Mr. Salander** (Sweden): Sweden aligns itself with the comments on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1 made by Germany on behalf of 29 States. Over and above these points, Sweden would like to clarify its position on one issue.

While fully sharing the concern at the possible effects on disarmament and non-proliferation of unilateral actions related to the possible deployment of a national missile defence system, Sweden does not share the overriding preoccupation with strategic stability expressed in the draft resolution. The concept of strategic stability is closely linked with cold war doctrines which, while they have formed an important part of traditional arms control negotiations, should, in Sweden's view, not be the sole basis for disarmament and non-proliferation in the post-cold-war era. Those should, to a greater extent, be based on agreements such as those reached at the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

These views, as well as the points raised by Germany, motivated Sweden's abstention on the draft resolution.

**The Chairman:** At this stage I should like to welcome to the Committee the President of the Millennium Assembly. We have a very busy day today and I am sure you, Mr. President, will witness very interesting voting and lively discussion. The proceedings are also going very smoothly. I thank the President for gracing the Committee with his presence this morning.

**Mr. Thapa** (Nepal): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, because it holds the principled position that global strategic stability, which is the cornerstone of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, needs to be preserved at all costs.

This landmark Treaty, although negotiated bilaterally, is the Treaty that tries to limit defensive anti-nuclear systems. It is beyond any doubt that defensive build-ups can even offset the offensive balance and hence give rise to destabilization. Therefore, in the opinion of my delegation this strategic balance has to be maintained, for its loss can have a chain effect impacting negatively on sincere efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

**Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation wishes to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”.

Argentina places a great deal of importance on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and other agreements among countries possessing nuclear weapons likely to promote general and complete nuclear disarmament. We are concerned at the lack of progress in this particular area in recent times on the part of nations possessing nuclear weapons, which is exemplified by the lack of progress in the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the START III negotiations.

There would be much more cause for concern if we saw a falling back in the agreements in force, such as the ABM Treaty. We believe that the international community has a legitimate concern in this regard.

For these reasons we repeat here the call we made bilaterally to the countries involved to redouble their efforts to strengthen existing agreements and move forward with new agreements in order to ensure that they are in full compliance with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nevertheless, Argentina abstained in the vote on this draft resolution because we are not persuaded that it contributes to the creation of a favourable climate for attaining the stated objectives.

**Mr. Pearson** (New Zealand): New Zealand abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems”, after the most careful consideration. Over the past year international concern has sharpened in relation to missile proliferation and the national missile defence plans of the United States, now deferred but not cancelled, and their impact on the multilateral disarmament agenda, including prospects for the implementation of the commitments to nuclear disarmament agreed at the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). New Zealand welcomes the decision by the President of the United States to defer a decision to deploy a national missile defence system and to continue the process of consultation with the international community on the question. But New Zealand’s strong caution about deployment of national missile defence remains, and is based on its concern that it has the potential to have a negative impact on nuclear disarmament efforts.

I am making this explanation of vote to ensure there is no misunderstanding of the rationale of New Zealand’s position. The New Zealand Government’s views on the subject of missile proliferation and missile defence were delivered to a forum in New York last month by the Prime Minister. I want to conclude by quoting from her statement.

“New Zealand’s concern about the deployment of the national missile defence system is that it could retard or even unravel nuclear disarmament efforts. We believe that the front-line defence against delivery of long-range missiles of weapons of mass destruction lies in strengthening implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its supporting regime, in full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in an effective verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention, and in strict control of access to missile technology and components.

“The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains the obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament. New Zealand strongly cautions against any act which could bring current bilateral and multilateral efforts to a halt and harm existing arms control treaties. While all countries have a stake in global security, we

believe that the most powerful nations have a special duty to act with care and prudence and with a strong sense of responsibility for the consequences of their actions.”

**Mr. Salazar** (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): Peru abstained in the vote on the draft resolution after a great deal of thought. That draft asked us to take a position on a substantive issue in the strategic relationship between two countries with major nuclear arsenals, which has a significant impact on the security of the entire international community, in particular because it signifies a pause in the effort to limit the nuclear-arms race and a consequent reduction of the nuclear danger. Peru hopes that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the ABM Treaty, can be strengthened because of the favourable impact it has on the rest of the international community. In relative terms it reduces the nuclear danger, and that affects us all.

The current concept underlying the strategic equilibrium should be thoroughly revised along the lines of resolutions that demand total nuclear disarmament and that we will likely approve during this session, as we did in the past, taking into consideration the results of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The delegation of Peru welcomes the decision of the Clinton Administration to postpone its strategic defence initiative, which could require a revision of the ABM Treaty — which is exclusively a privilege of the parties — but it could lead to a repeal of the Treaty, but not to its strengthening.

**Mr. Osei** (Ghana): Ghana abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.2/Rev.1, as it did on a similar resolution last year primarily, because we believe that the international community should be encouraging the parties to cooperate at the bilateral level in resolving differences about the preservation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the ABM Treaty, which, as we all agree, remains the cornerstone for preserving global peace and stability. We consider that such a process of dialogue, which is indeed under way, should be sustained by the Treaty parties and, if so sustained, would have a salutary effect on efforts to preserve the objectives of the Treaty.

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1.

I call first on those delegations wishing to explain their position or vote before a decision is taken.

**Mr. Benítez Versón** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda”, has a number of aspects which do not correspond with the positions that Cuba has maintained and will continue to maintain on nuclear disarmament. We have reservations about a number of paragraphs in the draft resolution, including the fifteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 16. My delegation will abstain in the separate vote on those two paragraphs of the draft resolution.

With respect to the fifteenth preambular paragraph, Cuba’s position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and on the outcome of the sixth Review Conference of the Treaty is well known, so I will not repeat it here.

On the matter of the whole question of security assurances dealt with in operative paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, I repeat that the security assurances to non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be universal, unconditional and non-discriminatory. Cuba cannot accept that such assurances should be granted only to States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Our country, as a non-nuclear State and one that has put all its nuclear installations under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has a right to full security assurances from nuclear States independently of its status as a party or non-party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Despite our reservations on these and other paragraphs in draft resolution L.4/Rev.1, Cuba has decided to vote in favour of the text as a whole. That decision is the outcome of a very careful analysis which took various factors into account, especially the fact that we consider that this draft resolution, despite its inconsistencies and limitations, could make an additional contribution to promoting the priority objective which Cuba has in the area of disarmament: the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The sole fact that this draft resolution puts forth the need for a world free from nuclear armaments and sets out a certain number of clear steps to make progress in that direction

gives it merits of its own, which we acknowledge and encourage. We hope for the realization of these good intentions, which we know motivate the sponsors of this text, in order to move towards the objective of nuclear disarmament. This is the objective shared by the immense majority of the States represented here. We have no option but to work together and in a constructive spirit in order to move towards nuclear disarmament, independently of our differences as to the ways and means of doing so.

**Mr. Khan** (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation is taking the floor to explain its position before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1. The draft resolution this year has incorporated numerous elements from the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A statement made in the thematic debate on 23 October 2000 spells out our position on the NPT Review Conference.

One of the preambular paragraphs mentions the question of status. I wish to state once again that we have never asked for any special status but that we should continue to maintain our ability to deter nuclear or other aggression from any quarter. Paradoxically, the provisions of this preambular paragraph may have the opposite effect to what it may be trying to achieve. In any case, this paragraph indirectly implies that certain States do have a special status to continue to possess nuclear weapons. That is a strange proposition to be included in a draft resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world".

In particular, my delegation strongly opposes unrealistic demands contained in operative paragraph 13 of the draft resolution. We had suggested some modifications to the sponsors to at least make provisions of operative paragraph 13 an integral part of the process of nuclear disarmament envisaged in the preceding paragraph. Unfortunately, those suggestions were not taken on board by the sponsors. On the contrary, the draft resolution in its revised form has become even more unacceptable to my delegation. For these reasons the Pakistan delegation is constrained to vote against the draft resolution.

**Mr. Mukul** (India): My delegation has asked for the floor to explain its position before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda".

The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, remains the only consensus document on disarmament adopted by the international community as a whole. The Final Document contains a Programme of Action which remains only partially implemented. Any agenda for the future would necessarily have to take into account as the starting premise the implementation of the Programme of Action from the tenth special session. It would be evident that on the most important element, nuclear disarmament, the international community has made little progress. The question we need to ask is whether there is a need for a new agenda at all, when the most important element in the existing agenda remains valid and yet to be accomplished.

We understand the genesis of the draft resolution, which began with the joint declaration issued in Dublin on behalf of eight countries in June 1998. India welcomed that declaration. However, this draft resolution this year not only goes far beyond the parameters of the joint declaration but has been totally changed and cast in the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a framework and agenda that is as old as 1967. The draft resolution includes extraneous elements and formulations that were adopted in other forums. We reject descriptive approaches concerning security issues, such as those contained in the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs and operative paragraphs 13, 14 and 17, that are not only irrelevant to this draft resolution but are also fictional, being completely divorced from the reality on the ground. India no longer has a nuclear-weapons option. That option has been exercised and India is a nuclear-weapon State. We do not seek conferment of this status, nor is it a status for others to grant. It is a reality that cannot be denied, a reality that any realistic agenda has to factor in.

The reference in operative paragraph 17 to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia not only borders on the unreal but also calls into question one of the fundamental guiding principles for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, namely, that arrangements for such zones should be freely arrived at among States of the region concerned. That principle was again endorsed by consensus in the United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines last year. As we have stated on other occasions, given current realities, the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-

free zone in South Asia is no more valid than nuclear-weapon-free zones in East Asia, Western Europe or North America.

Given the omnibus nature of the draft resolution, there is a surprising lack of any mention of the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear doctrine of the only remaining transcontinental multilateral alliance, whose security policy is predicated on nuclear weapons, reaffirmed its policy of first use of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the draft resolution ignores efforts in certain countries to refine and modernize nuclear weapons for retention well into the new century. Even the specific references to interim measures such as de-alerting and the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles have been deleted from the draft resolution in an evident attempt to appease the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Ongoing efforts to build ballistic missile defences could well have the effect of further eroding an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. Instead of emphasizing the gravity of these actions, which imperil the entire fabric of multilateral disarmament efforts, the draft resolution has recast most paragraphs to make them more palatable to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT.

My delegation's views on the NPT are well known. The draft resolution attempts to revive the sagging fortunes of a treaty that has disappointed the vast majority of its States parties. We sympathize with those who have been striving in vain over the years to get the five self-anointed nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT to accept concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution is silent on the multifarious sources of proliferation that the NPT has failed to stem. We believe that all such efforts, however worthy and energetic, are limited by the intrinsic inequality and discriminatory framework of obligations enshrined in the NPT.

As we have maintained, any new agenda cannot succeed in the old framework of the NPT. The sponsors of the draft resolution this year appear to be reverting to the old agenda in the old framework that is bound to be unsuccessful. The need therefore is to move beyond the old framework towards a durable system of international security, based on the principles of equal and legitimate security for all. We expected that the draft resolution would include proposals contained in

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) documents starting from the Durban summit, given that a number of sponsors are also members of NAM. The NAM positions include concrete proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free world, particularly the call for an international conference with the objective of reaching agreement on the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. We would also have preferred that the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, be designated as a crime against humanity within the purview of the International Criminal Court.

Finally, although my delegation also shares the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the need to work for a nuclear-weapon-free world, we remain unconvinced of the utility of an exercise bound by the flawed and discriminatory approaches of the NPT. We will therefore cast a negative vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

**Mr. De la Fortelle** (France) (*spoke in French*): Allow me to make a brief comment on the translation into French of the draft resolution. My delegation cannot accept the French translation of the wording in the draft resolution on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After consultation among the interested parties, the Secretariat about two weeks ago issued a corrigendum in which the English expression "dealing with nuclear disarmament" in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference is translated into French as "chargé du désarmement nucléaire". I therefore am asking that this correction be respected in the French text of document A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1.

I conclude by recalling that France attaches great importance to the equal validity of the six official languages of the United Nations.

**The Chairman:** The statement by the representative of France has been duly noted.

The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested. Separate votes have also been requested on the fifteenth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 16.

The Committee will now take a decision on the fifteenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution L.4/Rev.1.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Mr. Lin Kuo-chung** (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the Committee's 25th meeting, on 30 October 2000. The sponsors are listed in the draft resolution itself and in document A/C.1/55/INF.2. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Kuwait have become sponsors.

The Committee will now proceed to vote on the fifteenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution L.4/Rev.1, which reads as follows:

*"Welcoming the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"*

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia,

Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

India, Israel, Pakistan

*Abstaining:*

Cuba

*The fifteenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 was retained by 151 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.*

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now take a decision on operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Mr. Lin Kuo-chung** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution L.4/Rev.1, which reads as follows:

*"16. Notes that the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that it called upon its Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue;"*

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana,

Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan

*Operative paragraph 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 was retained by 151 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.*

**The Chairman:** The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to conduct the voting.

**Mr. Lin Kuo-chung** (Secretary of the Committee): The Committee will now vote on draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 as a whole.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:*

India, Israel, Pakistan

*Abstaining:*

Bhutan, France, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Russian Federation, Uzbekistan

*Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 as a whole was adopted by 146 votes to 3, with 8 abstentions.*

**The Chairman:** I call now on those delegations wishing to explain their position or vote after the vote.

**Mr. Cheng Jinye (China)** (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1, in part because it draws extensively upon the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Also, China advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, which is consistent with the thrust and objectives of draft resolution L.4/Rev.1, put forward by the New Agenda Coalition. Therefore China supports the draft resolution.

At the same time, in our view the draft resolution could be improved in the following ways. First, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems — the ABM Treaty — is the cornerstone for safeguarding international strategic balance and stability, for advancing nuclear disarmament and for preventing nuclear proliferation. We have taken note of the reference in draft resolution L.4/Rev.1 to the importance of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, we consider that the draft resolution should be able to take a more explicit stance.

Secondly, the country possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals in the world should take the lead in continuing to drastically reduce its nuclear weapons. In our view, the draft resolution can also be further strengthened in this regard. In connection with mention in the draft resolution of measures for nuclear transparency, we consider that the adoption of these measures should be conditional upon a larger international environment of peace, security, stability and trust. It should have a link with the nuclear disarmament process and must have as its premise the undiminished security of the countries concerned.

It is also necessary to mention that the draft resolution should clearly call upon nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to be the first to use, or to

threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

**Mr. Grey (United States):** The United States is pleased that this year the sponsors presented a draft resolution which, with its revisions, we have been able, broadly, to support. I can assure the Committee that we did not come to this decision easily. We reviewed the draft resolution against the Final Document of this year's Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is our guiding light for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 has wisely focused on the agenda charted in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference and supplemented by the decisions taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Draft resolution L.4/Rev.1 recognizes that nuclear disarmament is a process that requires pragmatic proposals in a step-like process, not political calls from possible goals. We view the draft resolution in this context, including the rather unclear and ambiguous operative paragraph 18, which should not be construed as in any way limiting the ways and means available to pursue our shared objectives. The nuclear disarmament path has included, and will continue to include, the negotiation of additional treaties and agreements, as well as unilateral initiatives which reflect national and international security and stability concerns. It is these incremental but vital steps that may most successfully bring us to a world free of nuclear weapons.

Many steps towards nuclear disarmament have already been taken, including, *inter alia*, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the INF and START treaties, the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and the recently agreed Plutonium Disposition Agreement between Russia and the United States. A fissile material cut-off treaty is the next logical step on this path, and we look forward to the immediate commencement of negotiations on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament at the outset of its next session.

Hard work by all parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference this past spring resulted in the first consensus NPT Review Conference Final Document in years. It is most unfortunate that rather than turning to this consensus outcome for language to include in the fourth preambular paragraph, the sponsors instead

turned to earlier proposals inconsistent with the NPT Final Document. United States support for A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 does not reflect an acceptance of this misleading paragraph but rather our overall support for the results of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

**Mr. Sungar** (Turkey): As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other international agreements in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, Turkey desires that all countries come to share the goals of non-proliferation and work collectively towards their achievement. We continue to believe that systematic and progressive efforts by nuclear-weapon States are essential to the reduction of nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons within the framework of general and complete disarmament. Since last year's resolution contained certain elements that made it difficult for us to support, we opted to abstain and to explain our reasons for doing so. This year, however, we changed our vote to yes, as the draft resolution in question properly reflects the consensus outcome agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

**Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom): I have asked for the floor to set out the United Kingdom's approach to draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1. May I begin by thanking the sponsors of the draft resolution for the constructive spirit in which they have engaged in dialogue with other delegations on this text.

As I made clear at the outset of voting on draft resolutions in cluster 1, on nuclear disarmament, the United Kingdom's main concern has been that at this session the General Assembly should give its strong and unambiguous support to the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We therefore considered it particularly important that draft resolutions emerging from this Committee should faithfully reflect the letter and the spirit of what we, as parties to that Treaty, agreed here earlier this year. With that in mind, we are pleased to have been able to vote in favour of this draft resolution.

As we made clear here in May, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. We welcome the fact that the 2000 NPT Review Conference endorsed a package of measures that are reflected in this draft

resolution, many of which the United Kingdom has undertaken nationally. The United Kingdom has already made substantial unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal and now has fewer nuclear weapons than any other nuclear-weapon State. Trident operates at a reduced state of readiness. We are fully committed to transparency about our nuclear forces. We are consistent with our non-proliferation obligations under article I of the NPT and with our national security requirements. Nuclear weapons already play a reduced role in the security policies of the United Kingdom and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stopped producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Fissile material no longer required for military purposes is being placed under international supervision. All enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the United Kingdom are subject to international inspection.

We believe the immediate priorities for further action are further reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals through the START process, the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. These have been the agreed priorities of the international community in the nuclear disarmament field since at least 1995. They will make the world a safer place and thereby also help to create the necessary conditions for further national and international steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Clearly the achievement of the global elimination of nuclear weapons will require the United Kingdom and the other nuclear-weapon States to do more. We will continue to work with the other nuclear-weapon States in the spirit of our joint statements to the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the meetings of its Preparatory Committee. But we cannot pretend that nuclear disarmament measures can be carried forward in a security vacuum. Creating the conditions to make possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons will require action from all States, not just the five nuclear-weapon States, and across the whole global security agenda. This must include further progress on conventional armaments and on biological and chemical issues as well as in the nuclear field.

The United Kingdom set out its views on this issue in more detail in a "food for thought" paper put forward at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In this context, we attach particular importance to the development of credible and robust international

verification arrangements. Developing solutions to the complex challenges these raise is likely to be a lengthy process and will require a deep and continuing commitment by all States.

**Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to explain the vote of the Russian delegation on the draft resolution just adopted. First, we cannot fail to note the significant efforts of the delegations of the non-nuclear coalition in preparing the draft. It is clear that those countries have done a great deal of work and have made broad use of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

We note with satisfaction that the draft resolution welcomes Russia's ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and emphasizes that the completion of the ratification of this Treaty by the other side is a priority. It highlights the indissoluble link between the implementation of START II the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, while recognizing the latter as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, we cannot fail to note that the draft resolution, in our assessment, has clearly misplaced the emphasis that was expressed in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference. We even have questions regarding the title of the draft resolution, particularly in view of the success of the NPT Review Conference, which clearly defined the agenda for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We have also noticed discrepancies between several countries of the non-nuclear coalition regarding problems of strategic stability, the basis of which is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That means there are also divergences regarding the conditions in which further disarmament will be possible.

Thus, we believe that the adoption of this draft resolution could create the erroneous impression that we are taking a step towards the results of the work already done by all delegations that took part in drawing up the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference. Here I should like to emphasize that the major objective of the NPT parties was the full implementation of all decisions of the Conference, not

merely of some of them. The shortcomings of the draft did not allow us to vote in favour of it.

**Mr. De la Fortelle** (France) (*spoke in French*): The First Committee has been called upon for the third year in a row to take a decision on a draft resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", this year contained in document A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1. As the Committee knows, at the fifty-third and fifty-fourth sessions France voted against these draft resolutions, which in France's view seemed to call into question the priorities of nuclear disarmament in multilateral forums. Some of the difficulties that my country highlighted at that time remain, in particular with regard to the call in the title for "a new agenda" barely six months after the adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

My country is genuinely interested in responding to the desire of the sponsors of the draft resolution to reflect as clearly as possible the consensus achieved on the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference last May. It seems to us, however, that the text before the Committee today does not fully satisfy the need for fidelity to the document that was agreed upon on May, a need on which we all concur.

Allow me to clarify the position of my country on this fundamental issue. I should like to emphasize that there is not the slightest ambiguity concerning France's commitment to the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons, as spelled out in article VI of the NPT and reaffirmed in decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and in paragraph 15 (2) of the section on article VI contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Two of the concrete measures put forward in the Final Document — the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon States to achieve the elimination of these weapons, and the reaffirmation that the objective of the efforts of all for disarmament is general and complete disarmament — are of a specific nature. These two measures define the global position to be adopted by all States parties to the NPT. For France these two measures are indivisible.

However, the draft resolution adopted today does not, from our point of view, reflect this balance. While the other concrete measures on the list from the Final

Document of the 2000 Review Conference are reproduced in the form of separate points in the operative part, the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon-free States is taken out of context and presented in the preambular part as a general principle. That step affects the balance of the NPT, all the more so since that paragraph is followed by another one calling for action to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Thus, the elimination of nuclear weapons is not placed within the context of general and complete disarmament.

We believe that this presentation tends to change the scope of article VI of the NPT in ways that are not likely to strengthen the contribution of disarmament to the maintenance of peace and international stability and to the preservation of the security of all. My country does not wish to support that interpretation. France, while fully determined to fulfil all its commitments in the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation field, including the recommendations of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, therefore had no choice but to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

**Mr. Chang Man-Soon** (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to explain its vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1. Last year we abstained in the voting on the corresponding draft resolution. We have continuously supported

international efforts to achieve the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We also believe that a combination of multiple bilateral and multilateral efforts, as well as unilateral undertakings, can bring about concrete results on the road to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. That is why my delegation put more emphasis on a practical and incremental approach to nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, my delegation is of the view that draft resolution A/C.1/55/L.4/Rev.1 is much more in line with our aforementioned basic perspective on nuclear disarmament than last year's draft resolution. In addition, the language of the draft resolution is more balanced, reflecting the compromise language of the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

**The Chairman:** Before adjourning the meeting I would like to ask delegations to remain in the Conference room for the ceremony of the presentation of the 2000 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Certificates.

At this afternoon's meeting the Committee will take action on all remaining draft resolutions so as to conclude its work for the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*