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General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/74/50.



I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution [73/55](#), entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and appealed to them to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and encouraged States parties to the Convention to review its implementation; and urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

2. In resolution [73/55](#), the General Assembly also encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in that regard.

3. In the same resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Assembly at its seventy-fourth session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

4. By a note verbale dated 5 February 2019, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issue. Similar letters dated 5 February 2019 were dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant entities of the United Nations system. Member States and relevant international organizations were invited to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General and were informed that their submissions in extenso would be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament), if so requested by the Member State or international organization. The replies received are contained in sections II and IV of the present report. A reply from the European Union has been received and is reproduced in section III, in accordance with the modalities set out in General Assembly resolution [65/276](#). Any views received after 15 May 2019 will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the original language of submission. No addenda will be issued.

II. Replies received from Governments

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]

[26 April 2019]

Cuba, which has never allowed, and never will allow its territory to be used to carry out, plan or finance terrorist acts of any kind against any State, underlines its firm commitment to combating terrorism. As a victim itself of terrorism, Cuba reaffirms its unequivocal rejection and condemnation of all terrorist acts, methods and practices in all their forms and manifestations, by whomever, against whomever and wherever committed and whatever their motivations, including cases in which States are directly or indirectly involved.

Cuba has taken legislative, administrative and institutional measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, so as to ensure that no act of terrorism in any of its forms or manifestations is carried out in our country.

Under amendments to Act No. 93 of December 2001 on counter-terrorism, set out in Decree-Law No. 316 of 2013, measures taken at the national level to prevent the country from being used as a conduit for the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction or their components were boosted.

Moreover, under Decree-Law No. 317 of 2013, the coordinating committee to prevent and combat money-laundering, the financing of terrorism, arms proliferation and illicit capital flows was established. The Committee, which takes a comprehensive systemic approach, is made up of representatives of the Central Bank of Cuba, the Office of the Attorney-General, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Customs Service, the National Office of Tax Administration and, where necessary, experts from other bodies and agencies of the central State administration.

Cuba is a State party to 18 international conventions on terrorism and reaffirms its commitment to continue working to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in adopting measures and developing a broad legal framework to combat international terrorism. The conventions include the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the amendment of 2005 to the latter, which are explicitly mentioned in General Assembly resolution [73/55](#).

We are convinced that the only effective way to prevent the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction, including by terrorists, is by prohibiting and eliminating such weapons totally in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. As long as weapons of mass destruction exist, there will remain a latent threat to international peace and security.

Cuba does not possess and has no intention of possessing weapons of mass destruction of any kind, nor are they part of its national defence strategy. Our nuclear, chemical and biological programmes are for peaceful purposes only and are strictly monitored on an ongoing basis by the competent national authorities.

As set forth in the national report that Cuba submitted in February 2019 to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), we have an effective, predictable and reliable system for implementing, at the national level, our international obligations as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the conventions on chemical and

biological weapons. In addition, we are prepared for the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which we ratified on 30 January 2018.

The issue of terrorism requires a holistic approach. It must be confronted directly and prevented. It should not be associated with any particular religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. We reaffirm the importance of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the prime responsibility of Member States for implementing it in a transparent manner. We also support multilateral efforts to strengthen the central role of the General Assembly in its implementation.

The harmful and irresponsible practice of some States in financing, supporting or encouraging acts of subversion to achieve “regime change” violates the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The international community cannot stand by while, supposedly in the name of combating terrorism, certain States carry out acts of aggression, directly or indirectly, against sovereign peoples and commit flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

We firmly reject the manipulation of the highly sensitive issue of international terrorism as an instrument to be used against any country for political ends.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[15 May 2019]

El Salvador is greatly concerned about the attacks, conflicts and threats to international peace and security occurring around the globe and deeply regrets the loss of life, especially of children, caused by indiscriminate attacks in various parts of the world. It therefore attaches great importance to continued support for all efforts to combat organized crime and terrorism and promote and strengthen international security, disarmament and a culture of peace at the global level, and to joint efforts by the international community, together with the United Nations and other relevant international organizations, to seek peaceful solutions to such devastating situations, including by promoting actions in favour of disarmament and non-proliferation, taking into account the provisions of international law, in particular human rights and international humanitarian law.

Our country does not possess, import, produce or stockpile weapons of mass destruction. In taking this stance, we reaffirm our right and, indeed, we are aware of our duty to work for general disarmament to ensure international peace and security.

El Salvador considers that all initiatives and actions in favour of disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and the control of conventional weapons, in particular small arms, represent important contributions and effective measures for preventing terrorist and criminal entities from obtaining access to all types of weapons, and thereby reducing and even eradicating the armed violence and human suffering caused by such groups.

El Salvador therefore sets great store by the mandate established by the Security Council in resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), bearing in mind that its main objective is to prevent any form of support reaching non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, to strengthen national controls and ensure international security.

In that context, El Salvador is working through various national institutions, such as the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety, the Directorate-General of Customs and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural

Resources, to carry out an action plan and put in place a national mechanism for the effective implementation of the provisions of the resolution at the national level and the development of the corresponding domestic law.

India

[Original: English]
[15 May 2019]

India co-sponsored General Assembly resolution [73/55](#), entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, to highlight the concerns of the international community with regard to terrorism involving the use of such weapons. The international response to this threat needs to be realized at the national, multilateral and global levels. India expresses its satisfaction that the resolution was adopted by Assembly without a vote and supports its continued implementation.

India, recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is a major challenge facing the international community, has supported global efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. As a victim of terrorism for over three decades, India is fully cognizant of the catastrophic dangers that the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors and terrorists entails. The proliferation of clandestine networks for the transfer of such weapons has led to insecurity for all and must not be allowed to continue. The international community must join forces to eliminate the risk that sensitive materials and technologies may fall into the hands of terrorists and non-State actors. The focus on non-State actors should in no way diminish State accountability for combating terrorism, dismantling its support infrastructure and curbing its links with weapons of mass destruction.

India has taken steps to prohibit access to weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and non-State actors through measures at the national level, as well as participation in international cooperative efforts. India has put in place a well-established, stringent and effective export control system based on legislation, regulations and a control list of dual-use items and technologies consistent with the highest international standards. With a view to supplementing and complementing the existing legislation, India adopted the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act in 2005. It represents integrated and overarching legislation prohibiting unlawful activities in relation to weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials, equipment and technologies. In 2010, India enacted amendments to the Foreign Trade Act of 1992 to further strengthen the national export control system. India is committed to maintaining effective national export controls and participates as a full member in the discussions of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. The export control list maintained by India is harmonized with the 2018 plenary control lists and the guidelines of the four multilateral export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

India supports enhanced international cooperation, including through the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant forums, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. India contributed to the Nuclear Security Summit process and participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In February 2017, India hosted a meeting of the Implementation and Assessment Group of the Global Initiative in New Delhi. The meeting was attended by 152 technical experts and policy representatives from 41 partner nations of the Global Initiative, as well as four of its official international observer organizations.

India also participates actively in the Nuclear Security Contact Group. India believes that the primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear security rests at the national level, but that national responsibility must be accompanied by responsible behaviour as well as sustained and effective international cooperation. All States should scrupulously abide by their international obligations.

India has established a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, which cooperates with IAEA and other foreign partners, including in the area of capacity-building. India contributed \$1 million to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund for 2012 and 2013 and announced a further contribution of \$1 million at the Nuclear Security Summit held in 2016. India has submitted its reports and updates to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). An Indian expert participated in the work of the Committee between 2007 and 2009. India has also expressed its readiness to offer assistance to other countries in terms of capacity-building and in fulfilling their obligations under that resolution. Furthermore, India supported the adoption of Council resolution 1977 (2011), in which the mandate of the Committee was extended for a period of 10 years.

On 16 and 17 April 2018, in cooperation with Germany and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, India hosted the India-Wiesbaden Conference in New Delhi. The Conference, which was dedicated to the theme “Securing global supply chains through government-industry partnerships towards the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)”, was attended by Government representatives and representatives of industry from 39 countries, as well as experts from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Office for Disarmament Affairs in New York. The Conference provided an opportunity for participants to share experiences regarding their export control systems and to identify areas for legal and technical assistance, action plans and challenges in the national implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). India has also shared its experiences and lessons learned in the implementation of the resolution in a document that is available on the Committee’s website.

India continues to demonstrate its long-standing commitment to international non-proliferation through the establishment of a robust national export control system to implement resolution 1540 (2004) and through its recent decision to become a member of relevant multilateral export control regimes.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

[Original: English]
[11 March 2019]

The existence and development of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, pose the most serious threat to humankind. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly rejects the acquisition, development or stockpiling of such weapons by anyone. Any use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone under any circumstances would be a crime against humanity and a violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

Iran believes that, as long as weapons of mass destruction exist, the possibility of their acquisition and use by terrorists persists. Therefore, no measure other than the comprehensive prohibition and total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of all weapons of mass destruction can completely ensure that terrorists are prevented from acquiring them. To that end, the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation, by all States parties at all times, of all provisions of major multilateral treaties banning weapons of mass destruction, as well as ensuring their universality at the earliest possible time, are essential.

In this regard, Iran stresses the need for the destruction of all remaining chemical weapons in the shortest possible time frame, in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States is the only State party that possesses such weapons and that has not yet completed the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, although it has all of the necessary financial and technical capacities to do so. It must take every necessary step to comply with its obligations under the Convention without delay. The reports on the use of chemical weapons, in particular by terrorist groups in the Syrian Arab Republic, are very worrying. It is evident that those terrorist groups could not procure toxic chemical agents and produce and use chemical weapons without external assistance and support. Many reports indicate that the United States and the Israeli regime have provided assistance to terrorists in Syria.

This situation is very similar to how Saddam Hussein's army was able to acquire and use chemical weapons in the 1980s. There is substantial evidence that many European and American companies provided him with the required equipment, materials and technology to develop a chemical weapons programme. It is known that chemical precursors to chemical weapons and tubes for missiles and biological agents, including anthrax samples, were sent to Saddam Hussein by American suppliers. Given that all of those companies needed to obtain export licences from their Governments, they could not transfer chemical weapons precursors to him without the blessing of their Governments.

As a party to all international instruments banning weapons of mass destruction, namely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Iran has strictly complied with its obligations and has developed and maintained national controls to account for and secure any nuclear, biological and chemical material for exclusively peaceful purposes, and therefore to prevent any unauthorized access to them or their diversion to illegal activities.

III. Reply received from the European Union

[Original: English]
[15 May 2019]

The European Union remains strongly committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile materials, technical know-how and technology. This commitment is based on the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union Global Strategy (2016), the European Security Strategy (2003) and the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (2008 and 2013). The European Union and its member States apply comprehensive export controls and stringently implement Security Council resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#), [1887 \(2009\)](#), [1977 \(2011\)](#) and [2325 \(2016\)](#). All agreements between the Union and third countries contain a clause on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While States bear the prime responsibility for nuclear security, international cooperation helps to strengthen it. In December 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted its Decision (CFSP) 2018/1939 on Union support for the universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, a key element of the global nuclear security

and anti-terrorism architecture. The objectives of the decision are: to increase the number of adherents to the Convention and to assist with its effective implementation; to raise awareness among national policymakers and decision makers, as well as to enhance capacity-building; to help improve national legislation; and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials, to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. In this regard, the European Union will provide nearly €5 million over a period of three years to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of Counter-Terrorism.

The European Union has contributed to the implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Plan for 2018–2021 through Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383, under which funding is provided for IAEA activities towards: the universalization of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments; assistance to States in the establishment of the indigenous technical, scientific and human capacity necessary for effective, sustainable nuclear security; strengthening of capacities to prevent, detect, respond to, and protect people, property, environment and society from, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control; strengthening of detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material; contribution to computer security in the nuclear field; strengthening of the security of radioactive sources to bring them to safe and secure storage in the countries in need of support, including repatriation to the country of origin or supplier; and strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material.

The European Union continues to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. The European Union and its member States are actively involved in all areas of the work of the Implementation and Assessment Group of the Global Initiative, including nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation, and have contributed to the substance of all reference documents of the working groups of the Implementation and Assessment Group. The Nuclear Detection Working Group hosted a two-day expert meeting in Bilthoven, the Netherlands, on 25 and 26 January 2018, and Finland hosted a meeting of the Implementation and Assessment Group on 11 and 12 June 2018. In addition, the European Union and its member States have organized and participated in events to help foster international awareness of and commitment to nuclear security, including the Blue Lion: Recovery and Consequence Management Workshop and Experts Meeting, hosted by the United Kingdom from 6 to 8 February 2018; the Fierce Falcon: Radiological Source Security and Theft Response Workshop, organized by Hungary in cooperation with the Global Initiative and the United States Department of Energy from 10 to 12 April 2018; and the Sentinel II workshop: Developing National Nuclear Security Exercise Programmes, hosted by Lithuania in collaboration with the United Kingdom from 9 to 11 October 2018.

The European Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials has been fully operational since 2013. The Training Centre benefits the member States of the European Union and partner countries, among them several members of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Centre is operated by the European Commission Joint Research Centre at its sites in Karlsruhe, Germany, and Ispra, Italy, in close cooperation with other international initiatives promoted by IAEA and several Global Initiative partner countries. The Centre is also used for practical exercises that are mainly related to countering nuclear smuggling. The European Commission and the member States of the Union continue their nuclear forensics activities on the basic identification and examination of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced

nuclear forensic investigation facility at the Joint Research Centre site in Karlsruhe. Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined, thus providing support to competent authorities in the member States of the Union and beyond.

The European Union and its member States have been at the forefront of international efforts to achieve a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and they continue to call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. Through Council Decision (EU) 2017/2284, the Union is providing significant financial support for the Office for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the participation of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries in consultations and other activities related to the treaty. The Union calls on all members of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on such a treaty without delay and to begin work on the other issues on the agenda, and encourages all countries possessing nuclear weapons that have not done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The two European nuclear-weapon States have declared relevant moratoriums and dismantled or converted such facilities.

In 2016, the European Union and its member States supported the adoption of General Assembly resolution [71/67](#) on nuclear disarmament verification, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, as well as Assembly decision 72/513, adopted in 2017, on the recommendation of the First Committee, to keep the relevant item on the agenda. The Union is supportive of the work of broader partnerships and cooperative verification arrangements and has participated in the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification since its inauguration in 2015. The active engagement of the Union has continued during phase II of the International Partnership, with the Union taking part in the meetings of the working groups in Stockholm from 26 to 28 March 2018 and in Seoul from 10 to 12 July 2018, as well as in the plenary meeting held in London from 3 to 7 December 2018.

The European Union continued to support the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to ensure the full and effective implementation of and universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Union supported the initiative to convene the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 26 and 27 June 2018, to preserve and uphold the Convention and the global prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. The Special Session was the appropriate response to the repeated use of those weapons since 2012 in Iraq, Malaysia, Syria and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Union therefore welcomed the adoption of OPCW Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of 27 June 2018, “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use”. The European Council, in its conclusions of 28 June, committed the Union to supporting the implementation of the decision of the Special Session. In October 2018, the Union adopted a new regime of restrictive measures to address the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 and Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542.

Based on the Council conclusions of 16 April 2018, the European Union engaged actively in the preparations for the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, held from 21 to 30 November 2018, to ensure the relevance and increase the effectiveness and capacity of the Convention, including by addressing current and

future challenges. The Union continued its support for the work of the OPCW fact-finding mission and the Declaration Assessment Team in investigating reports of chemical weapons use in Syria and seeking to verify the reports. On 10 December 2018, the Council adopted its Decision (CFSP) 2018/1943 extending the implementation period of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2303 for the provision of satellite imagery in support of the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic by 12 months.

The European Union continued its strong political and financial support for the full and effective implementation and universalization of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, including through the comprehensive implementation by the Convention Implementation Support Unit of the Union's fourth assistance programme, set out in Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/51. Two regional workshops supporting universal adherence to the Convention in Africa and four regional workshops fostering dialogue on science and technology among countries from Latin America, Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa were organized. Seven more workshops and training events took place in the countries benefiting from extended assistance programmes on the national implementation of the Convention. The Union welcomed the start of the intersessional process and the technical and substantive discussions during the Meetings of Experts of the Convention in August 2018 and engaged actively in the discussions during the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2018.

The European Union actively participated in the review process for Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which led to the unanimous adoption of Council resolution 2325 (2016). The Union provided a report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with concrete proposals concerning implementation, assistance, international cooperation, transparency and outreach, as well as the role and competence of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Through Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/809, the Union is providing €2.7 million over a period of three years for the effective implementation of the resolution. The latest activities under the Council Decision included a national capacity-building workshop in Lomé (23 January 2019) and a training course in Addis Ababa (26 to 28 March 2019) for anglophone member countries of the African Union. In the context of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), the Union also adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1252 in support of the strengthening of chemical safety and security in Ukraine, with a budget of €1.43 million over a period of three years.

The European Union centres of excellence on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk mitigation initiative is a worldwide capacity-building programme, gathering 61 partner countries grouped around eight regional secretariats, located in the following regions: African Atlantic facade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; Gulf Cooperation Council countries; the Middle East; North Africa and the Sahel; South-East Asia; and South-Eastern and Eastern Europe. The initiative is financed under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and is aimed at mitigating risks related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials, strengthening partner countries' preparedness and nurturing security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a bottom-up, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. The platforms develop policy proposals and capacities on the basis of specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported by several regional cooperation projects funded under the initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 66 regional projects have been financed. The budget for the initiative for the 10-year period starting in 2010 amounts to €250 million.

The centres of excellence network is now well developed and has allowed the European Union to undertake table-top and field cross-border training exercises on matters such as civil protection, incident response, biosecurity and waste management in the framework of centres of excellence projects, in order to enhance visibility and concretely assess their impact. Moreover, the initiative is now developed enough to support further actions addressing security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructures, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, as well as to develop further cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual-use items.

The European Union supports the implementation and functioning of and universal adherence to the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, namely, the Hague Code of Conduct. Through a series of successive decisions/joint actions, the Union has financed outreach activities relating to the Code, including side events, research papers, expert meetings and regional awareness seminars. Those activities, which are carried out by the Paris-based Fondation pour la recherche stratégique and usually involve the participation of the rotating Chair of the Hague Code of Conduct, aim to: support the full implementation of the Code; promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States; encourage restraint and create more stability and security for all; reinforce the Code's visibility; raise public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; and explore possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation under the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.

IV. Replies received from international organizations

Collective Security Treaty Organization

[Original: Russian]

[19 April 2019]

The “Kobalt 2018” special tactical exercise, involving special forces units of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), was carried out successfully in the Republic of Kazakhstan in May 2018. The exercise enabled the testing of methods for mounting special operations to suppress the activities of terrorist and extremist groups. The purpose of the exercise was to rehearse joint operations by the Collective Force to eradicate illegal armed groups.

On 9 November 2018, the Acting Secretary-General of CSTO, Valery Semerikov, and the Under-Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov, signed a memorandum of understanding in Moscow on cooperation and coordination between the CSTO secretariat and the Office of Counter-Terrorism.

The memorandum provides for close cooperation and regular consultations on preventing and combating terrorism, long-term planning and the implementation of counter-terrorism projects, and the sharing of information and dissemination of best practices in order to counter extremist and terrorist threats.

Implementation of the memorandum's provisions will improve the coordination of efforts by the relevant entities of CSTO and the United Nations to counter terrorism, extremism and other threats to international security, including with regard to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the need for additional measures to minimize global threats arising from the proliferation of such weapons, was discussed by experts of CSTO member States during consultations, held at the CSTO secretariat in Moscow on 2 April 2019, on collaboration on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation matters. Participants underscored, in particular, the danger of not taking sufficiently seriously the prospect of chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

In that regard, we would also like to draw attention to the statement, distributed on 4 April 2019, by the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the States members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the context of implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), in which we expressed our readiness to continue cooperating with all stakeholders in order to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime for weapons of mass destruction.

Commonwealth of Independent States

[Original: Russian]
[11 March 2019]

The States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are working systematically to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. CIS countries regularly report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on measures taken by them to improve their national systems for monitoring trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials related to their manufacture.

Joint measures are carried out with due regard for the leading role of the United Nations and the development of cooperation with other international institutions and specialized bodies.

Most CIS member States have acceded to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005.

In line with the implementation of the programme of cooperation between CIS member States for the period 2017–2019 for countering terrorism and other violent manifestations of extremism, approved by a decision of the CIS Council of Heads of State on 16 September 2016, measures are being taken to:

- Suppress the illicit production and circulation of and trafficking in potent chemical, biological and radioactive materials;
- Protect sites that pose a high technological and environmental risk;
- Identify and dismantle laboratories and other specialized facilities used by terrorist and extremist organizations to assemble equipment for criminal use, including components for weapons of mass destruction.

CIS member States attach great importance to providing counter-terrorism forces with special training and preparing equipment for active deployment to suppress criminal activity associated with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

During the joint “Issyk-Kul Counter-Terrorism 2018” exercise and a meeting of the heads of counter-terrorism units of CIS member States’ security bodies and special services, which were coordinated by the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, the coordination and command of emergency services personnel and equipment was fine-tuned to respond to the potential seizure of vital facilities, rescue hostages and deal with the aftermath of terrorist acts.

The Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS member States has carried out joint exercises on the exchange of information on the radiation, chemical and biological situation in the territory of their countries.

Work is also continuing on the development of automated databases from registers of criminal activity, which could be used to detect and expose cross-border crimes and to detain individuals for whom an international arrest warrant has been issued.

There is no information pointing to the production or acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction or their components, or regarding their access to technologies for their manufacture, in the CIS region.

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[15 May 2019]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to assist States, upon request, through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan 2018–2021.

IAEA promoted universal adherence to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, one of the primary binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security, including organizing informal meetings to initiate formal preparations for the 2021 conference of the States parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Agency continued to develop comprehensive guidance on nuclear security, with the active involvement of experts from member States.

To help member States fulfil their international obligations, the Agency, *inter alia*, carried out four International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions in 2018, bringing to 85 the total number of such missions conducted to date. The International Physical Protection Advisory Service provides Member States with peer advice on implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, other international instruments and Agency guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities. The Agency has also established new guidelines for International Nuclear Security Advisory Service missions.

IAEA continued to develop comprehensive guidance on nuclear security with the active involvement of experts from member States. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee met twice during 2018 and issued five new publications. By the end of 2018, IAEA had issued a cumulative total of 32 publications in the Nuclear Security Series, with more than 20 draft publications under development.

Incidents reported to the Incident and Trafficking Database demonstrate that illicit trafficking, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material continue to occur. In 2018, there were 253 incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control, bringing the total in the database to 3,497 confirmed incidents reported by participating States.

In 2018, IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment; development, use and maintenance of design basis threats; vulnerability analysis; and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems. Other activities, such as securing vulnerable radioactive sources, upgrading facilities and repatriating highly enriched uranium, continued.

The Agency also continued to provide assistance to member States in implementing nuclear security systems and measures for major public events. In 2018, such assistance was provided to seven States, with nearly 400 radiation detection instruments loaned to support States in securing major public events.

In 2018, the Agency conducted 105 nuclear and radiological security-related training activities, 42 at the national level and 63 at the international or regional level, for more than 2,200 participants from 139 States.

In December 2018, the Agency organized the International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection, held in Vienna. The conference, which attracted some 550 participants from 100 member States, was focused on methods of securing radiological material during its full life cycle, detecting radioactive material involved in criminal and unauthorized acts and ensuring international cooperation and communication, as well as on the sustainability of national nuclear security regimes.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[1 May 2019]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) supports the counter-terrorism objectives set out in General Assembly resolution [73/55](#), entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, by enhancing the security of the international civil aviation system through international legal instruments on counter-terrorism and through the development and review of Standards and Recommended Practices in annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

ICAO continues to promote the universal adoption of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), which entered into force on 1 July 2018. The Beijing Convention criminalizes acts of using civil aircraft for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; of using civil aircraft to release or discharge any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or similar substances to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; and of using any such weapon or similar substances on board or against civil aircraft. It further criminalizes the unlawful transport of any such weapon, related material or other dangerous material. Various resolutions were passed during the thirty-ninth session of the ICAO Assembly encouraging States to sign and ratify the Convention as soon as possible.

Recognizing the potential use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons by terrorists, ICAO continues to identify possible mitigating measures for those threats. While preventing the acquisition of such weapons can be challenging, mitigating the effects of a biological, chemical or nuclear attack may deter terrorists from carrying out such assaults.

ICAO has recently completed the development of guidance material that addresses key high-level elements of an emergency response plan aimed at mitigating the effects of attacks on aviation facilities, including on board aircraft, using chemical, biological and radiological agents. The publication, made available in June 2018 through the ICAO secure portal, constitutes a solid basis for the development by competent authorities of a fully fledged emergency response plan to chemical, biological and radiological attacks on aviation facilities. While the guidance material focuses on response and recovery, it is envisaged that future updates to the publication may address the issue of detection of chemical, biological and radiological agents.

With regard to the legal transport of dangerous goods as cargo on aircraft, annex 18, “The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air”, together with the detailed specifications contained in the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 2018–2019 edition, provide States with an internationally agreed set of provisions governing their safe transport for all international operations of civil aircraft. With regard to the transport of high-consequence dangerous goods, additional security measures are contained therein. Furthermore, ICAO has worked with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to facilitate the latter’s work when transporting samples for analysis.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

[Original: English]
[15 May 2019]

As agreed by the Heads of State and Government at the 2018 Brussels Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2009 Comprehensive, Strategic-level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats, as the Organization’s overarching policy document, is still valid, comprehensive and flexible enough to deal with the evolving threats. Its implementation is continuously ongoing and driving the development of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities.

On numerous occasions, the NATO Heads of State and Government have called for universal adherence to and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement, as well as for the full implementation of Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and further work to strengthen national anti-proliferation regimes under Council resolution [2325 \(2016\)](#). Reference to those instruments is made in paragraph 45 of the Brussels Summit Declaration of 11 July 2018. Additionally, the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as their use in Iraq, Malaysia and the United Kingdom, which we condemn unreservedly, underscores the evolving and increasing threat to the Alliance posed by weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence capabilities

The multinational Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Task Force, which is composed of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Joint Assessment Team, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear component of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, is the key asset for protection against and response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks from State and non-State actors or incidents involving such material. The NATO Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Centre of Excellence, with its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear reach-back capability, operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, on a limited basis and provides scientific and operational advice before, during and after chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear reach-back capability provides an essential and effective contribution to the entire spectrum of NATO response to weapons of mass destruction proliferation, protection and recovery.

NATO chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence activities aiming for prevention and protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats from State and non-State actors are supported through the Committee on Proliferation in Defence format and by the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological

and Nuclear Defence Capability Development Group, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Medical Working Group, the Joint Centre of Excellence, the Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work and subject matter experts throughout the NATO command structure.

Civil-military cooperation on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks

In February 2019, the North Atlantic Council approved a set of non-binding guidelines for enhanced civil-military cooperation to deal with the consequences of large-scale events involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks associated with terrorist attacks. The aim of those guidelines is to support national strategic, operational and tactical planners in their efforts to enhance civil-military cooperation.

Cooperation with partners

NATO attributes great importance to cooperation with its partners, and is investigating ways to improve the military's ability to provide support to civilian authorities in response to overwhelming mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents. NATO and the United Nations have recently launched a partnership to strengthen the resilience and capacity of Jordan to deal with threats posed by terrorist attacks with the use of weapons of mass destruction. On 5 March 2019, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, representatives of the two organizations signed a memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the joint United Nations-NATO project on enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to a terrorist attack in Jordan featuring the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. The project will be jointly implemented by NATO international staff and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, over a period of 36 months.

A separate strand of work seeks to develop a better understanding of ways in which counter-terrorism may benefit from defence capability development, including for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence.

Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and with other partners across the globe, NATO has deepened cooperation and information-sharing on weapons of mass destruction threats and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives.

As one of the largest NATO outreach activities, the annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation gathers decision makers, senior officials and distinguished academics in the field of weapons of mass destruction and security from a wide range of countries. The most recent such conference was held in Reykjavik in October 2018.

Science cooperation

The NATO Science for Peace and Security programme supports practical security-related civil science research and technology collaboration between scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries. The programme directly facilitates mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest to NATO and partner countries and contributes to capacity-building, particularly to international efforts on meeting emerging security challenges, including counter-terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

[Original: English]

[15 May 2019]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) continued to promote the seven international legal instruments against terrorism dealing with the criminalization of conduct by non-State actors involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and materials, as well as the implementation of relevant obligations under Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).

In cooperation with the Government of Canada, the Office developed an online e-learning module on the international legal framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, which is available on its website in English, French and Spanish (www.unodc.org). In March 2018, in cooperation with the Canadian Government, UNODC held a workshop in Vienna on the universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment thereto.

UNODC also conducted three national activities on the international legal framework against nuclear terrorism and several national drafting workshops on the international legal framework against chemical terrorism.

During the reporting period, UNODC contributed expertise to the following activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency: International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection; Technical Meeting on Nuclear Forensics; three workshops on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment thereto; and a visit in connection with the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan.

UNODC also provided presentations at the training course for national points of contact for Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) for anglophone African States and at a national capacity-building event on resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs.

UNODC provided expertise on international cooperation in nuclear forensics to a global exercise of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and to a Global Initiative regional workshop for Africa on legal frameworks.

UNODC also participated in meetings of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and of the Nuclear Security Contact Group and briefed members of both forums and the participating international organizations on its work in preventing and suppressing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has requested UNODC to continue to develop its specialized knowledge on the international legal framework against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism as enshrined in the relevant international conventions and protocols, and to continue to provide related assistance to Member States in preventing and countering those forms of terrorism.