



# General Assembly

Seventieth session

**56<sup>th</sup>** plenary meeting  
 Tuesday, 17 November 2015, 3 p.m.  
 New York

Official Records

*President:* Mr. Lykketoft . . . . . (Denmark)

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Zinsou (Benin),  
 Vice-President, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.*

## Agenda item 87 (continued)

### Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

**Note by the Secretary-General transmitting  
 the report of the International Atomic Energy  
 Agency (A/70/219)**

**Draft resolution (A/70/L.8)**

**Mr. Bustamante** (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina would like to express its appreciation of and support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its thanks for the Agency's annual report for 2014 (see A/70/219). Argentina believes that the Agency plays a very important role in international cooperation for scientific and technological development in the nuclear field and non-proliferation.

Argentina stresses the technical and procedural nature of the draft resolution (A/70/L.8), which does not introduce distorting political elements. We thank the Federative Republic of Brazil for its efforts..

The efficiency of the Agency's verification system with regard to nuclear activities is fundamental for achieving the non-proliferation objectives. Our country has steadily maintained that the central matter of the future design of the nuclear security architecture should be the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as it is the relevant body of the United

Nations system in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Argentina believes that one of the pillars of the Agency's work is nuclear and radiation security and the safe transport and management of radioactive waste — areas that my country considers very important. A central objective of the Agency is to foster and encourage international cooperation on nuclear issues, and Argentina has continuously contributed with various programmes and activities.

International safeguards constitute another pillar of the Agency. Along with nuclear and radiation security, they are especially important for facilitating nuclear development. My country reiterates its conviction that those guarantees should be developed in an atmosphere of cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the States.

Argentina believes that joint efforts are necessary in order to generate stronger nuclear infrastructures that are more solid, efficient and sustainable over time.

**Mrs. Natividad** (Philippines): On behalf of the Philippine Government and the Filipino people, allow me to express our solidarity with and sympathy to the people of Beirut and Paris in this time of great sorrow following the recent terrorist attacks that killed hundreds of people. We stand in solidarity with the international community in condemning those horrific attacks and in the fight against terrorism. It is urgent, now more than ever, to bolster the global non-proliferation regime so that terrorists are not able to possess nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

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In the face of those threats, the Philippines recalls the recent assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as the United States Department of Energy, in strengthening the Philippines' nuclear security measures to ensure the security of all our visitors and nationals within our borders. For that, the Philippines is most grateful.

The Philippines welcomes the report of the Agency for the year 2014 (see A/70/219) and lauds the continuing balanced manner in which its objectives have been pursued and implemented. The IAEA's active involvement in the deliberations for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (resolution 70/1) is also worth noting and commending. There is no doubt that nuclear science and technology will play a crucial role in the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, such as in the areas of health, energy, water, agriculture and food security and climate change, to name but a few.

The Philippines has tremendously benefited from the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme over the years. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano was in the Philippines in January to witness the country's latest advances in nuclear science and technology. Our electron-beam irradiation facility, which was established with the Agency's assistance, is now fully operational and is handling the grafting of abaca fibres to produce metal adsorbents and honey alginate for the dressing of wounds.

Next month, the Philippines will hold its third Nuclear Congress, which will provide a useful platform for the exchange of information on the current state of global, regional and national applications in nuclear science and technology for development and inclusive growth.

In the area of nuclear safety, the Philippines welcomes the approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the six new safety requirements, which will be established as safety standards in an effort to further strengthen the global nuclear safety framework.

We also support the establishment of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee and intend to participate actively in its work. The Philippines also commends the IAEA's report on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, which was the product of extensive international collaboration among experts from 42 member States, including my country. The Philippines is working with the IAEA to enhance its capability to

cope with nuclear or radiological emergencies through the establishment of an online environmental radiation monitoring system, comprising initially five stations.

On nuclear security, the Agency is assisting us in setting up a nuclear security support centre. The European Commission Joint Research Centre and the United States Department of Energy are also providing a radiation portal monitor for training front-line and border control officers.

The Philippines is also an active partner in the implementation of the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan. To strengthen cooperation among our various Government agencies in the field of nuclear security, we convened a workshop on threat assessment and design basis threat in April.

The Philippines welcomes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by the E3/EU+3 and Iran, as well as Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the JCPOA. The Philippines calls for full compliance with that agreement and the resolution of outstanding and remaining issues. We also look forward to the December 2015 report of the Director General, which will provide the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme of action by the Board of Governors.

The Philippines also continues to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, to return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to fully comply with IAEA safeguards and relevant Security Council resolutions.

In closing, allow me to reiterate the Philippines' strong commitment to the work of the IAEA and to contributing, as a member of the Board of Governors for 2015-2016, to improving the Agency's operations and looking into ways that nuclear science and technology can improve people's lives and contribute to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda.

**Mr. Moselle** (United States of America): The United States fully supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the great breadth of work reflected in the IAEA's 2014 annual report (see A/70/219). We would also like to thank Director General Amano for his leadership.

For many years we have joined the consensus in this forum on the draft resolution before us today

(A/70/L.8), expressing our strong collective support for the IAEA and its work.

The IAEA annual report for 2014 is the report of the IAEA Board of Governors mandated by the IAEA Statute. It was approved by the IAEA General Conference without reservations, in accordance with the IAEA Statute. It is submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with the United Nations/IAEA relationship.

It is a shame that this routine resolution of support for the IAEA should be politicized. We were similarly disappointed by Russia's efforts to suggest changes to the 2014 IAEA annual report when it was considered by the Board of Governors in Vienna. Russia's position is a clear attempt to amend technical IAEA documents, including this annual report, to imply recognition of Russia's attempted annexation of Crimea. Those efforts are inconsistent with resolution 68/262 on Crimea's sovereignty, and they were roundly rejected in Vienna. Crimea remains an integral part of Ukraine. Ultimately, the IAEA Board of Governors, subsequent to the IAEA General Conference, made it clear that such political efforts had no place in a technical document from a technical agency.

We commend Brazil's efforts with regard to the draft resolution, and we stand with Brazil as a sponsor. We encourage all States to join us in supporting the draft resolution, as we have done in years past.

**Mr. Špokauskas** (Lithuania): Let me thank the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Yukiya Amano, for his presentation of the Agency's annual report (see A/70/219) and the update on its activities in 2015.

Lithuania is pleased to co-sponsor and will vote in favour of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA (A/70/L.8), reaffirming the indispensable role of the Agency with regard to non-proliferation and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as well as nuclear verification, safety and security. We thank Brazil for its skilful guidance in the difficult negotiations on this important draft resolution.

Lithuania associates itself fully with the statement made on behalf of the European Union (see A/70/PV.55).

Nuclear energy is a viable solution in the face of the challenges facing the international community arising from climate change and the need to ensure

energy security. Yet nuclear energy has a future only if developed in the most responsible way and in conformity with the spirit and letter of the international safety standards and requirements. Lithuania appreciates the role of the IAEA in setting high nuclear safety standards through the constant improvement of regulations, assistance in implementation and efforts to foster the concept of safety culture.

The comments by the Russian delegation with regard to the IAEA report and the nuclear facilities on the Crimean peninsula (see A/70/PV.55) are disconcerting and do not reflect reality. Lithuania is concerned that the work of the Agency is being politicized by bringing up the issue of the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. We regard that as a detrimental attempt to influence the work of the Agency, which is an independent and technical agency. The position of the Assembly regarding Crimea is very clear. Resolution 68/262 affirms its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders. Crimea remains part of Ukraine, and its illegal annexation constituted a breach of the Charter of the United Nations and its principles.

Moreover, the decision of the IAEA to classify all nuclear facilities in Sevastopol, including research reactor IR-100, as belonging to Ukraine was completely in line with resolution 68/262, which calls upon all international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration in the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status.

For those reasons, Lithuania urges all Member States to maintain their support for the draft resolution, as in previous years.

**Mr. An Myong Hun** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to state its position on a nuclear issue that was mentioned in a prejudicial manner in the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (see A/70/219).

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is the direct product of the hostile policy of the United States and its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If the United States had not acted with hostility against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had not threatened it with its

nuclear weapons, the nuclear issue would never have been created on the Korean peninsula. Since the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula was created by the United States, its solution will depend entirely upon the United States terminating its hostile policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Nevertheless, each year, the IAEA presents its partial and unjust report and draft resolution, intentionally following the hostile policy of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If the IAEA sincerely wants a solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, it should call to account the United States, which created the nuclear issue and constantly threatens the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its nuclear weapons.

However, the IAEA report mentions the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea only in a discriminatory manner, without mentioning even one word about the nuclear threat and blackmail by the United States. The attitude of the IAEA cannot be construed otherwise than as being unfair, which is far short of impartiality in its work. It is none other than the IAEA that in the past created suspicion regarding the peaceful nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the instigation of the United States; and none other than the United States and the IAEA that compelled the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take self-defensive action by withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The IAEA should learn a lesson from having produced such unprecedented serious consequences by blindly followed the hostile policy of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea takes this opportunity to urge the IAEA not to blindly follow the hostile policy of the United States any longer. The IAEA should bear in mind that the annual submission of this kind of report, which is full of prejudice and distortions, does not at all help address the issue.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has never recognized the relevant resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, not to speak of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

As long as the United States' extremely hostile policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues, no solution can be expected with

regard to the nuclear issue or to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and beyond.

The aggressive joint nuclear military exercises staged every year by the United States in South Korea, despite strong condemnation of the international society constitute concrete manifestations of the United States' hostile policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As long as United States continues to infringe upon the sovereignty and dignity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and drives dark clouds of nuclear war towards the Korean peninsula, the nuclear issue cannot be solved. On the contrary, such actions will only lead to the further modernization and qualitative and quantitative improvements of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

As has already been clarified, the nuclear power of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea serves to deter attacks and aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, defend the nation's security and safeguard the peace and security of the region. The nuclear power of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not constitute a threat to non-nuclear-weapon States that are not engaged in attacks or aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will fulfil its obligations assumed before the international community with a high sense of responsibility as a nuclear-weapon State.

**Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): There is universal agreement that the real nuclear threat in the Middle East is Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, including long-range missiles that can threaten the whole region and, with their range of 5,000 miles, can even reach the Chinese border.

Yet some do not recognize that obvious fact, preferring to draw attention to other, illusionary issues in order to avoid any focus on the real threat resulting from Israel's nuclear reality. This tendency lacks integrity and objectivity and unveils their allegations when they express keenness to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. For decades they provided Israel with nuclear technology and material that enabled it to acquire nuclear weapons, including advanced submarines capable of carrying and launching nuclear missiles. They have done their best, quite illogically, to keep the international community

from focusing on that important issue during the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which were held in 2010 and 2015 in New York. They also worked to thwart the 2012 Conference on a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East in order to help conceal the fact Israel was still acquiring a nuclear weapon at the expense of the safety and security of the peoples in the region, proving once again their policy of double standards.

In his statement, the Director General of the IAEA referred to the fact that the Agency had recently concluded that it was highly probable that a building destroyed at Dair Alzour was a nuclear reactor, which should have been declared to the Agency. In that context, please allow me to state the following.

First, the Director General of the IAEA knows quite well that Syria made the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons one of its national priorities in both words and deeds. Therefore, early on, back in 1968, Syria started by acceding to the NPT. It also signed the Safeguards Agreements with the Agency in 1992. Moreover, on 27 December 2003, Syria, on behalf of the Group of Arab States, submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution on the topic that is still in blue. That draft sought to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. All of that underscores the fact that the credibility of our national commitment to non-proliferation cannot be questioned. That is particularly the case since that draft, which is in line with the provisions and objectives of the IAEA, met with the objection of the United States of America, which threatened to use the veto against it.

Second, the Security Council and the IAEA did not condemn the Israeli military aggression against Syria or Israel's refusal to cooperate with the Agency, nor did the Council allow Agency inspectors to inspect the pollution that is potentially due to the Israeli missiles and the materials used to destroy and pollute that site. We must also take into consideration Israel's continued refusal to cooperate with IAEA requests, its ongoing development of its nuclear military capabilities beyond any international supervision or control and its disregard for all calls to turn the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons.

All of this threatens the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safety and security of the States and the peoples in the Middle East and undermines the universality of the Treaty. Those are

very dangerous issues. The facts have been corroborated and documented, and are known to the IAEA. We expected the Director General of the IAEA to refer to those facts in his statement instead of using expressions devoid of any real meaning, such as "It was very likely that...".

Third, it would be useful here to read a paragraph from the memoirs of Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the previous Director General of the IAEA, entitled *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*. I quote from pages 228 and 229:

*(spoke in English)*

"One of the strangest and most striking example of nuclear hypocrisy, multilateral and multifaceted, must surely be Israel's bombing of the Dair Alzour installation in Syria in September 2007, and the aftermath of that attack. Speculation began almost immediately that the site had housed a nuclear facility. Syria denied the accusations. Israel and the United States remained officially silent, although American officials spoke anonymously on the subject to the media. I spoke out strongly, noting that any country with information indicating that the bombed facility was nuclear was under a legal obligation to report it to the IAEA. But no one came forward with such a report. For the six weeks following the bombing, the most crucial period in terms of our seeing inside the facility, we were unable to obtain any high resolution images from commercial satellites."

*(spoke in Arabic)*

Despite that account, Mr. Amano has, for four consecutive years, been repeating the same erroneous and misleading statements that he repeated this morning.

Fourth, the commitment of the member States to the Statute of the IAEA would have required the United States of America to inform the Agency with the information they had before they destroyed the building, and not eight months after it was destroyed. The same applies to Israel, which did not provide the Agency with any information. Not only did it not provide all the information — that is, if the information was correct — but it also launched a military aggression on sovereign Syrian territory by infiltrating the air space of a neighbouring country, namely, Turkey. The Agency did not deal with the issue according to its mandate. It did not follow the necessary procedures in accordance

with its responsibilities and prerogatives with regard to Israel's violation of its international obligations.

Fifth, most of the conclusions of the Agency under the current mandate of Director General Amano with regard to the Dair Alzour site have been based on the photos and analysis submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency. That raises a lot of questions as to the credibility of that information received by the IAEA and the nature of the supporting documents. The fact that a State that follows a hostile policy towards my country's interests presented the documents should also be taken into account, as should the precedents on the issue relating to the catastrophic Iraqi dossier. That file is misleading and led to the invasion of Iraq, the destruction of its infrastructure and the promotion of terrorism. The result came years later, in 2008, when the report of the United Nations Special Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolution 687 (1991 (UNSCOM) was placed in a box marked "Confidential", not to be opened for 60 years. Why is that? Because the report concluded that UNSCOM, which was looking for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, could not find any.

Sixth, the recent report of the Director General includes inconclusive conclusions based on information that lacked credibility and comprehensiveness, and which contradicted the assessments of his predecessor, Mr. ElBaradei. That also raises a lot of questions that require justification and clarification.

Seventh, it is obvious that there is an intermingling between the legal commitments of member States to the safeguard agreements and the voluntary procedures for accession to the additional protocol, which is not based on any legal foundation and which seeks to impose further political pressure on my country.

Eighth, we have a question for the countries that have provided a cover-up for Israeli nuclear weapons, as well as for the Director General of the IAEA and for the Agency itself. What have they done to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which has been on record for 30 years? Allow me to quote from paragraph 5 of that resolution, in which the Security Council called for

*(spoke in English)*

"Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

*(spoke in Arabic)*

Ninth, an important report on armament and disarmament and international security, which was issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, has devoted an entire chapter to what it calls Israeli nuclear "powers" — not "power". I call on the Director General of the IAEA to read that chapter in order to draw on the lessons learned and to immediately and conclusively deal with Israeli nuclear weapons, which threaten the lives of the peoples and States of the region, in implementation of the resolutions of the Agency, along with those of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

**The Acting President:** We have heard the last speaker in the debate on agenda item 87.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/70/L.8, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

I now give the floor to the representative of the Secretariat.

**Mr. Botnaru** (Department for General Assembly and Conference Management): I should like to announce that since the submission of the draft resolution and in addition to those delegations listed on the draft document, the following countries have become sponsors of A/70/L.8: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

**The Acting President:** A recorded vote has been requested.

*A recorded vote was taken.*

*In favour:*

Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,

Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

*Abstaining:*

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chad, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

*Draft resolution A/70/L.8 was adopted by 99 votes to none, with 10 abstentions (resolution 70/10).*

[Subsequently, the delegation of Malta informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

**The Acting President:** Before giving the floor to speakers in explanation of vote, may I remind delegations that explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

**Mr. Mohamed** (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like once again to express my deep condolences to the peoples, families and Governments that were targeted by the heinous terrorist attacks in France and the previous terrorist attacks in Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq.

In recent years, my country has been part of the consensus on the resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We had hoped that today's resolution would avoid making any indirect reference to political matters that should not be addressed here but that properly belong in the framework of bilateral interactions, especially between two countries with deep historical relations. I would like to note that the two countries concerned have friendly relations with my country. My delegation will continue to support all of the paragraphs of the resolution.

Therefore, in accordance with our explanation of vote, our delegation decided to abstain in the voting on the resolution.

**Mr. Zdorov** (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): Belarus voted in favour of resolution 70/10, because it supports the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its annual report on the substance.

At the same time, we wish to express our concern about the fact that we were unable to reach consensus on the adoption of the resolution, which we could have done if we had taken into account the specific positions of States on issues important to them. We hope that, in the future, we will be able to find a format that will allow us to avoid such a situation and to focus on discussion of the mandated issues of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

**Mrs. Del Sol Dominguez** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me to why my delegation abstained in the voting on resolution 70/10, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency for 2014. Cuba abstained because my country laments the fact that not all possible efforts were exhausted in all possible forums to accommodate the legitimate concerns of all delegations and to preserve the traditional and important consensus on the resolution.

**Mr. Vallejos** (Nicaragua) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation abstained in the voting. We acknowledge, however, the importance of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its valuable cooperation with our countries. Nevertheless, we profoundly regret that we were not able to adopt resolution 70/10 by consensus and that it was not possible to accommodate all delegations by taking their legitimate concerns into account. We hope that the debate on this issue will continue so that we can find a solution and arrive at the consensus we need so badly on this as well as other important resolutions.

Our delegation appreciates the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we will continue to cooperate with the Agency.

**The Acting President:** May I take it that it is the wish of General Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 87?

*It was so decided.*

*The meeting rose at 3.55 p.m.*