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SECURITY COUNCIL

Forty-first year

Letter dated 15 October 1986 from the Deputy Head of the delegation of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the forty-first session
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a speech given by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M. S. Gorbachev, on Soviet television.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 21, 47, 54, 55, 60, 62, 68, 126 and 141, and of the Security Council.

V. PETROVSKIY
Deputy Head of the delegation of the
USSR to the forty-first session of
the General Assembly

ANNEX

Speech given by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), M. S. Gorbachev,
on Soviet television

As you know, my meeting in Iceland with President Ronald Reagan of the United States ended on Sunday, the day before yesterday. There was a televised press conference on its results. The text of my statement and my replies to journalists have been published.

Having returned home, I consider it my duty to tell you how things were and how we regard the events in Reykjavik.

The results of the meeting in the Icelandic capital have just been discussed at a meeting of the Politburo. An account will be published tomorrow of the views of our Party's leadership on this major political event, whose consequences, we are convinced, will be felt in international relations for a long time to come.

Before Reykjavik, much was said and written about the forthcoming meeting. As usually happens in such cases, there was a multitude of views and conjectures. That is natural. This time there was speculation as well.

Now that the meeting is over, its results are at the centre of the world community's attention. Everyone wants to know what happened, what the meeting produced and what the world will be like after it. We were determined that the main problems of world politics - ending the arms race and nuclear disarmament - should be given top priority at the Reykjavik meeting. And that, in fact, is what happened.

What are the motives for our persistence in this matter? The word from abroad is often that our domestic difficulties are the reason. The West's calculations incorporate the premise that, in the end, the Soviet Union will not be able to sustain the economic strain of the arms race, and it will crack and bow to the West. All that is needed is to turn up the pressure on us and build up a position of strength. This note has already been struck in a statement by the United States President since our meeting.

I have often had occasion to state that such plans are not only built on sand but dangerous, because they may lead to fateful political decisions. We know our problems better than others. We do have problems, and we discuss and solve them openly. We have our own plans, our own approaches and a common accord of Party and people on this score. On the whole, I am bound to say that the Soviet Union today draws strength from its solidity, the political activity of its people and its dynamism. I think that these trends, and therefore the strength of our society, too, will continue to develop.

We shall always know how to stand up for ourselves. The Soviet Union has the capacity to respond to any challenge if need be. The Soviet people know this, and people throughout the world should know it too. But we do not wish to play power games. That is an extremely dangerous occupation in the age of nuclear missiles.

We are firmly convinced that the protracted feverishness of international relations may break out into sudden, disastrous crisis. Practical steps away from the nuclear abyss are needed. Concerted Soviet-American efforts, efforts by the whole international community, are needed to bring about a radical improvement in international relations.

For the sake of these goals, we in the Soviet leadership made extensive preparations for the meeting, even before we obtained President Reagan's agreement to attend. Taking part in that work, apart from the Politburo and the Central Committee secretariat, were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, other government departments, scientists, military experts and specialists from various branches of industry. The positions that we worked out for the Reykjavik meeting were the result of several extensive discussions with our friends, the leaders of the other countries of the socialist community. We were determined to have a meeting devoted solidly to matters of principle and far-reaching proposals.

Let me turn, now, to the meeting itself and how events developed there. You must be told about this not only to hear the truth, which our partners in the Reykjavik talks are already distorting, but mainly so that you know what we intend to do next.

The first conversation with President Reagan began on Saturday at 10.30 a.m. After the greetings that are obligatory on such occasions and a brief exchange with correspondents, we remained alone - just us and our interpreters. We exchanged views on the general situation and how the dialogue between our countries was progressing, and outlined the problems we were to discuss.

Then I asked the President to hear our concrete proposals on the main problems that had brought us to the meeting. I have already spoken about them in considerable detail at a press conference, but let me remind you of them briefly.

A whole package of major measures was put on the negotiating table: measures which, if accepted, would usher in a new era in the history of mankind - a nuclear-free era. That was the essence of a major breakthrough in the world situation, which was an evident and real possibility. We were no longer talking of limiting nuclear arms, as in the SALT I, SALT II and other treaties, but of abolishing nuclear weapons within a comparatively short period of time.

The first proposal concerned strategic offensive weapons. I said I was ready to cut them by 50 per cent over the next five years. Land-based, submarine-launched and airborne strategic weapons were all to be reduced by half. To facilitate agreement we made a major concession, withdrawing our previous demands for American medium-range missiles within reach of our territory and American forward-based systems to be included in the strategic equation. We were also ready to take into account United States concern about our heavy missiles. We were considering this proposal in the context of the total abolition of strategic weapons we proposed on 15 January this year.

Our second proposal concerned medium-range missiles. I proposed to the President that this category of Soviet and American missiles in Europe should be completely eliminated. We offered a major concession here, too, stating that, as

distinct from our previous stand, British and French nuclear missiles need not be taken into account. We had in mind the need to clear the way to détente in Europe, to liberate the nations of Europe from the fear of a nuclear catastrophe, and then progress to the eradication of all nuclear weapons. You will agree, this was another bold step on our part.

Knowing beforehand what objections there might be, we said that we were ready to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometres and to start talks immediately about their future. As for the medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union - an issue that has constantly featured in President Reagan's "global option" - we offered to start talks immediately on that question also. Here too, as you can see, our proposals were of an important and serious nature, providing the opportunity for a radical solution to this problem.

The third question I raised during my first conversation with the President, and an integral part of our package of proposals, was the existing treaty on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and agreement on a nuclear-test ban. Our approach is that since we are embarking on an entirely new situation, where we shall begin cutting back substantially on nuclear weapons and eliminating them in the foreseeable future, we must protect ourselves from any unexpected developments. At issue are weapons which still make up the core of our country's defences.

It is therefore necessary to prevent anything happening to undermine equality in the disarmament process and rule out any possibility of developing a new type of weapon affording military superiority. We consider this position perfectly legitimate and logical.

And since that is so, we firmly stressed the need for strict observance of the 1972 ABM treaty, which has no expiry date. Furthermore, to harden the terms of that treaty, we proposed to the President that the United States and the Soviet Union should each pledge not to exercise the right to pull out of the treaty for at least 10 years, and get rid of their strategic weapons in the mean time.

In view of the particular difficulties which the Administration had created for itself, with the President personally committed to space weapons, the so-called SDI, we did not insist on a stop to work in this area, on the understanding that all provisions of the ABM treaty would be complied with fully; in other words, research and testing in that field would not go beyond the laboratory. The restriction would apply equally to the United States and the USSR.

As he listened to us, the President made comments and asked for more details on some points. During the conversation, we firmly and specifically raised the question of verification and made the link with the post-nuclear situation, which would demand a particularly responsible attitude. I told the President that if both countries embarked on nuclear disarmament, the Soviet Union would toughen its stance on verification, which should be real, comprehensive and convincing. It must engender full confidence in the reliability of compliance, and must incorporate the right to do on-site inspection.

I should tell you, comrades, that the President's initial reaction was not entirely negative. He even stated: "What you have just said gives us hope". It did not escape our notice, however, that our partners (Comrade Shevardnadze and George Shultz had both joined the discussion on these issues) were somewhat nonplussed. Doubts and objections surfaced immediately in their occasional remarks. The President and the Secretary of State started talking right away about divergencies and disagreement. In those words we clearly recognized the familiar old sounds we had been hearing at the Geneva negotiations for months: we were reminded of all sorts of sub-levels in strategic nuclear weapons and the "interim proposal" on missiles in Europe, and told that we in the Soviet Union ought to join SDI and replace the existing ABM treaty with something new, and a great many other things in the same vein.

I expressed surprise. How can this be? We propose to accept the American "zero option" in Europe and get down to negotiations on medium-range missiles in Asia, and you, Mr. President, abandon your previous stand. This is incomprehensible.

On the ABM treaty, we suggest preserving and toughening up this fundamental agreement, and you want to renounce it, you even suggest we should replace it with some new agreement, thus - right after abandoning SALT II - also destroying this mechanism for preserving strategic stability. This is also incomprehensible.

We have sorted out our plans on SDI as well, I said. If the United States creates a three-tier ABM system in space, we shall respond. But that is not what concerns us. SDI would mean placing weapons in a new environment, which would destabilize the strategic situation and make it even worse than it is today. If that is the goal of the United States, you should say so. But if you truly want real security for your people and the world as a whole, the American position is absolutely untenable.

I told the President frankly: we have made major new proposals, but what we are hearing from you is stuff that everybody is already pretty tired of and cannot get us anywhere. Please, Mr. President, go over our proposals again, carefully, and give us an answer point by point. I handed him the English translation of a draft of possible instructions prepared in Moscow which, if agreement was reached in principle, we could give to our foreign ministers and other departments for them to draw up three draft agreements. They could be signed during my visit to the United States.

In the afternoon we met again. The President announced the position that had been drawn up during the break. The first few words made it clear that we were again being presented, as I put it at the press conference, with the mothballed rubbish which is already stifling the Geneva talks: all sorts of intermediate proposals, figures, levels, sub-levels, etc. Not a single new thought, not a single fresh approach, not a single idea which might contain so much as a hint of a solution or progress.

It was becoming clear, comrades, that the Americans had gone to Reykjavik with nothing to offer. They seemed to have turned up, empty-handed, only to pick up what they could get.

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A dramatic scene was taking shape.

The American President was not ready to take a bold stance on the basic issues or make any concessions in order to give a real boost to constructive and promising negotiations. But that is exactly what I urged him to do in my letter, suggesting a meeting without delay so as to give a powerful boost, at the top leadership level in both countries, to negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Convinced that our proposals were balanced and took our partners' interests into account, we decided not to abandon our efforts to reach a breakthrough at the meeting. After many clarifying questions, there seemed to be a break in the clouds over strategic armaments. Clutching the opportunity, we took another great stride towards a compromise. I told the President: we both acknowledge that there is a triad of strategic offensive weapons - ground-based missiles, strategic submarines and strategic bombers. Well then, let us cut each part of that triad by 50 per cent. That way there will be no need for levels and sub-levels and subtotals of this and that.

After much argument we managed to reach a mutual understanding on that issue.

Then the discussion turned to the problem of medium-range missiles. The Americans stubbornly defended the so-called interim option, which would retain some of their missiles in Europe, including Pershing-2s and, naturally, our matching SS-20s. We categorically refused. I have already explained why. Europe deserves to be rid of atomic weapons and stop being a nuclear hostage. It was hard for the President to oppose his own "zero option", which he has been promoting for so long. And yet we sensed that the Americans intended to undermine the agreement behind a display of special concern for their allies in Asia.

A lot of untenable things were said by the American side. It is simply embarrassing to repeat it all. The talks only began to move when, here again, we made a compromise step and agreed to a formula of zero missiles in Europe and 100 warheads apiece on medium-range missiles - in the east for us, and in United States territory for the Americans. The most important thing was that we agreed to rid the European continent of nuclear weapons.

So we also had agreement on the problem of medium-range missiles. There was a major advance in this area of nuclear disarmament. The American Administration was unable to dodge our persistent drive towards positive results.

There remained the ABM issue and a ban on nuclear explosions.

Before we met the next day, on Sunday, for our third conversation, which was scheduled to be the last, two groups of experts, from our side and the Americans' had worked through the night, carefully analysing what had been discussed at the two earlier meetings, and had reported the outcome of their respective nights' labours to me and to the President.

The conclusion was that it might now be possible to draw up agreements on strategic offensive armaments and medium-range missiles.

The ABM treaty took on key significance in this situation. Its role was becoming ever more important. How can we destroy the very thing which has so far, somehow, managed to control the arms race, was my question. If we now start cutting strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons, both sides must be certain that no one will develop new systems which would undermine stability and parity. Therefore, I think it perfectly logical to agree on a cut-off date - the Americans spoke of seven years, we suggested ten - the ten years proposed for eliminating nuclear weapons. We suggested that ten years, during which time neither the Soviet nor the American side should avail itself of the right - which both sides have - to withdraw from the ABM treaty. And research and testing should be conducted in laboratories only.

I think you will now understand why we said ten years. It was not a chance figure. The logic is simple and straightforward. The first 50 per cent of strategic weapons go in the first five years, and the other half in the other five years. Hence ten years.

In this connection, I proposed instructing our representatives to start full-scale talks on discontinuing nuclear explosions with an eye to agreement on banning them outright. While the agreement was in preparation - and here again we were flexible and constructive - we could also resolve the specific problems relating to nuclear explosions.

In reply, President Reagan again put forward the arguments we have come across at Geneva and in his public statements: SDI was a defence system, and if we started eliminating nuclear weapons, how could we protect ourselves from some madman who might get hold of them, and he was ready to share with us the results of the work on SDI. Answering his last remark, I said: Mr. President, I cannot take seriously your idea of sharing the results of your work on SDI. At the moment you are not even prepared to share equipment for the oil and dairy industries, yet you expect us to believe a promise to share your discoveries on SDI. That would amount to a "second American Revolution", and revolutions do not happen so often. Let us be realistic and pragmatic, I told him. It is safer that way. The issues we are discussing are too serious.

Incidentally, yesterday, while attempting to justify his stand on SDI, the President said that America and its allies needed the programme if they were to remain invulnerable to Soviet missile attack. As you see, the madmen have vanished. The "Soviet threat" has been trundled out again.

That is really quite a trick. We were proposing to abolish not only strategic armaments, but all nuclear armaments in American and Soviet possession, subject to strict verification.

Why does the "freedom of America" and its friends need to be protected against Soviet nuclear missiles if these missiles will no longer exist?

If there are no nuclear weapons, why protect against them? The entire "Star Wars" undertaking, in other words, is purely militaristic and directed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union.

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But let us return to the talks. Although an agreement on strategic arms and medium-range missiles had been reached, it was premature to believe that everything had been finally settled at the first two sessions. There was still a whole day ahead of us, nearly eight hours of non-stop, high-pressure discussion, during which we returned time and again to these ostensibly resolved issues.

In these discussions, the President sought to tackle ideological problems as well, demonstrating, to put it mildly, a total ignorance of the socialist world and an inability to understand what goes on there. I rejected attempts to link ideological differences to questions of ending the arms race. I repeatedly drew the President and the Secretary of State back to the subject that had brought us to Reykjavik. It was necessary to remind our interlocutors again and again about the third element in our package of proposals, without which overall agreement was not possible: the need for strict compliance with the ABM treaty, the need to harden the terms of that major treaty and ban nuclear tests.

Time and again, we had to draw attention to what might have seemed perfectly clear: now we had agreed to deep cuts in nuclear arms, we must create a situation that would preclude not only efforts at but also all thought of disrupting the strategic balance and circumventing our agreement. Hence, we must be certain that the ABM treaty, which has no expiry date, would remain in effect. You, Mr. President, I said, ought to agree that if we are going to cut back on nuclear weapons, it must be absolutely certain that the United States will not do anything behind the USSR's back and the Soviet Union will not do anything behind the back of the United States that would jeopardize your security, rob the agreement of its point, or create difficulties.

Hence the key task of strengthening the ABM régime. Not to go into outer space with the results of work on this programme, to remain in the laboratories. The ten years of not exercising the right to withdraw from the ABM treaty are necessary to create the certainty that, while solving the problem of arms reduction, we are ensuring security for both sides, as well as security worldwide.

But the Americans obviously had something different in mind. We saw that the United States actually wanted to weaken the ABM treaty, to revise it so that it could develop a large-scale space-based ABM system for its own egoistic ends. To agree to that would have been simply irresponsible.

As for nuclear tests, here, too, it was blindingly obvious why the American side did not want to hold serious talks on the issue. It would have preferred to make them endless, to put off the solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests for decades. And once again we had to reject attempts to use the talks as a screen for a free hand in the field of nuclear explosions. I stated bluntly that I had doubts about the honesty of the United States position: Is there not something in it that might damage the Soviet Union? How can agreement be reached on the elimination of nuclear weapons if the United States continues perfecting them? Still, we had the impression that SDI was the main stumbling-block. Had we removed it, we would have been able to reach agreement on the prohibition of nuclear explosions as well.

At a certain stage of the talks, when it had become perfectly clear that it would be a waste of time continuing the discussion, I reminded the other side: We have proposed a specific package of measures and I ask you to consider it as such. If we have worked out a common position on the possibility of a major reduction in nuclear weapons and have failed to reach agreement on the subject of SDI and nuclear tests, then everything we have tried to create here falls apart.

The President and the Secretary of State took our firmness badly. But I could not state the issue otherwise. The security of our country and the security of the whole world - all peoples and continents - was at stake.

We made major, truly far-reaching proposals, which were clearly by way of a compromise. We made concessions. However, we did not detect even the slightest desire on the part of the Americans to respond in kind, to meet us half-way. We were deadlocked, and began thinking about how to conclude the meeting. Still, we persisted in our efforts to draw our partners out into constructive dialogue.

There was not enough time for the conversation scheduled to conclude the meeting. Given that situation, instead of going home - we back to Moscow and they to Washington - we announced yet another break in the meeting in order to give each side time to think everything over and meet again after lunch. When we returned to the mayor's home after the break, we made another attempt to bring the meeting to a successful conclusion. We proposed the following text as the basis for a positive summing up.

This is the text:

"The USSR and the United States of America undertake, for a 10-year period, not to exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM treaty - which has no time-limit - and, during that period, to comply strictly with all of its provisions. The testing of all space elements of an outer space ABM defence system, except for research and tests conducted in laboratories, is prohibited.

"During the first five of the ten years (until 1991 inclusive), the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced by 50 per cent.

"During the next five years of that period, the remaining 50 per cent of the strategic offensive weapons of the sides will be reduced.

"Thus, by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States will have been completely eliminated."

Commenting on that text, I made an important addition, referring to the paper I had given to the President at the end of our first meeting. The gist of it was that, after the ten years have elapsed and there are no longer any nuclear weapons, we propose to work out, at special negotiations, mutually acceptable decisions on what to do next.

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But this time, too, our attempts to reach agreement prove fruitless. For four hours, we tried, once again, to persuade the other side that our approach was well-grounded, posed no threats to them and did not affect the interests of the genuine security of the United States. But the longer we talked the clearer it became that the Americans would not agree to limit SDI research, development and testing to laboratories. They are eager to take their weapons into outer space.

I stated firmly that we would never agree to help undermine the ABM treaty with our own hands. For us, this is a matter of principle, a matter of our national security.

Thus, while we were literally one or two or three steps from decisions which could have become historic for the whole nuclear-space era, we were unable to take those steps. The turning-point in the world's history did not materialize. Even though - and I say this once again with full confidence - it was possible.

However, our conscience is clear, and no one can reproach us with anything. We did all we could.

Our partners lacked the broad approach, the understanding of how unique the moment was and, ultimately, the courage, responsibility, and political resolve needed to solve urgent key world problems. They stuck to their old, time-worn positions which do not correspond to present-day realities.

Foreigners asked me in Iceland and my comrades ask me here: What do you see as the reasons for the American delegation's attitude at the Reykjavik meeting? There are many causes - both subjective and objective - but the principal one is that the leadership of that great country is too dependent on the military-industrial complex, on the monopolistic groups which have turned the race for nuclear and other arms into big business, means for making profits, into the goal of their existence and the meaning of their activities.

In my opinion, the Americans are making two serious mistakes in their assessment of the situation.

The first is a tactical mistake. They think that the Soviet Union will, sooner or later, reconcile itself to the attempts to revive American strategic diktat and will agree to limit only Soviet weapons, to reduce only Soviet arms. It will do so because, they think, it is more interested than the United States in disarmament agreements. But that is a serious delusion. And the sooner the American Administration discards that delusion - and this is perhaps the hundredth time I have said so - the better it will be for them, for our relations and for the world situation in general.

The other mistake is a strategic one. The United States wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through an arms race involving the most up-to-date and costly space weapons. It wants to create all kinds of difficulties for the Soviet leaders, upset their plans, including those for social progress and improving our people's living standards, and thereby stir up popular discontent against the country's leaders. Another aim is to limit the Soviet Union's possibilities in its economic ties with developing countries, which in such a situation would all be

forced to go, cap in hand, to the United States. These are far-reaching designs. The strategic course of the present Administration is also based on delusions. Washington is apparently unwilling to take the trouble to make a thorough analysis of the changes taking place in our country, does not wish to draw the corresponding practical conclusions for itself and its policy, and is engaged in wishful thinking. And its policy with regard to the USSR is based on this delusion. It is not, of course, difficult to foresee all the long-term consequences of such a policy. One thing is already clear to us now: this policy will not and cannot bring anything positive to anyone - including the United States itself.

Before addressing you, I read the statement by the President of the United States on Reykjavik. It is noteworthy that the President claims the credit for all the proposals that were discussed. Well, evidently these proposals are attractive enough to Americans and to the peoples of the world to warrant such trickery. We are not eaten up by pride. But it is nevertheless important that people get a true picture of what took place in Reykjavik.

What happens next? I already said at the press conference that the work carried out both before the meeting and there in Reykjavik would not be in vain. We ourselves put a great deal of thought into that meeting and have taken a fresh look at many things. The way is now clearer for an intensified campaign for peace and disarmament. We have got rid of the accumulated obstacles, the details, trivialities, and stereotypes which impeded new approaches in this very important area of our policy.

We know where we stand and we see our possibilities more clearly. The preparations for Reykjavik helped us to formulate a platform - a new, bold platform which increases the chances of ultimate success. It is in keeping with the interests of our people and our society at a new stage in its socialist development. And at the same time, this platform is in keeping with the interests of all other countries and peoples, and is therefore worthy of trust. We are convinced that it will meet with understanding in many countries of the world and in the most diverse political and public circles.

I think that many people throughout the world, including leaders vested with power, can and must draw serious conclusions from the Reykjavik meeting. They will all have to consider again and again what the matter is, why such persistent efforts to achieve a breakthrough and make progress towards a nuclear-free world and general security have so far failed to produce the needed results.

I would like to hope that the President, too, now has a clearer and fuller understanding of the course of our analysis, the intentions of the Soviet Union, and the possibilities and limits of changes in the Soviet position. I say clearer and fuller particularly because Mr. Reagan received first-hand explanations of our constructive steps to promote the stabilization and normalization of the international situation.

Obviously, the American leaders will need some time.

We are realists and we clearly understand that questions which have remained unresolved for many years and even decades can hardly be resolved at one sitting. We also have considerable experience in dealing with the United States. We know how changeable the domestic political climate there is, and how strong and influential the opponents of peace across the ocean are. None of this is either new or unexpected for us.

And if we do not lose heart, if we do not slam the door and give vent to our emotions, although there is more than enough justification for doing all of these things, it is simply because we are sincerely convinced of the need for new efforts to build normal inter-State relations in the nuclear age. There is simply no other way.

Another thing: after Reykjavik, the infamous SDI has become even more apparent to everyone as the symbol of an obstacle to the cause of peace and as a concise expression of militaristic designs and unwillingness to avert the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. There can be no other way of looking at it. This is the most important lesson of the meeting in Reykjavik.

As a brief summing-up of these very busy days, I would say this. The meeting was a major event. A reappraisal took place. A qualitatively new situation came about. No one can go on acting as he acted before. The meeting was useful. It prepared the way for a positive step forward, toward a real change for the better, if the United States adopts, finally, realistic positions and refrains from illusory appraisals.

It convinced us of the rightness of the path we have chosen and of the necessity and the constructiveness of the new mode of political thinking in the nuclear age.

We are full of energy and determination. Having undertaken a process of restructuring, the country has already made some headway. We have only just begun, but there are already changes. The growth in industrial production over the last nine months amounted to 5.2 per cent; labour productivity increased by 4.3 per cent; and national income showed a 3.7 per cent rise over the previous year. All these indicators have exceeded the plan targets for this year. This is the mightiest show of support by our people, because all this is the result of our people's work, the mightiest show of support for the Party's policy - support through deeds.

This shows that the people's work under new conditions makes it possible to accelerate the build-up of the country's economic potential and thus consolidates its defence capabilities.

The Soviet people and the Soviet leaders are unanimous in the view that the policy of socialism can and must be a policy of peace and disarmament. We shall not swerve from the course of the Twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.