Naciones Unidas S/2023/656

Consejo de Seguridad

Distr. general
12 de septiembre de 2023
Español
Original: inglés

Nota de la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad

En el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2680 (2023), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que le proporcionara un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. Por consiguiente, la Presidencia remite adjunto el informe recibido del Grupo de Expertos (véase el anexo).

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Anexo

Carta de fecha 8 de septiembre de 2023 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

El Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad tiene el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe de mitad de período sobre su labor, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2680 (2023) del Consejo.

El informe adjunto se remitió al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) el 4 de agosto de 2023 y fue examinado por el Comité el 29 de agosto de 2023.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y que se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)
del Consejo de Seguridad

Apéndice

Carta de fecha 4 de agosto de 2023 dirigida a la Presidencia del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)

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Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)
del Consejo de Seguridad

Resumen

Durante el período sobre el que se informa, que va de enero a julio de 2023, siguieron creciendo las tensiones políticas y militares en la península de Corea.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue haciendo caso omiso de las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad en muchos ámbitos. Siguió desarrollando armas nucleares y produciendo materiales fisibles, aunque su último ensayo nuclear conocido tuvo lugar en septiembre de 2017. En el polígono de Yongbyon tuvieron lugar nuevas actividades de construcción y continuaron las actividades en el polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri. Prosiguieron a buen ritmo las actividades de misiles balísticos: la República Popular Democrática de Corea lanzó por lo menos 19 misiles balísticos de corto alcance con propergol sólido y, como en 2022, ensayó misiles balísticos intercontinentales (dos de propulsión líquida y dos de propulsión sólida). Los días 13 de abril y 12 de julio se ensayó el Hwasong-18, primer misil balístico intercontinental del país con propergol sólido. El Grupo de Expertos también siguió investigando las transferencias intangibles de tecnología que podrían contravenir las sanciones.

En el presente informe el Grupo describe muy diversas medidas de evasión de las sanciones practicadas por buques que entregaban a la República Popular Democrática de Corea productos refinados derivados del petróleo. Se trataba de medios más sofisticados para evitar la detección, cambios en las ubicaciones comerciales en las aguas afectadas y la participación de un mayor número de embarcaciones en transbordos en etapas múltiples. El Grupo recibió información en el sentido de que el país seguía importando productos refinados derivados del petróleo en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. Persistió la adquisición de buques en contravención de las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad: el país adquirió 14 buques nuevos en el período sobre el que se informa. Continuaron las exportaciones prohibidas de buque a buque de carbón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

Aunque las fronteras del país permanecieron esencialmente cerradas, los volúmenes de comercio aumentaron, sobre todo a raíz de la reanudación del tráfico ferroviario. Han reaparecido muy diversos bienes extranjeros. El Grupo siguió investigando noticias de importación de artículos de lujo.

Tras un nivel sin precedentes de ciberrobos en 2022 cuyo valor se estimó en 1.700 millones de dólares, los piratas informáticos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea presuntamente siguieron atacando con éxito bolsas de criptomonedas e intercambios financieros de otro tipo a escala mundial. Agentes que trabajaban para la Oficina General de Reconocimiento siguieron haciendo uso de cibertécnicas cada vez más sofisticadas para robar fondos e información. Sus víctimas fueron, en particular, empresas de los sectores de las criptomonedas, la defensa, la energía y la salud.

La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió accediendo al sistema financiero internacional y tomó parte en operaciones financieras ilícitas. El Grupo investigó a instituciones financieras y representantes del país radicados en el extranjero que habían prestado apoyo a esas actividades. Con la reapertura de las fronteras podría aumentar el número de casos de nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trafican con efectivo y artículos de gran valor. El Grupo investigó las noticias de nacionales que trabajaban en el extranjero y percibían ingresos en contravención de las sanciones, en particular en los sectores de la tecnología de la información, la restauración, la medicina y la construcción.

El Grupo siguió investigando las presuntas exportaciones de equipo militar de comunicaciones y municiones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y puso en marcha varias investigaciones de posibles casos de venta por el país de armas u otros tipos de apoyo militar a Estados Miembros.

Siguen escaseando los datos fiables sobre la situación humanitaria del país. Las organizaciones humanitarias entrevistadas por el Grupo informaron de que persistían las dificultades en la entrega de ayuda y de que la situación del país había empeorado. Las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y su aplicación han tenido un efecto no deseado, aunque su papel relativo sigue siendo imposible de disociar de otros muchos factores.

El Grupo valora las contribuciones de los Estados Miembros a su labor.

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I. Introducción

1. En el párrafo 2 de su resolución 2680 (2023), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que presentara al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. A no ser que se indique otra cosa, la información del presente informe se refiere al período abarcado entre el 28 de enero y el 28 de julio de 2023[1].

II. Actividades relacionadas con el programa nuclear y el programa de misiles balísticos

Programa nuclear

2. La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió llevando a cabo actividades relacionadas con el desarrollo de armas nucleares y la producción de material fisible en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. El Grupo ha observado nuevas actividades de construcción en distintos puntos del polígono de Yongbyon y actividades constantes en el polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri, aunque no se hayan detectado ensayos nucleares desde septiembre de 2017.

Inspección por Kim Jong Un de "armas nucleares tácticas"

3. El 28 de marzo medios de comunicación estatales anunciaron que Kim Jong Un había inspeccionado "armas nucleares tácticas Hwasan-31 (화산-31)". Un Estado Miembro determinó posteriormente que la República Popular Democrática de Corea había indicado recientemente que se iba a centrar "en el desarrollado de denominadas armas nucleares "tácticas" que con casi toda seguridad pretende utilizar en la península y que probablemente tienen cabezas de misil de menor potencia que las cabezas de misil de los sistemas de mayor alcance". Otro Estado Miembro determinó que, a causa de la falta de información sobre su detonador interno y especificaciones técnicas conexas, "es difícil determinar si el dispositivo coincide con las características físicas vinculadas normalmente con las armas nucleares tácticas ... puede que la información se haya divulgado públicamente con fines de engaño ... se necesitan más análisis" (véase el anexo 1).

4. Durante la inspección por Kim Jong Un se mostraron diagramas de sistemas vectores diseñados para transportar una cabeza de misil de un arma nuclear táctica Hwasan-31 (véase la fotografía del anexo 1). El Grupo determinó que estos sistemas vectores, ensayados en plataformas distintas en diversas ubicaciones (véase el párr. 18), corroboran las afirmaciones que la República Popular Democrática de Corea viene formulando desde enero de 2021 en el sentido de que está mejorando su capacidad en materia de armas nucleares tácticas[2].

Polígono de ensayos de Punggye-ri

5. En imágenes satelitales tomadas a principios de marzo se observaba un camión y una estructura en forma de tienda que podía utilizarse para proteger equipo y artículos junto a la entrada del Túnel 3[3]. Había cables con fines de ventilación, electricidad, comunicaciones y conexiones entre posibles equipos de ensayo del

[1] Todas las tachaduras de texto del presente informe se señalan con recuadros negros o se pixelan para que no se pueda identificar físicamente a las personas.

[2] S/2023/171, párr. 5.

[3] Sobre la base de información proporcionada por expertos externos consultados por el Grupo.

Túnel 3. En una zona administrativa se vio a principios de febrero de 2023 a varias personas en un espacio abierto, aunque no se observaron obras apreciables de construcción de edificios de apoyo (véase el anexo 2). El Grupo viene detectando desde abril de 2023 pequeñas estructuras no identificadas junto a la entrada del Túnel 4[4].

Polígono de Yongbyon

Reactor de agua ligera

6. Un Estado Miembro detectó en marzo y abril de 2023 posibles ensayos del sistema de agua de refrigeración correspondiente al reactor de agua ligera y determinó que el reactor podría entrar en funcionamiento en cualquier momento. El análisis de imágenes satelitales del Grupo muestra descargas intermitentes de agua junto al río Kuryong desde enero en prácticamente el mismo lugar observado por el Grupo en 2022[5]. En marzo comenzó la construcción de un nuevo edificio junto al edificio de apoyo al oeste del reactor, y se observaron otras obras menores junto a otros tres edificios de apoyo finalizados en 2022 (véase el anexo 3).

Central nuclear experimental de Yongbyon (5 MW(e))

7. Según valoraciones de Estados Miembros y el análisis de imágenes satelitales, el reactor de 5 MW e) sigue en funcionamiento. A principios y mediados de abril tuvieron lugar descargas constantes de agua de refrigeración del reactor, con excepción de interrupciones intermitentes[6]. Se han observado habitualmente varios tipos de vehículos en las inmediaciones del reactor (véase el anexo 4).

Laboratorio de radioquímica

8. El análisis de imágenes satelitales muestra constantes actividades de vehículos en la zona del parque de vehículos del laboratorio de radioquímica. De febrero a abril se observaron montones de material junto al edificio de recepción de combustible nuclear gastado[7]. Un grupo de reflexión informó de nueva actividad de excavación al nordeste del laboratorio de radioquímica en marzo[8], algo que el Grupo corroboró posteriormente (véase el anexo 5). El Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica sospecha que este polígono, junto con otro, es un emplazamiento de almacenamiento de residuos nucleares[9], aunque el Grupo observa que no hay indicios concluyentes de que se hubiera reprocesado combustible gastado entre enero y fines de julio. Por ejemplo, la planta de vapor vinculada a la planta de reprocesamiento y sus operaciones de manipulación de residuos no estuvo en funcionamiento durante este período.

Planta de fabricación de varillas de combustible nuclear de Yongbyon

9. Un Estado Miembro determinó que era probable que la construcción de varios edificios en la zona meridional del emplazamiento, detectada a principios de marzo

[4] Un grupo de reflexión también observó que se estaban construyendo dos estructuras pequeñas. Véase https://beyondparallel.csis.org/punggye-ri-update-new-activity-at-tunnel-no-4. Según expertos externos consultados por el Grupo, es posible que tenga que ver con ulteriores actividades de reexcavación en el túnel.

[5] S/2023/171, párr. 8.

[6] Según expertos externos, es probable que el reactor estuviera cerrado por períodos breves. Véase www.38north.org/2023/04/possible-refueling-at-yongbyons-5-mwe-reactor.

[7] Según un experto externo, es probable que estos materiales se destinen a actividades de mantenimiento y construcción.

[8] Véase www.38north.org/2023/03/satellite-imagery-reveals-new-activity-at-the-old-waste-site-at-yongbyon.

[9] S/2023/171, párr. 11 y anexo 6-4.

por imágenes satelitales, tuviera fines administrativos. Sigue en pie una grúa desplegada al sur del edificio donde se procesa la producción de tetrafluoruro de uranio, lo cual es un indicio probable de que la renovación del edificio todavía no ha finalizado. El Grupo observa posibles señales de renovación de este edificio (véase el anexo 6).

Mina de uranio y planta de concentración de uranio de Pyongsan

10. Las imágenes satelitales indican que la mina y la planta seguían funcionando. El Grupo observó la expansión de pilas de residuos en dos minas, junto con actividades regulares de vagones en la planta (véase el anexo 7).

Otros emplazamientos

11. El Grupo siguió vigilando actividades en las inmediaciones de Kangson y la zona de Yongdoktong. En los anexos 8 y 9 pueden consultarse detalles.

Misiles balísticos

12. El programa de misiles balísticos siguió avanzando a un ritmo sostenido, con un rebrote de los ensayos y ejercicios en marzo (véase el anexo 10). La República Popular Democrática de Corea podría haber alcanzado un umbral en cuanto a la propulsión de misiles balísticos tras el ensayo el 13 de abril de un nuevo misil con propergol sólido denominado Hwasong-18 cuyo alcance intercontinental previsto es de 1.000 km. Con el tiempo, esta novedad podría mejorar el componente estratégico del arsenal del país. Como en 2022, los ensayos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales de propulsión líquida o sólida constituyeron una de las dos principales tendencias observadas; la otra consistió en lanzamientos paralelos de misiles balísticos de corto alcance con propergol sólido (de los que se dispararon por lo menos 19). En ambos casos el país notificó su actividad aduciendo el objetivo de alcanzar la disuasión nuclear a nivel estratégico y táctico.

13. En conjunto, la República Popular Democrática de Corea lanzó por lo menos 23 misiles balísticos (véase el anexo 10): cuatro lanzamientos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales (dos con motores de propulsión líquida y dos con motores de propulsión sólida) y 19 de misiles balísticos de corto alcance (todos ellos provistos de motores de propulsión sólida)[10].

Misiles balísticos intercontinentales

14. El hito consistente en el ensayo limitado de un misil balístico intercontinental en tres etapas de propulsión sólida, el Hwasong-18 (véase el anexo 11), tuvo lugar el 13 de abril desde una zona de lanzamiento situada 20 km al nordeste de Pyongyang. El penacho de escape que aparecía el 14 de abril en un vídeo de la Televisión Central Coreana[11] se corresponde con un quemado de propulsión sólida. Este lanzamiento tuvo lugar después del ensayo de un motor de propulsión sólida en Sohae el 15 de diciembre de 2022[12] y de otro el 29 o el 30 de enero de 2023 en Magun-Po[13], según

[10] En opinión de dos de los expertos, no existen pruebas suficientes para determinar la naturaleza y la tecnología de los proyectiles lanzados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea descritos en este párrafo.

[11] Véase https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/64395c9bbc9b7.

[12] S/2023/171, párr. 27.

[13] A una latitud de 39°48'06”N y una longitud de 127°33'39”E. El 15 de diciembre de 2022 tuvo lugar un ensayo detectado antes de un motor de propulsión sólida en una plataforma de ensayos de motores horizontales recién construida en Sohae a una latitud de 39°39'06”N y una longitud de 124°42'57”E (S/2023/171, párr. 27).

un Estado Miembro y una fuente abierta (véase el anexo 15)[14], además de la aparición de cinco misiles balísticos intercontinentales desconocidos en cartuchos en un desfile militar el 8 de febrero en Pyongyang (véase el anexo 12). Los grandes preparativos *in situ* del lanzamiento del Hwasong-18 cerca de una de las mansiones de Kim Jong Un, la presencia de Kim y su hija y la extensa difusión por los medios de comunicación oficiales[15] inmediatamente después son señales de la confianza en el éxito del lanzamiento, proclamado con rapidez por las autoridades del país. La República Popular Democrática de Corea llevó a cabo un segundo lanzamiento de un Hwasong-18 el 12 de julio desde el mismo punto de lanzamiento. También en este caso se proclamó el éxito de la operación (véase el anexo 10).

Figura I
Lanzamiento de un misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-18 el 13 de abril de 2023



Fuente: Televisión Central de Corea (14 de abril de 2023).

15. Antes del lanzamiento del Hwasong-18, la República Popular Democrática de Corea también realizó dos lanzamientos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales de propulsión líquida ya vistos antes. Según los Jefes de Estado Mayor de la República de Corea y el Ministerio de Defensa del Japón, el 18 de febrero se lanzó desde el Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan un misil balístico que siguió una trayectoria elevada en dirección este (véase el anexo 10). En fotografías publicadas por la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea se observa lo que parece ser un misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-15 lanzado desde un transportador-erector-lanzador en el Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan[16]. La Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea presentó ese lanzamiento como ejercicio en lugar de ensayo. El 16 de marzo los Jefes de Estado Mayor de la República de Corea informaron del lanzamiento desde el Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan de otro misil balístico con una trayectoria de misil elevado en dirección este. En las fotografías publicadas por la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea se observa lo que parece ser un misil balístico Hwasong-17 lanzado desde un transportador-erector-lanzador de 11 ejes. Una vez más, los medios de

[14] Véase https://twitter.com/DaveSchmerler, 30 de enero de 2023.
[15] Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea, Televisión Central de Corea y *Rodong Sinmun*. Véase también https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1681458619-912978826/another-mighty-entity-showing-continuous-development-of-strategic-force-unveiled-in-dprk-respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-first-test-fire-of-new-type-icbm-hwasongpho-18-on-spot.
[16] Véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1676776192-691717962/icbm-launching-drill-staged.

comunicación oficiales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea anunciaron el éxito del lanzamiento[17].

16. Un Estado Miembro ha detectado una modificación de esta nueva versión del Hwasong-17: la sección inferior de la primera etapa del misil es más recta de lo que se ha observado antes (véase la figura II). Gracias a esta modificación disminuye la resistencia durante la parte atmosférica del vuelo, lo que da a entender que, por lo demás, la Oficina General de Misiles confía en el rendimiento y la estabilidad del misil[18].

Figura II
Lanzamiento de un misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17 el 16 de marzo de 2023



Fuente: Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea (17 de marzo de 2023).



Fuente: Ministerio de Defensa del Japón (16 de marzo de 2023), con anotaciones del Grupo.

17. La República Popular Democrática de Corea celebró el 8 de febrero una ceremonia de inspección militar en la plaza Kim Il Sung de Pyongyang para celebrar el 75º aniversario de la fundación del Ejército Popular de Corea. Asistió a ella Kim Jong Un. Los Estados Miembros y el Grupo consideran que los principales sistemas de armas mostrados en esta ocasión eran un tipo nuevo de misil balístico intercontinental, probablemente de propulsión sólida, del cual se transportaron cinco unidades en cartuchos en transportadores-erectores-lanzadores WS 51200 de nueve

[17] Véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1679039432-23076180/demonstration-of-toughest-response-posture-of-dprk%e2%80%99s-strategic-forces-icbm-hwasongpho-17-launched.

[18] Organización de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mencionada oficialmente por primera vez en febrero de 2023. Un Estado Miembro considera que se creó para “desarrollar, producir y gestionar misiles y llevar a cabo misiones con fines de funcionamiento y despliegue efectivos de grandes armas nucleares estratégicas/tácticas”.

ejes[19], 11 o 12 misiles balísticos intercontinentales Hwasong-17 (cifra récord), misiles balísticos de corto alcance KN-23[20] y KN-25, así como un "arma guiada táctica nueva". El número excepcional de transportadores-erectores-lanzadores desplegados durante este desfile (17) plantea la posibilidad de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea haya indigenizado la producción de esos vehículos de apoyo pesados (véase el anexo 13).

Misiles balísticos tácticos

18. Los lanzamientos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales descritos no deben eclipsar los de misiles balísticos de corto alcance con propergol sólido: se lanzaron al menos 19 en ocho ocasiones (véase el anexo 10). Aparentemente, esos lanzamientos tuvieron lugar en entornos operacionales para demostrar la disposición operativa de las fuerzas armadas del país, al igual que los simulacros realizados del 25 de septiembre al 9 de octubre de 2022[21]. Los lanzamientos de misiles balísticos de corto alcance en 2023 incluyeron un lanzamiento el 19 de marzo de un misil KN-23 desde un silo en la zona de Sohae (véase el anexo 22) en el contexto de un "simulacro de contraataque nuclear" comunicado por la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea. Los Jefes de Estado Mayor de la República de Corea y el Ministerio de Defensa del Japón confirmaron este lanzamiento (véase el anexo 10). La Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea informó de la detonación de una cabeza de misil simulada a 800 m por encima del agua, algo que, de confirmarse, sería indicio del propósito y la capacidad de potenciar al máximo el impacto de las detonaciones de cabezas nucleares sobre tierra al tiempo que se reducía al mínimo el polvo radiactivo.

Figura III
Lanzamiento simultáneo de misiles balísticos de corto alcance el 9 de marzo de 2023 desde el lago Taesong

Fuente: Televisión Central de Corea (9 de marzo de 2023).

[19] Vistos por primera vez en la República Popular Democrática de Corea durante un desfile en abril de 2012.

[20] Parece que tienen dos variantes. Véase https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/Report-NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS%20%281%29.pdf.

[21] S/2023/171, párr. 28.

Figura IV
Lanzamiento el 9 de marzo de 2023 de un misil balístico de corto alcance KN-23 desde un silo en la zona de Sohae

Fuente: Televisión Central de Corea (20 de marzo de 2023).

19. Los medios de comunicación oficiales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea informaron profusamente de la disposición operativa de las fuerzas armadas. Un Estado Miembro considera que, al hacer hincapié en su capacitación y su voluntad de utilizar misiles para dotar de mayor credibilidad su capacidad de disuasión, la República Popular Democrática de Corea se propone efectivamente poner en práctica su capacidad en materia de misiles.

20. Kim Jong Un ha investido mayor relevancia en estos misiles balísticos de corto alcance pidiendo que se consolide la capacidad nuclear táctica. El 1 de enero celebró el despliegue del "sistema supergrande de lanzamiento múltiple de cohetes" de nueva producción como arma nuclear táctica sosteniendo que tenía "al territorio de Corea del Sur dentro del alcance de ataque y era capaz de transportar una cabeza nuclear táctica"[22]. Con ello quedó reafirmada su determinación de lograr la disuasión nuclear sobre la base de componentes tanto tácticos como estratégicos, en consonancia con los objetivos estratégicos descritos en un discurso pronunciado ante el Octavo Congreso del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea en enero de 2021 (véase el anexo 16). Además, los desfiles militares de los días 8 de febrero y 27 de julio dotaron de considerable prominencia a los misiles balísticos de corto alcance, incluidos KN-23, KN-25 y un "arma táctica nueva", antes del despliegue de misiles balísticos intercontinentales.

Lanzamiento de satélites militares

21. El 31 de mayo la Administración Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial (KPe.029) trató de poner en órbita un satélite militar después de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea notificara a la Organización Marítima

[22] Discurso pronunciado el 1 de enero de 2023 en la ceremonia de donación de un sistema supergrande de lanzamiento múltiple de cohetes de 600 mm. Véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543895-380674944/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-reply-speech-at-ceremony-of-donating-600mm-super-large-multiple-launch-rocket-system.

Internacional (OMI)[23,24] tres “zonas de caída” que estarían activas del 30 de mayo al 10 de junio. Los Jefes de Estado Mayor de la República de Corea informaron de que el lanzamiento tuvo lugar a las 6.29 horas (hora oficial de Corea) desde Tongchang-ri, que es donde está ubicada la plataforma de lanzamiento recientemente modernizada en la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 19), y de que parte del cohete cayó a 270 km de la costa occidental de la República de Corea. Sin embargo, el vehículo de lanzamiento espacial Chollima-1, que se basa en parte en el programa de misiles balísticos intercontinentales de propulsión líquida, no consiguió poner en órbita su carga útil, el satélite Malligyong-1. En imágenes publicadas por la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea se observa un penacho de escape inicial brillante y claro resultante del quemado de combustible líquido en primera fase. La República Popular Democrática de Corea achacó la ulterior pérdida de potencia “al arranque anormal del motor de segunda fase tras la separación de la primera fase durante el vuelo normal” (véase el anexo 20). La República de Corea ha divulgado posteriormente fotografías de secciones del cuerpo del cohete y el satélite Malligyong-1 que rescató del mar (véase el anexo 21). Prosiguen las investigaciones del Grupo.

Características principales

22. Los Estados Miembros notificaron o corroboraron la mayoría de la información sobre las trayectorias de los lanzamientos de misiles balísticos. Los lanzamientos contribuyen al cumplimiento de dos de los objetivos de la hoja de ruta quinquenal de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de enero de 2021: la adquisición de un “misil balístico intercontinental en tierra con propergol sólido” y capacidades en materia de “armas nucleares tácticas”. La República Popular Democrática de Corea confirmó sus ambiciones y difundió sus presuntos logros con ocasión del desfile militar del 8 de febrero, así como el 27 de julio, para celebrar el 70º aniversario del armisticio de la Guerra de Corea (véase el anexo 14).

23. El éxito en el lanzamiento de un satélite de reconocimiento militar funcional aportaría a la República Popular Democrática de Corea medios adicionales de dirección de los lanzamientos, que es otro objetivo de la hoja de ruta de enero de 2021. Sin embargo, puede que este lanzamiento en particular haya obedecido a la transmisión de mensajes internos y al prestigio en la misma medida en que ha sido un instrumento de mando y control[25]. Cabe esperar que el país siga invirtiendo cuantiosos recursos en el desarrollo de esta capacidad: la Administración Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial ha anunciado que se estaba planteando el lanzamiento de un segundo satélite “lo antes posible”[26].

24. La República Popular Democrática de Corea cada vez se centra más en los motores con propergol sólido, utilizados predominantemente en el primer semestre de 2023. El ensayo del Hwasong-18 ofrece un indicio preliminar del estado de estas novedades en el ámbito intercontinental, y este hincapié en la propulsión con propulsante sólido podría mejorar con el tiempo la disposición operativa del arsenal del país. El desarrollo de una variedad de tipos de misiles y plataformas de lanzamiento (por ejemplo, el lanzamiento de dos misiles de crucero desde un submarino el 12 de marzo, el ensayo de KN-23 desde un silo el 19 de marzo, la mejora de la capacidad de los transportadores-erectores-lanzadores y el lanzamiento desde

[23] En una resolución del 31 de mayo la OMI exhortó a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a que pusiera fin a los lanzamientos ilícitos y no anunciados de misiles balísticos sobre vías de navegación internacional.

[24] No se notificó a la Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional (OACI). Véanse las medidas ulteriores adoptadas por la OMI y la OACI (véase el anexo 17).

[25] Los Jefes de Estado Mayor de la República de Corea han considerado a título preliminar que el satélite Malligyong-1 carece de uso militar como satélite de reconocimiento.

[26] Véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1685600207-36284567/kcna-report.

un embalse el 25 de septiembre de 2022) y el aumento del número absoluto de misiles[27] podrían aumentar la capacidad y las posibilidades de supervivencia del arsenal del país. A principios de año Kim Jung Un pidió "un aumento exponencial del arsenal nuclear del país" (véase el anexo 18). La Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea afirmó posteriormente que un simulacro táctico llevado a cabo los días 18 y 19 de marzo tenía por objeto "reforzar sustantivamente la capacidad del país de disuasión bélica y contraataque nuclear"[28]. Estas novedades y declaraciones apuntan hacia una estrategia de disuasión afín a una capacidad de segundo ataque que podría mitigar los retrasos en la elaboración de un supuesto submarino furtivo de misiles balísticos.

Transferencia intangible de tecnología y actividades de universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

25. El Grupo siguió investigando la transferencia intangible de tecnología por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase la resolución 2321 (2016) del Consejo de Seguridad, párr. 11).

26. En el caso de un investigador de la República Popular Democrática de Corea empleado por un instituto de investigación de Suecia desde 2020[29], el instituto informó al Grupo de que a mediados de marzo de 2023 se había puesto fin al empleo del investigador conforme a una decisión adoptada a fines de febrero de 2023 por las autoridades de inmigración suecas a efectos de rechazar la solicitud de residencia y el permiso de trabajo del investigador y deportarlo (véase el anexo 23). El Grupo solicitó más información a Suecia.

27. El Grupo investigó una noticia aparecida en la prensa[30] en el sentido de que el investigador Im Song-jin de la Universidad Kim Il Sung de la República Popular Democrática de Corea había publicado trabajos académicos junto con investigadores chinos. El Grupo constató que el Sr. Im publicaba trabajos desde 2019 junto con investigadores chinos afiliados a un instituto de investigación ubicado en Beijing y que también estuvo afiliado en 2019 a otra universidad de China (véase el anexo 24). El Grupo había observado antes que cabía considerar que el campo de investigación del Sr. Im entraba dentro del doble uso[31]. El Grupo solicitó a China información sobre los intercambios académicos entre los institutos chinos y las universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y sobre la situación actual del Sr. Im en la universidad china. China respondió que "[las noticias aparecidas en] la prensa son tremendamente inexactas ... los dos trabajos mencionados en la [noticia de la] prensa se basan en la cooperación normal de los estudios científicos fundamentales, que no tienen ningún carácter de doble uso y no guardan relación alguna con la proliferación nuclear ... la participación de Im Song-Jin en los dos documentos estuvo limitada a la comunicación de aspectos teóricos, y los investigadores chinos no le suministraron datos. Los investigadores chinos incluyeron a Im entre los autores por puro respeto. Esta comunicación no equivale a un intercambio de cooperación científica y tecnológica, por lo que no contraviene las disposiciones conexas de las resoluciones. Im no regresó a la Universidad después de visitarla en septiembre de 2015, como tampoco desempeñó puesto alguno en ella ... La visita a la Universidad de Im tuvo lugar antes de que se aprobara la resolución 2321 (2016)" (véase el anexo 25).

[27] Un Estado Miembro considera que el despliegue de 12 misiles balísticos intercontinentales Hwasong-17 el 8 de febrero de 2023 tenía por objeto anunciar una nueva capacidad de producción en masa.

[28] Véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1679299314-83338627/nuclear-counterattack-simulation-drill-conducted-in-dprk.

[29] S/2023/171, párr. 17 y anexo 11.

[30] Véase www.dw.com/en/despite-un-sanctions-german-research-institute-worked-with-north-korean-scientists/a-63890089.

[31] S/2023/171, párrs. 19 y 20 y anexos 13 a 15.

III. Sanciones sectoriales y marítimas[32,33]

Comercio marítimo

Límite máximo del petróleo refinado

28. Los Estados Miembros tienen la obligación de comunicar al Comité toda entrega de productos refinados del petróleo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea[34]. Al 10 de julio de 2023 en el sitio web del Comité se habían consignado en total entregas de 157.862.701 barriles (31,57 %) por encima del máximo anual permitido de 500.000 barriles de productos refinados del petróleo (véase la fig. V).

Figura V
Entregas declaradas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea de productos refinados del petróleo, enero a abril de 2023
(Número de barriles)



Fuente: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/es/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum y el Grupo.

29. Un Estado Miembro ha proporcionado imágenes y datos satelitales de 25 buques cisterna con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que realizaron 46 entregas de productos refinados del petróleo a Nampo y otras instalaciones petroleras del 1 de enero al 1 de mayo de 2023 (véase el anexo 26). De estos 25 buques cisterna, nueve están designados por el Consejo de Seguridad, por lo que se les habría prohibido entrar en puertos extranjeros para cargar productos refinados del petróleo (véase la resolución 2321 (2016), párr. 12 c)). El Grupo observa asimismo que los

[32] La información presentada en esta sección es válida a junio de 2023 o en la fecha en que se accedió a ella en bases de datos o en que el Grupo la recibió. Puede que no incorpore las actualizaciones del Sistema mundial integrado de información marítima de la OMI, en el que figura información retroactiva referente a fechas anteriores a junio que se ha incorporado posteriormente.

[33] Las horas se registran en hora estándar del este (EST), tiempo universal coordinado (UTC) u hora local, en función de la fuente en que se originaran los datos.

[34] Resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad, párr. 5.

trasvases de buque a buque con embarcaciones que enarbolan el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea están prohibidos conforme al párrafo 11 de la resolución 2375 (2017).

30. Según el Estado Miembro, “es probable que [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] haya importado unos 781.497 [barriles] de petróleo refinado mediante 46 entregas. Determinando en 90 % [toneladas de peso muerto] las cantidades descargadas, es probable que [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] haya infringido el límite máximo de 500.000 [barriles] cerca del 2 de abril. Incluso al 60 % [toneladas de peso muerto], [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] habría superado el límite máximo de 500.000 [barriles] al 1 de mayo” (véase el anexo 26). Otro Estado Miembro estimó que la República Popular Democrática de Corea había importado ilícitamente cerca de 80.000 toneladas (638.400 barriles) de petróleo refinado en el primer trimestre de 2023 (véase el anexo 27)[35.36]

Aguas afectadas

31. El Grupo siguió vigilando embarcaciones que realizaban actividades comerciales ilícitas en zonas coincidentes con las zonas marítimas presentadas por un Estado Miembro en la figura VI (véase el anexo 28).

Figura VI
Zonas de trasvase ilícito de buque a buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2022 y durante el primer semestre de 2023

Global en 2022 Primer semestre de 2023



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

[35] La tasa de conversión del Comité es de 7,98 barriles de productos refinados del petróleo por tonelada.

[36] Dos expertos consideran que los datos de estos dos Estados Miembros son estimaciones y que el Grupo no puede distinguir actualmente entre entregas lícitas de productos refinados del petróleo notificadas al Comité y entregas ilícitas.

Métodos de evasión de las sanciones

Cambios de las ubicaciones comerciales en aguas territoriales

32. La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió utilizando aguas territoriales para realizar transferencias ilícitas, en particular en zonas observadas nuevas. Dentro de las aguas del país el Grupo observó actividades de trasvase de buque a buque en torno a la isla de Ch'o-do[37], así como en aguas situadas más al norte en torno a la isla de Sokdo-ri (véase el anexo 29). Fuera de las aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, buques del país siguieron exportando su carbón en aguas chinas, y un Estado Miembro detectó una nueva zona de actividad comercial junto a la isla de Taishan (véanse los párrs. 74 a 76).

Evitación de la detección

33. El Grupo siguió observando un uso generalizado de medidas para sortear las sanciones: transferencias ilícitas al amparo de la oscuridad (normalmente al amanecer o al anochecer), períodos más cortos de los trasvases de buque a buque, identificadores falsificados e interrupción de las señales del sistema de identificación automática (SIA) durante los trasvases. Otras medidas de elusión de la detección notificadas por Estados Miembros eran el uso de palabras en clave, el bloqueo de las señales del SIA y el envío de señales "disfrazadas"[38]. Estas medidas no se excluyen entre sí, y los buques sospechosos normalmente emplean una combinación de ellas.

Manipulación de la ubicación

34. Quienes evitan las sanciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea utilizan una nueva forma de manipulación de la ubicación: la geousurpación[39], dirigida a confundir las actividades dando la impresión de que los buques están ubicados en otra parte (véase el anexo 30). Por ejemplo, el 4 de abril una base datos marítimos registró la transmisión por el antiguo buque de entrega directa[40] New Konk (OMI: 9036387) de su identificador fraudulento conocido, F.Lonline (identidad del servicio móvil marítimo (ISMM): 312162000), que presuntamente pasaba por el estrecho de Taiwán y entraba en el mar de China meridional. Las imágenes satelitales confirmaron que el buque se encontraba en realidad en la bahía de Sansha (China) cuando comenzaron las manipulaciones.

35. Mientras la derrota del navío era objeto de geousurpación, el New Konk, que transmitía señales empleando otro nombre fraudulento conocido, Lifan (véase la figura VII), empezó a navegar hacia el norte antes de interrumpir las transmisiones del SIA a mediados de abril (véase la fig. VIII).

[37] El Grupo informó de que se trataba de una zona de actividad nueva en 2022. Véase S/2022/668, párrs. 35 y 36 y anexo 26.

[38] Estos métodos se han observado asimismo antes, como informó otro Estado Miembro en relación con el caso del Gold Star (OMI: 9146247). Véase S/2021/777, párrs. 62 a 67 y anexo 35.

[39] La geousurpación, conocida también como manipulación de los sistemas mundiales de navegación por satélite, tiene lugar cuando un buque manipula su sistema mundial de navegación por satélite para aparecer en otra parte. Se ha detectado antes en aguas de América Latina y Oriente Medio, pero es la primera vez que se ha descubierto en el contexto de la evasión por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Véase también www.nytimes.com/2022/09/03/world/americas/ships-gps-international-law.html.

[40] Se utiliza este término para designar a los buques cisterna no pertenecientes a la República Popular Democrática de Corea que entregaban petróleo refinado en los puertos del país antes de la pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19).

Figura VII
Transmisiones del New Konk como Lifan en septiembre y diciembre de 2021

Septiembre de 2021 *Diciembre de 2021*



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes satelitales en el recuadro, Estado Miembro.

Figura VIII
Buques sospechosos de utilizar identificadores fraudulentos en febrero de 2023, bahía de Sansha, y de geousurpar su itinerario en abril de 2023



Fuente: Windward; imágenes en el recuadro, Planet Labs, con calco cartográfico de las huellas del SIA en Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo.

36. El 21 de abril se ubicó un buque de eslora similar a la del New Konk en aguas donde se sabía que antiguos buques de entrega directa se encontraban con buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para transferir su cargamento de petróleo ilícito[41].

37. Por la época en que el New Konk empezó a practicar la geousurpación, otro antiguo buque de entrega directa, el Unica (OMI: 8514306), también comenzó a

[41] S/2023/171, párr. 37 y anexo 31.

practicarla con un identificador fraudulento conocido propio, Liton (ISMM: 457106000). El Shundlli (OMI: 8355724), de pabellón togolés, investigado también por el Grupo (véanse los párrafos 71 a 73), transmitió igualmente señales en las proximidades[42]. Es probable que los desplazamientos sincronizados de varios buques sospechosos en la misma ubicación constituyeran una tentativa de confundir el rastreo de las embarcaciones (véase la figura IX).

Figura IX
Geousurpación simultánea del New Konk y el Unica, 4 de abril de 2023



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo.

Trasvases ilícitos de petróleo refinado

Envíos ilícitos constantes de petróleo por medio de antiguos buques de entrega directa

38. El New Konk, el Unica y el Diamond 8 (OMI: 9132612) han seguido entregando petróleo refinado en la zona económica exclusiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 31). Lo hacen utilizando nombres fraudulentos conocidos que el Grupo ha detectado antes[43], así como otros nuevos. En el cuadro 1 figura una lista actualizada de ISMM fraudulentos utilizados por estos buques en 2023. El Grupo considera probable que estos buques hayan quedado bajo el control de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

39. Por ejemplo, el New Konk es sospechoso de haber asumido en mayo la identidad fraudulenta de Lian y de haber transmitido un número de ISMM (667001395) perteneciente antes al Joffa, que el Grupo había dado por desguazado en abril de 2022[44]. El nombre Lian es casi idéntico a Lifan, nombre fraudulento utilizado por el *New* Konk cuando realizó trasvases de buque a buque con el Joffa en diciembre

[42] Mientras el Unica y el New Konk geousurpaban simultáneamente su ubicación, el Shundlli comenzó a navegar en dirección norte con grandes lagunas en el SIA hasta llegar a la bahía de Corea.
[43] S/2023/171, cuadro 2.
[44] S/2022/668, párrs. 41 a 46 y anexos 28, 30, 32.6 y 34.

de 2021 (véase la figura X). Los itinerarios del Lian en mayo y junio rastreados en una plataforma marítima recuerdan el itinerario anterior del New Konk, lo cual es indicio de que se están realizando entregas ilícitas de petróleo para la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase la fig. XI).

40. Desde diciembre de 2022, el Shundlli también ha entregado petróleo refinado de manera semejante a la del New Konk y el Unica (véase el párr. 72).

Figura X

El New Konk en 2023 utilizando el identificador del servicio móvil marítimo del Joffa, actualmente desguazado. Ambos buques cisterna realizaron trasvases de buque a buque el 29 y el 30 de diciembre de 2021



Fuente: el Grupo.

Nota: además del Joffa, desde entonces han sido desguazados el Sky Venus, el Hong Hu y el Xiang Shun.

Figura XI
Comparación de los itinerarios del New Konk (“Lifan”) en enero de 2022 y el New Konk (“Lian”) en mayo y junio de 2023



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo.

Cuadro 1
Cuadro de identificadores fraudulentos transmitidos, enero a mayo de 2023[45]

Ship name	Fraudulent identifier
NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387)	F.LONLINE MMSI: 312162000 LIFAN MMSI: 312165230 MMSI: 312165923 LIAN MMSI: 667001395
UNICA (IMO: 8514306)	LITON MMSI: 457106000
DIAMOND 8 nka NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612)	SHUNLI MMSI: 457111000

Fuente: El Grupo.
Nota: Véase también el anexo 32.

41. Desde 2020 el Grupo ha informado de que antiguos buques de entrega directa a menudo se guarecen en aguas de la bahía de Sansha entre travesías ilícitas (véase el anexo 33)[46]. Mientras se encuentran allí, estos buques rara vez transmiten señales del

[45] Mientras antiguos buques de entrega directa seguían transmitiendo nombres fraudulentos conocidos, se manipularon algunos de sus ISMM.

[46] El Grupo ha alentado a las autoridades pertinentes en cuyas aguas territoriales puedan haber fondeado o comerciado esos buques a que investiguen y le informen. Véase S/2023/171, párrs. 39 y 40.

SIA o transmiten señales fraudulentas (véase la fig. XII). A continuación se examina con detalle el ejemplo de un buque cisterna que enarbolaba el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con el nombre Nam Dae Bong en agosto de 2021 (anteriormente Diamond 8: la OMI no recibió información actualizada al respecto hasta 2023)[47]. Por ese motivo, cuando el Grupo informó de él antes, el buque cisterna ya pertenecía a la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mientras se encontraba en la bahía de Sansha y mientras transportaba combustible ilícito. El Grupo pidió asistencia a las autoridades chinas para obtener información sobre los antiguos buques de entrega y las personas que facilitaban transferencias de petróleo ilícito a fin de poder estorbar la futura adquisición de petróleo por estos buques. China respondió que sus autoridades competentes seguían investigando que "según constataciones preliminares, desde 2020 no existen en China registros de entrada en puerto o salida de este del NEW KONK, el UNICA, el DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG y el SHUNDLLI" (véase el anexo 25).

Figura XII
Antiguos buques de entrega directa en la bahía de Sansha, 6 de enero de 2023



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

Actividades de evasión de las sanciones

42. La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue burlando las sanciones del siguiente modo[48]:

a) Trasvase de petróleo en varias etapas, en muchos casos con origen en el estrecho de Taiwán;

b) Actividad de oscuridad en el SIA (actividad no registrada de buques durante períodos sin transmisión en el SIA que podría servir para recalar en un puerto o realizar operaciones de buque a buque) de buques intermediarios[49];

[47] La OMI actualiza su información sobre el pabellón de los buques a partir de lo que le suministra el Estado del pabellón.

[48] S/2022/132 y S/2022/668.

[49] El Grupo utiliza la expresión "buques intermediarios" en relación con buques cisterna situados a lo largo de la cadena de transbordo en varias etapas de su cargamento de petróleo de buque a buque a antiguos buques de entrega directa, embarcaciones que carecen de número de la OMI o buques cisterna encubiertos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

c) Transmisión por antiguos buques de entrega directa de identificadores fraudulentos al dirigirse a aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea al encuentro de buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea;

d) Explotación de la propiedad empresarial registrada de buques caracterizados por un rastro en línea limitado o inexistente; información sobre el registro empresarial que solo enumera como puntos de contacto secretarios empresariales; correos electrónicos que parecen desechables (es imposible ponerse en contacto con ellos); uso de direcciones “al cuidado de”; y una titularidad efectiva desconocida.

43. Los dos ejemplos siguientes ilustran casos investigados por el Grupo en 2023.

Caso 1: Buque de suministro – Ever Glory – Nam Dae Bong (“Diamond 8/Shunli”) – *República Popular Democrática de Corea*

Transferencias de petróleo (véase la fig. XIII):

44. El Diamond 8 [50], al tiempo que transmitía fraudulentamente como Shunli (ISMM: 457111000), salió de aguas de la bahía de Sansha el 17 de febrero o en torno a esa fecha, se dirigió al sur bordeando el estrecho de Taiwán y se encontró con el Ever Glory (OMI: 9102813), que enarbolaba el pabellón de Sierra Leona. El Grupo informó antes de que el buque Shunli propiamente dicho (OMI: 8514435) fue desguazado en la práctica en 2021[51].

45. Tras el encuentro, el Diamond 8/Shunli regresó a la bahía de Sansha y a continuación se dirigió hacia el norte hasta llegar a aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea el 13 de marzo o en torno a esa fecha. Antes de encontrarse con el Diamond 8/Shunli, el Ever Glory se encontró con la embarcación de suministro (“embarcación de suministro X”) el 21 de enero o en torno a esa fecha. La embarcación de suministro X había cargado petróleo en el puerto de Mailiao dos días antes. Tras recibir el petróleo de la embarcación de suministro, el Ever Glory regresó a la zona del puerto de Kaohsiung, donde permaneció hasta el 17 de febrero, cuando se dirigió hacia el sur para atracar ese mismo día junto al Diamond 8/Shunli.

46. Success Regent Development Limited (“Success Regent”, en adelante), empresa de comercio constituida en las Islas Vírgenes Británicas y con sede en Kaohsiung, respondió a las preguntas del Grupo que el 21 de enero la embarcación de suministro X transfirió al Ever Glory 4.100 toneladas de petróleo por un valor cercano a 4 millones de dólares. Por su parte, Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd (“Full Victory”, en adelante), entidad con sede en Tainan y constituida en Anguila, compró a Success Regent el cargamento de petróleo destinado al Ever Glory. Success Regent confirmó también que su empresa, la compañía propietaria registrada de la embarcación de suministro X, el director técnico de la embarcación, Mega Glory Holdings, y la entidad que había comprado para Success Regent el cargamento de petróleo en el puerto de Mailiao pertenecían a un único propietario común.

[50] El Diamond 8 ha sido objeto de investigación por el Grupo en varios informes, y se recomendó su designación en relación con la entrega ilícita de petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2019 y 2020.

[51] S/2022/668, párr. 42.

Figura XIII

El Nam Dae Bong/Shunli atracado junto al Ever Glory antes de llegar a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, febrero-marzo de 2023



Fuente: Windward (las líneas discontinuas representan el itinerario previsto); imágenes satelitales, Planet Labs con calco cartográfico del SIA de Windward; con anotaciones del Grupo.

47. Success Regent registró que había practicado la diligencia debida en enero en relación con el barco receptor, el Ever Glory [52]. La empresa declaró que "no mantenemos relaciones comerciales directas" con el propietario registrado del Ever Glory, aparte del hecho de que Full Victory había designado el Ever Glory como embarcación receptora del transbordo del cargamento de petróleo. El Grupo observa

[52] El Grupo observa que Success Regent había indicado en otra parte que su equipo de cumplimiento había puesto en marcha la diligencia debida el 3 de mayo de 2023 en relación con Full Victory, el adquirente del cargamento de petróleo para el Ever Glory. El Grupo solicitó aclaraciones a Success Regent.

que Full Victory era también el comprador consignado para el transbordo del cargamento de petróleo solicitado de la embarcación de suministro X al buque cisterna Midas (OMI: 9105279), que enarbolaba el pabellón de Mongolia (véanse el caso 2 y la figura XVI).

Entidades y personas vinculadas

48. A partir de investigaciones anteriores, registros de expedición obtenidos de diversas contrapartes e información de fuentes primarias, con inclusión de documentación sobre el registro empresarial[53], el Grupo determinó diversas vinculaciones empresariales de la Persona A (véase la figura XVIII). La Persona A respondió, entre otras cosas, que él, sus empresas y sus entidades asociadas habían actuado como titulares del documento de conformidad y no habían participado en intercambios comerciales. El Grupo está evaluando la información (véase el anexo 34). Prosiguen las investigaciones.

49. Kindom Honor Ltd ("Kindom Honor", en adelante), propietario registrado del Ever Glory, declaró al Grupo que del 4 al 8 de enero el Ever Glory había cargado 4.000 toneladas de diésel en "las aguas septentrionales de Filipinas" para entregarlas a su cliente, el "Sr. Qui" Guo Rong de Fujian, los días 17 y 18 de febrero frente al puerto de Tainan. Al recibir nuevas preguntas, Kindom Honor se retractó de lo dicho y explicó que había anulado la compra al tratante de combustible filipino en vista de la "mala calidad del combustible". En cambio, confirmó que había comprado combustible a Success Regent, "pues el propietario de Full Victory … tenía muy buenas relaciones con [Success Regent]", gracias a lo cual obtuvo un precio mejor.

50. En respuesta a una solicitud de información del Grupo en relación con el buque receptor que posteriormente cargó el petróleo procedente del Ever Glory los días 17 y 18 de febrero, Kindom Honor explicó que "en vista de que los dos buques atracaron uno junto al otro por la noche y de que la línea de mira no era buena, el capitán del Ever Glory no aplicó las normas de operación de Kindom Honor para registrar la información de identificación del buque". Sostuvo que, "al no haber a bordo nadie que hablara coreano, las dos partes ... tampoco ... sospecharon que el buque receptor del cargamento asignado por el Sr. Qui ... estuviera vinculado en modo alguno con [la República Popular Democrática de Corea]" y añadió que "Kindom Honor nunca ha utilizado el Ever Glory para realizar actividades marítimas ilícitas de ningún tipo". En respuesta a la pregunta del Grupo sobre la embarcación que, a juicio de Kindom Honor, estaba transfiriendo el cargamento de petróleo, la empresa admitió que algunas embarcaciones receptoras "ocultaban el nombre del buque".

51. Kindom Honor sostuvo asimismo que controlaba plenamente el Ever Glory, que la embarcación no se había encontrado nunca con el Nam Dae Bong/Diamond 8 y que "el Ever Glory nunca ha atracado junto a un buque llamado Shunli". Sin embargo, una secuencia de vídeo publicada en medios sociales mostraba el presunto transbordo de buque a buque entre el Ever Glory y el Shunli, lo que contradecía la declaración de Kindom Honor (véase la figura XIV). El examen por el Grupo de los segmentos de vídeo, el análisis del SIA y la información de contrapartes obtenida por separado, como la nacionalidad de la tripulación del Ever Glory, que se correspondía con el idioma de la publicación en los medios sociales, coincide con la valoración del Grupo de que las dos embarcaciones atracaron efectivamente una junto a otra a mediados de febrero.

[53] La información obra en poder del Grupo.

Figura XIV
El Shunli y el Ever Glory uno junto al otro, 19 de febrero de 2023



Fuente: Imagen fija de un vídeo de medios sociales, con anotaciones del Grupo.

52. Success Regent declaró que el 3 de mayo su equipo de cumplimiento puso en marcha su proceso de diligencia debida y pidió a Full Victory que "presentara los contratos concertados con sus clientes y los documentos de expedición pertinentes" (véase el anexo 35), pero no recibió respuesta hasta el 5 de julio. El Grupo ha solicitado estos documentos a Success Regent.

53. El Grupo también se dirigió por escrito a otras partes pertinentes. Recibió asistencia de las Islas Marshall y Seychelles. Sierra Leona todavía no ha respondido. LW Maritime Service Co., Ltd tampoco ha respondido todavía.

Caso 2: *Embarcación de suministro* - Midas - Shundlli - *República Popular Democrática de Corea*

Transferencias de petróleo (véase la fig. XV)

54. Otro cargamento ilícito de petróleo destinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea se transbordó de forma semejante el mes siguiente. El 9 de marzo o en torno a esa fecha, el Midas (OMI: 9105279) realizó un trasbordo de buque a buque con el Shundlli en el estrecho de Taiwán. El Shundlli (véanse los párrs. 34 a 37) fue objeto en diciembre de 2022 de una investigación periodística en la que se informó de que había entregado petróleo refinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea[54], lo que lo convierte en reincidente. Al igual que en el caso del Ever Glory, el buque intermediario, el *Midas*, se encontraba en la zona portuaria de Kaohsiung antes de recibir la transferencia de petróleo del mismo buque, la embarcación de suministro X[55]. Antes de encontrarse con el Midas, esta embarcación de suministro

[54] Las autoridades de la República de Corea confirmaron al Grupo que se estaba investigando a una persona que había mediado en la transferencia de petróleo a la nave nodriza, el Mercury (OMI: 9262170). Véase también www.ft.com/content/41e47ba2-3e3b-414b-905b-df4336f22bed.

[55] De febrero a principios de marzo de 2023.

estaba ubicada igualmente en el puerto de Mailiao. El buque intermediario Shundlli también partió de aguas de la bahía de Sansha para encontrarse con el Midas en el estrecho de Taiwán, tras lo cual se dirigió hacia el norte por el mar de China Oriental. Aunque informó de que su destino era Dalian, el Shundlli viró hacia el este en dirección a las aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea antes de interrumpir la transmisión por el SIA el 21 de marzo o en torno a esa fecha.

Figura XV
El Shundlli se encuentra con el *Midas* antes de dirigirse hacia aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, marzo de 2023



Fuente: Windward y S&P Global Sea-web.

Entidades y personas vinculadas

55. El propietario registrado del Midas es la empresa Laurel International Co Ltd (en adelante, “Laurel International”), constituida en Samoa y con presencia operativa en Tainan. El operador y gestor técnico del buque es Navigator Ship Management Ltd (en adelante, “Navigator Ship”), con sede en Kaohsiung. Los datos de contacto de Navigator Ship coinciden con los de Green Ship Management Ltd (en adelante, “Green Ship”), la empresa del propietario del Ever Glory “encargada de su cuidado”. El bufete de abogados que representaba a Laurel International también puso en copia a Green Ship en la correspondencia con el Grupo sobre el Midas.

56. Laurel International declaró que el cargamento de petróleo comprado a Success Regent iba a ser transferido de la embarcación de suministro X al Midas. A continuación, se transferiría el petróleo del Midas a un buque receptor en nombre de Qiu Guo Shu, intermediario de la provincia de Fujian con el que Laurel International llevaba mucho tiempo manteniendo relaciones comerciales. Cuando se le pidió información sobre el buque receptor del Midas, Laurel International sostuvo que se

trataba de “una entrega excepcional” en el curso de la cual se transbordaron “1.000 toneladas de dieseloil” al “Shundlli”, en lugar de seguir su práctica comercial habitual de entregar el cargamento de petróleo directamente a buques de los clientes. En cuanto a la diligencia debida, Laurel International dijo que había encomendado a Navigator Ship, que presuntamente no participaba de otro modo en las operaciones comerciales del Midas, la verificación de que la información facilitada por el Sr. Qiu sobre la empresa propietaria registrada del Shundlli coincidía con la información que figuraba en el registro mercantil de Hong Kong y de que el “Shundlli no era una embarcación [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea]”. En cuanto a los registros de comunicación correspondientes al trasvase de petróleo, se informó al Grupo de que el Sr. Qiu no sabía utilizar un teléfono inteligente.

57. Laurel International también declaró lo siguiente: “El cargamento de diésel comprado... a Success Regent en marzo de 2023... [fue] vendido en su totalidad a buques pesqueros chinos y embarcaciones de trabajo mar adentro a través del Sr. Qiu” (véase la fig. XVI). El Grupo observa que el cargamento de petróleo se transbordó sucesivamente y que, en cambio, la información obtenida aparte por el Grupo de un Estado Miembro daba a entender que se suponía que se habían transferido 1.800 toneladas de cargamento de petróleo del Shundlli al buque cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Kum Ryong 3 (OMI: 8610461) (véanse los párrs. 71 a 73). El Grupo observa que los barriles a bordo del Midas facturados se aproximan a las 1.800 toneladas de petróleo.

Figura XVI
Facturas en las que aparecen entidades asociadas a transferencias de cargamentos de petróleo

Factura de transferencia de petróleo al Ever Glory

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
[redacted]
COMMERCIAL INVOICE
DATE: Feb. 01, 2023
INV. NO.:
CONTRACT NO.: [redacted]
MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO.,LTD
SUPPLY TANKER: [redacted]

DATE	VESSEL NAME	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QUANTITY (BBL)	UNIT PRICE (USD)	AMOUNT (USD)
2023/1/21	Ever Glory	Gasoil 10ppm	30,744.83	130.905	US$3,901,672.65

TOTAL AMOUNT US$3,901,672.65

Factura de transferencia de petróleo al Midas


SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
[redacted]
PROFORMA INVOICE
MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD
DATE: Mar. 03,2023
INVOICE NO.: [redacted]

DESCRIPTIONS OF GOODS	QUANTITY(BBL)	UNIT PRICE(USD)	AMOUNT(USD)
GASOIL 500ppm	15,103.20	111.000	1,676,455.20

TOTAL AMOUNT(USD) 1,676,455.20

Fuente: El Grupo

58. Success Regent, en nombre de la embarcación de suministro X, facilitó al Grupo la documentación y la información solicitadas. El Grupo ha pedido a la empresa aclaraciones sobre los motivos por los que envió una carta de fecha 30 de marzo de 2023 a Full Victory por la que rechazaba emprender ulteriores actividades comerciales con el Midas a causa de las dudas suscitadas por los documentos presentados a Success Regent. En el anexo 36 figuran más detalles sobre las ventas de cargamentos de petróleo contratadas por la embarcación de suministro X como primer vendedor/proveedor en régimen de franco al costado del buque y/o franco a bordo.

59. En la figura XVII se observa el flujo de petróleo y de dinero.

Figura XVII

Envío de cargamento de petróleo y su flujo monetario para los envíos del caso 2, marzo de 2023



Fuente: El Grupo.

Modus operandi

60. Al comparar las respuestas de Kindom Honor (Ever Glory) y Laurel International (Midas), el Grupo observó semejanzas como el uso del mismo bufete de abogados; la inclusión en copia de una parte externa común (Green Ship); semejanzas en los métodos de diligencia debida mencionados; semejanzas en los nombres y antecedentes de los intermediarios involucrados; afirmaciones de que los compradores finales de los cargamentos de petróleo eran “buques pesqueros chinos” sin que se aportara documentación que lo demostrara; incapacidad de presentar registros sustantivos de comunicación o la identidad del buque en relación con las transferencias de petróleo; una misma entidad compradora (Full Victory) para las compras por el Ever Glory y el Midas de cargamentos de petróleo a la embarcación de suministro X; y empleo de métodos de pago semejantes. Al describir las transacciones financieras realizadas por los intermediarios en relación con el cargamento de petróleo recibido del Ever Glory y el Midas, ambas empresas explicaron que, debido a problemas de remesas encontrados por “clientes chinos” que pagaban en dólares de los Estados Unidos, el pago se realizaba en efectivo a través de servicios bancarios paralelos para poder realizar transacciones en la moneda local. Por lo tanto, no se disponía de datos sobre los pagos. En los anexos 37 y 38 puede consultarse una recopilación editada de las respuestas pertinentes proporcionadas por Kindom Honor y Laurel International y de las comparaciones del Grupo.

61. Aunque Laurel International declaró que había comprado el cargamento de petróleo directamente a Success Regent, la información financiera indicaba que Full Victory había remitido el pago a Success Regent por el cargamento de petróleo transferido de la embarcación de suministro X al Midas antes del trasvase de buque a buque entre el Midas y el Shundlli. Ante las nuevas preguntas del Grupo, Laurel International declaró que operaba “bajo la supervisión de su empresa matriz Full Victory”, que era “una de las principales entidades que aportaba capital a Laurel International”. El Grupo sigue investigando la compra por Full Victory de cargamentos de petróleo a bordo del Ever Glory y el Midas transbordados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Mongolia respondió a las preguntas del Grupo. El Grupo aguarda una respuesta de Samoa.

62. En la figura XVIII se muestra un diagrama de las asociaciones de las entidades vinculadas con el Midas y el Ever Glory.

Figura XVIII
Conexiones de entidades[56] y personas observadas durante la investigación del Midas y el Ever Glory



Fuente: El Grupo.
Nota: Véase también el anexo 34[57].

Venta y adquisición de buques

63. Entre enero y mayo, la República Popular Democrática de Corea adquirió 14 buques en infracción permanente de las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad que prohíben el suministro, la venta o la transferencia directa o indirecta de buques al país. En el cuadro 2 (véase también el anexo 39) se actualiza la lista de buques que enarbolan el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde 2021 y que no figuraban antes en el cuadro 33 de S/2023/171. El Grupo sigue rastreando otros buques que probablemente han pasado a estar bajo el control del país pero aún no enarbolan oficialmente su pabellón, y espera que se agreguen más buques a la lista.

64. El análisis por el Grupo de las adquisiciones recientes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea es el siguiente:

a) Aumento del número de buques costeros chinos que enarbolan el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea: ahora representan la mayoría de los buques adquiridos hasta la fecha en 2023[58]. La mayoría de ellos no tenía número OMI, lo que indica que no se los había registrado para realizar viajes internacionales. Al ser limitados o inexistentes los números OMI, los rastros históricos o los historiales de propiedad, estos buques de cabotaje no muestran ninguna prueba comercial de su adquisición antes de empezar a enarbolar oficialmente el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea;

b) Adquisición de buques más nuevos y más grandes;

[56] Sobre la base del registro mercantil, la OMI y los registros de matriculación de buques.
[57] Entre las entidades con las que se ha mantenido correspondencia figuran las empresas “encargadas del cuidado”.
[58] El 80 % de los buques adquiridos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea entre enero y mayo de 2023 operaban antes como buques de cabotaje chinos, frente a cerca del 50 % en 2022.

c) Adquisición principalmente de buques de carga a granel o buques de carga o portacontenedores;

d) Cambio de nombre por la República Popular Democrática de Corea de un número limitado de sus buques recién adquiridos en 2023, entre ellos el Ryon Phung (OMI: 9154189) (antes Sin Phyong 11) y el A Bong 1 (OMI: 8669589) (antes Kum Ya Gang 1).

65. En los cinco primeros meses de 2023, el Grupo identificó, a partir de rastreos en bases de datos marítimos y de registros de la OMI, 10 buques que antes enarbolaban pabellón chino o eran propiedad de entidades chinas y que fueron transferidos a la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 40). El Grupo utilizó diversos análisis del comportamiento de los buques y diversas firmas para identificar estos buques. En algunos casos en que no existían rastros o información históricos, los buques solo pudieron identificarse cuando empezaron a transmitir en aguas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

66. China respondió: “el SHUNCHAO 9, el HUI YI, el HONG JIE 1, el RUN HONG 58, el XIN HONG XIANG 77, el WEN TONG FA ZHAN y el XIANGHUI 10 fueron dados de baja en el registro [en] mayo de 2022, enero de 2023, agosto de 2022, noviembre de 2021, octubre de 2022, febrero de 2023 y noviembre de 2018, respectivamente. Desde entonces no se ha vuelto a dar de alta en el registro a estos buques. El ZHI KUN 6 y el HUA JIN SHENG 8 siguen figurando en el registro como buques chinos. El HONG TAI 215 no ha solicitado que se registre su nacionalidad” (véase el anexo 25).

67. El Grupo también rastreó varios buques de cabotaje que viajaban con pabellón chino a la República Popular Democrática de Corea[59]. Estos buques habían navegado antes por rutas costeras y presentaban periodos considerables de lagunas en el SIA antes de llegar a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. De los buques rastreados, el Bao Ying Hai 18 (ISMM: 412550950) y el Xin Yang Hong (OMI: 8358192) forman ahora parte de la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con los nombres Song Nim 9 (OMI: 8360248) y Nam Pho 5, respectivamente. Dado que muchos de estos buques de cabotaje chinos no disponían de datos públicos sobre su propiedad, el Grupo solicitó información a China, en particular su matrícula, beneficiarios finales, información aduanera y su compra y venta antes de que salieran de aguas chinas. El Grupo también pidió a las autoridades chinas que transmitieran sus preguntas a los armadores. En el anexo 41 pueden consultarse detalles.

68. China respondió que “el BAO YING HAI 18, el XIN YANG HONG, el QIMING 168 y el FU LONG 98 fueron dados de baja en los registros entre fines de 2022 y principios de 2023, y no se han vuelto a dar de alta desde entonces”, por lo que no había información “sobre su paradero exacto”. China también declaró que “no se encontraron registros de entrada en puerto o salida de él del XIN HANG SHUN y el LONG XIN 12” y que “no disponía de información detallada sobre estos buques” (véase el anexo 25).

69. Dada la naturaleza compleja de la venta de buques, con inclusión de los intermediarios, los corredores y la falta de verificación de los compradores, el Grupo ha observado que es difícil detectar la venta de buques a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Para mitigar el riesgo, el Grupo reitera sus mejores prácticas recomendadas y pasos de diligencia debida durante la venta de buques que figuran en su informe más reciente[60].

[59] Los buques rastreados por el Grupo se limitaban al periodo comprendido entre septiembre de 2022 y mayo de 2023.

[60] S/2023/171, párr. 97 i) a iii).

Cuadro 2

Buques adquiridos (1 de enero a 1 de mayo de 2023) y lista actualizada de buques adquiridos no registrados antes (2021-2022) que complementa la anterior lista del Grupo de buques que navegan bajo el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, en S/2023/171

Year 2023					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
1	8660909	SIN PHYONG 10 ex WALES	Cargo	28451	-
2	1015167	TAE DONG MUN 1 ex SHOU XIANG 8	Cargo	8667	-
3	1017787	MO RAN BONG 7 ex HUA XIANG 669	Cargo / Container	5115	-
4	1018614	UN HA SU ex WEN TONG 7	Cargo	3282	-
5	8592774	HWA PHYONG ex HAI SHUN FENG 6	Cargo / Container	5529	-
6	8598431	THAE JA BONG ex XIANG HUI 10	Cargo	5114	Detailed in current report
7	8662933	HWANG RYONG SAN ex HUA JIN SHENG 8	Cargo	3278	Detailed in current report
8	8360248	SONG NIM 9 ex BAO YING HAI 18	Cargo	6431	Detailed in current report
9	8360406	TOK SONG ex HONG TAI 215	Cargo	14,116	Detailed in current report
10	8358697	KUM GANG 1 ex HUI YI	Cargo	6310	Detailed in current report
11	8360250	HYANG SAN ex WEN TONG FA ZHAN	Cargo	5007	Detailed in current report
12	9054896	A SA BONG ex HAI JUN	Tanker	4785	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, and current report)
13	8358192	NAM PHO 5 ex XIN YANG HONG	Cargo	4831	Detailed in current report
14	1016355	SONG NIM 5 ex WANG HAO 1	Cargo	5263	-
Year 2022					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
15	8669589	A BONG 1 / KUM YA GANG 1 ex HENG XING	Tanker	3221	Yes (S/2023/171, S2022/667, S/2019/171 and current report)
16	8891297	PU YANG 2 ex SF BLOOM	Cargo / Container	3539	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
17	8356584	KYONG SONG 3 ex ANNI	Cargo / Container	5226	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)

Fuente: El Grupo; información sobre los buques obtenida de S&P Global y registros de la OMI.
Nota: La mayoría de las entradas de buques se han fechado retroactivamente.

Year 2022					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
18	9142409	CHON HA 2 ex SHUN CHAO 9	Cargo / Container	4860	Current report
19	8864464	PUK CHON 2 ex SEA STAR 5	Cargo	4835	Detailed in current report
20	8358324	MO RAN BONG 5 ex HONG JIE 1	Cargo / Container	5515	Detailed in current report
21	8596122	UN SUN ex HUA YUAN DA 9	Cargo	5150	-
22	1015533	TAE RYONG 3 ex XING HONG XIANG 77	Cargo	5116	Detailed in current report
23	9536272	PU YANG 6 ex SEA GLORY	Cargo / Container	4802	-
24	9088031	HWANG GUM PHYONG 3 ex YUKO MARU 8	Cargo	4635	Detailed in current report
25	8597827	PHO HANG 1 ex AN YUAN 1	Cargo / Container	3637	-
26	8718639	JANG SU ex WEN XIANG	Cargo	3457	Detailed in current report
27	8660909	SAE GIL ex ZHI KUN 6	Cargo	4730	Detailed in current report
28	9154189	RYON PHUNG ex SIN PHYONG 11 / ex CONTREL	Tanker	3159	Yes (S/2023/171, and current report)
29	8597944	HONG DAE 2 ex HUA YU 108	Cargo	4519	-
Year 2021					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
30	8312497	SONG WON 2 ex NEW REGENT	Tanker	5167	Yes (S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, S/2019/171)
31	9132612	NAM DAE BONG ex DIAMOND 8	Tanker	9273	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211, S2020/840, S/2020/151, and current report)
32	8593209	MO RAN BONG 1 ex RUN HONG 58	Cargo	2162	Detailed in current report

Fuente: El Grupo; información sobre los buques obtenida de S&P Global y registros de la OMI.
Nota: La mayoría de las entradas de buques se han fechado retroactivamente.

70. El buque intermediario, Hai Jun (OMI: 9054896)[61] (véase la fig. XIX) fue adquirido por la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2023 y ahora opera como A Sa Bong (véase la fig. XX).

[61] S/2022/132, párrs. 53 a 58 y anexos 36, 37 y 42, y S/2022/668, párr. 40 y anexo 27.

Figura XIX
El Hai Jun como buque intermediario entre el Sky Venus (OMI: 9168257) y el Unica, septiembre de 2021



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo.

Figura XX
El Hai Jun como A Sa Bong en Nampo, 2 de mayo de 2023

Fuente: Estado Miembro y Maxar Technologies, con anotaciones del Grupo.

Facilitadores

71. El Grupo está investigando a HongKong Great Star Development Ltd/香港偉星發展有限公司 (en adelante, “HKGSD”), entidad que está detrás de varios buques de interés. HKGSD fue el último propietario y administrador registrado de los siguientes

buques antes de que pasaran a enarbolar el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea:

a) El Sea Star 5, conocido ahora como Puk Chon 2 (OMI: 8864464), que enarbola el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde julio de 2022;

b) El Yuko Maru 8, conocido ahora como Hwang Gum Phyong 3 (OMI: 9088031), que enarbola el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde octubre de 2022.

72. Además, desde enero de 2022, HKGSD es propietario y gestor registrado del Shundlli, que transbordó petróleo destinado a la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde el Midas en marzo de 2023 (véanse los párrs. 54 a 56). Las pautas de las travesías mensuales del Shundlli indicaban otras transferencias ilícitas, al menos hasta junio (véase la fig. XXI). Un Estado Miembro facilitó datos sobre entregas ilícitas mensuales del Shundlli a buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea entre diciembre de 2022 y junio de 2023 (véanse el cuadro 3 y el anexo 42).

Figura XXI
Muestras de travesías del Shundlli, propiedad de HongKong Great Star Development Ltd, mayo y junio de 2023



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo.

Cuadro 3

Cargamento de petróleo transferido por el Shundlli a buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, diciembre de 2022 a junio de 2023

No.	Date and Time	Location	Presumed DPRK receiving vessel	Presumed amount of refined petroleum
1	Dawn of 8 December 2022	381710N, 1240546E (104km Southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHONG RYONG SAN (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 1,300 tons
2	Evening of 22 March to dawn of 23 March 2023	Unknown	KUM RYONG 3 (IMO: 8610461)	Approx. 1,800 tons
3	Dawn to morning of 13 April 2023	381600N, 1240400E (107km southwest of West Sea Dam)	UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962)	Approx. 2,000 tons
4	Noon of 13 May to dawn of 14 May 2023	382056N, 1240500E (102km southwest of West Sea Dam)	KUM CHIN KANG 2 (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 2,000 tons
5	Near midnight of 8 June to dawn of 9 June 2023	381612N, 1240507E (105km southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313)	Approx. 2,000 tons

Fuente: Estado Miembro.

Nota: Ninguno de los buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea transmitía, y se comunicó que el Shundlli había bloqueado su señal del SIA en torno a la presunta hora de las transferencias. La fecha y la hora se indican en hora local.

73. El Grupo escribió a los antiguos registros de pabellón y a HKGSD. Panamá respondió que había dado de baja el Sea Star 5 en el registro el 7 de junio de 2022, supuestamente para su transferencia al registro de buques de Palau. Sin embargo, el Sea Star 5 enarboló el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea el mes siguiente. Palau aún no ha respondido en relación con el Yuko Maru 8. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Exportaciones de carbón desde la República Popular Democrática de Corea

74. En los informes del Grupo desde 2019 se han descrito buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que exportan cargamentos prohibidos de carbón mediante transferencias de buque a buque en aguas territoriales chinas, en contravención de las resoluciones pertinentes. Los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de los que se habían comunicado antes operaciones de exportación de carbón fueron rastreados de nuevo por el Grupo hasta aguas de Lianyungang donde antes se exportaba carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[62]. Un Estado Miembro ha determinado que ahí es donde se desembarca el carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el ejemplo de la fig. XXII). El mismo Estado ha identificado las aguas cercanas a la isla de Taishan como nueva zona para la exportación de carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mediante transferencias de buque a buque. Esta zona se encuentra al sur de las aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan[63], donde antes se concentraban las exportaciones de carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[62] S/2020/151, párrs. 67 a 70, y S/2021/777, párr. 85 y anexo 43.

[63] Secciones sobre el carbón marítimo de los informes del Grupo desde 2019.

75. Aunque un número limitado de buques exportadores de carbón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea transmiten esporádicamente señales del SIA, normalmente después de haber descargado su cargamento ilícito[64], muchos siguen viajando a oscuras durante la mayor parte de sus itinerarios ilícitos. Sin embargo, las autoridades marítimas competentes en cuyas aguas territoriales se encuentran estos buques deberían seguir pudiendo rastrear su presencia y su actividad para aplicar las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad. El Grupo reitera su llamamiento a las autoridades portuarias y aduaneras para que intensifiquen la inspección de los buques receptores y de su documentación de expedición y confisquen todo buque sospechoso de transportar artículos prohibidos. Véanse más casos en el anexo 43.

Figura XXII
El Hung Bong 3 viajando a oscuras para descargar su cargamento, Lianyungang, diciembre de 2022 a enero de 2023



Fuente: Windward, con anotaciones del Grupo. Imágenes: (arriba) Maxar Technologies, (abajo) Estado Miembro.
Nota: Las líneas discontinuas indican ausencia de transmisión del SIA.

76. El Grupo solicitó a China información sobre la exportación de carbón por buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas de Lianyungang y otras aguas territoriales chinas en 2023, incluida información sobre el cargamento descargado por buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mediante transferencia de buque a buque en esas aguas; los identificadores de los buques receptores; las entidades y los particulares que posean, exploten y adquieran cualquier cargamento de buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea; y la documentación de expedición y las transacciones financieras pertinentes. En relación con el Hung Bong 3, China declaró que el buque "declaró una entrada en el puerto de Lianyungang procedente de Nampo en enero del año en curso sin carga ... y salió... sin carga". En el anexo 25 puede consultarse información sobre los demás buques por los que ha preguntado el Grupo.

[64] S/2023/171, anexo 48.

Camuflaje de buques

Tretas de los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a la República Popular Democrática de Corea

77. Para seguir navegando y comerciando, los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y los que actúan en su nombre se camuflan tanto digital como físicamente, en particular utilizando formas sofisticadas de falseamiento de la identidad de los buques[65]. Un Estado Miembro facilitó al Grupo una fotografía tomada en octubre de 2022 del Puk Dae Bong[66] (antes Hua Fu), buque sancionado que enarbolaba el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, con un número OMI pintado en el casco que coincidía con el de otro buque de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el Myong Sin (véase la fig. XXIII). El análisis del Grupo muestra que el Myong Sin tiene una superestructura muy diferente de la del Puk Dae Bong (véase el anexo 44). Aunque ninguno de los cargueros transmitía señales del SIA en la fecha de la fotografía del Estado Miembro, ambos buques se transmiten en ocasiones los identificadores del SIA de cada uno de ellos entre prolongados periodos de oscuridad, presuntamente para enmascarar el paradero del Puk Dae Bong.

Figura XXIII
El Puk Dae Bong, sancionado, con un número OMI diferente en su casco, 27 de octubre de 2022



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

Cuestiones pesqueras

Posibles exportaciones de alimentos de origen marino de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

78. El Grupo está investigando la presunta venta de alimentos de origen marino de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[67] en la que está implicada una empresa china. Según un Estado Miembro, una empresa china, North Korean Seafood Wholesale[68], vendió alimentos de origen marino procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el mercado Yanji West[69], por lo menos en julio de 2022 (véase el anexo 45). China respondió que la empresa presente en el mercado "lleva varios años utilizando el emblema 'North Korea Seafood Wholesale' (Mayorista de

[65] S/2022/132, párrs. 43 a 51 (el New Konk como F.Lonline), y S/2021/777, párrs. 29 a 41 (el Subblic como Hai Zhou 168, el Billions No.18 como Apex).
[66] El verdadero número OMI del buque es 9020003.
[67] La venta de alimentos de origen marino procedentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea está prohibida en virtud del párrafo 9 de la resolución 2371 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad.
[68] 北朝鲜海鲜批发.
[69] 延吉西市场.

alimentos de origen marino de Corea del Norte) como medio para atraer clientes. Se constató que los alimentos de origen marino vendidos en el puesto habían sido en realidad importados de Rusia por canales legales, y no se habían obtenido ilegalmente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea" (véase el anexo 25).

Recomendaciones

79. La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue comerciando principalmente por vía marítima. En consecuencia, persisten las evasiones y violaciones de las sanciones, y con el tiempo aumenta la sofisticación de los métodos de elusión. Siguen siendo vitales las numerosas recomendaciones relacionadas con el sector marítimo que figuran en los anteriores informes del Grupo.

Estadísticas comerciales y cuestiones aduaneras

Análisis de las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

80. Según los datos disponibles[70,71], el volumen comercial de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2022 duplicó con creces el de 2021 y aumentó más del 50 % en comparación con 2020 (véase la figura XXIV). El principal factor determinante del aumento del volumen comercial fue la reanudación del tráfico ferroviario de mercancías entre el país y China, como se observaba en los informes anteriores del Grupo. El comercio con China representó más del 90 % del comercio exterior de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2022. A pesar de este aumento, el volumen total del comercio registrado en el país se mantuvo en 2019 en torno a un tercio del volumen comercial anterior a la pandemia.

[70] Hay casos en las cifras comerciales publicadas que son resultado de un uso erróneo de los códigos de país (véase el párr. 85), incumbiendo su corrección a las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros.

[71] Sobre la base de estadísticas comerciales actualizadas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para 2022 que seguirán cambiando a medida que más Estados Miembros comuniquen su comercio bilateral a plataformas de estadísticas comerciales pertinentes, como el mapa de comercio del Centro de Comercio Internacional.

Figura XXIV
República Popular Democrática de Corea, comercio registrado, 2019-2022
(Millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: Mapa de comercio del Centro de Comercio Internacional (ITC), consultado el 9 de julio de 2023.

81. En las estadísticas comerciales se observa que durante 2022 (véase el anexo 46) las tres principales mercancías declaradas exportadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron combustibles y aceites minerales (código 27 del Sistema Armonizado (SA)), menas, escoria y cenizas (código 26 del SA) y hierro y acero (código 72 del SA). Las tres principales mercancías declaradas importadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron plásticos (código 39 del SA), grasas animales o vegetales (código 15 del SA) y caucho (código 40 del SA)[72]. Sin embargo, esas cifras del volumen comercial se componen de los registros aduaneros de los países asociados comerciales, que en algunos casos se notifican erróneamente. Las estadísticas tampoco incluyen las mercancías exportadas e importadas ilícitamente por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como el carbón y el petróleo refinado (véanse los párrs. 29, 30 y 74 a 76)[73].

82. El volumen comercial global de la República Popular Democrática de Corea aumentó gradualmente de junio de 2022 a marzo de 2023 (véase la fig. XXV). Aunque las importaciones mensuales del país siguieron siendo inferiores a los niveles anteriores a la pandemia, las exportaciones mensuales han alcanzado, y en algunos casos superado, estos niveles. Es probable que el volumen comercial mensual siga aumentando en 2023, teniendo en cuenta la tendencia a la normalización del comercio con China.

[72] Véase en el anexo 46 la lista completa de las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea correspondientes a 2022 por producto básico.

[73] Un Estado Miembro ha facilitado sus estimaciones sobre las tendencias recientes de las exportaciones ilícitas de carbón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 47).

Figura XXV
Estadísticas comerciales registradas, República Popular Democrática de Corea, junio de 2022 a marzo de 2023 (mensual)



Fuente: mapa de comercio del ITC, consultado el 9 de julio de 2023.

Seguimiento de las prohibiciones sectoriales

83. El Grupo siguió supervisando las exportaciones e importaciones prohibidas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[74,75] Los códigos del SA utilizados a tal efecto figuran en el anexo 50. Lo que sigue abarca principalmente el periodo comprendido entre octubre de 2022 y marzo de 2023[76,77]

84. Sobre la base de registros del ITC de datos comerciales nacionales, algunas mercancías parecían entrar en categorías sancionadas. El Grupo preguntó a 15 Estados Miembros por sus transacciones con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluidos detalles sobre rechazos de solicitudes de despacho de aduana o incautaciones de mercancías[78].

85. Varios de los 15 Estados Miembros indicaron que no se habían registrado actividades comerciales con la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que las estadísticas eran atribuibles principalmente al uso erróneo de códigos de país durante el proceso de declaración aduanera, es decir, se introducía por error el código de país de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KP) en lugar del código de país de la República de Corea (KR). Un Estado Miembro respondió que las transacciones

[74] En relación con la pregunta del Grupo sobre las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de abril a septiembre de 2022, el Canadá y El Salvador respondieron que las estadísticas comerciales eran inexactas debido a variables de países mal codificadas en los datos aduaneros. En el caso de El Salvador, el país de origen de las mercancías importadas era la República de Corea. Véase también el anexo 48. En lo que respecta a las estadísticas, véase S/2023/171, anexo 57.

[75] Para el comercio de productos pesqueros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, véase el párr. 78.

[76] Véase en el anexo 49 el cuadro comparativo de las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y las respuestas de los Estados Miembros sobre el comercio con el país.

[77] Las estadísticas comerciales globales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea disponibles al 9 de julio de 2023 abarcan el período comprendido hasta marzo de 2023.

[78] Según las estadísticas disponibles, 23 Estados Miembros informaron de que comerciaban con la República Popular Democrática de Corea; 15 de ellos habían incluido el comercio con el país de productos con códigos del SA restringidos.

realizadas se atenían al régimen de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas[79]. El Grupo observa que puede que algunos Estados Miembros sigan teniendo problemas para determinar si está prohibido transferir ciertos artículos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o desde ese país.

86. El Grupo siguió solicitando a las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros que informaran acerca de la aplicación práctica de las obligaciones en materia de sanciones, como el requisito de inspeccionar todos los cargamentos cuyo destino o cuya procedencia fuera la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de incautarse de ellos y eliminarlos cuando se encontraran artículos prohibidos. En el anexo 51 figura un ejemplo de aplicación nacional de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad por las autoridades aduaneras de Singapur.

Recomendaciones

87. **El Grupo insiste en sus recomendaciones anteriores de que:**

a) la Organización Internacional de Normalización y los Estados Miembros adopten las medidas adecuadas, en particular por medio de actividades de divulgación dirigidas a las respectivas autoridades aduaneras, para evitar el uso erróneo de los códigos de país;

b) los Estados Miembros racionalicen sus listas de control de exportaciones e importaciones utilizando como material de apoyo la lista no oficial de productos básicos prohibidos (véase el anexo 50);

c) las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros utilicen la lista mencionada para informar a los agentes comerciales de sus respectivas jurisdicciones y para que los utilicen con fines de diligencia debida, especialmente cuando se trate de productos básicos de ese tipo en las proximidades de jurisdicciones sujetas a sanciones como la República Popular Democrática de Corea;

d) en lo que respecta a los Estados Miembros que necesitan ayuda en la aplicación de la prohibición sectorial, el Comité considere la posibilidad de emprender labor de información.

IV. Embargos, entidades y personas designadas y trabajadores en el extranjero

Embargos

Global Communications (Glocom)

88. En 2017 el Grupo llegó a la conclusión de que Glocom, por entonces empresa con sede en Malasia que anunciaba y vendía equipo de comunicaciones por radio a organizaciones militares y paramilitares, era una empresa pantalla de la sucursal en Pyongyang de Pan Systems (en adelante, “Pan Systems Pyongyang”), empresa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. La gestión de Pan Systems Pyongyang corresponde a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento (RGB) (KPe.031), principal agencia de inteligencia del país[80].

89. Posteriormente, el Grupo investigó dos presuntos envíos de equipo de radio de Glocom a la Dirección del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Etiopía en junio de

[79] Las respuestas de los Estados Miembros pueden consultarse en el anexo 52.
[80] S/2017/150, párrs. 77, 79 y 85.

2022[81]. Según un Estado Miembro, una empresa indonesia, Advanced Technology Facility, impartió formación en nombre de Pan Systems Pyongyang sobre el uso de radios de Glocom a las Fuerzas Nacionales de Defensa de Etiopía en diciembre de 2022.

90. Además, el Grupo constató que Advanced Technology Facility parecía haber anunciado y vendido en su sitio web equipos que se consideraban productos de Glocom[82]. El Grupo determinó, a partir de un análisis comparativo de fotografías del sitio web de Advanced Technology Facility, que el equipo había sido fabricado originalmente por Glocom. Además, uno de los productos expuestos en el sitio web, ER-310, era probablemente el mismo tipo de equipo de comunicación que el GR-310 de Glocom utilizado por la Dirección del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Etiopía (véase el anexo 53). Indonesia, Etiopía y Advanced Technology Facility aún no han respondido.

Presunto caso de corretaje de armas y material conexo de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

91. El Grupo está investigando información en el sentido de que un ciudadano eslovaco, Ashot Mkrtychev, intentó intermediar con armas o material relacionado de la República Popular Democrática de Corea entre fines de 2022 y principios de 2023. Un Estado Miembro designó al Sr. Mkrtychev en marzo (véase el anexo 54). Según el comunicado de prensa del Estado Miembro, “Mkrtychev colaboró con funcionarios [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] en la obtención de más de dos docenas de tipos de armas y municiones para Rusia a cambio de material que iba de aviones comerciales a materias primas y productos básicos para enviar a [la República Popular Democrática de Corea]. En las negociaciones de Mkrtychev con funcionarios [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] y rusos se detallaban los beneficios mutuos de la cooperación entre Corea del Norte y Rusia a efectos de incluir pagos financieros y acuerdos de trueque ... Mkrtychev colaboró con un individuo ruso en la localización de aviones comerciales adecuados para su entrega a [la República Popular Democrática de Corea]”.

92. La Federación de Rusia respondió: “La información relativa a presuntas negociaciones del ciudadano eslovaco A. Mkrtychev en torno al suministro de armas y municiones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a Rusia a cambio de mercancías se reduce a insinuaciones infundadas por parte de los Estados Unidos de América y no está confirmada” (véase el anexo 55). Los Estados Unidos facilitaron información sobre el pasaporte del Sr. Mkrtychev (véase el anexo 56). Eslovaquia aún no ha respondido.

Noticias sobre la exportación de armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea

93. En una noticia de prensa de fecha 28 de abril, se afirmaba que en el Sudán se estaban utilizando lanzacohetes múltiples BM-11, bombas planeadoras AGP-250 y cohetes guiados de 122 mm fabricados en la República Popular Democrática de Corea[83]. En la noticia se reconocía que no se había confirmado oficialmente la

[81] S/2023/171, párr. 115.

[82] Al menos dos productos expuestos en el sitio web de Advanced Technology Facility tienen una apariencia casi idéntica a la de productos anunciados en el catálogo de Glocom y comparten con estos descripciones y especificaciones semejantes. Véase www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1205992/not-your-usual-game-of-whack-a-mole.

[83] Véase www.nknews.org/2023/04/north-korean-weapons-could-be-contributing-to-bloodshed-in-sudan-experts-say.

identificación de las armas[84]; sin embargo, el Grupo señala que, al parecer, la República Popular Democrática de Corea había suministrado secciones de mandos de cohetes de precisión guiados de 122 mm y bombas AGP-250 al Sudán en 2013[85]. El Sudán aún no ha respondido.

94. El 2 de mayo, el máximo dirigente de Burkina Faso, Ibrahim Traoré, reconoció durante una entrevista en la televisión nacional, entre otras cosas, que su ejército manejaba armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea adquiridas en el decenio de 1980[86]. El Sr. Traoré expresó su interés en la posibilidad de adquirir más armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a medida que se estrechaban los lazos con el país[87]. Burkina Faso aún no ha respondido.

95. El Grupo sigue investigando a una empresa de Myanmar, Royal Shune Lei Co. Ltd (en adelante, "Royal Shune Lei")[88], que intermedió en la importación de armas para el ejército de Myanmar desde la Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KPe.001) (en adelante, "KOMID"), designada por las Naciones Unidas[89]. Un Estado Miembro informó de que en 2022 Royal Shune Lei "trabajó con elementos designados [por las Naciones Unidas] de [la República Popular Democrática de Corea]" para adquirir juegos de accesorios de bombas de guiado aéreo. El jefe de Royal Shune Lei ejerce al mismo tiempo funciones de jefe de una empresa con sede en Tailandia, TMA Network Group Co., Ltd. También es posible que Royal Shune Lei haya trabajado con Chromo Science Co Ltd, empresa ubicada en Myanmar. Myanmar y Tailandia aún no han respondido.

96. El Grupo siguió investigando las denuncias de exportación de armamento a la Federación de Rusia por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[90]. Además de la afirmación de que en noviembre de 2022 se había entregado munición (proyectiles de artillería, cohetes de infantería y misiles) por ferrocarril, los Estados Unidos informaron de que KOMID y el Grupo Wagner estaban detrás del acuerdo. La Federación de Rusia respondió: "Las fotografías proporcionadas "por un Estado Miembro" no son pruebas exhaustivas y no demuestran que se hayan infringido las medidas restrictivas internacionales impuestas contra Pyongyang. La circulación de mercancías con destino a [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] o desde este país tiene lugar conforme a los requisitos de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad relativas al país. Se cumplen las sanciones, prohibiciones y restricciones del Consejo. Las autoridades competentes rusas no constataron infracciones" (véase el anexo 57). El Grupo no ha obtenido más pruebas y sigue sin poder confirmar que el tren que aparece en las imágenes facilitadas[91] se utilizara para transportar munición.

Sospechas de cooperación militar con la República Popular Democrática de Corea

97. Según una noticia aparecida en los medios de comunicación, el Gobierno de transición de Malí ha emprendido un proyecto dirigido a construir una fábrica de municiones con el apoyo de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[92]. En la noticia se afirmaba que diplomáticos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea destinados en Guinea habían visitado Malí. Malí y Guinea aún no han respondido.

[84] No se dispone de información sobre la fecha de la presunta adquisición de las armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.
[85] S/2017/150, párr. 106.
[86] Véase www.youtube.com/live/7aEgXcmzPvE?feature=share&t=2760.
[87] Véase www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aEgXcmzPvE&t=2760s.
[88] Dirección: Bahosi Housing, Lanmadaw Township, Rangún (Myanmar).
[89] S/2023/171, párr. 124.
[90] S/2023/171, párrs. 122 y 123.
[91] S/2023/171, anexo 68.
[92] Véase https://netafrique.net/cooperation-mali-coree-du-nord-un-projet-de-construction-dune-usine-de-munitions-a-bamako.

Armas pequeñas y armas ligeras

98. Aunque tomó nota de la valoración de un grupo de expertos según la cual el embargo de armas del Consejo de Seguridad ha reducido en general el comercio de armas pequeñas y ligeras por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[93], el Grupo investigó información sobre transacciones de posibles "armas y material conexo" importados por Polonia de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2022 (por un total de 5.492 dólares, según la base de datos UN Comtrade (https://comtradeplus.un.org/))[94]. Polonia respondió que "el análisis de las bases de datos nacionales ... no muestra que en el período en cuestión tuvieran lugar importaciones de mercancías clasificadas en los códigos 9305 y 9306 del SA u otras mercancías relacionadas con armas procedentes de [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] con destino a Polonia" (véase el anexo 58).

Aplicación de la prohibición relativa a los artículos de lujo

99. La reapertura parcial de las fronteras en 2023 facilitó la reaparición en el comercio al por menor de gran variedad de productos extranjeros, incluidos algunos que podrían considerarse de lujo, incluidos artículos de marcas internacionales, así como vehículos nuevos de fabricación extranjera, según afirman testigos presenciales y se desprende de noticias aparecidas en los medios de comunicación. Las estadísticas comerciales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[95] reflejan un aumento de los volúmenes de importación de bienes de consumo con los códigos, entre otros, 24, 33, 43, 60 a 66 y 91 del SA, mientras que puede que estos grupos de mercancías incluyan artículos susceptibles de clasificarse como artículos de lujo. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

100. Las autoridades de Singapur declararon en junio al Grupo en una exposición informativa: "Las investigaciones establecieron que nueve empresas habían practicado actividades comerciales prohibidas con [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] de 2013 a 2018. Algunas de estas empresas vendían mercancías para la exportación y algunas ejercían funciones logísticas. Se ha enjuiciado a cinco empresas y nueve particulares, y se ha condenado a tres empresas y siete particulares por su participación en dichas actividades. [Están] pendientes de investigación los casos contra [otra] empresa y dos particulares" (véanse los anexos 59 y 60). El Grupo señala la importancia de vigilar las mercancías en tránsito o transbordo al aplicar las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad sobre las sanciones a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

101. El Grupo empezó a investigar a partir de imágenes de un vehículo Land Rover Defender recién entregado en Pyongyang en enero de 2023. El fabricante respondió al Grupo que este vehículo era "un Land Rover Defender 110, muy probablemente un modelo de 2020" (véase el anexo 61). Prosiguen las investigaciones.

[93] Véase www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation. Sin embargo, el Grupo ha detectado anteriormente transacciones de artículos que pueden considerarse incluidos en la categoría de "armas y material conexo" entre la República Popular Democrática de Corea y varios Estados Miembros. Véase S/2023/171, párrs. 118 a 121.

[94] El Grupo señala que Polonia era el único país cuyos datos aduaneros indicaban en 2022 exportaciones de armas pequeñas y armas ligeras de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. En este contexto, un experto externo indicó al Grupo tres posibles razones por las que "no se tenían indicios de las presuntas exportaciones a Rusia [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea]": a) la República Popular Democrática de Corea no informa a las Naciones Unidas de sus actividades comerciales; b) los Estados Miembros, entre ellos la Federación de Rusia, no divulgan plenamente los datos relativos a su comercio internacional; y c) la República Popular Democrática de Corea no realizó exportaciones.

[95] Véanse los párrs. 80 a 82.

102. El Grupo siguió investigando un piano de cola observado en la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2021 que, según los medios de comunicación, era de marca Steinway[96],[97]. Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc. respondió que no podía "determinar terminantemente si el piano era un piano Steinway sin inspeccionarlo físicamente y revisar su número de serie (si lo tiene)", si bien "múltiples incoherencias en la apariencia del piano vienen a indicar que el piano probablemente no es un Steinway" (véase el anexo 62).

Recomendaciones

103. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros examinen la posibilidad de actualizar sus listas de control de las exportaciones de forma que reflejen sus listas de artículos de lujo prohibidos conforme a los objetivos de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) y 2321 (2016), sin caer en ampliaciones innecesarias a fin de no restringir el suministro de bienes no prohibidos a la población civil ni provocar efectos humanitarios negativos**.

104. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que alienten a las entidades y los ciudadanos de su territorio que se dediquen a la exportación de artículos de lujo a incorporar en los contratos cláusulas que prohíban impidan su reenvío a la República Popular Democrática de Corea**.

Oficina General de Reconocimiento (Reconnaisance General Bureau, KPe.031)

105. El Grupo siguió vigilando e investigando ciberataques atribuidos a agentes generadores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea subordinados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento (RGB)[98], entre ellos Kimsuky, Lazarus Group y BlueNoroff[99]. Como se ha informado antes, las principales tareas de estos actores consisten en identificar y atacar objetivos a fin de solicitar fraudulentamente información de valor para la República Popular Democrática de Corea y generar ingresos de forma ilícita (véanse los párrs. 139 a 144).

106. Múltiples Estados Miembros han sancionado a actores de ciberamenazas vinculados a la RGB y a unidades conexas dentro de esta[100,101]. En febrero y mayo, dos Estados Miembros designaron también la Dependencia de Vigilancia Técnica (Reconocimiento). Los Estados Miembros han publicado advertencias y alertas con información detallada sobre las operaciones e indicadores de alerta de estos agentes generadores de ciberamenazas[102].

107. Según información de empresas de ciberseguridad y de los Estados Miembros, Kimsuky siguió realizando campañas de envío de mensajes con suplantación de identidad, remitiendo programas maliciosos mediante diversos tipos de archivos adjuntos y creando sitios web y URL usurpados para captar las credenciales de los atacados. Lazarus Group llevó a cabo campañas maliciosas contra empresas de los

[96] Véase www.nknews.org/2021/06/kim-jong-uns-new-favorite-band-lives-life-of-luxury-in-new-music-videos.

[97] S/2022/132, párr. 148.

[98] Véase S/2020/840, anexo 48, donde se indican las funciones de la RGB en las ciberoperaciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

[99] Los nombres utilizados en esta sección para los actores de las ciberamenazas y sus campañas son ampliamente utilizados en la industria de la ciberseguridad.

[100] En S/2023/171, figura XXXVII, puede obtenerse información sobre los agentes generadores de ciberamenazas dentro de la estructura organizativa de la RGB.

[101] Véase https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498 y www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373338&page=53.

[102] En relación con Kimsuky, por ejemplo, véase el anexo 63.

sectores de las criptomonedas, la defensa, la energía y la medicina. En un caso, se observó por primera vez una doble puesta en peligro de la cadena de suministro. BlueNoroff siguió practicando campañas de envío de mensajes con suplantación de identidad, y por primera vez dirigió programas maliciosos a usuarios de macOS. Sin embargo, uno de los casos suponía el envío de correos electrónicos con el objeto de dirigir involuntariamente a quienes respondían a una página de captación de credenciales. Se trataba de una novedad con respecto a la técnica habitual de BlueNoroff de remitir programas maliciosos.

Kimsuky[103,104]

108. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó de que Kimsuky se ha dedicado a distribuir archivos maliciosos adjuntos camuflados —documentos de macros de Word, archivos de Microsoft Compiled HTML Help, archivos de OneNote, etc.— que, al ejecutarse, filtran datos del ordenador de la víctima, en particular información del sistema y el programa antivirus instalado. En otro caso, Kimsuky creó un sitio web de correo electrónico (véase la fig. XXVI) que parecía idéntico al de un instituto de investigación relacionado con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, y utilizó mensajes con suplantación de identidad para inducir a las víctimas a iniciar sesión, gracias a lo cual Kimsuky obtenía información sobre el inicio de sesión[105].

Figura XXVI
Página de inicio de sesión de correo electrónico creada para atacar a investigadores relacionados con la República Popular Democrática de Corea



Fuente: ASEC.

[103] Una empresa de ciberseguridad publicó un informe detallado sobre Kimsuky (denominado APT43) en marzo de 2023. Véase https://mandiant.widen.net/s/zvmfw5fnjs/apt43-report. En el informe se señala que APT43 se suele rastrear públicamente como Kimsuky, aunque esta empresa de ciberseguridad cree que APT43 es un grupo aparte. Otra empresa de ciberseguridad se refiere a un agente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea generador de ciberamenazas, ARCHIPELAGO, como subconjunto de APT43. Véase https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/how-were-protecting-users-from-government-backed-attacks-from-north-korea.

[104] Pueden consultarse más casos relacionados con Kimsuky en el anexo 65.

[105] En el anexo 64 figuran enlaces con informes conexos.

109. Se conoce a Kimsuky principalmente por ataques de ingeniería social lanzados mediante envío de mensajes con suplantación de identidad, pero también ha atacado directamente a servidores web. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó en marzo de que Kimsuky había atacado un servidor web de servicios de información sobre Internet de una empresa de construcción con vulnerabilidades al no haberse actualizado los parches. La vulneración instaló un programa malicioso Meterpreter[106] en los sistemas atacados para permitir a Kimsuky hacerse con el control del servidor web. En un caso distinto, se ha informado de que Kimsuky utiliza Flujos Alternativos de Datos para ocultar un programa malicioso que recopila datos iniciando el lenguaje Visual Basic Script incluido en un archivo de Lenguaje de Marcación de Hipertexto (HTML)[107].

110. Según una advertencia publicada en marzo de 2023 por dos Estados miembros[108,109], Kimsuky emprendió una campaña de mensajes con suplantación de identidad que suponía el uso de extensiones maliciosas de Google Chrome para extraer subrepticiamente correos electrónicos de Gmail explotando la interfaz de programación de aplicaciones Chrome DevTools a fin de facilitar la interceptación y el robo de mensajes de correo electrónico. La advertencia también contenía un aviso sobre el uso por Kimsuky de programas maliciosos para Android FastFire, FastViewer y FastSpy[110].

111. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó en mayo[111] de que Kimsuky había emprendido una campaña de suplantación de identidad que invitaba a intercambiar opiniones sobre cuestiones geopolíticas de actualidad para atraer a destinatarios de todo el mundo y extender una nueva herramienta de reconocimiento, ReconShark, que recopila datos confidenciales y elude los mecanismos de seguridad. El programa malicioso ReconShark se activaba cuando el destinatario abría un documento descargado y activaba las macros. ReconShark robaba datos de sistemas infectados, como mecanismos de detección de puntos finales y respuesta a ellos, y enviaba los datos robados a un servidor de mando y control a través del instrumental de administración de Windows (WMI).

112. El Grupo recibió de un Estado Miembro información en el sentido de que Kimsuky también era responsable de operaciones de envío de mensajes con suplantación de identidad relacionadas con ReconShark dirigidas a los correos electrónicos de diversos funcionarios de las Naciones Unidas. Kimsuky camufló correos electrónicos con la identidad suplantada como si procedieran de agencias de noticias y grupos de reflexión que solicitaban observaciones y contribuciones por escrito. Los correos electrónicos de Kimsuky procedían de las direcciones andersonj@rfa.ink y ashraf@ipinst.online.

[106] El programa malicioso Meterpreter se emplea como puerta trasera que puede realizar varios comportamientos maliciosos al recibir órdenes de un agente generador de amenazas. Proporciona este programa malicioso Metasploit, herramienta de código abierto utilizada como marco de ensayos de penetración.

[107] En el anexo 64 figuran enlaces con informes conexos.

[108] Véase www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/prevention/2023-03-20-joint-cyber-security-advisory-korean.html.

[109] Véase www.nis.go.kr/resources/synap/skin/doc.html?fn=NIS_FILE_1679299138913.

[110] El Grupo informó sobre los programas maliciosos para Android en S/2023/171, anexo 79. Véase también https://medium.com/s2wblog/unveil-the-evolution-of-kimsuky-targeting-android-devices-with-newly-discovered-mobile-malware-280dae5a650f.

[111] Véase www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-evolves-reconnaissance-capabilities-in-new-global-campaign.

Lazarus Group[112]

113. En marzo, piratas informáticos pusieron en peligro aplicaciones de escritorio de 3CX[113] para Windows y macOS y las incorporaron en paquetes con programas maliciosos. Como consecuencia de ello, los clientes de 3CX descargaron inadvertidamente versiones maliciosas del programa de la empresa de llamadas de voz y por vídeo. Al utilizar las versiones maliciosas del programa, los atacantes pudieron descargar y ejecutar código arbitrario en las máquinas víctimas. Este ataque a la cadena de suministro[114] fue resultado de un ataque previo a la cadena de suministro de Trading Technologies, empresa de programas financieros, ejemplo poco habitual de cómo un único autor se sirvió de un ataque a la cadena de suministro de programas informáticos para llevar a cabo otro en sentido descendente. Entre los objetivos figuraban infraestructuras críticas del sector energético. Las empresas de ciberseguridad han atribuido este ataque a Lazarus Group[115].

114. El 18 de abril, un Estado Miembro anunció[116] que Lazarus Group había pirateado 207 ordenadores de 61 organizaciones y agencias locales, entre ellas cuatro empresas de biotecnología y tres que operaban en el ámbito de la defensa. El Lazarus Group atacó aprovechando una vulnerabilidad de un programa esencial para los servicios de banca por Internet y los servicios financieros electrónicos y utilizó códigos maliciosos distribuidos a través de sitios web de medios de comunicación en peligro. En el proceso se utilizó un ataque “de abrevadero”[117]. Gracias a esfuerzos conjuntos interinstitucionales de respuesta, el Estado Miembro bloqueó el ulterior acceso de los autores.

115. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó al Grupo en junio de que entre mayo y noviembre de 2022 se había observado que el Lazarus Group dirigió ataques contra organizaciones de investigación de los sectores público y privado y los sectores energéticos y de investigación médica de un Estado Miembro, así como sus cadenas de suministro. Esta campaña, denominada “No Pineapple”[118],[119], se centró en la

[112] Pueden consultarse más casos relacionados con Lazarus Group en el anexo 67.

[113] 3CX es un desarrollador y distribuidor internacional de programas de protocolo de transmisión de voz por Internet que presta a muchas organizaciones servicios de telefonía. Según su sitio web, 3CX tiene más de 600.000 clientes y 12 millones de usuarios en diversos sectores, como el aeroespacial y el de la atención sanitaria. Proporciona programas instalados para utilizar sus sistemas a través de un navegador web y de aplicaciones móviles o de escritorio.

[114] En julio de 2023, JumpCloud, empresa de gestión de tecnologías de la información, anunció que un agente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea generador de ciberamenazas había obtenido acceso no autorizado a su sistema para atacar a un conjunto reducido y específico de sus clientes (véase www.sentinelone.com/labs/jumpcloud-intrusion-attacker-infrastructure-links-compromise-to-north-korean-apt-activity y https://jumpcloud.com/blog/security-update-incident-details). Las empresas de ciberseguridad determinaron que el Lazarus Group era el culpable de este ataque a la cadena de suministro y que el robo de criptomonedas era el objetivo (véase www.reuters.com/technology/n-korea-hackers-breached-us-it-company-bid-steal-crypto-sources-2023-07-20).

[115] Véase www.crowdstrike.com/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cxdesktopapp-customers, www.welivesecurity.com/2023/04/20/linux-malware-strengthens-links-lazarus-3cx-supply-chain-attack, www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise y https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/xtrader-3cx-supply-chain.

[116] Se pueden consultar detalles en el anexo 66.

[117] En un ataque “de abrevadero” el atacante infecta un sitio web visitado con frecuencia o utilizado habitualmente por personas u organizaciones a los que se dirige un ataque. El objetivo es poner en peligro los ordenadores de las víctimas para cuando visiten el sitio web infectado mediante la instalación de programas maliciosos adicionales.

[118] Véase https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/WithSecure-Lazarus-No-Pineapple-Threat-Intelligence-Report-2023.pdf.

[119] “No Pineapple” es un mensaje de error visto que transmite un programa malicioso de acceso remoto cuando se cargan datos robados en el servidor del Lazarus Group.

recopilación de información, empezando por un ataque a una empresa explotada mediante CVE-2022-27925 (ejecución remota de código) y CVE-2022-37042 (elusión de la autenticación), dos vulnerabilidades que afectan a la plataforma de colaboración digital Zimbra[120]. Mediante el acceso a Zimbra, el Lazarus Group rastreó el contenido de buzones de correo para recopilar información. A continuación, se desplazó lateralmente a otro dispositivo vulnerable de la misma red y utilizó el programa malicioso Dtrack[121] como puerta trasera de robo de información para acabar robando 100 GB de datos.

BlueNoroff

116. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó en enero[122] de que TA444, grupo de amenaza persistente avanzada patrocinado por la República Popular Democrática de Corea que "se solapa con BlueNoroff", envió a fines de diciembre de 2022 a una gran variedad de destinatarios de múltiples Estados Miembros correos electrónicos con la identidad suplantada que abarcaban diversas "verticales", como la educación, el gobierno y la atención sanitaria, además de las finanzas[123]. Los correos de señuelo inducían a los usuarios a hacer clic en una "URL de SendGrid"[124], que redirigía a las víctimas a una página de captación de credenciales. Se trataba presuntamente de una novedad con respecto a anteriores operaciones TA444, que normalmente consistían en la extensión directa de programas maliciosos.

117. En abril se observó por primera vez que BlueNoroff se dirigía a usuarios de macOS a través de un nuevo programa malicioso para macOS denominado RustBucket[125] que se hace pasar por una aplicación de visualización de PDF e induce a las víctimas a descargar y abrir la aplicación. A continuación, RustBucket transmite un troyano que permite a BlueNoroff llevar a cabo acciones como robar información confidencial, borrar o modificar archivos, instalar programas maliciosos adicionales y controlar remotamente el sistema que corre peligro. En junio otra empresa de ciberseguridad detectó una versión actualizada de RustBucket con capacidades mejoradas para establecer persistencia y evitar la detección[126].

Trabajadores en el extranjero

118. El Grupo sigue investigando a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que obtienen ingresos en el extranjero (trabajadores en el extranjero) en contravención del párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad. El Grupo observa que el cierre de las fronteras del país sigue haciendo difícil que los Estados Miembros repatríen a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aplicación de la resolución.

[120] En www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-228a puede consultarse una advertencia de ciberseguridad sobre aspectos vulnerables y riesgos comunes relacionados con Zimbra.

[121] Pueden consultarse más detalles sobre el programa malicioso Dtrack en S/2023/171, párr. 171, y S/2020/151, párr. 119.

[122] Véase www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta444-apt-startup-aimed-at-your-funds.

[123] Las actividades de TA444 han tenido históricamente una motivación financiera. Por ejemplo, se conoce a este grupo por su "campaña Snatchcrypto". Véase S/2022/668, párr. 127.

[124] SendGrid es una herramienta de comercialización por correo electrónico basada en la nube que ayuda a comercializadores y desarrolladores a gestionar campañas y atraer audiencia.

[125] Véase www.jamf.com/blog/bluenoroff-apt-targets-macos-rustbucket-malware.

[126] Véase www.elastic.co/security-labs/DPRK-strikes-using-a-new-variant-of-rustbucket y www.sentinelone.com/blog/bluenoroff-how-dprks-macos-rustbucket-seeks-to-evade-analysis-and-detection.

Trabajadores de tecnología de la información[127]

Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company (conocida también como Jinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company)

119. Según información de los Estados Miembros y de fuentes abiertas, Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company (en adelante, "Chinyong IT"), entidad subordinada al Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares (KPe.054) (también conocido como Ministerio de Defensa y Ministerio de Defensa Nacional), "emplea a delegaciones de trabajadores de [la República Popular Democrática de Corea especializados en tecnología de la información] que operan en "múltiples países". Además, una persona de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de nombre Kim Sang Man de la que se sabe que está radicada en Vladivostok (Federación de Rusa) y es el presunto Director General de Chinyong IT, supuestamente estaba involucrada en la venta y transferencia de equipo de tecnología de la información para la República Popular Democrática de Corea, y en 2021 recibió transferencias en criptomoneda de trabajadores de tecnología de la información de China y la Federación de Rusia. Se afirma que los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Kim Ki Hyok, Jon Yon Gun[128] y Kim Song Il, representantes de Chinyong IT en la Federación de Rusia, la República Democrática Popular Lao y China, respectivamente, han participado en la generación ilícita de ingresos extranjeros para la República Popular Democrática de Corea[129]. Dos Estados Miembros designaron en mayo a Chinyong IT y Kim Sang Man, y uno de los dos Estados Miembros designó también en mayo a los ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Kim Ki Hyok, Jon Yon Gun y Kim Song Il[130].

120. Un Estado Miembro también informó al Grupo de que entre 2017 y 2022 Chinyong IT realizó transacciones por valor de más de 50 millones de dólares y de que mantiene decenas de cuentas bancarias para blanquear ingresos ilícitos. Según el Estado Miembro, una empresa con sede en un tercer país ha participado directamente en el blanqueo de dinero en nombre de Chinyong IT. El Estado Miembro aportó información en el sentido de que Chinyong IT utilizó varias cuentas bancarias y servicios de transferencia de dinero para realizar transacciones por valor de más de 20 millones de dólares en relación con el equipo de Chinyong IT con sede en la República Democrática Popular Lao entre principios de 2020 y principios de 2022, así como transacciones por valor de más de 5 millones de dólares en relación con los equipos de Chinyong IT con sede en China y la Federación de Rusia a mediados de 2022. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

121. La Federación de Rusia respondió que "no disponía de datos sobre ciudadanos norcoreanos que, según terceros, se encontraban en Rusia y eran sospechosos de violar las sanciones financieras del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas participando en actividades específicas en el ciberespacio". China respondió que "no encontró ciberactividades financieras ilegales por parte de los individuos en cuestión

[127] En www.state.gov/guidance-on-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-information-technology-workers y www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_25525/contents.do pueden consultarse orientaciones/advertencias de un Estados Miembro sobre los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero. El Grupo entrevistó a varios expertos en relación con trabajadores (véanse sus conclusiones en el anexo 68). Las conclusiones son coherentes con el contenido de las orientaciones/advertencias de los Estados Miembros.

[128] El Grupo recibió en junio de 2023 información en el sentido de que Jon Yon Gun había abandonado la República Democrática Popular Lao.

[129] En el anexo 69 puede consultarse información sobre los ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mencionados en este párrafo.

[130] Véanse https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498 y www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=17.

dentro de las fronteras chinas” (véase el anexo 25). La República Democrática Popular Lao todavía no ha respondido.

República Democrática Popular Lao

122. El Grupo informó antes sobre Oh Chung Song, trabajador de tecnologías de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que, al parecer, desarrolló y suministró programas relacionados con las tecnologías de la información a una serie de empresas distintas a través de una plataforma de trabajo autónomo[131]. El Sr. Oh, junto con otras ocho personas relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, se trasladó de Dubái (Emiratos Árabes Unidos) a Vientiane en diciembre de 2021. La República Democrática Popular Lao respondió que el Sr. Oh, junto con otras dos personas (Kim Il Hyok y Kim Myong Chol), habían salido de Vientiane en febrero de 2023 y que las seis personas restantes serían “repatriadas a su país de origen” y “sus expedientes se comunicarían al [Grupo] una vez que se hubiera aplicado la medida”. En junio el Grupo recibió información en el sentido de que las ocho personas habían abandonado Vientiane. El Grupo está a la espera de información de inmigración de la República Democrática Popular Lao relativa a estas personas.

123. Un Estado Miembro aportó al Grupo información en el sentido de que Tongmyong Technology Trade Company (en adelante, “Tongmyong Tech”), al parecer filial del Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (KPe.028) con sede en la República Democrática Popular Lao, había enviado al extranjero a trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Según el Estado Miembro, el nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Kim Hyo Dong es el representante de Tongmyong Tech en la República Democrática Popular Lao. Además, otros dos ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea afincados en la República Democrática Popular Lao, Yu Song Hyok y Yun Song Il, presuntamente han prestado apoyo a trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que buscaban espacio de oficinas y alojamiento y han mediado con corredores extranjeros para cobrar en efectivo activos virtuales malversados. Estas dos personas también regentan un restaurante de la República Democrática Popular de Corea[132] en la República Democrática Popular Lao (véase el párrafo 124)[133]. Por todo ello, el Estado Miembro designó a Tongmyong Tech, Kim Hyo Dong, Yu Song Hyok y Yun Song Il en mayo de 2023[134]. La República Democrática Popular Lao todavía no ha respondido. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Trabajadores de restaurantes

124. El Grupo informó anteriormente de que cuatro restaurantes y un mercado nocturno habían empleado a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea después de diciembre de 2019, cuando deberían haber sido repatriados[135]. La República Democrática Popular de Laos respondió que “de ellos, dos restaurantes transfirieron su propiedad y su gestión a ciudadanos laosianos y volvieron a abrir con el mismo nombre y a servir comida coreana”, y explicó que la propiedad y la gestión de los restaurantes cumplen totalmente la normativa laosiana y ya no contravienen las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad. El Grupo observa que la República Democrática Popular Lao no facilitó información sobre los trabajadores de restaurantes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Además, si el control o

[131] S/2023/172, párr. 153, y S/2022/668, párr. 142.

[132] Tokyo Sushi & Teppanyaki (dirección: Donchan Road, Thatkhao Village, distrito de Sisattanak, Vientiane).

[133] En el anexo 71 puede consultarse información sobre los ciudadanos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mencionados en este párrafo.

[134] Véase www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373689&page=1.

[135] S/2022/132, párr. 174 y anexo 82.

los beneficios del restaurante siguen correspondiendo a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, el cambio de la propiedad o la gestión oficiales a una persona local podría constituir una táctica de evasión de las sanciones[136]. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Trabajadores médicos

Libia

125. Según la información obtenida por el Grupo, un equipo médico de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trabajó en enero en un hospital de Libia. La información indicaba que el equipo fue transportado a Kufra en un avión fletado por una compañía de transporte aéreo con sede en Libia. La investigación del Grupo muestra que el Senegal empleó a al menos 10 de los trabajadores entre 2019 y 2020[137]. El Grupo ha pedido a Libia que aporte información adicional. Prosiguen las investigaciones (véase el anexo 72).

Mozambique

126. El Grupo obtuvo información en el sentido de que al menos tres trabajadores médicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea parecían encontrarse trabajando en dos hospitales de Mozambique a diciembre de 2022. Mozambique respondió que “reconoc[ía] la determinación comunicada ... de poner fin a la contratación de nuevos médicos [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] y cancelar los contratos existentes”, y añadió que “se trataba de médicos altamente cualificados y especializados para reforzar la atención de las necesidades del Servicio Nacional de Salud” (véase el anexo 73).

Senegal

127. En el Senegal, un equipo médico de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trabajó en varios lugares en colaboración con una organización no gubernamental (ONG) entre 2019 y 2020. La ONG respondió a la pregunta del Grupo que un equipo médico de la República Popular Democrática de Corea compuesto por 30 personas fue presentado a la organización por un embajador de la República Popular Democrática de Corea; que el equipo médico trabajó con la ONG en varias ocasiones, incluso en actos religiosos y locales; y que el equipo trabajaba de forma voluntaria. El Grupo pidió al Senegal que aportara información adicional sobre cualquier remuneración percibida por el equipo a cambio de su trabajo (véase el anexo 74). Prosiguen las investigaciones.

[136] Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que, para encubrir su participación en actividades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de evasión de sanciones, personas y entidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de países distintos han utilizado facilitadores extranjeros para crear una negación plausible y han cambiado el registro de empresas, aviones y buques, incluso sustituyendo los nombres de nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea por los de personas de otros países, mientras que los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea mantenían el control o percibían beneficios de otro modo. Véanse, por ejemplo, S/2013/337, párrs. 78 y 110 y anexo XIII; S/2015/131, párrs. 131 y 132; S/2017/150, párr. 154; S/2018/171, para.189; S/2019/171, anexos 46 y 47; y S/2022/668, párr. 64 y anexo 39. Puede consultarse una investigación anterior de los restaurantes de la República Democrática Popular de Corea en la República Democrática Popular Lao en S/2020/840, párr. 133.

[137] El Grupo anotó las fotografías originales de las personas que figuran en los anexos a fin de proteger su intimidad.

Trabajadores de la construcción

128. El Grupo se ha dirigido antes por escrito a varios Estados Miembros y entidades acerca de información sobre nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajan en el extranjero con visados de estudiante[138], y un Estado miembro le ha confirmado la práctica[139].

129. El Grupo investigó el caso de los presuntos trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea implicados en un accidente en las obras de construcción de un edificio residencial en Korsakov, Sajalín (Federación de Rusia), en abril de 2020. La Fiscalía de la ciudad de Korsakov determinó que la empresa implicada, LLC Euro-Standard [140], permitió a ciudadanos extranjeros trabajar en la obra de construcción de un edificio residencial de varias plantas en contravención de la legislación laboral y en materia de migración. La Federación de Rusia respondió que "los dos ciudadanos de [la República Popular Democrática de Corea] heridos durante la construcción de un edificio residencial estaban realizando un curso de prácticas industriales como parte de sus estudios en la Universidad del estado de Sajalín, institución de enseñanza superior financiada con fondos federales" (véase el anexo 75).

Recomendación

130. **El Grupo recuerda a los Estados Miembros que no existen exenciones humanitarias o de servicios sanitarios al requisito, de conformidad con el párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad, de repatriar a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a todos los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero que obtuvieran ingresos en un territorio sujeto a la jurisdicción de ese Estado Miembro y a todos los agregados de supervisión de la seguridad del Gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que vigilaran a los trabajadores de este país en el extranjero, a menos que el Estado Miembro en cuestión determinara que un nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea fuera nacional de ese Estado Miembro o que se tratara de un nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea cuya repatriación estuviera prohibida, con sujeción a las disposiciones aplicables del derecho nacional e internacional**.

V. Finanzas

131. El Grupo considera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue accediendo al sistema financiero internacional y realizando operaciones financieras ilícitas, en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

Representantes bancarios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero

132. El Grupo está investigando información en el sentido de que el nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Sim Hyon Sop es un representante de Korea Kwangson Banking Corporation[141] (KPe.025) (en adelante, "KKBC") radicado en un tercer país hasta fechas recientes, pero actualmente radicado en Dandong (China)[142].

[138] S/2020/151, párr. 146 y anexo 39; S/2020/840, párrs. 108 y 137 a 139 y anexo 54; S/2021/211, párr. 130 y anexo 67; y S/2022/132, párrs. 176 y 177 y anexo 83.
[139] S/2020/840, párr. 139.
[140] ООО "Евро-Стандарт".
[141] Entidad subordinada al Banco de Comercio Exterior (KPe.047).
[142] Véase www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1581281/download.

Según un Estado Miembro, entre 2021 y marzo de 2023 el Sr. Sim recibió más de 24 millones de dólares en moneda virtual blanqueada, incluidos al menos 12 millones de dólares de trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea subordinados al Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (KPe.028). Al parecer, algunos de estos trabajadores de tecnología de la información obtuvieron ilícitamente empleo en empresas de los Estados Unidos y solicitaron que se les remunerara por su trabajo en moneda virtual. Además, el Sr. Sim presuntamente ordenó a operadores extrabursátiles (véase el párrafo 142) que enviaran pagos a empresas pantalla con fondos procedentes de monedas virtuales robadas para que dichas empresas pudieran efectuar pagos en dinero fíat por mercancías en nombre de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Dos Estados Miembros designaron al Sr. Sim en abril de 2023[143]. China respondió que “no encontró ciberactividades financieras ilegales por parte de los individuos en cuestión dentro de las fronteras chinas” (véase el anexo 25).

133. Según información de los Estados Miembros, el Sr. Sim, en nombre de KKBC, también trabajó con otras personas en la adquisición de mercancías para la República Popular Democrática de Corea mediante empresas pantalla, registros de envío falsos y otros medios de engaño. El Estado Miembro estimó que estas actividades supusieron ingresos por valor de casi 700 millones de dólares para la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Sr. Sim y sus asociados también adquirieron presuntamente un helicóptero de un tercer país para la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2019, en contravención de las resoluciones[144]. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Acceso al sistema financiero internacional

134. Según un Estado Miembro, Green Pine Associated Corporation (KPe.010) está colaborando con un nacional de un tercer país para acceder a servicios bancarios. El Estado Miembro señala además que también se conoce a Green Pine Associated Corporation por utilizar varios nombres de empresas pantalla de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[145]. Prosiguen las investigaciones. Se trata de los siguientes nombres de empresas pantalla:

a) Jihyang Associated Corporation;

b) Jihyang Technology Trade Company;

c) Jihyang Trading Corporation;

d) Korea Construction & Gym Equipment Corporation;

e) Gym Equipment Corporation;

f) Gym Equipment Associated Corporation;

g) Gymnastic Equipment Corporation;

h) Korea Construction and Sports Equipment United Corporation;

i) Sports Equipment United Corporation.

135. El Grupo sigue recibiendo información en el sentido de que personas y entidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea acceden ilícitamente al sistema financiero internacional (véase el párrafo 120). Del mismo modo, según un Estado Miembro, una entidad subordinada al Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares

[143] Véanse https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1435 y www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373600&page=1.

[144] Véase www.justice.gov/usao-dc/press-release/file/1584251/download.

[145] Se hace referencia a las tres primeras empresas en S/2022/668, párr. 120.

(KPe.054) utiliza decenas de cuentas bancarias en terceros países para remitir los ingresos a su cuartel general a fin de que este recupere su control. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Empresas conjuntas, entidades cooperativas y actividades comerciales ilícitas

136. El Grupo inició una investigación de la Korean National Insurance Company (KPe.048) (en adelante, “KNIC”), que, según un Estado Miembro, en los últimos años ha intensificado considerablemente su colaboración con compañías de seguros y reaseguros y bufetes de abogados de todo el mundo en relación con la liquidación de antiguas reclamaciones y la participación en nuevas pólizas de seguros. Para ocultar su identidad y eludir las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad, KNIC presuntamente trabaja con los nombres de sus empresas pantalla o subordinadas, entre ellas Rainbow Intermediaries, Samhae Insurance Corporation y Polestar Insurance Company, y sus representantes en el extranjero (muchos de los cuales se encuentran “bajo cobertura diplomática” en embajadas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea). Según información de un Estado Miembro y medios de comunicación[146], KNIC tiene un historial de fraude en los seguros, y se sospecha que sus empresas subordinadas están igualmente implicadas en actividades fraudulentas. Al parecer, han utilizado empresas locales como intermediarias para recibir o enviar pagos a fin de sortear las sanciones. El Grupo ha solicitado información a las empresas potencialmente vinculadas con KNIC y sus entidades subordinadas, pero espera respuestas de la mayoría de ellas. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

137. Según un Estado Miembro, la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue estableciendo empresas conjuntas y entidades cooperativas con el fin de eludir las sanciones y utilizando empresas pantalla y fantasma. El Grupo investiga nueva información de un Estado Miembro relativa a una persona, Choi Chon Gon, que en 2019 estableció en Mongolia una empresa pantalla de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Hanne Ulaan LLC (en adelante, “Hanne Ulaan”), que utilizó para adquirir bienes para Pyongyang. El Grupo investigó anteriormente al Sr. Choi y a Hanne Ulaan, y las autoridades mongolas informaron entonces al Grupo de que la documentación de registro de la empresa se había remitido a una dirección en Moscú que coincidía con la de la embajada de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Mongolia consideró a título preliminar que Hanne Ulaan era una empresa pantalla de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con el fin de eludir las sanciones, e informó además de la congelación de fondos en cuentas bancarias vinculadas con Hanne Ulaan y el Sr. Choi[147]. En junio, un Estado Miembro designó a Hanne Ulaan y al Sr. Choi por participar en negocios financieros ilícitos en nombre de la República Popular Democrática de Corea[148]. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

138. El Grupo observa que la reciente apertura parcial de las fronteras por la República Popular Democrática de Corea puede aumentar el número de casos de nacionales suyos que trafican con efectivo y artículos de gran valor. Se sabe que algunos ciudadanos del país que viajaban al extranjero llevaban en su equipaje

[146] Véanse, por ejemplo, www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/apr/23/uk-freezes-assets-of-north-korean-company-in-south-london-insurance-nuclear-weapons, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061703852.html?wpisrc=newsletter, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/ID013001/KNIC-refutes-new-fraud-allegations y https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0209.pdf. El Estado Miembro informó de que KNIC y el Gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea han intentado cometer fraude en los seguros sobreasegurando fábricas u otros edificios de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde el comienzo de una póliza o inflando el importe monetario de las pérdidas, además de, probablemente, inventando reclamaciones por desastres.

[147] S/2021/211, párr. 152 y anexo 89.

[148] Véase www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=373848&page=1.

artículos de gran valor, como dinero en efectivo, oro y productos de la fauna y la flora silvestres, para eludir las sanciones[149]. Un Estado Miembro ha informado de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue dedicándose al tráfico de efectivo. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

Generación ilícita de ingresos mediante ciberactividades

139. En febrero, una empresa de ciberseguridad informó[150] de que ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea patrocinados por el Estado, como el Lazarus Group[151], fueron responsables de robos de criptodivisas por valor de casi 1.700 millones de dólares en 2022, suma que supone más del triple de la robada en 2021 (véase la fig. XXVII). La empresa considera además que el país está dando prioridad a las operaciones de pirateo de criptodivisas "para financiar sus programas de armas nucleares". De la cantidad total robada por agentes generadores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2022, casi dos tercios (cerca de 1.100 millones de dólares) se originaron en ataques dirigidos contra plataformas financieras descentralizadas, en concreto las operaciones de pirateo de Harmony Bridge[152] y la red Ronin de Axie Infinity[153,154]. Del mismo modo, según una noticia aparecida en mayo en los medios de comunicación sobre el análisis de otra empresa de ciberseguridad[155], la República Popular Democrática de Corea dirige sus ataques contra activos virtuales de múltiples empresas de los Estados Miembros "para obtener las divisas que utiliza para su programa de misiles", habiendo robado criptomoneda por valor de 2.300 millones de dólares entre 2017 y 2022. Un funcionario de un Estado Miembro estimó en mayo que mediante las ciberactividades maliciosas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se financia la mitad de su programa de misiles[156,157].

[149] Véanse, por ejemplo, las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad 2321 (2016), párr. 35, 2270 (2016), párr. 37, y 2094 (2013), párr. 14; y https://static.rusi.org/OP-embassies-and-elephants-north-koreas-involvement-in-the-IWT-final-web.pdf.

[150] Véase https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/2022-biggest-year-ever-for-crypto-hacking.

[151] Subordinado a RGB (KPe.031); véanse los párrs. 105 a 107 y 113 a 115.

[152] Las autoridades de los Estados Miembros han colaborado con empresas de cambio de criptomonedas y de ciberseguridad para recuperar fondos procedentes de estas actividades de pirateo. Véase https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/elliptic-collaborates-with-binance-and-huobi-to-freeze-lazarus-group-hack-proceeds.

[153] S/2022/668, párrs. 147 y 148, y S/2023/171, párr. 165.

[154] En febrero de 2023 la Autoridad Nacional para la Investigación y el Enjuiciamiento de Delitos Económicos y Ambientales de Noruega (Økokrim) anunció que se habían recuperado criptomonedas por valor de unos 60 millones de coronas noruegas (5,8 millones de dólares). Véase www.okokrim.no/record-cryptocurrency-seizure-in-the-axie-case.6585495-549344.html

[155] Véase https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cryptocurrencies/North-Korean-crypto-thefts-target-Japan-Vietnam-Hong-Kong.

[156] Véase https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/north-korean-missile-program-cyberattacks/index.html y www.youtube.com/watch?v=fz_3PZq8gXs.

[157] Otros Estados miembros también han determinado públicamente que la República Popular Democrática de Corea está utilizando sus ciberactividades maliciosas para financiar sus programas nucleares o de misiles. Véase, por ejemplo, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230719008400320.

Figura XXVII
Total anual de criptomonedas robadas por agentes generadores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2016-2022
(Millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: Chainalysis

140. Los agentes generadores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen dirigiendo su actividad a proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales y al sector de los activos virtuales en general con el fin de evadir las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas. El Grupo sigue investigando estas infracciones de las sanciones financieras por parte de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

Sector de las criptomonedas

141. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó[158] en febrero de 2023 de que el nuevo mezclador de monedas virtuales Sinbad era probablemente una nueva versión de Blender.io con la imagen rediseñada[159]. Según el informe, Sinbad había blanqueado en Bitcoin cerca de 100 millones de dólares procedentes de operaciones de pirateo atribuidas al Lazarus Group, incluida la de Harmony Bridge en junio de 2022. Sinbad tiene a “la misma persona o grupo como responsable” de su funcionamiento, y los monederos vinculados a un presunto operador de Blender.io también mostraban criptomonedas destinadas a Sinbad[160]. El patrón de comportamiento en cadena es presuntamente muy semejante para ambos mezcladores, incluidas las características específicas de las transacciones y el uso de otros servicios con fines de confusión. Además, “el funcionamiento del mezclador Sinbad es idéntico al de Blender en varios

[158] Véase https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/has-a-sanctioned-bitcoin-mixer-been-resurrected-to-aid-north-korea-s-lazarus-group.

[159] En 2022, un Estado Miembro designó los mezcladores de monedas virtuales Blender.io y Tornado Cash. Véanse S/2022/668, párr. 147, y S/2023/171, párr. 161.

[160] Otra empresa de ciberseguridad informa (véase la anterior nota 150) de que “observó monederos pertenecientes a piratas informáticos vinculados a Corea del Norte que enviaban fondos al servicio [Sinbad]”

aspectos, incluidos los códigos del mezclador de diez dígitos, las cartas de garantía firmadas por la dirección del servicio y un plazo máximo de siete días para realizar la transacción". Prosiguen las investigaciones.

142. El Grupo investiga la información de los Estados Miembros relativa a Wu Huihui, ciudadano chino y comerciante extrabursátil de moneda virtual, por haber facilitado la conversión de moneda virtual robada por ciberagentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en dinero fíat, y a Cheng Hung Man, comerciante extrabursátil de un tercer país radicado en Hong Kong que trabajó con el Sr. Wu para remitir pagos a empresas a cambio de moneda virtual. Al parecer, el Sr. Cheng utilizó empresas pantalla para que agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea eludieran los controles de la financiación ilícita establecidos en instituciones financieras. Los Sres. Wu y Cheng fueron designados por un Estado Miembro en abril[161]. En estas actividades actuaron bajo la dirección de una tercera persona de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Sim Hyon Sop (véanse los párrs. 132 y 133). A la pregunta del Grupo sobre el Sr. Wu y el Sr. Cheng, China respondió que "no había encontrado ciberactividades financieras ilegales cometidas por las personas en cuestión en el interior de China ... las ciberactividades mencionadas por el Grupo no entran en el ámbito prohibido por las resoluciones" (véase el anexo 25).

143. El 3 de junio, Atomic Wallet, monedero descentralizado sin custodia con sede en Estonia, confirmó que había recibido información sobre monederos en peligro[162]. Una empresa de ciberseguridad determinó que el responsable era Lazarus Group y señaló que el blanqueo de los criptoactivos robados siguió "una serie de pasos que coinciden exactamente con los empleados para blanquear los ingresos de anteriores actividades de pirateo llevadas a cabo por el Lazarus Group"[163]. Los activos robados se blanquearon a través de Sinbad. Según otra información de la misma empresa[164], se habían robado más de 100 millones de dólares de más de 5.500 monederos en peligro. Además, determinó que los piratas informáticos "han recurrido a la bolsa [de criptomonedas] Garantex[165], radicada en Rusia, para blanquear los activos robados". Garantex fue designado por un Estado Miembro en abril de 2022[166]. En respuesta a una pregunta del Grupo, Estonia respondió que el caso se estaba investigando.

Programas maliciosos secuestradores

144. El Grupo observa que dos Estados Miembros emitieron en febrero una advertencia en relación con una campaña mundial de secuestración informática maliciosa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea contra objetivos sanitarios y de infraestructura crítica[167]. La alerta avisaba a las víctimas para que no pagaran rescates porque "hacerlo no garantizaba la recuperación de archivos y registros y podía suponer riesgos para las sanciones". La advertencia incluye recomendaciones para defenderse de los incidentes de secuestración informática maliciosa y mitigarlos, detalles sobre aspectos vulnerables y riesgos comunes e indicadores de riesgo en relación con las variantes Maui y H0lyGh0st de este tipo de programas

[161] Véase https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1498.

[162] Véase https://atomicwallet.io/blog/june-3rd-event-statement.

[163] Véase https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/north-korea-s-lazarus-group-likely-responsible-for-35-million-atomic-crypto-theft.

[164] Véase https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/north-korea-linked-atomic-wallet-heist-tops-100-million.

[165] Garantex se registró en Estonia en 2019, pero perdió su licencia de prestación servicios de monedas virtuales en febrero de 2022. Según un Estado Miembro, la mayoría de las operaciones de Garantex con divisas virtuales se llevan a cabo en Moscú y San Petersburgo (Federación de Rusia).

[166] Véase https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0701.

[167] En el anexo 76 puede consultarse la advertencia conjunta titulada "#StopRansomware: Los ataques de programas maliciosos secuestradores contra infraestructuras críticas sirven para financiar ciberactividades maliciosas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea".

secuestradores[168]. Según la advertencia, la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha utilizado los ingresos procedentes de ataques de tales programas para financiar otras ciberoperaciones maliciosas y las prioridades y objetivos del país.

Recomendaciones

145. **El Grupo alienta a los Estados Miembros a que se mantengan atentos a la evasión de sanciones financieras por la República Popular Democrática de Corea mediante el uso por entidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea designadas por las Naciones Unidas de empresas pantalla y subordinadas. El Grupo también alienta a los Estados Miembros a que faciliten nombres de empresas y otros datos de identificación al Grupo o al Comité, según proceda**.

146. **El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados miembros apliquen lo antes posible las orientaciones del Grupo de Acción Financiera Internacional sobre los activos virtuales y los proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales, incluida la plena aplicación de la recomendación 15 revisada (y la "Regla para Viajes")**.

147. **El Grupo recomienda además a los Estados Miembros que consideren la posibilidad de emitir una divulgación más activa al sector de los activos virtuales para garantizar una amplia conciencia sobre los robos de activos virtuales por medios cibernéticos perpetrados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, así como sobre las medidas adecuadas para defenderse de esos ataques y responder a ellos.**

VI. Efectos humanitarios imprevistos de las sanciones

148. En el párrafo 25 de la resolución 2397 (2017), el Consejo de Seguridad reafirma que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no tienen el propósito de acarrear consecuencias humanitarias adversas para la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, y destaca también la responsabilidad primordial del país y la necesidad de que este atienda plenamente las necesidades de subsistencia de su población. El Grupo siguió supervisando la información disponible relacionada con la situación humanitaria y la asistencia humanitaria al país de conformidad con los párrafos 24 y 25 de la resolución 2397 (2017) y otras resoluciones pertinentes.

149. El Grupo observa que recientemente se aprobó la resolución 2664 (2022), en la que el Consejo de Seguridad subraya la necesidad de minimizar los efectos humanitarios adversos imprevistos de las sanciones y sugiere medidas a tal fin, y que el Comité actualizó el 2 de junio de 2023 la nota orientativa para la aplicación de resoluciones núm. 7 incorporando los elementos pertinentes de la resolución 2664 (2022) y una explicación de su aplicación en el contexto de la asistencia humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea[169].

Situación humanitaria

150. El Grupo sigue reconociendo que faltan datos fiables sobre la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea, especialmente como consecuencia del cierre de fronteras del país y de la consiguiente incapacidad de la mayoría de los observadores extranjeros y organizaciones humanitarias para informar

[168] Se conoce al agente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea generador de ciberamenazas que está detrás de los ataques de secuestración con el nombre Andariel. Véase S/2023/171, párrs. 163 y 164.

[169] En el anexo 77 figuran las actualizaciones de la nota orientativa para la aplicación de resoluciones núm. 7.

sobre las condiciones dentro del país. El Grupo también observa la ausencia de una metodología que desglose las consecuencias de las sanciones multilaterales separándolas de otros factores. El Grupo mantuvo la práctica de enviar a las organizaciones humanitarias su cuestionario (véase el anexo 78), cuyas respuestas anonimizadas aparecen reflejadas en el anexo 79.

151. Las entidades de las Naciones Unidas, los Estados Miembros y las ONG siguen considerando que la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea se deteriora, con 11,3 millones de personas necesitadas de asistencia y un índice de población desnutrida del 45,5 %, según fuentes de las Naciones Unidas[170]. La seguridad alimentaria, la nutrición infantil, la cobertura de inmunización y el acceso al agua limpia y a servicios básicos de saneamiento e higiene han empeorado[171].

152. La situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea es posiblemente resultado de la combinación de muchos factores. Por orden descendente, cabe mencionar las políticas socioeconómicas del país, que dan prioridad a las armas de destrucción masiva y los misiles balísticos, la pandemia de enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19) y el consiguiente cierre de fronteras, los desastres naturales, la escasa prioridad que el país concede a la ayuda humanitaria[172] y los efectos imprevistos de las sanciones.

153. Un ligero alivio de la política de cierre de fronteras y la relajación de las restricciones de la cuarentena en la primavera de 2023 permitieron reanudar en cierta medida las importaciones de cereales, otros productos alimenticios y productos médicos, con lo cual la situación había mejorado en verano al menos levemente. Puede que los encargados de formular políticas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea estén dando mayor prioridad a la producción agrícola y de cereales[173].

154. Aunque es difícil precisar con exactitud, sobre la base de sus anteriores evaluaciones y de información facilitada por Estados Miembros, agentes humanitarios y expertos independientes, el Grupo observa que, aunque la influencia relativa de las sanciones ha disminuido desde que la República Popular Democrática de Corea cerró las fronteras a raíz de la COVID-19 a principios de 2020, no cabe duda

[170] Véase www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc3017en

[171] A pesar de que la cosecha de otoño se ha mantenido en el promedio, muchas fuentes publicaron noticias contradictorias sobre los precios de los alimentos en la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véanse, por ejemplo, www.38north.org/2023/06/north-korean-market-prices-suggest-serious-food-shortages y www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/foodprice-06262023095213.html). La Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios estimó en 2022 que el número de personas que padecían inseguridad alimentaria había aumentado hasta el 60 % de la población (véase https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/crisisinsight-weekly-picks-31-may-2023). También abundaba la información sobre el aumento de las muertes por inanición, aunque las opiniones variaban (véanse los anexos 80 y 81). Expertos externos han sugerido al Grupo que es plausible pensar que algunas zonas se encuentran en condiciones cercanas a la hambruna y que puede que algunos grupos padezcan directamente hambruna.

[172] En febrero un periódico estatal de la República Popular Democrática de Corea declaró que confiar en la ayuda exterior para hacer frente a la escasez de alimentos equivaldría a aceptar “caramelos envenenados” (véase www.nknews.org/pro/state-media-review-north-korea-rejects-humanitarian-aid-as-poison-candy y http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?MTJAMjAyMy0wMi0y Mi1OMDI4QDE1QDJAQDBAMjg==). Como dijo al Grupo una organización humanitaria, “las autoridades norcoreanas no creen que la ayuda humanitaria vaya a mejorar en lo fundamental su situación económica; en cambio, piensan que sólo aumenta la dependencia del exterior de sus altos funcionarios y su pueblo”.

[173] En la séptima reunión plenaria del octavo Comité Central del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea, celebrada en marzo de 2023, los dirigentes del país hicieron de la agricultura una prioridad, y en diciembre de 2022 la producción de cereales apareció como primero de los “12 objetivos principales”. Véanse www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/be316125bbf4e33c49d80b628336942c.kcmsf y www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/ca7280c2250709518dc9e8e91bac53cf.kcmsf.

de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y su aplicación han afectado involuntariamente a la situación humanitaria y a algunos aspectos de las operaciones de ayuda, lo cual ha agravado los problemas causados por las políticas económicas del país. Antes de la pandemia, el Grupo informó[174], sobre la base de información de diversas fuentes, de que el impacto no intencionado de las sanciones en las necesidades humanitarias de la población civil podría consistir en lo siguiente:

a) Aumento de la marginación social a medida que las élites responden a las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y a otras sanciones reforzando el control ejercido sobre los recursos[175,176];

b) Disminución de las fuentes de sustento de las personas empleadas en las industrias afectadas por las sanciones y persistencia del desempleo resultante[177];

c) La continua escasez de equipo agrícola[178] y la falta de combustible[179], que agravan los ya bajos niveles de mecanización de la agricultura[180];

d) Perturbación en aumento de las cadenas de suministro médico[181,182].

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[174] S/2019/171, párr.176; S/2019/691, párr. 83; S/2020/151, párr. 209; S/2020/840, párrs. 156 a 158 y 160; S/2021/211, párrs. 168 a 171; S/2021/777, párrs. 174 a 178; S/2022/132, párrs. 187 a 190; S/2022/668, párrs. 163 a 166; y S/2023/171, párrs. 179 y 180. Véase también el anexo 82 del presente informe.

[175] Dos expertos opinan que el aumento del control estatal conduce a la depresión del sector del mercado, lo que se ha traducido desde 2017 en una disminución del acceso de las familias comunes al mercado, así como en la contracción de sus presupuestos.

[176] En el párrafo 4 del preámbulo de la resolución 2397 (2017), el Consejo de Seguridad, entre otras cosas, expresa grave preocupación porque el país sigue desarrollando armas nucleares y misiles balísticos mediante el desvío de recursos sumamente necesarios para su población, dadas sus numerosas necesidades insatisfechas.

[177] La República Popular Democrática de Corea garantiza el pleno empleo a su población (artículos 29 y 30 de la Constitución del país). Dos expertos opinan que esta mención es irrelevante.

[178] La industria de las municiones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea puede fabricar grandes volúmenes de diversos equipos agrícolas y maquinaria agrícola si el Gobierno decide asignar los recursos necesarios (véase https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1664356199-252182552/kim-jong-un-sends-farm-machines-to-south-hwanghae-province). Dos expertos opinan que esta determinación es inexacta e incompleta, ya que se necesitan artículos prohibidos para la producción de dichos bienes.

[179] Los Estados Miembros han aportado información conforme a la cual la República Popular Democrática de Corea viene superando sustancialmente el límite máximo de importación de productos refinados derivados del petróleo todos los años desde su introducción en virtud de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad (véanse los párrafos 29 y 30); entretanto, las importaciones de petróleo crudo no se han acercado al máximo de 4 millones de barriles anuales, y el país sigue exportando carbón en contravención de las resoluciones (véanse los párrafos 74 a 76). Tras la introducción del máximo para el petróleo, el volumen total de importaciones de petróleo refinado ha disminuido.

[180] Dos expertos opinan que la disminución general de los ingresos de exportación, causada por la prohibición sectorial, provocó la reducción de los recursos disponibles para la importación de equipo agrícola, fertilizantes y combustible, y que las importaciones de estos productos básicos también se vieron afectadas por la prohibición sectorial a la “importación”. Según los mismos expertos, a raíz de todo ello se resintieron la alimentación, la energía y la seguridad social.

[181] No está prohibida la exportación de medicamentos y suministros médicos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, mientras que las organizaciones humanitarias se han esforzado por entregar al país los suministros pertinentes a través del proceso de exención con fines humanitarios, que está establecido y funciona correctamente.

[182] Dos expertos opinan que estas perturbaciones en la importación de artículos cruciales con fines médicos se deben a la disminución de las reservas de divisas y a la prohibición sectorial de “importación” (pueden consultarse ejemplos de artículos prohibidos de carácter médico en S/2019/171, anexos 86 y 87), así como a la reducción del riesgo por parte de los proveedores extranjeros.

Operaciones de las organizaciones humanitarias

155. Antes de la pandemia, la magnitud de la ayuda humanitaria ascendía a aproximadamente 2 dólares anuales per cápita[183] y constituía un recurso fundamental en determinadas zonas geográficas y para grupos de población vulnerables. Las organizaciones humanitarias informan de que el cierre de fronteras y otras medidas de prevención de la pandemia provocaron resultados diversos, entre ellos la suspensión o reducción drástica de las actividades de ayuda de las organizaciones, una menor capacidad para evaluar el posible impacto de las sanciones y el deterioro de la situación humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Aunque algunas organizaciones destacaron que las ofertas de ayuda no han recibido respuesta positiva, otras informaron de la capacidad de proporcionar un nivel bajo de suministros humanitarios a la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2023, con un seguimiento limitado.

156. Las organizaciones humanitarias que respondieron subrayaron asimismo las dificultades en curso para proporcionar ayuda debido al cierre de las fronteras, el extenso periodo de cuarentena y desinfección y problemas administrativos. Las organizaciones difieren en su valoración de las posibles repercusiones de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en su trabajo y, entre otros, citan los siguientes factores potenciales:

a) Ausencia de un canal bancario;

b) Se presentan a las licitaciones menos proveedores, lo que afecta al precio y la calidad;

c) Aumento de los retrasos aduaneros;

d) Carga de trabajo adicional en relación con las solicitudes de exención;

e) Retrasos en las adquisiciones;

Dos organizaciones consideraron que la política de cierre de fronteras ha agravado considerablemente la situación humanitaria del país y que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no han tenido ninguna influencia o han tenido una influencia mínima; otros dos estimaron que la situación humanitaria se debe tanto al cierre de las fronteras como a las sanciones.

157. Muchas de las organizaciones que respondieron indicaron que el actual proceso mejorado de exención humanitaria era suficiente y acogieron con satisfacción la actualización de la nota orientativa para la aplicación de resoluciones núm. 7 del Comité. Varias organizaciones recomendaron un periodo de exención más largo o una prórroga automática hasta la conclusión de un proyecto aprobado, así como exenciones permanentes para determinados productos de bajo riesgo. La mayoría no prevé la apertura total de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en 2023, y varios expresaron preocupación por que en adelante sólo se permita un acceso limitado.

158. Según una fuente oficial de las Naciones Unidas, en 2023 han mejorado algunas limitaciones al acceso, con entregas satisfactorias de medicamentos, vacunas, artículos de nutrición y suministros de agua, saneamiento e higiene. Sin embargo, debido a la escasa relajación de las medidas del país contra la COVID-19, los trabajadores humanitarios siguen sin poder realizar visitas a los puntos de distribución y verificar las entregas. el Comité ha concedido cuatro nuevas exenciones y nueve prórrogas en materia de asistencia humanitaria.

[183] Véase https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/provisional-2020-dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-overview.

Recomendaciones

159. **El Grupo valora las exposiciones informativas semestrales de las entidades competentes de las Naciones Unidas sobre los efectos imprevistos de las sanciones y recomienda que el Comité mantenga esa práctica**.

160. **El Grupo subraya una vez más la urgencia de restablecer un canal bancario duradero para las operaciones humanitarias en la República Popular Democrática de Corea**.

161. **El Grupo recomienda que, en el contexto de la aplicación de la resolución 2664 (2022) del Consejo de Seguridad, el sistema de las Naciones Unidas, incluido el Comité, tenga en cuenta la información proporcionada por los agentes humanitarios sobre la mitigación de los posibles efectos adversos de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas en la población civil y en la asistencia humanitaria en la República Popular Democrática de Corea**.

162. **El Grupo insiste en sus recomendaciones anteriores de que**:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad siga ocupándose de los problemas y procesos de mitigación de posibles efectos negativos no deseados de las sanciones en la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y las operaciones de ayuda humanitaria;

b) El Comité y otras partes interesadas pertinentes sigan dando consideración práctica a la idea de eximir determinadas exportaciones actualmente sometidas a sanciones, cuyos ingresos podrían utilizarse para financiar suministros humanitario;

c) El Comité considere la posibilidad de establecer un contacto más activo con los actores de la sociedad civil que prestan asistencia humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a fin de contribuir a aplicar la resolución 2664 (2022) del Consejo de Seguridad;

d) El Comité considere en la práctica la idea de permitir exenciones renovables y permanentes para los agentes de ayuda humanitaria y los productos relacionados con esta.

VII. Informes nacionales sobre la aplicación

Situación de la presentación por los Estados Miembros de informes sobre la aplicación de las resoluciones pertinentes

163. Al 28 de julio de 2023, 66 Estados Miembros habían presentado informes sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución 2397 (2017) del Consejo de Seguridad; 81, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 17 de la resolución 2397 (2017); 95, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2375 (2017); 90, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2371 (2017); 107, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2321 (2016); y 115, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2270 (2016). El Grupo observa que el número de Estados Miembros que no presentan informes (127) sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución 2397 (2017) sigue siendo significativo[184,185].

[184] Pueden ocultarse estadísticas en relación con los informes nacionales sobre la aplicación en www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/implementation-reports.

[185] Véase también www.smallarmssurvey.org/resource/value-reporting-national-reporting-practices-under-un-sanctions-regime-north-korea.

164. Por otra parte, el porcentaje total de Estados Miembros, entidades y particulares que han respondido a las consultas del Grupo en relación con sus investigaciones sigue siendo bajo: el Grupo observa que los Estados Miembros, entidades y particulares deben acatar las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad y cooperar plenamente con las indagaciones del Grupo.

VIII. Recomendaciones

165. En el anexo 83 figura una lista consolidada de las recomendaciones.

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Annex 1: Kim Jong Un's inspection of "*tactical nuclear weapons*" (excerpt from DPRK media report) and Member State assessments

1) Photo from DPRK media

Source: Rodong Sinmun, 28 March 2023.

2) Assessments by Member States on “tactical nuclear weapons” (excerpts)

[Member State 1]

On 28 March 2023, North Korea state media showed leader Kim Jong Un inspecting ten purported “tactical” nuclear devices alongside ballistic and cruise missile systems. Also shown were diagrams of warheads integrated with a range of delivery systems including an unmanned underwater vehicle. The nuclear devices being inspected appeared physically smaller than previous purported nuclear devices featured in North Korean media.

In recent years, North Korea has signalled a focus on developing so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons which are almost certainly intended for use on the peninsula and likely have a lower yield warhead than warheads for longer range systems.

It is highly likely that nuclear weapon design personnel would prefer to see a full-scale test to validate the new design. However, despite the reactivation of the test site last year North Korea has not resumed nuclear testing.

Source: Member State.

[Member State 2]

[MS2] government assumes that the "Hwasan-31" is likely to be a tactical nuclear weapon when considering only its appearance, such as size and shape. However, the DPRK has yet to disclose the device's internal detonator and technical specifications, so assessing whether the device matches the physical characteristics typically associated with tactical nuclear weapons is difficult. In this vein, whether the device possesses a range of explosive yields depending on its technical use is also difficult to evaluate.

Meanwhile, considering that "Hwasan-31" is possibly disclosed for deception purposes, the [MS2] government assessed that further analysis is required.

Source: Member State.

Annex 2: Activities at Punggye-ri nuclear test site (41° 16′ 41″ N 129° 05′ 15″ E)

*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are recent observations, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023.

1) Activities near Tunnel 3 (41° 16′ 35″ N 129° 05′ 17″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 March 2023.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 13 March 2023, 25 June 2023.

2) Activities near Tunnel 4 (41° 16′ 46″ N 129° 05′ 08″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 April 2023, Maxar Technologies, 7 May 2023.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 25 June 2023.

3) Activities at Administrative area (41° 16′ 41″ N 129° 05′ 15″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 8 February 2023.

Annex 3: Activities at LWR (39° 47′ 45″ N 125° 45′ 18″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023.

1) Construction of support buildings (39° 47′ 46″ N 125° 45′ 14″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 March 2023, 1April 2023.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 25 February 2018, Maxar Technologies, 18 June 2023.

2) Possible testing of cooling water system (39° 47′ 39″ N 125° 45′ 21″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 27 February, 7 March, 12 April 2023.

Annex 4: Activities at 5MW(e) reactor (39° 47′ 51″ N 125° 45′ 20″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023, 12 April 2023.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 1 July 2023.

Annex 5: Radiochemical Laboratory (39° 46′ 50″ N 125° 45′ 08″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023.

1) Suspected nuclear waste storage site (Old Waste Site) (39° 47′ 16″ N 125° 45′ 23″ E)

- A think tank reported new excavation activity was observed in March 2023. An outside expert consulted by the Panel explained that there had been some smaller excavation activities at this site even before 2023. The Panel's satellite imagery analysis corroborated these observations.
- According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this facility was not declared by the DPRK in its initial report submitted to the Agency in May 1992 along with another suspected nuclear waste storage site (aka: Building 500).[186] Despite repeated requests by the Agency for additional access to the facility, DPRK continued to refuse. This site was covered with soil before IAEA's visit in 1992.[187]

Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 May 2023

[186] See https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf.
[187] See The Institute for Science and International Security, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle*.

2) Activities near spent fuel receipt building (39° 46′ 49″ N 125° 45′ 07″ E)

- The below images captured between late-February to mid-April 2023 showed the pile of unidentified material in front of spent fuel receipt building and vehicular activities at motor pool area.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 February 2023, Maxar Technologies, 21 March 2023.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023, 19 April 2023.

- The below image captures on 1 July 2023 showed vehicular activities in front of spent fuel receipt building in addition to motor pool area.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 1 July 2023.

Annex 6: Activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant (39°46′15″N 125°44′57″E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 April 2023.

1) New construction activities at southern area (39° 46′ 04″ N 125° 45′ 01″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 February 2023, Maxar Technologies, 4 March 2023.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2023, 1 July 2023.

2) Activities at UO2 production process building (39° 46′ 11″ N 125° 44′ 55″ E)

- The Panel did not observe smoke from the UO2 production process building, otherwise regularly observed by the Panel. A lack of smoke indicates that the conversion process from yellowcake to UO2 is not underway.
- In addition, a think tank reported the removal of drums and canisters from the building since March 2023 suggesting that renovations are taking place.[188] The Panel has also seen probable drums/canisters scattered around the building (see below). According to an outside expert, these signs appear to show that the building may be subject to renovation.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 4 June 2023.

[188] See https://www.38north.org/2023/04/yongbyon-nuclear-scientific-research-center-expansion-work-continues/.

Annex 7: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (Location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38° 19′ 04″ N 126° 25′ 54″ E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 16 June 2023.

1) Expansion of the piles of tailings at the mines (38° 19′ 57″ N 126° 27′ 20″ E, 38° 19′ 42″ N 126° 26′ 40″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 23 February 2023, 16 June 2023.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 19 February 2023, 18 March 2023.

2) Railcar activities at Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 19′ 02″ N 126° 25′ 55″ E)

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 February 2023, 5 March 2023, 16 June 2023.

Annex 8: Activities at Kangson (38° 57′ 26″ N 125° 36′ 43″ E)

The Panel continues to monitor activities in the vicinity of Kangson, an alleged clandestine uranium enrichment facility.[189] Constant activity of several types of trucks has been observed adjacent to the main building.

Source: Maxar Technologies, 21 March 2023, 3 April. 2023, 5 June 2023, 16 June 2023.

[189] S/2023/171, para. 14 and annex 9

Annex 9: Activities at Yongdoktong (40°01′51″N 125°18′28″E)

The Yongdoktong area is believed to be involved in DPRK's nuclear weaponisation programme, including as a nuclear weapons storage facility.[190] The Panel observed continuous vehicular activities around the buildings adjacent to the entrance and the presence of personnel near one of the possible explosive storage sites.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 May 2023.

[190] S/2023/171, para. 15 and annex 10

1) Activities near the entrances of the tunnels (40° 01′ 51″ N 125° 18′ 28″ E)

Source: Maxar Technologies, 2 February 2023, 1 April 2023.

2) Presence of personnel (40° 02′ 24″ N 125° 18′ 22″ E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 2 February 2023.

Annex 10: Ballistic missiles launches by the DPRK from 1 January to 28 July 2023

Official DPRK statements are in *italics*.

Mentions of liquid (LP) or solid propellant (SP) engines.[191]

Tests in the year	*Date and time (local)*	*Reported type*	*Number of missiles*	*Reported launch location and trajectory*	*Reported distance travelled (km)*	*Reported apogee (km)*	*Remarks*	*DPRK reports*
1. **SP** (reported in S/2023/171)	**1 Jan.** 02:50	**SRBM KN-25** *Super large rocket System (600mm)*	**1**	From Pyongyang Yongsang area toward east.	350	100		*At dawn of January 1, 2023, fired one shell towards the East…with a delivered super-large multiple rocket launcher…* (KCNA DPRK Today, 2 Jan. 2023) *30 were recently deployed* (KCNA, 2 Jan. 2023)
2. **LP**	**18 Feb.** 17:22 or 17:21	**ICBM Hwasong-15** 9-axle wheeled TEL	**1**	From Sunan international airport toward east. Landed within Japan's EEZ at 18:27 about 200 kilometers west of Oshima Island in Hokkaido.	900	5 700	Depending on the weight of the warhead, the range may exceed 14 000 km (Japan).	*An ICBM launching drill was conducted on the afternoon of February 18. The Missile General Bureau guided the drill … using ICBM Hwasongpho-15 … missile traveled up to a maximum altitude of 5 768.5 km and flew 989 km for 4 015 seconds before accurately hitting the pre-set area in open waters* (KCNA, 19 February 2023)
3. **SP**	**20 Feb.** 07:00 or 06:59	**SRBM KN-25**	**2**	From Sukchon, South Phyongan Province toward east. Landed in the sea at 07:20.	390 to 400 and 350	100 and 50		*… multiple launch rocket firepower sub-units … set virtual targets 395 km and 337 km away … and fired two shells of 600 mm multiple rocket launchers… It is a tactical nuclear attack means boasting of the great might powerful enough to assign only one multiple rocket launcher with four shells so as to destroy an enemy operational airfield* (KCNA, 20 February 2023)

[191] A solid-propellant delivery system can be maintained in a ready-to-fire condition, i.e., as a whole with the solid-propellant motor and the pyrotechnics. A liquid-propellant missile is preferably fueled shortly before a potential launch, to avoid corrosion of the tank. This hazardous process can take around 45 minutes. In addition, the fuel and oxidizer must be stored separately in monitored tanks and facilities, further constraining the mobility of the missile. These constraints amount to added vulnerability in comparison to solid propellant missiles.

4. **SP**	**9 Mar.** 18:20	**Undetermined SRBM** 4-canister launch system on a 3-axle TEL	**6**	From Lake Taesong (38°54'27.19"N125°26' 24.94"E) toward west. Hit targets off the coast northwest of Nampo.	110		6 missiles launched simultaneously. Kim Jung Un attended. Appearance similar to that of a KN-23 missile	*The Hwasong artillery unit…fired a powerful volley under the simulated conditions of the major elements of the enemy operation airport… [Kim Jung Un] stressed that the fire assault sub-units should be strictly prepared …by steadily intensifying … drills* (KCNA, 10 March 2023)
5. **SP**	**14 Mar.** 07:41 and 07:51	**SRBM KN-23** *Ground-to-ground tactical ballistic missiles* 4-axle TEL	**2**	From southwest Jangyon area in the South Hwanghae Province (38°16'31.27"N 125° 4'16.60"E) toward the sea.	620		First observation of a BM launch from Jangyon area.	*The missiles fired in an area around Jangyon County of South Hwanghae Province precisely hit the targeted Phi Islet off Pangjin-dong, Chongam District, Chongjin City of North Hamgyong Province 611.4 km away The 11th striking company … launched two ground-to-ground tactical ballistic missiles by the medium range system* (Voice of Korea, 15 March 2023)
6. **LP**	**16 Mar.** 07:10 or 07:09	**ICBM Hwasong-17** ㅈ 09151779 11-axle TEL 321 (same number as on 18 Nov. 2022)	**1**	From Sunan international airport (launch pad 39°14'37.14"N 125°40'37.26"E) following a lofted trajectory toward east. Landed in the sea at 08:19 about 200 kilometers west of Hokkaido Island.	1 000	6 000	Japan MoD assesses the Hwasong-17 can fly a distance of up to 15 000 km. Kim Jon Un attended.	*On March 16, an intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwaseongpo-17" type firing drill was conducted… …exercise was conducted with the aim of confirming the maneuverability and reliability of the DPRK's nuclear war deterrent…launched from the Pyongyang International Airport ascended to a maximum altitude of 6,045km and flew a distance of 1,000.2km for 4,151s before landing in the target waters off the high seas in the East* (Rodong Sinmun, 17 March 2023)
7. **SP**	**19 Mar.** 11:05	**SRBM KN-23** *Ballistic missile tipped with a mock nuclear warhead* From a silo (or possible semi-buried silo)	**1**	From Tongchang-ri toward the east.	800	50	Flight time of 15 min and a possibly irregular trajectory. Oblique flames shown on KCTV could be due to the lateral evacuation of combustion gases out of a silo. A silo would have been	*Kim Jong Un… guided the combined tactical drill for nuclear counterattack …The missile was tipped with a test warhead simulating a nuclear warhead… The tactical ballistic missile launched in Cholsan County … accurately exploded at 800 meters*

							dug in the area between February and March 2023 (annex 22). Kim Jon Un attended.	*above the target waters set in its 800 km strike range, thus proving … the reliability of the operation of nuclear explosion control devices and detonators.* (Rodong Sinmun, 20 March 2023)
8. **SP**	**27 Mar.** 07:47 and 08:00 or 07:57	**SRBM KN-23**	**2**	From Junghwa area in North Hwanghae Province toward the north-east. Debris landed at 07:54 (BM 1) and 08:05 (BM 2).	370 or 350 and 350	50	Flight time of 7 min and a possibly irregular trajectory.	*… demonstration firing with a nuclear air explosion striking mode by two ground-to-ground tactical ballistic missiles … The tactical ballistic missiles were loaded with warheads for trial simulating nuclear warheads.* (KCNA, 28 Mar. 2023)
9. **SP**	**13 Apr.** 07:22 or 07:23	**ICBM Hwasong-18** *A new-type ICBM, Hwasongpho-18* 9-axle wheeled TEL	**1**	From a launch pad (39° 6'40.84"N 125°59'52.89"E) next to an official mansion, 20 km north-east of Pyongyang, toward the east at a high angle. Landed in the sea.	1 000	Appx. 5000 (ROK media)	First SP ballistic missile with probable intercontinental range tested by the DPRK. Three-stage missile. The first-stage engine could be the same as the one tested on a horizontal test bench on 15 Dec. 2022. The TEL shown is identical to the five paraded on 8 Feb 2023. Construction in March, including at the nearby mansion from 13 to 16 March, suggested preparation for the launch. (NKNews and a Member State). Kim Jung Un attended.	*The aim of the test-fire was to confirm the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles and the reliability of the stage-jettisoning technology and various functional control systems …* *the test fire was conducted in the way of applying the standard trajectory flying mode to its first stage and the vertical mode to the second and third stages,* *… the development of the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 will extensively reform the strategic deterrence components of the DPRK* (Rodong Sinmun, April 2023)
10. **SP**	**15 Jun.** between 19:25 and 19:37	**Probable SRBM KN-23**	**2**	From the Sunan Area. Landed in the Japanese EEZ 250 km west of Ishikawa Prefecture.	780 (ROK) 850/900 (Japan)	50	Flight time of 7 min and a possibly irregular trajectory. 900 km would be a long range for a KN-23.	No explicit admission.

11. **SP**	**12 Jul.** 10:00	**ICBM Hwasong-18**	**1**	From a launch pad (39° 6'40.84"N 125°59'52.89"E) next to an official mansion, 20 km north-east of Pyongyang, toward the east. Landed in the sea.	1 000	Over 6 000	Flight time of 74 min. Calculations show the range of the Hwasong-18 might exceed 15 000 km (Japanese deputy permanent representative Mitsuko Shino, at the 9376th UNSC session of 13 July 2023). Kim Jung-Un attended.	*Our test fire of a new type of ICBM…. Hwasongpho-18…did not pose any risk to surrounding countries. [We hold] the right …to self-defence… to safeguard the security of our State… Military provocations of the United States are growing as never before.* (DPRK permanent representative Kim Song at the 9376th UNSC session). *The test-fire was aimed at re-confirming the technical creditability and operational reliability of the new-type ICBM … The missile traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 648.4 km and flew a distance of 1 001.2 km for 4 491s before accurately landing* (KCNA, July 13 2023, and videos on KCTV).
12. **SP**	**19 Jul.** between 03:29 and 03:46	Probable **SRBM KN-23**	**2**	From the vicinity of the west coast (possibly the Sunan area) toward the east, landing in the sea.	Around 550 (ROK) and 600 (Japan)	50	A possibly irregular trajectory.	
13. **SP**	**24 Jul.** between 23:54 and 00:00	Undetermined SRBM possibly KN-25 missiles given the trajectories reported by Member States	**2**	Both missiles landed in the sea on the eastern side of the Korean Peninsula	Around 400 (ROK) 350 and 400 (Japan)	100		

Source: Member States (MSs) and the Panel.

Annex 11: Assessments of the significance of the launch of a solid-propellant Hwasong-18 ICBM

Hwasong 18 launch on 13 April 2023: cold-launch sequence whereby the missile is expelled by an independent gas generator

Source: KCTV (14 April 2023), analysis by a Member State and the Panel.

Member State 1 (unofficial translation)

On 14 April 2023, Pyongyang claimed this launch [of a Hwasong-18] by means of an official statement. The missile fired was a solid-propellant ICBM named 'Hwasungpho-18'. It will occupy a central role in DPRK's arsenal in the future. This test was conducted by the Missile General Bureau under the supervision of Kim Jung Un. The goal was to check solid-propulsion, stage separation and systems controls. The DPRK authorities did not communicate about the missile's performance but claimed total success and stated their concern for the safety of neighboring countries, citing the areas where the stages landed. The statement highlighted that these missiles will be deployed in strategic forces units to contribute to their missions both to deter and to strike back.

Analysis of satellite imagery shows the location of the launch to be the garden of a villa 20 km north-east of Pyongyang. Important construction work had been conducted there before the launch. The first modification in the layout of the grounds (initially agricultural land) happened between April 2022 and February 2023. Major landscaping was then conducted from 1 to 31 March 2023. During this period, one witnessed important earth-levelling work leading to the creation of landscaped gardens comprising artificial ponds, enclosed by earth banks. Additional groundwork took place at the launch site itself, possibly to reinforce it in order to increase its stability.

Preliminary analysis of the pictures released by the DPRK show a solid-propellant three-stage intercontinental missile, based on the fact that it was transported in a launch tube and given the typical plume of smoke stemming from first-stage ejection gases. […]

In those pictures, it appears the first stage might be guided by a flexible-bearing nozzle when Pukkusong-1 and 2 missiles were steered by exhaust gas stream deflectors. Also, the video released by the DPRK shows the Hwasong-18 launch system […] a 'cold-launch system'. It seems the same launch sequence as the Pukkusong-2 took place, on a smaller scale.

This is the first known launch of this missile and the first of a solid-propulsion north-Korean ICBM.

From the pictures released by the DPRK, it appears that the TEL used on 13 April is identical to the five shown during the military parade on 8 February 2023.

DPRK's assertions about the "standard" trajectory of the first stage and the vertical ones of the second and third stages, and the partial detections by Korean and Japanese authorities, lead to the conclusion that the overall trajectory was meant to ensure the landing of the stages in the sea.

The magnitude of the developments at the launch site before 13 April as well as dissimulation in the pictures released by the DPRK, are noticeable. They aren't abnormal given the launching requirements for a missile of this caliber. The mobility of a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) allows for firing a missile from different areas with little forward preparation. However, this type of missile [the Hwasong-18] can only be used from areas prepared well in advance, at least in order to accommodate for trucks this size and weight. Launching the missile outside of the well-known production and preparation sites showcases one advantage solid-propellant missiles have over a liquid-fueled Hwasong-17: Hwasong-17 missiles have always been fired from concrete-covered surfaces right next to Sunan airport facilities dedicated to the filling of liquid propellant. […]

It is a major development, showing clear progress by Pyongyang in mastering solid propulsion. This event was to be expected and had been anticipated to the very least since the publication of the five-year plan in January 2021. It reflects efforts over a decade.

The transition to solid propulsion was one of the logical long-term goals of Pyongyang, apparent right from the very first signs of the development of mobile platforms for ballistic missiles. For reasons pertaining to the hazardousness of liquid fuels, the duration of the preparation steps and their lack of discreteness, especially when filling the fuel, a solid-fueled missile offers many operational advantages. More so if it is deployed from a mobile platform. […]. Even though these developments took longer than those relating to liquid-fuel propulsion, which yield intercontinental ranges since 2017,[192] *they showed marked progress during this period, on a parallel development track of ICBM propulsion.*

The developments of the Pukkuksong-1 and-2 missiles was the first tangible evidence of progress by the DPRK in the field of solid propulsion, adjusted for long ranges. As of 2016, through in-flight and ground testing, Pyongyang demonstrated gradual expertise in engines close to 1.5 meters diameters. It reached an important threshold […]. On 15 April 2017, Pyongyang signaled again its interest for solid-propulsion ICBMs by showcasing in a military parade two types of TELs (never tested or seen again) very similar to the type of TELs used for solid-propulsion ICBMs. The following development of short-range missiles fitted with solid propulsion allowed the DPRK authorities to gain expertise in relevant technologies and industrial processes.

The Pukkusong-3, -4, and -5 emblemized during that time the DPRK's constant efforts to develop solid propulsion designed for longer ranges. Eventually, in his speech in January 2021, Kim Jung Un laid out five-year goals, outlining those pertaining to land-based and sea-based solid-propulsion ICBMs. The most recent indication of activity for that programme had been the testing of a solid-propulsion engine with a large diameter, on the ground, on 15 December 2022 in Sohae. We couldn't establish if that test was for one of the stages of the Hwasong-18. However, it most probably helped confirm the use of technology associated with this missile.

This launch of a Hwasong-18 […] brings the DPRK closer to owning ballistic missiles which would allow for intercontinental launches on short notice, along with high operational readiness. Reaching that objective […] will heighten the threat posed by the north-Korean ballistic arsenal. This launch alone does not remove prior doubt about the country's intercontinental missiles, especially regarding the survivability of its re-entry vehicles when entering the atmosphere, never proven, and serial production.

The DPRK stated that the Hwasong-18 will take a major place in the country's arsenal. At this stage however, more developments and testing aiming at improving its performances should be expected. Choices made regarding the payload remain unknown.

[192] The DPRK's acquisition of soviet-design RD-250 liquid-fuel propulsion system, enabling it to speed up the development of ICBMs notably the Hwasong-14 and 15, both shown and tested in 2017.

Member State 2 (assessment of the latest ICBM tests overall)

[...] latest ICBM, the Hwasong-18 flight tested in April this year, is a three-stage solid propellant system. […]

North Korea's deterrence perceptions changed; it no longer believes that a 'basic' ICBM capability is enough to guarantee its security. This was evident by the 2021 Party Congress, with Kim Jung Un outlining an ambitious series of development programmes and emphasizing the need to keep pace with modern technology. As a result, since 2021, the pace of testing has significantly increased.

Missile testing since the beginning of 2023 has continued this trend, with North Korea focusing on the survivability of its systems and its ability to counter missile defence; it has tested multiple systems, from a variety of launch platforms. It has aimed to demonstrate both a 'tactical' capability designed to deter on the Peninsula, as well as an ICBM capability to hold US mainland at risk. Its 13 April test of a solid-fuel ICBM, which Kim had previously described as one of the Party's top five priorities, demonstrated a further milestone in its development aspirations. As well as testing for development purposes, North Korea is also attempting to operationalize its capability, incorporating missile launches into military training exercises. However, while recent North Korean activity reflects ongoing improvements in its capability, it is also deliberate messaging, based on its perceived need to deter.

To have a credible deterrent, North Korea needs potential opponents to believe that not only does it have a capability, but also it has the training and willingness to use it; much of its recent activity has been intended to bolster this narrative. As a result, over the last twelve months, it has publicized nuclear training exercises, as well as its nuclear doctrine.

Annex 12: DPRK media reporting of the Hwasong-18 launch on 13 April 2023[193]

Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides First Test-Fire of New-Type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 on Spot Pyongyang, April 14 (KCNA) - *The DPRK's nuclear war deterrent for self-defence is rapidly developing at increasing speed in keeping with the immutable strategic line and policy of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK to ceaselessly develop the might of the strategic force of the DPRK to turn it into an entity of super power and absolute strength, a powerful force capable of preventing the nuclear holocaust and deterring all sorts of possible dangerous enemy invasions, and a treasured sword for defending justice and peace.*

On April 13, 2023, a powerful entity symbolic of the ceaseless development of the strategic force of the DPRK notified the world of its emergence. A new-type ICBM, Hwasongpho-18, which will fulfill its mission of an important war deterrent as the future core pivotal means of the strategic force of the DPRK, was test-fired. Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, guided the first test-fire of the new-type ICBM on the spot. The aim of the test-fire was to confirm the performance of the high-thrust solid-fuel engines for multi-stage missiles and the reliability of the stage-jettisoning technology and various functional control systems and to estimate the military feasibility of the new strategic weapon system.

In consideration of the security of the neighboring countries and the safety of the multi-stage-separation of the missile during its flight in the territorial air, the test fire was conducted in the way of applying the standard trajectory flying mode to its first stage and the vertical mode to the second and third stages, and of confirming the technological features of all the components of the weapon system by restricting the maximum speed of the missile through delayed stage separation and motor reactivation. Kim Jong Un learned about the new weapon system on the spot while watching the pre-launch operation.

The launching site, which was to witness once again an important event of great significance in the history of the development of the strategic force of the DPRK under the direct guidance of Kim Jong Un, was seething with the burning will of all the defence scientists and workers in the field of munitions industry to inform the whole world of the emergence of another powerful nuclear attack means of the DPRK and demonstrate the reliable nuclear war deterrence of the state.

Ready for test-fire! When Kim Jong Un approved the test-fire of the new-type strategic weapon, General Jang Chang Ha ordered the second red flag company under the General Missile Bureau to launch the missile. The moment, a great entity fully representing the irresistible might of the DPRK began to soar into the sky with fierce flames at its tail, making a thunderous roar. The test-fire had no adverse effect on the security of the neighboring countries. Its first stage safely landed in the waters 10 km off the Hodo Peninsula in Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province and the second stage in the waters 335 km east of Orang County, North Hamgyong Province. The test-fire confirmed that all the parameters of the new strategic weapon system fully met the requirements of the design in terms of accuracy, providing guarantee and creditability that the new-type ICBM would serve as a powerful strategic attack means of greater military efficiency.

[193] See https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1681657470-258944918/another-mighty-entity-showing-continuous-development-of-strategic-force-unveiled-in-dprk/.
https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/64395c9bbc9b7/.

The Hwasongpho-18 weapon system, to be equipped with and operated by the strategic force of the DPRK under the long-term plan for building the state nuclear force, will perform its important mission and duty as the most powerful, pivotal and principal means in defending the DPRK, deterring aggression and defending the security of the state. Kim Jong Un expressed great satisfaction at the eye-opening successes while guiding the test-fire. He was pleased with the fact that the DPRK has clearly proved once again the tremendous potentiality and reality of its defence technology further developing as the days go by and powerfully demonstrated its unshakable determination and practical ability to attain the goal for bolstering up the armed forces. He noted that it is the consistent stand of the Workers' Party of Korea and the DPRK government to steadily and rapidly accelerate the development of more developed and advanced powerful weapon system to cope with the ever-worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula and long-term military threats. He mentioned with pride the significance of the test-fire, saying that the development of the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-18 will extensively reform the strategic deterrence components of the DPRK, radically promote the effectiveness of its nuclear counterattack posture and bring about a change in the practicality of its offensive military strategy. Noting that it is an absolute mission and duty to be fulfilled by the DPRK's defence scientists to uphold the WPK and the DPRK government's policy of countering the enemy's nukes and policy of frontal confrontation in kind with practical successes in the development of self-defence capabilities, he set forth the important strategic tasks for further accelerating the bolstering of the nuclear strategic force of the DPRK. He affirmed that the WPK and the DPRK government would make the enemy, who are imperiling the environment on the Korean peninsula and harassing the Korean people's peaceful life and struggle for socialist construction with their inveterate policy of aggression and threatening military moves, experience a clearer security crisis, and constantly strike extreme uneasiness and horror into them by taking fatal and offensive counter-actions until they abandon their senseless thinking and reckless acts, thus making them feel regret and despair for their wrong choice by surely exposing them to an irresistible threat.

The successful test of the new strategic weapon system serves as an occasion for proving that the nuclear strategic force and the missile scientists and technicians of the DPRK directly responsible for its development always thoroughly and perfectly implement the strategic intention of the WPK, getting fully prepared to carry out their important mission at any time.

Annex 13: Military parade in Pyongyang on 8 February 2023



Source: KCNA, KCTV, annotations by the Panel.



Source: KCNA, KCTV, annotations by a Member State.

Assessment

- Five TELs carrying KN-25 SRBMs shown
- Five TELs carrying KN-23 SRBMs shown
- "*Tactical nuclear weapons*", according to the KCTV commentator, on trucks
- Five TELs carrying modernized cruise-missiles shown
- 11 or 12 Hwasong-17 ICBMs shown, on 11-axle wheeled TELs
- Five new presumably solid-propellant ICBMs shown,[194] in canisters, on 9-axle wheeled WS-51200 TELs
- Altogether a record number of 17 heavy-duty TELs displayed

Source: Member States (MSs), the Panel.

[194] Described as a "Hwasong-class" missile on KCTV. The presentation was suggestive of solid-propellant missiles, based on the length of the missile and its canister and taking into consideration the DPRK's avowed ambition to develop such missiles. Canisters are more typical of solid-propellant missiles, helping control the environment (including temperature) and the pyrotechnics of the missile, already loaded with its propellant.

Annex 14: Images from the military parade in Pyongyang in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War (or "*Great Fatherland Liberation War*" for the DPRK).

27 July 2023

The following images were characterized by the DPRK media as a display of "tactical and long-range cruise missile units". The Panel will analyse further information about this parade.



Source: Rodong Sinmun, annotations by the Panel.

Display of similar weapon systems at the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” in Pyongyang
26 July 2023

Source: KCTV, Rodong Sinmun, annotations by the Panel.

Annex 15: Possible solid-propellant engine test at Magun-Po (39°48′06″N 127°33′39″E) on 29-30 January 2023

According to Member State information, an engine test occurred at the Magun-Po stand before 2 February 2023. An outside expert consulted by the Panel concurs,[195] placing the test date as 29 or 30 January 2023.

Panel satellite imagery analysis tends to corroborate those observations.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

[195] See Twitter/Dave Shmerler/30 January 2023.

Annex 16: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's January 2021 speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to military objectives)

Excerpts relating to ballistic missiles:[196]

...for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force…

...intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style

...review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb…

...was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear build up was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party…

...to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system…

... new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science ...

...developed the super-large MLRS, ...

... develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles ...

... achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex, ...

... perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage, finished research into developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets ...

... in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly ...

… that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched ...

... means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed,

[196] See https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610502377-14004652/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory/?t=1665001072714 .

Annex 17: Statements by IMO and ICAO on the unannounced launches of ballistic missiles by the DPRK

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

By means of a resolution[197] adopted on 31 May, the IMO called upon the DPRK to cease unlawful and unannounced ballistic missile launches across international shipping lanes, denouncing these as a serious threat to the safety of international navigation. The IMO urged compliance with due regulations, including giving prior notice ahead of any missile tests.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

During its Council's 229th session on 22 June, the ICAO condemned the recent unannounced missile launches by the DPRK noting that they "pose a serious risk to international civil aviation", and "*a complete disregard of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.*" The ICAO recalled its Assembly Resolution A41-3 (of October 2022) which urgently called upon the DPRK to comply with its international civil aviation obligations under the Chicago Convention. [198]

[197] See Maritime Safety Committee resolution on "Strengthening measures for ensuring the safety of international shipping": https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/MSC-107th-session.aspx.
[198] See https://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-Council-States-condemn-DPRK-missile-launches.aspx.

Annex 18: Report on 6th enlarged plenary meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee of 1 January 2023

Excerpts relating to the BM programme[199] (see S/2023/171 for the full text):

... the official legalization of the DPRK's policy on its nuclear force at the most appropriate and crucial time ...

... however, if it fails to deter, it will carry out the second mission, which will not be for defense

... a task was raised to develop another ICBM system whose main mission is quick nuclear counterstrike.

... it highlights the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal, the report said, clarifying the epochal strategy of the development of nuclear force and national defence for 2023 with this as a main orientation.

...the National Aerospace Development Administration will launch the first military satellite of the DPRK at the earliest date possible by pushing ahead with the full preparation for a reconnaissance satellite and its vehicle in progress at the final stage, the report pointed out ...

[199] See https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543894-200963704/report-on-6th-enlarged-plenary-meeting-of-8th-wpk-central-committee /.

Annex 19: Development of a new satellite launch pad in the Sohae area

Source: Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., annotated by the Panel.

Annex 20: KCNA reporting on the Chollima-1 SLV launch of 31 May 2023[200]

Pyongyang, May 31 (KCNA) - The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) made public the following report on Wednesday as regards an accident occurred during the launch of military reconnaissance satellite: The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK launched a military reconnaissance satellite, "Malligyong-1", mounted on a new-type carrier rocket, "Chollima-1", at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in Cholsan County of North Phyongan Province at 6:27 on May 31, Juche 112 (2023), as scheduled. The carrier rocket "Chollima-1" fell to the West Sea of Korea after losing thrust due to the abnormal starting of the second-stage engine after the separation of the first stage during the normal flight. The NADA spokesperson attributed the failure to the low reliability and stability of the new-type engine system applied to carrier rocket "Chollima-1" and the unstable character of the fuel used, saying that scientists, technicians and experts concerned start discovering concrete causes. The NADA said that it would thoroughly investigate the serious defects revealed in the satellite launch, take urgent scientific and technological measures to overcome them and conduct the second launch as soon as possible through various part tests.

[200] See https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1685600207-36284567/kcna-report/ .

Annex 21: Salvaging of sections of the Chollima-1 Space Launch Vehicle and of the Malligyong-1 satellite by the ROK Navy



Source: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 31 May 2023, 5 July 2023.

Statement by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 May 2023: "*We are providing you with a photo of an object presumed to be part of the North's claimed space launch vehicle. Our military has identified and is currently picking up an object presumed to be part of the North's claimed space launch vehicle at approximately 200 kilometers west of the waters near Eochong Island.*"

Statement by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 July 2023*:* "*The ROK has concluded the search and recovery operation for DPRK space launch debris and other remnants, which began on 31 May and ended on 5 July. Despite challenging operational conditions, the ROK military successfully recovered numerous debris, demonstrating excellent operational capabilities. Through the search and rescue operation, key components of the DPRK space launch vehicle and satellite were recovered and thoroughly analyzed by ROK and US experts, concluding that they have no military use as a reconnaissance satellite.*"

Translation by the Panel.

Annex 22: Construction of a silo used for the KN-23 launch on 19 March 2023

Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 February 2023, annotated by the Panel.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 15 January 2023, 28 January 2023, 1 February 2023, 13 March 2023, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 23: Reply from a research institute in Sweden



[redacted]

Sida: 1 (1)

2023-03-16

Dnr: 2-3506/2023

[redacted]
University Director

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

By email only

Reference [redacted]

Dear [redacted]

In reference to your letters dated 1 September 2022 and 15 December 2022 [redacted] would like to provide additional information.

When [redacted] first employed Dr. [redacted] in 2020 due check was made to ensure he had the relevant permits for work and residence in Sweden. The permits have been renewed after expiration. The Swedish Migration Agency's decision on February 28, 2023 to reject Dr. [redacted] application for a residence and work permit, deport him from the country etc. was brought to [redacted]'s knowledge on March 15, 2023 by Dr. [redacted]. Due to the decision [redacted] decided to terminate Dr. [redacted]'s employment at [redacted] with effect as of March 16, 2023. The decision was handed over to Dr. [redacted] at a meeting later the same day and hereby the termination of his employment at [redacted] is definite.

[redacted]
Acting University Director

[redacted]

Source: A Swedish research institute.

Annex 24: Co-authorship of Dr. Im Song-jin, Kim Il Sung University, with scholars from Chinese research institutes

1) List of co-authored publications of Dr. Im Song-jin

No	Title and we reference	Journal or source of information	Authors
1	Interactions between Plasmonic Nanoantennas and Vortex Beams	*Nano Letters* 2022, 22, 12, 5015−5021 5 June 2022 https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.nanolett.2c01926	[redacted] Song-Jin Im [redacted] Chol-Song Ri, Kum-Song Ho Ji-Song Pae [redacted]
2	Analytical analysis of spectral sensitivity of plasmon resonances in a nanocavity	***Nanoscale*** 2019,11, 10977-10983 06 May 2019 https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2019/NR/C9NR02766A	[redacted] Song-Jin Im [redacted]

2) Bibliographic information about Dr. Im's affiliation with Chinese university



[redacted] [a b], [redacted] S.[b], Im, S.-J.[b c], [redacted] [b], [redacted] [b], [redacted] [a]

Analytical analysis of spectral sensitivity of plasmon resonances in a nanocavity
(2019) *Nanoscale*, 11 (22), pp. 10977-10983. Cited 10 times.

DOI: 10.1039/c9nr02766a

[a] [redacted] Beijing, [redacted], China
[b] Institute for Advanced Studies, School of Physics, [redacted] University, [redacted], China
[c] Department of Physics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang, North Korea

Funding details
2016YFB0700700, 2017YFA0303402, 2017YFA0303404
National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNSFC21403081, NSAF U-1530401
Science Challenge Project
Funding details
[redacted]

Correspondence Address
[redacted]

Publisher: Royal Society of Chemistry

ISSN: 20403364
PubMed ID: 31140538
Language of Original Document: English
Abbreviated Source Title: Nanoscale
2-s2.0-85067057281
Document Type: Article
Publication Stage: Final
Source: Scopus

Source: Scopus

Annex 25: Letter from the Permanent Mission of China and China's Reply

中华人民共和国常驻联合国代表团

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, 15 July 2023

Respected Acting Coordinator and experts,

I am writing in response to your previous letters regarding the requests to investigate alleged violations of Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK.

China has been fully and strictly implementing the Resolutions and consistently and constructively supporting the work of the Panel. In this regard, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted thorough investigations on the issues raised by the Panel, and the details of the investigations are enclosed herewith. These investigations are by no means easy to conduct, and a lot of efforts have been made to verify the information provided by the Panel. China hopes these feedback could be reflected in the Panel's midterm report in a faithful and comprehensive manner.

I would also like to take this opportunity to emphasize that China has made great efforts in implementing the Resolutions on the DPRK and sustained great losses. I count on the Panel to base

Panel of Experts
Established pursuant to resolution 1874
New York

Address:350 East 35th Street, New York, NY10016 Tel: (212)655-6100 Web: www.china-un.org

its work on facts and request the Panel to carry out its assessments and analysis in line with its mandate as specified in the related Resolutions, and refrain from including unverified information in its report.

I look forward to continuing working with you to contribute to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and the political solution to the Peninsula issue.

Warm regards,

Zhang Jun
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative
of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

China's feedback to the 1874 Panel of Experts

1. Intangible Technology Transfers

China has been consistently and strictly implementing the provisions of the Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK regarding scientific and technological cooperation as well as academic communication. Necessary measures have been taken to prevent sensitive materials from being collected by the DPRK.

As verified by the related Chinese authorities, the German media reports are grossly inaccurate. First, the two papers mentioned by the media reports are based on normal cooperation of fundamental scientific studies, which has no dual use nature and has nothing to do with nuclear proliferation. Second, the involvement of Im Song-Jin in the two papers was limited to communication on theoretical issues, Chinese scholars did not provide any data to Im. Chinese scholars listed Im as an author just out of respect. This communication does not constitute scientific and technological exchanges or cooperation, and therefore is not a violation of the related provisions of the Resolutions. Third, Im visited the relevant University for only a short period of time from July to September 2015, with all expenses related to this visit paid by Im himself. The University did not provide any financial support or remuneration to him. Im did not return to the University after the end of his visit in September in 2015, nor did he have any status with this University. For Im's visit to this University occurred before the adoption of the Resolution 2321 in 2016, which restricts scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation with the DPRK,therefore his visit does not violate the Resolution.

The German media reports are clearly inconsistent with the facts,and the relevant Chinese research institutes, universities and individuals are not in violation of the Security Council Resolutions, China requests the Panel not to include this case into its report. We trust the Panel to base its work on facts rather than on media reports.

2. Illegal cyber financial activities

China conducted serious and thorough investigations on the information provided by the Panel, and did not find any illegal cyber financial activities by the relevant individuals within Chinese border. China consistently and strictly combats illegal cyber financial activities by Chinese laws and regulations in an equal manner no matter if related personnel violate the Security Council Resolutions or not. Besides, the cyber activities mentioned by the Panel do not fall into the scope prohibited by the Resolutions. China requests the Panel to conduct its work according to its mandate, and do not include unrelated content into its report.

3. Alleged sale of DPRK seafood by Chinese company

Chinese authorities have located the seafood stand in Yanji West Market mentioned by the Panel. This stand has been using the banner of "North Korea Seafood Wholesale" for several years as a means to attract customers. It was found that the seafood sold at the stand were actually imported from Russia through legal channels, not illegally obtained from the DPRK. Chinese authorities have ordered the stand operate the business according to law and remove the banner. Obviously, there is no violation of Security Council Resolutions in this case and it should not be included in the Panel's report.

4. Alleged export of coal by DPRK ships

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

HUNG BONG 3 declared one entry into Lianyungang Port from Nampo Port in January this year empty loaded. And the ship left Lianyungang Port empty loaded.

TAE Dong 1 declared two entries into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January and March this year empty loaded. And the ship left Dalian Port loaded with grain and other grocery.

PU SONG declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January this year loaded with containers, and left the port loaded with goods for daily necessities. In June this year, this ship declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port empty loaded and left loaded with goods for daily necessities.

No records of port entry and exit or customs declarations of TO MYONG, MIYANG 5, RYONG RIM were found in the Chinese port logs.

China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. The above-mentioned ships were loaded with goods for daily necessities, not Security Council embargoed items. The Panel should execute its duties cautiously and responsibly, carefully screening the information it acquired, and should not include unverified information in its report.

5. Alleged illegal export by Chinese ships to the DPRK

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

BAO YING HAI 18, XIN YANG HONG, QIMING 168, and FU LONG 98 were de-registered between late 2022 and early 2023, and these ships were not re-registered ever since. Chinese government does not have information on their exact whereabouts.

Records of port entry and exit of XIN HANG SHUN and LONG XIN 12 were not found and Chinese government does not have detailed information about these ships.

6. Alleged possession of Chinese ships by the DPRK

After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:

SHUNCHAO 9, HUI YI, HONG JIE 1, RUN HONG 58, XIN HONG XIANG 77, WEN TONG FA ZHAN, and XIANGHUI 10 were de-registered on May of 2022, January of 2023, August of 2022, November of 2021, October of 2022, February of 2023, November of 2018 respectively. These ships were not re-registered ever since. ZHI KUN 6 and HUA JIN SHENG 8 are still registered as Chinese ships. HONG TAI 215 have not applied for nationality registration.

Judging from the investigations conducted by Chinese authorities, the information received by the Panel are inaccurate. This is not the first time such thing happens and China has previously raised concerns over this issue. China requests the Panel to conduct necessary screening of the information it receives,and avoid including information that are inconsistent with facts in its report, so as to maintain the objectivity of the report.

7. Request for seizure of DPRK ship

China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. Relevant Chinese authorities are still conducting investigations on the case and preliminary findings show that NEW KONK, UNICA, DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG, and SHUNDLLI have no records of port entry and exit in China since 2020. The information provided by the Panel are not verified and should not be included in its report.

Annex 26: DPRK-flagged tankers observed delivering refined petroleum products at Nampo and other oil facilities, 1 January-1 May 2023

A Member State estimates that as much as 781,497 barrels of refined petroleum products may have been delivered to Nampo and other DPRK ports by 1 May, based on a maximum cargo capacity of 90 percent of each delivery vessel's deadweight tonnage. In reaching this conclusion the Member State used a methodology widely-accepted by industry. The Member State's calculations presume the carriage of "*refined petroleum*" to include diesel and/or fuel oil as both these products are widely recognized to be within the category "*refined petroleum*". The Member State uses a conversion rate of 7.5 barrels per metric ton, the average conversion rate of gasoline, kerosene, gas oil/diesel and residual fuel oil.

Based on a maximum cargo capacity of 90 percent of each vessel's deadweight tonnage, the Member States estimates that the cap would have been breached in mid-March (figure 26); assuming a 60% maximum cargo capacity the cap would have been breached end-April-beginning May; at 30% capacity[201] the cap would not have been breached during this reporting period.

[201] A Member State has reported to the Committee however that "*[i]t is highly unlikely that DPRK tankers … would arrive in DPRK ports with less than one third of their cargo capacities filled. The expenditure of resources and fuel [in so doing]… would not be justified …*".

Figure 26: Estimates arising from observed deliveries of refined oil products to Nampo, Hungnam, Chongjin and Songnim, 1 January – 1 May 2023 (barrels). The intersection of the horizontal line, at 500,000 barrels, and the three trend lines, indicate approximately when the oil cap would have breached in this period, assuming a total cargo carried of 90%, 60% and 30% of total DWT of vessels involved in deliveries.



Source: Member State, the Panel

Abbreviation: DWT: Deadweight Tonnage

The Member State's imagery (see below) indicates that 39 of the 46 deliveries went to Nampo and the remainder as follows:

DPRK Port	Nampo	Chongjin	Hungnam	Songnim
Number of deliveries (1 Jan – 1 May 2023)	39 deliveries	3 deliveries (one each by SIN PHYONG 5, SIN PHYONG 9, SIN PHYONG 14)	2 deliveries (both by SIN PHYONG 14)	2 deliveries (both by KUM UN SAN)

3 January **SIN PHYONG 9** **(IMO 8916293)** DWT 1150MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.		
8 January **PO CHON** **(IMO 8848276)** DWT 3538MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 23880 barrels.		
18 January **KUM UN SAN** **(IMO: 8720436)** DWT 2070MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.		

18 January **SIN PHYONG 5** **(IMO 8865121)** DWT 3295MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.			
19 January **SIN PHYONG 14** **(IMO: 8021579)** DWT 949MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.			
25 January **CHON MA SAN** **(IMO 8660313)** DWT 3566MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24068 barrels.			

18 January **JI SONG 6** **(IMO 8898740)** DWT 1250MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.		
2 February **PAEK YANG SAN 1** **(IMO 9129653)** DWT 4989MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33676 barrels.		
5 February **SAM JONG 2** **(IMO 7408873)** DWT 2507MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 16922 barrels.		

5 February **YU JONG 2** **(IMO 8604917)** DWT 1206MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels.		
8 February **SIN PHYONG 2** **(IMO 8817007)** DWT 2106MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.		
8 February **SIN PHYONG 14** **(IMO 8021579)** DWT 949MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.		

14 February **SIN PHYONG 14** **(IMO 8021579)** DWT 949MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.		
10 February **KUM RYONG 3** **(IMO 8610461)** DWT 1988MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.		
14 February **KUM JIN GANG 2** **(IMO 8708684)** DWT 1988MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.		

14 February **CHANG HAE 1** **(IMO 8791667)** DWT 4983MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33635 barrels.			
16 February **CHIL BO SAN** **(IMO 8711021)** DWT 1999MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.			
19 February **RYE SONG GANG 1** **(IMO 7389704)** DWT 3003MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 20270 barrels.			

21 February PAEK MA (IMO 9066978) DWT 2250MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 15188 barrels.			
23 February SIN PHYONG 9 (IMO 8916293) DWT 1150MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.			
26 February WOL BONG SAN (IMO 7636638) DWT 4296MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 28988 barrels.			

4 March **SIN PHYONG 5** **(IMO 8865121)** DWT 3295MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.			
15 March **SIN PHYONG 5** **(IMO 8865121)** DWT 3295MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.			
13 March **SIN PHYONG 14** **(IMO 8021579)** DWT 949MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 6406 barrels.			

19 March **YUN HONG 8** **(IMO None)** DWT 2900MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 19575 barrels.		
19 March **AN SAN 1** **(IMO 7303803)** DWT 3003MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 20273 barrels		
19 March **SIN PHYONG 2** **(IMO 8817007)** DWT 2106MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.		

26 March **KUM RYONG 3** **(IMO 8610461)** DWT 1998MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.		
29 March **KUM RYONG 3** **(IMO 8610461)** DWT 1998MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.		
29 March **SAM JONG 2** **(IMO 7408873)** DWT 2507MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 16922 barrels.		

30 March **NAM DAE BONG** **(IMO 9132612)** DWT 9273MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 62593 barrels.		
30 March **KUM UN SAN** **(IMO 8720436)** DWT 2070MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.		
2 April **SIN PHYONG 9** **(IMO 8916293)** DWT 1150MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.		

2 April **YU JONG 2** **(IMO 8604917)** DWT 1206MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels.			
2 April **KUM RYONG 3** **(IMO 8610461)** DWT 1998MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.			
7 April **KUM RYONG 3** **(IMO 8610461)** DWT 1998MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13487 barrels.			

7 April **CHIL BO SAN** **(IMO 8711021)** DWT 1999MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.		
9 April **CHIL BO SAN** **(IMO 8711021)** DWT 1999MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.		
7 April **CHANG HAE 2** **(IMO 8691702)** DWT 3398MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels.		

11 April **SIN PHYONG 5** **(IMO 8865121)** DWT 3295MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.			
16 April **CHON MA SAN** **(IMO 8660313)** DWT 3566MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24068 barrels.			
18 April **SAM JONG 1** **(IMO 8405311)** DWT 1665MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 11239 barrels.			

19 April **UN HUNG** **(IMO 9045962)** DWT 3685MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24874 barrels.			
24 April **UN HUNG** **(IMO 9045962)** DWT 3685MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24874 barrels.			
20 April **SIN PHYONG 2** **(IMO 8817007)** DWT 2106MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.			

20 April **CHANG HAE 1 (IMO 8791667) (nka KUM JIN GANG 3)** DWT 4983MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33635 barrels.			
21 April **KUM UN SAN (IMO 8720436)** DWT 2070MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.			
24 April **KWANG CHON (IMO 8605026)** DWT 1966MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13271 barrels.			

26 April **KWANG CHON** **(IMO 8605026)** DWT 1966MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13271 barrels.			
27 April **KUM JIN GANG 2** **(IMO 8708684)** DWT 1988MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.			
1 May **KUM JIN GANG 2** **(IMO 8708684)** DWT 1988MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13419 barrels.			

27 April **JI SONG 6** **(IMO 8898740)** DWT 1250MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.		
1 May **JI SONG 6** **(IMO 8898740)** DWT 1250MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8438 barrels.		
27 April **CHANG HAE 2** **(IMO 8691702)** **(nka YU SON)** DWT 3398MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22937 barrels.		

1 May **CHANG HAE 2** **(IMO 8691702)** **(nka YU SON)** DWT 3398MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22937 barrels.			
27 April **KUM UN SAN** **(IMO 8720436)** DWT 2070MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.			
1 May **KUM UN SANM** **(IMO 8720436)** DWT 2070MT Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13973 barrels.			

Source: Satellite imagery - Member State; ship information – Member State, IMO records, and the Panel.

Annex 27: Data provided by a Member State regarding breaches of the cap on refined petroleum products delivered to the DPRK

Annex 26 records that a Member State estimates that the cap on refined petroleum products delivered to the DPRK in 2023 has been breached. Data provided by another Member State support this assessment: This Member State estimates that approximately 80,000 tons of refined petroleum was illicitly imported by DPRK in the first quarter of 2023.

The Member State has provided additional data reflecting an equivalent breach in 2022, also by the end of the first quarter.

Data provided by the Member State, in tons

Smuggled refined petroleum imported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of refined petroleum illicitly imported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	None	Approx. 70,000 tons	Approx. 80,000 tons

Member State data converted to barrels by the Panel, using the Committee's conversion rate of 7.98 barrels per ton

Smuggled refined petroleum imported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of refined petroleum illicitly imported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	None	Approx. 558,600 barrels	Approx. 638,400 barrels

Annex 28: DPRK's illicit maritime activities in 2022

The DPRK's illicit sea trade took place over a larger number of locations than before.

Year 2022

1st Quarter | 2nd Quarter | 3rd Quarter



4th Quarter | 2022 overall



Source: Member State

Annex 29: Ship-to-ship activity at Sokdo-ri Island, DPRK

In 2023, the Panel observed activity around Sokdo-ri Island, near the DPRK's West Sea Barrage. This is the area where a floating crane, JIANG SHEN FU 6988, involved in ship-to-ship activity between DPRK vessels and former foreign-flagged vessels acquired by the DPRK, was located on 6 September 2022.[202] JIANG SHEN FU operated within DPRK's territorial waters between Nampo lockgate and Ch'o-do Island. The Panel recalls its earlier assessment[203] of contributing factors that have expanded the DPRK's use of territorial waters in conducting at-sea transfers, including the need to avoid monitoring vessels and the inability of many of its cargo vessels to enter foreign ports to offload banned commodities.

The following is a sample of satellite images of vessels taking part in what appear to be ship-to-ship transfers.

June 2023

[202] S/2023/171, para. 89 and annex 40
[203] S/2022/668, paras. 35-36.

May 2023

25 May 2023
38.67780, 125.01732
석도리
planet.

25 May 2023
38.67780, 125.01732
석도리
planet.

January 2023

Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

Annex 30: Geo-Spoofing as a new evasion technique for DPRK-related sanctions evasion, 2023

In April 2023, the Panel monitored two vessels on a maritime a.i. analytics platform sailing in an unusual pattern. AIS analysis revealed their voyages were consistent with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) manipulation, a machine-generated geo-spoofing, while the vessel was in fact traveling at the same speed and heading, but in a straight line. The two vessels in question were transmitting as:

- F.LONLINE, a known false identity for the former direct delivery vessel (FDDV) NEW KONK,
- LITON, a known false identity for the FDDV UNICA.

Figure 30-1: NEW KONK as F.LONLINE at Sansha Bay, 1-3 April 2023

On 1 April 2023, NEW KONK transmitting as F.LONLINE was anchored at Sansha Bay, China. Satellite Imagery by Planet Labs confirmed the vessel's presence in the same location a day later. According to the vessel's AIS transmission, NEW KONK / F.LONLINE departed its anchoring point on 3 April 2023 at 12:38 UTC.



Figure 30-2: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE begins geo-spoofing, 3 April

The vessel next transmitted an AIS signal at 13:21 UTC, at an apparent location approximately 28 nautical miles from where it last transmitted. This location would have required it to travel at the impossible average speed of about 20 nautical miles per hour. This GNSS manipulation lasted until 16 May 2023, making NEW KONK/F.LONLINE's AIS tracks during this period false.



Figure 30-3: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE remaining at Sansha Bay, 8-9 April

Medium resolution satellite imagery on Planet Labs showed that a vessel of similar length as NEW KONK remained at Sansha Bay after NEW KONK's GNSS manipulation began.



Figure 30-4: NEW KONK imaged at Sansha Bay, 9 April 2023

High resolution satellite imagery provided by a Member State confirmed NEW KONK's location on 9 April 2023.

Figure 30-5: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE transmitting as LIFAN, East China Sea, 15-16 April 2023

Satellite imagery show that by 16 April the vessel was no longer in Sansha Bay. Instead, AIS transmission showed a vessel transmitting as LIFAN, a known falsified identity of NEW KONK, sailing up through the East China Sea.



Figure 30-6: NEW KONK / F.LONLINE, Yellow Sea, 16 June to 8 July[204] 2023

NEW KONK repeated its GNSS manipulation again from 16 June 2023: The same geo-spoofing signatures suggesting travel in a straight line, at the same speed and heading, in a southerly direction through the Yellow Sea. This may indicate obfuscation of its actual location at the time to conduct further illicit activities.



Source: Windward; Satellite Imagery, Planet Labs; annotated by the Panel

[204] At date of writing.

Annex 31: Suspect vessels in DPRK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The following are examples over the last two years of FDDVs and suspect vessels located in the same area of the DPRK EEZ, conducting or waiting to conduct ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK tankers in the vicinity. Typically, the suspect vessels and DPRK tankers did not transmit AIS signals, conducting their illicit transfers in an effort to evade sanctions.

2022

Figure 31-1:

NEW KONK in the same area of the DPRK EEZ in November 2022



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

Figure 31-2:

UNICA berthed alongside DPRK-flagged MU BONG 1 in the same area of the DPRK EEZ in September 2022

Source: Member State

Figure 31-3 shows the former intermediary vessel HENG XING (IMO: 8669589; currently the DPRK-flagged A BONG 1), UNICA (IMO: 8514306) and VIFINE (currently sailing as the DPRK-flagged UN HUNG), on 21 January 2022 in the DPRK EEZ.

The DPRK-flagged tanker UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962) previously sailed as the FDDV VIFINE. NEW KONK, then acting in the capacity of an intermediary vessel, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer with VIFINE on 19 June 2019, before itself subsequently becoming an FDDV.[205] The Panel's investigations showed the entities behind the two vessels had common connections of ownership and management history. UN HUNG conducted ship-to-ship transfers with NEW KONK on at least one another occasion in January 2022, in the same DPRK EEZ location (figure 31-4).

Figure 31-3:

UNICA, HENG XING (nka A BONG 1) and NEW KONK 1 in the DPRK EEZ in January 2022



Source: Member State

[205] S/2022/151, para. 32, figure VI.

Figure 31-4:



Source: Satellite imagery: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; inset photograph, Member State

2021

Figure 31-5:

The DPRK-flagged NAM DAE BONG, then sailing as DIAMOND 8, with the DPRK-flagged CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313) in the same area of the DPRK EEZ, 8 August 2021[206]



Source: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

[206] S/2022/132, para. 40.

Figure 31-6:

FDDV NEW KONK and DPRK-flagged KUM JIN GANG in the DPRK EEZ, 23 September 2021

Source: Member State

Figure 31-7:

FDDVs in the DPRK EEZ, 14 April 2021[207]

Source: Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel

[207] S/2022/132, para. 41 and annex 34.

Annex 32: Table of fraudulent identifiers transmitted, January to May 2023

Table 32: Table of fraudulent identifiers transmitted, January to May 2023[208]

Ship name	Fraudulent identifier
NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387)	F.LONLINE MMSI: 312162000 LIFAN MMSI: 312165230 MMSI: 312165923 LIAN MMSI: 667001395
UNICA (IMO: 8514306)	LITON MMSI: 457106000
DIAMOND 8 nka NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612)	SHUNLI MMSI: 457111000

Source: The Panel

[208] While these FDDVs continue to transmit known fraudulent names, some of their MMSIs have been manipulated.

Annex 33: Former Direct Delivery Vessels (FDDVs) in the Sansha Bay area, China

The following are examples of FDDVs and suspect vessels co-located in Sansha Bay between 2020 and 2023. In many of these instances investigated by the Panel, the following pattern of activity was observed: departure from Sansha Bay; ship-to-ship transfer conducted in the Taiwan Strait; ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tankers in the DPRK EEZ.

The Panel sought Chinese authorities' assistance to obtain information from these FDDVs on the individuals facilitating the illicit oil transfers. This would enable disruption of future oil procurements conducted by these vessels. China replied: "*China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. Relevant Chinese authorities are still conducting investigations on the case and preliminary findings show that NEW KONK, UNICA, DIAMOND 8/NAM DAE BONG, and SHUNDLLI have no records of port entry and exit in China since 2020. The information provided by the Panel are not verified and should not be included in its report*".

2023

FDDVs NEW KONK / F.LONLINE and UNICA / LITON in Sansha Bay, 15 February 2023



Source: Planet Labs; AIS overlay, Windward; annotated by the Panel

2022

FDDVs NEW KONK / F.LONLINE, UNICA / HAI SHUN 2 and HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896; currently the DPRK-flagged A SA BONG), Sansha Bay, 17-26 May 2022[209]



Source: Windward; annotated by the Panel

FDDVs UNICA, DIAMOND 8 and NEW KONK in Sansha Bay, 30 June 2022[210]

Source: Member State

[209] S/2022/668, paras. 39-42.
[210] Ibid.

2021

FDDVs SUBBLIC and HOKONG in Sansha Bay, 2 August 2021

HOKONG[211]



SUBBLIC, sailing *as HAI ZHOU 168*[212]



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[211] This FDDV is registered as being broken up in November 2021. S/2022/132, annex 43.
[212] S/2022/132.

2 August 2021[213]



Source: Maxar Technologies and Member State

[213] S/2022/132, annex 41.

2020

FDDV NEW KONK in Sansha Bay, 20 August 2020[214]

Source: Member State

FDDV XING MING YANG 888 in Sansha Bay, 1 November 2020[215]



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Member State

[214] S/2022/132, annex 39a.
[215] S/2022/132, annex 34.

FDDV SUBBLIC transmitting as HAI ZHOU 168 in Sansha Bay, 26 November 2020[216]

Source: Windward

Source: The Panel

[216] Ibid.

Annex 34: Associated entities and individuals

The Panel recalls previous investigations have shown that facilitators capitalize on the maritime industry's complex ownership and operator arrangements to prevent easy linkage identification between them. To do so, different paper companies are often set up with different nominee directors, and company ownership and / or management characterized by only indirect linkages.

EVER GLORY's registered owner is Kindom Honor Co., Ltd (hereafter "Kindom Honor") with an operating presence in Kaohsiung.[217] The ship's operator and technical manager is LW Maritime Service Co., Ltd (hereafter "LW Maritime"), another Kaohsiung-based company.[218] Both entities were incorporated in the Marshall Islands until their status was annulled in April 2023.

Kindom Honor

- Kindom Honor lists an address in the care of the Kaohsiung-based Green Ship Management Ltd[219] (hereafter "Green Ship") (see para. 55 of the Main Text (Case 2)).
- Green Ship shares the same contact details and address with three other companies: Navigator Ship Management Ltd (hereafter "Navigator Ship"), Marine Safety Consultants Ltd (hereafter "Marine Safety") and Fu Feng Marine Services Co Ltd (hereafter, "Fu Feng Marine") (富豐海事服務有限公司)
- Fu Feng Marine[220] was founded by two individuals, one of which ("Individual A") the Panel had previously corresponded with. Marine Safety's email is used by both Individual A as well an associate of Individual A. This associate in turn has been listed on several shipping documents the Panel has in possession, including the Kaohsiung-based Gold Advance Corp, associated with AN PING (IMO: 7903366), another FDDV.[221]

LW Maritime

- LW Maritime was also listed as the ship manager of HENG XING (IMO: 8669589), another vessel investigated by the Panel,[222] before the tanker's transfer to the DPRK fleet in January 2022.
- Mr Wu GJ of LW Maritime, has been publicly recorded[223] as associated with the Kaohsiung-based Vanguard Shipping Safety Management Consultants Co Ltd, a company associated with entities linked to vessels previously investigated by the Panel.[224]

[217] IMO records.
[218] Ibid.
[219] With a Fuxing 2nd Road, Lingya District, Kaohsiung address.
[220] With a Zhongshan 2nd Road, Lingya District, Kaohsiung address.
[221] S/2021/211, para. 46 and annex 25.
[222] S/2023/171, table 34 and para. 99, S/2022/668, paras. 74-75 and annex 36 and S/2019/171, annex 6.
[223] See https://web.archive.org/web/20181207111011/http://vanguard1.webnode.cz
[224] S/2019/171, para. 9 and annex 6, and S/2018/171, paras. 68-69.

Individual A was also listed as having previously managed PU ZHOU when the vessel was still foreign-flagged and prior to its transfer to the DPRK.

The Panel wrote to Individual A concerning queries, inter alia, on his associations with the various entities; the entities' linkages viz one another, and to EVER GLORY and MIDAS. The Panel received a response from Individual A in late July 2023, to which it is still assessing the information provided.

In the meantime, the Panel highlights the following:

Individual A replied that he / his companies provide *"…ship safety consultant in complying relevant regulations …*" and served as *"…DOC company …dealing with ship safety audit, class survey assistance, external inspection for example PSC inspection*".

With regards the associated companies identified by the Panel at figure XVIII of the Main Text, Individual A did not deny their linkages to him/his associate, but replied that "This is impossible to hide anything from owners from the fact this system established for, DOC company contact and email will lead to us", indicated that the various companies identified by the Panel could be easily traced to him. The Panel maintains a different view. Identification to Individual A would not have been possible without access to various jurisdictional ownership information, restricted ship registration records, specialized subscription databases and the Panel's own investigations.

Green Ship

Individual A also claimed that Green Ship served as EVER GLORY's DOC holder rather than LW Maritime, and that Kindom Honor had no relationship with the other companies investigated by the Panel. IMO records list LW Maritime as EVER GLORY's DOC holder and that Kindom Honor was in the care of Green Ship.

Elsewhere, in a separate response to the Panel, Kindom Honor, which is the registered owner of EVER GLORY, stated that Individual A was "*…a consultant in the affair of vessel DOC management on EVER GLORY commissioned by Kindom Honor.*"

Navigator Ship

IMO records indicate Navigator Ship served as MIDAS' ship manager, operator and technical manager, in addition to being the DOC Holder at the time of the MIDAS' ship-to-ship transfer with SHUNDLLI.

Individual A further stated that in addition to simply providing DOC services, Navigator Ship provided no other commercial services nor had relationships with other companies investigated by the Panel. The Panel again notes IMO records indicate Navigator Ship shares a phone and fax number with Green Ship, Marine Safety, and Fu Feng Marine.

Individual A claimed Navigator Ship and Marine Safety had no relationships with the other companies investigated by the Panel. Yet, in his response Individual A acknowledged that the same associate of Individual A served as director of both Green Ship and Navigator ship. Elsewhere, Individual A claimed that MIDAS was supposed to have been transferred to Green Ship's management, but the transfer was not completed due to cost.

The Panel notes that while Individual A claimed to have provided only DOC services to vessels of interests to the Panel and had no knowledge of or role in the vessels' cargo or operations, the details in his response to the Panel's enquiries suggests much deeper knowledge, including that of Navigator Ship's internal communications.

Elsewhere, in a separate response to the Panel, Laurel International, which is the registered owner of MIDAS, replied that Individual A was "… *under the commission by Laurel International …". established Navigator ship as MIDAS' Document of Compliance (DOC) holder. Where "Individual A was engaged by Laurel International to do the job of DOC management and counseling of the vessel MIDAS* ..." Ms. [X], through Individual A's introduction, served as "*nominal person*" responsible for Navigator Ship, and that "*she was charged with keeping contact with [Individual A] … Neither... took part in the shipping management of MIDAS*".

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel

Annex 35: Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd

Full Victory's Certificate of Incorporation



ANGUILLA

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMPANIES ACT, 2000

(Section 8)

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

Company Number : 2450879

The Registrar of Companies hereby certifies that

FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.

Is this day incorporated.

Registrar of Companies
Dated this 3rd day of August, 2017

Source: The Panel

Invoice of oil transfer from supplier ship to Full Victory for EVER GLORY, 3 March 2023

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

[redacted]

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

DATE: Feb. 01, 2023
INV. NO: [redacted]
CONTRACT NO. [redacted]

MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO.,LTD
SUPPLY TANKER [redacted]

DATE	VESSEL NAME	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	QUANTITY (BBL)	UNIT PRICE (USD)	AMOUNT (USD)
2023/1/21	Ever Glory	Gasoil 10ppm	30,744.83	126.905	US$3,901,672.65
			TOTAL AMOUNT		US$3,901,672.65

Source: The Panel

Success Regent’s request to Full Victory on customer and shipping information for the 18 January 2023 oil cargo transfer to EVER GLORY, 3 May 2023



SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
3rd Floor, J&C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands
[redacted]

致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.

盡職調查

依 SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED（後稱本公司）與 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.（後稱貴公司）於 2023年01月18日 所簽訂之油品買賣合約（合約編號 [redacted]），本公司因企業盡職調查及國際制裁合規所需，請貴公司盡速提供以下資料，以便本公司進行相關法令遵循與合規管理：

1. 貴公司與下游客戶之合約。
2. 貴公司船舶卸貨文件（應包含卸貨起訖日期時間、卸貨地點、卸貨對象詳細資料、完整海運卸貨文件）。
3. 貴公司船舶軌跡紀錄（若貴公司卸貨對象為船舶，則該船舶的軌跡紀錄需一併提供）。

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
2023年05月03日

Unofficial Translation

1. Contracts between your company and downstream customers.

2. Your company's ship unloading documents (should include the date and time of unloading, unloading location, detailed information on unloading objects, and complete sea unloading documents).

3. Your company's ship track record (if your company's unloading object is a ship, the ship's track record must be provided together).

Source: The Panel

Oil cargo receipt confirming date of transfer of supplier ship to EVER GLORY, 21 January 2023



TO : MASTER OF VESSEL / BARGE

M / T : EVER GLORY (1729)

IMO: 9102813

DATE : 21-Jan-2023

(" CARGO RECEIPT")

1. THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT UNDER MENTIONED SHIP/BARGE HAVE PHYSICALLY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MENTIONED BUNKER IN GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AT THE MENTIONED PORT / POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS, CONDITION AND EXCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE SALE CONTRACT .

NAME OF RECEIVING VESSEL / BARGE : EVER GLORY (1729)

DESCRIPTION OF BUNKER : GAS OIL 10 PPM SULPHUR

QUANTITY OF BUNKER : 4100 MT METRIC TONS

FLOW-METER READING .

BEFORE : NO .1		M³	AFTER : NO.1		M³
BEFORE : NO .2	824765.3	M³	AFTER : NO.2	827035.3	M³
BEFORE : NO .3	620721.0	M³	AFTER : NO.3	623371.0	M³

F.W FLOW-METER

BEFORE : M³ AFTER : M³ TOTAL. : 0 M³

STATEMENT OF FACTS

	TIME	DATE			
ALONGSIDE :	17:30 LT	21.01.2023	GROSS LITRES	4920.000	M³
HOSE CONNECTED :	17:40 LT	21.01.2023	NET LITRES	4885.560	M³
COMMENCED SUPPLY :	17:50 LT	21.01.2023	US BBLS	30744.83	Bbls
COMPLETED SUPPLY :	23:30 LT	21.01.2023	TEMPERATURE	23.3	°C
HOSE DISCONNECTED :	23:40 LT	21.01.2023	DENSITY @ 15°C	0.8407	
VSL CAST OFF :	23:50 LT	21.01.2023	VCF	0.9930	

REMARKS : For and on behalf of FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.

Authorized Signature(s)

KINDOM HONOR CO., LTD. IMO#9102813 EVER GLORY

ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT BY : MASTER OF M/T

COUNTER - SIGN BY : MASTER OF [redacted]

Source: The Panel

Invoice of oil transfer from supplier ship to Full Victory for MIDAS, 3 March 2023



SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED

[redacted]

PROFORMA INVOICE

MESSERS: FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD

DATE: Mar. 03, 2023
INVOICE NO.: [redacted]

DESCRIPTIONS OF GOODS	QUANTITY(BBL)	UNIT PRICE(USD)	AMOUNT(USD)
GASOIL 500ppm	15,103.20	111.000	1,676,455.20
		TOTAL AMOUNT(USD)	1,676,455.20

Source: The Panel

Cargo receipt confirming date of transfer of supplier ship to MIDAS, 9 March 2023



TO : MASTER OF VESSEL / BARGE

M / T : MIDAS (0285)

IMO: 9105279

DATE : 9-Mar-2023

(" CARGO RECEIPT")

1. THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT UNDER MENTIONED SHIP/BARGE HAVE PHYSICALLY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MENTIONED BUNKER IN GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION AT THE MENTIONED PORT / POSITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS, CONDITION AND EXCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE SALE CONTRACT .

NAME OF RECEIVING VESSEL / BARGE : MIDAS (0285)

DESCRIPTION OF BUNKER : GAS OIL 500 PPM PPM SULPHUR

QUANTITY OF BUNKER : 2000 MT METRIC TONS

FLOW-METER READING .

BEFORE : NO .1		M³	AFTER : NO.1		M³
BEFORE : NO .2	870498.1	M³	AFTER : NO.2	871598.1	M³
BEFORE : NO .3	674833.7	M³	AFTER : NO.3	676133.7	M³

F.W FLOW-METER

BEFORE : M³ AFTER : M³ TOTAL : 0 M³

STATEMENT OF FACTS

	TIME	DATE			
ALONGSIDE :	22:15 LT	08.03.2023	GROSS LITRES :	2400.000	M³
HOSE CONNECTED :	22:25 LT	08.03.2023	NET LITRES :	2383.680	M³
COMMENCED SUPPLY :	22:35 LT	08.03.2023	US BBLS :	15000.50	Bbls
COMPLETED SUPPLY :	00:40 LT	09.03.2023	TEMPERATURE :	23.2	°C
HOSE DISCONNECTED :	00:50 LT	09.03.2023	DENSITY @ 15°C :	0.8524	
VSL CAST OFF :	01:00 LT	09.03.2023	VCF :	0.9932	

REMARKS :

MIDAS

ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT BY : MASTER OF M/T

COUNTER - SIGN BY : MASTER OF [redacted]

Source: The Panel

Success Regent's request to Full Victory on customer and shipping information, including for the 3 March 2023 oil cargo transfer to MIDAS, 23 March 2023

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
3rd Floor, J&C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands
[redacted]

致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.

盡職調查

依 SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED (後稱本公司) 與 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD. (後稱貴公司) 於 2023年03月03日 及 2023年03月09日 所簽訂之油品買賣合約 (合約編號 [redacted] 及 [redacted])，本公司因企業盡職調查及國際制裁合規所需，請貴公司盡速提供以下資料，以便本公司進行相關法令遵循與合規管理：

1. 貴公司與下游客戶之合約。
2. 貴公司船舶卸貨文件 (應包含卸貨起訖日期時間、卸貨地點、卸貨對象詳細資料、完整海運卸貨文件)。
3. 貴公司船舶軌跡紀錄 (若貴公司卸貨對象為船舶，則該船舶的軌跡紀錄需一併提供)。

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
2023年03月23日

Based on documentation provided by Success Regent, the company, on 30 March 2023, sent a letter to Navigator Ship, MIDAS' technical manager, rejecting further commercial activities with the vessel. The Panel has sought clarification with Success Regent on which basis it made this determination.

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
3rd Floor, J&C Building, P.O. Box 933, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands

[redacted]

致 FULL VICTORY ENTERPRISE CO., LTD.

本公司已收到貴司所提供的卸貨文件，但本公司對於該文件尚有疑義，在尚未釐清之前，本公司特以此信函通知貴司：

1. 本公司即刻起拒絕任何與 MIDAS 有關的一切商業行為；
2. 本公司即刻起拒絕與 MIDAS 的 Commercial Operator (NAVIGATOR SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD) 有關的一切商業行為；
3. 本公司亦將貴司本次制裁合規及盡職調查的表現，列為後續是否繼續進行商業合作的評估要點。

若貴司違反雙方所簽訂之油品買賣合約中的條款，貴司必須承擔全部法律責任，以及對本公司的全部損害負賠償責任。

SUCCESS REGENT DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
2023年03月30日

Unofficial translation

Our company has received the unloading document provided by your company, but our company still has doubts about the document. Before it is clarified, our company hereby informs your company with this letter:

1. The company immediately rejects all commercial activities related to MIDAS;

2. The company immediately refuses all commercial activities related to the Commercial Operator (NAVIGATOR SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD) of MIDAS;

3. The company will also list your company's performance in this sanction compliance and due diligence investigation as the key points for evaluating whether to continue business cooperation in the future.

If your company violates the terms of the oil product sales contract signed by both parties, your company must bear all legal responsibilities and be liable for all damages to the company.

Source: The Panel

Annex 36: Aspects of Sales Contract of Oil Cargo

The Panel notes that in cases of oil cargo contracts, particularly when first supplier vessels are involved, the seller of the oil cargo can either transact as 'Free Alongside Ship' (FAS) or 'Free on Board' (FOB).[225] FAS and FOB essentially defines the point at which risk and responsibility for the cargos is passed on to the buyer. Under a FAS contract, risk and responsibility for the cargos is passed on to the buyer when the seller's ship arrives alongside the buyer's ship or destination port, and the goods are considered as delivered. Meanwhile, under an FOB contract, the seller ensures that goods are loaded on board the ship from port. The risk and responsibility for the cargo passes on to the buyer once the goods are loaded on board the buyer's ship.

The Panel recalls[226] its recommendation that Member States and relevant international organizations ensure that commodity trading companies and the tanker fleets operating under their jurisdictions, including in at-risk segments of the FOB market and/or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers in relevant international waters, adopt contractual language that includes an effective end-user delivery verification mechanism.

Excerpts from the Contract between Supplier Ship X and EVER GLORY

1. 油品名稱：GASOIL 10PPM

2. 油品數量：4,100 MT+/-5%

3. 油品交易條件及價格：賣方可選擇交易條件為船邊「FAS」公海；或「FOB」臺灣任何一個港口。

4. 提貨日期：
(1)買方應於其船隻預定加油前 3~7 天，給予賣方裝貨通知，內應載明船舶名稱及船舶聯絡方式及數量。
(2)「FOB」：船舶進港口裝貨，裝貨數量的確認由買賣雙方同意並具有公信力的國際公證公司對貨品數量進行測量來做為提單的數量。
(3)「FAS」：公海內以船對船方式交貨，最終的交貨數量由買賣雙方船長簽名的正本或副本的交貨單據將作為完成本次交貨的證明。

[225] See INCOTERMS definitions of FAS and FOB at https://iccwbo.org/business-solutions/incoterms-rules/incoterms-2020/
[226] S/2019/171, annex 89 para.22.

9. 禁止條款：
禁止買方，將與我司所購買的油品販賣到受國際制裁的國家（如北韓地區等），如有涉及違法情事相關法律責任全由買方自負，若經查獲買方從事非法交易之確切證據，本公司將依合約立即中止交易並斷絕往來。

Unofficial translation of boxed text

“3. Oil product transaction terms and prices: the seller can choose the transaction terms as "FAS" on the high seas by the ship; or "FOB" …

4. Delivery date:

(2) "FOB": The ship enters the port for loading, and the confirmation of the quantity of the cargo shall be carried out by a credible international notarization company agreed by the buyer and the seller to measure the quantity of the goods as the quantity of the bill of lading.

(3) "FAS": Ship-to-ship delivery on the high seas, the final delivery quantity signed by the masters of the buyer and seller, the original or duplicate delivery documents will be used as proof of completion of the delivery…

9. Prohibited terms:

The buyer is prohibited from selling the oil products purchased by our company to countries subject to international sanctions (such as North Korea, etc.). If there is any violation of the law, the buyer shall bear all the legal responsibilities. If the buyer is found to have definite evidence of illegal transactions, the company will immediately suspend the transaction and cut off contact according to the contract.”

Source: The Panel

Annex 37: Correspondence with Kindom Honor (EVER GLORY) and Laurel International (MIDAS)[227]

(A) Correspondence with Kindom Honor

The Panel communicated with Kindom Honor Co., Ltd (hereafter "Kindom Honor"), the registered owner of EVER GLORY (IMO: 9102813) on 10 April 2023. Following a response from Kindom Honor via a legal firm on 21 April, the Panel wrote again to Kindom Honor on 26 June, seeking clarification and additional information.

The Panel is highlighting the following key information relevant to its investigations provided by Kindom Honor, followed by the Panel's comments:

EVER GLORY

Ship-to-ship transfers

Kindom Honor stated that it "… has never directed EVER GLORY to meet or conduct ship-to-ship transfer of refined petroleum with the DPRK-flagged NAM DAE BONG (IMO: 9132612), formerly known as DIAMOND 8, nor has EVER GLORY ever berthed alongside a vessel named SHUNLI (MMSI: 457111000)."

Comment: The Panel notes this stands contrary to video evidence taken onboard EVER GLORY by its crew, recording EVER GLORY's meeting with SHUNLI.

Kindom Honor stated during the months of January and February 2023, EVER GLORY "… loaded diesel cargo in the northern waters of the Philippines during the days of January 4 through January 8, 2023, delivered diesel cargo in the quantity of about 4,000 tons to the customer from Fujian … Mr Qui Guo Rong, in the sea area off Taichung Port … from February 17 to February 18, 2023 …" "EVER GLORY only sold diesel to Mr Qui … from China on February 18, with a quantity of 4,000 tons."

Comment: The Panel notes that no documentary proof was provided to back this assertion and it is contrary to information provided by the supplier vessel confirming that it provided EVER GLORY 4,100 tons of oil cargo on 21 January. This information corresponds with the Panel's maritime AIS tracking as well as documentation provided by the supplier ship.

[227] The Panel previously investigated another case of trans-shipped oil in multiple stages involving Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. The modus operandi showed some similarities. See S/2022/132, paras. 64-73 and annex 48; and S/2022/668, paras. 52-61 and annex 33.1. and 33.2.

Kindom Honor stated “EVER GLORY delivered diesel to Mr. Qiu[228] Guo Rong in China just for his supply to the fishery boat users …”

<u>Comment</u>: The Panel notes Kindom Honor did not provide documentary proof to back this assertion.

Due diligence

Kindom Honor stated “As for the receiving vessel assigned by Mr. Qui Guo-Rong on February 18, according to the captain of EVER GLORY, because the two vessels berthed alongside at night and the line of sight was not good, the captain of EVER GLORY did not follow the operation standards of Kindom Honor to record vessel identification information …” and “Kindom Honor has never used EVER GLORY to engage in any illicit maritime activity.”

Elsewhere, Kindom Honor wrote “There is no Korean-speaking person on board the two sides … neither the captain nor the purser of suspected that the cargo receiving vessel assigned by Mr Qui … had any connection with the DPRK.”

Communication records

In response to communication records and documentation regarding the sale of the oil cargo, Kindom Honor provided the following “communication records between Kindom Honor and Mr Qiu[229] Guo Rong dated February 18, 2023 with regard to the sale of the 4000 tons diesel” (see figure below)



[228] ‘Qiu’ is the spelling as provided in the legal firm’s letter in this instance.
[229] ‘Qiu’ is the spelling as provided in the legal firm’s letter in this instance.

Payments

Kindom Honor was unable to produce original proof of payment "effected by Mr Qiu[230] GR [sic]" given the difficulties to effect payment via USD remittance. Payment was instead transacted in local currencies using a Chinese underground banking service provider.

Comment: The Panel notes that the letter spelled the name of the "operator of offshore gas stations" both as Mr Qui and as Mr Qiu.

(B) The Panel's correspondence with Laurel International

The Panel communicated with Laurel International Co Ltd (hereafter "Laurel International"), the registered owner of MIDAS (IMO: 9105279), on 20 April 2023. Following a response from Laurel International received via the same legal firm as that of Kindom Honor on 4 May, the Panel wrote again to the company on 26 June, seeking clarification and additional information.

The Panel is highlighting the following key information relevant to its investigations, provided by Laurel International:

MIDAS

Ship-to-ship transfers

Laurel International stated that "The diesel cargos purchased by Laurel International from Success Regent in March 2023 … were fully sold to Chinese fishing vessels and offshore work ships through Mr. QIU GUO SHU (broker) who is an oil merchant from Fujian Province, China."

Later in the same paragraph, the company stated that "Normally MIDAS delivered the diesel cargo by filling the diesel into the oil tanks of the customers' ships. It was an exceptional delivery when Qiu Guo Shu asked for transhipment of 1000 tons of diesel to oil tanker "Shundlli"."

Comment: The Panel notes that no documentary proof was provided to back this assertion, beyond providing an explanation that the cargo of 1,000 tons of diesel oil was an 'exceptional delivery' of transhipment insofar as the company was unable to determine the onward sale beyond SHUNDLLI. Further, the Panel's vessel tracking data indicated that following the ship-to-ship transfer with MIDAS, SHUNDLLI proceeded to sail north to the Korea Bay. No further ship-to-ship transfers were logged.

[230] 'Qiu' is the spelling as provided in the legal firm's letter in this instance.

Due diligence

Concerning its due diligence conducted, Laurel International stated that it entrusted the job to its Document of Compliance Holder, Navigator Ship, and "*... was satisfied with the report demonstrating that Shundlli's registered owner was a Hong Kong company and that the information from Qiu … was fully consistent."*

Comment: The Panel notes that there already existed negative reporting on SHUNDLLI in international media.[231] As of mid-December 2022 SHUNDLLI was alleged to have illicitly delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK after loading oil cargo from MERCURY (IMO: 9262170).

NOTE: The Panel is also investigating SHUNDLLI's owner, HongKong Great Star Development Ltd, in relation to its vessel sale of YUKO MARU 8 and SEA STAR 5 to the DPRK.

Communication records

In response to the Panel's requests for all communication and payment information, Laurel International claimed to be unable to furnish documentation, explaining that Mr. Qiu Guo Shu had "…no idea how to use a smartphone … Communication was done via telephone with no text records".

Payments

Laurel International stated that for the voyages of ship-to-ship transfers undertaken by MIDAS in March 2023, the diesel cargos procured by Laurel International were "*... purchased from and supplied by Success Regent Development Limited (sic) ...*".

Comment: The Panel notes that while Laurel International claims to have purchased the oil cargos directly from the British Virgin Islands-based Success Regent Development Limited, financial information provided indicated that the Anguilla-registered company Full Victory Enterprise Co., Ltd remitted payment to Success Regent for oil cargo transferred from the supplier ship to MIDAS prior to the MIDAS's ship-to-ship transfer with SHUNDLLI.

[231] See https://www.ft.com/content/41e47ba2-3e3b-414b-905b-df4336f22bed

According to Laurel International, given the difficulties faced for Mr. Qiu to effect payment via USD remittance, transaction in local currencies was conducted using a Chinese underground banking service provider that arranged cash payments to Laurel International "personally". Laurel International provided further details of how such transactions in trade typically operated and was unable to provide documentary information of such "nonbank currency exchange providers" given its own acknowledgment of the unlawful nature of such underground banking activity.

Comparison of responses between Kindom Honor and Laurel International

The Panel notes several similarities between the responses from Laurel International (owner of the MIDAS) and Kindom Honor (owner of the EVER GLORY).

(i) Both companies, responding via the same law firm to the Panel, claimed that the oil transfers to the NAM DAE BONG and SHUNDLLI were brokered by individuals from Fujian Province with similar names. Laurel International claimed that a "Qiu Guo Shu" brokered the MIDAS's oil cargo transfer to SHUNDLLI while Kindom Honor claimed that a "Qiu Guo Rong" brokered the EVER GLORY's oil cargo transfer to SHUNLI.

(ii) Green Ship Management was copied in all responses provided by the legal office on behalf of their client, Laurel International, which owns MIDAS. Yet, Laurel International stated they had no knowledge nor have done any business with Green Ship, the document of compliance holder of EVER GLORY.

(iii) Both responses claimed that the end buyers were Chinese fishing vessels but provided no documentation as evidence.

(iv) The same buyer entity (Full Victory) paid for the oil cargos loaded onboard EVER GLORY and MIDAS.

(v) Both companies were unable to furnish payment details given the transactions made in cash and through an underground service provider.

(vi) Both employed the same offshore company in registering their companies. Primary source information showed the company in Samoa that Laurel International (MIDAS) was registered under is the same company, through its Seychelles office,[232] that also registered Sino Chance Enterprise Inc. Sino Chance manages (ISM) another vessel belonging to Kindom Honor, the registered owner of EVER GLORY.

Source: The Panel

[232] See https://www.goldinglobal.com/goldinglobal/default.aspx?lan=zh-TW

Annex 38: Follow-up correspondence with Kindom Honor (EVER GLORY) and Laurel International (MIDAS), July 2023

The following is a summation of the relevant responses from follow-up queries posed by the Panel to Kindom Honor and to Laurel International.

Kindom Honor

Oil cargo transfers

Kindom Honor, through its lawyers, confirmed it purchased the diesel fuel from [Success Regent] for the 18 February oil transfer to EVER GLORY "*through the connection of the owner of Full Victory ...*" Kindom Honor explained it did not purchase diesel fuel from the Philippines' dealer given "*poor fuel quality*".

In that regard, Kindom Honor admitted it "*...did pull alongside with [Supplier Ship X] on 22 – 23 January 2023…*", and "*That quantity of diesel fuel was purchased by Full Victory … under the request from … Manager of Kindom Honor, because the owner of Full Victory ... had very good relationship with Mr … [Success Regent]*", and that "*... the connection to Full Victory ... entitled to a lower price at which the fuel was purchased …*"

Receiver ship of oil cargo from EVER GLORY

Kindom Honor said it "*... engages in the fueling station on the sea for vessels and refills power fuel for fishing vessels and working vessels …*". In some cases where it bunkered with its customers' ships, the ships "*...would conceal the vessel name when sailing out to sea …", alluding to the smuggled nature of the refined petroleum transferred. In this regard, "Hence the vessel master of EVER GLORY was unable to recognize the name of the transfer vessel*".

EVER GLORY and MIDAS

In response to an enquiry on a meeting between EVER GLORY and MIDAS on 4 January 2023, identified by the Panel on maritime database platforms, Kindom Honor replied that "*... the shipping agency said that one of its customer's vessels, the tanker MIDAS had defective pumps that needed replacement and requested EVER GLORY to assist by carrying two pumps to MIDAS (IMO: 9105279) for repairing*". No petroleum was transferred. The Panel notes it had previously assessed common associations via companies and individuals between EVER GLORY and MIDAS.

DOC holder for EVER GLORY

Kindom Honor stated that Mr Wu (Panel's comment: of LW Maritime and Vanguard Shipping) was "*… the person responsible for Vanguard Shipping Safety management company for EVER GLORY*", and that Vanguard Shipping "*…ceased to commit the affair of DOC management on EVER GLORY … several years ago*".

With regards Individual A, Kindom Honor replied that the said individual was "*…a consultant in the affair of vessel DOC management on EVER GLORY commissioned by Kindom Honor*."

The Panel notes that this information was not updated on maritime databases. The Panel further notes past cases that it had investigated where different registered owner and management companies often changed hands, making the connection chain difficult to establish.

Kindom Honor maintained "*… we had no business whatsoever with any North Korean individual or company.*"

Investigations continue.

Laurel International

DOC holder for MIDAS

Laurel International, through its lawyers, replied that MIDAS' technical manager, Navigator Ship, was set up by Individual A. This individual, "*… under the commission by Laurel International …*". established Navigator ship as MIDAS' Document of Compliance (DOC) holder and was not involved in the operation management of the ship. Instead, the shipping business of MIDAS was "*… managed directly by Laurel International under the supervision of its parent company Full Victory Enterprise*".

Where "*Individual A was engaged by Laurel International to do the job of DOC management and counseling of the vessel MIDAS …*" the company explained that Ms. [X], through Individual A's introduction, served as "*nominal person*" responsible for Navigator Ship, and that "*she was charged with keeping contact with [Individual A] … Neither … took part in the shipping management of MIDAS*". The Panel notes from its previous correspondence with Individual A that Ms. [X] is his colleague in one of his companies.

Laurel International and Full Victory

"*Laurel International … operates fuel station on the sea for vessels, where buying and selling of diesel fuel is all done in high sea. Because fuel transaction done in high sea requires no entry to any specific port … to complete the customs clearance, that eliminates the necessity of preparing customs clearance and shipping documents including declaration of import/export*".

"*Laurel International is the owner of MIDAS and the real controller of MIDAS as well*". "*Full Victory Enterprise is a primary capital contributor to Laurel International. The latter has been supervised by the former in terms of operational earnings*".

Elsewhere, the Panel notes that Success Regent had indicated it sent a letter to Navigator Ship (DOC holder of MIDAS), on 30 March 2023, rejecting rejected further commercial activities with the vessel (see annex 35 above on Full Victory Enterprise).

Laurel International maintained "*... MIDAS knew no North Korean customers, nor did it sell any fuel to any North Korean company or individual ...*". The Panel notes that Panel reports have shown DPRK entities and individuals work through third party individuals and facilitators, and mask their identity (ship, company and persons).

Investigations continue.

Source: The Panel

Annex 39: Vessels that have been sold to or acquired by the DPRK*

See also Table 2 in the Main text.

The table below lists the acquired vessels (1 January to 1 May 2023) and an updated list of previously unrecorded acquired vessels (2021-2022), supplementing the Panel's S/2023/171 list of ships sailing under the DPRK's flag:[233]

Year 2023					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	8660909	SIN PHYONG 10 ex WALES	Cargo	28451	-
2	1015167	TAE DONG MUN 1 ex SHOU XIANG 8	Cargo	8667	-
3	1017787	MO RAN BONG 7 ex HUA XIANG 669	Cargo / Container	5115	-
4	1018614	UN HA SU ex WEN TONG 7	Cargo	3282	-
5	8592774	HWA PHYONG ex HAI SHUN FENG 6	Cargo / Container	5529	-
6	8598431	THAE JA BONG ex XIANG HUI 10	Cargo	5114	Detailed in current report
7	8662933	HWANG RYONG SAN ex HUA JIN SHENG 8	Cargo	3278	Detailed in current report
8	8360248	SONG NIM 9 ex BAO YING HAI 18	Cargo	6431	Detailed in current report
9	8360406	TOK SONG ex HONG TAI 215	Cargo	14,116	Detailed in current report
10	8358697	KUM GANG 1 ex HUI YI	Cargo	6310	Detailed in current report
11	8360250	HYANG SAN ex WEN TONG FA ZHAN	Cargo	5007	Detailed in current report
12	9054896	A SA BONG ex HAI JUN	Tanker	4785	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, and current report)
13	8358192	NAM PHO 5 ex XIN YANG HONG	Cargo	4831	Detailed in current report
14	1016355	SONG NIM 5 ex WANG HAO 1	Cargo	5263	-

[233] In addition to the 2023 new additions, this table updates the ships added in 2022 not listed in table 3/annex 33 of S/2023/171.

The 2022 and 2021 lists of acquired ships should be read in conjunction with the Panel's list contained in S/2023/171, which does not include the following ships that have since been backdated as flagged under the DPRK. Consequently, the total number of acquired ships flagged by the DPRK in 2022 and in 2021 is now higher.

Year 2022					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
15	8669589	A BONG 1 / KUM YA GANG 1 ex HENG XING	Tanker	3221	Yes (S/2023/171, S2022/667, S/2019/171 and current report)
16	8891297	PU YANG 2 ex SF BLOOM	Cargo / Container	3539	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
17	8356584	KYONG SONG 3 ex ANNI	Cargo / Container	5226	Yes (S/2023/171, listed as suspected acquired by DPRK)
18	9142409	CHON HA 2 ex SHUN CHAO 9	Cargo / Container	4860	Current report
19	8864464	PUK CHON 2 ex SEA STAR 5	Cargo	4835	Detailed in current report
20	8358324	MO RAN BONG 5 ex HONG JIE 1	Cargo / Container	5515	Detailed in current report
21	8596122	UN SUN ex HUA YUAN DA 9	Cargo	5150	-
22	1015533	TAE RYONG 3 ex XING HONG XIANG 77	Cargo	5116	Detailed in current report
23	9536272	PU YANG 6 ex SEA GLORY	Cargo / Container	4802	-
24	9088031	HWANG GUM PHYONG 3 ex YUKO MARU 8	Cargo	4635	Detailed in current report
25	8597827	PHO HANG 1 ex AN YUAN 1	Cargo / Container	3637	-
26	8718639	JANG SU ex WEN XIANG	Cargo	3457	Detailed in current report
27	8660909	SAE GIL ex ZHI KUN 6	Cargo	4730	Detailed in current report
28	9154189	RYON PHUNG ex SIN PHYONG 11 / ex CONTREL	Tanker	3159	Yes (S/2023/171, and current report)
29	8597944	HONG DAE 2 ex HUA YU 108	Cargo	4519	-

Year 2021					
	IMO number	**Ship name**	**Type**	**DWT**	**Previously referenced in Panel reports**
30	8312497	SONG WON 2 ex NEW REGENT	Tanker	5167	Yes (S/2021/211, S/2020/840, S/2020/151, S/2019/171)
31	9132612	NAM DAE BONG ex DIAMOND 8	Tanker	9273	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211, S2020/840, S/2020/151, and current report)
32	8593209	MO RAN BONG 1 ex RUN HONG 58	Cargo	2162	Detailed in current report

Source: The Panel. Ship information obtained from S&P Global and IMO records.

Annex 40: Chinese vessels acquired by the DPRK in 2023

The enclosed table is a non-exhaustive list of 10 cargo ships that were previously China-flagged ships or were last owned by Chinese entities before coming under the DPRK flag. The information is based on the Panel's AIS tracking on commercial maritime databases, IMO records, and results of the Panel's investigations.[234]

The Panel notes that the date of the ship's flagging under the DPRK's fleet may be submitted to the IMO at a later date. The table contains key details to assist the relevant Chinese authorities in their investigations, along with queries that supplement additional requested information.

The Panel separately continues to monitor other Chinese-flagged or Chinese-owned vessels of interest with similar characteristics. These vessels are presently of an unknown status and may possibly have been acquired by the DPRK.

The Panel sought information from China, including their ship registration, beneficial owners, customs information, ship purchase and sale prior to their departure from Chinese waters. Given that lack of available information on the owners and managers, the Panel also sought Chinese authorities' assistance to convey questions to the ship owners, including, *inter alia,* that would explain the presence of the ship in DPRK waters or verifiable evidence that show otherwise, as well as purchase and sale information where the vessel was sold on.

China replied: "*After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows: SHUNCHAO 9, HUI YI, HONG JIE 1, RUN HONG 58, XIN HONG XIANG 77, WEN TONG FA ZHAN, and XIANGHUI 10 were de-registered on May of 2022, January of 2023, August of 2022, November of 2021, October of 2022, February of 2023, November of 2018 respectively. These ships were not re-registered ever since. ZHI KUN 6 and HUA JIN SHENG 8 are still registered as Chinese ships. HONG TAI 215 have not applied for nationality registration. Judging from the investigations conducted by Chinese authorities, the information received by the Panel are inaccurate. This is not the first time such thing happens and China has previously raised concerns over this issue. China requests the Panel to conduct necessary screening of the information it receives, and avoid including information that are inconsistent with facts in its report, so as to maintain the objectivity of the report*".

Source: The Panel

[234] Information valid as in May 2023.

#	SHIP *	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
1	**formerly SHUNCHAO 9** Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**CHON HA 2** **IMO: 9142409** Flagged under the DPRK in May 2023	Hongkong Sun Rising Shipmanagement Co Ltd was the last registered owner prior to the ship sailing under the DPRK flag *-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* <u>Period of interest:</u> Since June 2022 *-Query: Information on ship's presence along Baima River; any ship repair or modification conducted;* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	SHUNCHAO 9 first featured as a vessel of interest for the Panel when it bunkered with another vessel of interest, 19 WINNER (IMO: 8613190) along Baima River in August 2022. 19 WINNER had also conducted bunker with other vessels of interest that were then flagged under the DPRK. The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
2	**formerly ZHI KUN 6** MMSI: 413332690 Last known as under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**SAE GIL IMO: 8660909** Flagged under the DPRK in November 2022	<u>Period of interest:</u> January to February 2022 -*Query: Information on vessel AIS and ports of departure* <u>Period of interest:</u> Since September 2016 when the vessel was sold from its former Hong Kong owner Hung Tai International Ocean Freight (HK) Ltd -*Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)* -*Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* -*Query: Information on ship's presence along Baima River; any ship repair or modification conducted; port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	ZHI KUN 6 was recorded moored outside Shidao between end January and 5 February 2022. The ship last transmitted AIS as it departed Shidao and sailed in the direction of the DPRK. -*Query: Information on the presence of the ship and of its activity (e.g. cargo load/offload; bunker; crew change etc.)* ZHI KUN 6 was prior at Rongcheng Yuantong shipyard in January 2022. This shipyard was featured in the Panel's last report S/2023/171. -Query: *Information on ownership of shipyard*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
3	**formerly** **HUI YI** MMSI: 413331780 Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**KUM GANG 1** **IMO: 8358697** Flagged under the DPRK in February 2023	<u>Period of interest:</u> November 2022 to January 2023 Registered Owner – Shandong Port Shipping Group; Manager Weihai Hairun Shipping Co Ltd *-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* <u>Period of interest:</u> January 2023 *-Query: Information on ship's presence at a Zhoushan Zhejiang Fushen Ship facility by January 2023; any ship repair or modification conducted* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The ship transmitted on multiple occasions in DPRK waters, entering Nampo lock-gate by 6 February 2022. NOTE: Dandong Jincheng Trade Co Ltd was listed as KUM GANG 1's registered owner, with a listed "care of address" belonging to the DPRK ship manager, as Taedongmun Shipping Co in the DPRK, according to submitted maritime information to the IMO. *-Query: Information and corporate registration information of any similarly named company(s) in China particularly where the company's line of business includes shipping-related trade, if so.* The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.*

Formerly China-flagged HUI YI (MMSI: 413331780), currently DPRK-flagged KUM GANG 1 (IMO: 8358697)

The Panel tracked HUI YI's historical voyages after it began transmitting from DPRK waters in January 2023. HUI YI was located at Laizhou Bay in early December and was berthed at Yantai port by 24 December 2022. HUI YI then sailed south, arriving at the Ningbo-Zhoushan area by late December 2022. It moored at a ship recycling facility there before ceasing AIS transmissions after 2 January 2023. HUI YI next transmitted in DPRK territorial waters. See figure 40-1.

A Member State subsequently provided high resolution satellite imagery of HUI YI at Nampo port in February 2023 offloading cargo and dry docked at Nampo the following month. See figure 40-2.

Figure 40-1: HUI YI's voyage from September 2022 to January 2023



Source: AIS tracks: Windward; inset imagery: (top right) Maxar Technologies; (bottom right) Planet Labs; (left), Member State; annotated by the Panel

Figure 40-2a: HUI YI unloading cargo at Nampo, 8 February 2023

Figure 40-2b: HUI YI dry docked at Nampo, 5 March 2023

Source: Member State

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
4	**formerly HONG JIE 1** Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**MO RAN BONG 5** **IMO: 8358324** Flagged under the DPRK in October 2022	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. There is no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship. There is no transmission of the vessel operating in Chinese waters prior to 19 December 2022 when the vessel was at Dalian port waiting area, based on Panel maritime tracking.	The vessel recorded a flag and name change to MO RAN BONG 5 in October 2022, based on IMO records. The Panel's commercial maritime tracking data showed the vessel transmitting in DPRK waters in February 2023. The vessel was recorded moored outside Dalian port area between 24 December 2022 and 8 January 2023 before sailing towards the DPRK.

			- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person) *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* *-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at Dalian area in December 2022 along with all ship and customs documentation* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
5	**formerly RUN HONG 58** Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**MO RAN BONG 1** **IMO: 8593209** Flagged under the DPRK in October 2021	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. Registered Owner and ship manager – Zhoushan Runhong Shipping Co Ltd with a Zhejiang address. *-Query: Confirmation of the above or latest information available on the ship owner and manager (company and natural person)* *-Query*: *Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag* *-Query: Any common or related association of ownership, ship management and / or broker information between RUN HONG 58 and HONG JIE 1.*	There were no recorded prior vessel tracks of RUN HONG 58. The vessel was registered built in August 2002 at Yueqing Huanghuagang Shipyard The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.* The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as MO RAN BONG 1 called at Chinese ports. including Dalian and Longkou ports. from the last quarter of 2022 through 2023, namely at container and grain terminals, indicating possible transportation of grain and other cargo. *-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should MO RAN BONG 1 next make a Chinese port area call.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
6	**formerly XIN HONG XIANG 77** MMSI: 413501410 Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**TAE RYONG 3** **IMO: 1015533** Flagged under the DPRK in April 2023	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. Registered owner and ship manager – Guangxi Hongxiang Shipping Co Ltd. *- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.* <u>Period of interest:</u> October 2022 to January 2023, when the vessel was in Lianyungang port area *-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence in Lianyungang area in December 2022, along with all ship and customs / cargo documentation.*	The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.* The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as TAE RYONG 3 was at Yancheng anchorage area between 20 and 30 April 2023. It was prior in Lianyungang port area on 16 April 2023. *-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should TAE RYONG 3 next make a Chinese port area call.*

Formerly China-flagged XIN HONG XIANG 77 (MMSI: 413501410), currently DPRK-flagged TAE RYONG 3 (IMO: 1015533)

XIN HONG XIANG 77 was a Chinese domestic vessel before it was acquired by the DPRK. According to a Member State, after departing Lianyungang waters, the cargo ship was enroute to the DPRK by December 2022, indicating it may have been purchased by the DPRK around that time. See figures 40-3a and 3b.

Following its flagging by the DPRK in April 2023, the vessel returned to Chinese waters, sailing as TAE RYONG 3, and by mid-April was imaged laden and at anchor near Lianyungang. TAE RYONG 3 was at the Wenzhou anchorage area four days later. See figures 40-4a and 4b.

Figure 40-3a: Ship photograph of XIN HONG XIANG 77 in August 2022

Source: Member State

Figure 40-3b: XIN HONG XIANG 77 at Lianyungang, China, 23 December 2022



Source: Member State

Figure 40-4a: TAE RYONG 3, formerly XIN HONG XIANG 77, returning to Lianyungang waters, 16 April 2023



Source: Member State

Figure 40-4b: TAE RYONG 3 proceeding to other Chinese port areas, April – May 2023

Source: S&P Global's SeaWeb

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
7	**formerly WEN TONG FA ZHAN (aka FENG XIN DA 1)** MMSI: 413693560 Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**HYANG SAN** **IMO: 8360250** Flagged under the DPRK in January 2023	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship. *-Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction.* <u>Period of interest</u>: August to November 2022 *-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at Xiamen port area and at Tangshan port area along with all ship and customs documentation* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The Panel's AIS tracking of the vessel showed it was in the Xiamen port area between August and November 2022. The vessel was last at Tangshan port around 20-22 November 2022. This was the last port of call prior to the vessel dropping AIS signal on 30 November as it sailed out of port, crossing the Bohai sea in the direction of Nampo port. The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
8	**formerly HONG TAI 215 (aka LI DA 8)** Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**TOK SONG IMO: 8360406** Flagged under the DPRK in April 2023	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship. *- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction.* <u>Period of interest</u>: From August 2022 *-Query: Accounting of the ship's presence at various Chinese ports along with all ship and customs documentation; an accounting of vessel identity manipulation* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The ship was last registered under the Chinese flag before it came under DPRK flag. AIS signal indicates possible spoofing. *-Query: Confirmation of dates when the ship was flagged under China and reasons for de-registration, where applicable.* The vessel sailing under the DPRK flag as TOK SONG called in the Yantai port area between 22 and 30 April 2023. *-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should TOK SONG next make a Chinese port area call.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
9	**formerly XIANG HUI 10** Last known as China-flagged prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**THAE JA BONG IMO: 8598431** Flagged under the DPRK in February 2023	<u>Period of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK. There are no listed records of the owner and manager of the ship. *- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The Panel's maritime tracking information indicated the vessel last transmitted AIS signal in mid-August 2022 in the Shanghai port area. AIS signal indicate possible spoofing. *-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should THAE JA BONG next make a Chinese port area call.*

#	SHIP*	Current Name*	Ownership and Management	Information
10	**formerly HUA JIN SHENG 8 (aka XIANG JING 838)** Last known as China-flagged and under Chinese ownership prior to flagging under the DPRK fleet	**HWANG RYONG SAN IMO: 8662933** Flagged under the DPRK in March 2023	<u>Periods of interest:</u> Prior to vessel transfer to the DPRK And Between September and December 2021 *- Query: Information on the Chinese ship owner(s) and manager(s) (company and natural person)* *-Query: Information and details on brokers; ship purchase and sale; and financial transaction* *-Query: port clearance of last Chinese port of call; reported crew list; destination; customs and cargo documentation prior to it coming under the DPRK flag.*	The Panel's maritime tracking information indicated the vessel last transmitted AIS signal in June 2022 with inconsistent data. Limited AIS tracks. *-Query: Any information to be obtained relating to the vessel's purchase should HWANG RYONG SAN next make a Chinese port area call.*

Source: The Panel.

*denotes information from IMO records.

NOTE: All dates of vessel tracking are recorded in Eastern Standard Time. Variation of actual dates when addressing local time should be taken into account.

Source: The Panel

Annex 41: Chinese coastal vessels in DPRK waters, November 2022 to May 2023[235]

The list below of China-flagged vessels tracked by the Panel in DPRK waters is restricted to the timeframe of September through May 2023. The information is drawn from the Panel's monitoring of ships based on commercial tracking data, IMO records and the Panel's on-going investigations. The Panel continues to analyse voyages of other China-flagged vessels in DPRK waters.

To assist the relevant Chinese authorities in their investigations, the Panel has listed the Chinese ownership and management information where available, the targeted periods of interest and other relevant information. The Panel has sought China's assistance with regards to these vessels' registration status and ownership information. As many of these Chinese coastal ships did not have publicly available ownership details, the Panel requested information from Chinese authorities relating to vessel ownership, including the nature of their activity in the DPRK, cargo, relevant customs and shipping documentation, AIS data and vessel purchase and sale information where relevant.

The Panel sought information from China, including their ship registration, beneficial owners, customs information, ship purchase and sale prior to their departure from Chinese waters. The Panel also asked Chinese authorities to convey questions to the ship owners, including, *inter alia*, that would explain the presence of the ship in DPRK waters or verifiable evidence that show otherwise, as well as purchase and sale information where the vessel was sold on. China replied: "*After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows: BAO YING HAI 18, XIN YANG HONG, QIMING 168, and FU LONG 98 were de-registered between late 2022 and early 2023, and these ships were not re-registered ever since. Chinese government does not have information on their exact whereabouts. Records of port entry and exit of XIN HANG SHUN and LONG XIN 12 were not found and Chinese government does not have detailed information about these ships*".

Source: The Panel

[235] All information contained in this annex is valid as of 30 June 2023.

BAO YING HAI 18 (MMSI: 412550950), currently DPRK-flagged SONG NIM 9 (IMO: 8360248)

BAO YING HAI 18 was reported transmitting as a 102m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Panel tracking analysis showed the vessel sailed as a Chinese coastal vessel prior to its AIS transmission in DPRK waters. It has not transmitted AIS since appearing at Nampo, DPRK on 7 March 2023 (figure 41-1).

Figure 41-1: Voyage of BAO YING HAI 18 before arriving in the DPRK, December 2022 – March 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

By April 2023, the vessel was flagged under the DPRK fleet, sailing as SONG NIM 9 with an assigned IMO number of 8358192. The last known owner prior to its acquisition is the China-based Fujian Wentong Shipping Co Ltd with an address in Fujian Province, according to IMO records.

XIN YANG HONG (IMO: 8358192), currently DPRK-flagged NAM PHO 5

XIN YANG HONG sailed as a Chinese coastal vessel prior to its AIS transmission in DPRK waters. It arrived in DPRK territorial waters, south of Cho-do island, on 9 November 2022, where it subsequently registered a draft change on maritime databases, outside the West Sea Barrage area, indicating possible offload of cargo. As of April 2023, XIN YANG HONG was flagged under the DPRK, sailing as NAM PHO 5. The vessel returned to Chinese waters in 2023, including in Ningde and Luoyuan Bay waters.

XIN YANG HONG was transmitting as a 98m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The vessel is registered as owned and managed by the same Chinese owner, Fujian Wentong Shipping Ltd, since 2005, with an address at Pingtan Xian, Fujian Province, according to IMO records. XIN YANG HONG was located at a ship facility, possibly a shipyard, on Pingtan Island in the Zhoushan area, by 20 September 2022. It then arrived at Nanjing port area, where it remained during the month of October, before departing. By 10 November, the vessel was located outside the West Sea Barrage area in the DPRK (figure 41-2). AIS data indicate the vessel was also engaged in identity manipulation, possibly sailing at some point as FU YUN HENG XIN.

Figure 41-2: Voyage of XIN YANG HONG before arriving in the DPRK, September -November 2022





Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

QIMING 168 (MMSI: 413244350)

QIMING 168 transmitted AIS signals at Nampo on 21 April 2023. Its previous location, according to AIS transmissions, was Shanghai on 9 March 2023 (Figure 3a). While in the DPRK, the vessel docked at Ryongnam Shipyard at Nampo, where other vessels including SHUN CHANG 78 / SUN CHANG 78, now sailing as the DPRK-flagged RAK NANG 2 (IMO: 8594552), have also been located before registering under the DPRK fleet (figure 41-3b).[236]

QIMING 168 was transmitting as an 86m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The vessel transmitted few AIS signals prior to its appearance in the DPRK. The Panel's vessel activity analysis indicated QIMING 168 had likely engaged in vessel identifier manipulation. It has not transmitted on its identifier since appearing in the DPRK.

[236] S/2023/171, paras. 70-72 and annex 41.

Figure 41-3a: Voyage of QIMING 168 before arriving at Ryongnam Shipyard, DPRK, March 2023

Source: AIS transmissions: Windward; inset, S&P Global, annotated by the Panel

Figure 41-3b: SHUN CHANG 78, dry docked at Ryongnam Shipyard, Nampo, July -August 2022

Source: AIS signal overlay, Windward; Satellite imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel

FU LONG 98 (MMSI: 413464610)

FU LONG 98 arrived in DPRK territorial waters above Cho-do by 5 March 2023, after sailing from the Yellow Sea for more than six days without transmitting AIS signals. The vessel was at the West Sea Barrage area by 12 March 2023 and located outside Nampo port by 26 March (figure 41-4).

FU LONG 98 was transmitting as a 99m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Prior to this, the vessel sailed a domestic route and called at multiple Chinese ports. The vessel exhibited inconsistent tracks and may have been spoofing in Chinese waters. It was last recorded making a call at a ship facility at Kan'ao in Pingtan Island, Zhoushan, departing on 8 January 2023. The vessel has not transmitted on its identifier since appearing in the DPRK.

Figure 41-4: Voyage of FU LONG 98 before arriving in the DPRK, March - April 2023





Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

XIN HANG SHUN (MMSI: 412502330)

XIN HANG SHUN arrived in DPRK waters in May 2023. Prior to this, maritime database tracking showed the vessel had been at a shipyard at Pingtan in Fujian Province since 12 January 2023, departing by 8 April for Zhoushan and Lianyungang port areas. On 27 April XIN HANG SHUN was in the vicinity of Cho-do Island before appearing at Nampo port (figure 41-5).

XIN HANG SHUN was transmitting as a 97m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. The Panel's vessel activity analysis indicates it had likely engaged in AIS manipulation. The vessel has not transmitted on its identifier since 21 May 2023.

Figure 41-5: Voyage of XIN HANG SHUN before arriving in the DPRK, January - May 2023



AIS spoofing



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset satellite imagery, Planet Labs.

LONG XIN 12 (IMO: 9485318)

LONG XIN 12 last transmitted on 3 December 2022 at Zhoushan Island, China, and was located at a shipyard at Zhoushan Zhejiang, prior to appearing in DPRK waters. It last transmitted AIS signals at Zhoushan in December 2022 before appearing in DPRK waters. The vessel was located near Cho-do Island on 4 April 2023 (figure 41-6).

LONG XIN 12 was transmitting as a 94m-long, China-flagged cargo ship. Open-source maritime information indicates the vessel was sold in October / November 2019 to undisclosed buyers. It remains China-flagged, based on IMO records. The vessel exhibited limited AIS signals prior to its appearance in the DPRK and engaged in vessel identifier manipulation while in Chinese waters. The vessel's registered owner and ship manager is Qinzhou Guiqin Shipping Co Ltd, with an address at Qinzhou, Guangxi Province.

Figure 41-6: Voyage of LONG XIN 12 before arriving in the DPRK, December 2022 - April 2023

Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset satellite imagery, Planet Labs.

Source: S&P Global's Seaweb

NOTE: All dates of vessel tracking are recorded in Eastern Standard Time. Variation of actual dates in local time should be taken into account.

Source: The Panel

Annex 42: Oil cargo transfers by SHUNDLLI to DPRK tankers, December 2022 to June 2023

No.	Date and Time	Location	Presumed DPRK receiving vessel	Presumed amount of refined petroleum
1	Dawn of 8 December 2022	381710N, 1240546E (104km Southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHONG RYONG SAN (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 1,300 tons
2	Evening of 22 March to dawn of 23 March 2023	Unknown	KUM RYONG 3 (IMO: 8610461)	Approx. 1,800 tons
3	Dawn to morning of 13 April 2023	381600N, 1240400E (107km southwest of West Sea Dam)	UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962)	Approx. 2,000 tons
4	Noon of 13 May to dawn of 14 May 2023	382056N, 1240500E (102km southwest of West Sea Dam)	KUM CHIN KANG 2 (no IMO number recorded)	Approx. 2,000 tons
5	Near midnight of 8 June to dawn of 9 June 2023	381612N, 1240507E (105km southwest of West Sea Dam)	CHON MA SAN (IMO: 8660313)	Approx. 2,000 tons

Source: Member State

Annex 43: Maritime trade in banned DPRK-origin coal

The Panel continued to track DPRK vessels that have off-loaded coal cargo in contravention of the relevant resolutions:

- Paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2371 (2017) decides "the DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, coal, iron, and iron ore, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK."

- Paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) decides "Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK."

- Paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017) authorizes all Member States to seize and dispose of items identified in inspections, the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the relevant Security Council resolutions.

In that regard, in 2023 the Panel tracked to Lianyungang waters the below DPRK-flagged cargo ships, suspected to have transported and off-loaded their DPRK-origin coal cargo there.

HUNG BONG 3 (IMO: 8603286)

HUNG BONG 3 was observed on satellite imagery at a coal-loading area at Taean, DPRK, on 18 December 2022. It next transmitted AIS signals, after travelling dark, near Lianyungang waters around 16 January 2023. A Member State recorded satellite imagery of the vessel a week earlier sitting high on water near Lianyungang, indicating it had off-loaded its assessed coal cargo. This is consistent with the Panel's tracking of previous DPRK-origin coal cargo export whereby DPRK vessels travelled dark when involved in illicit ship-to-ship coal transfer activity. On 19 January, with its AIS kept on, HUNG BONG 3 registered a draft change, indicating it could have loaded cargo at Lianyungang. The ship was back in DPRK waters by the end of January 2023. See figure 43-1.

HUNG BONG 3 was previously reported by the Panel to have exported its DPRK-origin coal cargo to Yantai, another Chinese port, in August 2021 (figure 43-2).

Figure 43-1: HUNG BONG 3 travelling dark to off-load assessed DPRK-origin coal cargo at Lianyungang, January 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; Imagery; Maxar Technologies, Member State
*Dashed lines denote no AIS transmission

Figure 43-2: HUNG BONG 3 exporting DPRK-origin coal and importing other cargo, Yantai, China, July – August 2021



Source: Windward, S&P Global, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; inset panchromatic imagery (top), Member State. Bottom imagery as representative of location, not actual date of AIS signal overlay.

The Panel asked China for information, including the relevant shipping documentation, on any banned cargo offloaded and loaded either pier-side or through ship-to-ship transfers at the respective Chinese ports. China responded that the HUNG BONG 3 "entered Yantai port empty-loaded in March and July 2021, respectively, and left the port by loading fertilizer and other agricultural supplies in March and August, respectively."[237]

TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318)

TO MYONG was observed by a Member State on satellite imagery anchored at a known coal-loading area at Songnim along the Taedong River, DPRK on 11 December 2022. It arrived in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by late December 2022, departing by 9 January 2023 to arrive in Lianyungang waters a day later, based on maritime database tracking. A Member State assessed that TO MYONG offloaded its DPRK-origin coal cargo at these two locations (see figures 43-3a~b).

Figure 43-3a: TO MYONG's voyage route, December 2022 – January 2023



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

[237] S/2022/132, paras. 91-92 and annex 59.

Figure 43-3b: TO MYONG at Songnim, DPRK, and in Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, December 2022 – January 2023



Source: Member State.

The Panel had reported on TO MYONG several times, and the vessel is known to have exported DPRK-origin coal to Chinese waters on multiple occasions.[238] This is also not the first time TO MYONG was at Lianyungang. For instance, a Member State assessed TO MYONG offloaded its DPRK-origin coal cargo there in March – April 2022 (figure 43-4).

Figure 43-4: TO MYONG delivering DPRK-origin coal, Lianyungang, March – April 2022

Source: Member State.

[238] S/2023/171; S/2022/668; S/2022/132; S/2021/211; S/2020/840.

On yet another occasion, TO MYONG, then sailing as RI HONG, was also located at Songnim port in December 2019, and in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in April 2020 (figure 43-5). The Panel has recommended that the Committee designate TO MYONG for its export of DPRK-origin coal as well as for the vessel's acquisition by the DPRK in 2020.

Figure 43-5: TO MYONG (then sailing as RI HONG) at Songnim port, DPRK, 23 December 2019, and anchored near Ningbo-Zhoushan, China, 29 April 2020

Source: Member State

According to a Member State, the following DPRK vessels were also assessed to have off-loaded DPRK-origin coal in Lianyungang waters. The Panel did not locate tracks of these vessels on the maritime databases to which it has access, indicating these vessels travelled dark or were transmitting on other identifiers.

MI YANG 5 (IMO: 8620454)

MI YANG 5 was assessed by a Member State to have exported DPRK-origin coal in the Lianyungang area in February 2023 (figure 43-6).

Figure 43-6: MI YANG 5 at Taean and at Lianyungang, February 2023

Source: Member State

The Panel previously reported on MI YANG exporting its DPRK-origin coal in Lianyungang waters in September 2019 (figure 43-7).[239]

Figure 43-7: MI YANG 5 near Lianyungang, 15 September 2019



Source: Member State

TAE DONG 1 (IMO: 8653229)

TAE DONG 1 was assessed by a Member State to have exported DPRK-origin coal in Lianyungang in March 2023 (figure 43-8).

Figure 43-8: TAE DONG 1 near Lianyungang, 13 March 2023

Source: Member State

[239] S/2020/151, para. 70.

PU SONG (IMO: 9534652)

PU SONG was assessed by a Member State to have exported bagged cargo containing DPRK-origin coal at Lianyungang in March 2023 (figure 43-9).

Figure 43-9: PU SONG exporting assessed bagged DPRK-origin cargo, Lianyungang, March 2023



Source: Member State

The Panel previously reported on PU SONG exporting DPRK-origin coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in April 2020 (figure 43-10).[240]

Figure 43-10: PU SONG anchored near Ningbo-Zhoushan, April 2020



Source: Member State

According to the Member State, ship-to-ship transfers involving DPRK cargo ships in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters have continued, while increased deliveries to Lianyungang waters have been observed in 2023.

Also in 2023, the Member State identified a new location near "Taishan Islands," where DPRK-origin coal exports are offloaded through ship-to-ship transfer. Panel investigations in this area remain on-going.

All the above DPRK vessels have featured in previous Panel reports as having engaged in the export of DPRK-origin coal in Chinese territorial waters. The Panel sought China's assistance on the DPRK vessels' export of coal in Lianyungang and other Chinese port areas in 2023. The Panel sought information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfers in those waters; the receiving vessels' identifiers; entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels; and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions.

[240] S/2020/840, paras. 46-47 and annex 25.

China replied: "*After thorough investigation by relevant Chinese authorities, the information of the ships mentioned by the Panel are provided as follows:*

HUNG BONG 3 declared one entry into Lianyungang Port from Nampo Port in January this year empty loaded. And the ship left Lianyungang Port empty loaded.

TAE Dong 1 declared two entries into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January and March this year empty loaded. And the ship left Dalian Port loaded with grain and other grocery.

PU SONG declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port in January this year loaded with containers, and left the port loaded with goods for daily necessities. In June this year, this ship declared one entry into Dalian Port from Nampo Port empty loaded and left loaded with goods for daily necessities.

No records of port entry and exit or customs declarations of TO MYONG, MIYANG 5, RYONG RIM were found in the Chinese port logs.

China attaches great importance to illegal maritime activities related to the DPRK, and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling activities according to Chinese laws and regulations. The above-mentioned ships were loaded with goods for daily necessities, not Security Council embargoed items. The Panel should execute its duties cautiously and responsibly, carefully screening the information it acquired, and should not include unverified information in its report".

Source: The Panel

Annex 44: Vessel disguise

In October 2022, a Member State photographed the sanctioned cargo ship PUK DAE BONG, with an IMO number of 9045182 painted on its hull, sailing past the coast of Kyushu, Japan. This IMO number belonged to another DPRK cargo ship, MYONG SIN. PUK DAE BONG (IMO: 9020003) had been the subject of several Panel reports for having exported banned DPRK-origin coal when it was sailing as HUA FU.

Both the PUK DAE BONG and the MYONG SIN had their AIS off over a period of time, inclusive of the dates when the PUK DAE BONG was photographed, between 26 and 28 October. Panel analysis of the AIS transmissions of both ships indicate long periods of non-AIS transmissions, overlapping AIS switch-off periods and spoofing of each other's identifiers, indicating the two ships are attempting to obfuscate vessel tracking on maritime databases.

The Panel's comparative analysis of photographs provided by the Member State against photographs obtained from open sourcing of PUK DAE BONG and MYONG SIN show these ships as having very different structures, confirming that the photographed ship was PUK DAE BONG.

PUK DAE BONG ship comparison

PUK DAE BONG sailing as HOAM,[241] undated photograph

Source: Maritime database

PUK DAE BONG, 27 October 2022

Source: Member State

[241] According to IMO records, PUK DAE BONG was sailing as HOAM between November 2000 and December 2011.

Panel comparison of ship structure between PUK DAE BONG and MYONG SIN

PUK DAE BONG, 27 October 2022

Source: Member State

MYONG SIN sailing as KUN JA RI, undated photograph[242]

Source: Maritime database

Legend:

- Different funnel shape and placement (blue box)
- Different placement level of lifeboat (purple box)
- Different superstructure of bridge area (red box)
- Different shaped hull (green box)
- Missing derricks (orange box)

Source: The Panel

[242] MYONG SIN was named KUN JA RI between 2002 and 2015. During that period, it sailed under the DPRK flag before being flagged out to several other ship registries. It was flagged back under the DPRK in 2015.

Annex 45: Information about the sale of DPRK seafood

1) Photographs of the sale of DPRK seafood at Yanji West Market

A Member State provided the Panel with information, including photos of the sale of DPRK seafood at Yanji West Market. The name of the Chinese company that allegedly sold the seafood at the market is “North Korean Seafood Wholesale” (see **Figure F1-1**). The photographed packages of dried cod indicate in Chinese they are “Product of North Korea” (see **Figure F1-2**).

Figure 45-1

Figure 45-2

Source: Member State.

2) Information about “North Korean Seafood Wholesale”

A Chinese e-commerce website introduces North Korean Seafood Wholesale as follows: “…North Korean Seafood Wholesale specializes in the wholesale distribution of abalone, sea cucumber, and hairy crab, which are popular in the consumer market and hold a high position among consumers…”



Source: https://www.11467.com/qiye/20147369.htm.

Annex 46: ITC Trade Map Data on DPRK Trade Statistics by Commodity (HS Code) (2022)

** Note: highlighted may include restricted HS Code commodities

Source : ITC Trade Map / Unit : thousand USD

Total Exports : 263,691

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	52,422
26	Ores, slag and ash	44,579
72	Iron and steel	38,999
39	Plastics and articles thereof	15,884
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	12,782
50	Silk	12,178
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	11,704
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	9,673
30	Pharmaceutical products	8,717
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	7,847
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	7,562

Total Imports : 902,858

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
39	Plastics and articles thereof	117,514
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	62,908
40	Rubber and articles thereof	62,479
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes;	52,315
30	Pharmaceutical products	44,756
29	Organic chemicals	41,829
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	38,437
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	35,576
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	34,061
10	Cereals	33,209
55	Man-made staple fibres	31,941

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
70	Glass and glassware	6,738
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	5,006
75	Nickel and articles thereof	4,450
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	3,365
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	2,921
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	1,883
31	Fertilisers	1,862
29	Organic chemicals	1,837
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	1,382
79	Zinc and articles thereof	1,278
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	1,116

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	30,492
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	25,111
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	19,973
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	18,314
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	17,445
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	15,989
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	15,316
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	14,983
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	14,626
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	14,125
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	13,828

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
73	Articles of iron or steel	1,077
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	1,052
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	916
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	607
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	505
40	Rubber and articles thereof	470
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	423
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	353
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	274
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	260

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
69	Ceramic products	12,734
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; luminaires and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	12,449
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	9,901
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	9,109
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	9,085
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	6,093
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	5,863
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	5,768
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	5,694
31	Fertilisers	5,470

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	244
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	242
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	228
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	223
55	Man-made staple fibres	222
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	219
74	Copper and articles thereof	197
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	190
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	185
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	183
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	170

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	5,230
70	Glass and glassware	5,092
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	4,983
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	4,710
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	4,536
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	4,460
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	4,045
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	4,040
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	3,756
52	Cotton	2,915
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	2,914

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	156
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	149
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	143
65	Headgear and parts thereof	136
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	113
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	78
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	58
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	41
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	38
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	35

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	2,635
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	2,040
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	2,031
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	1,607
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	1,363
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	1,034
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	909
65	Headgear and parts thereof	893
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	857
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	823

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	32
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	31
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	21
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	21
97	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	20
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	17
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	17
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	16
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	13
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	13
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	13
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes;	12

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	504
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	438
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	424
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	385
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	365
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	362
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	329
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	317
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	286
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	216
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	164
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	146

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	11
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	11
69	Ceramic products	10
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	9
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	7
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	6
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	5
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	5
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	4
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	4

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	145
16	Preparations of meat, of fish, of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates, or of insects	105
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	96
14	Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified or included	81
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yarn	60
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	51
74	Copper and articles thereof	45
8	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	20
50	Silk	13
80	Tin and articles thereof	13

HS Code	Commodity Type	Exported Value
78	Lead and articles thereof	3
8	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	1

HS Code	Commodity Type	Imported Value
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	11
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	8
5	Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	5
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	3
1	Live animals	1

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 9 July 2023, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 47: Recent trends of DPRK's coal exports

Maritime smuggling activities by the DRPK have expanded in 2023 for DPRK-origin coal (table 47). According to a Member State, the DPRK's activities in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait have increased, with the country also reportedly conducting illicit ship-to-ship transfers in waters on its East Coast, near Rajin. The Panel has separately noted increased activity of DPRK ships departing the country's eastern coast in 2022.

Table 47

Smuggled DPRK-coal exported through ship-to-ship transfers			
Amount of coal illicitly exported in the first quarter	2021	2022	2023
	Approx. 300,000 tons	Approx. 200,000 tons	Approx. 800,000 tons

Source: Member State

Annex 48: Additional replies from Member States on trade statistics in the Panel's previous report (S/2023/171, annex 57)

Canada

Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations

Mission permanente du Canada
auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

February 15, 2023

[redacted]
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters, New York, NY 10017

Dear [redacted]

Thank you for your letter of December 1, 2022, reference S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.324, with regard to ongoing efforts of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to gather, examine and analyse information regarding the implementation of the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the referenced Security Council resolutions, in particular incidents of non-compliance.

The Panel has written specifically "with regard to the DPRK's trade with Canada in items that are covered by the relevant sectoral sanctions provisions in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)", based on the Panel's analysis of available trade data. The Panel seeks our assistance in providing supplementary information concerning certain trade data, which you indicate is trade data reported by Canada that lists the DPRK as the partner country.

The Government of Canada has determined that the instances in which the DPRK is reported as the partner country are either confirmed errors or highly likely to be errors. The errors are most likely cases of miscoded country variables in the customs data.

Please note that we will be making changes on our end to replace miscoded references to the DPRK with the correct partner country in all of these transactions. The statistics reflecting the changes have been made public with our release on February 7, 2023. Processes in place to detect potential reporting errors have also been enhanced to reduce occurrences of trade being incorrectly attributed to the DPRK in published data going forward.

With respect to the Panel's request for information regarding any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving the DPRK as a country of destination / consignment / origin / manufacture or transit, the Government of Canada affirms that there have been no import seizures of goods from the DPRK as the country of purchase / origin.
Please be assured that the Government of Canada takes our obligations as a UN Member State with the utmost seriousness. To that end, Canada continues to stand ready to support the important work of the Panel. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require any further clarifications.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative

Canada

El Salvador

10:00 Am
17-2-2023

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ADUANAS

San Salvador, 13 de febrero de 2023
MH.UM.DGA/001.002/2023
Asunto: Emitiendo Informe.

SEÑORA VICEMINISTRA:

Atentamente hago referencia a nota MRREE/DGPE/DAM/2023/0504, de fecha 10 de enero de 2023, por medio de la cual se refiere al trabajo que realiza el Panel de Expertos establecido de conformidad a la Resolución 1874 (2009), del Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (CSONU), que recopila examina y analiza información relativa a la implementación de las medidas impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC).

En ese sentido, se indica que se ha recibido nota del coordinador de dicho Panel el señor [redacted] destacando que se han identificado transacciones en las que El Salvador importó de Corea del Norte, un monto de $4,000.00 en concepto de "maquinaria", por lo que solicita al Gobierno de El Salvador, explicaciones sobre esta situación, particularmente:

1) Si la información es fidedigna. Si no es fidedigna, solicita remitir digitalmente los documentos que pueda explicar lo anterior. Si los documentos para probar lo anterior no pueden ser provistos en tiempo, se solicita explicar al Panel la naturaleza de la transacción.

2) Si la carga de DPDC a El Salvador que contiene la importación, fue inspeccionada de conformidad con el párrafo 18 de la resolución 2270 (2016) y si esto es así, la razón por la cual no fue confiscada de conformidad al párrafo de la resolución 2397 (2017).

3) Otra información relevante o acciones tomadas por las autoridades de El Salvador respecto de las Importaciones de la RPDC.

En relación a lo solicitado, conforme a información recibida y registros que se tienen en los sistemas informáticos de la Dirección General de Aduanas de El Salvador, se ha constatado que la sociedad HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., el 24 de junio de 2022, registró en la Aduana Terrestre Las Chinamas, la Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, determinándose que a través de la misma se importaron las mercancías que se describen a continuación:

Km. 11.5 Carretera Panamericana, San Bartolo, Ilopango, El Salvador, C.A.
Conmutador Tel.: (503) 2244-5000, Atención al Usuario Tel: (503) 2244-5182
Sitio Web: www.aduana.gob.sv; Twitter: @aduanas_SV, Facebook: Aduana El Salvador y Correo electrónico: usuario@aduana.gob.sv

AENOR GESTIÓN DE LA CALIDAD ISO 9001 ER-0452/1999

CERTIFICADA BAJO LAS NORMAS ISO 9001 POR LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE NORMALIZACIÓN Y CERTIFICACIÓN

MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA DE EL SALVADOR
IQNet

No Item	Código Arancelario	Descripción	VALOR EN ADUANA	
			FOB	CIF
1	84841000 00	(9) KIT DE SELLOS, PLATO RETENEDOR	$579.53	$601.14
2	84129000 00	(25) BARRIL, SET DE PISTON, ESFERA, PLATO VALVULA	$3,531.55	$3,663.29
3	73209000 00	(4) SET DE RESORTES	$68.16	$70.70
5	40169300 00	(30) RETENEDOR PARA PRESION METRICO	$21.79	$22.60
TOTAL			$4,201.03	$4,357.73

Es pertinente indicar, que las mercancías antes relacionadas al haberse declarado como originarias de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), fueron seleccionadas por el módulo de Gestión de Riesgo de la Dirección General de Aduanas, para ser inspeccionadas físicamente, conforme lo establece la Resolución 2270 (2016), del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas; determinándose en la revisión que en efecto las mercancías amparadas en los ítems 1, 2, 3 y 5 fueron declaradas por HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., como originarias de la Republica Popular Democrática de Corea.

En ese mismo orden, este Ministerio, al amparo de los principios de Legalidad y Verdad Material, al tratarse de una importación procedente de Guatemala, solicitó a HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., documentación de respaldo con la cual las mercancías ingresaron a Guatemala, verificándose con la información remitida que las mercancías objeto de análisis, fueron importadas originalmente en la República de Guatemala por la sociedad HY SEAL, S.A., ubicada en 31 Avenida 14-53 Zona 7, Colonia Ciudad de Plata 2 Ciudad de Guatemala, por medio de Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA-D), GTGUAEA-21-062439-0001-8, de fecha 4 de mayo de 2021 y factura JH21C03944, de fecha 3 de marzo de 2021, determinándose de la revision realizada a los referidos documentos que las mercancías son originarias de la República de Corea, con código de país KR, exportadas por [redacted] con domicilio fiscal en KYUNGMOON BLD. 1F 41 GUKHOE DAERO 54-GIL UEONGDEUNGPO-GU, KOREA.

Con la documentación antes relacionada, se determinó que se trató de un error del agente aduanero al momento de registrar la Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, al haber consignado las mercancías como originarias de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KP), siendo lo correcto, originarias de la República de Corea

DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ADUANAS

con código de país KR, razón por la cual, las mismas no fueron objeto de incautación como lo dispone la Resolución 2397(2017).

Conforme a lo anterior, como resultado de la verificación y análisis documental de la operación aduanera relacionada, se concluye que las mercancías importadas por medio de la Declaracion Unica Centroamericana (DUCA -D), número 4-42754, del 24 de junio de 2022, a nombre de HY SEALS SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS S.A. DE C.V., son originarias de la República de Corea, adjuntando al presente la documentación respectiva en formato digital.

DIOS UNIÓN LIBERTAD

[redacted]

Ministro de Hacienda

A LA LICENCIADA ADRIANA MIRA

VICEMINISTRA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES

E.S.D.O.

[redacted]

Km. 11.5 Carretera Panamericana, San Bartolo, Ilopango, El Salvador, C.A.
Conmutador Tel.: (503) 2244-5000, Atención al Usuario Tel: (503) 2244-5182
Sitio Web: www.aduana.gob.sv; Twitter: @aduanas_SV, Facebook: Aduana El Salvador y Correo electrónico: usuario@aduana.gob.sv

CERTIFICADA BAJO LAS NORMAS ISO 9001 POR LA ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE NORMALIZACIÓN Y CERTIFICACIÓN

Translated from Spanish

Directorate General of Customs

San Salvador, 13 February 2023
MH.UM.DGA/001.002/2023
Subject: Issuing report.

Madam,

I have the honour to refer to note MRREE/DGPE/DAM/2023/0504, dated 10 January 2023, concerning the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), which compiles, examines and analyzes information related to the implementation of the measures imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In this regard, a note was sent by the coordinator of the Panel, [redacted] highlighting the fact that transactions had been detected that involved imports to El Salvador from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of "machinery" with a value of $4,000.00, in reference to which he requested an explanation from the Government of El Salvador, specifically:

"(1) Confirmation as to whether the listed data is reliable. If it is inaccurate, please submit the digital copies of original documents that can explain the cause of inaccuracy. If you cannot supply the relevant documents in time, please offer a precise explanation of the cause of inaccuracy to the Panel.

"(2) Whether the cargoes from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to El Salvador containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2270 (2016), and if so, the reason why they were not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).

"(3) Any other relevant information and/or action taken by the Salvadoran authorities with respect to exports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to El Salvador."

[redacted]
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

In relation to the request, according to the information received and records in the computer systems of the Directorate General of Customs of El Salvador, it has been confirmed that Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V. filed Central American single declaration number 4-42754 at the customs office at the Las Chinamas border post on 24 June 2022, when it imported the goods described below:

			Customs value (US dollars)	
Item No.	*Tariff code*	*Description*	*f.o.b.*	*c.i.f.*
1	84841000 00	(9) gasket kit, retainer plate	579.53	601.14
2	84129000 00	(25) barrel, piston set, ball, valve plate	3 531.55	3 663.29
3	73209000 00	(4) spring set	68.16	70.70
5	40169300 00	(30) pressure retainer, metric	21.79	22.60
Total			**4 201.03**	**4 357.73**

Note that the above-mentioned goods, because they were declared as having originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, were physically inspected by the risk management module of the Directorate General of Customs, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 2270 (2016). It was determined that the goods under items 1, 2, 3 and 5 had been declared by Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V., as having originated in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In addition the Ministry, in accordance with the principles of legality and material truth, this being a question of an import from Guatemala, asked Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A, de C.V. for the supporting documentation with which the goods had entered Guatemala, and confirmed with the information provided that the goods in question had been imported originally into the Republic of Guatemala by Hy Seal, S.A., located at 31 Avenida 14-53 Zona 7, Colonia Ciudad de Plata 2, Guatemala City, under Central American single declaration GTGUAEA-21-062439-0001-8, dated 4 May 2021, and invoice JH21C03944, dated March 3, 2021. A review of those documents determined that the goods originated in the Republic of Korea, with country code KR, and were exported by [redacted], with its fiscal domicile at Kyungmoon Bld. 1F 41 Gukhoe Daero 54-Gil Ueongdeungpo-Gu, Republic of Korea.



Thanks to the above documentation, it was determined that the customs agent made an error when registering Central American single declaration number 4-42754, recording the goods as having originated from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (KP), instead of the correct origin of the Republic of Korea, with country code KR, which is why they were not seized as provided for in resolution 2397 (2017).

In accordance with the above, as a result of the confirmation and documentary review of the related customs operation, it has been concluded that the goods imported under Central American single declaration number 4-42754, dated 24 June 2022, by Hy Seals Sistemas Hidráulicos S.A. de C.V., originated in the Republic of Korea. The respective documentation is attached hereto in a digital format.

God Union Liberty

[redacted]

Minister of Finance

Source: Member States, annotated by the Panel

Annex 49: Comparison table on DPRK Trade Statistics and replies provided by Member States

** Note: DPRK Trade Statistics and Member States' replies cover the six-month period of October 2022-March 2023/ Highlighted are restricted commodities.

As of 28 July 2023
* Unit : Thousand US$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Austria	0	16		1 (HS Code 85)	purchased from a UK company
2	Barbados	0	458		307 (HS Code 84) 71 (HS Code 85) 33 (HS Code 61) 1 (HS Code 73)	
3	Belgium, Kingdom of	105	57			(Not Restricted)
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	11			(Not Restricted)
5	Brazil, Federative Republic of	0	2			(Not Restricted)
6	Belize	0	111		1 (HS Code 84)	shipments were imported from the Republic of Korea
7	China, People's Republic of	805,820	99,751	5550 (HS Code 2710) 174 (HS Code 2712) 4244 (HS Code 2713) 73 (HS Code 84)	3221 (HS Code 50) 20689 (HS Code 72) 63 (HS Code 73)	goods are items not prohibited by the UNSC resolutions or humanitarian assistance which has exemptions from the UNSC
8	Colombia	1,590	102	1590 (HS Code 72)	4 (HS Code 84) 5 (HS Code 61)	
9	Czech Republic	0	1			(Not Restricted)
10	Denmark, Kingdom of	0	12		12 (HS Code 84)	goods originate from the Republic of Korea
11	El Salvador	0	6		6 (HS Code 54)	
12	Hungary	0	7		7 (HS Code 73)	
13	Indonesia, Republic of	0	911		385 (HS Code 60) 39 (HS Code 85) 77 (HS Code 84) 5 (HS Code 73) 2 (HS Code 08)	
14	Italy	4	2			(Not Restricted)
15	Madagascar, Republic of	0	282		34 (HS Code 84) 76 (HS Code 85)	
16	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	238	8		7 (HS Code 73)	
17	Poland, Republic of	187	0			(Not Restricted)
18	Seychelles, Republic of	0	3,444		3213 (HS Code 72) 162 (HS Code 84) 1 (HS Code 74) 2 (HS Code 73)	request extension to submit reply
19	South Africa, Republic of	2	6,923	2 (HS Code 84)	39 (HS Code 84) 6854 (HS Code 85) 3 (HS Code 73) 1 (HS Code 54)	
20	Spain, Kingdom of	217	9		1 (HS Code 1604)	
21	Thailand, Kingdom of	52	97		95 (HS Code 85) 2 (HS Code 84)	
22	Uganda, Republic of	0	39			(Not Restricted)
23	United Kingdom	28	814			(Not Restricted)

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 9 July 2023, annotated by the Panel

Annex 50: List of HS codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171, annex 4, as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. This list does not include items banned by previous resolutions such as arms embargo, dual-use items and luxury goods. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items for the complete list of prohibited goods.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Condensates and natural gas liquids	**2709**	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of 2375 (2017)
	2711	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
Industrial machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Transportation vehicles[243]	**86**	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	87	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	88	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof [244]	
	89	Ships, boats and floating structures	
Iron, steel and other metals	**72-83**		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	72	Iron and steel	
	73	Articles of iron or steel	
	74	Copper and articles thereof	
	75	Nickel and articles thereof	
	76	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	78	Lead and articles thereof	
	79	Zinc and articles thereof	
	80	Tin and articles thereof	
	81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

[243] Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

[244] Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
Coal	**2701**	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
Iron Ore	**2601**	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
Iron	**72**	Iron and steel (**7201-7229**)	
Iron and Steel products	**73**	Articles of Iron and steel (**7301-7326)**	
Gold	**261690**	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	7108	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	710811	Gold powder, unwrought	
	710812	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	710813	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	710820	Monetary gold	
Titanium	**2614**	Titanium ores and concentrates	
Vanadium	**2615**	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
Rare Earth Minerals	**2612**	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [**261210** and **261220**]	
	2617	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code **261790** - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	2805	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	2844	Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes etc.	
Copper	**74**	Copper and articles thereof (**7401-7419**)	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
	2603	Copper ores and concentrates	
Zinc	**79**	Zinc and articles thereof (**7901-7907**)	
	2608	Zinc ores and concentrates	
Nickel	**75**	Nickel and articles thereof (**7501-7508)**	
	2604	Nickel ores and concentrates	
Silver	**2616100** **7106, 7107**	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	7114	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)	**3**	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates (**0301-0308)**	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	1603	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	1604	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	1605	Crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
Lead	**78**	Lead and articles thereof (**7801-7806**)	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
Lead ore	**2607**	Lead ores and concentrates	

Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)	**50-63**		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	50	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	52	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	53	Vegetable textile fibres nesoi; yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibres nesoi and paper	
	54	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	55	Manmade staple fibres, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	57	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	58	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	59	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	61	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	62	Apparel and clothing accessories; *not* knitted or crocheted;	
	63	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
Agricultural products	**07**	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	08	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
Machinery	**84**	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
Electrical equipment	**85**	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia	**25**	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
Wood	**44**	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
Vessels	**89**	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709: crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713: refined petroleum products [cap: 500,000 barrels]

Source: the Panel

Annex 51: Organization of export controls pursuant to UN SC DPRK-related resolutions in Singapore





Immediate Implementation of UNSCRs

Regulation 6(1)(b) Regulation of Imports and Exports Regulations

"Notwithstanding regulation 3, there shall be no —**importation** into, **exportation** from or **transit** through Singapore of any goods which will contravene the decisions of the United Nations Security Council in resolutions made under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco on 26th June 1945."

We Protect Revenue, and Make Trade Easy, Fair and Secure. 5

List of Items Prohibited for Import, Export, Transhipment and Transit from/to the DPRK

- List of all prohibited items listed in various UNSCRs on the DPRK updated in the Seventh Schedule of the Regulation of Imports and Export Regulations
- Last update on 17 Oct 2018 to include additional items listed under UNSCR 2397 (2017) on DPRK:
  - ✓ Food and agricultural products (under HS codes 07, 08, 12)
  - ✓ Machinery (HS code 84)
  - ✓ Electrical equipment (HS code 85)
  - ✓ Earth and stone, including magnesite and magnesia (HS code 25)
  - ✓ Wood (HS code 44)
  - ✓ Vessels (HS code 89)

We Protect Revenue, and Make Trade Easy, Fair and Secure. 6

Trade with DPRK
With effect from 8 Nov 2017, Singapore has prohibited all commercially traded goods from or to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), including the transhipment and transit of these goods through Singapore.
Non-commercial transactions (e.g. humanitarian donation) of goods arriving from or destined for the DPRK is allowable, and require a permit to be submitted at least 3 working days before the intended shipment date.
We Protect Revenue, and Make Trade Easy, Fair and Secure.
7


Operationalizing OP 18 of UNSCR 2270 (2016) - Inspection of DPRK Cargo
With effect from 1 May 2018, enforcement powers extended to goods brought in transit, whose inspections are required pursuant to give effect to any relevant decision of the UNSC
Inspection scope covers cargo where there is reasonable grounds to believe:
Originates from the DPRK
Is bound for the DPRK
Is brokered or facilitated by/for the DPRK and any entity acting on behalf of the DPRK
We Protect Revenue, and Make Trade Easy, Fair and Secure.
8



Source: Member State

Annex 52: Replies from Member States

Austria

Permanent
Mission
of Austria

to the United Nations
in New York

Reference No. New-York-OV/POL/0254/2023

NOTE VERBALE

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to Note Verbale S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.109 dated 15 June 2023 would like to submit the following response:

The imported good referred to in your request is one satellite phone (Thuraya X5 Touch). The Austrian buyer ordered and purchased the item from company registered in the UK, from where it was shipped to Austria.

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 27 Juni 2023

REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH
STÄNDIGE VERTRETUNG BEI DEN VEREINTEN NATIONEN NEW YORK

To the
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)
New York, NY 10017
dppa-poe1874@un.org

600 Third Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016
E-Mail: new-york-ov@bmeia.gv.at, Tel.: (+1) 917 542 8400

Belize

PERMANENT MISSION OF BELIZE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
675 Third Ave., Suite 1911
New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212) 986-1240
Fax: (212) 593-0932 E-mail: blzun@belizemission.com

NV No. 53

The Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to the latter's correspondence referenced S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.111 of 15 June 2023 regarding data indicating trade between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Belize of items subject to sectoral sanctions pursuant to resolution 2397 (2017).

The Permanent Mission of Belize wishes to inform that the Belize Customs and Excise Department, the competent authority, has conducted an investigation into all trade from DPRK to Belize in 2021 and 2022. Their examination of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) showed two records of importation of machinery of HS Chapter 84 from DPRK in 2021 and 2022. The competent authority has now clarified with the relevant customs brokers and consignees that the said shipments were actually imported from the Republic of Korea, as clearly indicated in the attachments. Consequently, post-modifications for both customs declarations, herewith attached, were executed to reflect the accurate country of origin/export as Republic of Korea.

Further, the competent authority has advised that there has not been any cases of rejection of customs clearance or seizure of goods involving DPRK.

The Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) the assurance of its highest consideration.

New York, 5 July 2023

PERMANENT MISSION OF BELIZE TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK, N.Y.

United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)
NEW YORK

China

China replied, "*According to the data from China, the goods mentioned by the Panel either are items not prohibited by the UNSC resolutions or humanitarian assistance which has exemptions from the UNSC.*"

Denmark

Skatteministeriet

July 13, 2023
J.nr. 2023 - 5805

Ministry of Taxation
Nicolai Eigtveds Gade 28
DK 1402 – København K

Tel. +45 33 92 33 92
Mail skm@skm.dk

www.skm.dk

In regard to the letter from the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts dated 15. June 2023 concerning the measures imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), the Ministry of Taxation is pleased to provide the following information:

Question 1

Ministry of Taxation can confirm that there has been an import of goods to Denmark as displayed in Tabel 1: Machinery (HS Code 84).

However, a subsequent examination of the import conducted by Danish Customs Agency indicates that the origin of the goods is mistakenly stated by the American consignor as originating from DPRK, although the goods originate from the Republic of Korea.

The importing company has on the request of Danish Customs Agency provided documents (including commercial invoice and product information) which specifies that the imported goods originate from the Republic of Korea.

It is the Danish Customs Agency's assessment that the documents sufficiently support that the goods in question originate from the Republic of Korea and not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as stated in Table 1.

Table 1: Machinery (HS Code 84)1 DATE	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER COUNTRY	HS CODE	APPROXIMATE VALUE (USD)
December 2022	Denmark	DPRK	84	12,000

Hence, the information as stated in Table 1 is de facto inaccurate.

Question 2

A review of the import in the Danish Customs Agency's systems shows that a consignment corresponding to the information in the Table 1 was inspected on 27 December 2022. The consignment contained goods of Chapter 84 consigned from the United States but with declared origin in the DPRK.

The consignment was therefore subjected to physical control on the basis of a concrete risk profile that was created to ensure effective enforcement of the ban on the importation of goods subject to sanctions.

Thus, the consignment has been inspected in accordance with paragraph 18 of Resolution 2270 (2016).

However, the cargo was after the inspection not seized and disposed of pursuant to paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017).

Danish Customs Agency has been in dialog with the relevant control unit, and it has been established that the consignment was erroneously released despite the fact that the goods could potentially be prohibited from importation. Furthermore, it has been established that the instructions in the inspection description in the relevant risk profile have not been followed, and that the correct contact persons have not been involved in connection with the execution of the inspection.

Question 3

As a result of the erroneous release of the cargo, the Danish Customs Agency will emphasize to the responsible control unit that the described procedures must be followed.

Side 2 af 2

Source: Member States

Annex 53

Advanced Technology Facility (ATF) appears to be reselling Glocom Products

The Panel notes that at least two products displayed on the ATF website resemble products from Glocom's catalogue. The products are nearly identical in appearance, and share similar description and specifications, with only minor differences in wording. Despite using the brand name "EDSAT" and "ER" on ATF website, the Panel assesses that these products are originally Glocom-made products as seen in Glocom's catalogue.

1) Comparison between “EDSAT ER-310” and “Glocom GR-310” (Upper images are from ATF website and the bottom is from Glocom’s catalogue). The contents of both ① and ② are nearly identical.


ADVANCES TECHNOLOGY FACILITY
When Arts Meet Technologies
AVIATION
EDSAT SYSTEM
CONTACT US
ER-310 VHF/UHF Tactical SATCOM
Manpack/Mobile Radio Frequency Hopping, Digital Secure EPM
Description
Features
Specification
Documents
Frequency bands & modulations:
VHF-FM 30MHz to 88MHz
VHF-AM 108MHz to 116MHz (Rx only)
VHF-FM/AM 116MHz to 156MHz
UHF-FM 156MHz to 174MHz
UHF-FM/AM 225MHz to 512MHz
SATCOM 243-270MHz & 292-318MHz
Preset channels 100 channels
Channel spacing 8.33kHz, 12.5kHz, 25kHz
SATCOM (spacing) 5kHz, 25kHz
Emergency frequency 243.0MHz (121.5MHz option) Frequency stability ± 1ppm
Channel changing time 1ms
Duty cycle 1 min x Tx, 5 min x Rx without forced air cooling Receiver
Sensitivity 0.6μV(FM), 1.5μV(AM)
SATCOM -120 dBm for 10 dB SINAD
AM modulation index 80% to 100%
Audio output distortion 5%
Spurious rejection 70dB
Squelch Operates both on output signal-to-noise ratio and input carrier level, thresholds adjustable
IF interface characteristics Frequency: 70MHz, impedance: 50Ohm unbalanced Transmitter

2


Glocom
GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical Manpack/Mobile Radio
Frequency Hopping, Digital Secure EPM
Software Defined Radio
General specifications
Frequency bands & modulations
VHF-FM 30MHz to 88MHz
VHF-AM 108MHz to 116MHz (Rx only)
VHF-FM/AM 116MHz to 156MHz
UHF-FM 156MHz to 174MHz
UHF-FM/AM 225MHz to 512MHz
SATCOM 243-270MHz & 292-318MHz
Preset channels 100 channels
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Emergency frequency 243.0MHz (121.5MHz option)
Frequency stability ±1ppm
Channel changing time 1ms
Duty cycle 1 min x Tx, 5 min x Rx without forced air cooling
Receiver
Sensitivity 0.6μV(FM), 1.5μV(AM)
SATCOM -120 dBm for 10 dB SINAD
AM modulation index 80% to 100%
Audio output distortion 5%
Spurious rejection 70dB
Squelch Operates both on output signal-to-noise ratio and input carrier level, thresholds adjustable
IF interface characteristics Frequency: 70MHz, impedance: 50Ohm unbalanced
Transmitter
Output power 10W(Peak) in AM, 10W in FM
SATCOM 10W
Spurious emissions 50dB below carrier level
IF interface frequency 70MHz
Impedance 50Ohm unbalance
Power supply
Power input configuration DC12V
Power consumption < 180W (in Tx), <40W (in Rx)
Environmental
Operating temperature -30°C to + 70°C
Storage temperature -40°C to + 75°C
Shock MIL-STD-810E
Humidity 90% relative
EMC MIL-STD-461D
Physical
Dimension 230mm x 90mm x 230mm
Weight ≤4Kg (4.9Kg with battery)
GR-310/GR-310VH Available options
HG SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz) GA-310-AT-05
X-wing SATCOM antenna GA-310-AT-06
Aircraft antenna(108-137MHz) GA-310-AT-07
Aircraft antenna(220-400MHz) GA-310-AT-08
100W power supply unit GA-33A
320W power supply unit GA-34A
External speaker with cable GA-40A
GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical/Satcom Manpack Set
The Glocom GR-310 VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Manpack Set is ideal for extended portable field operations providing the tactical user with effective, secure and comprehensive communications with remote sited command locations. It includes all necessary handset, headset, antennas, batteries and ruck sack carrying system. The standard set comprises:-
VHF/UHF 10W EPM SDR GR-310LE
Remote control unit (For only GR-310R) GR-313
Officer handset GA-10A
Tactical headset GA-11A
VHF 2.4m whip antenna(30-88MHz) GA-211A
Whip antenna(100-400MHz) GA-310-AT-02
SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz) GA-310-AT-04
GPS antenna GA-50A
Clone cable GA-21A
Li-ion battery pack(2pcs) GA-31D
Battery charger GA-32D
Rucksack GA-122A
User Manual GA-131A
GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical/Satcom Mobile Set
The Glocom GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Mobile Set upgrades the GR-310 by providing a convenient vehicle installation kit and transmitter power amplification to 50W PEP. With options for power supply system and the flexibility of dismounted use of GR-310 radio when not in the vehicle (additional accessories may be required), the GR-310VH VHF/UHF Tactical Satcom Mobile Set can be installed in a wide range of vehicle types with antenna options to suit. The standard set comprises:-
VHF/UHF 10W EPM SDR GR-310LE
Remote control unit (For only GR-310R) GR-313
Officer handset GA-10A
Tactical headset GA-11A
VHF 2.4m whip antenna(30-88MHz) GA-211A
Whip antenna(100-400MHz) GA-310-AT-02
SATCOM antenna(240-400MHz) GA-310-AT-04
GPS antenna GA-50A
Clone cable GA-21A
Li-ion battery pack(2pcs) GA-31D
Battery charger GA-32D
Rucksack GA-122A
User Manual GA-131A
VHF/UHF 50W amplifier GR-301B
Mobile antenna(100-400MHz) GA-310-AT-03
3.8m VHF antenna GA-212A
Mobile installation kit GR-311B-ITK
Copyright © 2017 by Global Communications Co., All Rights Reserved.
14

2

2) Comparison between “EDSAT ER-452” and “Glocom GR-452” (Upper images are from ATF website and the bottom is from Glocom’s catalogue). The contents of both ① , ②, and ③ are nearly identical



Source: ATF website and Glocom catalogues

Annex 54: Notice of the U.S. Department of the Treasury

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Treasury Sanctions Facilitator for Attempted Arms Deals Between North Korea and Russia

March 30, 2023

WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one individual for attempting to facilitate arms deals between Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Sanctions and export controls imposed by a coalition of over 30 countries have constrained Russia's ability to replace lost military equipment and supplies with modern technology. At the same time, the United States and its partners are continuing to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons to defend itself against Russia's brutal war of choice.

"Russia has lost over 9,000 pieces of heavy military equipment since the start of the war, and thanks in part to multilateral sanctions and export controls, Putin has become increasingly desperate to replace them," said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. "Schemes like the arms deal pursued by this individual show that Putin is turning to suppliers of last resort like Iran and the DPRK. We remain committed to degrading Russia's military-industrial capabilities, as well as exposing and countering Russian attempts to evade sanctions and obtain military equipment from the DPRK or any other state that is prepared to support its war in Ukraine."

WEAPONS AND PROHIBITED GOODS

OFAC is designating a Slovakian national **Ashot Mkrtychev** (Mkrtychev) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13551 for having attempted to, directly or indirectly, import, export, or reexport to, into, or from the DPRK any arms or related materiel.

Between the end of 2022 and early 2023, Mkrtychev worked with DPRK officials to obtain over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK. Mkrtychev's negotiations with DPRK and Russian officials detailed mutually beneficial cooperation between North Korea and Russia to include financial payments and barter arrangements. He confirmed Russia's readiness to receive military equipment from the DPRK with senior Russian officials. Mkrtychev's negotiations with those officials indicated that necessary Russian preparations for

a proposed deal were complete, and that they were ready to receive materials from and transfer materials to the DPRK. He also provided DPRK officials with information from Russian officials, likely connected to his attempts to obtain military equipment for Russia from DPRK. Lastly, Mkrtychev worked with a Russian individual to locate commercial aircraft suitable for delivery to the DPRK.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, pursuant to E.O. 13551, all property and interests in property of the person named above that are in the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked person are also blocked.

In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individual designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for the individual designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC's Frequently Asked Question 897.

For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Find identifying information on the individual sanctioned today here.

###

Source: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377?utm_campaign=Readbook&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=252489754&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8CUtB47CLpIA1sL7zycVx7NGHKz7iHzsDx5U0uZVyH8ZCD-RntLDdWpiJi49MiIWimJLtVw8YgIR-6XpYrcFrZKkpvdw&utm_content=252489754&utm_source=hs_email

Annex 55: Russian Federation's reply

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.105 сообщаем следующее.

Сведения относительно якобы проводимых гражданином Словакии А.Мкртычевым переговорах о поставках из КНДР в Россию оружия и боеприпасов в обмен на товары не подтверждаются, являясь бездоказательными инсинуациями американской стороны.

Translated from Russian

In connection with reference No. OC.105 from the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following. The information concerning the alleged negotiations by Slovak citizen A. Mkrtychev on the supply of arms and ammunition from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Russia in exchange for goods, being unsubstantiated insinuations on the part of the United States of America, is unconfirmed.

Annex 56: United States' reply concerning Mkrtychev' passport information

MKRTYCHEV, Ashot (a.k.a. MKRTYCEV, Asot), Hana Melichkova Street 3448/37, Bratislava 84105, Slovakia; DOB 07 May 1966; POB Baku, Azerbaijan; citizen Slovakia; Gender Male; Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201 and 510.210; Transactions Prohibited For Persons Owned or Controlled By U.S. Financial Institutions: North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214; Passport BD3843329 (Slovakia) expires 08 Apr 2029; alt. Passport BD5609822 (Slovakia) expires 19 May 2024 (individual)[DPRK].

Annex 57: Russian Federation's reply

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.5 сообщаем следующее.

Представленные «одним государством-членом» фотографии не являются исчерпывающими доказательствами и не свидетельствуют о нарушении введенных против Пхеньяна международных ограничительных мер.

Движение товаров в/из КНДР осуществляется с учетом требований резолюций СБ в отношении этой страны. Установленные Советом санкционные запреты и ограничения соблюдаются. Компетентные российские органы нарушений не выявили.

Translated from Russian

In connection with reference No. OC.5 from the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following.

The photographs provided "by one Member State" are not comprehensive evidence and do not show a violation of the international restrictive measures imposed against Pyongyang.

The movement of goods to/from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is carried out taking into account the requirements of the Security Council resolutions concerning this country. The Council's sanctions prohibitions and restrictions are being complied with. The competent Russian authorities found no violations.

Annex 58: Poland's SALW trade statistics with DPRK and its reply

Poland's Trade Statistics with the DPRK on SALW in 2022

Month	HS Code	Imported Amount in USD
January	9306	404
February		366
March		327
April	9305	18
	9306	765
May	9305	18
	9306	1163
July	9305	18
	9306	446
October	9306	935
November		201
December		831

- **HS Code 9305**: Parts and accessories off arms (military weapons, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles etc.)
- **HS Code 9306**: Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including buckshot, shot and cartridge wads.

Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistic Database (https://comtradeplus.un.org/)

Poland's Reply

RZECZPOSPOLITA POLSKA
STAŁE PRZEDSTAWICIELSTWO PRZY
NARODACH ZJEDNOCZONYCH

REPUBLIC OF POLAND
PERMANENT MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

750 Third Avenue, NEW YORK, NY 10017
TEL.: (212) 744 2506 FAX: (212) 517 6771

SP.ONZ.NJORK.6340.212.2023

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York presents its compliments to the Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to the letter of 16 June 2023 (S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.137) regarding "arms and related materiel" imported by Poland from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2022 has the honor to submit herewith information on the issue at question.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations in New York avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts assurances of its highest consideration.

STAŁE PRZEDSTAWICIELSTWO RP PRZY NARODACH ZJEDNOCZONYCH W NOWYM JORKU

New York, 14 July 2023

[redacted]

Acting Coordinator of the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations
New York

Annex to the note SP.ONZ.NJORK.6340.212.2023

Information for the Panel of Experts established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) with regard to the import of "arms and related materiel" from the DPRK to Poland

With reference to the question of the Panel of Experts with regard to "arms and related materiel" imported by Poland from the DPRK in 2022, please find below information that you may consider relevant to the issue at question.

First and foremost we would like to reaffirm our commitment to international obligations. Sanctions regime imposed on DPRK as well as export control are addressed in the Republic of Poland in both domestic and EU-level legal framework. Measures against the DPRK imposed by the Security Council have been jointly implemented by Poland and the other Member States of the European Union within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy. In order to give an effect of these measures in the most comprehensive and uniform manner the European Union adopted relevant legislation such as decision and regulation issued on the basis of article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, respectively. It should be emphasized that these measures constitute an essential part of the European Union foreign policy tool that it uses to pursue objectives in accordance with the principles of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It should also be noted that from legal perspective regulation has direct binding effect for all persons and entities, without requirement to be implemented into national legislation, unless it is stipulated otherwise.

The obligations stemming from resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) have been enshrined in respective provisions of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/848 of 27 May 2016 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Council Regulation (EC) 1509/2017 of 30 August 2017 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (OJ L 224 31.8.2017, p. 1 with further amendments).

Considering robust sanctions' measures imposed on the DPRK, bilateral economic ties between Poland and DPRK are very limited. Apart from that due to the fact that the DPRK remains on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes, all the DPRK-linked activities are under the highest possible scrutiny. Under statutory requirements as provided for in AML/CFT Act financial market entities are obliged to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures taking into account the risk-based approach. Moreover the comprehensive national export control regime in force is based on close interagency cooperation between export control authority and various national authorities such as inter alia National Security Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Revenue Administration (KAS), the latter responsible for customs matters. It is therefore mandatory for competent authorities to apply enhanced scrutiny in line with detailed procedures, taking into account comprehensive import and export restrictions on the DPRK. It should also be underlined that competent authorities exercise continuous vigilance over business activities and transactions that may be directly or indirectly linked to designated entities and individuals as well as prohibited activities. Nonetheless, well-tailored customer due diligence measures applied by respective institutions, along with wide interagency cooperation ensure that relevant authorities give the highest consideration to all the DPRK-linked activities.

1

However, it should be emphasized that in this particular case national competent authorities are not in possession of any information that may confirm the transactions referred to by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts. The analysis of the national databases on economic turnover available to National Revenue Administration does not show that in the period in question imports of goods classified under HS codes 9305 (parts and accessories of articles covered by headings 9301 to 9304) and 9306 (bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, projectiles and similar armaments of war and parts thereof, cartridges and other ammunition and grenades and parts thereof, including shot and ball wads) or other arms-related goods from the DPRK to Poland, took place. It should also be pointed out that the data contained in the UN Comtrade Database available on the website https://comtradeplus.un.org/, as indicated in the Coordinator's letter, does not correspond with the data reported by Poland to United Nations Register of Conventional Arms https://www.unroca.org/poland/report/2022/. Considering the above, it will be helpful to investigate the matter further if we are provided with the sources of this specific data.

In 2022, according to official data gathered by Statistics Poland (GUS) economic turnover between DPRK to Poland was at very low level, covering mainly basic goods. DPRK is ranked 198 out of the total 236 economic partners (this list also includes overseas territories and dependencies). Please find also enclosed document prepared by EU Directorate – General for Trade illustrating in details volume and value of trade in goods between the European Union and DPRK.

Taking into account the gravity of violation of international obligations by the DPRK, we would like to inform you that Poland considers cooperation with the Panel of Experts with a view to analyzing all issues related to alleged non-compliance to be of the utmost importance. We would like to assure you of our full readiness to cooperate in this matter.

2

Source: Member State

Annex 59: Singapore's export control cases of luxury goods to the DPRK

Case Study: Sanctioned goods shipped to DPRK

- In 2018, Singapore Customs received information alleging that Singaporean companies have engaged in trade in luxury goods which were prohibited by the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") sanctions.
- Through investigations, different companies were established to be engaged in such trade.

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Key Points

- Singapore gives force to the UNSC sanctions by implementing the sanctions within domestic law
- Therefore, exporting goods which violate the sanctions constitute an offence under the United Nations (Sanctions — Democratic People's Republic Of Korea) Regulations
- Additionally, on 8 Nov 2017, Singapore prohibited all commercially traded goods from or to the DPRK, regardless of whether they are imported, exported, or transhipped or brought in transit through Singapore

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Outcome

- Investigations established that various companies had engaged in prohibited trade with the DPRK since 2013 to 2018
- These companies included those who sold goods for export, and those involved in the logistical role
- 5 companies and 9 individuals have been prosecuted, with 3 companies and 7 individuals convicted for their role in such trade
- Cases against further 1 company and 2 individuals pending investigations

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Examples of convicted cases

- Rejo Beverages was fined $160k; her director, one Loh Mun Sang was jailed for 6 weeks
- 123 Holdings was fined $60,000, 123 Duty Free was fined $30,000. Their director, one Wang Jung Chung was jailed for 8 weeks while the export director, one See Swee Hian, was jailed for 4 weeks

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Source: Member State.

Annex 60: Cases prosecuted by Singapore for the violation of luxury goods export to DPRK

PP v Ng Kheng Wah

- T-Specialist directly supplied designated luxury items to the Korean Bugsae shop between November 2010 and January 2017, including:
  - Wines and spirits
  - Perfumes, cosmetics, musical instruments and precious jewellery
  - Watches clad with a precious metal
- Total value of designated luxury goods supplied to DPRK was in excess of SGD $6m
- T-Specialist and Ng Kheng Wah faced 80 charges under Reg 5(a) of the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People's Republic of Korea) Regulations ("UN-DPRK Regs").

PP v Ng Kheng Wah

- Due to the sanctions, Li Ik/Li Hyon had difficulty paying T-Specialist and owed USD 20 m by end of 2013
- Ng then committed trade financing fraud – arranged for his friend Wang to create fictitious invoices for non-existent transactions to purchase MSG and instant noodles.
- Obtained over USD 94m in trade financing from five banks, which was then round-tripped back to T-Specialist. Loans were eventually repaid.
- Ng faced 81 charges of cheating and 8 charges under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act ("CDSA").

PP v Ng Kheng Wah



PP v Ng Kheng Wah

- Ng: 34 months' imprisonment
  - 4 months for UN DPRK-Regs charges
  - 30 months' imprisonment for cheating charges
- T-Specialist: fine of $880,000:
  - $380,000 for UN-DPRK Regs Charges
  - $500,000 for CDSA offences

THE STRAITS TIMES

Jail for company director who sold luxury goods to North Korea, cheated banks of $130m

PP v Chong Hock Yen and others



PP v Chong Hock Yen and others

- In total, 43 occasions where luxury items were supplied, with total value exceeding SGD 500k, and Richard Chong earning about $120k.
- Designated luxury goods supplied included perfumes and cosmetics, watches of metal clad with a precious metal and musical instruments.
- At first instance, District Judge imposed the following sentences:
  - Richard Chong: 3 weeks' imprisonment
  - SCN: $120,000 fine
  - Sindok: $10,000 fine
  - Laurich: $10,000 fine
- Prosecution and defence both appealed against sentences imposed.

PP v Chong Hock Yen and others – the appeal

- The violation of a UN measure enacted into domestic law would affect Singapore's international reputation, in particular, as an international trade and finance centre.
- Luxury goods do not pose a threat in itself but are prohibited, and "probably provide succour and motivation for the continued defiance or contravention of UN Sanctions by those in positions or power".
- Harm to Singapore's reputation and standing would be greater when it took place in relation during a period of heightened tension.
- Fines imposed had to take into account both punishment and disgorgement of profits.



Source: Member State.

Annex 61: Reply from Jaguar Land Rover

The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts
The United Nations Headquarters
Siege
New York
NY 10017

4 April 2023

Your Reference: S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.23

Dear [redacted]

I am writing in response to your letter of 15 March 2023 in relation to photographs of a Land Rover Defender in Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in January 2023.

Jaguar Land Rover takes Sanctions compliance very seriously. Our Corporate Policy on Export Controls & Sanctions Compliance prohibits all transactions in breach of sanctions and all trade with what Jaguar Land Rover term "Comprehensively Sanctioned countries", which includes DPRK. Our Policy is supported by proportionate monitoring and enforcement processes.

Jaguar Land Rover does not have any appointed Retailers or Service agents in DPRK. Vehicles are by their nature mobile and therefore we believe it likely that the vehicle photographed has been driven across the border or shipped in by a third party. The Panel notes in your letter that third party and criminal vehicle sales are difficult to follow. Jaguar Land Rover seeks to manage this diversion risk through robust contractual clauses and awareness raising with our counterparties in relation to permitted sales of our vehicles.

The table below contains our responses to the requests for information with regards to the vehicle photographed.

Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
1. The model, year of manufacture of the vehicle in the photographs, location of manufacturing facilities, and possible serial numbers	The Defender pictured has no visible registration plates and the photographs do not include the Vehicle Identification Number. We have shown the photographs to internal experts on the Defender and they believe that it is: • **Model**: Land Rover Defender 110 • **Model year**: Possibly 2020 model year (but they cannot be certain) • **Derivative**: P400 SE core specification (i.e. not X-Dynamic or X variant) • **Exterior Colour**: Santorini Black • **Interior**: Not visible • **Driver's Side**: Left-Hand Drive • **Manufacturing facility**: Jaguar Land Rover factory in Nitra, Slovakia • **Possible serial numbers**: The vehicle's serial number (Vehicle Identification Number / VIN) is usually displayed in the bottom corner of the windscreen. Are there any other photographs available with a close up of the windscreen? As can be seen from the response to question 3 below, the vehicle pictured could be any one of large number of vehicles. It may be feasible to generate list of all the VINs for Santorini Black 2020 Model Year Defender 110s and if the panel feels that this would be useful information we would endeavour to provide. However we would note that given the large number of possible vehicles, we would not be able to pinpoint the VIN for the specific vehicle.

1

Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
2. Prevailing markets for this type / model of vehicles, in particular any information on whether the vehicle was produced for a specific market	• This type of vehicle is sold into approximately 150 countries, however: ○ Given that it is a left-hand drive vehicle, it is unlikely (but not impossible) that it was originally supplied to a right-hand drive market. ○ Our internal experts note that this not a North American specification vehicle, as such vehicles have side markers in the front and rear wheel arch claddings.
3. Information concerning the supply of such models to these major markets after original manufacture, especially those in geographical proximity to DPRK [redacted]	• As noted above, we have not been able to identify which specific market this vehicle was originally supplied to and there is no way of knowing with certainty how the vehicle entered DPRK. It could have been driven over a land border or it could have been shipped in. • [redacted] Our internal experts think that is possibly a 2020 Model Year Vehicle and meaning it would likely have been manufactured and supplied to the original destination country in 2019 / 2020. • Below are the Global volumes of Defender 110s sold globally for the 20, 20.5 and 21 Model Years, including the subset of vehicles manufactured in Santorini Black [redacted]

[redacted]

Information Requested	Jaguar Land Rover Response
4. Information relating to any specific customization of the vehicle, either by your company and/or any subsequent company (such as an armouring / security company). What is the function of the equipment installed, and which companies might have performed such customization?	From what our experts can tell from the photographs, the vehicle does appear to have a number of accessories / modifications: Visible Accessories: • Front Protection System. • Chequer Plate Kit. • Black Gear Carrier box on the right side of the vehicle. From what we can tell from the images, this could be a genuine Land Rover accessory, but to date it has not been officially available in this colour, which suggests that it is either a counterfeit part or has been aftermarket painted (i.e. not by JLR). • Black Spare wheel cover – this was not available in a colour matching the body colour as a factory accessory until 23 Model Year. It could be a counterfeit or it is apparently quite common for genuine spare wheel covers to be aftermarket painted (i.e. not by JLR) to match the body colour of the vehicle. • Mudflaps (small). • Rear skid pan mounted bright scuff plate. Unavailable from factory possible aftermarket upgrades: • 5095 20" Wheels – these appear to be genuine Land Rover wheels, but they are not an official option on SE vehicle specification (which is the specification of the vehicle in the photographs), suggesting that they have been changed after the vehicle left the factory. • Brake Callipers – In the photos, they appear to be yellow, which are not a factory available option. This may mean that they are not genuine Land Rover parts or that they are genuine parts that have been painted yellow after the vehicle left the factory. • Extended Black Pack skid pans.

We hope that you will find the above responses satisfactory, but if you have any further queries or points that you would like further clarification on we would be pleased to try to help.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]

Director of Compliance, Ethics & Risk

JAGUAR LAND ROVER
ABBEY ROAD, WHITLEY, COVENTRY, CV3 4LF
T. 44 (0)2476 303 080
JAGUARLANDROVER.COM

REG. OFFICE: JAGUAR LAND ROVER LIMITED, ABBEY ROAD, WHITLEY, COVENTRY, CV3 4LF, UK. REGISTERED IN ENGLAND NO: 1672070

Annex 62: Reply from Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.

STEINWAY MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, INC.

SUBMITTED VIA EMAIL

March 28, 2023

Attn: [redacted]
United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009)
United Nations Headquarters
405 E 42nd Street
New York, New York (212-963-1055)

Re: S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.251 Letter; Response of Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.

Dear [redacted]

On behalf of Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc. ("Steinway"), I write to you in response to your letter, dated July 9, 2021 (the "Letter"), regarding the possible transfer of one of Steinway's grand pianos to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK").

First and foremost, we would like to thank the Panel of Experts (the "Panel") for their ongoing commitment to uphold United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874. Steinway is committed to compliance with all applicable laws, including UN sanctions obligations. Steinway has not engaged in any activities in violation of UN or other applicable sanctions against North Korea. In preparing this response, Steinway conducted a review of its records and third-party relationships under the guidance of our outside counsel at Dechert LLP with expertise in sanctions compliance matters.

As was discussed with both of you and our outside counsel, due to miscommunications by the United Nations of which the Panel is aware, we did not become aware of the Letter until recently. Upon learning about the Letter, however, Steinway and its outside counsel reached out to the Panel to promptly address the Panel's concerns.

In the Letter, the Panel asked Steinway to confirm whether the images of a certain piano in a DPRK music video (the "Piano") showed a Steinway model and, if so, details as to how the Piano got into the DPRK. As discussed with the Panel's representatives, Steinway cannot definitively determine whether the Piano is a Steinway piano without physically inspecting the Piano and reviewing its serial number (if any). However, upon review of Steinway's records and

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TEL 718.721.2600 • WWW.STEINWAY.COM

given the limited information available from the video regarding the Piano, it appears that the Piano might not be an authentic Steinway.

Steinway rarely manufactures red pianos and Steinway has no record of exporting pianos to the DPRK. Given the region involved, Steinway leadership determined that if the Piano were a Steinway, it would have been manufactured through Steinway's factory in Germany. Upon review of its records, Steinway's manufacturing team determined that only seven red pianos have been manufactured from 2016 to 2020 by the Steinway factory in Germany. Steinway did not identify any exports of any red pianos (or any other pianos) to the DPRK through a review of Steinway's retail sales records, wholesale sale records, or other financial records. Steinway also did not identify any warranty registrations, which are customarily issued upon initial purchase of a Steinway piano, made in the last ten years to any customers located in DPRK.

Although Steinway is unable to confirm or deny authenticity without reviewing the Piano or serial number (if any), Steinway's manufacturing department noted multiple inconsistencies in the Piano's appearance that suggest that the Piano likely is not a Steinway. Upon visual review of the Piano, Steinway's leadership noted that the Piano shows a black interior, but Steinway's red pianos have mahogany or red interiors – not black. Moreover, Steinway incorporates its logo on the fallboards of its pianos; however, based on the limited views from the music video, the Piano brandishes no such logo. For these reasons, the likelihood that the Piano is an authentic Steinway piano is low.

As set forth above, Steinway does not think the Piano came from a Steinway manufacturing factory or belongs to the Steinway brand. Steinway is happy to discuss any further queries of the Panel in an effort to expeditiously resolve the Panel's concerns.

Respectfully submitted,

[redacted]

Chief Legal Officer
Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc.

cc: United States Mission to the United Nations

Annex 63: US-ROK Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Kimsuky (1 June 2023)

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CYBERSECURITY
ADVISORY

Co-Authored by:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

TLP:CLEAR Product ID: CSA-20230601-1

June 1, 2023

North Korea Using Social Engineering to Enable Hacking of Think Tanks, Academia, and Media

SUMMARY

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of State, and the National Security Agency (NSA), together with the Republic of Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Police Agency (NPA), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), are jointly issuing this advisory to highlight the use of social engineering by Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK a.k.a. North Korea) state-sponsored cyber actors to enable computer network exploitation (CNE) globally against individuals employed by research centers and think tanks, academic institutions, and news media organizations. These North Korean cyber actors are known to conduct spearphishing campaigns posing as real journalists, academics, or other individuals with credible links to North Korean policy circles. The DPRK employs social engineering to collect intelligence on geopolitical events, foreign policy strategies, and diplomatic efforts affecting its interests by gaining illicit access to the private documents, research, and communications of their targets.

BACKGROUND

North Korea's cyber program provides the regime with broad intelligence collection and espionage capabilities. The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK a.k.a. South Korea) have observed sustained information-gathering efforts originating from these North Korean cyber actors. North Korea's primary military intelligence organization, the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which has been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, is primarily responsible for this network of actors and activities.

We assess the primary goals of the DPRK regime's cyber program include maintaining consistent access to current intelligence about the United States, South Korea, and other countries of interest to impede any political, military, or economic threat to the regime's security and stability.

Currently, the U.S. and ROK Governments, and private sector cyber security companies, track a specific set of DPRK cyber actors conducting these large-scale social engineering campaigns as

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Kimsuky, Thallium, APT43, Velvet Chollima, and Black Banshee. Kimsuky is administratively subordinate to an element within North Korea's RGB and has conducted broad cyber campaigns in support of RGB objectives since at least 2012. Kimsuky actors' primary mission is to provide stolen data and valuable geopolitical insight to the North Korean regime.

Some targeted entities may discount the threat posed by these social engineering campaigns, either because they do not perceive their research and communications as sensitive in nature, or because they are not aware of how these efforts fuel the regime's broader cyber espionage efforts. However, as outlined in this advisory, North Korea relies heavily on intelligence gained by compromising policy analysts. Further, successful compromises enable Kimsuky actors to craft more credible and effective spearphishing emails that can be leveraged against more sensitive, higher-value targets. The authoring agencies believe that raising awareness of some of these campaigns and employing basic cyber security practices may frustrate the effectiveness of Kimsuky spearphishing operations. This advisory provides detailed information on how Kimsuky actors operate; red flags to consider as you encounter common themes and campaigns; and general mitigation measures for entities worldwide to implement to better protect against Kimsuky's CNE operations.

If you believe you have been targeted in one of these spearphishing campaigns, whether or not it resulted in a compromise (particularly if you are a member of one of the targeted sectors), please file a report with www.ic3.gov and reference #KimsukyCSA in the incident description.

Please include as much detail as you can about the incident including the sender email address and the text of the email message, specifying any links/URLs/domains. Please specify whether you responded to the email, clicked on any links, or opened any attachments. Please retain the original email and attachments in case you are contacted by an investigator for further information.

- Please visit www.ic3.gov and use **#KimsukyCSA** in your submission.
- The U.S. Government also encourages victims to report suspicious activities, including any suspected DPRK cyber activities, to local FBI field offices.
- For the ROK government, you can report suspicious activities to the National Intelligence Service (www.nis.go.kr, 111), the National Police Agency (ecrm.police.go.kr, 182), or the Korea Internet & Security Agency (boho.or.kr, 118)

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KIMSUKY OPERATIONS: SOCIAL ENGINEERING

In a cybersecurity context, social engineering is a broad term referring to the use of deception to exploit human error and manipulate a target into unwittingly exposing confidential or sensitive information for fraudulent purposes. DPRK cyber actors employ social engineering techniques to enable much of Pyongyang's malicious CNE. Among social engineering techniques, Kimsuky actors use spearphishing—or the use of fabricated emails and digital communications tailored to deceive a target—as one of their primary vectors for initiating a compromise and gaining access into a target's devices and networks. For over a decade, Kimsuky actors have continued to refine their social engineering techniques and made their spearphishing efforts increasingly difficult to discern.

A Kimsuky spearphishing campaign begins with broad research and preparation. DPRK cyber actors often use open-source information to identify potential targets of value and then tailor their online personas to appear more realistic and appealing to their victims.

Sample of a program for generating DPRK spearphishing emails.

The Kimsuky actors will create email addresses that resemble email addresses of real individuals they seek to impersonate and generate domains that host the malicious content of a spearphishing message. DPRK actors often use domains that resemble common internet services and media sites to deceive a target.

- For example, Kimsuky actors are known to impersonate well-known news outlets and journalists using a domain such as "@XYZkoreas.news" spoofing a real news station while actual emails from the news service appear as "@XYZnews.com."
- DPRK cyber actors commonly take on the identities of real people to gain trust and establish rapport in their digital communications. Kimsuky actors may have previously compromised the email accounts of the person whom they are impersonating. This allows the actors to search for targets while scanning through compromised emails, with a particular focus on work-related files and personal information pertaining to retirees, social clubs, and contact lists. They craft convincing spearphishing emails by repurposing the person's email signature, contact list, and past email exchanges. DPRK cyber actors are also known to compromise

email accounts belonging to foreign policy experts and subsequently create a secondary email account, using the email account and identity of the expert to communicate with other significant targets.

- In other cases, a Kimsuky actor will use multiple personas to engage a target; one persona to conduct initial outreach and a second persona to follow-up on the first engagement to distract a potential victim from discerning the identity of the original persona. Another tactic is to "resend" or "forward" an email from a source trusted by a target.

- The initial phishing email occasionally contains a malicious link or document, often purporting to be a report or news article. These attached malicious documents are frequently password-protected, which helps them evade detection by antivirus software and other security measures. However, more often, the initial spearphishing email does not contain any malicious links or attachments and is instead intended to gain the trust of the victim.

- Once DPRK cyber actors establish engagement with a target, the actors attempt to compromise the account, device, or network belonging to the target by pushing malicious content in the form of a malicious macro embedded within a text document. This document is either attached directly to the email, or stored in a file hosting service, such as Google Drive or Microsoft OneDrive. These malicious macros, when enabled, quietly establish connections with Kimsuky command and control infrastructure, and result in the provision of access to the target's device.

- In some cases, Kimsuky actors have developed "spoofed" or fake but realistic versions of actual websites, portals, or mobile applications, and directed targets to input credentials and other information that are harvested by the DPRK. Compromise of a target account can lead to persistent access to a victim's communications, often through a malware used by Kimsuky actors called BabyShark. Kimsuky actors have also been known to configure a victim's email account to quietly auto-forward all emails to another actor-controlled email.

Notably, victim responses to spearphishing lures also provide Pyongyang with the added benefit of insight into foreign policy circles. This covert collection against the community of DPRK watchers is probably of high value to the Kim regime and provides another channel of information on top of what it gains through computer network operations.

Although all DPRK advanced persistent threat groups employ social engineering techniques, the campaigns and themes described in this advisory are specific to Kimsuky.

RED FLAG INDICATORS

Sector targets should be aware of the following activity that may be indications or behaviors of malicious DPRK cyber actors.

- Initial communications are often seemingly innocuous with no malicious links/attachments; follow-on communications usually contain malicious links/documents to facilitate exploitation of a computer or network.
- Email content may include real text of messages recovered from previous victim engagement with other legitimate contacts.
- Emails in English may sometimes have awkward sentence structure and/or incorrect grammar.
- Email content may contain a distinct Korean dialect exclusively used in North Korea.
- Victims/targets with both direct and indirect knowledge of policy information i.e., U.S. and ROK government employees/officials working on North Korea, Asia, China, Southeast Asia matters; U.S. and ROK government employees with high clearance levels; and members of the military, are approached with common themes and questions as referenced in this advisory.
- Email domains look like a legitimate news media site, but do not match the domain of the company's official website. The domains also may be identified as such in open-source malware repositories like Virus Total.
- Spoofed email accounts have subtle incorrect misspellings of the names and email addresses of the legitimate ones listed in a university directory or an official website.
- Malicious documents require the user to click "Enable Macros" to view the document.
- Actors are persistent if the target does not respond to the initial spearphishing email. They will likely send a follow-up email within 2-3 days of initial contact.
- Emails purporting to be from official sources but sent using unofficial email services.

CAMPAIGNS AND THEMES

Kimsuky cyber actors craft their spearphishing campaigns around themes characterizing the target, message content, and the malicious mechanism, or lure, through which a compromise is initiated. The main themes to beware of are impersonations and targeting of **journalists**, **academic scholars**, and **think tank researchers** to:

- solicit responses to foreign policy-related inquiries,
- conduct a survey,
- request an interview,
- review a document,
- request a resume, or
- offer payment for authoring a research paper.

Kimsuky actors tailor their themes to their target's interests and will update their content to reflect current events discussed among the community of North Korea watchers.

The following are examples of real Kimsuky spearphishing attempts that illustrate variations of the common themes. In some instances, the cyber actor poses as a journalist and targets a think tank researcher, while at other times, the DPRK actor may take on the persona of an academic scholar to target other scholars—virtually every combination of these themes and lures has been previously observed.

1. Impersonation of journalists

Kimsuky actors often spoof real journalists and broadcast writers to craft a credible front and make inquiries to prominent individuals working North Korea matters. Usually, the questions will revolve around current events and whether U.S. experts believe North Korea will re-join talks with the U.S., whether they believe North Korea will resume testing its missiles, and how they see China responding. In many instances, Kimsuky actors do not attach malware to their initial email. Instead, they first send an introductory email to inquire about interview opportunities.

Sample email communication 1:

Title: **<name of legitimate Korean journal program>**

Greetings,

My name is **<name of writer>**, and I am a writer for **<name of legitimate Korean journal program>**.

I am writing to you today because I am currently preparing for a program related to North Korean issues. Professor **<name of professor>** of **<actual Korean university>**, whom I contacted earlier, recommended you as an expert on this issue. I would be grateful if you could spare some time to answer a few questions.

Thank you for considering my request. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Best regards,

Follow-on email: If the targets agree to the interview, the actors will then follow up with a second email containing malicious content.

Title: RE: RE: **<name of legitimate Korean journal program>**

Dear **<name of expert>**,

As promised, I am sending you a questionnaire. It would be greatly appreciated if you could answer each question in 4-5 sentences. Thank you for your cooperation.

Best regards,

@ attached file: [**<name of legitimate Korean journal program>**] questionnaire.docx

Additionally, we have seen Kimsuky actors spoof legitimate journalists to specifically target think tank employees. Kimsuky actors commonly pose questions in their spearphishing emails about current events, such as issues regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine; U.S.-DPRK relations; DPRK nuclear and security topics; policymaker stances on the Asian region; and thoughts on current China-North Korea and Russia-North Korea relations.



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Sample email communication 2:

Greetings,

I hope you've been well! This is **<name of real journalist>** with **<legitimate U.S. news organization>**.

North Korea Fires Powerful Missile on 4 Oct using Old Playbook in a New Worlds. The last time Pyongyang launched a weapon over Japan was in 2017, when Donald J. Trump was president and Kim Jong-un seemed intent on escalating conflict with Washington.

I have some questions regarding this:

1) Would Pyongyang conduct its next nuclear test soon after [redacted] in mid-October?

2) May a quieter approach to North Korean aggression be warranted?

3) Would Japan increase the defense budget and a more proactive defense policy?

I would be very grateful if you could send me your answers within 5 days.

Have a good weekend.

Sincerely,

<name of legitimate journalist>

2. Impersonation of academic scholars

Kimsuky actors impersonate South Korean academic scholars to send spearphishing emails to researchers at think tanks. In these emails, the targets are asked to participate in a survey, such as on North Korean nuclear issues and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula or requesting an email interview.

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Sample email communication 3:

Title: **<name of legitimate Korean think tank institute>** Request for survey

Hello,

I am **<name of an academic scholar>** from **<name of legitimate Korean think tank>**.

I am reaching out to ask if you would be willing to participate in a survey on North Korea's nuclear development titled, "A survey on the perception on experts on the advancement of North Korean nuclear weapons and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". Our goal is to find ways to resolve North Korean nuclear issues and achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Rest assured that all answers will be kept confidential and used solely for research purpose. As a token of appreciation, we would like to offer 300,000 won to those who participate in the survey. If you're interested in participating, please reply to this message, and we will send you the survey questionnaire. Looking forward to hearing from you soon.

Best regards,

Follow-on email: Once targets respond to inquiries, Kimsuky actors send them a survey questionnaire and a document form for payment, which contains malicious content.

Title: RE: RE: **<name of legitimate Korean think tank institute>** Request for survey

Thank you for your response.

We will send you a document form for payment, which includes a personal information usage agreement. If possible, please fill out your affiliation, name, ID number, bank account, and signature, and attach copies of your bankbook and ID card.

Best regards,

P.S. The attached document is password-protected, and I will send you the password in a 'password.txt file'

@ attached file: PersonalInformationUsageAgreement

Sample email communication 4:

Below is an example of Kimsuky actors pursuing responses to questions on sector targets by posing as a university professor and research student. Once an initial response is received, actors will request an email interview with a list of questions and request that targets access documents via a malicious link to a cloud-hosted service.

To: **<name of foreign affairs expert>**

Subject: Re: Request for an interview

Dear **<name of foreign affairs expert>**, Sorry for my late response because of the Profs busy time and thanks so much for replying me your kind answers. I did confer with <legitimate U.S. University Professor >about it and modified a bit. Please find the link below and let me know if you have the different opinions.

https: **<malicious drive link>**

PWD: **<redacted>**

Best, **<fictitious university student>**

To: **<foreign affairs expert>**

Cc: **<scholar>**

Dear **<foreign affairs expert>**, Thanks so much for your fast feedback. I did confer with **<legitimate U.S. university professor>** again and complete it as your request. Please find the updated below. https: **<malicious drive link>**

PWD: **<redacted>**

We're planning to upload it on our website within a week after final review. Please feel free to contact with me if you have any questions.

Best, **<fictitious university student>**

3. Impersonation of think tank researchers

Kimsuky actors impersonate researchers from legitimate South Korean think tanks to send spearphishing emails to political and North Korean experts. They initiate communication by sending genuine emails to establish rapport and seek opinions on various topics, such as "North Korea's foreign policy and our response."

Sample email communication 5:

> Title: [Request for opinion] I'm **<name of legitimate Korean think tank> <name of deputy director>**
>
> Greetings,
>
> I am **<name of legitimate Korean think tank>**, deputy director of the **<name of deputy director>**.
>
> I am reaching out to you to discuss an article I am currently working on.
>
> The topic, "North Korea's foreign policy and South Korea's response" is somewhat distant from my expertise, so I would greatly appreciate hearing the opinions of experts like you.
>
> I would kindly request your comments on my writing, as I believe you are the most appropriate person to provide valuable insights on the subject. Your earlier article caught my attention, and I found myself nodding in agreement with each sentence. That is why I feel confident in asking for your opinion.
>
> I am eagerly awaiting your reply and appreciate your willingness to assist me. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Follow-on email: After receiving replies from their targets, the Kimsuky actors exchange multiple emails, which may include attachments containing malicious links or files and instructions on how to open the attached files. Even after stealing the account information of their victims and infecting their devices with malware, they sometimes continue to send "thank you" emails to their targets.

> Title: RE: RE: [Request for opinion] I'm **<name of legitimate Korean think tank> <name of deputy director> <attached large size file>**
>
> Thank you for agreeing to provide your opinion. Please find the attached files.
>
> We greatly appreciate your input. To ensure security in the face of increasing hacking activity, we have set a password (**<password string>**) for the attached file.
>
> We look forward to hearing your valuable feedback.

Sample email communication 6:

Below is an example of Kimsuky actors spoofing a think tank employee and utilizing a spoofed think tank domain in order to target another think tank employee. Once the target responds with input, the Kimsuky actor sends a follow-on email with a malicious attachment.

Dear <**think tank employee**>,

Hope you are doing well. On behalf of <**another think tank**>, it is my pleasure to invite you to write a 1,200-word piece on the recent NK's provocation.

North Korea's latest missile launches, including the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over Japan on October 4 and two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on October 6, provide a stark reminder of the numerous missile programs it is pursuing.

Subject is as follows:

1) Would Pyongyang conduct its next nuclear test soon after [redacted] in mid-October?

2) May a quieter approach to North Korean aggression be warranted?

3) Would Japan increase the defense budget and a more proactive defense policy?

You can send me this email by Oct 21. You can make your own title for your article. We can provide you with a small honorarium of around USD 480.00.

I would really appreciate it if you can contribute.

Best,

<**Redacted**>

Senior Fellow, <**think tank**>

Director, <**think tank**>

Follow-on email: The Kimsuky actor then sent a second communication with malicious content.

Dear <**think tank employee**>,

Sorry for my late response.

As promised, I'm writing to send our result of the review. Please find the attached and let me know if any problems.

PW: <redacted>

Best,

<**Redacted**>

Senior Fellow, <**think tank**>
Director, <**think tank**>

4. Impersonation of government officials, law enforcement, web administrators

Below is an example of how Kimsuky actors approach their targets by impersonating individuals responsible for North Korean policies in government agencies, such as the South Korean National Assembly or the presidential office. These impersonated individuals may have already had their accounts compromised through a previous attack. Kimsuky actors may mention specific information about the target's position or schedule, which they obtained from the target's email exchanges or address book.

Sample email communication 7:

Title: Office of <**member of the National Assembly**>/Seminar "Proposal for the Unification Policies of the Yoon Government"

Hello, this is <**name of secretary**> from the office of <**member of the National Assembly**>.

Let me express our gratitude for your attendance and participation at the seminar we hosted yesterday. Your presence and insights contributed greatly to the success of the event.

If it's not too much trouble, could you kindly provide us with a brief summary of the remarks you made during the seminar? We would like to keep it as an internal reference material.

Additionally, we would greatly appreciate it if you could fill out the attached form and send it back to us. This will serve as an evidence document for the speaking fee payment procedure.

Password: <**redacted**>

Thank you again for your participation and we hope to see you at future events. Have a great weekend.

Kimsuky actors may also impersonate investigative agencies or law enforcement officials to deceive a target into believing that their email account has been involved in an illegal incident. They use the authority of investigative agencies to approach the target, implying that their account may have been stolen and that they could be involved in a criminal or national security-related incident.

Sample email communication 8:

Title: <**legitimate Investigator**> of <**legitimate investigation agency**>.

I am <**legitimate Investigator**> of <**legitimate investigation agency**>.

I'm writing to inform you that someone has published content on YouTube using your email account that violates the National Security Law.

Link: https:// HYPERLINK "https://%3cyoutube/"< HYPERLINK "https://%3cyoutube/"YouTube video link>. The video was posted on <**Date: 0000. 0. 00.**> by <**target**>

We also suspect that the same user has posted content that slanders North Korean defectors. We need your cooperation to identify the real publisher of these posts.

1. Provide us with your computer media access control address (MAC address) and Ethernet hardware address, as they are needed to track any illegal access to your email account.

2. If you cannot locate these addresses in your computer system, please run the program below and send us the resulting document: <check tool.zip>

3) Please respond to this email within 24 hours and delete it immediately after sending your reply.

Thanks you for your cooperation

Additionally, Kimsuky actors impersonate operators or administrators of popular web portals and claim that a victim's account has been locked following suspicious activity or fraudulent use. Victims are advised to protect their personal information and unlock their account by clicking a link attached to the email and changing their password. The link leads to a phishing site that mimics a legitimate web portal login page where victims are directed to input personal information, including their usernames and passwords, for harvesting by DPRK cyber actors.

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Sample email communication 9:

Title: Your Password for <**legitimate portal site**> Account Has Been Compromised

We regret to inform you that we have detected an attempt to log into your account (<**email address**>) from an unauthorized application. The incident occurred on <**date**> at <**time**> (Korea Standard Time), and the IP address used was <**IP address**> located in Washington, the U.S.

In order to prevent any further unauthorized access to your account, we recommend that you change your password immediately. You can do this by clicking on the following link: <**link to change password - legitimate**>

Please note that if you fail to change your password, we may have to permanently delete or close your account in accordance with our security policy.

POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES

For email recipients:

- Implement basic cyber hygiene to include robust passwords, multifactor authentication, and installation of antivirus tools. See NSA's Best Practices for Securing Your Home Network or NIS's guidance for email security for more details.
- Do not enable macros on documents received via email, unless the source is verified.
- Do not open documents from cloud hosting services when shared via email, unless the source is verified.
- Closely scrutinize identities and associated social media or credentials for fraud. Be especially cautious of:
    - Official messages coming from unofficial or personal email accounts using commercial providers.
    - Domain/subdomain variations, as DPRK cyber actors have been known to register spoofed domains (e.g., johndoe@abccompany.live vs. johndoe@abccompany.com).
- If you were previously in communication with the individual, use the known legitimate contact information instead of the new, potentially malicious email or account.
- When in doubt, consult the organization's official website for correct contact information.
- If you are still not sure, verify identities via phone or video call before engaging further. DPRK cyber actors are not known to engage outside of the virtual environment and will avoid voice/video communications.

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- If you cannot verify the source of an email inquiry, consider the risks before responding.
- Consider navigating to websites using a search engine's non-sponsored results instead of clicking on URLs provided in the email(s).
- Be cautious of a request to move communications to a separate messaging platform.
- If sending documents, only send to verified email addresses.

For potential recipients' systems administrators:

- Implement a user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
- Require phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- Regularly use port checking capabilities to determine if your network is being accessed remotely via desktop sharing software or a VPN or VPS, particularly if usage of remote desktop sharing software or VPN services to access accounts is not standard practice.
- If you allow the use of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky remote services, secure and monitor them closely.
    - Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require phishing-resistant MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
    - Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols not in use for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol port 3389).
    - Restrict the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.

- Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.
- Implement application control policies that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs.

- Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
- Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
- Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.
- Consider requiring administrator credentials to install software.
- Add an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations indicating that they are higher risk messages.
- Consider adding rules to block emails that match the sample emails provided in this advisory. Ensuring that you know how to scan for malicious undelivered email messages on email servers is a critical step for preparing to understand the scope of this type of targeting once malicious email identifiers are discovered.
- Enabling DMARC and DKIM on email domains generally makes certain forms of email spoofing more difficult, though it may not directly mitigate the tactics described above.

DPRK Rewards for Justice

The U.S. and ROK Governments encourage victims to report suspicious activities, including those related to suspected DPRK cyber activities, to relevant authorities. If you provide information about illicit DPRK activities in cyberspace, including past or ongoing operations, you may be eligible for a reward. If you have information about illicit DPRK activities in cyberspace, including past or ongoing operations, providing such information through the Department of State's Rewards for Justice program could make you eligible to receive an award of up to $5 million. For further details, please visit https://rewardsforjustice.net/.

Disclaimer

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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL SPEARPHISHING SAMPLES

Sample email communication 10:

"This is **<name of legitimate journalist>** from **<legitimate non-U.S. news organization>**

I'm writing to know your thoughts on North Korea's future direction after the Beijing Winter Olympics are over. Many believe a recent absence of North Korean provocations is due to Pyongyang's decision not to hurt Olympic vibes held in its lone major ally, but with the Games in the books, speculation is growing that North Korea is likely to pick up where it left off in January, or a series of missile tests.

-Do you believe North Korea will resume testing its missile launches? If so, when is the best time for it and what kind of missiles it will opt?

-China is scheduled to hold the National People's Congress, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference from March 4 to 13 and do you think the schedule will further defer North Korea's possible missile testing?

-North Korea has indicated that it will lift its moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, but do you think there is the possibility that Pyongyang will offer to talk with the U.S., putting the moratorium on the line? If so, what would be the U.S. response? I'd be very grateful if you could send me your answers within this week

Sample email communication 11:

Title: Documents for the Policy Advisory Committee.

Hello, **<member of the committee>**,

I am **<name of government employee>** from **<government department>**.

I am writing to inform you that I have attached the filed related to the recent visit of Special Representative Biegun to this email.

As this email contains sensitive information, please treat it as confidential.

<file name.pdf>



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Sample email communication 12:

Dear **<university professor>**:

I hope you are safe and well.

This is **<legitimate journalist>** from **<legitimate non-U.S. news organization>**. I am sending e-mail to you because I would like to hear your opinions about how Russia's invasion of Ukraine will affect the situation surrounding North Korea. Would you like to give me your opinions about the questions below?

1) Some analysts argue that Russia's invasion of Ukraine may make North Korea much more reluctant to give up nuclear weapons, given that Ukraine has been eventually invaded by Russia after it abandoned its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees under the Budapest Memorandum. This certainly looks similar to an agreement made between Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore in 2018. What do you think about this kind of argument?

2) While the Biden administration is concentrated on the evolving circumstances surrounding Ukraine, possibly lowering its guard in the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea Launches New ICBM and may try to carry out nuclear tests. What do you think about North Korea's future developments?

3) Do you think North Korea believes that Biden is already a "lame duck" and sees this as a good chance to concentrate on developing new weapons?

4) Do you expect China will tolerate North Korea's spate of ballistic missile launches and possible nuclear tests? Do you think North Korea can or will maintain stable and amicable relations with China? Does Russia not afford to care about North Korea?

I would be very grateful if you could send me your answers within 5 days. Thanks for your consideration and time in advance.

best regards.

<legitimate journalist>

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

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Sample email communication 13:

Title: Your email account has been suspended

We are writing to inform you that your email account has been suspended because emails you sent appear to have violated relevant laws and in some cases you may be held legally liable. If you did not send any spam mails from your <portal site> mail account, it is possible that your account may have been compromised and used by someone else for spamming. We recommend checking your email settings to ensure that your POP/IMAP options have not 'Enabled' others to use your account.

If you are still unable to identify any problems with your email settings, it is possible that your account has been hacked and your personal information was stolen. To regain access to your email account, please follow the steps provided by our investigation department by clicking the button below.

<Button linking to phishing website disguised as a normal portal login page>

Sample email communication 14:

Title: Notification regarding your fraudulent account registration

This is the <legitimate portal site> operation team, and we regret to inform you that your ID <redacted> has been registered as a fraudulent account. To prevent any further harm, we recommend that you take immediate action.

We kindly request you to verify your identity as soon as possible to ensure the safety and security of your account. You can do this by visiting the member information page and checking the registered name. We also advise you to change your password to keep your account protected. Please be aware that the fraudulent account registration occurred on 00:00, 00/00/0000.

To unlock your account, please follow the link provided below:

<unlock your account: malicious link>

Thank you for choosing <legitimate portal site> as your trusted platform. We are committed to providing you with the best possible service and support.

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Source: https://www.state.gov/u-s-and-rok-agencies-cybersecurity-alert-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-dprk-social-engineering-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-academia-and-news-media/ and https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_25605/view.do?seq=5&page=1

Annex 64: Links to Ahnlab Security Emergency Response Center (ASEC) reports in 2023 (as of July 2023)

Kimsuky Group

Kimsuky Distributing CHM Malware Under Various Subjects

(21 June 2023)

Kimsuky Group Using Meterpreter to Attack Web Servers

(22 May 2023)

Kimsuky Group's Phishing Attacks Targeting North Korea-Related Personnel

(22 May 2023)

Kimsuky Group Uses ADS to Conceal Malware

(29 March 2023)

Kimsuky Group Distributes Malware Disguised as Profile Template (GitHub)

(29 March 2023)

OneNote Malware Disguised as Compensation Form (Kimsuky)

(24 March 2023)

CHM Malware Disguised as North Korea-related Questionnaire (Kimsuky)

(13 March 2023)

Malware Disguised as Normal Documents (Kimsuky)

(15 February 2023)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group Targetting Windows IIS Web Servers

(23 May 2023)

Anti-Forensic Techniques Used By Lazarus Group

(23 February 2023)

Source: ASEC

Annex 65: Additional cases related to Kimsuky

Case 1

In a June 2023, a cybersecurity firm reported[245] a Kimsuky social engineering campaign, targeting experts in DPRK affairs, to steal subscription credentials from Google and NK News, a DPRK- focused news and analysis service. via fake login websites and to gather strategic intelligence. Kimsuky employed sophisticated tactics, including extensive email correspondence, and spoofed URLs and deployed 'ReconShark' in the process.

Case 2

A cybersecurity firm reported[246] in May 2023 that Kimsuky was deploying a variant of the 'RandomQuery' malware via phishing emails sent to DPRK-focused information services, human rights activists, and defector support organizations. The main purpose was to entice victims into downloading and accessing the attached CHM file. When executed, the file eventually downloaded a second-stage payload 'RandomQuery' from the Kimsuky-controlled C2 server to the victim's system. The malware not only collected system data but also installed applications, files and directories which would be used to provide Kimsuky with more information. The data were eventually exfiltrated via the C2 server.

Case 3

On 10 May 2023, the National Police Agency (NPA) of the Republic of Korea announced the results of its investigations into a breach of a network of one of the country's largest hospitals, Seoul National University Hospital, by DPRK cyberthreat actors.

The incident, which occurred between May and June 2021, resulted in data exposure for 831,000 individuals, most of whom were patients. 17,000 of the impacted people were current and former hospital employees.

The NPA conducted an analytical investigation lasting two years to identify the perpetrators.

Analysis of the breach revealed that the attack was attributed to DPRK hackers based on the following information:

- the intrusion techniques observed in the attacks,
- the IP addresses that have been independently linked to DPRK threat actors,
- the website registration details,
- the use of specific vocabulary only used in the DPRK.

The NPA cautioned that DPRK hackers might try to infiltrate information and communication networks across various industries and emphasized the need for enhanced security measures and procedures, such as implementing security patches, managing system access, and encrypting sensitive data.

[245] See https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-new-social-engineering-campaign-aims-to-steal-credentials-and-gather-strategic-intelligence/

[246] See https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/kimsuky-ongoing-campaign-using-tailored-reconnaissance-toolkit/

The NPA did not mention the specific DPRK cyberthreat actor group, but ROK local media linked the attack to Kimsuky.

Below is NPA's press release of 10 May 2023.



경찰청 보도자료

보도시점 2023. 5. 11.(목) 조간, 누리망 방송 2023. 5. 10.(수) 12:00

서울대병원 해킹 및 개인정보 유출사건 (2021년), 북한 소행

- 약 83만 명의 환자 · 직원 개인정보 유출 정황 확인

경찰청 국가수사본부(사이버수사국)는 지난 2021년에 발생한 서울대학교병원 개인정보 유출사건을 수사한 결과, 북한 해킹조직의 소행이라고 밝혔다.

2021년 5월경부터 6월경까지 국내 · 외에 소재한 서버 7대를 장악하여 공격 기반을 마련하였으며, 서울대학교병원 서버의 취약점으로 내부망에 침입하여 환자 81만여 명, 전 · 현직 직원 1만 7천여 명 등 약 83만 명의 개인정보를 유출하거나 유출한 정황이 확인되었다.

경찰청은 그간 북한 해킹조직에 의한 주요 정보통신망 침입 사건을 여러 차례 수사한 사례가 있으며, 기존 북한발로 규명된 다수 사건과 비교하여, △ 공격 근원지의 아이피(IP) 주소 △ 인터넷 사이트 가입정보 △ 아이피(IP) 주소 세탁 기법 △ 시스템 침입 · 관리 수법 등이 같고, △ 북한어휘를 사용하는 점 등을 근거로 북한 해킹조직의 소행으로 판단하였다.

경찰청은 피해기관에 침입 및 정보 유출 수법과 재발 방지를 위한 보안 권고사항을 설명하였고, 관계기관에 북한 해킹조직의 침입 수법·해킹 도구 등 관련 정보를 제공하여 정보보호 정책 수립에 활용하도록 하였다.

경찰청은 의료 분야 외 다른 분야에도 주요 정보통신망에 대한 침입 시도를 지속해서 할 것으로 예상하므로 최신 보안 업데이트 적용, 불법적인 접속 시도에 대한 접근통제, 개인정보를 포함한 중요 전산 자료 암호화 등 보안 시스템과 보안 정책 강화를 당부하였다.

경찰청은 "국가 배후의 조직적 사이버 공격에 대해 치안 역량을 총동원하여 적극적으로 대응함과 동시에, 관계기관 정보공유 및 협업을 통해 추가적인 피해를 방지함으로써 대한민국의 사이버 안보를 굳건히 지키기 위해 노력할 계획이다."라고 밝혔다.

붙임: 사건 개요도(별도 첨부)



Source: https://www.police.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=d6c2795c-3930-44ab-970d-d2d7a14f9571.hwpx&rs=/viewer/202305

Annex 66: NPA Press Release on Lazarus hack exploiting finance-related software (18 April 2023)

경찰청 보도자료

보도시점 2023. 4. 19.(수) 조간 누리망방송 2023. 4. 18.(화) 12:00

보안인증프로그램 취약점 악용 해킹 사건, 북(北) '라자루스' 소행으로 확인

- 대규모 피해가 우려되는 북(北)의 사이버공격 시도 선제적 확인·차단
- 보안프로그램 취약점 및 언론사 사이트 해킹을 통한 '워터링홀' 공격 기법 확인
- 추가 피해 예방을 위해 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트 중요

경찰청 국가수사본부(안보수사국)에서는 지난해 11월부터 금융보안인증 소프트웨어 취약점 악용 공격 사건을 수사한 결과, 이번 사건이 북한 정찰총국이 배후인 것으로 알려진 일명 '라자루스*' 해킹조직의 소행인 것으로 확인하였다.

* '라자루스': '14년 미국 소니픽처스 해킹 사건, '16년 방글라데시 중앙은행 해킹사건, '17년 워너크라이 랜섬웨어 사건 등에 연루된 것으로 알려진 북(北) 해킹조직으로, 정부는 사이버 분야 대북 독자 제재 대상으로 '라자루스' 해킹조직을 지정('23. 2. 10.)

이번 사건은 북한이 인터넷뱅킹 등 전자금융서비스 이용에 필수적으로 설치되는 소프트웨어의 취약점을 악용하고, 국민 대다수가 접속하는 언론사 사이트를 악성코드 유포 매개체로 활용하여 피해가 대규모로 확산될 위험성이 있었던 해킹 사건으로 밝혀졌다.

이와 관련하여, 지난 3월 30일 정부 관계기관은 국민들에게 관련 보안 취약점을 공개하고 신속한 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트를 당부하는 한편, 발견된 악성코드를 백신 프로그램에 반영하고 피해업체에 대한 보안 조치를 완료하는 등 추가적인 피해를 방지한 바 있다.

수사 결과, 북한은 지난 2021년 4월 국내 유명 금융보안인증 업체를 해킹하여 소프트웨어의 취약점을 찾아내고, 공격에 활용할 웹 서버와 명령·제어 경유지 등 공격 기반시설을 장기간 치밀하게 준비한 것으로 확인되었다.

DPRK [the Lazarus Group] exploited vulnerabilities in a software essential for electronic financial services, including internet banking, utilizing a news media website widely accessed by the public as a means to distribute malicious code. This hacking incident could have led to large scale damages and losses.

Investigations revealed that the DPRK [the Lazarus Group] hacked a local financial security authentication company in April 2021 to identify the software's vulnerabilities, and for an extensive period of time meticulously prepared infrastructure, including web servers, to launch an attack.



경찰청은 취약 버전의 금융보안인증 소프트웨어가 설치된 컴퓨터가 특정 언론사 사이트에 접속할 경우 자동으로 악성코드가 설치되는 워터링홀* 수법을 통해 국내 61개 기관이 해킹된 것으로 확인하였다. 국내 1,000만 대 이상의 컴퓨터에 설치된 금융보안인증 프로그램의 취약점을 활용해 대규모 사이버 공격을 준비했을 가능성도 배제할 수 없지만, 관계기관 합동대응을 통해 이를 사전에 확인·차단한 사례라고 밝혔다.

* Watering hole: 방문 가능성이 높거나 많이 사용하는 사이트를 감염시킨 후 피해자가 해당 사이트에 접속시 컴퓨터에 악성코드를 추가로 설치하는 공격 방식

경찰청은 국정원·한국인터넷진흥원 등 관계기관 합동분석 결과, ▵공격 기반시설 구축 방법 ▵'워터링홀' 및 소프트웨어 취약점을 악용한 공격 방식 ▵악성코드 유사성 등을 토대로, 이번 사건을 북한 해킹조직 일명 '라자루스'의 소행으로 판단하였다.

경찰청은 북한의 해킹 수법이 날로 고도화되고 있는 만큼, 추가적인 피해 예방을 위해 보안인증 프로그램을 최신 버전으로 업데이트해 줄 것을 다시 한번 강조하였다.

※ 4. 14. 현재, 취약점 악용된 금융보안인증 프로그램 업데이트 약 80% 수준

경찰청은 "이번 사건에서 확인된 해외 공격·피해지에 대한 국제 공조수사를 진행하는 한편, 추가 피해 사례 및 유사 해킹 시도 가능성에 대한 수사를 계속 이어 나갈 계획이다."라고 밝혔다.

붙임 1. 사건 개요도
2. 금융보안인증 소프트웨어 취약 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법

The NPA confirmed a watering hole attack, which automatically installs malicious codes, was used to hack 61 domestic institutions by means of computers with vulnerable versions of financial security authentication software accessing a specific news media website. With the financial security authentication software installed on over 10 million computers nation-wide, preparations for a large scale cyberattack could not be ruled out. However, through joint interagency efforts, additional cyberattack was prevented.

With relevant agencies such as National Intelligence Service and the Korea Internet Security Agency, the NPA analysed that the Lazarus Group was behind the attack based on the methods used to establish an attack infrastructure, the tactics used during the process (watering hole attack and use of software vulnerabilities), and malicious code similarities.

붙임1 사건 개요도


① 해킹공격을 위한 기반 구축
(보안 S/W 업체, 언론사, 명령·제어 서버 해킹)
보안 S/W 업체
언론사
명령·제어 서버
③ 악성코드 유포서버로 연결
② 언론사 웹 페이지 접속
④ 악성코드 설치
⑤ 관리자 권한 탈취
⑥ 내부 시스템 장악
(좀비 PC 등 악용)
보안 S/W 설치 PC
피해 기관

붙임2 **금융보안인증 S/W 취약 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법**

□ S/W 취약 · 해결 버전 구분

○ **(취약 버전)** 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.40' 이하

○ **(해결 버전) 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.41'**

□ S/W 버전 확인 및 업데이트 방법

① **(버전 확인)** 사용 중인 PC에서 검색 기능을 통해 [제어판] 검색 후 클릭 → [프로그램] → [프로그램 및 기능]을 순서대로 클릭, 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3' 버전 확인

② **(취약 버전 삭제)** 'INISAFE CrossWeb EX V3 3.3.2.40' 이하의 취약한 버전으로 확인될 경우 [제거] 클릭하여 삭제

③ **(해결 버전 설치)** 이용 중인 금융사이트 등에 접속하거나 개발사 홈페이지에 직접 접속하여 취약점이 해결된 버전(3.3.2.41) 재설치

※ http://demo.initech.com/initech/crosswebex_pack/3.3.2.41/INIS_EX_SHA2_3.3.2.41.exe

– 서비스 운영자의 경우, 개발사를 통해 해결 버전으로 교체

Source: https://www.police.go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=c45a5bc8-fd59-4c27-b4d8-1ce898fb2d19.pdf&rs=/viewer/202307

Annex 67: Additional cases related to the Lazarus Group

Case 1

In April 2023, a cybersecurity company reported[247] on an October 2019 - March 2022 campaign, dubbed 'DeathNote'. The campaign is also referred to as 'Operation Dream Job'.[248]

Through this campaign, the Lazarus Group used social engineering lures mimicking cryptocurrency businesses and defense contractors to trick victims into interacting with macro-laced Word attachments and PDF files.

When the victims opened the file, the macro installed an obfuscated VBScript that extracted payloads in the form of harmful UltraVNC[249] with backdoor capabilities which evade detection and establish a connection to a separate C2 server.

Case 2

Another cybersecurity company reported in May 2023 that the Lazarus Group has been carrying out attacks against Windows IIS web servers by placing a malicious DLL (msvcr100.dll) in the folder path as a normal application through the web servers' process.

This 'DLL Side-Loading technique' hijacks targets' legitimate applications to bypass security software.[250]

In addition, the Lazarus Group has also been using anti-forensic techniques to conceal its activity, including hiding and encrypting data, file deletion and timestamp changes.[251]

[247] See https://securelist.com/the-lazarus-group-deathnote-campaign/109490/
[248] See S/2021/211, para.126 and footnote 107.
[249] UltraVNC is a remote desktop software that allows users to remotely access and control computers over a network or the internet. It is a popular and free open-source application that provides remote access capabilities for Windows operating systems.
[250] The Panel has reported on this technique in S/2023/171, para. 116 and annex 79.
[251] See annex 64 for links to related reports.

Annex 68: The Panel's summary of interviews with relevant experts on DPRK IT workers

On several occasions over the past year, the Panel had the opportunity to interview experts on the issue of DPRK IT workers.

1) Account Creation in Freelance Platforms

In order to create an account in freelance work platforms (websites), users are required to go through an identity authentication process which is often conducted via email, text message, identification card, and/or a real-time video interview.

There are cases where IT workers pay a foreign partner to conduct the authentication process as well as ongoing account verification (such as two-factor authentication). In other cases, IT workers utilize a falsified or stolen identity to complete the authentication process. IT workers are able to collect identification documentation, including passports and drivers licenses, and replace the original photo with their own.

Such IT workers will often not pursue a developer project if the employer requires fingerprint verification, drug testing, and/or for the developer to work on-site for all or a portion of the employment. Potential employers should also consider requiring developers to share their computer screen and appear on a video call during technical interviews to confirm the integrity of their responses, to ensure the developers are not cheating by looking up answers on a separate computer or utilizing AI software. Potential employers are advised to check answers to technical interview questions or other responses obtained in the job hiring process to determine if AI software was used, such as in response to interview questions or when producing coding upon request.

2) Subcontracts with Proxy Account Holders

These IT workers are employing new methods to identify foreign individuals willing to create proxy accounts, in exchange for a percentage of the profits earned. They upload posts on different social media and networking websites such as Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as on freelance developer platforms, advertising that they are IT programme developers who would share their earnings with those who can lend them accounts and identities on freelance work platforms. These IT workers often disguise themselves as Chinese or from other Asian countries, asserting that they are able to earn much more by using foreign national accounts. Some of them use dating apps to search for foreign individuals who create can proxy account for them in exchange for money. More recently, they use websites such as 'playerup.com' to buy freelance platform accounts from foreigners.

3) Direct deals with Clients

Once a client is identified, these IT workers seek to lure the client into establishing contracts directly, without going through the freelance work platforms. In many cases, clients have to pay a commission fee to use these websites, so it is also in the interest of the clients to direct contracts with the reliable IT developers.

These IT workers often perform work at a high level of competence with comparatively low hourly rates. They are able to obtain subsequent contracts directly with the client and also successfully recommend other DPRK freelance IT workers for jobs with the client.

4) Employing Other Developers

A subset of these IT workers is increasingly employing non-DPRK developers to conduct work for U.S. and other foreign companies - including in Europe and Middle and Latin America. These hired developers are often located in South Asia, Africa, or South America. The DPRK IT workers, often purporting to represent a developer hiring company, only hire them for short periods of time, such as the length of a single project. These IT workers use U.S. or other local person information to create freelance platform and social media accounts for the hired workers, who then use the alias accounts to pose as U.S. or other local persons looking for remote jobs with U.S. or other local companies, applying for dozens of jobs daily. The developers then provide a large portion of their earnings to these IT workers. Profile information about these individuals is often falsified. The developers utilize proxy IP and VPN services to pretend to be located in the United States.

These IT workers - and the non-DPRK developers they hire - submit applications within the normal work hours of the location in which they are purporting to be citizens of. For instance, these workers apply to jobs with U.S. companies during U.S. time zones.

5) Methods to Circumvent Account Shutdown

These IT workers are aware that freelance platforms are looking for red flag activities that could result in accounts being suspended or shut down. These red flag indicators include inconsistencies in the nationality of the account and the location of an IP address, logins into one account from multiple IP addresses in a short period of time, and excessive biddings on numerous projects from one account.

To evade their accounts being flagged for these reasons, these IT workers are known to utilize a proxy account holder's computer directly via remote desktop control tools. This makes it appear they are using the IP address of the proxy account holder and are located in the proxy's country. DPRK IT workers also have a set of guidelines to evade detection. For instance, instructions are given to bid only for three projects a day using one account so that the account does not stand out for further scrutiny from the freelance platforms. Considering the high competitiveness of the software development market where only a fraction of the bids gets responses, these IT workers use multiple accounts to raise their chances of winning a bid for a project.

6) Payment

DPRK IT workers will maintain group accounts on payment platforms and at local, regional, and international banks. These accounts receive payments for multiple workers' projects. These payments are often in round-dollar amounts, and the IT workers often seek to limit the amount of money flowing through each account on a monthly or annual basis, or the number of transactions conducted, so as not to raise suspicions. Given that the accounts are utilized by multiple workers, payments may take place every several days or even multiple payments (from different sources) in one day.

These IT workers, many of whom lack reliable payment platforms or mechanisms, are increasingly request payment in cryptocurrency, which is much easier for them to receive and use - rather than payment via a bank or non-virtual asset on a payment platform, which the IT workers then need to move through multiple accounts to cash out or otherwise use.

In many instances, the funds generated by these DPRK IT workers are eventually transferred to, and aggregated within, accounts in a third country financial system. They are likely then effecting cash withdrawals of at least some of the funds in these accounts. These third country-based bank accounts and debit card accounts are likely the accounts of third country nationals acting as proxies, selling the use of their accounts and their identification information to the IT worker.

7) Estimates of Workers, Revenue Generated, and Expenses

The experts estimated that the DPRK has dispatched between 3,000 to 10,000 IT workers overseas. In addition to these overseas IT workers, the DPRK is also increasing the number of home-based IT workers. These workers are often assigned to DPRK cities near the border, for better internet connection. These workers often rely on their overseas counterparts to obtain jobs for them; the overseas IT workers interact with the client and maintain the relationship while the home-based IT workers conduct the actual work, passing it back to the overseas IT workers when finished. This method allows the DPRK to obtain substantially more revenue without deploying additional IT workers overseas.

Overseas IT workers on average work on several projects at the same time and earn around $3,000-$5,000 a month, although those who are highly skilled can make $10,000 to $20,000 a month.

These IT workers pay 5-30% of their income to their proxy account holders. American and Western European account holders are preferred and paid the most, since developers from these regions can charge higher hourly rates and are more likely to win bids. These IT workers also seek Russian and Eastern European proxy accounts. These IT workers also have to pay financial intermediaries to access digital payment services and/or to launder their earnings. Usually, approximately 20-30% of their revenue is paid to these intermediaries – or a fixed monthly rate of $600-$1000 per person. In many cases, a team of these IT workers employ a single intermediary to access digital payment and/or money laundering services.

On top of these expenses, they must also pay for their office space, equipment, and other living expenses. Supervisors and managers of a DPRK IT worker team also receive a share of their subordinates' revenue, as does their dispatching organization in the DPRK. In most cases, DPRK IT

workers handover funds to ‘Pyongyang’ based on their designated quota earnings requirement.

8) Additional Illicit Activities

DPRK IT workers with high coding skills have been known to take advantage of IT clients demonstrating poor security practices, by utilizing their administrator access and/or write vulnerabilities into their coding that they later exploit.

For instance, one DPRK IT worker provided IT services (including building smart contracts) to a cryptocurrency platform for several tokens. Later, the DPRK IT worker stole hundreds of thousands of U.S. dollars' worth of these tokens from the platform, enabled by vulnerabilities the IT worker wrote into the smart contracts.

In another example, a DPRK IT worker was involved with the development and deployment of various smart contracts, including for cross-chain bridges. The DPRK IT worker purported to be a citizen from the Western Hemisphere when obtaining freelance jobs with cryptocurrency platforms, possibly using his access to enable future exploitation (hacking) of the smart contracts to steal funds.

DPRK IT workers and malicious cyber actors have also worked together in limited instances to develop software programs with malicious applications - and then likely utilize the applications in efforts to spread malware and conduct additional network intrusions.

DPRK malicious cyber actors are also performing IT work, which increases the threat posted to companies by even seemingly "harmless" IT workers. These cyber actors performing IT work may be particularly likely to utilize their administrator credentials or other privileged accesses and knowledge gained through IT freelance jobs to later conduct a malicious cyber-attack on their employer – potentially including theft of IP or other data, a ransomware attack, or theft of funds.

Source: The Panel

Annex 69: Information on DPRK nationals related to Chinyong IT (subordinate to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces, (KPe.054))

Name: **Kim Sang Man** (김상만, last name : Kim)
Occupation: General Manager of Chinyong IT
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 109420132, 827220538, 563220082
DoB: 25 April 1965

Name: **Kim Ki Hyok** (김기혁, last name : Kim)
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Russian Federation
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 572420019
DoB: 30 May 1980

Name: **Jon Yon Gun** (전연근, last name : Jon)
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Lao PDR
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 927233154
DoB: 22 April 1973

Name: **Kim Song Il** (김성일, last name : Kim)
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in China
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 836438590
DoB: 2 February 1976

Source: Member State

Annex 70: Information on eight DPRK individuals related to Oh Chung Song

Name: **Kim Il Hyok** (김일혁, last name : Kim)
Occupation: IT worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 108441346
DoB: 20 September 1993

Name: **Kim Myong Chol** (김명철, last name : Kim)
Occupation: N/A
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 108132085
DoB: 14 February 1968

Name: **Jon Yon Gun** (전연근, last name : Jon)
Occupation: Representative of Chinyong IT in the Lao PDR
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 927233154
DoB: 22 April 1973

Name: **Ri Song Il** (리성일, last name : Ri)
Occupation: IT Worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 927233194
DoB: 11 January 1997

Name: **Kim Kwang Jin** (김광진, last name : Kim)
Occupation: IT Worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 109380363
DoB: 24 January 1998

Name: **Kang Tae Bok** (강대복, last name : Kang)
Occupation: IT Worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 927233182
DoB: 22 February 1997

Name: **Jang Nam Il** (장남일, last name : Jang)
Occupation: IT Worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 109380365
DoB: 7 October 1999

Name: **Jong Pong Ju** (정봉주, last name : Jong)
Occupation: IT Worker
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 9272331607
DoB: 25 January 1997

Source: Member State

Annex 71: Information on other DPRK nationals earning income in the Lao PDR

Name: **Kim Hyo Dong** (김효동, last name : Kim)
Occupation: Representative of Tongmyong Technology Trade Company
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 108130754
DoB: 28 December 1989

Name: **Yu Song Hyok** (유성혁, last name : Yu)
Occupation: Known to be operating a DPRK restaurant
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 108130754
DoB: 1 August 1981

Name: **Yun Song Il** (윤성일, last name : Yun)
Occupation: Known to be operating a DPRK restaurant
Nationality: DPRK
Passport: 927332691
DoB: 23 September 1969

Source: Member State

Annex 72: DPRK medical team in Libya

The media reported that[252] a DPRK medical team has been working at a hospital since their arrival in Libya in early January 2023. The Facebook page of Martyr Atiya Al-Kashef Teaching Hospital – Kufra posted the below content and video footage of the DPRK medical team. Information obtained by the Panel indicated that the team was transported to Kufra by charter plane operated by a Libya-based air transport company. The Panel assessed that at least ten of the DPRK medical workers in Libya had previously worked in Senegal between 2019 and 2020. Investigations continued

1) Facebook of Martyr Atiya Al-Kashef Teaching Hospital – Kufra posted the arrival of a DPRK medical team.

"Just a little while ago, an international plane carrying the Korean medical team arrived at Kufra airport, with Mr. "Ismail Al-Eidah" on board, heading to the educational Al-Shahid Atiya Al-Kashef Hospital in Kufra. The medical team consists of 38 members, including specialists in:

- *General Surgery*
- *Anesthesia*
- *Obstetrics and Gynecology*
- *Ear, Nose, and Throat*
- *Pediatrics*
- *Cardiology*
- *Orthopedics*
- *Internal Medicine*
- *Dentistry*
- *Physical Therapy*
- *12 specialized nurses.*

Thanks to the "Subul Al-Salam" battalion, where Sheikh Abdulrahman Hashem has borne the cost of renting the international company's plane that carried the doctors to Kufra. The battalion and its commander have carried a lot of burdens throughout the past period. This is a very big step towards providing better services to the people of Kufra…"

Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

[252] NK News, https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/libyan-hospital-welcomes-dozens-of-north-korean-medical-workers/?t=1688232932.

2) Images of the flight transporting the DPRK medical team (excerpt)

The Panel assessed that the pictured airplane is affiliated with a Libya-based air transport company that provided a charter/private plane to the DPRK medical team.

Source: Facebook, Flightradar 24, annotated by the Panel.



Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 10 January 2023 08:06:53 UTC.

Annex 73: Reply from Mozambique



Republic of Mozambique
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Office of the Minister

Maputo, 14 June, 2023

Honorable,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter with reference S/AC.49/2023/PE/OC.36, dated 10 April 2023, addressed to his Excellency Pedro Comissário Afonso, the Permanente Representative of the Republic of Mozambique in which the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the implementation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), share information and request assistance concerning the alleged existence of the DPRK medical workers in Mozambique.

Allow me to assure you that the Republic of Mozambique is committed to the implementations of the UN Security Council resolutions, specifically the 2397(2017) and recognize the reported determination of Mozambique to stop the employment of new DPRK doctors and cancel the existing contracts. In addition, my country is concerned with high qualified and specialized doctors to reinforce the need of the National Health Service.

In this regard, I take this opportunity to reiterate my invitation to the panel of Experts to as soon as possible visit Mozambique, in order to interact with the government and to have a field testimony regarding the implementation of the UNSC resolutions on DPRK.

Please, accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration

Verónica Nataniel Macamo Dlhovo
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

Honorable Mr.

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts Established to Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

NEW YORK

Endereço: Avenida 10 de Novembro nº 620, Tel: +258 21327020/5, Fax: +258 21327021

Source: Member State.

Annex 74: DPRK medical activities in Senegal between 2019 and 2020

According to open-source information,[253] a DPRK medical team worked at several locations in Senegal in collaboration with a non-governmental organization (NGO) between 2019 and 2020. The DPRK medical team included pediatricians, cardiologists, dentists, gynaecologists and other specialists. In a video that was posted online in 2019, the interpreter of the DPRK medical team said that she was from Mangyonbong and that the DPRK team was able to treat more than 400 people.

The NGO replied to the Panel's enquiry that a DPRK medical team composed of 30 personnel was introduced to the organization by the local DPRK Ambassador. The NGO explained that the DPRK medical team joined their events on several occasions, including religious and local events, "based on volunteering". The Panel requested Senegal provide additional information, in particular regarding any renumeration received by the DPRK medical team for their work.

On the basis of analysis of photographs of individuals in Senegal and in Libya, the Panel has concluded that some of the same DPRK medical workers arrived in Libya in early January 2023 to carry out further medical work (See annex 72).

1) DPRK medical activities at Touba in October 2019

Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

[253] NK News, https://www.nknews.org/2023/01/libyan-hospital-welcomes-dozens-of-north-korean-medical-workers/?t=1688232932.

The woman in below photo reviewed two-day long medical activities by DPRK medics (posted to Facebook on 19 October 2019). The contents of her interview (in French, English translation was done by the Panel) was as follows:

"Bonjour, je m'appelle SO, je suis l'interprète de l'agence de coopération extérieure de la RPDC (nom) en partenariat avec le [redacted]*, présidente de l'association humanitaire « Medisol International ».*
Nous sommes arrivés à Mbacké avec toute une équipe médicale, gynécologues-obstétriciens, anesthésistes, dentistes, kinésithérapeutes, chirurgiens, pédiatres, ORL. Nous avons mené des activités pendant 2 jours et nous avons pu effectuer des consultations sur plus de 400 personnes qui ont été satisfaites de nos traitements médicaux. Ce fut une très bonne expérience avec le peuple sénégalais. A cette occasion, je tiens à remercier le [redacted] *et le peuple sénégalais qui ont été très chaleureux avec nous. Nous espérons que notre coopération se développera de plus en plus à l'avenir et qu'elle sera bénéfique pour tous. Je vous remercie de votre attention."*

[Unofficial translation]

Hello, my name is… I am the interpreter of the DPRK's external cooperation agency Mangyonbong in partnership with [redacted], president of the humanitarian association "Medisol International". We arrived in Mbacké with a whole medical team, gynecologists-obstetricians, anesthesiologists, dentists, physiotherapists, surgeons, pediatricians, ENT specialists. We conducted activities for 2 days and we were able to carry out consultations on more than 400 people who were satisfied with our medical treatments. It was a very good experience with the Senegalese people. On this occasion, I would like to thank Dr. Rose Wardini and the Senegalese people who have been very warm to us. And we hope that our cooperation will develop more and more in the future and will be beneficial for everyone. Thank you.

Source: Facebook, image was annotated by the Panel.

2) DPRK medical activities at Tivaouane in November 2019

Local media[254] reported that the NGO Médisol International deployed a team of around thirty 'Korean'[255] doctors to Tivaouane.

Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

[254] See https://senego.com/tivaouane-des-coreens-en-appui-a-la-couverture-sanitaire-du-gamou_999035.html.
[255] The Panel notes previous instances in which DPRK nationals are represented or presented as "Korean," which may be a tactic to evade detection. For instance, see S/2019/171, annexes 46-47, S/2018/171, para. 111 and 199 and annex 88.

3) DPRK medical activities at Ouakam and Dakar between February and March 2020

Source: Facebook, annotated by the Panel.

Annex 75: Russian Federation

1) Summary of the Statement of the Investigative Committee of Russia of the Sakhalin Region

The statement of the Investigative Committee of Russia of the Sakhalin Region, entitled “An investigation is being conducted in Korsakov regarding an accident involving foreign citizens”, described that on 7 April 2020, at 14:50, a report was received by the Investigative Committee that two citizens of DPRK had been taken to the intensive care unit of the State Budgetary Healthcare Institution “Komsomolskaya Central District Hospital” with severe bodily injuries. It explained that they were employed by the company Detal LLC (ООО «Детал»), which was carrying out the construction work. During the course of the work, a scaffolding collapse occurred, causing the men to fall from a height of approximately 6-7 floors to the ground, resulting in injuries.

В Корсакове по факту несчастного случая, произошедшего с иностранными гражданами проводится проверка

07 апреля 2020 года в 14 часов 50 минут в Корсаковский межрайонный следственный отдел следственного управления Следственного комитета РФ по Сахалинской области поступило сообщение о том, что в реанимационное отделение ГБУЗ «Корсаковская центральная районная больница» с тяжкими телесными повреждениями поступили два гражданина Северной Кореи.

В ходе осмотра места происшествия установлено, что пострадавшие работали на строительной площадке многоэтажного дома по улице Советской в городе Корсаков в качестве разнорабочих в ООО «Детал», которое осуществляло строительные работы. В ходе работ произошло обрушение лесов, и мужчины с высоты примерно 6-7 этажа упали на землю, в результате чего получили травмы.

В настоящее время следственным отделом по данному факту проводятся проверочные мероприятия, направленные на установление причин произошедшего. По результатам проверки будет дана правовая оценка действиям должностных лиц указанной компании по ч. 1 ст. 143 УК РФ – нарушение правил техники безопасности.

07 Апреля 2020 16:03

Source : https ://sakh.sledcom.ru/news/item/1454029.

2) Statement of the Korsakov City Prosecutor's Office

According to a statement issued on 8 April 2020, the Prosecutor's Office of Korsakov City launched in investigations into the collapse of a scaffolding during the construction of a multi-apartment building, which resulted in injuries to individuals. The document stated that during the investigation, an assessment will be made concerning compliance with urban planning, labor, migration, and other legislation.



Источник:
Корсаковская городская прокуратура

Дата публикации:
8 апреля 2020, 02:00

Прокуратурой организована проверка по факту обрушения строительных лесов при строительстве многоквартирного дома, в результате чего пострадали люди

Корсаковская городская прокуратура проводит проверку по факту обрушения строительных лесов при строительстве многоквартирного дома по ул.Советской в г.Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди.

В ходе проверки будет дана оценка соблюдению градостроительного, трудового, миграционного и иного законодательства.

По результатам проверки, при наличии оснований, будут приняты меры реагирования.

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Адрес: 694020, г. Корсаков, ул. Краснофлотская, 16 (поднадзорная территория: г. Корсаков, Корсаковский район)
Телефон: Тел. 8(42435)41311; Электронная почта: korsakov@65.mailop.ru

Source : https ://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_65/search ?article=47277183.

The statement issued on 1 June 2020 explained that an investigation has been conducted by the Korsakov City Prosecutor's Office regarding the publication in the media titled "Scaffolding Collapses on Sovetskaya Street in Korsakov, Resulting in Injuries to People." The Prosecutor's Office established that in violation of labor and migration legislation, the company "Euro-Standard LLC" allowed foreign citizens to work on the construction of a multi-apartment residential building. As a result of the collapse of scaffolding on the said building, these workers suffered varying degrees of injuries…Administrative offense cases have been initiated against the responsible individuals and the legal entity under Part 1 of Article 18.15 of the Administrative Offenses Code (illegal employment of foreign citizens or stateless persons in the Russian Federation) and Part 1 of Article 5.27.1 of the Administrative Offenses Code of the Russian Federation (violation of state regulations on labor protection).



Источник:
Корсаковская городская прокуратура

Дата публикации:
1 июня 2020, 15:30

Обратная связь: приняты меры прокурорского реагирования по итогам проверки по публикации СМИ «Строительные леса обвалились на улице Советской в Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди»

Корсаковской городской прокуратурой по публикации СМИ «Строительные леса обвалились на улице Советской в Корсакове, в результате чего пострадали люди» проведена проверка.

Установлено, что в нарушение трудового и миграционного законодательства, ООО «Евро - Стандарт» допущены иностранные граждане для выполнения работ на строящемся многоквартирном жилом доме, в результате обрушения строительных лесов на котором, указанным рабочим причинен вред здоровью различной степени тяжести.

Об устранении нарушений законодательства генеральному директору предприятия внесено представление.

В отношении должностного и юридического лица возбуждены дела об административных правонарушениях, предусмотренных ч. 1 ст. 18.15 КоАП (незаконное привлечение к трудовой деятельности в РФ иностранного гражданина или лица без гражданства) и ч. 1 ст. 5.27.1 КоАП РФ (нарушение государственных нормативных требований охраны труда).

Рассмотрение актов реагирования находятся на контроле прокуратуры.

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Телефон: Тел. 8(42435)41311; Электронная почта: korsakov@65.mailop.ru

Source : https ://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_65/search ?article=36707624.

3) Russian media report (Excerpt)

According to a Russian media report titled “Investigative Committee: Workers from DPRK fell from the 6th to 7th floor at a construction site in Korsakov”, a scaffolding collapsed on April 7 at a construction site in Korsakov. According to Russian media ASTV.RU, the building is being constructed at the end of Sovetskaya Street on the site of a former parking lot.



Следственный комитет: на стройке в Корсакове рабочие из КНДР упали с 6-7 этажа

СУ СК начал проверку по факту обрушения строительных лесов

3 комментария

Строительные леса обвалились 7 апреля на новостройке в Корсакове. Дом возводят, как рассказали очевидцы ASTV.RU, в конце Советской улицы на месте бывшей автостоянки.

Во время происшествия пострадали трое рабочих. Их доставили в местную районную больницу. Два человека в тяжелом состоянии, у третьего - лёгкие травмы.

Пострадавшие рабочие - граждане КНДР.

Как сообщили в областном следственном комитете, по факту несчастного случая, произошедшего с иностранными гражданами, проводится проверка.

В ходе осмотра места происшествия установлено, что пострадавшие работали на строительной площадке многоэтажного дома по улице Советской в Корсакове в качестве разнорабочих в ООО "Детал", которое осуществляло строительные работы. В ходе работ обрушились леса, и мужчины с высоты примерно 6-7 этажа упали на землю, в результате чего получили травмы.

Следственный отдел по данному факту проводит проверку, устанавливаются причины произошедшего. По результатам проверки будет дана правовая оценка действиям должностных лиц указанной компании по ч. 1 ст. 143 УК РФ – нарушение правил техники безопасности.

Обновление информации 8 апреля в 11:17.

Как стало известно журналистам ASTV.RU, один из строителей находится в тяжелом состоянии в реанимации на аппарате ИВЛ. Другой гражданин КНДР стабилен и получил травмы средней тяжести.

Source : https ://astv.ru/news/criminal/2020-04-07-sledstvennyj-komitet-na-strojke-v-korsakove-postradali-rabochie-iz-severnoj-korei/.

4) Satellite imagery analysis

A Russian media reported (see above) that the construction site was previously used as car parking lot. The Panel's satellite imagery analysis corroborated the media's reporting and further confirmed the location as the only place where a car parking lot became the construction site of multi-storey building between 2019 and 2020. The Panel assessed that the construction of the building began between August and October 2019. This is consistent with the start of the building's construction (19 September 2019) as displayed at the construction site. Satellite imagery captured on 14 April 2020 showed the exterior of a multi-storey building, a location that match the date of the reported construction site incident of 7 April 2019.

<u>The development of the construction</u>

The poster displayed at the construction site

Construction starts on 19 September 2019 (19.09.2019 г.); Construction ends on 8 February 2021 (08.02.2021 г.).

5) The photos of the building

The photo of the building reported by the media after the incident (bottom left) is identical to Russian georeferenced information (top and bottom right) which shows the address: “Sovetskaya Street 57, Korsakov City”

Source: Yandex

Source: ACTB



Source: Yandex

6) Russian Federation's reply

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.140 сообщаем следующее.

Пострадавшие при строительстве жилого дома двое граждан КНДР проходили производственную практику в рамках обучения в ФГБОУ ВО «Сахалинский государственный университет». 7 апреля 2020 г. при погрузке керамогранитных плит на строительные леса ими были превышены нормы нагрузки на 1 шаг стоек вдоль стены в 3 метра (900 кг вместо допустимых 200 кг). Это привело к обрушению лесов, в результате чего оба северокорейца упали с высоты примерно 28 метров, получив телесные повреждения различной степени тяжести. Они были госпитализированы в Корсаковскую центральную районную больницу. По результатам проведенной проверки виновные были привлечены к административной ответственности.

Translated from Russian

In connection with enquiry OC.140 from the Panel of Experts, we are providing the information below.

The two DPRK citizens injured during the construction of a residential building were on an industrial work experience course as part of their studies at the Sakhalin State University federally-funded institution of higher education. On 7 April 2020, while lifting granite-ceramic panels onto the construction scaffolding, they exceeded the permissible load of a row of supports along a three-metre wall (900kg instead of the permitted 200kg). This led to the collapse of the scaffolding, and the two North Koreans fell from a height of approximately 28 metres, receiving various degrees of injury. They were hospitalized at the Korsakov central regional hospital. Following an investigation, those responsible were brought to administrative accountability.

Annex 76: US-ROK Joint Advisory on Ransomware (9 February 2023)



TLP:CLEAR

Cybersecurity Advisory

Defense Security Agency

#StopRansomware: Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

Summary

Note: This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and various ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories detail historically and recently observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The United States National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Republic of Korea (ROK) National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the ROK Defense Security Agency (DSA) (hereafter referred to as the "authoring agencies") are issuing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight ongoing ransomware activity against Healthcare and Public Health Sector organizations and other critical infrastructure sector entities.

This CSA provides an overview of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored ransomware and updates the July 6, 2022, joint CSA North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This advisory highlights TTPs and IOCs DPRK cyber actors used to gain access to and conduct ransomware attacks against Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations and other critical infrastructure sector entities, as well as DPRK cyber actors' use of cryptocurrency to demand ransoms.

U/OO/114471-23 | PP-23-0183 | FEB 2023 Ver. 1.2

TLP:CLEAR

The authoring agencies assess that an unspecified amount of revenue from these cryptocurrency operations supports DPRK national-level priorities and objectives, including cyber operations targeting the United States and South Korea governments—specific targets include Department of Defense Information Networks and Defense Industrial Base member networks. The IOCs in this product should be useful to sectors previously targeted by DPRK cyber operations (e.g., U.S. government, Department of Defense, and Defense Industrial Base). The authoring agencies highly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.

For additional information on state-sponsored DPRK malicious cyber activity, see CISA's North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA23-040A.stix (STIX, 197 kb).

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.

This CSA is supplementary to previous reports on malicious cyber actor activities involving DPRK ransomware campaigns—namely Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware. The authoring agencies are issuing this advisory to highlight additional observed TTPs DPRK cyber actors are using to conduct ransomware attacks targeting South Korean and U.S. healthcare systems.

Observable TTPs

The TTPs associated with DPRK ransomware attacks include those traditionally observed in ransomware operations. Additionally, these TTPs span phases from acquiring and purchasing infrastructure to concealing DPRK affiliation:

- **Acquire Infrastructure [T1583].** DPRK actors generate domains, personas, and accounts; and identify cryptocurrency services to conduct their ransomware operations. Actors procure infrastructure, IP addresses, and domains with cryptocurrency generated through illicit cybercrime, such as ransomware and cryptocurrency theft.

- **Obfuscate Identity.** DPRK actors purposely obfuscate their involvement by operating with or under third-party foreign affiliate identities and use third-party foreign intermediaries to receive ransom payments.
- **Purchase VPNs and VPSs [T1583.003].** DPRK cyber actors will also use virtual private networks (VPNs) and virtual private servers (VPSs) or third-country IP addresses to appear to be from innocuous locations instead of from DPRK.
- **Gain Access [TA0001].** Actors use various exploits of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) to gain access and escalate privileges on networks. Recently observed CVEs that actors used to gain access include remote code execution in the Apache Log4j software library (known as Log4Shell) and remote code execution in unpatched SonicWall SMA 100 appliances [T1190 and T1133]. Observed CVEs used include:
  - CVE 2021-44228
  - CVE-2021-20038
  - CVE-2022-24990

Actors also likely spread malicious code through Trojanized files for "X-Popup," an open source messenger commonly used by employees of small and medium hospitals in South Korea [T1195].

The actors spread malware by leveraging two domains: `xpopup.pe[.]kr` and `xpopup.com`. `xpopup.pe[.]kr` is registered to IP address `115.68.95[.]128` and `xpopup[.]com` is registered to IP address `119.205.197[.]111`. Related file names and hashes are listed in table 1.

Table 1: Malicious file names and hashes spread by xpopup domains

File Name	MD5 Hash
xpopup.rar	1f239db751ce9a374eb9f908c74a31c9
X-PopUp.exe	6fb13b1b4b42bac05a2ba629f04e3d03
X-PopUp.exe	cf8ba073db7f4023af2b13dd75565f3d
xpopup.exe	4e71d52fc39f89204a734b19db1330d3
x-PopUp.exe	43d4994635f72852f719abb604c4a8a1
xpopup.exe	5ae71e8440bf33b46554ce7a7f3de666

- **Move Laterally and Discovery [TA0007, TA0008].** After initial access, DPRK cyber actors use staged payloads with customized malware to perform reconnaissance activities, upload and download additional files and executables, and execute shell commands [T1083, T1021]. The staged malware is also responsible for collecting victim information and sending it to the remote host controlled by the actors [TA0010].

- **Employ Various Ransomware Tools [TA0040].** Actors have used privately developed ransomware, such as Maui and H0lyGh0st [T1486]. Actors have also been observed using or possessing publically available tools for encryption, such as BitLocker, Deadbolt, ech0raix, GonnaCry, Hidden Tear, Jigsaw, LockBit 2.0, My Little Ransomware, NxRansomware, Ryuk, and YourRansom [T1486]. In some cases, DPRK actors have portrayed themselves as other ransomware groups, such as the REvil ransomware group. For IOCs associated with Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware usage, please see Appendix B.

- **Demand Ransom in Cryptocurrency.** DPRK cyber actors have been observed setting ransoms in bitcoin [T1486]. Actors are known to communicate with victims via Proton Mail email accounts. For private companies in the healthcare sector, actors may threaten to expose a company's proprietary data to competitors if ransoms are not paid. Bitcoin wallet addresses possibly used by DPRK cyber actors include:

    - 1MTHBCrBKYEthfa16zo9kabt4f9jMJz8Rm
    - bc1q80vc4yjgg6umedkut3e9mhehxl4q4dcjjyzh59
    - 1J8spy62o7z2AjQxoUpiCGnBh5cRWKVWJC
    - 16ENLdHbnmDcEV8iqN4vuyZHa7sSdYRh76
    - bc1q3wzxvu8yhs8h7mlkmf7277wyklkah9k4sm9anu
    - bc1q8xyt4jxhw7mgqpwd6qfdjyxgvjeuz57jxrvgk9
    - 1NqihEqYaQaWiZkPVdSMiTbt7dTy1LMxgX
    - bc1qxrpevck3pq1yzrx2pq2rkvkvy0jnm56nzjv6pw
    - 14hVKm7Ft2rxDBFTNkkRC3kGstMGp2A4hk
    - 1KCwfCUgnSy3pzNX7U1i5NwFzRtth4bRBc
    - 16sYqXancDDiijcuruZecCkdBDwDf4vSEC
    - 1N6JphHFaYmYaokS5xH31Z67bvk4ykd9CP
    - LZ1VNJfn6mWjPzkCyoBvqWaBZYXAwn135

- 1KmWW6LgdgykBBrSXrFu9kdoHz95Fe9kQF
- 1FX4W9rrG4F3Uc7gJ18GCwGab8XuW8Ajy2
- bc1qlqgu2l2kms5338zuc95kxavctzyy0v705tpvyc
- bc1qy6su7vrh7ts5ng2628escmhr98msmzg62ez2sp
- bc1q8t69gpxsezdcr8w6tfzp3jeptq4tcp2g9d0mwy
- bc1q9h7yj79sqm4t536q0fdn7n4y2atsvvl22m28ep
- bc1qj6y72rk039mqpgtcy7mwjd3eum6cx6027ndgmd
- bc1qcp557vltuu3qc6pk3ld0ayagrxuf2thp3pjzpe
- bc1ql8wsflrjf9zlusauynzjm83mupq6c9jz9vnqxg
- bc1qx60ec3nfd5yhsyyxkzkpts54w970yxj84zrdck
- bc1qunqnjdlvqkjuhtclfp8kzkjpvdz9qnk898xczp
- bc1q6024d73h48fnhwswhwt3hqz2lzw6x99q0nulm4
- bc1qwdvexlyvg3mqvqw7g6l09qup0qew80wjj9jh7x
- bc1qavrtge4p7dmcrnvhlvuhaarx8rek76wxyk7dgg
- bc1qagaayd57vr25dlqgk7f00nhz9qepqgnlnt4upu
- bc1quvnaxnpqlzq3mdhfddh35j7e7ufxh3gpc56hca
- bc1qu0pvfmtxawm8s99lcjvxapungtsmkvwyvak6cs
- bc1qg3zlxxhhcvt6hkuhmqml8y9pas76cajcu9ltdl
- bc1qn7a3g23nzpuytchyyteyhkcse84cnylznl3j32
- bc1qhfmqstxp3yp9muvuz29wk77vjtdyrkff4nrxpu
- bc1qnh8scrvuqvlzmzgw7eesyrmtes9c5m78duetf3
- bc1q7qry3lsrphmnw3exs7tkwzpvzjcxs942aq8n0y
- bc1qcmlcxfsy0zlqhh72jvvc4rh7hvwhx6scp27na0
- bc1q498fn0gauj2kkjsg35mlwk2cnxhaqlj7hkh8xy
- bc1qnz4udqkumjghnm2a3zt0w3ep8fwdcyv3krr3jq
- bc1qk0saaw7p0wrwla6u7tfjlxrutlgrwnudzx9tyw
- bc1qyue2pgjk09ps7qvfs559k8kee3jkcw4p4vdp57
- bc1q6qfkt06xmrpclht3acmq00p7zyy0ejydu89zwv
- bc1qmge6a7sp659exnx78zhm9zgrw88n6un0rl9trs
- bc1qcywkd7zqlwmjy36c46dpf8cq6ts6wgkjx0u7cn

Mitigations

Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. For more

information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections, see cisa.gov/cpg.

The authoring agencies urge HPH organizations to:

- Limit access to data by authenticating and encrypting connections (e.g., using public key infrastructure certificates in virtual private network (VPN) and transport layer security (TLS) connections) with network services, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system [CPG 3.3].
- Implement the principle of least privilege by using standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts [CPG 1.5], which grant excessive system administration privileges.
- Turn off weak or unnecessary network device management interfaces, such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.
- Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when displayed and rendering it unreadable when stored—through cryptography, for example.
- Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for personally identifiable information (PII)/protected health information (PHI), per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures could prevent the introduction of malware to the system [CPG 3.4].
    - Secure PII/ PHI at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit using technologies, such as TLS. Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available.
    - Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI.
- Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer [CPG 8.1].
- Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise [CPG 3.1].

In addition, the authoring agencies urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for and mitigate ransomware incidents:

- **Maintain isolated backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration** [CPG 7.3]. These practices safeguard an organization's continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses.
    - Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization's data infrastructure.
- **Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan** that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident [CPG 7.1, 7.2].
    - Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include data breach incidents response and notification procedures. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable laws.
    - See the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide and CISA Fact Sheet Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches.
- **Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released** [CPG 5.1]. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
- **If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely** [CPG 5.4].
    - Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse [CPG 1.3]. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate

and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports [CPG 1.1, 3.1].

- Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols not in use for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol port 3389).
- Restrict the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
- Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity [CPG 5.6, 6.2].
- Implement application control policies that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs [CPG 2.1].
- Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.

- **Implement a user training program and phishing exercises** [CPG 4.3] to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
- **Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible** [CPG 1.3]—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- **Use strong passwords** [CPG 1.4] and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information.
- **Require administrator credentials to install software** [CPG 1.5].
- **Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges** [CPG 1.5] and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.

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- **Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts**.
- **Only use secure networks**. Consider installing and using a VPN.
- **Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations** [CPG 8.3] indicating that they are higher risk messages.
- **Consider participating in CISA's no-cost Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS)** program to receive real-time exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and defensive measures.

If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:

- Follow your organization's ransomware response checklist.
- Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.
- **U.S. organizations**: Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. Report incidents to appropriate authorities; in the U.S., this would include the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.
- **South Korean organizations:** Please report incidents to NIS, KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency), and KNPA (Korean National Police Agency).
  - NIS (National Intelligence Service)
    - Telephone : 111
    - https://www.nis.go.kr
  - KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency)
    - Telephone : 118 (Consult Service)
    - https://www.boho.or.kr/consult/ransomware.do
  - KNPA (Korean National Police Agency)
    - Electronic Cybercrime Report & Management System: https://ecrm.police.go.kr/minwon/main
- Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Resources

Stairwell provided a YARA rule to identify Maui ransomware, and a Proof of Concept public RSA key extractor at the following link:

https://www.stairwell.com/news/threat-research-report-maui-ransomware/

Request For Information

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, bitcoin wallet information, the decryptor file, and/or benign samples of encrypted files. As stated above, the authoring agencies discourage paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered and may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, the agencies understand that when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees, and customers.

Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay a ransom, the authoring agencies urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents using the contact information above.

Acknowledgements

NSA, FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank ROK NIS and DSA for their contributions to this CSA.

Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Trademark recognition

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. Apache®, Sonicwall, and Apache Log4j are trademarks of Apache Software Foundation. TerraMaster Operating System is a registered trademark of Octagon Systems.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authors' cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.


Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities
Contact
NSA Client Requirements / General Cybersecurity Inquiries: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov
Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov
To report incidents and anomalous activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact CISA's 24/7 Operations Center at Report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870 or your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
Media Inquiries / Press Desk:
NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov
CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov
U/OO/114471-23 | PP-23-0183 | FEB 2023 Ver. 1.2
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Appendix A: CVE Details

CVE-2021-44228	CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.	
Recommended Mitigations Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates.	
Detection Methods See vendors' Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability.	
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, please check https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228.	
See https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 for more information.	

CVE-2021-20038	CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)

Vulnerability Description

A Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in SMA100 Apache httpd server's mod_cgi module environment variables allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to potentially execute code as a 'nobody' user in the appliance. This vulnerability affected SMA 200, 210, 400, 410 and 500v appliances firmware 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv and earlier versions.

Recommended Mitigations

Apply all appropriate vendor updates

Upgrade to:

- SMA 100 Series - (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v (ESX, Hyper-V, KVM, AWS, Azure):
  - SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.0.9-41sv or later
  - SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.1.3-27sv or later

System administrators should refer to the SonicWall Security Advisories in the reference section to determine affected applications/systems and appropriate fix actions.

Support for 9.0.0 firmware ended on 10/31/2021. Customers still using that firmware are requested to upgrade to the latest 10.2.x versions.

Vulnerable Technologies and Versions

Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv
Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv
Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv
Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv
Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv
Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv
Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv
Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv
Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv
Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv
Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv
Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv
Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv
Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv
Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

See https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038 for more information.

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CVE-2022-24990	CVSS 3.x: N/A
Vulnerability Description	
The TerraMaster OS Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via PHP Object Instantiation Vulnerability is characterized by scanning activity targeting a flaw in the script enabling a remote adversary to execute commands on the target endpoint. The vulnerability is created by improper input validation of the webNasIPS component in the api.php script and resides on the TNAS device appliances' operating system where users manage storage, backup data, and configure applications. By exploiting the script flaw a remote unauthenticated attacker can pass specially crafted data to the application and execute arbitrary commands on the target system. This may result in complete compromise of the target system, including the exfiltration of information. TNAS devices can be chained to acquire unauthenticated remote code execution with highest privileges.	
Recommended Mitigations	
Install relevant vendor patches. This vulnerability was patched in TOS version 4.2.30	
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions	
TOS v 4.2.29	
See https://octagon.net/blog/2022/03/07/cve-2022-24990-terrmaster-tos-unauthenticated-remote-command-execution-via-php-object-instantiation/ and https://forum.terra-master.com/en/viewtopic.php?t=3030 for more information.	

Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The IOC section includes hashes and IP addresses for the Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware variants—as well as custom malware implants assumedly developed by DPRK cyber actors, such as remote access trojans (RATs), loaders, and other tools—that enable subsequent deployment of ransomware. For additional Maui IOCs, see joint CSA North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.

Table 2 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with malware implants, RATs, and other tools used by DPRK cyber actors, including tools that drop Maui ransomware files.

Table 2: File names and hashes of malicious implants, RATs, and tools

MD5Hash	SHA256Hash
079b4588eaa99a1e802adf5e0b26d8aa	f67ee77d6129bd1bcd5d856c0fc5314169 b946d32b8abaa4e680bb98130b38e7
0e9e256d8173854a7bc26982b1dde783	--
12c15a477e1a96120c09a860c9d479b3	6263e421e397db821669420489d2d3084 f408671524fd4e1e23165a16dda2225
131fc4375971af391b459de33f81c253	--
17c46ed7b80c2e4dbea6d0e88ea0827c	b9af4660da00c7fa975910d0a19fda0720 31c15fad1eef935a609842c51b7f7d
1875f6a68f70bee316c8a6eda9ebf8de	672ec8899b8ee513dbfc4590440a61023 846ddc2ca94c88ae637144305c497e7
1a74c8d8b74ca2411c1d3d22373a6769	ba8f9e7afe5f78494c111971c39a89111ef 9262bf23e8a764c6f65c818837a44
1f6d9f8fbdbbd4e6ed8cd73b9e95a928	4f089afa51fd0c1b2a39cc11cedb3a4a32 6111837a5408379384be6fe846e016
2d02f5499d35a8dffb4c8bc0b7fec5c2	830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba23 21b866428aa04360376e6a390063570
2e18350194e59bc6a2a3f6d59da11bd8	655aa64860f1655081489cf85b77f72a49 de846a99dd122093db4018434b83ae
3bd22e0ac965ebb6a18bb71ba39e96dc	6b7f566889b80d1dba4f92d5e2fb2f5ef24 f57fcfd56bb594978dffe9edbb9eb
40f21743f9cb927b2c84ecdb7dfb14a6	5081f54761947bc9ce4aa2a259a0bd60b 4ec03d32605f8e3635c4d4edaf48894
4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346	5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd76 9dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e

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43e756d80225bdf1200bc34eef5adca8	afb2d4d88f59e528f0e388705113ae54b7 b97db4f03a35ae43cc386a48f263a0
47791bf9e017e3001ddc68a7351ca2d6	863b707873f7d653911e46885e261380b 410bb3bf6b158daefb47562e93cb657
505262547f8879249794fc31eea41fc6	f32f6b229913d68daad937cc72a57aa452 91a9d623109ed48938815aa7b6005c
5130888a0ad3d64ad33c65de696d3fa2	c92c1f3e77a1876086ce530e87aa9c1f9c bc5e93c5e755b29cad10a2f3991435
58ad3103295afcc22bde8d81e77c282f	18b75949e03f8dcad513426f1f9f3ca209d 779c24cd4e941d935633b1bec00cb
5be1e382cd9730fbe386b69bd8045ee7	5ad106e333de056eac78403b033b89c58 b4c4bdda12e2f774625d47ccfd3d3ae
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640e70b0230dc026eff922fb1e44c2ea	6319102bac226dfc117c3c9e620cd99c7e afbf3874832f2ce085850aa042f19c
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70652edadedbacfd30d33a826853467d	196fb1b6eff4e7a049cea323459cfd6c0e3 900d8d69e1d80bffbaabd24c06eba
739812e2ae1327a94e441719b885bd19	6122c94cbfa11311bea7129ecd5aea6fae 6c51d23228f7378b5f6b2398728f67
76c3d2092737d964dfd627f1ced0af80	bffe910904efd1f69544daa9b72f2a70fb29 f73c51070bde4ea563de862ce4b1
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827103a6b6185191fd5618b7e82da292	--
830bc975a04ab0f62bfedf27f7aca673	--
85995257ac07ae5a6b4a86758a2283d7	--
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891db50188a90ddacfaf7567d2d0355d	0837dd54268c373069fc5c1628c6e3d75e b99c3b3efc94c45b73e2cf9a6f3207
894de380a249e677be2acb8fbdfba2ef	--
8b395cc6ecdec0900facf6e93ec48fbb	--



92a6c017830cda80133bf97eb77d3292	d1aba3f95f11fc6e5fec7694d188919555b7ff097500e811ff4a5319f8f230be
9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1	45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78
9b9d4cb1f681f19417e541178d8c75d7	f5f6e538001803b0aa008422caf2c3c2a79b2eeee9ddc7feda710e4aba96fea4
a1f9e9f5061313325a275d448d4ddd59	dfdd72c9ce1212f9d9455e2bca5a327c88d2d424ea5c086725897c83afc3d42d
a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3	99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f
a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358	3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878
ad4eababfe125110299e5a24be84472e	a557a0c67b5baa7cf64bd4d42103d3b2852f67acf96b4c5f14992c1289b55eaa
b1c1d28dc7da1d58abab73fa98f60a83	38491f48d0cbaab7305b5ddca64ba41a2beb89d81d5fb920e67d0c7334c89131
b6f91a965b8404d1a276e43e61319931	--
bdece9758bf34fcad9cba1394519019b	9d6de05f9a3e62044ad9ae66111308ccb9ed2ee46a3ea37d85afa92e314e7127
c3850f4cc12717c2b54753f8ca5d5e0e	99b448e91669b92c2cc3417a4d9711209509274dab5d7582baacfab5028a818c
c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a	458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456
cf236bf5b41d26967b1ce04ebbdb4041	60425a4d5ee04c8ae09bfe28ca33bf9e76a43f69548b2704956d0875a0f25145
d0e203e8845bf282475a8f816340f2e8	f6375c5276d1178a2a0fe1a16c5668ce523e2f846c073bf75bb2558fdec06531
ddb1f970371fa32faae61fc5b8423d4b	dda53eee2c5cb0abdbf5242f5e82f4de83898b6a9dd8aa935c2be29bafc9a469
f2f787868a3064407d79173ac5fc0864	92adc5ea29491d9245876ba0b2957393633c9998eb47b3ae1344c13a44cd59ae
fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b	56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19
--	0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80b430e170d6e7c22fcf75261e9a3a71
--	151ab3e05a23e9ccd03a6c49830dabb9e9281faf279c31ae40b13e6971dd2fb8
--	1c926fb3bd99f4a586ed476e4683163892f3958581bf8c24235cd2a415513b7f

--	1f8dcfaebbcd7e71c2872e0ba2fc6db81d651cf654a21d33c78eae6662e62392
--	f226086b5959eb96bd30dec0ffcbf0f09186cd11721507f416f1c39901addafb
--	23eff00dde0ee27dabad28c1f4ffb8b09e876f1e1a77c1e6fb735ab517d79b76
--	586f30907c3849c363145bfdcdabe3e2e4688cbd5688ff968e984b201b474730
--	8ce219552e235dcaf1c694be122d6339ed4ff8df70bf358cd165e6eb487ccfc5
--	90fb0cd574155fd8667d20f97ac464eca67bdb6a8ee64184159362d45d79b6a4
--	c2904dc8bbb569536c742fca0c51a766e836d0da8fac1c1abd99744e9b50164f
--	ca932ccaa30955f2fffb1122234fb1524f7de3a8e0044de1ed4fe05cab8702a5
--	f6827dc5af661fbb4bf64bc625c78283ef836c6985bb2bfb836bd0c8d5397332
--	f78cabf7a0e7ed3ef2d1c976c1486281f56a6503354b87219b466f2f7a0b65c4

Table 3 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes are associated with Maui Ransomware files.

Table 3: File names and hashes of Maui ransomware files

MD5 Hash	SHA256 Hash
4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346	5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e
9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1	45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78
fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b	56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19
2d02f5499d35a8dffb4c8bc0b7fec5c2	830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba2321b866428aa04360376e6a390063570
c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a	458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456
a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3	99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f



TLP:CLEAR

Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358	3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6 d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878
802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb	87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562e c4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6
--	0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80b 430e170d6e7c22fcf75261e9a3a71

Table 4 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with H0lyGh0st Ransomware files.

Table 4: File names and hashes of H0lyGh0st ransomware files

SHA256 Hash
99fc54786a72f32fd44c7391c2171ca31e72ca52725c68e2dde94d04c286fccd*
F8fc2445a9814ca8cf48a979bff7f182d6538f4d1ff438cf259268e8b4b76f86*
Bea866b327a2dc2aa104b7ad7307008919c06620771ec3715a059e675d9f40af*
6e20b73a6057f8ff75c49e1b7aef08abfcfe4e418e2c1307791036f081335c2d
f4d10b08d7dacd8fe33a6b54a0416eecdaed92c69c933c4a5d3700b8f5100fad
541825cb652606c2ea12fd25a842a8b3456d025841c3a7f563655ef77bb67219
2d978df8df0cf33830aba16c6322198e5889c67d49b40b1cb1eb236bd366826d
414ed95d14964477bebf86dced0306714c497cde14dede67b0c1425ce451d3d7
Df0c7bb88e3c67d849d78d13cee30671b39b300e0cda5550280350775d5762d8
MD5 Hash
a2c2099d503fcc29478205f5aef0283b
9c516e5b95a7e4169ecbd133ed4d205f
d6a7b5db62bf7815a10a17cdf7ddbd4b
c6949a99c60ef29d20ac8a9a3fb58ce5
4b20641c759ed563757cdd95c651ee53
25ee4001eb4e91f7ea0bc5d07f2a9744
18126be163eb7df2194bb902c359ba8e
eaf6896b361121b2c315a35be837576d
e4ee611533a28648a350f2dab85bb72a
e268cb7ab778564e88d757db4152b9fa

* From Microsoft blog post on h0lygh0st

U/OO/114471-23 | PP-23-0183 | FEB 2023 Ver. 1.2

TLP:CLEAR

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Source : https://media.defense.gov/2023/Feb/09/2003159161/-1/-1/0/CSA_Ransomware_Attacks_on_CI_Fund_DPRK_Activities_v1.2.PDF

Annex 77: 2 June 2023 updates to the 1718 Committee's "*Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7: Guidelines for Obtaining Exemptions to Deliver Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK*," originally issued on 6 August 2018

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) believes that the following information may be useful to Member States in carrying out their obligations contained in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017). The Security Council has repeatedly affirmed that the measures imposed by the abovementioned resolutions are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by these resolutions. Furthermore, many of the measures found in these resolutions contain explicit humanitarian exemptions that include, in some cases, the need to obtain an explicit exemption from the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis.

Nevertheless, in order to create a comprehensive humanitarian exemption mechanism, paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017) reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK, stresses the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK, and decides that the Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the Committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK, or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions.

The Committee recalls that paragraph 6 of resolution 2664 (2022) directs it to assist Member States in properly understanding and fully implementing paragraph 1 of resolution 2664 (2022) by issuing Implementation Assistance Notices. To that end, the Committee notes that paragraph 1 of resolution 2664 (2022) created an exception to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006),[1] which was subsequently expanded by paragraph 27 of resolution 2094

[1] At the time of the publication of this update, the Council has designated individuals and entities for the asset freeze in paragraph 5(a) of resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 8 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 10 of resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 3 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 3 of resolution 2356 (2017), paragraph 3 of resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 3 of resolution 2375 (2017), and paragraph 3 of resolution 2397 (2017). The Committee has

(2013) and paragraph 32 of resolution 2270 (2016) and clarified by paragraph 12 of resolution 2270 (2016), to permit "the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets, or economic resources, or the provision of goods and services necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs" by certain organizations.[2] Accordingly, consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 2664 (2022), a case-by-case Committee exemption is not required with respect to the asset freeze described above for activities permitted by resolution 2664 (2022).

Because the exception set forth in paragraphs 1 and 4 of resolution 2664 (2022) applies only to the asset freeze, a case-by-case Committee exemption is required to engage in activity prohibited by any other measure imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) or 2397 (2017), including but not limited to sectoral measures. The Committee also notes that paragraph 6 of resolution 2664 (2022) directs the Committee, assisted by its Panel of Experts, to monitor the implementation of paragraph 1 of the resolution, including any risk of diversion. The Committee therefore encourages that Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out humanitarian assistance and relief activities for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK to provide the Committee and its Panel of Experts with any information relevant to the risk of diversion.

As such, the Committee offers the following recommendations for Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK.

Format of Exemption Requests

The Committee recommends that Member States and international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and requiring a 1718 Committee exemption, submit requests for exemptions in a letter containing the following elements:

- Nature of humanitarian assistance proposed to be provided to the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK;
- Explanation of the DPRK recipients and criteria employed to select beneficiaries;
- Reasons for requiring a Committee exemption;

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also designated individuals and entities for the asset freeze under the authority granted to it by the Council in paragraph 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006).

[2] The United Nations, including its Programmes, Funds and Other Entities and Bodies, as well as its Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, international organizations, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organizations, or bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals, or OCHA-coordinated humanitarian "clusters," or their employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities, or by appropriate others as added by any individual Committees established by this Council within and with respect to their respective mandates.

- Detailed description with quantities and relevant specifications (including, to the extent possible, make, model and manufacturer) of the goods and services to be provided within the exemption period to the DPRK for what purpose and to whom;
- Planned date(s) of proposed transfer to the DPRK within the exemption period;
- Planned route(s) and method(s) of transfer including ports of departure and entry to be used for shipments;
- All parties involved in the transfers, including DPRK entities, whether receiving authorization or providing support, that can be identified at the time of submission of the application;
- Financial transactions associated with the transfers;
- Annex containing itemized list of all planned transfers of goods and services with quantities, approximate value of goods and services in U.S. dollars or local currency, planned shipment date; and
- Measures to ensure that assistance to be provided to the DPRK are used for the intended purposes, such as a monitoring plan, and not diverted for prohibited purposes.

The Committee recommends that Member States and international or non-governmental organizations obtaining humanitarian exemptions should do their utmost to consolidate all planned shipments into three shipments or less every nine months, per project, to the best extent practicable. If an applicant who has received a Committee exemption needs to make necessary and well-justified changes to items planned for transfer to the DPRK (such as exact specifications and quantities) and/or the method and parties involved in the transactions (such as the final shipping and delivery plan) , the applicant must promptly provide the Committee with all changes needed for review through a follow-up exemption letter. The Committee would then review all the changes requested and make appropriate adjustments to the exemption it provided, where necessary.

If an applicant is unable or in any other way not in a position to provide the above information, the Committee recommends submitting the reason the information is missing and a plan to update the Committee as the details become available. If applicants face any challenges during the process, the Committee recommends they consult its Member State, the Committee Chair, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK. For applicants' convenience and optional use, please find a blank application and annex template for organization's applications on the 1718 Committee website.

Routing of Exemption Requests from International and Non-Governmental Organizations to the 1718 Committee

There are three ways international or non-governmental organizations can seek exemptions from the Committee as outlined below. However, United Nations agencies, ICRC, IFRC, IOC, or an organization that has received two or more exemptions during 18 months preceding the date of the new application, or the exemption request is in regards to providing urgent emergency humanitarian assistance to the DPRK people, such as aid to fight against pandemic outbreaks, like COVID-19, or aid to respond to a natural disaster, can submit exemption requests directly to

the Committee via the Committee Secretary, in accordance with relevant national authorities and organization by laws:

1. **Member States**: Because the resolution imposes obligations on Member States, it is Member States that should submit exemption requests to the Committee on behalf of international or non-governmental organizations seeking to deliver humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. Member States can be contacted domestically or through their Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York. The contact information for Member States' Permanent Missions is available at https://bluebook.unmeetings.org/.
    - The Committee recommends that Member States explain to applicants how their application will be routed to the Committee (for example, if the application needs to be reviewed first by national authorities before being submitted to the Committee) and how much time the Member State will need to submit the application to the Committee. The Committee further recommends that the Member States update applicants frequently on the status of their application.

2. **United Nations**: If a Member State is unable or in any other way not in a position to route such a request to the Committee, the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK may serve as a liaison for the international or non-governmental organization to send exemption requests to the Committee and provide guidance to the organizations. The Resident Coordinator can be contacted at rco.kp@one.un.org.

3. **Committee Secretary**: If both Member States and the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the DPRK are unable or in any other way not in a position to submit exemption requests to the Committee on behalf of an international or non-governmental organization or fit the criteria above, the international or non-government organization may submit an exemption request directly to the Committee Secretary at sc-1718-committee@un.org. The Committee Secretary will forward exemption requests to the Committee when they meet the following criteria:
    - The requesting entity is an international or non-governmental organization with a track record of having delivered aid to the DPRK or other countries in the past and/or the non-governmental organization is nationally recognized by the relevant Member State(s);
    - The nature of assistance planned to be provided to the DPRK is for humanitarian purposes and benefits the civilian population of the DPRK;
    - The exemption request addresses the informational requirements outlined above.

Committee Approval Process

Due to the time-sensitive nature of humanitarian assistance, the Committee will endeavor to process exemption requests as quickly as possible to provide decisions within a reasonable timeframe in accordance with the Committee Guidelines. Exemptions will be granted for a period of nine months from the date of the letter by which the Committee has granted the exemption, unless the applicant specifically requests otherwise and provides a well-founded

justification, such as transportation delays related to a pandemic, for the Committee to consider. If the party that received an exemption is unable to complete the project within the exemption timeframe, the Committee recommends that the party submit an extension request with an explanation, at least ten business days before the expiration date of the exemption. The Committee will review extension requests, updated exemption requests, and urgent emergency humanitarian assistance requests, such as those aimed at responding to pandemic outbreaks, like COVID-19, or natural disasters on an expedited timeframe.

Committee Exemption Approval Letter

After the Committee has reviewed the exemption request, it will issue a response letter with its decision. If the Committee approves the request, it will issue a letter to the requesting party that explains specifically what the Committee approves for transfer to the DPRK. An annex with an approved list of goods and services by quantity and planned shipment date will be appended to the Committee approval letter. The Committee approval letter and its annex will be published on the 1718 Committee website upon issuance for the public for the exemption period. The approval letter will be translated to all UN languages and the applicant may share it with relevant parties. If there is a need for the annex to be translated, for example, to help with procurement, customs, or financial transactions, the applicant should include a translated version in its initial application to be posted online once approved. Publication of the exemption allows relevant national authorities involved in reviewing the exempted transfers to the DPRK, and financial institutions and suppliers working with the applicant to quickly and independently verify the exemption.[3]

Best Practices

The Committee believes international and non-governmental organizations planning to carry out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK may benefit from reviewing previously approved exemption applications. If a party is willing to make its approved exemption request, or a portion of its exemption request, available for review for the above purpose, or to provide guidance to a prospective party, the Committee requests this information be included in the application. If a party opts in, the Committee Secretary, UN Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, or relevant Member State, will share the authorized information to prospective international and non-governmental organizations requesting support. Participating in this best practice process will not impact an applicant's application. Additionally, the Committee Secretary will collate relevant anonymized information for the sake of holding a repository of generalized best practices.

[3] If applicants require portions of their annex to be kept confidential and not posted online, the applicant should indicate this in their application and submit both a full annex for the Committee's review and a redacted annex to be posted online, if approved. If an applicant requires anonymity, an approval letter indicating only the applicant's Member State, type of project, and a short description of the work will be posted online. Applicants requesting redacted annexes or anonymity should note that third parties may not be able to independently verify any portions of their application that are not posted online, and lack of verification might impact certain processes of aid procurement and delivery.



Banking Channel

The Committee is fully aware of the urgent need for establishing a stable and risk-free banking channel for humanitarian purposes and is actively seized in the process to create one.

Limitations of 1718 Committee Exemptions

The Committee reminds all international and non-governmental organizations that receiving exemptions from the Committee for United Nations sanctions does not exempt those organizations and their proposed transactions from the relevant domestic regulations and licensing requirements of Member States involved in those transactions. All international or non-governmental organizations requesting exemptions from the Committee must also fully observe relevant regulatory and licensing requirements of Member States that have jurisdiction over all aspects of the proposed transactions and involved parties, such as submitting a translated version of the annex of the Committee exemption approval letter to the customs authority in countries where English is not an official language and adhering to cash carry limitations.

* * *

Source: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/ian7_updated_2jun23.pdf; highlight annotations by the Panel

Annex 78: Questionnaire for humanitarian organizations that have worked in the DPRK

For this reporting period the Panel asked some reformulated questions addressing the impact of COVID-19 and the closed borders on organizational operations, as well as each group's estimate of when they expect to resume operations in DPRK.

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

Annex 79: Responses from humanitarian organizations

The Panel has redacted humanitarian organizations' identities and other phrases which might jeopardize the safety of the relevant organizations and in a few cases on other grounds. The Panel takes no position on the responses provided by these organizations.[256]

Organization 1

[Org.1] has suspended its activities in DPRK since 2020 and therefore no new developments have occurred which might provide information for the panel. We intend to resume our activities as soon as possible, depending on the opening of border and adequate working conditions in DPRK to be able to implement humanitarian projects.

[256] Two experts are of the view NGOs submissions should be verified and edited before publication.

Organization 2

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

The effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in DPRK, from [Org. 2]'s perspective, are the following:

- Banking and cash supply issue:

  The transfer of funds to DPRK being banned, [Org. 2] has to rely on its international staff who are the only option to bring funds to the country during their rotations into the country.

  Even though this alternative solution has so far allowed [Org. 2] to keep on working and implementing projects in DPRK, until the border closed in January 2020, this cash supply modality provokes vulnerabilities in [Org. 2]'s operations. First of all, [Org. 2's national] banks are more and more reluctant to supply sufficient amounts of cash, particularly if the cash supply is intended for projects in DPRK. Despite the exemptions that are granted to the funds dedicated humanitarian operations, it is common that banks delay or block the supply of cash, leading to additional administrative work on [Org. 2] side to unblock the situation.

- Procurement and supply:

  Since the sanctions have come to force, a drop in the number of suppliers applying for the tenders [Org. 2] open in the frame of the procurement of goods and equipment. This decrease in the potential supplier diversity has a direct impact on prices competitively, goods and equipment quality.

- Delay of delivery:

  This impact is one of the most visible, considering that it directly impacts the implementation of the projects' activities. As mentioned previously, the exemption process is now well understood and managed but can still provoke delays in case of unexpected administrative issue (e.g.: [Member State's] customs that sometimes refuse to recognize the exemptions granted to [Org. 2] –calling for additional negotiations).

  Even though the COVID 19 related restrictions on importations decided by DPRK are responsible for this situation, it has to be mentioned that [Org. 2] had materials and equipment ([project items]) blocked at the border since January 2020. Recently, in [Month] 2023, [Org. 2] had to close the project under which this purchase was planned, as the importation of these blocked materials has not been possible from January 2020 until [present].

- Additional workload:

  The sanctions and needs for exemptions provoke an additional workload for [Org. 2] teams who have to deal with additional constraints, prepare and follows the exemptions requests.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

The strict measures and limitations that [Org. 2] has been facing regarding the COVID 19 have significantly reduced the organization's capacity to monitor the impacts of the restrictions at a local and national level.

The last [Org. 2]'s expatriate staff left the country in [Month] 2020 considering the total suspension of the activities and the complete lack of visibility regarding a potential restart of [Org. 2] operations in the country, as well as the possibility to send personnel, funds and equipment needed to properly run the projects.

Despite its reduced capacity on the ground, [Org. 2] has kept on monitoring the situation prevailing in DPRK through external sources, a bilateral meeting with representants of the DPRK delegation at Paris level, through its liaison officer who remains active in the country and by participating to the UN-led meetings (clusters and HCT).

The access and communication barriers imposed by the COVID 19 situation as well as the lack of secondary data from other sources make impossible for [Org. 2] to propose an analysis of the humanitarian situation evolution in regards with the current pandemic and borders closure.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

[Org. 2]'s operational capacity has been decreasing from the moment DPRK decided to impose strict quarantine measures in January 2020. However, [Org. 2] did its best to comply with the decreed measures to continue its operations in the country.

As [Org. 2] program activities can only be implemented if an international staff member can physically visit the field sites, all programs were suspended from January 2020. Indeed, from February 2020, the situation at country level was the following:

- No international flights and no entry visa issuance (making impossible the supply of cash and the rotation of international staff)
- Strict limitation of humanitarian equipment and material imports
- No access to the field for expatriate teams

These additional restrictions made impossible for [Org. 2] to keep implementing its projects within acceptable quality and integrity standards, forcing the organization to suspend all its activities.

Despite the suspension of all the activities, [Org. 2] decided to maintain its Pyongyang office opened to avoid losing its capacities to redeploy and relaunch its projects once it is possible again.

Considering the impossibility to send cash to DPRK in the absence of international staff movement, [Org. 2] has therefore been accumulating debts since the suspension of its operations. [Org. 2] sold, through an auction process, two of its vehicles to be able to keep its office running and to pay national staff food allowances among others. […]

In terms of future operational capacity, the restart of [Org. 2]'s activities in the country will imply a mission revitalization period (restart the coordination with the [DPRK organization], clean up liabilities, identifying potentially new national staff, sending back international staff to the country, assessing the situation of each suspended projects and restart the contact with farms and partners, etc.).

Additional extension of projects will probably be needed, inducing costs that were not initially planned; [Org. 2] is coordinating with its financial partners and will propose adjustments to its projects once the situation will have been reassessed.

[Org. 2] is still expecting to see the borders to reopen in 2023 in order to be able to restart its operations. If the borders remain closed across 2023, [Org. 2] will potentially revise its strategy around December 2023 for the year 2024.

The main limiting factor for [Org. 2]'s operations at the moment is borders closure and the absence of international staff in country, which is the condition to resume the implementation of assessments and field activities at country level.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

The exemption process provoked some delays during the first months after its implementation since the different stakeholders ([Member State's] customs, NGOs, UNSC) had to adapt to this new regulation. The first request from [Org. 2] took up to 5 months up to its approval (including [Org. 2] internal delay to manage the request), the second request 3 months and the shortest one only 2 weeks.

It has to be mentioned that thanks to the support of its donors as well as the reactivity of [Org. 2's relevant] [government institutions] who are in charge of introducing the exemption requests, and a better understanding of the process by [Org. 2], the exemption process has been running better and the maximum necessary delay from the exemption request up to the delivery of the procured items in DPRK has been reduced to 4 months maximum (out of COVID 19 period).

It is worth noting that [DPR] Korean government constraints (Korean customs, restrictive rules, access constraints to the field, etc.) have had greater impact on [Org. 2] projects, leading to delays in the implementation of activities.

An issue to report is that the exemptions granted to [Org. 2] are sometimes not recognized by [a Member State's] customs, which implies additional negotiations and explanation delays with [a Member State's] authorities to eventually lift this barrier.

The customs office in [border checkpoint] did not recognize the note and requested confirmation from the [Member State's central customs authority], that is, the central administration in [a city].

As of October 2018, the Sanctions Committee now publishes authorizations online, this can be very useful in asserting permissions. A good practice that could be implemented to facilitate the process would be to translate these documents into [language of the relevant customs authority] as well.

In the frame of the projects [Org. 2] implements in DPRK, [Org. 2] has requested 6 exemptions to the UNSC under the 1718 Directive.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

In terms of potential improvement to the exemption process, [Org. 2] would recommend the following actions:

- the extension of the 6-month validity period granted for each exemption. Indeed, considering the weight of the exemption request process as well as the procurement delay necessary to import the goods and equipment in DPRK, the 6-month exemption granted so far complicates the implementation of the projects since it has to be quickly renewed to prevent delays in the delivery of the following items to be imported. In addition, even though the exemption process is now well understood and managed by all the stakeholders, any issue in the exemption granting process or more likely in the importation process could delay the importation to more than 6 months and therefore make null and void the exemption valid for 6 months. The current restriction on imports linked to the COVID 19 situation is a good example of this constraint: as mentioned previously, [Org. 2] had to request extension of the exemption since the goods and equipment covered by the granted exemption were blocked at the border.

- To think about possible solutions regarding cash supply due to financial sanctions.

- Strengthen the link with the [Member State's] authorities to facilitate the customs clearance process.

- Make fast tracks when it comes to 1) amendment justified in terms of quantity 2) renewal in the event of expiration.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

This measure, if concretely applied, would allow to gain significant amount of time and ease the planning of activity implementation considering that the exemption process was taking between 1 to 5 months up to completion over the past years (when the borders were still open). Even if well managed by NGOs, this long and heavy process was not leaving room for any unplanned needs and extra purchases in the scope of the implemented projects.

Given the diversity of humanitarian projects and activities, bilateral consultations led by a coordination actor with each humanitarian actor implementing activities in DPRK would allow to prepare a list of goods and equipment needed and purchased on a regular basis.

Once consolidated, a global list common to all humanitarian actors could be pre-approved. Considering the instability of the supply chain to DPRK and in order to remain flexible, it would be important that the pre-approved items and equipment remain generic to avoid blocking the supply in case of minor changes in the technical specifications of the items to be imported.

Depending on the possibilities, a regular update of such a list should be considered to adapt to context and need evolutions.

Possible effects:

- Increased reactivity for humanitarian actors to respond to sudden needs/changes that could not be anticipated.
- Reduced administrative burden over humanitarian actors' shoulders.
- Easier project and activity planning.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

UN sanctions over DPRK prevent easy financial transfer to Pyongyang to allow smooth implementation of the activities as listed at question 1). On top of the financial transfer blockage to DPRK, sanctions prevent today the ability of NGOs to pay their contracted debt. If activities are on standby since Covid period, few running costs are still associated with local expenses (office rent, fuel, etc.) […]

Organization 3

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

> The North Korean governments decision to close its borders in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated the humanitarian situation in the country; in our understanding and assessment, the UN sanctions had no influence in this. Aid offers from outside to ameliorate the situation received no positive response from the government. Sources: Monitoring the news in international and South Korean media.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

> Due to the closing of the borders, our regular visits to the country came to a complete stop; consequently we lost our detailed first hand information from our local counter parts. Drawing from our experiences, the limitations of available health services in country, in particular the challenges of medical laboratories to monitor infectious diseases and to provide necessary preventive and vaccination materials, the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of the borders hit seriously the overall health status of the population. Food insecurity aggravated this further.

3) What has been the scope of your organization s operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

> From the very beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, we offered preventive and lab materials to our local counter part, the North Korean Health Ministry. All reactions to support any delivery were slow and came to a complete halt with the closure of the border. Monitoring visits werde not anymore possible and crucial contacts to the our counter parts lost. So even in case the border would open again and visits could be resumed, it would take time to recover project activities and to establish access to local sites. We have been informed that former contact persons changed or even have died.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization s humanitarian response.

> As mentioned under 1) we don’t see a correlation between the humanitarian situation and the UN sanctions, but with political decisions by the North Korean government. The UN mechanism to receive a humanitarian exemption had in the past gone smoothly and had no negative impact on our operations.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

The main challenges are at this stage the loss of trust and contacts on our local counter parts' side. So far, we don't see any effort from North Korean government to welcoming international NGO back into the country. Consequently a significant change of attitude of the North Korean government would be required to clearly show that humanitarian assistance is accepted.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

As there is no clear perspective for continuing cooperation with local counter parts in the humanitarian field any suggestion would be irrelevant.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

We hope that the UN panel can contribute to changing the North Korean government's attitude towards allowing humanitarian assistance back into the country.

Organization 4

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

> [Org. 4's] general assessment is that people in DPRK are suffering from a combination of border closures and sanctions against the country. We are concerned that humanitarian support cannot reach people in need, which are expected to be a large part of the population. This is a general understanding of the situation based on media articles, reports and sharing of information among peers.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

> The [Org. 4] country delegation in Pyongyang has been kept in place since the closing of the borders [….] Due to the Covid-19 restrictions along with the lack of a functioning banking channel, operations have been very limited. Primary focus has been to procure emergency items and supporting emergency preparedness activities. Items are purchased outside DPRK to be shipped to DPRK and sent to [Org. 4] warehouses. [Org. 4] is dedicated to keep supporting the [local Org. 4] to be prepared in case of a natural disaster. The central problem for [Org. 4] is the inability to get money into DPRK and to pay off the incurred debt to the DPRK [Org. 4] Society, local suppliers and [Org. 4] staff. It is not possible to identify a specific time for [Org. 4] to return with international staff, but we are preparing for a return and ready to respond if there is a request for international assistance during a natural disaster of scale.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

> The effects of the sanctions have primarily impacted the ability to transfer funds for the support of operations and staff. The absence of a banking channel along with the unwillingness and risk awareness of banks and suppliers have made it almost impossible to continue funding activities in country. The overall situation is contributing to overall reduced funding and might influence the [Org. 4] ability to sustain presence in DPRK.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

> The exemption approval process has met our needs lately. [Org. 4] had helpful and speedy support during the last request and need for publishing of the approval. We appreciate the new 2664 UN resolution but also acknowledge that private actors, especially banks, are still hesitant to support transfers to DPRK.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

> Humanitarian organizations must be able to deliver humanitarian assistance in a way that does not compromise the humanitarian principles. There is a need for a permanent banking channel for humanitarian funding.

Organization 5

1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

In the current situation of the country's self-imposed border closure and self-imposed import restrictions, we deem that the UN sanctions currently do not have a major direct effect on the humanitarian situation. On the other hand, we can assume that the humanitarian impact of the DPRK's self-isolation because of COVID-19 is severe and threatens to undo some of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health. However, it has to be noted that any assessment of the impact within the DPRK of the COVID-19 pandemic or the country's border closure is based on assumptions rather than evidence at this point. No foreigner has visited the areas outside Pyongyang since 22 January 2020. Very little reliable information trickles out of the country.

2) *How has the COVID- 19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The border closure is a concern especially for the most vulnerable population requiring specific medical treatment, be it for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. With the exception of [one UN agency], which was able to import and distribute therapeutic foods and micronutrients in February this year, international humanitarian actors that used to support the country's health system seem not to have been able to import and distribute goods on a significant scale since June 2020 [….]The strict border closure further affects the livelihood of small traders and industries relying on cross-border trade and imported goods.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

The COVID-19 pandemic preventive measures taken by the DPRK Government have strongly affected the ability of all humanitarian actors to deliver humanitarian goods and assistance.

[Org. 5] had to put its activities in the DPRK on hold […] The office in Pyongyang is running with minimal local staffing looking after the maintenance of the premises and other assets. An independent monitoring of the situation is impossible.

A recent positive development has been the delivery to DPRK in [month] 2022 of a stock of PPE gear (Personal Protective Equipment) destined for hospitals. It received clearance at the [Member State's] border, where it was blocked since [Month] 2020. No other activity is currently implemented.

The first and main condition to be able to resume humanitarian operations in the DPRK will be the reopening of borders. As long as they are closed and no international staff is allowed to enter into DPRK, the current minimal activities (maintenance of the premises and other assets) will continue. As for now, there is no concrete signal for any development in that direction or a time horizon for a potential reopening of the border. Without such a signal, it is difficult and too early to assess the level of operations that will take place once they could resume. Their feasibility and the DPRK humanitarian needs at that moment will have to be taken into account.

4) *Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.*

As stated above, the strict border closure imposed by DPRK has had more impact on the difficulties to respond to COVID-19 than the UN sanctions. For example, the stock of [project items were] allowed to enter into the country after waiting for clearance from the DPRK authorities for [number of] years, meaning the humanitarian exemption from the 1718 Committee had to be extended several times.

5) *If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?*

In some cases in the past, the approval process was lengthy and required a lot of information to be collected. However, there has been a significant improvement in the approval process for humanitarian exemptions in the course of the last years. We are satisfied with the procedures, and welcome the 1718 Committee's update of the IAN7 specifying the implementation of Resolution 2664 in the context of the DPRK. We welcome the joint call to work together to sustainably resolve the banking channel. This matter has further increased in urgency, as cash-carry in the current situation is not a feasible option.

6) *Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that " relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?*

[Org. 5] welcomes initiatives aimed at facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid, while attaching the utmost importance to the proper implementation of UN sanctions. At this stage, we do not have specific elements to share regarding the Panel of Experts' recommendation.

7) *Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?*

There is room for improvement in the implementation of sanctions as follows:

- establishment of a humanitarian international banking channel, and we refer here to our letter of [Month] 2022 on that matter. We need a way to legally and transparently bring humanitarian funds into DPRK to be able to pay local expenses. Without being able to pay our debts, we put at risk our cooperation with local partners.

- consideration of a "green list" of humanitarian goods for which multi-year exemptions could be granted (for example: water pipes, plastic sheeting for agriculture, personal protective equipment etc.).

Organization 6

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

The humanitarian crisis is a reality that the North Korean authorities refer to the current situation, such as international sanctions against North Korea, COVID-19, and natural disasters caused by the climate crisis, as "triple hardships." However, at the fifth plenary session in December 2019, the North Korean authorities declared the "front-to-front breakthrough" and decided to resolve the crisis by self-reliance, judging that the situation would be prolonged. These policies remain unchanged over three years (Source: Rodong Newspaper, a party newspaper). Recently (June 15), however, various media outlets in Korea quoted the BBC as saying that starving people appear in North Korea.

In response, we checked with North Korean insiders and contacts to find the authenticity and obtained information that the broadcast could be true. However, insiders also said that although the situation of North Koreans is serious, they should overcome it on their own, not with external help. In other words, it is judged that they are not in a condition where they can request external assistance.

We are concerned about whether the situation before and after 1995 is repeated. At that time, it was recognized that there would be a high humanitarian crisis in North Korea, but there was no way to help it out, so I recall the experience of nearly 300,000 starvation. I hope not to repeat the tragic history. To do so, humanitarian aid organizations must actively seek opportunities to talk with North Korea.

The U.N. says humanitarian aid to North Korea is possible at any time and is ready to provide it if it wants, but we believe that the U.N. is not taking action acceptable to the North Korean authorities.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK a affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

The North Korean authorities have closed their borders for over three years, preventing even their citizens from entering the country. Recently, the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia borders have been opened, allowing trains and vehicles to enter, but the North Korean authorities need most of the material transported. It is still impossible for ordinary North Koreans to come forward and import the necessary supplies. The COVID-19 quarantine the North Korean authorities are taking is still strongly promoted.

However, we recently sent [item] from Dandong […] to Sinuiju, confirming that the natural neglect date for preventing supplies in the previous period considerably eased from 90 days (3 months) to 14 days (2 weeks). And from the second half of this year, rumors have been confirmed that it is possible to accept not only supplies but also outsiders' visits to North Korea.

Still, if the international atmosphere is unfavorable to the North Korean authorities, the humanitarian crisis could be prolonged because it is improbable to open the border. We hope the international community will discuss measures to resolve this issue.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?

We have promoted humanitarian aid projects to North Korea since [Date in the 1990s], but contact with North Korean business partners has been suspended since 2019. Moreover, with the inauguration of a new South Korean government in 2022, military tensions have increased, and as the current government has been confirmed to be pessimistic about inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, we have given up the North Korea project itself. In other words, neither South nor North Korean authorities accept NGO exchanges and cooperation.

Therefore, we are waiting for the time when inter-Korean exchange and cooperation are possible with the minimum number of people. We will closely watch the situation in North Korea and collect related data to focus on education and research projects.

The North Korean authorities are also seriously in a difficult economic situation, so the need to open the border is likely to increase over time. In addition, in May 2023, the WHO decided to lift the COVID-19 pandemic. As many countries are turning to the endemic, North Korea is also likely to come to the international community in the second half of 2023 to supply necessary supplies and secure funds through tourists. Unfortunately, however, the [Org. 6 national] government or NGOs will not be considered.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

UN sanctions against North Korea make it difficult to deliver supplies smoothly. We can't do business when it's impossible to make bank transfers to purchase supplies. The willingness to actively develop the project has been dampened as we have seen the difficulty of delivering humanitarian aid to North Korea during the three years of the COVID-19 pandemic.

As exchange and cooperation with North Korea and humanitarian aid, which are the basis for our organization's existence, have become impossible, we are stuck in a vicious cycle that has decreased the interest from sponsors and doubled the difficulties in raising funds.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be full further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

It is true that the process has improved a lot, with the UN 1718 Committee's approval process for sanctions exemption being streamlined and the time it takes to make an approval decision being shortened. However, from the standpoint of NGOs, it still feels cumbersome and challenging to get approval. In particular, even if we do get approved, humanitarian aid itself is still impossible when North Korea, which accepts it, is not receptive.

Unfortunately, the decision to accept outside humanitarian aid is in the hands of the North Korean authorities. Humanitarian aid is in a difficult place to take hold at a time when the international community, which is unable to resolve the issue of UN sanctions, and the North Korean authorities, which reject UN sanctions, are in a tight tug-of-war. Also, North Korean authorities do not believe that humanitarian aid will fundamentally improve their economic situation; instead, they think it only increases the dependence of its high-ranking officials and people on the outside world.

However, if the internal situation of North Korea is dire enough to dampen the will of the North Korean authorities, as it was in 1995, they may ask for help. But it is the worst-case scenario, and we know from experience that the level of suffering among North Koreans was already excessive in 1995 and that many starvation deaths had already occurred.

In addition, the climate crisis is causing more damage to poorer countries like North Korea, which the North Korean authorities recognize and are trying to solve it. The UN agencies needs to step up and promote projects that can fundamentally improve the situation in North Korea. Only then can the North Korean authorities move.

The longer the connection with North Korea is completely cut off, as it is now, the more the way is blocked to grasp the situation on the ground accurately. This is likely to act as an obstacle to the peace of the international community along with the prolonged tension on the Korean Peninsula.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668. para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

Items already approved should be exempted from the same approval process, or clear humanitarian supplies such as food and healthcare should be exempted from the UN sanctions waiver approval process altogether. The UN 1718 Committee on North Korea should review and actively implement the system of preparing a list of goods and removing sanctions exemption. We believe that the evaluation of the effectiveness could be sufficiently conducted through comparison of indicators across UN agencies before and after the implementation of the system.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

[…] We hope that [North Koreans] will never starve to death again in another humanitarian crisis. We also hope that UN sanctions on North Korea due to its nuclear program will not drive North Koreans to death.

In common sense, no one believes that North Korea, the world's most impoverished country, can solve strong international sanctions against it, COVID-19, and the climate crisis on its own. North Koreans should not be sacrificed to break the will of the North Korean authorities. We do not think that humanitarian aid, in particular, should ignore this type of business.

Organization 7

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

There have been reports that the health of North Koreans is not as good as it used to be since the UN sanctions in 2018. In particular, we have heard from the North Korean Consulate in [Member State] and North Korean sources that the nutrition and health of people in rural areas are worse than in Pyongyang.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK a affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

COVID-19 and border closures have significantly impacted North Korea's economy and humanitarian sectors. Internally, North Koreans have been surviving on their folk remedies due to the lockdown and disruption of medicine supplies from abroad. Also, we've heard from North Korean defectors that North Koreans are struggling to buy medicine, even at the market.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?

Since the border was closed in 2020, we have virtually lost contact with North Korea. We received a waiver from UN sanctions in 2021. Since then, we have consistently asked the North to meet in third countries […] conveying our opinion to the country on the resumption of [Org. 7's project]. However, we have been unable to do so due to COVID-19. Our occasional correspondence through the North Korean Consulate in [Member State] has also been cut off.

According to a North Korean source, we've heard that flights between North Korea and China will resume between July and August this year. Now we are all set to resume the [Org. 7's] project. Suppose we receive a positive response from North Korea. In that case, we will immediately proceed with the project to resume the construction of [Org. 7's project]. As the WHO declared end to COVID-19 as a global health emergency on May 5, we hope North Korea will open its borders soon.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

Since most of the items we wanted to resume the project with were under sanctions, it took over a year to get the waiver approved. With the borders closed due to COVID-19, we were unable to make any plans for the project as an organization due to the length of time it took to get the waiver approved.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be full further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

We are always grateful to the 1718 Committee for providing Sanctions Exemption Guidelines and humanitarian assistance through the Implementation Assistance Notices. Thanks to them, we were able to be exempted from UN sanctions for a significant amount of goods to resume the construction of [Org. 7's project].

However, getting approval for such a large-scale exemption was quite time-consuming and economically draining. Therefore, if the facts of the exemption applicant's project are verified, I think it would be better to exempt the project as a whole rather than approving individual items.

Also, we were approved for sanctions exemption, but we have yet to make any progress due to COVID-19. The exemption approval was extended in [Month] 2022, and we need it to be extended again this year. Instead of continuously extending without making progress, we would like to request an automatic extension until the end of the project.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668. para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

First, the whitelist will be created by selecting the most sanctioned items and prioritized items for each field of humanitarian aid. We believe that the evaluation of the effectiveness of the whitelist can be achieved through the monitoring of the organizations that have implemented the assistance and the subsequent submission of monitoring reports.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

As per the answer to question 5, we need the sanctions exemption extended until the project is completed. Please review the automatic extension system for the goods already exempted from sanctions. We are unsure when we will be able to send the goods to North Korea, and we believe continuous extensions are pointless.

Organization 8

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

As outlined in the annexed letter there is a continuing and pressing need to provide emergency relief and development to the most vulnerable people in DPRK. The UN OCHA's Needs and Priorities Report for 2023 estimates that 11.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the population (10.1 million) are food insecure and according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2022, DPRK scored 24.9, a level of hunger that is serious.

It is important to emphasise also that up-to-date data is not available at this time and that the situation is likely to be worse than estimates indicate. The biggest humanitarian challenges facing the country include chronic malnutrition; lack of access to basic health services; declining conditions in water and sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); malnutrition and high vulnerability to natural disasters

The details in Question 1 in the annexed letter also outlines the unintended consequences of the sanctions.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

The annexed letter outlines the information we have regarding the economic and humanitarian situation in the country as a result of the COVID-19 measures. As you are aware the strict lockdown measures implemented in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic have indeed posed significant challenges for humanitarian operations. The suspension of many humanitarian programs and the lack of international staff since early 2020 have impacted the delivery of essential services to vulnerable populations. The restrictions on supplies into the country, limited to China and Russia, have hampered the flow of goods; including food, medical supplies, and equipment. This has put a strain on the availability of food, access to healthcare, and water and sanitation services. It is still not possible to get verifiable data however there are continuing reports in the media about serious food security concerns.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

Again the annexed letter outlines [Org. 8's] operations in the DPRK since early 2020. We are still working from the assumption that the borders may reopen sometime in quarter three 2023. Since our last correspondence there has been some positive reports that the flow of trade by rail and ship are getting back to normal and there is on-going negotiations to open the border by land transport. Moreover, quarantine period of items coming from outside the country at present is 3-6 weeks compared to previously 3 months.

It was also confirmed that [a Member State's] ambassador also crossed a bridge at the […] border city of Dandong into Sinuiju on the DPRK side by vehicle last March 2023. There have also been some informal reports that there may be some lifting of restrictions for diplomats, UN & International NGO staff in 2023. Nevertheless, until this information has been officially conveyed or validated, we remain in the current situation.

Given the global crisis caused by COVID-19, the challenges faced in DPRK are particularly complex and require concerted efforts from all stakeholders involved. To effectively respond to the humanitarian needs in the country, it urgently require greater cooperation of all stakeholders and needed support to secure entry for international staff and facilitate their movement with fewer restrictions both inside and outside the country.

We recognize that securing the necessary permissions and access for international staff has been challenging due to various factors, including diplomatic and logistical constraints. However, it is crucial that we continue to engage with DPRK authorities and various diplomatic missions to emphasize the negative consequences of restricted access on humanitarian assistance. Through these engagements, we can work towards negotiating a formal arrangement that facilitates the entry and movement of international staff, ensuring access to vulnerable communities and the uninterrupted delivery of critical humanitarian aid.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

Please refer to Question 1 in the annexed letter for further information on the unintended consequences of UN sanctions.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

Please refer to Question 5 in the annexed letter.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para.188) include a suggestion that relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

Before we are able to provide a response to this suggestion it would be useful to get more clarity on this question specifically related to what are the 'selected exports' currently under sanctions that are being considered for exemptions to finance humanitarian supplies. In hindsight, although the objective is to alleviate human suffering, the challenge in DPRK will be how it could be operational in a very restrictive and controlled environment. Unhindered access to the most vulnerable and unrestricted monitoring of humanitarian supplies delivered should be the most important priority while maintaining the highest standards of transparency, accountability, and impact.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

Please refer to Question 7 in the annexed letter for recommendations regarding the UN sanctions.

Annex to [Org. 8]'s letter

Based on the conditions of the UN Security Council's resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), [Org. 8]'s Country programme has streamlined its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to comply with the obligatory UNSC policies and process. We actively pursued the derogation approval processes through the [Org. 8's national] Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as the competent member state authority responsible for the monitoring of the Sanctions. The guidance and collaboration with DFAT on derogations from the UN Sanctions Committee 1718 has always proved to be an effective and collaborative support to [Org. 8] in adhering to the mandatory process and smooth submission.

[Org. 8] successfully received three UNSC approvals; two in 2019 and one in 2020 from the 1718 Committee for the derogation of all humanitarian supplies falling under the restricted Harmonised Standard (HS) Codes on a half yearly basis. The cooperation and approval from the 1718 Committee and support from our Member Sate, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the [Org. 8's country] Aid team ensured timely humanitarian assistance in [North Korea] up to 2021. Currently our biggest challenge is the strict lockdown of the country as a result of COVID-19 preventative measures. As you may be aware, the majority of humanitarian programmes have been suspended with limited international staff on the ground since early 2020. Supplies into the country (restricted only to China & Russia) have been severely hampered, which has no doubt put a huge strain on food supply, the health system and water and sanitation services. In addition, these restrictions have severely limited [Org. 8] and the International Community's ability to assess and verify the level of humanitarian need on the ground.

1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

There is an immense need to provide emergency relief and development to the most vulnerable people in DPRK in a timely manner to save lives and uplift the lives of the people. The UN OCHA's Needs and Priorities Report for 2022 estimates that 11 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the population is undernourished and according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2022, DPRK scored 24.9, a level of hunger that is serious. It is important to emphasise also that up-to-date data is not available and that the situation is likely to be worse than estimates indicate. The biggest humanitarian challenges facing the country include chronic food insecurity; lack of access to basic health services; declining conditions in water and sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); malnutrition and high vulnerability to natural disasters.

The unintended consequences of the sanctions continue to have a major impact on the humanitarian operations coupled with the gradual decline in funding. Other factors such as the disruption to the banking channel as the result of the sanctions; the delay in supply chains due to the border restrictions for the transportation of vital goods; inflation in the prices of humanitarian goods and a steady decline in donor funding due to restricted working environments have all complicated and delayed humanitarian responses. The situation gets more challenging in the case of rapid-onset-emergencies, where the humanitarian response needs to be swift to respond in real-time to needs. The capacity to secure supplies to deliver a timely humanitarian response is restricted and complicated by access issues and compliance issues relating to UNSC sanctions. While there is a mechanism of humanitarian exemptions of banned items for UN agencies and INGOs, the approval process of UNSC adds another layer to the huge logistical challenges of bringing the much needed relief assistance to the people in a timely manner. As detailed under question six below, modifications to the sanction approval timelines would be welcomed to expedite the process of delivery of humanitarian supplies once the country opens up.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

The humanitarian situation in the DPRK is characterized by chronic food insecurity and lack of access to lifesaving essential basic services with profound impacts on the most vulnerable. The situation has been exacerbated during the global pandemic. DPRK, with its fragile health system took a more protective stand to shield the country from the spread of the pandemic. COVID-19 related restrictions, especially the closure of the border, further hampered the already complex and challenging humanitarian operations on the ground, with international staff unable to return to the country, and the entry of humanitarian supplies severely restricted. The ongoing border closures and the resulting suspension of most humanitarian programmes, means that the humanitarian situation is likely to have worsened significantly in 2022, and will continue to deteriorate through 2023.

The ongoing socio-economic and other challenges resulting from COVID-19 are likely to reverse the meagre development gains made in previous years and result in additional people

requiring humanitarian support and deeper vulnerabilities. Natural disasters such as drought, floods and storms are recurring phenomena in the country, compounding vulnerabilities and food insecurity, and increasing the need for humanitarian assistance. There have been some reports of food imports from China and Russia but these are unverified, and there is no information on how the food items are being distributed across the country and if it reached those most in need.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, field monitoring has not been possible and no verifiable data on the humanitarian situation is available, therefore the data is tentative and subject to adjustment once is access is restored.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?

DPRK has been under strict lockdown since early January 2020. The [number] international [Org. 8] staff left the country at different stages following the closure of the border. The Country Director along with all remaining international staff left in March 2021 by crossing the border by land to China. Since then, [Org. 8] and other agencies have been waiting for the borders to re-open to resume full operations. [Org. 8] was able to remotely deliver some ongoing activities (including COVID response activities with IFRC) in 2020 and 2021, however, it was not possible in 2022 with no international staff in-country throughout the year. As a result, projects were either suspended or terminated impacting the delivery of food security & agriculture, WASH and [disaster risk reduction (DRR)] activities.

Despite this context, [Org. 8] has still maintained its presence in DPRK with limited national staff supervised remotely by the Interim Country Director. The difficulty in accessing cash in country to support the remaining national staff has been a huge challenge, not only for [Org. 8] but also to the UN and other INGOs. [Org. 8] continues to accrue administration operational costs and once the country reopens, these costs will be considered.

4) If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to their pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?

It is anticipated that the country will re-open again in quarter three of 2023 and [Org. 8] is cautiously optimistic that international staff will be able to return. There have been reports of a 'return plan' being drafted by the UN Permanent Representative to DPRK, following meetings with the DPRK Ambassador in Bangkok. The on-going DPRK response planning for 2023 is based on the assumption that the border will open at least in the third quarter of 2023. Resuming operations to pre-COVID levels will take time. There may be significant quarantine periods for international staff entering the country as well as long quarantine periods for imported goods. Therefore the priority first step upon re-entry will be to conduct detailed needs assessment to understand the needs on the ground and to scale up operations as quickly as possible.

5) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response.

In 2020 [Org. 8] joined with the UN and [another organization's] team to respond to the COVID preparedness at the community level, under the "Global Humanitarian Response plan for COVID-19" in DPRK. Between April and May 2020, [Org. 8]'s COVID-19 preparedness response facilitated the distribution of PPE material/hygiene kits to 314 kindergartens, nurseries, schools and clinics, benefitting 12,394 children and community members.

However, as the monitoring and access to the field by the international team has been restricted since January 2020, monitoring and verification of data was limited. Due to the strict COVID restrictions, [Org. 8] faced delays in procuring humanitarian supplies which resulted in the UNSC derogation approval received in April 2020 expiring, as it was valid for up to six months. This meant that COVID response, WASH and other activities could not be continued.

6) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

Looking at the post- COVID-19 scenario when the border re-open and the increasing complexity of the operational environment as a result, it would be extremely helpful to extend the validity of the approval process to allow for expected delays in procurement and other processes.

Further, the consideration of a 'blanket waiver' for local procurement for humanitarian operations would be welcome to avoid the delays in meeting the priority needs for effective humanitarian assistance, once the border opens.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

The list of sanctioned items from agricultural machinery to simple vegetable garden hand tools affect many aspects of everyday life and present serious challenges to social economic and development in the country. This impacts the most vulnerable people who live in remote villages and have very limited access for food, WASH, health supplies, and fuel for cooking and heating in winter. A review of the UN sanctions mechanisms would be welcome to make it more streamlined with wider inclusion to cover humanitarian supplies to reach the most vulnerable in timely manner. Apart from the supply of sanctioned items, many if not all the humanitarian agencies have been forced to suspend their operations due to the limitation of cash supply in the country. It would be very timely and progressive if a decision to pursue an operational banking channel was facilitated to ensure the continuity of the actions with cash flow possibilities for humanitarian operations.

Given the global crisis that COVID-19 has created and the unique consequences in DPRK, we must all work together to prevent further suffering and increasing vulnerability of communities. In order to do this, [Org. 8] must be able to plan and coordinate our operations effectively and efficiently. We also require greater cooperation and support to secure entry for international

staff and ensure international staff can move with fewer restrictions inside and outside the country. This will require continued bilateral engagement with relevant authorities and diplomatic missions to emphasise the negative consequence on the humanitarian assistance and negotiate for a formal arrangement in this regard.

Thanking you again for the opportunity to engage in these critical discussions in relation to the impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on DPRK. We cannot underestimate the importance of greater cooperation and coordination to ensure humanitarian programming can resume and continue to deliver to the most vulnerable communities in DPRK.

Organization 9

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

We believe there is a “structural vulnerability” when it comes to North Koreans' access to cooking and heating fuels. A vicious chain reaction of energy shortages continues.

Economic hardship due to UN sanctions → Deforestation for cooking and heating fuels → Forest degradation → Landslides due to heavy summer rains → Food shortages → Economic hardship and energy shortages

We’ve learned that the reality inside North Korea has been revealed through news reports of typhoons and torrential rains in the country and media interviews with North Korean defectors about their struggles to heat their homes and make meals in the winter.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK a affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

In the early days of COVID-19, shortages of COVID-19 quarantine supplies, vaccines, etc. in North Korea were already known. However, North Korean defectors suggest that the situation of cooking and heating fuels has improved somewhat as UN sanctions have prevented North Korea from exporting coal, which is distributed internally.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID Actors and what, other factors are at play?

It has been more difficult to get in touch with North Korea than before since the border closure in 2020. Our organization did not have local staff on the ground in North Korea before the border closure, and the closure limited our ability to get information about the humanitarian situation inside the country. North Korea is likely to partially open its borders with the recent easing of COVID-19, but it will take time as political factors such as inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea relations, apart from the humanitarian situation, are strongly at play.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

Implementing UN sanctions required an additional process, called UN sanctions exemption, in addition to the domestic legal process for humanitarian aid. To proceed with the project of providing coal briquette machines, we had to first obtain a UN sanctions waiver before we could begin the domestic import and export process and consultations with North Korea. It was another gateway that we had to go through.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be full further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

The process of obtaining the approval for sanctions exemption went smoothly. Still, if the 1718 Committee reduced the time, it would benefit organizations to carry out their projects.

It is also likely to improve meeting the needs and achieving the goals of the humanitarian sector if the approval letter includes recommendations for governments to implement their projects exempted from the sanctions imposed by the Committee.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668. para. 188) include a suggestion that "... relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

We believe it would benefit us if the sanctions exemption continued to apply to the items approved for a sanctions waiver. In addition, the 1718 Committee should make a whitelist by organizing a list of items exempted from sanctions, including non-disclosure items.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

We would love the opportunity to organize online or offline seminars on the implementation of UN sanctions exemptions to share information.

Organization 10 [257] [258]

With respect to the questions raised by the Panel, the provision of accurate analysis of recent developments of the impact of UN sanctions on the civilian population continues to be challenging due to the lack of transparent data and strict limitations imposed by the DPRK government on access inside the country.

Throughout our submission, we have particularly focused on examining the responsibility of the DPRK government in perpetuating a widespread situation of humanitarian concern among the population, especially the most vulnerable. In particular, we have addressed government expenditure on its nuclear weapons and missile program at the expense of the citizens' health, nutrition, and human security. The human security of North Koreans has remained precarious, especially since the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. This becomes increasingly problematic not only as the population remains at the edge of a widespread humanitarian crisis, but also because the state's commitment to develop its nuclear and missile programs continues to pose a threat to international peace and security while violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

[Org. 10] respectfully submits the following observations to the Panel based on our experience, expertise, and current understanding of the topics addressed. Our response below addresses questions 1, 2 and 3 from the list of questions provided by the Panel as these questions most directly pertain to our activities.

1) *What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?*

   In our previous submissions to the Panel of Experts, we described the ongoing concerns relating to the humanitarian and human rights situations in the DPRK by highlighting and addressing the government's responsibility in protracting the dire conditions that threaten the human security of the North Korean citizens. Moreover, we addressed the DPRK government's continuation of sponsoring its nuclear development and missile programs despite the critical humanitarian situation that remains widespread in the country and the multiple UN Security Council resolutions that sanction such activities.

   One year later, the conditions have not improved. 2022 has in fact characterized a turning point concerning the escalation of tensions in the East Asian and Pacific region. In December 2022, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) stressed the importance of advancing the mass production of tactical nuclear weapons for their potential employment against Japan and the Republic of Korea.[259] Additionally, with the DPRK launching more than 90 missiles in one year, the Republic of Korea and Japan may consider the potential deployment of nuclear weapons within their own territories and/or the increase of military security spending in light of the escalating threats deriving from the DPRK missile launches.[260] Moreover, despite the fact that it remains challenging to establish the exact ratio of the national budget assigned to nuclear weapons and artillery development, it is believed that both the Supreme People's Assembly and Kim Jong-un requested an additional increase of budgetary allocation devoted to military equipment, from

[257] Note: Sourcing and bolding are in Org. 10's submission.

[258] Two experts are of the view that this organization did not answer the Panel's questions from a professional perspective. Its response is full of ideological bias and misinformation and should not be reflected in the report.

[259] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "World Nuclear Forces," 2022, retrieved from https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB23%2007%20WNF.pdf.

[260] Kim Tong-hyung, "North Korea sustains high defense spending with new budget," *AP News*, 2023, January 19, retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/politics-united-states-government-kim-jong-un-north-korea-south-d834bdffda0c2277f180e2e749b5e764.

15.9 % in 2022.[261] For each missile launch, Bruce Bennet, analyst and researcher at the RAND Corporation, stated that costs range from $3 to $10 million USD. Ever since the 1970s, the DPRK is estimated to have allocated up to $1.6 billion for the development of its nuclear weapons.[262] Such expenditure would have sufficed to feed the North Korean population for 4 years straight.[263] While the DPRK government continues to allocate funds to the country's military apparatus, humanitarian actors and international organizations believe that the population is continuing to endure increasingly critical conditions relative to their human security.

The most recent FAO-WFP report highlighted that a large segment of the population remains food insecure due to the extremely low levels of food access and consumption.[264] Defined as a "strategic issue" other than merely a humanitarian one by Dr. Marcus Noland,[265] humanitarian concerns and, mostly, food insecurity are deepening within the country as a consequence of the government's policy-making which disregards its own citizens. Exclusive interviews from inside the country quoted by BBC News have recently revealed that food insecurity remains widespread today and people are dying from starvation.[266] Some have argued that the current situation might become catastrophic soon and might amount to the worst humanitarian crisis ever since the famine of the 1990s, also considering the worsening climate conditions and increased global food prices.[267] The FAO currently estimates that the number of malnourished people in the country range from 40 to 60 %,[268] as the number of undernourished people has increased since the 2000s up to more than 10 million people today.[269]

[261] Christy Lee, "Price of North Korea's Missile Launches Measured in Food Relief," *VOA Asia*, 2022, February 2, retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/price-of-north-korea-s-missile-launches-measured-in-food-relief-/6423243.html.

[262] Rok Suk-jo, "Starving N.Korea Squanders Billions on Developing Nukes," *The Chosunilbo*, 2022, September 27, retrieved from https://english.chosun.com/m/news/article.amp.html?contid=2022092701605.

[263] Greg Scarlatoiu, "Long Overdue Paradigm Shift: A Human Rights up Front Approach toward North Korea," *HRNK Insider*, 2022, November 2, retrieved from https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/11/long-overdue-paradigm-shift-human.html.

[264] WFP and FAO, "Hunger Hotspots. FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook," 2022, Rome.

[265] Marcus Noland, "North Korea as a complex humanitarian emergency: Assessing food insecurity," 2022, *Asia and the Global Economy, 2*(3): 100049.

[266] Jean Mackenzie, "North Korea: Residents tell BBC of neighbours starving to death," *BBC News*, 2023, June 14, retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65881803.

[267] Paula Hancocks, "North Korea's food shortage is about to take a deadly turn for the worse, experts say," *CNN*, 2023, March 3, retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2023/03/03/asia/north-korea-hunger-famine-food-shortages-intl-hnk/index.html.

[268] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, "FAO Hunger Map," 2022, Rome retrieved from https://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/SOFI/2022/docs/map-pou-print.pdf.

[269] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, "The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World," 2022, Rome, retrieved from https://www.fao.org/3/cc0639en/cc0639en.pdf.

Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted multiple resolutions for sanctioning and terminating the illicit activities of the DPRK government to ultimately safeguard the North Korean population and the international community as a whole. The fundamental aim of the sanctions encompasses limiting the regime sources of funding that allow it to pursue its illicit activities. According to our previous submissions and statements, **the sanctions are not meant to degrade the human security or humanitarian situation of DPRK citizens. Rather, accountability for the lack of health, food, and human rights of the DPRK population is to be attributed to the country's regime.** The funds that remain available to the DPRK government continue to be invested in the development of nuclear warheads and missile launches, in turn having a significant negative impact on its population.

To illustrate this proposition, we can look at last year's arms development expenditures versus food shortages. In 2022 alone, the DPRK is believed to have spent $589 million on nuclear weapons development, approximately one third of its GNI (35%), witnessing an increase of $21 million from the previous year.[270] As of 2023, the DPRK is expected to not be able to provide enough food to its population as it is facing a food deficit of about 800,000 tons of rice.[271] As the average price of rice is currently estimated to be $0,70 cents per kilogram,[272] the DPRK government could have used the funds spent on nuclear weapons in 2022 to buy the tons of rice that the population needs. Therefore, despite the potential financial burdens arising from the UN sanctions, the DPRK government could have sufficient funds to ensure a more stable food supply to its population. And yet the DPRK leadership has knowingly and willingly decided to allocate the available funds to its military and security apparatuses. It is therefore a question of will, not capacity, which continues to perpetuate human insecurity among the population.

Although the UN sanctions may have unintended and indirect negative effects on the civilian population, the DPRK government's priority on the nuclear weapons program directly affects the human security, especially the food and health security of the civilian population. While UN sanctions can "frequently delay and suspend the delivery of international humanitarian aid",[273] the DPRK government has continued to refuse the humanitarian aid offered by international organizations and bilateral aid offered by other countries ever since the imposition of the COVID-19 border closure.[274] The DPRK's allocation of funds to the nuclear weapons program while also rejecting foreign aid and vaccines for over two years demonstrates how the DPRK's priority on the nuclear weapons program affects the citizens of the DPRK.

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[270] International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, "Wasted: 2022 Global Nuclear Weapons Spending," 2023, June, retrieved from https://assets.nationbuilder.com/ican/pages/3785/attachments/original/1686495965/ICAN_Spending_Report_2023_sm.pdf?1686495965.

[271] Sung Whui Moon and Do Hyung Han, "Food shortage spreads in North Korea, with some starving farmers unable to work," *Radio Free Asia*, 2023, May 23, retrieved from https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/food-05232023121954.html.

[272] RimJin Gang "Latest Market Price Index Inside N.Korea,", 2023, *Asiapress*, retrieved from https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/north-k-korea-prices/.

[273] Council on Foreign Relations, "What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea," 2022, July 27, retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-sanctions-un-nuclear-weapons.

[274] The Guardian, "'Poisoned candy': North Korean state media shuns food aid despite hunger crisis," 2023, February 22, retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/22/poisoned-candy-north-korean-state-media-shuns-food-aid-despite-hunger-crisis#:~:text=3%20months%20old-,'Poisoned%20candy'%3A%20North%20Korean%20state%20media%20shuns,food%20aid%20despite%20hunger%20crisis&text=The%20major%20North%20Korean%20state,increase%20in%20deaths%20from%20starvation.

Moreover, UN sanctions against DPRK illicit activities have not been enforced unanimously and consistently. [Certain Member States] in particular have maintained a certain level of relationships, trade, and exchanges with the DPRK despite sanctions. This includes officially dispatching North Korean workers to [certain Member States], leading to further human rights violations at overseas worksites. The DPRK's official dispatching of overseas workers provides the government with hard currency which fuels the elite and the country's nuclear weapons and missile program rather than assisting its own population.[275] Dispatching North Korean workers to the Middle East and other areas has become more difficult, due to applicable UNSC sanctions, and most of them are now sent to [certain Member States]. Their worksites are managed by agents of the DPRK. They work under conditions that constitute forced labor while the DPRK regime confiscates up to 90 percent of their salary, under different pretexts. Nevertheless, providing work authorizations and allowing North Koreans to work within the territories of UN Member States remains prohibited by the UN Security Council, following Resolution 2397 from 2017.[276] Despite sanctions having been implemented at the UN level to halt this exchange, North Korean workers appear to have remained in [certain Member States].[277] The latest US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report estimated that between 20,000 to 100,000 North Koreans are currently working in [a Member State].[278] Latest developments have also included the consideration by the DPRK regime to send North Korean workers to [a Member State's]-occupied territories in support of the war in Ukraine,[279] highlighting the continuation of the sanctioned activity also after the spark of the pandemic.

The DPRK continues to use cyberattacks to fund its nuclear program while bypassing sanctions. These cyberattacks and cryptocurrency thefts are used to steal millions or even billions of dollars for the regime while the citizens suffer from food insecurity and health issues.[280] In May 2023, CNN reported that almost half of the regime's nuclear program is funded through cyberattacks and cryptocurrency thefts.[281] Latest data on this matter indicates that billions of dollars are garnered through these illicit activities which is funding that could be directed to alleviate the country's humanitarian crisis.[282] It is evident that cyberattacks, cryptocurrency theft, and the exploitation of illicit overseas workers are essential strategies for the DPRK to fund the nuclear weapons program, despite the UN sanctions and the resulting human and labor rights violations of its citizens.

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[275] https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Overseas_Workers_0926.pdf.

[276] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2397 (2017)," 2017, S/RES/2397.

[277] Jacob Fromer, "After UN Worker Ban Took Effect, Russia Granted 753 Work Visas to North Koreans," *NK Pro*, April 21, 2020, https://www.nknews.org/pro/after-un-worker-ban-took-effect-russia-granted-753-work-visas-to-north-koreans/. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-china-sanctions-idUSKBN1ZL34H.

[278] US Department of State, "2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: North Korea," 2023, retrieved from https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-trafficking-in-persons-report/north-korea/.

[279] Justin McCurry, "North Korean labour could be sent to rebuild Donbas, Russian ambassador says", *The Guardian*, July 19, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/19/north-korean-workers-could-help-rebuild-donbas-region-russian-ambassador-says

[280] Benjamin Young, "North Korea Knows How Important Its Cyberattacks Are," Foreign Policy, 2022, February 9, retrieved from Underestimating North Korean Cyberattacks Leaves the West Vulnerable (foreignpolicy.com).

[281] Sean Lyngaas, "Half of North Korean missile program funded by cyberattacks and crypto theft, White House says," CNN, 2023, May 10, retrieved from Half of North Korean missile program funded by cyberattacks and crypto theft, White House says | CNN Politics.

[282] Jeff Stone, "North Korean IT Workers Help Spy from UAE and Russia, UN Says," Bloomberg, 2023, May 31, retrieved from: North Korean IT Workers Help Spy from UAE and Russia, UN Says - Bloomberg.

The DPRK regime continues to violate numerous UN sanctions in order to procure the funds needed to support its nuclear and missile development programs. Funds continue to be invested on the country's military apparatus while the population continues to suffer increasing levels of food insecurity and what appears to be an evolving healthcare crisis.

2) *How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.*

The current conditions of the economic and humanitarian spheres in the DPRK are driven by political factors. The constant food insecurity and the limited access to basic healthcare and clean water in the country have left millions of people in need of humanitarian assistance. However, the limited and restricted access to information inside the country, along with the absence of official statistics, makes it challenging to correctly assess the needs of the economic and humanitarian spheres within the country.[283] Nevertheless, the evidence collected has highlighted that both have particularly worsened since the COVID-19 pandemic and border closures imposed by the DPRK regime in January 2020. After two years of claiming no confirmed COVID-19 cases, the DPRK government disclosed a nationwide outbreak in May 2022 and launched emergency epidemic prevention measures, including a strict national lockdown.[284] We have previously expressed the concern that the inability to conduct independent assessments within the DPRK directly hinders other countries, institutions and aid organizations from not only estimating the current COVID-19 situation, but also from providing humanitarian assistance in an effective manner.[285]

The DPRK government continues to deny any great negative impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, announcing in August 2022 that it has successfully defeated the virus. The government's preferred narrative remains framing the outbreak as under control for two reasons. Firstly, to boost Kim's legitimacy and enhance domestic control over the population, and secondly, to signal to the world that it is self-reliant under its *Juche* "self-reliance" ideology - able to handle its own affairs without outside assistance.[286] This is only a smokescreen masking the true condition of the country.

It is perplexing to see how the DPRK has been reluctant to reveal the facts regarding COVID-19 - hiding the truth from its people to avoid any potential unrest, and from the outside world to avoid any speculation and investigation.[287] Despite this, the recognition of the spread of COVID-19 has led the government to impose tighter travel controls, both internationally and domestically. Moreover, the overall situation has been defined by worsening food insecurity, decreasing food consumption and nutritional diversity levels among the most vulnerable.[288] As mentioned in our previous correspondence, official statistics indicated a cumulative total of 4.7 million cases in a country of 25 million, with only 74 deaths reported as of July 7, 2022. Around 4.8 million cumulative fever cases (nearly 20% of the country's total population) were reported

[283] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19," 2023, retrieved from https://www.acaps.org/country/dprk/crisis/complex-crisis.

[284] Ibid.

[285] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

[286] Khang Vu, "North Korea's Politics Defeats COVID…Almost," *Lowy Institute,* 2022, September 7, retrieved from https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/north-korea-s-politics-defeats-covid-almost.

[287] Kim Myong, "The Need for the Truth: COVID-19-Free North Korea," *HRNK Insider*, retrieved from https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2020/04/the-need-for-truth-covid-19-free-north.html.

[288] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

in the DPRK as of August 2022.[289] Yet on August 11, 2022, the DPRK claimed that it had succeeded in defeating the virus without vaccines. Kim Jong-un called it the "greatest miracle," accomplished without a single vaccine being administered. Subsequently, on August 13, 2022, the DPRK government lifted the mask mandate and social distancing regulations.[290] We have previously submitted that public health experts including WHO have noted that the healthcare system in the DPRK is not at all equipped to deal with such a massive outbreak. Moreover, experts have argued that it remains difficult to provide a proper analysis of the most closed country where we do not have access to the necessary data, casting uncertainty on the government's narrative.[291] In October 2022, Elizabeth Salmón, the special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK, expressed her concerns about the people's access to healthcare given the fragile state of the health system, plagued by unreliable electricity supply, lack of equipment, and lack of access to basic medicine, which has reportedly been further limited during the prolonged border shutdown brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic.[292] Nevertheless, Kim Jong-un announced victory over the COVID-19 pandemic purportedly without a single vaccine being administered, and after refusing to receive millions of vaccines from foreign countries in the past two years, implying their lack of "technical preparedness" and supply shortages.[293] The situation seemingly changed when, last September, Kim Jong-un announced that the DPRK would begin distributing COVID-19 vaccines officially for the first time in fall 2022, having been wary of the virus spreading during the winter. The origin of the vaccines remains unclear and undisclosed, but most of them are believed to be Chinese imports.[294]

The COVID-19 restrictions have affected the already dire food insecurity and nutritional deficiency levels in the country, especially among the most vulnerable, including the children and the elderly.[295] Between 2020 and 2021, the population affected by food insecurity was estimated to be 45–60% of the total population and the prevalence of malnutrition among children under five years of age was estimated at 18%.[296] The prices of staple foods, i.e. rice and corn, have increased in recent months, with more people not being able to access food. A series of satellite images indicates that the increased border security has almost entirely stopped unauthorized cross-border economic activity, which has contributed to severe shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities. The DPRK government has been taking advantage of the pandemic to tighten control and further oppress its citizens. The government continues to impose severe restrictions on basic freedoms to allegedly contain the spread of the virus. These restrictions include the shutdown of informal marketplaces commonly known as *jangmadangs*, as well as a crackdown on cross-border trade. Kim Yeong-soo, a professor of Political Science and International Studies at Sogang University, said, "North Korean residents obtained food through rations in the past, but since the Arduous March, they have been securing food from the marketplace.[297] Many marketplaces have been shut down due to the COVID-19 pandemic, severely affecting the food supply. "The North has been in serious economic difficulties since a total border lockdown early in the coronavirus pandemic. Yoo Seong-ok, a former chief of the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, "The North is launching provocations to create a

[289] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

[290] Ibid.

[291] Maria Cheng, "WHO Believes COVID is Getting Worse, Not Better in North Korea," *AP News,* 2022, June 2, retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/covid-politics-health-epidemics-north-korea-ba092ba8f0dfd1e534fb420a0efddd91.

[292] OHCHR, "Report of the Special Rapporteur to the 77th session of the General Assembly," 2022, October 13, A/77/522.

[293] James Fretwell, "State media silence fosters uncertainty around COVID vaccinations in North Korea," *NK Pro,* 2022, November 16, retrieved from https://www.nknews.org/pro/state-media-silence-fosters-uncertainty-around-covid-vaccinations-in-north-korea/.

[294] Ibid.

[295] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

[296] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

[297] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

warlike atmosphere and quell domestic discontent with economic difficulties".[298] As such, the strict containment measures issued by the DPRK are expected to have long-term consequences on the economy as trade, imports/exports, aid, and livelihood opportunities have been disrupted.[299] Furthermore, the reduced cases of DPRK citizens who seek asylum abroad are also attributed to the strengthening of border control. The DPRK government has used purported COVID-19 measures to further repress the citizens of the DPRK, which violates freedom of movement and other fundamental human rights.[300]

Constraints on humanitarian access have persisted in the DPRK. As mentioned in previous correspondence, international aid organizations and countries including the United States and the Republic of Korea have attempted to make multiple aid shipments to the DPRK to alleviate the COVID-19 situation in the country, but they have been consistently refused by the DPRK's government.[301] As previously submitted, UNICEF has been one of the few aid organizations that has been able to ship supplies to the DPRK after it shut its borders in early 2020 (after being granted a second exemption from UN sanctions against the DPRK). However, once a shipment crosses the border, it will likely be held at a storage facility for several months and no information relative to its distribution will be provided to the sender. Considering the organization's most recent aid shipment took more than a year to reach the country, it is unclear when the latest health and nutrition supplies may reach the DPRK's most vulnerable groups.[302] It is noteworthy that the DPRK has been implementing the *songbun* system, a socio-political classification system that favors groups who are viewed as loyal to the DPRK regime, its top leadership in particular as well as the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). This system inevitably discriminates against certain groups and limits their access to resources in the country, also including basic services and necessities, and especially humanitarian aid. As mentioned in our previous correspondence, the Republic of Korea approved two recent deliveries of humanitarian aid to the DPRK in October 2022, according to the ROK Ministry of Unification, which was the fourth aid delivery that had been approved under the Yoon administration and subsequently rejected. It seems that regardless of the sender, the DPRK appears unlikely to accept aid as it still exerts strict COVID-19 border controls resulting in very few humanitarian shipments reaching the DPRK over the last three years.[303]

The right to freedom of movement remains strictly controlled in the DPRK. Traveling abroad or moving within the country without government authorization is rendered illegal. The announcement of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in stronger COVID-19 containment measures, with the implementation of a strict national lockdown, tighter border control (including total closure), and a further restriction of the freedom of movement. This resulted in heightened movement restrictions for the population and led to a negative impact on both trade and the remaining humanitarian responses.[304] Tómas Ojea Quintana, the previous Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, claimed that "prolonged border closures and restrictions on movement in-country have decimated the market activity that has become essential for the general population to access basic necessities.[305] Since April 2021, there have been no foreign aid workers left in the country. International aid organizations have

[298] Kim Myong-song and Yang Seung-sik, "N.Korea's Missile Launches 'Squandered a Year's Rice Imports'," *The Chosunilbo,* 2022, November 4, retrieved from https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2022/11/04/2022110400890.html.

[299] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

[300] Human Rights Watch, "North Korea: Covid-19 Used as Pretext to Seal Border," 2022, November 17, retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/17/north-korea-covid-19-used-pretext-seal-border.

[301] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

[302] Ifang Bremer, "Seoul approves two new deliveries of humanitarian aid to North Korea," *NK News,* 2022, October 18, retrieved from https://www.nknews.org/2022/10/seoul-approves-two-new-deliveries-of-humanitarian-aid-to-north-korea/.

[303] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

[304] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

[305] [Org. 10], "Submission: UN Panel of Experts," 2022.

been relying on local staff to distribute aid throughout the country, resulting in the increased control of the government over the distribution of humanitarian aid and subsequently increasing the likelihood of maldistribution (as this is subject to the *songbun* system). In her first report to the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Elizabeth Salmón, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, noted that "the DPRK's self-imposed COVID-19 restrictions led to the departure of all international humanitarian staff from the country.[306]

COVID-19 and the subsequent tighter border controls have placed a lot of strain on an already failing DPRK economy. Despite this, Kim Jong-un's choice is still to prioritize his nuclear and missile programs, not food or other necessities of the population. The DPRK remains consistent with its strategy of advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to gain recognition for its status as a nuclear power and to increase its bargaining power with the United States. However, this is a strategy that does not allow any sustainability for future generations. We have previously indicated that sources within the DPRK escapee community who are in contact with sources inside the country have informed [Org. 10] that, in absolute terms, the level of human insecurity may be comparable to the mid to late-1990s, the days of the "Arduous March," the great famine that devastated the DPRK. It is unfortunate that the DPRK continues to deliberately choose to prioritize the regime's perceived "security" at the expense of the population's health and well-being. In our previous correspondence, it was highlighted that if there were a shift in the DPRK's budget allocation from military spending to COVID-19 relief, the humanitarian impact of COVID-19 on the DPRK could be limited. "The money North Korea spent launching missiles this year could have been used to procure 20 million to 32.5 million coronavirus vaccine doses, according to KIDA.[307] That would be enough to give each North Korean citizen one round of vaccination, the institute said." This is the value that the DPRK places on its nuclear and missile program versus that of the lives of its people.[308]

At this point, the DPRK is likely facing a prolonged humanitarian crisis caused by worsening food shortages resulting from long-term border closures, adverse weather, and a failing economy. It has been reported that in March 2023 the country requested assistance from the WFP, which could not be provided due to disagreements around access into the country. According to statistics, before the COVID-19 pandemic, approximately 42% of the population was malnourished, and an estimated 40% of the population was unable to access food or other supplies. In 2022, the number of people affected by food insecurity was estimated to increase to 60% of the population.[309] In the economic sphere, trade with [a Member State] decreased by up to 90% in 2021 compared to 2019. The current humanitarian and economic situation in the DPRK is exceptionally dire. This is due to the lack of imports, including agricultural inputs, and the decline in food production which has led to significant price increases and food shortages. Furthermore, continued access restrictions make assessment data difficult to obtain, allowing Kim Jong-un's narrative to mislead the population. Nevertheless, the DPRK government continues to build its nuclear and missile programs and allocate its funding elsewhere. In 2023, there is no marked improvement in the humanitarian, human security, or human rights situation in the DPRK.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has a clear humanitarian and economic impact on the DPRK, the government continues to prioritize its military power over reducing the impact of the pandemic on its population. The DPRK's rejection of foreign aid while allocating funds to the nuclear weapons and missile programs demonstrates how the DPRK's prioritization of such

[306] OHCHR, A/77/522.

[307] Junnosuke Kobara, "North Korea missile tests cost 2% of GDP already this year: report," *Nikkei Asia*, 2022, June 11, retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-missile-tests-cost-2-of-GDP-already-this-year-report.

[308] Junnosuke Kobara, "North Korea missile tests cost 2% of GDP already this year: report," *Nikkei Asia*, 2022, June 11, retrieved from https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/North-Korea-missile-tests-cost-2-of-GDP-already-this-year-report.

[309] ACAPS, "DPRK: Humanitarian Needs in the Context of COVID-19."

programs worsens any possible unintended negative effects of the UN sanctions on its citizens, resulting in an exacerbated humanitarian and economic crisis affecting the North Korean population.

3) *What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?*

[….] The COVID-19 border closure implemented by the DPRK has not directly affected our operations and research projects, as we do not operate and engage with local actors within the country's borders. Nevertheless, considering the strict measures imposed in early 2020, including the *shoot-to-kill* orders at the country's borders,[310] the number of North Koreans who escaped the country has notably decreased during the last three years, reaching a record low of fewer than 100 escapees entering the Republic of Korea in 2021 and 2022.[311] As a consequence, the number of recently escaped North Koreans that we have been able to interview has decreased. As we rely on interviews and testimonies of escapees for the collection of data on human rights violations, it has been challenging to obtain direct information about the conditions experienced by the population, both related to the humanitarian emergency as well as the repression and human rights abuses perpetrated by the government.

Additionally, despite the sporadic release of unofficial news announcing the total re-opening of the DPRK-China border for tourism and trade, as of now it remains unlikely that such activities will fully resume soon and that the DPRK will officially open its entire northern border. Nevertheless, small-scale exchanges of both authorized and illicit goods, such as hair products, rice and seafood, have been detected at the beginning of this year at border cities in China and the DPRK.[312] Moreover, considering the crumbling DPRK economy, which deteriorated after the closure of the borders and interruption of all economic exchanges as well as inflows of hard currency, it appears that the country has not entirely interrupted its cross-border trade with China and Russia.[313] Over the course of the pandemic, despite enforcing the strictest COVID-19 border closure in the world, the DPRK has continued to engage in illicit trade for sponsoring its nuclear weapons program, neglecting the needs of its population and breaching UN-imposed sanctions.

In conclusion, the COVID-19 border closure has been an additional challenge to international organizations aiming to gather information on the humanitarian and human rights situations within the country and for assisting the people of the DPRK. Nevertheless, the DPRK regime has not altered its sanctioned and illegal activities, continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and never ceasing to represent a threat to regional and international peace and security.

In closing, [Org. 10] wishes to emphasize the egregious human rights situation in the DPRK. [Org. 10] continues to support human rights initiatives in the DPRK and abroad. [Org. 10] would like to highlight a "Human Rights up Front" approach towards the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK, also ming to successfully denuclearize the country, which includes international

[310] France 24. "North Korea issues shoot-to-kill orders to prevent virus: US," September 9, 2020, retrieved from: https://www.france24.com/en/20200911-north-korea-issues-shoot-to-kill-orders-to-prevent-virus-us.

[311] Ministry of Unification, "Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors," n.d., retrieved from: https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/whatwedo/support/.

[312] https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/N-Korea-at-crossroads/From-wigs-to-seafood-North-Korea-scrambles-for-[redacted]-trade.

[313] Sangsoo Lee. "North Korea Likely to Lift Pandemic Border Restrictions in 2023," January 6, 2023, The Diplomat, retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/north-korea-likely-to-lift-pandemic-border-restrictions-in-2023/.

access to DPRK detention facilities, increased transparency, and in-country access for human rights organizations as well as humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable groups in the DPRK. [Org. 10] respectfully recommends that the Panel ask organizations requesting sanctions exemptions for specific information on the intended locations of the disbursement of humanitarian aid as well as its beneficiaries. This will facilitate better monitoring of humanitarian aid and allow to determine more accurately whether the aid prioritizes the most vulnerable DPRK citizens.

Organization 11

1) What is your assessment of the cumulative effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK since 2018? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?

The DPR Korea has suffered a severe set-back, impacting the humanitarian situation due to UN and bilateral sanctions and to the complete closure of borders since February 2020. This has further weakened [Org. 11]'s efforts to supply critical equipment and human resources development initiatives.

The sanctions and closure of borders also have challenged and, in some cases, stopped the work of [Org. 11] and other … humanitarian organizations. The dysfunctionality of international banking channels has further led to acute liquidity crunch and severely constrained the critical in-country activities. Concomitantly, with limited in-country funds, [Org. 11]'s focus remained in supporting and responding to humanitarian crisis and emergencies, such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, floods and typhoons, etc. Resultantly, there is dearth of resources needed to develop strategies enabling prevention and mitigation of shocks and emergencies, as demonstrated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

For instance, procurement got delayed due to the closure of borders and ultimately some items could not be procured.

These challenges further cascaded when some supplies and equipment got stranded at the [Member State's] borders and not allowed to enter the country, thus incurring huge storage/demurrage/cold chain charges.

2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic and the related closure of the borders of DPRK affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.

[See also response under 1) above]

In January 2020 the Government of DPRK closed its international borders (air, sea, and land) in an attempt to prevent the entry of the novel coronavirus into the country when WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak to be a pandemic. As of date, the borders continue to remain closed although the limited supply of essential commodities are being allowed on a case-by-case basis.

The strict restrictions on cross-border movement has a profound negative impact on the flow of supplies, which the DPRK population heavily relied on to supplement the government initiatives to meet needs of its vulnerable population.

To reiterate, several shipments of essential and critical equipment that [Org. 11] procured, most of which were approved by the UN Sanctions Committee were held up at different locations incurring large expenses on storage charges and customs demurrage. Several shipments expired while being held up, costing more money to dispose such shipments. Some shipments had to be re-routed to other countries, causing additional financial burden.

3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period? When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? How do you see the prospects of re-opening of the borders? How are these prospects related to COVID factors and what other factors are at play?

In the absence of any international staff allowed in the country for about three years, the operations were remotely managed. The implementation of technical activities however, got severely impacted.

There were certain difficulties encountered as during the year 2021 and early 2022 the borders and ports were closed due to pandemic which impacted in delivering supplies to the country. Also due to the sanctions imposed on certain items, the procurements are delayed.

The preparation of the required documentation for the UN Sanctions Committee is lengthy and requires several levels of consultations.

As of now, there is no concrete information from the Government on the border reopening. However, with WHO's declaration of COVID-19 no longer a public health emergency of international concern, it is anticipated that the Government may consider opening its borders in the near future.

4) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's humanitarian response.

With the decision of the Government to limit the presence of international staff, the capacity of the [Org. 11] Country Office was markedly reduced. Limited capacity due to suboptimal staff presence led to challenges in providing emergency support to the country. This got further aggravated when all international staff had to leave the country.

5) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?

[Org. 11] has been able to obtain humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 committee in the past as required, generally on a fast-track process, whenever required. [Org. 11] also appreciate the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months (i.e., up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays. This development is very helpful and welcome. Thanks to the quick approval process used during the pandemic, [Org. 11] requests to procure emergency supplies were approved within 4 days, which is a positive example of the UN Sanctions Committees flexibility and understanding of the severity of the situation.

6) Recommendations of the Panel of Experts in its latest Midterm Report (see S/2022/668, para. 188) include a suggestion that "… relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies". Do you have any ideas or suggestions how this measure can be implemented and what is your assessment of possible effects?

> The Panel's recommendation is a welcome move if considered. It would be good to know the selected exports under sanctions that will be considered for exemption. without which it will be difficult to comment or suggest how the proceeds for financing humanitarian supplies will be utilized.

7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

> One of the major challenges in [Org. 11]'s work in DPRK has been the absence of a viable banking channel to transfer much needed funds for in-country operations and programmatic implementation. This has a significant negative impact on [Org. 11] activities, and a quick and efficient solution is required to be found. This also negatively impact international staff to meet their daily subsistence expenses like accommodation, food, and other personal expenses.

Annex 80: Excerpts of *BBC News* interviews conducted in 2023 with North Korean citizens in the DPRK

Individual 1 ("Myong Suk" – a border town)

"I wake up at 5 am and make breakfast for my family. Then I go and prepare my business at the market, where I sell medicine. Before COVID, life was stable. I didn't smuggle every day, but my business made quite a profit. But since COVID, my earnings have halved. It's become much harder to smuggle things over the border, and the crackdowns have become stricter. I tried to smuggle, but I got caught. I had to bribe an official with money I didn't have, and barely got away with it. After that, I was monitored, and I couldn't do anything. Most of the products in the market came from China, but its empty now. You could always find grain, but not these days. The scarcest thing is medicine. Even if you can find it, it's too expensive."

"Our food situation has never been this bad," Myong Suk tells us.

She is the main earner in the family. Before the border closure, Myong Suk would arrange for much-needed drugs, including antibiotics, to be smuggled across from China, which she would sell at her local market. She needed to bribe the border guards, which ate up more than half of her profits, but she accepted this as part of the game. It allowed her to live a comfortable life in her town in the north of the country, along the vast border with China.

The responsibility to provide for her family has always caused her some stress, but now it consumes her. It has become nearly impossible to get hold of products to sell.

Once, in desperation, she tried to smuggle the medicine herself, but was caught, and now she is monitored constantly. She has tried selling North Korean medicine instead, but even that is hard to find these days, meaning her earnings have halved.

Now when her husband and children wake, she prepares them a breakfast of corn. Gone are the days they could eat plain rice. Her hungry neighbours have started knocking at the door asking for food, but she has to turn them away.

"We are living on the front line of life," she says.

The pandemic, she believes, has merely provided the authorities with the excuse to re-exert its diminished control over people's lives. *"Really they want to crack down on the smuggling and stop people escaping,"* she says. *"Now, if you even just approach the river to China, you'll be given a harsh punishment."*

Individual 2 ("Chan Ho" – a border town)

"I work on construction projects. Often, we have to work late into the night, and I sleep at the site. I wouldn't be able to survive if my wife didn't work at the market. When they closed the border, everything became scarce. The price of grain, sugar and seasoning has shot up. Food supplies are so low, people have started dying."

"I want people to know that I am regretting being born in this country," says Chan Ho, a construction worker.

He helps his wife set up for the market, before heading to the construction site. He carries her products and loads them on to her stall, aware that her business is the only reason he is still alive. The 4,000 won he makes a day is no longer enough to buy one kilo of rice, and it has been so long since his family received government food rations, he has forgotten about them.

The markets, where most North Koreans buy their food, are now almost empty, he says, and the price of rice, corn and seasonings has soared.

At first Chan Ho was afraid he might die from Covid, but as time went on, he began to worry about starving to death, especially as he watched those around him die.

The first family in his village to succumb to starvation was a mother and her children. She had become too sick to work. Her children kept her alive for as long as they could by begging for food, but in the end all three died. Next came a mother who was sentenced to hard labour for violating quarantine rules. She and her son starved to death.

More recently, one of his acquaintance's sons was released from the military because he was malnourished. Chan Ho remembers his face suddenly bloating. Within a week he had died.

"I can't sleep when I think about my children, having to live forever in this hopeless hell," he says.

This is the hardest period he has ever lived through. The famine was difficult, he says, but there were not these harsh crackdowns and punishments. *"If people wanted to escape, the state couldn't do much,"* he says. *"Now, one wrong step and you're facing execution."*

His friend's son recently witnessed several executions carried out by the state. In each instance three to four people were killed. Their crime was trying to escape.

"If I live by the rules, I'll probably starve to death, but just by trying to survive, I fear I could be arrested, branded a traitor, and killed," Chan Ho tells us. *"We are stuck here, waiting to die."*

Individual 3 ("Ji Yeon" – Pyongyang)

"I know one family that starved to death at home. No-one came in or out for three days. Water was brought around, and we knocked on their door telling them to get some. But nobody answered. There are lots of beggars now. if they're lying down, we check them and usually find they're dead. There are others who kill themselves at home or disappear into the mountains. I never used to hear of this happening."

Ji Yeon has two children and her husband to support with the pennies she makes working in a food shop.

She used to sneak fruit and vegetables out of the shop to sell at the market, alongside cigarettes her husband received in bribes from his co-workers. She would buy rice with the money. Now her bags are thoroughly searched when she leaves, and her husband's bribes have stopped coming. No-one can afford to give anything away.

"They've made it impossible to have a side-hustle," she frets.

Ji Yeon now goes about her day pretending she has eaten three meals, when in truth she has eaten one. Hunger she can endure. It is better than having people know she is poor.

She is haunted by the week she was forced to eat puljuk – a mash of vegetables, plants and grass, ground into a porridge-like paste.

"We survive by thinking 10 days ahead, then another 10, thinking that if my husband and I starve, at least we will feed our kids," Ji Yeon says. Recently she went two days without food.

"I thought I was going to die in my sleep and not wake up in the morning," she says.

Despite her own hardship, Ji Yeon looks out for those worse off. There are more beggars now, and she stops to check on the ones lying down, but usually finds they are dead. One day she knocked on her neighbour's door to give them water, but there was no answer. When the authorities went inside three days later, they discovered the whole family had starved to death.

"It's a disaster," she says. *"With no supplies coming from the border, people do not know how to make a living."* Recently she has heard of people killing themselves at home, while others disappear into the mountains to die. She deplores the ruthless mentality that has blanketed the city.

"Even if people die next door, you only think about yourself. It's heartless."

Source: BBC News, lightly edited by the Panel, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/bskbb4rmae/inside-north-korea

Annex 81: Russian Ambassador Alexander Matsegora's interview with NK News

INTERVIEWS

Russian ambassador rejects reports of famine in North Korea, corpses on streets

In interview, Alexander Matsegora admits food situation is 'not easy' but dismisses BBC documentary claims of starvation

Chad O'Carroll June 23, 2023

The Russian Embassy in North Korea has not observed an increase in beggars in Pyongyang or dead bodies lying in the streets, the country's ambassador has told *NK News*, dismissing claims featured in a new documentary on famine in the DPRK.

But Ambassador Alexander Matsegora acknowledged that the food situation is "not easy" and that North Korea lacks fertilizers, farm machinery and other materials needed to boost harvests, blaming international sanctions for preventing their import.

In written remarks sent to *NK News* on Thursday, Russia's envoy to the DPRK described a new BBC documentary on food shortages in the country as "biased" and "far from the truth" and claimed that there are "no signs of starvation" in the capital.

In the documentary released last week, an anonymous Pyongyang source told the British broadcaster that she had seen a growing number of beggars on the streets, adding that "if they are lying down we check them and usually find that they are dead."

The source also said she knew of a family of three that starved to death at home, while sources in other parts of the country told the BBC they had experienced major food shortages.

Jesus Aise Sotolongo, Cuba's former ambassador to North Korea who ended his post in April, also rejected BBC's reports of famine in the capital and told *NK News* that the food situation was stable when he left.

He also said there had been "radical" improvements in food supplies compared to summer 2021, when North Korean state media openly admitted to a "food crisis."

Both Cuba and Russia have historically maintained friendly ties with the DPRK, and Moscow and Pyongyang have notably made efforts to strengthen cooperation since last year.

A third diplomat in Pyongyang told *NK News* on condition of anonymity that they had not observed famine-like conditions in the capital, but they did note rising food scarcity of late.

Experts have raised alarm about the food situation in North Korea since earlier this year, with some analysts warning that price data and other signs point to the worst food insecurity since the Arduous March famine of the 1990s.

The South Korean government also assessed that a "significant" number of North Koreans are dying of starvation in smaller cities, while concluding that the situation has not yet devolved in to mass famine.

The following interview has been edited for clarity and style.

Amb. Alexander Matsegora: I've received your letter with a request to answer the questions about the situation in North Korea. Being an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I was supposed to ignore such an inquiry, especially from the representative of the unfriendly state's media.

I'm sure that ambassadors, for example, of the USA or Great Britain, accredited in any state, would not have done so in case Russian media made such a request. But the story by BBC, which I surely watched and read, is so biased and so far from the truth that I've decided to answer some of your questions in order to discredit that false impression, which English colleagues deliberately or not could have created in the minds of their audience. Besides, I think that if I stay silent that will give grounds to believe the story made by BBC.

I ask you to publish this letter and my answers in full. Keeping in mind our previous agreement, I suppose that you will not add any comments in the vein of the modern Western mainstream. [Editor's note: *NK News* proposed using the ambassador's responses to inform this report.]

So, here are my answers to your questions.

NK News: A source in Pyongyang reportedly told the BBC that there are now lots of beggars on the streets of the capital, and that often they can be found "lying down." When the bodies are checked, they are "usually dead," the source said. What is your and colleagues' experience of walking around Pyongyang? Have you ever encountered such scenes?

Matsegora: Neither I nor my colleagues walking or driving around Pyongyang have ever seen beggars lying or loitering in the streets.

There are even no drunk people lying around in the streets here, as is often the case in many other capitals.

It is impossible to imagine someone falling down and not having a passerby run up and help him get up.

NK News: DPRK state media acknowledged a "food crisis" in summer 2021. However, Chinese trade data now shows that bilateral trade has recovered to nearly pre-pandemic levels. How would you characterize the changing supply of food and medical supplies since the beginning of the pandemic to date?

Matsegora: As for the availability of locally produced food (grain, beans, potatoes, meat, poultry, eggs, vegetables, fruits), the situation has not changed compared to the pre-pandemic period — the aisles in stores were full of all kinds of goods both then and now. There is more fish available as sea and river fishing resumed after being temporarily put on hold by the Emergency Anti-Epidemic Headquarters.

Prices, as always, fluctuate slightly depending on the season but generally remain stable. The range of imported food products is slightly wider than at the end of 2020, but it is still nowhere near as extensive as it was before the pandemic.

Medicines, including those made in Russia, are now quite available in pharmacies, and the deficit in pharmaceutical products is virtually gone, except maybe for a few rare medications.

I would add one caveat here: Although the markets in Pyongyang and all other cities are overcrowded with both vendors and customers, certainly not everyone can afford to buy food at market prices on a daily basis.

That's why there is a fixed rationing supply system in place here. Depending on a person's workplace, either the state or his enterprise is responsible for providing food rations. The main thing is to have sufficient resources to meet the population's needs to the utmost. Hence, the availability of these resources remains the key issue. I will talk about it later.

NK News: A source in the BBC report claims closed-door executions are now taking place in the DPRK. Have you or colleagues ever heard of such a phenomenon?

Matsegora: I have never heard of any "closed-door executions."

NK News: Overall, what is your assessment of the BBC documentary and the text report that claims that the DPRK currently is enduring food shortages so significant that people are starving to death? The ROK government has shared similar assessments in recent months.

Matsegora: The situation with food resources is not easy, and the DPRK government admits this. One of the main reasons for it is last year's unfavorable weather conditions. But the current difficulties are nothing compared to those during the Arduous March [famine of the 1990s]. At that time, it was very hard. I was here at that time, so I can compare. Now there are no visible signs of starvation here.

Regarding the last point, I would like to add the following. Increasing grain production is the main, top-priority goal on the list of 12 goals to be achieved by the government during the five-year plan (2021-2025). All government efforts are aimed at solving the problem of nutrition once and for all. A lot is being done; we can see it with our own eyes.

But, unfortunately, there are still many issues that cannot be resolved quickly, and harvest yields cannot be increased dramatically due to a lack of fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, agricultural machinery and spare parts for them. The local industry can't fully satisfy these needs. However, the country could have imported all these items, including grain, from abroad. But sanctions do not let it happen.

In the West, you whine pharisaically that North Korean authorities don't provide food to their people and also don't let humanitarian organizations in to help with the food situation. In fact, this country doesn't need any of your help, especially since in recent years humanitarian aid has not reached more than $25 million a year (that's one dollar per person per year).

The DRRK could have fully coped with its problems if there were no sanctions imposed on it. Lift the sanctions or ease them at least partially, give North Koreans an opportunity to legally export their coal, iron ore and seafood. Allow them to open a bank account, and deposit a well-earned $2 billion so they could pay for 500,000 tons of grain, 300,000 tons of fertilizer, 100,000 tons of diesel fuel, 50,000 tons of pesticides, tractors and harvesters.

Make customs officers authorize bringing these goods to the DPRK, and do not harass foreign manufacturers, suppliers and transporters for maintaining ties with North Korea. Then the issue of DPRK people's nutrition will be solved in the shortest possible time!

But we understand that the West will never let this happen. Because the worse it is here, the better it is for them. Because the West wants to make the life of the people of North Korea as difficult as possible, stoke up grievances against the authorities, provoke protests and (this is a golden dream!) finally give rise to social upheavals, overthrow the political system and achieve the overarching goal of destroying the DPRK as a sovereign state.

By the way, the West is trying to do the same in my country. That won't work either in Russia or in DPRK.

Edited by [redacted]

Source: https://www.nknews.org/2023/06/russian-ambassador-rejects-reports-of-famine-in-north-korea-corpses-on-streets/

Annex 82: Excerpts from previous Panel reports on humanitarian factors

S/2019/171, paragraph 176

176. Member States, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations have expressed concern that despite the exemption clauses and the Committee's efforts, United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations continue to experience unintended consequences on their humanitarian programmes that make it impossible to operate normally in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The six main areas of concern communicated to the Panel are: delays in receiving exemptions; the collapse of the banking channel; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in willing foreign suppliers; the increased cost of humanitarian-related items and operations; and diminished funding for operations (see annexes 85–87). These are negatively affecting their ability to implement humanitarian-related programmes. In particular, the sectoral sanctions are affecting the delivery of a number of humanitarian-sensitive items (see ibid.). For the Panel's assessment of adverse humanitarian consequences of sanctions for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, see annex 85.

S/2019/691, paragraph 83

83. In its previous final report, the Panel identified six main areas of concern communicated by United Nations agencies and humanitarian operations in which unintended consequences had adversely affected the operation of their humanitarian programmes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (S/2019/171, para. 176). Two leading concerns were delays in receiving exemptions from the Committee and the collapse of the banking channel. On 6 August 2018, the Committee adopted "Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7: guidelines for obtaining exemptions to deliver humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".[48] While the average time between the receipt and approval of exemption requests has been significantly reduced,[49] there has been no restoration of a banking channel. This, together with the practice by financial institutions of rejecting all transactions tied up to high-risk jurisdictions, has continued to hinder the programmes of United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations, with adverse consequences for the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

[48] Available at www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718_implementation_assistance_notice_7.pdf.

[49] From February 2019 to the time of writing, the Committee granted 16 approvals. Information about the exemptions approved by the Committee are posted on the website. See www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/exemptions-measures/humanitarian-exemption-requests.

S/2020/151, paragraph 209

209. There can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations, although access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic factors within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the latest United Nations sanctions could exacerbate an already difficult situation in the country for those employed in sectors directly or indirectly affected by sanctions, as well as potentially disrupting supplies of necessities to the civilian population. The unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following:

- The disappearance of, or a decrease in, sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by United Nations sanctions and for repatriated overseas workers; this effect may be up to hundreds of millions of dollars, based on rough estimates[200] (see annex 68).
- An increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, including the "new market economy", in some cases channelling these resources to purposes other than the needs of the population.
- Continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization in agriculture, which can limit harvest windows and compound food insecurity caused by adverse environmental conditions and mismanagement of domestic resources (see annex 69).
- Increases in the disruption of medical supply chains, which can significantly impact the chronically underfunded and inadequate health-care system in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
- The collapse of the United Nations banking channel and the subsequent lack of access to consistent and reliable financing jeopardizes supply chain operations and results in projects being suspended or stopped altogether. It has also created risky situations for humanitarian personnel.
- Financial institutions and private-sector entities continue to refrain from transactions tied to a high-risk jurisdiction. Moreover, some financial institutions draw no distinction between United Nations and unilateral sanctions. This affects the humanitarian operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the United Nations and other organizations, to include increased costs.

[200] Estimates from the Bank of Korea (see https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/main/contents.do?menuNo=200091, webpage in Korean).

S/2020/840, paragraphs 156-158 and 160

156. As the Panel has previously noted, it is difficult to disambiguate United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic and political factors, but there can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation and aid operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.[97] Additionally, according to a Member State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "government policy lockdown measures – enacted early in response to [COVID-19-related] low capability for health preparedness – have hit the economy in a way that sanctions alone do not appear to have".

157. The Panel notes that several non-governmental organizations have concerns about United Nations sanctions affecting the civilian population. One concern, for example, is how sanctions may further constrain limited agricultural resources (for example, transportation, machinery and production of fertilizers) and the allocation of financial resources for food imports, leading to reduced food "availability" (that is, decreasing food security). This effect is further compounded by the political priorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which have reduced "accessibility" through the redirection of needed resources.

158. According to some assessments, sectoral sanctions may result in negative social and economic consequences for those employed in those sectors, including loss of income.[98] The extent of this effect, however, is largely unknown as there is no accurate compilation of economic data and the fiscal and monetary policy priorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may also have a significant impact. There is also a concern about lost wages for repatriated workers, especially those who may have been affected by COVID-19-related quarantine measures.

…

160. The concern of financial institutions and private-sector entities over compliance with sanctions regimes continued to affect humanitarian operations. The efforts to restore the banking channel for United Nations humanitarian organizations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and provide access to consistent and reliable financing continued with marginal progress owing to the pandemic, jeopardizing supply chain operations and also creating risky situations for humanitarian personnel.

[97] For the Panel's most recent reporting, see S/2020/151, sect. VI.

[98] Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, media statement, Geneva/Seoul, 9 June 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25929&LangID=E.

S/2021/211, paragraphs 168-171

168. United Nations agencies, Member States and non-governmental organizations describe the evolving humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as dire and rapidly deteriorating. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, environmental disasters, sanctions and the mismanagement of social and economic policies have exacerbated food shortages,[141] led to price spikes and panic buying and further limited the availability of medical supplies and services.[142]

169. Given these factors, in addition to the scarcity of accurate data, the Panel is unable to make a quantitative assessment of the unintended consequences of United Nations sanctions[143] but notes that during the reporting period sanctions likely had unintended effects affecting civilian population.

170. According to two Member States, the unintended consequences of United Nations sanctions were as follows:

- Limitations on fuel imports negatively influenced energy security,[144] production of electricity,[145] civil transport and agriculture, and resulted in ecological problems like deforestation
- Constraints on agricultural resources, e.g. transportation services, imports of machinery and production of fertilizers, led to reduced food "availability"[146]
- The health care, sanitation and hygiene spheres were negatively affected by import restrictions on medical equipment and its supplements[147]
- Sectoral sanctions caused an estimated loss of at least 200,000 jobs, resulting in a disappearance of income and a rise in hidden unemployment
- The repatriation of workers has led to the loss of income and adverse socioeconomic conditions. Such workers were mostly sent to do construction work in remote mountainous regions, practically without pay, and some faced a debt crisis because of the abrupt termination of their earnings.

[141] A Member State conveyed to the Panel that the public distribution system quota as of October 2020 had been reduced to 545 grams.
[142] See annex 98 for the statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the humanitarian crisis in that country.
[143] Two experts have different views on this.
[144] According to research materials (http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Refined-Products-Balance-Thru-July-22-2020-SR-PDF.pdf), imported fuel is predominantly used in the civilian sector (see annex 97).
[145] According to the Member States: "Amid growing scarcity of hydrocarbons in the country, many thermoelectric power stations suspended their operation".
[146] According to the Member States: "Unable to use the fuel-consuming farming equipment, Korean farmers are forced back to implement less effective methods (up to using draught cattle and manual labour)".
[147] The Member State notes that "health-care problems grow out of import restrictions on medical equipment and its supplements related to coercive measures and of a deficit of foreign currency due to export restrictions".

171. Two additional Member States reported to the Panel that their analyses indicate that the trajectory of economic mismanagement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including "white elephant" projects and the diversion of resources, not sanctions, has been the primary driver of agricultural declines, food insecurity and inadequate health and medical services. The Member States further noted the following:

- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to prioritize the stability and continuity of the Kim family regime over all other national priorities, including health and medical services and food security
- The vast majority of the income that nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea earn abroad is retained by the State-owned enterprises that employ them, so the regime is the primary beneficiary of their labour. Additionally, any "social benefit" derived from overseas workers is hampered by strict living conditions that are controlled and monitored;
- Agricultural and enterprise reforms were publicly launched months after Kim Jong Un took power in 2012 and rolled back almost immediately afterwards, nearly five years before the Security Council unanimously implemented sectoral sanctions and bans on overseas workers in 2017
- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has politicized humanitarian assistance. It is only accepting aid in areas that the Korea Workers' Party considers a priority, and it is only accepting aid from countries that do not pose an ideological problem for the regime or demand procedures that minimize diversion. Moreover, the aid has "almost certainly" been diverted to meet the needs of the leadership, ultimately reducing the incentive for meaningful economic reform.
- The regime has focused all its energy on hastily building a showcase hospital in the heart of the capital city. Construction was started, apparently, without a comprehensive plan for even completing the building and was rushed to meet an artificial political deadline, which was not met.

S/2021/777, paragraphs 174-178

174. United Nations agencies, Member States and non-governmental organizations continue to characterize the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as deteriorating. In April 2021, Kim Jong Un underscored the severity of the country's economic situation, noting that "the people's food situation is now getting tense as the agricultural sector failed to fulfil its grain production plan due to the damage by typhoon last year",[118] and the situation was officially described as a "food crisis",[119] which official data support.[120] This admission coincided with an unusual price volatility for many consumer commodities, food shortages, a drop in access to goods and services, panic buying and a further decrease in the availability of medical supplies and services. The Panel attributes the following as factors contributing to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

(a) Measures related to the prevention of COVID-19, including border closures since January 2020 and the virtual cessation of consumer imports, declines in export earnings and strict limits on the ability to purchase food and other essential goods;

(b) Continuing restrictions related to United Nations sanctions: In its previous reports, the Panel assessed that these restrictions, such as limitations on the importation of fuel, machinery and spare parts, had unintended effects on energy security, civil transport, agriculture, health care, sanitation and hygiene. Although the Panel is unable to make a quantitative assessment of this impact and further notes that its relative impact has probably decreased due to the country's border closures, travel limitations and import restrictions, the Panel does assess that in the reporting period, sanctions likely have had some unintended effects and would continue to have negative humanitarian consequences after the borders are opened;[121]

(c) Attempts to increase centralized control over the economy and further limitations on market activity (for example, restricting domestic sales of consumer goods other than food), resulting in the loss of stimulus for individuals' economic activities.

[118] Remarks made by Kim Jong Un during the Workers' Party Central Committee plenum in June, which is traditionally a period when the depletion of food stocks is at its lowest. See "Kim Jong Un admits food security issues as party plenum event kicks off", *NK News*, 19 August 2021, available at www.nknews.org/2021/06/party-plenum-event-kicks-off-kim-jong-un-admits-food-security-issues.

[119] "North Korea admits 'food crisis,' says grain to be distributed to population", *NK News*, 20 June 2021. Available at www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korea-admits-food-crisis-says-grain-to-be-distributed-to-population/.

[120] According to the information officially provided by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, "the production in 2018 was about 4.95 million tons, the lowest during the last 10 years", and experts estimate a food shortage of around 1.3 million tons in 2021. See also "N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018", *The Korea Herald*, 14 July 2021. Available at http://www01.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20210714000330.

[121] Two experts are of the view that there can be little doubt that United Nations sanctions have had unintended effects on the humanitarian situation. Another expert notes that there is no evidence to support the assessment that sanctions have had an effect on the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

175. The Panel continued to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions on humanitarian operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In May 2021, the Panel surveyed 38 United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations that applied for exemptions to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), either directly or indirectly[122] (see annexes 65 (1) to 65 (3) for a summary of responses).

176. Responding organizations noted little or no improvement in their ability to conduct humanitarian aid operations since the border closures in January 2020.[123] Most organizations no longer have in-country personnel and lack access to information, making independent monitoring impossible. Continued restrictions on movement for the few remaining personnel have weakened relationships with local officials. This decreased transparency makes it increasingly difficult to seek new funding. Organizations are struggling to maintain overhead costs in the absence of ongoing projects.

177. With respect to sanctions' impact on humanitarian aid, the main areas of concern for the organizations are delays in receiving exemptions; the absence of a stable banking channel, which ultimately increases administrative costs and risks; delays in customs clearance; a decrease in the willingness of foreign suppliers; increased costs of humanitarian-related items and operations; de-risking by financial institutions; and diminished funding for operations. One organization noted: "The legal expertise required to understand the information involved in the sanction mechanisms and the absence of a direct channel for resident INGOs to communicate with the UNSC Sanctions Committee has, on some occasions, proven detrimental to other tasks and responsibilities." Complicated customs procedures create significant delays, despite the imports having received the proper exemptions. Suppliers to aid groups have stopped submitting offers, specifically noting the challenge with customs authorities.[124] According to another organization, the "secondary boycott" measures have prevented bank transactions for payments for humanitarian supplies purchases and vessels to enter ports in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, as a result, Democratic People's Republic of Korea counterparts have given up on humanitarian projects for the country. Shipping and logistical delays have also been attributed to both sanctions compliance and customs enforcement.

178. The Panel recognizes the importance of humanitarian aid as the country recovers from the pandemic and underscores the need for Member States to ensure that humanitarian aid to the country proceeds unhindered, consistent with the relevant resolutions. The exemption process, which has improved considerably since the start of pandemic, should be further streamlined and made more transparent and understandable.

[122] See S/2021/211, paras. 173–174 and annex 99 (a) for a summary of previous survey responses.

[123] According to one organization, measures imposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have resulted in a shortage of domestic production, ultimately affecting the civilian population.

[124] Since 2018, the price of goods for humanitarian projects has increased, sometimes by as much as 25 per cent, ultimately putting pressure on the operating budgets of aid organizations.

S/2022/132, paragraphs. 187-190

187. The Panel's analysis, however, focuses on the unintended impact of the United Nations sanctions. Access to data and evidence is limited and there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates the effects of United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic problems.

188. However, there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation and the right to development,[136] exacerbating the problems caused by the inward-looking centralized economic mismanagement by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Although the influence of sanctions is not the most important factor in the dismal humanitarian situation, it has not been negligible (see figure XLVI). As a result of the Security Council resolutions in 2016 and 2017, export and currency earnings declined, trans-border financial operations stopped and transportation encountered growing limitations, while foreign economic and financial entities started to avoid risks of any operations involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This contributed to limiting the ability of the country to legally acquire humanitarian necessities and medical commodities, and the degradation of social services including health care (see annex 87; see also annex 88 for the Panel's pre-pandemic analysis of the possible factors of sanctions impact on humanitarian sphere).

Figure XLVI
United Nations sanctions as one of several factors causing humanitarian problems (examples)
(Factors retrospective since 2018 (after Security Council resolutions), outcomes 2020–2021)



Source: The Panel.

[136] This right for nation States is enshrined in the Declaration on the Right to Development, see General Assembly resolution 41/128, annex; and A/41/53. See also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Discussion paper: implications of the Right to Development for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other United Nations Member States", August 2021, p. 11, in which it was proclaimed that "sanctions should always take full account of the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx.

189. Any negative humanitarian effect of the sanctions is probably long-term and is not directly linked to COVID-related isolation. The Panel notes the comments on these issues by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Tomás Quintana.[137] In October 2021, China and the Russian Federation submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for the relaxation of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-related sanctions, citing the absence of nuclear and long-range missile testing by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 2017.[138,139]

190. International aid operations that have contributed to mitigating the above-mentioned negative effects have currently been drastically reduced. To assess the impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on humanitarian operations, the Panel surveyed around 40 organizations (including both United Nations and non-governmental aid organizations), most of which had applied for exemption requests, either directly to the Committee, through the United Nations Resident Coordinator or through a Member State (for the list of questions, see annex 89).[140] The following analysis is based mostly on the information received (see annex 90):

- Limitations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of all cross-border movements have complicated humanitarian operations. Most organizations had to suspend both implementation and monitoring efforts in 2021. Some retain a small local presence after the departure of international staff
- The absence of a banking channel is continuing to be a major issue leading to the depletion of cash reserves[141]
- The organizations are not very optimistic about the possibility of resuming their operations even when and if the borders are reopened

[137] The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Tomás Quintana, noted in October 2021 that "sanctions imposed by the Security Council should be reviewed and eased when necessary both to facilitate humanitarian and life-saving assistance and to enable the promotion of the right to an adequate standard of living of ordinary citizens" (A/76/392).

[138] See www.nknews.org/2021/10/china-and-russia-submit-proposal-to-ease-un-sanctions-on-north-korea-sources.

[139] Four experts object to this sentence, believing that the reports of the Panel are not a place for political statements.

[140] Responses to the Panel's inquiry were optional and had no bearing on the exemption approval processes.

[141] World Food Programme (WFP), "WFP DPR Korea country brief", December 2021. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP-0000135453.pdf.

S/2022/668, paragraphs. 163-166

163. Although difficult to specify precisely, the Panel has previously concluded that there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation and the right to development, even as the relative influence of sanctions has probably lessened after 2020.[148]

164. Although it concentrates on analysing the influence of United Nations sanctions, the Panel notes that the dismal humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is probably the result of a number of factors, including a lack of resources and capital, low productivity, the prioritization of heavy industry and military needs, which dwarf the consumer sector, the country's internal decision-making, a failed centralized planning system, frequent natural calamities, self-isolation, a lack of export earnings and import capacity and the closure of borders because of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effect of sanctions.

165. The direct impact on the humanitarian situation of the COVID-19 outbreak (referred to by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as "fever"), which reportedly started in the country in April 2022, is difficult to assess. The illness was estimated by July to have affected around 25 per cent of the population, but very few lethal cases were reported (although some sources suspect underreporting).

166. Prior to the pandemic, the medical system of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was already in a dilapidated state due to a number of factors (see para. 164) and the country reportedly imported only a limited supply of medical commodities (see annex 71), most of them through aid channels. Disaggregating the impact of United Nations sanctions from these other factors is difficult. The Panel has calculated that in 2020 and 2021, with the borders closed, the country imported COVID-19-related medical goods amounting to approximately $1.87 per person.[149]

[148] S/2022/132, para. 188.

[149] This figure is calculated on the basis of the population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and ITC data on the country's COVID-19-related imports (see annex 71).

S/2023/171, paragraphs 179-180

179. Although difficult to specify precisely, and based on its previous conclusions[163] and information from humanitarian actors, the Panel is of the view that there can be little doubt that the United Nations sanctions have unintentionally affected the humanitarian situation, even as the relative influence of sanctions has probably lessened after 2020.[164]

180. The responses provided to the Panel by the humanitarian organizations reflect the difficulties presented by continued closed borders, as well as differing opinions about the impact of United Nations sanctions and the Committee on their work. They noted that COVID-19-related restrictions and the absence of a banking channel enabling humanitarian operations were particular concerns.[165]

[163] S/2020/151, para. 209; S/2021/777, para. 174; S/2022/132, paras. 188 and 189; and S/2022/668, paras. 121 and 122 and annexes 51 and 52.

[164] In S/2020/151, para. 209, before the pandemic, the Panel concluded that the unintended consequences of sanctions on the humanitarian needs of the civil population might include the following: the decrease in sources of livelihood for those employed in industries affected by sanctions; the increase in social marginalization as the elites respond to both United Nations and other sanctions by increasing control over scarce resources, in some cases channelling those resources to purposes other than the needs of the population; continued shortages of agricultural equipment and lack of fuel, exacerbating already low levels of mechanization of agriculture; and increases in the disruption of medical supply chains.

[165] In interviews with non-governmental organizations, the Panel learned that internal debts within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea weighed heavily on organizations because of their inability to pay rent for their buildings, purchase new supplies of aid and pay salaries to employees, some of whose contracts needed to be terminated owing to a lack of funds, or who simply left the organization. It should be noted that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, without publicizing, does carry the burden of the local expenses for the operation of the humanitarian assistance representative offices, showing a degree of interest in continuing cooperation for obtaining humanitarian assistance without requesting it.

Annex 83: Consolidated list of recommendations

Trade Statistics and Customs Issues

1. The Panel emphasizes its previous recommendations that:

(a) Appropriate measures be taken by the International Organization for Standardization and Member States, including outreach activities to respective customs authorities, to prevent erroneous usage of country codes;

(b) Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supporting material the informal list of prohibited commodities (see annex 50);

(c) Customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, in particular when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;

(d) With regard to Member States requiring assistance with the implementation of the sectoral ban, the Committee consider information outreach.

Luxury Goods Ban

2. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact.

3. The Panel recommends that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals involved in exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prohibit forwarding to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Overseas Workers

4. The Panel reminds Member States that there is no humanitarian or health services exemption to the requirement, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2397 (2017), to repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals overseas earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad, unless the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law.

Finance

5. The Panel encourages Member States to be vigilant regarding Democratic People's Republic of Korea financial sanctions evasion through the use, by United Nations-designated entities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, of front and subordinate companies. The Panel also encourages Member State provision of company names and other identifying data to the Panel and/or Committee, as appropriate.

6. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States implement as soon as possible the Financial Action Task Force guidance on virtual assets and virtual asset service providers, including full implementation of the revised recommendation 15 (and the "Travel Rule").

7. The Panel further recommends that Member States consider more active outreach to the virtual asset industry to ensure a broad awareness of Democratic People's Republic of Korea cyber-enabled thefts of virtual assets, as well as appropriate measures to defend against and respond to such attacks.

Unintended Humanitarian Effects of Sanctions

8. The Panel values the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations entities on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.

9. The Panel once again stresses the urgency of re-establishing a durable banking channel for humanitarian operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

10. The Panel recommends that, in the context of implementation of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), the United Nations system, including the Committee, take into account information provided by humanitarian actors on the mitigation of the potential adverse impact of United Nations sanctions on the civilian population and on humanitarian assistance in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

11. The Panel reiterates its previous recommendations that:

- **(a) The Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations;**
- **(b) The Committee and other relevant stakeholders continue to practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies;**
- **(c) The Committee consider more active outreach with civil society providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK to help to implement Security Council resolution 2664 (2022);**
- **(d) The Committee practically consider the idea of renewable and standing exemptions for humanitarian aid actors and humanitarian-related commodities.**