



## Consejo de Seguridad

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### Nota de la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad

En el párrafo 2 de la resolución [2627 \(2022\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución [1874 \(2009\)](#) que le presentara un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. Por consiguiente, la Presidencia remite adjunto el informe que le envió el Grupo de Expertos (véase el anexo).



## Anexo

### **Carta de fecha 2 de septiembre de 2022 dirigida a la Presidencia del Consejo de Seguridad por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)**

El Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad tiene el honor de remitir por la presente, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2627 (2022) del Consejo, el informe de mitad de período sobre su labor.

El informe se presentó al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) el 3 de agosto de 2022, y el Comité lo examinó el 26 de agosto de 2022.

El Grupo agradecería que la presente carta y el informe se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

## Apéndice

### **Carta de fecha 3 de agosto de 2022 dirigida a la Presidencia del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) por el Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009)**

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Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad

## *Resumen*

Durante el período sobre el que se informa, la República Popular Democrática de Corea realizó preparativos en su polígono de ensayos nucleares, si bien no llevó a cabo ningún ensayo de dispositivos nucleares. En el primer semestre de 2022, el país continuó acelerando sus programas de misiles (proceso iniciado en septiembre de 2021), habiendo realizado 31 lanzamientos de misiles que combinaban tecnologías balísticas y de guía, incluidos seis ensayos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales y dos misiles que describió explícitamente como armas balísticas, en franca violación de las sanciones impuestas por las Naciones Unidas. Además, la República Popular Democrática de Corea afirmó haber avanzado en el desarrollo de “armas nucleares tácticas”.

Una cierta relajación del bloqueo del país en respuesta a la enfermedad por coronavirus (COVID-19) dio lugar a envíos ferroviarios transfronterizos a principios de 2022. Sin embargo, un presunto brote de COVID-19 en el país en abril y mayo hizo que se renovara la estricta restricción de la circulación transfronteriza.

Continuaron las importaciones ilícitas de petróleo y las exportaciones ilícitas de carbón. Aunque se notificó al Grupo de Expertos la aplicación de nuevas metodologías para la importación de petróleo y se investigaron nuevos buques, en general las mismas entidades, redes y buques continuaron evadiendo sin estorbos las sanciones valiéndose de las mismas metodologías y en los mismos lugares. Continuó la ofuscación de las estructuras de propiedad y el uso indebido de los sistemas de identificación automática, al tiempo que la flota de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió adquiriendo buques.

Las investigaciones muestran que el país siguió realizando actividades cibernéticas, entre ellas dos grandes operaciones de piratería informática en 2022, al menos una de ellas atribuida a agentes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que dieron lugar al robo de criptoactivos por valor de cientos de millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos. Otras actividades cibernéticas se centraron en el robo de información y en medios más tradicionales para obtener información y materiales de valor para los programas prohibidos del país, en particular los relativos a la fabricación de armas de destrucción masiva.

Según los organismos de las Naciones Unidas, persiste la crisis humanitaria en el país, probablemente exacerbada por el brote de COVID-19. El alcance de esa crisis y el papel relativo que en ella desempeñan los efectos de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas son extremadamente difíciles de evaluar con precisión por todos los interesados, incluido el Grupo. Sin embargo, no cabe duda de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas han tenido efectos no deseados en la situación humanitaria.

El Grupo de Expertos reitera su agradecimiento a los Estados Miembros que lo apoyan de forma constructiva en el cumplimiento de su mandato y alienta a quienes puedan hacer más a que lo hagan.



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\* Los anexos se distribuyen únicamente en el idioma en que fueron presentados y sin revisión editorial oficial.

## I. Introducción

1. En el párrafo 2 de su resolución 2627 (2022), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó al Grupo de Expertos establecido en virtud de la resolución 1874 (2009) que presentara al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución 1718 (2006) un informe de mitad de período con sus conclusiones y recomendaciones. El presente informe abarca el período comprendido entre el 29 de enero y el 27 de julio de 2022.

## II. Actividades recientes relacionadas con el programa nuclear y el programa de misiles balísticos

### Programa nuclear

2. La República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió desarrollando su capacidad de producción de material nuclear fisible en el polígono de Yongbyon. El Grupo observó que en marzo de 2022 el país había comenzado la reexcavación en la entrada del Túnel 3 (también conocido como Portal Sur) en el polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri y había reconstruido los edificios de apoyo desmantelados en mayo de 2018. El 6 de junio de 2022, el Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica declaró que “habían observado indicios de que se había procedido a la reapertura de uno de los pozos, posiblemente en preparación de un ensayo nuclear” (véase el anexo 1).

3. En enero de 2022, el Buró Político del Comité Central del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea anunció que “examinaría sin demora la cuestión de la reanudación de todas las actividades suspendidas temporalmente”, lo que implica una posible reanudación de los ensayos nucleares y de misiles balísticos intercontinentales. Los trabajos en el polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri allanan el camino para la realización de nuevos ensayos nucleares para el desarrollo de armas nucleares, objetivo declarado en el Octavo Congreso del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea en enero de 2021 (véase el anexo 2).

### *Polígono de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri (véase el anexo 3)*

4. La República Popular Democrática de Corea ha procedido a la reapertura de su infraestructura de ensayos nucleares, incluidos el túnel de ensayos y los edificios de apoyo (véanse las figuras I a III), que se habían desmantelado en mayo de 2018. El Grupo ha observado actividades de reexcavación en torno a una entrada secundaria del Túnel 3, que parecía estar relativamente intacta incluso después del proceso de desmantelamiento (véase la figura IV). El análisis de las imágenes de satélite mostró un aumento del número de huellas de vehículos en torno a esa entrada secundaria a partir de mediados de febrero de 2022, a lo que siguió la construcción de un nuevo edificio adyacente a la entrada a principios de marzo. Alrededor de la misma fecha también se detectó una pila de madera, para su posible uso en la construcción de la estructura del túnel<sup>1</sup>. El Grupo corroboró la observación de un centro de estudios sobre una estructura cuadrada, que parecía ser la entrada de un túnel, la cual se hizo visible a finales de marzo<sup>2</sup>. Al mismo tiempo se observaron montículos de tierra de la excavación del túnel alrededor de la entrada<sup>3</sup>.

5. En abril y mayo de 2022 se observó la construcción intensiva de edificios de apoyo cerca de la nueva entrada del túnel y en la zona administrativa principal. Imágenes de satélite muestran posibles cables desde la entrada del túnel hasta lo que pudiera ser un compresor o una central de bombeo desde finales de abril. El Grupo y varios expertos consultados por el Grupo consideran que los cables tienen varios fines

<sup>1</sup> Basado en la información proporcionada por un experto externo consultado por el Grupo.

<sup>2</sup> Véase <https://opennuclear.org/publication/developments-dprks-punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-december-2021>.


<sup>3</sup> Véase [www.38north.org/2022/03/punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-probably-spoil-at-the-south-portal](http://www.38north.org/2022/03/punggye-ri-nuclear-test-site-probably-spoil-at-the-south-portal).

posibles, entre otros de ventilación, transmisión eléctrica y comunicación. Según un Estado Miembro, se han detectado ensayos de dispositivos de activación nuclear, aunque el Grupo no ha podido identificar las fechas y los lugares en que se llevaron a cabo los ensayos. A principios de junio, dos Estados Miembros determinaron que la preparación de los ensayos nucleares estaba en su fase final.

6. El análisis del Grupo corroboró los informes de actividades de construcción de carreteras cerca del Túnel 4 (también conocido como Portal Occidental) a mediados de junio de 2022<sup>4</sup>.

Figura I

**Zona de ensayos nucleares de Punggye-ri (Túnel 3, 41°16'35"N 129°05'18"E)**



Fuente: Google Earth Pro, 12 de octubre de 2018.

Figura II

**Primer plano de los portales y de la zona administrativa principal (41°16'41"N 129°05'16"E)**



Fuente: Google Earth Pro, 12 de octubre de 2018.

<sup>4</sup> Véase <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/new-activity-at-punggye-ri-tunnel-no-4>.


Figura III  
Imágenes anteriores (mayo de 2018) y recientes del túnel 3  
(41°16'35"N 129°05'18"E)



Fuente: Planet Labs. 31 de mayo de 2018 y 17 de mayo de 2022.



Figura IV  
Demolición del túnel 3 el 24 de mayo de 2018 (41°16'35"N 129°05'18"E)



Fuente: Planet Labs. 19 de mayo de 2018 y 31 de mayo de 2018; y Sky News.

*Polígono de Yongbyon*

7. El Grupo no ha observado actividades significativas en el emplazamiento del reactor de agua ligera, aunque desde marzo de 2022 se han construido dos nuevos edificios en la zona sur del reactor. Se desconoce la finalidad de los edificios (véase el anexo 4)<sup>5</sup>.

8. Según pudo determinar un Estado Miembro, el reactor de 5 MW e) ha seguido funcionando. Imágenes de satélite mostraron la continua descarga de agua de refrigeración del reactor desde julio de 2021<sup>6</sup>. Se han observado vehículos, incluido un camión azul que probablemente sea un camión cisterna de dióxido de carbono, alrededor del reactor (véase el anexo 5).

9. Según un Estado Miembro, se han observado continuas retiradas de materiales de construcción del emplazamiento de 50 MW e). Imágenes de satélite de abril a julio de 2022 mostraron la retirada de un tejado de uno de los edificios del reactor. Un centro de estudios informó de la construcción “de la conexión del bucle de refrigeración secundario del reactor de 50 MW e)” en mayo de 2022<sup>7</sup>. El Grupo corroboró esa actividad, aunque es necesario un seguimiento adicional para determinar su finalidad (véase el anexo 6).

10. Imágenes observadas por el Grupo muestran la actividad de los vehículos en el laboratorio radioquímico desde marzo de 2022. El 6 de junio de 2022 el Director General del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica declaró que se habían detectado indicios de actividad en el laboratorio compatibles con actividades de tratamiento de desechos o mantenimiento<sup>8</sup>. El Grupo también observó humo esporádico procedente de la central térmica, aunque su importancia sigue sin estar clara (véase el anexo 7)<sup>9</sup>.

11. Las labores de construcción en la zona adyacente a la instalación de enriquecimiento por centrifugación de Yongbyon parecen haber concluido<sup>10</sup>. Entre abril y mayo de 2022 se observaron columnas de vapor en el edificio de producción de dióxido de uranio, lo que probablemente sea señal de una producción continua de materiales nucleares fisibles (véase el anexo 8).

*Mina de uranio y planta de concentración de uranio de Pyongsan*

12. La mina y la planta siguen funcionando. El Grupo observó la expansión de las pilas de residuos en una de las minas y desechos sólidos en el depósito de decantación de residuos situado al sur de la planta de concentración. Se ha observado con regularidad la actividad de los vagones en la planta (véase el anexo 9).

*Otros emplazamientos*

13. El Grupo ha observado una actividad continua de vehículos en torno a Kangson<sup>11</sup>, presunta instalación clandestina de enriquecimiento de uranio, pero no se ha detectado ninguna otra actividad significativa en ese lugar (véase el anexo 10). El Grupo observó continuas actividades de excavación en dos valles situados aproximadamente a 3 km al oeste y a 3 km al sur de la zona de almacenamiento

<sup>5</sup> S/2022/132, para. 3 y anexo 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, párr. 4 y anexo 4.

<sup>7</sup> Véase [www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1215802/new-construction-at-yongbyon](http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1215802/new-construction-at-yongbyon).

<sup>8</sup> Un experto externo consultado por el Grupo convino en que las actividades posiblemente guardasen relación con el tratamiento de desechos y el mantenimiento y que era poco probable que las actividades de reprocesamiento estuvieran en marcha en marzo de 2022.

<sup>9</sup> S/2021/777, párr. 5 y anexo 5.

<sup>10</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 7 y anexo 7.

<sup>11</sup> S/2021/777, párr. 9 y anexo 10.

principal de Yongdokong, que se cree que está relacionada con el programa de armamento nuclear de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, inclusive como instalación de almacenamiento de armas nucleares (véase el anexo 11)<sup>12</sup>.

### **Transferencia intangible de tecnología y actividades de universidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea**

14. El Grupo ha continuado su investigación sobre la transferencia intangible de tecnología en la que participan científicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en determinados ámbitos contemplados en el párrafo 11 de la resolución [2321 \(2016\)](#). Un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo de que había estudiantes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en el extranjero que enviaban información al país por orden de organizaciones militares y departamentos gubernamentales responsables de la ciencia, la tecnología y la economía.

15. El Grupo continuó investigando los intercambios académicos entre la Universidad de Ciencia y Tecnología de Pyongyang y universidades extranjeras<sup>13</sup>. El Grupo remitió consultas a las siete universidades e institutos de investigación extranjeros a los que desde 2016 la Universidad de Ciencia y Tecnología de Pyongyang ha enviado estudiantes de doctorado, maestría y estudios conjuntos. La investigación de dos estudiantes de una universidad del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, que tienen previsto terminar su doctorado en 2023-2024, quedaba “comprendida en las disposiciones relativas a la investigación médica”. Dos estudiantes de doctorado en una universidad sueca terminaron sus cursos de investigación en ciencias de la vida en 2019 y 2020, respectivamente. En cuanto a los estudiantes de dos universidades y un instituto de investigación de China, esta respondió que “llevaba un control estricto de los cursos para estudiantes de la RPDC que estudiaban en China y adoptaba las medidas necesarias para asegurarse de que no se tocaran esferas sensibles ni información prohibida por las resoluciones” (véase el anexo 12). El Grupo está a la espera de una respuesta de las demás instituciones.

16. El Grupo investigó los posibles intercambios técnicos entre la Universidad Tecnológica Kim Chaek e International Global Systems (M) Sdn. Bhd. e International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd. en Kuala Lumpur, que parecían ser empresas pantalla de Pan Systems Pte. Ltd. (también conocida como Glocom)<sup>14</sup>. Malasia declaró que esas empresas habían cesado sus operaciones en julio de 2011 y febrero de 2014 y que se habían disuelto en enero de 2019 y junio de 2018, respectivamente. También explicó que “las autoridades malasias no disponían de información sobre ningún posible intercambio técnico entre [la Universidad Tecnológica Kim Chaek] y [las empresas] que estuviese relacionado con el programa nuclear [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea]” y confirmó que “actualmente ningún nacional [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] vivía o trabajaba en Malasia”. El Grupo espera recibir más información sobre los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajaban para esas empresas (véase el párr. 108, bajo Embargos).

### **Misiles balísticos**

17. El programa de misiles balísticos ha seguido acelerándose desde principios de 2022<sup>15, 16</sup>, habiendo alcanzado una intensidad, una diversidad y una capacidad operacional sin precedentes, tanto en lo que respecta a los propios ensayos de misiles

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, párr. 10 y anexo 11, y [S/2022/132](#), párr. 12 y anexo 11.

<sup>13</sup> [S/2022/132](#), párr. 14 y anexos 13 a 16.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, párr. 15 y anexo 17.


<sup>15</sup> Anteriormente se había informado hasta el 17 de enero ([S/2022/132](#), párr. 17).

<sup>16</sup> En opinión de dos de los expertos, no existen pruebas suficientes para determinar la naturaleza y la tecnología de los proyectiles lanzados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea mencionados en ese párrafo.

balísticos como a la estrategia de comunicación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en relación con esos misiles (véanse las figuras V a XVIII y el cuadro 1).

Figura V

**Lanzamientos de misiles balísticos o de misiles en que se combinan la tecnología balística y tecnología de guía durante el período comprendido entre el 5 de mayo de 2019 y el 27 de julio de 2022<sup>17</sup>**



Fuente: El Grupo.

<sup>17</sup> Desde 2018, el 86 % de los misiles balísticos probados han utilizado motores de propulsión sólida y el 14 % han utilizado propelentes líquidos. De ellos, el 82 % eran misiles balísticos de corto alcance, el 4 % eran misiles balísticos lanzados submarinos, el 5 % misiles balísticos de mediano alcance y misiles balísticos de alcance intermedio y el 8 % misiles balísticos intercontinentales. Alrededor del 90 % de todos los misiles balísticos de propulsión líquida se lanzaron en 2022.



18. Los dos acontecimientos recientes más importantes, subrayados por la propia República Popular Democrática de Corea, son la rápida y observable aceleración del programa de misiles balísticos intercontinentales<sup>18</sup> y una supuesta nueva participación del programa de misiles balísticos de corto alcance (MBCA)<sup>19</sup> en el desarrollo de la capacidad operacional nuclear táctica.

19. Esa tendencia se ajusta plenamente al impulso estratégico a los programas de armamento de la República Popular Democrática de Corea delineado en el discurso de Kim Jong Un ante el Octavo Congreso del Partido de los Trabajadores de Corea en enero de 2021<sup>20</sup> y a la estrategia de comunicación demostrada en acontecimientos como el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022 (véase el párr. 22 y las figuras VII a XVIII), así como la cobertura del ensayo de lanzamiento de misiles balísticos intercontinentales del 24 de marzo (véase el cuadro 1 y el anexo 17).

20. Basándose en la información proporcionada por varios Estados Miembros, el Grupo ha identificado los siguientes logros operacionales y tecnológicos específicos:

a) Optimización de la disponibilidad operacional de los sistemas de misiles de propulsión sólida y líquida (S/2022/132, párrs. 19 y 25 y anexos 20 y 21), mediante:

i) La utilización de “ampollas” de propelente líquido o motores de propulsión sólida en los aceleradores de refuerzo de misiles balísticos (véanse los anexos 14, 15 y 18, y S/2022/132, párrs. 23 y 24 y anexos 22 y 24);

ii) Aumento de la diversificación, la movilidad y la resistencia de los sistemas de misiles que utilizan sistemas de transportador-erector-lanzador móvil, de orugas y ferroviarios, así como submarinos (véanse los anexos 14 y 20, y S/2022/132, párrs. 19, 20 y 22 y anexos 20 a 24);

iii) Mejoras en la eficiencia de los motores de propulsión líquida, como el derivado del RD-250<sup>21, 22</sup>.

b) Innovaciones, incluidas los ensayos de nuevos sistemas vectores, como el misil balístico intercontinental supergrande Hwasong-17 (véanse los anexos 16, 16.1 y 17), cuya mayor cabeza de misil sugiere un objetivo operacional despliegue de vehículos de reentrada múltiple (o vehículos de reentrada múltiple e independiente)<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> Véase también el anexo 13.1, cuadro 1.

<sup>19</sup> Véanse también el anexo 13.2, cuadro 1), y Voice of Korea, 17 de abril de 2022: “El sistema de armas tácticas guiadas de nuevo tipo desarrollado bajo la supervisión especial del Comité Central del Partido es de gran importancia para aumentar radicalmente el poder de ataque de las unidades de artillería de largo alcance en el frente y fortalecer la eficacia de la operación nuclear táctica de la [República Popular Democrática de Corea] y la diversificación de la tarea relacionada con la potencia de fuego.”

<sup>20</sup> Véase el anexo 13.3. Los cinco objetivos militares estratégicos se están alcanzando gradualmente (S/2022/132, párr. 18).

<sup>21</sup> El RD-250 se utiliza en el misil balístico de alcance intermedio Hwasong-12 (véase el anexo 15) y en el misil hipersónico Hwasong-8, así como en los misiles balísticos intercontinentales Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 y probablemente en el Hwasong-17 (véanse los anexos 16, 17, 19 y 21, y S/2022/132, párr. 20, figuras IV a VII y anexos 20, 22 y 24).

<sup>22</sup> Según un Estado Miembro, que corroboró el análisis del Grupo, desde 2017 (S/2022/132, figura V y anexo 10, S/2021/211, anexo 10, y S/2018/171, párrs. 14 y 15), el motor de propulsión líquida RD-250 se exhibió en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021”. Ese motor se dio a conocer públicamente en ensayos estáticos en el centro de lanzamiento de satélites de Sohae en 2016/2017 y se sometió a ensayos de vuelo como motor (40 toneladas de empuje) con una sola tobera en el Hwasong-12 y el Hwasong-14. El motor también se empleó como motor de empuje de 80 toneladas con toberas dobles en el misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-15. El nuevo Hwasong-17 utiliza un par de motores RD-250 con cuatro toberas que proporcionan el empuje necesario para lanzar un misil de más de 110 toneladas.

<sup>23</sup> S/2021/211, anexo 10.

Los “vehículos planeadores hipersónicos” y un vehículo de reentrada maniobrable, que utilizan impulsores de misiles balísticos, requieren el dominio de las ciencias y la tecnología de los materiales, la miniaturización, la transmisión de señales y los sistemas de guía<sup>24</sup>. Ese dominio es necesario para los nuevos MBCA (véase el anexo 14) y los nuevos “misiles balísticos a corta distancia” (véanse los anexos 18 y 20);

c) Mayor coherencia de la capacidad de disuasión global de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, demostrada por los presuntos ensayos de sistemas de lanzamiento y control de mando de un satélite de reconocimiento, cuyas capacidades podrían contribuir a las capacidades de alerta temprana y reconocimiento óptico del país, y por la digitalización de la cartografía terrestre para actualizar los sistemas de guía de misiles (véanse los anexos 15, 16 y 16.1)<sup>25</sup>.


21. La estrategia de comunicación de la República Popular Democrática de Corea respecto de sus programas de disuasión y de armas de destrucción masiva ha sido deliberada y resuelta. El país ha revelado sus nuevas capacidades en acción, habiendo afirmado (falsamente) el 25 de marzo de 2022 el exitoso lanzamiento a plena capacidad del misil balístico intercontinental supergrande Hwasong-17 (véanse los anexos 16 y 17 y el cuadro 1, y [S/2022/132](#), figura IV) y habiendo hecho una demostración del “vehículo planeador hipersónico” Hwasong-8 ([S/2022/132](#), párr. 24 y figura VI). La estrategia ha revelado indirectamente las nuevas infraestructuras dedicadas al programa en las instalaciones del programa de misiles balísticos Sil-li (véase el anexo 17 y [S/2020/840](#), párr. 16) y ha destacado directamente el nuevo centro de control de satélites de la Administración Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial designada por las Naciones Unidas (KPe.029) (véanse los anexos 16, 17 y 23.1).

<sup>24</sup> Potencialmente a través de la transferencia intangible de tecnología. Para el informe más reciente del Grupo, véase [S/2022/132](#), párrs. 13, 19, 20 y 22 y anexos 22 y 24.

<sup>25</sup> [S/2022/132](#), párrs. 20, 24 y 25, e informes anteriores del Grupo.

Figura VI

**Lanzamientos de ensayos de misiles balísticos los días 27 y 30 de enero, 27 de febrero, 5, 16 y 24 de marzo y 16 de abril de 2022. Después de esta última fecha, la República Popular Democrática de Corea no emitió ninguna declaración ni publicó ninguna imagen fotográfica sobre las siguientes seis ensayos de misiles balísticos del 4 de mayo al 5 de junio de 2022<sup>26</sup>**




*Fuente:* Televisión Central de Corea, 28 de enero de 2022 (emisión completa, disponible en <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b>); Televisión Central de Corea, 31 de enero de 2022 (boletín de las 20.00 horas, disponible en <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f7e740a9bbf>); <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646039170-769328268/nada-academy-of-defence-science-conduct-important-test-for-developing-reconnaissance-satellite>; y Televisión Central de Corea, 25 de marzo de 2022 (disponible en <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b>).

<sup>26</sup> Se ha demostrado que la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha modificado o falsificado imágenes fotográficas en lanzamientos anteriores, supuestamente con fines propagandísticos.

22. El desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022, en conmemoración del nonagésimo aniversario del Ejército Popular de Corea, fue cuidadosamente diseñado para mostrar toda la gama de sistemas de misiles balísticos numerados de forma que sugiriera que se encontraban actualmente desplegados en unidades operativas<sup>27</sup>. A excepción de un nuevo misil balístico submarino (hasta ahora el de mayor tamaño) de la serie Pukguksong, todos los sistemas de armas expuestos se habían ensayado anteriormente.

Figura VII

**Actividad en la réplica de la zona de garajes de la Plaza Kim Il Sung, en Pyongyang, donde tuvo lugar el entrenamiento para el desfile, que revela los movimientos de vehículos militares de gran tamaño del 17 al 24 de abril de 2022. El 17 de abril de 2022 se observaron marcas negras de camiones de gran tamaño y transportadores-erectores-lanzadores en los alrededores de la zona, especialmente entre la estación de tren, los almacenes y la zona de entrenamiento (39°04'49" N 125°45'23" E)**



Fuente: Planet Labs, 17 de abril de 2022, 01.56 UTC, y 23 de abril de 2022, 01.53 UTC.

23. El misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17 (véase la figura VIII) presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022 se dio a conocer en el desfile militar del 10 de octubre de 2020 y exhibido en la exposición de misiles “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021 y la República Popular Democrática de Corea declaró que se había ensayado el 24 de marzo de 2022<sup>28</sup>. Según varios Estados Miembros, los

<sup>27</sup> Véase el anexo 23.2.

<sup>28</sup> Existen dudas sobre la naturaleza del ensayo realizado en esa fecha; el análisis demuestra que las imágenes de la Televisión Central de Corea del lanzamiento de un misil balístico intercontinental el 24 de marzo, supuestamente de un “Hwasong-17”, en realidad incorporaban imágenes del lanzamiento fallido de un misil balístico intercontinental el 16 de marzo (véase el anexo 17).



ensayos de misiles balísticos intercontinentales se reanudaron el 27 de febrero de 2022, tras un primer ensayo de lanzamiento del Hwasong-17, seguido de cuatro probables ensayos posteriores del misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17, el 5 de marzo, el 16 de marzo (fallido), el 4 de mayo y el 25 de mayo. El “Hwasong-17” que se declaró que se había ensayado el 24 de marzo era probablemente un Hwasong-15 mejorado.

Figura VIII

**Misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17 presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022 (39°01'12"N 125°45'07"E)<sup>29</sup>**



Fuente: <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f67924e38> y <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f63d3465c><sup>30</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> Véase el anexo 23.2.1.

<sup>30</sup> Para las figuras VIII a XVIII se utilizaron las mismas fuentes.

Figura IX

Misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-15 presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022<sup>31</sup>. Se declaró que se había ensayado el 29 de noviembre de 2017, exhibido en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021 y en el desfile militar del 10 de octubre de 2020 y dado a conocer anteriormente en el desfile militar del 8 de febrero de 2018



## ICBM Hwasong-15

- two-stage booster with liquid propellant engines (two nozzles may indicate the use of one DPRK version of the twin-combustion chamber RD-250 engine)
- 9 axle wheeled TEL
- Presentation of 4 ICBM systems (possible that another one has been kept as a spare system),
- Last possible launch test on 24 March 2022 and first on 29 November 2017. (Resulting in between 1 and 3 tests)
- Declared tested on 29 November 2017 by the DPRK and unveiled at the military parade on 8 February 2018
- See S/2022/132 fig.5
- S/2021/211 para.22, fig.1
- S/2020/840 annex 11, Fig. 11-1,
- S/2020/151 para.194, annex 65-66,
- S/2019/171 para.173, annex 84-4,
- S/2018/171 para.1, 7-10, Tab.1, Fig. II

<sup>31</sup> Véase el anexo 23.2.2.

Figura X

Misil balístico de mediano alcance Hwasong-8 con posible vehículo planeador hipersónico, presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022<sup>32</sup>. Se declaró que se había ensayado el 28 de septiembre de 2021 y se exhibió en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021



**MRBM/IRBM Hwasong-8**  
with a possible **Hypersonic Glide Vehicle**  
(Named “the hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile”  
by the DPRK)

- One stage booster (derived from Hwasong-12) with a liquid propellant engine using “missile fuel ampoule” (one nozzle may indicate the use of one DPRK version of the RD-250 engine and 4 additional vernier engines)
- 6 axle wheeled TEL
- Presentation of 6 MRBM systems (possible that another one has been kept as a spare system)
- Last possible launch test on 28 September 2021
- Declared tested on 28 September 2021 by the DPRK and unveiled at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.
- See S/2022/132 para. 19-20, 23, tab.1, annex 22




<sup>32</sup> Véase el anexo 23.2.3.



Figura XI

Misil balístico de mediano alcance con posible vehículo de entrada maniobrable presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022<sup>33</sup>. Según varios Estados Miembros, sus dos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento anteriores habrían ocurrido los días 5 y 11 de enero de 2022, cuando se declaró que se había ensayado como “sistema de armas de misiles hipersónicos”. Anteriormente se había dado a conocer en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021



<sup>33</sup> Véase el anexo 23.2.4.



Figura XII

**MBCA KN-23 presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Según varios Estados Miembros, dos de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían ocurrido el 25 de mayo y el 5 de junio de 2022. Se dio a conocer en el desfile militar del 14 de enero de 2021, se declaró que se había ensayado el 25 de marzo de 2021 como “misil guiado táctico de nuevo tipo” y se exhibió en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021**


	<p><b>SRBM modified KN-23</b></p> <p><i>(named “New-type tactical guided missiles” by the DPRK)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• with a solid propellant engine</li> <li>• 5-axle wheeled TEL</li> <li>• Presentation of 6 SRBM systems equipped with 2 launching pads, resulting in 12 missiles (possible one more system)</li> <li>• Last possible launch tests on 5 June and 25 May 2022 and first on 25 March 2021. (Resulting in at least 3 tests)</li> <li>• Unveiled at the military parade on 14 January 2021 and at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.</li> <li>• See S/2022/132 para.25, fig.8, tab.1, annex 24</li> <li>• S/2021/777 para.16</li> <li>• S/2021/211 para.20</li> </ul>
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Figura XIII

**MBCA KN-24 presentado en el desfile militar el 25 de abril de 2022. Según varios Estados Miembros, dos de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían ocurrido el 17 de enero y el 5 de junio de 2022. Se declaró que había sido ensayado el 10 de agosto de 2019 y el 21 de marzo de 2020 como “nueva arma” y “arma táctica guiada” y se presentó en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021 y en los desfiles militares del 10 de octubre de 2020 y el 14 de enero de 2021**



	<p><b>SRBM KN-24</b></p> <p>(named “<i>Tactical guided weapon</i>” by the DPRK)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• with a solid propellant engine</li> <li>• caterpillar tracked TEL</li> <li>• Presentation of 6 SRBM systems equipped with 2 launching square-form canister, resulting in 12 missiles (possible one more system)</li> <li>• Last possible launch tests on 5 June and 17 January first on 10 August 2019. (Resulting in at least 5 tests)</li> <li>• Unveiled at the 10 August 2019 test and presented at the military parades on 10 October 2020, 14 January 2021 and at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.</li> <li>• See S/2022/132 para.25, fig.10, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4</li> <li>• S/2021/211 fig.1, annex 12</li> <li>• S/2020/840 para.11, tab.1, annex 7</li> <li>• S/2020/151 para.194, tab.3, annex 59</li> </ul>
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Figura XIV

**MBCA KN-23 presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Según varios Estados Miembros, tres de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían tenido lugar los días 14 y 27 de enero y 5 de junio de 2022. Se declaró que se había ensayado el 4 de mayo de 2019 como “arma táctica guiada” y presentado en los desfiles militares del 10 de octubre de 2020 y del 14 de enero de 2021 y en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021<sup>34</sup>**

	<p><b>SRBM KN-23</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• with a solid propellant engine</li> <li>• 4-axle wheeled TEL</li> <li>• Presentation of 8 SRBM systems equipped with 2 launching pad, resulting in 16 missiles (possible one more system)</li> <li>• Last possible launch tests on 5 June, 14 and 27 January 2022, first on 4 May 2019. (Resulting in at least 10 tests)</li> <li>• Unveiled at the 4 May 2019 test and presented at the military parades on 10 October 2020, 14 January 2021 and at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.</li> <li>• See S/2022/132 para.25, fig.10, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4</li> <li>• S/2021/211 fig.1, annex 12</li> <li>• S/2020/840 para.11, tab.1, annex 7</li> <li>• S/2020/151 para.194, tab.3, annex 58.1</li> </ul>
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<sup>34</sup> Según varios Estados Miembros, este sistema de MBCA comparte una serie de capacidades de diseño y rendimiento con el sistema Iskander (S/2020/151, anexos 58 y 59).



Figura XV

**MBCA de pequeño tamaño presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Según varios Estados Miembros, dos de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían ocurrido el 16 de abril y el 5 de junio de 2022. Probablemente se haya derivado de los MBCA KN-23 y KN-24 y fuera similar al nuevo misil balístico submarino de pequeño tamaño presentado en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021 (véase la figura XVII). El 16 de abril de 2022 se declaró que se había ensayado como “arma táctica guiada de nuevo tipo [...] desarrollada para aumentar la eficacia de las operaciones nucleares tácticas”**




	<p><b>New small SRBM probably derived from the SRBMs KN-23 and KN-24, it resembled the new small SLBM)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• with a solid propellant engine</li> <li>• 3-axle wheeled TEL</li> <li>• Presentation of 6 SRBM systems equipped with 4 launching square-form canister, resulting in theoretically 24 missiles (possible one more system)</li> <li>• Last possible launch tests on 5 June first on 16 April 2022. (Resulting in at least 1 test)</li> <li>• Unveiled at the 16 April test and presented at this military parade on 25 April 2022.</li> </ul>
	
	

Figura XVI

Nuevo misil balístico de mayor tamaño de combustible sólido, probablemente un misil balístico submarino (posiblemente un “Pukguksong-6”), presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Es probable que se haya derivado del misil balístico submarino Pukguksong-5 presentado en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021



Figura XVII

Nuevo misil balístico de pequeño tamaño de combustible sólido, probablemente un misil balístico submarino, presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Es probable que se haya derivado de los MBCA KN-23 y KN-24 (véase la figura XV). Según varios Estados Miembros, dos de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían tenido lugar el 9 de octubre de 2021 y el 7 de mayo de 2022, cuando se declaró que se había ensayado como “un nuevo tipo de misil balístico submarino”. Se había dado a conocer en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021





Figura XVIII

**MBCA KN-25 presentado en el desfile militar del 25 de abril de 2022. Según varios Estados Miembros, dos de sus últimos posibles ensayos de lanzamiento habrían ocurrido el 12 de mayo y el 5 de junio de 2022. Se declaró que se había ensayado el 24 de agosto de 2019 como “lanzacohetes múltiple supergrande” y fue presentado en los desfiles militares del 10 de octubre de 2020 y del 14 de enero de 2021 y exhibido en la exposición “Legítima defensa 2021” el 11 de octubre de 2021**

	<p><b>KN-25 Super-large multiple rocket launcher</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• with a solid propellant engine</li> <li>• 4-axle wheeled TEL</li> <li>• Presentation of 9 SRBM systems equipped with 4 cylindrical launch canisters, resulting in 36 visible missiles (possible one more system)</li> <li>• Last possible launch tests on 5 June and 12 May 2022, first on 24 August 2019. (Resulting in at least 9 tests)</li> <li>• Unveiled at the 24 August 2019 test and presented at the military parades on 10 October 2020, 14 January 2021 and at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.</li> <li>• See S/2022/132 para.25, fig.11, tab.1, annex 21, fig.21-4</li> <li>• S/2021/211 para. 20, fig.3, 4, annex 12</li> <li>• S/2020/840 para.11, tab.1, annex 7</li> <li>• S/2020/151 para.194, tab.3, annex 59</li> <li>• See S/2020/151 para.194, Tab.3, annex 59</li> </ul>
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24. En los anexos se proporcionan detalles técnicos adicionales sobre los 16 ensayos de misiles balísticos realizados del 27 de enero al 27 de julio de 2022. En esos ensayos se emplearon 6 misiles balísticos intercontinentales (1 de los cuales, el realizado el 16 de marzo, resultó fallido) (véanse los anexos 16, 17, 19 y 21), 1 misil balístico de alcance intermedio (véase el anexo 15), 1 nuevo misil balístico submarino de pequeño tamaño (véase el anexo 20) y 17 MBCA (véanse los anexos 14, 18 y 22), lo que demuestra la extrema intensificación del programa de misiles balísticos en lo que va de 2022 (véanse el cuadro 1 y el anexo 23.1). En su informe anterior, el Grupo proporcionó información sobre los ensayos de lanzamiento de misiles balísticos entre el 15 de septiembre de 2021 y el 17 de enero de 2022<sup>35</sup>.

25. Además, la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguió adaptando su infraestructura de producción industrial, como en el caso del astillero sur de Sinpo<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> S/2022/132, anexos 21 a 24.

<sup>36</sup> Actividad en la industria y las bases vinculadas al programa de misiles balísticos: astillero sur de Sinpo (40°01'20" N 128°09'47" E), febrero a junio de 2022. Véase el anexo 20.



Cuadro 1

**Resumen de los lanzamientos de misiles balísticos o de misiles en que se combinan tecnología balística y de guía con motores de propulsión líquida y sólida efectuados por la República Popular Democrática de Corea hasta el 27 de julio de 2022 (para más información, véase el anexo 23.1, cuadro 23)**

<i>Ensayos (todos) en el año</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión líquida y sólida desde 2018</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores de propulsores de combus- tible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Fecha y hora (local)</i>	<i>Tipo notificado</i>	<i>Número de misiles</i>	<i>Lugar de lanzamiento notificado</i>	<i>Distancia de viaje notificada (km)</i>	<i>Apogeo notificado (km)</i>	<i>Observaciones</i>	<i>Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea<sup>a</sup></i>
17	28	8	2022	– Misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión sólida disparados entre 2019 y el 5 de junio de 2022	63					
				– En 2022 hasta la fecha	22					
	10	9	2022	– Misiles balísticos de combustible líquido disparados entre 2019 y el 25 de mayo de 2022	10					
				– En 2022 hasta la fecha (3 misiles balísticos de alcance intermedio y 6 misiles balísticos intercontinentales)	9					
5	23	III.	27 de enero de 2022, 8.00 y 8.05	– MBCA (KN-23) – De motor de propulsión sólida – Transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 4 ejes	2	Desde la zona de Hamhung, a 39°48'45"N 127°39'50"E	190	20	– Nivel de ensayos operacionales – Tiempo transcurrido entre lanzamientos: 5 minutos – Trayectoria muy deprimida	“Misil táctico guiado tierra-tierra” <sup>b</sup>
6	4	III.	30 de enero de 2022, 7.52	– Misil balístico de alcance intermedio Hwasong-12 – De motor de propulsión líquida – Transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 6 ejes	1	Desde la misma plataforma de lanzamiento del Hwasong-14 el 28 de julio de 2017, Muphyong-ri, en el condado de Jonchon, en 40°36'41"N 126°25'33" E	800 o 790	2 000	– Órbita elevada y el vuelo más largo de un misil balístico desde 2017 – En fase de uso práctico y producción (Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea, 31 de enero de 2022)	Disparo de prueba del misil balístico tierra-tierra de alcance intermedio y largo del tipo Hwasong-12 <sup>c</sup>

<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión líquida y sólida desde 2018</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Fecha y hora (local)</i>	<i>Tipo notificado</i>	<i>Número de misiles</i>	<i>Lugar de lanzamiento notificado</i>	<i>Distancia de viaje notificada (km)</i>	<i>Apogeo notificado (km)</i>	<i>Observaciones</i>	<i>Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea<sup>a</sup></i>
7	5	IV	27 de febrero de 2022, 7.52 o 7.51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Nuevo misil balístico intercontinental, probablemente un Hwasong-17</li> <li>– De motor de propulsión líquida</li> <li>– Nuevo transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 11 ejes</li> </ul>	1	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°13'17"N 125°40'17"E	300 o 320	600 o 620	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Trayectoria elevada</li> <li>– Solo la imagen de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea tomada desde el lanzador. Probablemente la intención era ensayar las funciones de un satélite de reconocimiento. Sin embargo, los cohetes de entrega para el lanzamiento de satélites utilizan las mismas tecnologías que para el lanzamiento de misiles balísticos<sup>d</sup></li> </ul>	“[El Organismo Nacional de Desarrollo Aeroespacial] y la Academia de Ciencias de la Defensa realizaron el domingo un importante ensayo en el marco del plan de desarrollo de un satélite de reconocimiento” <sup>e</sup>
8	6	V	5 marzo de 2022, 8.52 u 8.47	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Nuevo misil balístico intercontinental, probablemente un Hwasong-17</li> <li>– De motor de propulsión líquida</li> <li>– Nuevo transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 11 ejes</li> </ul>	1	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°13'17"N 125°40'18"E	270 o 300	560 o 550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Trayectoria elevada</li> <li>– No se dispone de ninguna imagen proveniente de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea y el ensayo de lanzamiento tenía el mismo propósito que el del 28 de febrero</li> </ul>	Otro importante ensayo para el desarrollo del satélite de reconocimiento <sup>f</sup>
9	7	VI	16 de marzo de 2022, 9.30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Nuevo misil balístico intercontinental, probablemente un Hwasong-17</li> <li>– De motor de propulsión líquida</li> <li>– Transportador-erector-lanzador de 11 ejes</li> </ul>	1	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°11'18"N 125°40'00"E – La llamada “Instalación de apoyo a los misiles balísticos Sil-li” (39°10'54"N 125°39'49"E (S/2020/840 párr. 16)) se presenta claramente como involucrada en el apoyo al programa de misiles balísticos.	Fallido	Fallido	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Este ensayo de lanzamiento de un misil balístico intercontinental resultó fallido y el misil explotó a menos de 20 km de altura</li> <li>– El misil balístico ensayado el 16 de marzo de 2022 es el misil balístico intercontinental Hwasong-17 que fue presentado por la Televisión Central de Corea el 25 de marzo como el misil balístico intercontinental ensayado el 24 de marzo</li> </ul>	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por primera vez desde 2022)

<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión líquida y sólida desde 2018</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Fecha y hora (local)</i>	<i>Tipo notificado</i>	<i>Número de misiles</i>	<i>Lugar de lanzamiento notificado</i>	<i>Distancia de viaje notificada (km)</i>	<i>Apogeo notificado (km)</i>	<i>Observaciones</i>	<i>Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea<sup>a</sup></i>
–	–	–	20 de marzo de 2022, 7.20 <sup>g</sup>						No hubo declaración
10	8	VII.	24 de marzo de 2022 14.34 horas	– Misil balístico intercontinental, posiblemente un Hwasong-15 modificado, pero designado por la República Popular Democrática de Corea como Hwasong-17 – Con un motor de propulsión líquida – Probablemente un transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 9 u 11 ejes	1 Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°11'19"N 125°40'01"E	1 080 o 1 100	6 200 o 6 000	Los datos registrados y analizados se consideran los más coherentes hasta la fecha e indican que el misil balístico intercontinental tiene capacidad para una distancia de vuelo de más de 15.000 km. Sin embargo, se considera que es un Hwasong-15 modificado	“Hwasongpho-17, misil balístico intercontinental de nuevo tipo de las fuerzas estratégicas [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea]” <sup>h</sup>
11	24	IV	16 de abril de 2022 17.50 horas y 18.11 horas	Nuevo MBCA derivado del KN-23 y KN-24 pero de menor tamaño y descrito como una versión terrestre del nuevo MBCA de pequeño tamaño lanzado el 19 de octubre de 2022 – Bote cuádruple montado en un pequeño transportador-erector-lanzador móvil de 3 ejes	2 Desde la playa de Majon, cerca de la residencia de Kim Jong Un en Chaktodong, lo mismo que para los ensayos de lanzamiento de MBCA del 27 de enero de 2022 y del 10 de agosto de 2019, en 39°48'45"N 127°39'50"E	110	25	– Es la primera vez que la República Popular Democrática de Corea presenta un MBCA como sistema vector de armas nucleares tácticas – Velocidad máxima: Mach 4 – Tiempo de vuelo: 60 segundos – Tiempo transcurrido entre lanzamientos: 21 minutos – Probablemente un nivel de ensayos operaciones	“Arma táctica guiada de nuevo tipo [...] que fortalece la eficacia de la operación nuclear táctica” <sup>i</sup>
12	9	8	4 de mayo de 2022, 12.03 o 12.02	– Misil balístico intercontinental, posiblemente un Hwasong-15 o Hwasong-17 – Con un motor de propulsión líquida	1 Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°13'14"N 125°39'55"E	470 o 500	780 u 800	– Velocidad máxima: alrededor de Mach 11, unos 13.600 km/h, 21 minutos de vuelo – Lanzado por debajo de su capacidad máxima y con una trayectoria estándar en lugar de elevada	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por segunda vez desde 2022)

<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión líquida y sólida desde 2018</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Fecha y hora (local)</i>	<i>Tipo notificado</i>	<i>Número de misiles</i>	<i>Lugar de lanzamiento notificado</i>	<i>Distancia de viaje notificada (km)</i>	<i>Apogeo notificado (km)</i>	<i>Observaciones</i>	<i>Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea<sup>a</sup></i>
13	25	V	7 de mayo de 2022, 14.07 o 14.06	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Nuevo misil balístico submarino/MBCA derivado de un KN-23 o KN-24</li> <li>– Similar al nuevo misil balístico submarino de pequeño tamaño ensayado el 19 de octubre de 2021 y presentado en los actos militares</li> </ul>	1	Desde un submarino o una plataforma de pruebas en el mar a gran distancia de la costa de Sinpo	600	60 o 50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Menos de 18 minutos de vuelo</li> <li>– Trayectoria irregular</li> <li>– Posiblemente lanzado desde el “8.24 Yongung SSBA”</li> <li>– Tercer ensayo de un misil balístico submarino desde 2018</li> </ul>	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por tercera vez desde 2022)
14	26	VI	12 de mayo de 2022, 18.29 o 18.28	– MBCA, probablemente el KN-25 (lanzacohetes múltiple supergrande)	3	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang	360 o 350	90 o 100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Velocidad máxima: Mach 5</li> <li>– Nivel de ensayos operacionales</li> <li>– Tiempo transcurrido entre lanzamientos: casi simultáneos</li> <li>– Hay que confirmar la posible trayectoria deprimida</li> </ul>	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por cuarta vez desde 2022)
15	10	IX	25 de mayo de 2022, 6.00 o 5.59	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Nuevo misil balístico intercontinental, probablemente un Hwasong-17</li> <li>– De motor de propulsión líquida</li> </ul>	1/ <sup>1</sup>	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, a 39°13'14"N 125°39'55"E	360 o 300	540 o 550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Primera vez que se lanzan simultáneamente un misil balístico de propulsión líquida y uno de propulsión sólida</li> <li>– Posible ensayo para evaluar la combinación operacional</li> </ul>	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por quinta vez desde 2022)
16	27	VII	25 de mayo de 2022, 6.37 y 6.42	– MBCA, probablemente un nuevo KN-23 modificado	2	Desde la zona del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang, hacia el este y amarizaje	desconocido/ 760 o 750	20 y 60 o 50	1 desapareció debido a un presunto fallo o a un vuelo irregular con posible trayectoria deprimida	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por sexta vez desde 2022)

<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motor de propulsión líquida y sólida desde 2018</i>	<i>Ensayos de misiles balísticos de motores de propulsores de combustible líquido y sólido en lo que va de año</i>	<i>Fecha y hora (local)</i>	<i>Tipo notificado</i>	<i>Número de misiles</i>	<i>Lugar de lanzamiento notificado</i>	<i>Distancia de viaje notificada (km)</i>	<i>Apogeo notificado (km)</i>	<i>Observaciones</i>	<i>Clasificación de la Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea<sup>a</sup></i>
17	28	VIII 5 de junio de 2022 9.06, 9.10, 9.15, 9.24, 9.30 y 9.41	– MBCA, 4 tipos diferentes de MBCA (probablemente KN-23, KN-24, KN-25 y el nuevo KN-23 modificado): 2 de los 8 misiles volaron a corta distancia y a una altitud extremadamente baja (hay que confirmar la hora y los datos de vuelo)	4 x 2	Desde 4 lugares diferentes de la costa oeste a la costa este (desde Sunan, Kaechon (39°45'11"N 125°54'02"E), Dongchang-ri y Hamhung) hacia el este y amarizaje	110 a 670	25 a 90	– Velocidad máxima de Mach 3 a Mach 6 – Es la primera vez que se combinan a la vez tantos misiles y rangos diferentes – Posible entrenamiento operacional para disparar MBCA de diferentes alcances y capacidades de ataque utilizando las tácticas de la antigua Unión Soviética	La República Popular Democrática de Corea no formuló ninguna declaración ni proporcionó ninguna información (lo que ocurre por séptima vez desde 2022)

<sup>a</sup> En el anexo 23.1 figura más información sobre esta columna y otras.

<sup>b</sup> *Rodong Sinmun*, 28 de enero de 2022.

<sup>c</sup> Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea y *Rodong Sinmun*, 31 de enero de 2022.

<sup>d</sup> Por ejemplo, tecnologías para la separación de dispositivos de propulsión por etapas, control de actitud y control de guiado. Según varios Estados Miembros, el programa espacial también podría servir para aumentar las capacidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en materia de misiles balísticos intercontinentales. Véase el anexo 23.1, fila correspondiente al 27 de febrero de 2022.

<sup>e</sup> *Rodong Sinmun*, 28 de febrero de 2022.

<sup>f</sup> Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea y *Rodong Sinmun*, 6 de marzo de 2022.

<sup>g</sup> Según un Estado Miembro, sistema de lanzamiento múltiple de cohetes con motor de propulsión sólida, 4 cohetes lanzados en 1 hora desde la zona de la provincia de Pyongan del Sur hacia la costa occidental. Según NK News (20 de marzo de 2022), se trataba de posibles sistemas de lanzamiento múltiple de cohetes KN-09 (240 mm, 300 mm).

<sup>h</sup> Agencia Central de Noticias de Corea, 25 de marzo de 2022.

<sup>i</sup> Voice of Korea, 17 de abril de 2022.

<sup>j</sup> Véase el anexo 21.

### III. Sanciones sectoriales y marítimas<sup>37</sup>

#### Importaciones de petróleo


##### *Productos refinados derivados del petróleo*

26. Hasta el 27 de julio de 2022, un Estado Miembro había notificado oficialmente al Comité del Consejo de Seguridad establecido en virtud de la resolución [1718 \(2006\)](#) el 8,15 % del volumen máximo anual permitido de 500.000 barriles<sup>38</sup> de productos refinados del petróleo (véase el cuadro 2).

Cuadro 2

#### **Entregas declaradas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea de productos petrolíferos refinados, enero a abril de 2022**

(Número de barriles)




Fuente: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/es/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum>.

27. Un Estado Miembro ha proporcionado imágenes por satélite de 16 buques cisterna registrados en la República Popular Democrática de Corea que realizaron 27 entregas de productos petrolíferos refinados a instalaciones petroleras de Nampo entre enero y abril de 2022. Ese Estado Miembro estima que hasta el 30 de abril podrían haberse entregado en Nampo hasta 458.898 barriles de productos petrolíferos refinados (véase el cuadro 3), basándose en una capacidad de carga máxima del 90 % del tonelaje de peso muerto de cada buque (véase el anexo 24).

<sup>37</sup> Toda la información, incluida la información relativa a los buques, como el pabellón y la propiedad, que figura en esta sección y en los anexos que la acompañan es válida a partir de julio de 2022. Todas las fechas se registran en Hora Estándar del Este (EST), hora local o tiempo universal coordinado (UTC), según la fuente de datos de origen. Todos los pasajes que han sido objeto de revisión aparecen en recuadros negros.

<sup>38</sup> Resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, párr. 5.

**Cuadro 3**  
**Estimaciones derivadas de las entregas observadas de productos petrolíferos refinados, Nampo, enero a abril de 2022 (en barriles)**



*Fuente:* Estado Miembro, el Grupo.

*Abreviatura:* TPM, toneladas de peso muerto.

28. Las imágenes proporcionadas por el Estado Miembro indican que, al parecer, varios buques descargaron sus cargas en Nampo, salieron de la esclusa y volvieron rápidamente con una segunda carga para descargar. El Pu Ryong descargó la carga el 3 de marzo y de nuevo el 11 de marzo; el Song Won descargó la carga el 3 de marzo y de nuevo el 14 de marzo. El Grupo estima que no todos los buques cisterna de la República Popular Democrática de Corea se ven obligados a entrar en cuarentena en relación con la COVID-19 y que las transferencias de buque a buque para obtener los productos pueden estar teniendo lugar cerca de Nampo.

29. Actualmente, el Grupo no puede distinguir entre entregas lícitas de productos petrolíferos refinados notificadas al Comité y entregas ilícitas. Es posible que algunos de los productos petrolíferos entregados por los buques que figuran en el anexo 24 se hayan notificado al Comité.

30. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a China<sup>39</sup> para solicitar los nombres, la propiedad y los datos de gestión de los buques involucrados en entregas lícitas, así como los puertos y las fechas de carga y entrega<sup>40</sup>. China respondió que informaba al Comité de sus exportaciones de productos petrolíferos refinados, que las empresas chinas no realizaban transacciones con entidades sujetas a sanciones y que concedía

<sup>39</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 35.

<sup>40</sup> En el párrafo 5 de su resolución 2397 (2017), el Consejo de Seguridad estableció el límite máximo de 500.000 barriles, “siempre que el Estado Miembro notifique al Comité cada 30 días la cantidad de productos refinados derivados del petróleo que suministra, vende o transfiere a [la República Popular Democrática de Corea], junto con información sobre todas las partes que participan en la transacción”.

importancia a la privacidad de las partes comerciales que participaban en el comercio internacional. El anexo 25 contiene la respuesta completa de China.

*Buques de carga reconfigurados para ampliar las importaciones de petróleo refinado*

31. Aunque han continuado las entregas no declaradas de productos petrolíferos refinados, un número menor de petroleros ha entregado petróleo en los puertos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en comparación con años anteriores<sup>41</sup>. A pesar de esa trayectoria descendente, a lo que se suman las actuales restricciones en relación con la cuarentena, las estrictas medidas de vigilancia de los Estados Miembros y la reducción del comercio debido a la pandemia de COVID-19, los precios del petróleo refinado en el país se han mantenido relativamente estables.

32. Uno de los posibles factores explicativos ha sido la información preliminar obtenida de un Estado Miembro según la cual la República Popular Democrática de Corea ha equipado ilegalmente algunos de sus buques de carga para transportar productos petrolíferos.

33. Según el Estado Miembro, se han utilizado dos métodos:

a) Método 1: las bodegas de carga y los tanques de lastre se han reconfigurado en múltiples tanques de petróleo con hormigón instalado en el fondo del buque para que este mantenga el equilibrio;

b) Método 2: se utilizan solo los tanques de lastre. Los tanques de lastre lavados están cargados de productos petrolíferos. La carga se utiliza para mantener el equilibrio del buque.

34. El Grupo está investigando esa información. Esas metodologías permitirían ampliar la capacidad de adquisición de petróleo refinado y habría que tenerlas en cuenta al analizar las cifras que habitualmente se limitan a las entregas de camiones cisterna (véanse los párrafos 27 a 30).

**Patrones de comportamiento de los buques sospechosos**

*La bahía de Corea y las aguas territoriales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea como zonas de transferencia entre buques*

35. La zona económica exclusiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue utilizándose para realizar transferencias ilícitas de buque a buque con petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea<sup>42</sup>. Desde diciembre de 2021, el Grupo también ha observado las transferencias entre buques de carga en torno a la isla de Ch'o-do (초도), a 50 km al suroeste de Nampo. Algunas de esas transferencias de buque a buque se producen en configuraciones de tres buques. Durante esas transferencias se observaron buques de diferentes tamaños, así como posibles grúas flotantes<sup>43</sup> utilizadas para transferir la carga. La mayoría de esos transbordos en el mar parecen producirse al oeste de la isla de Ch'o-do y muchos tuvieron lugar en mayo de 2022 (véase la figura XIX y el anexo 26).


<sup>41</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 33 y 34 y anexo 31, y anexos pertinentes de informes anteriores del Grupo sobre las cantidades calculadas de petróleo refinado lícito e ilícito importado por la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

<sup>42</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 40 y 41.

<sup>43</sup> En S/2020/840, párr. 48, y en el anexo 26 y la recomendación 9 se presenta el uso de grúas flotantes.



Figura XIX  
Imágenes de satélite de transbordo entre cargueros, febrero y mayo de 2022



Fuente: Planet Labs, anotaciones del Grupo.

36. El Grupo observa que esas transferencias de buques de carga en aguas territoriales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea son una nueva metodología de evasión de sanciones, que posiblemente responde a una serie de factores, como la necesidad de evitar el control de los activos, la aplicación de las normas relacionadas con la COVID-19 y las medidas de cuarentena de los buques y la imposibilidad de que muchos de los buques de carga del país entren en puertos extranjeros.


#### *Otras aguas afectadas*

37. El Grupo continuó rastreando las actividades de los buques vinculados con las transferencias de petróleo a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, entre ellos el New Konk (núm. 9036387 de la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI)) y el Unica (núm. 8514306 de la OMI)<sup>44</sup>. Esos buques de “entrega directa”, término utilizado para designar a los buques cisterna no pertenecientes a la República Popular Democrática de Corea que entregaban petróleo refinado en los puertos del país antes de la pandemia de COVID-19, han seguido contraviniendo las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad.

38. Las fotografías de los Estados Miembros mostraban la ruta seguida por el Unica en marzo de 2022 para entregar petróleo refinado con destino a la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que navegaba muy cargado mientras se dirigía al norte y ligeramente cargado en su regreso al sur (véase la figura XX).

Figura XX

**Actividad del Unica (como Haishun2), 15 a 22 de marzo de 2022**



<sup>44</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 42 a 73, y anexos 35 a 48, S/2021/777, S/2021/211, S/2020/840 y S/2020/840/Corr.1 y S/2020/151.



Fuente: Estado Miembro.

39. En mayo de 2022, se observó al New Konk y al Unica en una plataforma marítima<sup>45</sup> transmitiendo identificadores fraudulentos del sistema de identificación automática (SIA) como F.Online (núm. 31216200 de identidad del servicio móvil marítimo (ISMM)) y Haishun2 (núm. 457400047 de ISMM), respectivamente<sup>46</sup>, cerca de la isla de Dongyin y la bahía de Sansha (véase la figura XXI). El Grupo ha informado anteriormente de que se sabe que esas aguas son lugares en que merodean buques sospechosos<sup>47</sup>.

40. El Hai Jun, de pabellón togolés (núm. 9054896 de la OMI; núm. 671244100 de ISMM), buque intermediario investigado por el Grupo como parte de una cadena de transferencia de petróleo refinado con destino a la República Popular Democrática de Corea<sup>48</sup>, transmitió en la zona a los pocos días (véase la figura XXI y el anexo 27). El 26 de mayo de 2022, el Xiang Shun (número 9153800 de la OMI), entonces con pabellón de Mongolia, fue grabado mientras salía del puerto de Taichung en dirección hacia la zona del estrecho de Taiwán, donde también se registraron transmisiones del SIA del Hai Jun y el Unica (véase la figura XXII). Según lo determinado por un Estado Miembro, desde 2019 el Hai Jun ha operado exclusivamente como petrolero intermediario, transfiriendo la carga de petróleo de otros petroleros a buques de “entrega directa”. El Grupo sigue investigando las redes que están detrás de los envíos anteriores del Hai Jun.

<sup>45</sup> Windward, plataforma de bases de datos marítimas de inteligencia artificial.

<sup>46</sup> S/2022/132, cuadro 3 y anexo 39a.


<sup>47</sup> Ibid., párrs. 49 y 52 y anexos 34, 39, 41 y 42, y S/2021/777, párr. 50 y anexo 33a.

<sup>48</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 53 a 58 y anexo 42. Ruicheng (HK) Shipping Co. Ltd. sigue siendo el propietario y operador registrado del buque, según los registros de la OMI.



Figura XXI


**Buques sospechosos alrededor de la isla de Dongyin y en la bahía de Sansha, del 17 al 26 de mayo de 2022**



Fuente: Windward<sup>49</sup>, anotaciones del Grupo.

Figura XXII

**Buques sospechosos cerca de la zona de transferencia de buque a buque, 17 a 27 de mayo de 2022**




Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo.

<sup>49</sup> A menos que se indique lo contrario, todas las fechas y horas reflejadas en la plataforma Windward se indican en Hora Estándar del Este y tiempo universal coordinado para las capturas de imágenes por satélite.

41. Por otra parte, en septiembre de 2021, el New Konk, que transmitía como Lifan, se hizo pasar por el núm. 312360000 de ISMM, anteriormente asignado a un petrolero registrado en Belice, Leo (núm. 9066473 de la OMI), cerca de la isla de Wuqiu (véase la figura XXIII). Las investigaciones del Grupo indican que el New Konk también ha utilizado al menos otro número de ISMM asociado a Belice (véase la figura XXIV), así como dos números de ISMM asociados a Sierra Leona, en 2021 y 2022, para llevar a cabo sus actividades ilícitas. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito al operador del buque Leo, Sinar Cemerlang Marine Sdn. Bhd., que respondió que el Leo ya no se encontraba bajo su gestión durante el tiempo material y proporcionó una carta de cancelación del registro del pabellón de Belice que mostraba que el buque se había dado de baja el 26 de agosto de 2021 “debido al registro del buque bajo el pabellón de Guinea Ecuatorial mientras todavía estaba registrado provisionalmente bajo el pabellón de Belice”. El Grupo observa que la información sobre la cancelación del registro del buque no se actualizó oportunamente<sup>50</sup> y que no existe ningún registro de que el Leo haya operado bajo el pabellón de Guinea Ecuatorial. El uso por el New Konk del número de ISMM del Leo en la época en que fue dado de baja por Belice merita un análisis más detallado. El Grupo aguarda una respuesta de Belice sobre el Leo (para más detalles, véanse los anexos 28.1 y 28.2).

Figura XXIII

**New Konk como Lifan (número 312360000 de ISMM), 29 de septiembre de 2021**




*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro, Estado Miembro.

<sup>50</sup> La actualización del estatus de pabellón de Belice del buque fue posterior, según los registros de la OMI.



Figura XXIV

**New Konk con un diferente número de ISMM del “Lifan” (312360680), enero de 2022**



Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo.

42. El 30 de junio de 2022, imágenes de satélite mostraban los mismos buques en la bahía de Sansha, entre ellos el Diamond 8 (núm. 9132612 de la OMI). Los buques transmitían con los mismos números de ISMM identificados en la figura XXI, y el Diamond 8 transmitía un número de ISMM perteneciente al Shun Li (núm. 8514435 de la OMI), registrado como desguazado en junio de 2021<sup>51</sup>. El Shun Li también compartía el mismo número de ISMM reciclado asociado con Mongolia que pertenecía a otro petrolero registrado como roto alrededor de la misma fecha. El titular del documento de conformidad de este último era You Young Ship Management and Consultant Co. Ltd. (宥陽船舶管理顧問有限公司). En las secciones pertinentes que figuran a continuación se ofrecen más detalles sobre el Xiang Shun (núm. 9153800 de la OMI) y el Hong Hu (núm. 9125293 de la OMI) en relación con You Young Ship. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

<sup>51</sup> Registros de la OMI.

Figura XXV

**Buques sospechosos en la bahía de Sansha, 30 de junio de 2022**

Fuente: Estado Miembro

*Transferencias de petróleo en varias etapas*

43. La República Popular Democrática de Corea sigue adquiriendo petróleo refinado mediante el transbordo de petróleo en varias etapas, en que varios buques cisterna emplean regularmente tácticas de evasión para no ser detectados. Esas tácticas de evasión permiten que los buques sigan violando lo dispuesto en el párrafo 5 de la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, que prohíbe el suministro, la venta o la transferencia directa o indirecta al país de todo tipo de productos petrolíferos refinados, a menos que se notifique de acuerdo con los requisitos de la resolución.

44. Se trata de una metodología anteriormente detectada en la que intervienen buques nodriza, buques cisterna intermediarios y buques cisterna de “entrega directa” o de la República Popular Democrática de Corea<sup>52</sup>. El Grupo ha identificado otros buques sospechosos basándose en patrones de comportamiento similares a los del Sky Venus (núm. 9168257 de la OMI)<sup>53</sup> (véase también la sección sobre empresas facilitadoras y los anexos 32.1 a 32.6). Entre esos indicadores figuran la manipulación del SIA y el uso de múltiples buques que participan en transferencias de buque a buque, así como viajes a lugares donde los buques sospechosos merodean o realizan operaciones de buque a buque, como la bahía de Sansha, la isla de Dongyin, el

<sup>52</sup> [S/2022/132](#), párrs. 68 a 73.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, párrs. 54 a 57 y 64 a 72 y anexos 37 a 42 y 48.

estrecho de Taiwán y la zona económica exclusiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

45. Al igual que el Sunward<sup>54</sup> y el Sky Venus<sup>55</sup>, el Xiang Shun (núm. 9153800 de la OMI), entonces con pabellón de Mongolia (véanse las investigaciones en los anexos 29.1 y 29.2), y el Hong Hu (núm. 9125293 de la OMI), con pabellón de Palau (véanse las investigaciones en los anexos 30.1 y 30.2), se utilizaron como buques nodriza que cargaron petróleo refinado en el puerto de Taichung en diciembre de 2021. Esos buques se encontraron entonces con el Joffa (núm. 8513405 de la OMI), de pabellón de Sierra Leona, en distintas ocasiones en el estrecho de Taiwán. El New Konk y el Unica, que navegaban con identidades fraudulentas, transmitieron en las proximidades de esos buques nodriza antes de que se perdiera la transmisión del SIA para todos los buques. El New Konk y el Unica reanudaron la transmisión del SIA cuando navegaban hacia la zona económica exclusiva de la República Popular Democrática de Corea antes de perder la transmisión durante un tiempo (véase la figura XXVI).


#### *Los buques comprometidos se desguazan*

46. Al igual que el Sunward, el Joffa y el Xiang Shun llegaron a un depósito de chatarra de Bangladesh en abril y junio de 2022, respectivamente, para ser desguazados tras su implicación en presuntas transferencias ilícitas de petróleo. El Grupo observa una tendencia emergente en virtud de la cual los buques más antiguos implicados en la evasión de sanciones son desguazados tras ser identificados.

Figura XXVI

**Representación gráfica del Xiang Shun - Joffa - New Konk (como Lifan) – Un Hung, diciembre de 2021 a enero de 2022**

**Xiang Shun y Joffa<sup>56</sup>, 28 y 29 de diciembre de 2021**




Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo.

<sup>54</sup> Ese buque se ha desguazado.

<sup>55</sup> S/2022/132, párs. 64 a 73 y anexo 48.


<sup>56</sup> Ibid., anexo 40, y S/2021/777, anexo 33b, sobre la lista de buques de interés.

### Joffa y New Konk (transmitiendo como Lifan), 29 y 30 de diciembre de 2021



Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo.

### New Konk y Un Hung, 21 de enero de 2022



Fuente: Imágenes de satélite: Planet Labs, anotaciones del Grupo; fotografía en el recuadro, Estado Miembro (S/2022/151, párr. 32, figura VI).

### Vinculos de propiedad

47. Una comparación de la documentación de diferentes fuentes mostró que el propietario registrado del Xiang Shun, Vantage Point Enterprise Ltd., aunque constituido en Seychelles, comparte el mismo número de teléfono que You Young Ship. You Young Ship, empresa con sede en Kaohsiung, es también gestor y operador del Hong Hu (núm. 9125293 de la OMI), buque nodriza investigado por el Grupo que



participó en presuntos traspasos en varias etapas en los que estuvieron envueltos el Joffa y el Unica.

48. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a Mongolia, Palau, Seychelles, You Young Ship, Vantage Point Enterprise Ltd. y Fortune Maker Internation Ltd. en relación con el Xiang Shun y el Hong Hu. You Young Ship, que funge como director técnico de ambos petroleros, respondió que no era responsable de la operación comercial y de carga de los buques, pero que “recordaba a los armadores y al capitán que debían evitar comerciar en la zona sujeta a sanciones. También solicitaban al capitán que verificara que el buque comercial no perteneciera a los países sancionados”. La empresa no proporcionó ninguna información sobre el propietario registrado que figuraba al cuidado de You Young Ship.

49. El Grupo también observó discrepancias en la información proporcionada por la empresa con respecto a la información de fuentes primarias<sup>57</sup> y al análisis del Grupo sobre las transferencias de buque a buque realizadas por el Hong Hu.

50. En cuanto a las largas lagunas en la transmisión del SIA de los dos buques durante los períodos de investigación, la empresa declaró que en el caso del Xiang Shun “la información del sistema de identificación automática se actualizaba cada dos meses”. En un informe de servicio proporcionado al Grupo se indicaba: “El SIA no registra la función de posición del sistema de posicionamiento global” y “solo puede registrar un período limitado [sic] de encendido/apagado”. El Grupo observa que, si bien la referencia al problema del SIA data de 2019, el informe tiene firma y fecha de agosto de 2021. En el caso del Hong Hu, la compañía declaró: “Nos enteramos por el capitán de que la transmisión del SIA puede verse perturbada por una señal débil o puede apagarse a discreción del capitán en alta mar”. En los anexos 29.1, 29.2, 30.1 y 30.2 figuran detalles y respuestas adicionales.

#### *Alteración del aspecto físico*

51. La República Popular Democrática de Corea y los buques sospechosos siguen alterando su aspecto físico y sus identificadores, casi con toda seguridad para ocultar su identidad y limitar las posibilidades de recogida de información por parte de terceros. La manipulación por los buques de sus perfiles en el SIA complica el seguimiento en las bases de datos marítimas. En el anexo 31 se ofrece un ejemplo del petrolero Sin Phyong 5 (núm. 8865121 de la OMI), con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que ocultó su identidad física para obtener un cargamento ilícito de petróleo.

#### **Empresas facilitadoras**

##### *Cheng Chiun Shipping*

52. Sierra Leona retiró su pabellón del Sky Venus (que actualmente navega con el nombre de Jan Victoria) el 24 de junio de 2022. Al recibir la investigación del Grupo, Palau, el anterior registro de pabellón del Sky Venus, llevó a cabo una investigación y canceló el registro del buque. Las investigaciones del Grupo sobre el Jan Victoria, antes Sky Venus, se encuentran en los anexos 32.1 a 32.6.

53. El Grupo también continuó sus investigaciones sobre el propietario del buque, Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co. Ltd. (程群船務代理有限公司) y sus asociados<sup>58</sup>. Hasta la fecha, Cheng Chiun Shipping no ha respondido completamente a todas las solicitudes de información pero, basándose en la información y documentación disponibles, el Grupo ha detectado varias incoherencias en las respuestas de Cheng

<sup>57</sup> Documento confidencial que obra en poder del Grupo.

<sup>58</sup> S/2022/132, pars. 64 a 73 y anexo 48.



Chiun Shipping. En los anexos 33.1 a 33.4 se ofrece un análisis detallado. Más adelante se describen dos ejemplos.

*Representación incoherente de la información relativa al Sky Venus*

54. En respuesta a la consulta del Grupo, Cheng Chiun Shipping alegó que había creado empresas “subsidiarias” separadas para llevar a cabo su “relación proveedor-cliente” (véase la figura XXVIIa). Las investigaciones del Grupo habían establecido previamente la propiedad y los intereses financieros que compartían esas entidades supuestamente separadas (dentro de los guiones amarillos) (véase la figura XXVIIb).

Figura XXVIIa

**Ejemplo de flujo diagrama sobre la relación de la cadena de suministro de petróleo explicada por Cheng Chiun Shipping**




Fuente: Cheng Chiun Shipping, anotaciones del Grupo.

<sup>a</sup> La información del Grupo indica que se establecieron varias empresas ficticias detrás de la empresa comercial, el agente marítimo y el propietario registrado de los buques.

Figura XXVIIb

**Conexiones entre segmentos**



Fuente: El Grupo.

55. Cheng Chiun Shipping no proporcionó originalmente ninguna información de identificación de los buques que supuestamente recibieron petróleo del Sky Venus y afirmó que esos buques receptores siempre ocultaban cualquier identificación física. No obstante, el Grupo obtuvo información de un tercero que mostraba que Cheng Chiun Shipping poseía, de hecho, identificadores para tres buques que supuestamente

habían cargado petróleo del Sky Venus, que no se habían notificado al Grupo. Un Estado Miembro informó de que se utilizaban buques pequeños para transferir sus cargamentos de petróleo a los petroleros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Cheng Chiun Shipping confirmó posteriormente las identidades de los tres buques receptores, que el Grupo facilitó en su carta posterior (véase el cuadro 4 y la figura XXVIII).

Cuadro 4

**Información registrada<sup>a</sup> de los buques receptores**

Nave nodriza	Fecha de la descarga en el buque receptor	Buque receptor Transferencias de buque a buque	Recibo de entrega de la carga (búnker)
Sky Venus (núm. 9168257 de la OMI)	14 de mayo de 2021	Hui Hang 97	620 t transferidas
	17 de mayo de 2021	Jian Xing 78	670 t transferidas
	30 de mayo de 2021	Quan Yi You 02 <sup>59</sup>	500 t transferidas

<sup>a</sup> Información proporcionada por Cheng Chiun Shipping; cuadro elaborado por el Grupo.

Figura XXVIII

**Recibos de entrega de la carga (búnker)**

CARGO (BUNKER) DELIVERY RECEIPT SHIP NAME: HUI HANG 79 (NUMBERS ON CHINESE BILL: 1899)					CARGO (BUNKER) DELIVERY RECEIPT SHIP NAME: JIAN XING 78 (NUMBERS ON CHINESE BILL: 6091)					CARGO (BUNKER) DELIVERY RECEIPT SHIP NAME: QUAN YI YOU (NUMBERS ON CHINESE BILL: 1056)				
估價單 1899 實號 2021年5月14日					估價單 6091 實號 2021年5月18日					估價單 1056 實號 2021年5月31日				
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	品名	數量	單價	金額	備註
1 32200					1 32900					1 42100				
2 400					2 400					2 300				
3 32600					3 33300					3 42400				
4					4					4				
5					5					5				
6 43320					6 44036					6 44440				
7 344					7 404					7 300				
8 43664					8 44440					8 44740				
9					9					9				
10					10					10				
11 400+344=744 64					11 400+404=804 64					11 300+300=600 64				
12 744÷1.2=620 0t					12 804÷1.2=670 0t					12 600÷1.2=500 0t				
13					13					13				
14					14					14				
15					15					15				
№ 112954 合計NT\$ 刘					№ 112957 合計NT\$ 刘					№ 112976 合計NT\$ 刘				

Fuente: El Grupo.

56. El Grupo observa que esos recibos de entrega de búnker contienen información muy limitada en comparación con otros recibos de entrega de carga. Las gestiones del Grupo para ponerse en contacto con el Sr. Liu y la empresa Hong Yao International

<sup>59</sup> Mientras que en el recibo de entrega de la carga el pequeño buque receptor figura como Quan Yi You, la carta de Cheng Chiun Shipping hacía referencia al nombre completo del buque como Quan Yi You 02.

Trading Co. Limited (弘耀國際貿易有限公司), registrada en Hong Kong, el comprador y la persona que, según Cheng Chiun Shipping, había designado los buques receptores, resultaron infructuosas. Cheng Chiun Shipping no ha respondido a la solicitud del Grupo de que se le faciliten otros datos de contacto del Sr. Liu.

*Plazos de entrega incoherentes con los buques receptores*


57. La información de seguimiento del SIA mostró que esos pequeños buques receptores, identificados como buques costeros chinos en las bases de datos de seguimiento marítimo, no se encontraban cerca del Sky Venus en las fechas de las transferencias de buque a buque proporcionadas por Cheng Chiun Shipping y que, por tanto, es poco probable que hayan realizado dichas transferencias (ver figuras XXIX a XXXI)<sup>60</sup>.

Figura XXIX

**Hui Hang 79 operando en aguas interiores, del 8 al 15 de mayo de 2021.**

**Fecha prevista para las transferencias de buque a buque con el Sky Venus:**

**14 de mayo de 2021**




*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro (proporcionadas solo con fines de referencia).

<sup>60</sup> Según el propietario, la zona de operaciones del Sky Venus se limitaba a las coordenadas proporcionadas de 23-26°N, 119-121°E. El Sky Venus también registró una caída de la señal del SIA entre el 9 y el 19 de mayo de 2022.

Figura XXX


**Jian Xing 78 en la zona portuaria de Changshu, del 15 al 19 de mayo de 2021.**  
**Fecha prevista para las transferencias de buque a buque con el Sky Venus:**  
**17 de mayo de 2021**



*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro (proporcionadas solo con fines de referencia).

Figura XXXI

**Quan Yi You 02 en la zona portuaria de Quanzhou, del 30 de mayo a 2 de junio de 2021. Fecha prevista para las transferencias de buque a buque con el Sky Venus: 31 de mayo de 2021**



*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro (proporcionadas solo con fines de referencia).

58. Cheng Chiun Shipping ha seguido negando su participación en cualquier actividad de evasión de sanciones. El propietario declaró: “[M]i (posición) comercial era [...] dentro del estrecho de Taiwán. Mi contraparte comercial es un nacional chino, el Sr. Liu, de la empresa Hong Yao de Hong Kong. Los buques receptores de petróleo eran embarcaciones de navegación interior y buques de pesca. En la lista de vigilancia (o en la lista de sanciones) no figuraba ningún buque receptor. No he infringido ninguna ley”. Cheng Chiun Shipping no ha abordado su papel relacionado con el transbordo de cargamentos de petróleo en varias etapas según lo revelado por el Grupo.

59. Tras examinar la información, los documentos y los datos pertinentes, incluidos los proporcionados por la empresa, el Grupo considera que Cheng Chiun Shipping no ha podido o no ha querido corroborar varias de sus afirmaciones. La empresa no adoptó las medidas de diligencia debida para verificar la identidad de sus clientes y asegurarse de que su entrega de cargamentos de petróleo no estaba destinada a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Su permisividad a la hora de aceptar buques receptores anónimos ha seguido facilitando actividades ilícitas, incluida la evasión de sanciones.

60. Según lo determinado por un Estado Miembro, Cheng Chiun Shipping facilitó repetidamente la transferencia de “cientos de miles de barriles de petróleo refinado a la [República Popular Democrática de Corea] a través de su red de empresas ficticias”. Esas transferencias, entregadas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a través de transbordos de buque a buque en varias etapas, “se llevaron a cabo deliberadamente”, y el personal de la empresa “era consciente de que las



transferencias de petróleo refinado estaban destinadas a la [República Popular Democrática de Corea]”.


61. Según pudo determinar un Estado Miembro, Hong Yao International desempeñó un papel en la coordinación de las transferencias de carga de petróleo entre Cheng Chiun Shipping, sus buques pequeños receptores designados y los buques de “entrega directa”. El Grupo sigue investigando.

#### *Nuwanni y buques sospechosos asociados*

62. Las investigaciones del grupo revelaron que el Joffa, antes de ser desguazado, operaba como buque intermediario que cargaba petróleo desde los buques nodriza —el Sky Venus (actualmente Jan Victoria), el Xiang Shun y el Hong Hu— en una cadena de transferencias de buque a buque (véase la figura XXXII). El Joffa procedió entonces a reunirse con los petroleros de “entrega directa” New Konk (como Lifan) y con el Unica (como Haishun 2) en 2021 y 2022 (véase el anexo 34). Con anterioridad a esas transferencias, el Joffa visitó astilleros a lo largo del río Baima, entre los que se encontraba Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd. (福建省易和船舶重工有限责任公司), un astillero que ha sido objeto de investigaciones en relación con el servicio a buques cisterna que realizaban actividades sancionables<sup>61</sup>. Tras permanecer en el río Baima entre abril y diciembre de 2021, el Joffa se encontró con el Sky Venus alrededor del 3 de diciembre de 2021. Como buque intermediario compartido, el Joffa se utilizó para transferir cargamentos ilícitos de petróleo desde diferentes buques nodriza a buques de “entrega directa” conocidos, como el New Konk y el Unica. Ello constituye una firme indicación del carácter coordinado de esas transferencias.

Figura XXXII

#### **Ejemplo de buques involucrados en las transferencias de petróleo en varias etapas**



Fuente: El Grupo.

63. Desde hace algún tiempo el Joffa ha sido un buque de interés<sup>62</sup> para el Grupo y las investigaciones del Grupo sobre la propiedad y las empresas de gestión del buque mostraron que, al igual que otros buques sospechosos, el propietario y gestor del

<sup>61</sup> S/2021/132, párrs. 47 a 53 y 60 a 63, y anexos 35 y 39.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., anexo 40, y S/2021/777, anexo 33b, sobre la lista de buques de interés.

Joffa, Joffa Trade International Co. Ltd., registrada en Hong Kong, también había registrado una dirección de secretaría corporativa<sup>63</sup> que proporcionaba servicios de secretaría de empresa a otras entidades investigadas, entre ellos el propietario registrado para el New Konk.

64. El Joffa incluyó en la lista a Nuwanni International Ship Management Co. Ltd. (紐漫日國際船舶管理有限公司), registrada en Hong Kong, como su anterior director técnico en 2019. El Grupo ha informado anteriormente de que Nuwanni desempeñaba la misma función para otros buques de “entrega directa”<sup>64</sup>. Según se informó, Nuwanni se disolvió en julio de 2019<sup>65</sup>, pero investigaciones del Grupo indican que la persona que figura como único director y accionista de Nuwanni probablemente sea solo un candidato<sup>66</sup>. Ello se corresponde con otras investigaciones del Grupo que demuestran que los directores o accionistas del propietario registrado de un buque que figura en los archivos del registro de empresas no eran los propietarios reales.

65. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito al Estado del pabellón del Joffa (Sierra Leona), a la Union Bureau of Shipping<sup>67</sup> con sede en Dalian (que prestaba servicios de registro a Joffa Trade y Nuwanni) y a China en relación con el ciudadano chino que figuraba como director de Joffa Trade en los archivos del registro de empresas de Hong Kong. China respondió que Joffa Trade no se había involucrado en actividades relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que el Joffa no había registrado escalas en puertos de China y que China no tenía información sobre el comercio ilícito de productos petrolíferos refinados de buque a buque realizado por el Joffa. Las respuestas completas de China para cada caso figuran en los anexos 34 a 41. La Union Bureau of Shipping y Sierra Leona aún no han respondido.

66. El Grupo prosigue sus investigaciones sobre las transferencias en varias etapas de cargamentos de petróleo para la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

### **Buques detenidos, desabanderados y adquiridos**

#### *Buque detenido*

67. El Grupo obtuvo información actualizada del Estado Miembro que había incautado el Billions No. 18 (núm. 9191773 de la OMI), buque designado que navegaba con el nombre de Shun Fa, entonces con pabellón de Mongolia<sup>68</sup>. Se aportaron pruebas documentales y fotográficas de la identidad real del buque, muestras de las cuales aparecen en la figura XXXIII.

<sup>63</sup> Room 502C, 5th Floor, Ho King Commercial Building, Fa Yuen Street 2-16, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China.

<sup>64</sup> Nuwanni fungía como director técnico del New Konk y el Unica. Véase también [S/2022/132](#), anexo 38, en que se describe la red de entidades vinculadas con los petroleros de “entrega directa”.

<sup>65</sup> Registros de empresas de Hong Kong.

<sup>66</sup> La información de las redes sociales indica que un individuo con el mismo nombre y la misma nacionalidad es amigo de los miembros de la tripulación que sirvieron a bordo de uno de los buques nodriza mencionados. Esa información obra en los archivos del Grupo.

<sup>67</sup> La Union Bureau of Shipping prestó servicios a una serie de buques que llevaron a cabo actividades objeto de sanciones, entre ellos el *Gold Star* (núm. 9146247 de la OMI) y los siguientes petroleros de “entrega directa”: Hokong, Unica, Subblic, Vifine (actualmente Un Hung) y New Konk. Véase [S/2021/777](#), anexo 35a.

<sup>68</sup> [S/2021/777](#), párrs. 35 a 41 y anexo 29.

Figura XXXIII

**Falsificación de la placa con el número IMO de identificación del buque y chalecos salvavidas<sup>69</sup> a bordo del Shun Fa**



*Fuente:* Estado Miembro.

68. Las investigaciones anteriores del Grupo sobre la propiedad del Billions No. 18 indicaron una cadena de transferencias tras su designación el 28 de diciembre de 2017, habiendo sido el último propietario un tal Sr. Wang de Joy Wealthy Trading Limited. Según el Estado Miembro incautador, tras establecer un primer contacto con el Sr. Wang, este interrumpió las comunicaciones. Como el Sr. Wang se encontraba en otra jurisdicción, se dejó que el capitán del buque (de otra nacionalidad) actuara como representante. A solicitud de los acreedores, el buque será subastado. La tripulación fue repatriada de acuerdo con el procedimiento establecido en la legislación nacional.

<sup>69</sup> Los chalecos salvavidas llevaban la marca “Golden Yuki”, nombre original del Billions No. 18.

*Buque de carga de pabellón desconocido en la esclusa de Nampo*

69. Un carguero cargado, el An Hai 6 (núm. 8355786 de la OMI), fue localizado frente a la puerta de la esclusa de Nampo a mediados de junio de 2022. El Grupo se puso en contacto con los Estados Miembros y las contrapartes pertinentes. El registro del pabellón de Niue confirmó que el buque había sido abanderado para un único viaje de entrega para su venta posterior y dado de baja el 23 de mayo de 2022 al ser notificado de la llegada del buque a su destino en un tercer país, con dos paradas solicitadas durante el trayecto, incluido un cambio de tripulación.

70. Según un Estado Miembro, el An Hai 6 se encontraba en su zona de fondeo en el puerto para un cambio de tripulación entre el 16 y el 18 de mayo de 2022, con la mitad de la tripulación desembarcada. No se cargó ni se descargó nada.

71. El Grupo observa que el seguimiento del SIA muestra que el buque no llegó al tercer país al que debía ser entregado.

72. En su informe anterior, el Grupo hizo referencia a otros buques adquiridos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, también transferidos a través de viajes de entrega única<sup>70</sup>, posiblemente aprovechando la certificación limitada. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

*Buques adquiridos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea*

73. La República Popular Democrática de Corea continuó adquiriendo tanto buques de carga como buques cisterna durante el período de la pandemia de COVID-19 mediante un proceso de transición, en violación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 14 de la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad. Los buques que figuran en el cuadro 5 se han ido incorporando oficialmente a su flota desde 2020.

<sup>70</sup> Pu Zhou (núm. 8605727 de la OMI), Rui Ji Star (núm. 9010058 de la OMI) y Ocean Sky (núm. 9125308 de la OMI).

## Cuadro 5

**Buques de transición oficialmente registrados que navegan bajo el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2020-2022<sup>a</sup> (véase también el anexo 35)**

2022					
	Núm. de la OMI	Nombre del buque	Tipo	Capacidad de peso muerto	¿Mencionado anteriormente en los informes del Grupo?
1	9125308	Chol Bong San 1 (antes Ocean Sky)	Tanquero	5 807	Sí (S/2021/777)
2021					
2	8356120	Tae Dong Mun 2 (antes Jiang Peng 337)	Cargo	2 790	No
2020					
3	8865121	Sin Phyong 5 (antes Woo Jeong)	Tanquero	3 295	Sí (S/2022/132, S/2021/777)
4	9016430	Su Ryong San (antes CJK Osaka)	Cargo	4 519	Sí (S/2022/132)
5	8602763	Tae Phyong 2 (antes Ming Zhou 6)	Cargo	26 013	Sí (S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211)
6	8651178	Mu Pho (antes Double Lucky)	Cargo	2 980	No
7	9045962	Un Hung (antes Vifine)	Tanquero	1 978	Sí (S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2020/151)
8	9340257	Kang Hung (antes Sun Miracle)	Carguero	3 800	Sí (S/2022/132)
9	9340271	Ra Son 6 (antes Sun Hunchun)	Carguero	3 800	Sí (S/2021/777)
10	7636638	Xin Hai (antes Wol Bong San)	Tanquero	4 969	Sí (S/2021/777, S/2021/211)
11	9011399	Tae Dong Mun (antes Pole Star 1)	Carguero	5 137	Sí (S/2021/211)
12	9162318	To Myong (antes Ri Hong)	Carguero	8 773	Sí (S/2022/132, S/2021/211, S/2020/840)
13	9018751	Tae Phyong (antes Great Wenshan)	Carguero	26 369	Sí (S/2021/211, S/2020/840)
14	9020003	Puk Dae Bong (antes Hua Fu)	Carguero	10 030	Sí (S/2019/171 y S/2019/171/Corr.1)

Fuente: El Grupo. Información sobre los buques obtenida de S&P Global y los registros de la OMI<sup>71</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Varios de esos buques investigados por el Grupo habían sido declarados en operaciones bajo sus pabellones anteriores cuando realizaban actividades sancionables. En el cuadro se relacionan las fechas oficiales en las que los buques fueron reabanderados (a menudo de forma retroactiva) bajo el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

<sup>71</sup> Consultado en mayo de 2022.




## Heng Xing

74. Las imágenes de satélite mostraban al Heng Xing (núm. 8669589 de la OMI), petrolero anteriormente registrado en Sierra Leona e investigado por el Grupo<sup>72</sup>, en la nueva terminal petrolera de Nampo en marzo de 2022 (véase la figura XXXIV). A pesar de haber sido retirado del registro de la bandera de Sierra Leona en noviembre de 2021, el Heng Xing siguió navegando en aguas internacionales. El Grupo considera que es probable que el Heng Xing fuera transferido a la República Popular Democrática de Corea<sup>73</sup>. Antes de su llegada a Nampo, el Heng Xing fue observado en un astillero chino de interés en la segunda mitad de 2021, donde permaneció al menos tres meses. El Grupo continuó investigando a Heng Chen Rong (Hong Kong) Marine Co. Limited (恒晨榮(香港)海運有限公司), propietario registrado y gestor, que comparte la misma secretaría empresarial que otros buques sospechosos.

Figura XXXIV

**Heng Xing en el puerto de Nampo, 11 de marzo de 2022**



Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro, Estado Miembro.

75. El Grupo se dirigió por escrito a Heng Chen Rong, a Sierra Leona y a China sobre el ciudadano chino que figuraba como director de Heng Cheng Rong en los registros de empresas de Hong Kong y sobre la información de propiedad efectiva de Heng Chen Rong. Sierra Leona proporcionó la documentación solicitada. China respondió que Heng Chen Rong no se había involucrado en actividades relacionadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, que el Heng Xing no había registrado escalas en puertos de China y que China no tenía información sobre el comercio ilícito de productos petrolíferos refinados de buque a buque realizado por ese buque. Heng Chen Rong aún no ha respondido. Para más información, véanse los anexos 36.1 y 36.2.

<sup>72</sup> Véanse S/2019/171 y S/2019/171/Corr.1, nota al pie 12 y anexo 6.

<sup>73</sup> Actualmente figura como de pabellón desconocido según los registros de la OMI. El Grupo observa que ningún buque de pabellón extranjero ha atracado en los puertos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea debido a las restricciones derivadas de la COVID-19.

## Exportaciones marítimas desde la República Popular Democrática de Corea

### *Buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que exportan carbón*

76. El Grupo no dispone de datos para cuantificar la cantidad de carbón exportada por la República Popular Democrática de Corea en violación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución [2371 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad durante el período que abarca el informe. Sin embargo, se ha observado en las bases de datos marítimas que los buques de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea siguen emitiendo con identificadores fraudulentos, navegan con transmisiones del SIA limitadas o inexistentes y frecuentan aguas conocidas en las que se ha exportado carbón ilícito procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

77. Según las investigaciones del Grupo, la información proporcionada por un Estado Miembro e informes de fuentes abiertas, buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea seguían descargando carbón en aguas territoriales chinas durante el período en cuestión. Si bien el Grupo había informado anteriormente de que Ningbo-Zhoushan era una zona frecuentada por cargueros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para descargar carbón mediante transferencias de buque a buque, los buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea también han descargado carbón en otras aguas territoriales chinas, como la zona de anclaje de Huanghua, Bo Hai y Lianyungang<sup>74</sup>.

### *Ningbo-Zhoushan*


78. El Hoe Ryong (núm. 9041552 de la OMI) y el Thae Song 8 (núm. 9003653 de la OMI), ambos de pabellón de la República Democrática de Corea e investigados anteriormente por el Grupo<sup>75</sup>, descargaron carbón mediante transferencias de buque a buque en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan. El Hoe Ryong había llegado desde la República Popular Democrática de Corea el 3 de febrero a aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan, mientras que, según lo registrado, el Thae Song 8 había navegado por esas mismas aguas el 21 de febrero. Tras descargar su carbón, ambos buques fondearon frente a Shidao en marzo. Al tiempo que el Hoe Ryong apareció a continuación en Nampo, el Thae Song 8 procedió a atracar en la zona portuaria de Yantai para el 10 de abril, a fin de cargar la mercancía en sacos antes de regresar a Nampo (véanse las figuras XXXV y XXXVI). El Thae Song 8 realizó al menos otro viaje para descargar carbón en enero de 2022 (véase el anexo 37).

<sup>74</sup> Dos de los expertos opinan que ese párrafo debe comprobarse más a fondo.

<sup>75</sup> Para el Hoe Ryong, véase [S/2022/132](#), anexo 55. Para el Thae Song 8, véase [S/2021/777](#), anexo 46.

**Figura XXXV**  
**Buque Hoe Ryong, con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea,**  
**exporta carbón en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan, en marzo de 2022**

Chongjin – Ningbo-Zhoushan – Shidao – Nampo



*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes de satélite: Planet Labs y Estado Miembro.

Figura XXXVI

**El Thae Song 8, con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, exporta carbón en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan y recoge la carga puesta en sacos en Yantai, febrero a abril de 2022**

Ningbo-Zhoushan – Shidao – Yantai



Fuente: Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes de satélite: Planet Labs y Estado Miembro.

### Lianyun gang

79. Según un Estado Miembro, el Tong San 2 (núm. 8937675 de la OMI) y el Ryong Rim (núm. 8018912 de la OMI), de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, descargaron carbón de origen coreano cerca de Lianyun gang en diciembre de 2021 y de enero a febrero de 2022, respectivamente. En 2020, el Grupo informó de la presencia de múltiples cargueros de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que descargaban carbón mediante transferencias de buque a buque con buques nacionales<sup>76</sup>. El Tong San 2 volvió a entrar en aguas de Lianyun gang el 10 de abril de 2022, para exportar carbón (véanse las figuras XXXVIIa y XXXVIIb). Para la representación gráfica del Ryong Rim, véase también el anexo 38.

<sup>76</sup> S/2020/151, párrs. 67 a 70.

Figura XXXVIIa  
Exportaciones de carbón del Tong San 2 bajo el pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Lianyungang, 8 a 25 de diciembre de 2021






Figura XXXVIIb  
**Tong San 2, abril de 2022**



*Fuente:* Maxar Technologies, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes en el recuadro, Estado Miembro.

#### *Bo Hai*

80. Entre diciembre de 2021 y junio de 2022, el Boun 1 (núm. 9045986 de la OMI)<sup>77</sup>, con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, navegó en múltiples ocasiones entre Nampo y las aguas de la zona portuaria de Huanghua, en Bo Hai (véase la figura XXXVIII). El Boun 1 había exportado carbón procedente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en aguas territoriales chinas en mayo de 2020. El 5 de octubre de 2021, el Boun 1 fue observado en imágenes de satélite junto con otros buques de pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluido el Tong San 2 (véase el párrafo 79), en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan mientras exportaba carbón (véase el anexo 39)<sup>78</sup>.


<sup>77</sup> El Boun 1 también transmitió un número falsificado de ISMM, navegando como “Roun 1”.

<sup>78</sup> [S/2022/132](#), anexo 56 y figura 56.

Figura XXXVIII

**Historial de viajes del Boun 1 (que navega como “Roun 1”) con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Bo Hai, diciembre de 2021 a mayo de 2022**

May 2022, Bo Hai



April 2022



March 2022



Dec 21 -Jan 22



*Fuente:* Windward, anotaciones del Grupo; imágenes de satélite en el recuadro, Estado Miembro (Boun 1 el 3 de mayo de 2020, aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan).

81. El Grupo preguntó a China sobre las actividades de los numerosos buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en la exportación de carbón, incluyendo solicitudes detalladas sobre los cargamentos, las entidades involucradas (incluidos los buques receptores y los compradores de carbón) y las medidas adoptadas por las autoridades portuarias.

82. China respondió que, en el caso del Hoe Ryong, no se habían registrado escalas en China en 2022 y que “las autoridades chinas habían comprobado que ese buque había aparecido en el mar de China oriental, pero que no se había detectado ninguna actividad que violara las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad”. En el caso del Thae Song 8, el buque “entró en el puerto de Yantai sin estar cargado en proveniencia


del puerto de Nampo en abril de 2022 y salió de la zona de carga del puerto de Yantai en el mismo mes”. En el caso del Tong San 2, no se han registrado escalas en China desde 2021. En el caso del Boun 1, no se registraron escalas en China desde 2021: “No se encontraron pruebas de ninguna actividad relacionada con el transporte de carbón por el buque”.

83. El Grupo también preguntó a China si algún buque de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que figurara en la lista de la presa del Mar Oeste del país<sup>79</sup> (véase la figura XXXIX) y en una sección a lo largo del río Taedong entre diciembre de 2021 y el 2 de junio de 2022 había transitado por aguas territoriales o puertos chinos y se estaba investigando su participación en actividades que contravinieran las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad. China respondió que “Hoe Ryong y Ryo Myong figuraban en el anexo 3 de la [S/RES/2270 \(2016\)](#) como activos de la entidad designada Ocean Maritime Management. China siempre había mantenido la política de no permitir que los buques designados hicieran escala en puertos chinos y llevaran a cabo actividades ilícitas en las aguas territoriales chinas. En cuanto a los otros 48 buques [...] no había registro de escalas en China para algunos de ellos en 2021 y 2022 y los buques que habían hecho escala en puertos chinos habían cargado solo productos de primera necesidad”.

84. En el anexo 40 se describen las investigaciones acerca de otros buques de la República Popular Democrática de Corea con antecedentes de exportación de carbón.

Figura XXXIX

**Buques de carga con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea frente a la esclusa de Nampo, 2 de junio de 2022**



Fuente: Planet S&P Global, anotaciones del Grupo.

<sup>a</sup> Según la transmisión del SIA.

85. Según un Estado Miembro, el buque de carga designado con pabellón de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Ji Nam San (núm. 9114555 de la OMI) había suplantado al Hope 1 cuando exportó su carbón en aguas de Ningbo-Zhoushan entre octubre y noviembre de 2021 (véase el anexo 41). El Grupo señala que, aparte de transmitir una identidad falsa que levantara sospechas, cualquier diferencia física, como la longitud transmitida del buque, sería observable a poca distancia. China

<sup>79</sup> Lista en la que figuran aproximadamente 50 buques.

respondió que “no se habían registrado escalas en el puerto de China para [...] Ji Nam San (Hope 1) desde 2021 [...] ese buque había aparecido en el mar de China oriental, pero no se había detectado ninguna actividad que violara las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad”.

### **Recomendaciones**

86. Habida cuenta de que continúan muchas de las actividades anteriormente detectadas de evasión y violación de sanciones, el Grupo reitera la continua importancia de las numerosas recomendaciones relacionadas con el sector marítimo contenidas en sus informes anteriores. A continuación se formulan algunas recomendaciones adicionales.

#### *Sobre los cargueros reconfigurados que importan ilícitamente cargamentos de petróleo*

87. El Grupo recomienda que las autoridades marítimas de los Estados Miembros sean conscientes de la práctica engañosa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de reconfigurar sus buques de carga para transportar petróleo refinado y que realicen las inspecciones necesarias de los buques cuando los buques de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea hagan escala en sus puertos o zonas portuarias<sup>80</sup>. Los agentes marítimos pertinentes también deberían adoptar las medidas preventivas adecuadas para protegerse de posibles adquisiciones ilícitas de petróleo realizadas por esa vía.

88. El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros difundan entre los astilleros de reparación de buques y los corredores de buques asociados información sobre esa práctica engañosa y el riesgo de que la faciliten en caso de que dichos cargueros se exporten a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

#### *Falseamiento de la identidad de los buques y manipulación del SIA*

89. El Grupo reitera que los Estados Miembros y los registros de buques deben añadir a sus circulares información relativa a los casos detectados de blanqueo o manipulación de la identidad de los buques y asegurarse de su más amplia difusión. Dicha información debería incluir:

- Identificadores de los buques en su registro que hayan transmitido identidades camufladas
- Identificadores de buques en su registro de los que otros buques puedan haber hecho un uso indebido
- Nombres de los registratarios de buques cuyas embarcaciones hayan transmitido identificadores fraudulentos

90. El Grupo reitera que los Estados del pabellón deben disponer de las herramientas necesarias para identificar e investigar las sospechas de uso fraudulento del número de ISMM cuando estas se detecten y compartir los resultados de su investigación con otras autoridades marítimas, así como con el Grupo.

<sup>80</sup> Por ejemplo, el Grupo ha informado en numerosas ocasiones sobre buques de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que hacen escala en puertos o zonas portuarias, incluso para cargar cargamentos humanitarios.

*Sobre la adquisición de buques por la República Popular Democrática de Corea*

91. El Grupo recomienda a los registros de pabellones que, para los viajes de entrega única, se establezcan controles sobre el seguimiento completo del sistema de identificación automática, controles del buque para confirmar la conformidad con las condiciones restringidas de navegación y controles adicionales de verificación de la entrega del buque con el destinatario.

92. El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros alienten a los vendedores a verificar la información, incluyendo, entre otros datos, el destino final y los usuarios finales (propietario y fletador) del buque, la identidad del corredor o corredores conexos y los anteriores registros de transacciones.

93. El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros alienten a los vendedores a obtener de los compradores una declaración de confirmación en el momento de la venta del buque en la que se den seguridades de que el buque no será transferido de ninguna manera a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o a cualquier persona afiliada a ese país, que el comprador no facilitará ninguna violación de las sanciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y que el comprador será responsable si y cuando se presente el caso.

94. El Grupo recomienda que los Estados Miembros alienten a los vendedores, compradores y corredores a informar a sus respectivas autoridades tras la transferencia del buque en caso de que salga a la luz cualquier información relativa a la posible violación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad por el buque.


**Estadísticas comerciales y cuestiones aduaneras**

95. A pesar de un cierto repunte del limitado comercio exterior de la República Popular Democrática de Corea a partir de junio de 2021<sup>81</sup>, el volumen comercial global del país para 2021 se redujo aún más en comparación con los años anteriores. Las importaciones totales registradas en 2021 fueron de aproximadamente 241,4 millones de dólares, alrededor del 42 % de la cifra correspondiente a 2020, mientras que las exportaciones totales ascendieron a 122,2 millones de dólares, alrededor del 65 % del monto registrado en 2020 (véase la figura XL).

Figura XL

**Buques adquiridos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 2019 a 2021**

(Millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: Mapa de comercio del Centro de Comercio Internacional, consultado el 30 de junio de 2022.

<sup>81</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 121 y figura XLIII.



96. Según estadísticas comerciales de fuente abierta, durante 2021 las tres principales mercancías declaradas exportadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron los combustibles y aceites minerales (código 27 del Sistema Armonizado (SA)), el hierro y el acero (código 72 del SA) y maquinaria y equipo eléctrico (código 85 del SA) (véase el anexo 42). Los tres principales productos declarados importados por el país fueron los plásticos (código 39 del SA), el caucho (código 40 del SA) y los fertilizantes (código 31 del SA). Sin embargo, esas cifras de volumen comercial se componen de los registros aduaneros de los países asociados comerciales, que en algunos casos se notifican erróneamente (véase el párrafo 102). Como resultado, la transferencia transfronteriza real de carga sería menor. Esas estadísticas no incluyen las mercancías exportadas e importadas ilícitamente por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, como el carbón y el petróleo refinado (véanse los párrafos 27 a 34 y 76 a 85). El Grupo examinó algunos procedimientos judiciales chinos relativos a la condena de personas involucradas en la importación ilegal de carbón de origen coreano (véase el anexo 43).

97. En enero de 2022 se reanudó el tráfico ferroviario de mercancías entre Dandong (China) y Sinuiju (República Popular Democrática de Corea)<sup>82</sup>. Los contenedores fueron entregados a la instalación de desinfección de Uiju para su puesta en cuarentena, donde para julio de 2022 permanecía la mayoría de ellos (varios centenares) (véase la figura XLI).


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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, párr. 122.

Figura XLI  
Contenedores en la zona de descontaminación del aeródromo de Uiju,  
centro del aeródromo (40°09'08"N 124°29'58"E)



7 January 2022




12 February 2022



5 March 2022



1 April 2022



7 May 2022



1 June 2022


Fuente: Planet Lab.

98. Según las estadísticas disponibles, el volumen comercial global de la República Popular Democrática de Corea aumentó ligeramente en términos mensuales en el primer trimestre de 2022 (véase la figura XLII), con la reanudación del tráfico de mercancías por ferrocarril entre Dandong y Shinuiju. No obstante, ese tráfico de mercancías por ferrocarril se suspendió a finales de abril debido a la situación planteada por la COVID-19<sup>83</sup>, lo que supuso un descenso del 80 % en el volumen comercial de abril a mayo y junio de 2022.

Figura XLII

**Estadísticas comerciales, República Popular Democrática de Corea, junio de 2021 a marzo de 2022 (mensual)**

(Millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos)



Fuente: Trade Map del ITC (consultada el 30 de junio de 2022).

99. El Grupo prosiguió su análisis de las exportaciones e importaciones prohibidas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y, a ese respecto, el presente informe abarca principalmente el período comprendido entre octubre de 2021 y marzo de 2022<sup>84</sup>.

100. Sobre la base de los registros de datos comerciales nacionales del Centro de Comercio Internacional, algunos de los cuales parecían corresponder a categorías sujetas a sanciones, el Grupo solicitó a 24 Estados Miembros información sobre transacciones efectuadas con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, así como detalles sobre cualquier caso de rechazo de despacho o incautación de bienes exportados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o importados desde ese país<sup>85</sup>. En el anexo 44 figura la lista de productos de código del Sistema Armonizado de Designación y Codificación de Mercancías restringido que el Grupo utiliza para controlar la aplicación de las sanciones en los respectivos sectores.

101. El Grupo también solicitó a las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros que informaran acerca de la aplicación práctica de las obligaciones en materia de

<sup>83</sup> Véase [www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/xwfw\\_665399/s2510\\_665401/2511\\_665403/202204/t20220429\\_10680765.html](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202204/t20220429_10680765.html).

<sup>84</sup> Las estadísticas comerciales globales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea disponibles al 30 de junio de 2022 abarcan el período comprendido hasta marzo de 2022.

<sup>85</sup> Según las estadísticas disponibles, 46 Estados Miembros informaron de la realización de actividades comerciales con la República Popular Democrática de Corea, 24 de los cuales habían realizado actividades comerciales con productos de códigos restringidos del Sistema Armonizado.

sanciones, como el requisito de inspeccionar todos los cargamentos cuyo destino o cuya procedencia fuera la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de incautarlos y eliminarlos cuando se encontraran artículos prohibidos.

102. Algunos Estados Miembros indicaron que no se había registrado ninguna actividad comercial con la República Popular Democrática de Corea durante el último trimestre de 2021 y el primero de 2022 y mencionaron un uso erróneo de los códigos de países, por el que se había introducido equivocadamente el código de país de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (KP) en lugar del código de país de la República de Corea (KR), el verdadero asociado comercial. Otros declararon que las transacciones realizadas se atenían al régimen de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas<sup>86</sup>. Varios Estados Miembros describieron los resultados de las investigaciones de casos de posible incumplimiento. En los anexos 45 y 46 figuran datos comparativos que, en muchos casos, demuestran las discrepancias entre las estadísticas de comercio internacional y los datos nacionales.

103. El Grupo aguarda respuesta de varios Estados Miembros y observa que algunos siguen teniendo problemas para determinar si está prohibido transferir ciertos artículos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea o desde ella.

#### **Recomendaciones**

104. **El Grupo recomienda que la Organización Internacional de Normalización y los Estados Miembros adopten las medidas necesarias para evitar el uso erróneo de los códigos de país de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la República de Corea (KP y KR, respectivamente).**

105. **El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que racionalicen sus listas de control de exportaciones e importaciones utilizando como material de apoyo la lista no oficiosa de productos básicos prohibidos (véase el anexo 44).**

106. **El Grupo recomienda que las autoridades aduaneras de los Estados Miembros utilicen la lista mencionada para informar a los agentes comerciales de sus respectivas jurisdicciones y para que los utilicen con fines de diligencia debida, especialmente cuando se trate de productos básicos de ese tipo en las proximidades de jurisdicciones sujetas a sanciones.**

107. **El Grupo recomienda, en lo que respecta a los Estados Miembros que necesitan ayuda con la cuestión de la prohibición sectorial, que el Comité considere la posibilidad de realizar una labor de información.**

## **IV. Embargos, entidades y personas designadas y trabajadores en el extranjero**

### **Embargos**

#### *Global Communications (Glocom)*

108. Ante la evidencia de que Glocom sigue activo en Internet, el Grupo pidió a Malasia información actualizada sobre las medidas específicas adoptadas por las autoridades malasias sobre Glocom y sus asociados en los últimos años<sup>87</sup>. Malasia respondió: “Las autoridades malasias confirmaron que Global Communications (Glocom) nunca ha operado en Malasia” (véase el anexo 47).

<sup>86</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 127 a 129.

<sup>87</sup> Véase el párr. 17.

### *Sri Lanka*

109. Según un informe de los medios de comunicación<sup>88</sup> de febrero de 2022, un ministro de Sri Lanka admitió haber comprado armas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea durante la guerra civil de Sri Lanka de 1983 a 2009. El Grupo preguntó a Sri Lanka sobre ese informe de prensa, pero aún no ha recibido respuesta, si bien cabe señalar que el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Sri Lanka ha negado categóricamente lo afirmado en medios de comunicación<sup>89</sup>.

### **Aplicación de la prohibición relativa a los artículos de lujo**

110. Durante el período sobre el que se informa, los volúmenes de importación de todo tipo de bienes de consumo, incluidos posibles artículos de lujo, siguieron siendo extremadamente bajos debido al cierre de las fronteras. Sin embargo, tras la reanudación parcial de los envíos de carga por ferrocarril en enero de 2022, bienes de consumo importados volvieron a aparecer en tiendas de divisas y, al parecer, en algunos mercados, aunque a precios muy elevados (1 kg de café costaba entre 900 y 950 dólares).

111. El Grupo investigó un informe de prensa sobre el uso en la República Popular Democrática de Corea de cámaras Canon y Nikon de alta gama por parte de fotoperiodistas profesionales. El Grupo proporcionó los números de serie de alrededor de 20 de esas cámaras a los fabricantes, quienes confirmaron la información sobre las ventas por distribuidores locales y puntos de venta a compradores en el Japón, Singapur, Tailandia, China y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Una de las cámaras se había utilizado con fines de visualización y otra como modelo de inspección en una planta de fabricación; al parecer no se había dispuesto de ninguna de los dos en forma adecuada por las correspondientes empresas locales de eliminación de residuos. Para más información, véanse los anexos 48 y 49.

112. Según un informe aparecido en medios de comunicación, funcionarios del gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea habían utilizado un Mitsubishi Pajero, al parecer un modelo fabricado entre 2015 y 2021 (véase la figura XLIII). Analistas independientes han determinado que el modelo posiblemente perteneciera a la “Edición de Coleccionista” de lujo o, alternativamente, a la edición “V97”. El vehículo apareció por primera vez en la Televisión Central de Corea el 8 de marzo de 2020 y, posteriormente, en su grabación del 25 de marzo de 2020, aparcado cerca del lugar de lanzamiento del misil balístico intercontinental en una instalación de misiles cerca del Aeropuerto Internacional de Sunan, en Pyongyang. El vehículo volvió a aparecer en una fotografía de grupo con el líder del país, Kim Jong Un, el 31 de marzo de 2022. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation informó al Grupo de que los vehículos de la imagen “habían sido fabricados en nuestra planta japonesa después del [ejercicio] 2014” y que ese modelo “era un producto que vendíamos desde el Japón a la región del norte de Asia y Oriente Medio”. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

<sup>88</sup> Véase [www.nknews.org/2022/02/top-sri-lankan-official-admits-to-arms-deal-with-north-korea-then-backtracks/?t=1652198644870](http://www.nknews.org/2022/02/top-sri-lankan-official-admits-to-arms-deal-with-north-korea-then-backtracks/?t=1652198644870).

<sup>89</sup> Véase <https://mfa.gov.lk/fm-north-korea>.



Figura XLIII

**Imágenes de vehículos Mitsubishi Pajero en la República Popular Democrática de Corea**

*Fuente:* Televisión Central de Corea y el Grupo.

113. Analistas independientes han visto e identificado vehículos utilitarios deportivos Mitsubishi Pajero modificados en desfiles militares en la República Popular Democrática de Corea en octubre de 2020 y enero de 2021 (véase la figura XLIV). El fabricante subrayó: “Nuestra política es no realizar el montaje de vehículos con fines militares y nunca se ha modificado ningún vehículo con fines militares como el que aparece en la imagen. Además, nuestro acuerdo de distribución prohíbe la venta, la modificación o el uso de nuestros vehículos con fines militares o de alteración del orden internacional”.

Figura XLIV

**Imágenes de vehículos utilitarios deportivos Mitsubishi Pajero modificados con fines militares**



*Fuente:* NK News.

114. El Grupo investigó un informe aparecido en medios de comunicación<sup>90</sup> sobre una empresa de Singapur que violaba la prohibición de artículos de lujo al suministrar vinos y bebidas alcohólicas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El Grupo recibió información de un Estado Miembro de que “123 Holdings Pte. Ltd.”, empresa registrada en Singapur, había sido acusada en mayo de 2022 en un tribunal de Singapur por el supuesto suministro de whisky, coñac y vinos de marca a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a través de China en 2016-2017. Hubo al menos cinco entregas, por un valor total de unos 720.000 dólares de Singapur. El Grupo está dando seguimiento a los resultados de ese caso.

115. A solicitud del Grupo, el Japón proporcionó información adicional sobre el caso de la incautación de una tarjeta digital segura en junio de 2021 (véase el anexo 50).

116. El Grupo aguarda la respuesta de Steinway Musical Instruments Inc. en relación con un piano de cola en la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase [S/2022/132](#), párrafo 148).

### **Recomendaciones**

117. El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros examinen la posibilidad de actualizar sus listas de control de las exportaciones de forma que reflejen sus listas de artículos de lujo prohibidos conforme a los objetivos de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad [1718 \(2006\)](#), [1874 \(2009\)](#), [2094 \(2013\)](#), [2270 \(2016\)](#) y [2321 \(2016\)](#), sin caer en ampliaciones innecesarias a fin de no

<sup>90</sup> Véase [www.todayonline.com/singapore/beverage-exporter-charged-illegally-exporting-pokka-drinks-worth-s340000-north-korea-1907286](http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/beverage-exporter-charged-illegally-exporting-pokka-drinks-worth-s340000-north-korea-1907286).

restringir el suministro de bienes no prohibidos a la población civil ni provocar efectos humanitarios negativos una vez que se reanude el comercio.

118. El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que los Estados Miembros alienten a las entidades y a los ciudadanos de su territorio que exporten artículos de lujo a que incorporen en los contratos cláusulas que impidan el transbordo de esos artículos a la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

#### **Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KPe.001)**

119. El Grupo ha recibido información adicional de un Estado Miembro de que Guinea Ecuatorial mantiene relaciones con Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, incluida en listas de las Naciones Unidas a partir de principios de 2022<sup>91</sup>. El Grupo se ha vuelto a dirigir por escrito a Guinea Ecuatorial, pero aún no ha recibido respuesta.

#### **Green Pine Associated Corporation (KPe.010)**

120. Según un Estado Miembro, en 2019, Green Pine Associated Corporation (también conocida como Saeng Pil Trading Corporation; anteriormente conocida como Paeksan Associated Corporation y Taedonggang Technical Associated Corporation) cambió su nombre por el de Jihyang Associated Corporation (también conocida como Jihyang Technology Trade Company y Jihyang Trading Corporation (지향기술무역회사)) al realizar negocios en el extranjero, con el fin de evadir la vigilancia y las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas.

#### **Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones (Munitions Industry Department, KPe.028)**

121. Según la información facilitada por un Estado Miembro, trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea vinculados al Departamento de Industria de Municiones han estado ganando divisas vendiendo aplicaciones de *phishing* de voz<sup>92</sup> y operando múltiples servidores y direcciones de protocolo de Internet en el extranjero<sup>93, 94</sup>.

122. En julio de 2020, cuatro ciudadanos de la República de Corea fueron detenidos por las autoridades de Tianjin (China) y extraditados a la República de Corea<sup>95</sup>. Uno de ellos declaró que grupos delictivos habían comprado información personal de ciudadanos de la República de Corea, así como aplicaciones de *phishing* de voz, a un trabajador de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El análisis del servidor utilizado por el grupo de *phishing* de voz reveló términos lingüísticos que se utilizan solamente en la República Popular Democrática de Corea<sup>96</sup>. A principios de 2022, el Estado Miembro obtuvo un manual de la aplicación de piratería informática y videos de demostración de sus funciones (véase

<sup>91</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 152.

<sup>92</sup> Conocido también como “vishing”, el *phishing* de voz consiste en el uso de llamadas telefónicas seleccionadas con fines de suplantación de voz, empleando protocolos de transmisión de voz por Internet, para suplantar la identidad de la persona que llama que se asemeje a organizaciones legítimas, a fin de engañar a las víctimas. Véase [www.law.cornell.edu/wex/phishing](http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/phishing).

<sup>93</sup> El Departamento de la Industria de las Municiones ha participado directamente en el traslado a China de trabajadores de la tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Véase S/2021/211, párr. 124, S/2020/840, párrs. 106 a 111 y anexo 47, y S/2020/151, párrs. 120 a 125.

<sup>94</sup> Según las autoridades de ese Estado Miembro, el importe de los fondos perdidos en estos casos de *phishing* de voz se estima en unos 635 millones de dólares.

<sup>95</sup> Véase <http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0410/c1002-32074728.html>.

<sup>96</sup> Entre esos términos figuran palabras como “Bat-um Jon-hwa” (받음 전화), que significa literalmente llamadas entrantes, y “Kol-um Jon-hwa” (걸음 전화), que significa literalmente llamadas salientes.

el anexo 51). Se pudo identificar a una las personas que aparece en el video como Song Rim<sup>97</sup>, trabajador de la empresa “Biryugang Overseas Technology Cooperation Company” (비류강해외기술협조사), directamente vinculada a la empresa “Hapjanggang Trading Corporation” (합장강무역회사), subordinada al Ministerio de la Industria de Cohetes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (로켓트공업부)<sup>98</sup>. El Ministerio de la Industria de Cohetes está subordinado al Departamento de la Industria de Municiones<sup>99</sup>. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

### **Oficina General de Reconocimiento (Reconnaissance General Bureau, KPe.031)**

123. Continuaron los ciberataques que se cree que son llevados a cabo por actores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (Kimsuky, Lazarus Group, BlueNoroff y Stonefly)<sup>100</sup> subordinados a la Oficina General de Reconocimiento<sup>101</sup>. Esos actores se dirigen a las víctimas para solicitar fraudulentamente información pertinente con el fin de eludir los efectos de las sanciones, obtener información de valor para la República Popular Democrática de Corea y generar ingresos de forma ilícita.

124. Una empresa de ciberseguridad informó de que el Grupo Kimsuky<sup>102</sup> había estado utilizando el programa malicioso “xRAT (Quasar RAT de código abierto basado en Quasar RAT)”, un troyano de acceso remoto, y otros archivos de Word y PDF camuflados para atacar a las víctimas. La misma empresa descubrió en abril de 2022 que el Grupo Lazarus había estado distribuyendo el programa malicioso “NukeSped”<sup>103</sup> aprovechando una vulnerabilidad en la utilidad de registro basada en Java Log4j. En otro caso, se descubrió que 47 empresas e instituciones —incluidas empresas de defensa— estaban infectadas con un nuevo programa malicioso distribuido por el Grupo Lazarus en el primer trimestre de 2022. Esos comportamientos malintencionados, como la ejecución de comandos arbitrarios desde una entidad externa dentro de los sistemas de estas organizaciones, habrían tenido su origen en el proceso INITECH (inisafecrosswebexsvc.exe) infectado por un tipo de programa malicioso llamado “SCSKAppLink.dll”<sup>104, 105</sup>.

125. El Grupo recibió información de que una campaña del Grupo Lazarus en enero de 2022 se había centrado en múltiples organizaciones del sector químico y de la tecnología de la información para obtener propiedad intelectual con el fin de promover los intereses de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en esos ámbitos. Un informe de una empresa de ciberseguridad<sup>106</sup> revela que se trata de una

<sup>97</sup> Para información específicamente relacionada con el trabajador de la tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, véase el anexo 52.

<sup>98</sup> Ambas entidades fueron incluidas en la lista de sanciones de la Oficina de Control de Activos Extranjeros de los Estados Unidos en abril de 2022. Véase <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions>.

<sup>99</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 30 y anexo 30.

<sup>100</sup> Los nombres utilizados en esta sección para los actores de las ciberamenazas y sus campañas son ampliamente utilizados en la industria de la ciberseguridad.

<sup>101</sup> Véase S/2020/840, anexo 48, en que se detallan las funciones de la Oficina General de Reconocimiento y otras organizaciones en las ciberoperaciones de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

<sup>102</sup> Véase el anexo 53.1 para los ciberataques de Kimsuky por medio del programa malicioso “KONNI”.

<sup>103</sup> “NukeSped” es un programa malicioso de puerta trasera que puede realizar varias actividades maliciosas basadas en comandos recibidos desde un dominio controlado por un atacante a distancia.

<sup>104</sup> El mismo tipo de programa malicioso fue detectado por otra empresa de ciberseguridad cuando el Grupo Lazarus atacó el sector químico. Véase el párr. 125.

<sup>105</sup> En el anexo 53.2 figuran los enlaces con esos informes.

<sup>106</sup> Véase <https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical>.

continuación de la “Operación Trabajo de Ensueño”<sup>107</sup> del Grupo Lazarus, que utilizaba falsas ofertas de trabajo para inducir a las víctimas a hacer clic en enlaces o archivos adjuntos que acababan instalando programas maliciosos. Según la misma empresa<sup>108, 109</sup>, recientemente Stonefly ha pasado de ataques de denegación de servicio distribuida contra entidades gubernamentales a operaciones de espionaje contra objetivos de alto valor. En febrero de 2022, Stonefly atacó cibernéticamente a una empresa de ingeniería de los sectores energético y militar, al tiempo que un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo de que se estaban llevando a cabo investigaciones para confirmar cualquier violación sustancial de datos.

126. Un Estado Miembro informó al Grupo de que la República Popular Democrática de Corea había utilizado el programa malicioso secuestrador para generar ingresos<sup>110</sup>. Según una empresa de ciberseguridad<sup>111</sup>, aunque no ocurra con frecuencia, el país ha utilizado programas maliciosos secuestradores como el VHD, aparecido en marzo de 2020. Además, se detectaron varios tipos nuevos de programas maliciosos secuestradores a saber, BEAF, PXJ, ZZZZ y ChiChi, la mayoría de los cuales presentan similitudes de código con el VHD atribuido a BlueNoroff (también conocido como APT38).

127. Otra empresa de ciberseguridad muestra que el Grupo Lazarus ha estado distribuyendo una versión trojanizada de un DeFi Wallet para almacenar los activos de criptodivisas de usuarios e inversionistas<sup>112</sup>. BlueNoroff, conocido por su ataque cibernético contra el Banco Central de Bangladesh en 2016, pasó “de golpear a los bancos y a los servidores conectados a SWIFT a golpear únicamente a los negocios de criptomonedas como la principal fuente de ingresos ilícitos del grupo”, lo cual es ilustrativo de la “campaña Snatchcrypto” del grupo<sup>113</sup>. Los blancos de la “campaña Snatchcrypto” eran empresas que manejaban criptomonedas y contratos inteligentes en todo el mundo. El Grupo no puede confirmar aún si las campañas de esos grupos tuvieron éxito en la generación de ingresos ilícitos por la República Popular Democrática de Corea, pero es probable que ese tipo de campañas continúen<sup>114</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> S/2021/211, párr. 126 y nota a pie de página 107.

<sup>108</sup> Véase <https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/stonefly-north-korea-espionage>.

<sup>109</sup> Según una empresa de ciberseguridad, “se cree que Stonefly se ha especializado en montar ataques selectivos contra objetivos que podrían aportar información para ayudar a sectores de importancia estratégica como el energético, el aeroespacial y el militar”. Prácticamente todas las tecnologías en las que parece estar interesado tienen usos militares y civiles y algunas podrían tener aplicaciones en el desarrollo de armamento avanzado”.

<sup>110</sup> El 6 de julio de 2022, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América (Buró Federal de Investigaciones, Agencia de Ciberseguridad y Seguridad de las Infraestructuras y Departamento del Tesoro) advirtió a través de un aviso conjunto de ciberseguridad que una variante de programa malicioso secuestrador llamada “Maui Ransomware” se estaba utilizando en una campaña llevada a cabo por actores de ciberamenazas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea desde mayo de 2021, principalmente para dirigirse a organizaciones del sector sanitario y de la salud pública. Véase [www.cisa.gov/uscrt/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-187a-north-korean%20state-sponsored-cyber-actors-use-maui-ransomware-to-target-the-hph-sector.pdf](https://www.cisa.gov/uscrt/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-187a-north-korean%20state-sponsored-cyber-actors-use-maui-ransomware-to-target-the-hph-sector.pdf).

<sup>111</sup> Véase [www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/the-hermit-kingdoms-ransomware-play.html](https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/the-hermit-kingdoms-ransomware-play.html).

<sup>112</sup> Véase <https://securelist.com/lazarus-trojanized-defi-app/106195>.

<sup>113</sup> Véase <https://securelist.com/the-bluenoroff-cryptocurrency-hunt-is-still-on/105488>.

<sup>114</sup> El despliegue exitoso de programas maliciosos secuestradores o el uso de la recolección de credenciales para generar ingresos ilícitos violaría las sanciones financieras, en particular el párrafo 11 de la resolución 2094 (2013) del Consejo de Seguridad. Véanse los párrs. 146 a 149 sobre el robo de criptomonedas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea.



## Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares (KPe.054)

### *Departamento 53*

128. Un Estado Miembro informó de que el Departamento 53 (también conocido como Oficina 53) del Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, designado por las Naciones Unidas, es una entidad de comercio de armas, con sede en Pyongyang. Al menos durante el período comprendido entre 2019 y 2021 (y posiblemente antes y después), la oficina de representación del Departamento 53 en la Federación de Rusia se habría encargado de adquirir en ese país componentes de rodamientos, comunicaciones y electrónica para la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Desde finales de 2021 (y posiblemente antes), el Departamento 53 también ha participado directamente en varios proyectos de construcción en el Congo. Esos proyectos, que casi con toda seguridad emplean a trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, comprenden múltiples hospitales (Brazzaville y Songolo) y complejos de viviendas (Kindele, Bacongo y Uenze) (véase el párrafo 138).

129. Según ese mismo Estado Miembro, el Departamento 53 tiene empresas subordinadas y empresas pantallas y representantes designados en varios países. El Grupo solicitó al Congo, Mozambique, la República Árabe Siria, la República Unida de Tanzania, la Federación de Rusia y China más detalles y aclaraciones sobre la información anterior.

130. La Federación de Rusia respondió que no había unidades acreditadas del Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares responsables del comercio de armas en la Federación de Rusia y que las personas nombradas eran diplomáticos. La República Árabe Siria respondió que no existía cooperación militar entre la República Popular Democrática de Corea y la República Árabe Siria. China respondió que no se habían encontrado pruebas de actividades relacionadas con el comercio ilícito de armas. Para ver las respuestas completas, véanse los anexos 54 a 56. El Grupo aguarda otras respuestas.

### *Haegumgang Trading Corporation*

131. Haegumgang Trading Corporation es una entidad de comercio de armas de la República Popular Democrática de Corea subordinada al Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Populares. Según un Estado Miembro, en junio de 2021, la empresa tenía previsto servir de intermediario en la venta de equipo militar a Nigeria por un valor aproximado de 3,5 millones de dólares. El Grupo aguarda la respuesta de Nigeria. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

## Trabajadores en el extranjero

132. El Grupo siguió investigando a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que obtenían ingresos en el extranjero (trabajadores en el extranjero). Según información proporcionada por varios Estados Miembros, nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea habían sido empleados en África, Asia, Oriente Medio y la Federación de Rusia en 2021 en los ámbitos de la tecnología de la información<sup>115</sup>,

<sup>115</sup> En lo que respecta a los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, en mayo de 2022, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos publicó “Guidance on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea information technology workers” (Orientaciones sobre los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea), en la que describe los esfuerzos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea por enviar a sus trabajadores de ese sector a empresas de todo el mundo a fin de obtener un acceso privilegiado que a veces se utiliza para facilitar ciberintrusiones. Las orientaciones proporcionan indicadores para ayudar a las empresas a identificar a esos trabajadores de tecnología de la información y recomienda varias medidas de protección. Véase [https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220516\\_dprk\\_it\\_worker\\_advisory.pdf](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220516_dprk_it_worker_advisory.pdf) y [https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220516\\_dprk\\_it\\_worker\\_fact\\_sheet.pdf](https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220516_dprk_it_worker_fact_sheet.pdf).

la cooperación médica, la construcción y la restauración, en contravención de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad. El cierre de las fronteras por causa de la COVID-19 sigue impidiendo a los Estados Miembros repatriar desde sus territorios a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

133. El Grupo obtuvo una lista de nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que habían salido de un Estado Miembro a finales de diciembre de 2019, pero pudo determinar que algunos de ellos no habían llegado a sus destinos declarados o a países de tránsito después de la salida. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

#### *Argelia*

134. Un Estado Miembro informó de que la empresa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea Namgang Construction General Corporation contrató a otra empresa de un tercer país para proporcionar trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para proyectos de construcción en Argelia entre junio y julio de 2021. Argelia respondió al Grupo que esa empresa de la República Popular Democrática de Corea “no figuraba en sus registros oficiales” (véase el anexo 57).

#### *Camboya*

135. El Grupo continúa investigando a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajan en Camboya. Al menos dos entidades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Keochakrey Trading Co. Ltd. y SCNK (Camboya) Co. Ltd., siguieron operando incluso después de que las autoridades camboyanas las dieran de baja en diciembre de 2019<sup>116</sup>. La entidad ha utilizado la información de una empresa disuelta, sustituyendo las partes pertinentes de la dirección y el país (véase el anexo 58). Camboya informó al Grupo de Expertos de que se había dado de baja a ambas entidades en febrero de 2022 y proporcionó información sobre los nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajaban para ellas. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

#### *Congo*

136. Según un Estado Miembro, en marzo de 2021 el Centro de Cooperación Médica Moranbong de Corea solicitó al Congo la prórroga de los visados de trabajo para varios médicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajaban en el Congo (véase el anexo 59). El Grupo aún no ha recibido respuesta del Congo.

#### *Côte d'Ivoire*

137. Un Estado Miembro informó de que el Centro de Cooperación Médica Moranbong de Corea había firmado contratos con centros médicos de Costa de Marfil para el empleo de médicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en junio y julio de 2019 (véase el anexo 60). El Grupo aguarda una respuesta de Costa de Marfil.

#### *República Democrática Popular Lao*

138. En julio de 2020, la República Democrática Popular Lao informó al Grupo de que no había ninguna empresa laosiana que contratara a trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, aunque un Estado Miembro informó de que un equipo de esos trabajadores vinculado con Lao-Toshyo IT Service Company Ltd. seguía trabajando en la República Popular Democrática de Corea. La República Democrática

<sup>116</sup> [S/2020/151](#), párr. 139 y anexo 38.

Popular Lao aún no ha dado respuesta en relación con esos trabajadores (véase el anexo 61).

#### *Federación de Rusia*

139. Un medio de comunicación local ruso informó de que la empresa rusa “SZ’Rybovodstroï”<sup>117</sup> estaba empleando a nacionales de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en una obra de construcción de un complejo residencial en Yuzhno-Sajalinsk. Según esos informes, las obras estaban relacionadas con un complejo de apartamentos, se habían iniciado a finales de 2019 y su finalización estaba prevista para el primer semestre de 2022 (véase el anexo 62). La Federación de Rusia respondió que no había información acerca del empleo de trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea por la citada empresa. En el anexo 63 figura la respuesta completa.

140. Según un Estado Miembro, una empresa de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Pyongyang Kwangmyong Information Technology Corporation (평양광명정보기술사)<sup>118</sup>, había estado operando en Vladivostok y, al parecer, empleaba a nacionales rusos para crear cuentas de tecnología de la información y prestar servicios bancarios en 2021 y 2022, a cambio de una parte de los ingresos de los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Otras actividades incluían el mantenimiento de cuentas en una plataforma para trabajadores independientes llamada “Upwork” (<https://www.upwork.com>) y la facilitación de verificaciones remotas en relación con el uso de las cuentas, la recepción de pagos para los trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea en las cuentas bancarias de los ciudadanos rusos y la identificación de posibles oportunidades de trabajo en la esfera de la tecnología de la información para trabajadores de ese sector en la República Popular Democrática de Corea. La Federación Rusa respondió que la empresa no estaba localmente registrada y que no había datos sobre las personas que participaban en sus actividades. En el anexo 63 figura la respuesta completa.

#### *Togo*

141. Según un Estado Miembro, médicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea trabajan en el Togo y habían participado en la creación de empresas conjuntas con varias entidades con sede en ese país. Iglesias evangélicas del Togo también habían invitado al país a trabajadores médicos de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 64). El Grupo aún no ha recibido respuesta del Togo.

#### *Emiratos Árabes Unidos*

142. Según otro Estado Miembro, un nacional de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, Oh Chung Song (오충성, nacido el 27 de febrero de 1989), entonces residente en Dubai, había creado una cuenta en la plataforma “Upwork”, para lo cual proporcionó información falsa sobre su nacionalidad. Por medio de esa plataforma, Oh habría desarrollado y suministrado programas relacionados con la tecnología de la información a varias empresas para adquirir divisas. En diciembre de 2021, un empleador descubrió la falsificación de la nacionalidad de Oh y, como consecuencia,

<sup>117</sup> ООО “СЗ “РЫБОВОДОСТРОЙ”, INN 650103952031.

<sup>118</sup> El sitio web de la Asociación Rusa de Empresas de Informática y Tecnología de la Información muestra que anteriormente esa empresa (agosto de 2014) había ofrecido a otras empresas rusas la oportunidad de contratar a trabajadores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea suministrándoles documentos en que describían las capacidades de sus especialistas en tecnología de la información.

Oh y otros trabajadores de tecnología de la información de la República Popular Democrática de Corea que trabajaban con él se marcharon inmediatamente a la República Democrática Popular Lao, preocupados por la posibilidad de ser investigados por las autoridades de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. El Grupo aún no ha recibido respuesta de los Estados Miembros pertinentes ni de “Upwork”.

#### *Viet Nam*

143. Viet Nam respondió a la pregunta del Grupo sobre el “Restaurante Koryo”, que continuaba operando en Hanoi<sup>119</sup>. Según la respuesta, “a los trabajadores no repatriados [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] en Vietnam se les han concedido visados temporales de un mes para prolongar su estancia en Viet Nam debido al impacto de la pandemia de COVID-19”. Viet Nam explicó que ya no se expedían permisos de trabajo y que “sin ninguna ayuda de su país, se encontraban en condiciones difíciles” y que el restaurante seguía funcionando “con el único objetivo de mantener condiciones mínimas de vida para los restantes empleados [de la República Popular Democrática de Corea] con fines humanitarios”.

144. Viet Nam también explicó que “las pinturas del restaurante Koryo tenían solo fines decorativos y que no existían pruebas que demostraran que sus empleados hubieran estado vendiendo ningún producto artístico del Estudio de Arte Mansudae”.

## V. Finanzas

145. En el período a que se refiere el informe, las investigaciones financieras del Grupo se centraron en las ciberactividades de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, aunque continuaron las investigaciones financieras anteriores<sup>120</sup>.

### **Generación ilícita de ingresos mediante ciberactividades**

146. Los ciberataques dirigidos a empresas y bolsas de criptomonedas eran cada vez más refinados<sup>121</sup> y entorpecían cada vez más el seguimiento de los fondos robados. La ausencia de mecanismos reguladores globales que rijan las criptodivisas agrava el problema.

147. A finales de marzo de 2022, la red Ronin, cadena lateral basada en Ethereum (ETH) utilizada para el juego de tokens no fungibles (NFT)<sup>122</sup> Axie Infinity<sup>123</sup>, fue blanco de un acto de piratería informática por un valor de más de 173.600 ETH y 25,5 millones de USD Coin<sup>124, 125</sup>. Según informaron boletines de la red<sup>126</sup>, los piratas informáticos habían accedido a cinco de los nueve nodos validadores de claves privadas, entre ellos uno de un validador de terceros gestionado por una organización

<sup>119</sup> S/2022/132, parr. 178 y anexo 84.

<sup>120</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 181 y S/2021/777, párrs. 159 a 164.

<sup>121</sup> S/2022/132, párrs. 182 a 184.

<sup>122</sup> Los tokens no fungibles son “tokens digitales en una cadena de bloques en la que representan algo único, como una obra de arte digital, un artículo especial en un juego, tarjetas coleccionables raras o cualquier otro activo digital/físico único”. Véase <https://chain.link/education/nfts>.

<sup>123</sup> Sky Mavis, una empresa tecnológica con sede en Viet Nam, desarrolló Axie Infinity y la Red Ronin.

<sup>124</sup> Debido a la variación del valor en dólares estadounidenses de las criptodivisas en los últimos meses, el Grupo describe la cantidad robada en las criptodivisas pertinentes. Véase [www.reuters.com/technology/crypto-crash-threatens-north-koreas-stolen-funds-it-ramps-up-weapons-tests-2022-06-28](https://www.reuters.com/technology/crypto-crash-threatens-north-koreas-stolen-funds-it-ramps-up-weapons-tests-2022-06-28).

<sup>125</sup> Véase <https://therecord.media/more-than-625-million-stolen-in-defi-hack-of-ronin-network>.

<sup>126</sup> Véase <https://roninblockchain.substack.com/p/community-alert-ronin-validators?s=w>.

autónoma descentralizada<sup>127</sup>. Pocas horas después de detectado<sup>128</sup> el incidente, se interrumpieron las extracciones y los depósitos efectuados por conducto de Ronin Bridge, para su investigación. Varias empresas de análisis de datos rastrearon los fondos robados, algunos de los cuales habían pasado por el “intercambio de monedas” en bolsas descentralizadas y habían sido enviados a servicios de mezcla de monedas<sup>129</sup>. A mediados de abril, el Buró Federal de Investigaciones de los Estados Unidos de América atribuyó el acto de piratería informática contra Ronin al Grupo Lazarus<sup>130</sup>, tras lo cual el Departamento del Tesoro de los Estados Unidos impuso sanciones sobre las direcciones de las carteras de ETH asociadas con el robo<sup>131</sup>. En mayo, las autoridades estadounidenses impusieron sanciones contra Blender, un mezclador de monedas virtuales que había sido utilizado por la República Popular Democrática de Corea para blanquear la criptomoneda robada, con lo cual se sancionaba por primera vez a una empresa de mezcla de divisas<sup>132</sup>. El 28 de junio Ronin Bridge reinició sus operaciones y actualmente colabora con los organismos encargados de hacer cumplir la ley para recuperar totalmente sus fondos<sup>133</sup>.

148. Según numerosas fuentes<sup>134</sup>, el Puente Horizon para la cadena de bloques Harmony<sup>135</sup>, que sirve de puente entre Bitcoin, la red ETH y la cadena Binance, se vio comprometido por un ciberataque muy similar el 23 de junio de 2022, en el que se realizaron múltiples transacciones para robar varios tipos de Altcoins. Harmony informó de que su equipo había encontrado “evidencia de que las claves privadas habían sido comprometidas” y de que “los fondos habían sido robados del lado de Ethereum del puente”. El pirata informático habría comprometido dos de los cinco monederos multifirma<sup>136</sup>. Los activos robados fueron enviados a diferentes monederos en el intercambio descentralizado Uniswap para el “intercambio de monedas” por un valor de 85.800 ETH. El 27 de junio Harmony proporcionó información actualizada, según la cual los piratas informáticos habían comenzado a mover fondos a través del mezclador Tornado Cash. El 29 de junio, basándose en la notable similitud con anteriores criptoataques del grupo, incluido el ataque contra Ronin, una empresa de análisis de cadena de bloques identificó como principal sospechoso al Grupo Lazarus<sup>137</sup>. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

149. Las evaluaciones de ambos incidentes no han revelado ningún desperfecto técnico, lo que apunta a un probable error humano como resultado de la ingeniería social desplegada por los piratas informáticos. En ambos casos se trata de un

<sup>127</sup> Sky Mavis, creadores del juego Axie Infinity, descartaron que las vulnerabilidades técnicas fueran la causa principal del acto de piratería y señalaron que “se trataba de un ataque de ingeniería social combinado con un error humano”.

<sup>128</sup> La red Ronin fue vulnerada el 23 de marzo, mientras que la violación se detectó el 29 de marzo.

<sup>129</sup> Véanse [www.elliptic.co/blog/540-million-stolen-from-the-ronin-defi-bridge](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/540-million-stolen-from-the-ronin-defi-bridge) y <https://medium.com/@danajwright/the-ronin-heist-c675b7b75efe>.

<sup>130</sup> Véase [www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-attribution-of-malicious-cyber-activity-posed-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-attribution-of-malicious-cyber-activity-posed-by-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea).

<sup>131</sup> Véanse <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220414> y <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220422>.

<sup>132</sup> Véase <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0768>.

<sup>133</sup> Véase <https://roninblockchain.substack.com/p/the-ronin-bridge-is-open->.

<sup>134</sup> Véanse <https://medium.com/harmony-one/harmonys-horizon-bridge-hack-1e8d283b6d66> y <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/over-1-billion-stolen-from-bridges-so-far-in-2022-as-harmony-s-horizon-bridge-becomes-latest-victim-in-100-million-hack>.

<sup>135</sup> La cadena de bloques Harmony fue creada por la empresa de inversiones en cadena de bloques Harmony One, con sede en los Estados Unidos.

<sup>136</sup> Al igual que en el caso del incidente de piratería informática de que había sido blanco Ronin, Harmony ha anunciado que no ha encontrado evidencias de una violación del código del contrato inteligente ni de ninguna vulnerabilidad en la plataforma Horizon.

<sup>137</sup> Véase <https://hub.elliptic.co/analysis/the-100-million-horizon-hack-following-the-trail-through-tornado-cash-to-north-korea>.



“intercambio de monedas” en bolsas descentralizadas y del uso de mezcladores en el proceso de blanqueo. La pronta notificación de ambos incidentes facilitó la rápida intervención de organismos encargados de hacer cumplir la ley<sup>138</sup> y empresas de análisis de cadenas de bloques, lo que permitió una mejor recuperación de los fondos robados.

150. Chainalysis, una empresa de análisis de tecnología de cadenas de bloques, ha analizado las tácticas, técnicas y procedimientos utilizados por los ciberactores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, especialmente el Grupo Lazarus. En el anexo 65 figura ese análisis, el cual se centra en el acceso (métodos utilizados para obtener el control de la infraestructura de las víctimas), la ofuscación (el intercambio de monedas de una cadena de bloques a otra y el uso de mezcladores) y el retiro de dinero (la transferencia de la criptodivisa a moneda fiduciaria).

151. Está en aumento el uso por los ciberactores de la República Popular Democrática de Corea de fichas no fungibles como medio de generación de ingresos y de blanqueo de dinero. Analistas de criptodivisas temen que se expanda el uso de ese mecanismo, en parte porque es uno de los menos regulados<sup>139</sup>. Según un Estado Miembro, desde finales de 2021 se han producido varios incidentes de fichas no fungibles generadas por la República Popular Democrática de Corea en varios lugares. Prosiguen las investigaciones.

### **Recomendaciones**

152. Actividades atribuidas a ciberactores afiliados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea fueron responsables del robo de activos de criptodivisas por valor de cientos de millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos durante el período a que se refiere el informe. El Grupo cree que esos actores seguirán explotando los eslabones más débiles en la cadena de bloques y entre los proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales a menos que se establezcan medidas reguladoras.

**153. El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que aconsejen a los agentes nacionales pertinentes, en particular instituciones financieras, empresas y proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales, que aprueben materiales adecuados de educación, formación, intercambio de información y asesoramiento para personas de todos los niveles de la plantilla, desde ejecutivos hasta empleados a tiempo parcial.**

**154. El Grupo recomienda que organismos de los Estados Miembros, así como instituciones financieras, empresas y proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales, presten la debida atención al aumento de la ciberhigiene exigiendo a todos los usuarios de criptomonedas que intenten acceder a un intercambio de criptomonedas en un umbral por defecto más alto, como una autenticación de dos factores de la transacción<sup>140</sup>.**

**155. El Grupo recomienda que cualquier entidad que sufra un ciberataque lo notifique y se ponga en contacto lo antes posible con las autoridades jurídicas competentes, que emita un anuncio público del incidente y que se ponga en contacto con los organismos pertinentes que sean del caso, incluidas empresas de**

<sup>138</sup> El 19 de julio de 2022, el Departamento de Justicia de los Estados Unidos anunció que “gracias a la rápida denuncia y a la cooperación de una víctima [...] los fiscales habían desarticulado las actividades de un grupo patrocinado por el Estado norcoreano que desplegaba el programa malicioso secuestrador conocido como ‘Maui’” y se habían incautado unos 500.000 dólares que correspondían al pago de rescates. Véase el anexo 66.

<sup>139</sup> Véase [www.eisneramper.com/non-fungible-tokens-money-laundering-flvs-blog-0821](https://www.eisneramper.com/non-fungible-tokens-money-laundering-flvs-blog-0821).

<sup>140</sup> Esa medida hará que aumente la seguridad y es una de las prácticas idóneas para algunos actores del sector privado. Véase [www.cnas.org/publications/reports/following-the-crypto](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/following-the-crypto).

análisis de tecnología de cadenas de bloques, con el fin de aumentar las perspectivas de recuperación de algunos activos robados.

156. El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que estudien la posibilidad de legislar o establecer directivas para que las ciberempresas hagan que se apliquen protocolos de “conocimiento de los clientes” y refuercen los procedimientos de registro de proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales<sup>141</sup>.

157. El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que fortalezcan la cooperación, faciliten el diálogo y mejoren el intercambio de información para hacer frente a la creciente amenaza financiera y de inteligencia que supone la ciberdelincuencia<sup>142</sup>.

158. El Grupo recomienda a los Estados Miembros que apliquen lo antes posible las orientaciones del Grupo de Acción Financiera Internacional sobre los activos virtuales, que tienen como objetivo evitar la financiación de la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva imponiendo requisitos contra el blanqueo de capitales y la financiación del terrorismo a esos activos y a los proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales<sup>143</sup>.

## VI. Efectos no deseados<sup>144</sup> de las sanciones<sup>145</sup>

159. En el párrafo 25 de la resolución 2397 (2017), el Consejo de Seguridad reafirma que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas no tienen el propósito de acarrear consecuencias humanitarias adversas para la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

### Posibles consecuencias humanitarias

160. El Grupo solicitó información a varios Estados Miembros sobre el impacto no deseado de las sanciones en la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase el anexo 68). Las respuestas han sido variadas. Algunos Estados Miembros sostienen que el efecto acumulado de las sanciones es considerable, mientras que otros consideran que no tienen un impacto significativo. El Grupo repitió su encuesta entre unos 40 organismos de las Naciones Unidas y organizaciones no gubernamentales de ayuda con un historial de actividad en la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Las respuestas se muestran en el anexo 70.

<sup>141</sup> Según las autoridades de la República de Corea, los incidentes de criptosequestro en la República de Corea disminuyeron después de que la Ley enmendada sobre la notificación y el uso de información específica sobre transacciones financieras entrara en vigor en marzo de 2021. La Ley exige a todos los proveedores de servicios de activos virtuales que transformen sus requisitos de lucha contra el blanqueo de dinero y la financiación del terrorismo y que se registraran ante los reguladores financieros antes de iniciar cualquier actividad. Véase [www.coinfirm.com/blog/south-korea-crypto-regulations](http://www.coinfirm.com/blog/south-korea-crypto-regulations).

<sup>142</sup> Un buen ejemplo es el grupo de trabajo sobre programas maliciosos secuestradores de los Estados Unidos y la República de Corea, creado en septiembre de 2021.

<sup>143</sup> Véase el anexo 67.

<sup>144</sup> Dos de los expertos se oponen al título de esta sección, subrayando que debería estar en consonancia con el lenguaje de la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad (“consecuencias” adversas de las sanciones), ya que la omisión de ese término puede dar lugar a la complicación de la exposición de los hechos y la calificación de las pruebas creíbles; a ese respecto, sugieren que se utilice esa terminología en los informes del Grupo y en su correspondencia.

<sup>145</sup> Dos de los expertos señalan que el Grupo no ha podido alcanzar una opinión consensuada sobre las consecuencias humanitarias de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas y lamentan la consiguiente ausencia de un análisis de esa cuestión en el presente informe.

161. El Grupo considera que la República Popular Democrática de Corea se enfrenta a un estado de deterioro de la crisis humanitaria a largo plazo, que se pone de manifiesto en la disminución de la satisfacción de necesidades humanas básicas, la incapacidad de los principales organismos humanitarios internacionales para prestar asistencia debido al cierre de todas las fronteras desde 2020 y el creciente brote de COVID-19 en el país. Esos factores han tenido un impacto desproporcionado en el acceso de las mujeres, los niños y otros grupos vulnerables a una alimentación y una atención sanitaria adecuadas<sup>146</sup>.

162. Los organismos de las Naciones Unidas señalan que en 2022 más de 11 millones de personas en la República Popular Democrática de Corea están necesitadas (frente a algo más de 10 millones en 2019), mientras que 5 millones carecen de un suministro adecuado de agua, saneamiento e higiene, y más del 41% están desnutridas: el país tiene la cuarta peor tasa de desnutrición del mundo<sup>147</sup>.

163. Aunque es difícil de precisar, el Grupo ha llegado a la conclusión de que no cabe duda de que las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas han afectado involuntariamente a la situación humanitaria y al derecho al desarrollo, aunque la influencia relativa de las sanciones probablemente haya disminuido después de 2020<sup>148</sup>.

164. Si bien su atención se centra en el análisis de la influencia de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas, el Grupo señala que la pésima situación humanitaria de la República Popular Democrática de Corea probablemente sea resultado de una serie de factores, como la falta de recursos y de capital, la baja productividad, la priorización de la industria pesada y de las necesidades militares, que reducen el sector del consumo, la adopción de decisiones interna del país, un fallido sistema de planificación centralizada, las frecuentes calamidades naturales, el autoaislamiento, la falta de ingresos por exportaciones y de capacidad de importación y el cierre de las fronteras a causa de la pandemia de COVID-19, así como el efecto de las sanciones.

165. El impacto directo en la situación humanitaria del brote de COVID-19 (denominado por la República Popular Democrática de Corea como “fiebre”), que al parecer comenzó en el país en abril de 2022, es difícil de evaluar. En julio se estimaba que la enfermedad había afectado a alrededor del 25 % de la población, pero se registraron muy pocos casos mortales (aunque algunas fuentes sospechan que no se notifican todos los casos).

166. Antes de la pandemia, el sistema médico de la República Popular Democrática de Corea ya se encontraba en un estado ruinoso debido a una serie de factores (véase el párrafo 164) y, al parecer, el país importaba solamente un suministro limitado de productos médicos (véase el anexo 71), la mayoría de ellos a través de canales de ayuda. Desglosar el impacto de las sanciones de las Naciones Unidas de esos otros factores es una tarea difícil. El Grupo ha calculado que en 2020 y 2021, con las fronteras cerradas, el país importó productos médicos relacionados con la COVID-19 por un valor aproximado de 1,87 dólares por persona<sup>149</sup>.

167. El brote de COVID-19 parece haber tenido un impacto limitado en la economía, incluso en el precio de los alimentos. Los precios del arroz y del maíz siguieron

<sup>146</sup> Véanse [www.unicef.org/globalinsight/reports/sanctions-and-their-impact-children](https://www.unicef.org/globalinsight/reports/sanctions-and-their-impact-children) y <https://koreapeacenow.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/human-costs-and-gendered-impact-of-sanctions-on-north-korea.pdf>.

<sup>147</sup> Véanse [www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0639en](https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0639en) y <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/05/1037831>.

<sup>148</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 188.

<sup>149</sup> Esa cifra se ha calculado sobre la base del número de habitantes de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y de los datos del Centro de Comercio Internacional sobre las importaciones del país relacionadas con la COVID-19 del país (véase el anexo 71).

aumentando en julio, cuando suelen bajar después de la “cuesta de la cebada”<sup>150</sup>. Sin embargo, no parece que se haya producido una crisis en gran escala<sup>151</sup>. Informes recibidos desde la República Popular Democrática de Corea atestiguan que el virus, aunque es muy contagioso, es de una variedad que en la mayoría de los casos no provoca sino fiebre y tos por algunos días<sup>152</sup>.

### **Posibles consecuencias para las operaciones de asistencia humanitaria**

168. En general, las entregas de ayuda humanitaria durante el período que abarca el informe apenas han sufrido cambios; el Comité concedió 4 nuevas exenciones y 13 prórrogas en materia de asistencia humanitaria. Según fuentes de las Naciones Unidas, el 90 % de los cargamentos humanitarios destinados a la República Popular Democrática de Corea permanecen almacenados en la frontera. En abril de 2022 se entregaron por tren varios contenedores con suministros médicos y humanitarios, que se pusieron en cuarentena durante tres meses en la instalación de desinfección de Uiju (véase el párrafo 97 y la figura XLI). Medios de comunicación señalaron a mediados de mayo que tres aviones de carga de la República Popular Democrática de Corea entregaron desde el extranjero suministros médicos destinados a combatir el brote de COVID-19 en el país. Algunos contenedores, entregados en 2021, se descargaron a finales de la primavera de 2022<sup>153</sup>. La mayoría de las organizaciones no han reanudado los esfuerzos de aplicación y vigilancia, aunque algunas mantienen una presencia mediante personal de contratación local o que presta servicios en modalidad de teletrabajo.

169. Como se desprende de sus respuestas a la encuesta del Grupo, las organizaciones humanitarias no se muestran optimistas sobre la posibilidad de reanudar sus operaciones en la República Popular Democrática de Corea, inclusive cuando se reabran las fronteras. La necesidad de largos procedimientos de exención, la reducción de riesgos, la reticencia de los donantes y, sobre todo, la ausencia de un canal bancario siguen siendo problemas importantes<sup>154</sup>.

170. Entre las sugerencias expresadas por las organizaciones que participaron en la encuesta figuran las siguientes:

- a) Conceder exenciones permanentes a las organizaciones humanitarias;
- b) Emitir una “carta de aprobación” del Comité o del Consejo de Seguridad para facilitar la aplicación de las exenciones;
- c) Preparar y publicar directrices para las exenciones que sean accesibles en coreano, incluido el norcoreano, y en inglés;

<sup>150</sup> Véase [www.dailynk.com/english/recent-spike-rice-corn-prices-make-things-even-more-difficult-ordinary-north-koreans](http://www.dailynk.com/english/recent-spike-rice-corn-prices-make-things-even-more-difficult-ordinary-north-koreans).

<sup>151</sup> Véase [www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2022/07/society-economy/market-research-2](http://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2022/07/society-economy/market-research-2).

<sup>152</sup> Sin embargo, según una organización no gubernamental, “[a]unque el número de casos haya disminuido, la [República Popular Democrática de Corea] sigue siendo vulnerable a un resurgimiento de la enfermedad. Expertos en salud pública han señalado que el sistema sanitario del país no está equipado para hacer frente a un brote de COVID-19”.

<sup>153</sup> S/2022/132, párr. 191.

<sup>154</sup> Se ha informado al Grupo de que, como solución provisional puntual a este problema, las Naciones Unidas han llegado a un acuerdo con el Gobierno de la República Popular Democrática de Corea para transferir dinero a través de la cuenta de la Misión Permanente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, por el que el Gobierno acreditará las cuentas de las organizaciones de las Naciones Unidas en el país, sin crear una relación de corresponsalía bancaria con ningún banco de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. El dinero se utilizará exclusivamente para actividades de ayuda humanitaria, de acuerdo con la excepción a la congelación de activos de un banco de la República Popular Democrática de Corea.

d) Elaborar un programa de exención de determinadas exportaciones actualmente sujetas a sanciones, cuyos ingresos podrían utilizarse para financiar suministros humanitarios.

### **Recomendaciones**

171. El Grupo reitera su recomendación de que el Comité considere la posibilidad de establecer un contacto más activo con los actores de la sociedad civil que prestan asistencia humanitaria a la República Popular Democrática de Corea a fin de contribuir a fundamentar la adopción de decisiones en el futuro y comprender mejor la situación humanitaria.

172. El Grupo toma nota de los recientes acuerdos para la transferencia de fondos a las organizaciones humanitarias de las Naciones Unidas en la República Popular Democrática de Corea (véase la nota 164), pero reitera la urgencia de restablecer un canal bancario más duradero.

173. El Grupo valora encarecidamente las sesiones informativas semestrales de los organismos competentes de las Naciones Unidas sobre los efectos no deseados de las sanciones y recomienda que el Comité mantenga esa práctica.

174. El Grupo recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad siga ocupándose de los problemas y procesos de mitigación de posibles efectos negativos no deseados de las sanciones en la población civil de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y en las operaciones de ayuda humanitaria en favor de los sectores vulnerables de esa población y superar los efectos de la pandemia de COVID-19.

175. El Grupo recomienda que el Comité y otras partes interesadas pertinentes consideren la idea de eximir determinadas exportaciones actualmente sometidas a sanciones, cuyos ingresos podrían utilizarse para financiar suministros humanitarios.

## **VII. Informes nacionales sobre la aplicación**

### **Situación de la presentación por los Estados Miembros de informes sobre la aplicación de las resoluciones pertinentes**

176. Al 27 de julio de 2022, 66 Estados Miembros habían presentado informes sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 8 de la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad; 81, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo 17 de la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#); 95, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución [2375 \(2017\)](#); 90, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución [2371 \(2017\)](#); 107, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución [2321 \(2016\)](#); y 115, sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución [2270 \(2016\)](#). El Grupo observa que el número de Estados Miembros que no presentan informes (127) sobre la aplicación de lo dispuesto en la resolución [2397 \(2017\)](#) sigue siendo significativo.

## **VIII. Recomendaciones**

177. En el anexo 72 figura una lista consolidada de las recomendaciones.



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**Annex 1: Excerpt of IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (6 June 2022)**

At the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri we have observed indications that one of the adits has been reopened, possibly in preparation for a nuclear test. The conduct of a nuclear test would contravene UN Security Council resolutions and would be a cause for serious concern.

At the Yongbyon site, activities are continuing. There are ongoing indications consistent with the operation of the 5MW(e) reactor. There are indications of activity at the Radiochemical Laboratory that are consistent with those observed during possible waste treatment or maintenance activities in the past. A roof has been installed on the annex to the reported Centrifuge Enrichment Facility, so the annex is now externally complete. Near the light water reactor (LWR), we have observed that the new building that had been under construction since April 2021 has been completed, and construction has started on two adjacent buildings. At the 50MW(e) reactor, construction of which stopped in 1994, we have observed the dismantling of buildings and the removal of some material, likely for re-use in other construction projects. There are ongoing indications of activities at the Kangson complex and the Pyongsan Mine and Concentration Plant.

The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear programme is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme.

*Source:* IAEA, IAEA Director General's Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (6 June 2022) <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-6-june-2022> (Accessed on 1 July 2022).

## Annex 2: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's January 2021 speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to nuclear and military developments)

*Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory on Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK*

*Date: 09/01/2021 | Source: Minju Choson KCNA*

The report detailed the historic course of masterminding a great revolutionary turn for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force.

Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style to meet their unique operational missions. This gave a clearer description of the status of our state as a nuclear weapons state and enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield.

**In the period under review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb.** By succeeding in the test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-15 on November 29, 2017, the Party Central Committee declared with pride to the world the accomplishment of the historic cause of building the national nuclear force and the cause of building a rocket power.

The report reviewed the fact that new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science one after another to cope with the enemy's desperate arms buildup, thus making our state's superiority in military technology an irreversible one and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting a war on the highest level.

**The national defence science sector developed the super-large MLRS, a super-power attack weapon the world's weaponry field had never known, and proceeded to develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.**

**It is necessary to develop the nuclear technology to a higher level and make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter for more tactical uses. This will make it possible to develop tactical nuclear weapons to be used as various means according to the purposes of operational duty and targets of strike in modern warfare, and continuously push ahead with the production of super-sized nuclear warheads.** In this way we will be able to thoroughly contain, control and handle on our own initiative various military threats on the Korean peninsula, which are inevitably accompanied the nuclear threat.

*Source: Minju Choson KCNA (in bold and underlined by the Panel).*

## Annex 3: Activities at Punggye-ri nuclear test site (41° 16' 35" N 129° 05' 18" E)

### Background

The DPRK has conducted six nuclear tests in Punggye-ri test site since October 2006. The first nuclear test was conducted at Tunnel 1 (East portal) and the subsequent five tests were held at Tunnel 2 (North portal) between May 2009 and September 2017. Tunnel 3 (South portal) and Tunnel 4 (West portal) have not been used for any nuclear weapons test and Tunnel 3 appears to have two entrances, primary and secondary.

In April 2018, in connection with the US-DPRK Summit in Singapore, Kim Jong Un said “***no nuclear test and intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire are necessary for the DPRK now...the mission of the northern nuclear test ground has thus come to an end***” and announced that the DPRK will dismantle the nuclear test site during the Third Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.<sup>1</sup>

On 24 May 2018, following the announcement, the DPRK held a ceremony for the dismantling of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site inviting foreign journalists, but without international inspectors. DPRK demolished all tunnels including Tunnel 2, Tunnel 3 and Tunnel 4, except for Tunnel 1, which had been already abandoned by DPRK.<sup>2</sup>

In January 2022, DPRK announced that they would “***reconsider in an overall scale the trust-building measures...and to promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally-suspended activities***”, during the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.<sup>3</sup> The announcement appears to imply the resumption of ICBM and nuclear tests.

This annex shows the following activities at the nuclear test site by the Panel's satellite imagery analysis.


- Annex 3.1** Increased tracks of the vehicles across Punggye-ri test site
- Annex 3.2** Construction of a new building at Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.3** Observation of structure or possible entrance to Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.4** Piles of soil from excavation at Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.5** Road leveling and stream bed reconstruction at Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.6** Increased construction of new buildings at Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.7** Cables at the newly developed entrance to Tunnel 3
- Annex 3.8** Renovation of the main administrative area
- Annex 3.9** Several vehicles' activities
- Annex 3.10** New activities near Tunnel 4

<sup>1</sup> Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un (21/04/2018), <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1528032553-97436392/third-plenary-meeting-of-seventh-c-c-wpk-held-in-presence-of-kim-jong-un/?t=1657409180710>.

<sup>2</sup> CNN reporters who had witnessed the destruction of the site reported that the DPRK officials told them that the Tunnel 1 had been already shut down. See CNN, North Korea Blows Up Tunnels at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, 25 May 25 2018; Katshuhisa Furukawa, “Developments at the DPRK's Punggye-Ri Nuclear Weapon since December 2021”, *Open Nuclear Network*, 28 March 2022, <https://oneearthfuture.org/file/2857/download?token=ln0DS97H>.

<sup>3</sup> 6th Political Bureau Meeting of 8th C.C., WPK Held (20/01/2022), <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1642631520-928202842/6th-political-bureau-meeting-of-8th-c-c-wpk-held>.

**Annex 3.1:** Increased tracks of the vehicles across Punggye-ri test site (Tunnel 3, Command center, Southern support area)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 18 February 2022, 22 February 2022.




### Annex 3.2: Construction of a new building at Tunnel 3



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 February 2022, 6 March 2022.

### Annex 3.3: Observation of structure or possible entrance to Tunnel 3



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 21 March 2022.



**Annex 3.4:** Piles of soil from excavation at Tunnel 3



*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., 31 March 2022.

**Annex 3.5: Road leveling and stream bed reconstruction at Tunnel 3**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 3 April 2022, 25 April 2022; Google Earth Pro, 4 May 2022.



**Annex 3.6:** Increased construction of new buildings at Tunnel 3

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 6 April 2022, 11 April 2022, 25 April 2022, 17 May 2022.

**Annex 3.7:** Cables at the newly developed entrance to Tunnel 3

Source: Google Earth Pro, 4 May 2022.




**Annex 3.8:** Renovation of the main administrative area

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 6 March 2022, 9 March 2022, 25 April 2022, 18 May 2022, 29 June 2022.



### Annex 3.9: Several vehicles' activities



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 5 April 2022, 6 April 2022.




Source: Planet Labs Inc., 9 May 2022, 10 May 2022.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 4 May 2022.



**Annex 3.10:** New activities near Tunnel 4

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 18 May 2022, 17 June 2022; Sky News.

**Annex 4: Construction activities in the southern area of the LWR (39°47'39"N125°45'18"E)**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 3 March 2022, 8 April 2022, 16 April 2022, 28 May 2022, 5 July 2022.



**Annex 5: Vehicle activities and cooling water discharge at 5MW(e) reactor  
(39°47'51"N125°45'20"E)**








Source: Planet Labs Inc., 6 April 2022, 27 April 2022, 28 May 2022.

**Annex 6: 50MW(e) reactor (39°47'20"N125°45'46"E)**


Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 April 2022, 15 May 2022, 5 July 2022.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 April 2022, 16 April 2022, 19 April 2022, 15 May 2022.



**Annex 7: Radiochemical Laboratory and Coal-fired thermal plant (39°46'50"N125°45'08"E,  
39°46'33"N125°45'27"E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 15 May 2022.



Source: Google Earth Pro, 9 May 2022; Planet Labs Inc., 5 July 2022.





Source: Planet Labs Inc., 3 March 2022, 28 May 2022.

**Annex 8: Activities at the Yongbyon Centrifuge Facility (39°46'15"N125°44'57"E)****Plumes****Construction**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 20 March 2022, 27 April 2022, 15 May 2022.




**Annex 9: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (Location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38°19'04"N126°25'54"E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 16 May 2022.

1) Expansion of the piles of tailings at the mine (38° 19' 58" N 126° 27' 21" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 September 2021, 3 February 2022, 4 May 2022, 16 May 2022.




2) Railcar activities at Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 19' 03" N 126° 25' 55" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 16 May 2022, 21 May 2022.



3) Tailings pond of Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 18' 40" N 126° 25' 46" E)




Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 September 2021, 12 December 2021, 16 May 2022.

**Annex 10: Activities at Kangson (38° 57' 26" N 125° 36' 43" E)**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 6 March 2022, 3 April 2022, 21 May 2022.



**Annex 11: Activities at Yongdoktong (40°00'01"N125°18'02"E, 40°01'45"N125°16'29"E)**



Source: Google Earth Pro, 17 April 2022; Planet Labs Inc., 15 May 2022.



## West valley



## South valley



Source: Google Earth Pro, 9 January 2021, 1 November 2021, 18 January 2022, 17 April 2022.



## Annex 12: Replies on Academic Exchanges with PUST

### 1) United Kingdom

A University in the UK replied that two students were registered in doctoral degrees in woman's and Reproductive Health and plant sciences, which were scheduled to end in 2023-2024. The University explained that both students were studying anticancer mechanisms and essential oils to suppress fungal pathogens respectively and their research topics fell within the provisions for medical research. They had been subject to review under ATAS (Academic Technology Approval System) which was required by the UK government policy as part of immigration requirements before being granted the right to study in the University (see figure 12-1).

### 2) Sweden

A University in Sweden replied that two students were admitted in Ph.D. courses on 30 June 2015 and 20 August 2015 and finished their courses on 5 September 2019 and 28 January 2020, respectively. Both have received funding from Erasmus Mundus Action 2 project LOTUS+. Prior to the Ph.D. studies, one student received a Master's degree at the University and the other obtained a Master's degree in genetics at PUST (see figure 12-1).

### 3) China

China replied to Panel's enquiries on following academic exchanges (see figure 12-3).

#### Research Institute 'A'

Student name	Period	Degree
XXXXXXXXXX	December 2015 – September 2016	Joint Research in Agriculture and Life Science
XXXXXXXXXX	December 2015 – September 2016	Joint Research in Agriculture and Life Science

#### University 'B'

Student name	Period	Degree
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX	August 2016 – June 2020	Master in Agriculture and Life Science
XXXXXXX XXXXXXX	September 2019 – present	Master in Agriculture and Life Science

#### University 'C'

Student name	Period	Degree
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX	October 2017 – October 2019	Joint Research in Agriculture and Life Science
XXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX	October 2019 – present	Ph.D. in Agriculture and Life Science

Figure 12-1: Reply from a University in UK

The Vice-Chancellor  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
 Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874  
 United Nations Headquarters  
 New York, NY 10017  
 USA

19 May 2022

– Dear Sirs,

**RE: Pyongyang University of Science and Technology**

I am writing in response to your letter dated 9<sup>th</sup> May 2022, reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.022, seeking details about students registered for study at [REDACTED].

There were four questions raised and these are addressed individually below:

(i) *Have the named students from PUST participated in graduate studies at [REDACTED]?*

I can confirm that the two named students are registered for postgraduate research study at the [REDACTED] as follows:

[REDACTED] – DPhil Women's and Reproductive Health, [REDACTED] Department of W&RH<sup>1</sup>.

[REDACTED] – DPhil Plant Sciences, Department of Plant Sciences<sup>2</sup>.

Both are scheduled to finish their studies in 2023-24.

(ii) *How many PUST students or academics have studied at, or visited, the University since 2016?*

(iii) *Are there other DPRK students or academics currently studying or involved in research at the University?*

Our records indicate that these are the only North Korean students who have been accepted for study at [REDACTED]. They both commenced study in 2019 and were the first from North Korea to do so.

Our central records do not show any North Korean academic as having been a visitor at the University, or to be currently visiting.

(iv) *Information on any preventive measures taken by the University to determine that any scientific or technical studies undertaken by any DPRK students or academics would not*

<sup>1</sup> [REDACTED]  
<sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]

2



*contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other WMD programmes.*

The two students currently studying at the [REDACTED] were subject to additional review under the ATAS (Academic Technology Approval System), as required by UK government policy set by the FCDO, as part of immigration requirements before being granted the right to study in the UK at [REDACTED]. The ATAS<sup>1</sup> process provides a high level of government clearance for the research to proceed taking due account of potential applicability to matters of a sensitive nature.

The specific research topics for these two students would, we believe, fall within the provisions for medical research. [REDACTED] is studying anticancer mechanisms and [REDACTED] is researching essential oils that are the most effective to suppress fungal pathogens.

I hope that the information provided in this response adequately addresses the concerns raised by the Panel of Experts in this area. However, if any other information is required or further questions arise please contact the Registrar [REDACTED]

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]

VC's Executive Officer (Policy & Governance)

<sup>1</sup> The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) applies to all international students and researchers (apart from exempt nationalities) who are subject to UK immigration control and are intending to study or research at postgraduate level in certain sensitive subjects. [Academic Technology Approval Scheme \(ATAS\) - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/academic-technology-approval-scheme)

Source: The Panel.

**Figure 12-2: Reply from a University in Sweden**

Response from [REDACTED] University on Communication #26, UN Panel of Experts, Reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.26

**1) Any confirmation of the information in Annex 1; have these named students from PUST participated in graduate studies of any sort at [REDACTED] University?**

[REDACTED] was admitted as a PhD student on 2015-06-30 with a scholarship funding from the Erasmus Mundus Action 2 project LOTUS+. Prior to that he had obtained a Master's degree within Natural Sciences at [REDACTED] University. He was active within the Department of Medical Biochemistry and Micro Biology and finished his PhD on 2019-09-05. The title of the thesis was: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was admitted as a PhD student on 2015-08-20 with a scholarship funding from the Erasmus Mundus Action 2 project LOTUS+. Prior to that he had obtained a Master's degree within genetics at PUST as well as free standing courses at [REDACTED]. He finished his PhD on 2020-01-28. The title of the thesis was: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**2) Information on the current status of any academic exchange between [REDACTED] University and PUST. How many PUST students or academics have studied at or visited the University since 2016?**

The academic exchange ended in 2014 (when Erasmus Mundus project LOTIS+ was terminated). No records of any number of students or visits carried out.

**3) Are there other DPRK students or academics currently studying or involved in research at the University, which could be considered as falling under the paragraph 11 of the resolution 2321 (2016) mentioned above? If so, please provide names, any academic affiliation in DPRK, course and thesis titles, the period of affiliation with the University and details about these individuals' source(s) of income whilst in Sweden, including sponsorship or scholarships (if applicable);**

No records of nationality available.  
No agreements of academic exchange reported.

**4) Information on any preventive measures taken by the University to determine that any scientific or technical studies undertaken by any DPRK students or academics would not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other WMD programmes.**

[REDACTED] University observes the Swedish law and security regulations. Matters in need of review are handled by the university's Division for Security.

Source: The Panel.



**Figure 12-3: Reply from China****7. Academic exchange (OC. 27-30)**

China has always been strictly implementing the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions related to academic exchanges. China performs strict control over the courses for the DPRK students studying in China, and takes necessary measures to ensure that the sensitive areas and information prohibited by the resolutions are untouched. If there is any conclusive evidence showing the DPRK students collecting sensitive technical information, please kindly provide it to the Chinese side for necessary investigation.

5

It should be pointed out that the Chinese Mission to the United Nations is the only appropriate channel the Panel should engage with when doing such investigations. The Panel should refrain from sending letters to them directly.

*Source:* The Panel.

**Annex 13:**

**13.1. KCNA reporting on Kim Jong Un watching test-firing of new-type tactical guided weapon**

**13.2. KCNA reporting on Kim Jong Un giving a written order to conduct the test-launch of Hwasongpho-17 (Hwasong-17) and**

**13.3. KCNA reporting on Kim Jong Un's January speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to military developments)**

**Annex 13.1:**

## **President of State Affairs Kim Jong Un watches test-firing of new-type tactical guided weapon**

Date: 17/04/2022 | Source: Voice of Korea (EN) |

The respected Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, President of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the DPRK, watched the test-firing of a new-type tactical guided weapon.

He was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik, Deputy Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK.

The test-firing was seen by commanding personnel of the Ministry of National Defence of the DPRK and the commanders of the large combined units of the Korean People's Army.

The new-type tactical guided weapon system developed under the special concern of the Party Central Committee is of great significance in radically increasing the fire striking power of the long-range artillery units on the front and strengthening the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operation of the DPRK and diversification of the firepower task.

The test-firing proved successful.

*Kim Jong Un highly estimated the successes made one after another by the defence science research institutions in attaining the pivotal goals for war deterrent advanced at the Eighth Congress of the WPK and warmly congratulated them in the name of the Party Central Committee.*

*Clarifying the future plan of the Party Central Committee for increasing the defence capabilities, he gave important instructions on further strengthening the defence capacity and nuclear combat forces of the country.*

Source: KCNA available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1650142847-935725828/president-of-state-affairs-kim-jong-un-watches-test-firing-of-new-type-tactical-guided-weapon/?t=1658076183497>.

**Annex 13.2:****Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Issues Order for Test-launch of New Type ICBM**

Date: 25/03/2022 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) |

Pyongyang, March 25 (KCNA) -- Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, gave a written order to conduct the test-launch of Hwasongpho-17, a new type intercontinental ballistic missile of the DPRK strategic forces, on March 23, Juche 111 (2022)4. - www.kcna.kp (Juche111.3.25.) -

Source : KCNA available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1648159663-278086617/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-issues-order-for-test-launch-of-new-type-icbm/?t=1663712750438>

**Annex 13.3:****KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's January speech at 8<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (excerpt related to military developments)**

*Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK*

Date: 09/01/2021 | Source: Minju Choson KCNA

*The report detailed the historic course of masterminding a great revolutionary turn **for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force.***

*Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, **intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style** to meet their unique operational missions. This gave a clearer description of the status of our state as a nuclear weapons state and enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield.*

*In the period under review **the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb.** By succeeding in the test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-15 on November 29, 2017, the Party Central Committee declared with pride to the world the accomplishment of the historic cause of building the national nuclear force and the cause of building a rocket power.*

*The great cause of building the national nuclear force, which was impossible to achieve even in 20 to 30 years in terms of existing formula, **was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear buildup was set forth and one year after the Seventh***

<sup>4</sup> Underlining by the Panel.

**Congress of the Party.** This is a miracle unprecedented in history and the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation the Seventh Central Committee performed for the Party and revolution, the country and people and posterity.

The Party Central Committee achieved new great victories by vigorously leading the struggle for upgrading the nuclear force even after the great historic November event in 2017.

Recalling that the Party Central Committee decided **to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system** and carried out this historic task by relying on the patriotism and loyalty of national defence scientists, the report affirmed that the new-type gigantic rocket on an 11-axis self-propelled launcher displayed during the military parade in celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party fully demonstrated the ultra-modernity and great striking capability of our nuclear force.

The accomplishment of the great cause of building the national nuclear force and its continued development constitute a victory of the organizational and leadership abilities of the Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong Un and a great victory of the national defence scientists and all other Koreans who waged a death-defying struggle with an indomitable faith in independence and valiant spirit.

The report reviewed the fact that **new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science** one after another to cope with the enemy's desperate arms buildup, thus making our state's superiority in military technology an irreversible one and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting a war on the highest level.

The national defence science sector **developed the super-large MLRS**, a super-power attack weapon the world's weaponry field had never known, and proceeded to **develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons** including **new-type tactical rockets** and **intermediate-range cruise missiles** whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.

This enabled us to gain a reliable edge in military technology.

National defence scientists and workers in the munitions industry properly set the orientation of developing main tank of our style following the world's development trends and have begun to enter a new track of development while upgrading production processes. They also **achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex**, self-propelled gun howitzer and anti-armour weapons.

The report also noted that in the period under review the sector of national defence scientific research was conducting research into **perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket** at the final stage, finished research into **developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets** and was making preparations for their test manufacture.

The report made public with pride that the standard of the goal **in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly** and it was remodelled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy, **that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched** and was in the stage of final examination and the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed, and that other achievements were



*made in national defence research of gigantic significance in developing the People's Army into a powerful one with the strongest military muscle in the world.*

*The report evaluated that the bold leap forward brought about in the national defence science and munitions industry made sure that the country ranked high in the world in terms of defence capabilities and, at the same time, it was of great significance in realizing the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee for developing the overall Korean revolution.*

*The report said that a great advance was made in the work of turning the People's Army into elite forces in the period under review.*

Source: KCNA (emphasis in bold by the Panel), available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610502377-14004652/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory/?t=1665001072714>.

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**Annex 14: 27 January 2022 (local time): two missiles combining ballistic and guidance technology launched from the area of Hamhung towards the sea in an easterly direction, impacting an uninhabited island.**

On 27 January 2022, the DPRK conducted mobile test launches of two solid-propellant short-range missiles combining ballistic missile and guidance technology. As was the case for previous test launches, they were conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. The missiles were successively launched, the first at around 08:00 and the second at around 08:05 (local time) from 4-axle wheeled TELs in the area of Hamhung. The possible launch pad location (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E) was the same as that used for the SRBM launch test on 10 August 2019 (see S/2020/151, table 3 and annex 58.3). According to a Member State, the missiles were launched in an easterly direction on a depressed trajectory. Both missiles flew about 190 km, with a maximum altitude of 20 km, before impacting the uninhabited Al-som Island (40° 38' 51" N 129° 32' 56" E), the likely target<sup>5</sup> (see figure 14.1 and annex 23 on solid propellant BM launch tests since 2018).

The missiles tested appear to have been the **SRBM KN-23**, previously displayed at the “Self-Defence 2021” exhibition on 11 October 2021<sup>6</sup> and presented and tested several times since 2019.<sup>7</sup> On 28 January, the weapon was described by the DPRK as a “*Surface to surface tactical guided missile*”<sup>8</sup> (see after figure 14.3 the article published by KCNA, Rodong Sinmun on 28 January 2022).

The reported flight performance of the missiles tested is consistent with images published by the DPRK in KCTV, Rodong Sinmun and KCNA on 28 January 2022 (figures 14.2, 14.3).

<sup>5</sup> The target Al-som island is consistent with the KCNA picture and with the calculated range between launch pad and island of around 190 km. See also KCTV, 28 January 2022, full broadcast available at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b/> and KCTV, 28 January 2022, 8pm bulletin, available at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f2996afaa/>. The subsequent findings of NKPRO and IISS on 8 February 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/pro/kim-jong-uns-private-beach-used-to-launch-missiles-last-month-analysis/?t=1659885202557> are consistent with this analysis.

<sup>6</sup> See annex 23.1 and S/2022/132, figure IX.

<sup>7</sup> See S/2021/211, annex 12; S/2020/151, para. 194, table 3 and annexes 58-1 and 59-1

<sup>8</sup> Source: Rodong Sinmun and KCNA, 28 January 2022. “*The Academy of Defense Science of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted the test-fire for updating long-range cruise missile system and the test-fire for confirming the power of conventional warhead for surface-to-surface tactical guided missile on Tuesday and Thursday respectively.*”. The Panel has previously noted that the report of the Eighth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, held in January 2021, declared that DPRK would pursue the development of tactical nuclear weapons (see S/2021/211, para.18, and S/2021/777, annex 18-1). See also annex 13.

At the time of the test, Kim Jong Un was near the area of the launch test sites<sup>9</sup> inspecting both a munitions factory in the area of Hamhung<sup>10</sup> (accompanied by his sister Kim Yo-jong, Jo Yong-won and Kim Jong Sik<sup>11</sup>) (figure 14.2), and an infrastructure project that will transform the military airfield at Ryonpho (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) into a vegetable greenhouse farm.<sup>12</sup>

The launches were overseen by officials of the Department of the Munitions Industry of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (KPe. 028) and leading officials of the Academy of Defence Science (KPe.021).<sup>13</sup>

Around that time, Kim Jong Un was reportedly in the vicinity of Hamhung inspecting a site for the Ryonpho vegetable greenhouse farm (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) as well as a possible missile factory the "February 11<sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex" (39°55'10"N 127°39'09"E). The launch pads of the SRBM (27 January 2022, 39°48'45"N 127°39'50"E) and LRCM (25 January 2022, 39°49'1.84"N 127°40'3.27"E) were located on two contiguous beaches close to Kim Jong Un's reported mansion (at the private Majon Beach, see figures 14.1, 14.2, 14.3) and close to the point from which he had observed the SRBM KN-24 launch test on 10 August 2019 (39°48'22.67"N 127°39'46.00"E, see S/2020/151, annex 58.3). It is possible that Kim Jong Un attended these launches.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>9</sup> It appears through the analysis of KCTV images that the launch test site of a long-range cruise missile (LRCM) (figure II) on 25 January (with a flight time of 126 minutes and a range of 1500 km flight, the LRCM appears to be similar to the LRCM tested on 12 September 2021) was located on the Chakto-long beach (39°48'59.62"N 127°40'2.57"E) approximately only 500 m north of the SRBM test site on 27 January 2022 (see previous footnote).

<sup>10</sup> Judging from the shape of the facility only a part of the munitions factory is located in an underground gallery. The shape of the facility resembles a long, wide, windowless tunnel covered by a vaulted ceiling. According to expert analysis (NKNEWS, <https://www.nknews.org/2022/01/kim-visits-major-weapon-factory-orders-military-base-turned-into-veggie-farm/?t=1661720911999>, and MIIS - Arms Control Wonk, <https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1486894952424607749>) the factory is likely to be the "February 11<sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong Machine complex" (39° 55' 10" N 127° 39' 09" E), visited by Kim Jong Un several times since 2013. The photographs of previous factory visits published by KCNA are comparable to those published on 28 January 2022. The large flow-forming machine and other equipment seen in the photographs could be used to make alloy missile bodies such as those for SRBMs (see figure 14.2).

Such an underground facility might also be located 9 km to the northwest, in the mountain between the location 39° 57' 13" N 127° 32' 49" E and the Chemical Material Institute (CMI) where the missile casing engines are produced (39° 57' 30" N 127° 33' 33" E, see S/2019/691, annex 32, and S/2019/171, annex 84.5). The SRBM and cruise missile launch sites on 30 January (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E, see figures 14.1 and 14.2 and S/2020/151, table 3 and annex 58.3), the future greenhouse farm (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) and the munitions factory are located in close proximity (see figure 14.2).

<sup>11</sup> Jo Yong Won, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau. See S/2022/132, table 1, and KCNA, 12 January 2022. Kim Jong Sik, the Deputy Department Director of the Party's military industry department (see figure 14.3)

<sup>12</sup> See KCTV full broadcast, 28 January 2022, at <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b/>; the Ryonpo airfield was used as a KN-25 launch site on 28 November 2019 (see S/2020/151, para. 194, table 3)

<sup>13</sup> Listed as KPe.021, the Academy of National Defence Science controls a network of overseas front companies tasked with collecting technical and scientific information in support of DPRK's WMD programmes.

<sup>14</sup> Two experts objected to this sentence, believing that the reports of the Panel are not for hypothetical political statements.

Figure 14.1: Launch tests of two SRBM KN-23 on 27 January 2022 (and LRCM on 25 January)



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 28 January 2022, 01:38 UTC; 27 January 2022, 01:22 UTC; 26 January 2022, 01:51:21 UTC; 18 January 2022, 02:53:01 UTC; Google Earth, 9 February 2020; KCNA, 28 January 2022, Full broadcast <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b/>.



**Figure 14.2: The SRBM and cruise missile launch sites on 25 and 27 January (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E, see figure 14.1 above and S/2020/151, table 3 and annex 58.3), the future greenhouse farm (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) and the possible munition factory (February 11<sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex and CMI) are in close proximity**



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 29 January 2022, 05 05 UTC ; and Google Earth, 9 February 2020; 8 June 2020; 21 and 27 August 2021; KCNA: 28 January 2022, Full broadcast <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f3f259b844b/> ; <https://kcnawatch.org/?t=1651179716109>.

**Figure 14.3: An article in Rodong Sinmun on 28 January 2022, published by KCNA, reporting the statement of the Academy of Defence Science on both the test of a long-range cruise missile system on 25 January (two LRCMs flying 152 minutes to hit the target island 1800km away) and the test to confirm “the power of conventional warhead of surface-to surface tactical guided missile” on 27 January 2022**



Source: Via NK PRO / WATCH: KCNA Rodong Sinmun, 28 January 2022, available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1643322805-368795958/academy-of-defence-science-conducts-important-weapons-tests/>.

# Annex 15: 30 January 2022 (local time): an IRBM (named Hwasong-12 by the DPRK) launched in an easterly direction from the area of Mupyong-ri in Jonchon county

On 30 January 2022, the DPRK conducted a test launch of a ballistic missile stating that “*evaluation test-fire of Hwasong-12 ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile was conducted on January 30 under a plan of the Academy of Defence Science, the Second Economy Commission and other institutions concerned*” (figure 15.2, the article in Rodong Sinmun on 31 January 2022 published by KCNA). As with previous test launches, the test was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. According to two Member States, the missile was launched at 07:52 (local time), from the Mupyong-ri (aka Jonchon) area in Jagang Province in an easterly direction. Launched on a lofted trajectory with a maximum altitude of 2000 km, the ballistic missile flew around 800 km before impacting waters off DPRK’s east coast (annex 23, on liquid propellant BM launch tests since 2018). According to KCNA photographs (figure 15.1), the missile was launched from a 6-axle TEL (see S/2021/211, para. 20 and figure I).

The missile appeared to be one of the systems displayed at the “Self-Defence 2021” exhibition on 11 October 2021.<sup>15</sup> As demonstrated in KCNA pictures of the launch, both the shroud and the main missile body (that of a single-stage liquid-fuelled missile) closely resembled the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12 (aka KN-17, figure XX3.1), last tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017.<sup>16</sup> The burnt gas had the characteristic of an elongated plume-like shape and colours of the combustion of a liquid propellant (orange and yellow colours, see S/2017/150, para.36).<sup>17</sup> At the time of the test, this missile had the longest potential range of any missile tested since 2017 (annex 23).

According to the DPRK this launch test was an operational trial that “*confirmed the accuracy, safety and operational effectiveness of the Hwasong 12 weapon system under production... it was organised by the Academy of Defence Science (ADS), the Second Economic Committee, and other institutions.*” The DPRK stated “*that the Hwasong-12 is meant to serve as a medium-long range strategic ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 – 4,000 km capable of reaching Guam*”.<sup>18</sup>

Member States confirmed the many similarities identified between this missile and the Hwasong-12, including its similar size and an engine system based on the DPRK version of the RD-250 engine.<sup>19</sup>

The launch was under the responsibility of the Academy of Defence Science (KPe.021) and the Second Economy Committee (KPe.032)

<sup>15</sup> See S/2022/132, figure VII

<sup>16</sup> Hwasong-12 was successfully tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017. See S/2021/777, para.26; S/2019/171, para.174; S/2018/171, paras.7, 12; S/2017/742, paras.7-13.

<sup>17</sup> According to Jane’s Intelligence Review “*North-Korea test multiple long-range missile systems*” available at [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP\\_8038-JIR](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP_8038-JIR), “*the published launch photo shows a flame and exhaust colour consistent with hypergolic propellant combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO), as well as a reddish cloud that is typical for nitrogen-based propellants at engine ignition*”

<sup>18</sup> See KCNA Pyongyang Times, 31 January 2022. On 14 August 2017 KCNA reported that “*the military was... carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam*” ... “*The military plans to attack Guam “through simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket”.*”, available at <https://www.nknews.org/2017/08/kim-jong-un-briefed-on-guam-attack-plan-at-strategic-force-command-kcna/?t=165421072275>

<sup>19</sup> The maximum length of the IRBM Hwasong-12 is around 17.4 m, its diameter around 1.65 m and its engine derived from the RD-250 (S/2022/132, figure V and annex 20; S/2021/211, annex 10; S/2018/171, paras.14-16). Its range was estimated at 4,500 km with a 500kg warhead (see CSIS “Missile defense project”, available at <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-12/> and Jane’s Defence Weekly, 31 January 2022, available [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP\\_12569-JDW](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP_12569-JDW))



**Figure 15.1: Launch test of a Hwasong-12 IRBM on 30 January 2022** from same location as the 28 July 2017 launch test of a Hwasong-14, at Mupyong-Jonchon 65 factory (40° 36' 41" N 126° 25' 33" E)



Source: KCTV 31 January 2022 – 8 PM Bulletin <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/61f7e740a9bbf/>; Planet Labs Inc. 30 January 2022, 02 20 UTC (= 11h20 Local time); 9 September 2021, 00 47 UTC.



**Figure 15.2: Articles and pictures from Rodong Sinmun on 31 January 2022 published by KCNA, reporting the statement that “*the evaluation test-fire of Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile was conducted*”**

[KCNA Rodong Sinmun \(En\)](#)

**Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held**

Date: 31/01/2022 | Source: Rodong Sinmun (En) | [Read original version at source](#)

The evaluation test-fire of Hwasong 12-type ground-to-ground intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile was conducted Sunday under a plan of the **Academy of Defence Science, the Second Economy Commission** and other institutions concerned.

The test-fire was aimed to selectively evaluate the missile being produced and deployed and to verify the overall accuracy of the weapon system.

It was conducted by the highest-angle launch system from the northwestern part of the country toward the waters of the East Sea of Korea in consideration of the security of neighboring countries.

The Academy made public the earth image data taken from space by a camera installed at the missile warhead.

It confirmed the accuracy, security and effectiveness of the operation of the Hwasong 12-type weapon system under production.

Rodong Sinmun



Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1643600436-694045929/test-fire-of-hwasong-12-type-ground-to-ground-intermediate-and-long-range-ballistic-missile-held/?t=1651424928305>; Picture: <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-7>; *emphasis in bold by the Panel.*

**Annex 16: 27 February 2022 and 5 March 2022 (local time): two suborbital projectile launchers using ballistic missile technology (with the flight features of a powerful ballistic missile) were launched in an easterly direction from the Sunan area. The DPRK stated that the test launches were intended to test the functions of a reconnaissance satellite**

On 27 February 2022, the DPRK conducted a ballistic missile launch, identified as possibly the new ICBM Hwasong-17, according to Member States. KCNA only released a photograph of the earth taken from the missile. As was the case for previous test launches, it was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. The missile was launched at around 07:52 (local time)<sup>20</sup> from the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area in an easterly direction (see figure 16.1). According to Member States the flight distance was 300 km with a maximum altitude of 620 km. (see annex 23.1)

On 5 March 2022, the DPRK conducted a similar ballistic missile launch, again identified as possibly the new ICBM Hwasong-17, according to Member States. KCNA did not release any photographs or detail of this test. As was the case for previous test launches, it was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. The missile was launched at around 08:52 (local time) from the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area in an easterly direction (see figure 16.1). According to Member States the flight distance was between 270 and 300 km with a maximum altitude between 550 and 560 km. (see annex 23.1)

Media reporting of Member State analyses as well as the Member State information provided to the Panel concluded that the DPRK had tested in these two launches a relatively new large intercontinental ballistic missile system,<sup>21</sup> possibly the untested ICBM Hwasong-17.<sup>22</sup> A Member State assesses that the ICBMs were equipped with RD-250 liquid propellant engines for the first stage. Two Member States assess that they may have been launched in order to verify some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile.<sup>23</sup>

Regarding the apparent new momentum of DPRK's space programme represented by these launches, a Member State assesses that the programme could also facilitate the improvement of DPRK's ICBM capabilities.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Time 07:51 was also recorded by another Member State.

<sup>21</sup> Due to the thermal signature of the engines, Member States evaluated the missiles to have been the new ICBM Hwasong-17 shown at the October 2020 Military parade (S/2020/840, para.17).

<sup>22</sup> - Reuters, 11 March 2022, available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-imposes-new-north-korea-related-sanctions-after-missile-launches-2022-03-11/>

- NK News, 14 March 2022, available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/us-and-chinese-officials-discuss-north-koreas-latest-projectile-launches/>

- a Member State statement on 11 March 2022, available at <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/03/11d.html>

<sup>23</sup> According to a Member State, if the 28 February and 5 March missiles had been launched on a normal ballistic trajectory, the estimated range would have been over 1,000 km. Given this assumption, the range was extremely short for an ICBM-class ballistic missile. In general terms, however, it is technically feasible to control the range to some extent by adjusting the launch thrust and angle of missiles. A Member State assesses that the delivery system could have failed partially or that the test could have been aimed at testing a Post Boost Vehicle equipment, aimed at putting satellites into orbit or at developing MIRV capabilities.

<sup>24</sup> According to the Member State,

Conversely, DPRK will continue to develop its genuine space capabilities based on its ICBM technologies, in particular the RD-250 booster.

Both launches were under the responsibility of the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA, KPe. 029) and the Academy of Defence Science (KPe.021).

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“- Suborbital flight tests are not common for a space programme and could point to a dual objective;  
- Recent launches could also have been used to test technologies useful for a MIRV capacity;  
- It is considered likely that the DPRK may soon transform one of its ICBMs (Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-17) which have shown propulsive maturity based on the RD-250 boosters into a space launch vehicle, consequently replacing its Unha SLV used in all its most recent space launches. As such, it would constitute yet another violation of UNSCRs.

**Figure16.1: Possible location of the two ICBM launch tests on 27 February (39° 13' 17" N 125° 40' 17" E) and 5 March 2022 (39° 13' 17" N 125° 40' 18" E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc 24 February, 02 19 UTC; 27 February, 02 02 UTC; 2 March, 01 30 UTC; 3 March, 0129 UTC; 5 March, 01 49 UTC; 5 March, 02 16 UTC.



# Annex 16.1: On 27 February 2022, the DPRK conducted a ballistic missile launch, according to Member States.

The reported flight performance and the pictures taken (if not falsified) from the vehicle during the parabolic trajectory at an altitude which theoretically would correspond to a low earth orbit<sup>25</sup> suggests that the booster, capable of delivering its payload at 620 km altitude, shares the characteristics of a powerful ballistic missile, ranging from a MRBM to ICBM. In addition, the apparent ability to control an onboard camera remotely and its possible re-entry vehicle provides information on the DPRK's developing capabilities in signal transmission and optical recognition potentially linked to guidance system technology.

According to KCNA on 28 February 2022, the purpose of the launch test was to help “*the DPRK National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) and the Academy of Defence Science confirm the characteristics and working accuracy of the high-definition photographing system, data transmission system and attitude control devices through the vertical and oblique photographing of a specific area on earth with cameras to be loaded on the reconnaissance satellite*”

This reported test launch and remote control of a reconnaissance satellite would be in line with Kim Jong Un's speech to the Eighth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) on 9 January 2021 (see annex 13.3), in which he stated that “*means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed*”.

However, according to information from official websites and media reporting of Member State analyses, the DPRK's largest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (also designated as an ICBM-capable platform) system has been used in two recent launches. One Member State estimated that “the ballistic missiles launched by North Korea on 27 February and 5 March were intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class and have been evaluated as the same as those first confirmed in the military parade held in October 2020 (called after “Hwasong-17”). It is believed that this may have been launched for the purpose of verifying some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile.”<sup>26</sup> Two Member States separately assessed that “the Kim regime's two most-recent launches had tested components of a new ICBM system.”<sup>27</sup>

An KCNA's article of 28 February reporting on the reconnaissance satellite test of 27 February mentioned: “*The National Aerospace Development Administration and the Academy of Defence Science of the DPRK made an important test according to the plan for developing reconnaissance satellite on February 27. They conducted vertical and inclined photographing of the specified area of the ground with cameras to be loaded on satellite and confirmed the characteristics of the high-resolution camera system, data transmission system and attitude control devices and the correctness of their performance. The recent test is of great significance in the development of reconnaissance satellite.*”


<sup>25</sup> The vehicle was not in orbit; it followed a suborbital trajectory in space for a few minutes (At an altitude of 300 km the speed of satellite in orbit is 28 000 km/h. This corresponds to circling the Earth in 90 minutes. See ESA website: [https://www.esa.int/kids/fr/Apprendre/Technologie/Le\\_controle\\_de\\_mission/Vitesse\\_dans\\_l'espace](https://www.esa.int/kids/fr/Apprendre/Technologie/Le_controle_de_mission/Vitesse_dans_l'espace))

<sup>26</sup> Member State statement on 11 March 2022 available at <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/03/11d.html>

<sup>27</sup> - The Wall Street Journal, 14 March 2022: “...The U.S. and South Korea, taking the rare step of declassifying military intelligence last week, said the activity was part of a build-up toward a full-length intercontinental ballistic missile launch...”

- The Wall Street Journal, 10 March 2022: “... Two recent North Korean missile launches tested components of a new intercontinental missile system that if fully developed could hit the U.S. or its allies, officials said...”

**Figure 16.2: Articles and pictures from Pyongyang Times and Voice of Korea published by KCNA on 28 February 2022, reporting the reconnaissance satellite test of 27 February.**



Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646039170-769328268/nada-academy-of-defence-science-conduct-important-test-for-developing-reconnaissance-satellite/>.

**Annex 17: 16 March 2022 and 24 March 2022 (local time) - two launches of ICBMs in an easterly direction from the Sunan area. The DPRK claimed to have launched the ICBM Hwasong-17 on 24 March, providing photographs and videos the following day. However, according to several Member States, the 16 March launch of the new ICBM Hwasong-17, failed. The second launch on 24 March was considered by the same Member States to be either of a Hwasong-17 or of a version of the Hwasong-15 (tested on 29 November 2017), probably modified in order to display a lofted trajectory similar to that of the more powerful Hwasong-17**

On 16 March 2022, the DPRK conducted a ballistic missile launch which failed when the missile exploded at an altitude of around 20 km, according to Member States. The DPRK did not mention this launch and KCNA did not release any photographs or details of it. However, analysis demonstrates that the KCTV footage of the 24 March ICBM launch, reportedly that of a “Hwasong-17”, actually incorporated footage from the failed ICBM launch of 16 March (see table 1). As with previous test launches, it was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. After being removed from its storage area (hall no.3) at the Sil-li ballistic missile support facility (39° 10' 53" N 125° 39' 50" E) located 2 kilometers south-west of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see S/2020/840, para. 16 annex 12), the 11-axle wheeled TEL deployed to the launch pad location (39° 11' 18" N 125° 40' 00" E) between the facility and the main runway of the airport. The missile was launched at around 09:30 (local time) (figures 17.1, 17.2, 17.3). According to media reports, reddish smoke was observed in the atmosphere after the explosion.<sup>28</sup>

On 24 March 2022, the DPRK conducted an ICBM launch, according to three Member States. The DPRK published photographs and a video to present and detail the event in which Kim Jun Un and the Hwasong-17 were the focus. However, the KCTV footage of the 24 March ICBM “Hwasong-17” launch actually incorporated footage from the failed 16 March ICBM Hwasong-17 launch, as well as possibly other earlier footage. As with previous test launches, it was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. The missile was launched at around 14:34 (local time) from the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport in an easterly direction. According to Member States the flight distance of the missile was about 1080 km with a maximum altitude of about 6200 km (see figures 17.1, 17.2, 17.3).

These launches clearly identify the infrastructure at the Sil-li site, previously only suspected to be linked to the BM programme (see S/2020/840, para. 16, annex 12), as a ballistic missile support facility where ICBMs have been stored. This new facility is located 2 kilometres south-west of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport. KCTV footage of the 16 March launch showed that the Hwasong-17 and its 11-axle wheeled TEL were stored in warehouse no. 3 at the facility (figures 17.2 and 17.3).

Both launches seemed to have been overseen<sup>29</sup> personally by Kim Jong Un and supported by Generals Jang Chang Ha and Kim Jong Sik: The video and photographs released by the DPRK on 25 March were intended to show Kim Jong Un guiding the 24 March test and congratulating the team in charge of the ICBM programme. The Panel’s assessment of the footage is contained in figure 17.3.

<sup>28</sup> The specific reddish-orange colour of the smoke could be related to the condensation and vaporisation of liquid fuel. See NK News article on 16 March 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/exclusive-north-korean-projectile-debris-fell-near-pyongyang-after-test-failure/?t=1655215602820>. The orange and yellow colour is often associated with the combustion of liquid fuel propellants (see S/2017/150, para. 36). However, specific ablative coatings inside an engine’s combustion chamber can produce gases whose colours can also be reddish orange.

<sup>29</sup> Two experts are of the view that there is insufficient evidence to support this statement.

**Figure 17.1 (Overview): Two ICBM launch tests on 16 and 24 March 2022, the first of which failed.**<sup>30</sup>



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 March, 01 49 UTC; 17 March, 02 02 UTC; 27 March 2022, 05 21 UTC. Photographs and screenshots from <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/623dc62b7e18e/>.

<sup>30</sup> According to the DPRK, the Hwasong-17 ICBM, presented by KCTV on 25 March, was tested on 24 March; however, according to Member States, it was tested on 16 March 2022 and failed during its flight. The 25 March KCTV broadcast incorporated older footage from the 16 March launch.



**Figure 17.2: Focus on the two ICBM launch tests on 16 and 24 March 2022, the first of which failed.**



Source: Planet Labs Inc. 5 March, 01 49 UTC; 17 March, 02 02 UTC; 27 March 2022, 05 21 UTC. Photographs and screenshots from <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/623dc62b7e18e/>

**Figure 17.3: KCTV footages and photographs of the 24 March ICBM “Hwasong-17” launch incorporated footage from the 16 March ICBM Hwasong-17 launch and possibly earlier additional footage. According to Member States, on 24 March the DPRK may have tested a modified "Hwasong-15" ICBM whose trajectory was intended to resemble that of the Hwasong-17.**

**Figure 17.3.1:**




The KCTV video released on 25 March 2022 of “the 24 March ICBM launch test” includes footage of the 16 March ICBM preparation and launch, and possibly other earlier footages	Satellite Imagery Planet Labs Inc inter alia, March 16-17, 2022.	Satellite Imagery Planet Labs Inc inter alia, March 22-27, 2022.	Analysis
 <p>40m</p> <p>40m</p> <p>40m</p> <p>"KCTV 25 March" possibly filmed on 16 or 5 Mar. or 27 Feb. or earlier</p>	 <p>40m</p> <p>40m</p> <p>17 Mar. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Mar.17, 2022, 02 02 UTC</p> <p>Tanks of oxidizing agent or fuel</p>	 <p>27 Mar. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Mar.27, 2022, 05 21 UTC</p>	<p><b>0.</b> The “Sil-li Ballistic missile support Facility” is identified as the area where the ICBMs were probably and temporarily stored on 16 March 2022 inter alia. This new facility is located 2 kilometres south-west of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see S/2020/840 para. 16 annex 12). Since the 16 March, the recent KCTV footages on the storage of the Hwasong-17 and its TEL in one of the warehouses of this facility demonstrated that it is related to the ballistic missile programme infrastructure.</p> <p>- Several tanks likely used to fuel the missile whilst horizontally and still in the warehouse no. 3. However, the location in the same room of the fuel and its oxidizing agent is hazardous. There are probably specific rooms dedicated to separate fuel components.</p>



Figure 17.3.2:




Figure 17.3.3:






Figure 17.3.4:



Figure 17.3.5:



Figure 17.3.6:



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**Annex 18: 16 April 2022 (local time): two missiles combining ballistic and guidance technology launched from the area of Hamhung towards the sea in an easterly direction.**

On 16 April 2022, at 17:50 and 18:00 from a quadruple canister mounted on a small 3-axle wheeled TEL, the SRBMs were possibly launched from the Majon beach near the residence of Kim Jong Un at Chakto-dong (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E), as in the case of the SRBM launch tests on 27 January 2022 and 10 August 2019, eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting the uninhabited Nando island (40° 18' 50" N 128° 45' 44" E) as a possible target at 109 km from the launchpad. The **DPRK** described the missile as a “*New-type tactical guided weapon*” to enhance the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operations (see figure 18).



**Figure 18: 16 April 2022 launch tests of new a SRBM (or close-range BM, CRBM) derived from SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 but smaller**




Source: Google Earth, 13 Dec 2015; Planet Labs Inc., 16 April 2022, 01 54 (10 54 loc.) and 01 21 UTC; 17 April 2022, 01 52 (10 52 loc.) and 01 49 UTC; and <https://kcnawatch.org>.

**Annex 19: 4 May 2022 (local time): An ICBM, possible Hwasong-15 or 17, launched below its full capacity and on a standard, rather than lofted, trajectory.**

The possible location of the ICBM on 4 May (12:03 Loc.) could be identified by the trace of burnt gas on tarmac and TEL black tyre marks. Moreover, medium-resolution satellite imagery showed what appears to be vehicles gathering on or around 30 April and 3 May at Sunan's northern airfield around the same location where vehicles were seen after the failed 16 March test, although it is possible the activity was agriculture-related.

**Figure 19: Possible location of the ICBM launch test on 4 May 2022 at 12:03 Loc (03 03 UTC) (39° 13' 14" N 125° 39' 55" E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 2 May 2022, 05 23 UTC; 4 May 2022, 05 47 UTC (14 47 Loc.).

**Annex 20: Activity at the Sinpo south shipyard and Mayang-do submarine base**

Sustained activity was detected in the secure boat basin between February and June 2022, which was likely to be related to the preparation of the launch test of the new SLBM on 7 May 2022 and possibly others. According to the analysis of satellite imagery by the Panel and a thinktank<sup>31</sup> the activity around the GORAE/SINPO-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) increased between May and June (see figure 20.2). However, figure 20.1 provides information on other facilities in the Sinpo and Mayang-do shipyards that have developed relatively slowly in recent months.

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<sup>31</sup> See “Post-SLBM Test Activity at the Sinpo South Shipyard”, CSIS Beyond Parallel, 1 June 2022, available at <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/post-slbm-test-activity-at-the-sinpo-south-shipyard/> and previous similar articles.




**Figure 20.1: The submersible test stand barge, the support vessel and the SSB have moved in and possibly out of the secure boat basin of the Sinpo south shipyard especially for the SLBM launch test of 7 May 2022. At the static test stand for launch tube (40° 01' 06" N 128° 09' 24" E), activity was observed especially around the structure on 21 March 2022.**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 3 February 2022, 05 01 UTC; 3 March 2022, 01 31 UTC; 21 March 2022, 02 04 UTC; 23 March 2022, 05 10 UTC; 8 April 2022, 01 56 UTC; 19 April 2022, 01 26 UTC; 23 April 2022, 01 34 UTC; 28 April 2022, 01 41 UTC; 9 May 2022, 02 42 UTC; 27 May 2022, 01 52 UTC; 29 May 2022, 01 45 UTC; 31 May 2022, 01 41 UTC; 02 June 2022, 01 30 UTC; 20 June 2022, 01 53 UTC.



**Figure 20.2:** From 27 March to 11 April 2022, the floating dry dock has also been temporarily relocated from its quayside location (40° 01' 07" N 128° 09' 51" E) to the launching docks in front of the buildings (40° 01' 20" N 128° 09' 47" E) where the new ballistic missile submarines are being built or upgraded.



Source: Same as above.

### Annex 21: 25 May 2022 (local time): An ICBM, possible Hwasong-17, launched below its full capacity

This was the first time that a liquid and a solid propellant BMs were launched at the same time (see annex 23.1). The simultaneous launch of several types of systems resembled an operational test to evaluate the operational combination of weapon systems. However, the flight did not have an intercontinental-range flight pattern as in the cases of the 27 February and 5 March launches. According to a Member State, the test may be dedicated to testing MIRV, or a reconnaissance satellite, as well as the first stage of an ICBM booster.<sup>32</sup>

**Figure 21: 25 May 2022 (06:00 Loc.) - possible location of the ICBM launch pad at 39°13'14"N 125°39'55"E**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 May 2022, 05 31 UTC; 24 May 2022, 20 27 UTC (25 May, 05:27 Loc.); 28 May 2022, 05 48 UTC.

<sup>32</sup> See also <https://www.nknews.org/pro/why-north-korea-launches-long-range-missiles-on-medium-range-trajectories/?t=1670961118886>.

**Annex 22: 5 June 2022 (local time): 4 different SRBM types (8 BMs, probably KN-23, KN-24, KN-25 and new modified KN-23) were tested almost at the same time.**

Six of the eight BMs were fired between 09:06 and 09:41 (loc.) from different locations. From the vicinity of east coast at 9:10, from west coast at 9:06, 9:15 and 9:30, from inland at 9:24, 9:41 (Sunan, Kaechon likely at 39° 45' 11" N 125° 54' 02" E, which was almost the same location as the SRBM test on 10 Sep. 2019, at Dongchang-ri, Hamhung).



**Figure 22: 5 June 2022 (loc.):** Consistent with the Member States reports about the series of SRBM tests on 5 June 2022, one location of the possible launch pads in Kaechon area would be  $39^{\circ} 45' 11''$  N  $125^{\circ} 54' 02''$  E. It is very close to the launch pad of the SRBM launch test on 10 September 2019 ( $39^{\circ} 45' 8.46''$  N  $125^{\circ} 53' 59.06''$  E, see S/2020/151, annex 58.6).<sup>33</sup>





*Source:* Planet Labs Inc., 19 May 2022, 09 37 UTC; 3 June 2022, 02 01 UTC; 8 June 2022, 01 28UTC ; 9 September 2019, 02 02 UTC; 11 September 2019, 00 43 UTC.

<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, it is understandable that the DPRK uses almost the same launch pad locations for launch tests in order to be able to compare relatively similar data sets.





**Annex 23: Launch tests from May 2019 to June 2022 and the analysis of TEL and ballistic missile numbering in recent parades**

**Annex 23.1: Table 23: Summary table of launches of ballistic missiles or missiles combining ballistic and guidance technology with liquid and solid fuel propellant engine by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the resumption of testing from 4 May 2019 to 5 June 2022**

Tests (all) in the year	Tests solid/ liquid since 2018	Tests solid/ liquid in the year	Date and time (local)	Reported type	Number of missiles	Reported launch location	Reported distance travelled (km)	Reported apogee (km)	Remark	Korean Central News Agency classification
17	28	8	2022	<b>Solid fuel BMs fired between 2018 and 5 June 2022:</b> <b>In 2022 (to date):</b>	63 22					
	10	9	2022	<b>Liquid fuel BMs fired between 2018 and 25 May 2022:</b> <b>In 2022 (to date): 3 IRBM + 6 ICBM=</b>	10 9					
1.	2.	I.	05 Jan. 2022 08:10 or 08:07	<b>MRBM or SRBM</b> - with a liquid propellant engine. - “Hypersonic glide vehicle warhead” disclosed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021, before the 5 January launch test. (KCNA) - Re-entry vehicle seems to be a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) - 6 axle wheeled TEL	1	From an inland area in Jagang Province, eastward into waters off the east coast 	500 (or more)	50	-The shape of the warhead of the missiles tested on 28 September and on 5 January were different. It is judged to be one of the other types of missiles first unveiled in October. -The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage Intermediary Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12. - max speed between Mach 3 and 6	<i>The hypersonic gliding warhead (KCNA, 7 Jan. 2022)<sup>34</sup></i>
2.	3.	II.	11 Jan. 2022 07:27 or 07:25	<b>HSBM or MRBM or SRBM</b> - with a liquid propellant engine. - “Hypersonic glide vehicle warhead” disclosed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021, before the 11 January launch test. - Re-entry vehicle seems to be a	1	From an inland area in Jagang Province, eastward into waters off the east coast 	700 (or more)	60	- Max speed: Mach 10 (3400m/s). - possible irregular trajectory including change to the direction of north - The shape of the warhead similar to the that of the BM tested on 5 January. - The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid	<i>“The hypersonic missile weapon system... ...600 kilometres and 240-kilometre acute circular... hit the target in the waters 1,000 kilometres</i>

<sup>34</sup> KCNA, 7 Jan. 2022: “The missile made a 120 km lateral movement from the initial launch azimuth and “precisely hit a set target 700 km away,”  
“The test launch clearly demonstrated the control and stability of the hypersonic gliding warhead which combined the multi-stage gliding jump flight and the strong lateral movement, “...” was overseen by the Academy of Defense Science”.

				<b>MaRV</b> - 6-axle wheeled TEL					propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12.	away” (KCNA 12 January 2022) <sup>35</sup>
3.	21.	I.	14 Jan. 2022 14:41 and 14:52	<b>SRBM (KN-23)</b> - It appears to be the same type of SRBM KN-23 recently tested twice as a railway-borne missile system on 15 Sept. 2021 and 14 Jan. 2022. It has been displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021 - railway car	2	From the Uiju area (Possibly located in the rectangle S-W corner 40° 13' 10" N 124° 34' 02" E, N-E corner 40° 13' 06" N 124° 33' 57" E), north-eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting an uninhabited island (possible target location 40° 38' 50" N 129° 33' 02" E") 	430 or 400	36 or 50	- New railway-borne missile system already tested on 15 Sept'2021 - Time between launches: 11 minutes - Max speed: Mach 6 - trajectories were comparable in range and manoeuvre to previous tests in 2019-2020, including a detected “pull-up manoeuvre”. - The use of a railway-borne launcher gives DPRK a mode of transport for a variety of missiles which can be rapidly deploy and launch from anywhere on their rail network providing another option for concealing and launching its missile force.	“Firing drill of railway-borne missile Regiment”) or “Firing Drill for Inspection of Railway Mobile Missile Regiment (KCNA 15 January 2022
4.	22.	II.	17 Jan. 2022 08:49 and 08:52 or 08:50 and 08:54	<b>SRBM (KN-24)</b> - It appears to be the same type of SRBM KN-24 tested on 21 March 2021 and that has been displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021. It was also called “Hwasong-11 Na” or Hwasong-11 B” - Track TEL	2	From the area of Pyongyang-Sunan airport area (Possibly located at 39° 15' 44" N 125° 40' 34" E trace of burnt gas), north-eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting an uninhabited island (possible target location 40° 38' 50" N 129° 33' 02" E") 	300 or 380	50 or 42	- Time between launches: 3 or 4 minutes - Max speed: Mach 5 - The possible fired location if confirmed was very close to the location of the Hwasong-12 launch test site on 29 August 2017 (S/2019/171 para. 174 annex 84) - The track TEL chassis may be	“Two tactical guided missiles” “to confirm the weapons system's accuracy”


<sup>35</sup> According to KCNA January 12, 2022, excerpt, “The hypersonic gliding warhead was separated from the launched missile, made a gliding re-leap from the point of 600 kilometres and 240-kilometre acute circular flight from the initial launch azimuth to the pinpoint to hit the target in the waters 1,000 kilometres away” available at NK NEWS / KCNA WATCH Website, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1641940310-600724419/distinguished-feat-of-wpk-in-history-of-leading-juche-based-defence-industry/?t=1649727166452>

- Kim Jong Un officially attended the missile test with Jo Yong Won, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau see S/2022/132 paragraph 20, 24, table 1

<sup>36</sup> Article “North Korea says it successfully launched ‘tactical guided missiles’ on Monday” from NK-News on 18 January 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/01/north-korea-says-it-successfully-launched-tactical-guided-missiles-on-monday/?t=1650290915010>

<sup>37</sup> KCNA (Jan 18, 2022): “The Academy of Defence Science confirmed the accuracy, security and efficiency of the operation of the weapon system under production.”

									based on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis (derived from T62 and T72),	
5.	23.	III.	27 Jan. 2022 08:00 and 08:05	- SRBM (KN-23) - displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021 and tested several times since 4 May 2019 - 4-axle wheeled TEL	2	From the area of Hamhung (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E), same launch pad as the one used for the SRBM KN-24 launch test on 10 August 2019) eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting the uninhabited Al-som Island (40°38'50.49"N 129°32'55.73" E)	190	20	- Level of operational testing - Time between launches: 5 minutes - very depressed trajectory - Kim Jong Un was nearby Hamhung inspecting a site for the Ryonpho Vegetable Greenhouse Farm and a possible missile factory, the “February 11 <sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex” <sup>38</sup>	“Surface to surface tactical guided missile” (Rodong Jan 28, 2022) <sup>39</sup> “confirming the power of conventional warhead”
6.	4	III.	30 Jan. 2022 07:52	- IRBM Hwasong-12 - with a liquid propellant engine. - Identified by MSs as an IRBM sharing characteristics with the Hwasong-12 last tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017 - 6-axle wheeled TEL	1	From same launch pad as for the Hwasong-14 launch on 28 July 2017, Muphyong-ri in Jonchon county (40° 36' 41" N 126° 25' 33" E) eastward into waters off the east coast after a 30-minute flight	800 or 790	2 000	- launched in a lofted orbit and identified through KCNA pictures as the IRBM Hwasong-12 – 800 km is the longest flight of BMs since 2017. <sup>40</sup> - Re-entry vehicle speed: Mach 16 <sup>41</sup> - The main engine still seems to be derived from RD-250 engine with 4 vernier engines. (See S/2018/171, paras 14-15, figure 3) - It is in the stage of practical use and production whose last test has	“Test-fire of Hwasong 12-type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range Ballistic Missile Held” (Rodong Sinmun Jan.31, 2022)



<sup>38</sup> SRBM KN-24 launch test on 10 August 2019 (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E) - the Ryonpho Vegetable Greenhouse Farm (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) and the “February 11<sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex” (39° 55' 10" N 127° 39' 09" E).

<sup>39</sup> “The Academy of Defense Science of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted the test-fire for updating long-range cruise missile system and the test-fire for confirming the power of conventional warhead for surface-to-surface tactical guided missile on Tuesday and Thursday respectively,” the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The LRCM was tested on 25 January, according to North Korea’s announcement, the missile [CM] flew for 2 hours and 32 minutes with a range of 1,800km.

<sup>40</sup> - Hwasong-12 (aka KN17) theoretical range could be up to 5 000 km. Lofted trajectories in May, August and September 2017 (last test) over the Japanese territory. KCNA reported that North Korea claims “that the Hwasong-12 is meant to serve as a medium-long range strategic ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 – 4,000 km capable of reaching Guam.” ...” The military plans to attack Guam “through simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket.” NKNEWS on 14 August 2017 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2017/08/kim-jong-un-briefed-on-guam-attack-plan-at-strategic-force-command-kcna/?t=1654210722275>.

<sup>41</sup> Article “Hwasong-12 test signals troubling new phase in North Korea’s missile programs” NKPRO on 31 January 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/pro/hwasong-12-test-signals-troubling-new-phase-in-north-koreas-missile-programs/?t=1654208852886>.



									been described as “ <i>operational trial of a Hwasong-12 production unit</i> ” (KCNA Jan. 31, 2022) <sup>42</sup>	
7.	5	IV.	27 Feb. 2022 07:52 or 07:51	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new ICBM Hwasong-17</li> <li>- flying as a suborbital satellite launcher with the flight features of long-range BM</li> <li>- with the RD-250 liquid propellant engines for the first stage.</li> <li>- identified as ICBM-class by several Member States or ICBM-capable platform such as the super large BM “Hwasong-17” (see row “5 March” below)</li> </ul>	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39° 13' 17" N 125° 40' 17" E because of visible trace of burnt gas on the tarmac after the launch) toward the east into waters near the east coast of North Korea,	300 or 320	600 or 620	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- lofted trajectory</li> <li>- if the images taken from space were genuine, the test launch was intended to test the functions of a reconnaissance satellite. According to MSS, such test was likely probable but, delivery rockets for satellite launches use technologies that are basically identical and compatible with those of ballistic missiles (see row “5 March”)</li> <li>- it may have been launched for the purpose of verifying some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile (see row 5 March”)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no KCNA’s image of the launcher,</li> <li>- “<i>NADA and Academy of Defense Science conducted an important test Sunday under the plan of developing a reconnaissance satellite</i>”<sup>43</sup></li> </ul>
8.	6	V.	5 Mar. 2022 08:52 or 08:47	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new ICBM Hwasong-17</li> <li>- flying as a suborbital satellite launcher with the flight features of long-range BM</li> <li>- with the RD-250 liquid propellant engines for the first stage.</li> <li>- identified as ICBM class by several Member States or as ICBM-capable</li> </ul>	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39° 13' 17" N 125° 40' 18" E clearly visible trace of burnt gas on the tarmac after the launch) toward the east into waters near the east coast of North Korea after a 40-minute flight.	270 or 300	560 or 550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- lofted trajectory</li> <li>- if the images taken from space were genuine, the test launch was intended to test the functions of a reconnaissance satellite. According to MSS, such test was likely probable but, delivery rockets for satellite launches use technologies that are basically identical and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no KCNA’s image of the launcher</li> <li>- <i>NADA and Academy of Defence Science Conduct Another Important Test for Developing</i></li> </ul>

<sup>42</sup> “It confirmed the accuracy, safety and operational effectiveness of the Hwasong-12 weapon system under production”. (KCNA Pyongyang Times 31 Jan.2022) Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the launch of the “Hwasong-12-type surface-to-surface intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile” was organised by the Academy of Defence Science (ADS), the Second Economic Committee, and other institutions. It added that the launch aimed to verify the Hwasong-12’s deployment and accuracy and was conducted by the “highest-angle launch system from the northwestern part of the country” towards the east of the Korean Peninsula.

<sup>43</sup> “Vertical and oblique photographing of a specific area on the ground” with cameras that will be “installed on the reconnaissance satellite” (Rodong Sinmun and KCNA 28 February2022).

				platform such as the super large BM “Hwasong-17” <sup>44</sup> Several Member States evaluated the BM as the Hwasong-17, and a MS assesses that this may have been launched for the purpose of verifying some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile <sup>45</sup>					compatible with those of ballistic missiles. <sup>46</sup> - Kim Jong Un, Deputy Dpt. Director Kim Jong Sik, Dpt. Director Yu Jin of party central committee officials visited the satellite control centre (SCC) in the week of the 5 March launch (39° 2'33.55"N 125°42'35.02"E) probably on 9 March. <sup>47</sup> He visited the Sohae satellite launching ground on probably 10 March. <sup>48</sup>	<i>Reconnaissance Satellite</i> <sup>49</sup>
9.	7	VI.	16 Mar. 2022 09:30	- new ICBM Hwasong-17 - with liquid propellant engine - identified as ICBM-class by several Member also as the super large BM “Hwasong-17” whose photos and video would be released after the	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39° 11' 18" N 125° 40' 00" E) same area as two ICBM system tests on Feb 27 and March 5 possible	failed	failed	- ICBM launch test according to several MSs, failed after some seconds flight and exploded at an altitude of less than 20km. - BM's debris fell in or near Pyongyang posing a threat to	No statement or information from DPRK ( <u>first no-statement in 2022</u> )

<sup>44</sup> MSs evaluated the 28 February and 5 March missile as the new ICBM Hwasong-17 shown at the October 2020 Military parade and mounted on a 11-wheeled TEL (S/2022/840 para.17 and S/2021/777 annex 18.2) In particular the thermal signature of the engines analysis (one, two or four nozzles) could differentiate Hwasong-17 from others.

<sup>45</sup> According to a Member State, the 28 February and 5 March missiles have at least the same or longer range compared to ICBM-class missiles previously launched by North Korea (Hwasong-14 and 15), but further details are still under analysis. A MS assesses that the delivery system could have failed partially or that the test could have been aimed at testing a Post Boost Vehicle equipment, aimed at putting satellites into orbit or at developing MIRV capabilities.

<sup>46</sup> e.g. technologies for the separation of multi-stage propelling devices, attitude control and guidance control. MSs add that the space programme could also serve the improvement of DPRK's ICBM capabilities:

1. Suborbital flight tests are not common for a space programme and could point to a dual objective.
2. Recent launches could also have been used to test technologies useful for a MIRV capacity.
3. It is considered likely that the DPRK should soon transform one of its ICBMs (Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-17) which have shown propulsive maturity based on the RD-250 boosters into a space launch vehicle, consequently replacing its Unha SLV used in all its most recent space launches. As such, it would constitute yet another violation of UNSCRs.

<sup>47</sup> Rodong Sinmun 10 March 2022, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646883133-164884312/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-national-aerospace-development-administration-nada/?t=1656438970198>.

<sup>48</sup> KCNA 11 March 2022, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646992923-861239615/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-sohae-satellite-launching-ground/?t=1656438872679>.


<sup>49</sup> *Through the test, the NADA confirmed the reliability of data transmission and reception system of the satellite, its control command system and various ground-based control systems* (KCNA and Rodong Sinmun 6 March 2022).

				ICBM launch on 24 March <sup>50</sup> - 11-axle wheeled TEL		destruction around 20km altitude			<p>population; last time a MRBM test has failed was in 2017</p> <p>- liquid propellant missile is also confirmed because of the typical colour of the vapour seen over Pyongyang<sup>51</sup></p> <p>- According to Member States and the Panel images analysis, this BM tested on 16 March 2022 is the ICBM Hwasong-17 that was presented by KCTV on 25 March as the ICBM tested on 24 March. Thus, the 25 March KCTV broadcast incorporated older footage of the launch sequences of the Hwasong-17.</p> <p>- the “Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility”, identified by the CSIS and the Panel (see S/2020/840 Para. 16) as being possibly related to the BM programme, is clearly presented as involved in the repeated ICBM testing on 27 February, 5 March, 16 March, 24 March, 4 May, and 25 May 2022.</p> <p>- First ICBM launch test without detaching it from the TEL.</p>	
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<sup>50</sup> For the 16 March same assessment as for the 5 March. Regarding the booster.

<sup>51</sup> A NK News article on 16 March 2022 reported that “*The images seen by NK News shows a red-tinted ball of smoke at the end of a zig-zagging rocket launch trail in the sky above Pyongyang. Smaller trails appear to extend straight down toward the ground*” available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/north-korea-tries-and-fails-to-launch-another-projectile-jcs/>.

Another NK News article on 16 March 2022 reported that “*the coloring matches [a] dispersed liquid oxidizer,*” suggesting a liquid-fuel propellant was used. *The projectile may have experienced a thruster failure...* “reddish-orange smoke” is commonly associated with liquid fuel...” NK News 16 March 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/exclusive-north-korean-projectile-debris-fell-near-pyongyang-after-test-failure/?t=1655215602820> . The orange and yellow colour is often associated with the combustion of liquid fuel propellants, (see S/2017/150, para. 36). However, specific ablative coatings inside an engine’s combustion chamber can produce gases whose colours can also be reddish orange.

									- Trucks activity detected after failure	
	-	-	20 Mar. 2022 at 7:20 <sup>52155</sup>							No statement or information from DPRK
10.	8	VII.	24 Mar. 2022 14:34 or 14:33	<p>- possible modified ICBM Hwasong-15</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- with liquid propellant engine.</li> <li>- called by the DPRK “Hwasong-17” but rather an upgraded “Hwasong-15” with a lighter payload.<sup>53</sup></li> <li>- 11-axle wheeled TEL (9-axle if Hwasong-15)</li> </ul> 	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area same area as the three ICBM system tests on 27 Feb., 5 and 16 March. On 24 March likely from 39° 11' 19" N 125° 40' 01" E, toward the east and splash down at around 15:44 after a 71-minute flight, inside Japan EEZ some 170 km west of Cape Tappi, Oshima Peninsula of Hokkaido.</p> <p>- According to MSs and Panel's analysis, on 25 March the DPRK presented photos and videos of an earlier Hwasong-17 test, such as those of 27 February, 5 March and 16 March but mentioning the 24 March test as the reference.</p>	1080 or 1100	6200 or 6000	<p>- the data recorded and analysed by MSs are considered as the best to date and consistent with the ability of the ICBM to travel over 15,000 km. However, it is identified an modified Hwasong-15 rather than a Hwasong-17- the thermal signature analysis of this launch possibly identified two engine nozzles (Hwasong-15) instead a four-engine nozzle (Hwasong-17) as the photos and video released after the 24 March had shown. Must be confirmed.</p> <p>- According to a MS it appeared to be identical to those launched on 27 Feb. and 5 Mar.</p> <p>- to carry out this deception manoeuvre, the DPRK had to reduce the payload of the Hwasong-15 to achieve a trajectory comparable to that of the more powerful Hwasong-17.</p>	<p>“Hwasongpho-17, a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile of the DPRK strategic forces”<sup>54</sup></p> <p>Flight: 67minutes Altitude: 6248.5km Distance: 1090km</p>

<sup>52</sup> -MLRS with solid propellant engine, 4 rockets, from South Pyongan Province area toward west coast for about 1 hour. Possible KN-09, 240 mm 300 mm multiple rocket launcher. This rocket test could be a violation of the Sept. 2018 inter-Korean military agreement if the launch occurred near the border with South Korea (NKnews 20 March 2022) and Reuter at <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nkorea-fires-multiple-rocket-launcher-south-says-2022-03-20/>.

<sup>53</sup> Defense ministry of ROK on 29 March 2022 "Although the projectile fired on March 24 looks like the Hwasong-17 due to the increase in its top altitude and flight time, our assessment is that it is more similar to the Hwasong-15 than the Hwasong-17," see also Yonhap News agency, available at <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220329008052325?section=national/defense>.

<sup>54</sup> “Pyongyang, March 25 (KCNA) -- Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and supreme commander of the armed forces of the DPRK, gave a written order to conduct the test-launch of Hwasongpho-17, a new type intercontinental ballistic missile of the DPRK strategic forces, on March 23, Juche 111 (2022) available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1648159663-278086617/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-issues-order-for-test-launch-of-new-type-icbm/?t=1663712750438>.

“The missile had made its debut in the military parade held two years ago and successfully test-fired in March this year, fully demonstrating its power” Naenara's declaration on 6 May 2022, see <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1651828167-937611443/declaration-in-april/?t=1659893211916>.







									<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Comparatively, the test of ICBM Hwasong-15 on 29 Nov. 2017 (53-min flight, lofted trajectory, range of 950 km and max altitude of 4 475km, see S/2018/171 Tab.1, para.9)</li> <li>- the missile test was officially under the guidance of Kim Jong Un<sup>55156</sup></li> </ul>	
11.	24.	IV.	16 Apr. 2022 17:50 and 18:11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new SRBM resembled but smaller than KN-23 and KN-24 and as ground-based version it resembled the new, smaller SLBM launched on 19 October 2022.</li> <li>(Single-stage system) (S/2002/132 annex 20.2)</li> <li>- From a quadruple canister mounted on a small 3-axle wheeled TEL presented at the next military parade on 25 April 2022.</li> </ul>	2	From possibly the Majon beach near the residence of Kim Jong Un at Chakto-dong, same as for SRBM launch tests on 27 January 2022 and 10 August 2019, 39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E), eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting the uninhabited Island as possible target at 110 km Nan-do Island 40° 18' 50" N 128° 45' 44" E 109 km from launchpad	110	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the first time the DPRK has presented an SRBM as a tactical nuclear weapon delivery system.</li> <li>- Max speed Mach 4</li> <li>- Flight time 60s</li> <li>- probably level of operational testing</li> <li>- Time between launches: 21 minutes</li> <li>- also described as Close-Range ballistic Missile (CRBM, range &lt;300km))</li> <li>- Kim Jong Un was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik<sup>56</sup></li> </ul>	"New-type tactical guided weapon" ... <b>strengthening the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operation</b> ... <sup>57</sup>
12.	9	VIII	04 May 2022 12:03 or	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ICBM</li> <li>- with liquid propellant engine.</li> </ul>	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area same as the four previous ICBM	470 or 500	780 or 800	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- max speed about Mach 11 around 13600 km/h</li> </ul>	No statement or information from

<sup>55</sup> See KCNA, 25 Mar. 2022, and also guided with Jo Yong Won, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau (KCNA 12 Jan. 2022)

- On 28 March KCNA Rodong Sinmum published photos and article that presented Kim Jong Sik and Jang Chang Ha as the top two military officials on the Hwasong class ICBM project.

<sup>56</sup> Deputy Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK and commanding personnel of the Ministry of National Defence of the DPRK and the commanders of the large combined units of the Korean People's Army, see Voice of Korea, 17 April 2022.

<sup>57</sup> Voice of Korea, 17 April 2022, "***The new-type tactical guided weapon system developed under the special concern of the Party Central Committee is of great significance in radically increasing the fire striking power of the long-range artillery units on the front and strengthening the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operation of the DPRK and diversification of the firepower task ...***" <https://kcnowatch.org/newstream/1650142847-935725828/president-of-state-affairs-kim-jong-un-watches-test-firing-of-new-type-tactical-guided-weapon/?t=1658076183497>

			12:02	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- possible <b>Hwasong-15 or 17</b> launched below its full capacity and on a standard rather than lofted trajectory</li></ul> 		system tests toward the east and splash down before 12:24 after a less than 21-minute flight <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Location: Possibly from 39° 13' 14" N 125° 39' 55" E because of burnt gas trace at the north edge of the main runway.</li></ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Medium-resolution satellite imagery showed what appears to be vehicles gathering on or around 30 April and 3 May at Sunan's northern airfield around the same location vehicles were seen after the failed 17 March test, though it's possible the activity is agriculture-related.</li></ul>	DPRK (second no-statement in 2022)
13.	25.	V.	<b>07 May 2022</b> 14:07 or 14:06 [05:06 UTC]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- <b>New SLBM/SRBM</b></li><li>- Derived from KN-23 (or KN-24); similar to the new small SLBM tested on 19 October 2021 and presented at the Self-defense exhibition and at the military parade on 25 April 2022</li></ul>	1	From a submarine (8.24 Yongung SSBA) or a submersible test stand barge in the sea at large off the coast of Sinpo toward the east and splash down before 14:25 after a less than 18-minute flight.	600	60 or 50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- possibly launched from the 8.24 Yongung SSBA.</li><li>- irregular trajectory</li><li>- 3<sup>rd</sup> SLBM test since 2018</li></ul> 	No statement or information from the DPRK (third no-statement in 2022)
14.	26.	VI.	<b>12 May 2022</b> 18:29 or 18:28	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- <b>SRBM</b></li><li>- probably the <b>KN-25</b> (super large multiple rocket launcher)</li></ul>	3	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area	360 or 350	90 or 100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Max speed Mach 5</li><li>- Level of operational testing</li><li>- Time between launches: almost simultaneous</li><li>- possible depressed trajectory needs be confirmed</li></ul> 	No statement or information from the DPRK (fourth no-statement in 2022)
15.	10	IX.	<b>25 May 2022</b> 06:00 or 05:59	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- <b>ICBM</b></li><li>- with liquid propellant engine.</li><li>- Possible <b>Hwasong-17</b></li></ul> 	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area, Location: possibly from 39° 13' 14" N 125° 39' 55" E because TEL shape was visible 30 minutes before launch time and the cleaning of burnt gas trace at this location was completed.	360 or 300	540 or 550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Series of tests point out the frequency and diversity of tests, first time that a liquid and a solid propellant BM are launched at the same time.</li><li>- The simultaneous launch of several types of systems resembles an operational test to evaluate the operational combination of weapon systems.</li><li>- Not intercontinental-range flight pattern as on Feb. 27 and March 5 launches possibly to test MIRV or</li></ul>	No statement or information from the DPRK (fifth no-statement in 2022)

										the reconnaissance satellite or the first stage of an ICBM booster <sup>58</sup>	
16.	27.	VII.	25 May 2022 06:37 06-42	- SRBM - likely new modified KN-23	2 <sup>59</sup>	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area, toward the east and splash down	unknown and 760 or 750	20 and 60 or 50	- vanished because of suspect failure or irregular orbit with possible depressed trajectory - 23rd ballistic missile in 2022, <sup>60</sup> one of the most intensive test campaigns	No statement or information from the DPRK (sixth no-statement in 2022)	
17.	28.	VIII.	5 June 2022  9:06 9:10 9:15 9:24 9:30 9:41	- SRBM 4 different SRBM types (probably KN-23, KN-24, KN-25 and new modified KN-23)	1 1 1 1 1 1	From different locations: from the vicinity of east coast at 9:10, from west coast at 9:06, 9:15 and 9:30, from inland at 9:24, 9:41 (Sunan, Kaechon likely at 39° 45' 11" N 125° 54' 02" E almost the same location as the SRBM test on 10 Sep. 2019, Dongchang-ri, Hamhung), toward the east and splashdown	110 to 670:  350 300 400 350 400 300	25 to 90:  50 50 50 100 50 100	- Possibly some include irregular trajectory - Speed Max form M3-M6 - first time so many different missiles and ranges are combined at the same time - operational training to fire SRBMs of different ranges and strike capabilities using the tactics of the former Soviet Union <sup>61</sup>	No statement or information from the DPRK (seventh no-statement in 2022)	
-	-	-	5 June 2022	SRBM (same series as above)	2	Same area	short	Very low	- Possible 2 other SRBMs detected	No statement	
4	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 19 Oct. 2021</u> : In 2021:				41 5						
	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 28 Sep. 2021</u> : In 2021:				1 1						



<sup>58</sup> According to MS and see also <https://www.nknews.org/pro/why-north-korea-launches-long-range-missiles-on-medium-range-trajectories/?t=1670961118886>.

<sup>59</sup> On 24 May 2022, the DPRK launched three missiles: one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and two shorter range ballistic missiles. So far this year, the DPRK has launched 23 ballistic missiles, including six ICBMs available at <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0801> 27 May 2022.

<sup>60</sup> Including **six ICBMs** (US 27 May 2022); <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0801>.

<sup>61</sup> - Frequency and diversity - a BM test every nine days but no report on the last five tests; - doctrine: "...use nuclear tactical against ROK at the beginning" (Kim Yo-jong from a MS's report).

	18.	I.	25 Mar.2021 0706 and 0725 hours (MS) or 0704 and 0723 hours	<b>New SRBM (modified KN-23)</b> It appears to be the new SRBM, and TEL displayed during the military parade on 14 January 2021 and identified as a possible modification and enlargement of the previously displayed and tested KN-23 SRBM	2	Hamju south Hamgyong area Near Sondok (2 airfields Sondok and Yonpo (Ryonpo))	450 600	60 Less 100	- New 5 axle wheeled TEL (if 26 March 2021 KCNA pictures are genuine. See 14 Jan 2021 military parade (Panel) - TBL: 19 minutes (0706-0725) (MS) - Possible depressed with pull-up trajectory 18 <sup>th</sup> SRBM launch test since 04 May 2019 (around 35 SRBM) (Panel) falling into waters outside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (MS)	<i>"New-type tactical guided missiles" or new-type tactical guided projectile</i>
	19.	II.	15 Sep. 2021 12:34 and 12:39 or 12:32 and 12:37	<b>SRBM.</b> It appears to be either the previously displayed and tested SRBM <b>KN-23</b> tested as a railway-borne missile system that has been displayed at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021 or possibly the modified and enlarged version of KN-23	2	From a railcar at the entrance of a tunnel located at 39°16'31"N 126°48'17"E in Yangdok area of South Phyongan Province, <sup>62</sup> eastward into waters off the east coast but inside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone.	800	60	- New railway-borne missile system - Time between launches: 5 minutes - The trajectories were the longest of the solid fuel ballistic missiles tested since 2019, with a "pull-up manoeuvre" detected. - If it was the KN-23 it showed increased range compared to previous tests, probably because of a reduced payload. - The use of a railway-borne launcher gives DPRK a mode of transport for a variety of missiles which they can rapidly deploy and launch from anywhere on their rail network providing another option for concealing and launching its missile force.	<i>"The Railway Mobile Missile Regiment"<sup>63</sup> (KCNA Voice of Korea 19 Sept 2021)</i>

<sup>62</sup> According to a Member State, the location could be at 39°16'2.04"N 126°47'17"E. This assessment of the coordinates is slightly different to the Panel's analysis of the KCNA video which gives an idea of the length of the tunnel and the curve of the track.

<sup>63</sup> "The Railway Mobile Missile Regiment took part in the drill with a mission to move to the central mountainous area and strike the target area 800 kilometres away early on the morning of September 15 (KCNA, Voice of Korea 19 Sept. 2021).



1.	I.	28 Sep. 2021 06:40 or 06:38	<b>MRBM HWASONG-8 “Hypersonic glide vehicle HGV”</b> with a liquid propellant engine. - disclosed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021, after the 28 September launch test. (KCNA) -SRBM or MRBM -Missile total length is around 14.5 m for a body diameter of 1.4 m. - Re-entry vehicle length is around 4.7m for a rear diameter of around 0.9 m. - 6-axle wheeled TEL	1	From North's Mupyong-ri, Jagang province eastward into waters off the east coast	200	60	- The mention by DPRK of a “missile fuel ampoule” used in liquid propellant ballistic missiles enables the missile to be loaded with propellant at the factory (KCNA) - The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage Intermediary Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12. - The possible HGV resembled an already existing HGV <sup>64</sup> . It appears to be at an early stage of development stage of development that would require considerable time for actual deployment. -It's known to have flown at a speed of around Mach 3 at that time	Academy of Defense Science conducted the first test fire of the hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile from Toyang-ri, Jagang Province, on Tuesday 28 Sep.(KCNA 29 Sep.2021) <sup>65</sup>
20.	III.	19 Oct. 2021 10:17 or 10:15	<b>New SLBM/SRBM</b> It appears to be a new Short-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile that has been displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.  Missile length, without tube adaptor, is around 6.8 m for a body diameter of 1 m	1	From a Gorae/Sinpo class submarine (or a submersible test stand barge) located in the area of Sinpo (South Hamgyong Province), eastward into waters off the east coast	600 or 430	60 or 50	New smaller SLBM, 2 <sup>nd</sup> SLBM test since 2018 - a pull-up manoeuvre has been detected but with no significant horizontal movement. -Its design is smaller than the SLBM Pukguksong missile series and resembled those of the SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 as well as having similar flight characteristics. It could be fielded in multiple	“a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)”. (KCNA 20 Oct) <sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> This HGV is a solid propellant hypersonic missile showcased by a Member State at a military parade in 2019.

<sup>65</sup> KCNA 29 Sep. 2021: “the navigational control and stability of the missile in the active section as well as its technical specifications, including the guiding manoeuvrability and the gliding flight characteristics of the detached hypersonic gliding warhead”. “The engine as well as of missile fuel ampoule that has been introduced for the first time” was “ascertained.”

<sup>66</sup> Rodong Sinmun /ANDS 20 Oct. 2021: The DPRK stated that it has “successfully” conducted a test-firing of a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) “The new SLBM ... will greatly contribute to our country's defense technology advancement and the Navy's underwater operational capabilities”; KCNA 20 Oct. 2021: “The Academy of National Defense Science conducted the test-launch from “8.24 Yongung” where its first SLBM was successfully launched five years ago to demonstrate the military muscle of the DPRK”... “It clarified that the new type SLBM, into which lots of advanced control guidance technologies including flank mobility and gliding skip mobility are introduced, will greatly contribute to putting the defense technology of the country on a high level and to enhancing the underwater operational capability of our navy.”

									launch tubes from a larger DPRK ROMEEO-class submarine that increase an offshore strike capability. - The missile was reportedly launched from an experimental <b>Gorae/Sinpo-B class ballistic missile submarine called "8.24 Yongung"</b> , whose launch tube may have been adapted for a smaller SLBM than Pukguksong type. - However, the missile may have been launched from a submersible test stand barge.	
4	17	4	2020	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 29 Mar. 2020</u> : In 2020:	36 11					
	0	0	2020	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 2020</u> : In 2020	0 0					
	14.	I.	02 Mar.2020 1237 hours	SRBM (KN-25); same as II and IV (24 Aug., 10 Sept., 31 Oct. and possibly 28 Nov. 2019)	2	Wonsan area	240	35	- Probably an operational training test integrated into a military exercise - Wheeled TEL with four launch tubes (if KCNA pictures are genuine; images resembled those from 28 Nov. 2019) - TBL: 20 seconds	<i>Multiple-launch rocket – long-range artillery</i>
	-	-	From 28 Feb. to 2 Mar 2020	MLRS (KN-09) 240 mm 300 mm	unknown	14 km from eastern Wonsan area 39°9'19.66"N 127°36'26.85"E	-	-	- Operational training test for artillery and MLRS during “joint strike military drills” (see S/2020/840 annex 7, figure 7-1)	<i>Joint strike military drills</i>
	15.	II.	9 Mar.2020 0736 hours	SRBM (KN-25); same as I and IV	3 (or 2)	Sondok area	200	50	- Probably one KN-25 launch failed. Member States only counted	<i>Front-line long-range artillery</i>

									two BMs - TBL: 20 seconds and 1 minute	
	-	-		MLRS (KN-09) 240 mm 300 mm	2	Sondok area	-	-	- Possibly two KN-09 were also launched	Front-line long-range artillery
	16.	III.	21 Mar.2020 0645 and 0650 hours	SRBM (KN-24); same as 10 and 16 August 2019	2	Pyongan area; near Sonchon according to a Member State	410	50	- Possible depressed with pull-up trajectory - TBL: 5 minutes	Tactical guided weapon
	17.	IV.	29 Mar.2020 0610 hours	SRBM (KN-25); same as I and II	2	Wonsan area	230	30	- Tracked TEL (if KCNA photographs are genuine; images showed a tracked 6-tube TEL instead of a wheeled 4-tube TEL) - TBL: 20 seconds	Super-large multiple rocket
13	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 28 Nov. 2019</u> : In 2019:				25 25					
	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 2019</u> : In 2019				0 0					
	1.	I.	4 May 2019 0830 and 1050 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as II, III and VI	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'32.25", E 127°31'53.63"	200- unknown (Possibly 240 to 400)	50- unknown (Possibly 40 to 60)	- One launch probably not fully successful - Four-axle wheeled TEL type 1 <sup>67</sup> - TBL: 2h20	Tactical guided weapons
	-	-	4 May 2019	MLRS 240 mm 300 mm (KN-09)	unknown		70-240		Rockets were tested	Large-calibre long-range multiple rocket launchers

<sup>67</sup> According to a Member State, the transporter erector launcher parallels previous models of Iskander. Both transporter erector launchers used a WS200 chassis. In the assessment of another Member State, "the caterpillar version is just a prototype" and the wheeled chassis that was used is new and could be derived from other MSS chassis. "The organization or the design is inspired by Iskander TEL."

2.	II.	9 May. 2019 1630 and 1650 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, III and VI	2	Kusong area N 40°01'47", E 125°13'38"	420; 270	50; unknown tank <sup>68</sup> Possibly 40	- Tracked TEL similar to T-72 - TBL: 20 minutes	Long-range strike means
3.	III.	25 Jul. 2019 0530 and 0600 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and VI	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'31", E 127°32'03"	430; 690	50; 50	- Wheeled TEL type 2 <sup>69</sup> - TBL: 30 minutes	New-type tactical guided weapon
4.	IV.	31 Jul. 2019 0510 and 0530 hours	New SRBM (possibly KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as V	2	Wonsan/Kalma area	250; 250	30; (?)	- Tracked- TEL - TBL: 20 minutes	New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system
5.	V.	2 Aug. 2019 0300 and 0320 hours	New SRBM (possible KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as IV	2	Hamhung area (Possibly Yonghung area)	220; (?)	25; (?)	- KCNA pictures show blurry MRL image not verified as for this test; possibly tracked TEL - TBL: 20 minutes	New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system
6.	VI.	6 Aug. 2019 0520 and 0540 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and III	2	Kwail airfield N 38°24'54.98", E 125°1'43.00"	450; 450	37; 37	- Wheeled TEL type 2; the missile flew over DPRK territory from west to east - TBL: 20 minutes (See S/2020/151 annex 58.2)	New-type tactical guided missiles
7.	VII.	10 Aug. 2019 0530 and 0550 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); <sup>70</sup> same as VIII	2	Hamhung/ Hungnam N 39°48'44.32", E 127°39'49.68"	400; 400 (Possibly 430)	48; 48	- Tracked TEL <sup>71</sup> (see S/2020/151 annex 58.3) - TBL: 20 minutes	New weapon
8.	VIII.	16 Aug. 2019 0800 and 0820 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); same as VII	2	Tongchon area N 39°03'33", E 127°46'44"	230; 230	30; 30	- Tracked TEL <sup>72e</sup> - TBL: 16 minutes (See S/2020/151 annex 58.4)	New weapon

<sup>68</sup> According to a Member State, this tracked, or caterpillar transporter erector launcher version could be just a prototype.

<sup>69</sup> According to a Member State, this wheeled transporter erector launcher type 2 could be a future operational version.

<sup>70</sup> The Panel notes that the system resembles such surface-to-surface missile systems as the Army Tactical Missile System or the King Dragon 300 (see S/2020/151 table 3, annex 59).

<sup>71</sup> Built on the Pokpung-ho battle-tank chassis, which was designed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and resembles the T-62.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid 21??? FOOTNOTE 21?



9.	IX.	24 Aug. 2019 0640 and 0700 hours	New MLRS <sup>73</sup> using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> ); same as X	2	Sondok airfield N 39°44’37.05”, E 127°28’23.79”	380; 380	97; 97	- Eight-axle wheeled TEL <sup>74</sup> - TBL: 17 minutes (see S/2020/151 annex 58.5)	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
10.	X.	10 Sept. 2019 0650 and 0710 hours	New MLRS using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> ); same as IX	2	Kaechon airfield N 39°45’8.46”, E 125°53’59.06”	330; 330	50; 60	- One flight test failed <sup>75</sup> Eight-axle wheeled TEL; KCNA picture of 31 Oct. launch was in fact from 10 Sept. - TBL: 19 minutes (see S/2020/151 annex 58.6)	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
11.	XI.	2 Oct. 2019 0710 hours	New SLBM/MRBM <sup>76</sup> <b>Pukguksong-3</b> Estimated potential range 1,700 km (see S/2020/151 annex 58.7)	1	Wonsan - Yonghung Bay	450	910	1st SLBM test since 2018 Submerged barge	<i>New-type SLBM Pukguksong-3</i>
12.	XII.	31 Oct. 2019	New MLRS <sup>78</sup> using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> )	2	Sunchon airfield N 39°24’48”, E 125°53’18”	370; 370	90; 90	- Wheeled TEL - TBL: 3 minutes	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
13.	XIII.	28 Nov. 2019	New MLRS using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> )	2	Ryonpo area of Sondok airfield or Ryonpo airfield	380; unknown (Possibly 380)	97; unknown (Possibly 50)	- Wheeled TEL - TBL: 30 seconds	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>

Source: Member States and Panel. Abbreviations: MS, Member State / KCNA, Korean Central News Agency.

<sup>73</sup> Four launch tubes; ballistic missile trajectory not aerodynamic, but small canards attached. The rocket is a guided battlefield missile.

<sup>74</sup> According to a Member State, the eight-axle wheeled transporter erector launcher of KN-25 is based on the KN-23 chassis (stretched chassis) with an armoured cabin specifically designed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

<sup>75</sup> Several Member States stated that one flight test had failed and crashed inland, but that the other had headed towards Alsom Island; three out of four tubes had been used. One tube could have been defective (a Korean Central News Agency photograph shows that the upper cap was off but that the missile had not been fired, as the bottom cap was still in place).

<sup>76</sup> The submarine-launched ballistic missile is the naval adaptation of the Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile, but with a different re-entry vehicle and payload section.

<sup>77</sup> The Korean Central News Agency picture of the 31 October 2019 launch is in fact a picture from 10 September 2019. What was fired on 31 October 2019 was a new large-calibre canister-launched short-range ballistic missile, according to a Member State.

## Annex 23.2: Analysis of the TEL and Ballistic Missile numbering in recent parades <sup>78</sup>

**Annex 23.2.1: ICBM Hwasong-17 presented at the 25 April 2022 military parade was unveiled at the military parade on 10 October 2020, presented at the 11 October 2021 missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” and declared tested on 24 March 2022 by the DPRK.**

According to several Member States, the resumption of ICBM tests began on 27 February 2022 with first Hwasong-17 launch test, followed by 4 ICBM Hwasong-17 tests on 5 March, 16 March (failed), 4 May and 25 May, and by the ICBM launch test of either an upgraded Hwasong-15 or an Hwasong-17 on 24 March.

Regarding the exact number, one or more spare systems may have been kept out of the parade, available to replace a vehicle in case of a breakdown, a common practice in military parade.

- Vehicles and missiles numbering: ICBM Hwasong-17 + TEL: ㄹ 03331922 rear/328, ㄹ 03525092 middle/329, ㄹ 04290911 front/321. In the KCTV footage on 25 April 2022 Parade, the Hwasong-17 ㄹ 08080436 on TEL 327 is an image of Hwasong-17 from another parade.

- The Hwasong-17 ㄹ 03031203 on TEL 321 is an image of a Hwasong-17 from footage released on 26 March 2022<sup>79</sup> its TEL number 321 was also the TEL number used by the TEL of the Hwasong-17 number ㄹ 7220406 at the 10 October 2020 parade. At this parade, the Hwasong-17 + TEL numbering were ㄹ (unreadable)/ TEL 324, ㄹ 31380408/TEL 323, ㄹ 21260405/TEL 322, ㄹ 07220406/TEL 321

**Annex 23.2.2: ICBM Hwasong-15 presented at the 25 April 2022 military parade. According to several Member States one of its last possible launch tests was on 24 March 2022, however it was declared tested on 29 November 2017 by the DPRK and presented at the 11 October 2021 missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021”, at the military parade on 10 October 2020 and beforehand unveiled at the military parade on 8 February 2018.**

- ICBM Hwasong-15 + TEL numbering: ㄹ 05250711 rear-left/314, ㄹ 07220205 rear-right/313, ㄹ 10200709 front-left/312, ㄹ 04290712 front-right/311.

- At October 2020 parade, the Hwasong-15 + TEL numbering was ㄹ 03031012 rear left/TEL 312; ㄹ (?)5031401 rear-right/TEL 311; ㄹ (???)403(?) front-left/TEL 311; ㄹ 03131004 front-right/ TEL 315.

<sup>78</sup> See KCTV footages on <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f67924e38/>, <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f63d3465c/>.

<sup>79</sup> See <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/623dc62b7e18e/>.

**Annex 23.2.3: MRBM Hwasong-8 with possible Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) presented at the 25 April 2022 military parade. It was declared tested on 28 September 2021 by the DPRK and displayed at the 11 October 2021 missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021**

- Vehicles and missiles numbering: MRBM “Hwasong-8” (HGV) + TEL:

- Rear-left ㄹ 11670718, HGV 12-029, TEL 306; rear-right ㄹ ?????21, HGV 12-028, TEL 305; middle-left ㄹ 07220610, HJV 12-027, TEL 304; middle-right ㄹ ???????, HGV 12-026, TEL 303; front-left ㄹ ?5650409, HGV 12-025, TEL 302, front-right ㄹ ???????, HGV 12-024, TEL 301.

**Annex 23.2.4: MRBM with possible Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) presented at the 25 April 2022 military parade. According to several Member States its two previous possible launch tests were on 5 and 11 January 2022; it was declared tested on these dates by the DPRK as a “Hypersonic missile weapon system”. It was unveiled earlier at the 11 October 2021 missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021**

- Vehicles and missiles numbering: MRBM short “Hwasong-8” (MaRV) + TEL:

- Rear-left TEL 296, rear-right MaRV 8-032, TEL 295; middle-left ㄹ 21611114, MaRV 8-035 TEL 294; middle-right MaRV 8-034, TEL 293; front-left ㄹ 01740604 MaRV 8-033, TEL 292; front-right #11210102, MaRV 8-032, TEL 291.

*Source for Annexes 23.2.1~23.2.4:*

<https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f67924e38/>,  
<https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6267f63d3465c/>,  
<https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/623dc62b7e18e/>

## Annex 24: DPRK flagged tankers observed delivering refined petroleum products at Nampo oil facilities January-April 2022

A Member State estimates that as much as 458898 barrels of refined petroleum products may have been delivered to Nampo by 30 April based on a maximum cargo capacity of 90 per cent of each vessels' deadweight tonnage. The Member State has used this methodology which is widely-accepted by industry. The Member State's calculations presume the carriage of "refined petroleum" to include diesel and/or fuel oil as both these products are widely recognised to be within the category "refined petroleum". The Member State uses a conversion rate of 7.5 barrels per metric ton, the average conversion rate of gasoline, kerosene, gas oil/diesel and residual fuel oil used by the Committee.

6 January: CHIL BO SAN (IMO 8711021 DWT 1999MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 13493 barrels.





14 January: YU SON (now known as CHANG HAE2, IMO 8691702 DWT 3398MT)  
Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels.



14 January: SAM MA 2 (IMO 8106496, DWT 1731MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 11685 barrels.



14 January: SONG WON (IMO 8613360, DWT 2101MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14183 barrels.




14 January: PO CHON (IMO 8848276, DWT 3538MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 23880 barrels.



14 January: SAE BYOL (now known as SIN PHYONG 9, IMO 8916293, DWT 1150MT).  
Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7763 barrels.



19 January: YU JONG 2 (IMO 8604917, DWT 1206MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels.



19 January: SONG WON (IMO 8613360, DWT 2101MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 8138 barrels. Second discharge in the period.



29 January: AN SAN 1 (IMO 7303803, DWT 3003MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 20273 barrels.






6 February: PU RYONG (IMO 8705539, DWT 2889MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 19500 barrels.



6 February: SIN PHYONG 2 (IMO 8817007, DWT 2106MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels.



10 February: SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO 8865121, DWT 3295MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels.




10 February: YU SON (IMO 8691702, DWT 3398MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels. Second discharge in the period.



10 February: CHONG RYONG SAN (IMO: not registered, DWT 1768MT<sup>80</sup>). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 11933 barrels.



20 February: KWANG CHON 2 (IMO 8910378, DWT 1159MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 7823 barrels.



<sup>80</sup> CHONG RYONG SAN is not listed on the IMO website, and its precise DWT is not known. The average deadweight tonnage of 120 tankers of a similar size (70 – 72 meters) has been used to calculate its capacity.

3 March: SONG WON (IMO 8613360, DWT 2101MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14183 barrels. Third discharge in the period.



3 March: PU RYONG (IMO 8705539, DWT 2889MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 19500 barrels. Second discharge in the period.





8 March: YU SON (IMO 8691702, DWT 3398MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels. Third discharge in the period.



11 March: HENG XING (IMO 8669589, DWT 3250MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 21938 barrels.



11 March: PU RYONG (IMO 8705539, DWT 2889MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 19500 barrels. Third discharge in the period.




14 March: SONG WON (IMO 8613360, DWT 2101MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14183 barrels. Fourth discharge in the period.



22 March: SONG WON 2 (IMO8312497, DWT 4999MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 33743 barrels.



26 March: YU SON (IMO 8691702, DWT 3398MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22935 barrels. Fourth discharge in the period.



31 March<sup>81</sup>: CHON MA SAN (IMO 8660313, DWT 3566MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 24068 barrels.




<sup>81</sup> Although the vessel is pictured on 31 March, the actual discharge of cargo occurred after this picture was taken. The cargo was included in calculations for April.




7 April: PO CHON (IMO 8848276, DWT 3538MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 23880 barrels.



15 April: SIN PHYONG 2 (IMO 8817007, DWT 2106MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 14213 barrels. Second discharge in the period.



23 April: SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO 8865121, DWT 3296MT). Cargo capacity (90% DWT) of refined petroleum: 22245 barrels. Second discharge in the period.




**Annex 25: China's Reply on Refined Petroleum Products****2. Refined petroleum products (OC. 50)**

China has always been strictly implementing the provisions of exporting refined petroleum products to the DPRK. After the adoption Security Council Resolution 2397, the Chinese side immediately published relevant notifications so as to ensure that the activities of Chinese enterprises and individuals are consistent with the resolutions. China has been notifying the 1718 Committee of the amount of China's exports of refined petroleum products to the DPRK. Chinese enterprises do not and will not carry out transactions with sanctioned individuals and entities.

China attaches great importance to protecting the information and privacy of trading parties involved in the international trade, which is an internationally accepted practice. Given the persistent leakage of the POE report and the lack of adequate information security measures, China finds it difficult to directly provide the relevant information.


**Annex 26: Additional sample satellite imageries of ship activity around Ch'o-do Island, January to June 2022**

January 2022





May 2022




*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 27: HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896)

The Panel reported on HAI JUN (IMO: 9054896) as an intermediary vessel engaged in ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum destined for the DPRK, since at least 2020.<sup>82</sup> In 2021, HAI JUN transhipped oil cargo from SKY VENUS (IMO: 9168257) onward to the ‘direct delivery’ tanker UNICA (IMO: 8514306), transmitting as LITON and as HAISHUN2.<sup>83</sup> The previous year, HAI JUN met NEW KONK (transmitting as M0USON), another ‘direct delivery’ vessel. HAI JUN was also photographed on the high seas the same year using removable identifiers that are against IMO regulations.

Photograph of HAI JUN, East China Sea, 3 October 2020



*Source:* Member State, annotated by the Panel.

Around the time investigations were conducted into HAI JUN, the Cook Islands de-registered HAI JUN from its ship registry in early December 2021, due to information obtained from the vessel’s registered owner and ship operator, Ruicheng (HK) Shipping Co Ltd., on the ship’s onward sale. HAI JUN was transferred to the Togo flag registry. The Panel notes that IMO records however showed HAI JUN remained under the same owner and operator. The Panel continued to track HAI JUN.

<sup>82</sup> S/2022/132, paras. 53-58 and annex 42.

<sup>83</sup> S/2022/132, para. 44 and annexes 36-37.

Since then, HAI JUN has continued to operate in the Taiwan Strait where suspected ship-to-ship activity with ‘direct delivery’ tankers occur. HAI JUN is also often located in proximity of ships identified as part of a chain of transfers of oil cargo destined for the DPRK. It continued to register dark activity without AIS transmission during significant periods of time where illicit transfers could have occurred.

On and around 27 April 2022, HAI JUN, intermittently transmitting under its Togo-registered MMSI: 671244100, was located<sup>84</sup> in the Taiwan Strait. Around this time, the ‘direct delivery’ vessel UNICA, transmitting on its known fraudulent identity, HAISHUN2, sailed south towards HAI JUN. A similar process was repeated in May 2022 (see relevant section of main text of this Panel report). HAI JUN had not transmitted on its Togo-registered MMSI since end-May 2022.<sup>85</sup>

HAI JUN has been assessed by a Member State to have operated exclusively as an intermediary by receiving oil cargo between tankers and transferring it to DPRK-bound ‘direct delivery’ vessels from as far back as 2019. The Panel continues to investigate the networks behind HAI JUN’s past shipments.

The Panel wrote to Togo and is awaiting Togo’s response.

*Source:* The Panel.

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
<sup>84</sup> Per AIS transmission.

<sup>85</sup> As of July 2022. Windward.

## Annex 28.1: NEW KONK transmitting as LIFAN and spoofing MMSI of LEO (IMO: 9066473)

Between September and October 2021, the Panel observed ‘LIFAN’ spoofing a Belize-registered MMSI: 312360000 belonging to a tanker named LEO (IMO: 9066473) operating in Southeast Asian waters (see figure 28.1.1). LIFAN’s voyage routes mirrored the direct delivery’ vessels the Panel has tracked over the years. LIFAN also transmitted in waters in Sansha Bay, China. Between September and October 2021 alone, LIFAN recorded multiple AIS transmissions sailing towards the Korea Bay. In 2021 and 2022, LIFAN transmitting on a number of MMSIs including on another Belize-associated MMSI number and two other MMSIs associated with Sierra Leone.

Figure 28.1.1: LIFAN spoofing the MMSI of another tanker, LEO




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel subsequently obtained a photograph from a Member State showing NEW KONK transmitting as LIFAN on 18 November 2021 while sailing in the Yellow Sea (see figure 28.1.2):



Figure 28.1.2: NEW KONK observed by a monitoring asset transmitting as LIFAN, 18 November 2021



Source: Member State.


The then ship operator of LEO, Malaysia-registered Sinar Cemerlang Marine Sdn Bhd, stated the vessel was no longer under its management during the material time. The company also provided the Panel a letter issued by the Belize Ship Administration in April 2022 confirming cancellation of LEO on 26 August 2021 from its registry, ex-officio, with the stated reason of the “... vessel registering under the flag of Equatorial Guinea whilst still provisionally registered under the Belize Flag”. According to the letter, the Belize Administration additionally confirmed that in presenting itself to the Belize Flag, the registered owner of LEO, SW2 Limited, was not recorded, and that a deletion certificate from LEO’s previous ship registry was never presented to Belize to “... accomplish permanent status” - see annex 28.2. The Panel notes that the tanker LEO continued to show under IMO records as Belize-flagged until at least June 2022,<sup>86</sup> with no record of the ship having been flagged under Equatorial Guinea. The suspect nature behind LEO’s flag status since 2021, along with its MMSI identity being used by NEW KONK transmitting as LIFAN the same year, is of note. IMO records currently list LEO as unknown-flagged.

The Panel wrote to Belize on LEO and is awaiting a response.

Source: The Panel.

<sup>86</sup> Recorded updates were post-dated.

**Annex 28.2: Cancellation Letter issued by the Belize Ship Registry, provided by LEO's then ship operator**



Control Number: EX-01/01-2022

### CERTIFICATION LETTER

Name of Vessel	Registration Number	Call Letters	IMO Number	Ownership Details
LEO	622120266	V3MI2	9066473	SW2 LIMITED No. 3 Jalan Tupai Singapore 249134


The undersigned Senior Deputy Registrar of the International Merchant Marine Registry of Belize (IMMARBE) hereby certifies that the above-mentioned vessel was initially enrolled under the Belize flag on April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2021 and cancelled by ex-officio on 26<sup>th</sup> August 2021 due to vessel registering under the flag of Equatorial Guinea whilst still provisionally registered under the Belize Flag.


- Be it resolved that the Merchant Ships (Registration) Act of 2010, S.I. 56 of 1999, duly empowers the International Merchant Marine Registry of Belize to cancel the existing record of a Belizean registered ship, inter alia, in the event if a vessel is registered in the Merchant Marine Registry of another country without the consent of IMMARBE;

By this means the Belize Administration confirms cancellation of the m.v "LEO" from the Belize Registry and confirms that the Ownership title in favour of registered owner mentioned above has not been recorded and a deletion certificate from its previous Registry, Malaysia was never presented to this Administration to accomplish permanent status.

We further certify that at the time of issuance of this certification letter, there were no recorded mortgages, liens or encumbrances registered at IMMARBE and all sums due to the Registry are fully satisfied.

Given this 4<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2022





Senior Deputy Registrar  
IMMARBE Head Office, Belize

Keystone Building, Suite 502,  
304 Newtown Barracks,  
Belize City, Belize  
+501 223 5031 / +501 223 5026  
immarbe@immarbe.com

BZ 0009080

Source: The Panel.

**Annex 29.1: XIANG SHUN (IMO: 9153800)**

XIANG SHUN was flagged under the Mongolia ship registry from September 2019 until it was sent for scrap in June 2022. XIANG SHUN was under the same registered owner and manager, the Seychelles-incorporated Vantage Point Enterprise Ltd (hereafter “Vantage Point Enterprise”) since 2017. The ship’s technical manager was You Young Ship Management & Consultant Co Ltd (hereafter “You Young Ship”). Vantage Point Enterprise is listed in the care of You Young Ship and has the same contact details provided in documentation. You Young Ship also manages HONG HU (IMO: 9125293) – see annex 30, another tanker investigated by the Panel in its role as mothership in a multi-stage oil transshipment of refined petroleum destined for the DPRK.

XIANG SHUN, like HONG HU, operated primarily out of Taichung port during the investigative periods of interests. XIANG SHUN recorded lost AIS transmissions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. During those times, transshipment of refined petroleum occurred. The Panel wrote to relevant parties including Mongolia, Seychelles, Vantage Point Enterprise and You Young Ship. For the latter two companies, the Panel sought information, *inter alia*, on the company and its beneficial (natural person/s) ownership and the company’s customer due diligence processes for the transfer of refined petroleum cargo, all ship-to-ship transfers conducted by XIANG SHUN during the investigative periods of interests, and the related information with regards counterparties involved in the transactions.

According to You Young Ship, it provided services for ship certification, crew manning and ship supplies. As the company did not own ships, it was “...*not responsible for the vessel’s commercial operation and we don’t have the required documents/information*” with regards records of the petroleum transfers and its cargo. According to the company, it was the ship owner that arranged the transshipment of the oil cargo. You Young Ship also stated that “*As the ship’s technical manager, we remind the ship owners and the master to avoid trading in the sanction area. We also request the master to verify the trading vessel not belonging to the sanction countries*”. No other documentation beyond this statement was provided to show its due diligence measures to ensure sanctions compliance. No information was supplied on the ship owner, which was listed in You Young Ship’s care.

On an explanation on the multiple extended and unaccounted periods of XIANG SHUN’s lack of AIS transmission, the company stated, “*We remind the ship owners and the master to maintain the full function of AIS transmissions. We learned from the master that the AIS transmission may be disturbed by weak signal or may be turn off by the master’s particular consideration at the high sea*”. See also annex 29.2.

Mongolia and Seychelles assisted the Panel in its investigations.

*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 29.2:




WAN HSIANG TRADE CO., LTD

萬祥貿易有限公司

 ADD: NO.180,Fongong Rd., Qianzhen Dist.  
 Kaohsiung City 806 Taiwan

## SERVICE REPORT

JOB NO.

Ship's Name (船名) M/T XIANG SHUN		Owner(船東)/Agent(代理)		Location(地點)	
Equipment Type/Model (設備型號) JRC JHS-180			S/No. (設備序號) BB13306		
Symptoms(症狀) RECORD POSITION OF AIS IN 2019 YEAR					
ACTION TAKEN (修理情況) <u>1. AIS NO RECORD GPS POSITION FUNCTION.</u> <u>2. ONLY RECORD POWER ON/OFF HISTORY LOG. (THE LIMITED FLASH MEMORY IN AIS CAN ONLY RECORD LIMIED PERIOD OF POWER ON/OFF )</u> <u>3. SPECIFIC EXPLANTION.</u>					
					
MATERIAL USED (使用零件)					
Description (摘要)		Qty. (數量)	Description (摘要)		Qty. (數量)
Time involved					
Date	Men	On Board	Travel/Wait	Total(h)	
Remarks :					
We confirm that the service requested has been carried out as per service report.					
		2021/08/27			
Service Engineer		Date	Master/Officer's signature		Ship Stamp



**Annex 30.1: HONG HU (IMO: 9125293)**

The DPRK continues to procure refined petroleum in violation of sanctions through the use of a multi-stage oil transshipment scheme involving multiple tankers that regularly employ evasion tactics to avoid detection. The scheme depends on a previously identified typology involving motherships which are engaged in the first step of oil procurement that then transfer them to other intermediary tankers, and in turn on to ‘direct delivery’ vessels or DPRK tankers. Such multi-stage transshipments also obfuscate tracking and frustrate enforcement efforts. The Panel has investigated several illicit oil supply chains during the reporting period and is highlighting the following example to illustrate the typology.

**HONG HU – JOFFA – NEW KONK (transmitting as LIFAN)**

On 28-29 January 2022, JOFFA was in proximity of NEW KONK, transmitting as LIFAN, before both lost transmissions for a period of time that allowed for ship-to-ship transfer to occur. A day later, around 30-31 January 2022, NEW KONK then proceeded to sail in a northerly direction, dropping transmission in the Yellow Sea area.

Prior to its meeting with JOFFA, NEW KONK made a similar trip sailing in a northerly direction past the Yellow Sea before dropping transmission on 4 January 2022 and re-appearing 16 days later sailing in the opposite direction, where it met JOFFA on 30-31 January 2022 (see figure 30.1.1), suggesting multiple transfers could have taken place.


As early as September 2021, NEW KONK was captured on satellite imagery transmitting as LIFAN in waters off Wujia Island. The Panel’s AIS tracking of NEW KONK, transmitting as LIFAN, showed NEW KONK already began making such voyages in August 2021.

HONG HU also conducted similar transfers that involved JOFFA and another ‘direct delivery’ vessel, UNICA, transmitting as HAISHUN2. The Panel is providing the following storyboard as an example.

Figure 30.1.1: Storyboard of multi-stage transshipment of refined petroleum destined for DPRK, January- February 2022

### HONG HU and JOFFA


*Step 1: HONG HU and JOFFA operating in Taiwan Strait, 12-14 January 2022*



JOFFA – UNICA (transmitting as HAISHUN2)

*Step 2: UNICA (transmitting as HAISHUN2) and JOFFA, with UNICA proceeding to sail in a northerly direction towards the DRPK's EEZ before dropping AIS transmission for half a month, 12 January to 5 February 2022*

*UNICA's (transmitting as HAISHUN2) ship activity, January-February 2022*



*Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.*

On 22 February 2022, satellite imagery captured UNICA in the Korea Bay in DPRK's EEZ where it remained over the next several days. UNICA had made several voyages to the Korea Bay, which the Panel notes is a hotspot for DPRK-related ship-to-ship transfers.

*UNICA in DPRK EEZ, 27 February 2022*



*Source:* Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel separately notes an all-cash payment for HONG HU in September 2017 by Fortune Maker International Limited (registered owner). See Bill of Sale at annex 30.2.<sup>87</sup>

Palau confirmed its de-registration of HONG HU and assisted the Panel in its investigation.

#### Ownership and cargo

You Young Ship Management & Consultant Co Ltd (hereafter “You Young Ship”), with a Kaohsiung City address, was HONG HU’s ship manager and operator since May 2020. HONG HU’s registered owner is the Seychelles-incorporated Fortune Maker International Ltd (hereafter “Fortune Maker”)<sup>88</sup>. Fortune Maker lists You Young Ship as its ‘care of’ address. You Young Ship also served as XIANG SHUN’s (IMO:9153800) ship’s technical manager during the investigative periods of interest (see relevant paragraphs in this report’s main text).

The Panel wrote to You Young Ship and Fortune Maker in its care, seeking *inter alia*, information on the company and its beneficial (natural person/s) ownership and the company’s customer due diligence processes for the transfer of refined petroleum cargo. The Panel also sought information on all ship-to-

<sup>87</sup> The Panel notes that the vast majority of legitimate ship purchases are completed as bank transfers which guarantee to the parties, including the financial institutions, proper accounting for significant purchases of this type. The irregularity of a USD 5.3 million cash purchase prompts the Panel to examine this transaction in fuller detail.

<sup>88</sup> IMO records. As of July 2022.



ship transfers conducted by HONG HU since 2019, including with JOFFA and the related information with regards counterparties involved in the transactions.

According to You Young Ship, it provided services for ship certification, crew manning and ship supplies. As the company did not own ships, it “*was not responsible for the vessel’s (HONG HU) commercial operation*” and its cargo. In that regard, it did not possess information nor documentation on shipments and shipping documentation concerning the oil cargo transfers. According to the company, it was the ship owner that arranged the transshipment of the oil cargo. “*As the ship’s technical manager, we remind the ship owners and the master to avoid trading in the sanction area. We also request the master to verify the trading vessel not belonging to the sanction countries*”. No information was supplied on the ship owner, which was listed in You Young Ship’s care.

The Panel has highlighted in its successive reports the DPRK’s deceptive shipping practices where DPRK ships do not identify themselves under their own profile to conduct illicit activities. Instead, DPRK and complicit vessels often disguise themselves physically as well as digitally and use false documentation to sail and trade. In that regard, beyond a reminder not to trade in sanctioned areas and to verify that ships did not belong to sanctioned countries, or that such ships were not being blacklisted by port authorities, little else was described by You Young Ship on its due diligence measures to ensure proper sanctions compliance. The company also stated “*We believe that all vessels we manage do not have sanction violation issue. However, the counter party our managed vessel trading with is under the owner’s commercial management*”.

### Discrepancies

The Panel also requested from You Young Ship, documentation of all ship-to-ship transfers conducted between December 2021 and February 2022 (material time). The company provided a table listing nine ship-to-ship transfers that occurred between 14 December 2021 and 12 March 2022. Only the date, ship name - but no IMO number – were provided, together with the ship’s location of ship-to-ship transfer activity (loading or discharge). See figure 30.1.2.

Figure 30.1.2: Ship-to-ship transfers conducted by HONG HU, December 2021 to March 2022

A LIST OF ALL SHIP TO SHIP TRANSFERS CONDUCTED BY HONG HU

NO	DATE	SHIP'S NAME	LOCATION	REMARK
01	14 DEC 2021	ROCKY	18° 15 000' N-120° 31 138'E	DISCHARGE
02	20 DEC 2021	ROCKY	18° 15 051' N-120° 31 130'E	DISCHARGE
03	1 JAN 2022	ROCKY	18° 15 062' N-120° 31 127'E	DISCHARGE
04	15 JAN 2022	JOFFA	22° 31 110'N-118° 39 709'E	DISCHARGE
05	29 JAN 2022	JOFFA	21° 19 821'N-118° 17 618'E	DISCHARGE
06	10 FEB 2022	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	LOADING STS
07	23 FEB 2022	ROCKY	18° 39 879'N- 106° 57 461'E	DISCHARGE
08	25 FEB 2022	ROCKY	18° 39 876'N- 106° 57 481'E	DISCHARGE
09	12 MAR 2022	HAI JUN	18° 39 874'N-106° 57 452'E	DISCHARGE

MASTER MT HONG HU



CHIEF OFFICER MT HONG HU



Scanned with CamScanner

*Source:* Table provided by You Young Shipping, redactions made by the Panel.

\*Ship named at #6 is not the subject of this present report.

The Panel's vessel tracking information showed HONG HU departed Taichung port by 10 December 2021 and sailed down Taiwan Strait in a southwesterly direction. The tanker then dropped AIS signal for over 21 days in the South China Sea, returning to when it last transmitted AIS signal by 3 January 2022. According to the table provided by You Young Ship, HONG HU conducted three ship-to-ship transfers with 'ROCKY' over a two-week period on the 14 and 20 December 2021 and again on 1 January 2022 to a vessel named ROCKY located near a port city<sup>89</sup> in the Philippines, before making its return trip. No IMO number was provided for this ship. Only two ships named ROCKY are recorded on the IMO website, with one operating as a tug-boat in waters of a different continent. The remaining ROCKY (IMO: 8878984) is a 29-meter long, 187 gross tonnage fishing boat with no AIS tracks.

<sup>89</sup> Coordinates provided for ROCKY is located near the coastal city of Laoag, Philippines.

Separately the Panel obtained documentation<sup>90</sup> that showed between 12-30 December 2021, almost 20 transfers of oil cargo totaling several thousand metric tons were transferred in December 2021 from HONG HU to unidentified non-IMO numbered ships over multiple occasions, and at a different location in the South China Sea. The said documentation differed significantly from the information provided by You Young Ship

#### AIS transmission

With regards AIS information from December 2021 to February 2022 (material time) and on the multiple extended and unaccounted periods of HONG HU's lack of AIS transmissions, You Young Ship stated *"We remind the ship owners and the master to maintain the full function of AIS transmissions. We learned from the master that the AIS transmission may be disturbed by weak signal or may be turn off by the master's particular consideration at the high sea"*.

In response to the Panel's enquiry, Palau informed the Panel that *"On February 25, 2022, we had requested explanation of AIS gaps transmission and ship managers sent us a technical service report for AIS which was issued on December 02, 2021. However, we requested further explanation as the vessel continues with AIS gaps after December 2021."*

*Source:* The Panel.

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<sup>90</sup> Confidential information held on file by the Panel.

## Annex 30.2: Bill of Sale for HONG HU, September 2017

Prescribed by the Commissioners  
of Customs & Excise with the  
consent of the Secretary of State  
for Trade and Industry

Form No. 10A

X.S. 79 A

## BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)


Registration Number / IMO No.	Name of Ship	Built year and port of registry	Whether a sailing, steam or motor ship	Horse power of engines (if any)
22823-96-E / 9125293	GOLDEN GION	1996, PANAMA	MOTOR SHIP	4,900 BHP
Length (Article 2(8))		Meters	Tenth	Number of Tons
		110	10	
Breadth (Reg 2(3))		20	00	Gross Net
		11	20	
Moulded Depth Amidships to Upper Deck (Reg 2(2))		6,253.00		3,549.00
		And as described in more detail in the Register Book.		

We, (a) BEAUTIFUL SOUTH SHIPPING S.A. having its registered address at 53<sup>rd</sup> E Street, Urbanizacion Marbella, MMG Tower, 16<sup>th</sup> Floor, Panama, Republic of Panama (hereinafter called "the Transferors") in consideration of the sum of United States Dollars Five Million Three Hundred Thousand (US\$5,300,000.) only in cash paid to us by (b) FORTUNE MAKER INTERNATIONAL LIMITED having its registered address at 306, Victoria House, Victoria, Mahé, Seychelles (hereinafter called "the Transferee(s)") the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, transfer all (100%) shares in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the said Transferee (s).

Further, we, the said Transferors for ourselves and our successors covenant with the said Transferee(s) and (c) their assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from (d) any and all encumbrances, mortgages, maritime liens or any other liens, taxes, levies, duties and any other debts or claims whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have executed this Bill of Sale on the 4<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2017.

BEAUTIFUL SOUTH SHIPPING S.A.



Title : Director/President

(a) Insert title in FULL of the Body Corporate. (b) Insert name and address in full and description of transferees. (c) Insert "his", "her" or "their".  
 (d) If there be any subsisting Mortgage, or outstanding Certificate of Mortgage or Sale, add "save as appears by the Registry of the said Ship".  
 (e) Description of Witness: Directors, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).  
 NOTE - A purchaser of a registered British vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.  
 NOTE - Registered Owners or mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Register of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.  
 Sec. F. 4058 (Aug. 1973)

Source: The Panel.




### Annex 31: Vessel Disguise of SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO: 8865121) to Conduct Sanctioned Activities

In 2021, the Panel tracked a number of DPRK vessels transmitting on limited occasions where it departed the DPRK's eastern coast, sailing in a southerly direction. Some of these vessels briefly transmitted on falsified identifiers. One such vessel was SONG PHYONG, transmitting on an invalid IMO number 8417812. An AI maritime platform showed the vessel transmitting on two DPRK MMSIs, with a length of 89 meters, and a reported destination of 'Zhoushan of China'.

The Panel noted that during its July to August voyage, one of the MMSI's SONG PHYONG transmitted (MMSI : 445121501) was similar to that of SIN PHYONG 5 (MMSI : 445121000), with a difference in the last three digits. See figure 31.1.

Figure 31.1: SIN PHYONG 5's (as SONGPHYONG) voyage in July and August, 2021



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel

Photographic evidence provided by a Member State on the tanker's outward-bound voyage from the DPRK and its return journey showed the tanker's waterlines of both occasions being markedly different, with the tanker sailing lightly laden on its outbound voyage while returning heavy-laden (figure 31.2). The Member State assessed that the vessel most likely "*loaded refined petroleum products when coming back from the west to the east*". SIN PHYONG 5 was captured on satellite imagery by another Member States at outside Hungnam port, an Eastern port of the DPRK, by 22 September 2021 (figure 31.3).

The Panel's tracking of the tanker showed it again briefly transmitted another outbound voyage, reporting again headed for 'Zhoushan' between August and October 2021, before it dropped transmission.

SIN PHYONG 5 has continued to illicitly deliver refined petroleum to the DPRK in 2022 (see annex 24).

Figure 31.2: SIN PHYONG 5 (as SONG PHYONG) outbound and inbound voyage, July – August 2021

Outbound: Sailing west, lightly laden, 30 July 2021




Inbound: Sailing east, heavy laden, 19 August 2021



Source: Member State

Figure 31.3: SIN PHYONG 5 outside Hungnam port, DPRK, on 22 September 2021



Source: Member State.

The Panel's comparative analysis of the vessel's structure and additional close-up photographs from another Member State confirmed SONG PHYONG to be SIN PHYONG 5.

*Source:* The Panel.

## **Annex 32.1: Investigations conducted into JAN VICTORIA (formerly SKY VENUS) (IMO: 9168257)**

### Investigations

#### JAN VICTORIA

The Panel continued its investigations into SKY VENUS,<sup>91</sup> a tanker suspected of supplying multiple shipments of refined petroleum that were ultimately delivered to the DPRK via successive ship-to-ship transfers from mid-2021 to early 2022. Following Palau's deletion of SKY VENUS from its flag registry in March 2022, the Panel learned that the vessel's owner, Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co., Ltd (hereafter "Cheng Chiun Shipping"), approached several flag registries to re-flag the ship. In April 2022, the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration issued an interim Document of Compliance certificate for the vessel at Kaohsiung - see annex 32.2. SKY VENUS was renamed JAN VICTORIA and transferred to a new owner and manager: the Samoa-registered Topaz International Corp (hereafter "Topaz International") – see annex 32.3 and Seychelles-registered, Philippines based Well-Found International Management Corp (hereafter "Well-Found International"), respectively.

The Panel wrote to Sierra Leone, Topaz International and Well-Found International to request additional information on their engagement with SKY VENUS, now known as JAN VICTORIA.

The Panel's review of documentation from several counterparties showed that an email address associated with Topaz International shared a similar name with an alias established by Cheng Chiun Shipping, Evermore Trading Corp. , The latter company, according to financial records provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping, was the beneficiary customer of bank transfers into the oil cargo transacted for SKY VENUS.<sup>92</sup> The Panel recalls it has previously identified Cheng Chiun Shipping as setting up multiple shell companies in offshore jurisdictions. The Panel's findings are also consistent with a Member State's separate assessment that Cheng Chiun Shipping had established Topaz International to further obfuscate their network of shell companies.

Sierra Leone assisted the Panel in its investigations.

The Panel continues to await responses from Samoa.

The Panel continues to await a response from the registered ship owner and management company, Topaz International and Well-Found International.

### De-registration of SKY VENUS

SKY VENUS was registered under the Palau flag state in August 2020. See annex 32.4. A "Prohibition from Sailing Notice" was issued by the Palau Ship Registry for SKY VENUS in December 2021, with suspected sanctionable activities conducted, including a violation of paragraph 5 of UN Security Council resolution 2397 (2017). The ship's registration with the Palau flag was revoked in March 2022, pending an Administrative hearing. A closure certificate was issued in May 2022, at the request of SKY VENUS' representative - see annex 32.5. Palau ship registry assisted the Panel in its investigations.

<sup>91</sup> See [S/2022/132](#), paras. 64-73 and annex 48.

<sup>92</sup> Document held on file by the Panel.



### Loss of AIS transmissions


In response to the Panel's enquiry, Palau Ship Registry provided information that as part of its due diligence process, it "*checked the AIS and LRIT reporting and identify some AIS gaps*" which the ship registry requested an explanation from the ship owner. Palau noted significant periods of AIS interruption spanning several months, including in the month of May 2021. Ocean Energy International Corp, the SKY VENUS' registered owner and alias of Cheng Chiun Shipping's<sup>93</sup> response was to attribute the ship's AIS outages to bad weather conditions. See figure 32.1.

The Panel however notes that maritime tracking data showed other vessels transmitted AIS signal in the same area and timeframe where SKY VENUS attributed bad weather conditions as affecting transmission. SKY VENUS moreover did not transmit AIS signal for significant periods of time in 2022, lasting up to a month. Her AIS outages also occurred during the investigative periods of interest. Further, SKY VENUS continued to sail and trade over several months before its AIS transponder was reported fixed in August 2021, in contravention to SOLAS regulations.

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<sup>93</sup> Cheng Chiun Shipping the owner of SKY VENUS, set up Ocean Energy International Corp to serve as the ship's registered owner.

Figure 32.1: An undated letter from SKY VENUS' registered owner to Palau Ship Registry on the ship's AIS / LRIT transmissions




The Panel continued to track the activities of SKY VENUS. In December 2021, SKY VENUS was suspected to have engaged with yet another multi-stage oil cargo transfer destined for the DPRK, involving JOFFA as the intermediary vessel and the 'direct delivery' vessel NEW KONK, transmitting as LIFAN. Details are at annex 32.6.

See also annex 33 on related Cheng Chiun Shipping investigations.





Source: The Panel.

## Annex 32.2: Certificate of Incorporation of JAN VICTORIA



Source: The Panel.

### Annex 32.3: De-registration certificate of JAN VICTORIA (former SKY VENUS) (IMO: 9168257)


	<h2 style="margin: 0;">REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE</h2> <h3 style="margin: 0;">CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION REMOVAL FROM REGISTER</h3> <p style="margin: 0; font-size: small;">Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Part III, Section 20 &amp; 21.</p>		
		Certificate No.	VHQ-200-22-1949
Name of Vessel <b>JAN VICTORIA</b>		Official No.	SLR10797
Call Sign <b>9LU 2810</b>	Port of Registry <b>FREETOWN</b>	IMO No.	<b>9168257</b>
MMSI No <b>667 002 007</b>	Type of Vessel <b>Oil Tanker</b>	Gross Tonnage	<b>5818</b>
Owner's Name and Address <b>TOPAZ INTERNATIONAL CORP., Unit 25, 2nd Floor, Nia Mall, Saleufi Street, Apia, Samoa</b>		Owner's IMO No	<b>6304140</b>
<p>I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.</li> <li>2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0; text-align: center;"> <p>The vessel is free from all registered Encumbrances and Mortgages on the register of Sierra Leone.</p> </div> </li> <li>3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is: <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px 0; text-align: center;"> <p>Other: Deleted in accordance with Article 20 (f) of the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act, 2003 as amended.</p> </div> </li> </ol>			
<p>Place and Date of issuance</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; text-align: center; width: 40%;"> <p>Freetown, Sierra Leone on 24 June 2022 at 13:47 UTC</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center; width: 30%;">  </div> <div style="text-align: center; width: 20%;">  </div> </div>			
<p style="font-size: small;">This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: center; align-items: center; margin-top: 10px;"> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 20px; margin-right: 10px;"></div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p style="font-size: small;">fi - Assistant Registrar</p> </div> </div>			
<p style="font-size: x-small;">To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at <a href="http://www.slmrad.com">www.slmrad.com</a> based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.</p>			
<p style="font-size: small;">Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD  <a href="mailto:info@slmarad.com">info@slmarad.com</a>   <a href="http://www.slmrad.com">www.slmrad.com</a></p>			
VHQ-200-22-1949		Page 1 of 1	

Source: The Panel.



## Annex 32.4: Continuous Synopsis Record of SKY VENUS

CERTIFICATE | CERTIFICADO | 証書 | СЕРТИФИКАТ | ΠΙΣΤΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟ | CERTIFICAT



## REPUBLIC OF PALAU

### CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD (CSR) DOCUMENT #16

IMO NUMBER: 9168257

Dates should be in the format yyyy/mm/dd

1	This document applies from (date):	2020/08/31
2	Flag State:	Republic of Palau
3	Date of Registration:	2020/08/04
4	Name of ship:	SKY VENUS
5	Port of Registration:	MAJALAH, HAREBOR
6	Name of Registered Owner (s) and address(es):	OCEAN ENERGY INTERNATIONAL CORP. SUITE 309, CAPITAL CITY BUILDING, INDEPENDENCE AVENUE VICTORIA, MAHE - REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES
7	IMO # of Registered Owner (s):	4617291
8	If applicable, name of current registered bareboat charterer(s) and address(es):	- N/A
9	Name of Company (International Safety Management) and address:	WILLS INTERNATIONAL CO.LTD NO.27 HOU AN ROAD, CHEN CHEN DIST, HAO-SIUNG CITY
10	IMO# of Managing Company:	5564351
11	Name of Classification Society with which the ship is classed:	IRS - International Register of Shipping
12	Administration/ Government/ Recognized Organization which issued the Document of Compliance:	IRS - International Register of Shipping
13	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Safety Management Certificate:	IRS - International Register of Shipping
14	Administration/Government/Recognized Security Organization which issued International Ship Security Certificate:	IRS - International Register of Shipping
15	Date in which the ship ceased to be registered with the Republic of Palau:	-
16	Remarks (insert relevant information as appropriate):	INITIAL REGISTRATION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT this record is correct in all respects. Issued by the Administrator of the Republic of Palau.


Issued On: 2020/08/31

Issued At: PIRAEUS, GREECE

Issued By: ARISTOFANIS CHIONIS

Certificate No: 200800201500004945

Deputy Registrar: [REDACTED]





Electronic Signature

Scan to verify this document or visit [www.palareg.com](http://www.palareg.com)

This original document was received on board the ship and attached to the ship's CSR file on the following:



Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

PSR C-121  
Rev. 17.07.19

Europe Head Office  
5, Sachouri Street  
Piraeus, Greece  
18536, 6th floor

USA Head Office  
The Woodlands, TX 77380  
9595 Six Pines,  
Suite 8210, Office 277

This is an electronic certificate pursuant to the requirements of [EAL 5/Ann.31](#) as amended, based on [PSR MN 232](#) as amended. For verification, scan the QR code or visit [www.palareg.com/information-centre/](http://www.palareg.com/information-centre/), and use certificate no.

Source: The Panel.

### Annex 32.5: Closure of Registry certificate of SKY VENUS \*

\*The ship registry's closure certificate was issued on 19 May 2021, with the original registration of SKY VENUS revoked on 14 March 2022.

CERTIFICATE | CERTIFICADO | 証書 | СЕРТИФИКАТ | ΠΙΣΤΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟ | CERTIFICAT

## REPUBLIC OF PALAU

### CERTIFICATE OF CLOSURE OF REGISTRY

---

Vessel Name: SKY VENUS	
IMO No or ID No: 9168257	Port of Registry: MALAKAL HARBOR
Call Sign: T8A3449	Official No: P045052
MMSI No: 511 100 326	Vessel Type: OIL TANKER

---

**Ownership Details:**

Name:	Residence:	IMO No:
OCEAN ENERGY INTERNATIONAL CORP.	SUITE 309, CAPITAL CITY BUILDING, INDEPENDENCE AVENUE VICTORIA, MAHE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES	617291

I hereby certify that the registration of the above-mentioned ship as a ship navigating under the Republic of Palau Flag was terminated on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship register to this effect.

The reason for de-registration is: PISR found M/T SKY VENUS in a violation of SOLAS Regulation V/19, PISR MN 124.2 related to the Automatic identification System (AIS), PISR MN 129.2 related to the Long Range Identification System Compliance (LRIT) and Section 608 (f) of Title 7 of Palau National Code, which prohibits activities that contravenes the laws of the Republic of Palau, or any international convention to which Palau is party.

As a result of these violations, PISR revoked the Certificates of Registry issued for M/T SKY VENUS. The vessel will be registered with Sierra Leone.

---

Issued On:	19/05/2022	
Issued At:	PIRAEUS, GREECE	
Issued By:	HLEOPATRA MICHALAKOPOULOU	
Certificate No:	22050020150005310	
Deputy Registrar:		Electronic Signature <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; margin-top: 10px;"> <span>Scan to verify this document or visit <a href="https://www.palauflag.com">www.palauflag.com</a></span> </div>

This is an electronic certificate pursuant to the requirements of [PAL S/2019/01](#) as amended based on PISR MN 232 as amended. For verification, scan the QR code or visit [www.palauflag.com/verification-center/](https://www.palauflag.com/verification-center/) and use certificate no.

PISR C-199 Rev. 08.09.20

Palau International Ship Registry [www.palauflag.com](https://www.palauflag.com)

Source: The Panel.

### Annex 32.6: SKY VENUS – JOFFA – NEW KONK (as LIFAN) ship-to-ship transfer activities


Between December 2021 and February 2022, SKY VENUS and JOFFA often sailed in proximity to each other before dropping AIS transmissions over a period of time, likely to conduct ship-to-ship operations.

One such meeting took place around 8 December 2021 where both SKY VENUS and JOFFA recorded extended periods of overlapping dark activity of over 10 hours, resuming transmission on 9 December 2021. Around that time, NEW KONK, transmitting as LIFAN (MMSI: 312360820), a fraudulent AIS profile, was recorded on 8 December sailing towards SKY VENUS and JOFFA. ‘LIFAN’ then resumed AIS transmission on 10 December 2021, proceeding to sail in a northerly direction towards the DPRK’s EEZ.

Other occasions where SKY VENUS and JOFFA sailed in proximity of one another and dropped AIS transmissions were around 4 December 2022, 8 January 2022 and 25 January 2022.<sup>94</sup>


Figure 32.6:

*NEW KONK as LIFAN sailing towards SKY VENUS and JOFFA on 8 December 2021*



<sup>94</sup> All dates are based on EST.

*NEW KONK as LIFAN sailing towards DPRK's EEZ before dropping transmission on 15 December 2021 for 5 days (top figure)*



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.



### **Annex 33.1: Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co., Limited**

Further to the last reported response from Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency Co., Ltd (程群船務代理有限公司) (hereafter “Cheng Chiun Shipping”) contained in S/2022/132, the Panel continued its correspondence with the company.

The Panel notes that to date, while Cheng Chiun Shipping had supplied responses, it has not responded to all requests for information and other queries fully. Based on the available information and documentation, the Panel has identified inconsistencies in Cheng Chiun Shipping’s responses. The Panel is reflecting key information relevant to its investigations provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping in annexes 33.2-33.4.

#### Panel’s correspondence with Cheng Chiun Shipping, 2022

The Panel sent a further request for information letter on 31 March 2022 to Cheng Chiun Shipping. Cheng Chiun Shipping responded on 22 April 2022. The Panel’s list of questions, Cheng Chiun Shipping’s response and the Panel’s comments to the latter’s responses are contained in annex 33.2.

In explaining Cheng Chiun Shipping’s business model, the owner explained that Cheng Chiun Shipping set up separate ‘subsidiary’ companies to conduct their “supplier-to-customer relationship” with their oil suppliers. According to Cheng Chiun Shipping, a one-to-one (1-to-1) supplier-to-customer relationship would place its company higher in terms of priority to be selected on a customer list. *“Other criteria for selection include the financial capacity, the amount of monthly trading, independent banking for transactions.” ... “As a result of this one-to-one correspondence, the contracts (signed contracts with petrochemical company), trading (with end-buyer), and shipping (delivering the cargo), all require separate subsidiary companies to carry out”.*

The Panel, through its correspondence with multiple parties, independently established shared ownership / beneficial interests across the supply chain which linked Cheng Chiun Shipping to shell companies -- companies it subsequently explained as ‘Trading Company’, ‘Shipping Agent’ and Registered Owner for ships it managed. For instance, Cheng Chiun Shipping’s owner (Person X) was also the owner (same Person X) of the SKY VENUS that conducted the refined petroleum ship transfers destined for the DPRK. Cheng Chiun Shipping purchased the oil cargo for transfers to ships reported as chartered by Hong Yao International Co., Limited. Cheng Chiun Shipping used a number of aliases including Everway Global Ltd and Evermore Trading Corp, as the beneficial customer for the payments rendered for the oil cargo sold.

Cheng Chiun Shipping's additional response, 12 May 2022

On 12 May 2022, Cheng Chiun Shipping sent another email to the Panel containing numerous challenges to the Panel's S/2022/132 report on its case.

The Panel is of the view that Cheng Chiun Shipping has misrepresented the Panel's reporting through a selection of specific paragraphs, taking the issue out of context. The Panel's entire statement of case and evidence can be found in the relevant extracts of the Panel's case report at S/2022/132, paragraphs 64-73 and annex 48. The Panel's comments to Cheng Chiun Shipping's explanations are attached.

The Panel's investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel.

## **Annex 33.2: List of queries submitted by the Panel to Cheng Chiun Shipping, Cheng Chiun Shipping's response and the Panel's comments**

### **1. On Cheng Chiun Shipping (CCS)\*abbreviated:**

**In your letter, you stated you are the acting manager of Cheng Chiun Shipping, as well as of the other entities listed in Annex 2 of the Panel's letter OC.381. You also stated that SUNWARD and SKY VENUS "belong to me and my shareholders".**

#### **1.1 Please provide full identifying and contact details of the other shareowners, directors and beneficial owners of Cheng Chiun Shipping and Cheng Chiun Shipping's other subsidiary companies.**

*CCS Response (excerpts): "The one-to-one (1-to-1) supplier-to-customer relationship has higher priority to be selected on the customer list. Other criteria for selection include the financial capacity, the amount of monthly trading, independent banking for transactions." ... : "As a result of this one-to-one correspondence, the contracts (signed contracts with petrochemical company), trading (with end-buyer), and shipping (delivering the cargo), all require separate subsidiary companies to carry out. The final shipments were done by Sunward and Sky Venus."*

Panel comment: The Panel notes Cheng Chiun Shipping did not provide requested information but instead described its business model.

#### **1.2 In addition to the list of entities provided by the Panel, please provide a list of all other (subsidiary) entities, their documents of incorporation, directors, shareholders and beneficial owners that Cheng Chiun Shipping used in connection with its shipments and transactions.**

*CCS Response (excerpts): "...please see the Certificate of Incumbency (COI) and company articles of the above mentioned companies shown in Figure 1 (Jaguar Trading Corp., Everway Global Ltd., Galaxy Amber Ltd., Ocean Energy International Corp., Sunward Marine S.A., and Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency)".*

Panel comment: The Panel requested the names for all 'subsidiaries' under CCS. CCS only confirmed the companies the Panel provided.

**1.3 Please explain your / Cheng Chiun Shipping's association with: Jaguar Trading Corp, Galaxy Trading Corp, Galaxy Amber Ltd, and Everway Global Ltd. Please also explain their connection with Hong Yao International Trade Co., Ltd (hereafter "Hong Yao company").**

*CCS response (excerpts): "...these companies are either trading companies (Everway Global, Jaguar, and Galaxy Amber) or shipping agent (Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency). While shipping arrangements are carried out by Sunward Marine and Ocean Energy. Hong Yao Company is the end-buyer."*

**1.4 Please provide full details of any other (physical) operating location(s) outside Taiwan used by Cheng Chiun Shipping.**

*CCS response: "No other physical companies operating outside Taiwan."*

**1. On Mr Liu / Hong Yao company:**

**You mentioned in your letter that you were unable to travel to Hong Kong due to the COVID-19 outbreak.**

**2.1 Please detail the nature of your business in Hong Kong? Have you met Mr Liu whom you say is in-charge of Hong Yao company? When and under what circumstances did you first engage and develop a business relationship with Mr Liu / Hong Yao company.**

*CCS response: "Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency did not set up branch office in Hong Kong since Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency is a small company. I did not have a chance to go to Hong Kong to visit Mr. Liu since the outbreak of COVID-19 in December of 2019 in China. I first knew Mr. Liu through a friend of mine in Hong Kong and later received the first purchase order from Mr. Liu through his Hong Yao Company in October of 2020."*

**2.2 Do you have another means of communicating with Mr Liu / Hong Yao company other than the telephone number you have provided? Have you been in touch with Mr Liu following the Panel's correspondence with you? Please provide us with a copy of all written communication with him.**

*CCS response (excerpts): "My communication with Hong Yao Company mostly relied on LINE instant message." .... "In these LINE screenshots the communications were mostly concerning accounting statements or asking for the required documents such as COI, company articles/by-laws, annual reports, registration certificates from Hong Yao Company." .... "Quite a few older dialogues and communications were missing since I changed my cell phone once last year."*



**2.3 How long has Mr Liu / Hong Yao company been your customer? Is Mr Liu / Hong Yao company also a customer of other vessels you own / operate to supply refined petroleum cargo? If so, please provide full vessel details.**

*CCS response:* “Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency received the first purchase order from Hong Yao Company in October, 2020. At that time, only Sunward shipped gasoil for Hong Yao Company. After Sunward was decommissioned in May 2021, only Sky Venus took the place for oil shipping.”

**2.4 You have stated in your letter that “Mr Liu had never arranged identifiable ships for his oil transporting”, and that “Mr. Liu always sends his ships which had the signs and numbers shown on the ships covered”. Why is this so? Is this always the case where ship names and identifiers are covered in your dealings with Mr Liu or was it only for SUNWARD and SKY VENUS ship transfers? In these circumstances, why did you/Cheng Chiun Shipping continue to proceed with these deals?**

*CCS response (excerpts):* “Most of the receiver boats arranged by Hong Yao Trading Company were small boats, usually with a capacity of only a few hundred tons. These boats were for inland navigation. It is common that most of these small Chinese boats did not show their identities ....” “As Cheng Chiun is a purchase and shipping agency, it receives purchase order and delivers the cargo to the buyer according to the FAS rules. The responsibility (and risk) for Cheng Chiun to deliver the oil to the designated location and transfer to the buyer is ceased and the responsibility automatically passes over to the buyer at the moment when the transfer is complete and oil pumping hose is disconnected.”

Panel comment: The Panel has noted the risk of FAS / FOB (Free-on-Board) principle and has provided recommendations on this issue.

**2.5 With knowledge of the high degree of risk concerning the smuggling of oil cargo to the DPRK, please explain why you consider your company’s actions in ship-to-ship transfers as sufficient. Please provide copies of your company’s current due diligence and know-your-customer policies.**

*CCS response (excerpts):*

- “(1) Ask the buyer to provide the detail information of the receiver ship at least ten days to two weeks before we accept the purchase order.
- (2) The buyer’s information about the receiver ship must include the name and the IMO number (if it has an IMO number). More importantly the Q88 must be included.
- (3) We check the company name on the entity list of the website: ....”
- (4) We check the name of receiver ship on the watch list ...”

*“A sample inquiry to ask for the information about the buyer’s receiver ship ... in this case the ship was JOFFA.”*

Panel comment: The Panel notes a similar procedure was not conducted for the small ships that received oil cargo from SKY VENUS during the material times of interest.

3. On vessels:

**3.1 Please explain why the SKY VENUS and SUNWARD’s AIS were not traceable during periods of time, including that covering the material times (i.e. the periods of the Panel’s investigative interest).**

CCS response (excerpts): *“The AIS on board Sky Venus had bad connection and short-circuited, as I have previously reported to Palau’s PISR on July 30, 2021 ...” ... “All these very harsh weather conditions resulted in bad AIS functioning. We had called repair service and the service report suggested that the bad AIS signal connection was due to the short circuit when the rain and sea water got through the seams of the outer covering tube of the device on the mast. The repair took certain time as the service company had no AIS in stock. A new AIS set was finally installed on August 17, 2021.”*

Panel comment: AIS non-transmission for SKY VENUS was recorded for significant periods of time (up to a month) in April 2021 and beyond, before CCS’s stated report to Palau Ship Registry. SKY VENUS nonetheless continued to sail and trade despite a malfunctioning AIS for months, in contravention of SOLAS regulation. With regards the weather conditions resulting in bad AIS transmissions, the Panel notes other vessels continued to transmit in the same waters during the same dates when SKY VENUS was not transmitting. The SKY VENUS’ AIS outages also coincided with the vessel’s suspected DPRK-related ship-to-ship transfers.

**3.2 Regarding the inland ships and fishing boats which received refined petroleum from SUNWARD and from SKY VENUS, please provide copies of all relevant documentation e.g. times-stamped photos of the receiving ships, meter readings before and after the transfers, bunker delivery receipts etc.**

CCS response (excerpts): *“... documents (i.e., the Bill of Lading, discharge summary, receipts with dates and quantities, and the one-dollar paper bills receipts) of Sunward in March and April, 2021 in Annex 2, total 21 pages).”*

Panel comment: The Panel cannot determine based on the table provided by CCS, the identity of any of the receiver vessels, and therefore cannot determine that these vessels were who they said they were, and where they said they were. Of the three identifiers of receiver vessels that

Cheng Chiun Shipping subsequently provided,<sup>95</sup> the receiver vessels could not have met SKY VENUS (see relevant section of this report's main text). No photographs, meter readings etc. were provided for the transfers, as requested.

**3.3 According to information separately obtained by the Panel, you / Cheng Chiun Shipping stated that the following small ships were involved in the transfer of refined petroleum cargo from the SKY VENUS in May 2021:**

- HUI HANG 79 on 14 May 2021;
- JIANG XING 78 on 18 May 2021;
- QUAN YI YOU 02 on 31 May 2021.

**3.3bis Please confirm the above transfers and provide all information and copies of original documentation of vessels that received oil cargo from the SKY VENUS.**

*CCS response (excerpts): "The dates were May 14, 18, and 31, 2021, respectively. Please find the three receipts shown".*

Panel comment: See also comments at 3.2.

**3.4 What is the relationship / association between Cheng Chiun Shipping and the above-named vessels?**

*CCS response: "There was no relationship between Cheng Chiun Shipping Agency and the above named boats in Part 3.3 which were arranged by Hong Yao Company."*

**3.5 Please explain SUNWARD's continued journey northwards in the East China Sea despite having discharged all of its cargo on 9 April 2021 to SKY VENUS, with the reason of the transfer given that the former was slated for scrap?**

*CCS response (excerpt): "Sunward had not sailed to the outside of its regular locations".*

Panel comment: The Panel notes Cheng Chiun Shipping did not provide an explanation for SUNWARD's voyage in question and instead provided SUNWARD's positional data on 1 May 2021 to make their case. However, SUNWARD disappeared from maritime tracking platforms had recorded lost positional data on maritime tracking platforms for around 10 days following

<sup>95</sup> Cheng Chiun Shipping did not volunteer the names of the three ships to the Panel when it had knowledge of it. Cheng Chiun Shipping confirmed the name of these ships following receipt of the Panel's letter submitting the ship names for confirmation, having separately obtained it from another counterparty.

its last transmission on 1 May. Cheng Chiun Shipping has not provided any positional data for SUNWARD between 9 April and 1 May 2021.

**3.6 Please explain why there was no trading (ship-to-ship transfers) until a month after the transfer of cargo in April 2021 from SUNWARD to SKY VENUS? Why was the SKY VENUS without AIS transmission for that duration?**

*CCS response (excerpt): "...explanation due to crew strike."*

Panel comment: The Panel notes no documentation was provided on the crew strike.

**4. On other ship-to-ship transfers:**

**4.1 As requested in the Panel's original letter, please provide a list of all vessels with which the SKY VENUS has conducted ship-to-ship transfers (including dates, identifiers, counterparty details and other relevant documentation) since March 2021.**

*CCS response (excerpt): "...details in Annex 3, which include the Bill of Lading, the discharge summary, receipts with dates and quantities, and the one-dollar paper bill receipts of Sky Venus since May 2021 ..."*

Panel comment: CCS provided a Word formatted table containing the dates of ship-to-ship transfers (discharged dates) with the alleged discharged amounts, associated renminbi numbers (that served as identification for the ship transfers), and photocopies of (limited information) cargo bunker delivery receipts – see overleaf of sample table and accompanying receipts provided for the SKY VENUS' ship-to-ship transfers for the month of May 2021. No independently verifiable information was provided.

**5. On associations:**

**5.1 Please provide the following information and any documentation as it relates to the following: [redacted]**

Panel comment: The Panel has omitted details of this section due to ongoing investigations.

**6. On financial information provided for the SUNWARD and SKY VENUS:**

**6.1 The SWIFT messaging records you provided lists various Hong Kong and Philippines-based ordering customers. Please explain who are these customers and how are they associated with Hong Yao and / or Cheng Chiun Shipping.**



**6.2 Please provide beneficiary customer details for all the SWIFT messaging records.**

CCS response (excerpt): “These remitter companies were on behalf of Hong Yao Company to fulfill the payment obligations for Hong Yao's purchase orders. The screenshot below shows the communication with the beneficiary's bank (the receiving bank) on 21 December 2021. My beneficiary's bank must audit (verify and check) various documents of the remitter companies. These documents required as shown in the screenshot, include (1) business registration certificate, (2) certificate of incumbency (COI) for company detail, (3) company annual report, (4) company articles/by-laws”.

Panel comment: The Panel’s investigation into the financial transactions is ongoing.

Source: The Panel.

**Sample of table and accompanying receipts provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping on information of ship-to-ship transfers conducted by SKY VENUS, May 2021**

Loading Date 裝貨日期	Loading Quantity 裝貨數量(MT)	Date of Discharge 卸貨日期	Discharge Quantity 卸貨數量(MT)	Sight(CNY) 代號	Period 交易期間	Remark 備註
2021/4/9	4,965.092	2021/5/10	650	3710	2021/5/10~2021/5/20	Contact: Mr. Liu [REDACTED] Loaded by MT Sunward and transferred to MT Sky Venus
		2021/5/10	630	3977		
		2021/5/12	600	6876		
		2021/5/13	650	2056		
		2021/5/14	620	1899		
		2021/5/15	560	3203		
		2021/5/18	670	6091		
		2021/5/20	610	3559		
			4,990			

## MT SKY VENUS

估價單				
3997		買號	2021年5月10日	
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註
1 ①31040				
2 400				
3 31440				
4				
5				
6 ②42224				
7 356				
8 42580				
9				
10				
11 $400+356=756$		641		
12 $756 \div 1.2 = 630$		04		
13				
14				
15				
No 112951		合計NT\$		

估價單				
3710		實號 2021		年 5 月 0 日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註
1	30640			
2	400			
3	31040			
4				
5				
6	41844			
7	380			
8	42224			
9				
10				
11	$400 + 380 = 780$	64		
12	$780 \div 1.2 = 650$	呔		
13				
14				
15				

No 112330      合計:NT\$ 21

估價單				
2056		實號	2021年5月13日	
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註
1 ① 31800				
2 400				
3 32200				
4				
5				
6 ② 42940				
7 380				
8 43320				
9				
10				
11 $400 + 380 = 780$ 公吋				
12 $780 \div 1.2 = 650$ 呎				
13				
14				
15				

№ 112953      合計NT\$ 21

估價單				
6876		買號 2021		年 5月12日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註
1	31440			
2	360			
3	31800			
4				
5				
6	42580			
7	360			
8	42940			
9				
10				
11	$360+360=720$	84		
12	$720 \div 1.2 = 600$	呔		
13				
14				
15				

№ 112952      合計NT\$   71

估價單					
3203	實號	2021	年	5	月15日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	
1 ① 32600					
2 300					
3 32900					
4					
5					
6 ② 43664					
7 372					
8 44036					
9					
10					
11 $300+372=672$ 公升					
12 $672 \div 1.2 = 560$ 吨					
13					
14					
15					
№ 112955		合計NT\$ <u>21</u>			

估價單					
1899	實號	2021	年	5	月14日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	
1 ① 32200					
2 400					
3 32600					
4					
5					
6 ② 43320					
7 344					
8 43664					
9					
10					
11 $400+344=744$ 公升					
12 $744 \div 1.2 = 620$ 吨					
13					
14					
15					
№ 112954		合計NT\$ <u>21</u>			

估價單					
3559	實號	2021	年	5	月20日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	
1 ① 33300					
2 400					
3 33700					
4					
5					
6 ② 44440					
7 332					
8 44772					
9					
10					
11 $400+332=732$ 公升					
12 $732 \div 1.2 = 610$ 吨					
13					
14					
15					
№ 112958		合計NT\$ <u>21</u>			

估價單					
6091	實號	2021	年	5	月18日
品名	數量	單價	金額	備註	
1 ① 32900					
2 400					
3 33300					
4					
5					
6 ② 44036					
7 404					
8 44440					
9					
10					
11 $400+404=804$ 公升					
12 $804 \div 1.2 = 670$ 吨					
13					
14					
15					
№ 112957		合計NT\$ <u>21</u>			

Source: The Panel.

### Annex 33.3: Cheng Chiun Shipping's email of 12 May 2022\*<sup>96</sup>

May 12, 2022

Dear Madams and Sirs,

The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts (POE) pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) presented a report S/2022/132 to Security Council on March 1, 2022 (Annex 1).

My letter is regarding the Annex 48 on pages 234 to 238 of the report (Annex 2, total five pages). In Annex 48, the POE 1874 (2009) Team gave two case examples alleging two oil tankers of my company violating sanction against Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Since this Report gives unproven serious allegations, I appeal to your office in this letter as my human rights, asking for the POE 1874 (2009) Team to correct the information.

In brief, POE alleged that both Sunward and Sky Venus conducted ship-to-ship transfer delivering oil to North Korean ships (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK).

I quote the figures and legends of Figures 48-1, 48-2, and 48-3 in POE 1874 Team's report in the following pages:

[pages referenced were pages 235-237 of S/2022/132]

**Figure 48-1 on page 235** shows four photos of one ship docked in a North Korean port with the figure legend wrote "*DPRK vessels involved in ship-to-ship transfers with the SUNWARD delivering refined petroleum*". The four photos in Figure 48-1 only showed one North Korean ship in the port of North Korea.

**In Figure 48-2 on page 236**, the figure legend wrote "YU JONG 2 and SAM JONG 1 involved ship-to-ship transfers with Sky Venus delivering refined petroleum".

**In Figure 48-3 on page 237**, the figure legend wrote "SIN PHYONG 5 involved in ship-to-ship transfers with Sky Venus, delivering refined petroleum".

All the photos in the above mentioned three figures of POE's report show only one North Korean ship conducting the alleged "ship-to-ship transfer." The quality of these three figures do not allow us to read clearly. All the characters shown on all these photos can hardly be seen (dates around September 22). All the positions can hardly be seen as well. The latitudes were around 29 to 30 degrees, and the longitude were around 127 to 129 degrees, all in North Korea.

My ships have not been near the North Korean waters. The position record from the British satellite telecommunication company, Inmarsat (International Maritime Satellite Organization), includes Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and Automatic Location Communicator (ALC), both devices together provide tracking history of Sky Venus between the interested September 15 and October 15, 2021, as shown below (and also in Annex 3).

In summary, (1) the positions of Sky Venus cover a range of latitude between 23.0 and 24.5°, and longitude between 118.5 and 120.5° in the time period alleged by the UN POE 1874 Team. These position records show Sky Venus all remained in Taiwan waters; and (2) the distance between Taiwan waters and North Korean waters is approximately 900 to 1,000 nautical miles and needs more than one week for Sky Venus to sail from Taiwan to North Korea back-and-forth. It is impossible for Sky Venus to appear in Taiwan waters and North Korean waters at the same time.

Conclusion: Since the positions from British Inmarsat satellite tracking history proved that Sky Venus has never been close to North Korean waters, the information given in Figures 48-1, 48-2, and 48-3 in the report presented by POE Resolution 1874 (2009) Team given to the Security Council on March 1, 2022 (please refer to Annex 2) is one-hundred percent erroneous and is completely contradicting with the British Inmarsat automatic satellite communication record of vessel tracking system.

In addition, Sky Venus was flagged under the Republic of Palau. POE Resolution 1874 (2009) Team had asked Palau maritime authority to investigate the suspicious violation of UN sanctions on DPRK. After investigation and open hearing on March 4, 2022, Palau International Ship Registry (PISR) on March 14, 2022, concluded that "*PISR finds that there are not enough evidence to confirm that the transfer of oil conducted in May, August, and December 2021 by Sky Venus was delivered to DPRK resulting in violation of the relevant UN sanctions and given the involvement of the Sky Venus in these activities result on the violation of UNSCR 2397 OP5.*" (Annex 4)

<sup>96</sup> \*Attachments not enclosed.



In conclusion, the Security Council Panel of Experts 1874 (2009) Team gave erroneous and contradicting results in its report on March 1, 2022, at least include the following erroneous information:

1. First, POE 1874 Team reported erroneous position data which is completely contradicting with positions history of international automatic vessel tracking system. The tracking system indicates Sky Venus was in Taiwan waters at the time period described by POE 1874 (2009) Team.

2. Second, POE 1874 Team had earlier (in December, 2021) asked Palau Ship Registry to conduct investigation. The results of investigation confirmed that Sky Venus has not violated UN sanctions of UNSCR 2397 OP5.

Finally, about damage to the reputation of my company as a result of POE's erroneous information. The United Nations Panel of Experts Resolution 1874 (2009) Team (the POE team) had finished its S/2022/132 report in February and presented this report to the Security Council on March 1, 2022. However, the official PISR investigation report appeared on March 14. Thus, the Security Council POE 1874 Team wrote its S/2022/132 report at very early stage even before the investigation came to an end. Thus, POE had (1) the erroneous data about the latitude and longitude of the oil tanker Sky Venus at the interested time period, and (2) apparently, Panel of Experts 1874 team lack the official report of maritime investigation conducted by PISR at the time when POE wrote its early version of S/2022/132 report. These erroneous information of the early version of S/2022/132 report presented by Panel of Experts (to the Security Council) have great impact on my personal fame and company reputation of my shipping agency. Therefore, I request the United Nations Panel of Experts 1874 (2009) Team must make corrections in the very near future for the erroneous information on pages 234 to 238 in its S/2022/132 report to the Security Council on March 1, 2022.

The Panel is of the view the above selective points that misrepresent the Panel's reporting. The Panel's report details the multi-stage ship-to-ship transfers involving SKY VENUS, resulting in the transfer of refined petroleum destined for the DPRK. Resolution 2397 (2017) paragraph 5 mandates the prohibition of the "*direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK ... of all refined petroleum products*" that are not reported towards the assigned restricted refined petroleum cap, as laid out in the resolution. The DPRK continues to illicitly procure unreported amounts of refined petroleum, as demonstrated in successive Panel reports over the years. The Panel's report demonstrated the typology of how illicit unreported refined petroleum were procured with sanctions evasion activities involving SKY VENUS and other ships suspected to have ultimately transferred their oil cargo to DPRK tankers.

In response to Cheng Chiun Shipping's email of 12 May 2022, the Panel notes the following:

- (i) Cheng Chiun Shipping claims that its ships could not have violated sanctions on oil transfers to the DPRK because they did not travel to the DPRK. The Panel has never alleged that Cheng Chiun Shipping's vessels travelled to the DPRK. Instead, the Panel has published extensive analysis of AIS data, satellite imagery, corporate records, and Member State information that show Cheng Chiun Shipping's vessels likely served as motherships in a multi-stage ship-to-ship transfer scheme that delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK in violation of sanctions. Vessels need not travel to the DPRK in order to conduct sanctionable activities. Cheng Chiun Shipping has misrepresented the Panel's findings in its defence.
- (ii) With regards Cheng Chiun Shipping's claim of inaccuracies in figures selected, 48-1, 48-2 and 48-3 on pages 235 to 237 of Annex 8 of S/2022/132, Cheng Chiun Shipping has made factually incorrect statements. Cheng Chiun Shipping asserts that "*All the photos in the above mentioned three figures of POE's report show only one North Korean ship conducting the alleged 'ship-to-ship transfer.'*" Each of the seven referenced satellite images was provided by a

Member State and clearly identifies the DPRK tanker, date and location of the image.

- (iii) It is unclear why Cheng Chiun Shipping has chosen to include the months of September and October 2021 to cite its AIS tracking history that included INMARSAT data. The Panel sought specific dates / months of investigative interest and asked clarification from Cheng Chiun Shipping on the all the relevant periods of AIS outages.
- (iv) With regards Cheng Chiun Shipping's claim that the Panel had published its report prior to the Palau Ship Registry's official investigation, the Panel notes it reports on its investigations to date. The Panel conducts its own investigations and corroborates data and information from a wide variety of sources. The Panel's investigations are not tied to ship registry investigations, who may conduct their own due diligence checks in conformity with the respective registry's requirements. The Panel encourages all regulatory bodies like flag registries to conduct their own investigations and share their findings with the Panel.


*Source:* The Panel.

### Annex 33.4: Cargo Bunker Delivery Receipts of receiving vessels provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping for SKY VENUS

In Cheng Chiun Shipping's original statement to the Panel, it indicated that it served as purchasing and shipping agent for gasoil customers near Fujian Province, China. All the oil cargo was purchased by a Mr Liu from the Hong-Kong incorporated Hong Yao International Trading Co., Limited (hereafter "Hong Yao International"). The oil was transferred to "*inland ships*" and "*fishing boats*" nominated by Mr Liu, which covered their identifiers, and identified by a "*CNY paper bill*", whose serial numbers were provided to Cheng Chiun Shipping to identify and match against the receiver ships.

The Panel recalls its typology of motherships used to transfer refined petroleum cargo destined for the DPRK, through a chain of ship-to-ship transfers. This ostensibly provides a layer of deniability of the associated individuals involved in the ship-to-ship transfer from mothership to the small feeder vessels.

#### Multi-stage oil transfers destined for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea



Source: The Panel.

The following receiver vessels were confirmed by Cheng Chiun Shipping in response to the Panel's follow-up letter which contained information on the identities of three receiver ships the Panel had obtained from a third party:

Table: Receiver vessels' identities recorded

Mothership	Discharge Date to receiver vessel	Receiver vessel (ship-to-ship transfer)	Cargo (bunker) delivery receipt
SKY VENUS (IMO: 9168257)	14 May 2021	HUI HANG 97	620 MT transferred
	17 May 2021	JIAN XING 78	670 MT transferred
	30 May 2021	QUAN YI YOU 02	500 MT transferred

\*Information according to Cheng Chiun Shipping; Table compiled by the Panel

To recall, a Member State had indicated the oil cargo offloaded from SKY VENUS onto small ships were in turn transferred to DPRK tankers YU JONG 2 (IMO: 8604917) for the 14 May 2021 transfer, to SAM JONG 1 (IMO: 8405311) on 17 May 2022 and again to SAM JONG 1 around 28 May 2021. The Member State assessed that Cheng Chiun Shipping “*was aware of the sanctions evasion activity and attempted to cover up their activities*”.

#### Cargo Bunker Delivery Receipts

The Panel notes the accompanying bunker delivery receipts provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping contained very limited information as compared to other cargo delivery receipts that typically provide more details of the counterparties. The Panel’s various attempts to reach Mr Liu and Hong Yao International were unsuccessful. Cheng Chiun Shipping also did not respond to the Panel’s request for alternate contact details of Mr Liu.

#### Tracking<sup>97</sup> inconsistencies

##### SKY VENUS

According to Cheng Chiun Shipping, SKY VENUS conducted its ship-to-ship activity around the coordinates 23-26°N, 119-121°E. The Panel’s tracking information showed SKY VENUS recorded dark activity for 10 days between 9-19 May 2021,<sup>98</sup> re-transmitting in the Taiwan Strait thereafter. The Panel’s tracking of the three receiver vessels showed those vessels were not in proximity of SKY VENUS during and around the said transfer dates, and therefore unable to have conducted the said transfers then.

<sup>97</sup> Vessels were tracked on Windward.

<sup>98</sup> Eastern Standard Time dates.

HUI HANG 79

With regards the receiver small ships identifier provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping, HUI HANG 79 is a Chinese coastal ship of a reported length of 53 meters, transmitting on the same MMSI since 2014. It has kept a coastal trading pattern and was sailing inland at Guangzhou between 13-15 May 2021, during the investigative dates of interest (material time). It is unlikely to have met SKY VENUS.

JIAN XING 78

With regards the receiver small ships identifier provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping, JIAN XING 78 is a Chinese coastal ship of a reported length of 69 meters, transmitting on the same MMSI since 2015. It has kept a coastal trading pattern and was at Changsu port area on 15 May 2021, and sailed in a northerly direction, reaching Dalian by 19 May 2021, covering the material time. It is unlikely to have met SKY VENUS.

QUAN YI YOU 02

With regards the receiver small ships identifier provided by Cheng Chiun Shipping, QUAN YI YOU 02 is a Chinese coastal ship of recorded length of 52 meters. It was at the Quanzhou port area between 29 May to 2 June 2021, during the material time. It is unlikely to have met SKY VENUS.

*Source:* The Panel.



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**Annex 34: JOFFA (IMO: 8513405) 99 as an intermediary vessel engaged with multiple motherships, in a chain of trans-shipments of refined petroleum destined for DPRK**

JOFFA, a former Sierra Leone tanker, exhibited indicators of a vessel of interest<sup>100</sup> that included dropped AIS signals sailing within the Taiwan Strait, operating in waters that were known staging areas where suspect ‘direct delivery’ vessels loitered. Panel investigations into the vessel’s ownership and management companies showed the vessel, like other suspect vessels, was owned and managed by a company that registered only a single ship. The registered owner, Joffa Trade International Co Ltd, incorporated in Hong Kong, listed a Chinese national as the sole director and shareholder. The Panel notes that in several instances where suspect vessels were investigated, the registered owner individual provided to corporate registries have a tenuous or non-existent link to the vessel, likely serving as a front. Joffa Trade registered a corporate secretary address<sup>101</sup> familiar to the Panel of having provided company secretary services to other investigated entities, including the registered owner for NEW KONK, New Konk Ocean International Company.

Examples of JOFFA serving as the intermediary vessel in a multi-stage ship-to-ship transfer chain of refined petroleum destined for the DPRK are at figures 34.1 to 34.3. Prior to this, JOFFA spent a few months along the Baima River, including at Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd, a shipyard of interest investigated by the Panel for its past association with servicing tankers that conducted sanctionable activity.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> JOFFA was listed as broken up on IMO records as of April 2022. It was renamed ZOFFA in March 2022 prior to scrap.


<sup>100</sup> See [S/2022/132](#), annex 40, and S/2021/777, annex 33b, on the list of vessels of interest.

<sup>101</sup> 502C, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor, Hong King Commercial Building, Fa Yuen Street, Mong Kok, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China.


<sup>102</sup> [S/2022/132](#), paras. 47-53, 60-63, and annex 35, 39.

Figure 34.1: JOFFA and SKY VENUS – JOFFA’s voyage, second half of 2021

*JOFFA* arrived the Baima River by April 2021, transmitting intermittently along the river including at Fujian Yihe Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd<sup>103</sup> and another shipyard further north. It sailed out of the river by early December 2021. Thereafter, it proceeded in a southerly direction and met with *SKY VENUS*.



<sup>103</sup> See also [S/2022/132](#), paras. 47-53, 60-63, and annexes 35, 39.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, (provided only for reference purposes)


JOFFA also met with SKY VENUS on another occasion on 8 December 2021. On both these occasions, NEW KONK, sailing as LIFAN, was in the vicinity. Maritime tracking analysis indicated the vessels would have met, allowing for at least over 9 hours of transshipment. LIFAN then proceeded to sail towards the DPRK's EEZ.

Figure 34.2: JOFFA and HONG HU, January 2022

Then Palau-flagged SKY VENUS was not the only vessel that JOFFA loaded its refined petroleum cargo. In 2022, the Palau-flagged HONG HU played the role of the mothership loading oil from Taichung port. The Panel's analysis of maritime tracking showed the suspected transfer of oil cargo from JOFFA to the UNICA and NEW KONK on different occasions in the Taiwan Strait in January 2022.


The UNICA and NEW KONK, fraudulently transmitting as HAISHUN 2 and LIFAN respectively, then sailed in a northerly direction towards the Yellow Sea before dropping transmission, in a similar pattern observed when these vessels had delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK since 2020 (see annexes 30 and 28 respectively for full storyboard).

*HONG HU and JOFFA ship activity in Taiwan Strait, 13-14 January 2022*






*JOFFA and UNICA (transmitting as HAISHUN 2, fraudulent identifier of UNICA), 12-14 January 2022*




*HONG HU and JOFFA, 28-29 January 2022*





JOFFA – NEW KONK (transmitting as LIFAN)


JOFFA also likely transhipped its oil cargo onto LIFAN, a falsified identifier associated with NEW KONK again in the Taiwan Strait two weeks after JOFFA met with UNICA. NEW KONK, transmitting as LIFAN, sailed in a northerly direction after meeting with JOFFA around 30-31 January 2022.

*JOFFA and NEW KONK (transmitting as LIFAN) ship activity, 30-31 January 2022*


Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery (provided only for reference purposes)

Figure 34.3: JOFFA and XIANG SHUN, December 2021-January 2022

Then Mongolian-flagged XIANG SHUN departed Taichung port by 28 December 2021, where it was remained in vicinity of JOFFA. Both vessels recorded an overlap of unexplained AIS outage of approximately one-and-a-half days.



JOFFA then likely met with NEW KONK, which was transmitting a fraudulent identifier as LIFAN.



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery (provided only for reference purposes).

The NEW KONK then sailed towards the DPRK's EEZ where it dropped AIS transmission for around three weeks. Satellite imagery showed the vessel conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962) on 21 January 2022.

The Panel wrote to JOFFA's flag state Sierra Leone, Dalian-based Union Bureau of Shipping<sup>104</sup> that provided registration services for Joffa Trade and Nuwanni, and sought assistance from China, including on the Chinese national listed as Director of Joffa Trade on Hong Kong corporate registry records.

China responded:

**5. Hong Kong companies (OC.45, OC. 61)**

In coordination with relevant authorities and the Hong Kong SAR Government, China found neither involvement in DPRK-related activities by the two Hong Kong companies mentioned in the Panel's letters, nor record of port calls in China for vessels *HENG XING* and *JOFFA*. The Chinese side has no information of the illicit ship-to-ship trade of refined petroleum products by the two vessels. In view of the lack of substantial evidence that the relevant companies and vessels were engaged in any activities violating the resolutions, we hope the Panel will not include the above-mentioned information into the report.

Union Bureau of Shipping and Sierra Leone have yet to respond.

Investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel.

<sup>104</sup> Union Bureau of Shipping provided services to a number of ships that conducted sanctioned activity including: GOLD STAR (IMO: 9146247), and the following 'direct delivery' vessels: HOKONG, UNICA, SUBBLIC, VIFINE (currently UN HUNG) and NEW KONK. See [S/2021/777](#), annex 35a.

**Annex 35: Table 35: Officially-registered transitioned ships sailing under DPRK flag, 2020-2022\***

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	9125308	CHOL BONG SAN 1 (ex- OCEAN SKY)	Tanker	5807	Yes (S/2021/777)
Year 2021					
2	8356120	TAE DONG MUN 2 (ex- JIANG PENG 337)	Cargo	2790	No
Year 2020					
3	8865121	SIN PHYONG 5 (ex- WOO JEONG)	Tanker	3295	Yes (S/2022/132, S/2021/777)
4	9016430	SU RYONG SAN (ex CJK OSAKA)	Cargo	4519	Yes (S/2022/132)
5	8602763	TAE PHYONG 2 (ex- MIING ZHOU 6)	Cargo	26,013	Yes (S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211 )
6	8651178	MU PHO (ex- DOUBLE LUCKY)	Cargo	2980	No
7	9045962	UN HUNG (ex – VIFINE)	Tanker	1978	Yes (S/2020/132, S/2021/777, S/2020/151)
8	9340257	KANG HUNG (ex- SUN MIRACLE)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2022/132)
9	9340271	RA SON 6 (ex- SUN HUNCHUN)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2021/777)
10	7636638	XIN HAI (ex- WOL BONG SAN)	Tanker	4969	Yes (S/2021/ 777, S/2021/211)
11	9011399	TAE DONG MUN (ex- POLE STAR 1)	Cargo	5137	Yes (S/2021/211)
12	9162318	TO MYONG (ex- RI HONG)	Cargo	8773	Yes (S/2022/132, S/2020/211, S/2020/840)
13	9018751	TAE PHYONG (ex- GREAT WENSHAN)	Cargo	26,369	Yes (S/2021/211, S/2020/840)
14	9020003	PUK DAE BONG (ex- HUA FU)	Cargo	10,030	Yes (S/2019/171)

\*A number of these vessels investigated by the Panel had been reported sailing under its previous flags when it conducted sanctionable activity. The table lists the official dates the vessels, often retroactively updated as re-flagged under the DPRK.

Source: The Panel. Ship information obtained from S&P Global and IMO records.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Accessed as of May 2022.



**Annex 36.1: Heng Chen Rong (Hong Kong) Marine Co., Limited**

Heng Chen Rong (Hong Kong) Marine Co., Limited (hereafter “Heng Chen Rong” is HENG XING’s (IMO: 8669589) registered owner and ship manager. The formerly Sierra Leone-flagged HENG XING was observed on satellite imagery by 11 March 2022 offloading refined petroleum at Nampo port, DPRK. The Panel sought China’s assistance on information on the Chinese national listed as director of Heng Cheng Rong on Hong Kong corporate registry records, the individual’s association with vessels or provision of maritime-related services and beneficial ownership information of Heng Chen Rong.

China replied:





**5. Hong Kong companies (OC.45, OC. 61)**

In coordination with relevant authorities and the Hong Kong SAR Government, China found neither involvement in DPRK-related activities by the two Hong Kong companies mentioned in the Panel’s letters, nor record of port calls in China for vessels *HENG XING* and *JOFFA*. The Chinese side has no information of the illicit ship-to-ship trade of refined petroleum products by the two vessels. In view of the lack of substantial evidence that the relevant companies and vessels were engaged in any activities violating the resolutions, we hope the Panel will not include the above-mentioned information into the report.

*Source:* The Panel.



## Annex 36.2: De-registration Certificate of HENG XING

	<h2 style="margin: 0;">REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE</h2> <h3 style="margin: 0;">CERTIFICATE OF DE-REGISTRATION REMOVAL FROM REGISTER</h3> <p style="margin: 0; font-size: small;">Issued in accordance with the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act of 2003, Part III, Section 20 &amp; 21.</p>	
		Certificate No. <b>VHQ-200-21-3807</b>
Name of Vessel <b>HENG XING</b>		Official No. <b>SLR10880</b>
Call Sign <b>9LU 2893</b>	Port of Registry <b>FREETOWN</b>	IMO No. <b>8809589</b>
MMSI No <b>667 001 377</b>	Type of Vessel <b>Oil Tanker</b>	Gross Tonnage <b>2076</b>
Owner's Name and Address <b>HENG CHEN RONG (HONG KONG) MARINE CO., LIMITED, 9B, CHEONG TAI COMMERCIAL BUILDING 68, WING LOK STREET, SHEUNG WAN, Hong Kong</b>		Owner's IMO No <b>6086421</b>
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that:		
1. The registration of the vessel described above as Sierra Leonean ship was terminated and on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship Register to this effect.		
2. At the time of de-registration the following particulars of encumbrances and rights were registered on the vessel:		
The vessel is free from all registered Encumbrances and Mortgages on the register of Sierra Leone.		
3. The reason for de-registration of the vessel is:		
Other: Deleted in accordance with Article 20 (c) of the Sierra Leone Merchant Shipping Act, 2003 as amended.		
Place and Date of issuance <b>Freetown, Sierra Leone on 10 November 2021 at 11:55 UTC</b>		
This is an electronically generated certificate. It has been digitally signed and stamped.		  Assistant Registrar
<p style="font-size: x-small;">To Whom it may Concern: Authenticity of this certificate can be verified through the Flag Administration's website at <a href="http://www.slmaraad.com">www.slmaraad.com</a> based on the Certificate Number or by contacting directly the Flag Administration through the contact details at the bottom of the certificate.</p>		
Sierra Leone Maritime Administration SLMARAD <a href="mailto:info@slmarad.com">info@slmarad.com</a> <a href="http://www.slmaraad.com">www.slmaraad.com</a>		
VHQ-200-21-3807		Page 1 of 1

Source: The Panel.

**Annex 37: DPRK-flagged cargo ship THAE SONG 8 (IMO: 9003653) exporting coal, Ningbo-Zhoushan area**

The Panel's tracking on a maritime database platform showed THAE SONG 8 (IMO: 9003653) briefly transmitted an AIS signal between 21-22 January 2022 sailing up the East China Sea towards the Yellow Sea. The Panel obtained information from a Member State that stated the ship offloaded coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters. The Panel's tracking on maritime database also showed THAE SONG 8 in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by 21 February 2022. The vessel proceeded to Yantai port area by 10 April 2022, anchoring *enroute* at the Shidao area.

*Taeon – Ningbo-Zhoushan – Nampo, December 2021 - February 2022*





Source: Member State

The Panel sought information from China on THAE SONG 8, including the vessel's activity in Ningbo-Zhoushan and other Chinese territorial waters in 2022, along with information on any ship-to-ship transfers, cargo loaded and offloaded, trans-shipped and at port / port area. China replied:


(3) **OC.93** *THAE SONG 8* entered Yantai port empty-loaded from Nampo port in April 2022, and left Yantai port loading urea in the same month. No evidence of any activity violating the Security Council resolutions by the vessel was found.

Source: The Panel.

### Annex 38: DPRK-flagged cargo ship RYONG RIM (IMO: 8018912) exporting coal, Lianyungang area

The DPRK-flagged RYONG RIM (IMO: 8018912) exported its coal cargo from the DPRK's eastern coast to Lianyungang, between January and February 2022, before returning to Nampo by April 2022. RYONG RIM did not broadcast on its AIS for the most part.

*Chonjin – Lianyungang – Nampo, December 2021 – April 2022*



Source: Member State.

China replied:

(6) **OC.97** There has been no record of port calls in China for *TONG SAN 2*, *RYONG RIM* since 2021.

China's position against ship-to-ship transfer and its commitment to cracking down on such violations of provisions in accordance with laws remain unchanged. There is no record of port calls in China for several vessels mentioned in the Panel's letters in 2021 and 2022, and vessels that called at Chinese ports only loaded necessary humanitarian cargoes. China kindly requests the Panel strengthen the screening and verification, instead of suspecting that all vessels related to the DPRK are engaged in ship-to-ship transfer activities or carrying embargoed items. China hopes that the Panel leaves out unverified information to ensure the credibility of the report.

*Source:* The Panel.




**Annex 39: DPRK-flagged cargo ship BOUN 1 (IMO: 9045986) exporting coal, Huanghua anchorage area, Bo Hai**

December – January 2021





### February-March 2022



Source: Member State.

China replied:

(2) **OC.92** There has been no record of port calls in China for Vessel *BOUN I* since 2021. No evidence of any activity related to carrying coal by the vessel was found.

*Source:* The Panel.


#### Annex 40: DPRK-flagged coal cargo ships at Chinese port / port areas, 2022

The Panel continued to track DPRK cargo ships that were reported by the Panel<sup>106</sup> to have engaged in sanctioned activity of the export of DPRK-origin coal via ship-to-ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters.


DPRK cargo vessel	IMO number	At port area or berthed at port	Dates [includes the month of material times of interest where the vessel was within the vicinity of Chinese ports]
KO SAN	9110236	Dalian  Longkou	The month of February 2022, including on and around 9-10 February 2022  The months of March and April 2022, including on and around 1 March 2022 and 23-29 March 2022
JIN HUNG 8	8416023	Dalian	The months of November and December 2022, including on and around 29 November to 7 December 2021
SU RYONG SAN	9016430	Longkou	The month of February 2022, including on and around 2-12 February 2022

Source: Maritime databases, the Panel.

<sup>106</sup> For KO SAN, see S/2021/777 paras. 100, 104 and annex 46. For JIN HUNG 8, see S/2021/777 para. 55 figure VII and annex 45. For SU RYONG SAN, see S/2022/132, paras.76, 90, 93, 117 and annexes 51, 58 and 60.

KO SAN (IMO: 9110236), March 2022, Longkou

Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

JIN HUNG 8 (IMO: 8416023), November to December 2021, Dalian

Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset satellite imagery, Planet Labs.



SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430), February 2022, Longkou



Source: S&P Global, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel sought assistance from Chinese authorities on the listed ships below, namely: confirmation of the presence of these DPRK ships at Chinese ports / port areas in 2022 and their activities, whether banned commodities or items were on or offloaded (either pier side or via ship-to-ship transfer) at Chinese port / port areas, and information on the outcome of any investigations conducted where it applied.

China replied:

(5) **OC.95 KO SAN** entered Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo port in March 2022, and left the port in April 2022 loading pesticides, herbicides and tires, all of which are not prohibited by the related Security Council resolutions.

*JIN HUANG 8* entered Dalian port in November 2021, and left the port in December 2021 loading sugars and PVC which are not prohibited by the Security Council resolutions.


*SU RYONG SAN* entered Longkou port in Yantai empty-loaded in February 2022, and left the port in the same month loading sodium carbonate, seasonings, flours and other groceries.

No evidence of any activity related to carrying coal or the ship-to-ship transfer by the three vessels mentioned above was found.

*Source:* The Panel.

#### Annex 41: Designated DPRK-flagged coal cargo ships at Chinese port / port areas, 2021

The designated DPRK-flagged cargo ships *JI NAM SAN* (IMO: 9114555) was spoofing as *HOPE 1* according to information provided by a Member State, when it exported its DPRK-origin coal at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters between October and November 2021.



China replied:

(4) **OC.94** There has been no record of port calls in China for Vessel *RYO SONG* (*POLE STAR*) and *JI NAM SAN* (*HOPE 1*) since 2021. The Chinese authority found that this vessel appeared in the East China Sea but did not find any activity violating the Security Council resolutions.

Source: The Panel.

## Annex 42: ITC Trade Map Data on DPRK Trade Statistics by Commodity (HS Code) (2021)

\*\* Note: highlighted may include restricted HS Code commodities

Source : ITC Trade Map / Unit : thousand USD

Total Exports : 122,218		
HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	23,763
72	Iron and steel	16,733
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	14,864
39	Plastics and articles thereof	10,138
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	9,063
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	7,560
30	Pharmaceutical products	5,871
29	Organic chemicals	5,074
76	Aluminium and articles thereof	4,932
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	3,912

Total Imports : 241,368		
HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
39	Plastics and articles thereof	30,202
40	Rubber and articles thereof	28,586
31	Fertilisers	24,241
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	21,942
30	Pharmaceutical products	16,386
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	10,738
29	Organic chemicals	9,514
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	9,084
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	8,968
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	8,758

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	3,349
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	2,518
50	Silk	2,442
73	Articles of iron or steel	1,936
31	Fertilisers	1,410
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	1,086
28	Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	1,006
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	564
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	516
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	504
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	441
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	438

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
55	Man-made staple fibres	8,029
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	6,573
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	6,310
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	6,082
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	5,558
54	Man-made filaments; strip and the like of man-made textile materials	4,545
4	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	3,812
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	3,482
69	Ceramic products	2,965
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	2,946
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	2,922
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	1,866



HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers; articles of human hair	394
40	Rubber and articles thereof	330
56	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	318
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	241
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	226
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	223
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	222
79	Zinc and articles thereof	189
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	187
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	179

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	1,667
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	1,642
84	Machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof	1,592
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	1,512
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	1,118
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	1,113
90	Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	1,048
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	1,009
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	871
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	868

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	127
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	109
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	101
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	101
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	87
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	78
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	71
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	65
74	Copper and articles thereof	63
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	61
69	Ceramic products	61
70	Glass and glassware	51
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard	50

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	614
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	542
6	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage	463
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	389
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	377
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	320
70	Glass and glassware	312
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	294
3	Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates	278
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	262
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	251
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	204
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	147

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	50
34	Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepare waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, 'dental waxes' and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	49
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings	42
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	41
55	Man-made staple fibres	39
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	38
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	35
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	32
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	26
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	25
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	19
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	18

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	128
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	116
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	90
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	83
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	76
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	74
52	Cotton	65
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	53
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such articles	53
72	Iron and steel	46
99	Commodities not elsewhere specified	40
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	34

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
75	Nickel and articles thereof	18
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electromechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	14
65	Headgear and parts thereof	14
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	9
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	8
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates	7
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	6
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	6
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	6
97	Works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques	6
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	5
9	Coffee, tea, maté and spices	4
81	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	3
17	Sugars and sugar confectionery	2

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Import Value
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut)	29
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	21
74	Copper and articles thereof	16
13	Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and extracts	14
73	Articles of iron or steel	7
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin	7
7	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	6
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	5
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	3
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	2

HS CODE	Commodity Type	Export Value
8	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons	2
52	Cotton	2
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	1
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	1

*Source* : ITC Trade Map, accessed on 30 June 2022, annotated by the Panel.



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**Annex 43: Recent Chinese legal proceedings concerning the sentencing of individuals involved in illegal imports of DPRK-origin coal**

The Panel reviewed some Chinese legal proceedings, involving the illegal DPRK exports of coal. In one case, between June 2020 and January 2021, several Chinese citizens conspired to smuggle DPRK-origin coal into China. Payments were made to an owner of a freighter called ‘Ninggaofeng 606’ to smuggle around 7,000 tons of DPRK coal. This individual seeking to make profits with DPRK coal was arrested in January 2021. The Chinese court, finding the defendant guilty, sentenced the individual to five years of imprisonment and a monetary penalty of 350,000 RMB.<sup>107</sup>

Another similar case, between May 2020 and November 2020, involved an individual who conspired with crew members of the freighter ‘Xiangcheng 678’ to smuggle 9,000 tons of DPRK coal. Conspirators of the freighter were caught by the Chinese authorities in July 2020, while the defendant was arrested in November 2020. The Chinese court sentenced the defendant to two years of imprisonment, two years of suspended sentence, and a monetary penalty of 200,000 RMB.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> <http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docid=6055b54f3ae44de7a27ead7500effcb5>

<sup>108</sup> <http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/website/wenshu/181107ANFZ0BXSK4/index.html?docid=872202c5862649e98e66ad21011f562a>

#### Annex 44: List of HS Codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171 annex 4 as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items> for the complete list of prohibited goods and Implement Assistance Notes.

a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Condensates and natural gas liquids</b>	<b>2709</b>	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>2711</b>	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
<b>Industrial machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Transportation vehicles<sup>109</sup></b>	<b>86</b>	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>87</b>	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	<b>88</b>	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof <sup>110</sup>	
	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	
<b>Iron, steel and other metals</b>	<b>72-83</b>		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel	
	<b>73</b>	Articles of iron or steel	
	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof	
	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof	
	<b>76</b>	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof	
	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof	
	<b>80</b>	Tin and articles thereof	
	<b>81</b>	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	<b>82</b>	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	<b>83</b>	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

<sup>109</sup> Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

<sup>110</sup> Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

## b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Coal</b>	<b>2701</b>	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
<b>Iron Ore</b>	<b>2601</b>	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
<b>Iron</b>	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel ( <b>7201-7229</b> )	
<b>Iron and Steel products</b>	<b>73</b>	Articles of Iron and steel ( <b>7301-7326</b> )	
<b>Gold</b>	<b>261690</b>	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	<b>7108</b>	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	<b>710811</b>	Gold powder, unwrought	
	<b>710812</b>	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	<b>710813</b>	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	<b>710820</b>	Monetary gold	
<b>Titanium</b>	<b>2614</b>	Titanium ores and concentrates	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
<b>Vanadium</b>	<b>2615</b>	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
<b>Rare Earth Minerals</b>	<b>2612</b>	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [ <b>261210</b> and <b>261220</b> ]	
	<b>2617</b>	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code <b>261790</b> - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	<b>2805</b>	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	<b>2844</b>	Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes etc.	
<b>Copper</b>	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof ( <b>7401-7419</b> )	
	<b>2603</b>	Copper ores and concentrates	
<b>Zinc</b>	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof ( <b>7901-7907</b> )	
	<b>2608</b>	Zinc ores and concentrates	
<b>Nickel</b>	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof ( <b>7501-7508</b> )	
	<b>2604</b>	Nickel ores and concentrates	
<b>Silver</b>	<b>2616100</b> <b>7106, 7107</b>	Silver ores and concentrates Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	<b>7114</b>	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
	<b>3</b>	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates ( <b>0301-0308</b> )	
	<b>1603</b>	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates)	
<b>Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)</b>	<b>1604</b>	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
	<b>1605</b>	Crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof ( <b>7801-7806</b> )	
<b>Lead ore</b>	<b>2607</b>	Lead ores and concentrates	
	<b>50-63</b>		

<b>Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)</b>	<b>50</b>	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>51</b>	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	<b>52</b>	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>53</b>	Vegetable textile fibres nesoi; yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibres nesoi and paper	
	<b>54</b>	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>55</b>	Manmade staple fibres, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>56</b>	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	<b>57</b>	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	<b>58</b>	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	<b>59</b>	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	<b>60</b>	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	<b>61</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>62</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; <i>not</i> knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>63</b>	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
<b>Agricultural products</b>	<b>07</b>	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	<b>08</b>	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	<b>12</b>	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
<b>Machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
<b>Electrical equipment</b>	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia</b>	<b>25</b>	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
<b>Wood</b>	<b>44</b>	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
<b>Vessels</b>	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709 : crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons ]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713 : refined petroleum products [ cap: 500,000 barrels ]

Source : The Panel.

### Annex 45: Comparison table of International Trade Statistics and replies provided by Members States on trade with the DPRK

\*\* Note: DPRK Trade Statistics and Member State's reply cover the last quarter of 2021 and first quarter of 2022 (October 2021 to March 2022)

As of 22 July 2022  
\* Unit : Thousand US\$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Armenia, Republic of	0	5		2 (HS Code 85) 1 (HS Code 73)	Technical error in the declaration of goods / Country of origin was the ROK
2	Barbados	0	136		80 (HS Code 84) 11 (HS Code 85) 26 (HS Code 61) 1 (HS Code 62) 1 (HS Code 73)	
3	Belgium	17	15			(Not Restricted)
4	Belize	0	10			(Not Restricted)
5	Benin, Republic of	0	178		178 (HS Code 84)	
6	Bosnia and Herzegovina	97	2			(Not Restricted)
7	Brazil, Federative Republic of	0	50			(Not Restricted)
8	Bulgaria, Republic of	0	1			(Not Restricted)
9	Burundi, Republic of	0	104		42 (HS Code 63)	
10	Canada	0	15		4 (HS Code 85)	Inaccurately reported as a result of miscoding of the country of origin / will be updated
11	China, People's Republic of	281,809	47,824	1178 (HS code 2710) 9 (HS code 2712) 1955 (HS code 2713)	17,686 (HS Code 72) 7,275 (HS Code 50)	Ferroalloys (HS Code 72) is different from iron and iron ore / Raw silk and silk waste (HS Code 50) fall in category of raw materials / These commodities are not prohibited by the Security Council
12	Colombia	78	86		15 (HS Code 84) 23 (HS Code 85) 1 (HS Code 61) 3 (HS Code 56)	Request extension for reply
13	Congo, Republic of the	0	2			(Not Restricted)
14	Costa Rica	0	345			(Not Restricted)
15	Czech Republic	0	14			(Not Restricted)
16	Eswatini, Kingdom of	0	1		1 (HS Code 84)	
17	Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of	92	477		1 (HS Code 84)	
18	Fiji, Republic of	63	1,026		493 (HS Code 72) 7 (HS Code 73) 4 (HS Code 63) 4 (HS Code 85) 8 (HS Code 84) 2 (HS Code 61)	
19	Finland, Republic of	0	1			(Not Restricted)
20	Greece (Hellenic Republic)	98	5	4 (HS Code 2710)		(Not Prohibited)



No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
21	Guyana, Co-operative Republic of	0	247		218 (HS Code 84) 16 (HS Code 85)	Country of origin based on supplier's info was the ROK
22	Honduras	0	131		45 (HS Code 72)	
23	Hungary	3	2			(Not Restricted)
24	Indonesia, Republic of	3	108		34 (HS Code 85) 9 (HS Code 84) 18 (HS Code 73) 3 (HS Code 74)	Need additional time to gather information
25	Kyrgyz Republic	0	2			(Not Restricted)
26	Madagascar, Republic of	2	2			(Not Restricted)
27	Mauritania, Islamic Republic of	0	5		5 (HS Code 56)	Misnamed the country of origin (DPRK instead of ROK)
28	Mozambique, Republic of	0	1,206		251 (HS Code 84) 199 (HS Code 85) 64 (HS Code 72) 85 (HS Code 54) 59 (HS Code 73)	
29	Nicaragua	0	40			(Not Restricted)
30	Nigeria	0	2,105		13 (HS Code 85) 449 (HS Code 84) 367 (HS Code 73) 3 (HS Code 63)	
31	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	204	3			(Not Restricted)
32	Poland, Republic of	153	7		1 (HS Code 73)	
33	Russian Federation	0	39			(Not Restricted)
34	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0	1		1 (HS Code 74)	Error made by shipment broker by entering wrong country code / country of origin was ROK
35	Samoa, Independent State of	0	1,105			(Not Restricted)
36	South Africa, Republic of	184	317	184 (HS Code 84)	19 (HS Code 84) 201 (HS Code 74) 1 (HS Code 85)	
37	Spain, Kingdom of	78	15	64 (HS Code 85) 4 (HS Code 87)	1 (HS Code 85)	
38	Sweden, Kingdom of	59	0			(Not Restricted)
39	Thailand, Kingdom of	38	196		164 (HS Code 59) 11 (HS Code 54) 1 (HS Code 84) 7 (HS Code 85)	Misfiled DPRK as country of destination/origin instead of ROK which is the correct code

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
40	Togo, Republic of	0	2,164			(Not Restricted)
41	Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of	0	219		7 (HS Code 73) 2 (HS Code 85) 41 (HS Code 72)	DPRK erroneously selected by as the country of origin/ country of origin was ROK
42	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	0	119		102 (HS Code 73) 16 (HS Code 85) 19 (HS Code 84)	
43	Zambia, Republic of	0	13		2 (HS Code 84)	

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 22 July, annotated by the Panel.

## Annex 46: Replies from Member States

[Armenia]



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
119 East 36th Street, New York, New York 10016  
Tel: 212-686-9079 Email: armenia@un.int

UN/3101/384/2022

29 June 2022, New York

[REDACTED]

With reference to your letter Ref: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.74 dated 3 June 2022, I am transmitting herewith the information, provided by the State Revenue Committee of the Republic of Armenia, according to which the country of origin of the items listed in the Tables 1 and 2 is the Republic of Korea. The inaccuracy of data is related to a technical error in the declaration of goods.

Attached please find the copies of the relevant declarations of goods.

The Permanent Mission of Armenia stands ready to provide any additional clarification, as needed.

Encl.: 20 pages

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mher Margaryan'.

MHER MARGARYAN  
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

[Canada]

Permanent Mission of Canada  
to the United Nations



Mission permanente du Canada  
auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

466 Lexington Ave, 20<sup>th</sup> Fl  
New York, NY 10017

June 28, 2022

Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you for your letter of 3 June 2022, reference S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.76, wherein the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) requested information pertaining to reported trade between Canada and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). More specifically, the Panel requested confirmation as to whether trade statistics reported by Canadian authorities to the International Trade Centre (ITC), involving electrical equipment subject to sectoral sanctions as stipulated in Resolution 2397 (2017), were accurate. The Panel also inquired as to whether such cargo containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 18 of Resolution 2270 (2016), and requested any other relevant information with respect to exports and imports with the DPRK.

For the data in Table 1 identified by the Panel in its letter, relating to electrical equipment (HS code 85), the Government of Canada can confirm that this information was inaccurately reported to the ITC and that these items were not imported by Canada from the DPRK.

The reason for these inaccuracies was determined to be the result of miscoding in relation to the country of origin for these items. The data will be updated and revised with the correct countries of origin in future submissions to the ITC.

Regarding the Panel's request as to whether the cargo containing the relevant items were inspected pursuant to paragraph 17 of Resolution 2270 (2016), the Government of Canada notes that such inspections did not take place, as this was not required given that the specified trade did not actually involve imports from the DPRK.

Canada

With regard to sanctions, Canada implements United Nations Security Council decisions through regulations enacted under Canada's *United Nations Act*. Sanctions regulations relating to the DPRK were first enacted in 2006 under the [\*Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea \(DPRK\)\*](#) to implement Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) into Canada's domestic law. Contravening an order or regulation made under the *United Nations Act* is a criminal offence. Possible violations of sanctions are investigated and enforced by the Canada Border Services Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Please be assured that the Government of Canada takes our obligations as a UN Member State with the utmost seriousness. To that end, Canada continues to stand ready to support the important work of the Panel. Please do not hesitate to contact us further.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Bob Rae', is centered on the page.

Hon. Bob Rae, P.C., C.C.  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative  
of Canada to the United Nations



[China]

**1. Raw material and ferroalloys (OC. 77)**

The Chinese customs authority has taken a series of effective measures in accordance with laws and regulations to ensure the implementation of DPRK-related embargo provisions of the Security Council.


The Panel's question on the customs data has already been answered by China in January 2022. China would reiterate that the Panel's understanding of the scope of embargo in the Security Council resolutions is not precise enough. The raw silk and silk waste imported from the DPRK under HS Code 50 fall in the category of raw materials, not textiles, whose exports are prohibited by the Security Council resolutions. The ferroalloys imported from the DPRK under HS Code 72 is also different from the iron and iron ore prohibited by the Security Council. We hope the Panel will not include the above-mentioned information into the report.

[Guyana]



THE GUYANA REVENUE AUTHORITY  
HEADQUARTERS  
200-201 CAMP STREET, GEORGETOWN PHONE: 227-6060, 227-8222

June 28, 2022



**RE: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Exports to Guyana:**

I refer to your letter dated June 3, 2022 in which you are seeking verification of information on the exports of goods from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Guyana during the period October 2021 to March 2022. The information gathered will be utilized to examine and analyses whether Guyana is in compliance with the implemented measures imposed on the DPRK by Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

The GRA has reviewed your request and wishes to advise that a thorough examination was conducted in ASYCUDA and the following should be noted:

- As it relates to point 1, there was a variance in the approximate value for table 1: Machinery (HS Code 84) as shown below.

**Table 1: Machinery (HS Code 84)**

DATE	INFORMATION PRESENTED				INFORMATION REFLECTED IN ASYCUDA
	REPORTING COUNTRY	PARTNER	HS	APPROXIMATE	APPROXIMATE
		COUNTRY	CODE	VALUE (USD)	VALUE (USD)
Oct-21	Guyana	DPRK	84	1,000	15,000
Jan-22	Guyana	DPRK	84	86,000	86,000
Feb-22	Guyana	DPRK	84	44,000	-
Mar-22	Guyana	DPRK	84	87,000	87,000

- Additionally, an in-depth examination was conducted in ASYCUDA on the individual declarations referencing the country of origin as DPRK. Based on the examination, it was revealed that while the e-SAD showed the country of origin as "DPRK", the attached invoices and waybills referenced suppliers' addresses as The Republic of Korea. Furthermore, three (3) of the nine (9) declarations showed the country of export as Trinidad and Tobago and the Country of Origin as Korea and one (1) showed the export as Panama and the Country of origin as China. It may be concluded based on the investigation conducted that the Brokers erroneously selected the country of origin as Democratic People's Republic

of Korea. This may be attributed to Brokers not being familiar with the difference between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and The Republic of Korea. (See table 2 below).

Going forward ASYCUDA would be amended to include Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and The Republic of Korea (South Korea)


**Table 2: Showing information reflected on e-SAD, Invoice and Waybill**

Declaration Number	Country of Origin on e-SAD	Exporter according Waybill and Invoice	Country of Origin according to Invoice
GY401 2022 362	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Massy Automotive Components O'meara Road Arima Trinidad & Tobago	Korea
GY405 2022 339	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Top Global Parts Co., Ltd. 2f Dong Sung Bldg, 94.89 Youngd 7- Ga, Youngdeungpo-Gu, Seoul. Korea	The Republic of Korea
GY406 2022 382	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	LG Electronics Panama, RUC 6490-0023- 074806D.V.42. CLAVE R656 Avenida 3A, Diagonal A Las Oficinas De Aduana, Area Commercial Coco Solito, Zona Libre De Colon. Rep. Panama	China
GY404 2022 6651	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	June Heung Filter Co Ltd 20 Dongkyo Ro Pocheon Si Gyeonggi Do Korea Tel 82 31 541 7111	The Republic of Korea
GY405 2022 2880	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Top Global Parts Co, Ltd. 2f Dong Sung Bldg, 94-89 Youngdeungpo-Dong 7-Ga, Youngdeungpo-Gu, Seoul, Korea	The Republic of Korea
GY412 2021 13349	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Massy Automotive Components O'meara Road Arima Trinidad & Tobago	Korea
GY403 2021 58263	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Noble Drilling International Services Pte Ltd C/O Ceva Logistics Korea Inc. 5f, 56 Magokjungang-Ro, Gangseo-Gu, Seoul, South Korea Zip: 07631	The Republic of Korea
GY412 2021 11097	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Amos Korea Co Ltd	The Republic of Korea

GY412 2021 11946	Korea Democratic People's Rep.	Massy Automotive Components O'meara Road Arima Trinidad & Tobago	Korea
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- Referencing point 2, as it relates to paragraph 18 of the resolution 2270 (2016) and paragraph 20 of resolution 2397 (2017), there was no need for any seizure or disposal of cargo, since the verification in ASYCUDA revealed that the consignments originated from The Republic of Korea (South Korea), or directly exported from Panama and Trinidad.
- In relation to point 3, there were no actions taken by the Guyanese authorities since the country of origin based on the supplier's information on the invoices referenced The Republic of Korea (South Korea). Please see addresses referenced in Table.

If you have any further clarifications, please feel free to contact my Office at 227-6060 Ext 2601 or 2602.



[Mauritania]



Mismaur/438/AS/22

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Expert established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), and in reference to your letter S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.81, dated June 3rd 2022, I have the honor to inform you that we received a response stating that confusion happened at the Customs level in naming the country of origin as Democratic People's Republic of Korea instead of Busan , Republic of Korea, which is the main source of these shipments as contained in the attached documents. Other than that, the Mauritanian authorities are not aware of any imports or exports operations to and from Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to the United avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Expert established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration. ✱

New York, July 20<sup>th</sup> 2022

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)




[Saint Vincent and the Grenadines]



**PERMANENT MISSION OF ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

685 3rd Ave., Suite 1108, New York, NY 10017 • Tel: (212) 599-0950 • Fax: (212) 599-1020 • [svgmisson@grail.com](mailto:svgmisson@grail.com) | <http://ovp-sv.org>

22 July 2022



Dear Coordinator,

The Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to the inquiry made via the latter's Correspondence No. S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.162, dated June 23, 2022, regarding a suspected trade made between Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and the DPRK in items that are covered by the relevant sectoral sanctions provisions in resolutions 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017).

In this connection, the Permanent Mission, on behalf of the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines wishes to inform that the trade data from the International Trade Centre (ITC) Trade Map between October 2021 and March 2022, indicating the DPRK transferred to Saint Vincent and the Grenadines items in the following categories subject to the sectoral sanctions pursuant to resolution 2321 (2016): copper, is in fact inaccurate.

The matter was investigated by the Customs and Excise department of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and it was determined that an error was made by a shipment broker in the State, who inadvertently entered the country DPRK as the source of the material in question, as oppose to the Republic of Korea where the material in question actually originated from.

Additionally, the Ministry takes this opportunity to transmit herewith the full report from the Customs and Excise Department explaining the cause of the inaccuracy along with all relevant evidence.

The Mission further informs that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has already taken the necessary steps to correct the information held at the ITC on this matter, and reiterates the State's full compliance with all

sanctions measures under the purview of the esteemed Panel of Experts (POE), as confirmed in the last report by the State to the POE.

The Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "I. Rhonda King". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first letter "I" is large and prominent. The name "Rhonda" is written in a series of connected loops, and "King" follows in a similar cursive style.

H.E. Inga Rhonda King  
Permanent Representative

[Trinidad and Tobago]



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK**

633 Third Avenue, 12<sup>th</sup> Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017  
Tel: 212-697-7620; Fax: 212-682-3580; Email: [tto@un.int](mailto:tto@un.int)

INT: 2/4/8

21 July 2022



I should like to refer to your letters dated 3 and 23 June 2022 requesting the assistance of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in providing information concerning reported trade data that listed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the partner country in the following categories subject to sanction pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2371 (2017) and 2397 (2017): iron, steel products and electrical equipment.

In this connection, based on a review of invoices, as well as conversations with the respective importers, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago wishes to advise that the DPRK was erroneously selected by each importer as the country of origin. This error can occur since the options presented for country selection are based on the official country names as opposed to their common names.

In this regard, please see the enclosed invoices pertaining to the shipments referenced in the aforementioned correspondence from the Panel of Experts, which show the country of origin as the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as follows:

- a) Attachment I: Iron and Steel Products (HS Code 73);
- b) Attachment II: Electrical Equipment (HS Code 85); and
- c) Attachment III: Iron (HS Code 72).

Given that these invoices contain sensitive information as a result of negotiations between the supplier and importer, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago requests that the information provided is treated with the highest standards of confidentiality and should be used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

**Annex 47: Reply from Malaysia to the Panel****REQUEST BY THE UN PANEL OF EXPERTS (POE) ON THE DPRK  
ON INFORMATION REGARDING GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (GLOCOM)**

Letter's Ref. No. : S/AC.49/2021/PE/OC.263

Letter's Date : 13 October 2021

**1. Any comments you may have on the authenticity of the media report in Annex 1.**

The Malaysian authorities confirmed that Global Communications (Glocom) has never operated in Malaysia.

**2. Confirmation of the current operation of Glocom (and any other DPRK-affiliated businesses) in your country along with:**

Global Communications (Glocom) has never operated in Malaysia.

However, there were two companies that the PoE suspected to be the 'front companies' to promote Glocom's products, namely International Global Systems Sdn. Bhd. and International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd. Both companies have already been dissolved.

**2.1. The names of owners and managers of Glocom whilst active in Malaysia.**

As mentioned above, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

The names of directors and shareholders of International Global Systems Sdn. Bhd. and International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd. were mentioned in our response to PoE's letter ref. no. S/AC.49/2016/PE.OC.999.

**2.2. The number of DPRK staff employed by Glocom.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

As for the two companies concerned, there were three DPRK nationals who worked with International Global Systems Sdn. Bhd. (Ryang Su Nyo, Pyon Won Gun and Pae Won Chol), and two with International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd. (Kim Chang Hyok and Kim Un Sim).

**2.3. Types and numbers of the passports and visas used by DPRK nationals employed by and affiliated with Glocom in your country, as well as their associated travel records.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

Nevertheless, please find the records of entries and exits to/from Malaysia of Ryang Su Nyo, Pyon Won Gun and Kim Chang Hyok, which were already shared with the PoE in our response to the PoE's letter ref. no. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.999.

**2.4. Copies of property leases for Glocom.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

**2.5. Information on revenue made by Glocom whilst active in Malaysia.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia and there was no record of any trade activities under a company named Glocom.

**2.6. Amount paid in taxes, if any.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia and there was no record of any trade activities under a company named Glocom.

**2.7. Information on the bank account(s) used by Glocom including records of transactions relating to operating expenses including but not limited to the purchase of supplies, paying of rent, deposit of or transfer of funds. Include all relevant invoices and remittance documents showing amounts transferred both to and from the account. If funds were deposited or withdrawn in cash, please provide copies of all relevant bank documents, invoices and receipts.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

For International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd., they had three bank accounts with CIMB Bank Berhad, i.e., one current account and two foreign currency accounts, from July 2012 until April 2015. Please find the information on bank accounts as well as records of some transactions undertaken from the bank accounts of International Golden Services Sdn. Bhd. in our responses to PoE's letters ref. no. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.999, S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.26 and S/AC.49/2017/PE/OC.108.



As for the International Global Services Sdn. Bhd., the Malaysian authorities do not have any other details regarding other bank accounts used by the company.

**2.8. Wages currently being paid to DPRK workers, if any.**

Since the severance of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and DPRK on 19 March 2021, there is no DPRK national living/working in Malaysia.

**2.9. Information on all contacts between the DPRK embassy (before its closure in March 2021) and Glocom or its associated businesses.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

**2.10. The specific actions undertaken by Malaysian authorities against Glocom and its associates in recent years, if any.**

As mentioned earlier, Glocom has never operated in Malaysia.

Nevertheless, the Malaysian authorities have undertaken steps in ensuring that Malaysian citizens who had business ties with Kim Chang Hyok have severed such ties with the latter.

The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) has been constantly working with relevant authorities and foreign intelligence agencies to trace, curb and conduct illicit activities conducted in Malaysia.

**2.11. Copies of any investigation or inquiry by your competent authorities on the activities of Glocom and its parent companies, any of its subsidiaries, or related companies for the past five years; and**

NIL.

**2.12. Measures taken by your competent authorities to prevent the provisioning of financial services or the transfers of any financial or other asset or resources, including cash, letters of credit, and other financing instruments, that could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes, or other activities prohibited by relevant resolutions.**

Malaysia's implementation of the operative provisions of the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions on DPRK is being governed by several laws and regulations including those described in Malaysia's response to PoE's letter ref. no. S/AC.49/2016/PE/OC.269.

**Annex 48: Reply from Canon****CANON INC. HEADQUARTERS**

30-2, Shimomaruko 3-chome, Ohta-ku, Tokyo 146-8501, Japan  
Phone +81-3-3758-2111

May 13, 2022

[REDACTED]

We would like to report the final investigation results regarding the cameras that are missing supply channel information in relation to Inquiry(3) as follows.

INQUIRY(3) "Any specific supply channel information for the cameras mentioned in Fig 4 (purchase location, date of purchase, price, information on the buyer(s))"

Canon EOS 70D : [REDACTED]

→ This serial number is not for sales purpose but used as a sample product for sales promotion at Canon (China) Co. LTD.

All the sample products must be disposed after the promotion period according to Canon's internal rule. And thus this camera was handed over to the disposal company in 2016.

Canon EOS 60D : [REDACTED]

→ We could manage to find out the manufacturing date and supply channel information after intensive investigation with manufacturing factory and marketing subsidiary.

We sincerely apologize for our previous answer as to this serial number on the letter dated 15 April 2022.

Canon EOS 60D : [REDACTED]

→ This serial number is not for sales purpose but used as an inspection tool in the manufacturing process at one of our factories, Canon Opt. Malaysia which manufactures camera lenses.

All the cameras for inspection purpose in our factory must be disposed after the usage period according to Canon's internal rule.

And thus this camera was handed over to the disposal company.

However disposal record is not available because the retention period of the document had expired based on the internal rule in Canon Opt. Malaysia.

[REDACTED]

We hope that our investigation results would meet your expectations.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require any further questions

Yours faithfully,

[REDACTED]

Global Logistics Management Center  
Canon Inc.

*Source:* The Panel.

**Annex 49: Reply on Cameras from China /Japan****[China]****3. Japanese cameras (OC. 109)**

The investigation requirement of the letter is beyond the mandate of related resolutions. The DPRK-related Security Council resolutions do not include camera in the list of prohibited luxury goods, nor do they give mandate to the panel to explain the scope of luxury goods. The information from the media is far from accurate. We hope the Panel will carry out its work on the basis of facts, and not include the information unverified or even inconsistent with the facts into its report.

**[Japan]**

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

22 July 2022



The Government of Japan highly values the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 (hereinafter “the Panel”) as well as that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (hereinafter “the 1718 Committee”), and reaffirms its commitment to cooperate with the Panel to ensure the full and strict implementation of all relevant UNSCRs against North Korea.


Upon instructions from the capital, I have the honour to share Japan’s response, as attached, to your letter dated 9 June 2022 (Reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.106) with respect to information on the sales of Canon and Nikon cameras in Japan.

The Government of Japan reaffirms its commitment to continue working closely with the Panel and the 1718 Committee. Should the Panel have any inquiries, please contact the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Please accept the assurance of my highest esteem.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Ishikane'.

Kimihiro ISHIKANE  
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations





**Japan's response  
regarding the information on the sales of Canon and Nikon  
cameras in Japan**

1 Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act prohibits the export to North Korea of all goods, not just those prohibited by Security Council sanctions, and we will continue to thoroughly enforce such measures, including border control. Since the introduction of these measures, we have been asking for the understanding and cooperation of related entities to ensure that the full ban on exports to North Korea is enforced. Since the economic sanctions against North Korea were initiated in 2006, we have been issuing reminders and requests for cooperation to industry associations (about 1,000 organizations) and local customs offices every one to two years (every extension of its own sanctions under Article 10 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. At first, every six months, more recently every two years). In addition, trade management training, including North Korean sanctions, is conducted annually, with customs officials and police officers participating.

2 We are aware that both Canon and Nikon have thorough distribution controls and have responded to the Panel's inquiry in extremely good faith. With respect to the sale of consumer products, such as the subject of the inquiry, there is nothing unnatural about the situation in which a manufacturer is unable to trace the distribution of products beyond the retailer. The issue of the transfer of samples or inspection equipment, which the Panel's letter describes as "operations that may be illegal" is whether the products were properly handled after being delivered to the disposal companies in China or Malaysia. Thus we understand those occurred outside of Japan.

3 In any case, as stated above, the Government of Japan will thoroughly enforce the ban on exports to North Korea of all goods, not only prohibited goods under Security Council sanctions, in accordance with Japan's domestic laws.

**Annex 50: Reply from Japan**

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

29 March 2022



The Government of Japan highly values the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 (hereinafter “the Panel”) as well as that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (hereinafter “the 1718 Committee”), and reaffirms its commitment to cooperate with the Panel to ensure the full and strict implementation of all relevant UNSCRs against North Korea.

Upon instructions from the capital, I have the honour to share Japan’s response, as attached, to your letter dated 1 March 2022 (Reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.5) with respect to a Secure Digital (SD) card found in mail sent to DPRK.

The Government of Japan reaffirms its commitment to continue working closely with the Panel and the 1718 Committee. Should the Panel have any inquiries, please contact the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Please accept the assurance of my highest esteem.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Ishikane'.

Kimihiro ISHIKANE  
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations



Japan's response to Panel's inquiry  
regarding a Secure Digital (SD) card found in mail sent to DPRK

1 Basis of the measure

The basis of the measure that the Government of Japan has taken with regard to the said SD card is found in Act on Special Measures Concerning Cargo Inspections Conducted by the Government Taking into Consideration United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, specifically its paragraph 4 of Article 3, paragraph 2 of Article 4, and paragraph 1 and 2 of Article 5. SD card is classified as a "luxury item" based on its "I", sub-paragraph 1 of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Article 1 of its Order for Enforcement, and section 21 of its Appended Table 6 under its Order for Enforcement.

2 Details of the SD card:

- Manufacturer and type: SanDisk Ultra 8GB HC1 40MB/S
- Content stored: 12 files of filename extension WAV (containing picture of transceiver display and voice.) and 7 files of filename extension MP4 (voice including songs).

3 Details of the sender and the addressee:

- Sender: [REDACTED]
- Addressee: The Voice of Korea Radio of the Radio and Television Broadcasting Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (address: Jongsung-dong, Moranbong District, Pyongyang)
- We do not have any further information regarding the sender and the addressee.

4 Practice and experience of deliveries of international mail addressed to North Korea since 2017

- Since June 2009, an export from Japan to North Korea has been generally prohibited. When there is an international mail to North Korea, the Japanese custom authorities have instructed to the Japan Post Ltd. to present it to the authorities. The custom authorities then inspect the mail, except in the case of a letter or diplomatic mail, in accordance with the Customs Act. When the authorities have

## Annex 51: Additional Information on the Voice Phishing Hacking Applications sold by DPRK IT workers, including screenshots of Demonstration Video Clips

### Screenshot of Song Rim explaining how to use the remotely controllable hacking application

5 개 / 페이지

No	발신시간	본번호	수/발신	통화번호	입제이름	메모
1	2021-12-28 19:49:29	62f8e882b9b1020e	발신		-	
2	2021-12-28 19:49:29	62f8e882b9b1020e	발신		-	
3	2021-12-28 18:13:32	62f8e882b9b1020e	발신		-	
4	2021-12-28 18:13:32	62f8e882b9b1020e	발신		-	
5	2021-12-28 11:22:07	62f8e882b9b1020e	발신		-	


페이지 1 / 5 (중 1,791 개)

5 개 / 페이지

No	상태	기능	11 유대번호	12 통신사	신호	배터리	13 휴대전화모델	14 설치시간	관리	시스템	버전	설정
1	오프라인			LTE	1%	SM-G977N	2021-12-24 18:33:46				1.0	설정완료
2	오프라인		F90ca1a59474c809	Wifi	78%	SM-G960N	2021-12-27 11:24:58				1.0	설정완료
3	오프라인			Wifi	20%	SM-G977N	2021-12-27 14:34:54				1.0	설정완료
4	온라인		62f8e882b9b1020e	Wifi	61%	SM-A505N	2021-12-27 20:36:38				1.0.1	설정완료
5	오프라인			LTE	92%	SM-A505N	2021-12-28 06:55:38				1.0.1	설정완료

- ① Device information
- ② Setting for redirection (of outgoing calls from the hacked smartphone)
- ③ Setting to disguise the caller's number (into a fake number) displayed on the hacked smartphone
- ④ Blacklist (blocked numbers)
- ⑤ User management
- ⑥ Voice recording
- ⑦ Video recording
- ⑧ Calls recording
- ⑨ Photo data
- ⑩ GPS
- ⑪ Mobile number
- ⑫ Service provider
- ⑬ Model name of mobile
- ⑭ Date and time the hacking application was installed

**Screenshot of Song Rim's demonstration video clip showing the redirection function of outgoing calls from hacked smartphone**



**Photo 1**



**Photo 2**

[Redirection function for outgoing calls]

◎ Purpose: When a victim makes a call from a hacked smartphone to a legitimate financial institution phone number, for example, the call can be redirected to the voice phishing group's office (call center, mobile) with the victim being unaware of the redirection.

◎ Demonstration of the redirection function

Photo 1: Remote control programme setting

(circled in red, voice phishing group's mobile no. / circled in yellow, fake no.)


Photo 2: Demonstration of redirecting outgoing calls from the hacked smartphone to voice phishing group's mobile

(circled in white, hacked smartphone no. / circled in yellow, fake no.)

Source: Member State, annotated by the Panel.




## Annex 52: Information on DPRK IT Worker Song Rim

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <u>DOB</u> : Feb. 25, 1991</li> <li>o Affiliation/Position: Head of IT development department of Biryugang Overseas Technology Cooperation Company under the Dandong branch of Hapjanggang Trading Corporation</li> <li>o Phone No. : [REDACTED]</li> <li>o WeChat ID : [REDACTED]</li> <li>o Major activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Illegal trade of hacking apps with voice phishing crime rings</li> <li>- Won SW development contracts under the fraudulent identity as a Chinese IT developer on LinkedIn</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
---	---

Source: Member State

### [Alias Linked in Profile]



**LinkedIn** 직원 Liu Naya

**Naya Liu**  
Programming Development & 2D,3D Animation  
캐나다 브리티시컬럼비아대 서리 · 1촌 85명  
가입해서 1촌 맺기

**GangChaoMaoYi**  
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

**정보**  
Hello, As I take this project, I will do my best!  
I'm a seasoned 2D,3D animator & 3D modeling expert with skills in Photoshop, Adobe XD, 3D Max, Solid, Maya, Cinema 4D R18, After Effect CC 2018.  
Please check my profile and sample works  
<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Zv41blmTzfEma0YmhlFuX4mzmL4wbygy?usp=sharing>  
Sincerely I hope long term relationship based on success, trust.  
If you send me your project spec, I can start your project immediately and can commit 40+ hours per a week.  
Look forward to hearing from you soon.

Source: Linked in, annotated by Member State

### **Annex 53.1: Kimsuky’s Cyberattacks using ‘KONNI’ Malware**

According to multiple reports,<sup>111</sup> Kimsuky hackers have attacked political institutions in several Member States, using the ‘KONNI Remote Administration Tool (RAT)’ malware to harvest credentials and compromise victims. A cybersecurity company noted that “*spear phishing emails usually are weaponized with macro embedded documents that upon opening drop one of KONNI RAT variants*”. Using the harvested credentials, the perpetrators gain access to sensitive information or deploy additional ransomware to generate illicit revenue. Recently, this malware has been found to include significant updates such as code improvements to make detection harder. The Panel itself has also received spoofed phishing emails carrying the ‘KONNI’ tool.<sup>112</sup>

*Source:* The Panel.

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<sup>111</sup> <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/01/konni-evolves-into-stealthier-rat/>, <https://blog.lumen.com/new-konni-campaign-targeting-russian-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/> and <https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targeting-russia/>

<sup>112</sup> [S/2021/211](#), para. 128

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## Annex 53.2: Links to reports from Ahnlab's ASEC in 2022

### **Kimsuky Group**

[Kimsuky's Attack Attempts Disguised as Press Releases of Various Topics](#)

(25 May 2022)

[APT Attacks Using Word File Disguised as Donation Receipts for Uljin Wildfire \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(1 April 2022)

[VBS Script Disguised as PDF File Being Distributed \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(28 March 2022)

[APT Attack Using Word Files About Cryptocurrency \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(25 March 2022)

[APT Attack Attempts Disguised as North Korea Related Paper Requirements \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(22 February 2022)

[Distribution of Kimsuky Group's xRAT \(Quasar RAT\) Confirmed](#)

(8 February 2022)

### **Lazarus Group**

[Lazarus Group Exploiting Log4Shell Vulnerability \(NukeSped\) - ASEC BLOG \(ahnlab.com\)](#)

(19 May 2022)

[New Malware of Lazarus Threat Actor Group Exploiting INITECH Process - ASEC BLOG \(ahnlab.com\)](#)

(26 April 2022)

*Source:* Ahnlab's ASEC, annotated by the Panel.

**Annex 54: Reply from the Russian Federation to the Panel**

## Original

В соответствии с запросом группы экспертов сообщаем следующее.

По информации компетентных ведомств, на территории Российской Федерации аккредитованных подразделений Министерства народных вооруженных сил КНДР, отвечающих за торговлю оружием, включая «Департамент 53», не имеется.

Указанные в обращении северокорейские граждане Choe Hyon Il, Song Il Hyuk и Kim Un Song являются дипломатическими сотрудниками посольства КНДР в Москве. Сведениями о приобретении ими продукции военного и двойного назначения, а также об использовании посольства КНДР в России для закупок товаров, на которые распространяются международные санкционные ограничения, компетентные ведомства не располагают.

Информации о совершении таможенных операций по запрашиваемой продукции в центральной базе данных единой автоматизированной системы таможенных органов не выявлено. В базе данных финансового мониторинга отсутствуют сведения о контрактах «Департамента 53» по приобретению продукции оборонного или военного назначения и о соответствующих им транзакциях.

## Officially translated from Russian

As requested by the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following.

According to the information received from the competent agencies, there are no accredited units of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) responsible for the arms trade, including "Department 53", on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The North Korean citizens mentioned in the submission are diplomatic staff members of the DPRK Embassy in Moscow, Choi Hyon Il, Song Il Hyuk and Kim Un Song. The competent authorities have no information about their purchases of military and dual-use products, or about the use of the DPRK Embassy in Russia for the purchase of goods subject to international sanctions restrictions.

No information on customs operations for the requested items was found in the central database of the unified automated system of the customs authorities. The financial monitoring database does not contain information on "Department 53" contracts for the purchase of defence or military items and their corresponding transactions.

**Annex 55: Reply from Syria to the Panel****THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

820 Second Ave., 15th Floor, New York, N. Y. 10017

Tel: (212) 661-1313

Fax: (212) 983-4439

E-mail: [exesec.syria@gmail.com](mailto:exesec.syria@gmail.com)**PM/2022/249****30 June 2022**

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) and with reference to his letter number S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.99 dated 03 June 2022 has the honor to inform the Panel that there is no cooperation in the military domain between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and that the information provided to the Panel is categorically incorrect.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) the assurances of its highest consideration.



Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established  
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
New York, NY.



**Annex 56: Reply from China to the Panel****6. DPRK Representatives in China (OC. 103)**

China has always been strictly implementing the DPRK-related embargo provisions of the Security Council resolutions and strictly regulating the export of military items. China has put in place a full-fledged policy and legal system of export control with strict implementation. No evidence of any activities related to the illicit trade of weapons was found within China. The information provided by the Panel's letter is very limited, and the persons cannot be accurately verified and targeted with names only.

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**Annex 57: Algeria****1) Construction workers**

According to information received by the Panel, the DPRK company Namgang Construction General Corporation contracted with the company from a third country to provide DPRK nationals to work in Algeria on construction projects in June and July 2021. This cooperation may have been structured as a joint venture. The Panel notes that Namgang Construction General Corporation might utilise the alias “Ryongrim Construction Company” in Algeria.

**2) Reply from Algeria**

Algeria replied to the Panel’s enquiry that neither DPRK companies exist in Algeria and these companies have never been registered in official records (see figure 57).

Figure 57: Reply from Algeria



**الجمهورية الجزائرية الديمقراطية الشعبية**  
**PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA**

**Permanent Mission of Algeria  
to the United Nations  
New York**

**البعثة الدائمة للجزائر  
لدى الأمم المتحدة  
نيويورك**

MPANY / NL / N° /2022/133

The Permanent Mission of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), and with reference to its letter S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.17 dated 18 March 2022, has the honour to inform that the investigation so far conducted by the Algerian Authorities revealed that neither DPRK company named "Namgang Construction General Corporation" or acting under the alias "Ryongrim Construction Company" exist in Algeria.

The Algeria Ministry of Trade and Export Promotion indicated that these companies have never been registered on the National Centre of Trade Register. The Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security also indicated that these companies do not appear in its official records. Both companies have not contracted any agreement or joint venture in Algeria with companies activating in the area of building and construction or civil engineering.

Furthermore, the Algerian Authorities expressed their readiness to share with the Panel of experts any updates in this regard.

The Permanent Mission of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022



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**Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council  
resolution 1874(2009)  
New York**

Address: 326 East 48th Street 10017, New York Phone: +12127501960, Fax: +12127599538,  
E-mail: [Algeria@un.int](mailto:Algeria@un.int); [algerianmission326@gmail.com](mailto:algerianmission326@gmail.com)

## Annex 58: Corporate registry of DRPK entities in Cambodia (Sunrise Horizon Co., Ltd and Keochakrey Trading Co., Ltd)



opencorporates  
The Open Database Of The Corporate World

Company name or number

Companies Officers

SUNRISE HORIZON CO., LTD. > All officers

Company  
Inactive SUNRISE HORIZON CO., LTD.


Name  
[Redacted]

Address  
Unit 1302 Floor 13th, Pyoangyang, Building 33, Buksac Dong, Korea, Democratic People's Republic Of

Position  
director

### Address of Sunrise Horizon Co., Ltd (Deregistered in 2019)

Unit 1302 Floor 13th, Pyoangyang, Building 33, Buksac Dong,  
Korea, Democratic People's Republic Of

Kingdom of Cambodia / Business Registration

HOME INFORMATION ONLINE SERVICES

View Local Company Details

ក្រុមហ៊ុន ភូមិ ២៣ (00027490) ភូមិភាគកណ្តាលកម្ពុជា

KEOCHAKREY TRADING CO., LTD. (00027490) Private Limited Company

If you want to maintain this company you must obtain authority from an authorised person

Remove from My Watched Items

General Details Addresses Directors

Director 1  
Name (Khmer) [Redacted]  
Name (English) [Redacted]  
Postal Registered Office Address Unit 1302, Floor 13th Building 33, Buksac Dong, Gang Won Province, Korea, Republic Of  
Telephone (+855) (No Area Code) 093755337  
Chairman of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Board of Directors

Director 2  
Name (Khmer) [Redacted]  
Name (English) [Redacted]  
Postal Registered Office Address Unit 1302, Floor 13th Building 33, Buksac Dong, Gang Won Province, Korea, Republic Of  
Telephone (+855) (No Area Code) 093755337  
Chairman of the Board of Directors No

### Address of Keochakrey Trading Co., Ltd (Deregistered in 2022)

Unit 1302, Floor 13th Building 33, Buksac Dong, Gang Won Province,  
Korea, Republic Of

Source : Opencorporates, Business registration of Cambodia.

**Annex 59: Cote d'Ivoire**

According to information received by the Panel, **Korea Moranbong Medical Cooperation Center (Moranbong Medical)** entered into two separate contracts with medical centres in Côte d'Ivoire covering the employment of DPRK medical doctors in June and July 2019. The Côte d'Ivoire entities partnering with the DPRK were as follows:

- **The Regional Hospital Center of Divo**
- **The Indica Diedri Pharma Medical Center in Abidjan**

Both relationships, which appeared to be structured as joint ventures or cooperative entities, involved the DPRK sending doctors and medical workers to Côte d'Ivoire for several years, an expansion of the partnership over time, and profit-sharing. The Panel has yet to receive a reply from Côte d'Ivoire.



## Annex 60: Lao People's Democratic Republic

The Panel has continued its investigations into the current status of the DPRK workers in Laos. According to recent information provided by a Member State, a team of DPRK IT workers have continued to work in Laos. These workers are associated with Lao-Toshyo IT Service Company Ltd and the details of information are below.

Laos already replied to the Panel in July 2020 that the operation of Lao-Toshyo IT service Company Ltd was cancelled (see figure 60) in June 2020 and there is no Lao company hiring DPRK IT workers. Investigations continue.

DPRK IT workers reportedly located in Laos:


- Kim Chol Hun
- Kim Kum Il
- Ri Song Kuk
- Sin Chun Song
- Ko In Jae

DPRK IT workers in Laos are associated with the following company and address:

Company name: Lao-Toshyo IT Service Company Ltd

Address: House 46, unit 3, Phonsinuan Village, Sisattanak District, Vientian

**Figure 60: Corporate registry of Lao-Toshyo IT Service Company Ltd**



Source: Laos National Enterprise Database.

**Annex 61: Republic of the Congo**

According to information received by the Panel, **Korea Moranbong Medical Cooperation Center** worked with the authorities of the Republic of the Congo to extend work visas for several DPRK medical doctors working in the Republic of the Congo in March 2021. One of these doctors worked at the **Republic of Congo Military Medical University Nerve Science Department**.

The information shows that **Moranbong Medical** has established a joint venture medical clinic with the Congo entity ‘**Association of Humanitarian Development and Actions (ADAH) of Congo**<sup>113</sup>’. This joint venture clinic is the **Royal Health Polyclinic**, and its staff included multiple DPRK and Congo doctors.

**Moranbong Medical** also established a medical joint venture in 2017 with the Congo entity ‘**Foundation Ecobahou Systems Plus (Ecobahou)**’ to establish medical facilities across the Republic of Congo. As part of this joint venture, **Moranbong Medical** was to provide teams of DPRK medical specialists to work in the facilities.

The Panel has yet to receive a reply from the Republic of the Congo.

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<sup>113</sup> Association de Développement et d’Action Humanitaire (ADAH).

## Annex 62: Russian Federation

According to the Russian media ASTV on 18 August 2021, DPRK nationals are working in the construction site in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk city, Sakhalin. ASTV reported that residents of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk are unhappy with the sounds, including North Korean tunes from the construction site that wake them up early in the morning. ASTV, whose company's office is located in close proximity to the construction site, confirmed the claim of residents and interviewed the contractor "SZ "Rybovodstroï" (OOO "C3 "РЫБОВОДСТРОЙ") for a comment. The foreman of the company confirmed that a large number of workers from North Korea are actually working at the facility. They promised that they will take into the claims into account, to make the music quieter, and to ensure silence early in the morning.

The Russian company has yet to respond to the Panel's enquiry.



Фото: архив astv.ru

**Жители Южно-Сахалинска устали просыпаться под северокорейскую музыку с соседней стройки  
Претензий к композициям у них нет, но не устраивает раннее время ежедневных трансляций**

Жители Южно-Сахалинска недовольны звуками со стройки, которые будят их рано утром. К шуму техники они давно привыкли, однако последние дни на него наложились и северокорейские напевы.

Как сообщила жительница одного из домов по улице Комсомольской, претензии вызывает огромная стройка, расположенная в районе перекрёстка улиц Комсомольской и Пограничной. Здесь возводят сразу шесть многоэтажных жилых секций на участке общей площадью более 3 гектаров.

- На объекте работают северокорейские бригады. Претензий к ним нет, не пьют, не дебоширят, мы их и не видим. Однако национальная музыка вечером и рано утром - это не то, что я хотела бы слушать каждый день, - поделилась горожанка.

Информацию подтверждают и сотрудники astv.ru, офис компании находится в непосредственной близости от строящегося объекта. Уже в семь утра северо-корейские мотивы врываются в окна, органично сочетаясь со строительным грохотом.

Редакция astv.ru обратилась за комментарием к подрядчику. Судя по информации на паспорте объекта, строительство ведёт ООО "СЗ "Рыбоводстрой".

**ПАСПОРТ ОБЪЕКТА**  
**«Многоквартирный жилой дом №2 с подземной автопарковкой северо-восточнее пересечения ул. Комсомольск ул. Пограничная в 16 микрорайоне в г. Южно-Сахалинск»**

Технико-экономические показатели: Площадь участка 8725,00 м²  
 Жилой дом № 2: Площадь застройки 6472,69 м²  
 Общедомовая площадь 31774,40 м²  
 Этажность 18/13/17  
 Количество жилых секций 6  
 Общее количество квартир 370 шт.  
 Подземная автопарковка: Общедомовая площадь 3321,16 м²  
 Количество парковочных мест 93 шт.

Разрешение на строительство: № 65-64791808-47674-2019 от 24.06.2019 г.

**ЗАКАЗЧИК-ЗАСТРОЙЩИК: ООО «СЗ «РЫБОВОДСТРОЙ»**  
 Генеральный директор: Тен Э.  
 Адрес: г. Южно-Сахалинск, ул. Ленина, д. 384Б/1  
 Телефон: 8 (4242) 735-923, (4242) 73-53-79 (факс)  
 Допуск СРО Саморегулируемая организация Некоммерческое партнерство «Сахалинское саморегулируемое объединение строителей»  
 Представитель заказчика-застройщика: Пак Сен Хан (Евгений Михайлович), тел.: 8 (4242) 73-59-23

**ГЕНЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ПОДРЯДЧИК: ООО «СЗ «РЫБОВОДСТРОЙ»**  
 Генеральный директор: Тен Э.  
 Адрес: г. Южно-Сахалинск, ул. Ленина, д. 384Б/1  
 Телефон: 8 (4242) 735-923, (4242) 73-53-79 (факс)  
 Допуск СРО Саморегулируемая организация Некоммерческое партнерство «Сахалинское саморегулируемое объединение строителей»  
 Производитель работ: Ким Д.Г., тел.: +7 (996) 345-22-02

**ПРОЕКТИРОВЩИК: ООО «ДВПИ»**  
 Директор: Черников А.А.  
 Адрес: г. Хабаровск, ул. Тихоокеанская, 169/2К  
 Телефон: (4212) 43-77-60  
 Допуск СРО Ассоциация «Саморегулируемая организация Архитекторов и проектировщиков Дальнего Востока»

**ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ СТРОИТЕЛЬНЫЙ НАДЗОР: Государственная инспекция строительного надзора Сахалинской области**  
 Генеральный директор: Галета В. И.  
 Адрес: г. Южно-Сахалинск, ул. Дзержинского, д. 23, оф. 550  
 Телефон: 8 (4242) 670-760, 8 (4242) 467-180

НАЧАЛО РАБОТ: IV квартал 2019 г. ОКОПЧАНИЕ РАБОТ: II квартал 2022 г.

**Острова, на которых хочется жить**

АСТВ

Прораб подтвердил, что на объекте на самом деле работают большое количество рабочих из Северной Кореи. Замечания обещали учесть, музыку сделать тише, а рано утром обеспечить режим тишины.

Source: АСТВ, <https://astv.ru/news/society/2021-08-18-zhiteli-yuzhno-sahalinska-ustali-prosypat-sya-pod-seve-rokorejskuyu-muzyku-s-sosednej-strojki>.

## Annex 63: Reply from Russian Federation

### 1. "SZ" Rybovodstroï

В связи с запросом группы экспертов Комитета СБ 1718 по КНДР ОС.23 сообщаем следующее.

ООО «СЗ «Рыбоводстрой» является девелоперской организацией, в штате которой граждане КНДР не состояли и не состоят. Российские компетентные ведомства сведениями об использовании этой компанией северокорейских рабочих при строительстве жилого комплекса «Авангард» в Южно-Сахалинске не располагают. Ссылка в статье на северокорейскую музыку является субъективной оценкой одной из жительниц Южно-Сахалинска.

В настоящее время трудовую деятельность на территории сахалинской области граждане КНДР не осуществляют. Действительных разрешений на работу у них нет. Возвращение на родину тех, у кого срок действия разрешительных документов на пребывание в нашей стране истек, не представляется возможным в связи с приостановкой транспортного сообщения с КНДР из-за коронавирусной пандемии.

#### *Translated from Russian*

In connection with the request from the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) contained in note OC.23, we should like to inform you of the following.

SZ Rybovodstroï LLC is a real estate development organization that has not employed and does not employ any nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Russian competent agencies have no information about the use by this company of workers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the construction of the Avangard apartment complex in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The reference in the article to North Korean music is a subjective assessment by one resident\* of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

No work is currently being done in Sakhalin Province by nationals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They do not have valid work permits. Those whose permits to stay in the Russian Federation have expired are not able to return to their home country because transport links with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been suspended owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.



## 2. Pyongyang Kwangmyong Information Technology Corporation

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС.153 сообщаем следующее.

Северокорейская корпорация информационных технологий «Пхеньян Кванмён» (Pyongyang Kwangmyong Information Technology Corporation) на территории Приморского края не зарегистрирована, к административной ответственности не привлекалась, по вопросу оформления виз и приглашений на въезд в Россию иностранных граждан не обращалась. Данных о лицах, причастных к ее деятельности, не имеется.

В Приморском крае отсутствуют граждане КНДР, прибывшие на территорию России с целью осуществления трудовой деятельности в IT- сфере. Разрешений на работу указанной категории лиц не выдавалось. Данные о нелегальном трудоустройстве и получении дохода северокорейскими IT-специалистами отсутствуют.

Сведения экспертов о попытках компании «Пхеньян Кванмён» трудоустроить северокорейских специалистов в сфере IT-технологий в российские коммерческие структуры датированы 2014 годом, когда перечень санкционных ограничений в отношении КНДР не включал запрета на привлечение иностранными государствами северокорейских граждан.

Сервис «Upwork» является международной платформой по установлению деловых и рабочих отношений, представляет собой площадку для размещения заказов на разработку отдельных элементов программного кода или цельных решений на так называемом «аутсорсинге». Рекомендуем экспертам обратиться к администраторам данного Интернет-ресурса с целью получения сведений об учетных записях.

*Translated from Russian*

In connection with reference No. OC.153 from the Panel of Experts, we hereby report the following.

The North Korean information technology (IT) company “Pyongyang Kwangmyong Information Technology Corporation” is not registered in Primorskiy krai, has not been brought to administrative responsibility, and has not applied for visas or invitations for foreign citizens to enter Russia. There are no data on the persons involved in its activities.

There are no citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Primorskiy krai who arrived in Russia for the purpose of working in the IT sphere. No work permits have been issued to this category of persons. There are no data on the illegal employment or income of North Korean IT specialists.

The information from the Experts about attempts by Pyongyang Kwangmyong to employ North Korean IT specialists in Russian commercial structures dates back to 2014, when the list of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not include a ban on the recruitment of North Korean citizens by foreign countries.

The “Upwork” service is an international platform for establishing business and working relationships. It provides a platform for placing orders for the development of individual elements of software code or entire solutions through “outsourcing”. We recommend that the Experts contact the administrators of this Internet resource to obtain information about the accounts.

*Source:* The Panel.

**Annex 64: Togo**

According to a Member State, DPRK medical workers had been cooperating with Togo-based organizations between 2019 and 2020.

**4) Contract between NGO La Perez and DPRK K.A. Medical Center**

In January 2020, **DPRK K.A. Medical Center** (located in the Republic of Congo), signed a medical labour contract with Togo-based NGO **La Perez**. Pursuant to the contract, DPRK K.A. Medical Center would assist the Togolese Ministry of Health with enacting its National Health Development Plan by staffing medical facilities in Togo with DPRK medical workers. The NGO La Perez would manage visas and accommodating the DPRK medical workers. The contract was to be in effect for a period of five years.

**5) Joint venture between Alzema Society SRL and DPRK Moranbong Medical Cooperation Company**

In January 2020, **Alzema Society SRL** based in Lomé, invited the DPRK to send DPRK nationals to travel to Togo to establish and work for an agricultural joint venture in Togo. In October 2019, Alzema Society SRL, invited a group of DPRK medical workers from the **DPRK Moranbong Medical Cooperation Company** to work in Togo. This relationship was structured as a joint venture or cooperative entity, and involved profit sharing between DPRK Moranbong Medical Cooperation Company and Alzema Society SRL

**6) Sponsorship by the Churches of the Evangelical Ministry of the Works of God of Togo for inviting DPRK medical workers**

In December 2019, the Churches of the Evangelical Ministry of the Works of God of Togo sponsored invitations for several DPRK doctors to work in Togo. This project was approved by the Togolese Ministry of the Interior and the mayor of Lomé.

## Annex 65: Chainalysis Report on ‘Overall Trends in DPRK’s On-Chain Activity’

### Overall Trends in DPRK’s On-Chain Activity

Three main typologies – access, obfuscation, and cash-out – distinguish DPRK’s nefarious activity on the blockchain. “Access” describes attack vectors, which are the recurring methods used to gain access to victims’ infrastructure and/or devices. “Obfuscation” refers to actors’ behavioral patterns, where they aim to disassociate the source of funds from their eventual cash-out methods. “Cash-out” describes the methods actors use to convert cryptocurrency to fiat currency or otherwise maintain custody over their ill-gotten proceeds.

Since 2017, DPRK-affiliated actors have used these access methods to steal approximately USD 2.1 billion worth of cryptocurrency. Experts have stated that these illicit gains help fund DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction programs; identifying and preventing similar activity in the future is a vital national security imperative (S/2019/691).

#### ACCESS: Attack Vectors

The Lazarus Group has a long and successful history of deceiving victims into unwittingly providing access to their systems and sensitive data. Dating back as far as 2016, DPRK affiliates have characteristically commenced the cyber intrusion process with off-chain tactics that hinge on two elements: social engineering and malware. First, threat actors gather organizational information, identify vulnerable individuals and weaknesses in infrastructure, and analyze the behavior of their targets. The hackers then deploy advanced social engineering tactics that rely on human error by targeting the gullible, trusting, and carelessness of human nature to elicit victims’ sensitive information and gain access to corporate networks. They then exploit this access by deploying malware without tipping off any virus detection protocols and take advantage of weak or improperly maintained information technology infrastructure.

Lazarus Group affiliates have leveraged both unaffiliated individuals and false personas with intricate cover stories to conduct their work. These actors have gone to extensive lengths to create sock puppet accounts,<sup>1</sup> establish fictitious businesses, and assume fake personas in order to communicate with and gain the trust of their targets. They have refined this type of deception for nearly a decade, using carefully curated identities to conduct cyber attacks, as evidenced by the “Kim Hyon Woo” persona used to breach Sony Pictures Entertainment, the Central Bank of Bangladesh, and many other technology and financial companies.<sup>2</sup> For example, DPRK-affiliated actors have created fake-yet-legitimate-looking accounts on social media platforms such as LinkedIn and Twitter. These accounts are comprehensive, updated with new content regularly, and active at the time of attack. The account users engage in personal and curated conversations with their specifically selected targets and present themselves as legitimate entities or operators in the cryptocurrency or information security industries, suggesting that the attackers conduct extensive research prior to making initial contact.

Additionally, state-affiliated DPRK cyber actors have launched widespread email phishing campaigns that contain either links for wateringhole attacks<sup>3</sup> or malware-ridden attachments. More recently, firms have reported their phishing attacks being delivered in the form of legitimate-looking automated emails which notify the recipient that someone the victim knows has shared a document with them. This most frequently appears as a

<sup>1</sup> A “sock puppet” is a false identity created on the internet for the purpose of deception.

<sup>2</sup> Source: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/press-release/file/1091951/download>

<sup>3</sup> Per the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a wateringhole attack is “a security exploit where the attacker infects websites that are frequently visited by members of the group being attacked with a goal of infecting a computer.”

shared Google Docs link, a Sharepoint invitation, or other email attachment. When the victim clicks to open the shared document or download the email's attachment, they are prompted to enable a feature (such as "enable macros" in Microsoft Office products) which authorizes the malware to download onto the device. Often, the content appears to be relevant and important to the recipient at face value.

One specifically alarming iteration of Lazarus Group cyberattacks is a malware strain dubbed "AppleJeuS," which presents as an automated cryptocurrency trading platform.<sup>4</sup> After download, when the victim approves or acknowledges a seemingly benign pop-up that lists the user's rights according to European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) or asks victims to enable the aforementioned macros, the second stage payload is enabled, during which the malware initiates command and control communication and provides the attacker unrestricted access to sensitive information, such as login credentials and private keys necessary to access hot wallets.

DPRK's behaviors after deployment vary, but indications suggest actors maintain a silent, undetected presence on a victim's system for a period of time after first gaining access. Threat actors exploit vulnerabilities in the victim's IT infrastructure, and because the malware has granted them access, they are able to gather system information, add decryption programs, grant themselves privileged access to controlled data, or remove or bypass detection and response mechanisms. While they remain undetected, they continue to target other employees in an attempt to gain additional access through other verticals of an organization.<sup>5</sup> At a certain point, the actors begin to move funds.

This movement of funds – especially at the volume the Lazarus Group has stolen in the past – has typically quickly alerted the victims and industry writ large to a breach, which then results in the rogue actors taking a series of steps in an attempt to obfuscate the true origin of the funds prior to cashing out.

#### **OBFUSCATION: Tactics, Techniques, and Characteristics**

##### **Chain Hopping**

Throughout its history of cryptocurrency-related hacks, the Lazarus Group does not appear to have a preference for the specific cryptocurrency it targets for theft. The Lazarus Group has stolen many varieties of cryptocurrency, irrespective of tokens' volume, value, desirability, or liquidity. Bitcoin (BTC) formerly dominated the composition of stolen coins, but among the DPRK-attributed cryptocurrency exchange hacks in 2021, 58% of stolen coins were ether (ETH)-denominated and 22% was denominated in either ERC-20 tokens or altcoins.

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<sup>4</sup> Source:

[https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/Joint\\_Cybersecurity\\_Advisory\\_AppleJeuS%E2%80%93Analysis%20of%20North%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Cryptocurrency%20Malware.pdf](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/Joint_Cybersecurity_Advisory_AppleJeuS%E2%80%93Analysis%20of%20North%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Cryptocurrency%20Malware.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Source: <https://labs.f-secure.com/assets/BlogFiles/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf>






IMAGE 1: A chart that displays the distribution of the varieties of cryptocurrencies allegedly stolen by Lazarus Group-related actors between 2017 and 2021.

Using non-custodial decentralized exchange (DEX) platforms, the Lazarus Group swaps more restrictive or less common denominations of crypto for more usable types, such as ETH). This process is called “coin swapping.” A DEX is a type of non-custodial cryptocurrency exchange that relies on smart contracts<sup>6</sup> to allow users to swap assets without an intermediary facilitating the transaction. This means users do not lose custody of their funds. Decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms therefore do not require their users to provide identification or Know Your Customer (KYC) information, which makes it easier for cybercriminals to move funds through DEXs with greater anonymity. DPRK actors occasionally employ multiple rounds of coin swapping, thereby executing multiple transactions before ultimately obtaining a payout in their desired amount and denomination. On the blockchain, this appears as several contract calls, where the remitter is initiating a swap with a contract (usually through a DEX). As such, it is not uncommon for stolen funds investigations to involve multiple DEXs, bridges, smart contracts, and other fund movement vehicles that enable actors to move funds between different blockchains.

After interacting with DEXs, the Lazarus Group then engages in “chain hopping.” This practice involves the use of smart contract bridges to swap a coin on one blockchain for a coin on another blockchain. The mirroring smart contracts operate in tandem on separate blockchains. When the transaction is initiated and the conditions are met on one blockchain (i.e., the funds are deposited and fees are paid), the destination blockchain’s smart contract releases the desired funds to the address provided by the initiator on the destination blockchain, thereby completing the transaction.<sup>7</sup> While chain hopping is neither unique to the Lazarus Group nor limited to illicit actors, it can be leveraged to further obscure the original source of funds while avoiding the requirement to provide KYC information.

<sup>6</sup> Smart contracts are immutable programs stored on the blockchain that execute when specific predetermined conditions are met. The Ethereum blockchain, and other platforms such as Solana and Cardano, are designed to execute smart contracts.

<sup>7</sup> Due to the conditional nature of smart contract programming, chain hopping works in a way that IF a condition is met on one blockchain, it will THEN trigger an execution of an action on another blockchain. For example, IF 1 ETH is deposited to a smart contract, THEN the equivalent in bitcoin will be remitted on the bitcoin blockchain to the address directed by the initiator.

At this point, Lazarus Group actors have traditionally converted the majority of stolen funds to ETH via decentralized exchanges. Then, through varied mechanisms, the funds are ultimately sent to centralized (custodial) exchanges to convert the ETH to BTC.

In addition to chain hopping, DPRK-affiliated actors use several obfuscation tactics in an attempt to further dissociate the source of the stolen funds from the destination. The Lazarus Group frequently uses the following techniques to move funds and conduct such activity: deploying peel chains; conducting test deposits and structured deposits; leveraging mixers and coinjoin services; and consolidating funds prior to cash-out.

### Peel Chains

Peel chains are strings of single use wallet addresses. A peel chain is created when an entity attempts to hide the source or destination of funds by sending coins through dozens or even hundreds of wallets. This can be a manual process or executed through an automatic feature of certain cryptocurrency wallet software. Peel chains can be identified on the bitcoin network by their characteristic transaction features, which are based on bitcoin's unspent transaction output model. One input in a peel chain transaction will create two outputs (where one output is the actual spend and the other output is the change from the transaction). This pattern will typically repeat in rapid succession before funds reach their ultimate destination address. Lengthy peel chains appear often in investigations of stolen funds movement purported to be associated with DPRK, which is likely a result of the actors' choice of wallet software. The peel chains identified in alleged DPRK activity most frequently occur between the initial stolen funds destination (or the destination wallet of the converted ETH to BTC) and deposits to mixing and coinjoin services.




IMAGE 2: A graphical representation of a peel chain deployed prior to the Lazarus Group cashing out at two different centralized exchanges.

### Test Deposits

Prior to transferring funds to a new wallet, before making a deposit to a new address at an exchange, or ahead of sending funds to a mixing service, DPRK-affiliated actors make low-value transfers in order to validate receiving addresses. These deposits characteristically begin with the actor making a 0.01 or 0.10 BTC payment – known as a “test deposit” – and then, in rapid succession, conducting subsequent deposits. Due to this transaction pattern’s distinct nature, it is often possible to identify DPRK-affiliated activity based on sending exposure and deposit patterns.




IMAGE 3: A small test deposit (0.10 BTC) made from an alleged DPRK affiliate-controlled account at a centralized exchange to a mixing service, immediately followed by additional deposits that increase in value.

### Structured Deposits

To launder funds, the Lazarus Group sends stolen funds in structured payments of the same size, often in a large, round, repeating value in bitcoin.<sup>8</sup> The actors typically wait for each payment's output to be confirmed by the recipient before sending a new one, in order to minimize the potential for loss in the event that the transaction does not validate.

### Mixers & Coinjoin Services

The Lazarus Group uses mixers and coinjoin services<sup>9</sup> to obfuscate the relationship between a user's deposit and the withdrawal of "clean" stolen fund outputs. In both types of services, cryptocurrency from multiple deposits is combined, mixed, and then paid out in "clean" coins. This practice makes it very difficult to trace the outputs from the mixing service back to the source of the deposits, similar to the concept of "layering" in traditional fiat money laundering.

### Consolidation Addresses

At a few different points through on-chain movement, DPRK-affiliated actors funnel all funds into one or a few wallets. Similar to flooding, this consolidation is not an obfuscation technique, but appears to be the DPRK affiliates' intentional and manual effort to retain central custody over the stolen funds. Consolidation points have been used in nearly every DPRK-attributed cryptocurrency exchange hack since 2017. The attackers most frequently use consolidation wallets immediately before making deposits to an exchange.

<sup>8</sup> These amounts may differ very slightly due to service fees.

<sup>9</sup> Mixers and coinjoin services are two obfuscation techniques frequently used in cryptocurrency money laundering. While both aim to create a disconnect between the source and destination of a user's funds and both pool incoming funds from many users at once, their differences are worth noting. Mixing services, or "mixers" are custodial in nature and have one deposit with multiple timed withdrawals in varying amounts. Coinjoin services, or "coinjoins," are non-custodial, meaning that no user loses custody of their funds. Coinjoins require multiple deposits that are withdrawn in batches over a longer period of time, typically structure withdrawals in similar sized outputs, and often have the same number of inputs and withdrawals. Due to the similarities of their function, "mixing" and "coinjoin" are terms frequently used interchangeably in the industry.






IMAGE 4: A graphical depiction of DPRK-affiliated actors' use of a consolidation point prior to moving stolen funds to a centralized exchange.

## CASH-OUT AND HOLDING

### Holding

As previously stated, DPRK-affiliated actors have demonstrated a pattern of moving funds into consolidation wallets. In some instances, the funds remain idle at those addresses for a period of time, ranging from a few weeks to as long as six years. Yet, the Lazarus Group's tactics for holding ill-gotten funds have evolved over time. Before 2018, it was not uncommon for the Lazarus Group to allow balances to sit idly in wallets for 12 to 18 months before suddenly sweeping these amounts into other pools of funds, and depositing these sums to an off-ramp, such as a peer-to-peer (P2P) service or exchange, where they could presumably trade for fiat currency. In 2019, a large majority of the funds stolen in DPRK-linked exchange hacks were liquidated in less than 60 days. More recently, the holding patterns of funds allegedly linked to nefarious DPRK activity are less predictable, where funds may sometimes move from the initial receiving wallet to a cash-out point in just a few days. In other instances, DPRK-affiliated actors cease the movement of funds at different points in the obfuscation process and let the funds sit idly for an indeterminate period of time.

The rationale behind DPRK's holding patterns remains a mystery. A commonly accepted theory is that cyber actors wait for a perceived lull in law enforcement activity in the hope that they will be able to move funds without detection. Alternatively, it is possible that there is a change of custody, wherein individuals acting on behalf of DPRK may physically turn custody over to a different, more trusted individual – perhaps even to the

Reconnaissance General Bureau or another government entity. Lastly, it is also possible that DPRK seeks to maximize its profits by using BTC as an investment vehicle, such that holding funds is a carefully calculated bet that the value of cryptocurrency will increase.




IMAGE 5: A graphical depiction of alleged DPRK stolen funds from 11 different cryptocurrency exchange hacks being moved to four consolidation wallets. This is likely DPRK's attempt to retain centralized control prior to cashing out at centralized exchanges.

### Cash-Out

DPRK-linked stolen funds often display common cash-out characteristics. In approximately 2017, during the early days of its attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges, the Lazarus Group cashed out laundered funds at P2P exchanges. P2P exchanges differ from traditional centralized exchanges in that some P2P platforms operate in ways that allow users to act as unlicensed virtual asset service providers (VASPs) or unlicensed money service businesses (MSBs). By leveraging a P2P exchange, users traditionally are not required to register or provide KYC documentation. The use of P2P exchanges implies that the affiliated actors had trusted relationships with individuals who had access to large amounts of funds and could facilitate crypto-to-fiat transactions.

The DPRK-attributed hacking activity of the past few years reflects a tactical shift in TTPs, where funds are now consistently deposited to accounts at Eastern European or Asia-based exchanges. These exchanges have remained mostly noncompliant when presented with law enforcement requests for information requests or subpoenas. These exchanges have also been known to facilitate other illicit activity. In the last few years, DPRK-linked actors have forgone cash-out at P2P exchanges and have instead relied solely on converting cryptocurrency to fiat currency via centralized exchanges. It is believed that the trusted individuals that once operated using P2P exchanges have shifted to conducting transactions using the well-established infrastructure at those Eastern European or Asian exchanges.

*Source:* Chainalysis



## **Annex 66: US Justice Department's Disruption of DPRK's 'Maui' Ransomware Campaign**

On 19 July 2022, US Justice Department announced the seizure of nearly half a million dollars in cryptocurrency that was paid as ransom to alleged DPRK cyberthreat actors and their accomplices by two US hospitals.

In May 2021, threat actors infected the servers of the medical center in the District of Kansas. The Kansas hospital paid approximately USD 100,000 ransom in Bitcoin to regain the use of their computers and equipment. The Kansas medical centre notified the authorities, which investigated the incident and was able to identify the previously unknown 'Maui' ransomware and trace the payment to money launderers abroad.


In April 2022, the authorities observed a Bitcoin payment worth approximately USD 120,000 into one of the seized cryptocurrency accounts. These accounts were identified with the cooperation of the Kansas hospital.

Authorities confirmed that the funds were related to the payment of a medical provider in Colorado that was hit by the 'Maui' ransomware. In May 2022, the FBI seized two cryptocurrency accounts that were used by the threat actors to receive the payments from the Kansas and Colorado health care providers. The District of Kansas then began proceedings to forfeit the hackers' funds and returned the stolen money to the victims.

See <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-seizes-and-forfeits-approximately-500000-north-korean-ransomware-actors> for details.

Previously, on 7 July 2022, US authorities (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Department of Treasury) released a Joint Advisory on 'Maui' ransomware, explaining that DPRK cyberthreat actors have been using this ransomware as early as May 2021 to target various healthcare and public health sector organisations. Victims of Maui ransomware was strongly advised "*to report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA*". For technical details on 'Maui' ransomware see figure 66.

Figure 66: Joint Advisory on ‘Maui’ Ransomware



**Alert (AA22-187A)** More Alerts

**North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector**

Original release date: July 06, 2022 | Last revised: July 07, 2022

**Summary**

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide information on Maui ransomware, which has been used by North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors since at least May 2021 to target Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations.

This joint CSA provides information—including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs)—on Maui ransomware obtained from FBI incident response activities and industry analysis of a Maui sample. The FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge HPH Sector organizations as well as other critical infrastructure organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood of compromise from ransomware operations. Victims of Maui ransomware should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.

The FBI, CISA, and Treasury highly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks. Note: in September 2021, Treasury issued an updated advisory highlighting the sanctions risks associated with ransomware payments and the proactive steps companies can take to mitigate such risks. Specifically, the updated advisory encourages U.S. entities to adopt and improve cybersecurity practices and report ransomware attacks to, and fully cooperate with, law enforcement. The updated advisory states that when affected parties take these proactive steps, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) would be more likely to resolve apparent sanctions violations involving ransomware attacks with a non-public enforcement response.

For more information on state-sponsored North Korean malicious cyber activity, see CISA's North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 553 kb.

[Click here for STIX.](#)

**Technical Details**

Since May 2021, the FBI has observed and responded to multiple Maui ransomware incidents at HPH Sector organizations. North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors used Maui ransomware in these incidents to encrypt servers responsible for healthcare services—including electronic health records services, diagnostics services, imaging services, and intranet services. In some cases, these incidents disrupted the services provided by the targeted HPH Sector organizations for prolonged periods. The initial access vector(s) for these incidents is unknown.

**Maui Ransomware**

Maui ransomware ( `maui.exe` ) is an encryption binary. According to industry analysis of a sample of Maui (SHA256: 5b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e) provided in Stairwell Threat Report: Maui Ransomware—the ransomware appears to be designed for manual execution [TA0002] by a remote actor. The remote actor uses command-line interface [T1059.008] to interact with the malware and to identify files to encrypt.

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Maui uses a combination of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), RSA, and XOR encryption to encrypt [T1486] target files:

1. Maui encrypts target files with AES 128-bit encryption. Each encrypted file has a unique AES key, and each file contains a custom header with the file's original path, allowing Maui to identify previously encrypted files. The header also contains encrypted copies of the AES key.
2. Maui encrypts each AES key with RSA encryption.
  - o Maui loads the RSA public ( `maui.key` ) and private ( `maui.evd` ) keys in the same directory as itself.
3. Maui encodes the RSA public key ( `maui.key` ) using XOR encryption. The XOR key is generated from hard drive information ( `\\.\PhysicalDrive0` ).

During encryption, Maui creates a temporary file for each file it encrypts using `GetTempFileNameW()`. Maui uses the temporary to stage output from encryption. After encrypting files, Maui creates `maui.log`, which contains output from Maui execution. Actors likely exfiltrate [TA0010] `maui.log` and decrypt the file using associated decryption tools.

See Stairwell Threat Report: Maui Ransomware for additional information on Maui ransomware, including YARA rules and a key extractor.

### Indicators of Compromise

See table 1 for Maui ransomware IOCs obtained from FBI incident response activities since May 2021.

Table 1: Maui Ransomware IOCs

Indicator Type	Value
Filename	<code>maui.exe</code>
	<code>maui.log</code>
	<code>maui.key</code>
	<code>maui.evd</code>
	<code>aui.exe</code>
MD5 Hash	<code>4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a3335346</code>
	<code>9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada1</code>
	<code>fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b</code>
	<code>2d02f5499d35a8dffbc4c8bc0b7fec5c2</code>
	<code>c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a</code>
	<code>a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a3</code>
	<code>a6e1efd70a077be032f052bb75544358</code>
	<code>802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffb62fcbbeb</code>
SHA256 Hash	<code>5b7ec7fe9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd769dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e</code>
	<code>45d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78</code>
	<code>56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19</code>
	<code>830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba2321b866428aa04360376e6a390063570</code>
	<code>458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456</code>
	<code>99b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3fceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9f</code>
	<code>3b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6d288732b04b073248b56cdaf878</code>
	<code>87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562ec4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6</code>

### Attribution to North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors

The FBI assesses North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors have deployed Maui ransomware against Healthcare and Public Health Sector organizations. The North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors likely assume healthcare organizations are willing to pay ransoms because these organizations provide services that are critical to human life and health. Because of this assumption, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury assess North Korean state-sponsored actors are likely to continue targeting HPH Sector organizations.

### Mitigations

The FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge HPH Sector organizations to:

- Limit access to data by deploying public key infrastructure and digital certificates to authenticate connections with the network, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system, as well as to ensure data packages are not manipulated while in transit from man-in-the-middle attacks.

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TLP:WHITE

- Use standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts, which allow for overarching administrative system privileges and do not ensure least privilege.
- Turn off network device management interfaces such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.
- Secure personal identifiable information (PII)/patient health information (PHI) at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit by using technologies such as Transport Layer Security (TPS). Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available if data is ever compromised.
- Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when it is displayed and rendering it unreadable when it is stored—through cryptography, for example.
- Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for PII and PHI, per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures can prevent the introduction of malware on the system.
- Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer.
- Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise.
- Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI.

In addition, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.

#### Preparing for Ransomware

- **Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration.** These practices safeguard an organization's continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses.
  - **Ensure all backup data is encrypted**, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization's data infrastructure.
- **Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan** that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident.
  - Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include response and notification procedures for data breach incidents. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable state laws.
    - Refer to the National Conference of State Legislatures: Security Breach Notification Laws for information on each state's data breach laws.
    - For breaches involving electronic health information, you may need to notify the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Health and Human Services, and, in some cases, the media. Refer to the FTC's Health Breach Notification Rule and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Breach Notification Rule for more information.
  - See CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide and CISA Fact Sheet Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches.

#### Mitigating and Preventing Ransomware

- **Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.** Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
- **If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely.**
  - Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a virtual private network (VPN), virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.

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Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.

- Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389 ).
- Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access servers that are necessary and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
- Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.
- Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established.
- Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
- **Implement user training program and phishing exercises** to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
- **Require MFA for as many services as possible**—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- Use strong passwords and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information.
- **Require administrator credentials to install software.**
- **Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges** and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.
- **Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.**
- **Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi networks.** Consider installing and using a VPN.
- **Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations.**
- **Disable hyperlinks in received emails.**

### Responding to Ransomware Incidents

If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:

- Follow your organization's Ransomware Response Checklist (see Preparing for Ransomware section).
- Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.
- Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan.
- Report incidents to the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at [us-cert.cisa.gov/report](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report), or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.
- Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Note: the FBI, CISA, and Treasury strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.

### Request for Information

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, bitcoin wallet information, the decryptor file, and/or benign samples of encrypted files. As stated above, the FBI discourages paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered and may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, the FBI understands that when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and Treasury urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to the FBI at a local FBI Field

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Office, CISA at [us-cert.cisa.gov/report](https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report), or the USSS at a USSS Field Office. Doing so provides the U.S. Government with critical information needed to prevent future attacks by identifying and tracking ransomware actors and holding them accountable under U.S. law.

**TLP:WHITE**

## Resources

- For more information and resources on protecting against and responding to ransomware, refer to [StopRansomware.gov](https://stopransomware.gov), a centralized, U.S. whole-of-government webpage providing ransomware resources and alerts.
- CISA's Ransomware Readiness Assessment is a no-cost self-assessment based on a tiered set of practices to help organizations better assess how well they are equipped to defend and recover from a ransomware incident.
- A guide that helps organizations mitigate a ransomware attack and provides a Ransomware Response Checklists: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
- The U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program offers a reward of up to \$10 million for reports of foreign government malicious activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. See the RFJ website for more information and how to report information securely.

## Acknowledgements

The FBI, CISA, and Treasury would like to thank Stairwell for their contributions to this CSA.

## Contact Information

To report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [fbi.gov/contact-us/field](https://fbi.gov/contact-us/field), or the FBI's 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [report@cisa.gov](mailto:report@cisa.gov).

## Revisions

July 6, 2022: Initial Version  
July 7, 2022: Added STIX

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Source: <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-187a>.

Annex 67: FATF Guidance on Virtual Assets and VASPs<sup>115</sup>


## Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers

Updated October 2021

### IN BRIEF


The virtual asset (VA) sector is fast-moving and technologically dynamic, which means continued monitoring and engagement between the public and private sectors is necessary. In June 2020, the FATF completed its *12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on VAs and VASPs*, which identified areas requiring greater FATF guidance in order to clarify the application of the revised FATF Standards.

The updated *Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Virtual Assets and VASPs* forms part of the FATF's ongoing monitoring of the virtual assets and virtual asset service provider (VASP) sector. The FATF will be vigilant and closely monitor the VA and VASPs sector for any material changes that necessitate further revision or clarification of the FATF Standards. This includes in relation to areas covered in this Guidance such as stablecoins, peer-to-peer transactions, non-fungible tokens and decentralised finance.

The updated Guidance, originally published in 2019, reflects the input from the public consultation in March –April 2021, and explains how the FATF Recommendations should apply to VA activities and VASPs; provides relevant examples; identifies obstacles to applying mitigating measures; and offers potential solutions. In particular, it focuses on the following six key areas:

 clarification of the definitions of VA and VASP	 guidance on how the FATF Standards apply to stablecoins	 additional guidance on the risks and the tools available to countries to address the ML/TF risks for peer-to-peer transactions
 updated guidance on the licensing and registration of VASPs	 additional guidance for the public and private sectors on the implementation of the "travel rule"	 principles of information-sharing and co-operation amongst VASP Supervisors

<sup>115</sup> Full version of FATF's 'Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers' is at <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.pdf>



## IN DETAIL

**Part One** reiterates the findings of the 2020 FATF report on *Virtual Asset Red Flag Indicators* and the FATF's *Second 12-Month Review of the Revised FATF Standards on VAs and VASPs*. The Guidance clarifies that central bank digital currencies are not considered to be VAs, although the FATF Standards would apply to them similar to any other form of fiat currency. It also outlines that all varieties of VASPs, regardless of their business model, should be treated on an equal footing from a regulatory and supervisory perspective.

**Part Two** discusses the concept of so-called stablecoins with a view to the risk of “mass-adoption”, while also referencing specific design features which can impact ML/TF risks. It calls on countries, VASPs and other obliged entities to identify and to assess ML/TF risks relating to so-called stablecoins before launch and in an ongoing and forward-looking manner. It also calls on them to take appropriate measures to manage and mitigate the risks before launch. In addition, it calls on countries and VASPs to understand risks associated with peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions, which are transactions in VAs that do not involve obliged entities, and as well as the types and drivers of P2P transactions. As such, the Guidance expands on the risks and the tools available to countries to address the ML/TF risks for P2P transactions.

This section also provides a non-exhaustive list of elements in relation to VAs/VASPs that countries and VASPs need to consider when identifying, assessing, and determining how best to mitigate the risks associated with VA activities and the provision of VASP products or services.

The updated guidance includes more detailed definitions of virtual asset and VASP than in the 2019 Guidance. Countries are advised to take an expansive approach to the definitions. The definitions apply to the asset or service and not to the nomenclature or terminology being used. The Guidance provides detailed information about each of the components of the VASP definition and includes information about what is covered by each of them. This includes updated guidance on how stablecoins, non-fungible tokens (NFTs), decentralised finance (DeFi) and decentralised or distributed applications (DApp) and multisignature arrangements relate to the FATF Standards.

The Guidance includes hypothetical case studies of stablecoins and initial coin offerings (ICOs) and the application of the FATF Standards, to shed more light on obliged entities. The revised Guidance also outlines that the FATF does not seek to regulate, as VASPs, natural or legal persons that provide ancillary services or products to a VA network, to the extent that they do not provide or actively facilitate as a business any covered VA activities or operations on behalf of their customers.






**Part Three** builds on the measures that countries should consider in understanding and mitigating the risks of P2P transactions. This revised section emphasizes that countries that ban or prohibit VA activities or VASPs should assess the ML/TF risks associated with VAs and VASPs on a periodic basis. It also refines the description on licencing/registration, including the addition of considerations concerning the licensing and registration process. The Guidance further sets out how to interpret the “correspondent banking and other relationships” definition in the FATF Standards.

In the context of Recommendation 16, the Guidance further refines the text on the travel rule by including a definition of transaction fees and how the travel rule applies to certain transactions where there are automatic refunds. It also clarifies :

- the approach towards counterparty VASP due diligence and what kind of information should be collected on transactions with unhosted wallets.
- the FATF’s approach to sanctions screening and the travel rule, and batch transfers, in particular; that the FATF does not accept post facto transmission travel rule data.
- how countries and VASPs should approach the sunrise issue.

**Part Four** covers the application of the FATF Standards to VASPs and other obliged entities that engage in or provide VA activities under the FATF definition of VA/VASP. This section has been updated to include references to:

- correspondent banking and other similar relationships
- technological solutions enabling VASPs to comply with the travel rule in an effective and efficient manner
- counterparty VASP identification and due diligence
- VA transfers to/from unhosted wallets
- key red-flag indicators for VAs



**Part Five** provides country examples of the risk-based approach to VAs/VASPs and remains largely the same, with updated and new case studies.

**Part Six** is a new section of the the FATF Guidance which discusses FATF principles of information-sharing and co-operation amongst VASP supervisors. These are non-binding principles for supervisors that introduce a wide range of requirements (e.g., supervisors should acknowledge receipt of requests, respond to requests for information, and provide interim partial or negative responses in a timely manner) and facilitate co-operation between counterparts and exchange of relevant information.

## DOWNLOAD THE GUIDANCE



*Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (Updated October 2021)*

[www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/guidance-rba-virtual-assets-2021.html](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/guidance-rba-virtual-assets-2021.html)



**More information:**

[www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/virtualassets/documents/virtual-assets.html](http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/virtualassets/documents/virtual-assets.html)



Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Virtual Assets and VASPs - updated October 2021  
IN BRIEF

Source: FATF, <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/guidance-rba-virtual-assets-2021.html>



## **Annex 68: Questions of Panel's survey to Member States and their replies**

### **Annex 68.1: Enquiries to Member States**

In its effort to assess the impact of sanctions on humanitarian situations and humanitarian assistance operations within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Panel in March 2022 requested information from a number of Member States, including those maintaining diplomatic presence in the country, with the following questions:

1. Any evidence in your possession, concerning the dynamics of the humanitarian situation in DPRK since 2017, when the latest comprehensive resolutions were adopted (concerning, p.e., incomes and employment, food availability, consumer goods availability, standards of living, healthcare, social benefits etc);
2. Assessment of the impact of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK and how has that impact changed over time, especially since the end of 2017;
3. Assessment of the total cumulative negative effect of sanctions for socio-economic situation in DPRK (including the areas mentioned in para 1) after 2017 and how it has translated into long-term factors affecting humanitarian situation;
4. What causal chains of the sanction impact on the humanitarian situation in DPRK do you observe? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment;
5. What are the sectors and population groups you consider most affected by the sanctions?
6. Assessment of the negative influence of UN sanctions on international co-operation, food aid and humanitarian assistance to DPRK and the work of international and non-governmental organisations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK. If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.
7. Could you propose ways in which UN Security Council and other UN organisations might act to prevent the negative humanitarian impact of sanctions and mitigate the unintended adverse impacts of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the country's vulnerable population?

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## Annex 68.2: Replies from Member States

### Member State 1

[Member State 1] remains committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable and crisis affected people in DPRK, based on need and in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. We note that COVID 19-related border constraints imposed by the DPRK have significantly limited international humanitarian response activities inside the country over the past two years. In 2021, [Member State 1] provided \$1.5 million in humanitarian assistance funding to the World Food Programme and UNICEF to support the humanitarian response in DPRK, where feasible, and enable a timely scale-up of their operations quickly once border restrictions are eased.

In terms of sanctions, [Member State 1] implements Security Council decisions through regulations enacted under [Member State 1's Act]. Sanctions regulations relating to the DPRK were first enacted in 2006 under the [Member State 1's Regulations]. Under these regulations, [Member State 1] mitigates unintended humanitarian consequences of sanctions through legislated exceptions for humanitarian activities, and through the permit and certificate process. We note a number of [Member State 1]-based non-governmental organizations have continued to apply for exemptions, in anticipation of the DPRK's eventual resumption of importation of goods. Some of these organizations have consistently pointed to the lack of banking/financial services as a challenge to delivering in-country assistance, including as a result of overcompliance by financial institutions in response to the prohibition on the provision of financial services and transfer of assets as prescribed by multiple Security Council resolutions, such as resolutions 2094 (2013) and 1874 (2009).

[Member State 1] stands ready to support the work of the Panel and welcomes further inquiries on the implementation of Security Council sanctions related to the DPRK.

## Member State 2 (UN Official Translation)

### **Non-paper submitted by [Member State 2] on the negative humanitarian impact of Security Council sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea<sup>116</sup>**

1. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been facing humanitarian challenges for a long time; sanctions imposed by the Security Council on the DPRK have impacted the humanitarian situation and people's livelihood in that country, producing serious negative humanitarian effects. Although the DPRK policy of "sealing the border to defend against the epidemic" has some connection with the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, that policy is a measure of last resort taken by the DPRK in consideration of its own backward medical situation, in an effort to prevent the entry of the virus. This provides a classic example of how long-term sanctions have deprived it of the ability to mount an active defence against the epidemic, as well as of those sanctions' negative humanitarian effects. All parties should draw a distinction between this epidemic-prevention border closure policy and the impact of sanctions on the DPRK, and avoid simply blaming this policy for the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

2. The 2016 and 2017 Security Council resolutions on sanctions against the DPRK heavily impacted DPRK bulk-commodity exports and foreign exchange earnings, and restricted its imports of machinery and equipment and some civilian goods. As these sanctions have been in place for more than five years now, their negative impact on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK is steadily increasing:

#### *(i) Restricting the right to development of the DPRK*

First, the size of the DPRK gross domestic product (GDP) is shrinking by the day. According to external estimates, the DPRK GDP could, under normal conditions, basically maintain a positive growth rate of 1 per cent per year; it grew by 3.9 per cent to US\$34.5 billion in 2016. As a result of the sanctions, the economy instead entered a period of negative growth in 2017, with yearly growth rates of -3.5 per cent, -4.1 per cent, 0.4 per cent and -4.5 per cent through 2020. Although the DPRK has continued to increase the proportion of fiscal expenditure in the areas of infrastructure construction and people's livelihood in recent years, the actual amount of funds has decreased significantly.

Second, the scale of DPRK foreign trade has sharply declined. The normal scale of DPRK imports and exports was around US\$6.5 billion per year in 2015, but it shrank to US\$700 million in 2020. Even before the DPRK implemented its epidemic-prevention border closure policy, the value of foreign trade was only US\$3.2 billion in 2019, with the export component shrinking particularly significantly and contributing to the continuous increases in the trade deficit. Financial sanctions have left the DPRK short of funds, while the repatriation of DPRK labourers by various countries has reduced its foreign exchange earnings by more than US\$200 million and rendered foreign-exchange turnover extremely difficult. Security Council sanctions resolutions, which are supposed to be a means, not an end, are restricting the right to development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The deterioration of the overall DPRK economy is an important cause of the humanitarian problem in that country.

<sup>116</sup> One expert believes that "impact" in this translation version should be "consequences".

(ii) *Constraining the right to survival of the common people in the DPRK*

First, food shortages are worsening. Agriculture in the DPRK has long been weather-dependent, and in 2020 and 2021 it suffered from successive floods and droughts, necessitating the mobilization of emergency food reserves to provide relief. The level of mechanization is an important determinant of food production in the DPRK. Before the implementation of the sanctions concerned, the country imported about US\$200 million-worth of vehicles and spare parts from [Member State 2] every year. Following sanctions implementation, the embargo on tractors, rice transplanters, grain drills, harvesters and their spare parts led directly to a serious shortage of agricultural equipment in the DPRK. Currently, 70 per cent of the agricultural machinery in the DPRK is reportedly already unusable owing to breakdowns and the shortage of spare parts. According to estimates by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, yearly grain yields in the DPRK from 2016 to 2020 in millions of tons were 4.97, 4.84, 4.23, 5.6 and 4.66 respectively, with an average annual food deficit of more than one million tons. The daily per capita intake of 52.3 grams of protein and 38.1 grams of fat in the DPRK is less than half of the normal level.

Second, clean water is a conspicuous issue. According to tests conducted by specialized agencies, *E. coli* bacteria counts in DPRK tap water exceeded the standard by more than 10 times. In 2017, the DPRK proposed to promote a water-supply and sewage pipeline renovation project in Pyongyang at the national level, but the project has been unable to move forward owing to difficulties in importing water pipes, valves and water purification equipment. According to statistics from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 8.4 million people in the DPRK still do not have access to clean drinking water.

Third, the medical situation is difficult to ameliorate. The DPRK relies on imported medical equipment, medical consumables and medicines, and there is a serious lack of basic medical supplies like vaccines, antibiotics, nutrients and vermicides, and tuberculosis, hepatitis and malaria are still highly prevalent in the country. Owing to shrinking foreign exchange earnings and cumbersome procedures for importing medical equipment resulting from the sanctions, replacement of medical equipment in the DPRK has been slow in recent years. The Pyongyang Friendship Hospital, for example, which specialises in treating diplomatic-mission personnel stationed in the DPRK, still relies on its self-modified X-ray and chest X-ray machines, which take half an hour to warm up each time they are used to provide examinations.

(iii) *Directly impacting the quality of life of the people in the DPRK*

First, there is a shortage of daily-use items and household appliances. As a result of the sanctions, it is difficult to buy small items such as wire dish-scouring pads, soup spoons, kitchen utensils, light bulbs and mobile phones on the market in the DPRK, as well as large items such as aluminium doors and windows, water heaters, washing machines, sinks, gas stoves, lifts, refrigerators and air conditioners. Although the DPRK Government is committed to improving people's livelihoods and is vigorously promoting the construction of 10,000 housing units per year, such construction projects are also affected by sanctions restricting the import of some decoration materials.

Second, people are suffering from power outages. With a total installed power-station capacity of 8.15 million kilowatts and a generating capacity of 23.8 billion kilowatt-hours, power plants in the DPRK are mainly hydroelectric and thus subject to seasonal factors, making the supply of electricity unstable. As a result of the

embargo on solar panels, household generators and transformers, 24-hour access to electricity for ordinary households in the DPRK has become a luxury.

Third, insufficient transport capacity is a prominent problem. In recent years, under the effect of sanctions, epidemic prevention measures and other factors, shipping is taking on increasing importance for the DPRK. The total capacity of DPRK ships is only 1.01 million gross tons, with port throughput totalling 43.61 million tons. As large numbers of ships are successively sanctioned and scrapped, DPRK shipping capacity has significantly weakened, severely restricting the import of goods for the livelihood of its people.

*(iv) Threatening the safety of life and property of the people in the DPRK.*

First, production accidents occur frequently. In 2020, the production of basic industrial products such as coal and steel were reduced by more than 9 million tons and 4 million tons respectively compared to 2016, and the number of safety accidents caused by aging and overloaded machinery and equipment has increased significantly.

Second, there are many traffic accidents. Infrastructure construction in the DPRK has not been improved for many years; the rail network totals roughly 5,300 kilometres of track, but with the embargoes of materials such as rails, rail sleepers and base plates, rails cannot be effectively maintained for long periods of time and train derailments and stoppages are common. There are about 26,000 kilometres of public roads in the country, which are basically dirt or gravel roads, most of which are maintained by bedding and re-burning backfill of waste asphalt, and the roads are in extremely poor condition. As imports into the DPRK of batteries, anti-skid chains, spark plugs, automotive hardware, car lights and other spare parts are embargoed, vehicles in the DPRK also go without effective maintenance for long periods of time and junk vehicles are still on the road, resulting in traffic accidents.

*(v) International organizations' humanitarian assistance to the DPRK is a drop in the bucket.*

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and other United Nations agencies and some non-governmental organizations have been providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK for a long time. Although they have achieved some results, they have had little effect in fundamentally improving the humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

First, there is great demand for humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. The annual budget of the above-mentioned agencies for humanitarian assistance to the DPRK is about US\$140 million, but the actual financing only amounts to about US\$40 million, and a single item of assistance can only cover a maximum of some 2 million people (the total population of the DPRK is about 25 million), so the actual effect is limited.

Second, the long-arm jurisdiction and secondary sanctions exercised by the United States have intimidated financial institutions and economic and trade entities in various countries, so that banks and trade and logistics companies are basically afraid to undertake business involving the DPRK, resulting in difficulty implementing humanitarian aid to the DPRK.

Third, although humanitarian aid to the DPRK is eligible for exemptions, it is nonetheless beset with difficulties in the practical operation of customs clearance and transport procedures; anything unforeseen occurring at a particular stage in the process results in the goods and materials being held in place, which greatly affects



the efficiency of the aid. With the withdrawal of United Nations staff from the DPRK over the past two years, it has become even more difficult to carry out the relevant work.

## Member State 3

### [Member State 3]’s response to questions regarding the humanitarian situation in North Korea

1. First of all, it is important for the Panel of Experts (PoE), as a basis of this discussion, to recall that under UNSCR 2397 paragraph 23, the Security Council “condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people while people in the DPRK have great unmet needs, emphasizes the necessity of the DPRK respecting and ensuring the welfare and inherent dignity of people in the DPRK, and demands that the DPRK stop diverting its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the cost of the people in the DPRK”. In addition, paragraph 25 of the resolution stresses “the DPRK’s primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK”.

2. We also take note of the PoE’s final report released on April 1, 2022, which mentions that the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in North Korea is “due to a combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting border closure, probably the most important factor in the past two years, sanctions, natural disasters and changes in internal economic policy for greater use of administrative command methods” (paragraph 186), and that “there is no reliable methodology that disambiguates the effects of United Nations sanctions from other factors, including unilateral sanctions regimes and domestic socioeconomic problems” (paragraph 187).

3. In our view, the root cause of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in North Korea is North Korea itself diverting its scarce resources toward development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles at the cost of the welfare of its own people. It is not only practically difficult but also misleading to try to objectively discuss only UN sanctions independent of other possible elements which can affect the humanitarian situation in North Korea. In this context, it is also worth recalling the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement responding to the launch of an ICBM by North Korea on 26 March 2022, which states that “[w]e are clear that the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK is the result of the DPRK’s diversion of the DPRK’s resources into weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs rather than into the welfare of its people”.

4. We would like to request the PoE that if it receives any “empirical data” or “assessment” from countries in response to its request for information, the objectivity and reliability of such information should be thoroughly verified as the PoE considers it, and that the PoE’s analysis should be carefully conducted using neutral, reliable and appropriate methodology.

5. It should also be recalled that UNSCR 2397 paragraph 25 provides for exemption of sanctions to enable necessary humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, we understand that, as a result of the review in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the application process for exemption has been expedited, and the period of exemption has been extended for cases not related to Covid-19 as well. We would like to stress that necessary humanitarian assistance can be provided if procedures are appropriately completed. [Member State 3] takes the position that humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of North Korea should be provided in accordance with the existing procedures and we support the efforts of the Committee and other relevant countries to further expedite and simplify the procedures as necessary.

6. Finally, in its letter dated 18 March 2022, the PoE asked if a receiving Member State could “propose ways in which the UN Security Council and other UN organizations might act to mitigate any negative humanitarian impact of UN sanctions”. We consider it critically important that the PoE’s consideration, discussion and recommendations should be made based on its own objective and unbiased examination and analysis of information. If any Member State submits such a policy recommendation in response to the said letter, it should not be used as a direct basis of new recommendations by the PoE, nor should such a recommendation be quoted directly in the PoE’s deliverables.

## Member State 4

[Member State 4] appreciates the Panel's reports to the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee on the DPRK on issues concerning the unintended impact of UN sanctions measures on the civilian population of the DPRK, pursuant to paragraph 25 of resolution 2397 (2017). The resolution reaffirms that the measures imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), 2397 (2017) are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by the above-mentioned resolutions, and the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK.

As you note in your letter, the Panel's ability to report on this issue has been hindered by a lack of empirical and verifiable data on which to base its analysis. The DPRK's self-imposed border closure since January 2020, and its impact on the in-country international presence and country visits, similarly affects our ability to provide adequate and reliable empirical data.

The humanitarian situation in the DPRK has long been of concern to the international community, expressed, *inter alia*, in Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) that underlined the "importance that the DPRK respond to other security and *humanitarian concerns* of the international community" (emphasis added). The lamentable humanitarian situation predates the UN sanctions measures, and points to the responsibility not of sanctions or ineffective implementation of exemptions, but of policy choices by the government of the DPRK. It is our assessment that economic priorities made by the DPRK government, where national resources are channelled to the continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles not only subverts stability in the region and undermines international peace and security, but also aggravates an already deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation, and the vulnerability of the people of the DPRK. The self-imposed closure of the DPRK's border has reinforced already difficult circumstances for the people of the DPRK. It furthermore directly adds to operational limitations for humanitarian organisations.

The 1718 Committee has since January 2021 approved sanction exemptions for 12 humanitarian projects in addition to 32 extensions/ amendments of already approved projects. However, due to the continuous blockade a limited amount of this humanitarian assistance has entered the country and reached the recipients. We are also aware that the international society, through various channels, have offered to provide Covid-19 vaccines, but that these offers so far have been turned down by the DPRK.

[Member State 4] is committed to the expedient processing of humanitarian exemptions aimed at facilitating humanitarian assistance to those in need. We have a long-standing policy of depoliticised humanitarian assistance. Over the years, we have consistently contributed assistance to the vulnerable population of the DPRK. On this basis, we note that among the changed factors that are related to the work of international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population, is the absence of a stable banking channel to support such activities. We are not in a position to assess the reason for the lack of such a channel but note that its absence has created unwanted

uncertainties for humanitarian activities. Lack of access and monitoring has compounded the effects of the in-country cash shortage.

Last year, the 3rd Plenary Meeting of 8th Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea reportedly assessed that "the people's food situation is now getting tense" and a nation-wide mobilisation took place to prevent and mitigate widespread risks linked to typhoons and floods, which have severely hit the country in the past years. We are, however, not aware that sanctions measures would have prevented the DPRK to import food supplies to make up for their reported shortfall in grain production.

We have been informed that among humanitarian partners, at least one organization is of the impression that sanctions in general have contributed to higher logistical costs as well as operational stresses in importing humanitarian goods into DPRK. As the Panel noted in its Final Report submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of Council resolution 2569 (2021), the "unintended humanitarian consequences of United Nations sanctions affecting the civilian population continue to be difficult to disaggregate from other factors".

The lack of access for and monitoring of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international principles continue to remain main obstacles for international and non-governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for the benefit of the civilian population. In the event that the DPRK's border closure is lifted to allow for unrestricted humanitarian operations, we could foresee situations for which the absence of an exceptional payment modality or a stable, safe and transparent banking channel in compliance with the UN Sanctions, at some point might delay or otherwise impact assistance and relief activities in the DPRK.



## Member State 5

International community and [Member State 5] experts on Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) assess that the humanitarian situation in the DPRK is critical. According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), humanitarian situation in the DPRK has worsened in terms of food security, medical and public health care system, and water. In particular, the situation for vulnerable groups, such as children and the elderly, has deteriorated. In 2021, the number of malnourished children significantly went up compared to 2020, and children with pneumonia from January to June of 2021 increased by 69% over the same period of the previous year.

While limited access to information does not allow a clear-cut assessment of the current humanitarian situation in the DPRK, the outbreak of COVID-19 and its border closure measure to respond it starting from January 2020 have impeded transports of humanitarian supplies and left great negative impact on conditions of the civil population of the DPRK. As of March 18, 2022, 11 of 13 projects by humanitarian organizations of the [Member State 5] that have been granted sanctions exemption were not able to ship aid and relief supplies to the DPRK due to its strict lockdown and applied for extension of their sanctions exemption. Besides, international organizations in the DPRK, including WFP, WHO, and UNICEF, have expressed concerns that its long-term border closure have prevented aid workers from returning to the country and aid supplies from being brought in. According to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the DPRK relies heavily on humanitarian aid in terms of crucial medicines and relief items. For instance, 98% of childhood vaccines for under the age of 5 are provided by international organizations and NGOs.

[Member State 5] government is concerned about the humanitarian crisis in the DPRK and believes that humanitarian assistance is necessary to relieve this crisis. We appreciate that the 1718 Committee revised the Implementation Assistance Notice No.7 (IAN No.7) on November 30, 2020, to streamline the process of sanctions exemption. This measure has contributed to accelerate the approval process for humanitarian projects and COVID-19 relief projects. There remains a need to re-establish the banking channel, bring back staffs of international organizations and NGOs to the DPRK in order to fully carry out and monitor humanitarian support, and continue to communicate with NGOs.

## Member State 6

In response to request OC.15 of 18 March 2022 from the Panel of Experts, we report the following.

The rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2018–2019 was a direct result of the indiscriminate application of international sanctions, which exacerbated existing problems (such as economic insularity and inefficiencies, and the impact of natural disasters). In 2020–2021, the situation was compounded by the negative effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the resulting measures to suspend foreign trade. These measures were necessitated in large part by the dire state of health care as a result of the sanctions.

For objective reasons, primarily the lack of agricultural land, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is unable to feed its population on its own; it does not have a developed pharmaceutical industry; and its health-care system is in an unacceptably poor state. Nevertheless, improving the well-being of the population in 2021–2022 was declared the main focus of the work of the party and the Government. A large-scale housing programme is being implemented, and about 12,000 new apartments are commissioned annually in the capital alone. As part of measures to address the food problem, more greenhouses, livestock farms and fertilizer production facilities are being built. The urgency of the situation is clear from the variety of the first consignments to arrive in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after the borders were opened, comprising construction and finishing materials, powdered milk, sugar, vegetable oil, soap, washing powder, medicines and garment accessories for sewing school uniforms.

The humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is very much, even crucially, dependent on links with the outside world.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea needs to acquire, by purchase and/or bilateral and international aid donation, food, fertilizers, pesticides, medicine, medical equipment and much more. It also requires assistance in training and developing the skills of local doctors.

Such opportunities have, however, been completely eliminated by the sanctions and the climate of ostracism that has been created.

Imports of petroleum products are restricted, and equipment and machinery, cars, chemical products and almost all types of raw materials cannot be lawfully procured from abroad. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot even buy permitted items because it has no export revenues or currency reserves, banking channels have been blocked, almost its entire merchant fleet has been outlawed and foreign ships are prohibited from entering its ports.

The self-isolation supposedly because of COVID-19 was essentially just the culmination of the long-standing blockade forced upon the country by the sweeping and indiscriminate sanctions. In real terms, the contribution of international humanitarian organizations to addressing the problems faced by the most vulnerable people in North Korea has been extremely small in recent years. The largest donor to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always been the World Food Programme, through which \$215 million is expected to be allocated over the five-year period from 2019 to 2023, representing \$10 per person per year (covering 4.4 million people). Such stinginess on the part of donors is due in

large part to external pressure and retaliation against anyone who enters into any sort of relations, even on humanitarian grounds, with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The food situation has worsened in 2022. The market price of rice, which serves as a basis for all food prices, has now surpassed 5,700 won per kilogram. By the beginning of the "barley hump" in June (the hungriest time of the year), the price could exceed 7,000 won, dragging with it all other commodity prices.

A food rationing system is in effect only in the capital and is reserved for privileged groups. It has emerged that a number of categories of people have been dropped from the list of those covered by the centralized supply, and rations have been reduced to a minimum for all other categories. To survive, families rely on small-scale black-market trading and all sorts of side jobs, such as street vending, home-based work and cooperatives. The real income of average North Koreans has decreased by at least 1.5 times over the past two years, entailing a significant reduction in the quantity and nutritional value of the food that they can afford. Some items have been completely excluded from their diet, such as sugar and vegetable oil. As always in such circumstances, children, persons with disabilities and pregnant women have been hit the hardest.

Without sufficient fertilizers, pesticides, fuel and machinery, which can be obtained only through imports, cooperatives cannot significantly increase food production. A radical change in the current situation will not be possible without urgent deliveries of grain from abroad.

The state of health care in North Korea has never been as dire as it is now. More than 90 per cent of medicine needs used to be met through imports. Domestic production of medicines has collapsed because of the failure to obtain the necessary components and packaging from abroad. As a result, almost all products sold at pharmacies are no longer available for purchase over the counter. Many drugs, including insulin, could not be purchased for any money in 2020–2021.

Given the lack of precursors, basic blood tests cannot be performed. The majority of laboratories and X-ray units were closed down after the stocks of imported consumables were exhausted and machines failed owing to a shortage of spare parts for medical equipment. Pyongyang Medical University now has the only working magnetic resonance imaging machine in the capital. There is no such equipment at all in the provinces.

Hospitals do not have even basic items such as alcohol, absorbent cotton, disposable syringes and adhesive plaster. People who have the means prefer to be treated by private doctors, but this is very expensive. The areas of medicine that were hit the hardest in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over the past two years were those that used imported components the most in treatment, namely, oncology, cardiovascular surgery, dentistry and ophthalmology. There has been a significant increase in the mortality rate for cancer, cardiovascular disease and, in particular, diabetes, which is widespread in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The construction of a multifunctional hospital building in Pyongyang has been completed, and large medical centres have been built or are under construction in every province. Equipping them, however, has posed serious problems. The country does not have, and does not expect to obtain, the hard currency necessary to purchase expensive modern equipment.

The suspension of vaccine supplies from abroad and the depletion of existing supplies led to the spread of diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis. Another negative consequence was an extreme shortage of hygiene items. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has traditionally procured from abroad large quantities of soap, washing powder, detergents and chemicals for cleaning clothes, and raw materials for the production of haberdashery goods. Such a shortage inevitably resulted in pervasive helminthiasis and an increase in gastrointestinal disease and poisonings.

An option that could be explored is the establishment of a special replenishment fund, which would be made up of the proceeds from exports under special quotas of North Korean goods that can be traded on the international market, including coal, iron ore and seafood, with funds deposited into a special account. Funds from this account would be used under the supervision of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to purchase food, medicine and Western parts and consumables for medical equipment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

## Member State 7

[Member State 7] has maintained diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, henceforth DPRK, since [year] and operates an Embassy in Pyongyang since [year]. [Member State 7]'s commitment to peace and development on the Korean peninsula remains strong and is manifested not least through the work of our Embassies in Seoul and Pyongyang, the [Member State 7 contingent], and through our [Special Envoy of Member State 7].

Due to the strict anti-epidemic measures of the DPRK in response to the coronavirus pandemic, [Member State 7] decided to temporarily relocate its diplomatic staff at the Embassy in Pyongyang to [City in Member State 7] in [month, year]. The Embassy remains open, with local staff working in Pyongyang. Our diplomatic staff stand ready to return to Pyongyang as soon as circumstances allow.

Over the first two decades of this millennium, [Member State 7] has consistently been one of the largest donors to international humanitarian organisations in the DPRK. [Member State 7]'s humanitarian assistance is strictly needs-based and adheres to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Information obtained through the work of humanitarian partners and organisations in the DPRK has fed into the analysis below.

The Government of the DPRK has primary responsibility for the wellbeing of its people and the humanitarian situation in the country. The sanctions instituted by the UN Security Council follow from the illicit activities of the Government of the DPRK. Therefore, the root cause of any consequences of UN Sanctions is the policy of the Government of the DPRK. The Government of the DPRK is consistently obstructing transparency about in-country humanitarian needs. Given the lack of reliable data and the difficulty in disaggregating the effects of UN sanctions from DPRK policy on the humanitarian situation, the answers below are only fragments. Hopefully, these can feed into a more holistic analysis by the Panel of Experts.

1. Empirical data on the effect of sanctions are generally easier to extract from the time immediately following the imposition of the sanctions in 2017. Over the course of 2018, the price of petrol in Pyongyang rose around 250%, adjusting for exchange rates and inflation. This was an immediate effect following the cap of oil imports. The direct humanitarian effect of the spike in petrol prices, however, is harder to determine. Distribution, including of humanitarian assistance, and agriculture will have been affected. However, the indirect effect on food prices was less pronounced. The price of basic foods in Pyongyang was, in fact, relatively stable from 2017 through 2020. Given the fact that the majority of the population lives on domestic produce, their standard of living does not directly depend on the price of imports such as petrol. Rather, in relative terms, higher prices for petrol and imported goods will have affected the middle class in Pyongyang more.

UN sanctions, in combination with explicit policy of the Government of the DPRK, may have created a pretext for the re-centralisation of economic activity in fewer enterprises and increased state control. In 2018,



Air Koryo, the national air carrier, diversified and started selling petrol and consumption goods. Conversely, it seems to have been harder for smaller businesses controlled by private individuals to weather the effects of sanctions. This economic re-centralisation has later been compounded by the strict anti-epidemic measures of the Covid-19 era. Seeing as most people in the DPRK are dependent on income outside the State Distribution System, the increased centralisation of economic activity has most likely had a negative humanitarian effect. This negative effect would have been gendered, seeing as official power structures in the DPRK are male-dominated and women have played a comparatively larger role in informal trade.

On a more aggregate level, economic growth seems to have decreased from 4% in 2016 to 1,5% in 2017. Estimates about how much of this is attributable to sanctions vary. Official trade data suggest that annual, aggregate trade fell by USD 3 billion annually in the years 2018-2019. The most direct impact of sanctions on the livelihood of people in need seems to have been the operational hurdles created for humanitarian organisations.

2. One of the more direct impacts of UN sanctions seems to have been the operational constraints created for humanitarian organisations. The Panel of Experts will be aware of such constraints and [Member State 7] welcomes that the process for granting humanitarian exemptions has been streamlined and the processing time has been reduced. Furthermore, before the coronavirus pandemic, none of the larger humanitarian organisations expressed that they lacked capacity to absorb additional funds. This suggests that the UN sanctions, while unintentionally negatively impacting some humanitarian operations, have not precluded additional funds to humanitarian assistance in the DPRK.

The main obstacle to humanitarian operations due to the Governments policy, unintended effects of UN sanctions, compounded by the coronavirus pandemic and the cancellation of regular travel, seems to have been the absence of a banking channel through which humanitarian organisations could pay for operational expenses inside the DPRK. The difficulty in ascertaining that the Government of the DPRK does not divert resources from banks and financial institutions

to fund illicit activities has regularly led to the complete absence of means to make financial transfers to the DPRK. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, roughly 90% of humanitarian financing was spent outside the country. Cash had to be brought in to pay for e.g. salaries, rent and logistics. Fundamentally, the DPRK economy is cash-based and lacks a credible system of accountability. As such, the difficulty to pay for operational expenses inside the DPRK has limited the scope of technical assistance programmes to Pyongyang and its environs, even though financing for broader programmes was available.

3. Disaggregation of the causes of humanitarian outcomes in the DPRK remains extremely difficult, not least because of the general lack of reliable data from national authorities. Even so, it is clear that the DPRK's border closure has had a significantly larger effect on humanitarian outcomes than unintended effects of UN sanctions.

The broad coverage pre-Covid of childhood vaccination programmes against measles, tuberculosis, polio and other preventable diseases has been reduced significantly as a consequence of the closed borders. Furthermore, the closed borders have also been followed by reports of acute shortages of medicine, insulin, and treatment for malnourishment. Significant food price spikes, even for domestic produce, were observed in 2020. Without international observers, it remains difficult to assess the humanitarian situation in the DPRK, especially outside Pyongyang.

4. As mentioned above, the absence of a banking channel has created significant operational constraints for humanitarian organisations in the DPRK. These constraints have been compounded by the coronavirus pandemic since cash can no longer be brought into the country. To maintain readiness to respond to a worsening humanitarian situation, it is important that UN agencies and humanitarian organisations can maintain structures such as offices and local staff in Pyongyang. Therefore, it would mitigate the unintended negative humanitarian impact of UN sanctions if the UN Security Council or other interested actors were able to aid the ongoing efforts to create a safe and sanctions-compliant means to make financial transfers to local offices of humanitarian organisations in the DPRK. It would also facilitate the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, however limited, that at present makes its way to the civilian population of the DPRK.

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**Member State 8**

As you know, due to the self-imposed border closure of the country, very little reliable information is currently available on the situation in the DPRK. Due to this, we are unable to provide you with any empirical data. However, we would like to raise one major challenge, which is the transfer of cash to the country.

The challenges on cash transfers to the DPRK directly impacts both programmatic and operational aspects. For example, office running costs such as the procurement of fuel vouchers to support field monitoring by government and local staff, and for construction work, are normally paid locally with available cash. We and our international partners have to work on complex workarounds, which is timeconsuming and ultimately more expensive.

In the current circumstances of the country's border closure, there is no way to legally bring cash into the country. We and our international partners are therefore accumulating debts. Without cash we cannot pay local expenses to cover travel and subsistence allowances for local partners to undertake routine field monitoring, leaving us and international partners reliant on the goodwill of local partners to absorb the cost on an accrued basis — this leaves us open to the risk that partners may refuse to continue such arrangements, and leave us with no viable field monitoring system in place. We and our international partners cannot procure local supplies such as consumables (toner, papers, office materials etc.) for both our own office and for partners, without local cash availability. And we cannot hire local expertise to undertake specific programmatic work without the ability to pay them locally — thus constraining some aspects of our and our international partners' programs.

We deem the resolution of the issue of cash supply as a matter of priority to enable us and our international partners to pay back accrued debts and avoid the risk of the existing goodwill expiring, with a further detrimental impact on the programming capacity.

## Member State 9

### Response from [Member State 9] to the Panel of Expert's Outgoing Communication #15 (reference S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.15)

Thank you for your inquiry on the impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK has for decades been the most self-isolated and opaque country in Northeast Asia. Following the Korean War (1950-1953), the DPRK adopted a communist development model similar to its allies in the region. These allies, however, eventually reformed their economic policies; integrated with the global economy; and improved the material lives of their people. Every country in the region has benefitted to some degree from this general economic transition over the course of the past three decades. Not only has the DPRK failed to make this transition, but in recent years it has made the choice to restore the failed economic policies of its past. We assess these policy choices have impeded the DPRK's economic growth; led to a deterioration of material well-being; and exacerbated humanitarian concerns. We also assess that deteriorating humanitarian conditions are of secondary concern to the DPRK's political imperative of protecting the Kim family regime, which drives its investment into its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile program.

Following the December 2019 5<sup>th</sup> plenum of the 7<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, and before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, DPRK leadership announced the country was failing to accomplish the goals of the five-year economic development strategy (2016-2020). The DPRK responded by launching a "head-on breakthrough offensive" (HOB0) to reinvigorate production. The HOB0 was formalized and made part of a new five-year plan (2021-2025) at the subsequent 8<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in January 2021. The new five-year plan aims to crack-down on informal and decentralized economic activity and the private coping mechanisms that grew to support people's livelihoods after the famine of the 1990s. The end goal is to re-establish centralized party-state control over all significant economic activity; "indigenize" production to weaken foreign leverage; and reinvigorate the official public rationing system. This is a return to the failed orthodox-communist policies of the past. As part of this policy package, DPRK leadership also seeks to increase the isolation of the DPRK people from the outside world to prevent the outflow of information that could reveal the true state of the DPRK's internal conditions and to prevent the inflow of "corrupting" goods, information, and ideas that could weaken the leadership's political legitimacy. We assess these policies will result in continued economic stagnation, leading the DPRK to fall economically further behind its neighbors with each successive year. To compensate for these weaknesses, the DPRK will continue to rely domestically on isolation and repression of its people and internationally on its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs to sustain the personalized Kim family regime.

The COVID-19 pandemic, occurring after the DPRK had chosen this new direction, has probably helped the DPRK leadership as they implement these policies. Under their COVID-19 mitigation measures, the DPRK has significantly increased border security to record levels, contributing to a severe reduction in outward migration; reduced cross border trade with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation; and choked off remittances and communication from abroad. These measures have provided the central government the greatest control over the distribution of imported goods it has possessed for a generation. The DPRK has nurtured a fear of the coronavirus as a tool to control population movement and allowed the resident foreign non-governmental organization (NGO), aid, and diplomatic communities to wither. Today the DPRK is the most isolated it has been in three decades, the economy is perhaps as dysfunctional as it has been in three decades, and the true state of humanitarian conditions in the DPRK is perhaps the most unknown as it has

been in three decades. Despite the current state of affairs, we do not see any signs that the DPRK regime intends to change course.

Despite these formidable challenges, [Member State 9], private NGOs, and the UN continue to promote humanitarian engagement with the DPRK. [Member State 9] has streamlined the application process for [Member State 9] licenses and authorized numerous humanitarian projects sourced by our domestic NGOs along with charitable organizations in Europe and the Republic of Korea. Since the beginning of 2021, the 1718 Committee has approved sanctions exemptions for 12 projects and extensions or amendments for an additional 32. The international community has promoted the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to the DPRK population. The vast majority of these overtures, however, have been ignored or rejected by the DPRK. [Member State 9] offered COVID-19 aid in early 2020, but the DPRK never responded to the offer.

**Inquiry 1:** *Empirical data (concerning incomes and employment, availability of food and other consumer goods, standards of living, healthcare, social benefits and any other relevant data) and assessment of the impact of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK; this should include both the direct and indirect (through their effect on DPRK's socio-economic situation) impact of UN sanctions.) What are the sectors and population groups you consider most affected by UN sanctions? How has this impact changed over time, especially since the end of 2017, and what has been the cumulative effect? Please provide as many verifiable examples of this impact as possible.*

Given the DPRK's long-standing policy of denying the outside world access to information on its internal conditions, a policy that is even more effective following the decisions of the 8th Party Congress and the impact of the DPRK's anti-epidemic measures, we are unable to provide the requested data with the level of scientific rigor or confidence that would be required to make policy. There are currently only three ultimate sources of demographic/quality of life data for the DPRK:

1. Information provided by the DPRK government and published through its official media or released to the UN for publication;
2. Information systematically collected from recent defector arrivals in the Republic of Korea; and
3. Information in other media.

We assess the first kind of data to be helpful for informing policy analysis, but ultimately biased, unverifiable, and not independently collected. We assess that the second kind of data is currently unavailable since as of 2020 there are not enough recent DPRK defectors from which social scientists and policymakers can draw a scientific sample of current economic conditions. The third kind of data has been very helpful in assessing economic conditions in the DPRK, but it is too limited in scope and availability to make timely, confident assessments beyond general trends. Before the 8th Party Congress and the DPRK's anti-epidemic measures, we could rely more systematically on diplomatic reporting, UN and NGO reports, and greater media penetration, but these sources have all deteriorated since January 2020 as a result of DPRK policy.

Alternative data sources are also available, and we consider them all helpful, but each is flawed in ways that limit their consistent usefulness for policy application.

The Republic of Korea's central bank (the Bank of Korea) generates national income accounts for the DPRK (GNI/GDP), and while we find this work important, the underlying data are not public and the methodology is not transparent or reproducible. The DPRK has also released recent GDP



figures to the UN, but we are skeptical of these numbers as we do not assess that the DPRK's Central Bureau of Statistics has the ability to generate sound GDP statistics, and the numbers appear to primarily serve as externally focused propaganda in the service of DPRK foreign policy goals.

As the DPRK does not publish trade statistics, we have historically looked at mirror trade statistics from the DPRK's trading partners to learn about trade composition and volume as an indicator of the DPRK's economic activity. These statistics are also flawed in many notable ways that limit their use for policy analysis. To begin with, illicit transactions, which are of vital importance to policy analysis, are nearly completely omitted from international trade databases. Humanitarian assistance to the DPRK is also frequently excluded. Although some of the DPRK's international trade data can be derived from publicly available mirror-statistics, we work to supplement it with our reports to the UN 1718 Committee, and we look forward to continuing to help the Committee fulfill its mission. Numerous other methodological problems also plague the use of trade statistics, such as establishing actual country of origin for cargo, reporting countries confusing the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, political manipulation of the data, human error, and difficulties assigning a change in data to a causal independent variable.

Collective UN measures adopted by the Security Council are targeted at individuals, organizations, and sectors that are involved in the sourcing, financing, and implementation of the DPRK's unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs, and this is where the burden of UN sanctions probably most heavily falls. There is no evidence to credibly link DPRK natural resource exports to domestic wages or even standards of living in communities around DPRK mines. To take an extreme example, it is highly likely that some of the mines that produce anthracite coal for export from the DPRK's South Pyongan Province are in political prison camps, where prisoners will essentially be worked to death irrespective of how much coal is exported for hard currency versus being used in domestic power plants. A similar story can be told for DPRK overseas workers, who in many cases live in deplorable conditions, working exploitative hours, only to be forced to relinquish approximately 70% (or more) of their earnings to the Korean Workers' Party. The DPRK does not allow independent workers to travel overseas and earn an income for themselves. These overseas labor activities are specifically intended as a tool for acquiring foreign exchange to facilitate regime priorities.

**Inquiry 2:** *Assessment indicating any negative influence of UN sanctions on international humanitarian assistance to DPRK, or on the work of international and non-governmental organisations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK. Please provide as many verifiable examples of this impact as possible.*

To the best of our knowledge, UN and other bilateral sanctions are not having any significant impact on humanitarian projects in the DPRK. The UN 1718 Committee has worked diligently to approve and extend approval for humanitarian exemption requests. However, nearly all of these projects have been unable to fulfill their missions due to the DPRK government's isolation and COVID-19 mitigation policies. The DPRK has even repeatedly refused COVID-19 assistance, such as vaccines, and is one of two countries worldwide to not provide its population with any vaccines to protect against COVID-19.

**Inquiry 3:** *What other factors have had an influence on the humanitarian situation in DPRK, particularly since 2017, and what has been their relative importance to that situation? How have your relevant authorities disaggregated their effect from that of UN sanctions? Please provide as many verifiable examples of this disaggregation as possible.*

Given the current state of DPRK data and available statistical tools, we are unable to disaggregate the relative weights of sanctions, or any other policy, on DPRK economic performance. We have no reliable metrics of DPRK economic performance. This, again, is primarily due to the DPRK's policy of hiding its information from the outside world.

Given the quantitative and qualitative data that is available, we assess that the two most significant factors that negatively affect humanitarian conditions in the DPRK today are the DPRK's own domestic economic policies, which have resulted in some of the lowest observed living standards in the region for decades, and the DPRK's anti-epidemic measures, which have resulted in boosting isolation to record levels compared with the previous two decades. Moreover, rather than addressing the humanitarian situation, the DPRK continues to focus its resources on advancing the size and sophistication of its WMD and ballistic missile programs and orchestrating sophisticated sanctions evasion activities through a network of illicit actors.

Humanitarian assistance potentially can play a role in mitigating some of the DPRK's problems, but substantial economic reforms, implemented over the course of decades, will be required to bring DPRK living standards up to regional levels. Looking just at the supply of food, according to the World Bank, the DPRK's arable land per capita = 0.09 hectares. This puts it on par with UK, Portugal, China; and above Vietnam (0.08). The ROK's arable land per capita = .03 hectares. DPRK agricultural failure is a consequence of policy, not resource endowments. Closing the gap in agricultural production between the DPRK and its neighbors will require reforms to the DPRK's outdated and failed cooperative farming and agriculture rationing schemes.

Sanctions relief will not likely boost the livelihoods of the neediest individuals in the current DPRK policy environment. We are currently unable to even determine who the neediest people in the DPRK are. However, given what we collectively know about the dynamics of the DPRK regime, we assess the benefits of sanctions relief in the current environment are more likely to result in channeling increased hard currency revenue into regime priorities, which include the

**Inquiry 4:** *Could you propose ways in which the UN Security Council and other UN organisations might act to mitigate any negative humanitarian impact of UN sanctions?*

1. The UNSC could increase data on the 1718 Committee website as to what aid has been offered to the DPRK (i.e., project approvals) and the status of project completion (i.e., whether the aid has been delivered) to improve awareness of what humanitarian projects are ongoing and in what areas.
2. UN organizations could increase in-country presence to better assess the impact of sanctions on humanitarian conditions as well as the overall economic situation in the DPRK.
3. The UN 1718 Committee could develop a humanitarian aid “effective practices” document that lays out guidance on aid provision, monitoring, and evaluation that could help guide organizations in planning aid projects for the DPRK (and other countries).

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**Annex 69: Question of Panel's survey to NGOs**

The Panel continued its previous practice, started in 2020, and in June 2022 surveyed around 40 organizations (including both UN and non-governmental aid organizations), most of which applied for exemption requests, either directly to the 1718 Committee or through a Member State, as well as some other organizations with record of activity in DPRK, suggesting the following questions:

1. What is your assessment of the impact of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK and how has that impact changed over time?
2. How has the current COVID 19 outbreak in DPRK and restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.
3. Please provide detailed information and data on your organization's current and planned work related to DPRK COVID 19 outbreak and any reductions in operational capacity due to issues related to quarantine measures in the DPRK.
4. Please provide detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organizations COVID 19 response.
5. If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs?
6. What, if anything, could be further improved in the exemption process, or in the implementation of UN sanctions, to better meet your operational needs and objectives?
7. Could you propose ways in which humanitarian and UN sanctions actors might enhance mutual understanding of each other's objectives and methodologies?

**Annex 70: Replies from NGOs**

**The following quotes have been compiled from the responses to the Panel's survey to NGOs.**

**NGO 1**

[NGO 1] has no activities ongoing in DPRK since 2020 and therefore no new developments have occurred which might provide information for the panel.

**NGO 2**

Since our last correspondence of [Date and Document No.] we have observed almost no changes regarding the situation with our project activities in North Korea. Since January 2020 our aid supplies (including test-sets for Covid) are stuck at the border and despite all our efforts this remains unchanged. Contacts into the country remain sparse; it is nearly impossible to get any information beyond what is already known through the media. Still, they seem to confirm the worrying situation in regards to food security and the spread of Covid.

**NGO 3**

- UN sanctions are taking a serious toll on the daily lives of North Koreans. It appears to be having adverse effects that completely go against the purpose of the 'Leave No One Behind' of the UN SDGs
- [COVID-19 outbreak] is reducing the vitality and productivity of North Koreans in their daily life. It seems that they are increasing their will to overcome the difficulties on their own without external support due to antipathy to sanctions.
- Due to the prolonged border blockade for more than two years, the North Koreans are getting tired of the blockade. There are North Korean organizations that say they can cooperate if they can receive food aid informally from outside, but it seems difficult to make a formal request for external aid in North Korea
- A collaborator who was carrying out humanitarian aid to North Korea became unable to visit North Korea due to the corona virus. As he took a break from his activities, it was difficult to collect any more internal news about North Korea that he had been collecting through him.
- Humanitarian aid to North Korea has shrunk by reducing the number of personnel in charge of humanitarian aid at our institution.
- UN sanctions aroused a negative public perception of not only the response to COVID-19, but also humanitarian aid activities in general.



- We don't have any opposition to approval process. However, sanctions themselves cause negative impact on humanitarian aid. We also request that the approval letter should strengthen the effect of exemption, which guarantees the practical support to DPRK after the approval.
- When applying for sanctions exemption for humanitarian aid to DPRK, materials that are not subject to sanctions (food, medicine, etc.) are considered a bundle of project implementation, and for all aid items, specific specifications must be researched and documents must be prepared to apply for exemption. As a result, manpower and administrative requirements increase, and difficulties arise such as a decrease in efficiency in preparing and executing our organization's operations and humanitarian projects. The suggestion is that materials classified as not subject to sanctions by the HS code are excluded from the application for exemption or the document is simplified by submitting the product name and HS code.
- After the approval of sanctions exemption, it is necessary to remit money for the purchase and transportation of goods, but due to the financial sanctions of the United States, banks are also refusing or avoiding remittance of humanitarian aid to North Korea.
- For humanitarian aid materials that have been approved for exemption by the United Nations, it must be recognized that they have been approved inclusive of the sanctions regulations of individual countries. The effect of sanctions exemption approval should be strengthened so that the humanitarian situation of North Koreans can be improved
- We propose that the United Nations meet and discuss with stakeholders and humanitarian organizations on the moratorium of UN sanctions in order to improve the humanitarian situation to North Korea
- It is proposed to apply the 'Oil-Food Program' adopted by the United Nations for humanitarian aid to Iraq in the past to humanitarian aid to North Korea.
- Please review and implement a program to export North Korea's coal by introducing the tentative name 'Coal-Food Program', and to provide food and medicine with the export proceeds

## NGO 4

- It is true that UN sanctions against the DPR Korea have impacted the regime in many aspects. They have impacted the production of daily necessities and also food shortage among North Koreans, the latter of which has been exacerbated by economic crisis to reach a stage of a food crisis. The crop productivity of North Korea stands at only 50-60% of that of its southern counterpart, which is attributable to the poor supply of an agricultural materials. It is a well-known fact that in 2018 when North Korean sanctions became tighter, food production in the DPR Korea dropped to the 9-year lowest of 4.95 million ton. For North Korea, in particular where damages from natural disasters including flood are serious, providing related materials and goods is quintessential to help with active response. However, most aid materials are subject to North Korean sanction regulations, and thus have to obtain exemption approval. We are going to mention this again later – even though the period required for exemption approval got shortened, several attempts had to miss an opportune timing due to working-level arrangements that needed to be made. In addition, NGOs must follow approval procedures of their own countries for shipping out materials for North Korea, which translates into more time and cost. In sum, the bigger the burden on North Korean aid organizations get, the more serious the humanitarian situation of North Korea will be.
- The COVID-19 outbreak has made it extremely challenging to provide medicine and medical supplies as well as humanitarian aid. Finding ways itself to enter the North Korea has become difficult, and even if the aid was approved, the materials had to stay at [border] customs office for a long time. Also, selecting materials including medicine and medical supplies is demanding, definitely contributing to the existing difficulties in humanitarian situation.
- [Project in DPRK] has still not resumed since it stopped in [month, year]. Back then, the percentage of completion stood at [percentage], with the exterior of the [project] being built to some visible extent. To restart the project, however, [diagnosis] needs to be conducted by [entities] considering that more than [number of years] have passed. To this end, [NGO 4] delivered a message in [month, year] that it would send [entities] across the North Korean border, to which the North Korea answered on [date, year] that it would invite a [entity] when the COVID situation gets better.
- So far, the [entities] visit mentioned by the North has not been realized yet because the COVID situation has not gotten any better. Furthermore, the [NGO 4] obtained sanction exemption on [date, year] to resume the [project], only to find itself stuck in failure to bring in [materials]. [Months] have already passed since the obtainment of sanction exemption. [NGO 4] had several rounds of consultation with related personnel from North Korea to resume [project]. But the COVID situation has since prevented the plan from staying on track.
- We are grateful for the exemption approval for the [materials] for [project], and fully agree that the time has significantly shortened from the submission of exemption applications to approvals. However, we had to provide information on approximately [number of goods and materials] for the application. We had to collect detailed information including HS CODE of each item not to mention the standards and size, which took us [number of months] in total.

In other words, the time required by the approval process definitely became shorter, but extra time spent arranging things at a working level still does and will remain the same as long as there exists sanctions against the North Korea, which is likely to increase the cost burden of aid organizations.

- The current methods of exemption seems to be in need of change. For example, sanction exemption lists have to be made for each and every item, but a little bit of flexibility would seem to streamline the process. We propose that a whitelist be kept to allow the items on it to be semi-automatically approved to be sent to the North without separate exemption applications having to be submitted. And each State is able to be responsible for whitelist- designated items aid, so new procedures would be needed capable of sending humanitarian-sensitive items more quickly and more smoothly.
- To have better understanding about the objective and methodologies among different actors, more opportunities are needed among related stakeholders to meet on a regular basis. All organizations and groups just receive one-way information regarding UN resolutions. Therefore, continued communication is required to help aid organizations better understand newly amended guidelines or newly adopted resolutions.

## NGO 5

[NGO 5] would like to stress the importance of transparency and access in enabling civil society organizations (CSOs) such as [NGO 5], to evaluate the impact of UN sanctions on the Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s humanitarian situation. Considering the reported COVID-19 outbreak in the DPRK and subsequent restrictions enforced by the DPRK government, it has become difficult to accurately determine the impact of UN sanctions in relation to the Panel's questions.

The aim of this correspondence is to request the UN Panel of Experts' support in allowing officials such as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights with unimpeded, in-person access inside the DPRK. Their presence, as well as the Panel's endorsement of their efforts, is the only way to provide some semblance of transparency amidst stringent restrictions imposed by the DPRK since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

We noted in our previous correspondence that a repeat of the great famine of the 1990s was unlikely for three reasons: (1) the development of informal markets (*jangmadang*) in North Korea; (2) the work of CSOs in obtaining information from North Korea; and (3) agricultural reforms under Kim Jong-un that slightly improved food security. All three elements have been weakened during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Under the pretense of enforcing a "zero-COVID" policy, the DPRK government has chosen to crack down on markets, cross-border trade, and information flows into and out of the country. It has imposed punishments against North Korean nationals involved in market activities or exchanging information with the outside world. In December 2020, the DPRK passed a new "Anti-Reactionary Thought Law," which "forbids the use, storage, and distribution of foreign cultural content...that is not state-approved." There has been a further tightening of border security during the pandemic. This has drastically reduced the number of North Korean escapees entering the Republic of Korea, with only [figures] arrivals in 2021 relative to a peak of [figures] in 2009.

Such policy decisions by the DPRK, as well as the departure of most foreign diplomats and international aid workers from North Korea since the onset of the pandemic, have made it extremely difficult to ascertain the impact of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the country. In its December 2021 report, the World Food Programme (WFP) noted that its country director for the DPRK had left the country in March 2021. Since then, "there has been no UN international staff present" in the DPRK.

Some analysts, beginning from the assumption that "sanctions and funding gaps were the chief reason for UNICEF and WFP's inability to reach their targeted population," estimated in August 2019 that sanctions may have contributed to "between 1,122 and 2,772 preventable deaths." However, such estimates are based on assumptions and statistics that cannot be independently verified, due to the DPRK leadership denying access to reliable statistical data and target areas, presumably to conceal the extent of the crisis and systemic redirection of aid and resources to the elite.

Past UN reports have attributed North Korea's chronic food shortages to "shortages of arable land, lack of access to modern agricultural equipment and fertilizers, and recurrent natural disasters." These are ancillary factors at best. The main factors contributing to the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK are as follows:

- The DPRK relies heavily on domestic sources of food supply despite chronically unfavorable agricultural conditions. It has persistently refused to adopt an export-oriented growth strategy, which is necessary to "earn the foreign exchange needed to import bulk grains on a commercially sustainable basis and reduce the country's reliance on aid." Contrary to claims that the DPRK leadership had, on multiple occasions, attempted to liberalize its economy only to be discouraged by international sanctions, it has consistently advocated "self-reliance" (*Juche*) as its guiding state ideology. The DPRK was one of the first countries in the world to seal its borders in response to the outbreak of COVID-19.
- The DPRK leadership exploits foreign aid to curtail currency outflows from commercial imports. Since the 1990s, a pattern has emerged wherein the North Korean regime's commercial food imports decrease whenever foreign aid increases. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that the leadership uses aid as a balance-of-payments support to conserve resources for other policy priorities, including its weapons programs. In other words, rather than complementing aid with commercial food imports to alleviate food shortages, the DPRK has deliberately chosen to prioritize the regime's security at the expense of the population's health and well-being.
- The DPRK's continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, as well as a lack of transparency in the monitoring and assessment of aid provision, have affected donors' willingness to provide aid. Decreases in foreign aid have historically coincided with periods when the DPRK leadership conducted nuclear tests or ballistic missile launches, which, along with purchases of luxury goods, account for a significant portion of state expenditures.

As noted in our previous communication to the Panel, if there is a causal relationship between sanctions and the precarious food situation, it remains to be verified and should be rigorously investigated through on-the-ground factfinding by the UN and humanitarian organizations, in cooperation with the DPRK.

In our previous correspondence dated [date, year], we warned about the humanitarian risk stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, including a deficient healthcare infrastructure, food insecurity, and an economic crisis. The DPRK officially admitted to an outbreak for the first time on May 12, 2022 and announced the first death from COVID-19 a day later. It had denied the existence of any cases for the preceding two years. Apparently due to the lack of COVID-19 testing capacity, new cases have been referred to by state media as "individuals with a fever."



Authorities have since claimed that the outbreak has been brought under control. Official statistics indicate a cumulative total of 4.7 million cases in a country of 25 million, but only 74 deaths have been reported as of July 7. Experts have questioned the accuracy of these statistics, as they would imply an exceedingly low fatality rate when compared to that of countries with robust public health institutions and a high vaccination rate. It is not possible to determine whether the spread of the disease has truly been contained.

Given widespread malnutrition from food insecurity and the lack of a nationwide vaccination campaign, the consequences of COVID-19 in the DPRK are almost certainly more severe than disclosed by the authorities.

The public health infrastructure in the DPRK is fragile, especially outside of Pyongyang and other major cities. Even if the number of cases has indeed fallen, the DPRK is still vulnerable to a resurgence of the disease. Public health experts have noted that the country's healthcare system is not equipped to deal with a COVID-19 outbreak. During the supposed height of the outbreak in May, state TV ran infomercials about "home remedies such as honey tea" and advised people to "see doctors if they have breathing problems, spit up blood or faint." [name], a North Korean escapee who now lives in the Republic of Korea, noted that "the government is asking people to contact doctors only if they have breathing difficulties, which means just before they die."

Regrettably, the inability to conduct independent assessments of the public health situation creates obstacles for countries, institutions, and aid organizations seeking to provide humanitarian assistance in an effective fashion. Both the United States and the Republic of Korea have offered to provide medical aid, but the DPRK has so far refused to accept foreign assistance. Pyongyang has also rejected offers of vaccines from the WHO-led COVAX initiative.

Adding to the impact on the healthcare system in the DPRK, COVID-19 threatens to worsen food insecurity. Lockdowns further constrained the population's ability to obtain food, and there have been scattered reports of deaths from starvation. In his final report to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2022, Tomás Ojea Quintana, the outgoing UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, noted that "prolonged border closures and restrictions on movement in-country have decimated the market activity that has become essential for the general population to access basic necessities." There were reports in late June that restrictions on in-country movement had been relaxed for the time being.

Furthermore, rainfall in April and May was only 70% of what the country typically receives, with worrying consequences for the country's food supply, which is heavily reliant on its summer crops. Natural disasters have long posed seasonal threats to the DPRK, and a major natural disaster could have profound economic and humanitarian consequences. In mid-June, there were also official reports of an unspecified enteric disease in South Hwanghae Province, a key agricultural area. While the details of this outbreak are unknown, it is likely to exacerbate the country's food situation. The country's agricultural industry is heavily reliant on human labor, and reports suggest that the COVID-19 outbreak created difficulties with mobilizing enough people to plant crops in May.

In this vein, Resolution 49/22 adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022 called on the DPRK in paragraph 30 to “allow international staff to operate in the country so that the international community can provide assistance based on independent needs assessments, including of vulnerable populations in detention centres, and a monitoring capacity, consistent with international standards and humanitarian principles and in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.” As noted at the beginning of this letter, independent assessments of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK could begin with in-country visits by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK or representatives of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Such officials could also include, for example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health.

## NGO 6

Over time sanctions have made the cost of providing humanitarian aid to the DPRK higher and higher. NGOs are forced to spend increasingly greater amounts of time and energy navigating the sanctions regime in order to keep programmes running. Aid budgets are eaten up by administrative processes in order to stay sanctions compliant, leaving fewer resources available to be spent on humanitarian needs.

Banking channels are becoming fewer and more difficult to navigate, and NGOs work under a constant fear that their bank accounts could be frozen or closed. For this reason [NGO 6] do not use [NGO 6's] local bank account for any DPRK work.

[NGO 6] don't have any direct information about the current humanitarian situation in the DPRK. All [NGO 6's] projects were paused indefinitely when the COVID-19 induced border closure started. [NGO 6's] local partners have said that it is too difficult to send anything by ship or train currently (and throughout the pandemic) so we have decided to wait until the border reopens before restarting our work.

The humanitarian exemption approval process is too cumbersome and places too great a burden on NGOs, so [NGO 6] designed [NGO 6's] projects to avoid the need to work through the UN system.

Anything to simplify the exemption process would be welcomed.

It would be helpful if the UN sanctions committee could publish a lay language guide in English and Korean setting out which activities require an exemption and which do not, and what organisations need to do to obtain a sanctions exemption. The Korean language version should not be written in the "South Korean" language, but efforts should be made to use "North Korean" language. There is a language barrier in dealing with the UN system for many people in the Korean diaspora conducting humanitarian work in the DPRK who do not have a strong command of English.

Exemptions should be expanded to allow for livelihood activities and legitimate business activities. In the DPRK, many people on the bottom rungs of society have lost their jobs in the garment industry and other manufacturing industries due to sanctions. These people should be allowed the opportunity to earn a livelihood. At a garment factory owned and run by people with disabilities, [NGO 6] personally witnessed the worsening economic circumstances (including food insecurity) which resulted from the sanctioning of the garment industry in 2017.

Better communication between UN sanctions actors and humanitarian NGOs could enhance mutual understanding. To be brutally honest, all foreign actors operating in the DPRK whether they are diplomats, humanitarian agencies, or private NGOs, break sanctions on a small scale all the time. It would be impossible not to. The sanctions regime has created a climate of fear making people reluctant to talk about what they do.

## NGO 7

1. The humanitarian situation in the DPRK is characterized by chronic food insecurity and a lack of access to essential lifesaving services, including quality healthcare, with profound effects on the most vulnerable people. In addition, the country remains highly susceptible to natural disasters, including cyclones, floods, and drought, further exacerbating humanitarian needs amongst the most vulnerable.

The 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for DPRK estimates that 10.6 million people (over 4 out of 10 persons) are in need of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian operations in the DPRK are a critical lifeline for millions of people suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition and lacking access to quality and essential health services, clean water, and sanitation facilities.

The major causes of scaled-back humanitarian assistance by [NGO 7] to the DPRK population remain the lack of funding, limited access to cash, the physical absence of international staff in the country and the challenges on importation of certain critical commodities or equipment, all of which have been exacerbated by the Covid-19 related restrictions imposed by the Government.

### 1.1 Funding shortfall and lack of cash in country

In 2020, UN agencies in the DPRK mobilized only a third of the total humanitarian requirements. On average, [NGO 7] requires [figure] each year for its humanitarian interventions but could only secure less than 50% of funding needs, resulting in a sharp drop in support towards ending maternal mortality and morbidity in the country.

Since 2006, the DPRK has been subjected to the UN Security Council sanctions (S/RES/1718), which has become more stringent over the years to cut-off funding for Pyongyang's ballistic missile and nuclear tests. The Sanctions Committee has provided an exemption of the DPRK bank for the UN-related transactions, but the channel has mainly remained ad hoc.

With a dysfunctional international banking channel and no alternative avenues approved for cash transfers and related transactions, UN ongoing programmes delivery is impacted negatively, making it highly challenging for timely humanitarian responses. Concurrently, UN agencies face a unique financial situation due to the dearth of cash in the country to implement local programme activities and sustain operations. This impasse results in prioritizing select activities rather than the full-fledged implementation of programmes.

## 1-2. Procurement of equipment

UN Sanctions Committee guidelines articulate that single - and dual/multiple-use items containing metal components must be referred to the 1718 Sanctions Committee for exemption approvals. [NGO 7] has been diligently following the directives of the Sanctions Committee. However, a significant proportion of... procurement of health equipment and commodities have metal components, e.g., copper for intrauterine devices (IUDs). Over the years, the process of securing exemption approvals for these items has often resulted in delays or cancellation of related procurements.

Procurement compliance has changed after the 2017 directives, focusing on single and dual/multiple-use items, which hindered financial support for dual or multiple-use equipment/instruments. Prior to implementing sanctions on the DPRK, [NGO 7] supported strengthening health facilities through procurement of equipment for health facilities, especially patient wards, operating theatres, and maternity rooms. However, given long years of use and due to the restrictions on single-use, this equipment is now in poor conditions, and [NGO 7] has not been able to replenish the items, contributing to an adverse health outcome for the health of women in the DPRK.

Furthermore, UN humanitarian programming requires a strong humanitarian needs overview substantiated by evidence and data generation, which, in turn, rely on modern IT-related equipment. For instance, in 2019, [NGO 7] could not support the DPRK census exercise due to the challenges of getting exemption approvals for the required IT equipment from the 1718 Sanction Committee and the U.S. Department for U.S. patented items, e.g., IT equipment. Similarly, the time required for processing the exemption approvals was out-of-sync with the timeline defined by the DPRK government. This delay resulted in the government conducting the census solely without meeting international standards accordingly.

Although an expedited consideration of specific humanitarian requests has been in effect since November 2020, [NGO 7] has had limited experience in seeking exemptions due to the border closure imposed by the DPRK authorities as part of the COVID-19 pandemic response measures, resulting in subsequent paralysis of imports - however with one exception in August 2021 for already-procured life-saving commodities.

2. The significant scale-back of humanitarian support in agriculture, nutrition, water and sanitation, health, and the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with the strict preventive measures and in-country mobility restrictions put in place by the Government, is having reverberating effects on the scarce humanitarian interventions.

For the health sector, [entities including NGO 7] are dealing with substantial demurrage charges due to the extended quarantine period to import critical life-saving commodities and equipment stuck in [one of the bordering Member States] for over a year. As a result, the country experienced a stock-out of all essential life-saving medical supplies, including sexual and reproductive health (SRH) medicines, child immunization vaccines, and other health-related commodities. This situation adversely impacts the UN's capacity to address the humanitarian needs in the DPRK while the country continues



to claim zero cases of COVID-19 since the pandemic outbreak and has rejected two offers from COVAX for the supply of vaccines.

This situation means that those in need of assistance have not received the necessary support from the UN. To the extent possible, the continuation of the delivery of life-saving assistance, including the provision of medical goods and supplies, has relied mainly on prepositioned stocks in-country. In the case of [NGO 7], the prepositioned stock of oxytocin, which is critical in averting maternal morbidity and mortality, lasted until mid-July 2021.

In July/August 2021, the DPRK government allowed some UN shipments for life-saving commodities to enter the country.

For the rest of the orders with running shelf life, [NGO 7] had to cancel some orders where possible (contraceptives, pharmaceuticals, and emergency kits) and diverted a majority of the orders to other countries that could make good use of the products (pharmaceuticals, medical devices, vehicles, and so on). In addition, [NGO 7] had to utilize funds to cover some of the costs of the diverted products.

3. As mentioned above, COVID-19 related restrictions in the DPRK, especially the closure of the international borders since January 2020 and the progressive departure of UN international staff members until March 2021, have hampered humanitarian operations on the ground. [NGO 7] international staff are still unable to return to the DPRK, and humanitarian supplies could not enter the country for over a year until the government's communication in August 2021, when a one-off approval was granted. Furthermore, there is still no clarity on whether the resumption of regular trans-shipments would continue, and [NGO 7] is awaiting a response from the government to this query.

Despite repeated requests by [NGO 7] to the MoFA counterparts, there has been no indication DPRK authorities will grant additional exemptions to import life-saving commodities. [NGO 7] has, therefore, decided to suspend any further procurement of supplies to the DPRK until the DPRK government provides a formal authorization.

As a result of the COVID-19 related restrictions, all international [NGO 7] staff members have worked remotely outside of the DPRK. The physical absence of international staff members in the country and other restrictions of internal mobility have posed challenges to programme implementation and field-based monitoring. On the programmatic front, significant activities related to the evaluation of the SRH strategy and development of the new SRH strategy, upscaling of the undergraduate midwifery education, and evaluation of the undergraduate course in demography that needed international facilitation was deferred. In addition, [NGO 7] postponed capacity-building activities related to family planning, urban SRH strategy development, and strengthening of the health logistics systems.

[NGO 7] had to prioritize activities and factor in the depleting in-country cash. As a result, local activities were kept to a minimum in 2020, and innovative ways were explored to pursue the mandate in 2021.

[NGO 7] had proposed conducting an extensive social, economic, and demographic health survey (SDHS) in 2021. Resource mobilization efforts were underway when the COVID-19 restrictions were imposed. However, the efforts are now stalled due to the uncertainties of a return to normal operations in the country.

In-country mobility restrictions are still in place and have limited the UN national secondees from undertaking field monitoring visits. Consequently, the data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics on administrative statistics related to the utilization of services and quality of services rendered during the clients' interaction with the health providers are hard to verify and validate. This also applies to the distribution of the pre-positioned life-saving supplies where validation and reconciliation have not been possible.

On the other hand, despite these restrictions, programmatically, the [NGO 7] has managed to roll out SRH and population and development-related capacity-building initiatives to ensure maximum impact and cost-effectiveness. For example, online capacity-building workshops were initiated throughout the year in priority regions of the programme, including developing and updating essential Sexual and Reproductive Health and Population Dynamics manuals/guidelines. Similarly, remote monitoring of capacity-building initiatives has been undertaken through video recording, pre and post-test assessments, documentation, and feedback from the participants (an innovation in the DPRK).

Exceptional clearance for the participation of national secondees has been provided by the DPRK government. The clearance - to an extent - helped in fulfilling the basic requirements of monitoring during the training sessions. However, the DPRK government has expressed appreciation for the continuous supply of pre-positioned lifesaving SRH medicines and the introduction of online-based training.

[NGO 7] appreciates the 1718 Sanctions Committee for reducing the turnaround time for exemption approvals and increasing the validity period of those exemptions. Flexibility in considering cases on a one-to-one basis is also highly appreciated.

To facilitate and strengthen the presence of UN agencies on the ground, it is nevertheless imperative to establish a viable banking channel for funds to be transferred to the DPRK to enable the UN agencies to implement their respective programmes and respond to emerging humanitarian needs.

Since early 2021, all UN agencies operating in Pyongyang have had to stop paying the salaries of their national staff, fuel, and all office expenses, due to the shortage of cash in the country. They are accruing debts of several hundred thousand dollars to the government.

In addition to the dysfunctional banking channel, UN agencies have to approach the 1718 Sanctions Committee for items containing metal components, given the clause related to single/multiple-use. Until the exemptions are received, the procurement process cannot be initiated despite the fast-tracking process adopted by the Committee. Therefore, consideration for a waiver or a blanket approval of approved standardized SRH, Inter-Agency Reproductive Health Kits (emergency kits), and other medical kits that the inter-agency task force has cleared at UN HQs would ensure better cost-efficiency and more flexibility for UN agencies to respond to humanitarian needs.

Given the nature of the interactions between humanitarian and development nexus, consideration of development activities that have a bearing on humanitarian programming could enable pursuing programmes more holistically. For example, there is a need to strengthen the statistical capacities of the statistical institutions. Furthermore, with the advancement in Information Technology (IT), there is a need to upgrade the hardware and software for these institutions to collect, compile, process, and disseminate data for humanitarian and development programming. Therefore, strategic exemption with a broader consideration for humanitarian and development nexus would facilitate the efforts of the UN agencies in fast-tracking programmatic initiatives for achieving the 2030 agenda in the unique context.

The broader context of the humanitarian-development nexus and its implications on programming needs further exploration from the perspective of the 2030 Agenda so that bilateral partners and the donor community are not restricted exclusively to supporting humanitarian initiatives.

## Annex 71: COVID-19 related imports of DPRK 2020-2021

\* yellow highlighted are items that are restricted from being imported to the DPRK

\* Data based on partner reported data /  
ITC Trade Map

Unit : USD thousand

Code	Product label	COVID-19 related	Imported value in 2020	Imported value in 2021
220710	Undenatured ethyl alcohol, of actual alcoholic strength of 80%	Alcohol solution	740	0
220890	Ethyl alcohol of an alcoholic strength of 80%	Alcohol solution	81	21
2847	Hydrogen peroxide, whether or not solidified with urea	Hydrogen peroxide in bulk	5	0
290512	Propan-1-ol, propan-2-ol	Propyl alcohol, isopropyl alcohol	2	0
291821	Salicylic acid and its salts	Salicylic acid and its salts	1	21
300490	Medicaments consisting of mixed or unmixed products for therapeutic or prophylactic purposes, put up in measured doses	Hydrogen peroxide presented as a medicant	15088	9193
300510	Adhesive dressings and other articles having an adhesive layer, impregnated or covered with pharmaceutical substances or put up for retail sale for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary purposes	Surgical tape and transparent adhesive plaster	47	64
300590	Wadding, gauze, bandages and the like, e.g. dressings, adhesive plasters, poultices, impregnated or covered with pharmaceutical substances or put up for retail sale for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary purposes	Wadding, gauze, bandages etc	35	12
340111	Soap and organic surface-active products and preparations, in the form of bars, cakes, moulded pieces or shapes, and paper, wadding, felt and nonwovens, impregnated, coated or covered with soap or detergent, for toilet use, incl. medicated products	Soap, bar form	473	51
340120	Soap in the form of flakes, granules, powder, paste or in aqueous solution	Soap, liquid or powder form	1300	4435
340130	Organic surface-active products and preparations for washing the skin, in the form of liquid or cream and put up for retail sale, whether or not containing soap	Liquid or cream hand or skin washes	37	2
380894	Disinfectants, put up in forms or packings for retail sale or as preparations or articles	Hand sanitizer and other disinfectant preparations	42	18
3822	Diagnostic or laboratory reagents on a backing and prepared diagnostic or laboratory reagents whether or not on a backing, other than those of heading 3002 or 3006 certified reference materials	Test kits	660	353
3821	Prepared culture media for the development or maintenance of micro-organisms "incl. viruses and the like" or of plant, human or animal cells	Swab and Viral transport medium set	7	0
392329	Sacks and bags, incl. cones, of plastics (excluding those of polymers of ethylene)	Plastic hazardous waste disposal bags	231	0
392620	Articles Of Apparel And Clothing Accessories (including Gloves, Mittens, And Mitts), others, of plastics	Plastic gloves	280	3
392690	Articles of plastics and articles of other materials of heading 3901 to 3914	Plastic face shields, urine bags, body bags, tents	1844	177
401519	Gloves other than surgical, of rubber	Other rubber gloves	57	88
401590	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, for all purposes, of vulcanised rubber	Protective unisex garments	55	0
481890	Toilet paper and similar paper, cellulose wadding or webs of cellulose fibres, of a kind used for household or sanitary purposes, in rolls of a width not exceeding 36 cm, or cut to size or shape; handkerchiefs, cleansing tissues, towels, table cloths.	Paper masks, boot covers, paper bed sheets	867	0
5603	Nonwovens, whether or not impregnated, coated, covered or laminated	Absorbent pads	643	431
611610	Gloves, mittens and mitts, impregnated, coated, covered or laminated with plastics or rubber	Knitted gloves impregnated with plastic or rubber	599	360
621010	Garments, Made-up Of Fabrics Of Felts And Nonwovens	Protective garments for surgical/medical use	309	0
630622	Tents of synthetic fibres	Synthetic fibres tents	2	0
630629	Tents of textile materials	Textile material tents	0	12
630790	Made-up articles of textile materials, incl. dress patterns, n.e.s.	Textile face-masks, single use drapes	461	362
6505	Hats and other headgear, knitted or crocheted, or made up from lace, felt or other textile	Disposable hair nets	38	0

\*yellow highlighted are items that are restricted from being imported to the DPRK

Code	Product label	COVID-19 related	Imported value in 2020	Imported value in 2021
701790	Laboratory, hygienic or pharmaceutical glassware, whether or not graduated or calibrated	Laboratory, hygienic or pharmaceutical glassware	1	0
841319	Pumps for liquids, fitted or designed to be fitted with a measuring device	Infusion pumps	13	0
8703	Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons	Ambulances	86	0
900490	Spectacles, goggles and the like, corrective, protective or other	Protective spectacles and goggles	64	1
901811	Electro-cardiographs	Electrocardiograph	9	0
901812	Ultrasonic scanning apparatus	Ultrasound machines	150	0
901831	Syringes, with or without needles, used in medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences	Syringes with or without needles	958	291
901832	Tubular metal needles and needles for sutures, used in medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences	Tubular metal needles and needles for sutures	79	67
901839	Needles, catheters, cannulae and the like, used in medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences	Nasal prongs and catheter	957	364
901890	Instruments and appliances used in medical, surgical or veterinary sciences,	Laryngoscopes, Magill intubation forceps etc	242	73
901920	Ozone therapy, oxygen therapy, aerosol therapy, artificial respiration or other therapeutic respiration apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	Oxygen therapy equipments	16	0
9020	Other breathing appliances and gas masks, excluding protective masks having neither mechanical parts nor replaceable filters	Gas masks	32	0
902519	Thermometers and pyrometers, not combined with other instruments	Infrared and digital thermometers	1734	16
902680	Instruments or apparatus for measuring or checking variables of liquids or gases	Flowmeter, Thorpe tube for oxygen 0-15L	31	0
9027	Instruments and apparatus for physical or chemical analysis	Diagnostic test instruments and apparatus	120	34
902820	Liquid meters, incl. calibrating meters therefor	Electronic drop counter	0	68
940290	Operating tables, examination tables, and other medical, dental, surgical or veterinary furniture	Medical or surgical furniture	77	0
		TOTAL	28473	16517

Source : ITC Trade Map, annotated by the Panel



**Annex 72: Consolidated list of Recommendations****Maritime***On re-configured cargo ships illicitly importing oil cargo*

- 1. The Panel recommends maritime authorities of Member States be aware of the DPRK's deceptive practice of re-configuring its cargo ships to carry refined petroleum and conduct the necessary ship inspections when DPRK cargo ships call at their port / port areas. Relevant maritime actors should further take appropriate preventive measures to guard against potential illicit oil procurement in such a manner.**
- 2. The Panel recommends that Member States disseminate to ship repair yards and associated ship brokers this deceptive practice and the risk of their facilitation role in the event such cargo ships are exported to the DPRK.**

*On vessel identity tampering and AIS manipulation*

- 3. The Panel reiterates that Member States and ship registries add to their ship circulars information pertaining to detected cases of vessel identity laundering or tampering and ensure wide dissemination. Such information would include:**
  - Identifiers of ships in their registry that have transmitted cover identities**
  - Identifiers of ships in their registry that may have had their identifiers exploited by other vessels**
  - Names of ship registrants whose vessels have transmitted fraudulent identifiers**
- 4. The Panel reiterates that flag States should possess the requisite tools available to identify and investigate suspected fraudulent use of the MMSI where it is detected and share the results of their investigation with other maritime authorities, as well as with the Panel.**

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*On addressing the DPRK's vessels acquisition*

5. **The Panel recommends to flag registries that for Single Delivery Voyages, checks are put in place on full AIS monitoring, vessel checks to confirm conformity to restricted conditions of sail, and additional verification checks on the vessel's delivery with recipient.**
6. **The Panel recommends that Member States encourage sellers to verify information including, but not limited to, the final destination and end-users (owner and charterer) of the vessel, the identity of related broker(s), and previous records of transactions.**
7. **The Panel recommends that Member States encourage sellers to obtain a Statement of Confirmation upon vessel sale from buyers that assures the vessel will not be transferred in any way to the DPRK or to anyone affiliated with the DPRK, that the buyer will not facilitate any DPRK sanctions violations, and that the buyer shall be responsible if /when such a case arises.**
8. **The Panel recommends that Member States encourage sellers, buyers and brokers to report to their respective authorities following vessel transfer should any information regarding the vessel's potential violation of Security Council resolutions come to light.**

**Trade and Customs**

9. **The Panel recommends that appropriate measures be taken by the International Organization for Standardization and Member States to prevent erroneous usage of country codes for the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (KP and KR, respectively).**
10. **The Panel recommends that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supportive material the informal list of prohibited commodities.**
11. **The Panel recommends that customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, in particular when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions.**
12. **The Panel recommends, with regards to the Member States requiring assistance with the issue of the sectoral ban, that the Committee consider information outreach.**

## **Implementation of Luxury Goods Ban**

- 13. The Panel reiterates its recommendations that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact once trade restarts.**
- 14. The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent transshipment to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.**

## **Finance**

- 15. The Panel recommends Member States advise relevant national actors, including financial institutions, businesses, and VASPs, to adopt appropriate education, training, information sharing, and advisory materials for individuals across all levels of the workforce, from executives to part-time employees.**
- 16. The Panel recommends that Member State agencies, as well as financial institutions, businesses, and VASPs devote appropriate attention to increased cyber hygiene by requiring of all crypto users attempting access to a cryptocurrency exchange set a higher default threshold, such as a two-factor authentication of transaction.**
- 17. The Panel recommends that any entity suffering a cyber-attack report this to and engage with the proper legal authorities as soon as possible, issue a public announcement of the incident, and engage with agencies relevant to the event including blockchain analysis firms, in order to increase the prospects for recovery of some stolen assets.**
- 18. The Panel recommends that Member States consider legislation or establishing directives for cyber companies to enforce “know your customer” protocols and to tighten procedures for VASP registration.**
- 19. The Panel recommends the Member States strengthen cooperation, facilitate dialogue and enhance information-sharing in order to address the growing intelligence and financial threat of cybercrime.**

- 20. The Panel recommends that Member States implement as soon as possible the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidance on virtual assets, which seeks to prevent financing of WMD proliferation by placing anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing requirements on these assets and VASPs.**

### **Unintended Impact of Sanctions**

- 21. The Panel reiterates its recommendations that the Committee consider more active outreach with civil society providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK to help substantiate its future decision-making and to better understand the humanitarian situation.**
- 22. The Panel notes the recent arrangements for transferring funds to UN humanitarian organisations in DPRK but reiterates the urgency of re-establishing a more durable banking channel.**
- 23. The Panel highly values the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.**
- 24. The Panel recommends that the Security Council continue to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on humanitarian aid operations to benefit the country's vulnerable population and overcome the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.**
- 25. The Panel recommends that the Committee and other relevant stakeholders consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies.**
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