



Consejo de Seguridad

Distr. general
13 de octubre de 2014
Español
Original: inglés

Carta de fecha 10 de octubre de 2014 dirigida al Presidente del Consejo de Seguridad por el Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones [751 \(1992\)](#) y [1907 \(2009\)](#) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea

En nombre del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones [751 \(1992\)](#) y [1907 \(2009\)](#) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea, y de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 28 de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, tengo el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea.

A este respecto, el Comité agradecería que la presente carta y su apéndice se señalaran a la atención de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad y se publicaran como documento del Consejo.

(Firmado) Oh Joon
Presidente

Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones
[751 \(1992\)](#) y [1907 \(2009\)](#) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea



Carta de fecha 19 de septiembre de 2014 dirigida al Presidente del Comité del Consejo de Seguridad dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y 1907 (2009) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea por los miembros del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea

Tenemos el honor de transmitir adjunto el informe sobre Somalia del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea, de conformidad con el párrafo 28 de la resolución 2111 (2013) del Consejo de Seguridad.

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**Informe del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea,
presentado de conformidad con la resolución 2111 (2013)
del Consejo de Seguridad: Somalia**

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** El anexo no se ha reproducido en el presente documento porque es estrictamente confidencial.

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Resumen

Una vez concluida la transición en Somalia a mediados de 2012, la elección como Presidente de Hassan Sheikh Mohamud y el establecimiento del Gobierno Federal de Somalia abrieron una oportunidad para un nuevo tipo de liderazgo y ofrecieron una base para la participación de los Estados Miembros. La nueva configuración ha recibido el máximo compromiso político y financiero internacional de los dos últimos decenios, desde la retirada de las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas en 1995. Sin embargo, como ya había señalado el Grupo de Supervisión, un verdadero final de la transición requeriría un cambio tanto de líderes personales como del sistema de gobierno que en el pasado había socavado la empresa de la construcción del Estado a causa de la apropiación indebida de bienes públicos y de los feudos que dominaban el sector de la seguridad. Mientras que en el pasado el control de las corrientes financieras y de las instituciones de seguridad estaba dividido entre varios caudillos principales, el nuevo Presidente heredó un sistema en el que no tenía el control de ninguna de ellas, por lo que tuvo que aplicar mecanismos que le permitieran afrontar la situación obteniendo fondos externos y reorganizando las relaciones de seguridad dentro y fuera del Gobierno.

Un año después del último informe del Grupo (S/2013/413), la inversión internacional a nivel político y ciertas iniciativas de reforma no han conseguido modificar la dinámica subyacente al sistema de gobierno, que es en gran medida una continuación de los anteriores arreglos de transición, tanto por lo que respecta a la falta de transparencia y de rendición de cuentas por los recursos públicos como por el hecho de que los intereses de los clanes dominan las fuerzas de seguridad y su logística. Mientras tanto, el hecho de que cada vez se dependa más de mecanismos de último recurso en materia financiera y de seguridad, debido en parte a los intereses creados y en parte a la necesidad de supervivencia política, ha producido líneas de control paralelas a las instituciones oficiales de gobierno con las que colabora la comunidad internacional. Por consiguiente, la disminución del apoyo popular a la actual configuración política hasta niveles equivalentes a los del período anterior al final de la transición y el incremento de la inestabilidad generada por los clanes en la capital y en otros lugares del país amenazan con erosionar el Gobierno Federal, las perspectivas de fortalecer las instituciones del Estado y la paz y la seguridad de Somalia.

A pesar de continuos incrementos del número de efectivos y del apoyo financiero a la Misión de la Unión Africana en Somalia (AMISOM), de éxitos tangibles en la ofensiva en curso (Operación Águila) y de la asistencia internacional al sector de la seguridad somalí, acompañada por una relajación del embargo de armas, Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) sigue siendo la principal amenaza para la paz y la seguridad en Somalia y en todo el Cuerno de África. En el pasado, el crecimiento de Al-Shabaab se debía a la debilidad del Gobierno central y sus fuerzas de seguridad o guardaba correspondencia con ella. Sin embargo, si bien no ha podido mantener el potencial militar ni la posición que tenía en 2009-2010, Al-Shabaab ha evolucionado cualitativamente, tal vez a causa de factores diversos, como la purga violenta pero pragmática de sus altos cargos disidentes en 2013, la capacidad que demostró, antes de su muerte, Mukhtar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed Godane) para consolidar su autoridad sin ningún desafío evidente y el consiguiente predominio de la facción dirigente más extremista del grupo, que ha recibido apoyo de sus aliados en África Oriental. De este modo, Al-Shabaab ha logrado mantener

una presencia efectiva y violenta en Mogadiscio y ha demostrado su capacidad operacional fuera de la capital adoptando aparentemente una estrategia de economía de esfuerzos. Ha generado ataques fatales en todo el sur y el centro de Somalia, al mismo tiempo que ha inspirado y coordinado ataques contra los vecinos del país.

Efectivamente, desde que la antigua Al-Qaida en África Oriental adquirió un papel relevante en el Cuerno de África la región no había sufrido los efectos de un grupo aliado de Al-Qaida que fuera tan determinado, prolífico y eficaz como Al-Shabaab. Las constantes presiones antiterroristas y la superación con éxito de las divisiones internas han llevado al núcleo de Al-Shabaab a ejecutar operaciones más audaces, haciendo más hincapié en la exportación de su violencia fuera de las fronteras de Somalia. Por otra parte, en el último año la estrategia regional manifiesta de Al-Shabaab ha dependido cada vez más de su base de apoyo bien afianzada de agentes de tipo *Aminyat*. A fines de 2013 su estrategia regional estaba clara: el resurgimiento de un grupo extremista suficientemente robusto para alinearse plenamente con Al-Qaida y aplicar estrategias adaptadas a las operaciones transnacionales de esta. Esto se puso de manifiesto en su capacidad de llevar a cabo ataques “complejos y espectaculares” en gran escala, como el atentado del centro comercial de Westgate en Kenya, y representaba una evolución de sus prácticas operacionales.

A nivel local en Somalia, existen factores idiosincráticos que se combinan en distintos lugares para constituir amenazas más generales a la paz y la seguridad. En la región de Sool, al noreste de Somalilandia, por ejemplo, las fuerzas de Somalilandia se han enfrentado a fuerzas de Puntlandia y milicias leales a Khatumo, una organización política del clan Dhulbahante que persigue la creación de un estado regional en Somalia y su separación de Somalilandia. La región de Sool está particularmente expuesta a los conflictos a causa de las reivindicaciones enfrentadas de Somalilandia, Puntlandia y Khatumo, que compiten por un territorio rico en petróleo, y de las luchas políticas internas del clan Dhulbahante, cuya lealtad está dividida entre Puntlandia, Khatumo y Somalilandia. Esto ha llevado a la militarización de la zona, particularmente desde noviembre de 2013, y al establecimiento de vínculos, en algunos casos con Al-Shabaab y en otros con el Gobierno Federal. Además, en el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio se desencadenó la violencia política entre los clanes, que se intensificó extraordinariamente a lo largo de 2013 y hasta la actualidad. Han participado en los combates milicias de los clanes Biyamal (Dir) y Habar Gedir (Hawiye), en el Bajo Shabelle, y Abgaal (Hawiye) y Shiidle (Bantú/Jareer), en el Shabelle Medio, y se han producido ataques contra asentamientos civiles que constituyen violaciones graves de los derechos humanos y, en algunos casos, del derecho internacional humanitario. Contribuye a la complejidad de la situación una combinación de la presunta participación en la violencia de altos mandos y de soldados del ejército, desviaciones de armas hacia las milicias de los clanes, la utilización de recursos apropiados indebidamente para avivar el conflicto, intereses comerciales relacionados con la captura de tierras y otros recursos y planes políticos cuyo objetivo es influir en el proceso de formación del Estado federal. El conflicto amenaza con desbordarse hacia otras regiones, y complica la campaña en curso contra Al-Shabaab.

La piratería somalí permanece a un nivel muy bajo. Sin embargo, si bien en gran medida está contenida, muchas de sus causas subyacentes siguen existiendo y continúa representando una amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad. Teniendo cuenta la persistencia de las redes de piratería y de sus estructuras

comerciales, las operaciones de los piratas pueden reanudarse fácilmente, incluso en gran escala, si las circunstancias en el mar vuelven a tornarse favorables. Además, a diferencia de los piratas que han sido detenidos y enjuiciados en todo el mundo, la mayoría de los principales organizadores, financiadores y facilitadores de esta forma de delincuencia organizada transnacional no han sido molestados ni sancionados. Por consiguiente, los piratas gozan en la actualidad de un clima de impunidad que les permite invertir en nuevas formas de negocio, tanto lícitas como ilícitas, blanquear sus ingresos y obtener nuevos beneficios. Las investigaciones sobre las finanzas de los piratas y antiguos piratas han revelado la existencia de grandes sumas de dinero que circulan en Somalia y fuera del país, tratos financieros con políticos somalíes, actividades de blanqueo de capitales en el extranjero y diversas cuentas bancarias de cabecillas piratas, financiadores y facilitadores, tanto en Somalia como en otros lugares, en algunas de las cuales hay cerca de 1 millón de dólares.

A pesar del cambio de las circunstancias políticas que supuso el establecimiento del Gobierno Federal en 2012, la corrupción subyacente como sistema de gobernanza no ha sufrido una transformación fundamental, y en algunos casos tal vez se haya intensificado. En sus investigaciones, el Grupo de Supervisión ha descubierto sistemáticamente prácticas de apropiación indebida con tasas de desviación del 70% y el 80% o más, y todo indica que los fondos desviados se utilizan para ejecutar proyectos partidistas que constituyen amenazas para la paz y la seguridad. Se han tomado medidas importantes para reformar la estructura de gestión financiera del Gobierno Federal, que deberán ampliarse e intensificarse en la práctica con asistencia internacional. Hasta la fecha, la realidad de las corrientes financieras del Gobierno no se ha visto alterada ni transformada con respecto al anterior período de transición, especialmente por lo que atañe a la rendición de cuentas y la transparencia. En particular, el fenómeno de la “contratación secreta” se ha convertido en una forma de hacer negocios para el Gobierno Federal por lo menos a partir de mediados de 2013, y crea oportunidades para la apropiación indebida. Funcionarios del Gobierno han firmado contratos relativos a bienes públicos nacionales que afectaban el interés público y los han mantenido en la máxima confidencialidad, frente a la población somalí, el parlamento y, hasta la fecha, los donantes internacionales. El abuso de la legitimidad del Gobierno Federal para firmar contratos que funcionan como contratos privados al margen de las instituciones de gobierno ha creado en la práctica un sistema paralelo de finanzas que escapa al ámbito de la gestión de las finanzas públicas y tiene un alcance mucho mayor.

Mientras tanto, en el último año no se han producido las condiciones ideales para una reforma fundamental del Banco Central, con sucesivos cambios en el cargo de Gobernador. Como seguimiento de lo expuesto en su informe anterior (S/2013/413), en el que se describía el sistema de *fadlan* para pagos del Banco Central a particulares o a funcionarios públicos para fines privados, el Grupo de Supervisión revisó las cuentas del Banco Central y descubrió que la proporción de este tipo de retiros de fondos se mantenía en gran medida entre el 70% y el 75%. A pesar de sus intenciones de reducir la escala del sistema de *fadlan*, el actual Gobernador se ha encontrado con que los gastos están fuera de su control. Los fondos que se retiran del Banco Central no se refieren a partidas del presupuesto nacional, lo que significa que el Gobernador no conoce el propósito real de los retiros de fondos. No obstante, ha instaurado un sistema de justificantes de pago como medio de conciliar las cuentas del Banco con las de la Oficina del Contador

General. En el puerto de Mogadiscio, grandes buques de transporte de contenedores iniciaron un tráfico regular con origen y destino en ese puerto a mediados de 2013. Esos buques no están tan condicionados por el clima como las embarcaciones de menor tamaño, por lo que la regularidad de ese tráfico en gran escala ha incrementado los ingresos del puerto, que ahora son más constantes todos los meses. Por consiguiente, en la segunda mitad de 2013, los ingresos mensuales medios del puerto habían aumentado a más de 5,5 millones de dólares tan solo por concepto de derechos de aduana, sin incluir las tasas portuarias ni los cargos adicionales sobre las importaciones libres de impuestos. Sin embargo, los depósitos mensuales medios efectuados en el Banco por el puerto desde mediados de 2013 han ascendido en total a 4,6 millones de dólares. El Grupo estima que en la actualidad no es posible contabilizar entre el 30% y el 35%, como mínimo, de los ingresos mensuales del puerto, lo cual representa aproximadamente una continuación de la tasa de desviación del año anterior.

Con el establecimiento por el Consejo de Seguridad de una exención del embargo de armas para el Gobierno Federal, este asumió a su vez un conjunto de obligaciones correspondientes en lo relativo a la notificación al Comité de las entregas destinadas al sector de seguridad y la presentación al Consejo de información sobre la estructura de mando de las fuerzas de seguridad y sobre la gestión del armamento. Si bien los informes del Gobierno Federal al Consejo todavía no son exhaustivos ni cumplen estrictamente todos los requisitos de las resoluciones pertinentes, indican sin embargo que se ha producido una mejora con el tiempo. Desde que se introdujo la exención, el número de armas de diversos tipos que se han entregado o se espera que se entreguen al Gobierno Federal de conformidad con notificaciones oficiales al Comité supera ya la cifra de 13.000, además de aproximadamente 5,5 millones de cartuchos de distintos tipos de munición. Parte de esas armas y municiones se han desviado a los mercados de armas de Mogadiscio. En conjunto, teniendo en cuenta las anomalías, las inexactitudes o las faltas de notificación al Comité, el Gobierno Federal no ha cumplido cabalmente sus obligaciones en sus importaciones de armas a Somalia. Además, el Grupo de Supervisión ha constatado otras violaciones del embargo de armas, incluida la desviación de armas a redes relacionadas con el Gobierno Federal, entregas de armas a Puntlandia, la entrega de cordones detonantes al noreste de Somalia, y la entrega de vehículos de tipo militar a Jubalandia. El Grupo también sigue preocupado por el cumplimiento por Somalilandia de las resoluciones del Consejo en lo que respecta a sus planes de establecer una unidad de protección del petróleo.

El acceso humanitario a muchas partes de Somalia ha seguido siendo frágil. Aunque el acceso físico se hizo posible en un territorio más amplio, y las Naciones Unidas y las organizaciones no gubernamentales establecieron su presencia en nuevas localidades, en muchos lugares la calidad y la sostenibilidad de ese acceso empeoraron debido a una combinación de factores como la intensificación del conflicto, el aumento de los desplazamientos y la degradación de la seguridad, todo ello exacerbado en particular por la ofensiva conjunta del ejército nacional y la AMISOM contra Al-Shabaab. En los centros urbanos “recuperados” como consecuencia de la ofensiva, el control gubernamental siguió estando limitado a una zona confinada y las líneas de abastecimiento seguían siendo muy vulnerables a los ataques, incluidos casos en que Al-Shabaab ponía sitio de forma violenta a poblaciones “recuperadas”. La prestación de asistencia a las zonas rurales siguió siendo particularmente difícil.

Mientras que se ha producido una disminución del volumen total de la asistencia humanitaria disponible para su distribución en Somalia, el anuncio del “Nuevo Acuerdo” de 2013 estimuló las iniciativas tendentes a crear y controlar nuevos puntos para la captación de recursos y tuvo un efecto indirecto en el contexto humanitario. Una investigación más a fondo de la desviación de materiales humanitarios y sus efectos, incluso por parte del Grupo de Supervisión, llevó a las entidades de las Naciones Unidas, las organizaciones no gubernamentales y los donantes a incrementar sus funciones de diligencia debida y supervisión y a formular nuevos instrumentos de gestión del riesgo. Sin embargo, las realidades de una desigual calidad del acceso, la inseguridad constante y la fluctuación de la autoridad, sumadas a la persistencia de prácticas de gestión remotas, tuvieron como resultado que continuara la desviación de la asistencia humanitaria por agentes estatales, incluidas las fuerzas de seguridad, agentes armados no estatales, incluido Al-Shabaab, empleados de organismos humanitarios, contratistas privados y entidades delictivas.

El aumento de la inseguridad y nuevos ciclos de conflicto crearon un entorno en el cual se cometieron en todo el país, pero especialmente en el sur y el centro de Somalia, violaciones del derecho internacional aplicable, como causar víctimas entre la población civil, además de violaciones de la prohibición de la violencia por razón de género, el reclutamiento y la utilización de niños como soldados y el desplazamiento forzado. Entre los responsables había miembros de todas las partes en los conflictos, incluidos Al-Shabaab y sus aliados, la AMISOM y sus socios estratégicos, las fuerzas armadas nacionales, las fuerzas de seguridad de las administraciones regionales y sus aliados, agentes armados asociados con las distintas administraciones regionales, subregionales y locales y las milicias de los clanes. Quienes estaban más expuestos a sufrir esas violaciones eran las comunidades minoritarias y los grupos vulnerables, como los desplazados internos, los niños, los jóvenes y las mujeres y las niñas.

Hasta la fecha, la magnitud del comercio internacional de carbón vegetal somalí equivale en general a la del período 2012-2013, y la estructura empresarial transnacional de ese comercio sigue en pie y continúa adaptándose para obtener beneficios en gran escala. La cadena de suministro presenta una imagen compleja de complicidad y colaboración entre comerciantes, transportistas, agentes, mayoristas y personas dedicadas a falsificar documentación para facilitar la violación sistemática de la prohibición relativa al carbón vegetal somalí. Sobre la base de los envíos documentados y de estimaciones de envíos adicionales, se calcula que se han exportado cada mes desde Kismayo 1 millón de sacos de carbón vegetal, además de los que se han exportado desde el puerto de Barawe, controlado por Al-Shabaab, y otros puertos más pequeños. Se calcula que el valor global en el mercado internacional del carbón vegetal exportado en 2013 y 2014 supera los 250 millones de dólares, pero podría ser muy superior si se tiene en cuenta que el Grupo de Supervisión tal vez no haya identificado todos los envíos. Mientras tanto, Al-Shabaab se sigue beneficiando, en una proporción mayor que cuando controlaba Kismayo, de los ingresos generados en los centros de producción del carbón vegetal, en los puestos de control en las rutas de transporte y por las exportaciones, en particular en Kismayo y Barawe. Hasta la fecha ninguna de esas actividades ha sido interrumpida por la ofensiva militar emprendida contra el grupo.

El Grupo de Supervisión se sigue topando con intentos de obstruir su labor, en particular con ataques dirigidos contra las investigaciones o contra la credibilidad y la reputación de determinados miembros del Grupo. Concretamente, el Gobierno de Kenya impidió que uno de los expertos del Grupo permaneciera en su lugar de destino, mientras que grupos de intereses que actuaban en nombre del Gobierno Federal procuraron socavar a determinados miembros e impedir que el Grupo en su conjunto cumpliera su mandato. Además, en las actuales condiciones de precariedad, los obstruccionistas identificados por el Grupo amenazan con erosionar la legítima autoridad en el país y las actividades de asistencia internacionales. A fin de consolidar los logros obtenidos hasta la fecha, el Grupo de Supervisión considera que se debería designar a las personas que violan las resoluciones pertinentes del Consejo de Seguridad para aplicarles medidas selectivas a la mayor brevedad posible. Con este fin, propone varias nuevas adiciones a la lista de sanciones establecida en virtud de la resolución [1844 \(2008\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad.

I. Introducción

A. Mandato

1. El mandato del Grupo de Supervisión para Somalia y Eritrea figura en el párrafo 27 de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#) del Consejo de Seguridad, aprobada el 24 de julio de 2013, y en el párrafo 13 de la resolución [2060 \(2012\)](#). Posteriormente se asignaron tareas adicionales al Grupo de Supervisión en las resoluciones [2093 \(2013\)](#) y [2142 \(2014\)](#).

2. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el párrafo 27 de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#) y en el párrafo 13 l) de la resolución [2060 \(2012\)](#), el Grupo de Supervisión presentó al Consejo de Seguridad, por conducto del Comité dimanante de las resoluciones 751 (1992) y [1907 \(2009\)](#) relativas a Somalia y Eritrea, una exposición informativa de mitad de período el 27 de marzo de 2014. El Grupo presentó también al Comité informes mensuales de actualización durante todo el período de su mandato.

3. En el curso de sus investigaciones, los miembros del Grupo de Supervisión viajaron a Alemania, la Arabia Saudita, Australia, Bahrein, Bélgica, Chipre, Djibouti, Egipto, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, España, los Estados Unidos de América, Etiopía, Francia, la India, Italia, Kirguistán, Noruega, los Países Bajos, Qatar, el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudáfrica, Sudán del Sur, Suecia, Turquía y Uganda. En Somalia, los miembros del Grupo pudieron realizar varias visitas a Mogadiscio, Hargeysa y Garowe, pero gran parte de la región sur del país permaneció inaccesible.

4. El Grupo de Supervisión, con sede en Nairobi, estaba integrado por los siguientes expertos: Jarat Chopra (Coordinador), Nicholas Argeros (experto en finanzas), Zeina Awad (experta en transporte), Déirdre Clancy (experta en cuestiones humanitarias), Joakim Gundel (experto en armas), Dinesh Mahtani (experto en finanzas), Jörg Roofthoof (experto en cuestiones marítimas) y Babatunde Taiwo (experto en grupos armados). Este último permaneció fuera de Kenya a partir de septiembre de 2013.

B. Metodología

5. Los criterios probatorios y los procesos de verificación enunciados en los informes anteriores del Grupo de Supervisión se aplican a la labor realizada durante su mandato actual. El Grupo reafirmó la metodología utilizada en sus informes anteriores (los más recientes llevan las signaturas [S/2013/413](#) y [S/2013/440](#)). La metodología aplicada en el presente informe es la siguiente:

- a) Siempre que sea posible, reunir información sobre hechos y temas utilizando fuentes múltiples;
- b) Siempre que sea posible, reunir información de fuentes con conocimiento de primera mano de los hechos;
- c) Determinar la coherencia de la información y comparar los datos existentes con información nueva y tendencias incipientes;

d) Tener constantemente en cuenta la capacidad técnica y el juicio del experto pertinente del Grupo de Supervisión y la evaluación colectiva de este en lo que respecta a la credibilidad de la información y la fiabilidad de las fuentes;

e) Obtener pruebas físicas, fotográficas, sonoras, videográficas o documentales para corroborar la información reunida.

6. El Grupo de Supervisión procuró de forma deliberada y sistemática obtener acceso a los implicados en violaciones por medio de personas que tenían conocimiento directo de los detalles de dichas violaciones o que conocían a personas que lo tuvieran. En algunas ocasiones, el Grupo de Supervisión pudo comprobar directamente violaciones que se estaban produciendo.

7. El Grupo de Supervisión se entrevistó con muy diversas fuentes que poseían información pertinente, como funcionarios gubernamentales y representantes de misiones diplomáticas, organizaciones de la sociedad civil y organismos de asistencia. Los miembros del Grupo se reunieron con varios funcionarios del Gobierno, incluidos el Presidente y varios ministros, y con representantes de los organismos de seguridad. El Grupo también se reunió o se comunicó con funcionarios de las administraciones de Puntlandia y Somalilandia, representantes de grupos políticos y armados, desertores y miembros de las comunidades de empresarios y de la sociedad civil somalí.

8. De conformidad con las directrices impartidas por el Comité, el Grupo de Supervisión se esforzó por incluir la mayor cantidad posible de testimonios y pruebas en su informe final. Sin embargo, las resoluciones de la Asamblea General sobre el control y la limitación de la documentación, en particular las resoluciones [52/214](#), [53/208](#) y [59/265](#), exigían el amplio uso de anexos, lo que impidió que gran parte del contenido sustancial fuera traducido. Además, las normas no permiten la inclusión de mapas, fotografías y gráficos en el informe principal. Durante todo su mandato el Grupo no ha dejado de presentar documentación pertinente al Comité.

9. De conformidad con el boletín del Secretario General sobre la confidencialidad, la clasificación y el manejo de la información ([ST/SGB/2007/6](#)), el Grupo de Supervisión ha presentado al Comité, junto con el presente informe, varios anexos estrictamente confidenciales que contienen información cuya divulgación podría ser perjudicial para el buen funcionamiento de las Naciones Unidas o para el bienestar y la seguridad de su personal o de terceros, o podría contravenir las obligaciones jurídicas de la Organización. Estos anexos no se publicarán como documento del Consejo de Seguridad.

II. Actos que amenazan la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad de Somalia¹

A. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin

La amenaza

10. Desde que el Grupo de Supervisión presentó su informe más reciente (S/2013/413), la organización Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin (“Al-Shabaab”) ha seguido representando la principal amenaza para la paz y la seguridad en Somalia y en todo el Cuerno de África. Pese a que Al-Shabaab no ha podido mantener la posición y el potencial militar que tenía en 2009-2010², su amenaza sigue viva, y provoca atentados fatales en todo el sur y el centro de Somalia al tiempo que inspira y coordina ataques contra países vecinos³.

11. Del mismo modo, Al-Shabaab ha continuado demostrando sus posibilidades de ejecutar acciones violentas más allá de Mogadiscio, donde ha aumentado su capacidad, al parecer adoptando una estrategia basada en la economía de esfuerzos⁴. La estrategia ha conllevado también el mantenimiento de una presencia efectiva y violenta de Al-Shabaab en la capital, a pesar de su retirada en agosto de 2011, que tanta publicidad recibió.

12. Como en tiempos pasados, sus ataques han sido calculados, han estado coordinados y han formado parte de una campaña estratégica basada en un conflicto asimétrico sostenido. Sus tácticas incluyen los artefactos explosivos improvisados (transportados por personas o por vehículos o controlados por radio), los ataques con fuego de mortero, el lanzamiento de granadas y los ataques por sorpresa seguidos de una retirada rápida, así como frecuentes emboscadas en localidades “recuperadas” como Baidoa, Beledweyne y Kismayo (véase un mapa de la presencia operacional de Al-Shabaab en Somalia en el anexo 1.1)⁵. Los ataques han tenido como blanco, entre otros, la población civil, diputados del parlamento, las fuerzas de la Misión de la Unión Africana en Somalia (AMISOM), personal de las Naciones Unidas e instituciones del Gobierno, incluso repetidos ataques “espectaculares” contra el palacio presidencial, un objetivo central de las operaciones de Al-Shabaab en

¹ En el párrafo 8 a) de la resolución 1844 (2008), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibía los actos que amenazaran la paz, la seguridad o la estabilidad de Somalia. En el párrafo 43 a) de la resolución 2093 (2013), el Consejo incluía entre los actos prohibidos los actos que supusieran una amenaza para el proceso de paz y reconciliación en Somalia, o supusieran una amenaza mediante la fuerza para el Gobierno Federal o la AMISOM. En el párrafo 2 de la resolución 2002 (2011), el Consejo amplió el alcance de los actos prohibidos para incluir la apropiación indebida de los recursos financieros públicos, una prohibición que el Consejo reiteró en el párrafo 2 c) de la resolución 2060 (2012). Además, en el párrafo 25 de la resolución 2111 (2013), el Consejo reiteró su disposición a adoptar medidas contra las personas involucradas en la apropiación indebida de los recursos públicos.

² Entre 2009 y 2010, Al-Shabaab fue la fuerza predominante en Somalia por lo que respecta a su presencia territorial y su capacidad militar.

³ El Grupo de Supervisión considera que en el período de su mandato actual Al-Shabaab ha demostrado que se ha convertido en una amenaza transnacional. Véase el estudio del caso del Cuerno de África en el anexo 2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial.

⁴ El Grupo de Supervisión cree que esta es una demostración significativa de la capacidad organizativa de Al-Shabaab.

⁵ Véase BBC News, “Somali African Union Beledweyne base hit by bomb attack”, 19 de noviembre de 2013. Puede consultarse en www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24998892.

Mogadiscio en el período del mandato actual (véase la sección relativa a los artefactos explosivos improvisados y la infiltración en el anexo 1.3).

13. Desde el punto de vista organizacional, si bien parece que Al-Shabaab se ha alineado más estrechamente con los planes transnacionales de Al-Qaida, también se ha repositionado para adoptar un enfoque táctico más violento en su campaña en el interior del país, como muestran sus actividades en lugares como Mogadiscio. Hay tres factores que pueden explicar este cambio.

14. En primer lugar, las secuelas de la purga violenta pero pragmática emprendida por Al-Shabaab de sus altos cargos disidentes en 2013 (véase una imagen de “Arabey”, uno de los pocos disidentes de alto rango de Al-Shabaab que han sobrevivido, en el anexo 1.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial)⁶. En segundo lugar, las consecuencias de la purga sugerían que antes de su fallecimiento en septiembre de 2014 Mukthar Ali al-Zubayr (Ahmed Godane) había podido consolidar su autoridad sobre Al-Shabaab sin demostración externa alguna de descontento o de desafío⁷. Tercero, la purga parece haber otorgado predominio al sector dirigente más extremista de Al-Shabaab en particular, que ha obtenido apoyo de sus asociados⁸, incluido Al-Hijra, y de otros altos mandos de África Oriental basados en Somalia⁹.

Presiones externas

15. Estratégicamente, Al-Shabaab ha demostrado su flexibilidad, especialmente en el sur de Somalia. Así, el grupo se ha adaptado siempre que ha sido necesario para responder a las fluctuaciones de su entorno operacional. Análogamente, una serie de presiones externas, incluidas las acciones letales periódicas emprendidas por Estados Miembros¹⁰, la escalada militar de la AMISOM y en cierta medida los combates con las fuerzas armadas, han obligado a Al-Shabaab a ir adaptando sus tácticas y métodos, aunque con resultados diversos.

⁶ Ello incluye los asesinatos en 2013 de Sheikh Abu Bakr Zaylai (al-Afghani Ibrahim Mee' aad), Abu Hamid Hashi Olhayi (Sheikh Burhan) y Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki (Omar Hammami), y la anunciada detención de varios otros miembros. El Grupo de Supervisión cree que el nivel de las divisiones internas en las semanas anteriores al verano de 2013 se había vuelto insostenible y constituía un desafío directo a la autoridad de Ahmed Godane. También cree que, ya a comienzos de 2013, se habían tomado decisiones, por lo menos por parte de algunos miembros de los niveles directivos de Al-Shabaab de tendencia más internacionalista, al efecto de neutralizar a varios disidentes de alto rango.

⁷ El Grupo de Supervisión no tiene conocimiento de ninguna información fidedigna que sugiera que Ahmed Godane se hubiera enfrentado a algún desafío significativo dentro de los niveles superiores de Al-Shabaab. Sin embargo, el 27 de julio de 2014, en informaciones no verificadas de los medios de comunicación se sugirió que Ahmed Godane tal vez había sobrevivido un intento de asesinato en Barawe.

⁸ El Grupo de Supervisión estima que Ahmed Godane gozaba no solo del apoyo de asociados como los combatientes de Al-Hijra basados en Somalia sino también de un número creciente de nuevos reclutas basados en Mombasa (Kenya) y en la República Unida de Tanzania.

⁹ En marzo de 2014, una Al-Shabaab renovada, de aspecto más transnacional, recibió una señal pública de aprobación del contingente de combatientes extranjeros de África Oriental. Durante una ceremonia de juramento en forma de mensaje de vídeo que llevaba por título “Mujahideen Moments 3”, puede verse a Abu Salim Al-Muhajir, un alto mando keniano con un poder creciente, originario de Mombasa, ratificando el compromiso de África Oriental con la yihad internacional y con Ahmed Godane.

¹⁰ Sigue habiendo indicios creíbles que sugieren que Estados Miembros como Etiopía, Kenya y los Estados Unidos han llevado a cabo operaciones antiterroristas letales contra Al-Shabaab en el interior de Somalia.

16. La ejecución y la amenaza de acciones letales como los ataques aéreos apoyados por datos de inteligencia que han realizado los Estados Miembros han privado a Al-Shabaab de algunos mandos superiores, en particular Ibrahim Ali Abdi “Anta Anta” y Ahmed Abdulkadir “Sahal Iskudhuq”¹¹, y posiblemente contribuyeron a la “deserción pública” escenificada por Sheikh Maxamed Sayid “Atom”¹². Más simbólicamente, a raíz de una operación de cinco años de duración basada en informaciones obtenidas por los Estados Unidos en Somalia, el “Emir” de Al-Shabaab Ahmed Godane murió en el ataque de una aeronave no tripulada¹³. La estimación del Grupo de Supervisión es que en general los ataques estratégicos han permitido obtener ganancias inmediatas pero han fracasado claramente a la hora de reducir la capacidad operacional de Al-Shabaab. Tampoco existen en la actualidad pruebas de que tengan el potencial de “degradar y destruir” a Al-Shabaab¹⁴. Mientras que la reciente eliminación de Ahmed Godane del campo de batalla representa un logro considerable para la AMISOM y el Gobierno Federal en su empeño por derrotar a Al-Shabaab, la desaparición de una figura tan importante no supone el final de Al-Shabaab ni de sus capacidades.

Consecuencias potenciales de la muerte de Ahmed Godane

El 6 de septiembre de 2014, Al-Shabaab anunció que Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah había sido nombrado nuevo “Emir” del grupo^a. Hay informaciones fidedignas^b que indican que había actuado como consejero directo y miembro del núcleo duro del antiguo “Emir”^c. Actualmente, el Grupo de Supervisión está haciendo un seguimiento de los acontecimientos en el interior de Al-Shabaab a fin de evaluar las consecuencias a mediano y largo plazo de la muerte de Ahmed Godane.

Según los indicios de que se dispone, especialmente la evolución operacional de Al-Shabaab^d y la información recibida, es poco probable que a corto plazo la muerte de Ahmed Godane haga variar notablemente las tendencias de inseguridad en Somalia y más allá de las fronteras del país^e, en particular la capacidad del grupo para cometer acciones violentas en Mogadiscio^f.

¹¹ Véase Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Somalia: reported US covert actions 2001-2014”, 22 de febrero de 2012. Puede consultarse en <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/02/22/get-the-data-somalias-hidden-war/>.

¹² El 7 de junio de 2014, el Ministerio de Información de Somalia anunció que “Atom” había aceptado desertar de Al-Shabaab. (véase <https://madmimi.com/p/c40ee4?fe=1&pact=23142609746>). El Grupo de Supervisión observa que, a raíz de la toma del control de Al-Shabaab en el noreste por “Yasin Kilwe” en enero de 2012, “Atom” comenzó a perder importancia y probablemente había desertado mucho antes de su supuesta “deserción pública” en 2014. Además, existen informaciones fidedignas, aunque no corroboradas, que apuntan directamente a que, a pesar de la prohibición de viajar impuesta por las Naciones Unidas, “Atom” puede haber tenido facilidades para viajar al extranjero con frecuencia.

¹³ Véase un boletín de prensa del Departamento de Defensa en www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16924.

¹⁴ Asimismo, hasta la fecha no hay pruebas fidedignas (desde el punto de vista político u operacional) que indiquen que el Gobierno Federal de Somalia o la AMISOM hayan podido explotar estratégicamente esas acciones.

Las primeras indicaciones sobre la determinación y la posible orientación futura de Al-Shabaab han consistido en una serie de operaciones realizadas después de la muerte de Ahmed Godane. Se trata de una emboscada contra funcionarios del Gobierno Federal en Caag Mareer (región de Hiraan)^g, un atentado contra un convoy de la AMISOM en Afgoye^h, cometido con un artefacto explosivo improvisado transportado por un vehículo, y el asesinato de un alto funcionario del Organismo Nacional de Inteligencia y Seguridad en Mogadiscioⁱ. Asimismo, la desarticulación de una célula de Al-Shabaab, durante la cual se comunicó el descubrimiento de un chaleco con explosivos listo para un atentado suicida^j, aportó pruebas sólidas de que Al-Shabaab estaba ultimando los preparativos para lanzar un ataque contra Uganda.

Sin embargo, por lo que respecta a la cohesión de Al-Shabaab, el Grupo de Supervisión tiene conocimiento de informaciones fidedignas que sugieren la existencia de rivalidades sectarias relacionadas con el nombramiento de Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah. De ser ciertas, es probable que las tensiones potenciales entre las facciones emergentes en el seno de Al-Shabaab se hagan más evidentes y tal vez ofrezcan una oportunidad que el Gobierno Federal podría explotar, aunque no se lograra paralizar permanentemente a Al-Shabaab^k.

^a Esta información se difundió a través de la cuenta autorizada de Twitter de Al-Shabaab en <https://twitter.com/s7bhjratrain/status/50830184>, que posteriormente ha sido desactivada.

^b Mensajes de correo electrónico intercambiados con funcionarios de seguridad de la AMISOM entre el 2 y el 7 de septiembre de 2014, y sesión informativa dirigida por un oficial de inteligencia de la región el 8 de septiembre de 2014.

^c Informaciones fidedignas indican que el nuevo líder es conocido por los nombres de “Ahmed Diriye” y “Mahad Umar Abdikarim”.

^d El Grupo de Supervisión ha utilizado el período operacional comprendido entre junio de 2013 y julio de 2014 como parte de su determinación de la evolución operacional de Al-Shabaab.

^e Como parte de su evaluación, el Grupo de Supervisión ha tenido en cuenta el hecho de que es poco probable que Ahmed Godane participara en la labor cotidiana de adopción de decisiones operacionales, y de que los comandantes que tenían esas responsabilidades inmediatas siguen gozando de libertad para cumplir “las intenciones del Emir” (una forma de proceder y un método de ejecutar y continuar la yihad violenta en Somalia y fuera del país).

^f Asimismo, el Grupo de Supervisión estima que la muerte de Ahmed Godane no afectará la capacidad de Al-Shabaab para emprender ataques en la región en el próximo período de tres a seis meses (incluida la capacidad del núcleo de Al-Shabaab para instigar e incitar a sus aliados regionales).

^g Informe confidencial de las Naciones Unidas y organizaciones no gubernamentales de fecha 7 de septiembre de 2014.

^h Informe confidencial de las Naciones Unidas y organizaciones no gubernamentales de fecha 8 de septiembre de 2014.

ⁱ Reuters, “Somali Islamists kill national security officer; Al-Shabaab claim responsibility”, 13 de septiembre de 2014. Puede consultarse en www.hiiraan.com/news4/2014/Sept/56331/somali_islamists_kill_national_security_officer_al_shabaab_claim_responsibility.aspx#sthash.aFWBSga4.dpbs.

^j Véase Risdell Kasasira y Albert Tumwine, “How al-Shabaab entered Uganda”, *Daily Monitor*, 16 de septiembre de 2014. Puede consultarse en [ww.monitor.co.ug/News/National/How-al-Shabaab-entered-Uganda/-/688334/2453730/-/3u3m4xz/-/index.html](http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/How-al-Shabaab-entered-Uganda/-/688334/2453730/-/3u3m4xz/-/index.html). El Grupo de Supervisión ha tenido conocimiento de que Al-Shabaab niega el revés sufrido en Kampala. Véase también Somaticurrent, “Al-Shabaab denies Ugandan officials foiled planned attack”, 15 de septiembre de 2014. Puede consultarse en www.somaticurrent.com/2014/09/15/al-shabaab-denies-ugandan-officials-foiled-planned-attack/.

^k El Grupo de Supervisión también está siguiendo informaciones fidedignas que han vinculado a varios altos mandos de Al-Shabaab con un posible juramento de fidelidad al Estado Islámico. El 6 de septiembre de 2014, Al-Shabaab y su nuevo líder reconfirmaron su juramento de fidelidad a Al-Qaida.

17. Así pues, en el período que abarca el informe, comandantes muy destacados, como Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir “Ikrima”, Mohamed Sultan Sandhere “Ukash” y Yusuf Dheeq¹⁵, todos los cuales habían sido relacionados con ataques “complejos” de gran repercusión cometidos en 2013 y 2014¹⁶, gozan de libertad operacional para planear y dirigir ataques desde su base de Barawe, en Somalia¹⁷. Paradójicamente las operaciones antiterroristas extranjeras (ataques aéreos apoyados por datos de inteligencia) en Somalia también han sido explotadas hábilmente por Al-Shabaab para sus propios fines de propaganda. Esto se puso claramente de manifiesto en octubre de 2013 después del intento fracasado de asesinar o capturar a “Ikrima”¹⁸, y más recientemente en agosto de 2014 cuando la sección de medios de comunicación de Al-Shabaab, Al-Kataib, hizo pública una reconstrucción en formato de documental del asalto fallido de fuerzas militares francesas y estadounidenses contra Bulo Marer el 11 de enero de 2013¹⁹.

Operación Águila

18. Mientras tanto, gracias a las acciones ofensivas llevadas a cabo por la AMISOM con el apoyo de las fuerzas armadas nacionales, Al-Shabaab ha cedido más territorio en todo el país durante el período que se examina (véase el mapa de las zonas capturadas a Al-Shabaab hasta julio de 2014 en el anexo 1.1). En marzo de 2014, tras la aprobación de la resolución 2124 (2013) del Consejo de Seguridad²⁰, se emprendió una campaña militar en el marco de la Operación Águila con el objetivo de reducir la capacidad de Al-Shabaab para controlar lugares estratégicos de Somalia²¹. A pesar de que ya han cesado las operaciones militares²², la

¹⁵ Según información clasificada, proporcionada por el Grupo de Supervisión en septiembre de 2014 y corroborada por un servicio regional de inteligencia, Yusuf Dheeq “Ismaaciil” presuntamente es el *Amniyat* principal de Al-Shabaab a cargo de las operaciones exteriores.

¹⁶ Hay informaciones no confirmadas que relacionan a “Ukash” con dos ataques en la región.

¹⁷ El Grupo de Supervisión cree que los ataques aéreos apoyados por datos de inteligencia contra Al-Shabaab en Somalia generan un beneficio de corto plazo, a diferencia de las operaciones antiterroristas dirigidas al núcleo de Al-Qaida. Estas, en su mayor parte, han privado de refugio seguro a determinados comandantes y líderes principales y los han mantenido “en fuga”. Este no parece ser el caso en Somalia por lo que respecta a los líderes de Al-Shabaab. En general, el nivel dirigente superior de Al-Shabaab permanece intacto y tiene la capacidad de circular libremente por el país. Ejemplo de ello es la información no confirmada sobre la visita del Gobernador de Banaadir en nombre de Al-Shabaab, “Ali Jabal”, a Mogadiscio para asistir a un concurso coránico (véase <http://dalsanradio.com/articles/7197/Senior-Alshabaab-Member-Takes-Part-a-Quran-Quiz-in-Mogadiscio>). El Grupo observa que el Gobierno Federal ha negado esta pretensión de Al-Shabaab.

¹⁸ El 7 de octubre de 2013, un miembro de Al-Shabaab, “Saqr Quarish”, ofreció lo que era presuntamente un testimonio directo de la operación antiterrorista realizada en Barawe para capturar a “Ikrima”. Su relato fue publicado en su cuenta de Twitter, y más tarde apareció en varios foros yihadistas. Puede consultarse en <http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/jihadist-gives-alleged-account-of-u-s-navy-seal-raid-in-Barawe.html>.

¹⁹ El vídeo puede verse en http://sitemultimedia.org/video/SITE_Shabaab_Failed_French_Raid.mp4.

²⁰ En su resolución 2124 (2013), el Consejo de Seguridad solicitó a la Unión Africana que aumentara la dotación de la AMISOM de 17.731 a 22.126 efectivos.

²¹ El Grupo de Supervisión observa que, si bien en cierta medida se han cumplido los objetivos de la Operación Águila, sigue habiendo indicios de que Al-Shabaab conserva su capacidad para atacar a voluntad en los lugares “recuperados” que se consideran estratégicos. Un ejemplo fue el asesinato del oficial de inteligencia de la Administración Provisional de Juba, Isse Kambano, en febrero de 2014 (véase http://www.keydmedia.net/en/news/article/somalia_senior_security_officer_shot_dead_in_Kismayo/).

Operación Águila parece haber conseguido éxitos tangibles²³, como la captura de zonas que dominaba Al-Shabaab en Bakool, Galguduud, Gedo, Hiiraan y el Bajo Shabelle (véase S/2014/330).

19. No obstante, tanto la AMISOM como las fuerzas armadas nacionales han tenido que hacer frente a ataques periódicos lanzados por Al-Shabaab en los lugares “recuperados”, lo cual pone de manifiesto el alcance de la infiltración del grupo. Un ejemplo de esta situación se produjo el 13 de marzo de 2014, tras la captura por la AMISOM de Buulobarde, en la región de Hiiraan. Menos de una semana después, el 18 de marzo de 2014, Al-Shabaab lanzó un ataque “complejo” contra una base improvisada de la AMISOM en Buulobarde, en el que resultaron muertos dos soldados de la AMISOM y varios miembros de las fuerzas armadas nacionales²⁴.

20. El Grupo de Supervisión cree que el “éxito” de la Operación Águila también debe relacionarse con el hecho de que Al-Shabaab prefiere renunciar al enfrentamiento militar con las fuerzas aliadas y aplica la táctica de ceder terreno sin resistencia. Esto indicaría que Al-Shabaab se propone concentrar sus esfuerzos en la reunión de información, la infiltración y los ataques asimétricos, como se ha observado en el período del actual mandato, en lugares estratégicos como Mogadiscio, y en refugios como Puntlandia y Somalilandia.

21. En el anexo 1.3 se ofrece una descripción de las tácticas, técnicas y procedimientos de Al-Shabaab en Mogadiscio.

22. En el anexo 1.4 se describe la presencia de Al-Shabaab en Puntlandia.

B. Al-Shabaab como amenaza regional e internacional

23. Desde que la antigua Al-Qaida en África Oriental²⁵ adquirió un papel relevante en el Cuerno de África, la región no había sufrido los efectos de un aliado de Al-Qaida tan determinado, prolífico y eficaz como Al-Shabaab²⁶. Asimismo, desde el anterior informe del Grupo de Supervisión (S/2013/413, anexo 2.1, de carácter estrictamente confidencial), Al-Shabaab ha demostrado su capacidad de reacción recuperándose de un estado de fragmentación a fines de 2012 y hasta mediados de 2013, causado por controversias operacionales y sobre el liderazgo, al

²² En el momento de redactar el presente informe no se había producido ninguna reanudación de las operaciones militares contra Al-Shabaab.

²³ Si bien militarmente la Operación Águila ha tenido resultados positivos, según el foro para el intercambio de información sobre la operación conjunta de la AMISOM siguen existiendo graves desafíos por lo que respecta a la estabilización de las zonas “liberadas”.

²⁴ Véase BBC News, “Somalia’s al-Shabab attacks army hotel in Bulo-burde”, 18 de marzo de 2014. Puede consultarse en www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26626335.

²⁵ Al-Qaida en África Oriental ha evolucionado a lo largo de varias generaciones desde que llegó al Cuerno de África a comienzos del decenio de 1990, y puede afirmarse que ha tenido tres generaciones: 1991-1996, 1996-2002 y 2002-2011.

²⁶ Durante varios años, Al-Qaida en África Oriental obtuvo éxitos operacionales en el Cuerno de África. El Grupo de Supervisión estima que Al-Shabaab está empezando a tener el mismo éxito operacional en la región de África Oriental. Véase “The Future of Al-Qaeda”; puede consultarse en www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/394.pdf.

tiempo que soportaba una serie de dinámicas campañas antiterroristas por parte de servicios de inteligencia regionales y extranjeros²⁷.

24. Las constantes presiones antiterroristas y la superación con éxito de las divisiones internas han llevado al núcleo de Al-Shabaab a ejecutar operaciones más audaces, haciendo más hincapié en la exportación de su violencia fuera de las fronteras de Somalia²⁸. Por otra parte, en el último año la estrategia regional manifiesta de Al-Shabaab ha dependido cada vez más de su base de apoyo bien afianzada de agentes de tipo *Amniyat*²⁹, especialmente en Djibouti y Etiopía, y en cierta medida de asociados externos³⁰, como Al-Hijra en Kenya, para lanzar ataques terroristas en toda la región³¹.

25. A fines de 2013, la estrategia regional de Al-Shabaab ya era evidente: el resurgimiento de un grupo extremista suficientemente robusto para alinearse con Al-Qaida y aplicar estrategias adaptadas a sus operaciones transnacionales. Esto se pone claramente de manifiesto en la “Operación Badru Nairobi”, más conocida como el ataque de septiembre de 2013 contra el centro comercial de Westgate. La operación³², concebida en Somalia, planificada en un campamento de refugiados de las Naciones Unidas y ejecutada teniendo como base el barrio de Eastleigh, en Nairobi³³, señaló la transformación operacional que muchos habían predicho. Indicaba el paso de “objetivos fáciles” a ataques “complejos y espectaculares” en gran escala más allá de Somalia³⁴, utilizando, siempre que resultara práctico, una combinación de recursos de Al-Hijra (en Kenya) a nivel periférico y por otra parte la

²⁷ Entre 2012 y 2013, informaciones de inteligencia tanto públicas como confidenciales han puesto de manifiesto que las partes internacionales, entre ellas los Estados Unidos y el Reino Unido, y aliados regionales, como los Estados miembros de la Autoridad Intergubernamental para el Desarrollo, han concentrado sus esfuerzos en contrarrestar las actividades de Al-Shabaab.

²⁸ En contradicción con las políticas aparentemente aislacionistas que había aplicado hasta la fecha, Ahmed Godane afirmó en su alocución radiofónica del ramadán hecha pública el 30 de junio de 2013 que “el muyahid debe saber que nuestra guerra contra el kafir no tiene fronteras ni se limita a algunas regiones geográficas o a algún territorio concreto”, y que “el muyahid debe comprender que nuestra yihad es una yihad global que presta apoyo a todos los musulmanes oprimidos de todos los rincones del mundo”. El Grupo de Supervisión cree que esa declaración era un indicador potencial de la intención de Al-Shabaab, después de la purga del verano de 2013, de redoblar sus operaciones regionales.

²⁹ Hay pruebas de que algunas de esas personas son somalíes que viven fuera del país, como diplomáticos, periodistas y activistas de la comunidad.

³⁰ Durante el período de su mandato actual, el Grupo de Supervisión se topó con graves dificultades operacionales para investigar a Al-Hijra en Kenya y en toda la región a causa de las preocupaciones de seguridad nacional del Gobierno de Kenya. En la actualidad, las Naciones Unidas y el Gobierno de Kenya mantienen conversaciones para resolver esta situación.

³¹ El Grupo de Supervisión está cada vez más preocupado por los vínculos externos con Al-Hijra, en particular sus financiadores extranjeros.

³² Véase Al-Shabaab, “Was the Badru Nairobi Operation a cowardly act”, Gaidi Mtaani. Puede consultarse en <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/gaidi-mtaani-issue-4.pdf>.

³³ El Grupo de Supervisión sigue estando sumamente preocupado por la utilización de campamentos de las Naciones Unidas como refugios seguros y bases para la preparación de operaciones de Al-Shabaab. Desde el inicio de su mandato en 2010, ha observado un incremento de la presencia de Al-Shabaab, que explota esos campamentos para actividades terroristas.

³⁴ Históricamente, los modelos y tácticas operacionales, las técnicas y los procedimientos utilizados por Al-Shabaab se han intentado y ensayado siempre en Somalia antes de ser exportados al resto de la región.

disciplina operacional de agentes de tipo *Amniyat* del núcleo de Al-Shabaab³⁵. A nivel psicológico, la operación ha invalidado la idea latente en Kenya, basada al parecer en una serie de fracasos de planes que pretendían ejecutar aliados como Al-Hijra, de que los ataques “complejos y espectaculares” eran imposibles³⁶.

26. En 2014, el nuevo ritmo de las operaciones de Al-Shabaab en Kenya se mantuvo con una serie de ataques simbólicos e intentos como el relativo a un artefacto explosivo improvisado, transportado por un vehículo, que estaba a medio construir y se introdujo con éxito desde Somalia. Hay informaciones de que el artefacto estaba destinado a un ataque importante en Mombasa (véase el anexo 2.1, de carácter estrictamente confidencial)³⁷. Como demostración de su filosofía operacional centrada en generar temor en Kenya, el 16 de enero de 2014 Al-Shabaab colocó un artefacto explosivo improvisado en el interior del Aeropuerto Internacional Jomo Kenyatta. Este atentado simbólico se relacionó con un diplomático somalí basado en Nairobi, Ilyas Yussuf Warsame, y otras cinco personas³⁸. A mediados de 2014, la acumulación de atentados de Al-Shabaab en el interior de Kenya y la potencia de la amenaza que representaba lograron al parecer que el grupo consiguiera parte de su objetivo: crear ansiedad en Kenya. La respuesta, según informaciones fidedignas, ha consistido en que diversas embajadas de países occidentales en Kenya han publicado advertencias sobre viajes y otras han reducido su personal³⁹.

27. En Etiopía, la planificación meticulosa y gradual de ataques violentos por parte de Al-Shabaab incluyó destacar agentes de tipo *Aminyat* desde Kenya, Somalia, Somalilandia y posiblemente el Yemen a Addis Abeba siguiendo el modelo de la “célula Bole Rwanda”⁴⁰. Esta constaba de un agente de Al-Shabaab que asumía la identidad de un empleado de las Naciones Unidas y otro que utilizaba su pertenencia a las fuerzas de seguridad de Puntlandia y la protección de las autoridades de Puntlandia para conspirar contra Etiopía. De haberse ejecutado según lo previsto, la conspiración habría tenido seguramente como consecuencia que Al-Shabaab saliera de su estado de parálisis operacional de larga data en Addis

³⁵ En su informe anterior (S/2013/413), el Grupo de Supervisión describió el propósito de Al-Shabaab de pasar de “objetivos fáciles” a ataques “complejos y espectaculares”.

³⁶ Informaciones fidedignas obtenidas por el Grupo de Supervisión en relación con varios miembros superiores de Al-Hijra, entre ellos Abubakar Shariff Ahmed “Makaburi”, y un mensaje directo de Twitter de Abu Mansour Al-Amriki, ponían de manifiesto su frustración por la incapacidad de llevar a cabo un ataque importante en Kenya coordinado y ejecutado por kenyanos.

³⁷ Hay indicios incompletos que sugieren que, a diferencia de años anteriores, han sido predominantemente agentes del núcleo de Al-Shabaab quienes han llevado a cabo ataques en el interior de Kenya en 2014.

³⁸ El Tercer Secretario de la Embajada de Somalia en Nairobi, Ilyas Yussuf Warsame, fue detenido el 23 de enero de 2014 en relación con este y otros ataques. El Grupo de Supervisión observa que ha negado ser miembro de Al-Shabaab o tener nada que ver con el ataque (véase <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/kenya-4-men-charged-court-airport-bombing>).

³⁹ BBC News, “Travel firms suspend flights to Mombasa after FCO warning”, 16 de mayo de 2014. Puede consultarse en www.bbc.com/news/uk-27434902.

⁴⁰ La captura por el Grupo de Supervisión de las cuentas de correo electrónico y los documentos financieros de la “célula Bole Rwanda” de Al-Shabaab en Etiopía pone de manifiesto los contactos de la célula con el Yemen y un nivel operacional vinculado con el Yemen, que diversas fuentes independientes describen como una filial de Al-Qaida.

Abeba⁴¹. Sin embargo, gracias al incremento de la seguridad, en las últimas horas previas a un atentado que habría causado enormes víctimas, Al-Shabaab se vio obligado a abortar un ataque “complejo y espectacular” el 13 de octubre de 2013, menos de un mes después del perpetrado contra el centro comercial de Westgate⁴².

28. Análogamente, en 2014, informaciones fidedignas reunidas sobre Al-Shabaab refuerzan las ideas sobre su alcance operacional y su disciplina para la planificación de ataques en el Cuerno de África. El núcleo de Al-Shabaab puede coordinar y ejecutar con éxito ataques en todo el Cuerno de África, y mantiene además la capacidad operacional para dirigir específicamente sus ataques contra occidentales en países como Djibouti y Kenya⁴³. Entretanto, información confidencial adquirida por el Grupo de Supervisión presenta sólidos indicios de que es posible que Al-Shabaab haya puesto los servicios de inteligencia regionales y extranjeros sobre una pista falsa con respecto a su objetivo (el restaurante La Chaumière) en Djibouti el 24 de mayo de 2014⁴⁴. Esta característica demuestra el mismo nivel de conocimientos operacionales observado por Al-Shabaab en las etapas de planificación de la “Operación Badru Nairobi” (véase el anexo 2.1, de carácter estrictamente confidencial).

29. En el anexo 2.1, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, se describen las operaciones regionales de Al-Shabaab en Kenya.

30. En el anexo 2.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, se describen las operaciones regionales de Al-Shabaab en Etiopía.

31. En el anexo 2.3, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, se describen las operaciones regionales de Al-Shabaab en Djibouti.

C. Amenazas locales a la paz y la seguridad en Somalia

Amenazas a la paz y la seguridad en la región de Sool

32. El Grupo de Supervisión ha seguido de cerca los acontecimientos en la región de Sool, en el noreste de Somalilandia, donde fuerzas de Somalilandia se han enfrentado a fuerzas de Puntlandia y milicias leales a Khatumo, una organización política del clan Dhulbahante que persigue la creación de un estado regional en Somalia y su separación de Somalilandia.

33. La región de Sool está particularmente expuesta a los conflictos a causa de las reivindicaciones enfrentadas de Somalilandia, Puntlandia y Khatumo, que compiten por un territorio rico en petróleo, y de las luchas internas del clan Dhulbahante, cuya

⁴¹ El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido información detallada y creíble sobre tres planes anteriores de Al-Shabaab para atacar Addis Abeba.

⁴² Véase “Two die in a bomb blast in Addis Ababa”, Addis Standard, 14 de octubre de 2013. Puede consultarse en <http://addisstandard.com/two-die-in-a-bomb-attack-in-addis-ababa>.

⁴³ Véase Voice of America, “Deadly blast in Djibouti”, 24 de mayo de 2014. Puede consultarse en www.voanews.com/content/deadly-attack-in-djibouti/1921950.html. El Grupo de Supervisión estima que una de las razones para elegir como objetivo el centro comercial de Westgate fue el gran número de occidentales que lo frecuentan diariamente. Hay indicios fidedignos que sugieren también que Mombasa es una zona de alto riesgo para los occidentales.

⁴⁴ Información adquirida “indirectamente” de un alto funcionario diplomático de Djibouti en mayo de 2014 indica que la vigilancia electrónica puso a los servicios de inteligencia sobre una pista falsa.

lealtad está dividida entre Puntlandia, Khatumo y Somalilandia. Estos conflictos también han tenido como consecuencia ataques contra civiles y desplazamientos de población (véase el anexo 8.2).

34. El Grupo de Supervisión expresa preocupación por la permanente militarización de Sool, especialmente desde noviembre de 2013. En particular, el movimiento Khatumo ha cultivado el apoyo político del Gobierno Federal, que no reconoce la reivindicación de Somalilandia sobre el territorio petrolífero, pero desde enero de 2014 también ha mejorado sus relaciones con el Gobierno de Puntlandia.

35. Si bien el Grupo de Supervisión está preocupado por los vínculos que parecen existir entre Khatumo y Al-Shabaab, también ha observado los riesgos potenciales que presentan los planes que ha hecho el Gobierno de Somalilandia para destacar una unidad de protección del petróleo en el territorio petrolífero de Sool (véase el anexo 3.1 sobre el empeoramiento de las condiciones de seguridad en Sool, y el anexo 6.7 sobre los planes de las autoridades de Somalilandia relativos a una unidad de protección del petróleo).

Amenazas a la paz y la seguridad en el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio

36. En el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio se rompieron las hostilidades por motivos políticos entre los clanes, que se han intensificado extraordinariamente desde 2013 hasta la actualidad. Han participado en los combates milicias de los clanes Biyamal (Dir) y Habar Gedir (Hawiye), en el Bajo Shabelle, y Abgaal (Hawiye) y Shiidle (Bantú/Jareer), en el Shabelle Medio, y ha habido asesinatos por venganza y ataques contra asentamientos civiles que constituyen violaciones graves de los derechos humanos y, en algunos casos, del derecho internacional humanitario. Contribuye a la complejidad de la situación, por ejemplo en el Bajo Shabelle, una combinación de la presunta participación en la violencia de mandos y soldados del ejército, desviaciones de armas a las milicias de los clanes, apropiación indebida de recursos y su utilización para avivar el conflicto, intereses comerciales relacionados con la captura de tierras y otros recursos y proyectos políticos cuyo objetivo es influir en el proceso de formación del Estado federal. Existe el riesgo de que el conflicto se desborde hacia otras regiones, incluida la región de la capital, Banadir (Mogadiscio) y la región de Bay (Baidoa), lo cual complica la campaña en curso contra Al-Shabaab.

37. Véase en el anexo 3.2 una descripción de la escalada de la tensión en el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio.

D. Piratería y secuestros extorsivos

Descripción general

38. La piratería somalí permanece a un nivel muy bajo. El último secuestro de un buque mercante de alto valor se remonta a mayo de 2012 (el del petrolero *Smyrni*, de propiedad de un armador y operador griego). Sin embargo, si bien la piratería está contenida en gran medida, muchas de sus causas subyacentes siguen existiendo. Además, a diferencia de los piratas que han sido detenidos y enjuiciados en todo el mundo, la mayoría de los principales organizadores, financiadores y facilitadores de esta forma de delincuencia organizada transnacional no han sido molestados ni sancionados.

39. Efectivamente, con tan solo 15 ataques registrados en 2013, incluidos dos secuestros, y estadísticas similares hasta mediados de 2014, la piratería somalí ha disminuido y se ha vuelto a situar a un nivel comparable al de 2006⁴⁵, aunque con notables diferencias entre las condiciones en tierra y en el mar.

40. Entre julio y diciembre de 2006, el aumento del fenómeno de la piratería somalí sufrió un grave revés cuando la Unión de Tribunales Islámicos, una fuerza política con bases ideológicas y religiosas, llevó a cabo una importante campaña de represión contra los piratas en las zonas sobre las que ejercía control, especialmente en refugios de piratas como Hobyó y Harardhere. El nuevo panorama político, en que los líderes del sur y el centro de Somalia tenían escaso interés en los ingresos de la piratería, produjo una reducción significativa del número de ataques y secuestros en comparación con 2005⁴⁶. No obstante, a pesar del incremento de las patrullas de fuerzas navales internacionales, los piratas siguieron obteniendo éxitos relativos en 2006, cuando uno de cada cuatro ataques tuvo como resultado el secuestro de un buque⁴⁷.

41. Con el derrocamiento de la Unión de Tribunales Islámicos en 2007, la piratería en el sur y el centro de Somalia se reanudó y volvió a registrar éxitos rápidamente⁴⁸. Los piratas, que no tenían oposición alguna en tierra, incrementaron y ampliaron sus actividades en el mar hasta el punto en que en 2009 y 2010 se registraba en promedio un ataque pirata contra un buque cada semana⁴⁹. No obstante, en 2011, esos éxitos empezaron a disminuir gracias a un mayor recurso a personal armado de empresas privadas de seguridad marítima a bordo de los buques, hasta que en 2012 llegó un momento en que los piratas dejaron de tener capacidad para secuestrar buques, excepto objetivos no protegidos y menos valiosos como los dhows y las embarcaciones de pesca.

42. La persistente incapacidad de los piratas para secuestrar objetivos de alto valor acabó llevando a una retirada de las inversiones de quienes los financiaban y a una reducción de las operaciones, y el resultado ha sido una importante disminución del número de secuestros⁵⁰.

43. Sin embargo, la piratería somalí no ha sido erradicada del todo y continúa siendo una amenaza para la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad. Se siguen denunciando ocasionalmente ataques armados de grupos de piratas. En la primera mitad de 2014 las fuerzas navales de la coalición liberaron por lo menos dos dhows que transportaban carbón vegetal y habían sido víctimas de los piratas (véase en el

⁴⁵ Cámara de Comercio Internacional, Oficina Marítima Internacional, "Piracy and armed robbery against ships: report for the period 1 January-31 December 2013" (Londres, enero de 2014).

⁴⁶ En 2006, la Oficina Marítima Internacional registró 20 ataques, incluidos cinco secuestros, lo cual representaba una disminución del 60% y del 66%, respectivamente, en comparación con 2005 (50 ataques, incluidos 15 secuestros).

⁴⁷ En 2006 se registraron cinco secuestros de buques: dos dhows, una embarcación pesquera, un buque de carga general y un buque tanque de transporte del producto refinado.

⁴⁸ En 2007, la Oficina Marítima Internacional registró 47 ataques, incluidos 12 secuestros, un incremento del 135% y el 140%, respectivamente, en comparación con 2006.

⁴⁹ En 2009, la Oficina Marítima Internacional registró 217 ataques, incluidos 47 secuestros. En 2010 las cifras aumentaron a 219 ataques y 49 secuestros.

⁵⁰ En 2013, la Oficina Marítima Internacional registró 15 ataques comprobados, incluidos dos secuestros, lo cual representa una tasa de éxito de los secuestros del 13,3%, la más baja desde 2005.

anexo 4.1 una lista de los ataques armados e incidentes registrados desde octubre de 2013).

44. Documentación y datos de comunicaciones capturados a piratas detenidos también pusieron de manifiesto asociaciones con anteriores casos de secuestro y con personas bien conocidas, como los cabecillas piratas Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”, Abdullahi Mohamed Jama “Farahow”⁵¹, y el negociador pirata Abdishakur Mohamud Mohamed “Fred”⁵², lo cual indica que las redes de piratas existentes siguen haciendo un seguimiento de la situación para determinar la viabilidad y la posibilidad de revitalizar el negocio de la piratería, que tan rentable había sido (véanse en el anexo 4.2 fotografías de “Gafanje”)⁵³.

45. Por otra parte, por lo menos 42 rehenes siguen cautivos en tierra. El 11 de marzo de 2014 las autoridades policiales de Kenya confirmaron el secuestro por piratas somalíes de dos ingenieros kenyanos en Mogadiscio el 12 de enero de 2014. Al parecer los ingenieros habían estado detenidos en Harardhere antes de ser trasladados a un lugar cercano a Hobyo⁵⁴.

46. Habida cuenta de la permanencia de las redes de piratas y de sus estructuras comerciales, las operaciones de piratería pueden reanudarse con facilidad, incluso en gran escala, si las circunstancias en el mar vuelven a ser favorables.

Respuestas somalíes a las detenciones internacionales de piratas

47. El 12 de octubre de 2013, las autoridades belgas detuvieron al notorio cabecilla pirata Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” a su llegada al aeropuerto de Bruselas, por haber participado en 2009 en el secuestro del buque belga de transporte de piedra *Pompeii*. Su socio comercial y ex “Presidente” de la autoproclamada región autónoma de Himan y Heeb, Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden “Tiiceey”, fue detenido con él y está acusado de facilitar el pago de rescates y otras actividades en beneficio de los piratas somalíes (véase el anexo 4.3).

⁵¹ Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” es un renombrado cabecilla de la red de piratería de Hobyo y Harardhere, que ha intervenido en decenas de casos de secuestro de buques y personas entre 2008 y la actualidad, incluido el secuestro de un periodista germano-estadounidense, Michael Scott Moore. Presuntamente, el 18 de agosto “Gafanje” fue capturado y detenido por las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno Federal de Somalia tras una redada en su casa de Mogadiscio, pero fue puesto en libertad un mes más tarde mediante el presunto pago de un soborno de 200.000 dólares. Abdullahi Mohamed Jama “Farahow” es un cabecilla pirata procedente originalmente de Barawe, que al parecer ha participado en el secuestro de un yate sudafricano, el *Choizil*. También se le relaciona con los secuestros de otros tres buques: el *Pompeii* (2009), el *Hansa Stavanger* (2009) y el *York* (2010).

⁵² “Fred” era un negociador pirata en el caso del buque secuestrado *Rak Afrikana* (2010). Se le relaciona con el cabecilla pirata Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne” y está en contacto directo con varios financiadores y cabecillas piratas, como Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” y Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji “Suhufi” (véase también S/2013/413, anexo 4.6, de carácter estrictamente confidencial).

⁵³ Información y datos de comunicaciones extraídos en relación con la desarticulación y la detención de dos grupos piratas en noviembre de 2013 y enero de 2014.

⁵⁴ Al 7 de julio de 2014, los rehenes restantes son los del *FV Prantalay* (12, incluidos 4 de Tailandia), el *MV Asphalt Venture* (7 de la India) y el *FV Naham 3* (11 de China, 5 de Filipinas, 5 de Indonesia, 4 de Camboya y 3 de Viet Nam), además de Michael Scott Moore y dos ingenieros civiles de Kenya.

48. El caso excepcional de la detención del cabecilla pirata y su cómplice causaron grandes malentendidos entre la población somalí, en particular en la región de Himan y Heeb, donde ambos actuaban. En octubre y noviembre de 2013 hubo varias manifestaciones de protesta en la capital, Adado, con decenas e incluso cientos de personas, a menudo mujeres y niños, que portaban carteles con el retrato de Afweyne y pedían su puesta en libertad, afirmando que no era un pirata sino un hombre de negocios (véanse fotografías en el anexo 4.4).

49. Religiosos y personas con discapacidad que asistieron a una manifestación organizada en Adado el 23 de noviembre de 2013 para protestar por las detenciones “ilícitas” declararon que las personas con discapacidad de toda la región de Himan y Heeb, que se habían beneficiado extraordinariamente de la generosidad de Afweyne, padecían penalidades, y exigieron la puesta en libertad inmediata e incondicional de ambos hombres⁵⁵.

50. Del mismo modo, los familiares, amigos y partidarios de Tiiceey denunciaron su detención, criticaron las denuncias hechas contra él y exigieron su puesta en libertad inmediata en los medios sociales, por conducto de peticiones y en entrevistas por televisión y reuniones organizadas en la ciudad de Minneapolis (Estados Unidos de América), donde residía.

51. Esas protestas y críticas son un ejemplo de que en Somalia la piratería se considera más una fuente de ingresos que una actividad ilícita. Muchos consideran que Afweyne, pese a ser responsable de docenas de secuestros, asesinatos y sufrimientos inhumanos, es un benefactor de la comunidad más que un delincuente. A nivel local es indiferente que haya adquirido su riqueza y su poder explotando con astucia un entorno de ilegalidad, pobreza y corrupción.

52. Las autoridades locales y centrales de Somalia, que en el pasado han facilitado la actividad de los piratas y perdonado a sus cabecillas, no contradicen en modo alguno la imagen distorsionada de los piratas y la piratería. Cuando se hicieron públicas las detenciones de Afweyne y Tiiceey, los funcionarios del Gobierno permanecieron en silencio, excepto algunos que criticaron públicamente las detenciones.

53. Dirigiéndose a los medios de comunicación locales de Mogadiscio el 16 de octubre de 2013, el Vicepresidente del Comité de Asuntos Internos del parlamento, Dahir Amin Jesow, condenó la detención de Afweyne⁵⁶. Acusó al Gobierno de Bélgica de violar la inmunidad diplomática de Afweyne, quien, según dijo, era un “funcionario gubernamental” que contribuía al restablecimiento de la seguridad en el país y la desmovilización de los piratas somalíes. Afirmó además que Afweyne ocupaba un cargo político en el Gobierno y describió su detención como un acto

⁵⁵ Véase www.goboladaradio.com/?p=19902.

⁵⁶ Dahir Amin Jesow es miembro del subclan Hawiye/Gaaljecel/Cifaaf Abdi de la región de Hiraan. En marzo de 2014 asistió, acompañado por Ugaas Abdirahman Ugaas Abdullahi, un anciano del clan Hawiye/Gaaljecel, a una reunión del clan Gaaljecel celebrada en La Haya (Países Bajos), con presencia de miembros del clan residentes en Alemania, Bélgica, los Países Bajos, el Reino Unido y Suiza. Se cree que ambos hombres tienen pasaportes extranjeros (expedidos por el Reino Unido y Nueva Zelanda, respectivamente). Véase www.radioweheh.com/2014/03/10/ugaaska-beesha-gaaljecel-xildhibaan-jeesow-oo-lagu-soo-dhaweeyay-holland-sawirro/.

ilícito. También la describió como una humillación, puesto que se había llevado a cabo sin notificarlo previamente al Gobierno⁵⁷.

54. En una entrevista concedida el 7 de junio de 2014 a un sitio web en idioma somalí, se pidió al portavoz oficial de Himan y Heeb, Arays Mohamed Haji⁵⁸, que proporcionara información actualizada sobre la privación de libertad de Tiiceey y Afweyne en Bélgica, e hizo los comentarios siguientes:

El destacado y famoso hombre de negocios de Himan y Heeb [Afweyne] y el ex Presidente de Himan y Heeb [Tiiceey] permanecen detenidos en Bélgica. Aún no han sido juzgados por ningún delito, por lo cual siguen siendo inocentes hasta que se demuestre su culpabilidad ante un tribunal. Desde que fueron detenidos, el gobierno regional de Himan y Heeb no ha escatimado esfuerzos, en el plano jurídico y en el diplomático, para obtener la liberación de los dos hombres. Seguimos reclamando su puesta en libertad. No son delincuentes. Si hubieran cometido algún delito ya se habría demostrado su culpabilidad y habrían sido condenados. Exigimos su puesta en libertad. Son ancianos muy respetados y políticos destacados. Su detención es ilegal. Seguimos reclamando su puesta en libertad⁵⁹.

55. Asimismo, la propia red delictiva de Afweyne reaccionó con firmeza, aunque no públicamente, ante su detención. En noviembre de 2013, se informó al Grupo de Supervisión de que el hijo de Afweyne, el cabecilla pirata Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi (véanse sus fotografías en el anexo 4.5), había ofrecido una recompensa de 500.000 dólares de los Estados Unidos a miembros del clan Hawiye/Habar Gedir que secuestraran a un belga, que sería utilizado para negociar la puesta en libertad de su padre⁶⁰.

56. En el mismo contexto, hay múltiples informes que indican que a comienzos de junio de 2014 piratas bien armados, pertenecientes a grupos controlados por Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje” y Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi, se estaban organizando en las poblaciones costeras de Hobyo y Ceel Huur⁶¹ en preparación de una operación marítima cuyo propósito era secuestrar un buque mercante, también para utilizarlo para negociar la puesta en libertad de Afweyne⁶².

57. No hay duda alguna de que Afweyne seguirá gozando del apoyo del clan Hawiye/Habar Gedir en general, y en particular de su subclan Saleebaan, ya que cada vez está más claro que muchos se han beneficiado de sus actividades de piratería.

⁵⁷ Véase www.raxanreeb.com/2013/10/xildhbaan-daahir-amiin-jeesow-oo-sharci-daro-ku-tilmaamay-xariga-maxamed/.

⁵⁸ Arays Mohamed Haji es un miembro de la diáspora somalí en Londres. Fue designado portavoz en febrero de 2014, en sustitución de Mohamed Omar Hagafey, otro miembro de la diáspora somalí en Londres.

⁵⁹ Véase <http://raasnews.com/dhageyso-aaalka-tiiceeye-iyo-afweyne-xaguu-ku-dambeeyaa/>.

⁶⁰ Información obtenida independientemente de fuentes policiales y militares.

⁶¹ La población costera de Ceel Huur está ubicada a unos 57 km al noreste de Harardhere y a 50 km al sudoeste de Hobyo (5°0'24" N, 48°16'9" E).

⁶² Información obtenida de una fuente naval militar y confirmada independientemente por el Grupo de Supervisión a través de una fuente somalí sobre el terreno que tenía acceso directo a los grupos piratas de Hobyo-Harardhere.

Impunidad y diversificación de las finanzas de los piratas

58. En sus informes de 2012 (S/2012/544) y 2013 (S/2013/413), el Grupo de Supervisión subrayó que los cabecillas piratas, sus financiadores y sus facilitadores identificados no habían sido objeto de sanciones de las Naciones Unidas ni habían sido enjuiciados, y la impunidad e inmunidad de que seguían gozando por este motivo. Sin embargo, las sanciones pueden ser el único y el último medio de ejercer influencia para persuadir al Gobierno Federal y a otros Estados Miembros (donde residen, viajan o tienen cuentas bancarias algunos piratas) de que adopten medidas.

59. Mientras tanto, con la reducción de la piratería durante tres años sucesivos, los piratas gozan de un clima de impunidad que les permite invertir en nuevas formas de negocio, tanto lícitas como ilícitas, blanquear sus ingresos y obtener más beneficios.

60. Así pues, y además de los casos documentados de cabecillas piratas que se dedican a operaciones pesqueras sin licencia en aguas somalíes como nueva fuente de ingresos (véase S/2013/413, anexo 3.1), el Grupo de Supervisión prosigue la identificación de antiguos piratas que participan activamente en otras actividades comerciales, como el tráfico de armas, el transporte aéreo, las tecnologías de la energía renovable, la exportación e importación de vehículos y la industria pesquera (véase en el anexo 4.6 un estudio del caso de Central Air Aviation).

61. Las investigaciones preliminares sobre las finanzas de los piratas y antiguos piratas han revelado la existencia de considerables sumas de dinero que circulan dentro y fuera de Somalia, tratos financieros con políticos somalíes, actividades de blanqueo de capitales en Dubai (Emiratos Árabes Unidos) y diversas cuentas bancarias en Somalia y Djibouti de cabecillas piratas, financiadores y facilitadores, en algunas de las cuales hay cerca de 1 millón de dólares de los Estados Unidos (véase en el anexo 4.7 una descripción de las finanzas de los piratas).

E. Corrupción y mala gestión financiera del sector público

62. Además de lo indicado en sus informes anteriores (S/2012/544 y S/2013/413), el Grupo de Supervisión siguió investigando actos de corrupción pasados y presentes que socavan las instituciones públicas mediante la desviación de corrientes financieras nacionales e ingresos devengados por los activos nacionales en Somalia. En sus investigaciones, el Grupo ha considerado que la apropiación indebida de recursos públicos incluye elementos de intencionalidad, capacidad y oportunidad y conducta. En general, el Grupo ha observado la perpetuación de pautas convencionales de desviación por quienes ocupan cargos públicos y funcionarios con acceso a recursos nacionales, o por los “guardianes” de las oficinas gubernamentales, que han mantenido las prácticas básicas del Gobierno Federal de Transición. No obstante, el Grupo también ha observado estrategias nuevas y aún más sofisticadas para la apropiación indebida de fondos gubernamentales. El Grupo sigue preocupado por los actos que amenazan con apoderarse del entorno de la gestión de las finanzas públicas en Somalia y socavar las iniciativas internacionales encaminadas a lograr una mayor transparencia y rendición de cuentas respecto de las finanzas somalíes.

63. El Grupo de Supervisión había indicado previamente que bajo las instituciones federales de transición la apropiación indebida, la malversación y el robo declarado

de recursos públicos se habían convertido básicamente en un sistema de gobernanza (S/2012/544, párr. 15), que socavaban las perspectivas de estabilización y perpetuaban una economía política de colapso del Estado. A pesar del cambio de las circunstancias políticas que supuso el establecimiento del Gobierno Federal en 2012, la corrupción subyacente como sistema de gobernanza todavía no ha sufrido una transformación fundamental y, en algunos casos, podría afirmarse que la situación ha empeorado, especialmente en relación con el fenómeno de la “contratación secreta”. El Grupo ha observado que el argumento prevaleciente con respecto a Somalia es que cierto grado de desviación es inevitable o incluso aceptable como parte del proceso de formación del Estado y del ejercicio del poder en las condiciones imperantes. Este argumento no es solo incongruente con la escala de las corrientes financieras irregulares sino que no tiene en cuenta la importancia de la corrupción para la inseguridad crónica de Somalia⁶³. En sus investigaciones, el Grupo ha descubierto sistemáticamente prácticas de apropiación indebida con tasas de desviación situadas entre el 70% y el 80%. Los indicios apuntan a que los fondos desviados se utilizan para ejecutar proyectos partidistas que constituyen amenazas para la paz y la seguridad⁶⁴.

64. El Gobierno Federal ha dado publicidad a las iniciativas que se han emprendido para reformar las instituciones financieras públicas y su gestión. Por ejemplo, el 24 de abril de 2014 el Gobierno eligió y aprobó un nuevo consejo de administración del Banco Central de Somalia, pero se sigue a la espera de ratificación parlamentaria. Tras un proceso de selección, el 13 de febrero de 2014 se nombró a un nuevo auditor general. Se propuso a una persona para ocupar el cargo de contador general, pero esa persona rechazó el nombramiento. El 22 de mayo de 2014 el Consejo de Ministros aprobó un proyecto de ley de modificación de los procedimientos de adquisición, y en junio de 2014 se aprobó un proyecto de ley de auditoría, pero ambas leyes están a la espera de ratificación parlamentaria. En febrero se publicó una orden ministerial que exige que todos los organismos gubernamentales utilicen la Cuenta Única del Tesoro y el Sistema de Información de Gestión Financiera de Somalia⁶⁵. Se trata de medidas importantes para reformar la estructura de gestión financiera, que deberían ampliarse e intensificarse en la práctica con asistencia internacional, porque la realidad de las corrientes financieras del Gobierno todavía no se ha alterado ni transformado con respecto al período del Gobierno Federal de Transición, especialmente por lo que atañe a la rendición de cuentas y la transparencia.

65. Como ha concluido repetidamente en el pasado el Grupo de Supervisión, el objetivo de construir un sector de la seguridad eficaz y legítimo, además de las instituciones civiles del Estado, como un nuevo paso hacia la estabilización de Somalia, se verá frustrado sistemáticamente hasta que se aborden de manera

⁶³ En un informe reciente, el Grupo de Trabajo sobre Corrupción y Seguridad advierte específicamente en contra de esos argumentos, puesto que hacer caso omiso de la corrupción para concentrarse exclusivamente en objetivos de seguridad tiende a socavar estos objetivos. Véase Working Group on Corruption and Security, “Corruption: the unrecognized threat to international security” (Washington, D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, junio de 2014). Puede consultarse en http://carnegieendowment.org/files/corruption_and_security.pdf.

⁶⁴ Estas cifras corresponden a las del período del Gobierno Federal de Transición. Véase “World Bank Summary of Financial Diagnostic Assessment of ‘audit investigative financial report 2009-10’”, 30 de mayo de 2012. Puede consultarse en http://wardheernews.com/World_Bank/World_Bank_Summary_of_FDA.pdf.

⁶⁵ Segundo informe periódico del Comité de Gobernanza Financiera, publicado en junio de 2014.

efectiva los problemas más generales de la corrupción pública. A este respecto, el Grupo recomienda que el Comité actúe con la mayor rapidez posible en relación con las personas y entidades que el Grupo ha propuesto designar en casos de apropiación indebida de recursos públicos, y en particular las personas y entidades del sector privado responsables de instrumentalizar esa corrupción.

El fenómeno de la “contratación secreta”

66. El Grupo de Supervisión está particularmente preocupado por el fenómeno de la “contratación secreta”, que se ha convertido en una manera de hacer negocios para el Gobierno Federal por lo menos desde mediados de 2013, y que crea oportunidades para la apropiación indebida. Funcionarios del Gobierno han firmado contratos relativos a bienes públicos nacionales que afectaban al interés público y los han mantenido en la máxima confidencialidad, frente a la población somalí, el parlamento y, hasta la fecha, los donantes internacionales. Ni el proceso de firmar los contratos ni su ejecución, incluida la transparencia y la rendición de cuentas por sus corrientes de ingresos, están sujetos a escrutinio público o a supervisión parlamentaria. Mientras que el Gobierno Federal de Transición firmaba regularmente contratos de uno u otro tipo, el reconocimiento político otorgado al Gobierno Federal ha permitido a este firmar contratos de un valor considerablemente superior al de los que podía firmar el Gobierno Federal de Transición. Un determinado contrato tiene por sí solo un valor superior al presupuesto nacional. El abuso de la legitimidad del Gobierno Federal para firmar contratos que funcionan como contratos privados al margen de las instituciones de gobierno ha creado en la práctica un sistema paralelo de finanzas que escapa al ámbito de la gestión de las finanzas públicas y tiene un alcance mucho mayor.

67. Hasta la fecha no se ha publicado oficialmente ninguno de los contratos relativos a bienes nacionales que se han firmado en nombre del Gobierno Federal. Algunos han sido dados a conocer para que los examinara el Comité de Gobernanza Financiera, que incluye representantes del Gobierno Federal y de instituciones financieras internacionales. El Comité de Gobernanza Financiera examinó confidencialmente siete contratos relacionados con el tratamiento y la comercialización de datos sísmicos, el desarrollo y las operaciones del puerto de Mogadiscio, el desarrollo y las operaciones del aeropuerto de Mogadiscio, las operaciones del puerto de contenedores de Mogadiscio, la exploración y la explotación del sector del petróleo y el gas, la construcción de buques guardacostas y la gestión y la protección de la actividad pesquera. Según el Comité de Gobernanza Financiera, “los exámenes confidenciales han determinado que la totalidad de los contratos o concesiones examinados padecen de dos omisiones importantes: la falta de especificaciones [o mandatos claros del Gobierno Federal de Somalia], y la falta de cualquier proceso competitivo de licitación”. Otro problema importante es que el secreto de los contratos crea desconfianza e incertidumbre en las distintas regiones de Somalia por lo que respecta a la participación en los recursos naturales, un hecho que no hará más que intensificarse con las perspectivas de firmar contratos relacionados con el petróleo, con los recursos marinos y con la posible extracción de otros minerales del territorio somalí. Esto puede tener efectos perjudiciales, muy especialmente para el proceso de federalización. Otros problemas que causa el secreto de los contratos consisten simplemente en saber cuántos son, obtener copias de ellos y determinar exactamente quién ha participado y de qué forma. Ciertas fuentes han informado al Grupo de Supervisión de que se han

firmado docenas de contratos⁶⁶. Véase en el anexo 5.1 una descripción de varios contratos.

68. En este contexto, el Grupo de Supervisión obtuvo pruebas documentales que demuestran que ciertas personas cercanas a la presidencia conspiran para hacerse con el control privado de bienes recuperados en el extranjero, que deberían ser puestos bajo el control fiduciario del Banco Central una vez recobrados. Esta actividad se emprendió como consecuencia de un contrato firmado en julio de 2013 entre el Gobierno Federal y el bufete de abogados estadounidense Shulman Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A., y propició la dimisión de Yussur Abrar como Gobernadora del Banco Central. Su sucesor, el actual Gobernador Bashir Issa Ali, revocó los poderes asociados con el contrato el 13 de mayo de 2014 y el 14 de julio rescindió el propio contrato. El Grupo investigó también a una de las personas clave implicadas en las actividades de recuperación en el extranjero, Musa Haji Mohamed “Ganjab”, que tuvo en el pasado relaciones con Al-Shabaab y había participado en la desviación de suministros de armas destinadas al ejército oficial (véase el anexo 6.4, de carácter estrictamente confidencial).

69. En el anexo 5.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, se presenta un estudio completo del caso del contrato con el bufete de abogados estadounidense como ejemplo del enfoque y de los métodos de la “contratación secreta”, aunque cada uno de esos contratos tiene sus propias características específicas.

El Banco Central de Somalia

70. En el período comprendido entre 2013 y 2014 no se han producido las condiciones ideales para una reforma fundamental del Banco Central, cuya Gobernadora dimitió el 13 de septiembre de 2013; su sustituto hizo lo propio el 30 de octubre, y un gobernador provisional nombrado por un período de 90 días no fue confirmado hasta el 24 de abril de 2014. En su informe anterior (S/2013/413, anexo 5.2), el Grupo de Supervisión describió el sistema de *fadlan* para pagos del Banco Central a particulares o a funcionarios públicos para fines privados, que, según descubrió el Grupo, en 2011 representó el 87% y en 2012 el 76% del total de los retiros de fondos. Esas cifras se redujeron al 72% después del establecimiento del Gobierno Federal. El Grupo ha examinado las cuentas del Banco desde su informe anterior, y estima que la proporción de pagos efectuados por el Banco Central a particulares con el sistema de *fadlan* se mantiene en general entre el 70% y el 75%. Sin embargo, cabe señalar que después de la publicación del último informe del Grupo en julio de 2013, los nombres de todas las personas que recibían pagos según consta en las cuentas del Banco fueron sustituidos por códigos numéricos a fin de ocultar la identidad de los receptores. No está claro quién posee la lista principal con el código que permite establecer la correspondencia entre los nombres y los números.

71. La independencia del Banco Central no se ha basado tanto en las estructuras institucionales, establecidas o no, como en la personalidad y la integridad de los distintos gobernadores. Este ha sido y sigue siendo un factor fundamental en los intentos hechos por el Gobierno para recuperar bienes en el extranjero que se describen en el anexo 5.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial. A pesar de sus intenciones de reducir la escala del sistema de *fadlan*, el actual Gobernador se ha

⁶⁶ Un alto funcionario declaró en junio de 2014 que en los seis meses anteriores se habían firmado entre 25 y 30 contratos.

encontrado con que los gastos están fuera de su control. Ha procurado instaurar un sistema con arreglo al cual los fondos pueden retirarse contra la presentación de justificantes de pago firmados por el Ministro de Finanzas y el Contador General, como medio de reconciliar las cuentas del Banco con las de la Oficina del Contador General. Sin embargo, los fondos que se retiran del Banco no se refieren a partidas del presupuesto nacional, lo cual significa que el Gobernador no conoce el propósito real de los retiros de fondos. Además, el Banco no tiene atribuciones para controlar y supervisar la forma en que las instituciones gubernamentales gastan los fondos recibidos, una tarea que oficialmente corresponde al Auditor General y el Comité de Finanzas del Parlamento, aunque ninguno de los dos tiene los poderes necesarios.

El puerto de Mogadiscio

72. Los ingresos generados por el puerto de Mogadiscio han sido tradicionalmente la principal fuente de ingresos internos para el Gobierno central, aparte de las donaciones bilaterales de otros gobiernos que pueden o no haber sido depositadas en el Banco Central. Sin embargo, los ingresos del puerto, ya sea por concepto de derechos de aduana o de tasas portuarias, se han desviado históricamente en origen mediante diversas prácticas que persisten hoy en día. Mientras que el control de las desviaciones que se producen en el puerto ha adoptado formas diferentes a lo largo de los años, el director del puerto o el director adjunto son invariablemente figuras clave.

73. A mediados de 2013 comenzó el tráfico de entrada y salida del puerto de Mogadiscio de grandes buques de transporte de contenedores. Esos buques no están tan condicionados por el clima como las embarcaciones de menor tamaño, por lo que la regularidad de ese tráfico en gran escala ha incrementado los ingresos del puerto, que ahora son más constantes todos los meses. Por consiguiente, en la segunda mitad de 2013 los ingresos mensuales medios del puerto habían aumentado de aproximadamente 3,8 millones de dólares hasta una cifra superior a los 5,5 millones de dólares tan solo por concepto de derechos de aduana, sin incluir las tasas portuarias ni los cargos adicionales sobre las importaciones libres de impuestos. Sin embargo, los depósitos mensuales medios efectuados en el Banco Central por el puerto desde mediados de 2013 han ascendido en total a 4,6 millones de dólares. Si bien los depósitos de ingresos del puerto en el Banco Central han aumentado en general, proporcionalmente son inferiores al incremento del tráfico portuario, lo cual constituye un indicio de una tasa de desviación comparable o posiblemente superior. El Grupo de Supervisión estima que en la actualidad no es posible contabilizar el 30% o el 35%, como mínimo, de los ingresos mensuales del puerto, lo cual representa aproximadamente una continuación de la tasa de desviación del año anterior.

III. Violaciones del embargo de armas⁶⁷

A. Modificaciones del embargo de armas para el Gobierno Federal

74. El Consejo de Seguridad modificó el embargo de armas impuesto a Somalia en sus resoluciones [2093 \(2013\)](#), [2111 \(2013\)](#) y [2142 \(2014\)](#), de forma que en la práctica se eximió al Gobierno Federal de la obligación de solicitar la aprobación del Comité para los envíos de armas destinados a sus fuerzas de seguridad. A su vez, el Gobierno Federal aceptó un conjunto de obligaciones correspondiente. Asumió la responsabilidad principal de notificar al Comité con detalles específicos, para informarlo con una anticipación mínima de cinco días, de cualesquiera envíos de armas o equipo militar o de la prestación de asistencia destinados exclusivamente a las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno. Además, estaba obligado a presentar cada seis meses al Consejo un informe sobre la estructura de sus fuerzas de seguridad, la infraestructura existente para garantizar la seguridad de la gestión y la distribución del equipo militar, y los procedimientos y códigos de conducta existentes para la gestión y distribución de las armas. Cabe destacar que el Consejo decidió que las armas o el equipo militar vendidos o suministrados únicamente a los fines del desarrollo de las fuerzas de seguridad no se podían revender, transferir ni facilitar con fines de utilización a ninguna persona o entidad que no estuviera al servicio de las fuerzas de seguridad.

75. En su resolución [2142 \(2014\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad aumentó las obligaciones de presentación de informes del Gobierno Federal, ya que no se habían cumplido cabalmente los requisitos impuestos en el marco de la suspensión parcial del embargo de armas. El Consejo subrayó que toda decisión de continuar o poner fin a la suspensión parcial del embargo respecto del Gobierno Federal se tomaría teniendo en cuenta hasta qué punto el Gobierno Federal había cumplido sus requisitos. Mientras tanto, el Consejo solicitó al Secretario General que presentara opciones y recomendaciones sobre las necesidades de asistencia del Gobierno Federal de modo que este pudiera demostrar progresos tangibles en el cumplimiento de las condiciones de la suspensión parcial del embargo de armas. Tras la visita de una misión de evaluación efectuada en marzo de 2014, el Secretario General respondió el 3 de abril de 2014 (véase [S/2014/243](#)), y el 22 de mayo se hizo pública una declaración presidencial ([S/PRST/2014/9](#)).

76. En el anexo 6.1 figura una evaluación del cumplimiento por el Gobierno Federal de sus obligaciones en el marco de las modificaciones del embargo de armas. Entre 2013 y 2014, el Gobierno Federal presentó cuatro informes al Consejo de Seguridad. Si bien todavía no eran exhaustivos ni cumplían estrictamente todos los requisitos de las resoluciones pertinentes, los informes indicaban sin embargo una mejora con el tiempo, en particular como consecuencia del apoyo prestado por la Misión de Asistencia de las Naciones Unidas en Somalia (UNSOM) y sus consultores internacionales.

⁶⁷ En el párrafo 8 b) de la resolución [1844 \(2008\)](#), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibió los actos que violaran el embargo de armas general y completo impuesto por el Consejo en el párrafo 5 de la resolución [733 \(1992\)](#). En virtud del párrafo 43 b) de la resolución [2093 \(2013\)](#) el Consejo enmendó provisionalmente el alcance de esta prohibición.

77. Desde que se aprobó la resolución 2093 (2013), el número de armas de diversos tipos que se han entregado o se espera que se entreguen al Gobierno Federal de conformidad con notificaciones oficiales al Comité supera ya la cifra de 13.000, además de aproximadamente 5,5 millones de cartuchos de distintos tipos de munición. Parte de esas armas y municiones se han desviado a los mercados de armas de Mogadiscio (véanse los anexos 6.2 y 6.3). En conjunto, teniendo en cuenta las anomalías e inexactitudes de las notificaciones al Comité, la desviación de armas notificadas, la entrega de armas en una cantidad superior a la notificada, las notificaciones parciales, la falta de notificación, el retraso persistente de las notificaciones anticipadas o la falta de notificaciones después de la entrega, especialmente después de la aprobación de la resolución 2142 (2014), en sus importaciones de armas a Somalia el Gobierno Federal no ha cumplido cabalmente sus obligaciones en virtud de la modificación del embargo de armas por el Consejo de Seguridad.

B. Redes de armas relacionadas con el Gobierno Federal

78. En su carta de 6 de febrero de 2014 dirigida al Comité (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.8), el Grupo de Supervisión se refirió a la existencia de redes de clanes que actuaban en el interior de las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno Federal, en particular de los principales subclanes Hawiye, el Abgaal y el Habar Gedir, que han tenido acceso privilegiado a los arsenales oficiales. Fuentes militares han informado al Grupo de que concretamente dos brigadas, la 1 y la 3, que son brigadas de los Abgaal y los Habar Gedir basadas tradicionalmente en Jowhar y Afgoye, recibieron grandes cantidades de armas de arsenales oficiales en el contexto de la escalada de los conflictos entre clanes en el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio⁶⁸. Las zonas situadas en torno a Jowhar y Afgoye fueron el epicentro de graves actos de violencia entre clanes, conflictos por la tierra y violaciones de los derechos humanos entre noviembre de 2013 y mayo de 2014, con las milicias Abgaal enfrentándose a las milicias Bantú, y los Habar Gedir enfrentándose a la minoría Biyamal y las milicias aliadas a ella. A medida que se han ido produciendo conflictos entre clanes en esas zonas, el Grupo de Supervisión ha podido observar relaciones cada vez más complejas y fluidas entre el ejército y agentes armados en el Bajo Shabelle, el Shabelle Medio y la región de Hiraan. En un marco de cooperación esporádica entre unidades de los Habar Gedir y los Abgaal, milicias que no han sido definidas por el Gobierno Federal como parte de las fuerzas de seguridad han actuado de concierto con el ejército (véase en el anexo 3.2 el estudio de un caso de amenazas a la paz y la seguridad en el Bajo Shabelle y el Shabelle Medio).

79. Además, el Grupo de Supervisión ha obtenido pruebas que implican a Musa Haji Mohamed “Ganjab”, que actuó como asesor del Presidente Hassan Sheikh Mohamud y que es miembro de su subclan Abgaal/Waesle, en la desviación de

⁶⁸ Dos oficiales de logística del ejército comunicaron al Grupo de Supervisión el 26 de noviembre de 2013 en Mogadiscio que elementos de la Brigada 3 y milicianos Habar Gedir aliados estaban expulsando a los clanes Biyamal de su tierra en el Bajo Shabelle, mientras que milicianos de la Brigada 1 estaban haciendo lo mismo con las tribus Bantú en el Shabelle Medio. Ambos oficiales informaron de que las dos brigadas recibían acceso preferente a la logística del ejército. La información fue corroborada por un funcionario de inteligencia militar extranjero y un funcionario de inteligencia somalí en diciembre de 2003.

armamento a Al-Shabaab y otras fuerzas distintas del ejército. Musa “Ganjab”, un prominente hombre de negocios somalí, ha actuado en el pasado como facilitador logístico de Al-Shabaab. En 2013 y 2014, ha sido una figura clave en las iniciativas del Presidente tendentes a recuperar bienes financieros en el extranjero (véase el anexo 5.2), pero también ha mantenido relaciones con personajes clave del sector de seguridad, en particular el jefe de logística del ejército, el coronel Abdullahi Moalim Nur, el anterior Ministro del Interior y de Seguridad Nacional, Abdikarim Hussein Guled, el Presidente de Galmudug, Abdi Hassan Awale “Qeybdiid”, y un antiguo caudillo militar, Abdi Nur Siad “Abdi Wal” (señalado previamente por el Grupo de Supervisión en el documento [S/2013/413](#) como una amenaza para la paz y la seguridad). Musa “Ganjab” se ha presentado a personas del sector de la seguridad privada diciendo que actúa en nombre del Gobierno Federal para promover sus actividades tendentes a equipar y adiestrar fuerzas militares. También es responsable de establecer una empresa de seguridad privada armada que actúa en Mogadiscio.

80. En el anexo 6.4, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, figura un estudio exhaustivo del caso de Musa “Ganjab”, sus actividades y sus conexiones con Al-Shabaab y otros.

C. Envíos de armas a Puntlandia

81. El Grupo de Supervisión ha documentado la importación de armas, municiones y otros artículos militares por parte de las anteriores autoridades de Puntlandia a comienzos de octubre 2013 sin que mediara la debida notificación al Comité. El 8 de octubre de 2013, una aeronave Ilyushin-18 con de matrícula TT-WAK, alquilada por Honest Air Cargo, una línea aérea gestionada por somalíes que tiene su sede en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, fue descubierta entregando artículos procedentes del Yemen en un volumen mayor que el notificado al Comité, además de artículos no notificados al Comité, entre ellos fusiles de asalto, ametralladoras ligeras y pesadas y municiones, en contravención de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#). Se ofrecen más detalles en el estudio del caso que figura en el anexo 6.5.

D. Entrega de cordones detonantes al noreste de Somalia

82. Entre junio de 2013 y fines de mayo de 2014, el Grupo de Supervisión contó por lo menos 237 incidentes en que se utilizaron artefactos explosivos improvisados en el sur y el centro de Somalia, en los que por lo menos 244 personas resultaron muertas y otras 402 heridas⁶⁹. La escala de los ataques ha ido aumentando en los últimos años, con un mayor número de ataques dirigidos a objetivos de alto valor. En Somalilandia y Puntlandia esos ataques han tenido en general un alcance limitado, y según un informe de la policía de Puntlandia correspondiente a 2013 solo se han documentado en Puntlandia 13 ataques entre 2011 y agosto de 2013.

83. El Grupo de Supervisión informó anteriormente (véase [S/2013/413](#)) sobre un importante envío de armas que habían sido suministradas desde el Yemen a un lugar cercano a Qandala, en el noreste de Somalia, en octubre de 2012. El alijo de armas incluía 220 cohetes RPG-7, 304 cargas propulsoras PG-7, 230 detonadores de

⁶⁹ Estadísticas obtenidas de una base de datos confidencial de ataques documentados con artefactos explosivos improvisados recopilada con la asistencia de un organismo policial.

granadas de mano, un cañón de 73 mm, 137 kg. de TNT, dos sacos de nitrato de amonio, cinco rollos de cordón detonante rojo y 500 detonadores eléctricos (C-DET); esto lo convierte en una de las mayores capturas de un alijo de armas ilegales de que se tiene constancia en Somalia en los últimos años.

84. El Grupo de Supervisión ha documentado la continuación de la entrega y utilización de detonadores eléctricos C-DET a Qandala a lo largo de 2013, y su utilización en diversos casos recientes de artefactos explosivos improvisados en todo el país, lo que sugiere que las líneas de suministro de importantes materiales para detonar explosivos siguen abiertas.

85. El comprador de los detonadores eléctricos C-DET y de los cordones detonantes rojos que se descubrieron en el envío de Qandala de octubre de 2012 ha sido identificado como Anwar Saleh Kodais, un nacional yemení con estrechos vínculos con Al-Shabaab y Al-Qaida en la Península Arábiga. También ha sido relacionado con personas identificadas en el informe anterior del Grupo de Supervisión (S/2013/413, anexo 3.1), en que se hacía referencia a una red delictiva de cabecillas piratas, pescadores ilegales y agentes de Al-Shabaab involucrados en el tráfico en el Golfo de Adén. La información recibida por el Grupo confirma que Al-Shabaab sigue obteniendo de esta red armas y materiales componentes de artefactos explosivos improvisados (véase el estudio del caso en el anexo 6.6).

E. Unidad de protección del petróleo de Somalilandia

86. El Gobierno de Somalilandia ha encargado a Assaye Risk, una empresa de seguridad privada con sede en el Reino Unido, que elabore un plan para una unidad de protección del petróleo, integrada por aproximadamente 580 personas, que actuaría como fuerza defensiva específica para atenuar las amenazas de seguridad contra operaciones sísmicas llevadas a cabo por empresas petroleras. El plan ha sido financiado por Genel Energy, que en septiembre de 2013 suspendió provisionalmente las operaciones en Somalilandia aduciendo un “empeoramiento de la situación de seguridad”.

87. El Grupo de Supervisión ya había informado sobre los riesgos para la seguridad que presentaban las reivindicaciones enfrentadas del Gobierno Federal y las administraciones regionales respecto de las licencias de explotación del petróleo, y recomendó al Consejo de Seguridad recomendar que las autoridades somalíes evitaran firmar contratos con empresas de petróleo y gas hasta que las disposiciones constitucionales, legislativas, fiscales y regulatorias apropiadas se hubieran aclarado y hubieran sido aceptadas por el Gobierno Federal y sus autoridades regionales (S/2013/413, párr. 176 b)). Mientras tanto, las partes comerciales siguen adelante con sus actividades en el sector del petróleo y el gas y es probable que atraigan amenazas para la seguridad a medida que se amplían sus actividades comerciales. Por consiguiente, el Grupo de Supervisión mantiene su posición de que la actividad comercial en ese sector probablemente desencadenará conflictos a menos que un enfoque conjunto internacional y somalí para la gestión de los recursos naturales pueda resolver los intereses enfrentados.

88. Efectivamente, la constitución de una unidad de protección del petróleo sin que se hayan establecido procesos transparentes conlleva diversos riesgos, que podrían empeorar las condiciones de seguridad en Somalilandia en un contexto en que los intereses de clanes minoritarios han desafiado la legitimidad de las

decisiones del Gobierno de Somalilandia con respecto a la concesión de licencias en el sector del petróleo, lo cual ha beneficiado a Al-Shabaab. En este contexto, el Grupo ha planteado la cuestión de la unidad de protección del petróleo tanto al Comité como al Gobierno de Somalilandia para lograr que se apliquen las mejores prácticas y que la unidad no se establezca en contravención de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad⁷⁰. El Grupo desea dejar constancia de la cooperación de Assaye Risk, que ha proporcionado toda la información solicitada por el Grupo de manera abierta y transparente.

89. En el anexo 6.7 figura un análisis de las opciones para la creación de una unidad de protección del petróleo.

F. Entrega de vehículos de tipo militar y de armas a Jubalandia

90. Entre abril y junio de 2014, la Administración Provisional de Juba importó a Kismayo 40 camionetas Toyota del modelo Land Cruiser, con tracción a las cuatro ruedas, enviadas desde los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y pagadas con fondos obtenidos de los derechos de aduana sobre las exportaciones de carbón vegetal. Se cree que la adquisición e importación de los vehículos ha sido facilitada por un comerciante de carbón vegetal afiliado a Al-Shabaab, Ali Naaji, en colaboración con el director del puerto de Kismayo, Abdullahi Dubad Shil “Hadun”, y el director adjunto del puerto, Yusuf Gamadid. Posteriormente los vehículos fueron pintados con colores de camuflaje y equipados con ametralladoras pesadas. Además, el Grupo de Supervisión fue informado de que la Administración Provisional de Juba había importado 3.000 armas ligeras, 30 armas pesadas y uniformes militares y equipo de comunicaciones. En el anexo 6.8 se presentan fotografías de los vehículos transformados en “vehículos técnicos”.

IV. Obstrucción de la asistencia humanitaria⁷¹

91. El entorno para la distribución de la asistencia humanitaria y el acceso a ella durante el año pasado se caracterizó por la proliferación de intervenciones humanitarias y de agentes en un territorio más extenso, en un contexto de fluctuación de los centros de poder, profundización de las divisiones políticas, nuevos ciclos de conflicto y aumento de la inseguridad. Si bien surgieron nuevas

⁷⁰ En el párrafo 11 a) de la resolución 2111 (2013) se estipula que el embargo de armas relativo a Somalia no se aplicará a: “El suministro de armas o equipo militar ni a la asistencia o capacitación técnicas prestadas por Estados Miembros u organizaciones internacionales, regionales o subregionales destinados exclusivamente a los efectos de ayudar a desarrollar las instituciones del sector de la seguridad de Somalia, de no haber una decisión en contrario del Comité dentro de los cinco días hábiles siguientes a aquel en que reciba una notificación de este tipo de asistencia del Estado u organización internacional, regional o subregional proveedores”.

⁷¹ En el párrafo 8 c) de la resolución 1844 (2008), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibió los actos que obstruyeran la prestación de asistencia humanitaria a Somalia, o el acceso a la asistencia humanitaria o su distribución en Somalia. El Grupo de Supervisión interpreta que esta disposición incluye la desviación de asistencia de modo que no llegue a sus beneficiarios previstos, ya sea en beneficio de un grupo armado o simplemente para obtener una ganancia.

oportunidades de acceso, la complejidad de los factores que había que negociar superaba en ocasiones la eficacia de la acción humanitaria⁷².

A. Denegación de acceso y ataques contra los trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria⁷³

92. A comienzos de 2013 pareció que el acceso humanitario mejoraría en el sur y el centro de Somalia gracias a la expansión de la autoridad del Gobierno Federal. En agosto de 2014 ya era posible acceder físicamente a un territorio más extenso, y las Naciones Unidas y las organizaciones no gubernamentales establecieron su presencia en nuevas localidades. No obstante, la calidad y la sostenibilidad de ese acceso han empeorado en muchos lugares⁷⁴. Esto obedeció a una combinación de factores como la intensificación del conflicto, el mayor número de desplazamientos y la degradación de la seguridad, todo ello exacerbado en particular por la ofensiva conjunta del ejército y la AMISOM contra Al-Shabaab. En los centros urbanos recuperados como consecuencia de la ofensiva, el control gubernamental siguió estando limitado a una zona confinada, ya que las líneas de abastecimiento eran muy vulnerables a los ataques. Había grandes dificultades de acceso tanto para los trabajadores humanitarios como para las partes comerciales. La prestación de asistencia a las zonas rurales siguió siendo particularmente difícil.

93. Al-Shabaab era la entidad que de manera más sistemática, y a menudo con violencia, negaba el acceso de la asistencia humanitaria a las personas que estaban en las zonas que controlaba y donde podía bloquear la circulación de personas y mercancías en dirección a otras zonas que estaban bajo la influencia del Gobierno. La multiplicación de estructuras de Estado en los planos federal, regional y local, paralela a la apertura de nuevos espacios para las operaciones humanitarias, creó también oportunidades para que más funcionarios intentaran captar recursos para consolidar su poder. Al mismo tiempo, las nuevas estructuras también proporcionaban a la comunidad humanitaria medios de superar esas obstrucciones, que a menudo eran más previsibles.

94. Con la aparición de nuevos conflictos por los recursos y de una lucha por el poder sobre las débiles estructuras del Estado, a las organizaciones humanitarias les resultaba a menudo imposible actuar a causa de la creciente inseguridad, y también como consecuencia de la falta de una autoridad clara sobre las zonas de operación. Efectuar aportaciones humanitarias críticas en un contexto de cambios constantes en el control del territorio exigía una renegociación perpetua. En este contexto tan complicado, al que se sumaba la intensificación de los ciclos de conflicto, las medidas de seguridad que tenían por objeto facilitar el acceso a veces servían para obstruirlo. En particular, la ofensiva del ejército y de la AMISOM y los

⁷² El Grupo de Supervisión asignó prioridad a la seguridad en sus estrategias de investigación, y la mayoría de personas de la comunidad humanitaria que proporcionaron información solicitaron que se mantuviera el carácter confidencial de dicha información.

⁷³ La denegación de acceso humanitario conlleva impedir la libertad de paso o la entrega puntual de asistencia humanitaria a las personas necesitadas, además de ataques deliberados contra trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria.

⁷⁴ Cuantificar el acceso es una tarea compleja, ya que a menudo hay demasiadas variables para poder hacer determinaciones claras. El último mapa del acceso producido por la Oficina de Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios es de septiembre de 2013. Véase www.unocha.org/somalia/maps-graphics/humanitarian-access-maps.

contraataques de Al-Shabaab en marzo de 2014 dieron lugar a desplazamientos, interrumpieron las labores de siembra y cosecha y cortaron las líneas de abastecimiento. Sumado a los factores ambientales, esto llevó a declarar una alerta de seguridad alimentaria en julio de 2014⁷⁵. Además, como consecuencia de los cambios en las prioridades de financiación de los donantes, a menudo no había suficiente apoyo disponible para necesidades humanitarias críticas, en particular los servicios médicos, una situación exacerbada por la retirada de la organización Médecins sans frontières de Somalia en agosto de 2013⁷⁶.

95. En este contexto de creciente inestabilidad política, inseguridad y conflicto armado, se intensificaron las amenazas contra los trabajadores y recursos humanitarios (aunque no fueron seguidas necesariamente por ataques), ya como blanco de acciones con una motivación ideológica y militar o porque se les consideraba activos que se podían capturar⁷⁷. Las amenazas procedían de varias fuentes, incluidos Al-Shabaab y otras partes en los conflictos de Somalia, representantes oficiales de las autoridades regionales o estados emergentes e intereses privados y grupos delictivos.

96. Un mortífero ataque contra el complejo común de las Naciones Unidas en Mogadiscio el 19 de junio de 2013 es un ejemplo de las intenciones y de la capacidad de Al-Shabaab de atacar globalmente la presencia de las Naciones Unidas, incluido su componente humanitario. A mediados de enero de 2014, Al-Shabaab hizo pública una declaración en la que afirmaba que las actividades humanitarias en general (y no solo los organismos de las Naciones Unidas, ya que había demostrado claramente su capacidad y su disposición a atacarlos) eran objetivos legítimos de sus operaciones⁷⁸. Se incrementaron las amenazas contra miembros del personal humanitario y las capturas de esas personas en las zonas controladas por Al-Shabaab, particularmente en el período anterior a la ofensiva del ejército y la AMISOM contra el grupo.

97. La ofensiva contra Al-Shabaab, la utilización por el grupo de tácticas de guerrilla y la reanudación de los conflictos entre clanes, motivados por la apropiación de recursos o por la búsqueda de poder, se combinaron para contribuir a crear un clima general de inseguridad e incertidumbre para los trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria en Somalia.

98. Véase en el anexo 7.1 una descripción general de la denegación de acceso humanitario en Somalia.

⁷⁵ Véase <http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/early-warning-alert-food-security-worsens-drought-looms-somalia-emergency-unfolding>.

⁷⁶ Véase, por ejemplo, la exposición hecha por el coordinador del grupo de actividades de salud de las Naciones Unidas sobre los efectos de la retirada de Médecins sans frontières en la situación de salud en Somalia, 26 de agosto de 2013 (en los archivos del Grupo de Supervisión).

⁷⁷ Un análisis de los incidentes de seguridad en relación con las operaciones de las organizaciones no gubernamentales, por ejemplo, pone de manifiesto que, si bien los incidentes de detención y privación de libertad de miembros del personal de organizaciones no gubernamentales aumentaron en 2014, se redujo el número de ataques con víctimas contra esas organizaciones. En 2013 hubo 10 incidentes en que resultaron muertos miembros del personal de organizaciones no gubernamentales. Sin embargo, a mediados de julio de 2014 solo se habían producido tres incidentes de este tipo. Véase www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2014/.

⁷⁸ Si bien algunos aspectos del lenguaje utilizado sugerían un cambio de orientación, las actividades se dirigieron de nuevo contra entidades consideradas partidistas.

99. Véase en el anexo 7.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, una descripción de determinadas prácticas que constituyen obstrucción de la asistencia humanitaria en Puntlandia.

100. Véase en el anexo 7.3, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, una descripción del funcionamiento de las Unidades de Protección Especial en Somalilandia y Puntlandia.

101. Véase el anexo 7.4, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, en relación con la apropiación temporal de suministros humanitarios por las Fuerzas de Defensa de Etiopía.

102. Véase en el anexo 7.5 una descripción general de los ataques contra trabajadores de asistencia humanitaria en Somalia.

B. Desviación y apropiación indebida de la asistencia humanitaria

103. Los negocios que se hacen con la asistencia humanitaria, tanto lícitos como ilícitos, han sido un elemento fundamental de la economía somalí durante decenios. La división de esos recursos ha llevado consigo un reparto no solo aceptado sino también esperado, a lo largo de una cadena de distribución que va del donante al transportista, a la autoridad controladora y al interlocutor local. Pueden participar en ella múltiples agentes oficiales y no oficiales, tanto somalíes como internacionales.

104. Si se compara con los momentos de grandes aportaciones durante el período de respuesta a la situación de hambre de 2011-2012, ha habido una disminución del volumen total de la asistencia humanitaria disponible para su distribución. Por ejemplo, hasta junio de 2014 solo se había financiado el 28% de las necesidades del proceso del llamamiento consolidado de 2014⁷⁹. El anuncio del “Nuevo Acuerdo” a fines de 2013 estimuló las iniciativas tendentes a crear y controlar nuevos puntos para la captación de recursos y tuvo un efecto indirecto en el contexto humanitario. Una investigación más a fondo de la desviación de materiales de asistencia humanitaria y sus efectos, incluso por parte del Grupo de Supervisión, llevó a las entidades de las Naciones Unidas, las organizaciones no gubernamentales y los donantes a incrementar sus funciones de diligencia debida y supervisión y a formular nuevos instrumentos de gestión del riesgo (véase S/2013/413, anexo 7.2). Esas iniciativas arrojaron resultados durante el último año por lo que respecta al reconocimiento de los desafíos, la voluntad de descubrir situaciones de fraude y desviación y una mayor coordinación entre los agentes humanitarios. Sin embargo, la respuesta a esas conclusiones exigía que los organismos establecieran un equilibrio delicado entre los distintos factores, debido en particular a la fragilidad del entorno, el volumen de las necesidades humanitarias y la reducción global de los fondos disponibles.

105. No obstante, si bien los nuevos instrumentos y la nueva voluntad política de hacer frente al robo de suministros de ayuda empezaron a tener efectos sobre el terreno, las realidades de la desigual calidad del acceso, la inseguridad constante y la fluctuación de la autoridad, sumadas a la persistencia de prácticas de gestión remotas, tuvieron como resultado que se continuara desviando asistencia

⁷⁹ Véase <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalia%20Humanitarian%20Snapshot%20-%20June%202014.pdf>.

humanitaria. El Grupo de Supervisión recibió información sobre una serie de denuncias relativas a apropiación indebida de recursos a lo largo de toda la cadena de suministro de las entregas. Se recibieron informaciones fidedignas y sistemáticas sobre la desviación y la apropiación indebida de recursos de asistencia humanitaria por parte de agentes estatales (incluidas las fuerzas de seguridad), agentes armados no estatales (incluido Al-Shabaab), empleados de organismos humanitarios, contratistas privados y entidades delictivas. Además del robo y el saqueo directos de los artículos, los métodos utilizados eran cada vez más perfeccionados, y en algunos casos incluían la producción por especialistas de documentos fraudulentos.

106. Véase en el anexo 7.6, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, información sobre la desviación y la apropiación indebida de la asistencia humanitaria.

107. Véase en el anexo 7.7 una descripción de las medidas encaminadas a mejorar el cumplimiento en el contexto de la desviación y la apropiación indebida de la asistencia humanitaria.

V. Violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario⁸⁰

108. El aumento de la inseguridad y nuevos ciclos de conflicto crearon un entorno en el cual se cometieron en todo el país, pero especialmente en el sur y el centro de Somalia, violaciones del derecho internacional aplicable, como causar víctimas entre la población civil, además de violaciones de la prohibición del reclutamiento y la utilización de niños⁸¹. Entre los responsables había miembros de todas las partes en los conflictos, incluidos Al-Shabaab y sus aliados, la AMISOM y sus socios estratégicos, las fuerzas armadas nacionales, las fuerzas de seguridad de las administraciones regionales y sus aliados, agentes armados asociados con las distintas administraciones regionales, subregionales y locales y las milicias de los clanes. Quienes tenían más probabilidades de sufrir esas violaciones eran las comunidades minoritarias y los grupos vulnerables, como los desplazados internos, los niños, los hombres y mujeres jóvenes y las niñas.

A. Ataques dirigidos contra civiles

109. No existe en Somalia en ningún sistema exhaustivo que permita un seguimiento o un registro de las víctimas civiles. En un análisis preparado para el Grupo de Supervisión, el proyecto de base de datos sobre la localización y los eventos de los conflictos armados concluyó que, mientras que el nivel de violencia contra los civiles había permanecido “relativamente estable” entre junio de 2013 y junio de 2014, la intensidad general (el número de víctimas asociadas con cada incidente) había aumentado⁸². Entre enero y junio de 2014, por ejemplo, se

⁸⁰ En el párrafo 1 d) y e) de la resolución 2002 (2011), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibió actos que contravinieran el derecho internacional aplicable, como la utilización de niños en conflictos armados, ataques contra civiles, violencia sexual o por razón género y secuestros y desplazamientos forzados.

⁸¹ Somalia presentaba el nivel de conflicto más alto de África en 2013, con un incremento de más del 50% en 2013 respecto de 2012. Véase www.acledata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No-22-January-2014.pdf.

⁸² Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, análisis del conflicto de Somalia, agosto de 2014 (inédito).

trataron 3.341 casos de lesiones causadas por armas en ocho hospitales de Mogadiscio, Kismayo, Baidoa y Mudug⁸³.

110. El contexto en que se produjeron ataques dirigidos contra civiles era complejo. Con frecuencia no es fácil categorizar las características de la violencia en los casos en que se cometieron graves violaciones del derecho internacional. En el último año, el principal conflicto armado fue la campaña que el ejército, sus aliados nacionales y la AMISOM y sus socios estratégicos emprendieron contra Al-Shabaab. Además, en Sool y Sanaag oriental hubo enfrentamientos entre las fuerzas de seguridad de Puntlandia y Somalilandia, incluidos sus aliados, y milicias asociadas con el autoproclamado estado de Khatumo. Sin embargo, esos conflictos estaban interrelacionados con otros conflictos y campañas de violencia e instrumentalizados por ellos. En todo el país, el uso de la violencia armada para controlar tierras, intereses comerciales y otros recursos se mezcla con un incremento de los conflictos políticos y conflictos entre los clanes, todo lo cual se produce en un contexto en que las estructuras de seguridad y justicia del Estado siguen siendo débiles y están secuestradas por intereses diversos.

111. Las estructuras del Estado central no podían ejercer un control efectivo sobre el uso de la fuerza armada. Tanto los clanes como personalidades del mundo de los negocios mantenían sus propias milicias armadas. Al-Shabaab seguía actuando en lugares donde no tenía el control del territorio, y los ataques contra la población civil a menudo se intensificaban después de que el Gobierno Federal hubiera conseguido el control de un lugar determinado. Las conquistas de territorio por el Gobierno Federal raramente se tradujeron en un aumento de la capacidad del Estado para proteger a la población civil contra los ataques.

112. La situación se complicó a causa de la debilidad de los activos y las estructuras centrales de mando y control de las fuerzas armadas. Era frecuente que los miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad se aprovecharan de los materiales y de la autoridad del Estado para perseguir intereses privados, y al hacerlo perpetraban ataques contra civiles. Dado que era fácil disponer de armas y uniformes, las partes en los conflictos y otros agentes que recurrían a la violencia armada para ejercer su poder explotaban la confusión. Por ejemplo, se denunciaba de manera oportunista que Al-Shabaab o las fuerzas de seguridad estaban involucrados en una situación particular a fin de legitimar el uso de la fuerza o atribuir la responsabilidad por determinadas violaciones. Al-Shabaab se aprovechaba de esta opacidad haciendo suyos los agravios de las personas violentamente excluidas de los centros de poder para promover más violencia y caos y erosionar un Estado inmaduro. Un análisis realizado por el proyecto de base de datos sobre la localización y los eventos de los conflictos armados, por ejemplo, atribuyó a grupos armados no identificados la mayor proporción de actos de violencia contra civiles y de víctimas denunciados entre junio de 2013 y junio de 2014⁸³.

113. Los principios e instituciones del derecho consuetudinario somalí (*Xeer*), que tradicionalmente regulaban la conducta de las hostilidades, sufrieron mayores presiones como consecuencia de la complejidad del conflicto⁸⁴. La ideología y los

⁸³ Correspondencia electrónica con un funcionario de la Organización Mundial de la Salud, 18 de julio de 2014.

⁸⁴ Tradicionalmente el sistema consuetudinario atenuaba y regulaba la conducta de las hostilidades entre los clanes y el tratamiento de grupos inmunes; por ejemplo, contemplaba que algunas categorías de personas debían estar “protegidas de la lanza”. También prohíbe el uso de algunos

objetivos de Al-Shabaab, por ejemplo, permitían medios y métodos de guerra contrarios tanto al derecho somalí como al derecho internacional. La violación de principios básicos, en particular las reglas de distinción y proporcionalidad, constituía a veces una táctica deliberada para infundir terror y socavar al enemigo. Ni las vidas de sus propios combatientes ni las de los civiles que resultarían perjudicados se tenían en cuenta en la planificación y la ejecución de los ataques⁸⁵. Esto era particularmente cierto en los casos en que Al-Shabaab emprendía operaciones fuera de Somalia (véase el anexo 2). Las tácticas elegidas por Al-Shabaab creaban con frecuencia un contexto en el cual era más difícil para sus adversarios atenerse a las normas del derecho internacional humanitario, lo que aumentaba el número de víctimas civiles. Las violaciones cometidas por ambas “partes” comprendían la detención arbitraria, la tortura y los tratos degradantes, así como las violaciones de garantías fundamentales relacionadas con el derecho a un juicio imparcial, incluso en el contexto de la imposición de la pena de muerte.

114. También se cometían violaciones del derecho internacional al margen del contexto específico del conflicto con Al-Shabaab. Desde comienzos de 2013 se ha producido un resurgimiento de las luchas entre clanes por ganar acceso a la tierra y a otros recursos económicos, en las cuales se han visto involucrados el ejército y sus activos. Algunos de los enfrentamientos más intensos en los que hubo víctimas civiles tuvieron lugar en el Bajo Shabelle, el Shabelle Medio y la región de Hiraan. La forma particular en que se desarrollaron esos conflictos entre clanes, con el poder del Estado desplegado en apoyo de una de las partes, presentaba un gran desafío no solo para la protección de los civiles sino también para la construcción del Estado y en general para la paz y la seguridad⁸⁶.

115. Véase en el anexo 8.1 una descripción general de los ataques dirigidos contra civiles en Somalia.

116. Véase el anexo 8.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, en relación con los ataques dirigidos contra civiles en aldeas situadas alrededor de Jowhar, en el Shabelle Medio, y en Taleex, en Sool, en noviembre de 2013.

B. Violencia sexual y por razón de género

117. La violencia sexual y por razón de género es generalizada en Somalia. Entre enero y julio de 2014, por ejemplo, los suministradores de servicios se ocuparon de 2.703 casos: 529 casos de violación; 226 casos de agresión sexual; 1.518 casos de violencia física; 95 casos de matrimonio forzado; 234 casos de denegación de

medios y métodos de guerra y ataques contra determinados recursos, como los pozos y los domicilios. Véase Omar Abdulle Alasow, *Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes, The Case of Somalia* (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010).

⁸⁵ En 2013, por ejemplo, las Naciones Unidas comprobaron que 47 niños habían muerto y 67 habían sido heridos por Al-Shabaab (véase [A/68/878-S/2014/339](#), párr. 118).

⁸⁶ Estos conflictos se produjeron principalmente entre los clanes Hawiye/Habar Gedir y Dir/Biyamal en el Bajo Shabelle, entre los clanes Hawiye/Abgaal y Jareer/Shiidle en el Shabelle Medio, y entre los clanes Hawiye/Hawadle y Dir/Surre en la región de Hiraan. El ejército nacional está integrado principalmente por miembros de los clanes Hawiye.

recursos, oportunidades o servicios; y 101 casos de abuso emocional psicológico⁸⁷. Debido a la persistencia del conflicto armado, exacerbado por factores sociales y culturales, las mujeres y los niños de grupos minoritarios y comunidades vulnerables, como los desplazados internos y los pobres de zonas urbanas o las poblaciones afectadas por el conflicto, tenían mayores probabilidades de ser víctimas de violencia sexual y por razón de género. La escala de la mutilación genital femenina en Somalia intensificaba el sufrimiento de las mujeres y complicaba el tratamiento de la violencia sexual y por razón de género⁸⁸.

118. “Agente armado” era la designación que se atribuía a los perpetradores del mayor número de casos denunciados de violencia sexual y por razón de género en el sur y el centro de Somalia. El incremento de la actividad militar, como consecuencia de la ofensiva del ejército y la AMISOM contra Al-Shabaab y de la intensificación de los conflictos entre clanes, hacía que las mujeres y niñas estuvieran más expuestas a ser agredidas⁸⁹. Las fuerzas de Al-Shabaab también cometían actos de violencia sexual y por razón de género, incluso en el contexto del matrimonio forzado. En medio de la proliferación de agentes armados y de las interconexiones entre ellos, un reto importante era la identificación de los culpables, especialmente porque la disponibilidad de armas y uniformes hacía difícil distinguir entre las diversas fuerzas.

119. El Grupo de Supervisión recibió una serie de denuncias fidedignas de violencia sexual y por razón de género, que incluían casos de explotación y abusos sexuales, por parte de personal de la AMISOM. Aunque la Misión adoptó medidas tendentes a mejorar la eficacia de la prevención y de la capacitación, seguía resultando difícil hacer cumplir la ley y las normas de la AMISOM, así como asegurar la rendición de cuentas y obtener reparaciones por las infracciones.

120. A nivel nacional, era extraordinariamente difícil encontrar remedios para los casos de violencia sexual y por razón de género, no solo por los importantes obstáculos existentes en el marco jurídico y por la interacción del derecho consuetudinario y la *sharia*, sino también a causa del clima social, cultural y político, en el cual se recurre a la protección del clan o a métodos de arreglo de las controversias más que a los medios judiciales. Persiste una cultura de negación, particularmente en casos en que agentes estatales o personas próximas a ellos eran acusados de actos de violencia sexual y por razón de género, como se puso de manifiesto en la forma de tratar dos casos de violación muy notables en 2013, en los cuales las presuntas víctimas y quienes denunciaron los incidentes o prestaron apoyo a las víctimas fueron acusados de delitos y declarados culpables. No obstante, el Gobierno Federal anunció toda una serie de nuevas iniciativas importantes para luchar contra la violencia sexual, incluso mediante la creación de planes de acción gubernamentales para sectores específicos y la elaboración de un proyecto de ley

⁸⁷ Información proporcionada por un organismo de las Naciones Unidas el 22 de agosto de 2014. Cabe señalar que las cifras reflejan casos denunciados por suministradores de servicios, y no representan la magnitud de la violencia sexual y por razón de género en Somalia en su conjunto.

⁸⁸ Entrevista telefónica con un miembro del personal de una organización no gubernamental humanitaria internacional el 20 de marzo de 2014. Más del 98% de las niñas de entre 7 y 12 años son sometidas a alguna forma de mutilación genital femenina (véase www.unicef.org/somalia/cpp_133.html).

⁸⁹ Entrevista con un miembro de una organización no gubernamental humanitaria internacional en Nairobi el 12 de febrero de 2014; entrevista con un funcionario de las Naciones Unidas en Nairobi el 2 de diciembre de 2013.

sobre delitos sexuales. Estas medidas son positivas, pero lo decisivo será su aplicación.

121. Véase en el anexo 8.3 una descripción general de la situación de la violencia sexual y por razón de género en Somalia.

122. Véase en el anexo 8.4, de carácter estrictamente confidencial, información relativa a actos de violencia sexual y por razón de género en que estuvo involucrado personal de la AMISOM.

C. Reclutamiento y utilización de niños en los conflictos armados

123. Todas las partes armadas continúan reclutando y utilizando niños en operaciones militares. Al-Shabaab sido el principal violador de la prohibición de la utilización de niños en los conflictos armados. En 2013, las Naciones Unidas documentaron y verificaron 908 incidentes de reclutamiento y utilización de niños por Al-Shabaab ([A/68/878-S/2014/339](#), párr. 116). La asociación con Al-Shabaab también hacía que los niños fueran más vulnerables a otras violaciones del derecho internacional, incluso en el contexto de operaciones de captura y detención por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado.

124. Aunque el ejército amplió sus esfuerzos de preselección de personal, prosiguió el reclutamiento y la utilización de niños en los conflictos armados, en particular a nivel de los distritos y en el contexto de operaciones en puestos de control y otras funciones de apoyo. También hubo casos de niños reclutados y utilizados por milicias aliadas con el ejército (véase [A/68/878-S/2014/339](#)). En junio de 2014, el Secretario General agregó a Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a a su lista de Al-Shabaab y el ejército nacional como partes que reclutaron y utilizaron niños en 2013 (*ibid.*, anexo I). Por otra parte, las fuerzas de Ras Kamboni y las milicias de otros clanes e intereses comerciales o milicias independientes también tenían niños entre sus filas. La intensificación del conflicto entre clanes dio lugar a un aumento de incidentes de reclutamiento de niños, incluso en el Bajo Shabelle, el Shabelle Medio y partes de Sool y Sanaag.

125. El Grupo de Supervisión recibió informaciones sobre el reclutamiento de niños en apoyo de las partes armadas de Somalia tanto dentro como fuera del país. Los esfuerzos por reducir el número de niños asociados con los grupos armados se vieron fortalecidos cuando el Gobierno suscribió en febrero de 2014 un procedimiento operativo estándar para la recepción y la entrega de niños separados de grupos armados. En junio de 2014, la AMISOM adoptó su propio procedimiento operativo estándar para el tratamiento de todas las personas detenidas por la Misión, en el que se aclaraban los procedimientos y principios con arreglo a los cuales, entre otras cosas, era legítimo detener a los niños y posteriormente ponerlos a cargo de las autoridades competentes para que se ocuparan de ellos.

126. Véase en el anexo 8.5 una descripción general de la situación del reclutamiento y la utilización de niños en los conflictos armados de Somalia.

D. Desplazamiento forzado

127. La población somalí sigue padeciendo una de las crisis de desplazamiento forzado más extensas y más prolongadas del mundo. En enero de 2014 había

1.157.210 refugiados y solicitantes de asilo registrados oficialmente fuera de Somalia, y más de 1.133.000 personas, principalmente de comunidades minoritarias, desplazadas en el interior del país⁹⁰.

128. Debido a la mejora de la seguridad en algunas zonas, en 2013 se registraron retornos en pequeña escala, tanto en el interior del país como desde el extranjero, y se esperaba que estos aumentaran en 2014⁹¹. No obstante, desde finales de 2013, la ofensiva conjunta del ejército y la AMISOM contra Al-Shabaab, sumada a nuevos ciclos de conflictos entre clanes, por controlar recursos o por motivos políticos, causó un aumento significativo de los desplazamientos (véanse también los anexos 3.1 y 3.2)⁹². En distintas situaciones, ha habido poblaciones confinadas por la fuerza, obligadas a huir o sitiadas como consecuencia de las tácticas de guerra. En algunos casos el desplazamiento de la población civil ha sido por sí mismo un objetivo de los ataques armados. Las expulsiones forzadas en Mogadiscio empeoraron gravemente la situación humanitaria y de protección de decenas de miles de somalíes, muchos de los cuales ya estaban desplazados en el interior del país. Desastres naturales como las inundaciones y los ciclones han aumentado el sufrimiento de comunidades vulnerables y han causado movimientos mixtos de población.

129. El aumento de la presión sobre los refugiados y los migrantes somalíes para hacerles regresar a Somalia se puso de manifiesto en dos importantes operaciones de seguridad y expulsión llevadas a cabo en 2014 en Kenya y en la Arabia Saudita. Las circunstancias en que se desarrollaron esas operaciones tuvieron como consecuencia en ambos casos situaciones que pueden describirse como *refoulement* y, en algunas ocasiones, un nuevo desplazamiento interno de los repatriados.

130. Las víctimas del confinamiento y el desplazamiento forzado tenían más probabilidades de estar expuestas a otras violaciones distintas del derecho internacional, incluidos los ataques contra los civiles, la violencia sexual y por razón de género, el reclutamiento forzado y la denegación de acceso a la ayuda humanitaria. A comienzos de julio de 2014, por ejemplo, el Coordinador Residente y de Asuntos Humanitarios de las Naciones Unidas para Somalia anunció, con respecto a 350.000 desplazados internos en Mogadiscio, que “las tasas de malnutrición aguda y los niveles de mortalidad ya habían sobrepasado los umbrales de emergencia”⁹³. En marzo de 2014 se anunció que se había elaborado un proyecto de marco de políticas sobre el desplazamiento en Somalia, pero dicho marco todavía no ha sido aprobado oficialmente.

⁹⁰ Véase www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483ad6.html. En realidad las solicitudes de asilo de somalíes aumentaron en un 23% en 44 Estados industrializados en 2013, y se registraron 23.071 nuevas solicitudes (véase UNHCR asylum trends 2013, marzo de 2014).

⁹¹ En 2013, la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR) comunicó que había prestado asistencia a 10.909 personas para que pudieran regresar a sus hogares, principalmente al Bajo Shabelle y al Shabelle Medio. Véase Returns Consortium, Joint Return Plan, Version February 2014, en el archivo del Grupo de Supervisión.

⁹² Entre el 1 de julio de 2013 y el 30 de junio de 2014, los análisis de las tendencias de los movimientos de población del ACNUR registraron el movimiento de 148.000 personas; los principales traslados se registraron en marzo de 2014 (32.000 personas), cuando estaba en marcha la ofensiva del ejército nacional y la AMISOM contra Al-Shabaab. No obstante, es importante señalar que las cifras reflejan tendencias de población, y no datos acumulados. Véase <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=197>.

⁹³ Véase <http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/drought-conditions-set-worsen-somalia-food-crisis-statement-philippe-lazzarini>.

131. Véase en el anexo 8.6 una descripción general de la situación relativa al desplazamiento forzado en Somalia.

VI. Violaciones de la prohibición relativa al carbón vegetal⁹⁴

132. Durante el período de su mandato, el Grupo de Supervisión ha seguido documentando las operaciones de carga y exportación de carbón vegetal desde el puerto de Barawe, controlado por Al-Shabaab, y desde el puerto de Kismayo, que se describieron con detalle en el anterior informe del Grupo (S/2013/413, anexo 9). En su tarea de describir la cadena de suministro del comercio internacional de carbón vegetal, el Grupo de Supervisión ha identificado a los exportadores e importadores, como continuación de las averiguaciones hechas en sus mandatos anteriores (véanse S/2011/433 y S/2012/544), y también ha ampliado el ámbito de sus investigaciones con objeto de determinar la función de los intermediarios, los mayoristas, los transportistas y quienes se dedican a falsificar documentación naviera para facilitar las importaciones de carbón vegetal somalí como si hubieran tenido su origen en lugares distintos de Somalia. De las investigaciones del Grupo se desprende una imagen compleja de complicidad y colaboración entre comerciantes, transportistas, agentes, mayoristas y personas dedicadas a falsificar documentación para facilitar la violación sistemática de la resolución 2036 (2012).

133. El 7 de mayo de 2014, el Comité hizo pública la nota orientativa núm. 1, que contenía recomendaciones sobre la prohibición de importar carbón vegetal procedente de Somalia por parte de los Estados Miembros, en cumplimiento de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad 2036 (2012), 2060 (2012) y 2111 (2013). Su propósito era ayudar a los Estados Miembros a dar cumplimiento a la prohibición impuesta al carbón vegetal somalí y desincentivar su comercio. Con referencia a la nota, el Asesor de Seguridad Nacional del Presidente de Somalia, Abdirahman Sheikh Issa, envió al Comité una carta de fecha 9 de junio de 2014 en la que indicaba las medidas que había adoptado el Gobierno Federal para aplicar la prohibición en coordinación con la AMISOM, las autoridades de Jubalandia y los Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. Sin embargo, hasta la fecha el Grupo de Supervisión ha observado que la magnitud del comercio internacional de carbón vegetal somalí corresponde más o menos a lo averiguado anteriormente (véase S/2013/413) y que la estructura empresarial transnacional de ese comercio sigue en pie y continúa adaptándose para obtener beneficios en gran escala. Mientras tanto, Al-Shabaab se sigue beneficiando, en una proporción mayor que cuando controlaba Kismayo, de los ingresos generados en los centros de producción del carbón vegetal, en puestos de control en las rutas de transporte y por las exportaciones, en particular en Kismayo y Barawe. Hasta la fecha ninguna de esas actividades ha sido interrumpida por la ofensiva militar emprendida contra Al-Shabaab (véase el anexo 9.1).

⁹⁴ En los párrafos 22 y 23 de la resolución 2036 (2012), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibió la exportación y la importación directa o indirecta de carbón vegetal desde Somalia y consideró que participar en ese comercio era una amenaza para la paz, la seguridad o la estabilidad de Somalia. El Consejo reiteró también la prohibición impuesta al carbón vegetal somalí en las resoluciones 2060 (2012) y 2111 (2013).

A. Metodología de las investigaciones

134. El Grupo de Supervisión dispone de fuentes en Kismayo y Barawe que tienen conocimiento anticipado de los planes de carga en Somalia y los planes de descarga en los puertos de destino, además de información naviera detallada. El Grupo también ha recibido información parcial de algunos armadores de buques que han alquilado sus embarcaciones a personas que intervienen en el transporte de carbón vegetal desde puertos somalíes. El Grupo ha complementado este flujo de información con pruebas fotográficas de buques que estaban descargando en algunos puertos de destino, además de documentación naviera que corrobora los hechos y de visitas sobre el terreno a almacenes de carbón vegetal en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, donde se ha entregado el carbón vegetal somalí. Por otra parte, se ha obtenido información de oficiales navales internacionales que participan en el seguimiento de algunos buques que transportan carbón vegetal. Mientras que la amplitud y la diversidad de las fuentes del Grupo le han permitido hacer un seguimiento de las violaciones de la resolución 2036 (2012), la escasa cooperación de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, especialmente por lo que respecta a la falta de respuesta a solicitudes de documentación aduanera, como se describe más adelante, ha obstaculizado las investigaciones del Grupo, sobre todo en lo relativo a identificar a los consignatarios. El Grupo de Supervisión también se ha topado con obstrucciones por parte de los armadores de buques que participan en el comercio del carbón vegetal, muchos de los cuales han confirmado que sus buques han exportado carbón vegetal de Somalia, pero se han negado a proporcionar información suficiente para identificar a los intermediarios y agentes que pagaron para fletar esos buques y que actúan en nombre de los fletadores y los consignatarios.

B. Producción, transporte y almacenamiento de carbón vegetal

135. El Grupo de Supervisión informó anteriormente de que, además de las principales zonas productoras de carbón vegetal al norte de Kismayo, como Jilib y Jamaame, en enero de 2013 la producción de carbón vegetal había aumentado extraordinariamente en Badhaade, hacia el sur, en una zona cercana a la frontera de Kenya (S/2013/413, anexo 9.2). En 2013 y 2014, las modalidades de la producción de carbón vegetal continuaron evolucionando de forma que esta se redujo en algunas zonas y aumentó en otras, incluidas las controladas por Al-Shabaab y la Administración Provisional de Juba, que tenía el apoyo de la brigada Ras Kamboni y del contingente de las Fuerzas de Defensa de Kenya de la AMISOM. Los cambios obedecen en parte a las variaciones experimentadas en las zonas de control y a la competencia por la distribución de los beneficios en el negocio global. En general, la producción de nuevo carbón vegetal no ha disminuido en el último año y la exportación de carbón vegetal recién producido continúa, impulsada por intereses que se extienden a lo largo de toda la cadena de suministro.

136. Por otra parte, los mercaderes que transportan el carbón vegetal por las rutas de suministro se han adaptado a unas prácticas más sistemáticas que incluyen puestos de control y el cobro de impuestos por Al-Shabaab y la Administración Provisional de Juba, lo cual ha reforzado una red comercial ininterrumpida que abarca desde los centros de producción hasta los puntos de exportación, y a menudo cuenta con financiación previa de inversores y comerciantes extranjeros. El Grupo

de Supervisión había determinado que entre 2012 y 2013 las grandes reservas de carbón vegetal que había en Kismayo, al norte en Barawe y en puertos más pequeños en el sur habían permanecido invariables o habían aumentado considerablemente como consecuencia de la escala de producción, mientras que la abrumadora mayoría de las exportaciones no se hicieron reduciendo las reservas sino que consistían en carbón vegetal de reciente producción (véase S/2013/413, anexo 9). En 2013 y 2014, el Grupo descubrió que en algunos momentos de gran volumen de exportaciones las reservas de Kismayo y Barawe se redujeron, pero que inmediatamente se repusieron gracias a la nueva producción.

137. En su evaluación de los centros de producción de carbón vegetal, la cadena de suministro y comercio y las reservas, el Grupo de Supervisión ha combinado información de fuentes sobre el terreno con el análisis de imágenes obtenidas por satélite para llegar a sus conclusiones (véase el anexo 9.1).

C. Tendencias de las exportaciones de carbón vegetal

138. Desde junio de 2013 hasta enero de 2014, los cargamentos de carbón vegetal se exportaban principalmente desde Barawe y Kismayo. Después de enero de 2014, los embarques tenían su origen principal en Kismayo. El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido fotografías aéreas que muestran que en febrero de 2014 las reservas de carbón vegetal en Barawe estaban casi agotadas (véase también el anexo 9.1.b)⁹⁵. Hombres de negocios somalíes que realizan operaciones en Kismayo y en Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo han proporcionado al Grupo información que indica que, en enero de 2014, Al-Shabaab y comerciantes de carbón vegetal asociados al grupo decidieron enviar la mayoría de suministros de carbón vegetal por Kismayo, donde las operaciones portuarias están supervisadas por la milicia Ras Kamboni y las Fuerzas de Defensa de Kenya (S/2013/413, anexo 9)⁹⁶. Este cambio tenía por objeto encubrir las operaciones de los comerciantes que colaboran más estrechamente con Al-Shabaab en Barawe. Un comerciante de carbón vegetal que solía realizar embarques regulares desde Barawe explicó al Grupo que Al-Shabaab había frenado las exportaciones desde el puerto de Barawe debido a que algunos comerciantes de carbón vegetal habían filtrado información relativa a las actividades de Al-Shabaab cerca de Barawe⁹⁷. Por consiguiente, además de lo indicado en el anterior informe del Grupo (S/2013/413, anexo 9.1), parece que todavía hay un tránsito de camiones de carbón vegetal desde Barawe y las zonas de producción cercanas a Kismayo, una coordinación regular entre los dos puertos y una estructura del negocio del carbón vegetal en que intervienen comerciantes de ambos lugares.

139. El Grupo de Supervisión ha contado 161 buques que exportaron carbón vegetal desde Barawe y Kismayo entre junio de 2013 y mayo de 2014. De ellos, 142 han

⁹⁵ Fotografía confidencial suministrada por una fuente de inteligencia militar, archivada por las Naciones Unidas y corroborada por imágenes de satélite suministradas por la Administración de Información sobre el Agua y la Tierra de Somalia, en el anexo 9.1.b, que muestra también la reposición de las reservas de Barawe a una escala mucho mayor en julio de 2014.

⁹⁶ Entrevista con un comerciante somalí de carbón vegetal en Dubai el 1 de junio de 2014; entrevista con un hombre de negocios somalí basado en Kismayo y Barawe el 16 de octubre de 2013; y entrevista con un intermediario somalí implicado en el comercio del carbón vegetal en Dubai el 30 de mayo de 2014.

⁹⁷ Entrevista con un comerciante somalí de carbón vegetal en Dubai el 1 de junio de 2014.

sido identificados como dhows de madera que generalmente transportan cargas de entre 10.000 y 65.000 sacos de carbón vegetal, según el tamaño de la embarcación⁹⁸. Durante el período de su mandato actual el Grupo ha observado que los comerciantes recurren cada vez más al transporte en dhows. Por lo que le han comunicado sus fuentes del sector naviero de Somalia, el Grupo entiende que esto se debe a que los comerciantes de carbón vegetal han adoptado una nueva estrategia de descomponer los envíos de carbón vegetal en cantidades menores transportadas por embarcaciones menos conspicuas, que no utilizan sistemas de navegación sofisticados, lo cual hace que sean más difíciles de seguir por las organizaciones marítimas y las fuerzas navales internacionales⁹⁹. De las 161 embarcaciones, se sabe que las 19 restantes que exportaron carbón vegetal entre junio de 2013 y mayo de 2014 eran buques mercantes, que normalmente transportan entre 50.000 y 200.000 sacos de carbón vegetal en cada embarque. De esos 19 buques mercantes, 17 transportaron carbón vegetal desde Kismayo, mientras que dos lo transportaron directamente desde Barawe⁹⁸.

140. Sin conocer los volúmenes exactos de todos y cada uno de los envíos, y basándose en cifras medias para el número aproximado de 97 envíos realizados en dhows y buques mercantes sobre los cuales se dispone de datos precisos, el Grupo de Supervisión puede aportar una estimación conservadora según la cual entre junio de 2013 y mayo de 2014 se exportaron desde Kismayo y Barawe como mínimo 6,57 millones de sacos de carbón vegetal. A los dhows les corresponde una cifra de 5,10 millones de sacos exportados, mientras que 1,47 millones de los sacos exportados durante el mismo período corresponderían a buques mercantes. A partir de los embarques conocidos, puede calcularse un número aproximado de 600.000 sacos de carbón vegetal exportados cada mes, pero este volumen podría duplicarse si se tiene en cuenta que probablemente el Grupo no haya identificado siquiera el 50% de envíos adicionales¹⁰⁰. Por consiguiente, es probable que la magnitud de las exportaciones sea equivalente a la de las exportaciones mensuales documentadas por el Grupo entre mediados de 2012 y mediados de 2013. Así pues, el valor total en el mercado internacional del carbón vegetal exportado en 2013 y 2014 puede estimarse en más de 250 millones de dólares¹⁰¹, aunque podría ser muy superior dado que el Grupo tal vez no haya identificado la totalidad de los envíos.

⁹⁸ Cálculos basados en información obtenida en tiempo real por el propio Grupo de Supervisión sobre la carga de buques y corroborada y complementada por datos de envíos recopilados por fuentes de Barawe y Kismayo.

⁹⁹ Numerosos hombres de negocios somalíes, incluidos los que participan en el comercio del carbón vegetal, han confirmado este punto durante el período del mandato del Grupo de Supervisión.

¹⁰⁰ El Grupo de Supervisión tiene conocimiento de que algunos de los buques que ha seguido han llevado a cabo múltiples travesías a Somalia para recoger carbón vegetal. Las estimaciones de esos múltiples viajes se basan en información recopilada por los propietarios de diversos buques, que han presentado información sobre el número efectivo de viajes de regreso realizados por los buques que, según ha podido documentar el Grupo, han exportado por lo menos una vez desde Somalia entre 2013 and 2014.

¹⁰¹ En 2013, el Grupo de Supervisión estimó que el valor global del mercado internacional del comercio de carbón vegetal se situaba entre 360 millones y 384 millones de dólares de los Estados Unidos (véase S/2013/413, anexo 9.2, párr. 2). La cifra de 250 millones de dólares no representa necesariamente una reducción de la magnitud o del valor del comercio, sino que es una estimación basada en los envíos de carbón vegetal que el Grupo pudo determinar en 2013 y 2014, que constituye un porcentaje de los envíos totales inferior al del año anterior.

141. El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido información sobre la identidad de los exportadores relacionados con 78 de los 161 envíos. Veintiséis de esos 78, es decir aproximadamente el 33%, se enviaron en nombre de Hassan Mohamed Yusuf (“Awlibaax”) y Ali Ahmed Naaji¹⁰². Este es esencialmente el mismo porcentaje comunicado por el Grupo de Supervisión en su último informe.

142. Tanto Yusuf como Naaji habían sido mencionados en el último informe del Grupo de Supervisión (S/2013/413, anexo 9.2) como personas vinculadas con Al-Shabaab. El primero pertenece al clan Darod-Marehan y preside el Comité de Empresarios de Juba, una coalición de comerciantes de carbón vegetal (véase S/2013/413, anexo 9.1.a). Se sabe que tiene vínculos comerciales y políticos con Al-Shabaab y que actúa como representante comercial de Al-Shabaab en Kismayo. Además, a menudo ha enviado carbón vegetal a Saleh Da’ud Abdulla, un hombre de negocios somalí con sede en el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo cuya afiliación ideológica con Al-Shabaab y su participación en el comercio de carbón vegetal han sido señalados por el Grupo en informes anteriores (S/2011/433, S/2012/544 y S/2013/413). Se sabe que Ali Ahmed Naaji, que pertenece al clan minoritario Arabta/Mahamuud/Salah¹⁰³, es un recaudador de impuestos y un financiador del *zakat* destinado a Al-Shabaab en Kismayo y Barawe¹⁰⁴. El Grupo ha obtenido nuevos testimonios sobre los vínculos de Naaji con Al-Shabaab y ha identificado un negocio basado en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y varias transacciones financieras relacionadas con él (véase el anexo 9.2). Otros exportadores importantes desde Kismayo son Aden Farah Hassan (del clan Darod-Mejerteen), Jama “Dhuxul” (Darod-Mejerteen), Mukhtar Sheikh (Sheikhaal) y Said Ahmed¹⁰².

143. El Grupo de Supervisión ha obtenido información que indica que, mientras que hombres de negocios vinculados con Al-Shabaab como Hassan Mohamed Yusuf y Ali Ahmed Naaji continúan comerciando libremente con carbón vegetal, los beneficios obtenidos con este comercio también han ayudado a financiar la compra de vehículos militares por Ras Kamboni, la milicia de un clan que ha ejercido un control independiente del puerto de Kismayo desde la retirada de Al-Shabaab en septiembre de 2012 y que posteriormente no integró sus fuerzas en el ejército nacional. La importación de vehículos, en contravención del embargo de armas, es un ejemplo de la forma en que la pugna desenfrenada por obtener ingresos del carbón vegetal ha contribuido a un entorno de proliferación de armas, lo cual probablemente ayudará a aumentar las tensiones históricas entre clanes, relacionadas con el control de Kismayo más que con la lucha contra Al-Shabaab (véase el estudio del caso en el anexo 6.8).

¹⁰² Datos sobre el transporte marítimo obtenidos de Kismayo entre junio de 2013 y mayo de 2014.

¹⁰³ El Grupo de Supervisión informó anteriormente de que Ali Ahmed Naaji pertenecía a otro clan minoritario, el Cawro-maleh (S/2013/412, anexo 9.2, párr. 11).

¹⁰⁴ Información sobre Yusuf y Naaji proporcionada por un comerciante de carbón vegetal en Somalia el 16 de octubre de 2013, por un hombre de negocios somalí basado en Barawe el 16 de octubre de 2013 y por dos funcionarios de la Administración Provisional de Juba basados en Kismayo el 5 de febrero de 2014 y el 11 de noviembre de 2013. La información se basa también en entrevistas generadas en el período del último mandato del Grupo de Supervisión y comunicadas en su informe anterior (S/2013/413).

D. Importaciones de carbón vegetal

144. La variedad de sus fuentes ha permitido al Grupo de Supervisión proporcionar a los Estados Miembros pertinentes y al Comité información en tiempo real sobre la carga y el transporte de carbón vegetal desde Barawe y Kismayo, principalmente con destino a puertos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Omán y Kuwait.

145. En la primera parte de su mandato, el Grupo de Supervisión facilitó esta información en tiempo real a las autoridades de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y al Comité, y ello permitió que en agosto de 2013 las autoridades aduaneras interceptaran en Port Rashid un buque, el *MV Energy 3*, con un cargamento de 140.000 sacos de carbón vegetal a bordo.

146. No obstante, al terminar los monzones en el Océano Índico y reanudarse el transporte de carbón vegetal en octubre de 2013, los comerciantes somalíes de carbón vegetal dejaron de exportar a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos para hacerlo al puerto de Khasab, en la provincia de Musandam, en Omán. Sin embargo, los productos importados a Omán seguían siendo transportados en camiones a través de la frontera a almacenes ubicados en Sharjah, en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Esta pauta de importaciones prosiguió hasta que el Grupo de Supervisión informó a las autoridades omaníes de envíos específicos de buques procedentes de Somalia, a raíz de lo cual los funcionarios de aduanas de Khasab bloquearon todas las importaciones en diciembre de 2013. Entonces los comerciantes empezaron a enviar el carbón vegetal al puerto omaní de Muscat para trasladarlo a los almacenes de Sharjah, al otro lado de la frontera, hasta que el Grupo alertó de nuevo a las autoridades omaníes, que empezaron a bloquear las importaciones a Muscat. Después del último envío conocido a Omán, a fines de enero de 2014, los comerciantes de carbón vegetal empezaron a trasladar las exportaciones al puerto kuwaití de Doha, y más adelante a Port Rashid, en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, adonde seguían llegando envíos cuando el Grupo comenzó a elaborar el presente informe en junio de 2014.

147. En el anexo 9.2 se presentan estudios de casos concretos de envíos a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Omán y Kuwait, junto con detalles sobre las principales personas y entidades responsables de las importaciones.

E. Almacenamiento del carbón vegetal

148. El Grupo de Supervisión ha identificado un conjunto importante de almacenes en Sharjah y Ajman, en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, que son las principales instalaciones donde el carbón vegetal somalí se conserva después de ser importado. El Grupo visitó los almacenes cercanos a la importante fábrica de cemento de Sharjah en enero de 2014, donde observó camiones con matrícula de Omán que llegaban con sacos de carbón vegetal y los descargaban en varios almacenes. Las entregas se observaron en un momento en que el Grupo había recibido información sobre envíos específicos de carbón vegetal somalí a puertos omaníes, después de lo cual la carga se transportaría en camión hasta los almacenes de Sharjah, al otro lado de la frontera. En mayo de 2014 el Grupo visitó esos mismos almacenes y otro almacén en Ajman, donde observó grandes cantidades de carbón vegetal apilado detrás de cada almacén. Personas que habían participado en el comercio de carbón vegetal han explicado al Grupo que los almacenes son depósitos centrales de los

envíos de carbón vegetal, que a continuación se distribuyen por carretera a otros Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo, en particular a la Arabia Saudita.

149. En el anexo 9.3 se presenta información específica sobre los almacenes y su propiedad.

F. Documentación aduanera falsificada

150. El Grupo de Supervisión puede demostrar que un grupo clave de intermediarios con sede en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos ha colaborado con consignatarios y agentes navieros para falsificar conocimientos de embarque y certificados de origen a fin de presentar cargamentos de carbón vegetal somalí a las autoridades aduaneras de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Kuwait como si procedieran principalmente de Djibouti o de Kenya. Los documentos fueron aceptados por las autoridades aduaneras de Omán hasta febrero de 2014, y en el momento de elaborar el presente informe, a mediados de 2014, continuaban siendo aceptados de manera rutinaria por las autoridades aduaneras de Port Rashid, en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, y en puertos de Kuwait.

151. El Grupo de Supervisión ha enviado a los Gobiernos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Kuwait y Omán numerosas solicitudes de acceso a la documentación aduanera presentada por los capitanes de docenas de buques que, según ha confirmado el Grupo, transportaban carbón vegetal procedente de Somalia. Efectivamente, el Grupo ha facilitado a las autoridades de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos los nombres de 14 buques que descargaron carbón vegetal en puertos de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos entre octubre de 2013 y abril de 2014 y solicitó la documentación presentada a las autoridades aduaneras por sus capitanes. El Grupo también ha proporcionado a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos detalles sobre cuatro empresas, dos de ellas con sede en Kenya y dos en Djibouti, que han presentado regularmente conocimientos de embarque y certificados de origen falsos en relación con carbón vegetal somalí, y ha solicitado a las autoridades aduaneras de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos que faciliten todos los documentos generados por esas empresas a fin de revisar todos los envíos realizados a su nombre. El Grupo no ha recibido respuesta a sus solicitudes.

152. El Grupo de Supervisión ha facilitado a las autoridades de Kuwait los nombres de 19 buques para que hagan la comprobación pertinente en sus bases de datos aduaneras. Además, también se facilitaron a las autoridades de Kuwait los nombres de tres empresas de Djibouti y Kenya para que los comprobaran en sus bases de datos aduaneras. El Grupo no ha recibido respuesta ni información alguna en relación con las solicitudes.

153. En el caso de Omán, el Grupo de Supervisión facilitó 25 nombres de buques que o bien descargaron carbón vegetal somalí o bien atracaron en puertos omaníes con carbón vegetal somalí a fines de 2013 y comienzos de 2014. Las autoridades de Omán solo han proporcionado documentación sobre tres de los buques. Se ha comprobado que los tres procedían de Somalia. Sin embargo, sus conocimientos de embarque y certificados de origen indicaban que el cargamento procedía de una de las empresas de Djibouti sobre las cuales el Grupo advirtió a las autoridades aduaneras de otros Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo.

154. En el anexo 9.4 se presenta información más detallada sobre las personas implicadas en la falsificación de documentos.

G. Función de los transportistas

155. Se ha comprobado positivamente que de los 142 dhows a los que se ha hecho referencia como exportadores de carbón vegetal de Somalia, por lo menos 84 (aproximadamente el 59%) eran de pabellón indio o de propiedad de nacionales de la India¹⁰⁵. El Grupo de Supervisión viajó a la India en mayo de 2014 para entrevistarse con funcionarios de la Dirección General de Asuntos Marítimos, en Mumbai. Asistieron a la reunión representantes de diversas federaciones de navieros de la India y propietarios de algunos de los buques que se habían señalado como transportistas de carbón vegetal entre Somalia y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Omán y Kuwait. Después de la reunión, la Dirección General transmitió sendas cartas a 34 empresas o personas que hasta ese momento habían sido identificadas¹⁰⁶ como propietarias de 37 buques que habían transportado carbón vegetal, o de los que se sospechaba que transportaron carbón vegetal, desde Kismayo y Barawe a partir de agosto de 2013. En todas las cartas se solicitaba la misma información a cada uno de los propietarios, especialmente las fechas en que la mercancía se había cargado en Somalia y descargado en los puertos de destino, el volumen de carbón vegetal enviado y los detalles de los agentes que habían pagado el flete del buque y de los consignatarios, además de la documentación conexas. El 18 de julio de 2014, la Misión Permanente de la India ante las Naciones Unidas proporcionó las respuestas de 31 de los 34 propietarios (de 37 buques). Los propietarios admitieron que 16 de sus buques habían cargado efectivamente carbón vegetal en Somalia. Los propietarios de 14 buques declararon que nunca habían transportado carbón vegetal desde Somalia. Los propietarios registrados oficialmente de tres buques dijeron que estos habían sido vendidos o alquilados a otros transportistas. Los propietarios de tres buques no respondieron, aunque uno de ellos facilitó información directamente al Grupo. Un transportista declaró también que no era el propietario de un buque que, según él mismo había confirmado previamente al Grupo, había operado bajo su control.

156. El Grupo de Supervisión obtuvo pruebas de que 6 de los 14 propietarios que afirmaban no haber transportado nunca carbón vegetal desde Somalia habían proporcionado información falsa. Quienes han estado transportando carbón vegetal insisten en que lo hicieron bajo coacción. Así pues, el Grupo aconsejó a las autoridades de la India, en un mensaje de correo electrónico enviado a la Misión Permanente de la India ante las Naciones Unidas el 31 de julio de 2014, que informaran a todos los transportistas que no zarparan de Kismayo o Barawe si

¹⁰⁵ Cálculos basados en información suministrada por fuentes portuarias en Kismayo y Barawe, por fuentes navieras de Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo y directamente por propietarios de buques. Para hacer un cálculo conservador, el Grupo de Supervisión no ha contado los buques sobre los cuales ha recibido confirmación de una sola fuente. Las identificaciones de bandera se basan en los datos sobre transporte marítimo obtenidos en Kismayo, donde se registró el Estado de bandera de todos los buques que transportaban carbón vegetal, así como en listas oficiales suministradas por asociaciones navieras del sector privado en la India.

¹⁰⁶ Las identificaciones se efectuaron sobre la base de listas oficiales de propietarios suministradas por asociaciones de transporte marítimo de la India.

habían sufrido este tipo de coacción, ya que se exponían a ser considerados participantes voluntarios en infracciones de la resolución 2036 (2012).

157. Muchos de los propietarios de buques indios han informado al Grupo de Supervisión de que, dado que alquilan sus buques a intermediarios y agentes, y debido a que los capitanes de los buques no conservan los conocimientos de embarque ni los certificados de origen (que simplemente se presentan a las autoridades aduaneras de los puertos de destino), no pueden facilitar detalles sobre los consignatarios ni documentación relativa a la carga. No obstante, algunos propietarios han informado privadamente al Grupo de que tienen conocimiento de que sus buques que zarpaban de Kismayo habían llevado, junto con carbón vegetal somalí, certificados de origen falsificados de Kenya y Djibouti. Algunos propietarios también han facilitado detalles de los agentes somalíes que participaron en el flete de sus buques y pagaron el transporte del carbón vegetal. En todos los casos esos intermediarios tienen su sede en Dubai, en los Emiratos Árabes Unidos.

158. En el anexo 9.5 se proporcionan detalles sobre los transportistas que no han cooperado con las investigaciones del Grupo de Supervisión.

VII. Obstrucción de las investigaciones o de la labor del Grupo de Supervisión¹⁰⁷

159. En el período de su mandato, el Grupo de Supervisión se ha topado con intentos de obstruir su labor, en particular con ataques dirigidos contra las investigaciones o contra la credibilidad y la reputación de determinados miembros del Grupo.

A. Gobierno de Kenya

160. Como consecuencia de una carta de fecha 30 de agosto de 2013 dirigida al Director General de la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas en Nairobi por el Secretario Principal del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Comercio Internacional de Kenya, Karanja Kibicho, en la que se afirmaba la existencia de una amenaza contra la seguridad de un miembro del Grupo de Supervisión, el experto en cuestión, Babatunde Taiwo, fue trasladado provisionalmente de su lugar de destino en Nairobi el 12 de septiembre de 2013. A raíz de una evaluación de la seguridad realizada por las Naciones Unidas en la que se aprobó el regreso del experto a Nairobi, y a la luz del mandato del Grupo de Supervisión en virtud del Capítulo VII de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, el Secretario General Adjunto de Asuntos Políticos y el Jefe en funciones del Departamento de Seguridad comunicaron al Representante Permanente de Kenya ante las Naciones Unidas, Macharia Kamau, en una carta de fecha 24 de diciembre de 2013, que el experto volvería a ser destacado a Nairobi. La Misión Permanente respondió en una carta de fecha 30 de diciembre de 2013 que el Gobierno no estaba dispuesto a permitir la entrada del experto en Kenya.

161. Después de celebrar consultas oficiosas el 10 de enero de 2014, el Comité envió al Representante Permanente de Kenya una carta de fecha 14 de enero de

¹⁰⁷ En el párrafo 15 e) de la resolución 1907 (2009) y en el párrafo 3 de la resolución 2111 (2013), el Consejo de Seguridad prohibió obstruir las investigaciones o la labor del Grupo de Supervisión y determinó que dicha obstrucción sería un criterio para la inclusión en la lista.

2014 en la que hacía hincapié en la importancia que asignaba al regreso inmediato del experto a Nairobi para que pudiera cumplir sus funciones con arreglo al mandato del Capítulo VII y en cumplimiento de las obligaciones que el derecho internacional imponía a Kenya en lo relativo a garantizar la protección y la seguridad de todo el personal de las Naciones Unidas que trabaja en el país. Hasta la fecha, el Gobierno no ha contestado al Comité. Mientras tanto, la reasignación del experto afectó considerablemente las investigaciones del Grupo, especialmente con respecto a Al-Shabaab, en un momento crítico para Somalia.

B. Gobierno Federal de Somalia

162. Las respuestas del Gobierno Federal al anterior informe del Grupo de Supervisión (S/2013/413, anexo 5.2) fueron preparadas por un equipo integrado por el bufete de abogados estadounidense Shulman Rogers, que había sido contratado por el Gobierno Federal para recuperar bienes somalíes en el extranjero, y FTI Consulting, en coordinación con Abdusalam Omer, a la sazón Gobernador del Banco Central, y Fawzia Yusuf H. Adam, a la sazón Viceprimera Ministra y Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional. En la respuesta preliminar del Banco a las denuncias de corrupción, de fecha 23 de julio de 2013, se ponían en cuestión la credibilidad y la competencia profesional de determinados miembros del Grupo. Análogamente, en la respuesta del Gobierno Federal al anexo 5.2 del informe del Grupo, de fecha 30 de agosto de 2013, volvía a ponerse en cuestión la competencia profesional de determinados miembros del Grupo y se recomendaba que el Consejo de Seguridad adoptara oficialmente medidas contra el Grupo, que incluían concretamente suprimir la parte de su mandato relativa a investigar la apropiación indebida de fondos públicos, revisar el informe del Grupo de 2013, reconstituir la totalidad de los miembros del Grupo y dirigir una amonestación pública al Grupo.

163. En una carta dirigida al Presidente del Comité de fecha 24 de octubre de 2013, la Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores solicitó también que el Consejo de Seguridad revisara el párrafo 25 de la resolución 2111 (2013), relativo a la gestión de las finanzas públicas, y que el Secretario General rescindiera el contrato del Coordinador del Grupo de Supervisión. Jeremy Shulman, de Shulman Rogers, preparó originalmente esta carta el 18 de septiembre de 2013, pero la Ministra no la transmitió al Comité. El 21 de octubre de 2013, el Sr. Shulman instó de nuevo a la Oficina del Presidente del Gobierno Federal a que la carta fuera aprobada por el Presidente y transmitida por la Ministra para demostrar que Somalia no toleraría denuncias de corrupción. El Comité recibió finalmente la carta el 12 de noviembre de 2013 (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.89/Add.5) (véase el anexo 5.2, de carácter estrictamente confidencial). El 17 de julio de 2014, la ex Ministra hizo público un comunicado de prensa en el que declaraba que nunca había firmado esa carta y que su firma había sido falsificada¹⁰⁸.

¹⁰⁸ Véase <http://www.wardheernews.com/press-statement-allegations-un-monitoring-report-group/>.

VIII. Lista de sanciones

164. El 24 de septiembre de 2014, el Comité aprobó una lista revisada de personas y entidades sujetas a la prohibición de viajar, la congelación de activos y el embargo de determinadas armas impuestos por el Consejo de Seguridad en los párrafos 1, 3 y 7 de su resolución 1844 (2008). Esta lista incluye ahora 14 personas y una entidad. Además de una persona que ha sido excluida de la lista, se ha comunicado que tres personas han sido asesinadas, dos se han entregado y una ha sido detenida. En septiembre de 2014 se añadieron otras dos personas a la lista.

165. Con el apoyo de la presión ejercida por dirigentes del Gobierno Federal e intereses del clan Hawiye, el 20 de septiembre de 2013 el Representante Permanente de Djibouti ante las Naciones Unidas presentó una solicitud de exclusión de Ali Ahmed Nur Jim'ale de la lista (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.102), en la que había sido incluido el 17 de febrero de 2012 por estar alineado ideológicamente con Al-Shabaab y prestarle apoyo financiero. El 27 de septiembre de 2013, dos miembros del Comité (los Estados Unidos y la Federación de Rusia) pusieron en suspenso la solicitud de exclusión de la lista (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.102/Add.1). Posteriormente, el 17 de octubre de 2013, la Federación de Rusia levantó su suspensión (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.102/Add.2). El 11 de marzo de 2014, los Estados Unidos levantaron su suspensión (S/AC.29/2014/COMM.23) y el Comité aprobó la solicitud.

166. El 25 de junio de 2013, Hassan Dahir Aweys, que había sido incluido en la lista el 12 de abril de 2010 por ser un importante líder político e ideológico de diversos grupos armados de oposición en Somalia, se entregó a las autoridades de Himan y Heeb en la población costera de Hobyo y fue escoltado a Adado con sus guardias de seguridad. Había huido de Barawe durante una purga de miembros destacados de Al-Shabaab por parte de su líder, Ahmed Godane. Tras mantener negociaciones con el Gobierno Federal, fue trasladado a Mogadiscio por vía aérea el 29 de junio de 2013. Al llegar al aeropuerto de Mogadiscio, donde fue necesario apaciguar las tensiones creadas por grupos armados, fue puesto en arresto domiciliario. Permanece en Mogadiscio, pero ha reanudado su actividad política. El 20 de mayo de 2014 hizo público un discurso incendiario pregrabado, y no se ha retractado de nada.

167. El 12 de septiembre de 2013, Omar Hammami (conocido también como Abu Mansour Al-Amriki), incluido en la lista el 28 de julio de 2011 como miembro destacado de Al-Shabaab que participaba en acciones que ponían en peligro la paz, la seguridad o la estabilidad de Somalia, resultó muerto en una emboscada tendida de madrugada por agentes de *Amniyat* en una aldea cercana a la población de Dinsoor, al sudoeste de Mogadiscio. Su muerte formaba parte de la purga de líderes de Al-Shabaab emprendida por Godane.

168. El 1 de abril de 2014, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (conocido también como "Makaburi"), incluido en la lista el 23 de agosto de 2012 por suministrar apoyo material a grupos extremistas en Kenya y en otros lugares de África Oriental, resultó muerto, en circunstancias que no se han aclarado, en Mombasa (Kenya). El Grupo de Supervisión ha recomendado al Comité que se mantenga su nombre en la lista de sanciones mientras se aclara la cuestión de sus activos y también teniendo en cuenta que prosiguen las investigaciones sobre Al Hijra y las actividades de sus antiguos socios. El Grupo hizo una recomendación similar en relación con Aboud Rogo

Mohammed, que fue incluido en la lista el 25 de julio de 2012 por prestar apoyo financiero, material, logístico o técnico a Al-Shabaab, y que posteriormente resultó muerto, en circunstancias que no se han aclarado, en Mombasa (Kenya) el 27 de agosto de 2012 (véase [S/2013/413](#), párr. 164).

169. El 2 de abril de 2014, Hassan Mahat Omar, incluido en la lista el 28 de junio de 2011 por reclutar personas y solicitar fondos en beneficio de Al-Shabaab, fue detenido en Nairobi por los servicios de seguridad de Kenya y acusado de posesión de explosivos.

170. El 7 de junio de 2014, Mohamed Sa'id (conocido también como Atom), incluido en la lista el 12 de abril de 2010 por participar en actos que amenazaban la paz, la seguridad o la estabilidad de Somalia, anunció que abandonaba Al-Shabaab en un intento de escapar del control que Godane ejercía sobre el grupo, y se entregó al Gobierno Federal en Mogadiscio.

171. El 23 de septiembre de 2014, Maalim Salman fue añadido a la lista por su relación con combatientes extranjeros en nombre de Al-Shabaab y su papel en las operaciones en África dirigidas contra turistas, locales de entretenimiento e iglesias.

172. El 24 de septiembre de 2014, Ahmed Diriye fue añadido a la lista tras ser nombrado nuevo emir de Al-Shabaab a raíz de la muerte de Ahmed Godane.

173. En cumplimiento del párrafo 27 de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#) y del párrafo 13 g) de la resolución [2060 \(2012\)](#), el Grupo de Supervisión sigue precisando y actualizando la información sobre la lista preliminar de las personas y entidades que llevan a cabo los actos descritos en el párrafo 1 de la resolución [2111 \(2013\)](#).

IX. Cooperación estatal y no estatal con el Grupo de Supervisión

174. El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido escasa cooperación de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo en sus investigaciones sobre el carbón vegetal. Las autoridades de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y de Kuwait no han dado respuesta a ninguna de las solicitudes del Grupo, relativas en particular al acceso a la documentación aduanera de los buques que, según se sabe, han descargado carbón vegetal somalí en sus jurisdicciones. Ni las autoridades de los Emiratos Árabes Unidos ni las de Kuwait han respondido tampoco a ninguna solicitud del Grupo relativa al acceso a los conocimientos de embarque y los certificados de origen falsos generados por empresas conocidas que operan en Djibouti, Kenya y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos. Las importaciones de carbón vegetal a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Kuwait han continuado sin impedimentos. Por otra parte, las autoridades de Omán han tomado medidas para bloquear la importación de carbón vegetal somalí en los puertos que están bajo su jurisdicción, pero se han negado a facilitar documentación aduanera, excepto en el caso de tres buques respecto de los cuales proporcionaron certificados de origen de Djibouti. El Grupo no recibió más información después de que pudo demostrar por escrito a las autoridades de Omán que en realidad los tres buques habían obtenido su carbón vegetal en Somalia, y no en Djibouti.

175. En el período de su mandato anterior, el Grupo de Supervisión recibió un apoyo alentador del Gobierno Federal, en particular del Presidente y de Abdi Farah

Shirdon, que era en ese momento Primer Ministro, pero el Grupo no pudo convertir esa buena voluntad en una cooperación más extensa a nivel de la labor sobre el terreno. Ahora el Grupo ha dejado de recibir este apoyo oficial del Gobierno Federal, pese a sus solicitudes de cooperación, especialmente con respecto a las investigaciones sobre Al-Shabaab y los contratos gubernamentales relacionados con bienes públicos nacionales. En particular, el Grupo ha solicitado la cooperación del Organismo Nacional de Inteligencia y Seguridad y un compromiso del Gobierno Federal de facilitar al Grupo acceso a las armas incautadas, así como a los prisioneros de Al-Shabaab o a los testimonios de detenidos de Al-Shabaab. Nada de esto se ha obtenido a pesar de repetidas solicitudes. No obstante, el Grupo ha procurado proporcionar al Gobierno Federal información transparente sobre sus averiguaciones y ha informado regularmente al Comité durante todo el período de su mandato. A pesar de la buena disposición del Grupo para aportar esa transparencia, ha sufrido de una falta de claridad del Gobierno Federal acerca de las personas con las que debía colaborar el Grupo, hasta que en julio de 2014 se señaló a un coordinador para los fines de aportar transparencia sobre el presente informe.

176. El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido escasa cooperación de las autoridades de Somalilandia. Tras los contactos iniciales de alto nivel mantenidos con diversos ministerios en Hargeysa al comienzo del período de su mandato, el Grupo no pudo establecer relaciones de trabajo con los organismos gubernamentales competentes. En particular, el Ministerio del Interior solo se puso a disposición del Grupo en una ocasión, mientras que la persona de contacto respondía con evasivas y afirmaba que no tenía autoridad para proporcionar información sustantiva. El Director de Inteligencia prometió información detallada sobre diversas cuestiones, en particular sobre la presencia de Al-Shabaab en Sool, que nunca facilitó a pesar de recibir múltiples solicitudes. El Grupo se reunió con representantes de la Guardia Costera y de la Dirección de Lucha contra la Piratería de Somalilandia, y solicitó información sobre cualquier actividad sospechosa relacionada con los envíos de armas que arribaban a Somalilandia a través del Golfo de Adén. Durante todo el período de su mandato, el Grupo recibió informaciones fidedignas de este tipo de envíos a la costa de Somalilandia, pero no obtuvo respuesta a sus múltiples solicitudes de información hechas a la Guardia Costera o al Director de Lucha contra la Piratería. Las autoridades de Somalilandia también han declarado repetidamente que están dispuestas a cooperar con el Grupo y acatar las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas con respecto a la propuesta creación de una unidad de protección del petróleo, aunque el Ministerio del Interior solo informó al Grupo acerca del proceso de licitación después de repetidas solicitudes por parte de este. El 7 de junio de 2014, el Presidente de Somalilandia declaró en su cuenta de Twitter que el Grupo tenía que “dejar de injerirse en los asuntos de Somalilandia”.

177. El Grupo de Supervisión ha recibido una cooperación desigual de las autoridades de Puntlandia. En los últimos 18 meses de la administración de Abdirahman Mohamud Faroole, el Grupo recibió una cooperación regular y franca sobre diversas cuestiones. Inmediatamente después de la elección de Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, el Grupo recibió una cooperación franca de las autoridades en el curso de visitas en que altos funcionarios de seguridad se pusieron a su disposición para responder a solicitudes concretas. El Jefe de Gabinete del Presidente, Deeq Yusuf, también se mantuvo en comunicación regular por correo electrónico. Con todo, más adelante la cooperación disminuyó. El Grupo se topó con repetidos intentos de las autoridades de Puntlandia, en particular del Presidente, de

obstruir sus investigaciones sobre las actividades de Al-Shabaab, tanto en el territorio de Puntlandia como fuera de él. El Presidente se ha negado sistemáticamente a ser entrevistado oficialmente y a facilitar acceso a altos funcionarios de Puntlandia¹⁰⁹ que son personas de interés en relación con una trama regional de Al-Shabaab en 2013¹¹⁰. Del mismo modo, en relación con el ataque “complejo” de Al-Shabaab en Bosasso en agosto de 2014, la oficina del Presidente se negó a facilitar asistencia fundamental en relación con el culpable identificado. A raíz de una reunión con un representante de Puntlandia en agosto de 2014, se informó al Grupo de que su mandato no abarcaba solicitar información sobre prisioneros de Al-Shabaab ni detalles sobre los prisioneros de Al-Shabaab que habían sido puestos en libertad¹¹¹.

178. Tanto la comunidad humanitaria como el Grupo de Supervisión continuaban estando justificadamente preocupados por las consecuencias de la cooperación para el acceso humanitario y para la seguridad de las comunidades vulnerables y del personal humanitario sobre el terreno. Sin embargo, en comparación con épocas pasadas, había una voluntad mucho mayor de participar en un intercambio de información apropiado en el cual todas las partes hubieran ponderado cuidadosamente las consecuencias de la forma y la índole de esa cooperación. Por su parte, el Grupo también se comprometió a mejorar la forma en que da a conocer su propia información y sus análisis en los casos en que ello pudiera mejorar la comprensión del clima imperante o de casos concretos por parte de la comunidad humanitaria. En particular, el Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia aumentó el nivel de su asistencia al Grupo, proporcionando análisis de expertos, sugerencias relativas a la prioridad de los problemas o asesoramiento sobre la forma de entrar en contacto con terceros. El Grupo también recibió una invitación abierta a asistir a las reuniones del equipo de tareas nacional del mecanismo de seguimiento y presentación de informes. Si bien dar a conocer datos no elaborados sobre violaciones graves cometidas contra niños en el conflicto armado no era posible por motivos de política general relacionados con la protección de la infancia y la confidencialidad de los datos, se prestó asistencia al Grupo para que se pusiera en contacto separadamente con otras partes.

¹⁰⁹ Durante el período de su mandato, el Grupo de Supervisión envió una serie de mensajes de correo electrónico al Sr. Abdiweli y a su Jefe de Gabinete, Deeq Yusuf, y una carta oficial relativa a sus investigaciones. En dos ocasiones separadas, el Sr. Abdiweli rechazó entrevistarse en Addis Abeba con un miembro del Grupo, a pesar de que el representante de Puntlandia en Etiopía había concertado una reunión.

¹¹⁰ A causa del carácter delicado de su investigación, el Grupo de Supervisión solicitó repetidamente entrevistarse con el Sr. Abdiweli y otras personas de interés fuera de Somalia.

¹¹¹ El 15 de agosto de 2014, el Grupo de Supervisión se entrevistó con un alto diplomático de Puntlandia, en cuyo momento dicho funcionario fue informado por teléfono (en presencia del Grupo) de que el Grupo no tenía ningún mandato para acceder a información reservada relacionada con la detención y puesta en libertad de agentes de Al-Shabaab.

X. Recomendaciones

A. Amenazas a la paz y la seguridad

179. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad recomiende que los Estados Miembros de África Oriental designen personas de contacto para los fines de coordinar e intercambiar información con el Grupo de Supervisión en relación con las investigaciones regionales sobre Al-Shabaab;

b) El Consejo de Seguridad solicite explícitamente en su próxima resolución sobre Somalia que el Gobierno Federal de Somalia, las autoridades regionales, incluidas las de Somalilandia y Puntlandia, y la AMISOM faciliten al Grupo de Supervisión pruebas documentales e información sobre las actividades de Al-Shabaab en Somalia y en la región;

c) El Consejo de Seguridad solicite a los gobiernos de Somalilandia y Puntlandia que informen detalladamente al Comité sobre las actividades de Al-Shabaab y el Estado de Khatumo, y sobre las actividades militares de Somalilandia y Puntlandia, en el territorio en disputa de Sool como base para atenuar la escalada de las tensiones políticas y de seguridad gracias a un proceso pacífico de mediación supervisado por las Naciones Unidas;

d) El Consejo de Seguridad considere decidir en una resolución solicitar una moratoria sobre la concesión de licencias petroleras hasta que se llegue a un acuerdo de carácter jurídico entre las autoridades regionales y federales respecto de la propiedad de los recursos naturales en Somalia.

B. Piratería

180. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que el Consejo de Seguridad siga alentando al Gobierno Federal de Somalia a identificar, arrestar y enjuiciar a todas las personas que, durante la última década, hayan participado en la organización y facilitación de actos de piratería.

C. Violaciones del embargo de armas

181. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad, en su próxima resolución sobre Somalia, otorgue a las fuerzas navales internacionales la autoridad, en virtud del Capítulo VII de la Carta, de interceptar en alta mar y en aguas territoriales de Somalia cualquier buque sospechoso de dedicarse al tráfico hacia Somalia de armas o de componentes de artefactos explosivos improvisados;

b) El Consejo de Seguridad restablezca un procedimiento de no objeción del Comité para todas las importaciones de armas a Somalia por parte del Gobierno Federal, al tiempo que se mantienen los requisitos de presentación de información que figuran en las resoluciones existentes, o que incluya en su próxima resolución relativa al embargo de armas una cláusula que permita al Consejo imponer a la

exención aplicada al Gobierno Federal las condiciones que puedan ser necesarias con carácter provisional;

c) El Consejo de Seguridad incluya en su próxima resolución relativa al embargo de armas un límite al número de armas que pueda importar anualmente el Gobierno Federal, y el requisito de que el número de armas que se importen guarde relación con necesidades y finalidades específicas de las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno;

d) El Consejo de Seguridad exija que el ejército nacional y la AMISOM documenten exhaustivamente y registren todo el equipo militar capturado en el campo de batalla o confiscado durante actividades de desarme; ello supone registrar el tipo y el número de serie de las armas y/o municiones, fotografiar todos los artículos y las marcas pertinentes y facilitar la inspección por el Grupo de Supervisión de todos los artículos militares antes de su redistribución o destrucción;

e) El Consejo de Seguridad establezca un mecanismo independiente de verificación externa encargado de realizar inspecciones rutinarias de los arsenales de las fuerzas de seguridad del Gobierno, los registros de inventario y la cadena de suministro de los armamentos, desde el punto de importación hasta el punto final de distribución, y facilite sus resultados al Comité y al Grupo de Supervisión, para los fines de reducir la desviación sistemática de armas y municiones del Gobierno Federal a los mercados ilícitos de Mogadiscio.

D. Obstrucción de la asistencia humanitaria

182. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad solicite a la AMISOM y a la comunidad humanitaria que asignen prioridad a la promoción y la aplicación de las directrices para la coordinación entre las entidades civiles y militares de las actividades humanitarias específicas para el país, aprobadas a principios de septiembre de 2014, que deberán aplicar los agentes humanitarios en sus relaciones con la AMISOM;

b) El Consejo de Seguridad aliente a la comunidad humanitaria a seguir mejorando la cooperación y el intercambio de información para responder mejor a las denuncias de desviación y apropiación indebida de la asistencia humanitaria, incluso entre entidades de las Naciones Unidas y entre estas y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, y mediante una colaboración más eficaz con la Dependencia de Gestión del Riesgo del equipo de las Naciones Unidas en el país y los órganos de investigación de las Naciones Unidas;

c) El Consejo de Seguridad inste al Gobierno Federal y a la AMISOM y sus socios estratégicos a rendir cuentas sobre los efectos para la población civil de las operaciones militares contra Al-Shabaab y sobre las medidas adoptadas para mitigarlos, incluso mediante la creación de las condiciones de seguridad necesarias para proporcionar acceso humanitario por las rutas de suministro en los lugares donde se produzca una transferencia de control de territorio entre las partes.

E. Violaciones del derecho internacional humanitario

183. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad exhorte a los Estados Miembros a incrementar sus esfuerzos en apoyo del Gobierno Federal de Somalia y las fuerzas armadas nacionales para que prevengan, investiguen y enjuicien las violaciones del derecho internacional, incluso mediante la capacitación y la sensibilización sobre el derecho internacional humanitario, mejores mecanismos de mando y control, modalidades eficaces de identificación y retribución del personal, la reforma del sistema de justicia militar, el desarrollo de una mayor capacidad de investigación y un aumento de las contribuciones al Fondo Fiduciario de las Naciones Unidas para el Ejército Nacional de Somalia;

b) El Consejo de Seguridad, a la luz de los requisitos onerosos y complejos de las normas de diligencia debida de las Naciones Unidas en materia de derechos humanos por lo que respecta a las operaciones de la AMISOM y el ejército nacional, considere ampliar el mandato y otros aspectos de la capacidad de la función de derechos humanos de la UNSOM, en particular con respecto a la supervisión del cumplimiento y a una evaluación efectiva de los riesgos, incluido un requisito más visible de presentación de informes públicos sobre los derechos humanos, teniendo en cuenta que este ha sido un instrumento eficaz en otras misiones;

c) El Consejo de Seguridad invite a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos a colaborar con el Gobierno Federal y los organismos pertinentes de las Naciones Unidas para precisar las violaciones más graves del derecho internacional aplicable cometidas por todas las partes en Somalia como requisito necesario para formular opciones para una estrategia amplia y apropiada de justicia de transición;

d) El Consejo de Seguridad invite a los Estados Miembros de la región a que, con el apoyo de los organismos pertinentes de las Naciones Unidas, formulen una intervención regional coordinada que prevenga y entorpezca las actividades de reclutamiento de niños para su participación en grupos armados de Somalia, en particular por parte de Al-Shabaab;

e) El Consejo de Seguridad aliente a los Estados Miembros a prestar apoyo a la Iniciativa Global sobre los Refugiados Somalíes, liderada por la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados, incluso prestando asistencia a los Estados Miembros de la región y de fuera de ella para que continúen proporcionando asilo y protección internacional a los refugiados somalíes, por considerar que un retorno prematuro e inseguro podría crear más desplazamientos y presentar nuevas amenazas para la paz y la seguridad;

f) El Consejo de Seguridad pida encarecidamente a la Unión Africana y a la AMISOM lo siguiente:

i) Acelerar el establecimiento de la Célula de Análisis y Respuesta para el Seguimiento de las Víctimas Civiles y velar por que los datos y los análisis generados se integren en las operaciones;

ii) Considerar la introducción de un mecanismo centralizado de denuncias que realice de manera eficiente e independiente las tareas de recepción, evaluación preliminar y seguimiento de las investigaciones de denuncias de

violencia sexual y por razón de género y de explotación y abusos sexuales, incluida la institución de medidas de protección para los denunciantes;

g) El Consejo de Seguridad inste al Gobierno Federal a:

i) Adoptar y aplicar el Marco de Políticas sobre el Desplazamiento en el Interior de Somalia;

ii) Ratificar la Convención de la Unión Africana para la Protección y Asistencia de los Desplazados Internos en África y la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y su Protocolo Facultativo relativo a la participación de niños en los conflictos armados.

F. Violaciones de la prohibición relativa al carbón vegetal

184. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que:

a) El Consejo de Seguridad, en su próxima resolución sobre Somalia, provea fuerzas navales internacionales con autoridad en virtud del Capítulo VII de la Carta para interceptar en alta mar y en aguas territoriales de Somalia cualquier buque sospechoso de transportar carbón vegetal desde Somalia;

b) El Consejo de Seguridad solicite a los Estados Miembros que establezcan medios para la disposición del carbón vegetal interceptado de conformidad con las opciones establecidas en la nota orientativa núm. 1, y que determine la asistencia internacional que pueda ser necesaria.

G. Lista de sanciones

185. El Grupo de Supervisión recomienda que el Comité proceda sin demora a designar a las siguientes personas y entidades para que se les apliquen medidas selectivas:

a) Los líderes de Al-Hijra en Somalia y sus miembros en Kenya, así como los financiadores de Al-Hijra, y en particular sus financiadores extranjeros;

b) Los líderes de los “Muyahidines de la cordillera de Golis”, o Al-Shabaab del Noreste;

c) Los piratas conocidos y sus aliados identificados por el Grupo de Supervisión o los Estados Miembros entre 2009 y 2014;

d) Las personas y entidades responsables de la apropiación indebida de recursos públicos, incluidas personas y entidades del sector privado;

e) Las personas que participan en la desviación de armas de los arsenales oficiales del Gobierno;


f) Las personas y entidades que participan en el comercio de carbón vegetal, con inclusión de los importadores, los exportadores y los transportistas.

Annex 1

Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin

Annex 1.1: Al-Shabaab areas of control in South-Central Somalia

Al-Shabaab operational presence as at July 2014



Areas captured from Al-Shabaab as at July 2014



**Annex 1.2: Photograph of Abdullahi Mohamed Ahmed “Arabey”
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 1.3: Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu: tactics, techniques and procedures

1. Unlike the past when Al-Shabaab's threat was amplified by the weakness of the Somali security forces, the armed group's violent ascendancy in Mogadishu would appear to be increasingly linked to its enhanced operational capacity.¹ This enhanced capacity stems from two tactical decisions. First, Al-Shabaab has maximized its reduced force strength by avoiding direct military engagements with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA), and chosen to limit its exposure where necessary in Mogadishu. Second, Al-Shabaab has placed greater emphasis on further developing its improvised explosive devices (IED) methods and use of targeted killings "assassinations", which have effectively heightened the atmosphere of fear and intimidation in Mogadishu.²

2. Similarly, linked to the current threat environment is Al-Shabaab "security structure" in Mogadishu.³ Based on preliminary information collected on this structure, the Monitoring Group believes it includes the following senior individuals:⁴

- Chief of Operations for Mogadishu, Abdullahi Ali Sheikh (*Hawiye/Abgaal*);⁵
- Deputy Chief of Operations for Mogadishu, Hassan Ahmed (*Hawiye/Abgaal*);
- Chief Aminyat for Banaadir, Khalif Adale (*Hawiye/Habar Gidir/Ayr*);
- Head of Finance for Mogadishu, Hassan Tabligh (*Hawiye/Sheekal*);
- Chief of Target Selection, Abdulwahab Sheikh Ibrahim;
- Aminyat Facilitator (transportation), Ibrahim Afweyne (*Hawiye/Abgaal*); and
- Aminyat Facilitator (accommodation), Adan Diyeeshe (*Hawiye/Habar Gidir/Saleban*).

IED developments

3. The Monitoring Group has observed a general increase in Al-Shabaab's use of IEDs in Mogadishu in comparison to 2013.⁶ Noticeable has been the introduction of

¹ In its assessment, the Monitoring Group has taken into account Al-Shabaab's increased ability to infiltrate strategic FGS institutions. Over the last 18 months this has become more apparent.

² The Monitoring Group has also received credible testimonies, which suggests Al-Shabaab increased its payments to operatives in Mogadishu considerably through the use of Zaad. The method of paying Al-Shabaab operatives via Zaad has also been used in Kenya by Al-Shabaab using MPESA. An example of this was the twin bombings in Nairobi in May 2014 where the two operatives were paid for placing IEDs via MPESA. See also <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27277811>.

³ The Monitoring Group's assessment is that the Al-Shabaab's structure across the South-Central regions remains fluid. It further assesses that Al-Shabaab's structure, in particular in Mogadishu, has changed since the information presented in AMISOM's classified information-sharing meetings.

⁴ The Monitoring Group is in its preliminary phase of assessing and collating credible information obtained on the current Al-Shabaab structure in Mogadishu.

⁵ The Monitoring Group understands Abdullahi Ali Sheikh reports directly to Bashir Mohamed Mohamud 'Qorgaab' (*Hawiye/Habar Gidir/Saleban*), the head of Al-Shabaab Operations.

⁶ Both successful and EOD neutralized.

the magnetic IED as a tactic. The use of magnetic IEDs as a battlefield weapon has also been used in Afghanistan and Iraq, and may represent a transfer of battlefield knowledge to Somalia.⁷ An illustration of this tactic is the case when, on 3 May 2014, Abdikafi Hilowle Osman, a former senior Banaadir official was killed following a suspected magnetic IED was attached to his vehicle in the Hodan district of Mogadishu.⁸ The deployment of magnetic IEDs in Mogadishu continues to provide Al-Shabaab with a more reliable and low-risk tactic of attacking its targets. This tactic also helps reduce the risks of apprehension of Al-Shabaab operatives by the security forces.

4. Additionally, information received by a credible source with knowledge of Al-Shabaab activities in Mogadishu, suggests the general increased trend in IED use may be due the high number of IED operatives trained by Al-Shabaab.⁹ An example of an IED development has reportedly been the cigarette-packed IED, which uses fertilizer.¹⁰

5. An emerging trend would suggest that Al-Shabaab is placing greater importance on target selection, which would seemingly correlate to the group's enhanced intelligence capabilities in the capital. Unlike during the previous reporting periods, when rank and a file Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) were considered primary targets, Al-Shabaab is focusing more on former/current senior Government officials and senior security officials.¹¹ This not only represents a form of intimidation but an effective use of IEDs in targeting senior officials, and also potentially links to another new trend of Al-Shabaab, namely its current modification of VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised devices) in "complex" attacks.¹²

6. Between August 2013 and July 2014, the Monitoring Group has documented at least fifteen VBIED attacks in Mogadishu. In some instances these attacks have been "complex" in their approach and effectively directed at "high profile" targets. Noticeable has been the period between February and July 2014, when Al-Shabaab highlighted this potent and effective shift with sustained "complex" attacks using VBIEDs as delivery methods against two "high profile" targets: the Presidential Palace and the Somali Federal Parliament.

7. On 21 February 2014, a group of about 11 Al-Shabaab operatives in three vehicles, including two VBIEDs, breached the Presidential Palace gates by assuming

⁷ E-mail correspondence with Jane's Intelligence Review IED expert, 11 August 2014.

⁸ <http://somalimemo.net/index.php/maqal/8919-halyeeyoshcali-jabal-03-05-2014mp3-sheekh-cali-jabal-qmujaahidiinta-ayaa-khaarijiyay-cabdi-kaafi-hilowle-xildhibaan-kalane-si-dirqi-ah-buu-ku-fakadayqdhageyso>.

⁹ Interview with a Somali-based security expert, February 2014.

¹⁰ Credible information indicates fertilizer has been regularly procured and sought after by Al-Shabaab.

¹¹ The Monitoring Group regrets that during the current mandate, in spite of numerous requests to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and AMISOM, it has received no cooperation or assistance in regards to critical information on Al-Shabaab. As a result, the Group has been unable to interview detained Al-Shabaab members and inspect seized weapons from Al-Shabaab or corroborate its statistical information on Al-Shabaab tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

¹² The Monitoring Group notes the use of VBIEDs is not a new tactic but evidence suggests a growing modification in its use.

identities of security officials, a common Al-Shabaab tactic.¹³ As soon as they passed the immediate perimeter, the first VBIED detonated, thus creating an entry point into the Presidential Palace. This was then subsequently followed by a detonation of the second VBIED, and finally a PBIED (person-borne improvised device). In the ensuing shoot out in the Presidential Palace, the attackers and a number of officials were killed, including a former deputy Director General of NISA and a Prime Ministerial Aide.¹⁴ Three months later, on 24 May 2014, adopting the same mode of attack, an unknown number of Al-Shabaab operatives launched the first of two “complex” operations against the Somali Federal Parliament with a VBIED.¹⁵

Infiltration

8. The current modification of the delivery method of VBIEDs in Mogadishu raises two critical issues. First, it calls into question the capacity and willingness of AMISOM and SNAF to protect sensitive Government installations, such as the Presidential Palace and the Somalia Federal Parliament, against Al-Shabaab’s “complex” attacks. Second, and more critically, it demonstrates the enhanced level of Al-Shabaab’s capacity to infiltrate the FGS.¹⁶

9. Over the past year, increasing evidence continued to point to a dangerous shift in Al-Shabaab’s approach to infiltration.¹⁷ Apart from known infiltration of SNAF,¹⁸ credible information strongly indicates that Al-Shabaab Aminyat have infiltrated the FGS at the highest levels.¹⁹ This includes sensitive Government agencies, such as the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and various levels within the Presidential Palace.²⁰

10. The Monitoring Group has accessed correspondence by two senior international officials, one dated 22 February 2014, and another also dated in early 2014.²¹ Their contents depict among other things the level of distrust and fear within the higher echelons of the FGS with regards to Al-Shabaab’s infiltration,

¹³ Historically, since 2009, Al-Shabaab has successfully been able to disguise itself as Somali security force officials.

¹⁴ See <http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalias-shebab-major-suicide-attack-presidential-palace>.

¹⁵ See <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/24/us-somalia-blast-idUSBREA4N03B20140524>. Al-Shabaab’s second “complex” operation against the Somalia Federal Parliament was on 5 July 2014.

¹⁶ See http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2014/Aug/55854/villa_somalia_attack_facilitator_executed.aspx#sthash.uUpXQr64.dpbs

¹⁷ Monitoring Group interview with a former senior NISA official, February 2014.

¹⁸ Historically, and based on AMISOM MAC statistics, Al-Shabaab has found it relatively easy to infiltrate SNAF.

¹⁹ Monitoring Group interview with a serving senior NISA official, March 2014.

²⁰ The Monitoring has received multiple testimonies from private individuals, serving senior NISA officials, and FGS officials in relation to Al-Shabaab’s infiltration of NISA. In some case a number of senior NISA officials were mentioned repeatedly as being Al-Shabaab sympathizers. While the Monitoring Group assesses most of the testimonies as credible it is unable, however, to corroborate this information. As such, it is unable to reveal names of suspected senior NISA officials who have been linked to Al-Shabaab.

²¹ See <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/uk-somalia-security-idUKBREA3F0LZ20140416>.

especially Al-Shabaab's infiltration of the Presidential Palace.²² More disturbing is that one correspondence suggests the "MIA" (Mogadishu International Airport), which includes AMISOM and UN bases, has also been infiltrated by Al-Shabaab.²³ As alarming as the above information suggests, the Monitoring Group has not received any corroborating information concerning this potential threat.²⁴ Nonetheless, it assesses the likelihood of Al-Shabaab currently retaining the capacity to infiltrate both AMISOM and UN camps as increasingly high.²⁵

11. On 17 June 2011, Al-Shabaab released a video titled: "AMISOM [redacted].²⁶ The video captured surveillance inside "MIA" and likely formed part of the covert surveillance conducted for the hybrid attack against AMISOM in September 2009.²⁷ Analysis of the video, which includes covert filming of AMISOM, Bancroft, and UNSOA (United Nations Support Office for AMISOM) personnel, is revealing of Al-Shabaab's approach to infiltration. First, it demonstrates Al-Shabaab's capacity to recruit and task individuals who would appear to be employees of AMISOM, Bancroft or the United Nations.²⁸ Second, the video highlights Al-Shabaab's apparent appreciation of "priority intelligence requirements" in covertly targeting officials with intrinsic information value: an AMISOM intelligence officer in his "Ops room", an UNSOA logistics officer and a group of Bancroft employees "tasked with EOD" (explosive ordinance disposal).²⁹

Targeted killings "assassinations"

12. In the past year, Al-Shabaab continued to adopt a sinister policy of targeted killings as an essential tactic in intimidating the population and destabilizing the FGS in Mogadishu. Since 2009, the Monitoring Group has observed a gradual escalation in this tactic, especially with disturbingly high numbers recorded during 2014.³⁰ In 2014, the killing of individuals from shopkeepers, businessmen, government employees, politicians, journalists, members of the security forces and individuals linked to AMISOM are all examples of this trend (see violations of applicable international law in annex 8 to the present report).

13. Similarly, Al-Shabaab is purposefully targeting parliamentarians as part of its calculated strategy in the capital. Two recent significant public statements by Al-Shabaab show the group's determination in pursuing this strategy. On 13 January

²² The correspondence dated 22 February 2014 has been redacted and archived with the United Nations.

²³ The correspondence has been redacted and archived with the United Nations.

²⁴ The Monitoring Group notes that a number of confidential security reports in the past year have reported possible Al-Shabaab plans to carry out an attack inside "MIA".

²⁵ See for example unconfirmed report concerning AMISOM being infiltrated by Al-Shabaab: <https://twitter.com/amisomsomalia/status/466958728265482240>.

²⁶ The Monitoring Group is aware the video has now been removed from the Internet due to its content.

²⁷ The Monitoring Group is aware that the AMISOM intelligence officer in question had left AMISOM in September 2009 following the hybrid attack by Al-Shabaab. Based on this, it is assessed that the covert surveillance on the intelligence officer was prior to 17 September 2009.

²⁸ According to the FGS, a similar tactic was adopted with the Al-Shabaab attack on 8 July 2014 where Al-Shabaab had recruited an individual working inside the Presidential Palace.

²⁹ See [www.\[redacted\]](#).

³⁰ In its assessment of targeted killings, the Monitoring Group has taken into account statistical information collected from confidential NGO reports and informal briefings from Mogadishu-based security officials.

2014, Ali Mohamud Hussein “Ali Jabal”, Al-Shabaab’s governor for the Banaadir region, released a message warning people to stay away from FGS institutions.³¹ While not specifically mentioning the Parliament or Members of Parliament, the Monitoring Group’s assessment is that the warning to and about parliamentarians was implicit. Regardless, by May 2014, following a “complex” attack against the Somali Federal Parliament on 24 May 2014, Al-Shabaab’s Spokesperson, Ali Mohamud Rage “Ali Dhere”, released a new audio message with a more specific threat:

14. We [Al-Shabaab] warn you [Members of Parliament] that the [Al-Shabaab] Mujahideen will come after you [Members of Parliament] if you don’t repent. [Al-Shabaab] will target the Members of Parliament collectively and individually on the highways or in the alleys. You will have nowhere to run. Allah says fight the non-believers and target their leaders.³²

15. In the past year, the Monitoring Group has documented six targeted killings of Somali Members of Parliament. These include:

- Feisal Warsame Mohamed (*Darod/Merjerteen/Arab Saleh*) assassinated on 6 December 2013, following a suspected magnetic IED attached to his vehicle;³³
- Isak Mohamed Ali Rino (*Rahweyn/Mirifle/Dumaal*) assassinated on 21 April 2014, after a suspected magnetic IED was attached to the vehicle;³⁴
- Abdul Aziz Isaq Mursal (*Rahweyn/Mirifle/Leysan*) assassinated on 22 April 2014, by unknown masked gunmen on leaving his apartment in Dharkeynely district;³⁵
- Mohamed Mohamud Heyd (*Tumaal*) assassinated on 3 July 2014, by gunmen wearing Somali military uniforms on exiting Marwas Mosque in Xamar Weyne district;³⁶
- Saado Cali Warsame (*Darod/Harti/Dhulbahante*) assassinated on 23 July 2014, by unknown gunmen on Maka al-Mukarama Road in Hodan district;³⁷ and
- Sheikh Aden Mohamed Mader (*Rahweyn/Mirifle/Luway*) assassinated on 1 August 2014, by unknown gunmen on exiting Marwas Mosque in Xamar Weyne district.³⁸

³¹ See <http://somalimemo.net/index.php/maqal/7728-sh-cali-jabal-shacabka-muqdisho-markale-waxaan-leenahay-ka-fogaaday-xarumaha-cadawga-bartilmaameed-ayay-noo-yihiin--dhageyso>. While not necessarily a reliable indicator, the Monitoring Group notes a prior warning by the Al-Shabaab governor on 29 December 2013 towards Somalis had resulted in an attack against Jazeera Hotel.

³² See http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia-Al-Shabaab-speaks-on-terror-attack-on-Parliament-complex.shtml.

³³ See amisom-au.org/2013/12/au-special-representative-condoles-with-somalia-on-the-loss-of-a-member-of-parliament-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia/.

³⁴ See <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/134390/second-somali-mp-killed-in-two-days>.

³⁵ See <http://www.worldbulletin.net/news/134390/second-somali-mp-killed-in-two-days>.

³⁶ See http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2014/07/03/newsbrief-01.

³⁷ See <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28446489>.

³⁸ See <http://www.bar-kulan.com/2014/08/01/somali-legislator-shot-dead-in-mogadishu-by-unknown-gunmen/>.

16. Confidential information received from AMISOM and corroborated by a credible source with knowledge of Al-Shabaab's activities in Mogadishu, suggests the above Members of Parliament were all victims of Al-Shabaab's "assassination" campaign.³⁹ However, preliminary investigations suggest the targeted killings of Feisal Warsame Mohamed and Saado Cali Warsame may not be Al-Shabaab-related, despite Al-Shabaab's claim of responsibility for Saado Ali's assassination.⁴⁰ Likewise, the Monitoring Group has received a credible, but uncorroborated, account of the targeted killing of Saado Cali, information which suggests alternative motivations for the killing of the late Somali Member Parliament and which, if accurate, implicates senior Government officials and a diaspora businessman (see below an image of Saado Warsame).⁴¹

Saado Cali Warsame



³⁹ The Monitoring Group notes that credible media reports attributed to Al-Shabaab senior leaders claim responsibility for the above assassinations, with the exception of Feisal Mohamed Warsame.

⁴⁰ The Monitoring Group is not aware of any group claiming responsibility for the assassination of Feisal Mohamed Warsame.

⁴¹ Information received by the Monitoring Group from a close family relative to Saado Cali Warsame, August 2014.

Annex 1.4: Al-Shabaab in Puntland

17. While the Monitoring Group enjoyed extensive facilitation and cooperation from the Puntland authorities during its previous mandate, such cooperation and facilitation was not extended to the Group by the office of President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas this mandate.⁴² The office of President Abdiweli has consistently declined to cooperate with the Monitoring with regards to its investigations into Al-Shabaab.⁴³ In many instances, this has been through hindering investigations by offering protection to persons of interest,⁴⁴ and in one case abetting the activities of an Al-Shabaab regional “Aminyat” who had infiltrated the Puntland Security Forces (PSF) as part of a terrorist attack against a regional Member State in late 2013.⁴⁵

18. The Puntland authorities hindrance is indicative of its apparent unwillingness to robustly address the threat of Al-Shabaab.⁴⁶ Likewise, the Monitoring Group has observed an increased presence and movement of Al-Shabaab Northeast (ASNE) throughout Puntland, in particular the regions of Bari, Mudug and Nugaal.⁴⁷ There are four potential reasons for the increased presence of Al-Shabaab in Puntland.

19. First, evidence suggests the Government of President Abdiweli has adopted a “catch and release” policy with respect to suspected and arrested Al-Shabaab members.⁴⁸ Second, unconfirmed but credible information points to the low morale of the Puntland Security Forces since President Abdiweli’s election in January 2014, with senior security officials claiming financial mismanagement in terms of unpaid salaries.⁴⁹ Third, the territorial gains made by Operation Eagle seem to have forced Al-Shabaab to consider movements into new sanctuaries.⁵⁰ Fourth, according to

⁴² During its previous mandate, the Monitoring Group had unprecedented cooperation from the Government of President Faroole with regards to Al-Shabaab-related investigations.

⁴³ Despite the intervention of some regional Member States, President Abdiweli has still not extended cooperation with regards to Al-Shabaab investigations. As a result, the Monitoring Group’s investigations into Al-Shabaab’s activities have been severely hampered.

⁴⁴ During the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group made several attempts to access key persons of interest in regards to its Al-Shabaab investigations. This included among others General Khalif Ciise Mudan, the former Puntland Minister of Security, who would appear to be a significant person of interest with regards to an Al-Shabaab regional plot. During the course of the mandate, repeated request were made for a meeting in a secure location outside Somalia to meet the former Minister but the Puntland authorities blocked all attempts.

⁴⁵ The Monitoring Group has identified three persons of interest residing in Bossaso who it believes had assisted in one case directly an Al-Shabaab plot to destabilize a regional Member State and attack a Western embassy.

⁴⁶ The Monitoring Group is in receipt of e-mails both from Puntland officials and senior security officials, which describes the increasing frustration at the deterioration of the security situation since President Abdiweli’s election.

⁴⁷ Based on informal briefing with Puntland diplomats and confidential United Nations reports.

⁴⁸ During separate interviews with a senior Puntland diplomatic and security source in May and August 2014 respectively, the Monitoring Group was informed of a policy of arresting suspected Al-Shabaab members only to be released, and in some cases where overwhelming evidence had strongly suggested a credible Al-Shabaab link. The Monitoring Group notes also that the above testimonies are consistent with a confidential United Nations report, which monitors the security situation in Puntland.

⁴⁹ E-mail correspondence with a senior Puntland security official, 15 August 2014, also corroborated by senior Puntland diplomatic source.

⁵⁰ Information based on confidential United Nations and NGO reports between February and August 2014.

credible reports, Al-Shabaab Northeast (ASNE) has undergone a possible reconfiguration of its leadership and shift in operations.⁵¹

Al-Shabaab Northeast (ASNE)

20. Since its last report (S/2013/413), Al-Shabaab Northeast (ASNE) unlike Al-Shabaab's core appears to have undergone a non-violent "purge". Its outcome has been the reported reorganisation of ASNE's chain of command and strategy.⁵² While investigations are currently ongoing into the extent of the ASNE's reorganisation, credible information suggests that most of its political leadership remains in place, as described in the Monitoring Group's previous report (S/2013/413, annex 1.7), but with noticeable changes within its operational structure.

21. According to credible but unconfirmed information received by the Monitoring Group, in late 2013, Yassin Khalid Osman (a.k.a. "Yassin Kilwe" and "Kilwe") had been deployed from ASNE's base in the mountains of Galgala to meet with Al-Shabaab core in Barawe.⁵³ The purpose of the meeting was to facilitate internal discussions on issues such as reorganisation and strategy, in particular infiltration into Puntland (see below section on Al-Shabaab infiltration into Puntland). With regards to potential leadership changes, the Monitoring Group is aware of the following:

- Bashir Shire Maxamed a member of the Harti/Dishiishe subclan has now assumed overall operational leadership for ASNE (see the photograph below of Bashir Shire Maxamed);⁵⁴
- A senior Isaaq subclan member known as "Sekeriye" has been appointed as head of ASNE Aminyat; and
- Ali Ga'amey, a member of the Harti/Tinle subclan, has been moved from finance and administration to operations commander.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Monitoring Group interview with a Puntland security official, 8 November 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁵² Monitoring Group interview with a Puntland security official, 8 November 2013, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁵³ Credible information received by a Puntland security official suggests 'Kilwe's' discussions with Al-Shabaab core had also involved discussions with Ahmed Godane.

⁵⁴ Bashir Shire Maxamed was a former employee of Golis Telecom and had previously been listed as ASNE's financial "treasure" and training commander.

⁵⁵ Ali Ga'amey had previously been listed as ASNE's deputy regional and chief finance commander.

Bashir Shire Maxamed, “Amir” of Al-Shabaab Northeast (ASNE)



22. In regards to its strategic outlook, credible information received from a Puntland security source suggests that the “Al-Shabaab core — ASNE discussions” agreed to increase ASNE’s use of IEDs and enhance the group’s use of infiltration into Puntland.⁵⁶ The Monitoring Group’s assessment is that the above information not only appears consistent with Al-Shabaab’s current operational strategy in South-Central Somalia but also correlates with its observations of an increased use and flow of IED components trafficked from Yemen into Somalia for Al-Shabaab core and ASNE (see annex 6.6 on smuggling of IED equipment). During the current mandate, the following incidents are where ASNE has used IEDs in Puntland:

- On 4 August 2014, a person-borne improvised device (PBIED) targeted the Bossaso Central Police station, killing the Bari Regional Police Commander, Abdurahman Ali Hussein “Muslim”;⁵⁷
- On 15 July 2014, a radio-controlled improvised device (RCIED) targeted a PSF vehicle along the Galkacyo airport road;⁵⁸
- On 8 July 2014, a roadside IED targeted a vehicle belonging to a Puntland Intelligence Agency (PIA) official in Galkacyo North;⁵⁹
- On 14 June 2014, an RCIED targeted a Puntland Police vehicle in Garsoor, Galkacyo North;⁶⁰
- On 29 April 2014, Puntland Police arrested a suspected ASNE member carrying a bag full of explosive devices;⁶¹

⁵⁶ According to a briefing by a Puntland security official, the internal discussion had proposed an infiltration of Al-Shabaab core Aminyat from southern Somalia into Puntland.

⁵⁷ Information based on confidential United Nations and NGO reports between February and August 2014.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

- On 31 March 2014, Puntland Security forces arrested 20 suspected members of Al-Shabaab with explosives devices;⁶² and
- On 17 March 2014, a senior Puntland commander, Colonel Jama Said Warsame, was killed in a roadside IED incident in Yalho village outside Bossaso.⁶³

Al-Shabaab infiltration into Puntland

23. Until recently, Al-Shabaab's infiltration strategy has focused primarily on the Somali armed forces operating in southern Somalia and, as mentioned in annex 1.3, on infiltrating the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). However, during in the past year, increasing evidence indicates that Al-Shabaab has also successfully attempted to infiltrate the Government of Puntland.

24. In Puntland, Al-Shabaab has used its infiltration to conduct offensive action, such as surveillance of United Nations compounds,⁶⁴ and in one instance as a sanctuary for carrying out an operation against a regional Member State.⁶⁵ Alarming, this has included an Al-Shabaab "Aminyat" who had used his family patronage to join the PSF, a Puntland Darwish⁶⁶ officer suspected of being an Al-Shabaab member, and a potential Puntland Police recruit who carried out a PBIED attack.⁶⁷

25. Puntland Security Forces

26. Following the "*Badru Nairobi Operation*" (Westgate Mall attack) in Kenya, credible evidence confirms Al-Shabaab's plans were at an advance stage in preparation for a follow-up attack against another regional Member State. According to testimonies received from one of the operatives involved in the plot, potential targets included Western embassies (see Horn of Africa case study in strictly confidential annex 2 to the present report).⁶⁸

27. Among the Al-Shabaab recruits for the plot was a Nairobi-based "Aminyat" called "Pimp".⁶⁹ In the interviews with the Monitoring Group, "Pimp" claimed that he was member of the PSF, a fact also confirmed by the Government of Puntland

⁶² See <http://www.somallicurrent.com/2014/03/31/puntland-apprehends-20-al-shabab-suspects-with-explosives/>

⁶³ See <http://terrorfreesomalia.blogspot.com/2014/03/somalia-senior-puntland-forces.html>.

⁶⁴ Briefings by Puntland security officials suggest the United Nations presence has become a target of Al-Shabaab surveillance. United Nations confidential reports have also referred to possible Al-Shabaab surveillance. The Monitoring Group notes the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) has not responded to its e-mail dated 16 August 2014 concerning clarification of Al-Shabaab surveillance on United Nations compounds.

⁶⁵ Monitoring Group interview with an 'Aminyat-like' operative in March 2014.

⁶⁶ Ciidamada Daraawiishta Puntland or Puntland paramilitary force. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puntland_Dervish_Force

⁶⁷ In August 2014, the Monitoring Group received an informal briefing by a senior Puntland diplomatic source on a potential police recruit who later carried out a PBIED attack.

⁶⁸ Monitoring Group interviews with arrested Al-Shabaab members linked to the regional plot, March to August 2014.

⁶⁹ During interviews with "Pimp" he denied ever being an Al-Shabaab member or involved in an Al-Shabaab plot to destabilize a regional Member State.

officially.⁷⁰ Credible and corroborating evidence also suggests that while “Pimp” was serving as a member of PSF, and before being deployed by Al-Shabaab to the neighbouring regional Member State,⁷¹ he had been routinely collecting information on PSF activities.⁷² Unconfirmed information provided by “Pimp’s” accomplice suggests that he may have had operational links with a known ASNE commander, Khalid Jama Nur.⁷³ Following “Pimp’s” arrest in 2013 for his involvement in the regional plot, the Government of Puntland has consistently raised the issue of “Pimp’s” immunity as a member of the PSF.⁷⁴

“Pimp”



Darwish Forces

28. On 30 March 2014, a group of Al-Shabaab suspects were arrested in Garowe. The suspects were reportedly made up of two tiers: an attack group that would target “high profile” targets such as a diplomatic post with a PBIED and a second group, which had reportedly been tasked to conduct a vehicle-borne improvised device (VBIED) attack against targets, including the United Nations compound.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of the letter from the Puntland Government confirming “Pimp’s” membership of the PSF.

⁷¹ The Monitoring Group notes that the travel route of “Pimp” from Bosasso to the neighbouring regional Member State is peculiar for a PSF official. During the interview with “Pimp” he admitted to travelling illegally through various routes in order to enter the regional Member States’ territory.

⁷² Credible and corroborating information indicates “Pimp” had regular and unfettered access to the office of the head of PSF. During an interview with “Pimp” he boasted of having friendships with foreign forces training the PSF.

⁷³ While the Monitoring Group was provided the named “Khalid Jama Nur”, it is unable to confirm if this is the same Khalid Jama Nur described in its annex 6.6 on smuggling of IED equipment. It, however, notes both Khalid Jama Nur and “Pimp” are Majerteen.

⁷⁴ During the course of the mandate, credible information obtained by the Puntland authorities indicates President Abdiweli has repeatedly attempted to secure the release of “Pimp” in spite of being fully briefed on “Pimp’s” activities.

⁷⁵ Confidential United Nations report, March 2014.

29. According to credible information, one of the suspects had included a serving official from the Darwish forces. Among the items seized from the group were grenades, pistols, electrical wires and a detonator. The Monitoring Group has since learned that the Darwish official has been released.


Items captured from suspected ASNE members on 30 March 2014⁷⁶



Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr⁷⁷

30. On 4 August 2014, a PBIED targeted the Bosasso Central Police station, killing the Divisional Commander of Police, Abdurahman Ali Hussein “Muslim”, and injuring nine others.⁷⁸ The attack not only demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s continued threat to Puntland but also highlighted the group’s ability to infiltrate Puntland’s security apparatus.⁷⁹ Preliminary evidence confirms that the perpetrator, Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr from the Majerteen/Omar Mohamud subclan, had attempted to infiltrate the Bossaso Police as a potential police recruit (see below for a copy of Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr’s passport).⁸⁰

Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr



⁷⁶ See <http://puntlandi.com/sawirodhagaysi-dowlada-puntland-oo-gacanta-ku-dhigtay-koox-ka-tirsan-shabaabsoona-bandhigtay-qalab-iyo-agab-ay-wateen/>.

⁷⁷ All official e-mail and other e-mail correspondence with senior Puntland officials regarding Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr has been archived with the United Nations.

⁷⁸ See <http://www.somalicurrent.com/2014/08/04/al-shabaab-claims-bosaso-suicide-attack/>.

⁷⁹ See http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/newsbriefs/2014/08/08/newsbrief-02.

⁸⁰ Monitoring Group briefing with a Puntland diplomatic source in Addis Ababa, 5 August 2014.

31. The Monitoring Group can confirm that prior to the attack on 4 August 2014, Mohamed Abukar had been in jail for an Al-Shabaab-related offence and later released.⁸¹ While information surrounding Mohamed Abukar's release is unclear, credible information obtained from multiple sources, including diplomatic and senior Puntland officials suggests he was released either by the Police or granted amnesty by President Abdiweli in 2014.⁸² The Monitoring Group has also been briefed by a senior Puntland diplomatic source that following his release, Mohamed Abukar was a frequent visitor to the Bossaso Police and had made several attempts to join the Police service.⁸³ On 15 August 2014, the Monitoring Group was informally advised that it had no mandate to inquire whether Mohamed Abukar had been a potential police recruit or who had granted permission for his release.⁸⁴

Analysis

32. In spite of the lack of cooperation from the Puntland authorities, the Monitoring Group is confident that its assessment of ASNE represents an increased threat to peace and security in Puntland. It also remains convinced that since the election of President Abdiweli, Puntland authorities have struggled, both politically and operationally, to effectively reverse the security trajectory emerging in northern Somalia.

33. Conversely, the Monitoring Group believes as Al-Shabaab continues to cede more territory in the south and is forced to move north, this may, under the right conditions, including a committed Puntland authority, present an opportunity to begin degrading Al-Shabaab militarily.

⁸¹ Monitoring Group briefing with a Puntland diplomatic source, 5 August 2014, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and e-mail from Puntland security official dated 15 August 2014. A confidential e-mail from a Puntland senior official on 20 August 2014 and archived with the United Nations relating to Mohamed Abukar's background suggests he had previously been in Bosasso prison.

⁸² The Monitoring Group understands there are conflicting reports surrounding Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr's release. A diplomatic official from Puntland has informed the Monitoring Group that President Abdiweli granted Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr amnesty. However, other reports suggest the Bosasso police had released Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr.

⁸³ On 10 August 2014, the Monitoring Group contacted the Office of President Abdiweli seeking clarification on the release of Mohamed Abukar Zubeyr and details of his relationship to senior Puntland officials. To date, there has been no substantive response regarding Mohamed Abukar's release and links to the Puntland Authority.

⁸⁴ On 15 August 2014, the Monitoring Group witnessed a telephone conversation between a senior Puntland diplomatic source and the office of President Abdiweli in relation to the Group's request in which the office of President Abdiweli raised a number of concerns in relation to the Group's mandate to investigate Mohamed Abukar. The Monitoring Group has also sent an e-mail on 15 August 2014 to the office of President Abdiweli in response to the informal meeting with a senior Puntland diplomatic source.

Annex 2

Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 3

Local threats to peace and security in Somalia

Annex 3.1: Threats to peace and security in the Sool region

1. The Monitoring Group previously reported (S/2013/413, annex 5.5) on political and clan tensions in the Sool region of northeastern Somalia, parts of which have been claimed by the authorities in Puntland and Somaliland, and parts of which are also subject to overlapping claims by competing oil companies licensed by Puntland and Somaliland. In addition, the Monitoring Group reported on rival territorial claims by the self-declared state of Khatumo, a political organization drawn principally from the *Dhulbahante* clan, which has stated its opposition to any oil industry activity in territory it claims as well as its intention to liberate Sool region, in particular the capital Lascanod, from Somaliland forces.

2. Over the course of 2013, the Government of Somaliland embarked on a co-option strategy of *Dhulbahante* elders and clan militia,¹ thereby weakening baseline support for Khatumo. Meanwhile, Khatumo also came under pressure by the Government of Puntland. In November 2013, violence erupted in the northern Sool province of Taleex, when leaders of Khatumo attempted to hold a political conference there but were disrupted by clan militia ordered by the then Vice-President of Puntland, who had stationed his troops nearby (see strictly confidential annex 8.2 for a case study on killing of civilians in Taleex).

3. Since the election of Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas as President of Puntland in January 2014, it appears that Puntland has reversed its outright hostility to Khatumo, absorbing former Khatumo leaders into Government² and co-opting others to break from Khatumo. However, this co-option strategy, which is part of a wider strategy by President Gaas of unifying *Haarti* clans, such as the *Dhulbahante* and *Warsengeli* in Sool and Sanaag, has quickly been followed by escalating tensions between Puntland and Somaliland.

4. In mid-March 2014, armed clashes erupted near the town of Las Qoray, Sanaag province, following the visit of Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo to Las Qoray. On 18 March 2014, Puntland troops near Dhahar village (95 kilometres east of Las Qoray) confronted a convoy of Somaliland officials passing nearby. A brief clash ensued though no casualties were reported. In the days that followed, Puntland troops deployed west of Garowe towards Lascanod, the capital of Sool, while Somaliland militia were sent to reinforce positions near Badhan and Gambadha, in Sool.³

5. On 10 April 2014, a delegation of clan leaders, including Khatumo President Mohamed Yusuf Jama “Indoshel”, flew in a small aircraft registered 5Y-JKN that took off from the international airport in Mogadishu and landed in the town of Buhodle,⁴ on the border between Somaliland and Ethiopia (see annex 3.1.a for

¹ Interview with Somaliland Minister of Defence on 28 October 2013, who stated that 600 *Dhulbahante* militia had been integrated into Somaliland’s army 42 kilometres southeast of Erigavo, and a further 350 *Dhulbahante* militia had been absorbed in Buhodle.

² See “Puntland President forms larger cabinet”, 29 January 2014, at <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/01/somalia-puntland-president-forms-larger-cabinet/> which names Ahmed Elmi Osman ‘Karash’ as Minister of Interior of Puntland and Abdinur Elmi Mohamud ‘Biindhe’ as Minister of Fisheries and Sea Resources. Karash was a former Khatumo State President, and Biindhe was also a senior figure in the Khatumo movement before they joined the Puntland Government.

³ Confidential security report dated 4 May 2014. Information corroborated by two sources in Puntland and Somaliland.

⁴ Information provided on 7 May 2014 by air traffic control source.

photo of Indoshel disembarking from the aircraft). Within days, Somaliland troops reinforced positions around Taleex, where Yusuf and other Khatumo leaders were once again preparing for a Khatumo political conference. Somaliland troops took control of Taleex on 15 April 2014 before retreating towards the village of Hol Hol. On 16 April 2014, Ethiopian troops near Buhodle seized two vehicles reportedly transporting a number of individuals and military equipment that were destined for parts of Sool.⁵ Heavy Somaliland troop movements were reported in Hol Hol, Sool region, around 26 April 2014.⁶

6. On 17 May, Somaliland troops clashed with Khatumo militia 70 kilometres southeast of Lascanod when Somaliland troops were deployed to arrest Somali Federal Member of Parliament and Khatumo chief financier Ali Khalif Galaydh (*Dhulbahante*), who subsequently escaped back to Taleex.⁷ On 22 May 2014, pro-Puntland and pro-Khatumo militia clashed near Taleex.⁸

7. On 10 June 2014, according to Puntland officials, Somaliland forces again advanced towards Taleex town, which was captured on 12 June 2014.

8. On 13 June 2014, security sources in the region reported that a Dhulbahante clan militia and Khatumo forces ambushed a Somaliland military convoy which was moving from Lascanod to Saxdheer, a village 60 kilometres southwest of Lascanod. Seven troops from Somaliland and the Khatumo militia were killed, with Somaliland troops reportedly capturing three Khatumo members and several combat vehicles.⁹

9. On 15 June 2014, Puntland's Vice President Abdihakim Abdulahi Haji Omar (*Dhulbahante*) issued a press release stating that Sool was part of Puntland.¹⁰ On 16 June 2014, Indoshel was interviewed by local media from a location near Saxdheer and announced his administration would continue to fight against Somaliland forces until they withdrew from "Khatumo territory". He also warned *Dhulbahante* clan members to resist co-optation by Somaliland.¹¹ On 18 June 2014, the Monitoring Group received reports of Khatumo militia building up 30 kilometres southwest of Taleex, with a number of unidentified battle wagons that had appeared from the Puntland border to the east of Taleex.¹² The Monitoring Group has received information that the battlewagons have been provided by Isse Yullux, a pirate leader who the Monitoring Group identified as linked to weapons smuggling networks and Al-Shabaab, and who has reportedly been provided amnesty by the Puntland government (see annex 4.7 for more on this case).

⁵ Information verified with Ethiopian security services, although no photographic evidence has been provided to the Monitoring Group.

⁶ Information contained in confidential security report dated 4 May 2014, and corroborated by eyewitness source on 11 May 2011.

⁷ Confidential security report, 23 May 2014. Khatumo sources told the Monitoring Group on 11 April 2014 that Ali Galaydh controls a bank account in Dubai, registered in the name of another Khatumo official, which receives diaspora contributions from Dhulbahante community members providing finances to the Khatumo cause.

⁸ Confidential security report, 30 May 2014.

⁹ Confidential security report, 15 June 2014.

¹⁰ Confidential security report, 16 June 2014.

¹¹ Confidential security report, 17 June 2014.

¹² Information provided by source in Taleex, 18 June 2014, and corroborated in confidential security report, 20 June 2014.

10. By late June 2014, Somaliland forces had retreated from Taleex once again, leaving behind militia loyal to Hargeisa. Puntland troops also retreated from near Taleex back to Galkacyo in Puntland. Somaliland's withdrawal, however, was quickly followed up by a presidential decree on 4 July 2014 by Somaliland President Silanyo who created the Haysimo region within Sool, nominating the regional capital for the new region as Taleex.¹³ Between 13 and 19 July 2014, Somaliland troops and Khatumo militia clashed three times at Lascanod and two neighbouring towns resulting in at least eleven casualties. On 21 July 2014, Puntland deployed a small number of troops to Tukaraq, in Sool.¹⁴

11. On 3 August 2014, Khatumo leaders resumed their political conference at Saxdheer. This was followed by reports of 250 Khatumo troops moving from Saxdheer to Taleex.¹⁵ At the time of submitting this report in late August 2014, Galaydh had been nominated as the president of Khatumo.

Al-Shabaab connections into Sool

12. Somaliland security officials have voiced concern that deteriorating security conditions in Sool could draw in Al-Shabaab, who are likely to take advantage of clan division within the *Dhulbahante*. Jama Botan, director of Somaliland's intelligence services informed the Monitoring Group in December 2013 that his services were investigating renewed Al-Shabaab infiltration into Sool, including Al-Shabaab trainers involved in training Khatumo militia in at least two training camps in Sool. However, in spite of numerous requests for elaboration, the Somaliland authorities have provided no further information.

13. While the Monitoring Group has taken note of the allegations by Somaliland, it also received information that Khatumo militias arrested two suspected individuals linked to Al-Shabaab on 28 April 2014 in Taleex. If the suspects were genuinely Al-Shabaab, this would suggest the movement is attempting to exploit clan tensions even within the *Dhulbahante*, who are split in loyalty between Khatumo, Puntland and Somaliland.

14. The Monitoring Group has however obtained information of Al-Shabaab links to the Khatumo movement. Contacts close to Indoshel have informed the Monitoring Group that during the course of 2014, he maintained regular contact with Abdifatah Mohamed Ali (*Dhulbahante*), the former finance chief of the now defunct Hizbul Islam.¹⁶ Abdifatah Mohamed Ali has been based in Mogadishu since his surrender in 2013 alongside former Hizbul Islam leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, and currently acts a liaison between the FGS and Al-Shabaab networks who are considering defection.¹⁷

15. At least two contacts who know Abdifatah Mohamed Ali have reported that he has stated openly in private meetings that he is a supporter of the Khatumo

¹³ Confidential security reports, 1 July 2014 and 8 July 2014.

¹⁴ Confidential security report, 25 July 2014.

¹⁵ Confidential security report, 8 August 2014.

¹⁶ Three separate sources interviewed on 3 June 2014, 4 June 2014 and 6 June 2014, who stated that Indhosel has met regularly with Abdifatah Mohamed Ali at the Jazeera Palace Hotel in Mogadishu prior to his flight to Buhodle in April 2014.

¹⁷ Abdifatah Mohamed Ali has been hosted at the Jazeera Palace Hotel, courtesy of the FGS, since his surrender, and his bills have been settled by the FGS, according to two of his associates who confirmed this information to the Monitoring Group.

movement.¹⁸ In addition to his association to Indoshel, Abdifatah Mohamed Ali is also connected to the Al-Shabaab *Amniyat* operative Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamud “Arabey” (*Dhulbahante*), who was arrested by the Somaliland authorities in late January 2013 or early February 2014.¹⁹ According to Somaliland’s intelligence services, “Arabey” has been an important recruiter for Al-Shabaab in Somaliland and a key member of *Amniyat* in Barawe, but had migrated back to a location near Las Anod during 2013 before his eventual capture by Somaliland forces in 2014.²⁰ Arabey’s mobile phone, confiscated by Somaliland authorities at the time of his arrest, contains the number of Abdifatah Mohamed Ali in its address book. See annex 6.6 for more on Arabey’s connections to Al-Shabaab trafficking networks.

16. Given the above connections, the Monitoring Group is concerned that support extended by the FGS to Khatumo, whose leaders have been welcomed to Mogadishu in 2014 with the arrival of Indoshel to Mogadishu, could indirectly benefit Al-Shabaab.²¹ FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has openly voiced his support for the Khatumo movement.²²

¹⁸ Interviews on 5 June 2014 and 6 June 2014.

¹⁹ Confirmed by numerous Somaliland Government officials. The Monitoring Group has repeatedly requested access to Arabey, and although the Somaliland authorities have agreed to provide access, no organizational efforts were made on the part of the Somaliland government. Indeed the Ministry of Interior restricted his interaction with the Monitoring Group to one formal meeting at the start of the Group’s mandate in late 2013.

²⁰ No further information on Arabey’s status of cooperation or his testimony from questioning by Somaliland authorities was shared with the Monitoring Group.

²¹ For Indoshel’s arrival to Mogadishu and press conference at the Jazeera Palace Hotel, see http://www.veooz.com/videos/FG_RmzT.html and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wZlqbKVpSEg&feature=youtu.be>.

²² Hassan Sheikh stated that ‘if the people of Khatumo State have agreed on something we will respect those and we will support them’ as reported on 21 January 2014 on <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2014/01/somalia-president-hassan-says-govt-to-respect-khatumo-state/>.

Annex 3.1.a: Mohamed Yusuf Jama “Indoshel” disembarking at Buhodle



Annex 3.2: Threats to peace and security in Lower and Middle Shabelle

17. Over the course of 2013, a particular, violent form of clan politics broke out in the wake of joint African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) offensives against Al-Shabaab in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of the country. A sharp escalation of violence occurred towards the end of 2013, involving clashes between clan militias of the *Biimaal (Dir)* and *Haber Gedir (Hawiye)* in Lower Shabelle and the *Hawiye (Abgaal)* and *Shiidle (Bantu)* in Middle Shabelle, revenge killings, and attacks on civilian settlements amounting to gross violations of human rights and international criminal law. As these events continued into 2014 (still ongoing by August 2014), the Monitoring Group is deeply concerned that the situation in the Shabelle regions — and particularly in Lower Shabelle — is constituting a wider threat to peace and security, which risks spilling over to other regions, including the capital region of Banaadir (Mogadishu) and Bay region (Baidoa), and complicates the ongoing campaign against Al-Shabaab.

18. A combination of inter-linked factors appear to have shaped a spoilers complex, or a resurgence of a new form of “warlord politics”, including the alleged active involvement of senior SNA officers and soldiers in the violence, leakages of SNA arms to clan-based militias, use of misappropriated Government funds to fuel the conflict, driven by business interests in capturing land and attempts to violently influence the future formation of federal states.

Lower Shabelle²³

19. The current conflict grew out of the offensive against Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle in May 2012, which saw the Somali Government and its allies seize Afgooye on 25 May 2012.²⁴ Marka was captured on 27 August 2012 and Wanla Weyn on 7 October 2012. Janaale on the border between the districts of Marka and Qoryooley was seized on 14 February 2013. Thereafter, the offensive came to a halt. As the newly established Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) sought to extend its authority in the region, tensions arose between the *Dir/Biimaal* and *Hawiye/Haber Gedir* clans, which had been dormant since Al-Shabaab took control of Lower Shabelle in 2008.

20. The tensions between the historically indigenous *Biimaal* clans and the *Hawiye/Haber Gedir* clans, considered to be (except for certain sub-clans) newcomers to the region,²⁵ stem from the military putsch of the *Hawiye*-based faction, the United Somali Congress (USC), from 1991 to 1994, in which *Haber Gedir* militias

²³ This overview of events is sourced from reliable confidential NGO and United Nations sources.

²⁴ Interview with Mohamed Shirwa, Somali Peaceline, Mogadishu, 11 June 2014.

²⁵ The clans historically resident in Lower Shabelle are considered to be the *Biimaal* of the *Dir* clan-group, *Digil* of the *Digil-Mirifle (Rahanwyn)* clan-group, and “*Wacdan*” (stem) segment of the *Hawiye* clan-group, as well as other ethnic groups such as the *Jareer (Bantu)*, the *Banaadiri* (of Arabic descent), and minority groups such as the *Tumaal* (blacksmiths), *Sheekhal*, *Hintire* and *Eyle*. See Landinfo, *Somalia: Lower Shabelle*, published by the Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo), 18 October 2013. Note that the discourse of ‘clan cleansing’ during the civil war in the early 1990s led to deep differences in terms of how the Somali clan genealogy came to be described by the various clans, as they sought to politically adapt, or socially construct, the clan structures, their history and identity as an ideological instrument for achieving political agendas. For this reason, since 1990, descriptions of clan-structures tend to have a subjective bias towards clan perceptions of their origins and often become mired by controversy. See Lidwien Kapteins, *Clan Cleansing in Somalia — The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2013.

invaded and drove out many of the resident communities and occupied in particular the Government-owned farmland in the region. The *Haber Gedir* exploited their military supremacy to take control of the former Government farmlands and the lucrative banana plantations, and to dominate and tax the trade and business sectors, as well as the distribution of international aid through local NGOs.

21. Therefore, the *Biimaal* clans, in particular, were concerned that the offensive against Al-Shabaab would be exploited by the *Haber Gedir/Ayr* and *Sa'ad* clans to regain the political power and control over farmlands they lost when Al-Shabaab took over Lower Shabelle by 2009, and with it causing the social and economic marginalization of the weaker communities. Their fear of a return of *Haber Gedir* influence was fuelled as it became clear that the main SNA fighting force (3rd Brigade) leading the offensive involved many of the same *Haber Gedir* fighters that had dominated Lower Shabelle in the past, associated with its commander General Mohamed Roble Jim'aale "Gobale" (*Haber Gedir/Ayr*), who controlled the *Haber Gedir* militias between Kismayo and Mogadishu from 1999 to 2005, together with the *Haber Gedir/Ayr* "warlord", Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indha'ade (see S/2013/413, annex 3.3). However, the *Biimaal* were determined not to let this happen again, as the *Biimaal* now too were seeking to gain the power over the region to benefit from its agricultural resources, in particular from the potential of the banana plantations.

22. The appointment of new interim district administrations in February-March 2013 by then Minister of Interior and National Security, Abdikarim Hussein Guled (*Haber Gedir/Sa'ad*) (see strictly confidential annex 6.4), reinforced *Biimaal* concerns. Although, a *Biimaal*, Mohamed Osman Yarisow, was appointed as the new District Commissioner (DC) for Marka, it was clear that administrations were placed firmly under *Haber Gedir* control, as 70 percent of the new commissioners would be from non-indigenous clans, and the entire security sector came under *Hawiye*, in particular *Haber Gedir/Ayr* control. Hence, the Regional Security Commander for Lower Shabelle and the District Security Commander for Marka District, Abdi Omar Abdulle and Ahmed Omar Madane, respectively, were both *Haber Gedir/Ayr*. The acting Police commander for Marka, Osman Hiraab, was *Hawiye/Abgal*. The Humanitarian Affairs Commissioners for both Lower Shabelle Region and the Marka District were *Haber Gedir/Ayr*. Although the Regional Governor, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur "Sidi", who initially was appointed by the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President, Abdullahi Yusuf, in 2007, is from the *Digil/Garre* clan, he does not enjoy *Biimaal* confidence as they consider him to be allied with *Hawiye* interests in Lower Shabelle.²⁶ Local clan elders and the replaced DC of Marka, Mohamed Ali Okash (*Biimaal*), reportedly complained to then FGS Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, that the SNA *Haber Gedir* forces were trying to intimidate his people and warned that the *Biimaal* were prepared to defend themselves against such attempts if they continued and if the Government failed to intervene.

23. Increasingly through 2013, disputes occurred over land and taxation. These are key elements in controlling the agricultural resources in Lower Shabelle, as dominance of the plantations, especially the banana plantations, and taxation of the transport of products to ports in Marka and Mogadishu, constitute the primary sources of revenue. While *Biimaal* businessmen wanted to finally secure control of

²⁶ Multiple interviews, *Biimaal* community, Nairobi/Mogadishu, May-July 2014.

these resources, the *Hawiye/Haber Gedir* wanted to recover the control they had from 1992 to 2008. In particular, the old banana tycoons, such as Ahmed Duale Gelle “Haaf” (*Habr Gedir/Sa’ad*), and import/export, shipping and transport tycoons, such as Mohamed “Deylaf” (*Haber Gedir/Ayr*), who was controlling the trade through the port of Marka from 1995 to 2006, appeared to want to return to the region.²⁷

24. In March 2013, FGS Prime Minister Shirdon ordered the establishment of a pro-Government civil police force drawn from local communities. In Marka, the majority of this force was believed to be *Biimaal*. However, as the formal police forces and the SNA were dominated by the *Haber Gedir*, tensions developed with the civil police force, resulting in a number of skirmishes. Complicating the situation further was the increase in incidents where rogue SNA soldiers and *Hawiye* clan-based militias in SNA uniforms committed crimes, such as extortion, armed robberies, torture and arrest of locals accused of supporting Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab, in turn would seek to exploit the tensions and infiltrate FGS/AMISOM-allied authorities and the SNA.

25. In July 2013, a sharp escalation of the tensions occurred when *Biimaal* and *Haber Gedir/Ayr* SNA soldiers broke ranks and clashed in Marka district, after which the conflict deteriorated considerably, triggering cycles of revenge killings, violent clashes, and attacks on civilians, farms and settlements, which resuscitated old grievances between the clan communities stemming from the “clan-cleansing” that unfolded in southern Somalia during the early civil war from 1991 to 1993.²⁸ However, describing the current conflict as being between the *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* is an over-simplification of a complex, which is about control of land resources and trade, political power and clan identity.²⁹ Although, clan conflicts are widespread in Somalia, the current situation in Lower Shabelle is driven by a combination of several factors, entailing land invasion, political, social, and economic marginalization, and human rights violations.³⁰

²⁷ According to a confidential United Nations report dated 5 June 2013, the economic resources in Lower Shabelle were controlled by powerful *Hawiye* clan families who migrated from the central parts of the country. The *Haber Gedir* clan militias confiscated fertile land, and forced unarmed groups, in particular the *Bantu*, to work for them on the plantations. The more profitable businesses are still in the hands of these *Hawiye* business families. From 1992 to 2006, Ahmed Duale Gelle “Haaf” (*Haber Gedir/Sa’ad*), Haji Abukar Omar Adani (*Abgal/Hawiye*) and Abdirashid Ilqeyte (*Haber Gedir/Sa’ad*) were the main businessmen that financed the clan militias and were parties to banana conflicts in 1996. See further, Christian Webersik, *Fighting for the plenty — The banana trade in southern Somalia*, Paper presented to the Conference on Multinational Corporations, Development and Conflict, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, Saturday 6th December 2003.

²⁸ One consequence of the identity conflict in Somalia since the ‘clan-cleansing’ during the early civil war (1990-1992), was the emergence of a new divisive ‘us vs. them’ clan discourse manipulated to promote the strategic interests of the new dominant clans that came to power following the fall of the Siyad Barre regime. See Lidwien Kapteins, *Clan Cleansing in Somalia — The Ruinous Legacy of 1991*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2013.

²⁹ Interview with Mohamed Shirwa, Somali Peaceline, Mogadishu, 11 June 2014.

³⁰ This categorization of factors is suggested by CEWERU: See CEWERU, *From the bottom up: Southern Regions — Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower Juba, and Lower Shabelle*, by the Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit with support from Conflict Dynamics, September 2013.

26. From July 2013 onwards, the violence in Lower Shabelle intensified. On 22 July 2013, a group of *Haber Gedir* SNA forces were ambushed by a group of *Biimaal* soldiers. The *Haber Gedir* commander had previously been injured in a clash between the same groups in November 2012. In retaliation later the same day, another group of *Haber Gedir* SNA forces attacked the *Biimaal* SNA forces. Three soldiers were killed and two others (including the regional chief of intelligence) were injured. On 25 July 2013, armed *Haber Gedir* militias attacked *Biimaal* militias at Ceel-Wareegow, to avenge two *Haber Gedir* men killed on 23 July 2013. On 26 July 2013, a delegation led by FGS Interior and National Security Minister Guled was sent to Lower Shabelle region to initiate talks between the *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal*. A ceasefire was reportedly agreed upon. Earlier the same day, *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* clan militias had clashed in Muuri village, where at least 6 people were killed in the fighting.

27. On 28 August 2013, the *Haber Gedir* strongly opposed the appointment of a *Biimaal* as finance officer of Janaale village by the FGS Governor of Lower Shabelle Region, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur “Sidi”.

28. On 30 August 2013, Minister of Interior Guled, and Lower Shabelle Governor Nur arrived in Marka to support the implementation of the agreement reached between the *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* over the management of the local administration and security forces. However, they failed to enforce the decision to remove all illegal road-blocks along the Afgooye-Marka road. Neither was a proposal for integrating local militias into the SNA and transfer them to more remote areas implemented.

29. In September 2013, a prominent *Biimaal* elder, Mohamud Osman Sablaale, was killed in the city of Marka by militias of Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indha’ade, reportedly because of his out-spoken criticism of Indha’ade and his *Haber Gedir* militias.

30. The next major eruption of clan clashes occurred in mid-November 2013. On 15 November 2013, SNA forces (*Haber Gedir*) clashed with *Biimaal* clan militias in Janaale over a tax dispute. Following the clash on the next day, the residents of Janaale staged a demonstration demanding the SNA forces leave the village. On the same day, 16 November 2013, a related shooting incident occurred at a *Biimaal*-manned checkpoint at Ceel-wareegow, where the militia stopped a mini-bus and ordered two SNA soldiers out of the vehicle. The SNA forces based in Janaale later joined the battle. On 17 November 2013, SNA *Haber Gedir* forces clashed with *Biimaal* militias at K50 airstrip and village and at Buufow Bacaad. The next day, 18 November 2013, *Biimaal* militias killed 4 *Haber Gedir* men at K50 in revenge for their losses in the clashes the day before, and yet another major clash broke out, reportedly involving looting and burnings. This attack not only resulted in killing of civilians and burning of the village but it reinforced clan hostilities, and as a consequence rallied the *Biimaal* together.

31. In a radio interview, the head of the K50 village, Abdullahi Wafow (*Biimaal*), accused Yusuf Mohamed Siyad Indha’ade, the former warlord of Lower Shabelle region, of being responsible for the attack, and for killing, attacking and chasing innocent civilians.³¹ General Mohamed Roble Jimale Gobale, Commander of the 3rd Brigade of the SNA (see S/2013/413, annex 3.3), and General Mahamed Hasan

³¹ <http://www.allidamaale.com/article.php?id=4748>.

Qaafow, led the attack on K50. Governor of Lower Shabelle Nur confirmed that Somali military force commanders deliberately attacked the local population. The attack triggered strong condemnation from *Dir* Members of Parliament and *Biimaal* traditional leaders claiming that the SNA forces had been killing and terrorizing civilians. On 20 November 2013, Minister of Interior Guled visited K50 and met with the Regional Governor of Lower Shabelle Nur, and traditional elders. The Minister promised that the Government would conduct a full investigation into the events. However, the tensions remained and spread to new locations as SNA attacked *Biimaal* militias in Ugunji.

32. By mid-December 2013, the situation deteriorated again as serious clashes broke out and revenge killings occurred in several locations, leading to civilians driven from their homes, rape and other human rights violations. On 13 December 2013, *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* militias clashed in Aybutey/Gumesi Diid in a land dispute. The fighting lasted three days and at least 15 people were killed and more than 30 others were injured. Land disputes also triggered clashes on 15 December 2013 between *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* militias in Janaale and Busley Da'ud. On 16 December 2013, the fighting spread to K50, where the fighting continued for three days and resulted in the killing of reportedly at least seven civilians, extensive burning of dwellings and the flight of the majority of the population.³² On 19 December 2013, clashes erupted at Kali-Caafimaad. On 18 December 2013 the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia Nicolas Kay warned that the conflicts in Lower and Middle Shabelle could “threaten the country’s progress towards peace and stability as well as the rights of thousands of affected citizens.” He particularly identified that those affected by the attacks and evictions from “productive farm land” were from “smaller or minority clans and communities”.³³ On 25 December 2013, the FGS Minister of Defense, Abdulkarim Fiqi, declared that a peace agreement between *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* had been achieved, that SNA forces had cleared all illegal checkpoints along the Afgooye-Marka road, and that additional soldiers had been deployed to K50 to keep the peace.

33. However, the peace did not last long into the new year. On 25 January 2014, two *Biimaal* clansmen were killed near Busley Da'ud by *Haber Gedir* militias. In response, the DC of Marka, Yarisow, declared that the December peace agreement had been violated by the *Haber Gedir*. On 30 January 2014, new clashes between the *Biimaal* and *Haber Gedir* broke out in Janaale, and continued for three days. An unknown number of people were killed and injured. The fighting spread to Busley Da'ud, as *Biimaal* militias burnt a farm owned by a member of the *Haber Gedir*. The fighting lasted for three days. On 19 February 2014, fighting broke out again in Busley Da'ud, subsiding until 8 March 2014, when *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* militias engaged in heavy fighting for three days.³⁴

³² E-mail from former NGO staff member with knowledge of events on the ground, 21 May 2014.

³³ UNSOM, Statement, “UN Special Representative concerned over local conflicts in Somalia”, 18 December 2014.

³⁴ Interview, former NGO staff member in communication with local community, Nairobi, 19 March 2014.

34. On 23 March 2014, tensions with the *Biimaal* significantly intensified as 8 *Biimaal* elders were assassinated near Burhakaba,³⁵ allegedly by *Haber Gedir* SNA soldiers under the command of General Gobale (*Haber Gedir/Ayr*).³⁶ The elders were on their way to their homes in Lower Shabelle after having participated in a conference in Baidoa that elected a President and Government for the disputed Southwestern State of Somalia (six regions state). The new FGS Prime Minister, Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed (*Marehan*), subsequently released a statement condemning the assassinations, sending condolences to the families of the slain elders, and indicating that the Government would launch an investigation into the murders. Although both the Prime Minister and the Police Commissioner for Bay region blamed Al-Shabaab, this was categorically denied by Al-Shabaab.

35. On 21 April 2014, Abdullahi Wafow's *Biimaal* militia attacked an SNA convoy near K50. The level of erosion of public trust in the function and loyalties of the SNA was illustrated by the fact that later the former K50 Chairman publically justified the attack — in which combatants were killed and civilians injured — on the grounds that the soldiers were not Somali Government soldiers but “armed robbers.”³⁷

36. Yet another serious deterioration of the situation occurred on 25 April 2014, when 5 *Biimaal* worshippers were killed and four injured (two of them children) in the Mosque of Muri, reportedly by a group of gunmen in SNA uniforms.³⁸ The incident raised several counter accusations. The *Biimaal* accused the *Haber Gedir* of being behind the killings.³⁹ The *Haber Gedir* and SNA denied involvement, and instead pointed to Al-Shabaab disguised as SNA soldiers in an attempt to incite inter-clan violence. The following day, two *Haber Gedir* clansmen were killed by suspected *Biimaal* militias near Bufow, Marka District, likely in retaliation for the mosque attack. On 27 April 2014, another attack on a Mosque at K50 took place, in which several *Biimaal* clansmen were killed. This time the blame fell on *Abgal* clan militias.

37. On 7 May 2014, *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* militias clashed again at K50 and Ceel-Wareegow. The inter-clan fighting extended further to Buufow Bacaad and other villages along the main road to Shalaambood. On 9 May 2014, the *Haber Gedir* launched an attack against *Biimaal* militias at the outskirts of Marka. Eventually the *Haber Gedir* took over the town. The attack effectively ousted Yarisow, the DC of Marka (*Biimaal*), who reportedly fled. The following day, on 10 May 2014, tensions rose in Shalaambood as Yarisow announced that he had dismissed the DC in Shalaambood, Nuur Jiidoow (*Haber Gedir*), in order to appoint a new one. The Jiidoow claimed that as he was appointed by the FGS, he could only be replaced by the FGS, while Yarisow claimed that Shalaambood was under the

³⁵ In the Somali tradition, as encoded in the “Birimageydo” principles, clan elders (together with children and women) are supposed to be “spared from the spear”, hence killing elders is considered forbidden.

³⁶ See http://www.keydmedia.net/en/news/article/somali_pm_condemns_killing_of_tribal_elders_near_buurhakabo_town/; e-mail local NGO staff member with details of the victims and circumstances of the killings, Nairobi, 16 May 2014.

³⁷ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 22 April 2014.

³⁸ Names of the dead and photographs of the injured on file with the Monitoring Group.

³⁹ Interview with NGO staff member with knowledge of the region, Nairobi, 9 May 2014; interview with former NGO staff member in contact with local communities, Nairobi, 11 May 2014.

jurisdiction of Marka District, hence he could replace the DC. On 11 May 2014, *Haber Gedir* militias committed a revenge killing of a *Biimaal* man at Busley Da'ud. On 13 May 2014, in retaliation for the killing in Busley Da'ud, *Biimaal* militias killed a *Haber Gedir* mini-bus driver at Ceel Jaale. Nuur Jiidow, the incumbent DC of Shalambood, blamed these killings on Yarisow, the DC of Marka.

38. The cycles of revenge killings continued into June. On 2 June 2014, a *Haber Gedir* man was killed in Marka District. *Haber Gedir* elders placed the blame on militias under the command of the DC of Marka, Yarisow (*Biimaal*). On 3 June 2014, *Haber Gedir* militias killed four *Biimaal* men and two women in Farango. On 4 June 2014, *Biimaal* militias attacked the residence of Nuur Jiiddow, the DC in Shalaambood. The DC was not home, but his daughter was killed in the attack. On 5 June 2014, *Haber Gedir* and *Biimaal* militias clashed in Shalaambood. The fighting later spread to Ceel-Jaale where AMISOM forces intervened and managed to separate the two sides. Heavy clashes were reported on 7-9 June 2014 in various locations in Marka District up to the border with Afgoye District, including at Buufow, Busley, Shalambood, Janaale, Ceelwaregow and KM50, resulting in over 20 militias killed and more injured.

39. On 9 June 2014, a group of *Haber Gedir* clan militias wearing SNA uniforms reportedly entered Marka and forced the local *Biimaal* administration to flee.⁴⁰ Following the seizure of control on 9 June 2014 of the port city of Marka and the K-50 area in Lower Shabelle by the *Hawiye*-dominated 3rd and 5th Brigades of the SNA, the district administration and the *Biimaal* clan militia allied to it were displaced. This was another dangerous escalation of the conflict between the *Hawiye/Haber Gedir* and the *Biimaal*. UNHCR recorded that 7,100 fled Marka as a result of the conflict: local *Biimaal* elders, however, estimated that as many as 28,200 from their communities had been displaced by the clashes.⁴¹

40. The *Biimaal* suffered 35-40 civilian casualties, including women and children, and private homes and property were looted. On 9 June 2014, *Haber Gedir* elders blamed Prime Minister Abdiweli for giving the *Biimaal* clan unjustified support in the ongoing clan conflict in the Lower Shabelle Region. On 11 June 2014, the Minister of Interior and Federalism, Abdullahi Godah Bare, and the Minister of Defence, Mohamed Sheikh Hassan, arrived in Marka to mediate a truce. The delegation met with the *Haber Gedir* side, while the ousted DC of Marka, Mohamed Yarisow, refused to meet with them. According to confidential sources of the Monitoring Group, the FGS delegation during their meeting with *Haber Gedir* side expressed that the *Biimaal* militias were the perpetrators of the conflict in the region, responsible for setting up illegal checkpoints, for being anti-FGS and affiliated with Al-Shabaab, which justified the SNA 3rd and 5th Brigade engagement in the conflict in support of the *Haber Gedir*.⁴² Consequently, the hostilities between the *Biimaal* and *Haber Gedir* did not subside. Clashes took place in K50 on 12 June 2014, Buulo Jaan neighbourhood in Marka and K50 on 22 June 2014, Kali-Cafimaad on 23 June 2014, and at K50 on 24 June 2014. Reports of

⁴⁰ In an interview on 19 March 2014 a former NGO staff member warned the Monitoring Group that Inna'hade had "promised to go back to Marka."

⁴¹ United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Inter-Agency Mission Report, Marka. Lower Shabelle region, 9 July 2014, on file with Monitoring Group.

⁴² Confidential source with direct knowledge of the meeting, 2 July 2014.

SNA-instigated crime also continued and resulted in two fatal shootouts in Afgoye district on 22 and 26 June 2014.

41. Consequently, the conflict continued through July 2014. *Biimaal* clan militias reportedly ambushed a group of *Haber Gedir* clansmen near Ceel-Wareegow and at K60 on 2 July 2014, while on 4 July 2014 they reportedly attacked *Haber Gedir* militia positions at K50. At least 15 fatalities were reported. On 7 July 2014, a group of SNA uniformed *Haber Gedir* militias reportedly set fire to an informal IDP settlement near K50. The IDPs were rescued by AMISOM troops at their base, though some were reportedly injured in an exchange of crossfire between SNA troops. Further clashes occurred between *Biimaal* and *Haber Gedir* militias near Marka on 8 July 2014, at K50 and K60 on 12 July 2014, and at K50 on 26 July 2014, in which 11 *Haber Gedir* and 4 *Biimaal* militia members were killed. On 27 July 2014, SNA 3rd Battalion led by Liban Madahweyne in association with *Haber Gedir* militia attacked El Saleney, an informal IDP camp near K50.⁴³ The camp was first shelled and then partially burned. Four civilians were killed (two in cross fire and two executed) and the settlement was taken over.

Federalism as a factor

42. In addition to the dimensions of land⁴⁴ and clan identity, the conflict in Lower Shabelle is both affected and complicated by the process towards creation of federal states, which since the beginning of 2013 triggered a political power struggle in which clan-based interests and historical grievances from the civil war have been instrumentalized. Therefore, due to its resources, geographical location and heterogenous clan composition, Lower Shabelle has become a contested region between three competing federal state projects: the Southwestern State of Somalia (6 regions), a three-region state and the two-region “Shabelle State”. Actors leading the formation of each of these three state projects are taking different sides in the Lower Shabelle conflict. Proponents of the six-region state appear to both support and receive support from the *Biimaal*. The two-region state appears to represent the *Hawiye* project of linking Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions together. Representatives of the three regions state, which formally is supported by the FGS, are mixed, although they have condemned the SNA/*Haber Gedir* violence against the *Biimaal*. As an example of how the self-proclaimed federal states have tried to claim Lower Shabelle, on 27 June 2014, the “President” of the two-region state comprising Lower and Middle Shabelle regions appointed a *Biimaal* as the new DC of Marka.

Al-Shabaab as a factor

43. Al-Shabaab is not yet defeated and is still controlling parts of Lower Shabelle, including the seaport of Baraawe. Therefore, Al-Shabaab is also complicating the conflict as they will seek to manipulate it to their advantage, particularly in terms of exacerbating clan tensions in order to preoccupy and delay the current SNA/AMISOM offensive against them. For instance, on 18 December 2013, Al-Shabaab issued a statement saying that the fighting had affected many civilians

⁴³ E-mail, United Nations staff member, 17 August 2014.

⁴⁴ Land dispossession was a constant factor in testimonies of *Biimaal* IDPs, such as in an account provided in an interview conducted on behalf of the Monitoring Group with an IDP farmer driven off his land in Farhane in early 2014, location undisclosed, 18 August 2014.

from both clans and caused destruction of property, and that the bloodshed among the Muslim clans needed to stop. On 27 January 2014, Al-Shabaab met with representatives from the *Biimaal* clan in Buulo Mareer in an attempt to gain their support and in February 2014 a *baya'ah* or pledge of support between some *Biimaal* and Al-Shabaab took place.⁴⁵ At the same time the Monitoring Group received consistent reports that Al-Shabaab was engaged in courting, and was being courted by, *Haber Gedir* militia and political elements in terms of leveraging mutual support for their respective agendas.⁴⁶

Violations involving targeting of civilians

44. Civilians have increasingly borne the brunt of these struggles for power. During the mandate the Monitoring Group collected credible direct eye-witness testimonies and testimonies from family members, of attacks on civilian areas in Lower Shabelle between November 2013 and August 2014, including relating to killing of civilians, burning of homes and farms, rape of women, and population displacement, primarily concentrated around Janale, Marka and K50.⁴⁷ One source alleged that around K50 alone 84 civilians had been killed between March and late July 2014 by “the SNA”.⁴⁸

45. K50 has been a particular focus of the fighting with control of the town going back and forth during 2014. The violent conduct unfolding at K50 reflects the pattern of conduct seen elsewhere with clan militia and government soldiers launching attacks, killing and wounding of civilians and widespread burning of dwellings. According to confidential sources of the Monitoring Group, the attacks on K50 in November/December 2013 and June 2014 were orchestrated and led by Yusuf Indha'ade's *Haber Gedir/Ayr* militias, General Gobale and soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, and General Qaafow, and elements of the 5th Brigade of the SNA.⁴⁹ The Monitoring Group confirmed that during the attack on 16 December 2013 at least seven civilians, including women and children, were killed and 11 others were seriously wounded.⁵⁰ The entire *Biimaal* population of the village was driven from their homes into the bush while houses were looted and dwellings extensively burned.⁵¹

46. In addition to large-scale attacks on civilian areas, individual civilians were deliberately targeted for murder and rape. One IDP man described, for example, how he and his brother on their way to their fields early in the morning “after Ramadan” were stopped by a group of armed personnel wearing military uniforms

⁴⁵ Information received by e-mail from a source with knowledge of security situation in Lower Shabelle, 23 March 2014.

⁴⁶ Interview with activist with knowledge of the security context, Mogadishu, 18 June 2014; interview with former NGO staff member based in Lower Shabelle, Nairobi, 28 March 2014; interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi 24 April 2014.

⁴⁷ Interviews with IDPs from Lower Shabelle in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe, December to June 2014.

⁴⁸ Confidential submission from communities around K50, received 29 July 2014.

⁴⁹ With respect to the attack on K50 in December: interview with individual present at K50 shortly after the attack, Mogadishu, 28 April 2014; interview with local elders, Nairobi, 11 May 2014; interview with former member of the SNA, location and date undisclosed for security reason.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Interviews with, and e-mail from, *Biimaal* elder 17 May 2014; detailed list of losses by family from burning and looting on file with the Monitoring Group.

which were at a staging point. His brother was taken to one side and executed. The witness recognised a senior official in the local political administration, known to lead his own militia, in a position of command at the site.⁵²

Arms and financial support

47. Multiple sources of the Monitoring Group have indicated that the *Haber Gedir* soldiers and militias are being provided with weapons and funds from *Haber Gedir/Sa'ad* businessmen.⁵³ Sources also suggest the existence of an agreement to eject the *Biimaal* from power and the plantations in Lower Shabelle, as part of a *Haber Gedir* strategy to claim Lower Shabelle.⁵⁴ This is independently corroborated by another source that claims there have been 3 meetings since autumn 2013 in the “Hawa Tako House” in the Zoppe area of Mogadishu, which belongs to Asha Elmi, the wife of former Prime Minister Shirdon. In these meetings, leading *Haber Gedir* clan members discussed the actions against the *Biimaal* in K50 and Marka.⁵⁵

Middle Shabelle

48. Similar to Lower Shabelle, the conflict between the pastoralist *Abgaal* (in particular the *Mohamed Muse* sub-clan) and the agriculturalist “bantu” or “jareer” minority, the *Shiidle*, who reside along the banks of the Shabelle river, broke out following offensives against Al-Shabaab there. The tensions between these two communities also have roots in the grievances from the “clan-cleansing” period of the civil-war, from 1991 to 1993, during which the armed pastoral *Abgaal* broke with past customs regulating a peaceful co-existence between the two sub-clans, and trespassed through the cultivated farm lands of the powerless *Shiidle*, affecting grazing areas for their livestock and water access, and went to the extent of pillaging and raping *Shiidle* women with impunity. The pastoralist clans called the *Shiidle* “*looma ooye*” meaning “the ones no one cries for” and “*looma aare*” meaning “the ones no one will revenge”.⁵⁶ Since then, the *Abgaal* have also been seeking to exploit the farm produce of the *Shiidle*. After the defeat and retreat of Al-Shabaab in December 2012, the tensions between the clans increasingly resurfaced, as disputes over farmland re-emerged.

49. During June and July 2013, a series of incidents escalated the tensions, including a number of killings around the village of Weydow between 15 June and 1 July 2013, and an attack on a mosque in Beyaxaaw village by *Abgaal* militia on 4 July 2013.⁵⁷ On 10 July 2013, a ceasefire agreement was reached between the *Jareer/Shiidle/Walamoy* and *Abgaal/Mohamed Muse*. On 14 July 2013, a peace agreement was entered into, by which the disputed land was ruled in favour of the

⁵² Interview IDP man, location undisclosed, 21 January 2014.

⁵³ See for example, e-mail, former NGO staff member with knowledge of events in Lower Shabelle, 16 June 2014; e-mail NGO staff member with knowledge of Lower Shabelle, 7 June 2014; see also letter from the Council of Lower Shabelle Elite and Elders for Peace and Development to UNSOM, 10 June 2014.

⁵⁴ Confidential sources with knowledge of the *Haber Gedir* strategy.

⁵⁵ At these meetings, Duale “Haaf”, a prominent *Haber Gedir/Sa'ad* businessman allegedly pledged USD 1.5 million to the *Haber Gedir* campaign in Lower Shabelle. Haaf has an interest in re-gaining the K50 airstrip, and the banana plantations he controlled from 1993 to 1997.

⁵⁶ See Joakim Gundel, *The predicament of the 'Oday'*, Danish Refugee Council/Novib Oxfam, 2006, p. 36.

⁵⁷ Confidential United Nations and NGO security reports.

Shiidle. Although losses on both sides were acknowledged, no compensation was paid.⁵⁸ On 8 September 2013, a group of *Shiidle* elders were arrested by the Middle Shabelle regional administration who accused them of organizing meetings that were contrary to the stability of the region. The elders insisted that they were discussing issues concerning recent flood disasters in the region. Although the elders were released on 9 October 2013, tensions once again escalated. Following incidents in which cattle belonging to the *Mohamed Muse* sub-clans trespassed into *Shiidle* farmland consuming and destroying crops and with disputes over farmland ownership on 18 and 31 October 2013, and 1 November 2013, the situation spiralled on 6 and 7 November 2013.

50. Confidential annex 8.2 contains a detailed account of the events on 6 and 7 November 2013 in 20 villages northeast of Jowhar and related violations of international law. In brief, a series of attacks were launched by *Abgaal/Mohamed Muse* militias, and SNA personnel, in the course of which civilians were killed, homes burned, assets looted, women were raped and thousands displaced. The fighting continued at a different level of intensity until 27 November 2013, when a new agreement between the sides was reached.

51. Apart from the violations against civilians, the Monitoring Group has obtained information indicating some deeply worrying aspects of the conflagration in Middle Shabelle, in particular observations of direct involvement of SNA personnel against the *Shiidle*, possible leakages of arms to the *Abgaal* militias, and business interests in taking control of fertile farmland in Middle Shabelle. The character of the attacks was described by *Jareer* elders as a “brutal cleansing genocide” against six *Jareer/Shiidle* sub-clans, in particular in the village of Walamoy.⁵⁹ Testimonies obtained by the Monitoring Group indicate that, in a similar fashion to what happened in Lower Shabelle, *Abgaal* clan elements of the SNA participated in the fighting on the side of the *Mohamed Muse* sub-clan. A few *Jareer* SNA deserters responded to the attacks in defence of what the *Jareer/Shiidle* community experienced as an effort to remove them from their land by force in contrast to past conflicts, which mainly were about grazing rights and access to water.

52. According to witness accounts, members of the 1st Brigade in addition to other elements including soldiers from the *Abgaal/Mohamed Muse*, *Warsangeli*, and *Da'ud* sub-clans from other sections of the SNA, as well as “Haber Nugaal”, participated in the attack. According to United Nations sources, the 1st Brigade is primarily composed of former *Abgaal* clan-militias.⁶⁰ Battalions of the 3rd Brigade, which mainly are composed of *Haber Gedir* sub-clans, and Battalion 60 (mainly *Abgaal*) were also alleged to have participated in the attack, although there were conflicting reports as to the extent to which some elements of the SNA might have been sent with the objective of stopping the fighting.⁶¹ It cannot be established fully whether the commanders were directly involved in orchestrating the SNA forces or that it was a case of “undisciplined” SNA elements who broke ranks with those under their command to join their sub-clans in the fighting.

⁵⁸ Agreement Signed by Walamoy and Mohammed Muse Elders (unofficial translation into English), 14 July 2013, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁵⁹ Statement of Jareerweyne elders, 9 November 2013, on file with Monitoring Group.

⁶⁰ Internal United Nations document, May 2013, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁶¹ Security source working with the SNA, Mogadishu, January 2014.

53. The Monitoring Group is concerned that the involvement of SNA soldiers, and the apparent heavy armament of *Abgaal* militias during the November clashes, may be linked to the leakages of arms and equipment from the SNA, and/or from illegal arms imports by *Abgaal* elements close to the FGS (see annex 6). An expert with knowledge of the Somali military context asserted that “weapons, arms and clothing were issued to those fighting the *Shiidle*.”⁶²

⁶² Interview former United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 14 January 2014.

Annex 4

Piracy and kidnap for ransom

Annex 4.1: Registered armed attacks and disruptions since October 2013

Armed pirate attacks¹

DATE	VESSEL	FLAG	TYPE OF WEAPON ²	WEAPONS FIRED ³	INCIDENT TYPE
11 Oct 13	ISLAND SPLENDOR	Hong Kong	Automatic weapons	Y	Attack
6 Nov 13	ZHONGJI NO.1	Hong Kong	Automatic weapons	Y	Attack
9 Nov 13	MV TORM KANSAS	Denmark	AK47	Y	Attack
9 Dec 13	GULF PEARL	Bahamas	-	Y	Attack
9 Dec 13	GOLDEN ICE	Hong Kong	-	-	Attack
17 Jan 14	NAVE ATROPOS	Marshall Islands	Automatic weapons	Y	Attack
13 Feb 14	ANDREA	Sierra Leone	AK47	Y	Attack

Disruptions of Pirate Action Groups (PAG's)

DATE	NAVAL VESSEL	FLAG	DISRUPTION OF	PAG	TRANSFERRED TO
15 Oct 13 ⁴	HMAS MELBOURNE	Australia (CTF151)	Whaler and skiff	9	-
5 Nov 13 ⁵	FGS NIEDERSACHSEN	Germany (EUNAVFOR)	Whaler and skiff	10	-
10 Nov 13 ⁶	HDMS ESBERN SNARE	Denmark (NATO)	Whaler and skiff	9	Seychelles
16 Nov 13 ⁷	UPS H. SAGAIDACHNY	Ukraine (NATO)	Skiff	7	-
18 Jan 13 ⁸	FS SIROCO	French (EUNAVFOR)	Hijacked dhow ⁹	5	Seychelles
26 Apr 14 ¹⁰	FGS BRANDENBURG	Germany (EUNAVFOR)	Hijacked dhow ¹¹	6	-

¹ Information obtained from European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) on 9 July 2014.

² When left blank ("-"), weapons were observed but the reporting did not indicate the type of weapons that were observed.

³ When left blank ("-"), reporting did not indicate whether weapons were fired or not.

⁴ <http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2013/10/18/ctf-151-apprehends-somali-pirates-and-destroys-their-skiffs/>.

⁵ <http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-piracy-continues-eu-warship-prevents-suspect-pirates-going-to-sea-and-a-merchant-ship-is-attacked-by-pirates-in-the-indian-ocean/>.

⁶ <http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/NATO-disrupts-suspected-Pirate-Group.aspx>.

⁷ <http://www.mc.nato.int/PressReleases/Pages/NATO-Counter-Piracy-Ukrainian-Frigate-UPS-HETMAN-SAGAIDACHNY-Boards-Pirate-Skiff-.aspx>.

⁸ <http://eunavfor.eu/suspect-pirates-apprehended-by-eu-naval-force-flagship-transferred-to-the-seychelles/>.

⁹ Indian dhow MSV *Shane Hind*, hijacked off Barawe shortly after 4 January 2014 where it had loaded Somali charcoal.

¹⁰ <http://eunavfor.eu/somali-pirates-flee-captured-dhow-as-eu-naval-force-applies-pressure/>.

¹¹ Indian dhow MSV *Al Nazir*, hijacked around 12 April 2014 off the coastal town of El Hur after it had loaded charcoal in Barawe on 6 April 2014.

9 suspected pirates with skiff and whaler contained by HMAS Melbourne's (CTF151) boarding team on 15 October 2013



Disrupted pirate skiff being destroyed by HMAS Melbourne on 15 October 2013



Annex 4.2: Photographs of pirate leader and financier Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”

Mohamed “Gafanje” photographed during a meeting in Adado on 9 January 2013





Annex 4.3: Pirate facilitator Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey”

1. Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim Aden was arrested and jailed in Belgium on 12 October 2013 for facilitating activities of Somali piracy. Nicknamed “Tiiceey”, he is a 42-year-old U.S. citizen from Burnsville, Minneapolis. He was born in Somalia and reportedly emigrated to the U.S.A. at the age of 22.

Picture of former Himan and Heeb “President” Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim Aden “Tiiceey”



2. Tiiceey became Deputy Chairman of the United Somali Diaspora, established in October 2007, before moving back to Somalia. In March 2008, with the support of the Somali diaspora, he formed Himan and Heeb, an autonomous Habar Gidir-controlled regional administration located in the west of Galgadug and covering the South Central Somali Districts of Adado, Godinlabe, Bahdo, Gelinsor, Amara, Elhur, Harardhere, and Hobyo.

3. As the Chairman and later “President” of Himan and Heeb, Tiiceey introduced local governance and development in a highly insecure region characterized by lawlessness, clan fighting, warring Islamic factions and criminals, including pirates from the Hobyo-Harardhere piracy network who were already running a successful piracy business.

Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” and his two tanks in Adado, Himan and Heeb



4. In October 2009, asked by the media about the booming and ever growing phenomenon of Somali piracy, Tiiceey was quoted as saying:

*“I’d take these guys on, but I can’t right now because I don’t have the resources. Besides, you can’t just wipe out a whole line of work for thousands of young men. If you take something away, you must replace it with something else. Otherwise, more problems.”*¹²

5. Established facts, testimony and other information, however, revealed that in addition to bringing development and prosperity to Himan and Heeb, Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” also used his powerful position, as a local politician and Saleban militia leader, to enrich himself by assisting and facilitating the activities of local Saleban pirates as well as renowned pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne”.

Afweyne and Tiiceey in a picture presumed to be taken in Adado in 2012



6. Moreover, it appears that the main assistance of Tiiceey to the pirates consisted of facilitating the release of hostages, the payment of ransoms and associated negotiations. In several cases, Tiiceey extorted tens of thousands of dollars from victim parties for granting permission for aircraft to land, which is normally charged at a rate of some USD 200 (see also real landing fees and security surcharges at Adado Airport below).

7. Tiiceey is also suspected to have provided the pirates all necessary means and assistance to ensure smooth communications and negotiations with representatives of hijacked vessels, and will be prosecuted for the alleged membership of a criminal organization led by pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne”.¹³

¹² http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/world/africa/03somalia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

¹³ Information obtained from law enforcement source on 14 August 2014.

Stella Maris (2008)

8. Several “Crew Evaluation Forms” (dated 5 February to 5 March 2008) belonging to the Japanese bulk carrier *Stella Maris*, which was hijacked on 20 July 2008, were found in Tiiceey’s possession after his arrest (see strictly confidential annex 4.3.a). Tiiceey’s possession of these documents is notable, since no less than 20 contacts registered in Tiiceey’s phone book have been part of or involved with the pirate gang holding the *Stella Maris*, including the son of Afweyne, pirate leader Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi, in addition to renowned pirate negotiator Abdullahi Farah Qarey,¹⁴ pirate leader Abdi Beenlow and the logistical *khat* supplier Hawa Dirie Ahmed, also known as “Hawo Five”, the wife of pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”.¹⁵

9. Another one of Tiiceey’s contacts involved in the *Stella Maris* hijacking was the Jubba Airways office chief in Adado, Arays Sheikh Mohamud.¹⁶ Arays, who is believed to be a pirate financier but who is also a registered agent of Amal Express,¹⁷ transferred USD 990 to Tiiceey on 13 September 2012,¹⁸ and another USD 2,475 during early 2012 to pirate negotiator Ahmed Mohamud Mohamed, also known as “Adam”,¹⁹ a member of the pirate facilitation company “Indian Ocean Consultants” (see S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.3) and involved in multiple hijacking cases.²⁰ In addition, communication data shows Arays to be in contact with other individuals involved in piracy, such as pirate financier Mahamed Said Jimale.²¹

10. The role Tiiceey played in this hijacking case remains unclear. Pirates released the *Stella Maris* on 26 September 2009 for a reported ransom payment of USD 2 million.²²

Faina (2008)

11. Tiiceey also seemed to have played a role in the negotiations of the *Faina*, the Ukrainian general cargo vessel carrying 33 Soviet-made T-72 tanks, weapons and ammunition, which was hijacked by Somali pirates on 25 September 2008 on delivery to Kenya.

12. Credible information obtained by the Monitoring Group seems to indicate that a Kenyan intelligence agency was actively assisting with ransom negotiations and was in contact with Tiiceey in order to get the vessel and its valuable cargo released as quickly as possible.²³

¹⁴ Abdullahi Farah Qarey is also known as “Abdullahi Jareer”, “Abdi” and “Jabril”.

¹⁵ Information obtained from credible law enforcement sources.

¹⁶ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=9381>.

¹⁷ <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:vx5m6lZqVM4J:amalexpress.net.au/international-agents/&hl=en&strip=1>.

¹⁸ Copy of money transfer in the possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁹ Copy of money transfer in the possession of the Monitoring Group.

²⁰ In addition to other activities, Adam acted as a pirate negotiator in the hijackings of the *Beluga Nomination*, *Gemini*, *Izumi* and the *Orna*.

²¹ Communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

²² <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20080927-163311/Pirates-release-Japanese-ship-with-Filipinos-for-2M>.

²³ Information obtained from military intelligence source on 16 July 2014.

13. An e-mail originating from “Nairobi” and sent to Tiiceey on 25 January 2009 by an individual named “Major Yahya” seems to confirm this.²⁴ Not only does the e-mail provide direct and detailed information in the Somali language about the ongoing negotiations of the *Faina*, it also contains information about the pirates holding the *Faina* and suggests that this information had been obtained from the “coalition forces” in Bahrain.²⁵

14. In addition, the sender requests Tiiceey to provide him with more information concerning the involvement of a German professor and the Saleban elders in Nairobi and indicates that they are being followed. Such specific details and the appearance of the sender’s e-mail address on internet fora discussing Kenyan Government affairs and political developments reinforce the suspicion that Major Yahya is a Kenyan official (see strictly confidential annex 4.3.b).²⁶

15. Again it is not clear what Tiiceey’s exact role was in the negotiations of the *Faina*, which service he was allegedly providing, and to whom and for who’s benefit he was providing the service. However, information obtained about his later involvement in other hijacking cases suggests that Tiiceey’s facilitation services are neither free nor cheap.

Indian Ocean Explorer (2009)

16. On 27 March 2009, reportedly in the vicinity of Alphonse island, some 215 nautical miles from the main Seychelles island of Mahé, the Seychellois-flagged passenger (cruise) ship *Indian Ocean Explorer* (IOE) and its 7-member crew, all Seychellois nationals, were hijacked by Somali pirates.

17. Like the Belgian-flagged stone carrier *Pompeii*, hijacked on 18 April 2009, the IOE was taken by Hobyo-Harardhere pirates under the control of pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ and his son Abdikadir Abdi Mohamed. On the side of the pirates, negotiations were led by Afweyne’s preferred negotiator, Abdullahi Farah Qareey, also known as ‘Abdi’.²⁷

Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi, pirate leader and son of Afweyne



²⁴ E-mail address also registered as “Yahya Mohamed” and “Yahya ‘Mo’”.

²⁵ Information in possession of the Monitoring Group.

²⁶ <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/uchunguzionline/conversations/topics/3952?var=1>;
<https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/wanabidii/cMH0ikeIHJo>.

²⁷ Information obtained from credible law enforcement on 11 June 2009.

18. Negotiations proved to be difficult, especially during the final stages when there was agreement about the ransom payment but prevailing weather conditions prevented the ship and its crew from sailing back to the Seychelles. The crew had to be flown out of Somalia, which implied land transportation and additional security risks. The pirates also wanted to ensure that they would receive the ransom payment first, before releasing the hostages.²⁸

19. In order to accelerate the process, both parties had a first meeting in a small café at The Junction Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, on 17 June 2009, in order to discuss further modalities of the payment and the release of the hostages.²⁹

20. The representative of the pirates identified himself as “Mohamed Aden”, a senior official in the Adado Administration, and said that he was living in Minnesota, U.S.A., where he had a wife and children but had returned to work in Somalia.³⁰

21. Mohamed Aden, who was later recognized and identified as Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden ‘Tiiceey’, explained that he had to be given the full ransom payment and travel documents for the hostages in order to secure their safe release.³¹

22. In a second meeting on 18 June 2009, Tiiceey demanded an additional USD 20,000. In return, he said, the hostages would be transferred to Adado airport, from where they could be flown out to Kenya.³²

23. Left with no further options, an additional USD 20,000 was raised, and on 19 June 2009 Tiiceey was sent a letter from the Kenyan Government with arrangements for the safe passage of the hostages in Kenya.³³

24. During the next meeting, which presumably took place on 20 June 2009 in an unidentified hotel in Nairobi, Tiiceey was given the agreed ransom payment of USD 400,000 and the additional funds he had requested. However, all the funds had to be returned, since Tiiceey, while counting the payment, rejected some 15 percent of the U.S. dollar bills because the pirates would only accept U.S. 100-dollar notes printed after a specified date.³⁴

25. After exchanging the unwanted bills to meet Tiiceey’s requirements, a subsequent and final meeting was set up in the same hotel, where Tiiceey recounted and reexamined the new notes and accepted the payment. He then called pirate negotiator ‘Abdi’ to say that all was satisfactory and left the hotel with the USD 420,000.³⁵

²⁸ As described by the former hostage and Captain of the *Indian Ocean Explorer*, Francis Roucou, in his book *88 Days*.

²⁹ Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

³⁰ Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

³¹ Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

³² Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

³³ Information in possession of the Monitoring Group.

³⁴ Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

³⁵ Credible information provided by confidential source with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

26. A day later, all hostages were released from the ship and transferred to Adado, where the next morning on 22 June 2009, they were picked up by a Capital Airlines chartered Beechcraft Kingair and flown to Nairobi.³⁶

Francis Rocou, Captain of the hijacked Indian Ocean Explorer on his arrival at Wilson Airport, Nairobi, Kenya



Serenity (2009)

27. Also in March 2009, Somali pirates hijacked the sailing yacht *Serenity* and took hostage the Seychellois citizens on board, Conrad Andre, Gilbert Victor and Robin Samson. Their release on 6 September 2009 in the vicinity of the pirate-infested town of Gara'ad coincided with the release and deportation of 23 suspected Somali pirates from Seychelles to Gara'ad. This surprised and provoked fierce criticism from the Puntland Government, which claimed that the chartered aircraft used for the operation had no legal clearance to land and accused the Seychelles Government of organizing an illegal pirate-hostage exchange. In a subsequent press release the Puntland Government further alleged that, "the transaction was facilitated by elements involved in pirate smuggling and ransom transfers".³⁷

28. The Seychelles Government, which is said to have negotiated the release of the *Serenity* crew,³⁸ dismissed the allegations of the Puntland Government and responded that the 23 Somali suspects had been cleared by the court and were therefore deported as illegal immigrants, not pirates. Returning the hostages to the Seychelles on the same plane, they argued, was a means of reducing the cost of the overall operation and avoiding the need for two separate trips into Somalia.³⁹

29. However, confidential communications and documents in possession of the Monitoring Group show that in June 2013, Tiicey had already been provided with a list of the names of the 23 suspected pirates jailed in the Seychelles, indicating advance preparations for a hostage deal. Once again, Tiicey was involved in

³⁶ As described by the former hostage and Captain of the *Indian Ocean Explorer*, Francis Roucou, in his book *88 Days*.

³⁷ http://wardheernews.com/Press_Releases/Puntland/Sept_07_Kenya_Seychelles_Pirate_Smuggling.html.

³⁸ <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=%20224277>.

³⁹ <http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=224277>.

brokering or facilitating negotiations on behalf of the Hobyo-Harardhere pirates (see strictly confidential annex 4.3.c).

30. The fact that the pirates reportedly moved the *Serenity* between Gara'ad, Hobyo and Harardhere suggests that elements of both pirate networks had a stake in the capture. Similar to the *Faina* hijacking, this provides a logical explanation for Tiiceey's involvement in the negotiations.⁴⁰

31. As Tiiceey requested and received USD 20,000 for his facilitation services in the *Indian Ocean Explorer* case, it can be assumed that he was also provided an incentive for brokering the hostage-pirate exchange.

Alakrana (2009)

32. Documents and communications obtained by the Monitoring Group show that Tiiceey was directly involved in an attempt to extradite two Hobyo-Harardhere sea-pirates jailed in Madrid, following their arrest on 3 October 2009 by the Spanish Navy in relation to their involvement in the hijacking of the Spanish fishing vessel 'Alakrana' on 2 October 2009. (See strictly confidential annex 4.3.d).

Somali pirates Cabdiweli Cabdullahi ("Abdu Willy") and Mr. Raagegesey Hassan Hagi ("Raagegesey Adji Haman"), sentenced to 439 years each for their role in the hijacking of the Alakrana



33. The original letter requesting the extradition was sent from the Somali Embassy in Nairobi to the Spanish Ambassador in Nairobi on 8 November 2009 under the pretext that an extradition was required "in order to follow and complete the ongoing investigations" (see annex 4.3.e).

34. Four days later, both the Somali letter of request and the signed reply from the Spanish Ambassador addressed to then Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdurashid Sharmarke ended up in the possession of Mohamed Dhunkal Hersi, nominated by Tiiceey as Himan and Heeb Chairman and State Representative for East Africa, and Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale, NationLink manager in Harardhere. Both men have

⁴⁰ <http://www.sail-world.com/cruising/index.cfm?nid=58867&rid=11>.

been identified as notorious pirate facilitators and are in contact with senior pirates, pirate financiers and negotiators.⁴¹

35. Pirates Abdiweli Abdullahi (“Abdu Willy”) and Raagegesey Hassan Hagi (“Raagegesey Adji Haman”) were never extradited and in May 2011 they were sentenced in Spain to 439 years each for their role in the hijacking of the *Alakrana*.⁴²

***Lynn Rival* — the Chandlers (2009-2010)**

36. On 23 October 2009, Somali pirates hijacked the yacht ‘*Lynn Rival*’ with her crew, Paul and Rachel Chandler, while sailing in the Seychelles Archipelago.

37. The Chandlers were brought on land in South Central Somalia and were held captive there by Hobyo-Harardhere pirates until their release 388 days later.

38. At a very early stage in the negotiations, when a ransom payment of USD 6 million had just been demanded, the pirates were already referring to the release of the couple. An e-mail sent by pirate negotiator ‘Omar’ on 27 December 2010 refers to a safe area called ‘Himan and Heeb’ and ‘Mohamed Aden’, a Somali-American who runs a town called Adado, and where he has built an airport. The e-mail further suggests making contact with ‘Mohamed Aden’ in order to arrange for a plane to pick up the couple after their release.⁴³

39. Tiiceey was not contacted and negotiations made progress with the newly appointed pirate negotiator Ali a.k.a. ‘Saneeg’.⁴⁴ On 21 April 2010, after the family of the Chandlers thought they had reached an agreement with the pirates for a sum of USD 440,000, Tiiceey made contact with them through a journalist and requested a meeting in London.⁴⁵

40. The family agreed and a friend of theirs met with Tiiceey in London on 23 April 2010. During the meeting, Tiiceey explained that his family lived in the U.S.A., that he was educated there and that he was a resident in Kenya and Somalia. He claimed to have already assisted with two other ‘hostage air operations’ and that similar to those cases the pirates would release the Chandlers in his custody to arrange for a safe return to Nairobi. Tiiceey mentioned that the airport of Adado is 300 kilometers away from Harardhere, by which he seemed to indicate awareness about the location where the Chandlers were being held.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Supporting evidence and letters in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁴² <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/10/30/espana/1256929137.html>.

⁴³ Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

⁴⁴ Known by the Monitoring Group and identified in its 2011 reporting as Ahmed Saneeg (S/2011/433, pages 36, 40-41), a renowned Hobyo-Harardhere pirate negotiator involved or connected to many hijacking cases, such as the *Thai Union*, *Alakrana*, *Bow Asir*, *Izumi*, *York*, *Beluga Nomination*, and *Gemini*.

⁴⁵ Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

⁴⁶ Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

41. After the meeting but later that day, the family sent Tiiceey an e-mail to inquire whether he would expect any fees for his assistance, as the deal they had struck with the pirates included the couple's departure costs. To that e-mail Tiiceey replied as following:

42. "About the payment, Himan & Heeb Regional Administration are not part of the Pirates, and they don't deal or/and share money, and we are not expecting ANY payment from the Pirates or Paul and Rachel family. The only support we were offering was humanitarian support and to facilitate Paul and Rachel's save passage, so if the pirates are handling the departure of Paul and Rachel that's fine with us."⁴⁷

43. Negotiations then got stalled for some weeks but gained momentum on 8 June 2010 when the pirates expressed readiness to proceed with the amount earlier agreed of USD 440,000. An agreement was signed and the family got back in touch with Tiiceey to make arrangements for the Chandler's release and departure.⁴⁸

44. However, on 14 June 2010, after some communications back and forth, Tiiceey suddenly demanded USD 21,750 from the family, a payment required to cover landing fees and security he said.⁴⁹ The unexpected demand for additional funds obliged the family to suspend their deal with the pirates until they could reach an agreement with Tiiceey over his demand.⁵⁰

45. The family eventually persuaded Tiiceey to accept an offer of USD 20,000 to cover his facilitation services. The money was sent to him on 16 June 2010 through Tiiceey's hawala agent in Nairobi, Mohamed Yusuf. This was one day before the ransom money, as agreed, was dropped near the runway of Adado airport.⁵¹

46. However, after Tiiceey was paid and the ransom dropped, the pirates did not release the couple and instead cut all communications. Sometime later it was assessed that some of the pirates had disagreed with the ransom amount and objected to the release. Negotiations soon resumed and started again from the beginning, with a new demand that rose up to several million dollars.⁵²

47. The Chandlers were eventually released and flown out of Adado on 14 November 2010. It remains unknown how much ransom was additionally paid to secure their release.

48. Both negotiators 'Omar' and 'Saneeg' are known contacts of Tiiceey.⁵³

⁴⁷ E-mail in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁴⁸ Agreement in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁴⁹ In contrast Tiiceey told MPR News in 2010 that he helped raise ransom money from the Somali diaspora that led to the couple's release: <http://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/10/23/mohamed-aden-arrested-belgium>.

⁵⁰ Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

⁵¹ Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

⁵² Information extracted from an interview on 9 June 2014 in London, United Kingdom, with a member of the Chandler family with inside knowledge of the communications and negotiations with the pirates.

⁵³ Pirate negotiator Omar is known in Tiiceey's phone book as "Omar O. Lid".

Gemini (2011)

49. On 30 April 2011, Somali pirates hijacked the Singapore-flagged chemical/oil products tanker *Gemini* approximately 180 nautical miles East of Malindi, Kenya. It was held off Harardhere and released on 30 November 2011. There were a total of 25 crewmembers on board: 13 from Indonesia, 5 from China, 4 from South Korea, and 3 from Myanmar (Burma).

50. On 28 November 2011, four days before the release of the *Gemini*, USD 250,000 was transferred from Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), to Mohamed Aden 'Tiiceey' in Mogadishu. The sender of the money is indicated on the transfer as "Muhammad Ali Said". Two mobile phone numbers are also indicated on the transfer, one registered in UAE and one in Singapore.⁵⁴

51. The UAE mobile number appears in Tiiceey's phone contact list under the name of "Ambassador Olow" with an additional Indonesian mobile number and a Gmail address. The Indonesian mobile number traces back to H.E. Mohamed Olow Barow, the former Somali Ambassador to Indonesia (2007-2012) and current Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources with the Federal Government of Somalia.⁵⁵

Former Ambassador to Indonesia Mohamed Olow Barow



52. Communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group show that on 3 and 10 October 2011 and on 2 December 2011 the Indonesian phone number of Ambassador Olow Barow was in direct contact with Hobyo-Harardhere pirates involved in negotiating the release of the *Gemini*, more specifically with:

- The mobile phone number used by pirate negotiator Hersi Ali Mohamud (Ali Hassan), who was involved in numerous hijacking and abduction cases, including the *Gemini*.⁵⁶ Hersi Ali is a member of 'Indian Ocean Consultants' (IOC), a pirate-affiliated group and company based in Mogadishu and involved

⁵⁴ Information obtained from an identified money transfer company.

⁵⁵ <http://somalieembassies.gov.so/index.php?emb=Indonesia&page=Home>.

⁵⁶ As confirmed by credible military intelligence agency and several owners and operators of hijacked vessels during 2010–2011 and 2012.

in negotiating ransom payments on behalf of Hobyo-Harardhere pirate groups (see photographs of Hersi Ali Mohamud in annex 4.3.f).

- The mobile phone number used by pirate facilitator and United Kingdom national Mahad Mahamuud Nuur, Director General of IOC. Mahad Nuur operates both in Dubai and Mogadishu and extorted a USD 50,000 side payment from the ship owner of the hijacked bulk carrier *Orna* in January 2012 (see picture of Mahad Mahamuud Nuur in annex 4.3.g).
- The mobile phone number used by Mohamed Abdi Dahir, who is believed to be Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader Hussein Jiis, also known as Hussein Mohamed Abdi, and alleged member of IOC.⁵⁷

53. Communication data further show that on 18, 19, 26, 28 and 30 November 2011 (the day the *Gemini* was released), Tiiceey communicated with the above mentioned pirate facilitator and negotiator Mahad Mohamuud Nuur and Ali Hassan, and for that purpose used two of his known mobile phone numbers.⁵⁸

54. Also another Indonesian contact in Tiiceey's phone book records, 'Mohamed Ali Jacfar', communicated with the *Gemini* pirate negotiator prior to the release of the vessel. In fact, as of 11 August 2011, a total of 18 telephone calls were registered between Jacfar's Indonesian mobile number and the mobile number of Ali Hassan. Again, the last call took place on the day that the *Gemini* was released (30 November 2011).⁵⁹

55. In addition, the Monitoring Group possesses three e-mail communications dated 13 and 17 November 2011 between a pirate negotiator and an individual named "Muhammad" believed to be representing Indonesian interests.⁶⁰ The e-mails, which are written in the English language, refer to efforts to getting the Indonesian crew released and to the case being handled by Government officials. It further indicates a payment ranging between USD 350-500,000, possible financial support of Indonesian businessmen and a mediator named "Professor Ahmed Hassan", who travelled to Indonesia to finalize the case. There are also instructions for the money to be paid to the pirate negotiator in Dubai or to have Professor Ahmed Hasan send the money directly to the pirates via money transfer.⁶¹

56. All the elements described above strongly indicate that a side payment of USD 250,000 was transferred to Tiiceey on 28 November 2011 to ensure and facilitate the safe release of the 13 Indonesian crewmembers on board the *Gemini*, which was due to take place two days later.

57. Indeed, similar to the 7 Indian crewmembers of the hijacked tanker '*Asphalt Venture*' and the 4 South Korean crewmembers of the *Gemini*, all of whom had been kept as hostages after their vessel got released in retaliation for counter-piracy actions taken by their respective Governments, it can be assumed that the same pirate group also threatened to keep as hostages the Indonesian crewmembers of the *Gemini*, in retaliation for the 30 April 2011 incident during which Indonesian naval

⁵⁷ Hussein Jiis' involvement was established in the hijacking of the *Orna* and the abduction of 2 Spanish MSF workers.

⁵⁸ Communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁵⁹ Communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁶⁰ Muhammad's e-mail was sent from his "Telkomsel" empowered Blackberry, a telecommunication provider based in Indonesia.

⁶¹ E-mails in possession of the Monitoring Group.

forces killed 4 Somali pirates who were vacating the released Indonesian bulk carrier *Sinar Kudus* after a ransom was dropped on board. In fact, a Korean Government official quoted in the Korea Times confirms such a modus operandi: “Throughout the negotiations, the pirates (on the *Gemini*) have demanded compensation from our government for their killed colleagues and the release of those on trial.”⁶²

58. In this connection, the *Gemini*'s ship-operator stated to the Monitoring Group that he distinctly remembers a phone conversation with one of the pirate negotiators who indicated a side-payment being offered by the Indonesian Government. In addition, Captain Bak of the *Gemini* refers in his diary — which he kept during his captivity — to several statements made by pirate negotiator Ali Hassan in which he mentions money being offered by the Indonesian Government for the safe release of the Indonesian crewmembers.

59. After their release and on arrival in Jakarta airport on 9 December 2011, the legal counsel of the Indonesian hostages, Muhammad Ali, was quoted by Antara News as saying: ““But luckily, thanks to the assistance of the Indonesian government, they have now arrived back in Indonesia after being held hostage for seven months by Somali pirates.”⁶³

60. Both the Indonesian Government and Somali Minister Mohamed Olow Barow were informally queried on the matter. While the Somali Minister did not respond, the Indonesian Government confirmed receipt of the Monitoring Group's communication but at the time of writing was yet to provide the clarifying information requested.⁶⁴

61. Given Tiiceey's method of operation, it has to be assumed that he demanded and negotiated a fee for facilitating the USD 250,000 money transfer and for funnelling the proceeds to the relevant Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leaders in control of the *Gemini* and its 25-member crew.

Judith Tebbutt (2011-2012)

62. On 11 September 2011, United Kingdom nationals Judith and her husband David Tebbutt were attacked by six Somali gunmen in their lodge at the Kiwayu Safari Village resort near Kiwayu Island in northern Kenya. David Tebbutt was shot dead during the assault while Judith Tebbutt was kidnapped and brought to Somalia where she would be held captive for seven months.

63. During her captivity, Judith Tebbutt was reportedly transferred or sold onwards to a pirate group active in and around Harardhere. Although moved to different locations to avoid detection, Tebbutt is believed to have been held mainly in the vicinity of Adado, where she was released on 21 March 2011 after an alleged ransom payment ranging between USD 800,000 and USD 1.1 million. Various

⁶² http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/12/113_99913.html.

⁶³ <http://beta.antaranews.com/en/news/78318/twelve-former-somali-pirate-hostages-back-in-indonesia>.

⁶⁴ E-mails sent to representatives of the Indonesian Government and Somali Minister Mohamed Olow Barow on, 26 June 2014 and 27 July 2014, respectively. The Indonesian Government confirmed receipt of the communication on 13 August 2014.

media reporting also referred to a second payment of around USD 140,000 for middlemen, brokers and handlers who helped negotiate the release.⁶⁵

Judith Tebbutt picked up in Adado on 21 March 2012



64. Permission to land and pick up Judith Tebbutt at Adado was requested and as usual provided by Tiiceey himself, as President of Himan and Heeb (see landing request in strictly confidential annex 4.3.h). She was picked up in Adado and flown to Nairobi by a Beech Super King Air with Kenyan registration number 5Y-JJZ, operated by Phoenix Aviation Ltd.

65. The aircraft picking up Judith Tebbutt also carried an envelope for Tiiceey containing USD 10,000 he had demanded for obtaining his landing permission. Because Tiiceey was out of the country on 21 March 2012, the envelope was passed on, as instructed, to “Ahmed”, one of Tiiceey’s confidants (see photograph in annex 4.3.i).⁶⁶

Aride (2011-2012)

66. On 30 October 2011, Somali pirates attacked and hijacked the artisanal fishing vessel ‘*Aride*’ with its two crewmembers, Roly Tambara and Mark Songoire, at approximately 65 nautical miles northwest of Mahé, Seychelles. Soon after, it became clear that the two crewmembers were taken to Hobyo, Somalia, where they were brought on land and held hostage under control of Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ and pirate financier Ali Dula, also known as Ali Mohamed Ali.⁶⁷

67. Negotiations to release Tambara and Songoire lasted a year and turned out to be extremely difficult. Demands remained unrealistically high for long periods of time, communications were often stalled and there was clearly ongoing rivalry between Gafanje and Ali Dula. During the course of the negotiations, alarming

⁶⁵ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9157551/Hostage-Judith-Tebbutt-release-as-it-happened.html>; http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/03/21/somali_gunmen_free_british_woman_after_six_months_captivity.html.

⁶⁶ As confirmed on 22 July 2014 by an individual involved in the release arrangements for Judith Tebbutt.

⁶⁷ The Seychellois fishing vessel *Aride* and its 2 crew members were the last high-value ‘catch’ for the pirates of the Hobyo-Harardhere pirate network.

messages and evidence was received indicating that the hostages had been subject to abuse and torture.⁶⁸

68. Only during late September 2012, when Gafanje appointed the experienced and renowned negotiator 'Adbi',⁶⁹ did negotiations started moving forward and by the end of October 2012 agreement was reached over a final ransom payment.⁷⁰

69. Similar to previous piracy cases, Adado once again was suggested as the place to extract the hostages, which implied a secondary negotiation with President Tiiceey. More demanding than before, Tiiceey rejected an initial offer of USD 25,000 to permit an aircraft to land and pick up the hostages, an amount that was thought he had received in the Chandlers' case. Instead, he demanded USD 90,000 for the same service, an amount subsequently paid to him in cash in Nairobi. However, on the agreed day of transfer of the hostages, Tiiceey delayed the arrangements for their release and requested another USD 30,000, which was unavoidably paid to him again in cash and in Nairobi.⁷¹

70. In a letter dated 30 October 2012, the Seychelles Minister of Home Affairs and Transport requested the use of Adado airport for the release of the two hostages between 1 and 4 November 2012. Only on 3 November 2012 did Tiiceey respond, permitting the over flight and landing of the aircraft in Adado on 3 and 4 November 2012 (correspondence in strictly confidential annex 4.3.j).

71. A short time later, and after a reported ransom drop of USD 5 million, Seychelles nationals Roly Tambara and Mark Songoire were picked up at Adado airport by a Cessna 210 with registration number 5Y-BHT, operated by Heliprops Ltd., and flown to Nairobi, Kenya. Their release was announced in the media on 4 November 2012.⁷²

Real landing fees and security surcharges at Adado Airport

72. On the basis of revenue generation for the Himan and Heeb Administration, Tiiceey sent out a 15 May 2013 directive addressed to airline companies Central Air and Jubba Airways, instructing payment of the following landing and security fees (see strictly confidential annex 4.3.k):

1. USD 5 from each ticket sold
2. USD 1 from each sack of outgoing goods
3. Security fees:
 - a. 50 seating capacity: USD 50 per flight
 - b. 100 seating capacity: USD 70 per flight
 - c. 150 seating capacity: USD 100 per flight

⁶⁸ Information obtained from law enforcement source on 12 October 2012.

⁶⁹ Also known as Abdullahi Jareer, Jabril or Abdullahi Farah Qarey.

⁷⁰ Information obtained from different sources with inside knowledge of the negotiations.

⁷¹ Information obtained from law enforcement source on 22 January 2013.

⁷² <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/04/us-somalia-piracy-idUSBRE8A30EC20121104>.

Legal cover for pirate leadership and facilitators

73. In its previous report (S/2013/413, paragraph 58), the Monitoring Group expressed concern about a 28 February 2013 letter from the FGS President, which confirmed his intention to offer partial amnesty to young pirates but emphasized that the amnesty would not apply to pirate kingpins, who had financially benefitted most.

74. However, a letter dated 6 January 2013 from Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’ to the FGS indicates the opposite. The letter refers to an earlier “signed general agreement” with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and in that context notifies the FGS of the nomination of renowned and senior pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ as “First Deputy of the Piracy Advisor Committee to the Himan and Heeb President”. The letter further requests the FGS to extend to Gafanje all possible assistance, thereby introducing an effective amnesty for him.⁷³

75. Tiiceey’s letter of 6 January 2013 was sent 8 weeks after the Seychelles Government informed him that Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ was holding hostage two of their nationals, and 3 days before he organized a press conference in Adado where both Afweyne and Gafanje denounced their involvement in piracy. Moreover, in January 2013 Gafanje was still holding hostage dozens of individuals.⁷⁴

76. Later in January 2013, Tiiceey sent similar letters on behalf of senior pirate leaders Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ and his son Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi, notifying the FGS of their nomination as ‘Piracy Advisor’ and ‘Secretary of the Pirate Advisor’, respectively, of Himan and Heeb.⁷⁵

The Chairman of the ‘Somali Anti-Piracy Agency’, Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’, speaks at the Agency’s annual meeting in Mogadishu in September 2013



⁷³ Letter in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁷⁴ In January 2013, Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ was reportedly holding hostage American-German journalist Michael Scott Moore, Kenyan aid workers Janet Muthoni Kanga, Martin Mutisya Kioko and Abdinoor Dabaso Bor, and 28 crewmembers of the hijacked fishing vessel *Naham 3*. At the time of writing (early August 2014), only the 3 Kenyan aid workers had been released from captivity on 5 June 2014, after an alleged payment of a ransom.

⁷⁵ Letters in possession of the Monitoring Group.

77. These communications illustrate that neither the FGS nor local administrations in Somalia have any intent to pursue pirate leaders, most who have been identified and are well known to them. On the contrary, there have been creative efforts to provide a legal cover for piracy crimes committed under the guise of a so called 'pirate rehabilitation program', which was only established after the pirates realized that they were no longer able to hijack any ships and needed to change their tarnished image in order to become accepted as respectable businessmen.⁷⁶

78. Tiiceey, who supported pirates and pirate facilitators and benefitted from their activities since he came to power, sent several letters to the TFG and FGS over the years requesting the issuance of diplomatic passports for individuals he claimed were associated with the Himan and Heeb administration. However, some of these individuals, such as Abdullahi Dirie Abtidoon (Himan and Heeb Religious Advisor) and Abdi Takiye Farah (Himan and Heeb Minister of 'Finance'), are found to have been connected to activities of Somali piracy.⁷⁷

Pirate communications

79. The limited communication data available to the Monitoring Group nevertheless show that Tiiceey over the past several years directly communicated with pirates active in the Hobyo-Harardhere piracy network, or people directly connected or involved with Hobyo-Harardhere pirates. For that purpose Tiiceey was using at least three of his mobile numbers, including his one registered in the U.S.A.⁷⁸

80. Tiiceey's phone book registers 149 individuals that directly or indirectly connect to activities of Somali piracy, including well known pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators and facilitators, such as Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne', Abdi Beenlow a.k.a. Sugulle Ali, Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane 'Buundo', Abdullahi Mohamed Jama 'Faraxow', 'Hawo Five', Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Gafanje', Galad Aden Tahlil, Mohamed Musse 'Guusha', Abdullahi Farah Qarey (Abdi), Mohamed Abdi Olad, Ahmed Saneeg, and Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi.⁷⁹

Central Air

81. In addition to conspiring in piracy activities, Tiiceey has been identified as a business partner of Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne' in his airline company Central Air Aviation established in 2012 (see annex 4.6 for a case study on Central Air Aviation).

82. Tiiceey is believed to have offshore bank accounts, as well as bank accounts in Kenya, Somalia, UAE and the U.S.A.

⁷⁶ The 30 October 2012 hijacking of the Seychellois fishing vessel 'Aride' with its two crewmembers would be the last high-value 'catch' for the pirates of the Hobyo-Harardhere piracy network.

⁷⁷ 2011-2012 and 2013 letters in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁷⁸ Information obtained from law enforcement source on 12 March 2012.

⁷⁹ Information obtained from law enforcement source on 10 March 2014.

Annex 4.3.a: *Stella Maris* “Crew Evaluation Forms” (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 4.3.b: Attachment to a 25 January 2009 e-mail sent by
“Major Yahya” to Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 4.3.c: Attachment to a 24 June 2009 e-mail sent by a
Seychelles Government official to Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey”
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.3.d: Letter from the Government of Spain to Mohamed Aden “Tiiceey” (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 4.3.e: Letter from the Somali Embassy in Nairobi dated
8 November 2009 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.3.f: Photographs of pirate negotiator Hersi Ali Mohamud

*Pirate negotiator Hersi Ali Mohamud, also known as "Ali Hassan"*⁸⁰



⁸⁰ Member of Indian Ocean Consultants pirate facilitation and negotiation company. In addition to the *Gemini* hijacking, Hersi Ali Mohamud's involvement has been established and suspected in multiple other hijacking and abduction cases, including but not limited to the hijacking of the *Rak Afrikana* (2010-2011) (attempt), *Asphalt Venture* (2010-2011), *Orna* (2010-2012) and the abductions of British national Judith Tebbutt and 2 Spanish MSF aid workers.

Annex 4.3.g: Photograph of pirate facilitator Mahad Mahamuud Nuur

*Indian Ocean Consultants' Director General, Mahad Mahamuud Nuur, a.k.a. "Nasser"*⁸¹



⁸¹ In addition to the *Gemini*, Mahad Mahamuud Nuur's involvement has been established in the hijacking of the *Orna* (2010-2012) and *Choizil* (2010-2012).

Annex 4.3.h: Request for landing clearance at Adado (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.3.i: Photograph of Tiiceey’s confidant, “Ahmed”

“Ahmed”, with lilac outfit and glasses, escorted the released pirate hostage Judith Tebbutt to the awaiting aircraft and took receipt of USD 10,000 on behalf of pirate facilitator Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’



Annex 4.3.j: Letter of the Seychelles Government and letter of reply from Mohamed Aden 'Tiiceey' (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.3.k: Letter to Central Air and Jubba Airways indicating landing fees for Adado airport

**JAMHUURIYADDA
SOOMAALIYA**

**MAAMULKA
GOBALEEDKA
XIMAN & XEEB**

XAFIISKA MADEXWEYNAHA



**SOMALI
REPUBLIC**

**HIMAN & HEEB
REGIONAL
ADMINISTRATION**

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Tell: (25261) 5322008, (2526) 99987156, Adado, Central Region of Somalia

May 15, 2013

Ku: Shirkadaha Duulimaadyada Diyaaradaha
Ku: Wasaarada Maaliyada Ximan & Xeeb

Mudanayaal,

Kadib markaan aragnay isla markaana aan ka doodnay daqli u sameynta Maamulka Ximan & Xeeb. Kadib markaan aragnay sida loogu baahi qabo in la helo duulimaadyo kaafiya dadka ku dhaqan Gobalada Dhexe isla markaana Maamulku ka helo daqliga ku waajiba shirkadahaas, ayaan waxuu Maamulku go'aansanay inaan Shirkadaha Central Air & Jubba Airways laga qaado khidmadaan:

1. Tikidh kasta oo baxaya \$5 ayuu Maamulku leeyahay
2. Khidmada Alaabta baxaysa kiintaalkii waa \$1
3. Kharashka Amniga duulimaadkii waa:
 - a. Diyaaradaha 50 qaadka ah \$50 duulimaadkii
 - b. Diyaaradaha 100 qaadka ah \$70 duulimaadkii
 - c. Diyaaradaha 150 qaadka ah \$100 duulimaadkii

Waxaan si sharaf leh u codsaneynaa in shirkadaha duulimaadyada ee ka howlgala Ximan & Xeeb iney fududeeyaan awaamiirtan, isla markaana waxaa lagu amrayaa Wasaarada Maaliyada iney ku hawlgasho wareegtadan.

Waad Mahadsantihiiin,

Mohamed A. Moalin-Aden "Tiiceey"
Madaxwenaha Maamul Gobaleedka Ximan & Xeeb
Adado, Gobolada Dhexe ee Soomaaliya
Email: tiiceey@hotmail.com, tiiceey@gmail.com
himanandheebstate@gmail.com

Annex 4.4: Photographs of protests against pirate arrests

83. Following the arrests in Belgium on 12 October 2013 of pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ and pirate facilitator Mohamed Adullahi Moalim-Aden ‘Tiiceey’, who are being prosecuted for suspected membership in a criminal organization and involvement in the 2009 hijacking of the Belgian stone carrier *Pompeii*, several protest marches were held in Adado and Godinlabe, denouncing the imprisonment of both individuals.

Adado, Somalia, 15 October 2013:⁸²

Demonstrators holding posters with pictures of Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ stating “Ma, ahan burcad badeed”, meaning “He is not a pirate”



⁸² <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=18514>; <http://www.deegaan.com/?p=21025>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zw97FVBN5o4>.

Demonstrators holding posters with Belgian flags stating “Biljam, muwaadinka Soomaaliyeed waxa ay ku haysato waa khalad, usoo celiya xoriyadiisa??”, meaning “Belgium is wrongly holding the Somali national, give him his freedom”⁸³



Demonstrators holding posters stating “Burcad badeed waqtigeedii wuu dhamaaday”, meaning “The era of piracy is over”



⁸³ Both Himan and Heeb Vice President ‘Abdi Mohamed Sultan Ahmed Nur’ and Interior Minister Hassan Abdullahi Mohamed attended the protest and spoke to the participants at the rally.

Godinlabe, Somalia, 17 October 2013:⁸⁴

Demonstrators holding posters with pictures of Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ stating: “Noo Soo Daaya, meaning “Let him free”



Interview with local elder



⁸⁴ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=18583>.

Adado, Somalia, 22 October 2013:⁸⁵



⁸⁵ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=18839>.

Adado, Somalia, 11 November 2013:⁸⁶


Women and children were also summoned to join the protests to increase the number of demonstrators



⁸⁶ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=19464>.

Adado, Somalia, 23 November 2013:⁸⁷

Religious men and disabled individuals attended a rally held in Adado on 23 November 2013 in protest of the unlawful arrest of businessman/diplomat 'Afweyne' and the politician 'Tiiceey'. The protest was broadcast on Somali National TV (SNTV) on 24 November 2013⁸⁸



Mogadishu Times, interview with the wife of Mohamed Aden 'Tiiceey', posted on 12 February 2014:⁸⁹

Shamsa Abtidoon Mohamed, who appealed to the Somali-American diaspora and the United States Government for their intervention, demanded Tiiceey's immediate release



⁸⁷ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=19902>.

⁸⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da2HjnPJfA>.

⁸⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeBPvVtYUby>.

Safari Hotel, Minnesota, U.S.A., 1 March 2014:⁹⁰

Members of the Hawiye / Habar Gidir clan, family, friends and Iman Sheikh Hassan Mohamud 'Jamici' of the Islamic Daw'ah Institute mosque in St. Paul, Minneapolis, speaking at the "Minnesotans for Tiiceey" event



"Free Tiiceey Now" Facebook Page created on 17 October 2013⁹¹

The "Free Tiiceey Now" Facebook Page refers to the "Free Tiiceey Now" Twitter account and the online petition at "change.org"⁹²



⁹⁰ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=II1TJqSnr_8.

⁹¹ <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Free-Tiiceey/205438112971041>.

⁹² <https://twitter.com/FreeTiiceeyNow>.

Online petition at “MoveOn.org” with first signee Farhio Khalif on 15 March 2014:⁹³

FREE TIICEEY NOW

Petition by [Farhio Khalif](#)

To be delivered to The Minnesota State House, The Minnesota State Senate, Governor Mark Dayton, The United States House of Representatives, The United States Senate, and President Barack Obama

Mohamed A. Aden “Tiiceey”, a Somali-American and former governor of Himan & Heeb state of Somalia, was unduly arrested October 12, 2013 by the Belgium authorities accusing him of being complacent to piracy! Mr. Tiiceey is an honorable statesman and has been in Somalia to help find a lasting peace after 21 years of civil war.

There are currently 43 signatures. We need 50 signatures!

PETITION BACKGROUND

Online petition created in October 2013:⁹⁴

change.org Start a petition Browse Search

FREE TIICEEY NOW

Petitioning Free Tiiceey


FREE TIICEEY NOW

Petition by Free Tiiceey Mogadishu, Somalia

⁹³ <http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/free-tiiceey-now>.

⁹⁴ <http://www.change.org/petitions/free-tiiceey-free-tiiceey-now>.

**Annex 4.5: Photographs of pirate leader and financier
Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi (son of pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi
Hassan ‘Afweyne’)**





Annex 4.6: Central Air Aviation

84. On 19 May 2012 at 1:00 PM, a white Dornier 228 cargo-passenger aircraft with registration number 5Y-BWN flying from Mogadishu landed at the airstrip of Adado, capital of Himan and Heeb regional administration in Galgaduud, Somalia.⁹⁵

85. It was reportedly the first flight of the newly established regional passenger airline company ‘Central Air Aviation’ (hereafter “Central Air”), owned by pirate kingpin Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ in partnership with other individuals who maintained close ties to Somali pirates, including Ali Mohamud Ali, the finance manager of the company, and Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden ‘Tiiceey’, the former President of Himan and Heeb.⁹⁶

86. Between 2012 and 2014, Central Air was found to be operating multiple aircraft in cooperation with several foreign airline companies in Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, and had established offices throughout Somalia. With limited data available, the Monitoring Group nevertheless found that Central Air conducted at least 117 flights between 19 May and 31 December 2012, its first year of operation, and at least 542 flights between 3 January and 30 September 2013.

Central Air’s Dornier 228 landing at Adado airport on 19 May 2012



Transition from pirate leader to CEO

87. Afweyne was one of many who realized that the lucrative period of Somali piracy had come to an end, and he took full advantage of the continuing absence of international sanctions and any form of prosecution in Somalia to diversify his interests and engage in other business activities.

88. Indeed, the prevailing climate of impunity enabled Afweyne to invest the proceeds he had illegally accumulated during the past decade in the newly established airline company Central Air, and it enabled others to partner with him unhindered.

89. In this regard, Afweyne and his business partners conveniently denounced piracy publicly and spread a counter-piracy media and propaganda campaign in

⁹⁵ The Dornier DO-228 is a twin turboprop light transport aircraft with low operating cost and adaptable for a wide variety of roles.

⁹⁶ <http://www.somalinet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=25&t=308422>; and <http://galobalnews.com/?p=4016>.

order to convince those inside and outside Somalia sceptical of their newly minted good intentions. Rebranding Afweyne's image paved the way for the unimpeded laundering of piracy proceeds as he assumed the role of a respected and legitimate businessman and diplomat (see S/2013/413, paragraphs 56-59).

Aircraft used by Central Air

Dornier 228 (5Y-BWN) and Embraer 120 Brasilia (5Y-FAE and 5Y-FAM)

90. Afweyne entered into a business arrangement with the Somali-Kenyan owners of Freedom Airline Express Ltd., based at Wilson Airport, Nairobi, Kenya. On a regular basis in 2012, he chartered from Freedom Airline Express two aircraft, a Dornier 228 with registration number 5Y-BWN and an Embraer 120 Brasilia with registration number 5Y-FAE (see photographs of the aircraft in annex 4.6.a). Officially, Central Air operated the Dornier 228 only once in 2012, when it flew from Nairobi to Adado via Mogadishu, but the aircraft also conducted 59 anonymous *khat* flights from Wilson Airport, Nairobi, to Somalia, and 2 other flights were registered as operated by the owner of the aircraft, Freedom Airline Express.⁹⁷ Since Afweyne had been running a *khat* business for some time⁹⁸ and since both airlines were operating as a joint venture in 2012,⁹⁹ the 59 *khat* flights appear to have involved Central Air as well.

91. Shortly after its first official flight on 19 May 2012, Central Air began operating the Embraer 120 Brasilia (registration number 5Y-FAE), and conducted a total of 74 flights between 26 May and 29 December 2012.¹⁰⁰ Central Air was then fully operational. Most of the 5Y-FAE flights were conducted between Nairobi and Adado, with one exception on 15 September 2012, when the aircraft landed in Guri'el. In between Central Air operations, the aircraft was also regularly used — 21 times — by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and on some occasions by other Wilson Airport-based airlines.¹⁰¹

92. In 2013, Central Air continued operating the Embraer 120 Brasilia (5Y-FAE), though to a lesser extent. Between 26 January and 28 September 2013, 34 flights were registered, the great majority destined for Guri'el. However, the volume of joint operations with Freedom Airline Express remained substantially the same, since Central Air began using a third aircraft belonging to that airline, another Embraer 120 Brasilia (registration number 5Y-FAM). Between 5 January and 24 August 2013, Central Air conducted 33 flights with this aircraft (see photograph of the aircraft in annex 4.6.b).¹⁰²

'Blue Goose' (EX-18006)

93. While in business with Freedom Airline Express, Afweyne sought to expand his enterprise and operate a larger passenger aircraft to conduct regular flights throughout Somalia. In October 2012, aviation broker Ahmed Biite of Sahura

⁹⁷ Flight registration details in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁹⁸ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/magazine/taken-by-pirates.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁹⁹ Letter dated 11 July 2012 from Mohamed Aden Tiiceey and addressed to "Central Air/Freedom Air Administration" in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁰⁰ The Embraer 120 Brasilia is a 30-seat short haul commuter aircraft featuring high cruise speed and low operating costs.

¹⁰¹ Flight registration details in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁰² Flight registration details in possession of the Monitoring Group.

Airways introduced Afweyne to Gennady Griaznov, the owner of Sky KG Airlines, an airline company based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, which was advertising the lease/sale of their 1969-built Ilyushin-18 aircraft.¹⁰³ Griaznov offered Afweyne to lease the 84-seater aircraft and sent him a contract proposal through Ahmed Biite, which led to a 14 November 2012 Wet Lease Agreement signed by both parties (see annex 4.6.c).¹⁰⁴

94. Around 23 November 2012, the Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number EX-18006, which in a previous incarnation reportedly served as the Presidential aircraft of the late Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, was flown to Berbera, where it was refuelled, loaded with cargo and flown to Mogadishu, becoming operational thereafter by its Somali nickname 'Blue Goose'.¹⁰⁵

*Central Air's 84-seater IL-18 passenger aircraft 'Blue Goose' on arrival at Mogadishu International Airport on 11 August 2013*¹⁰⁶



95. Already by 31 December 2012, 'Blue Goose' had undertaken 40 flights to seven different destinations in Somalia. On average, the aircraft was operational every other day and flew to Adado, Baidoa, Berbera, Galkayo, Kismayo, Mogadishu, and on one occasion to Garowe. In 2013, Afweyne increased the operations of the Ilyushin-18, which flew nearly every day to the same destinations, and exceptionally to Hargeisa, and even Djibouti on 4 August 2013.

¹⁰³ http://centreforaviation.com/data/fleet/myairlease_ILYUSHIN_187009904.

¹⁰⁴ The 14 November 2012 Wet Lease Agreement was later amended and re-signed on 29 January 2013, and another annex was added on 31 January 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Gennady Griaznov of Sky KG Airlines in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 28 January 2014.

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.jetphotos.net/viewphoto.php?id=7679924>.

'Blue Goose' EX-18006 boarding passengers at Kismayo on 13 December 2012



96. At present, there is no indication that the arrest of Afweyne in October 2013 has affected the operations of Central Air, which is now believed to be functioning under the supervision of his son, Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi. Indeed, in 2014, Central Air continued operating 'Blue Goose', which is a conspicuous sight not only at Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, but elsewhere in Somalia.

97. The aircraft can accommodate 84 individuals per flight. A one-way ticket is sold for around USD 80.¹⁰⁷ Since November 2012, the monthly lease of the Ilyushin-18 EX-18006, which seems to vary between USD 45,000 and 50,000, is paid to Sky KG Airlines either by money transfer or cash handover in Dubai, UAE.¹⁰⁸

Fokker F-27 (5Y-SIB)

98. A white Fokker F-27 with registration number 5Y-SIB is another aircraft operated by Central Air. It had been repainted and bears the company logo. The aircraft is owned by Skyward Express Ltd. and leased to its affiliate Skyward International Aviation Ltd.,¹⁰⁹ both Somali-Kenyan airlines with offices at Wilson Airport, Nairobi, and believed to be associated with Freedom Airline Express. Flight data obtained for the aircraft indicates 65 registered flights conducted between 10 September and 27 November 2013 and 182 flights conducted between 1 January and 28 June 2014 (see additional photographs of the aircraft in annex 4.6.d).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.theafricanaviationtribune.com/2013/03/somalia-despite-ongoing-war-somali.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Money transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group. Also, interview with Mr. Griaznov of Sky KG Airlines in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 28 January 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Skyward Express Limited and Skyward International Aviation Limited are affiliated companies through their shareholders.

¹¹⁰ Information obtained from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 29 April and 31 July 2014.

Central Air's Fokker F-27 at Adado airport on 9 October 2013



99. According to his Facebook account, the operations manager of Skyward International Aviation is Mahat Nur Geele. Mahat Nur's e-mail address was one of the two recipients of a 24 January 2012 e-mail containing a pirate release agreement for the December 2010 hijacked general cargo vessel *Orna*. The e-mail was subsequently forwarded by the second recipient to the pirate negotiator of the *Orna*, Hersi Ali Mohamud, a member of the pirate negotiation company Indian Ocean Consultants (see annex 4.3 and 4.3.f.).

100. On Facebook, Mahat Nur is 'friends' with pirate negotiator Galad Aden Tahlil (see annex 4.7), pirate facilitator Mohamed Abdi Olad (see annex 4.7.) and several other individuals associated with pirates or piracy activities.

Mahat Nur Geele disembarking from Central Air's 'Blue Goose'



101. One of those individuals is Abdulkadir Ali Jahaf 'Gaarrah',¹¹¹ who arrived as a refugee in Belgium three years ago, and is a member of the Abdi Isse/Omar Mohamud clan. He is known in Galkaayo as a pirate leader associated with renowned pirate leader and financier Abdullahi Ahmed Haji Farah 'Abdi Yare' (see annex 4.7).

¹¹¹ Abdulkadir Ali Jahaf's formal name is Abdulkadir Ali Abdille Ali, nicknamed 'Gaarrah'.

102. Gaarrah is believed to be residing in Gent, Belgium, while his brothers are managing his businesses in Somalia. One of his brothers, Gifaan Ali Jahaf, has been found by the Monitoring Group to be in contact with Ahmed Diriye Abdile, a pirate facilitator residing in the UAE who maintains a financial relationship with ‘Abdi Yare’ and other individuals involved in piracy (see annex 4.7.).

103. On Facebook, Gaarrah displays several pictures of himself in Belgium and the Netherlands. In one of the pictures, taken in Gent, he features as a player of a Somali football team sponsored by SOBSI, a Belgian-subsidized non-profit local community organization run by a Somali-Belgian residing in the UAE, Abdirashid Issa Noah, who features in the same picture. The Monitoring Group has found that Noah is involved in the United Nations-banned Somali charcoal business and maintains close connections with radical Islamist leaders (see annex 9.2 and 9.2.f).

104. Another picture displayed by Gaarrah on 29 April 2012 shows him with Ismail Ahmed Qaali (Abdirashid Issa Noah’s brother-in-law) and General Abdullahi Said Samatar, a former Puntland Minister for Internal Security, who was previously identified by the Monitoring Group (S/2010/91, paragraph 137) for having “received proceeds from piracy and/or kidnapping”. This picture was apparently taken in Belgium as well.¹¹²

105. Other Facebook ‘friends’ of Abdulkadir Ali Jahaf include Central Air’s representative in Garowe, Ali Yusuf Jama (see the section on “management and offices” below) and pirate facilitator Ahmed Diriye Abdile (S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.4). Notably, Ali Yusuf Jama also displayed a picture of himself on Facebook with General Abdullahi Said Samatar in Garowe.

Fokker F-27 (5Y-VVJ)

106. Another Fokker F-27 with registration number 5Y-VVJ is believed to be Afweyne’s long time *khat* carrier, which he used for transporting the stimulant from Wilson Airport, Nairobi, to Adado. The aircraft is owned by the Somali-Kenyan airline Bluebird Aviation Ltd., based at Wilson Airport and reportedly associated with Freedom Airline Express and Skyward Express. While at least one flight of the aircraft has been registered as operated by Central Air, most of the data obtained simply registers Blue Bird Aviation as the operator.¹¹³

107. On 20 April 2014, when landing at Guri’el, the aircraft overran the runway and came to a stop on rough terrain, suffering significant damage. The tail number of the Fokker F-27, which was transporting a cargo of six tons of *khat*, was reportedly painted out (see pictures of the aircraft in annex 4.6.e).¹¹⁴

¹¹² <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=424451780916492&set=pb.100000550219140.-2207520000.1407694444.&type=3&theater>.

¹¹³ The 5Y-VVJ Central Air-operated flight was registered on 19 January 2013, flying from Adado to Wajir (Kenya). Further but incomplete 2013 flight data for the aircraft indicates 12 additional flights between 19 January and 9 August 2013, 44 flights in October 2013 and 62 in November 2013, nearly all flying between Wilson Airport, Nairobi, and Adado, with the owner, Bluebird Aviation, registered as the operator. It is assumed that all flights to Adado were carrying *khat*.

¹¹⁴ http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4741588a&opt=0&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter; <http://www.aeroinside.com/item/4070/blue-bird-f50-at-guriceel-on-apr-20th-2014-overran-runway>.

Other aircraft used by Central Air

108. Central Air rented 3 aircraft from the Wilson Airport-based airline company Capital Airlines Ltd. on 7 and 17 January, 19 February and 14 March 2014, including two Beech King Air's with registration numbers 5Y-NKI and 5Y-JAI, and another, as yet unidentified, aircraft with registration number 5Y-JKL. All 3 aircraft were indicated as being used for the transportation of 'cargo'.¹¹⁵

109. In reply to the Monitoring Group's request for additional information, the Managing Director of Capital Airlines stated that he has never known any company called Central Air or Central Air Aviation, nor is he familiar with the aircraft registration number 5Y-JKL. He confirmed, however, ownership of the Beechcraft 5Y-NKI and 5Y-JAI, but said the company does not lease out the aircraft.¹¹⁶ Capital Airlines also confirmed that on the specified dates both aircraft were carrying cargoes of *khat* from Wilson Airport to Mogadishu, but that it does not know who owns the *khat* cargoes, shipments of which are exclusively managed by their Somali-Kenyan cargo manager, Adan Abdullahi Abdi, who handles all their Somali operations.

110. However, the nature of the cargoes and the fact that the Beechcraft flights were registered in Mogadishu as operated by Central Air, suggests that they were related to Afweyne's *khat* business. Moreover, investigations have revealed that the Capital Airlines cargo manager is in contact with Afweyne, his son Abdikadir, and Hiray Abdi Hashi, a suspected Harardhere pirate facilitator in close contact with many individuals involved in piracy, including Afweyne himself.

Central Air publicity

111. Central Air has been advertised to the public by various means, including on the internet through the company's website, 'centralairaviation.com'. The website — which is no longer active — provided a "company profile", and information about Central Air's "community involvement", "employees", "schedules" and "flight destinations".¹¹⁷

112. The website was created and registered on 6 May 2013 by 'Hassan Ali' of Cawaale Printing and Technology in Mogadishu, a known pirate facilitator and negotiator affiliated with the pirate negotiation company Indian Ocean Consultants (see S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.3), whose website he registered as well.

113. The Monitoring Group has identified 'Hassan Ali' as Hassan Ahmed Ali, also known as Hassan Macsharo, the brother of pirate facilitator and United Kingdom national Abdirahim Ahmed Ali (see photograph of Hassan Ahmed Ali in annex 4.6.f).

114. Central Air also managed the Facebook Page "Central Air", where it provided the company's address in Mogadishu, contact details, and some pictures of the Speaker of the Federal Parliament of Somalia travelling on one of their aircraft. In

¹¹⁵ Information obtained on 9 April 2014 from a reliable contact within Somalia and with inside knowledge of Somali airspace operations.

¹¹⁶ Reply to the Monitoring Group received via e-mail on 25 July 2014.

¹¹⁷ Centralairaviation.com is no longer active due to "Bandwidth Limit Exceeded".

the meantime the Facebook Page has been closed down or is no longer available (see screen shots of the Facebook Page in annex 4.6.g).

115. Another Facebook Page, which is likely connected to Central Air, is “Central Air Somalia”, created on 12 February 2013 and with a registered address in London, United Kingdom.¹¹⁸ The address and phone number appearing on the Page are also in London and assigned to the charity organization Somali Relief And Islamic Cultural Centre.¹¹⁹ The Facebook Page displays flight destinations inside and outside Somalia, and one person ‘liking’ Central Air Somalia is an adolescent from Mogadishu, but living in Minneapolis, U.S.A., with Afweyne’s name, ‘Omar Mohamed Abdi Hassan’.¹²⁰

116. Central Air was also regularly promoted during public meetings, often organized by Afweyne himself as the CEO. On 24 November 2012, for example, Afweyne held a meeting at the airport of Adado attended by local elders, intellectuals, women, and Himan and Heeb leaders. Afweyne briefed the attendees on the company’s accomplishments and apologized for unintended flight delays during the previous two weeks. Other speakers at the meeting included local politician and senior member of the management team of Central Air, Hassan Hashi Muhumed, as well as Abdulkadir Said Ahmed, a member of the Somali diaspora. Both praised Central Air for its accomplishments. Also, Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’, the President of Himan and Heeb, spoke at the event, and welcomed and praised Central Air’s achievements.¹²¹

Free flights for Government officials

117. In addition to never having intervened or taken the initiative to disrupt his criminal activities, in January 2012 the Somali Government provided Afweyne with a diplomatic passport and three months later appointed him on an ad hoc basis as the Government’s ‘counter piracy’ expert (see S/2012/544, paragraph 50), coincidentally when he was briefly detained at the Kuala Lumpur airport in early April 2012.

118. Afweyne appears not to have forgotten the support and protection he enjoyed from friends in Villa Somalia and displayed the following message on his website:

119. “Central Air supports the government with free flights for government officials in their line of duty within the country (to and from the different regions)”.

120. Without reservation, several Government officials indeed made good use of Afweyne’s generous offer and on various occasions publicly traveled on Central Air. In addition, African Union and Somali Government soldiers have been sent on domestic assignments with the airline (see photographs in annex 4.6.h).

Central Air expansion

121. As the operations of Central Air grew rapidly and the commercial service of the Ilyushin-18 ‘Blue Goose’ proved successful, Afweyne sought opportunities to expand his business overseas.

¹¹⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Central-Air-Somalia/52244871777226>.

¹¹⁹ <http://opencharities.org/charities/1133144>.

¹²⁰ <https://www.facebook.com/hyperbee>.

¹²¹ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=6257>.

122. Prior to Afweyne's arrest, Central Air was about to purchase, in further joint venture with SKY KG Airlines, a 1985-built Ilyushin-18/36 from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. A Contemplation Agreement to this effect had been drawn up, indicating that in addition to the USD 500,000 purchase price, an additional USD 300,000 was allocated to equip the aircraft and make it suitable for international use and passenger transport. The terms of payment were also included and described in the agreement (see annex 4.6.i).

123. In addition, in June 2013, Afweyne wrote to Frank Baistrocchi, Director of Sales of Bombardier in Toronto, Canada, to introduce Central Air's "representative to outside business", Abdirahman Sabriye, and to express his interest in partnering with Bombardier and leasing a Dash 300 and 400 aircraft (see strictly confidential annex 4.6.j).

124. When the Monitoring Group contacted Mr. Baistrocchi to obtain additional information about Afweyne's letter, he replied: "I can only confirm to you that I have no record of communication with the named individual", and referred the Group to the company's legal representative for further communication or enquiries. Whether he had actually dealt or communicated with Mohamed Abdi Hassan, Central Air Aviation, or any of their representatives, remained unanswered.¹²²

Involvement of Tiiceey

125. Since 2008, Somali-American Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden 'Tiiceey', former President of Himan and Heeb, financially benefitted from Afweyne's piracy activities, by supplying his piracy network with communication devices and facilitating hostage releases, ransom payments, negotiations, and other arrangements (see annex 4.3).

126. Communications and documents relating to legal transactions and daily management activities of Central Air, some which were found in Tiiceey's possession on his arrest in Belgium, are evident of Tiiceey's involvement in the company and his relation of mutual trust with Afweyne.¹²³

127. On 16 November 2012, for example, Sky KG Airlines received an e-mail from Tiiceey on behalf of Central Air, in which certain financial conditions stipulated in Appendix 1 of the Wet Lease Agreement were being discussed or renegotiated. The e-mail was signed with the name of Mohamed A. Moalin-Aden "Tiiceey", President of Himan & Heeb State. Two days later, Tiiceey sent a Central Air test e-mail to Sky KG Airlines (see annex 4.6.k).

128. Also in March 2013, when Mr. Griaznov of Sky KG Airlines was due to meet with Afweyne in Dubai, UAE, it was Tiiceey who unexpectedly appeared and explained to Griaznov that Afweyne could not make the meeting due to visa issues. He showed Griaznov his American passport and stated that as an American citizen he did not have these problems. He eventually invited the owner of Sky KG Airlines

¹²² E-mail communication with Mr. Baistrocchi in possession of the Monitoring Group, dated 5, 8, 9 and 22 May 2014.

¹²³ Central Air documentation in possession of Tiiceey included: an edited 14 November 2013 version of the Wet Lease Agreement for the Ilyushin-18 EX-18006 aircraft; the Contemplation Agreement for the purchase of another Ilyushin-18/36 aircraft; a draft Letter of Introduction addressed to Bombardier; a Consent Letter addressed to Baiona Films; and a November 2012 SCAMA flight permit for EX-18006.

to visit Mogadishu in May 2013 to meet with Afweyne in person. During the meeting, Tiiceey gave his cell phone to one of his entourage, who he instructed to take a picture of him and Griaznov.¹²⁴

129. During a meeting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 29 January 2014, the Monitoring Group showed Mr. Griaznov a picture, which was found stored in Tiiceey's cell phone along with the name 'Gennady KG Airlines'. He confirmed the picture to be of him and Tiiceey, taken during their meeting in Dubai in March 2013.

Picture of Mr. Griaznov and Tiiceey in Dubai



Airworthiness of 'Blue Goose'

130. According to a 20 January 2014 article published on the Kyrgyzstan news website www.24kg.org, Sky KG Airlines and the lease of its Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number EX-18006 appears to have been the subject of a criminal case initiated under Article 288 ("Violation of International Flights Rules") and Article 350 ("Forgery, production, Sale or Use of False Documents, State Awards, Stamps, Seals, and/or Forms") of the Kyrgyz Criminal Code.

131. In reply to the Monitoring Group's enquiries, the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan stated that on 7 August 2013, the Civil Aviation Agency of the Kyrgyzstan Republic (CAA) received an e-mail from Ahmed Abdurahman Farah, on behalf of the Somali Civil Aviation & Meteorology Authority (SCAMA), asking about the technical condition of the "Sky KG Airlines" IL-18 aircraft under the registration number EX-18006.¹²⁵

132. In response, the CAA of the Kyrgyzstan Republic provided SCAMA with the Certificate of Air Worthiness and the Certificate of Registration of the Ilyushin-18 (EX-18006).¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Information extracted from an interview the Monitoring Group conducted with Mr. Griaznov Gennady in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 28 January 2014.

¹²⁵ Information obtained from the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on 16 May 2014 (Note Verbal 016/119).

¹²⁶ Information obtained from the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on 16 May 2014 (Note Verbal 016/119).

133. On 23 August 2013, SCAMA notified the CAA of the Kyrgyzstan Republic that differences existed between the documents presented earlier by Central Air and the documents provided by the CAA of the Kyrgyzstan Republic.¹²⁷

134. Subsequently, the CAA of the Kyrgyzstan Republic established a committee on ascertainment of facts, which on 25 August 2013 concluded that there were indeed discrepancies in the documents to be noted, and certain elements were indicative of suspected forgery. As such, on 17 January 2014, the Transport Prosecutor's Office of the Kyrgyzstan Republic opened a criminal case and investigation into the matter. As of 30 March 2014, the case was still under investigation.¹²⁸

135. At present it remains unclear to the Monitoring Group whether the 44-year old aircraft has been operating its passenger flights in Somalia with a valid Certificate of Airworthiness or if SCAMA has issued a new Flight Permit for the Ilyushin-18 (EX-18006) to Central Air.

Management and offices

136. When it was active, the website of Central Air displayed the following individuals as 'key executives' of the company:

- Chief Executive Officer and President of Dunia Group of Companies: Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hassan
- Manager: Mr. Mohamed Abdi Hassan
- Finance Officer: Mr. Ali Mohamud Ali
- Operations Manager: Mr. Abdirahman Hirsi Farah

137. Finance Officer Ali Mohamud Ali, also known as 'Ali Dhuux', is the proxy holder of one of Afweyne's bank accounts in Mogadishu. He is also in direct contact with Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Gafanje', pirate financier Mohamed Said Jimale, and associates of both individuals.¹²⁹

*Ali Mohamud Ali, Finance Officer of Central Air*¹³⁰



¹²⁷ Information obtained from the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on 16 May 2014 (Note Verbal 016/119).

¹²⁸ Information obtained from the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on 16 May 2014 (Note Verbal 016/119).

¹²⁹ Bank account information and communications in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹³⁰ As confirmed by airport contacts in Mogadishu on 9 April 2014. Business card of Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir in possession of the Monitoring Group.

138. In addition to information and pictures appearing in annex 4.6.1, other individuals identified as working for Central Air include:

- Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir, Managing Director in Mogadishu;¹³¹
- Ahmed Abdulhak Mohamed, ‘Operation Manager’ in Mogadishu. Also known as Ahmed Sheikh Abdulhak Mohamed and Ahmed Abdi. On Facebook, Ahmed Abdulhak ‘likes’ both Central Air and Skyward Express;¹³²
- Hassan Hashi Muhumed, senior member of the management team in Mogadishu;¹³³
- Abdullahi Kulane, ‘Central Air Purchaser’;¹³⁴
- Ali Yusuf Jama, representative of Central Air in Garowe;¹³⁵
- Abdi Nor Kadiye, Central Air official in Kismayo;¹³⁶

*Central Air boarding passes entered manually*¹³⁷



¹³¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSbDc-S6mNU#t=102>.

¹³² <https://www.facebook.com/abdulhak166>.

¹³³ <http://www.wacaal.com/2013/04/03/shirkadda-central-air-oo-muddo-gaaban-horumar-ka-sii-gaareysa-duulimaadyada-gudaha-iyo-dibadda-amin-yusuf-khasaaro/>.

¹³⁴ While ‘Abdullahi Kulane’ has not been identified, the Monitoring Group notes that Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane “Buundo” is a well known Hobyo-Harardhere pirate financier and that both Buundo and the finance officer of Central Air are in contact with pirate financier Mohamed Said Jimale.

¹³⁵ <http://allpuntland.com/warar/shirkada-diyaaradaha-central-air-ayaa-heshey-ogolaanshii-u-horeeyey-iney-isticmaasho-garoonka-diyaaradaha-garowe>.

¹³⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oil9E67rIHM>.

¹³⁷ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=13299>.

Blank Central Air Boarding Passes



Annex 4.6.a: Photographs of aircraft 5Y-BWN and 5Y-FAE

Dornier 228 cargo-passenger aircraft with registration number 5Y-BWN

Delivering khat at Mogadishu International airport on 12 December 2012



Picking up 11 released Pakistani pirate hostages in Adado on 29 November 2011



Embraer 120 Brasilia commuter aircraft with registration number 5Y-FAE

*Picking up passengers at Adado*¹³⁸



Landed at Adado during June 2012




¹³⁸ Picture published on 15 March 2013.

Annex 4.6.b: Photograph of aircraft 5Y-FAM

Old picture of the commuter aircraft Embraer 120 operated by Central Air



Annex 4.6.c: Signed Wet Lease Agreement of 14 November 2012 (first and last page)¹³⁹



¹³⁹ All 7 pages in possession of the Monitoring Group.

ARTICLE 11. FORCE MAJEURE

11.1. Actually Force- Major circumstances are the circumstances arisen after the Agreement have been concluded and which were unpredictable and beyond control of the Parties
11.2. If the circumstances preventing the fulfillment of the obligations have arisen, the Parties should at the earliest possible time advise the other Party of the beginning and termination.

11.3. If the contingencies last more than two months, the Agreement is suspended.

ARTICLE 12. ARBITRATION

12.1. The Parties shall settle all disputes and disagreements that may arise from the application or interpretation of this Agreement through direct bilateral negotiations in the spirit of understanding and cooperation.

12.2. If the dispute cannot be solved between the Parties directly by such negotiations, the dispute shall be referred to arbitration of a simple arbitrator, to be agreed upon by the Parties hereto. The decision of the said arbitration shall be final and binding on both Parties.

12.3. In case of any third party claims against the party hereof in connection with the fulfillment of the Agreement the other party hereof can take part in court examination if required thus the Parties will defend together any such claim.

The present Agreement is signed in two examples in English and Russian, both copies are equal in legal rights.

ARTICLE 13. LEGAL ADDRESSES OF THE PARTIES.

13.1. The LESSEE:

"Central Air" Company

13.2. The LESSOR:

"SKY KG Airlines"
The address: 15-80, 8 m/d, Bishkek
720075, Kyrgyz Republic
Tel/Fax: + 996 312 57 81 75
E-Mail: skykg@mail.ru

ON BEHALF OF THE LESSEE
ЗА АРЕНДАТОРА

Mokhammed Abdil
CA
CENTRAL AIR

письменном виде с подтверждением получения на официальном адреса Сторон.

10.5. Обе стороны гарантируют, что лица, подписывающие настоящей Договор, имеют на то законное право и полномочия.

СТАТЬЯ 11. ФОРС-МАЖОР.

11.1. Обстоятельствами Форс-мажора называются обстоятельства, возникшие после подписания Договора, которые непредсказуемы и находятся вне контроля сторон.

11.2. Если появились обстоятельства, препятствующие выполнению обязательств, то сторона, для которой стало невозможным выполнение своих обязательств по настоящему Договору, должна в кратчайший срок известить другую сторону о наступлении и прекращении действия таких обстоятельств.

11.3. Если обстоятельства длятся более одного месяца, действие настоящего Договора приостанавливается.

СТАТЬЯ 12. АРБИТРАЖ

12.1. Стороны должны решать все споры и несогласия, которые могут возникнуть от применения или толкования данного Договора, путем прямых двусторонних переговоров и духе понимания и сотрудничества.

12.2. Если спор не может быть решен напрямую, посредством переговоров, то он должен быть рассмотрен простым арбитром, которого выберут обе стороны. Решение этого арбитра должно являться окончательным и обязательным для обеих сторон.

12.3. В случае, если к одной из сторон настоящего Договора будет предъявлен иск какой-либо третьей стороной в связи с выполнением условий настоящего Договора, другая сторона может принять участие в разбирательстве. Таким образом, обе стороны будут совместно осуществлять защиту против такого иска.

Настоящий Договор подписан в двух экземплярах из английского и русского языках. Оба экземпляра имеют одинаковую юридическую силу.

СТАТЬЯ 13. АДРЕСА СТОРОН

13.1. АРЕНДАТОР

Компания "Central Air"

13.2. АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЬ:

Авиакомпания «SKY KG Airlines»
Адрес: 720075, Кыргызская Республика
г. Бишкек, 8 мкр, 15-80
Тел/Факс: + 996 312 578175
Эл. Почта: skykg@mail.ru

ON BEHALF OF THE LESSOR
ЗА АРЕНДОДАТЕЛЯ



Annex 4.6.d: Additional photographs of Fokker F-27 aircraft (5Y-SIB)

5Y-SIB at Aden Adde International Airport (Mogadishu) on 17 September 2013



5Y-SIB in Adado on 9 October 2013



“Central Air Duulimaad Raaxo Leh” or “Enjoy flying Central Air”, advertisement on runta24.com showing 5Y-SIB¹⁴⁰



¹⁴⁰ <http://runta24.com/2013/07/page/25/>.

Annex 4.6.e:**Photographs of *khat* transporting aircraft Fokker-27 with registration number 5Y-VVJ**

*Landing at Wilson Airport, Nairobi, Kenya, on 27 February 2013*¹⁴¹



*In the background at Adado airport, published on 15 March 2013*¹⁴²



¹⁴¹ [http://www.airliners.net/photo/Untitled-\(Bluebird-Aviation\)/Fokker-50/2244964/&sid=c373423aa49bce97373c9252b613ebc0](http://www.airliners.net/photo/Untitled-(Bluebird-Aviation)/Fokker-50/2244964/&sid=c373423aa49bce97373c9252b613ebc0).

¹⁴² <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=10500>.

At Adado airport, published 28 May 2013¹⁴³



5Y-VVJ crashed at Guri'el airstrip when overrunning the runway on 20 April 2014¹⁴⁴



¹⁴³ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=13299>.

¹⁴⁴ <http://avherald.com/h?article=4741588a>; <http://www.baaa-acro.com/2014/archives/crash-of-a-fokker-50-in-guriceel/>.

Annex 4.6.f:**Photograph of pirate facilitator Hassan Ahmed Ali and recognition letter***Hassan Ahmed Ali, a.k.a. Hassan Macsharo*



139. Hassan Ahmed Ali is a businessman and member of the pirate facilitation and negotiation company ‘Indian Ocean Consultants’, which was found to be involved in multiple hijacking and abduction cases (see S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.3). Hassan Ahmed has been found to be connected to the hijacking cases of the *York* (2010-2011), *Gemini* (2011) and the abduction of two Spanish MSF aid workers (2011-2013).

140. As a representative of Indian Ocean Consultants, Hassan Ahmed Ali was provided with a 29 March 2012 letter of recognition issued by “Warsame Mohamed Hassan”, the then acting Governor of Benadir region and Mayor of Mogadishu.



Annex 4.6.g:

Screen shots of Central Air's Facebook Page



Annex 4.6.h:**Photographs of Somali officials travelling with Central Air**

141. On 6 March 2013, an FGS delegation led by former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon ‘Saacid’ and including the Minister of Interior and National Security, Abdikarin Hussein Guled, the Minister of Defence, Abdihakim Fiqi, and the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Jaylani Nur Ikar, arrived in Adado with two aircraft, including Central Air’s EX-18006 ‘Blue Goose’.¹⁴⁵

Photograph showing Central Air’s EX-18006, Prime Minister Shirdon, Defence Minister Fiqi and Himan and Heeb President Mohamed Aden ‘Tiiceey’



142. On 29 June 2013, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was flown from Adado to Mogadishu escorted by Government security forces. The Government used Central Air’s EX-18006 ‘Blue Goose’ to fly Aweys and the security forces from Adado to Mogadishu. The escorting soldiers were believed to be part of the Presidential security forces.¹⁴⁶



¹⁴⁵ <http://radiomuqdisho.net/daawo-sawirada-raysul-wasaaraha-dalka-oo-si-wanaagsan-loogu-soo-dhaweeyay-dagmada-cadaado/>; <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=10006>.

¹⁴⁶ <http://radiokulmiye.com/knn/daawo-sawirada-markii-xasan-daahir-laga-soo-qaadayay-dagmada-cadaado/>; <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23115819>; <http://som.horseedmedia.net/2013/06/xassan-daahir-aweys-oo-lagu-xiray-xarunta-nabad-sugida-sawiro/>.



143. As reported on Somali Channel TV, a number of federal Members of Parliament led by Member of Parliament Abdirashid Mohamed Hiddig, travelled from Mogadishu to Kismayo on 15 August 2013 on Central Air's EX-18006 'Blue Goose'.¹⁴⁷



¹⁴⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7fDdsAf3Cjs>.



144. On 9 October 2013, a delegation led by the current Himan and Heeb President, Abdullahi Ali Mohamed Kediye (a.k.a. 'Baarleeh'), returned from Mogadishu back to Adado. The delegation flew with Central Air's white Fokker 5Y-SIB.¹⁴⁸

145. On 18 September 2013, a delegation led by the Speaker of the Somali Parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari, arrived in Baydhabo. The Speaker and his delegation flew from Mogadishu airport with Central Air's white Fokker 5Y-SIB. High-ranking Government officials including Ministers and Members of Parliament led by the then Somali Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon saw off the delegation at Mogadishu airport.¹⁴⁹



146. From 15 to 20 June 2014, the Director General of the Office of the President of Puntland, Dek Saleban Yusuf, reportedly travelled from Galkayo to Mogadishu

¹⁴⁸ <http://radiomuqdisho.net/wafdi-uu-hogaaminayo-madaxwaynaha-ximan-iyo-xeeb-oo-cadaado-lagu-soo-dhaweeyay-sawirro/>.

¹⁴⁹ <http://radiomuqdisho.net/ku-simaha-madaxweynaha-iyo-wafdi-sare-uu-hogaaminayo-...02/04/2014>.

with Central Air. He stayed in Mogadishu for three days before returning to Puntland.¹⁵⁰

Dek Saleban Yusuf



147. On 26 April 2014, the President of Himan and Heeb, Abdullahi Ali Mohamed Kediye, and his entourage returned to Adado following a long visit to Mogadishu. On this occasion, the President and his delegation flew with Central Air's EX-18006 'Blue Goose'. The Himan and Heeb leaders reportedly fly regularly with Central Air.¹⁵¹



¹⁵⁰ <http://www.puntlandfox.com/2014/06/agaasimaha-madaxtooyada-puntland-oo-tagay-muqdisho/>.

¹⁵¹ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=24433>.

Annex 4.6.i: Draft contemplation agreement between SKY KG Airlines and Central Air

Contemplation agreement between «SKY KG Airlines» and «Central Air»

Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
«__» May 2013

Air company «SKY KG Airlines», represented by Mr. Griaznov G.V., Executive Director acting in accordance with his Memorandum and Articles of Association and Air company «Central Air», represented by Mohamed Abdi acting in accordance with his Memorandum and Articles of Association has agreed to purchase the aircraft IL18-36, serial number _____, year of manufacture 1985, from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Ukraine.

The project cost of this transaction will be approximately 800 000 (eight hundred thousands) USD. This amount includes:

- The cost of the aircraft -500 000 (five hundred thousands) USD;
 - Installation of equipment for international flights TCAS, EGPWS, ELT, Transponder - 180 000 (one hundred and eighty thousands) USD;
 - Carrying out maintenance -20,000 (twenty thousands) USD;
 - Painting of the aircraft and installation of passenger seats - 30 000 - 35 000 (thirty thousands to thirty-five thousands) USD;
 - Distillation of the aircraft to a based-place - 60,000 (sixty thousands) USD.
- And other incidental expenses.

The parties agreed that the initial payment to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Ukraine will be made in amount of 225 000 (two hundred twenty five thousands) dollars from each side, totally 550 000 USD.

Within twenty days after the first payment, the second payment will be made to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Ukraine by 25 000 (twenty five thousands) USD on each side, totally 50 000 USD.

After 30 days – parties would pay in equal shares the purchase and installation of equipment for international flights, painting and installation of passenger seats.

After 40 days, the Parties undertake, in equal shares to pay for airferry and other incidental charges.

The parties agreed that the cost of registration of the aircraft in the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Somalia will be borne in equal shares.

Later in the operation of the aircraft, the parties agreed that the flight hours charge would be 850 (eight hundreds and fifty) USD per hour, the minimum guaranteed flight hours (the minimum number of flight hours per month) will be 60 hours per month.

Air company «Central Air» will provide

Договор намерения между АК «SKY KG Airlines» и АК «Central Air»

Бишкек, Кыргызская Республика
«__» мая 2013 г

Авиакомпания «Sky KG Airlines» в лице Исполнительного директора Грязнова Г.В., действующего в соответствии с Уставом и Авиакомпания «Central Air» в лице Мохамеда Абди, действующего в соответствии со своим Уставом договорились о покупке самолета Ил18-36, серийный номер _____, 1985 года выпуска у Министерства Обороны Республики Украина.

Стоимость проекта данной сделки, ориентировочно будет составлять 800 000 (восемьсот тысяч) долларов США. В эту сумму включены:

- Стоимость самолета -500 000 (пятьсот тысяч) долларов США;
- Установка оборудования для выполнения международных рейсов TCAS, EGPWS, ELT, Transponder – 180 000 (сто восемьдесят тысяч) долларов США;
- Проведение технического обслуживания - 20 000 (двадцать тысяч) долларов США;
- Покраска самолета и установка пассажирских сидений – 30 000- 35 000 (тридцать тысяч- тридцать пять тысяч) долларов США.
- Перегонка самолета к месту базирования - 60 000 (шестьдесят тысяч) долларов США.
- И другие непредвиденные расходы.

Стороны договорились, что первоначальный платеж в Министерство Обороны Республики Украина будет произведен по 225 000 (двести двадцать пять тысяч) долларов США с каждой стороны, итого 550 000 долларов США.

Через двадцать дней после первой оплаты, будет произведен второй платеж в Министерство Обороны Республики Украина по 25 000 (двадцать пять тысяч) долларов США с каждой стороны, итого 50 000 долларов США.

Через 30 дней – оплата в равных долях покупки и установки оборудования для выполнения международных полетов, покраски и установки пассажирских кресел.

Через 40 дней стороны обязуются, в равных долях произвести оплату за перелет и другие непредвиденные платежи.

Стороны договорились, что расходы по регистрации воздушного судна в Республике Гвинея или Республике Сомали будут нести в равных долях.

В последующем при эксплуатации данного ВС, стороны договорились, что стоимость летного часа будет составлять 850 (восемьсот пятьдесят) долларов США в час, минимально гарантированный налет (минимальное количество летных часов в месяц) будет составлять 60 часов в месяц.

accommodation, meals and daily allowance for crew, as well as landing at the airport of Mogadishu. Air company «SKY KG Airlines» will provide operation of aircraft, maintenance, insurance and the provision of flight and maintenance crews, spare parts and consumables that will be 300 (three hundred) U.S. dollars from flight hour.
The remaining amount will be divided equally between the Airline «SKY KG Airlines» Airline and «Central Air».
If one of the parties in the future wants to sell its quantas in the plane, the other party will have the priority right to purchase that interest. This percentage will be 50% of the initial cost.

Авиакомпания «Central Air» будет обеспечивать проживание, питание и суточные экипажу, а так же посадку в аэропорту Могадишо. Авиакомпания «SKY KG Airlines» будет обеспечивать эксплуатацию ВС, техническое обслуживание, страхование и предоставление летного и технического экипажа, запчастей и расходных материалов, что будет составлять 300 (триста) долларов США с летного часа. Оставшаяся сумма будет делиться пополам между Авиакомпанией «SKY KG Airlines» и Авиакомпанией «Central Air» .
Если одна из сторон в последующем захочет продать свою долю в самолете, то вторая сторона будет иметь приоритетное право на покупку данной доли. Данная доля будет составлять 50 % от первоначальных затрат.

On behalf of «Central Air»
От имени «Central Air»

On behalf of «Sky KG Airlines»
От имени «SKY KG Airlines»

_____ Mohamed Abdi

_____ Griaznov G.V.

**Annex 4.6.j: Letter of introduction to Bombardier Inc.
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.6.k: E-mail communication from Mohamed Aden 'Tiiceey' on behalf of Central Air

E-mail dated 16 November 2012



“Test” e-mail from ‘Tiiceey’ dated 18 November 2012



Annex 4.6.I: Central Air management and offices

Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’, CEO and Managing Director of Central Air Aviation.

Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ in pink shirt leaving his own aircraft, the Ilyushin-18 EX-18006 ‘Blue Goose’¹⁵²



Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir, Managing Director of Central Air.

148. In an interview with Iran's Press TV, Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir, the Managing Director of Somali domestic carrier, Central Air, said his airline had been doing good business flying to front line towns, charging as much as USD 80 for one-way flights.¹⁵³

Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir in his office



¹⁵² <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=10500>.

¹⁵³ <http://www.theafricanaviationtribune.com/2013/03/somalia-despite-ongoing-war-somali.html>;
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSbDc-S6mNU#t=102>


149. On Facebook, Abdirahman Hirsi Dahir is ‘friends’ with pirate negotiator and facilitators Galad Aden Tahlil, Mohamed Abdi Olad and Mahat Nur Geele (see also annex 4.7).

Ahmed Abdulhak Mohamed, ‘Operation Manager’ in Mogadishu. Also known as Ahmed Sheikh Abdulhak Mohamed and Ahmed Abdi.

Ahmed Abdulhak Mohamed



Business card of Central Air’s Operation Manager in Mogadishu, Ahmed Abdulhak Mohamed.



Abdi Nor Kadiye, airport official in Kismayo.¹⁵⁴

Abdi Nor Kadiye in front of Central Air’s EX-18006 ‘Blue Goose’



¹⁵⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OiI9E67rIHM>.

Ali Yusuf Jama, representative of Central Air in Garowe, Puntland.

*Ali Yusuf Jama*¹⁵⁵



Ali Yusuf Jama at the same office in Garowe



¹⁵⁵ <http://allpuntland.com/warar/shirkada-diyaaradaha-central-air-ayaa-heshey-ogolaanshii-u-horeeyey-iney-isticmaasho-garoonka-diyaaradaha-garowe>.

Ali Yusuf Jama (left) sitting next to former Puntland Minister of Internal Security, General Abdullahi Said Samatar



150. General Abdullahi Said Samatar (middle) was previously named by the Monitoring Group (S/2010/91) as one of the members of Faroole's cabinet receiving proceeds from piracy and/or kidnapping. He was then Faroole's Minister for Internal Security.

151. On Facebook, Ali Yusuf Jama is connected to the alleged Puntland pirate leader Abdulkadir Ali Jahaf 'Gaarrah' and suspected pirate financier 'Haji' Abiaziz Mohamud Ali.

Annex 4.7: Pirate finances

152. The continuing absence of international sanctions against Somali pirate leadership has allowed pirate leaders, investors and facilitators, not only to invest their illegally acquired funds into other business ventures, but also to keep those funds in bank accounts, transfer them to business partners, launder them overseas or support family and friends in the diaspora.

153. In this regard, the Monitoring Group has identified various money transfers and bank accounts of identified pirate leaders, investors and facilitators, some of which have account balances of close to one million dollars and reflect dealings with a wide range of individuals inside and outside Somalia, including holders of senior positions in the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’

154. Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’ has been involved in the piracy business at least since 2005. He is considered to be responsible for at least 24 hijacking and abduction cases and has often and publicly admitted his involvement, including during a 24 April 2013 interview with AFP.¹⁵⁶ In 2010, the Monitoring Group proposed Afweyne for sanctioning, but he has as yet not been listed.

155. For years Afweyne ran a successful *khat* business in Somalia and since May 2012 he has operated the domestic airline company Central Air Aviation (see annex 4.6).

156. Afweyne is currently jailed in Belgium awaiting trial for his 2009 involvement in the hijacking of the Belgian stone carrier *Pompeii*. He was arrested at Brussels airport on 12 October 2013 along with his business partner and accomplice, pirate facilitator Mohamed Abdullahi Moalin-Aden ‘Tiiceey’.¹⁵⁷ While in prison, Afweyne’s businesses interests are represented and supervised by his son, Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi.

157. The Monitoring Group has identified 4 of Afweyne’s bank accounts in 3 different banks. Three bank accounts are located in Mogadishu and one is in Hargeisa:¹⁵⁸

- 1) Bank account A with the Salaam Financial Services Bank in Hargeisa reportedly has a balance of USD 900,137 and is registered with a proxy account holder named ‘Amina Mohamed Abdi Hassan’, a Member of the Federal Parliament of Somalia and allegedly a member of Afweyne’s family.¹⁵⁹
- 2) Bank accounts B and C are in the Salaam Somali Bank in Mogadishu, which is associated with the Salaam Financial Services Bank in Hargeisa and the Salaam African Bank in Djibouti.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4OhALvHUKXI>.

¹⁵⁷ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/10378290/Somali-pirate-chief-arrested-after-being-lured-to-Belgium-by-police-posing-as-documentary-makers.html>.

¹⁵⁸ All bank account numbers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁵⁹ Information obtained on 11 January 2014.

¹⁶⁰ Information obtained on 30 October 2013.

3) Bank account D is in Bank X in Mogadishu.¹⁶¹

158. Assistance requested from the banks in order to confirm the information obtained regarding bank accounts A, B and C was not forthcoming.

Bank account D

159. In bank account D of Bank X in Mogadishu, a total amount of USD 948,883 was deposited between May 2012 and December 2013. The proxy holder of the account has been identified as the finance officer of Central Air Aviation, Ali Mohamud Ali, who is associated with several individuals involved in piracy, including Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ (see annex 4.6).

160. The e-mail address that was used to register the bank account belonging to Afweyne has been identified as the personal e-mail address of Kamal Dahir Hassan ‘Gutale’, the former Chief of Staff of FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Kamal Hassan is said to be a ‘cousin’ of Afweyne.¹⁶²

161. Another acquaintance and business partner of Afweyne is Aruse Nur Shuriye, a.k.a. Nur Lugey, who serves as a person of introduction on Afweyne’s bank account. Nur Lugey lives in Adado and runs the local “Walaalaha Company” which owns and manages Adado Airport. For the past decade Walaalaha Company has been involved in the rebuilding of the airport, which facilitated the growing *khat* and airline business of Afweyne but also meant additional tax-income or revenues for the local Himan and Heeb Administration.¹⁶³

162. Twenty-two incoming transfers or deposits between May 2012 and December 2013 can be identified in the account, with an overall average amount of USD 43,132 per transfer. The highest incoming transfer registered was USD 327,000. Of 221 outgoing transfers or withdrawals recorded on the account, the average transfer amounted to USD 4,292.

163. The incoming and outgoing transfers on the account contain insufficient information to allow proper identification of senders and beneficiaries. However, some of the names of the beneficiaries are similar to names of well-known pirates and facilitators associated with the Hobyo-Harardhere piracy network:

- *Mahad Mohamuud Nuur*: Beneficiary of USD 2,400; United Kingdom national; Director General of Indian Ocean Consultants company; involved in negotiation and mediation activities on behalf of the Hobyo-Harardhere pirate network; identified pirate facilitator.¹⁶⁴
- *Galad Adan Tahlil*: Beneficiary of USD 3,480; Somali national and Norwegian refugee; identified pirate negotiator (see also the section on “other transfers” below).¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Information obtained on 4 November 2013.

¹⁶² Bank account registration form in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁶³ <http://www.goboladaradio.com/?p=16604>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pF2hE98rjOg>; <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/magazine/taken-by-pirates.html?pagewanted=1>.

¹⁶⁴ Monitoring Group report S/2012/544 (strictly confidential annex 4.3).

¹⁶⁵ Monitoring Group report S/2013/413 (strictly confidential annex 4.6).

- *Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdi*: Beneficiary of USD 4,000; Somali national; son and representative of his father Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’; identified pirate leader.
- *Abdisalan Khalif Ahmed*: Beneficiary of USD 1,000; Somali national; former District Commissioner of Harardhere; identified pirate negotiator.¹⁶⁶

Separate transfer to Zakarie Hussein Arreh

164. There are dozens of money transfers to or from Afweyne that have been identified by the Monitoring Group, but these transfers for the most part do not include sufficient information to allow proper identification of the senders or beneficiaries.

165. However, on 14 July 2012, Afweyne sent USD 30,000 to the Djiboutian telephone number +253 77833137, which appears to be monetary compensation for facilitation services provided by the owner of the telephone number, ‘Zekria Husein Are’, identified as ‘Zakarie Hussein Arreh’, a Somali diplomatic passport holder and Member of the Somali Federal Parliament since 18 August 2004.¹⁶⁷

166. Zakarie Hussein Arreh, who is said to rarely appear for sessions of Parliament, is also a Djiboutian national and a member of the Djiboutian President’s clan, Isse Madobe. He is known in Djibouti as ‘Zakaria Djama Arreh’ and described to be a ‘high ranking officer’ in the Djiboutian intelligence service. Zakarie was allegedly handpicked in 2004 by the President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, to serve in the Somali Parliament, where he subsequently became an ally of the Speaker of the Parliament, Sharif Hassan.¹⁶⁸

167. Unconfirmed information obtained by the Monitoring Group indicates that since 2008 Zakaria has been facilitating various groups and organizations responsible for destabilizing Somalia and the wider region. He is alleged to be one of the Members of Parliament affiliated with Sheikh Sharif that joined ARS-Asmara and became a member of the committee responsible for transporting and smuggling arms from Eritrea to Somalia in support of armed opposition groups.¹⁶⁹

168. In 2009, Zakaria reportedly came into contact with Abdifatah Hassan Afrah, who served as then Somali President Sheikh Sharif’s envoy to Libya. Both men entered into a business arrangement to facilitate the travel of eight senior pirates to Tripoli: Mohamed Abdi Hassan ‘Afweyne’, Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’, Mohamed Abdi Garaad, Fathi Osman Kahiye and 4 others. They were invited to attend the celebrations marking President Muammar Gaddafi’s fortieth anniversary in power during early September 2009, and subsequently flew to Libya on Djiboutian passports furnished by Zakaria.

¹⁶⁶ Monitoring Group report S/2013/413 (strictly confidential annex 4.5).

¹⁶⁷ Money transfer and passport identification are in possession of the Monitoring Group. Zakarie Hussein Arreh was a Member of the Somali Parliament between 18 August 2004 and 17 April 2007, and from 17 August 2012 until the present.

¹⁶⁸ Confirmed by credible European military intelligence source on 25 November 2013, and a confidential Somali source, with contacts inside Somali and Djibouti intelligence agencies, on 5 June 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Information obtained from a confidential Somali source, with contacts within Somali and Djibouti intelligence agencies, on 5 June 2014.

169. In subsequent years, Zakaria apparently continued to facilitate the international travel of pirates and senior members of Al-Shabaab by providing them safe passage at Djibouti airport for their onward journey to Yemen, Eritrea and Sudan, allegedly under the cover of the Djiboutian Government.¹⁷⁰

170. Both Zakaria and Afrah are alleged to have acted as pirate financiers and invested funds in pirate operations. Afrah is the current Governor of Hiraan region in Somalia. According to the 'Chambre de Commerce de Djibouti', Zakaria is Director of a construction company called 'Dallah Djibouti SARL'.¹⁷¹

171. In addition, Zakaria has been in contact with:

- Several individuals previously involved in piracy, including pirate kingpin Afweyne, pirate leader Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi (the son of Afweyne) and pirate negotiator Hersi Ali Mohamud — also known as Ali Hassan and Ali Hersi (see annexes 4.5 and 4.3.f);¹⁷²
- Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir Mohamed, the FGS State Minister in the Office of the President until December 2012 and currently Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs;
- Said Hassan Shire, Speaker of the Puntland Parliament;
- Ali Abdi Aware, the representative of Puntland in Djibouti during 2011, the former State Minister of the Puntland President's Office and Presidential candidate in 2008 and 2014;
- Said Mohamed Rage, the current Minister of Ports and Marine Transport for Puntland;
- Kamal Dahir Hassan Gutale, former assistant of the TFG Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Chief of Staff of FGS President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud;
- Asha H. Elmi, wife of the former Somali Prime Minister Sa'id Shiridon and a serving Member of the Somali Federal Parliament;
- Abdiwali Mohamed Ali Gaas, the current President of Puntland;
- Eng. Nadifo Mohamed Osman, the current FGS Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction and a serving Member of the Somali Federal Parliament;¹⁷³
- Suri Diriye Arab, a serving Member of the Somali Federal Parliament;¹⁷⁴
- Mohamed Ali Hagaa, a serving Member of the Somali Federal Parliament and the current FGS State Minister of Defence;¹⁷⁵ and

¹⁷⁰ Information obtained from a confidential Somali source, with contacts within Somali and Djibouti intelligence agencies, on 5 June 2014.

¹⁷¹ <http://www.ccd.dj/enterprise/dallah-djibouti-906.html>.

¹⁷² Hersi is also a member of the pirate negotiation and mediation company Indian Ocean Consultants.

¹⁷³ <http://almisnews.info/2014/01/war-dag-dag-ah-liiska-golaha-wasiirrada-dawlada-taagta-daran-ee-somaliya-oo-dhameystiran/#>.

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.somalilandcitizen.com/2012/08/18/xubnaha-beesha-habarjeclo-ee-liiska-baarlamaanka-somaliya-ku-soo-baxay/>.

¹⁷⁵ He is also in contact with Mohamed Aden Tiiceey.

- Abdi Mohamed Abtidon, a.k.a. Abtidoon Koofi Shabaq, a serving Member of the Somali Federal Parliament.¹⁷⁶

Pirate negotiator ‘Ali’

172. During the course of 2011, Somali pirate negotiator ‘Ali’, negotiated the release of a hijacked tanker.¹⁷⁷ When negotiations were nearing their final stage, Ali attempted to extort a multi thousand dollar side payment in compensation for his services, and provided the ship owner with a bank account number at the Salaam African Bank in Djibouti for the transfer.¹⁷⁸ In addition, Ali provided the number of a second bank account in the Salaam Somali Bank in Mogadishu, affiliated with the Salaam African Bank in Djibouti. The second account included the name of the account holder.¹⁷⁹

173. Further to these established facts, the Monitoring Group was informed that the owner of the Salaam African Bank account number in Djibouti, who is believed to be negotiator Ali, is a friend and business partner of the owner of the Salaam Somali bank account number in Mogadishu and allegedly the first ‘cousin’ and son-in-law of Ali Ahmed Nur Jim’ale, the Al-Barakat owner formerly sanctioned by the United Nations. The first ‘cousin’ and son-in-law was also said to be working at the Salaam African bank in Djibouti and to operate a car business with Ali.¹⁸⁰

174. The Monitoring Group obtained a photograph of pirate negotiator ‘Ali’ that was subsequently shown to 11 crewmembers of a 2010 hijacked vessel, who were able to recognize Ali’s image (see photograph in strictly confidential annex 4.7.a).¹⁸¹

Non-cooperation in verification

In order to verify the facts and substantiate the allegations above regarding Ali, and given the added information that Afweyne possesses bank accounts with the Salaam Financial Services Bank in Hargeisa and the Salaam Somali Bank in Mogadishu, the Monitoring Group met in Djibouti on 17 February 2014 with the Chairman of the Salaam African Bank, Omer Ismail Egal.

During the meeting, Mr. Ismail Egal indicated that the bank had no desire to directly assist the Monitoring Group with its queries and investigations and referred the Group to the Central Bank of Djibouti for any further information related to the Salaam African Bank and/or its affiliates in Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

¹⁷⁶ He is also a contact of Mohamed Aden Tiiceey and likely the brother of Shamsu Mohamed Abtidon, the wife of Tiiceey and a member of the Habar Gidir Saleebaan clan.

¹⁷⁷ Pirate negotiator Ali’s involvement was also established in various other hijacking cases identified by the Monitoring Group.

¹⁷⁸ The hijacked tanker is identified by the Monitoring Group and was released for a multi-million dollar ransom payment.

¹⁷⁹ Both bank account numbers and full name of the account holder of the second bank account in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁸⁰ Detailed information in possession of the Monitoring Group and obtained from a confidential Somali source with direct knowledge of these relationships via e-mail on 30 October 2013.

¹⁸¹ Information obtained on 10 July 2014.

The same day, on 17 February 2014, the Monitoring Group met with Ali Daoud Houmed, Chief of the Financial Intelligence Unit of the 'Banque Centrale de Djibouti', who confirmed that the Central Bank held the information requested by the Monitoring Group. However, he insisted that the Group first meet with the Governor of the Central Bank, Ahmed Osman Ali. While he informed the Monitoring Group that a meeting with the Governor would be arranged later that day or the following day, the Group did not hear back from Mr. Houmed and he did not respond to repeated phone calls and e-mails sent on 17 and 18 February 2014.¹⁸²

Further attempts to obtain the information sought by the Monitoring Group via the Government of Djibouti were equally unsuccessful. The Group did not receive a response to its official letter sent on 14 April 2014 to the Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the United Nations, Roble Olhaye, and several follow-up e-mails and telephone calls with the Permanent Mission of Djibouti to the United Nations yielded no result.¹⁸³

Consequently, some of the facts and allegations above remain unverified. As in the past, the Government of Djibouti seldom responds to enquiries relating to its alleged nationals or residents that are considered a threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Withholding information about such individuals not only obstructs the work and investigations of the Monitoring Group, it also contributes to the impression that Djibouti continues to service as a safe haven for regional spoilers.

Abdullahi Mohamed Jama 'Farahow'

175. Abdullahi Mohamed Jama 'Farahow' is a Barawe-based pirate leader and investor whose involvement was established in multiple piracy cases, including the hijackings of the vessels *Indian Ocean Explorer* (2009), *Hansa Stavanger* (2009), *Pompeii* (2009), *Alakrana* (2009), *UBT Ocean* (2010), *Izumi* (2010-11), and *York* (2010-11), as well as the hijacking of the yacht *Choizil* (2010-11) and abduction of the South African couple Deborah Calitz and Bruno Pelizzari.¹⁸⁴

176. "Farahow" or "Farah" reportedly used to sell cows and camels in the local market in Barawe. He became wealthy from his involvement in piracy activities and he now owns a small but luxurious house in Barawe. Farahow is from the Habar Gidir Saleban clan and is 44 years old (see photograph attached in strictly confidential annex 4.7.b).¹⁸⁵

177. The Monitoring Group identified one bank account owned by Farahow, registered in the name of Abdullahi Mohamed Jama Farah, with a balance of

¹⁸² E-mails in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁸³ S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.35 sent via fax on 14 April 2014.

¹⁸⁴ Credible information obtained and corroborated by various military intelligence sources on 24 May 2011, and law enforcement sources on 8 February 2013.

¹⁸⁵ Information extracted from an interview with a resident of Barawe in Nairobi on 19 November 2013.

USD 51,932. Between 28 July 2010 and 30 November 2013, 16 incoming transfers were deposited on the account, representing a total of USD 612,072 or an average of USD 38,245.50 per transfer.¹⁸⁶

178. As is often the case, both the incoming and outgoing transfers contain too little information to properly identify the senders and beneficiaries, although the names of some of the individuals match the names of known pirates.

180. For example, on 16 May 2011, an individual named Mohamed Mohamud Kulane 'Indha'ade transferred USD 60,000 to Farahow's account, a name that is identical to that of a 49-year old suspected pirate financier and brother of Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane 'Buundo', a notorious pirate financier previously identified by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, strictly confidential annex 4.4) and involved in various hijacking and abduction cases.¹⁸⁷

180. Also, various incoming transfers representing a total amount of USD 349,600 were sent under the name of 'Abdullahi Ali Cad', a name identical to the name of a suspected pirate financier who during 2011 and 2012 transferred USD 3,950 to negotiator 'Adam', a member of the pirate negotiation company Indian Ocean Consultants. 'Adam', who was identified as 'Ahmed Mohamud Mohamed', negotiated in 2012 the release of 4 South Korean hostages of the hijacked chemical tanker '*Gemini*', who had been kept in captivity following the release of the vessel. 'Adam' was also found to be involved in other hijacking cases.¹⁸⁸

181. Separate from his bank account, the Monitoring Group identified 22 additional transfers related to Farahow, three of which contained enough information to allow for further identification.¹⁸⁹

183. On 13 June 2011, suspected pirate financier based in Harardhere, Mohamed Mohamud Kulane 'Indha'ade', the brother of Harardhere pirate financier 'Buundo', transferred another USD 18,500 to Farahow in Barawe.

183. On 10 October 2012, Bacer Mohamed Bulale received USD 497 from Farahow, transferred from Barawe. Communication data reveals that Mohamed Bulale is a known contact of renowned Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Gafanje' and pirate financier Abukar Moalim Hassan.¹⁹⁰

184. On 17 April 2013, Farahow transferred USD 590 from Barawe to Abdikadir Ahmed Osman, based in Ajman, UAE. Communication data indicates that Abdikadir Ahmed Osman, holding a UAE mobile number, was in contact with two individuals linked to the hijacking of the *York*. The same two individuals were found registered on a SIM card in possession of Abillahi Isse Jama, a pirate arrested at sea for the attempted hijacking of the Spanish tuna fishing vessel *Izurdia* on 24 October

¹⁸⁶ All bank account details and transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁸⁷ Buundo's involvement was established in the hijackings of the *Rak Afrikana* (2010), *York* (2010-11), *Gemini* (2011), *Orna* (2010-12) and both the post-release retention of hostages of the *Gemini* (2012) and the *Orna* (2012-13).

¹⁸⁸ These include the *Izumi* (2010-2011) and the *Beluga Nomination* (2011).

¹⁸⁹ Additional 22 transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁹⁰ Money transfers and communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

2012.¹⁹¹ The arrested pirate Jama was also found to be in contact with Mohamed Mohamud Kulane ‘Indha’ade’, the suspected pirate investor and brother of pirate financier ‘Buundo’. The two individuals on the SIM card were registered as Yahye Abdi Osman and Abdi Ahmed Burane.¹⁹²

Ahmed Diriye Abdile

185. Ahmed Diriye Abdile ‘Cagdheer’ (meaning “long-footed”), also known as Ahmed Elmi ‘Cagdheer’ and ‘Cagdheer’ Diriye Dhagaweyne, is a member of the Omar Mohamud/Abdi Isse sub-clan from Gara’ad, Jerriban district in Mudug region. He reportedly lost one eye during a battle in 1997.

186. In 2012, the Monitoring Group reported that the 45-year old Ahmed Diriye, an Ethiopian passport holder residing in the UAE, was a recipient of piracy proceeds and involved in money laundering activities (S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.4). Similar to other pirate leaders, financiers and facilitators identified, Ahmed Diriye was never subject to international sanctions.

187. Twice the Monitoring Group sought additional details on Ahmed Diriye from the UAE Government, but the Group did not receive responses to its letters.¹⁹³

188. Within the Somali financial community in Dubai, Ahmed Diriye is described as a broker who receives money from businessmen in Somalia, and transfers value by purchasing commodities that are shipped back to Somalia for resale in vessels or wooden dhows.¹⁹⁴

190. With only limited insight into his financial activities, the Monitoring Group is aware that between May 2009 and May 2014 Ahmed Diriye Abdile was the recipient of USD 1,575,112.47, which largely derived from Somalia. While most of the information obtained by the Monitoring Group contains too few details to allow proper identification, two individuals associated with activities of Somali piracy, Astur Jawaase and Abdi Yare, were found to have sent funds to Diriye, as was his brother Abdiqani Diriye Abdile.¹⁹⁵

Astur Jawaase

190. Astur Jawaase Abdi, also known as Astur Ibrahim Abdi, is from the Majerteen Osman Mohamoud clan. She and her husband, Abdul Warsame, live in Garowe, Puntland, and were reportedly active as pirate facilitators and investors for several pirate groups, including the one led by Isse Yuluh. Astur Jawaase Abdi sent transfers totaling USD 8,197 to Ahmed Diriye between late November 2013 and January 2014.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ On 24 October 2012, 120 nautical miles southwest of Socotra, the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) ship *ESPS Castilla* took custody of six suspected Somali pirates, who allegedly attempted to seize the Spanish tuna-fishing vessel *Izurdia*. Their transfer to Spain was ordered by the Central Court of Prosecution no. 3 in Madrid.

¹⁹² Information obtained from European law enforcement source on 1 November 2013.

¹⁹³ Letters S/AC.29/2012/SEMG/OC.43 of 6 March 2012 and S/AC.29/2013/SEMG/OC.25 of 8 March 2013.

¹⁹⁴ Information obtained from a reliable contact within the Somali financial community, in Dubai on 16 June 2014.

¹⁹⁵ Money transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

¹⁹⁶ Money transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

Abdi Yare

191. Abdullahi Ahmed Haji Farah, also known as ‘Abdullahi Farah Hassan’ and ‘Ahmed Mohamed Hajji Abdi’, is better known as ‘Abdi Yare’ (meaning “Small Abdi”). He is believed to be between 28 and 32 years old and was identified by the Monitoring Group in 2011 as a Puntland pirate leader and investor from Gara’ad who runs a heavily armed militia (S/2011/433, paragraphs 28-30). As a Puntland pirate leader he also operated in Hobyo and Harardhere and was in contact with Afweyne and his son Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi. He was found to be involved in at least 15 hijacking cases between 2008 and 2011.¹⁹⁷

192. During 2011 and 2012, Abdi Yare sent several money transfers to Ahmed Diriye, representing a total amount of USD 41,504. During the same period, Abdi Yare also sent a total amount of USD 125,980 to various other Somali’s in Dubai.

Abdiqani Diriye Abdile

193. Abdiqani Diriye Abdile is identified as the brother of Ahmed Diriye and sent him USD 26,300 in 2013. Judging from their Facebook accounts, both brothers seem to have ties or some form of relationship with Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali ‘Gaas’. While Ahmed glorifies Puntland and posts pictures of Gaas,¹⁹⁸ Abdiqani posts a photograph in which he is depicted with President Gaas.¹⁹⁹

Abdiqani Diriye Abdile with Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali ‘Gaas’



Ahmed Mohamud Sheikh Aweis

194. In 2013, the Monitoring Group identified a bank account in Harardhere in the name of ‘Diini Spare Parts’, to which a victim shipping company was instructed to transfer USD 30,000 as an incentive for ensuring a smooth release of a hijacked vessel (S/2013/413, strictly confidential annex 4.4).

195. Between April 2010 and January 2014, over USD 1.5 million was transferred onto this account in Harardhere, which is owned by Ahmed Mohamud Hassan

¹⁹⁷ *Bright Ruby* (2008), *Nipayia* (2009), *Hansa Stavanger* (2009), *Pompeii* (2009), *Alakrana* (2009), *Saad I* (2009-2010), *Lynn Rival* (2009-2010), *Win Far 161* (2009-2010), *Navios Apollon* (2009-2010), *Samho Dream* (2010), *Marida Marguerite* (2010), *York* (2010-2011), *Hannibal II* (2010-2011), *Blida* (2011), and the *Khaled Muhieddine K* (2011).

¹⁹⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/mohamedabdiqadir.puntlander>.

¹⁹⁹ <https://www.facebook.com/abdiqani.diriye1>.

‘Aweis’. The suspected pirate financier Mohamed Mohamud Kulane ‘Indha’ade’ also transferred funds onto the account.²⁰⁰

Pirate facilitator Ahmed Mohamud Aweis



Other transfers

196. The Monitoring Group has identified various other money transfers of individuals connected to activities of Somali piracy.²⁰¹

197. *Abdiweli Yusuf Cilmi* was identified as a pirate logistical supplier for the Puntland piracy network. In April 2012, he laundered USD 42,000 worth of shares in the ransom payment for the pirated vessel ‘Irene SL’ through Ahmed Diriye Abdile in Dubai (S/2012/544, strictly confidential annex 4.4). On 29 October 2012, he transferred another USD 17,970 to himself from Bossaso to Galkayo. Earlier, in April 2009, he received USD 9,690 from an individual named Guled Abdullahi Mohamed in Bossaso, and other transfers suggest that he has family members residing in Canada and Kenya.

198. *Yusuf Bashir Nur Gedi*, also known as ‘Joseph’, was identified as a Puntland negotiator active in Isse Yuluh’s pirate network and negotiated the release of at least 12 hijacked vessels, including the EMS River (2010-2011), *Susan K* (2011) and *ING* (2011).²⁰² When agreement was reached on the ransom payment for the *Susan K*, ‘Joseph’ demanded a side payment for his successful negotiations and provided the ship owner with a bank account number at the Dubai Islamic Bank in the name of Abdillahi Yousuf Rage. ‘Joseph’ also received a money transfer for USD 998 sent by an unknown individual named ‘Abdikhadar Adawe Adem’ (photographs of Yusuf Bashir Nur Gedi appears in strictly confidential annex 4.7.c).

199. *Abukar Sheikh Hassan Duale*, the NationLink manager in Harardhere and identified as a pirate facilitator linked to senior pirate leaders, financiers and negotiators, transferred USD 660 on 1 August 2013 to *Abdishakur Mohamud Mohamed*, identified as a pirate negotiator involved in the hijacking of the *Rak Afrikana* (2010-2011). The Monitoring Group previously described the involvement of both individuals in activities of Somali piracy (S/2013/413, strictly confidential annexes 4.8 and 4.9).

200. *Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’*, the renowned Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader known for his involvement in numerous hijacking and abduction cases, and

²⁰⁰ Money transfers in possession of the Monitoring Group.

²⁰¹ All details of the transfers indicated in possession of the Monitoring Group.

²⁰² Information received from credible law enforcement agency on 21 February 2014.

who is still holding captive the American-German journalist Michael Scott Moore, sent in 2009 funds to two women in Mogadishu and Nairobi, identified as Khadiija Sahal Farah and Anab Ali Ahmed.²⁰³

201. *Abdullahi Farah Qarey*, a well-known Amara-based pirate negotiator also known as Abdullahi Jareer, Jabril and Abdi, received USD 1,000, which had been sent to Adado by an individual assumed to be a family member named Shino Hersi Qarey. Abdullahi Jareer's involvement has been established in many hijacking and abduction cases and is reportedly still active negotiating the release of Michael Scott Moore.²⁰⁴

202. *Galad Adan Tahlil*, a pirate negotiator, received in Mogadishu at the end of June 2010 a transfer for USD 500 from Nairobi-based BBC World journalist Mohamud Ali Mohamed. A year later, Tahlil would be negotiating the ransom payment for the release of the pirated UAE-operated general cargo vessel *Orna* and its 19 crewmembers (S/2013/413, confidential annex 4.6). The mobile number associated with Galad Adan Tahlil on the money transfer, however, belongs to *Mohamed Abdi Olad*, a pirate facilitator with whom Tahlil is acquainted and an accomplice of pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer (pictures of Mohamed Abdi Olad appears in annex 4.7.d).²⁰⁵ Tahlil currently runs a company called "Express Cars", involved in the export and import of cars and spare parts, and with offices in Dubai and Mogadishu. On 23 October 2013, he was transiting in Frankfurt Airport at the Lufthansa First Class Terminal.

203. *Mohamed Muse Said*, one of Puntland's major pirate investors also known as 'Aargoosto' or 'lobster', sent USD 5,978 during 2009 and 2010 to Yasir Hassan Yahye-abkar, an unknown individual believed to be from Yemen. Aargoosto was reportedly involved in the hijackings of the *Golden Nori* (2007), *Marida Marguerite* (2010), *Samho Dream* (2010) and *Golden Blessing* (2010).²⁰⁶

204. *Isse Mohamud Yusuf*, widely known as 'Isse Yuluh' and one of Puntland's top pirate leaders, was responsible for many hijackings during the past 6 years, including the last high-value merchant vessel Somali pirates managed to capture.²⁰⁷ In 2009, Isse Yuluh sent USD 6,993 from Bossaso to an individual named Osman Mohamud Osman in the UAE. In March 2014, Yuluh announced in the media his renunciation of piracy and was reportedly given 'amnesty' by the Puntland Government.²⁰⁸ The deal was brokered by 'Abdullahi Eid', the interior and

²⁰³ On 18 August 2014, Somali Security Forces reportedly arrested pirate leader Gafanje, whom the FGS was meeting with during February 2013 in Mogadishu to negotiate amnesty for individuals formerly involved in piracy. At the time of writing it remained unclear for which reasons Gafanje was arrested; <http://goobjoog.com/english/?p=2672>.

²⁰⁴ For example, the *Indian Ocean Explorer* (2009), *Pompeii* (2009), *Alakrana* (2009), *Al Khaliq* (2009-2010), *Panama* (2010-2011), *Orna* (2010-2012), *Spanish MSF aid workers* (2011-2013), *Aride* (2011-2012), and *Naham 3* (2012-present).

²⁰⁵ Mohamed Abdi Olad (born 28 February 1968) has been involved in facilitating extortion of side payments from ship owners (for the hijacked 'Pompeii', 'Al Khaliq', and four South Korean crewmembers of the 'Gemini') in cooperation with pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer.

²⁰⁶ For more details on Mohamed Muse Said 'Aargoosto' see Monitoring Group report S/2013/413, annex 3.1.c.

²⁰⁷ For more details on Isse Mohamud Yusuf 'Yuluh' see Monitoring Group report S/2013/413, annex 3.1.c.

²⁰⁸ March 2014: <http://horseedmedia.net/2014/03/07/somalia-top-somali-pirate-commander-quits-decline-industry/>.

municipalities affairs adviser to the Puntland President, Abdiweli Mohamud Ali 'Gaas', and formerly a prominent member of Gaas' Puntland Presidential election campaign team. Like Isse Yulluh, Abdullahi Eid is also a member of the Majeerteen/Ali Saleebaan sub-clan.²⁰⁹

205. *Hussein Mohamed Abdi*, a Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader and financier also known as 'Hussein Jiis' and Hussein Mohamed Yare, received transfers amounting to USD 11,088.50 during 2011 and 2012 sent by different individuals involved or associated with activities of Somali piracy. On 23 May 2011, he received USD 4,985 from Hawa Dirie Ahmed, the wife of pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Gafanje', and he also received funds from pirate financier Abdullahi Mohamud Kulane 'Buundo' and his brother Indha'ade.²¹⁰

206. *Mahad Mohamuud Nuur*, nicknamed 'Nasser' and Director General of the pirate negotiation company Indian Ocean Consultants, sent from Dubai USD 37,500 on 26 January 2012 to Abdihadif Ali Roble in Mogadishu. Mahad Nuur's involvement in piracy activities was established in the *Orna*, *Gemini* and *Choizil* hijacking cases.

207. *Hassan Sheikh Ahmed Ali 'Macsharo'*, is a known pirate negotiator who registered the websites of the pirate negotiation company Indian Ocean Consultants and Afweyne's airline company Central Air Aviation (see annex 4.6 and annex 4.6.f). On 14 April 2011, he received USD 25,000 from Mahboob Ali Nasibali in the UAE,²¹¹ who was found to be in contact with renowned Hobyo-Harardhere pirate leader and financier Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji 'Suhufi'²¹² and with pirates on board the hijacked vessel '*Asphalt Venture*', which was coincidentally released on 15 April 2011, the day after the transfer of the funds.²¹³ As Suhufi was an investor in the *Asphalt Venture* hijacking, and as members of Indian Ocean Consultants were involved in the ransom negotiations for the release of the vessel, it is almost certain that the USD 25,000 served as a side payment for the Indian Ocean Consultants and its negotiator.²¹⁴

208. In addition, Macsharo received funds from suspected pirated financier Mohamed Mohamud Kulane 'Indha'ade', and sent funds to his brother in the United Kingdom and to himself in Djibouti.

209. *Mohamed Shirweyne* is a pirate leader and organizer using a mobile telephone number connected to the names Dahir Ali Abtidon and Mohamed Hussein Ahmed.

²⁰⁹ See also <http://www.galgalanews.com/2014/05/04/dowlada-puntland-ciise-yulux-oo-is-kaashanaya-warbixin/>; and <http://puntlandi.com/puntland-mid-ka-mid-ah-raga-ugu-caansanaa-burcadbadeeda-soomaalida-oo-sheegay-inuu-isaga-baxaydhagayso/>.

²¹⁰ Hussein Jiis' involvement was established in the hijacking of the *Orna* and the abduction of 2 Spanish MSF workers.

²¹¹ Money transfer in possession of the Monitoring Group.

²¹² Local Somali sources claim that Suhufi's full name is "Abdulrahman Abdullahi Haji Aden" and that he is the first cousin of Ahmed Abdisalan Haji Aden, Somalia's current Ambassador to Ethiopia and co-founder/managing partner and former director of programs of the Mogadishu-based radio 'HornAfrik' (2007). Suhufi reportedly trained and worked as a full-time staff member at Abdisalan's radio station, well before he joined the lucrative piracy business. Hence, his nickname 'Suhufi (journalist).

²¹³ <http://eunavfor.eu/mv-asphalt-venture-released-from-pirate-control/>.

²¹⁴ Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji 'Suhufi' is believed to still hold hostage 7 Indian crewmembers of the *Asphalt Venture*, held back following its release. The vessel was hijacked on 28 September 2010.

Between 2010 and 2013, these two men received transfers amounting to USD 17,128 from several individuals associated with Somali piracy. Shirweyne was found to be involved in a number of hijacking cases and to be in direct contact with pirate leaders Mohamed Osman Mohamed ‘Gafanje’ and Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji ‘Suhufi’.²¹⁵

210. *Qorane Aden Farah*, a Barawe-based pirate leader also known as ‘Qorane’, received three transfers amounting to USD 1,097 sent by individuals in Kismayo and Qoryoley. Qorane was reportedly the leader of a pirate group that hijacked the sailing yacht *Choizil* on 23 October 2010 and brought the two crewmembers ashore at Barawe in early November 2010.²¹⁶ The two South African crewmembers were both held hostage until their release on 21 June 2012.

²¹⁵ Pirate leader Mohamed Shirweyne’s involvement was established in the hijackings of the *Alakrana*, *Hansa Stavanger* and *Choizil*.

²¹⁶ As declared by an arrested pirate on 27 November 2010.

**Annex 4.7.a: Photograph of pirate negotiator Ali
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 4.7.b: Photograph of pirate financier Abdullahi Mohamed
Jama Farah (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.7.c:


**Photographs of pirate negotiator Yusuf Bashir Nur Gedi
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 4.7.d:

Photographs of pirate facilitator Mohamed Abdi Olad

Mohamed Abdi Olad, pirate facilitator and accomplice of renowned Hobyo-Harardhere pirate negotiator Abdullahi Jareer



Annex 5

Misappropriation of public financial resources

Annex 5.1: Illustrative overview of contracts

Oil and Gas sector

1. In its previous report (S/2013/413 annex 5.5), the Monitoring Group described some of the risks associated with increasing commercial activity in the oil and gas sector in Somalia without a resolution to constitutional and legal disputes surrounding the control of natural resources. It also highlighted transparency and accountability issues in the key Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) petroleum institutions that would govern capacity building and regulation, notably the Somali Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Agency (SPA). During the course of 2013 and 2014, the FGS has nonetheless continued to engage in private negotiations with oil and gas companies and other corporations, resulting in a number of secret contracts and cooperation agreements that in due course are likely to exacerbate legal tensions and ownership disputes and stunt the transparent development of Somalia's oil and gas sectors.

Soma Oil and Gas

2. In August 2013, Soma Oil and Gas Exploration, a United Kingdom-registered company created in 2013 and chaired by the former leader of the United Kingdom Conservative Party, Lord Michael Howard, announced an agreement on 6 August 2013 signed with the FGS to conduct seismic surveys in Somalia's territorial waters and to collate and process historic seismic data, which would be placed into a data room controlled by the FGS. In return, Soma Oil would receive the right to apply for up to 12 oil licenses covering a maximum of 60,000 square kilometres of territory in Somalia.¹

3. The contract has never been made public, nor was it approved by the Federal Parliament of Somalia although it was ratified by the Council of Ministers on 3 October 2013. Those involved in the architecture of the deal included Dr. Abdullahi Haider, special advisor to Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Jay Park, a Canadian lawyer who is managing partner of Petroleum Regimes' Advisory and Park Energy Law.² At a signing ceremony, Jay Park was accompanied by Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, the then Minister of Natural Resources.³

4. On 3 February 2014, the company announced it had signed a seismic contract with Seabird Exploration to cover 20,000 square kilometres of seismic data off the coast of Somalia. On 6 June 2014, the company announced it had completed 20,500 square kilometres of seismic data acquisition and that processing of the data would run until late 2014.

5. On 6 August 2014, Robert Shepherd and Philip Wolfe, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Soma Oil and Gas Exploration Limited wrote to the

¹ Announcement on 6 August 2013 of the *Oil and Gas Agreement Signed with Somalia* and Soma presentation entitled *Unlocking Somalia's Potential*, 29-30 April 2014.

² Four separate industry sources interviewed on 26 September 2013 and 12 April 2014. A former advisor to President Hassan Sheikh on oil matters also stated he had been informed by FGS energy ministry officials that Jay Park and Abdullahi Haider were the key architects of the deal on the FGS side.

³ See <http://som.horseedmedia.net/2013/08/somalia-federal-government-signs-oil-and-gas-agreement-with-soma-oil-gas-exploration-limited/>. The former minister has been working as a consultant advisor to the Presidency following his departure from the FGS ministerial cabinet.

Monitoring Group to explain how they had managed the security arrangements for the Seabird operations. They stated that Soma had “contracted Peace Business Group, a licensed Somali security sector company to provide armed Somali personnel” and that “each seismic vessel was supported and protected by four support vessels and international and Somali security personnel on such support vessels”. They stated that only Somali personnel held arms within the 12 nautical mile limit, and “internationally operated firearms remained outside the 12 nautical mile limit”.⁴

Mubadala

6. On 17 July 2014, Mubadala, the sovereign investment fund of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a cooperation agreement with the FGS aimed at “sharing knowledge, increasing the strength of the Somalia Ministry and its staff, and over time, developing upstream opportunities in Somalia”.⁵

7. Given the institutional lack of capacity of Somali petroleum institutions, notably the SPA, the Monitoring Group is concerned that conflicts of interest could result from the provision of technical capabilities by corporate entities that are also seeking to secure oil acreage. If Mubadala’s provision of “capacity” is not channelled into a transparently run SPA, which is responsible for managing a cadastre of licenses through a process of transparent auctions, the risk is that such “capacity” would serve to empower informal decision makers within the system who also may have a vested interest in parceling out licenses to favoured companies in secret deals. Seismic data, in particular, should be completely controlled by the SPA in a secure data room so that all companies eventually bidding for licenses would have equal opportunities to access data in a regulatory environment free from insider dealing.

8. In this regard, notably even at this stage the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Daud Mohamed Omar, has often been excluded from strategic decisions made by others who exert broader informal leverage over the decision making process related to oil licensing.⁶

Shell, ExxonMobil and BP

9. On 13 June 2014, Minister Omar visited the headquarters of Shell in The Hague, Netherlands. Shell was originally awarded a concession for five oil blocks (M3-M7) in Somalia in 1988, after which Mobil Exploration (now a unit of ExxonMobil) joined in as a 50 per cent partner (see S/2013/413, annex 5.5.b, for a map of where concessions lie). The companies have now begun discussions with the Ministry to convert the existing concessions, which have been under *force majeure* since 1990, to a Production Sharing Agreement, as called for by the 2008 Petroleum Law.⁷

⁴ Security for Seabird Exploration’s activities was provided by Solace Global Maritime (based in the United Kingdom) and Salama Fikira International (registered in Mauritius).

⁵ See announcement made on 17 July 2014 on <http://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-petroleum-signs-cooperation-agreement-somalia>.

⁶ Diplomatic source dealing with oil sector stated that the Minister had frequently complained about this problem, 5 May 2014. A Somali source known to the Minister also stated the same on 24 July 2014.

⁷ Joint Statement by the Federal Republic of Somalia and Shell, 13 July 2014.

10. While the negotiations with Shell and Exxon were widely publicized, the Monitoring Group is nonetheless concerned that such negotiations are premature and could spark conflict, especially since they have not been conducted in consultation with regional authorities who may be affected. Indeed, M5 is licensed over offshore territory claimed by Puntland. Just days after the announcement by Shell on the new discussions, Puntland's Director General of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Petroleum, Issa Mohamoud Farah, rejected the legality of the negotiations, stating that "The Federal Government of Somalia does not govern over Puntland and all accords should be postponed until all states agree on how to share the country's natural resources".⁸ The 2008 Petroleum Law, which directly contradicts constitutional provisions giving regional authorities rights to control the licensing of their natural resources, is also yet to be approved by the Federal Parliament.

11. On 4 August 2014, President Mohamud was reported as saying that the FGS was also in renegotiations with BP.⁹ As previously shown by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 5.5), BP's prior concessions in Somalia clash with current concessions licensed out by the Somaliland authorities.

Turksom

12. The Monitoring Group has received documentation concerning efforts by Musa Haji Mohamed 'Ganjab'¹⁰ and Abdullahi Haider to operate a joint Turkish — Somali company known as "Turksom" that would be involved in building and operating a fuel distribution business and securing Turkish investments in Somalia.

13. On 25 November 2011, Musa Ganjab e-mailed a document purporting to be a proposal letter from Turksom, thanking the Government of Turkey for its support and requesting the company to be appointed as sole representative of all of Turkey's economic interests in Somalia. The letter stated that the company was registered in both Turkey and Somalia, although the phone numbers provided for its Somalia office are Ugandan numbers. The letter also stated that the company would be able "to provide effective security to each and every project that Turkey Government and private business are planning to implement in Somalia" (see annex 5.2.a for a copy of the letter).

14. By 2012, Turksom was incorporated and in discussions with another Somali company, Hass Petroleum, a leading oil marketing company in East Africa originally founded by a group of *Dhulbahante* businessmen from Sool region in northeastern Somalia. In an e-mail to Ganjab on 30 October 2012 entitled "*Memorandum of Understanding Between Turksom & Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd*", a director at Hass Petroleum discussed a joint venture for the rehabilitation of petrol stations in Mogadishu and for construction of a fuel depot and port infrastructure with Turksom. The director requested clarification from Ganjab on how he would like his shareholding to be structured within the joint venture. The e-mail was

⁸ See "Puntland rejects oil deal with Shell and ExxonMobil", 22 June 2014, at <http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/Puntland-rejects-oil-deal-with-Shell-and-ExxonMobil/-/979184/2357968/-/f9fklwz/-/index.html>.

⁹ See <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/somalia-sees-oil-results-this-year-as-bp-exxon-woed.html>.

¹⁰ See annex 6.4 for Ganjab's relations to arms embargo violations and Al-Shabaab, and annex 5.2 for his role in the recovery of Somali overseas assets.

accompanied by an attachment signed by Ganjab as CEO and Adbullahi Haider as Director General of Turksom Somalia Inc (see annex 5.2.b for a copy of the attachment).

15. On 6 September 2013, Ganjab received an e-mail from the address hersiburanea@yahoo.com entitled “*Oil Depo and security project Financing*” stating (unofficial translation from the Somali language as follows):

Haji Musa,

After greetings. You must have been busy yesterday. I have given your phone number to a guy in the UK called Ahmed who is the representative of a security company based in America (FLORIDA). Please contact them and negotiate as they are ready.

Mr. Mike Deegan is back from Dubai. Him and Mr Deylaf has not met ... please let me know when you are ready for a conference call.

*Thank you
Abdulhamid*

16. Independently, the Monitoring Group has been informed that Ganjab has been in discussions with Mohamed Deylaaf, a businessman previously named by the Group in the context of diversion of food aid, including to Al-Shabaab (S/2010/91).¹¹ Deylaaf is known to have interests in the downstream fuel sector.¹² The Monitoring Group has also obtained documentation that Turksom Security Company was officially registered as an approved private security company with the Ministry of Interior in 2013 (see annex 5.2.c), although it is not clear to what extent this company operated and how it obtained its weaponry.

Fisheries protection and management

17. On 25 July 2013, the FGS signed a letter of appointment nominating a company called Somalia FishGuard Limited as the sole agent and representative of the FGS with exclusive rights to undertake the patrol, protection, management and development of fisheries in Somalia’s waters, including in the Exclusive Economic Zone. The contract was signed by the then Minister of Natural Resources, Abdirizak Omar Mohamed. The company is obliged to provide and operate vessels for fisheries protection, including through the establishment and training of a Somalia Fisheries Protection Force, as well as prepare the provision of fishing regulations and the management of the licensing and regulatory infrastructure of the Government pertaining to fisheries. In return, the FGS would be obliged to provide the company access to state infrastructure and ports and “permission to carry light and medium sized weapons and ammunition consistent with the FPF requirements to exercise its obligations under this contract subject to UN Security Council resolutions”. The company would also receive military style uniforms and be conferred with the necessary authority to detain and arrest vessels fishing illegally in Somali waters. The Monitoring Group has been informed that FishGuard would

¹¹ Information received by three independent Somali businessmen in Mogadishu familiar with Ganjab’s businesses, interviewed in December 2013.

¹² Somali company CEO and UN contractor who has provided services to Deylaaf, February 2014, and a Somali source with knowledge of Deylaaf’s business affairs, May 2014.

retain 51 percent of all revenues¹³ derived from licensing fees, although the figures have been deliberately blacked out in the copy of the contract obtained by the Monitoring Group (see annex 5.2.d for a copy of the FishGuard letter of appointment).

18. On 27 July 2013, two days after the contract was signed, Ganjab received an e-mail from Abdi Amalo (who the Monitoring Group has investigated for conspiracy to divert overseas assets in strictly confidential annex 5.2, which was entitled “Info”. The text of the e-mail simply reads as follows:

*Xaaji Musa,
Let's talk brother
<http://companycheck.co.uk/company/04958710/FISHGUARD-MARINE-LIMITED>*

19. In April 2014, representatives of Somalia Fishguard Limited accompanied by President Mohamud and Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources, Mohamed Olow Barow, were in Brussels to attend a fisheries meeting with Europêche and Federpesca at the Headquarters of the European Commission. The representatives included Chairman David Walker, Director John Church, William Oswald and Christopher Brooke.¹⁴

20. The Monitoring Group has been informed that Somalia Fishguard Limited has been in discussions with Saladin Security Ltd, a UK private security company, whose representatives were introduced to President Mohamud in Mogadishu by Abdullahi Haider (the business partner of Ganjab in Turksom, and a presidential advisor on oil and gas) in mid May or June 2013.¹⁵ The company has operations in Mogadishu and is the private security contractor for Kilimanjaro Capital, a private equity firm which has farmed into an oil block awarded by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2008 to a private company, and which partly falls in Al-Shabaab territory.¹⁶

National Theatre

21. The Monitoring Group has obtained a copy of a draft contract between the Ministry of Public Works and Reconstruction, Marine and Transport, Ports and Energy and Sinohydro Corporation Ltd for the reconstruction of the National Theatre in Mogadishu for a sum of USD 31 million. This contract was transmitted by Musa Ganjab to Jeremy Schulman of the U.S. law firm of Shulman Rogers on 23 November 2013 (see annex 5.2 for investigation into the diversion of overseas assets by Ganjab and Shulman Rogers). It is not clear whether any financial transactions related to this contract have taken place, as no major rehabilitation works on the National Theatre have taken place in 2013 and 2014.

¹³ Information obtained from a fisheries advisor to the FGS on 5 May 2014.

¹⁴ Correspondence obtained by the Monitoring Group with a list prepared by Ahmed Mohamed Iman, Director General of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, dated 1 April 2014. Christopher Brooke is the brother of Alan Henry Brooke, the 3rd Viscount Brookeborough, a member of the United Kingdom House of Lords.

¹⁵ Information obtained from advisor to the FGS, 6 May 2014, and from private security source, 10 June 2014.

¹⁶ See <http://www.saladin-security.com/the-companies.php> and <http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/kilimanjaro-signs-somalia-security-memorandum-gxg-kcap-1909408.htm>.

UNSOA

22. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence that service contracts issued by the United Nations Support Office for African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) may have been issued to companies associated with Ganjab.

23. On 26 June 2013, Nurta Sheikh Mohamud, the sister of President Mohamud wrote to Ganjab, forwarding a memo issued by UNSOA to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation dated 20 June 2013. The memo informed the ministry of a two day business seminar to be held by UNSOA with the purpose of raising awareness among the Somalia business community on how to win contracts as vendors to the United Nations.

24. In the e-mail, the President's sister draws the attention to Ganjab to the memo and informs him that she has set up a conglomerate known as the Trust Group of Companies, for the express purpose of bidding for UN contracts. She requests a meeting with Ganjab to discuss the matter further.

25. While UNSOA has not registered any contracts to any company referred to as Trust or Trust Group, as a matter of due diligence and risk management, the Monitoring Group would recommend a full audit of all its contracts to determine whether there are any companies in which Ganjab has an interest, given the evidence pertaining to Ganjab's other illicit activities documented in strictly confidential annex 5.2 and strictly confidential annex 6.4.

Annex 5.1.a: Turksom correspondence



Turkey Office	Somalia Office
Kirazli cad. Sumbul sok No, 1 3 Gunesli Bagcilar Istanbul	Airport Road 12 Magadishu Somalia
Tel : +902126568026 Fax : +902126566412	Tel : +25618763175 +25618763177 +25618763173

Date:

Our ref:

Subject: Formal request

His Excellency

TurkSom would like to take this opportunity to thank the Turkey Government's brotherly assistance to Somali people in its most difficult time.

In an extremely volatile security situation it is difficult to engage the Somali people and stimulate the war torn economy and above all liaising with the public authorities without an effective link capable to transform promises and commitments into action.

TurkSom will fill that gap by enabling the Turkey Government to interact with efficiency with both the Somali governmental institutions and private individuals in achieving its noble aims. TurkSom is also able to provide effective security to each and every project that Turkey Government and private business are planning to implement in Somalia.

To that extent, TurkSom is kindly requesting being appointed as the sole representative of Turkey's economic interests in the Somali Republic.

TurkSom has a solid and successful business foundation that relies on its international experiences and partner organizations' capabilities to deliver on our joint ventures. We have a pool of highly qualified technical and professional staff to ensure effective completion of our contractual obligations.

TurkSom is committed to community development through its social responsibility arm by devoting a percentage of profit to social causes.

TurkSom is registered both in Somalia and in Turkey.

Sincerely yours,

Halil Altuntas, Director

Annex 5.1.b: Turksom and Hass Petroleum Memorandum of Understanding

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TURKSOM INC; SOMALIA AND HASS PETROLEUM (K) LTD

This Memorandum of Understanding is entered into by and between Turksom Inc, Somalia and Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd (the parties) in pursuance of their intention for proposed business ventures in Somalia.


Now, therefore, it is agreed by and between the parties that:

1. Hass Petroleum shall organize a team to visit and evaluate Mogadishu for the assessment of the major rehabilitation of the 5 petrol station sites currently on long-term lease to Turksom Inc. by the second week of August, 2012.
The team shall also conduct a general survey of the sites available for the construction of the proposed fuel depot, and port infrastructure related thereto.
2. The technical team shall prepare, and submit an evaluation report with broad estimates of costs for review, and approval by a joint committee of Turksom Inc., Somalia and Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd at Directors level by August 30, 2012.
Following this review process, the Directors of the two parties shall meet for formal discussions, and approval of the proposed construction of the 5 petrol stations located in Mogadishu by September 14th, 2012.
The review of the depot construction shall be based on feasibility study that should be completed by September 30th.
3. Turksom Inc. Somalia and Hass Petroleum (K) Ltd undertake to formalize their relationship into a legal entity that might be a limited Company, a joint venture, or such other business operating vehicle as the parties deem acceptable within 90 days from the date of this Memorandum of Understanding.
The parties agree to provide the required share capital and the shareholding of each party in the chosen legal entity within the same 90 days period.
4. The parties hereby undertake to explore other sectors, e.g. real estate, light industries, materials and product inspection services, etc., that might offer opportunities for joint investment through appropriate investment vehicles.
5. This Memorandum of Understanding becomes effective from the date of its signing by the parties.



For and on behalf of,
MUSA HAJI MOHAMED
C.E.O
TURKSOM SOMALIA INC.
SOMALIA

Date: 02/08/12




For and on behalf of,
ABDINASIR ALI HASSAN
CHAIRMAN
HASS PETROLEUM (K) LTD

Date: 02/08/12

For and on behalf of,
DR. ABDULLAHI HAIDER
DIRECTOR GENERAL
TURKSOM SOMALIA INC.
SOMALIA

Date: 02-08-2012





For and on behalf of,
ABDULKADIR AHMED HUSSEIN
DIRECTOR
HASS PETROLEUM (K) LTD

Date: 02/08/12

Annex 5.1.c: Turksom Security Company registered by the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Interior

Jamhuuriyadda Soomaaliya
Xukuumadda Federaaliga
Wasaaradda Arrimaha Gudaha &
Amniga Qaranka


 Somali Republic
 Federal Government
 Ministry of Interior & National Security

جمهورية الصومال
 الحكومة الفيدرالية
 وزارة الشؤون الداخلية والأمن القومي

Ref: WAG&AQ/XWA/0036/13 Date: 21st October, 2013

LIST OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES

No.	Name of the Company	Name of the contact Person	Telephone	E-mail	Ref	Date Registered	License Expiry Date
1	Turk-Som Security Company	-----	-----	-----	001	12/4/2012	12/4/13
2	Ilaalo Security Company	Gen. Cali Maxamed Xasan (Cali madobe)	0615553322	ahmedhassan@hotmail.com	002	1/8/2013	1/11/13
3	Janus Service Somalia	Maxamud Axmed	0615995064	Dasiindom55@hotmail.com	003	6/8/2013	6/11/13
4	Calidus Knight LTD	-----	-----	-----	004	15/4/2012	15/4/13
5	Duguf enterprise Security Company	C/laahi Faarax Duguf	-----	duguffarah@hotmail.com	005	14/1/13	14/1/14
6	Group 5 Somair Logistics Security	C/samad Sh. Yusuf	0615338444	-----	006	28/7/2012	28/7/13
7	Nation Wide Enterprise Private Security	Maxamed Abukar Islow	00254711903 338	info@natiowide.com	007	22/7/2012	22/7/13
8	Global Security & Monitoring Center LTD	Saciid Axmed Xaaji	-----	info@globalsecuritymonitoringcenter.com	008	20/5/2012	20/5/13
9	Sabah General Services Company	Cartan Cabdi Ibrahim	-----	shiekhshabah@yahoo.com	009	31/5/2012	31/5/13
10	City Security Company	Diini Axmed Cabdi	0618282220	Nura1141@hotmail.com	010	02/6/2012	02/6/13

Annex 5.1.d: FishGuard Letter of Appointment

Federal Republic of Somalia
Ministry of National Resources
Office of the Minister



جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية
وزارة الثروة الوطنية
مكتب الوزير

Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya
Wasaaradda Kheyraadka Dalka
Xafiiska Wasiirka

Re: WKHD/XW/0261/2013

Date: 25/07/2013

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT

From: The Federal Republic of Somalia

TO: Somalia FishGuard Limited

Somalia Fishguard Limited is hereby APPOINTED and AUTHORISED the sole agent and representative of The Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia with exclusivity to UNDERTAKE the patrol, protection, management and development of fisheries in the Federal Republic of Somalia and on/in those waters and islands of Somalia's Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf Zone, defined here and in the appending contract as Somali Waters, with a view to conserving and utilising the fishery resources in those areas to the benefit of the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and future generations of Somali people.

No other person or company or outfit shall be entitled to exercise any of the above activities in the areas specified and any such appointments that have been made prior to the date hereof are hereby cancelled and/or withdrawn.

Somalia Fishguard Limited's specific powers assigned by the Federal Government of Somalia are contained within the corresponding Service Contract which together with this letter of Appointment constitutes the terms and conditions of Somalia Fishguard's engagement for the Federal Government of Somalia and together they are intended to be legally binding.

Dated

Signed (Federal Republic of Somalia)



Official

Seal

Witnessed



Signed (Somalia Fishguard Limited)

Witnessed

Annex 5.2

**Contracting for the recovery of public overseas assets of the
Federal Republic of Somalia (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 6

Violations of the arms embargo

Annex 6.1: Federal Government of Somalia compliance with modifications of the arms embargo

Arms embargo modifications

1. The Security Council modified the arms embargo on three occasions during the course of 2013 and 2014, particularly as it applied to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).¹ In its resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council decided that for a period of twelve months until 6 March 2014 the arms embargo “shall not apply to deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia”,² except in relation to deliveries of those items listed in an annex to the resolution.³ As such, the Council effectively exempted the FGS from seeking the Committee’s approval for arm deliveries destined for its security forces. In its resolution 2111 (2014), the Security Council clarified that the items listed in the same annex to both resolutions 2093 (2013) and of resolution 2111 (2014) remained subject to advance approval by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.⁴ The partial suspension of the arms embargo for the FGS was renewed in resolution 2142 (2014), adopted on 5 March 2014, for a further seven months.⁵

2. The FGS in turn incurred a corresponding set of obligations. Initially, the FGS assumed the primary responsibility to notify the Committee, for its information at least five days in advance, of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of assistance intended solely for the Security Forces of the FGS. Such notifications had to include all relevant information, including where applicable, the type and quantity of weapons, ammunitions, military equipment and materiel to be delivered, the proposed date and the specific place of delivery in Somalia.⁶

3. In addition, the FGS was obliged to report to the Security Council every six months on: (a) the structure of the Security Forces of the FGS; (b) the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the FGS; and (c) the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the FGS, and on training needs in this regard.⁷

¹ Paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013) and resolution 2142 (2014) modified the arms embargo originally imposed on Somalia by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992), and further elaborated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002).

² Paragraph 33 of resolution 2093 (2013).

³ The items listed in the annex were: 1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS); 2. Guns, howitzers, and cannons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and ammunition and components specially designed for these. (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.); 3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm; 4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items; 5. Charges and devices intended for military use containing energetic materials; mines and related materiel; and 6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability.

⁴ Paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013).

⁵ Paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014).

⁶ Paragraph 38 of resolution 2093 (2013), reaffirmed in paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013).

⁷ Paragraph 39 of resolution 2093 (2013), reaffirmed in paragraph 9 of resolution 2111 (2013).

4. Notably, the Security Council decided that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Security Forces of the FGS may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Security Forces of the FGS.⁸

5. Pursuant to paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), and prior to the 6 March 2014 deadline, the Group transmitted to the Committee a letter dated 6 February 2014 assessing the status of the exemption for the FGS and identifying options for further modification of the arms embargo (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.8).

6. Consequently, in resolution 2142 (2014), the Security Council increased the FGS reporting obligations. The Council underlined the imperative need for the FGS to improve compliance with its requirements under the partial suspension of the arms embargo, expressed serious concern that the requirements under the suspension of the arms embargo as set out in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013) had not been fully met, and stressed that any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the FGS would be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the FGS's implementation of its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions.

7. As such, the FGS was required to provide more detailed advance notifications as well as two post-delivery notifications to the Committee.⁹ In particular, advance notifications had to include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the arms and ammunition, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of storage. Also, no later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the FGS was required to submit to the Committee a written confirmation of the completion of the delivery, including the serial numbers for the arms and ammunition delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage. Furthermore, within five days of the distribution of imported arms or ammunition, the FGS was required to inform the Committee in writing of the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage.

8. In addition, the FGS was obliged to report to the Security Council in greater detail regarding: (a) the structure, strength and composition (including the status of allied militia) of the Security Forces of the FGS, including the names of current commanders, the locations of the headquarters, and the status of militias; (b) the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the FGS, including details of all available armouries and storerooms, their location, storage capacity, staffing capacity, arms and ammunition management systems and status of use; and (c) the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the FGS, and on training needs in this regard, including procedures for receipt, verification and recording of weapons imports through any Federal Government controlled port of entry, procedures for the transport of weapons and ammunition with the Security Forces of

⁸ Paragraph 34 of resolution 2093 (2013), reaffirmed in paragraph 8 of resolution 2111 (2013).

⁹ Paragraphs 5 to 7 of resolution 2142 (2014).

the FGS, and the current systems of logging and auditing in the Security Forces of the FGS.¹⁰

9. Considering the enhanced requirements placed on the FGS in resolution 2142 (2014), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations within 30 days on United Nations and other technical assistance to the FGS in complying with its notification and reporting obligations, and in improving its capacities in the safe and transparent storage, distribution and management of weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and verification.¹¹

10. To this effect, the Secretary-General deployed an assessment team, including the Monitoring Group to Mogadishu and Nairobi from 12 to 18 March 2014. In addition to its assessment of ground conditions, the team identified options and recommendations for assistance to the FGS. On 3 April 2014, the Secretary-General addressed a letter detailing the outcome of the assessment to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/243). On 22 May 2014, a Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2014/9) responded to the assistance needs of the FGS in order for it to show tangible progress in complying with the terms of the partial suspension of the arms embargo.

FGS reports to the Security Council

11. FGS reporting requirements to the Security Council were designed in part to improve transparency in the stockpiling, accounting and distribution of weapons and ammunition of the Somali National Army (SNA), in a context where the SNA and its allies were expected to escalate their military campaign against Al-Shabaab. Such transparency would further allow Member States to target assistance to Somalia's Security Forces in a more systematic and informed manner. Determining the composition of the Security Forces was also critical in identifying who was entitled to receive arms and other assistance pursuant to the FGS exemption.

12. Pursuant to resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), the FGS submitted three reports to the Security Council on 4 April 2013, 30 October 2013 and 7 February 2014.

13. In its 2 April 2013 report, as indicated in the previous report of the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 6.2, paragraphs 51 and 52), the FGS stated that the Ministry of Defence had appointed a team to assess Somalia's weapons armouries and noted that the construction of a main armoury, known as "Halane", within the security perimeter of Mogadishu International Airport, was under way. Information provided by the FGS on the structure, infrastructure and procedures of the Security Forces was rudimentary, notably in the form of a basic and aspirational organizational chart of the Somali Armed Forces command and map of its sector headquarters. No information was provided concerning the Somali Police Forces or the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). Other annexes included cut-and-paste excerpts from arms and ammunition management manuals.¹²

¹⁰ Paragraph 9 of resolution 2142 (2014).

¹¹ Paragraph 10 of resolution 2142 (2014).

¹² Report forwarded by the Chair to the Committee on 5 April 2014 via note with reference number [S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.34](#).

14. In its 30 October 2013 report, the FGS stated that the structure of its Security Forces had not changed since its first report to the Security Council. The FGS reported on the establishment of a National Security Council. In addition, it provided approximate numbers of soldiers deployed in two sectors, with no precise breakdown of the distribution of troops and or description of the infrastructure in place to support the storage and management of weapons and logistics.¹³

15. On 21 January 2014, during an Arms and Ammunition Management Workshop¹⁴ held in Mogadishu, the Monitoring Group met with the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia (NSA), Abdirahman Sheikh Issa, to provide feedback on FGS reporting to the Security Council to date. The Monitoring Group explained that the reporting provided by the FGS lacked sufficient detail in terms of numbers, specific units and locations of the different elements of the Security Forces, and did not address the issue of which militias were allied or integrated with the Security Forces and which were not. In addition, in the reporting there was an almost complete lack of information provided on existing storage infrastructure being used by the Security Forces and that the information provided on storage and distribution procedures did not reflect the reality of the systems actually in use by the SNA and other security forces. At the request of the NSA, on 31 January 2014, the Monitoring Group provided him with further written feedback in terms of reporting expectations prior to the next deadline for reporting to the Security Council (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.7).

16. Following the workshop, two international consultants hired by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) remained in Mogadishu to assist the FGS with its third report dated 6 February 2014.¹⁵ This report provided much greater detail, including organizational charts detailing the structure and size of various forces. With regards to weapons and ammunition management, the FGS stated that the armoury at Halane had been completed, that the principal historical armouries at Villa Baidoa and Villa Somalia had already been closed and that five battalion-sized armouries were being established at Villa Gashandiga, Villa Somalia, Villa Baidoa, Jazeera One and Sector 12 HQ.¹⁶ The report also mapped out operating procedures for weapons management and described the use of weapons registries and weapons cards.¹⁷ However, no sample documents were attached to the report. The management system described appears still to be aspirational and was deemed insufficient according to reporting by the United Nations Institute for

¹³ Report forwarded by the Chair to the Committee on 30 October 2013 via note with reference number S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.109.

¹⁴ In addition to the Monitoring Group, the 21 to 22 January 2014 Workshop was attended by senior security officials of the FGS, UNSOM, UNMAS, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM), Member States and regional arms experts, and included implementing partners involved in the construction and refurbishment of armouries for use by the FGS. The Workshop preceded a programme of visits to FGS armouries described in the Monitoring Group's letter to the Committee dated 6 February 2014 (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.8).

¹⁵ Report forwarded by the Chair to the Committee on 7 February 2014 via note with reference number S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.17.

¹⁶ Villa Gashandiga is historically a Ministry of Defence facility. Villa Somalia is the name given to the main civilian government complex in Mogadishu and seat of the Presidency. Villa Baidoa is historically the main SNA logistics base in Mogadishu. Jazeera One is a training camp.

¹⁷ Registries are supposed to store details of the weapon type, serial number, name of the owner, owner's signature, butt number, date of entry and commander's signature. Cards are supposed to store the name of the holder of the weapon, description of the type, serial and butt number.

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which conducted an assessment of SNA weapons management that was endorsed by the FGS.¹⁸ In addition, the procedures described in respect of safety management appear to be copied from guidelines of a generic manual but have not been put in place.

17. Pursuant to resolution 2142 (2014), on 13 June 2014, the FGS submitted its fourth report to the Security Council.¹⁹ The report provided detailed organizational charts of the Security Forces and details concerning the state-allied militia Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ). It also provided details of a number of new armouries built or in commission for the Security Forces²⁰ but did not detail the 66 state armouries that had been rehabilitated by November 2013 according to UNIDIR. The report also stated that there was no marking system in place to mark weapons at the point of import, and that weapons registration only existed at the armoury level, with the weapon card system not yet in effect.²¹

18. In addition, the 13 June 2014 report presented a baseline survey conducted with the assistance of UNSOM between 3 and 8 May 2014, which was commissioned to assess all weapons imported and still in storage, to inspect storerooms of the various Security Forces and their log books, and to assess the system of documentation used by the Security Forces to account for imported weapons. The survey team found that arms and ammunition in stock at the Halane armoury corresponded with the armoury's weapons and ammunition logbooks as well as the 48 distribution forms that the SNA issued since October 2013. The survey team also visited NISA where it viewed a storeroom and a handwritten ledger accounting for distribution of weapons to its agents in the field. Two Somali Police Force armouries completed by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) were not in use at the time of the survey.²²

19. While FGS reporting to the Security Council may still not be comprehensive and strictly fulfilling the scope of requirements in resolutions 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013) and 2142 (2014), it does reflect improvement over time, particularly as a result of support provided by UNSOM and its international consultants. While the FGS has produced paperwork accounting for every single weapon distributed and stored, the FGS cannot claim that this paper trail is proof that all weapons are secured given the leakage of weapons into the Mogadishu arms markets that the Monitoring Group has documented below. In addition, the Monitoring Group has

¹⁸ The UNIDIR report entitled *Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia* (23 April 2014) was submitted as part of the FGS report to the Security Council on 13 June 2014. On page 21 of the report, UNIDIR states that "Weapons registration has so far been restricted to the armoury level (primarily SPF). SNA authorities intend to implement registries of all weapons within its storage facilities. Issuing will reportedly be by a 'weapon card' system". This wording is also used on page 13 of the 13 June 2014 FGS report to the Security Council.

¹⁹ Report forwarded by the Chair to the Committee on 13 June 2014 via note with reference number [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.64](#).

²⁰ On page 9 of the 13 June 2013 report, the FGS reported that two armouries had been built at the Ministry of Defence, two were in the process of being completed at Villa Baidoa, one was being completed at the Jazeera One training camp, and a final armoury was being completed at Villa Baidoa.

²¹ Training with the assistance of UNMAS is now however under way.

²² See page 3 of the *Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey* annexed to the 13 June 2013 report of the FGS to the Security Council.

identified consistent anomalies and violations of notification procedures in respect of FGS arms imports.

FGS notifications to the Committee and arms diversion

Notifications pursuant to resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013)

20. In respect of FGS notifications to the Committee of weapon deliveries pursuant to resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), the Monitoring Group has identified a number of serious anomalies and concerns regarding weapons deliveries from Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia to Mogadishu. Between July and October 2013, the FGS and these Member States intended to deliver four consignments of weapons and ammunition for use by the SNA. See annex 6.1.a for a table of quantities and types of weapons notified and delivered from these three countries.

21. The first notification from the NSA to the Committee dated 1 July 2013 concerned 1,000 AK-47 rifles provided by the Government of Uganda and to be delivered from Kampala to Mogadishu within ten days of the notification. Following a request by the Committee to clarify where these weapons were to be delivered, the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the United Nations wrote on 9 July 2013 informing the Committee that the weapons were intended for use between Brigades 1 and 6 of the SNA (see annex 6.1.b). However, following their arrival in Mogadishu in early July 2013, the weapons were moved to an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) storeroom, where 700 of the weapons were subsequently transferred into the custody of the Somali Police Force (see annex 6.1.c for additional documentation).²³

22. The FGS report to the Security Council of 13 June 2014 noted that the principal Somali Police Force armoury in Mogadishu, which had recently been completed by UNMAS with capacity for 1,000 rifles, was only storing six rifles at the time of a 3 May 2014 inspection by an UNSOM team. The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) armoury, also completed by UNMAS in April 2014 with capacity for 2,000 rifles, was unused by the time the inspection took place.²⁴ The Somali Police Force has been unable to provide the Monitoring Group with a list of serial numbers of the 700 weapons it is supposed to have received, for verification against the list of serial numbers provided by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF).²⁵

23. On 29 July 2013, the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations notified the Committee of the intention of the FGS to import 3,500 assault rifles,²⁶ 3 million rounds of 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 100 PKM machine guns,

²³ Two AMISOM logistics officers confirmed to the Monitoring Group on 22 January 2014 that the weapons were first moved to an AMISOM storage site in Mogadishu and then released, with 700 weapons issued to the Somali Police Force and 300 to the SNA. The documentation appears to corroborate this version of events.

²⁴ See page 3 of the *Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey* submitted by the FGS as part of its report of 13 June 2014, circulated by the Chair to the Committee via note with reference number [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.64](#).

²⁵ The Monitoring Group requested these serial numbers from the Somali Police Force on 11 July 2014 but had not received a response by 18 August 2014.

²⁶ The original notification document refers to Type 56-1 assault rifles. However a physical inspection of these rifles in the Halane storehouse in Mogadishu, and subsequent reverification with authorities in Ethiopia confirmed the rifles as being Type 56-2 rifles.

250,000 rounds of 7.62 x 54 ammunition and fifty 12.7 mm machine guns from Ethiopia. The delivery was earmarked for early August 2013, but when the first delivery plane crashed on 9 August 2013 in Mogadishu the overall consignment had to be broken into other consignments that arrived in September 2013.²⁷

24. The Monitoring Group eventually confirmed with authorities in Ethiopia that the actual deliveries were considerably less than what was originally notified and match what the SNA claim was finally imported from Ethiopia (see the table in annex 6.1.a regarding all weapons imported from Uganda, Djibouti and Ethiopia). A baseline survey team from UNSOM also reviewed internal SNA documentation that accounted for the distribution of all weapons not present in the Halane weapons store to elements of the FGS Security Forces.²⁸

25. However, despite the SNA accounting for every single weapon imported, the Monitoring Group obtained concrete evidence of Ethiopian-supplied weapons, notably brand new Type 56-2 assault rifles, freely available in the illicit arms markets in Mogadishu between February and April 2014, alongside other SNA stock that had also been leaked. One of the new Type 56-2 assault rifles, never previously seen in Somalia, has also been documented in the possession of Al-Shabaab (see annex 6.2).

26. On 12 August 2013, the FGS notified the Committee of weapons and ammunition to be delivered from Djibouti, the details of which are also noted in the table in annex 6.1.a. The FGS has claimed that all of these weapons were delivered directly to the SNA in Sector 4, Hiran region.²⁹ However, the SNA commander of Brigade 10, in Sector 4 in Hiran, reported that the Brigade 10 had not received any arms, ammunition or explosives from the SNA in Mogadishu and that the only arms and ammunition the Brigade had received in 2013 and 2014 were provided locally by Djibouti AMISOM forces.³⁰

27. The Monitoring Group also understands that a second consignment of weapons was sourced from Djibouti, based on a packing list dated 3 October 2013. According to SNA documentation reviewed by the UNSOM baseline survey team, the SNA received less than what was stated on the 3 October 2013 packing list (see table in

²⁷ The deliveries took place on 11 and 13 September 2013, in aircraft that were chartered by UNSOA and which flew from Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, to Mogadishu. Cargo documents for these flights seen by the Monitoring Group indicate the delivery as an AMISOM to AMISOM delivery, although the consignee was the SNA according to UNSOA.

²⁸ The SNA Director of Logistics (G4) manages the receipt and distribution of weapons. All imported weapons are manually entered into a logbook. When the SNA distributes items from the Halane armoury, it enters the date, recipient, quantity and stock balance into the armoury logbook, and then issues a distribution form that must be signed by the SNA Chief of Defense Forces. As indicated above, the survey team found that arms and ammunition in stock at Halane armoury corresponded with the armoury's weapons and ammunition logbooks (the SNA has one logbook for weapons and one for ammunition) as well as with the 48 distribution forms that the SNA has issued since October 2013. Details are tabulated in the *Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey* submitted by the FGS as part of its report of 13 June 2014, circulated by the Chair to the Committee via note with reference number [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.64](#).

²⁹ As reported by the FGS in its 13 June 2014 report to the Security Council, on page 18 of the attached *Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey*.

³⁰ As noted in the UNSOM "Survey visit to Belet Weyne (Sector 4) to cross-reference data from the Federal Government of Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey", 11 June 2014, p. 2.

annex 6.1.a for actual deliveries) and has generated paperwork accounting for the distribution of all items it claims it did receive.³¹

28. However, the Monitoring Group has obtained evidence of large-scale leakage of some of the 291,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition delivered by Djibouti into the illicit arms markets in Mogadishu. On 23 January 2014, the Monitoring Group visited the Halane armoury, where it inspected this ammunition, which had been produced in Sudan and bore various combinations of 3-entry head stamps. Between October 2013 and April 2014, sources of the Monitoring Group documented thousands of rounds of identical ammunition with arms dealers at KM 4 and KM 5 in Mogadishu, and in one instance documented a box containing Sudanese-manufactured ammunition identical to those stored in the Halane armoury (see annex 6.3). Prior to 2013, this type of ammunition had not been seen in the Mogadishu arms markets.

29. In addition, the FGS received weapons, ammunition and uniforms from Yemen. On 26 September 2013, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations informed the Committee that it would be supplying 4,000 military uniforms to the FGS as well as 4,000 military uniforms, 200 personal pistols and ammunition to Puntland. However, following a letter dated 10 October 2013 from the Committee requesting the Yemeni authorities to provide further information on the type and quantity of weapons and ammunition to be supplied, and details of the proposed end users, the Yemeni Mission wrote again to the Committee on 12 December 2013. This letter stated that the Yemeni authorities had already provided 4,000 uniforms and 200 pistols with ammunition to the FGS, which had been transported by African Express Airways to Mogadishu, although no date for the flight was specified. The Yemeni Mission also stated that its authorities had already transported 4,000 uniforms, 200 pistols and 500 assault rifles with ammunition by Ilyushin aircraft to Garowe, Puntland, although no date was specified. The provision of 200 pistols and ammunition to the FGS and 500 assault rifles and ammunition to Puntland was not specified in the original advance notification of 26 September 2013, as required by Security Council resolutions.

30. The notifications for deliveries to Mogadishu and Garowe relate to visits to Yemen by Abdirahman Mohamud “Faroole”, then President of Puntland, and Abdikarim Hussein Guled (*Habar Gedir/Saad*), then Minister of Interior and National Security of the FGS. In September 2013, both individuals visited Sana’a where they individually reached agreements with Yemeni authorities to procure weapons for their respective authorities.³² The Monitoring Group has confirmed that in mid October 2013 an aircraft landed in Mogadishu where it offloaded the Yemeni pistols, ammunition, boxes of uniforms as well as rocket propelled grenades, which had not been referred to in any notification to the Committee. Delivery of the cargo was taken on the tarmac by the SNA chief of logistics Colonel Abdullahi Moalim

³¹ See *Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey* submitted by the FGS as part of its report of 13 June 2014, circulated by the Chair to the Committee via note with reference number [S/AC.29/2014/NOTE.64](#).

³² Interview with FGS diplomat on 24 September 2013, and with former member of President Faroole’s administration on 30 May 2014.

Nur (*Abgaal/Waesle*).³³ While the Monitoring Group has not been able to confirm more details in respect of the aircraft used and precise quantities of weapons offloaded in Mogadishu, it has identified the actors involved in deliveries to Puntland, which relate to considerably more weapons than were notified (see annex 6.5 regarding the Puntland case).

31. The Monitoring Group has noted in annex 6.2.e a number of weapons found in arms markets in Mogadishu, which arms dealers attest were provided by SNA officers who informed the dealers that the weapons had been sourced from Yemen.

Notifications pursuant to resolution 2142 (2014)

32. On 28 April 2014 in Mogadishu, during a meeting of the Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group, attended by the FGS, the Monitoring Group and international partners, General Dahir Adan Elmi, then chief of the Somali Armed Forces, confirmed that the logistics facility at Halane is the primary receiving point and clearinghouse for all imports of arms, ammunition and equipment. He further confirmed that he, along with the SNA department of logistics, were the only ones responsible for the entire supply chain of procurement, importation, management and distribution to other security services of all lethal and non-lethal assistance. However, Member States and international organizations providing assistance to the Somali security sector have been doing so directly with individual security services. In addition, the NSA, who is responsible for notifications to the Committee and for reporting to the Security Council, is not regularly apprised of deliveries of assistance to the Somali security forces, which has affected the timing and accuracy of notifications.

33. Following adoption of resolution 2142 (2014), in late April 2014, the Monitoring Group raised with the NSA three cases of the delivery to Somalia of non-lethal assistance that had not been notified to the Committee. Subsequently, the Committee received one notification and one partial notification after the fact of delivery.

34. First, in a letter dated 24 April 2014, the NSA notified the Committee of the assistance from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to NISA, including uniforms and 10 Toyota Land Cruiser pick-ups, which had been delivered on 19 April 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.40](#)).

35. Second, the Monitoring Group enquired with the NSA regarding a delivery from the UAE to the Ministry of Interior in November 2013 reportedly including 10 military vehicles, 2 fire engines, 2 ambulances, 4 armoured vehicles and 5,000 uniforms and received by then Minister of Interior and National Security of the FGS, Abdikarim Hussein Guled. The Committee did not receive a notification regarding this delivery.

³³ Interview with military intelligence source in Mogadishu on 3 December 2013 who stated that the aircraft contained uniforms, but that at least three boxes of RPG-7 launchers containing nine launchers each were observed offloaded from the aircraft, as well as several pallets of ammunition. RPG-7 rounds were observed as concealed in the uniform boxes. This interview was corroborated by a Monitoring Group source with access to SNA logistics in Mogadishu in December 2013. A foreign military intelligence officer and an AMISOM officer confirmed the presence of Abdullahi Moalim Nur on the tarmac at delivery, December 2013.

36. Third, on 2 April 2014, the Government of Italy issued a press release regarding a package of assistance to the FGS, primarily to the Somali security sector. The Monitoring Group verified that within this package, 29 Toyota pickup vehicles were delivered to Somalia in two shipments by the beginning of April 2014 for the Somali security sector. The Monitoring Group informed the NSA that it was the Group's understanding that the vehicles had arrived in Somalia. Subsequently, in a letter dated 12 May 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.47](#)), the NSA notified the Committee of only 19 of the vehicles for the Somali Police Forces, well after their delivery to Mogadishu and presentation to the FGS on 2 April 2014, and made no mention of the other 10 vehicles or the other elements of the assistance package to the Somali security sector announced in the press release. In a letter dated 7 June 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.50](#)), the NSA finally notified the Committee of the remaining 10 vehicles intended for the Somali Police Forces.

37. Regarding lethal assistance, in a letter dated 27 April 2014 and received by the Committee on 5 May 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.42](#)), the NSA notified the Committee that the UAE had presented to the Somali Embassy in Abu Dhabi, in the form of a donation, a number of arms and ammunition, including, amongst other items, 3510 AK-47 assault rifles, 1,100,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition (7.62 x 39 mm), 510 pistols (9 mm calibre) and 130,000 rounds of ammunition for the 9 mm pistols. The Committee has received no further information regarding the delivery of these weapons intended for the SNA.

38. In addition, in a letter dated 23 June 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.56](#)), the NSA notified the Committee regarding the purchase of a consignment of weapons from the Metals and Engineering Corporation of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia intended for the SNA. The consignment included 500 AK-47 rifles with 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 PKM machine guns with 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 DSHK anti-aircraft machine guns (12.7 mm calibre) with 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and 300 Tokarove pistols with 4,800 rounds of ammunition. The Committee has received no further information regarding the delivery of these weapons.

39. Furthermore, in a letter dated 5 June 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.49](#)), the NSA notified the Committee regarding a donation from the Republic of Sudan, including training of 300 NISA personnel and the provision of 301 AK-47 assault rifles and 10 Toyota Land Cruiser pick-ups. According to the notification, the training of NISA personnel had already been completed by 2 June 2014 and the 301 AK-47 rifles had been delivered on 4 June 2014. While General Elmi had stated that all assistance to the Somali security sector passed through the SNA and the Halane logistics facility before distribution to the other security services, the Sudanese weapons were delivered directly to NISA without the knowledge of international partners and did not pass through Halane, where weapons registration training had begun. Post-notifications for this delivery as required by resolution 2142 (2014) are still pending.

40. Similarly, in a letter dated 30 June 2014 ([S/AC.29/2014/COMM.60](#)), the NSA again notified the Committee after the fact of another delivery from Sudan, including 100 Belgian pistols with 6,000 rounds of ammunition, 10 PKM machine guns with 7,000 rounds of ammunition, 6 DSHK anti-aircraft machine guns (12.7 mm calibre) with 3,060 rounds of ammunition, as well as 10,800 rounds of ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles. Again, the delivery had already taken place on

27 June 2014 and the weapons did not pass through Halane but were provided directly to NISA. Post-notifications for this delivery as required by resolution 2142 (2014) are still pending.

41. Since adoption of resolution 2093 (2013), the number of various types of arms that have been delivered or are expected to be delivered to the FGS pursuant to formal notifications to the Committee now exceeds 13,000, with some 5.5 million rounds of different types of ammunition. Given the size of the Security Forces as reported by the FGS to the Security Council on 13 June 2014,³⁴ these numbers of weapons exceed the needs of the current offensive against Al-Shabaab. They are also additional to weapons sourced locally from stocks already in the country and weapons that have entered Somalia in violation of the arms embargo.

42. Overall, given the anomalies and inaccuracies of notifications to the Committee, the diversion of notified weapons, the delivery of weapons exceeding what has been notified, partial notifications, non-notifications, or persistent advance notifications after the fact of delivery, particularly following adoption of resolution 2142 (2014), the FGS has not imported weapons into Somalia in full compliance with their obligations pursuant to the Security Council's modification of the arms embargo.

Assistance to the FGS

43. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Secretary-General (S/2014/243) and the Security Council Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2014/9) a variety of assistance has been forthcoming to the FGS. Some of this is reflected above. Assistance has been provided in the preparation of FGS reports to the Security Council through consultants hired by UNSOM, and in the preparation of notifications to the Committee by the United Nations Secretariat, and both with feedback from the Monitoring Group. In addition, UNSOM, UNMAS and UNDP have assisted in defining an institutional framework for weapons and ammunition management oversight. UNSOM and its international partners have also helped undertake a phased baseline survey in Mogadishu and the regions, as described above. Furthermore, with UNMAS support, the FGS has initiated a weapons and record keeping system, again as assessed above. Overall, a range of technical, human and administrative assistance has been provided to the FGS, in part to the Office of the NSA and in the construction of weapons storage facilities, mostly in Mogadishu.

44. Still, FGS capacity in arms and ammunition management remains minimal and far from compliant with international standards or best practices. Notably, the FGS has yet to establish a joint verification team with international experts that would coordinate with the Monitoring Group. During the 28 April 2014 Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group meeting, the issue was not discussed but is expected to be on the agenda for future meetings.

³⁴ See annexes 3 to 10 of the report of the FGS to the Security Council, 13 June 2014.

Annex 6.1.a: Summary of arms and ammunition imported into Somalia from Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti in 2013³⁵

Supplier	Item	Date of Notification	Quantity Notified	Quantity Received	Destination of Delivery
Uganda	Ak-47	01 July 2013	1,000	1,000	700 to Police, 300 to SNA
Ethiopia	AK Type 56-2	29 July 2013	3,500	2,755	SNA Halane Armoury
Ethiopia	AK ammunition	29 July 2013	3,000,000	1,944,500	SNA Halane Armoury
Ethiopia	PKM machine gun	29 July 2013	100	87	SNA Halane Armoury
Ethiopia	PKM ammunition	29 July 2013	250,000	150,320	SNA Halane Armoury
Ethiopia	DShK machine gun	29 July 2013	50	46	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	RPG-7 rockets	12 August 2013	35	35	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	Hand grenade (offensive)	12 August 2013	40	40	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	Hand grenade (defensive)	12 August 2013	240	240	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	MK-19 grenades	12 August 2013	500	500	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	AKMS rifles	12 August 2013	560	560	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	AKMS magazines	12 August 2013	800	800	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region

³⁵ As explained in annex 6.1, regarding weapons destined for “SNA Sector 4, Hiran region” listed in the table, the SNA commander of Brigade 10 in Sector 4 in Hiran has reported that the Brigade 10 had not received any arms, ammunition or explosives from the SNA in Mogadishu and that the only arms and ammunition the Brigade had received in 2013 and 2014 were provided locally by Djibouti AMISOM forces (as noted in the UNSOM “Survey visit to Belet Weyne (Sector 4) to cross-reference data from the Federal Government of Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey”, 11 June 2014).

Supplier	Item	Date of Notification	Quantity Notified	Quantity Received	Destination of Delivery
Djibouti	Brevettes de transport	12 August 2013	200	200	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	FM SK 40	12 August 2013	20	20	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	Mailons (links)	12 August 2013	20 boxes	20 boxes	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	PKM machine gun	12 August 2013	10	10	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	PKM ammunition	12 August 2013	10 packets	10 packets	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	7.62 mm short ammunition	12 August 2013	199,500	199,500	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	7.62 mm long ammunition	12 August 2013	79,200	79,200	SNA Sector 4, Hiiran region
Djibouti	Kalashnikovs 39.7.62	03 October 2013	1,000	690	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	Grinoff	03 October 2013	40	-	-
Djibouti	DShK 12.7	03 October 2013	10	6	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	RPG-7	03 October 2013	45	27	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	7.62 x 39 ammunition	03 October 2013	400,500	291,000	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	7.62 x 54R mm ammunition	03 October 2013	20,000	-	-
Djibouti	12.7 mm ammunition	03 October 2013	49,500	37,500	SNA Halane Armoury
Djibouti	RPG-7 ammunition	03 October 2013	474	372	SNA Halane Armoury

Annex 6.1.b: Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Committee in respect of 1,000 AK-47 rifles sourced from Uganda

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 751 (1992) AND 1907 (2009)
CONCERNING SOMALIA AND ERITREA

S/AC.29/2013/COMM.49/Add.1
10 July 2013
ORIGINAL: English

Letter dated 9 July 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee

SOM/MSS/149/13

In accordance to the paragraphs 33 and 38 of resolution 2093 (2013), the Federal Government of Somalia hereby notifies the Committee, for its information, of the delivery, from the stocks of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) Contingent to AMISON, of the following items and assistance:

-1,000 AK-47 Rifles, each with one empty magazine


The intended recipients and end-users are the 1st through 6th Brigades and speciality battalions of the Somali Armed Forces in AMISON sectors I and II. This assistance is provided and funded by the UPDF Contingent in coordination with AMISON HQ and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

Such deliveries of weapons, military equipment, and provisions of advice, assistance and training, are intended solely for the development of the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia and to provide security for the Somali people.

Furthermore, the Federal Government of Somalia has taken the necessary measures and implemented the required safeguards to avoid such that weapons or military equipment will not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, which structure has been detailed in the letter to the President of the Security Council dated 2 April 2013.

The Federal Government of Somalia is also committed to ensuring unhindered access to the Monitoring Group of Somalia and Eritrea should it would like to monitor the abovementioned delivery in accordance with Paragraph 41 of resolution (2093).

Annex 6.1.c: Letter from the Somali Police Force confirming receipt of 700 rifles³⁶



³⁶ The 700 rifles were also confirmed as having been distributed to the Police by the UNSOM-assisted baseline survey team.

Annex 6.2: Leakage of Somali National Army rifles into arms markets in Mogadishu

45. The Monitoring Group has investigated the management of (Somali National Army) SNA stockpiles given the importance the Security Council has given to weapons and ammunition management by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In particular, the Group has attempted to monitor the management of newly imported weapons that were shipped to Mogadishu by Member States for deployment to units of the Security Forces principally engaged in combat against Al-Shabaab.

46. On 29 July 2013, the FGS notified the Committee of its intention to import 3,500 Type 56-1 assault rifles,³⁷ 3,000,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition, 100 PKM machine guns, 250,000 rounds of 7.62 x 54 mm ammunition, and fifty 12.7 mm machine guns from Ethiopia. However, after an Ethiopian supply plane crashed on arrival in Mogadishu on 9 August 2013, deliveries of the materials were delayed and rescheduled on two flights on 11 September 2013 and 13 September 2013, courtesy of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) (see cargo manifests in annex 6.2.a).³⁸

47. According to documentation provided by the Ethiopian authorities, only 2,755 of the assault rifles of the 3,500 notified were delivered (see annex 6.2.b), which matches with what was recorded in SNA log books. The 2,755 rifles form part of a total stock of 4,445 rifles supplied to the SNA since July 2013, roughly half of which the SNA claimed has been distributed to specific units according to SNA documentation. (See annex 6.2.c for a summary³⁹ of SNA log books which purport to account for the distribution of all assault rifles that were notified to the Committee and delivered to Mogadishu between July 2013 and September 2013). When the Monitoring Group visited the SNA's "Halane" store on 23 January 2014, it observed boxes of Ethiopian-supplied Type 56-2 rifles, which the chief logistician of the SNA identified as part of the consignment of 2,755 rifles that had mistakenly been referred to as Type 56-1 rifles in the original notification. The rifles were brand new and stacked within the boxes in plastic packaging. Photographs of the rifles at Halane are provided in annex 6.2.d, including samples of rifles displaying the two main factory markings and sequences of serial numbers.

48. In SNA documentation, the 2,755 rifles may appear to be all accounted for either in Halane or as part of distribution to units of the SNA and Security Forces. However, the Monitoring Group has obtained photographic evidence of several brand new Type 56-2 rifles observed in two Mogadishu arms markets between February and April 2014, which match the factory markings and sequence of serial numbers on Type 56-2 rifles observed in the Halane weapons store. The Monitoring Group received a list of serial numbers for 2,500 of the 2,755 rifles supplied by the Ethiopian Government and also was able to match exactly the serial numbers of

³⁷ The notification and subsequent shipping documentation referred to Type 56-1 rifles, though actually Type 56-2 rifles were finally delivered, as explained further in this annex.

³⁸ The manifests refer to the deliveries as between AMISOM and AMISOM, although the weapons were delivered directly to the SNA and stored in the main SNA warehouse "Halane" located in the secure perimeter surrounding Mogadishu International Airport.

³⁹ According to the Federal Government of Somalia Arms and Ammunition Baseline Survey submitted as part of the FGS reporting to the Security Council on 13 June 2014.

some rifles in the market with those on this partial list, thereby confirming the stock of Type 56-2 in the market to be undeniably sourced from SNA stockpiles. In addition, arms dealers selling these weapons stated that the Type 56-2 weapons had come onto the market from SNA stockpiles, and that this type of rifle had never been seen in the markets prior to their delivery in Mogadishu in September 2013. Arms dealers also stated that Al-Shabaab agents were procuring weapons in at least one of the markets. The Monitoring Group has viewed an Al-Shabaab propaganda video, which shows an Al-Shabaab fighter cleaning a brand new Type 56-2 rifle (see annex 6.2.e for evidence).

49. Given SNA documentation for the distribution of all rifles to known units of the SNA, the Monitoring Group can only conclude that the weapons were sold illegally by SNA officers taking advantage of poor accountability at the unit level, or that these weapons have been leaked at a higher level and the SNA's supporting documentation has been doctored or manufactured as cover for missing weapons. Notably, the Monitoring Group has consistently received testimony that relates to high-level involvement in direct transfers of arms to the markets and to Al-Shabaab, which is detailed in strictly confidential annex 6.4.

50. In addition to the cases above that relate to the Type 56-2 rifles, the Monitoring Group has documented other weapons stock in the Mogadishu markets, notably assault rifles that have had their serial numbers rubbed off by a steel file. Arms dealers in the markets have stated that such weapons came from SNA stockpiles and were ultimately sourced from Yemen. This is the first time that the Group has documented serial numbers rubbed off from rifles found in the arms markets. The tampering of serial numbers on such SNA stock indicates either efforts to cover up the delivery of weapons to the SNA which have been made without notification to the Committee, or leakage of weapons at a high level, since lower level officers or soldiers selling their weapons opportunistically would be less concerned about visibility of the serial number. Photographic and other evidence of this phenomenon is also documented in annex 6.2.e.

Annex 6.2.a: Manifests of UNSOA deliveries of weapons and ammunition from Ethiopia

13.09.13
12 SEP 13

UNSOA CARGO MANIFEST


date

CMR #	FLT #	QTY	Sending Unit	Receiving Unit	From	Destination	Cargo Description	Weight	Vol cuM
AMISOM/0091/041	03824	744	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire Dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Ammunition of 7.62mm AK-47 Rifle Type	22794	18.432
AMISOM/0091/041	15574	1	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire Dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Ammunition of 7.62mm AK-47 Rifle Type 42 boxes	504	0.4
		744						22794	18.432

UNIT REPRESENTATIVE: *[Signature]* **FIELDMAN IC 300307 t-10.30.**

UNSOA REPRESENTATIVE: *[Signature]*

RECEIVED BY: *[Signature]*



UNSOA CARGO MANIFEST

date 11 Sep 13

CMR #	FLT #	QTY	Sending Unit	Receiving Unit	From	Destination	Cargo Description	Weight	Vol cuM
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	250	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle AK-47 Type	16250	40.25
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	48	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle Machine gun Type	1309.5	1.63
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	144	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden boxes of Ammo PKM	5363	3.31
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	15	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle Machine gun Type	780	1.39
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	3	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle Machine gun Type- Anti-act-Magazine	201	0.56
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	15	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle Machine gun Type- Anti-act-Mag	840	3.73
AMISOM-0000/601	UNR24	3	AMISOM	AMISOM	Dire-dawa	Mogadishu	Wooden Box of Rifle Machine gun Type- Anti-act-Dual stage	73	0.21
		416						22716.5	51.7



AGENT REPRESENTATIVE *re SR53* *11.30*
 UNSOA REPRESENTATIVE *Mose*
 RECEIVED BY

Annex 6.2.b: Delivery note provided by Ethiopian authorities

The rifles are recorded as “AK-47 Rifle Guns” and were delivered in two batches.

February 7/2014

Statues of Equipment which are Deliver to FRS

No	Description	UOM	QTY		Unit Price In USD	Total Price In USD				
			1 st Round Delivered	2 nd Round Delivered		1 st Round Delivered	2 nd Round Delivered			
1	Ak-47 Rifle Gun		2,500	255	240	10	600,250	00	61,225	50
2	7.62 *39 mm Ak-47 Ammunition		1,145,500	806,000	0	30	343,650	00	241,800	00
3	7.62 mm Squad Machine Gun (Pkm) Heavy Type	PCS	55	20	1,684	00	92,620	00	33,680	00
4	7.62*54mm PKM Ammunition		100,000	50,000	0	70	70,000	00	35,000	00
5	12.7 mm Machine Gun Type -77 Dish Anti Air Craft.		15	25	3,076	00	46,140	00	76,900	00
GRAND TOTAL							1,152,660	00	448,605	50
1	7.62 mm Squad Machine Gun (Pkm) Heavy Type		-	12	1,684	00	20,208	00	Equipment's which was bought by cash (They are Purchased out of the contract)	
2	12.7 mm Machine Gun Type -77 Dish Anti Air-Craft.	PCS	-	6	3,076	00	18,456	00		
GRAND TOTAL							38,664	00		


1

Annex 6.2.c: Summary of SNA log books which purport to account for the distribution of all assault rifles notified to the Committee and received between July 2013 and September 2013

AK-47 or variant				
Importation Record			Distribution Record	
Supplier	Quantity Notified	Quantity Received	Delivery destination	Quantity
			SPF	750
Uganda	1000	1000	NISA	300
Ethiopia	3,500	2,755	Speaker of Parl.	18
Djibouti	1,000	690	MOJ	20
TOTAL	5500	4445	MOD	25
			SNA Sector 1 HQ	805
			SNA HQ Cii Tire	25
			SNA DANAB	210
			SNA HQ Unit 21	235
			SNA Mil. Police	20
			SNA Personell Dept.	4
			SNA Engineer Corps	2
			Coast Guard	5
			Central Bank	2
			Total Delivered	2421
			Undelivered at Halane	2,024
			Total	4445

Annex 6.2.d: Photographs of Type 56-2 assault rifles observed at Halane storehouse on 23 January 2014


A sample of boxes of Ethiopian-supplied Type 56-2 rifles observed stacked at Halane warehouse



Type 56-2 rifles in plastic packaging within one of the boxes delivered at Halane



A sample of a rifle showing factory marking 9336, type (56-2), and serial number sequence beginning with "40"



Another sample of a rifle showing factory marking 386, type (56-2), and serial number with sequence beginning with "60"



Annex 6.2.e: SNA Type 56-2 assault rifles documented in the illicit arms markets in Mogadishu

Diversion of Type 56-2 rifles

Case 1: SNA-issued Type 56-2 rifles found in arms market at KM5, Mogadishu, 17 February 2014 and 20 April 2014

51. On 17 February 2014, a source of the Monitoring Group entered an illegal arms market at KM5, Mogadishu, with a camera and took the photographs in Figures 1 and 2. The market is close to the Safari Hotel, and also close to the houses of a number of SNA officers. Al-Shabaab procurement agents frequent the market.⁴⁰ As is evident in the photograph in Figure 1, the weapon is brand new and displays the factory marking number (9336) and serial number (in this case beginning with “40”), which were displayed on some of the Type 56-2 rifles observed at the Halane warehouse on 23 January 2014. Arms dealers at the market stated that at least 250 of these rifles had been brought to the market, and that SNA officers told them that the SNA had acquired such assault rifles from Ethiopia.⁴¹

52. On 20 April 2014, the source went back again to the same market, where another similar brand new Type 56-2 assault rifle was photographed on sale. In this case, the serial number 405443 directly matches an entry on the document provided by the Ethiopian authorities, which lists 2,500 serial numbers for the 2,755 Type 56-2 weapons supplied (Figures 3 and figure 4). Arms dealers again confirmed that the weapon had been sourced from SNA stockpiles.

53. A separate source of the Monitoring Group also visited this market in February 2014 and confirmed that arms dealers were selling SNA weapons such as these for between USD 1,500 to USD 1,600 per weapon.⁴²

⁴⁰ Information provided by two independent sources who visited the KM5 arms market in February 2014. Arms dealers at the market also identified to the sources a number of Al-Shabaab agents.

⁴¹ Testimonies from arms dealers in the KM5 market provided to Monitoring Group source.

⁴² Interview on 3 March 2014.

Figure 1 (below): Photograph taken at KM5 arms market in Mogadishu on 17 February 2014 of an Ethiopian-supplied Type 56-2 assault rifle displaying factory marking 9336 and serial number with sequence beginning "40", corresponding to those observed in Halane storehouse



Figure 2 (below): A picture of the same rifle displaying the signature foldable butt of the Type 56-2



Figure 3 (below): A Type 56-2 rifle photographed at KM5 market in Mogadishu on 20 April 2014



Figure 4 (below): A close up of the same Type 56-2 bearing the factory marking 9336 and serial number 405443, corresponding to a number included on the document provided by the Ethiopian authorities



Case 2: SNA-issued Type 56-2 rifles found in arms market at KM4, Mogadishu, 16 March 2013

54. On 16 March 2014, a source of the Monitoring Group entered an illegal arms market near KM4, one of the main road junctions in Mogadishu. The source documented four Ethiopian Type 56-2 assault rifles that were on sale. The four can be seen clearly together in the photograph in Figure 5. A close up photograph on one of the rifles reveals factory marking 386 and serial number 6014658 (Figure 6), a direct match with an entry on the document provided by the Ethiopian authorities, which lists 2,500 serial numbers for the 2,755 Type 56-2 weapons supplied. The arms dealer who was responsible for selling these weapons informed the Monitoring Group's source that the weapons had been sourced from SNA stockpiles.

Figure 5 (below): Four SNA-issued Type 56-2 rifles photographed at KM4 arms market on 16 March 2014



Figure 6 (below): One of the four weapons, displaying factory marking 386 and serial number 6014658, corresponding to a number included on the document provided by the Ethiopian authorities



Case 3: Use of Type 56-2 rifles by Al-Shabaab

55. Given the presence of Al-Shabaab agents in the KM5 arms market, it is worth noting an Al-Shabaab fighter cleaning a brand new Type 56-2 rifle appearing in an Al-Shabaab propaganda video circulated in 2014 (Figure 7).⁴³ While it is not possible to observe the factory marking or serial number on this particular rifle, nevertheless Al-Shabaab have never been photographed using this type of weapon prior to its import from Ethiopia in 2013.

⁴³ Full video accessible at http://ia700807.us.archive.org/17/items/shared_khalfahom5/Fasharid5_HQ.mp4. Pause at 2 minutes and 28 seconds for view of fighter with the weapon. Last accessed on 15 July 2014.

Figure 7 (below): Still shot from an Al Kataib video showing an Al-Shabaab fighter cleaning an apparently brand new Type 56-2 assault rifle



Other cases

56. Other weapons documented in the KM5 arms market on 17 February 2014 included at least one AK-type assault rifle which was photographed with its serial number scrubbed off from the external surface of the weapon and from the internal firing pin (Figure 8). Arms dealers in the market stated that the weapon had come from SNA stockpiles and had originally been sourced from Yemen. They also stated that at least 150 of these types of weapons had been leaked into the arms markets directly from SNA storerooms. Without confirmation of the serial numbers it is impossible to verify their origin in the way that the Type 56-2 rifles above have been verified. However, the systematic scrubbing off of serial numbers is a new phenomenon observed in the Mogadishu arms markets, which indicates efforts to cover up leakages.

Figure 8 (below): An AK-type rifle photographed at KM5, displaying a serial number that has been scrubbed off from the external surface of the weapon



Annex 6.3: Analysis of Djiboutian-supplied ammunition in Mogadishu arms markets

57. The Monitoring Group has obtained evidence of large-scale leakage of some of the 291,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition delivered by Djibouti in October 2013.

58. On 23 January 2014, the Monitoring Group visited the “Halane” storehouse, where it inspected this ammunition, which had been produced in Sudan and bore various combinations of 3-entry head stamps. Below is a sample picture of one such piece of ammunition observed at Halane.

Sample of Djiboutian-supplied ammunition at Halane (below)



59. Between October 2013 and April 2014, sources of the Monitoring Group observed thousands of rounds of identical ammunition with dealers at the KM4 and KM5 arms markets in Mogadishu, and in one instance documented a box containing Sudanese-manufactured ammunition identical to those stored in “Halane”. Where possible the Monitoring Group obtained photographic evidence of samples of ammunition it observed in the arms markets. Photographed ammunition has been listed in the table below, which is accompanied by the photographic evidence of the individual samples of ammunition rounds, as well as the ammunition box.

Table of Djiboutian-supplied ammunition photographed in Mogadishu arms markets (below)

Headstamp	Date Found	Arms Market
2_39_09	16 October 2013	KM 4
3_39_09	16 October 2013	KM 4
2_39_09	10 November 2013	KM 4
3_39_09	10 November 2013	KM 4
2_39_011	17 February 2014	KM 5
3_39_09	18 March 2014	KM 5
2_39_09	18 March 2014	KM 5
2_39_011	21 April 2014	KM 5

2_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM4 market on 16 October 2013 (below)



3_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM4 market on 16 October 2013 (below)



2_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM4 market on 10 November 2014 (below)



3_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM4 market on 10 November 2014 (below)



2_39_011 head stamp photographed in KM5 market on 17 February 2014 (below)



3_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM5 market on 18 March 2014 (below)



2_39_09 head stamp photographed in KM5 market on 18 March 2014 (below)



2_39_011 head stamp photographed in KM5 market on 21 April 2014 (below)



Ammunition box found in KM4 market on 16 October 2013. The same boxes have been observed in Halane, and identified as having been supplied from Djibouti (below)



**Annex 6.4: Diversion of arms by political networks connected to
the Federal Government of Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 6.5: Arms deliveries to Puntland

60. On 9 October 2013, the Monitoring Group was informed of the arrival at Garowe International Airport of several shipments of weapons and ammunition flown in from Yemen by Russian made aircraft on 6, 7 and 8 October 2013 and of related supplies being delivered at Bosasso seaport by boat.⁴⁴

61. According to the information, the shipments consisted of anti-aircraft guns, small arms, and ammunition destined for the Puntland authorities, and were purchased during a September 2013 visit of the then Puntland President, Abdirahman Mohamud Faroole, to Yemen with the intent of preparing an offensive to retake Las Anod and/or to reinforce the President's military capacity during the period of the upcoming Presidential elections.

62. The Puntland Minister of Security, Khalif Isse Mudan, was reportedly on board of the third flight of 8 October 2013.

Eyewitness testimony

63. An eyewitness present at Garowe airport on 8 October 2013 described seeing a white Russian aircraft on the tarmac and stated that he had been informed by airport ground staff that the aircraft had arrived from Yemen and was carrying weapons on board.⁴⁵

64. A second eyewitness also described the presence at Garowe airport on 8 October 2013 of a white Antonov-12 type aircraft about the size of a Hercules, with a long straight tail and green features painted on the aircraft including the propeller hubs.⁴⁶

65. A picture taken on 8 October 2013 at Garowe airport by a third eyewitnesses confirms the delivering aircraft to be a white Ilyushin-18 with registration number TT-WAK, featuring a green nose, green striped tail, green propeller hubs and a red coloured marking indicating the website name 'www.airsirin.com' (see photograph in annex 6.5.a).

Further corroborating information

66. Additional information suggests that the aircraft delivery from Yemen on 8 October 2013 was part of a larger consignment involving additional flights delivering military uniforms, small arms, and ammunition on 14 and 15 October 2013, and that a sea transport delivered military logistics, including heavy-duty trucks and weaponry via Bosasso. During that time period, 10 trucks reportedly transported cargo from Bosasso to the Presidential Palace in Garowe and Puntland soldiers in Garowe were observed wearing new boots and camouflage uniforms bearing Yemeni emblems.⁴⁷

Owner, operator and flight data (TT-WAK)

67. Investigations have revealed that the Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number TT-WAK is owned by the Ukrainian company 'Air Sirin', based in

⁴⁴ Information received from credible military intelligence source on 9 October 2014.

⁴⁵ Information received from eyewitness on 11 October 2013.

⁴⁶ Information received from eyewitness in Garowe, 5 November 2013.

⁴⁷ Information obtained from a security source in Garowe on 22 October 2013.

Kirovograd city and represented by its directors Tatyana Snezhko (President) and George Snezhko (Commercial Director).⁴⁸

68. When informed about the alleged cargo and operations of their aircraft in Somalia, the owners initially ignored the Monitoring Group's request to provide information about the Lessee and/or Sub-Lessee and said that they would provide further information following an 'inside' investigation.⁴⁹

69. Eventually, Air Sirin confirmed that the aircraft was leased to a Scotland-registered offshore company named 'U.B.C. Investments L.P.', which appears to serve as a front company for Air Sirin and which sub-leased the aircraft on 16 September 2013 to the Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), based airline company 'Honesty Air Cargo L.L.C.' owned by a Somali businessman based in Dubai, Abdikarim Ali Isse.⁵⁰

70. However, information that Air Sirin claimed to have received from Honesty Air Cargo L.L.C. identified the aircraft as operated during early October 2013 by 'Somali Air Services', represented by 'Abdiaziz Mohamed' with the Somali mobile phone number +25290779418. Honesty Air Cargo did not provide Air Sirin with any further information or documentation about the operator or cargo transported.⁵¹

71. The International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) possesses no flight data indicating that the aircraft TT-WAK had landed at Garowe airport on 6, 7 or 8 October 2013, which despite the eyewitness statements and photograph taken, either implies that the aircraft never called in at Garowe airport or that airport officials did not transmit the flight data to ICAO.

72. ICAO flight data, however, does identify TT-WAK flights on other dates in October 2013 and indicates that the aircraft had flown:⁵²

73. From Berbera to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and from Dar es Salaam to Aden (Yemen) on 3 October 2013 (operator unknown, call sign HRV4404);

74. From Djibouti to Berbera and Berbera to Aden (Yemen) on 6 October 2013 (operator Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline), call signs HAG301 and HAG302); and

75. From Djibouti to Berbera and Garowe to Djibouti on 10 October 2013 (operator Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline), call signs HAG302 and HAG301).

76. The presence of the aircraft in Yemen on 3 and 6 October 2013, in Garowe on 8 October and 10 October, and the absence of registered flights between 3, 6 and 10 October 2013 indicates the masking of more flight movements in Somalia and possibly further illicit deliveries during this time period.

77. In addition, and in light of the initial information that several shipments of weapons were flown into Garowe from Yemen by Russian made aircraft, it is noteworthy that on 5 October 2013, another Ilyushin-18 aircraft with registration number EX-601 landed in Garowe. Similar to TT-WAK, the aircraft flew in from

⁴⁸ Information derived from AeroTransport Data Bank.

⁴⁹ E-mail received from Air Sirin on 22 January 2014.

⁵⁰ Relevant lease contracts obtained from Air Sirin on 21 February 2014.

⁵¹ E-mail received from Air Sirin on 29 January 2014.

⁵² According to ICAO flight data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

Aden (Yemen), was operated by Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline) and used the call sign HAG301.⁵³

78. Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline) is run by ‘Abdiaziz Mohamed’, the representative of Somali Air Services and managing flight agent in Puntland for Honesty Air Cargo, the Sub-Lessee of TT-WAK, as referred to above and below.⁵⁴

Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali ‘Haji’

79. Inquiries into ‘Somali Air Services’ indicate that the company is virtually non-existent. The last open source registration of a company operating by that name dates back to 1994 and a 2006 screenshot of a website ‘under construction’.⁵⁵

80. Honesty Air Cargo, however, is well known to the Monitoring Group as activities of the airline company were investigated in 2009, when it was found operating the subleased Ilyushin-18 aircraft EX-75466 suspected of transporting weapons and foreign fighters to Mogadishu. At the time, the owner of Honesty Air Cargo, Abdikarim Ali Isse, rejected the allegations but then never provided the Monitoring Group with the documentary evidence it requested that could have exonerated him from any further suspicion.⁵⁶

81. On the Facebook account of Abdikarim Ali Isse, with the username ‘abdigallad’,⁵⁷ the Monitoring Group identified an individual named ‘Haji Abdi Aziz’ who describes himself as ‘Director of Operations of Honesty Air Cargo’. His name and function suggests that he could be ‘Abdiaziz Mohamed’, the representative of Somali Air services and operator of TT-WAK.⁵⁸

82. Analysis of the Facebook account of Haji Abdi Aziz’ indicates that his full name is ‘Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali’, who is also known under the names ‘Haji Abdiaziz’, ‘Abdiaziz Sayn’ and ‘Haji Sayn’. He is a member of the Darod/Majerteen/Omar Mohamud/Reer Mahad sub-clan. Haji Abdiaziz, who lives in Dubai and Garowe, was part of Abdiweli Mohamud Ali Gaas’ 2014 election campaign and coordinated the meetings and visits of the future President in Dubai.⁵⁹

83. Several of his pictures posted on Facebook also suggest that Haji Abdiaziz holds an official position in the current Puntland Government. On 6 May 2014, for example, he posted a picture of himself with the Puntland and Yemeni Ministers of Security during a 5 May 2014 meeting at the Yemeni Ministry of Security. Other pictures show Abdiaziz with the Puntland Minister of Security and the Nigerian President in Addis Ababa, and with President Abdiweli Gaas in Dubai (see photographs in annex 6.5.b).

⁵³ As confirmed by ICAO flight data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁵⁴ As confirmed by the Sub-Lessee of TT-WAK, Abdikarim Ali Isse, owner of Honesty Air Cargo LLC based in Dubai.

⁵⁵ http://www.planes.cz/en/search/company/1362/somali-air-services/?pho_company=1362;
[http://www.screenshots.com/somaliairservices.com/.](http://www.screenshots.com/somaliairservices.com/)

⁵⁶ Honesty Air Cargo was operating the Ilyushin-18 with registration number EX-75466 as a sub-contractor for Abdulkadir Ali Ossoble (Ossob Air).

⁵⁷ Note that the aircraft TT-WAK was registered as operated by Horn Africa Airline (‘Gallad’ Airline).

⁵⁸ [https://www.facebook.com/abdigallad?fref=pb&hc_location=friends_tab.](https://www.facebook.com/abdigallad?fref=pb&hc_location=friends_tab)

⁵⁹ [https://www.facebook.com/aziz.ali.773124.](https://www.facebook.com/aziz.ali.773124)

84. A Puntland official confirmed to the Monitoring Group the close relationship between Abdiiaziz Mohamud Ali 'Haji' and Puntland President Abdiweli Gaas, and said that both men are related. He further stated that Abdiiaziz is believed to be in his twenties, comes from a wealthy family, and holds the position of Puntland Advisor on Oil. He is reportedly famous in Galkayo, and is connected to individuals involved in Somali piracy.⁶⁰

85. The Monitoring Group independently confirmed that Abdiiaziz Mohamud Ali 'Haji' has close ties to pirates in Puntland and has been in contact with several individuals involved in the hijackings of the vessels 'Zirku' (2011), 'Rosalia d'Amato' (2011), 'Irene SL' (2011), Sinin (2011) Khaled Muhieddine K. (2011) and 'Enrico Ievoli' (2011-2012). One of these individuals is pirate commander and investor 'Nur Abshir Gardhere', who was a member of Isse Yuluh's pirate group⁶¹ and found to be involved in the hijackings of the 'Zirku', Suzan K (2011) and 'ING' (2011). Abshir Gardhere is said to be originally from Harardhere and is also a contact of pirate facilitator Mohamed Aden 'Tiiceey'.⁶²

Honesty Air Cargo

86. The owner of Honesty Air Cargo, Abdikarim Ali Isse, confirmed that Abdiiaziz Mohamud Ali 'Haji', a.k.a. 'Haji Abdiiaziz, is the owner of Somali Air Services, a local service provider and flight agent with offices in Garowe and Galkayo, and a representative of Honesty Air Cargo in Puntland. He also said that Haji Abdiiaziz is a Puntland 'official' who has a close relationship with President Abdiweli Mohamud Ali Gaas.⁶³

87. While Abdikarim Ali initially told the Monitoring Group that he had "no details at all" about the 8 October 2013 TT-WAK flight, he later confirmed Haji Abdiiaziz to have managed and operated the TT-WAK flight under the name of 'Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline)' (mentioned above) but said the aircraft conducted only one direct flight from Aden (Yemen) to Garowe on 6 or 7 October 2013.

88. Furthermore, according to Abdikarim Ali Isse, it was Khalif Isse Mudan, the former Puntland Minister of Security, who organized the TT-WAK cargo delivery from Yemen to Garowe, which was accompanied by an unknown Puntland official who carried the transportation documents with him. Abdikarim Ali could not confirm whether the unknown Puntland official was Khalif Isse Mudan but he did confirm that the former Minister of Security was present at Garowe airport when the aircraft landed and took receipt of the 'diplomatic' cargo.

89. Abdikarim Ali Isse said he did not possess any documents of the cargo transported, which he assumed to be in possession of Haji Abdiiaziz who made all necessary transport arrangements. He also claimed to have been informed by e-mail that the cargo contained medicines and clothes and that the aircraft would probably not have transported any military items other than 'perhaps' uniforms.

⁶⁰ Meeting with Puntland official, who also stated that Haji Abdiiaziz works closely with Africa Oil and has contacts all over East Africa, 21 May 2014.

⁶¹ The Monitoring Group has previously reported on Yuluh's activities in [S/2013/413](#), annex 3.1 (Yuluh was spelled as Yullux in that report).

⁶² Communication data in possession of the Monitoring Group.

⁶³ Interview with Abdikarim Ali Isse in Dubai on 4 June 2014.

90. As in 2009, Abdikarim Ali Isse again did not provide the Monitoring Group with any of the documentary evidence requested, which would have a) confirmed the e-mail communication referring to the content of the transported cargo, b) showed the whereabouts of aircraft TT-WAK between 1 and 10 October 2013, and c) indicated the exact date on which the aircraft transported the Puntland consignment from Aden to Garowe. He also did not provide the names requested of the pilots and crew that had operated the aircraft who could have provided additional information with respect of the content of the cargo and the itinerary of the aircraft.

Confirmation of weapon shipments

91. Different sources, including a former Puntland official who was closely involved in organizing the weapon shipments, confirmed that during early October 2013 weapons, ammunition and uniforms, commissioned by the Puntland Minister of Security, Khalif Isse Mudan, were transported from Yemen to Bosasso and Garowe.⁶⁴

92. The consignments reportedly included:

- 15,000 uniforms;
- AK47 assault rifles and PKM light machine guns (unknown quantity);
- 100 heavy machine guns;
- 200 barrels for anti-aircraft gun (ZU or ZU-type); and
- 150 tons of ammunition.

93. These were shipped with a total of 6 flights and 2 dhows. However, it remains unclear whether more than one aircraft was used to conduct the different air deliveries, even if on 5 October 2013, ICAO data registered the arrival at Garowe airport of EX-601, another Ilyushin-18 aircraft operated by Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline) and coming from Aden, Yemen.

94. On 19 June 2014, the Monitoring Group met with former Puntland Minister of Security Khalif Isse Mudan at the Continental Hotel in Nairobi but he was unwilling to discuss the October 2013 arms deliveries and said that as he is no longer part of the Government he cannot bear responsibility for any past Government activities and referred to the new Puntland administration for any further comment.

95. Also, an e-mail written to Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali to request further information and clarifications has yielded no response or reaction.⁶⁵

Violation of the arms embargo

96. The preponderance of the available evidence, including witness statements and other indications of suspicion, as well as the failure or refusal of the individuals and companies involved to provide further information and clarity about the shipments identified and their transportation, suggests that the former Puntland Government, in the person of its Minister of Security, Khalif Isse Mudane, has indeed imported

⁶⁴ Information obtained from a diplomatic source in Nairobi on 6 March 2014 and from a former Puntland Government official in Dubai on 30 May 2014.

⁶⁵ Monitoring Group e-mail dated 12 August 2014.

weapons, ammunition and other military items into Somalia, and in absence of any notification to the Committee has violated the arms embargo on Somalia. Moreover, Honest Air Cargo and Haji Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali may be considered accomplices and bear responsibility of the violation of the arms embargo given their refusal to provide full transparency with regards to the shipments.

Annex 6.5.a: Photograph of Ilyushin-18 aircraft (TT-WAK) at Garowe, Puntland

Photograph taken by eyewitness on 8 October 2013 at Garowe airport



The same photograph, in close-up



Annex 6.5.b: Photographs of ‘Haji’ Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali⁶⁶

‘Haji’ Abdiaziz (right) and the Puntland (left) and Yemeni (middle) Ministers of Security at the Yemeni Ministry of Security in Sana’a, Yemen, 5 May 2014



⁶⁶ ‘Haji’ Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali is a Puntland Government advisor on oil, a flight agent of Honesty Air Cargo in Puntland, a representative of Somali Air Services and Horn Africa Airline (Gallad Airline) in Garowe and Galkayo, and a suspected pirate facilitator.

'Haji' Abdiaziz (left) next to former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo at Bole International Airport, Addis Ababa, on 27 April 2014. Also figuring in the photograph is the Puntland Minister of Security, Hassan Osman Mahamud Aloore (second from the right)



Puntland President Abdiweli Mohamud Ali Gaas flanked by his confidant and current Puntland Advisor on oil, 'Haji' Abdiaziz Mohamud Ali, in several photographs taken at various locations and dates:

In Dubai, UAE, on 11 November 2012 (left) and 19 October 2013 (right)



In Mogadishu on 6 February 2014



Annex 6.6: Smuggling of IED equipment and associated smuggling networks

97. The Monitoring Group previously documented (S/2013/413) a large shipment of weapons that had been supplied from Yemen to a location close to Qandala, in far northeastern Somalia, in October 2012. The arms cache included 220 RPG-7 rockets, 304 PG-7 boosters, 230 hand grenade detonators, a 73mm cannon, 137 kilograms of TNT, two bags of ammonium nitrate, five rolls of red detonating cord and 500 electric detonators (C-DET), making it one of the biggest seizures of an illegal arms cache documented in Somalia in recent years.

98. The PG-7 rounds were traced back to official stockpiles in Yemen, although it is not clear how these weapons were leaked from such stockpiles. This information corroborated by the Monitoring Group at the time suggested the entire cache had been assembled in Yemen by an organized network of individuals.

99. The 500 electric detonators were manufactured by C-DET Explosive Industries in Maharashtra, India. The Monitoring Group has since continued to document cases of new and identical C-DET detonators arriving in Qandala, and their use in IED attacks in various locations across southern Somalia. Indeed, on 9 December 2013, Puntland authorities presented a new batch of 500 identical C-DET electric detonators, which police had seized in Qandala.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Puntland police confirmed to the Monitoring Group the items had been seized under a tree in Qandala, having been identified by local community members who reported the cache as a new arrival.

C-DET detonators inspected in Garowe, 9 December 2013



100. The reoccurrence in Qandala of these important IED component parts is consistent with information obtained by the Monitoring Group that has identified the Las Qoray to Qandala area as an important entry point for weapons and IED equipment from Al-Shabaab support networks operating in Yemen. This network operating between Las Qoray and Qandala is involved in illegal fishing and smuggling activities in the Gulf of Aden, and has been previously mapped out (S/2013/413, annex 3.1).

101. During 2013, the Monitoring Group documented at least four cases in which C-DET detonators were recovered from IED finds as far south as Merka and Mogadishu. These include incidents on: 23 July 2013 in Wadajir district, Mogadishu; on 18 August 2013 in Merka; on 5 September 2013 in Hawlwadaag, Mogadishu; and on 20 October 2013 in Hoodon district in the Banadir area.⁶⁸ In two of the four incidents, on 23 July 2013 and 20 October 2013, red detonator cords were also recovered (see annex 6.6.a for photographs of C-DETs and detonator cords recovered from each incident).

102. As noted above, the original Qandala find of October 2012 also included five rolls of red detonator cords. These were manufactured by Vetrivel Explosives Pvt Ltd in India. On 15 April 2013, the Government of India provided information that

⁶⁸ Information retrieved from database managed by a security agency documenting IED attacks across Somalia. Nobody was injured or killed during these four incidents.

the five rolls had been part of an original consignment of 100,000 metres (or 400 rolls) of detonator cords that had been exported from India in 2009 to a private customer, named as Anwar Salah Abdo Kodais, who registered his address in Djibouti.⁶⁹ An intelligence source had told the Monitoring Group that the detonator cords were transferred from Djibouti to Yemen, where some of the rolls were absorbed into the shipment eventually transported to Qandala (see S/2013/413). On 1 September 2014, C-DET Explosive Industries also confirmed Kodais as the purchaser of the C-DET electric detonators found in Qandala in October 2012. Those electric detonators were originally purchased as part of a batch of 1,000,000 such detonators by Kodais, also in 2009.⁷⁰

103. The Monitoring Group has obtained further information that Kodais paid for the import of the red detonator cords via a letter of credit for USD 180,000 raised by Saba Islamic Bank in Sana'a, Yemen, and eventually settled by Mujahid Jarman of International Trading Co Ltd, Al Zubairi Street no. 52, P.O. Box 15117, Sana'a, Yemen on behalf of Kodais. The broker for the deal was Mohsen Saleh Salim Bin Al Naqeeb, of Mohsen Al Naqeeb General Trading LLC, P.O. Box 171499, Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE).⁷¹ The Monitoring Group has shared this information with the Yemeni authorities who have stated they need additional time to investigate the matter further. Kodais also paid for the C-DET detonators via a letter of credit for USD 205,000 raised Saba Islamic Bank and also settled by International Trading Co Ltd.⁷²

104. The Monitoring Group has obtained the following information in respect of 'Kodais'. His official name is Anwar Saleh. He is of Djiboutian nationality (see annex 6.6.b for identity documents), although he is described by Djiboutian officials as originally from Yemen. He is a former dealer in explosives who was based in Djibouti. He previously worked for the Franco-Djiboutian company *Savon et Ries* in Djibouti before emigrating from the country. He is known to have resided in France for some of 2013 and 2014.⁷³ He is known to have connections to Al-Shabaab,⁷⁴ and has cultivated connections to *Dhulbahante* clan interests in the disputed Sool region, which straddles Puntland and Somaliland (see annex 3.1 for more on threats to peace and security in this region).⁷⁵

105. Saleh is also known to be close to the Somaliland Member of Parliament Mohamed Ahmed Mohamoud 'Dhakool' (*Dhulbahante*), who has been investigated by the Somaliland authorities in the past for potential links to Al-Shabaab and involvement in the assassination of Somaliland government officials in Las Anod,

⁶⁹ Name and address on shipping manifest provided as Anwar Salah Abdo Kodais, Handaly Street, PO Box 2120, with telephone number +253832794.

⁷⁰ Information provided by C-DET Explosive Industries, 1 September 2014. The company stated Kodais has been the only purchaser of C-DET electric detonators in either Djibouti or Yemen.

⁷¹ Information obtained from confidential banking documentation obtained by the Monitoring Group and archived at the United Nations, as well as summarized from order communications.

⁷² Information provided by C-DET Explosive Industries, 1 September 2014.

⁷³ Information provided by Djibouti Government, 6 May 2014.

⁷⁴ Information provided by two separate western intelligence sources, 20 October 2013 and 11 January 2014, and corroborated by Somali intelligence source.

⁷⁵ Information provided by western intelligence source, 11 January 2013, and Djiboutian intelligence service, 6 May 2014.

the main city in Sool.⁷⁶ The two men are said to be business partners together in Las Qoray, an important hub for the illegal fishing and trafficking network profiled by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 3.1), where they are engaged in importing and trading general merchandise.⁷⁷

106. ‘Dhakool’ is the half brother of Al-Shabaab Amniyat officer Abdullahi Ahmed Mohamud ‘Arabey’ (*Dhulbahante*), who was arrested by the Somaliland authorities in late January or early February 2014.⁷⁸ According to Somaliland’s intelligence services ‘Arabey’ has been an important recruiter for Al-Shabaab in Somaliland and a key member of Amniyat in Barawe, but had migrated back to a location near Las Anod in Sool during 2013 before his eventual capture by Somaliland forces in 2014.⁷⁹

107. The Monitoring Group has obtained the address book from Arabey’s telephone, which was confiscated by Somaliland authorities. One of the numbers in the address book is that of Abdifatah Mohamed Ali (*Dhulbahante*), the former finance chief of the now defunct Hizbul Islam, who has been based in Mogadishu since his surrender in 2013 alongside former Hizbul Islam leader Hassan Dahir Aweys. See annex 3.1 for more on Abdifatah Mohamed Ali, and his links to the Khatumo separatist movement in Sool.

Al-Shabaab smuggling from Yemen

108. The Monitoring Group has obtained credible information from military intelligence sources that maritime vessels from Yemen have delivered consignments of weapons and IED component materials to Al-Shabaab commanders at drop off points on the Somali coast.

109. In particular, the Monitoring Group has obtained information about the deployment of two vessels from the Yemeni port city of Shoqra to near Haradheere and to another location near west of Las Qoray in late February 2014.⁸⁰ According to eyewitnesses at the drop off near Haradheere, the consignment contained RPG’s, machine guns, pistols, ammunition and IED components. Among the leadership present at the drop off included Sheikh Yusuf Isse “Kabukatukade”, who has been involved in other shipments from Yemen (see annex 6.4).⁸¹ A key individual responsible for the transfer of IED equipment from Yemen to Somalia in 2013 and 2014 is Khalid Jaama Nur⁸², who is mentioned in annex 1.4.

⁷⁶ Somaliland Ministry of Interior official stated that ‘Dhakool’ had been investigated in the past, although no evidence was found against him, 5 February 2014. A former Somaliland intelligence official reported that he had personally investigated ‘Dhakool’ but declined to go into details into the case, 16 January 2014.

⁷⁷ Information provided by western intelligence source, 11 January 2014, and corroborated by Somali intelligence source, 2 February 2014.

⁷⁸ Confirmed by numerous Somaliland Government officials. The Monitoring Group has repeatedly requested access to Arabey, and although the Somaliland authorities have agreed to provide access, no organizational efforts were made on the part of the Somaliland Government. Indeed, the Ministry of Interior restricted his interaction with the Monitoring Group to one formal meeting at the start of the Group’s mandate in late 2013.

⁷⁹ No further information on Arabey’s status of cooperation or his testimony from questioning by Somaliland authorities was shared with the Monitoring Group.

⁸⁰ The vessels are said to have left Shoqra on the same day, according to an IGAD member state intelligence service, 12 March 2014, and Puntland intelligence service, 25 February 2014.

⁸¹ According to two eyewitnesses present at the drop-off.

⁸² Information provided by two separate and unrelated intelligence sources, 25 February 2014 and 16 April 2014.

Annex 6.6.a: Photographs of electric detonators and detonator cord recovered from IED incidents

3 C-DET caps recovered from the 23 July 2013 incident at Wadajir (below)




100mm of red detonator cord also recovered from the 23 July 2013 incident at Wadajir (below)



C-DET caps recovered from the 18 August 2013 incident at Merka (below)



C-DET cap recovered from the 5 September 2013 incident at Hawlwadaag (below)




C-DET cap recovered from the 20 October 2013 incident at Hoodon (below)




*Red detonator cord recovered from the 20 October 2013 incident at Hoodon (below).
The det cord is red but covered in TNT/aluminum residue from the main charge.*



Annex 6.6.b: Immigration profile for Anwar Saleh, using two Djiboutian passports

Demande		Reçu le:
N°:	A0000776	
Raison:		
Passeport		Tarif:
Numéro / Status:	07RE15316	
Type:		
Personal data		
Nom:	ANWAR	N° CNI: 110385
Nom jeune fille:		
Prénom(s):	SALEH	
Sexe:		
Né(e) le:	19631123	
Lieu de naissance:	DJIBOUTI	
Pays de naissance:		
Etat civil:		
Profession:	EMPLOYE	
		
Couleur des yeux:		
Couleur des cheveux:		
Taille: 170		
Adresses		

Demande		Reçu le:
N°:	A0034955	
Raison:		
Passeport		Tarif:
Numéro / Status:	10RE48828	
Type:		
Personal data		
Nom:	ANWAR	N° CNI: 110385
Nom jeune fille:		
Prénom(s):	SALEH	
Sexe:		
Né(e) le:	19631123	
Lieu de naissance:	DJIBOUTI	
Pays de naissance:		
Etat civil:		
Profession:	COMMERCANT	
		
Couleur des yeux:		
Couleur des cheveux:		
Taille: 170		
Adresses		

Annex 6.7: Analysis of the proposed Oil Protection Unit for Somaliland

110. A number of foreign oil companies are now operating in Somaliland, notably Genel Energy, Rakgas, DNO and Ansan Wikfs. Most of these companies have completed environmental impact assessments and are looking to commence seismic activity. See annex 6.7.a for a map of the licenses, and a list of companies and the status of their activities.

111. The legality of some of these licenses has been challenged by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as previously reported by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413). As such, the Group recommended a political dialogue to resolve disputes over resource allocation in Somalia, and for the cessation of all commercial activity in the oil sector pending resolution of these disputes. However, such a recommendation does not necessarily deny the need for security forces to protect oil workers, should commercial activity proceed in the oil and gas sector in the interim.

112. In September 2013, Genel Energy temporarily suspended its seismic operations in Somaliland citing a “deteriorating security situation”. Indeed, the Monitoring Group is aware of an alleged plot by a Burao-based businessman, Sheikh Ahmed Said Jaar, who was arrested in August 2013 on suspicion of coordinating a possible armed attack against a convoy of Genel workers. While the Somaliland Government confirmed Jaar’s arrest in respect of this plot and alleged links to Al-Shabaab,⁸³ officials have maintained that the threat against Genel was not imminent or sufficient to warrant a suspension of activities and that there was no material evidence against Jaar, who was subsequently released.⁸⁴

113. Despite claims that the threat against Genel was minimal, the Government of Somaliland commissioned a study into the viability of an Oil Protection Unit, which would serve as a defensive force to protect oil industry operations from threats. Some oil companies are not willing to operate in Somaliland without the deployment of an Oil Protection Unit.⁸⁵

⁸³ Somaliland’s director of intelligence, Jama Botan, informed the Monitoring Group in early December 2013 that Jaar was suspected of involvement in a plot to attack Genel workers using explosives and to also kidnap some of the international workers, though because the plot was at the initial stages of preparation, little material evidence could be brought to bear. However, Jaar had been under surveillance and had been documented holding telephone conversations with individuals linked to Al-Shabaab, according to Botan. Despite repeated requests for further information neither Somaliland’s intelligence services nor its Interior Ministry has been willing to provide a full account of the alleged plot or indeed the operations against Jaar. Instead, according to sources close to the Presidency, and a former Somaliland intelligence officer interviewed in 2013, Somaliland officials have been instructed by the Presidency not to reveal the true extent of the security lapse, for fear of destabilizing Somaliland’s image as a relatively safe environment for international business.

⁸⁴ E-mail from Somaliland Interior Ministry official Ato Kochin, on behalf of Interior Minister, dated 25 June 2014, stating that “this individual was detained on numerous occasions, but was released on the bases that there was no enough evidence to convict him through the courts and subsequently released by authorities (*sic*)”.

⁸⁵ Indeed, Sterling Energy, which is a junior partner of Genel in the Odeweyne Block has delayed operations until an Oil Protection Unit is established. “Operations in Somaliland have been delayed while the Government of the Republic of Somaliland establishes a trained and equipped Oilfield Protection Unit ‘OPU’ that can provide the level of security required by the in-country operators so that future seismic and drilling operations can be conducted safely,” says Sterling Energy chairman Alastair Beardsall, as quoted in the *Somaliland Sun*, 19 July 2014.

114. The Government of Somaliland has informed the Monitoring Group of its willingness to abide by Security Council resolutions pertaining to the import of military equipment and training for any such Oil Protection Unit. The legal import of equipment and training would require a Member State or international, regional or sub-regional organization to notify the Committee of any such supply of equipment or training and would require the absence of a negative decision by the Committee.⁸⁶

115. The Oil Protection Unit is still in its design phase and is unlikely to be created for months. However, the Monitoring Group is raising a number of issues of concern which it would recommend the Government of Somaliland to mitigate before any notification is submitted to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013).

Proposed structure

116. Assaye Risk, a London-based risk assessment company has been contracted by the Government of Somaliland to design a blueprint for the creation of an Oil Protection Unit for the protection of all international oil companies operating in Somaliland. The costs of producing this blueprint have been borne by Genel Energy. The Monitoring Group would like to acknowledge Assaye Risk's role in taking all available steps to engage and inform the Monitoring Group on its activities in respect of its proposal.

117. The Assaye Risk blueprint recommended the Oil Protection Unit be "legally constituted". The Government of Somaliland has informed the Monitoring Group that it does not need Parliamentary approval to constitute the Oil Protection Unit, since it will be made up of existing Army and Police units. As such the Oil Protection Unit is seen by the Government of Somaliland as a reorganization of existing security forces rather than a creation of a new territorial force.

118. However, the force would be governed by a Coordinating Committee under the instruction of the Ministry of Interior with guidance from the Ministry of Mines and Energy. As such, some members of the Somaliland Parliament believe that since the OPU will report to a committee yet to be created within the Ministry of Interior, its regulation would require parliamentary approval.⁸⁷ This difference of opinion could lay the ground for future political opposition to the Oil Protection Unit should the management of the Unit ever come into question.

119. Assaye Risk, in consultation with the Somaliland Government, has proposed that an Oil Protection Unit force be composed of initially 420 personnel, fully drawn from the existing Police and Army units of the Government of Somaliland, and eventually scale up to 580.⁸⁸ The Oil Protection Unit would include six mobile

⁸⁶ Paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013) states that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to supplies of weapons or military equipment and technical assistance or training by Member States or international, regional and subregional organizations intended solely for the purposes of helping develop Somali security sector institutions, in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification of any such assistance from the supplying State, international, regional or subregional organization.

⁸⁷ Comments made by a Somaliland MP who sits on the internal affairs and security committee, 5 August 2014.

⁸⁸ There will be a small number of civilian personnel hired by the Oil Protection Unit for administrative and legal tasks.

support units of 36 personnel per mobile unit responsible for accompanying and protecting oil industry personnel in the field. Depending on the demand for services, the size of the Oil Protection Unit can be scaled down, with units being re-assigned back to the Army and Police following the completion of seismic work by oil companies. At full force of 580 personnel, two separate seismic operations can be supported.

120. It is unclear how the Government of Somaliland would guarantee the clan neutrality of such a force, even though the Assaye Risk plan states that the force would be made up of a permanent cadre and a local cadre reflective of local clans in the area of operation.

121. The Oil Protection Unit would be mandated to deter threats through its armed presence and to defend against attacks with proportionate and regulated force as a last resort. It would ordinarily detect threats and deflect them into the hands of other Somaliland security agencies. According to Assaye Risk, the Oil Protection Unit itself would collect its own intelligence on local security conditions pertaining to oil industry activities as well as rely on inputs from other Somaliland security agencies.

122. Assaye Risk state that Risk Management Companies would interface defining the security requirement on behalf of oil companies and pass a request for services to the Oil Protection Unit.

Funding

123. The Assaye Risk plan proposed that the Oil Protection Unit be “Government Owned but Commercially Operated”, whereby the OPU would be a Government owned entity whose services would be available commercially to private oil companies who would pay for services rendered. Financing for the build and operation of the unit could be achieved either through a commercial investor, or from a repayable loan, or from a humanitarian fund, which have yet to be identified. The available funds would be used to contract with private companies or “delivering entities” who would handle procurement, training and mentoring for the Unit. These delivering entities would be selected through a transparent invitation to tender process.

124. According to Assaye Risk, the Oil Protection Unit operational cost would require an investment of an estimated USD 20-25 million for training and equipping and setting up headquarters and initial operations. The unit would incur a monthly cost estimated at USD 900,000⁸⁹ when the Unit becomes fully operational. When no protection services are required, the majority of the unit would return to normal police or army duties with only a small body of headquarters staff retained on a full time basis.

125. If the investment came from a humanitarian fund,⁹⁰ such a fund could recover a share of profits from the Oil Protection Unit over a finite period in order to recover its principal investment (but with no interest) after which the full control of the Oil Protection Unit would be handed back to the Government of Somaliland.

⁸⁹ The USD 900,000 would be covered from Oil Protection Unit fees applicable to oil company clients.

⁹⁰ The Monitoring Group is aware of at least one humanitarian investor who has expressed interest in this model, but is verifying details regarding the investor’s identity and incorporation.

126. If the funding is secured through a repayable loan, all profit would go back into the Oil Protection Unit with the exception of payments of the principal loan and interest. Once the loan has been repaid, the Government of Somaliland would have 100 per cent ownership of the Oil Protection Unit. In the interim, it is likely that the creditor would request a quasi-commercial body to supervise the commercial operation of the Oil Protection Unit in order to protect its return.

127. If the USD 20-25 million pool of funding was put up by a commercial investor, such as an international private military company, the Government of Somaliland would share profit from the Oil Protection Unit with the commercial investor over a specific period of time, or over the lifetime of the project, depending on the contract for funding.

128. Given the funds for the creation of the Oil Protection Unit will not be generated from the Somaliland budget itself, it is worth considering whether the Government of Somaliland will realistically be able to extend independent authority over the force.

Composition and control

129. The issue of whether influence can be brought to bear over the Oil Protection Unit is of critical importance to peace and security, particularly in a context within Somaliland where the allocation of oil licenses by the Government in Hargeisa has drawn resistance from some clan and opposition groups.

130. Indeed, in all three funding proposals laid out above, the Oil Protection Unit would come under the influence of a commercial entity or investor for a period of time. If the interests of any selected delivery entity (beyond its contractual obligations to provide a technical service for a fee) were tied to the financial interests of the financiers or oil companies, this could compromise or complicate the decision-making process within the Oil Protection Unit. Such risk is especially acute under the Assaye Risk proposal as the company expects any delivery entity involved in mentoring the Oil Protection Unit to maintain its own staff embedded in the Oil Protection Unit until such a time as the Unit can function smoothly without supervision.

131. It is therefore crucial to ensure that the financing of the Oil Protection Unit remains separate from any delivery entities involved in its build and management and that an independent supervisory body is appointed to ensure such conflicts of interest do not arise. The Monitoring Group would envisage working closely with such an independent supervisory body.

132. When the Oil Protection Unit is operational, each oil company would articulate its security needs to the Oil Protection Unit through a designated Risk Management Company, which would define the requirements and pass a request for services to the Oil Protection Unit. The delivery of the security plan by the relevant Oil Protection Unit sub-unit would be achieved in coordination with the Risk Management Company on the ground. As such it is also crucial that Risk Management Companies are also separate from the financing of the Unit.

133. So far the Somaliland Government has reported that six companies have bid in time for contracts as delivering entities: 1) Saladin Security 2) Newport Africa 3) R4 Incorporated 4) Physical Risk Solutions 5) Hanvard-Sanad Security and 6)

Interpid Security Management.⁹¹ The Government is also taking on Assaye Risk as the supervisory agency for the tendering process.

Potential avenues for conflict

134. The Monitoring Group has noted in its previous report (S/2013/413) that legal and constitutional discrepancies in respect of oil licensing throughout Somalia could fuel conflicts between the FGS and regional authorities, and between regional authorities themselves.

135. In its report (S/2013/413), the Monitoring Group made reference to a number of contested oil licenses between regional authorities, and between regional authorities and the FGS. In this context, the deployment of an Oil Protection Unit may increase a risk of political fallout over certain licenses. In the short term, seismic work is likely to focus in areas that are less controversial, but over the long term, it is possible that activities will extend into more controversial areas, such as the DNO license, contested by Puntland and Mogadishu. Khatumo, a *Dhulbahante* clan-based political organization which claims sovereignty over parts of Sool province, also openly challenges the legitimacy of DNO's license with Somaliland. In mid-August 2014, DNO reported shots fired in the vicinity of one its survey teams in Sool.⁹²

136. The Monitoring Group has observed ongoing military developments in the Sool region, which is contested by Somaliland and Puntland and which is also the heartland of the Khatumo movement. Any further escalation of tensions in this region risks instigating a more serious conflict (see annex 3.1 for more on threats to peace and security in Sool region).

137. The Monitoring Group has attempted to engage with the Somaliland Interior Minister and Director of Intelligence on developments in the Sool region, but has received no concrete reporting on the crisis in Sool from the Somaliland authorities. This has made it impossible to assess whether Somaliland's own analysis of events in Sool match those of the Monitoring Group, or whether Somaliland would be ready to use the Oil Protection Unit in a judicious and controlled manner in Sool. Such concerns are even more acute given the Oil Protection Unit has no specific regulations enshrined in national law that would govern the use and deployment of force.

Observations and recommendations

138. The Monitoring Group has strongly recommended to the Somaliland authorities that it complies and acts in accordance with Security Council provisions, namely paragraph 11 (a) or resolution 2111 (2013). The Monitoring Group has advised the authorities of Somaliland not to attempt to import any weapons or training without the Committee's consent. Moreover, without the Committee's advance approval, it is unlikely that the commercial or non-commercial investors would front the necessary funding for the Oil Protection Unit, unless they were prepared to do so in violation the arms embargo on Somalia.

⁹¹ E-mail from Ministry of Interior official on 23 July 2014.


⁹² <http://online.wsj.com/articles/norways-dno-says-shots-fired-near-somaliland-team-1407949094>.

139. Deteriorating security conditions in Somaliland, as claimed by Genel Energy or in respect of Sool region, provide reasonable grounds for seeking to deploy a mechanism such as an Oil Protection Unit. However, an Oil Protection Unit must be regulated, transparent and accompanied by mitigating measures in order to avoid conflicts of interest that could otherwise stoke political opposition or clan tensions.

140. As a first step, the Monitoring Group thereby recommends to the Committee to request the Somaliland authorities to provide detailed reporting on the security issues in the Sool region in parallel with any application for the import of weapons and training for any Oil Protection Unit.

141. More broadly speaking, the Monitoring Group would recommend to the Somaliland authorities to define more precisely the terms of engagement for an Oil Protection Unit, and to seek parliamentary approval to minimize the risk that the Unit be perceived as a paramilitary force operated by a narrow elite in Hargeisa.

Annex 6.7.a: Map of Somaliland oil concessions and table of operating companies



IOC	Block	Share	Progress
RAKGAS UAE	9 & 12	RAKGAS 75% Ophir Energy 25%	Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) complete.
GENEL East UK/Turkey	10B & 13	Genel 75% E Africa Resources Group 25%	EIA complete. Electromagnetic survey complete. Line survey part complete.
GENEL West Odeweyne UK/Turkey	6, 7W & 10A	Genel 50% Sterling Energy 40% Petrosoma 10%	EIA complete. Electromagnetic survey complete.
DNO Norway	18	DNO 100%	EIA planned for March 2014
ANSAN Wikifs Yemen/Dubai	7E, 14 & 19		

Annex 6.8: Delivery of military type vehicles and weapons to Jubaland

142. The Monitoring Group obtained information that the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) used revenue from the charcoal trade to purchase 40 Toyota 4WD Pick-Up Land Cruisers in Dubai, United Arab Emirate (UAE) and transformed them into combat vehicles equipped with DShK (Dushka) 12/76 (50 cal) heavy anti-aircraft machine guns.⁹³

143. The first shipment of 10 Pick-Up Land Cruisers (known in Somalia as “Abdi Bile”) was off-loaded in Kismayo on 10 April 2014 (see photographs in annex 6.8.a). Another 30 Land Cruisers imported from Dubai were off-loaded in Kismayo Port on 16 June 2014 (see photographs in annex 6.8.b). The Land Cruisers were parked at the “Presidential Palace” in Kismayo, where they were later repainted in camouflage colors (see photographs in annex 6.8.c).

144. The procurement and import of the vehicles from Dubai are believed to have been handled by Ali Naaji (Arabta/Mahamuud/Salah), who has businesses in both Kismayo and Dubai and is also known as one of the key Al-Shabaab-affiliated charcoal traders (see charcoal annex 9.2),⁹⁴ in addition to the Kismayo port manager, Abdullahi Dubad Shil “Hadun” (Absame/Abdalla/Tolamoge) (see his photograph in annex 6.8.d), and the deputy port manager, Yusuf Gamadid (Absame/Abdalla). The Monitoring Group has not been able to obtain exact information about who and where the vehicles were purchased from other than that the shipments originated in Dubai.

145. According to information provided to the Monitoring Group, part of the procurement of the 40 Land Cruisers was funded by the customs revenue from charcoal exports at Kismayo, while another part was covered by the Jubaland Chamber of Commerce (JCC), whose chairman is a Somali businessman based in Nairobi known as Haji Yassin.⁹⁵ Ali Naaji is believed to have financed and facilitated the logistical support for the shipments, while Hadun provided funding from the customs fees imposed on charcoal imports (see charcoal annex 9.1).

146. In addition to the 40 Toyota 4WD Pick-Up trucks, the Monitoring Group received information that the IJA had received approximately 3000 light arms (AK-47s and pistols), 30 artillery-type weapons, most of them DShKs, military uniforms and communication equipment, reportedly from sources in Ethiopia. While uncorroborated, information suggests that the shipment of these arms and equipment from Ethiopia were facilitated by Ali Abdi Raghe, who is the advisor on political

⁹³ Information obtained from three separate local and reliable confidential sources between April and July 2014.

⁹⁴ Despite Ali Naaji’s affiliation with Al-Shabaab, he has also maintained relations with whichever armed group controls the port of Kismayo, including currently the IJA, for the sake of facilitating trade interests. Indeed, Ali Naaji is an old ally of IJA President, Ahmed Madobe, and has reportedly been providing civilian vehicles and other smaller cars for local politicians, elders, and ministers in Jubaland. Historical affiliations and common business interests, particularly in the charcoal trade, explain seemingly contradictory relations between elements of the IJA and Al-Shabaab, who cooperate in business, compete in business and may or may oppose each other politically.

⁹⁵ The JCC was also partially financing the “Jubaland” conferences in 2013 and is comprised of Ogaden-clan businessmen in Somalia and from the diaspora.

and economic affairs to IJA President, Ahmed Madobe.⁹⁶ Information corroborated by photographs indicate that at least 15 of the Toyota 4WD Pick-Up Land Cruisers have been equipped with DShKs and thus turned into “technicals” (a Somali term for this type of combat vehicle) (see photographs in annex 6.8.e). Furthermore, on 6 July 2014, the IJA with assistance from the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) concluded training of 400 new Ras Kamboni Brigade (RKB) soldiers in Dhobley, distributed uniforms, arms and 15 of the new camouflage-colored Land Cruiser “technicals” (see photographs in annex 6.8.e). The IJA has also established a training camp in Dhobley, with assistance from the KDF. There is an ongoing mobilization and registration of new trainees from the different sub-clans living in Afmadow and Dhobley.

147. The objective of the acquisition of the “technicals” and the training of the new soldiers is ostensibly to strengthen the military power of the IJA/RKB in preparation for an offensive against elements of Al-Shabaab in the areas they still control in the Lower and Middle Jubba Regions, as well as the militias of Barre Hirale (Marehan). Regardless, the import of the vehicles and weapons were not notified to the Committee and constitute a violation of the arms embargo.

⁹⁶ Ali Abdi Raghe was previously named by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 7.2) in his capacity as executive director of the African Rescue Committee (AFREC) and in the context of the diversion of donor funds.

Annex 6.8.a: 10 April 2014 shipment of 10 Pick-Up Land Cruisers off-loaded in Kismayo Port



**Annex 6.8.b: 16 June 2014 shipment of 30 Pick-Up Land Cruisers
off-loaded in Kismayo Port**



Annex 6.8.c: Land Cruisers parked at the Presidential Palace, Kismayo, and repainted in camouflage colours





Annex 6.8.d: Photograph of Kismayo port manager, Abdullahi Dubad Shil “Hadun”

Abdullahi Dubad Shil “Hadun”



Annex 6.8.e: Completed “technical’s” equipped with DShK heavy anti-aircraft machine guns and the ceremony of newly trained recruits



In convoy through the charcoal stockpile areas of Kismayo



With newly trained Ras Kamboni Recruits, including Ahmed Madobe, at a training graduation ceremony





Annex 7

Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

Annex 7.1: Denial of access

Al-Shabaab

1. In areas under Al-Shabaab's control United Nations agencies and most international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) were banned from operating. Very few local humanitarian organisations were permitted to function. Although humanitarian inputs functioned as a resource for Al-Shabaab, they were also viewed as political currency for undermining the self-reliance of populations and as a tool of propaganda for the 'enemy.' Therefore, Al-Shabaab had a high degree of paranoia relating to humanitarian activities, including variations in personnel and types of inputs. Negotiations for access became particularly difficult at times during 2013 as the organisation evolved internally and Al-Shabaab lines of authority became blurred.¹

2. Denial and provision of access to humanitarian assistance was often used by Al-Shabaab as a form of control of the population. In Middle Jubba, for example, Al-Shabaab severely restricted access to medical care in a variety of ways, including holding family members hostage in exchange for granting permission to travel for medical care outside its area of operation. One credible local source reported that between December 2013 and January 2014 approximately 11 young "girls" from the Bantu community died during child delivery in Al-Shabaab held areas in Lower and Middle Jubba due to this obstruction, although the Monitoring Group was not able to independently verify this report.² Al-Shabaab officials also regularly destroyed medication or supplementary food supplies given by humanitarian agencies, for example, to women post partum, upon arrival back into its territory. In advance of the SNA/AMISOM offensive in March 2014, a number of medical clinics were also closed down by Al-Shabaab.³ It is understood that the organisation feared entry points for intelligence gathering by the enemy.⁴

3. In January 2014, there were concerns that the mobile internet ban introduced by Al-Shabaab would complicate communication with staff and security for those NGOs without VSAT or other forms of telecommunications.⁵ In a number of locations smart phones were also confiscated by the group.⁶ Ultimately, however, the humanitarian community adapted to these restrictions and the impact was mostly mitigated.⁷ The ban on mobile internet continues.

¹ Phone interview with United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 8 August 2014. The build up towards the March 2014 offensive, however, provided an opportunity for Al-Shabaab to regroup.

² Interview with Somali human rights activist, Nairobi, 14 April 2014.

³ Interview with INGO staff member, Nairobi, 13 February 2014.

⁴ Interviews with INGO staff members, Nairobi. February and March 2014.

⁵ See, inter alia, Reporters without borders, "Al Shabaab bans internet in areas it controls", 9 January 2014; see also, Shabelle News, "Some aid groups affected by mobile internet shutdown in Somalia," 18 February 2014.

⁶ Smart phones, including their GPS coordinates and photographic capabilities, are increasingly being used as monitoring tools, including as a result of the remote management policies necessitated by operations in Al-Shabaab areas.

⁷ Interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 31 July 2014; phone interview with United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 8 August 2014.

The impact of the SNA/AMISOM offensive against Al-Shabaab

4. The humanitarian community was able to re-engage during 2013 in places outside of direct Al-Shabaab control, including towns such as Afmadow, Baidoa, Jowhar, Kismayo and Marka. The joint SNA/AMISOM offensive later in March/April 2014 added nine towns and nearby territory in Bakool, Galgadud, Gedo, Hiran, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle to that list. At the same time, FGS authority remained contingent in many areas with Al-Shabaab still managing to retain some form of local presence, the resulting opacity complicating humanitarian access. In one instance described to the Monitoring Group, for example, an NGO staff member in an ostensibly FGS-controlled area was unable to provide information on harvest yields without first getting permission from a local Al-Shabaab representative.

5. The SNA/AMISOM offensive in the six regions, although creating new opportunities in the long term for provision of sustained support to communities, added to the difficulties facing humanitarian actors in a number of ways. Al-Shabaab generally tactically withdrew in advance of the allied assault. It subsequently laid siege to its former territories, preventing movement of people and supplies whether by humanitarian agencies or commercial entities. In many of the recovered locations, road transportation was the only reasonable logistics option. The few available helicopters could only move small volumes and airplane access was costly and unsustainable. In addition, transporters which had previously been able to operate were unwilling to accept contracts for supply to 'liberated' towns due to the virulence of Al-Shabaab's blockade.⁸

6. As a result, access was severely restricted to Maaxas, Bulo Burto, Waajid, Warsheikh and Ceel Bur. Maaxas, for example, came under the control of the FGS and its allies in late March 2014, but by late May 2014 Al-Shabaab still maintained control of the southern side of the town and the critical supply route from Mogadishu.⁹ Embargoes were violently enforced. In one incident in May 2014, a civilian donkey cart owner was killed in Falan Faay village, reportedly on suspicion of attempting to transport goods to Hurdur.¹⁰ Later, in June 2014, Ethiopian troops escorting a Turkish-donated food convoy came under fire on their way to Hudur but managed to repulse the attack.¹¹ In June 2014, Al-Shabaab was still attempting to enforce its blockade on Qoryooley, reportedly ambushing a civilian vehicle travelling to the town from Mogadishu, killing two passengers and wounding three.¹² In July 2014, four donkey cart divers transporting food to Waajid were detained and arrested and their food burned.¹³

7. The actions of Al-Shabaab to block movements by road added greatly to the already fragile food security of 'newly recovered' areas. In June 2014, United

⁸ Interviews with United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 1 July 2014; and United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 8 August 2014.

⁹ As a result, food had to be sourced from Bosasso driving up prices by between 70 percent and 163 percent on different items. See, Inter Agency mission report, Maaxas, Hiraan, 28 May 2014.

¹⁰ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 8 May, 2014.

¹¹ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the area, 17 June 2014. The consignment eventually arrived, Raxanreeb, "Despite challenges, emergency relief continues where possible in Somalia", 28 July, 2014.

¹² Dhacdo, "Al-Shabab fighters opened fire on mini bus killing two civilians" (translation from Somali), 16 June 2014, Available at <http://dhacdo.com/main/news.php?readmore=22244>.

¹³ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the security situation, 17 July 2014.

Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator described how “the average price[s] of basic items in Waajid, Xudur and Maaxas in Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions, ha[d] more than doubled”.¹⁴ In May 2014, even after clearance of Al-Shabaab checkpoints in a radius of between 15 to 40 kilometers around Waajid town, for example, elders told the United Nations that cereal supplies still had to be smuggled into the town by donkey cart. The prices of sugar and rice had tripled.¹⁵ These blockades not only disrupted supplies to their intended target but affected onward movements of goods. Destabilisation of routes in and out of Bulburte and Jalalaqsi, for example, had an impact on supply lines between South-Central and northeastern Somalia more broadly.

8. The impact of Al-Shabaab’s obstruction of humanitarian assistance was felt not just in terms of its siege of recovered areas. At the end of phase I of the SNA/AMISOM offensive, the former predictability and consistency of Al-Shabaab’s mode of territorial control had given way to a chaotic situation in which often there was no clear power structure. Implementation of some humanitarian projects in areas no longer under Al-Shabaab control had to be abandoned as a result of either a vacuum of authority, or where Al-Shabaab had been pushed into new areas.¹⁶ Even in places which had been under FGS influence since 2013 there continued to be great fluidity of authority. In Baidoa in Bay, and Dhuusamareeb in Galgaduud, for example, different authorities, reflective of both local and federal power-holders and rival administrations, jockeyed for power. The resulting confusion forced a number of humanitarian projects to close. Even in Mogadishu, Government control remained in flux with not all districts firmly under FGS control both by day and by night.¹⁷

9. Both Al-Shabaab’s policies restricting freedom of movement, and the impact of the conflict itself, affected planting, harvesting and other essential livelihood strategies.¹⁸ On 7 July 2014, FAO’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) issued an early warning food security alert for various parts of Somalia, citing among other issues “shrinking humanitarian assistance and access” relating to the impact of the offensive. On 10 August 2014, the United Nations Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator for Somalia reported that he had “appealed” to AMISOM and the FGS to attend to supply routes as phase II of the SNA/AMISOM offensive got under way.¹⁹ In mid August 2014, as an emergency

¹⁴ Statement of Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, Security Council briefing on the humanitarian situation in Somalia, 4 June 2014.

¹⁵ United Nations Inter-agency mission report, Waajid, 27 May 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group; See also Radio Ergo, “Food prices rise in Gedo region”, 16 April, 2014, extracted in AMISOM daily media monitoring report. Available at <http://www.unsom.org/2014/04/16/april-16-2014-daily-monitoring-report/>.

¹⁶ Phone interviews with INGO humanitarian staff member, 19 July 2014; INGO humanitarian staff member, 1 August 2014; and INGO staff member, 27 July 2014. Due to the sensitivity of the situation on the ground it is not possible to publicly provide details of these cases.

¹⁷ Skype interview with former INGO humanitarian staff member, 20 March 2014.

¹⁸ In its analysis of the deteriorating food security situation in Somalia, FAO/FSAU identified in July 2014 that environmental factors such as the delayed and reduced rains had been exacerbated, inter alia, by the interruption of the planting season in six regions affected by the offensive. See FAO/FSAU, Early Warning Alert: Food Security worsens as Drought looms in Somalia — Emergency unfolding among Mogadishu IDPs, 7 July 2014.

¹⁹ Reuters, “Somali donors must act now to avoid famine catastrophe,” 10 August 2014.

measure, the World Food Programme (WFP) commenced daily humanitarian flights to the main towns subjected to blockade.²⁰

Government entities

10. The extension of formally recognised administrations into new areas in the last year, including the consolidation of central Government, was accompanied by a variety of initiatives to coordinate, regulate and tax the humanitarian sector. As part of this, Government entities used a variety of tactics to control and/or benefit from the presence of humanitarian projects. Some of these went beyond what was appropriate regulation and amounted, in some circumstances, to obstruction of humanitarian access, whether in terms of undermining the timeliness, effectiveness, reach and feasibility of operations, or as a form of diversion of aid.

11. These practices included: imposition of multiple registration ‘requirements’; efforts to restrict and control contracting, procurement, and staffing and partner decisions; and opportunistic and unpredictable ‘taxation’. In her June 2014 briefing to the Security Council, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, recognised the challenge: “[u]npredictable bureaucratic impediments imposed by local and regional administrations, including arbitrary taxation, payment of registration fees, and the need for aid agencies to seek approval for recruitment of staff, renting of premises and choice of national partners often inhibit the ability of agencies to access people in need.”²¹ These practices also tended to prevent the development of predicable and appropriate regulation of the humanitarian function. Furthermore, the time and effort which humanitarian organisations had to spend in many instances on defending their staff safety, resources and space for independent, impartial and neutral action, was significant. As one INGO staff member commented, it was often. “more difficult now with the ‘government’ than it was negotiating and operating under Al-Shabaab authority.”²²

12. Although the phenomena experienced were themselves not new, the multiplication and consolidation of formal state structures, at federal, regional and district level, created new layers of opportunity for, and legitimisation of, obstruction. Indeed, in many places old monopolies of power and control were simply transformed onto a new plane, bolstered by state-bestowed legitimacy and deployment of state assets. In this regard, powers of arrest, detention and in some cases, expulsion from the area of control, were misused to pressure humanitarian staff to comply with demands.²³

²⁰ Phone interview with WFP staff member, 21 August 2014.

²¹ Statement of Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, Security Council briefing on the humanitarian situation in Somalia, 4 June 2014.

²² Interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 20 March 2014.

²³ The situation in Puntland is described below in strictly confidential annex 7.2. In South Central Somalia, for example, it was reported in February 2014 that two NGO staff were arrested in Kismayo in connection with a dispute over the coordination of food vouchers distribution. E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the security situation, 15 February 2014. In January 2014 in Mogadishu, police reportedly arrested and held 5 NGO staff members for a number of hours on the basis that they had no permission from the relevant District Commissioner to work. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 27 January 2014.

13. Efforts to enforce ‘registration’ of NGOs and charge access fees constituted the most pervasive means of ‘formalised’ obstruction. First, the FGS authorities required NGOs to register yearly on payment of USD 1000 (INGOs) or USD 500 (local NGOs).²⁴ Second, unpredictable layers of registration and fee ‘requirements’ at regional, and even at district level, mushroomed across the country. These demands made operations difficult as the various local authorities purported to have the power to halt the work of the NGO if payments were not met. It also complicated assessing compliance and preparing budgets.²⁵ A snapshot of the registration related challenges NGOs faced in five areas in South-Central Somalia is as follows:

- In Beletweyne in August 2013 the then Governor issued a letter to NGOs declaring that not only did NGOs have to register with the regional administration, projects were to be jointly developed prior to fundraising, approved budgets shared, and implementation and monitoring strategies jointly developed.²⁶ A deadline for payment of a registration fee, reportedly of USD 3000, was imposed with threat of suspension of operations.²⁷ On 15 January 2014, however, it was reported that the administration had announced that it would begin to collect taxes in order to assist with the running of the administration and to pay SNA salaries.
- On 11 May 2014, the Galmadug Minister of Planning and International Cooperation issued a letter directing all INGOs working in Galmadug state to register themselves with his office within 48 hours with fees of USD 1000.²⁸
- In Baidoa, a decree by the Governor on 17 May 2013 established the Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management, later renamed as the Agency for Non State Actors Coordination (ANSAC).²⁹ At a meeting in October 2013, the Governor declared that ANSAC had the power to “question, suspend temporarily or blacklist NGOs”.³⁰ A 15 January 2014 deadline for all NGOs to register and pay a fee or face inability to operate in the area was later announced.
- In Middle Shabelle on 21 May 2014, a letter from the regional administration demanded payment of an 11 percent tax of the value of projects.³¹

²⁴ While United Nations agencies insisted that partners were registered with the federal authorities, Al-Shabaab saw registration as an unacceptable expression of Government allegiance. NGOs attempting to operate across the conflict frontlines had to carefully navigate to maintain their staff safety, let alone effective operations. Interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 25 July 2014.

²⁵ It was not always clear, for example, to what extent donors would permit charging of such fees to project costs. ECHO, for example, generally does not cover the payment of registration fees, unless they can be categorised as direct project costs specific to the action, whether at federal or regional level. E-mail, EU Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection Department (ECHO), 1 August 2014.

²⁶ Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.

²⁷ Interview with United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 24 November 2013.

²⁸ E-mail, reliable INGO source with knowledge of NGO registration challenges, 28 July 2014.

²⁹ Abdi Adam Hoosow, Governor of Bay Regional Administration of the FGS, Governor Decree, 17 May 2013, on file with the Monitoring Group.

³⁰ Meeting minutes, ANSAC meeting 28 October 2013, on file with the Monitoring Group.

³¹ Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.

- In Luq in Geddo, it was reported in December 2013 that the local district authority had requested USD 4000 from local NGOs in order to assist in the payment of *diya* resulting from losses in local inter-clan clashes.³² There were also reports that staff had been arrested and vehicles held in order to pressure NGOs to consent to the payment.³³

14. Although the new sites of governance presented opportunities for obstruction, at the same time they provided channels for resolution. In the majority of situations it was possible for the humanitarian community to eventually negotiate suspension of these fiats. In Middle Shabelle, for example, intervention by OCHA and NGOs in respect of the project budget tax resulted in an e-mail confirmation from the Deputy Governor that the administration did not “intend to impose tax to any NGO’s currently working in our region.”³⁴ Fluidity of authority and roles underlay much of the mixed messaging and confusion. In some of the incidents noted above, for example, the authorities retreated from their position by explaining that the official who issued the demand in fact had no authority to do so. The ‘directives’ were, however, rarely rescinded completely and there was always the concern that they could resurface at will. Due to the sensitivity of the issue it was difficult to ascertain to what extent humanitarian resources were successfully captured.

15. The FGS position on regional registration was that NGOs should ‘register’ with the local authority but not be required to pay additional fees. In mid 2014, the FGS Ministry of Interior, through the Aid Coordination Unit, agreed to appoint focal points in each region to help smooth out some of the problems being encountered by humanitarian organisations.³⁵ By mid August 2014, focal points had been appointed for Lower and Middle Shabelle respectively and the remainder were expected to be in place by the end of August 2014.³⁶

United Nations rules, regulations and practices and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations

16. With respect to United Nations’ humanitarian engagement, federal and regional authorities in all three areas of South Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland, to different extents, flouted United Nations rules, regulations and practices and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. This resulted in some cases in disruption of, or additional cost to, humanitarian operations. Some of these challenges stemmed from the struggle around assertion of central and regional ‘sovereign’ control over key assets, such as airspace and customs duties. In Somaliland, for example, United Nations humanitarian flights were suspended between 15 May and 16 July 2013.³⁷ In South

³² E-mail, United Nations staff member, 18 December 2014.

³³ Interviews with United Nations staff members, Mogadishu, 19 January 2014; and United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 8 February 2014.

³⁴ E-mail on file with the Monitoring Group.

³⁵ In June 2014, it was announced that the Aid Coordination Unit would be housed at the Ministry of Finance. See Letter from the Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed to the SRSG and RC/HC, 17 June 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group. The FGS has committed to developing an NGO law although the process of consultation has not yet begun.

³⁶ Phone interview with United Nations staff member, Mogadishu, 9 August 2014.

³⁷ Most humanitarian sources indicated, however, that although the suspension added to the difficulty of operations in general terms it did not have a serious impact on humanitarian access as alternative measures were implemented. See, for example, interview with United Nations staff member, Hargeisa, 8 January 2014.

Central Somalia, the FGS on at least two occasions demanded payment of customs fees for exempt imports resulting in temporary back up of supplies at Mogadishu port.³⁸

The situation in Puntland and Somaliland

17. The situation under the Somaliland administration presented the least obstructive environment overall for humanitarian operations.³⁹ It was not, however, free from the practices observed elsewhere. Inappropriate pressure on national and international NGO and United Nations staff by Government officials to influence staffing, projects and decisions was experienced, with resulting project disruption and, occasionally, suspension.⁴⁰

18. The situation in Puntland on the other hand illustrated many of the obstructive official practices encountered elsewhere in concentrated form, encompassing actions which amounted to diversion, or attempts to divert humanitarian assets, denial of humanitarian access and threats to humanitarian workers — in addition to corruption. An overview of these systematic practices is set out in strictly confidential annex 7.2.

19. The stand-off between the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland regarding from which “side” humanitarian supplies reached their territories had an impact on humanitarian access. On 5 July 2014, for example, the Puntland Minister for Finance addressed a letter to “all UN agencies [and] international NGOs” announcing that “humanitarian goods and other items coming from Somaliland by road” would not be accepted and that the Government would no longer grant tax exemptions to items coming via Somaliland. Insecurity in the region was cited as the reason for the ban.⁴¹ As humanitarian agencies determined how to work around the decision, there were significant challenges created to the movement of aid destined for Puntland and those parts of South Central Somalia accessible only through Galkayo.⁴² For more details on the impact of this obstruction, and other forms of obstruction of humanitarian access in Puntland, see confidential annex 7.2.

Security institutions and humanitarian obstruction

20. Within a fragmenting security and political environment, security threats, assessments and mitigating measures themselves — intended to be facilitative of

³⁸ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia concerning the status of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, 26 February 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group.

³⁹ In Somaliland NGOs are regulated by the NGO Law Act No. 43/2010 and the By Laws for Completion and Clarification of the NGO Law (Act No: 43/2010). A Letter of Agreement is entered into yearly with the Ministry for National Planning and Development (MNPD). Income tax for both local and international staff (since June 2014) is paid. In Somaliland NGOs and United Nations agencies participated actively providing input to, and review of, the NGO Act. Interviews with NGO and United Nations staff members, Hargeisa 7 and 8 January 2014; and humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 25 July 2014.

⁴⁰ Interviews with NGO staff member, Nairobi, 3 January and 25 July 2014; NGO staff member, Nairobi, 28 July 2014; and United Nations staff, January 2014.

⁴¹ Letter on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁴² Letter to the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia from the Minister of Finance, Puntland State of Somalia, 5 August 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group.

humanitarian access — sometimes became tools of control and obstruction or were manipulated for political or financial ends. Security incidents were even themselves created ‘to design’ in some instances in order to impact decisions relating to humanitarian access.⁴³ Lack of capacity, corruption, and poor support of security forces assigned to protect humanitarian operations complicated the job of safeguarding humanitarian workers and impeded access in some cases. Confidential annex 7.3 describes some of the challenges experienced in the operation of the Special Protection Units (SPUs) which were created to maintain the security of international actors in Puntland and Somaliland, and particularly, to facilitate humanitarian operations.

21. In December 2013, draft Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines for Humanitarian Actors Engagement with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Civ-Mil Guidelines) were developed.⁴⁴ The Guidelines reflected the humanitarian community’s perspective on civilian military engagement with AMISOM and aimed to “to establish and promote principles and practice for constructive and effective civil-military engagement in this context.” Unfortunately the Civ-Mil Guidelines were not finalised in time to be implemented during the first phase of the joint SNA/AMISOM offensive against Al-Shabaab. As insecurity worsened in the aftermath of the SNA/AMISOM offensive, military accompaniment of convoys became ever more necessary. A revised version of the Civ-Mil Guidelines was negotiated in late July 2014 and finally adopted in September 2014.

22. The lack of Civ-Mil Guidelines and clear framework for engagement between the humanitarian community and international forces in Somalia was highlighted by a situation which arose in December 2013 and remained unresolved until July 2014. In December 2013, elements of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) seized three consignments of humanitarian supplies in Somalia, and held them in various locations in Somalia and Ethiopia for over six months. The basis for the seizure was described as concern about the capacity of the transporters to negotiate passage — or, in the case of one consignment, how the transporters had *already* negotiated passage — from Yeed in Bakol, through Al-Shabaab-held territory, to locations in Belet Weyne, Bossaso and Hargeisa. As a result of this security determination, the trucks were impounded and cargo and vehicles subsequently removed across the border into Ethiopian territory. They were not released until July 2014. Implementation of the Civ-Mil Guidelines would assist in avoiding, and providing a channel for more efficiently resolving, such scenarios in the future. For the emerging details of this case see confidential annex 7.4.

⁴³ Interviews with UN staff member, Nairobi, June 2014 and 30 July 2014; INGO staff member, Nairobi, 20 February 2014.

⁴⁴ Draft on file with the Monitoring Group. The Guidelines are non-binding and reflect international policy guidance developed for the humanitarian community globally.

**Annex 7.2: Selected practices constituting humanitarian
obstruction in Puntland (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 7.3: The operation of the Special Protection Units
in Somaliland and the Puntland State of Somalia
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

**Annex 7.4: Temporary seizure of humanitarian supplies by the
Ethiopian National Defence Forces (STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 7.5: Attacks on humanitarian aid workers

Attacks by, or attributed to, Al-Shabaab

23. In areas both under and outside its official control, Al-Shabaab remained a potent threat — whether actual or perceived — to humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The largest single attack by Al-Shabaab on humanitarian workers conducted since the Monitoring Group's last report (S/2013/413) was the 19 June 2013 attack against the United Nations common compound in Mogadishu, which resulted in the deaths of at least 20 individuals, including 6 Al-Shabaab fighters. Al-Shabaab launched a complex operation involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) detonation, followed by a ground attack inside the compound. In a Twitter statement by the HSM press office claiming responsibility, Al-Shabaab declared that “[t]he UN, a merchant of death & a satanic force of evil, has a long inglorious record of spreading nothing but poverty, dependency & disbelief.”⁴⁵

24. On 14 January 2014, Al-Shabaab's Governor for the Banadir Region and spokesperson, Sheik Ali Mohamed Hussein (Sheikh Ali Jabar), declared in a radio statement that Muslims should “stay away from what is called the humanitarian agencies that bring the bad things”.⁴⁶ He warned that “people should not work for them, people should not go to their offices because they are invaders, they are people fighting against us”, whether they are “Turkish, UN agencies or others.” The Somali people were told instead that they should “extend their hand to Allah and beg him if they need anything, because it is him who feeds people, it is him who brings diseases and cure”.

25. This new threat rhetoric from official Al-Shabaab sources was paralleled by violence directed against United Nations humanitarian workers. On 13 February 2014, a suicide VBIED attacked a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convoy in Mogadishu bordering the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) compound, killing 5 civilians. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack characterising those it targeted as “invaders.”⁴⁷ On 14 February 2014, Al-Shabaab spokesperson, Sheik Ali Mohamud Raghe (‘Ali Dhere’), once again reportedly warned that there would be additional attacks on United Nations agencies: “[t]he UN and other so-called global agencies operating in Somalia must leave the country immediately, if they don't do so, our Mujahideens will continue targeting them.”⁴⁸

26. Although not engaged in humanitarian work, two international consultants working for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) were assassinated at Galkayo airport on 8 April 2014 by a security officer who worked

⁴⁵ The original Twitter message from HSM is no longer on line. See, alternatively, press statement by Sheikh Ali Mohamud Raghe (‘Ali Dhere’), the Official Spokesperson of Al-Shabaab at <http://newsomali.com/2013/06/19/dhageyso-ama-daawo-afhayaan-ka-al-shabaab-oo-ka-hadlaya-qaabkii-kooxdiiisa-u-fulisay-weerarkii-lagu-qaaday-xarunta-unka-ee-muqdisho/>.

⁴⁶ The statement was distributed via Somalimemo and Radio Kulmiye. See original statement (in Somali) posted at <http://somalimemo.net/index.php/maqal/7728-sh-cali-jabal-shacabka-muqdisho-markale-waxaan-leenahay-ka-fogaaday-xarumaha-cadawga-bartilmaameed-ayay-noo-yihiin--dhageyso>.

⁴⁷ AFP, “At least six dead in car bomb attack at Mogadishu airport”, 13 February 2014.

⁴⁸ Hiiraan Online, “Al Shabab vows more attacks on UN agencies”, 15 February 2014.

there. While it did not claim responsibility for the attack, Al-Shabaab immediately issued a statement praising the attack and encouraging other such actions.⁴⁹

27. On 24 May 2014, Al-Shabaab launched a complex attack against the Federal Parliament of Somalia. In its official claim of responsibility Al-Shabaab called for additional attacks, including on the United Nations.⁵⁰ This statement reflected the rise in specific threat information that was being received at the time with respect to United Nations operations, including humanitarian operations, not just in South Central Somalia but also in Puntland and Somaliland (see annex 1.4 on Al-Shabaab in Puntland). In mid June 2014, for example, the United Nations temporarily reduced the number of its international staff based in Garowe as a result of a number of hostile surveillance incidents. The placing of armed private security guards within the United Nations compound was later authorised. The first phase deployment of a United Nations Guard Unit to the main compounds of the MIA was completed in June.⁵¹

28. Despite the more prominent rhetoric by Al-Shabaab against foreigners, it was Somali nationals who bore the brunt of Al-Shabaab's campaign of violence.⁵² First, the remote management strategies put in place by humanitarian agencies inadvertently tended to transfer risk to local staff or local partners and contractors as they became the face of the work on the ground. Second, enhanced security measures and restrictions on the movement of international staff increased the vulnerability of those who lived outside the protected zones, but travelled to and from them. Humanitarian workers frequently received threats purporting to be from Al-Shabaab. One NGO operating across both Al-Shabaab and FGS held territory told the Monitoring Group that its "biggest issue" was "harassment from Al-Shabaab". Living with and countering the threats by phone and in person often required continuous negotiation and frequent changes in work patterns.⁵³ It was also reported that "almost all health staff" experienced harassment by text messages and telephone calls as a result of perceived or actual affiliation with the United Nations and international NGOs.⁵⁴

29. Although the relentless context of threat and harassment was clear, deteriorating security in urban areas and evolving Al-Shabaab operations and alliances meant it was not always possible to verify the identify of the perpetrators of particular attacks against individuals associated with humanitarian operations. In November 2013, a security guard who worked for an INGO was killed in Mogadishu, reportedly by Al-Shabaab fighters. He was shot dead outside his home

⁴⁹ Mareeg, "Al Shabaab admires the soldier who killed two western workers", [informal english translation], Available at <http://www.mareeg.com/alshabaab-oo-bogaadiyey-askarigii-gaalkacyo-ku-dilay-labo-shaqaale-reer-galbeed-ah/>.

⁵⁰ See audio statement by Sheikh Ali Mohamud Raghe ('Ali Dhere'), the Official Spokesperson of Al-Shabaab, 24 May 2014. The latter statement particularly referenced the United Nations. Available at <http://www.risaala.net/view.php?id=20450>.

⁵¹ Resolution 2158 (2014) welcomed "the recent deployment of a UN Guard Unit to strengthen security at UNSOM compounds".

⁵² As is noted in annex 8.1, Somali nationals associated with the United Nations presence more broadly in Somalia or with AMISOM operations (whether as staff or contractors) were also targeted.

⁵³ Interview with Somali NGO staff member, 29 April 2014, Mogadishu.

⁵⁴ E-mail, United Nations staff member, 19 July 2014.

in Karaan district.⁵⁵ There were other killings, however, where clear attribution of responsibility was difficult. In Galkayo in late January 2014, Abdi Mohamed Aden (Abdi Dhere), the head of a local aid organisation National Relief Organization (NRO) was killed by unknown men.⁵⁶ Also in January 2014 there was an attempted assassination of a local NGO staff member in Mogadishu.⁵⁷ On 25 February 2014 Sharifo Yusuf Mohamed, a woman reportedly working on a vaccination program was shot dead in the course of her duties.⁵⁸

30. From the end of December 2013 when preparations began for a new round of offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, there was a rise⁵⁹ in the number of arrests and interrogations of local staff of local organisations, in addition to local contractors for international organisations, in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, in particular in Bay and Lower and Middle Juba regions. The assumption that humanitarian access might be exploited to gain advantage by parties to the conflict appeared to underpin these actions. Some of those held suffered serious ill-treatment, including injury requiring hospitalisation. As new areas came ostensibly under the influence of the FGS and AMISOM, the threat level sometimes escalated as engagement in those areas was interpreted by Al-Shabaab as support to the expansion of FGS power (see annex 7.1). With the commencement of Ramadan in June 2014, humanitarian agencies prepared for increased dangers.⁶⁰ Turkish aid agencies in Mogadishu temporarily suspended their operations in Mogadishu on the basis of higher assessed levels of risk.⁶¹

Other actors

31. Al-Shabaab and its affiliates were not the only perpetrators of attacks on humanitarian workers. The security situation in Somalia as a whole during the reporting period became more complex with both multiplying grey zones — where who was “in charge” was unclear — and the emergence of new lines of conflict. This added to the number of armed actors with which humanitarian workers had to grapple. One analyst described the situation in early 2014 as one in which, “an increasingly diffuse range of diverse and nascent militant units are operating across the country, reflecting the growing complexity of a security context in which Al-Shabaab may be persistent, but may no longer enjoy primacy.”⁶²

⁵⁵ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 6 November 2013.

⁵⁶ Raxanreeb, “Head of NRO murdered tonight in Galkayo”, 25 January 2014.

⁵⁷ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 10 January 2014.

⁵⁸ Garowe on line, “Three Women shot dead in Mogadishu”, 25 February 2014.

⁵⁹ There were 14 incidents involving arrests and detentions of NGO staff in 2013 (not just by Al-Shabaab). By mid July 2014, however, there had already been 11 such incidents, the highest on average since tracking began in 2011. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 25 July 2014.

⁶⁰ IED attacks, armed clashes and specifically, assassinations, attributed to Al-Shabaab peaked in Mogadishu in July 2013, which coincided with Ramadan.

⁶¹ See, inter alia, Hiiraan Online, “Turkish aid agencies halt operations in Somali capital,” 13 July 2014.

⁶² Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Conflict Trends, No. 24, Real Time Analysis of African Political Violence, March 2014. Available at http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No-24-March-2014_final.pdf.

32. This chaotic security situation led to higher levels of violent criminality which in some areas affected humanitarian workers and humanitarian operations.⁶³ In some places a daily experience of violence was the norm, with one town described as having a level of “ambient” violence reflecting a high level of inter-clan tension with at least one incident involving a gun threat a week.⁶⁴ Violence was also used in some cases to disrupt, control and redirect the distribution of humanitarian inputs, including for simple criminal purposes.⁶⁵ As the first phase of the offensive against Al-Shabaab got underway, not only did Al-Shabaab lay siege to routes to key locations, but the general level of insecurity rose. There was increased looting of humanitarian convoys, including at checkpoints controlled by “men in uniform.” A snapshot of reports from mid July to the early days of August 2014, for example, included: looting by Jubaland forces of food aid during a distribution to IDPs in Farjano in Kismayo;⁶⁶ stealing of a food convoy on its way to Mahaday in Middle Shabelle at an SNAF checkpoint;⁶⁷ and looting of a food convoy near Afgowe in August 2014.⁶⁸ In some cases negotiation and restitution was possible: in the latter two examples the food was eventually recovered and distributed to the intended beneficiaries.

33. Another factor in the threat environment was the extension of new state administrations at central, regional and district levels, which often involved the re-hatting of those who had posed threats to humanitarian workers in the past (see annex 7.1). Humanitarian workers thus faced former adversaries now also wielding state power as a tool of control. Those who challenged these practices were sometimes subject to attacks. Staff of one local NGO, for example, were detained by local officials and told that their presence was not welcome because the organisation had refused to pay kickbacks to officials.⁶⁹ In Mogadishu it was reported that armed militias were used to intimidate humanitarian workers at critical moments, such as rent negotiations.⁷⁰ In Galkayo the capture of businesses by pirate interests made safeguarding staffing and procurement decisions reportedly complex and a security issue for NGOs.⁷¹

34. Humanitarian workers who provided services viewed as controversial or sensitive, such as support to survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, or who

⁶³ See, for example: On 31 March 2014 gunmen opened fire on an INGO vehicle in Belet weyne district. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 31 March 2014. On 21 April 2014, gunmen attacked an NGO food aid convoy along the Afgoye corridor, reportedly killing two SNAF soldiers and managing to divert part of the consignment. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 21 April 2014. In July 2014, gunmen opened fire on an INGO vehicle west of Cabudwaaq in Galgaduud. E-mail, reliable NGO source 20 July 2014.

⁶⁴ Phone interview with former humanitarian INGO staff member, 12 February 2014.

⁶⁵ See, for example: an incident in Hiiraan which involved the erection of checkpoints to prevent the arrival of beneficiaries at a food distribution point and the subsequent shooting dead of two and the wounding of others during attempts by elders to resolve the impasse. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 8 June 2014. An incident in Lower Jubba in June 2014, where a food aid distribution was attacked by gunmen who reportedly looted the food, killed a woman beneficiary and beat others with sticks. Twenty were injured. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 26 June 2014.

⁶⁶ E-mail, reliable humanitarian INGO source, 14 July 2014.

⁶⁷ Phone interview with United Nations staff member, 7 August 2014.

⁶⁸ Phone interview with United Nations staff member, 7 August 2014.

⁶⁹ Local humanitarian NGO, interview, Nairobi, 19 March 2014. Further details cannot be shared due to security concerns.

⁷⁰ Phone interview with former INGO staff member, 20 March 2014.

⁷¹ Phone interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, 12 February 2014.

challenged sites of political power, also reported high levels of fear and sometimes direct harassment from local authorities. NGOs working with women were particularly vulnerable.⁷²

35. Overall, the complexities and multiple sources of the threats facing humanitarian agencies in Somalia were illustrated starkly by the decision of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) family of organizations to withdraw from Somalia in August 2013 after 22 years of operation.⁷³ In MSF's final months in Somalia not only were two members of staff who had been held in captivity for almost two years finally released, but the convicted murderer of another two of its staff members was released from prison just weeks after he had received a 30 year sentence. In its statement announcing the closure of its operations, MSF described "an environment where armed groups and civilian leaders increasingly support, tolerate, or condone the killing, assaulting, and abducting of humanitarian aid workers." Speaking in an interview on 19 August 2013, Arjan Hehenkamp, then MSF General Director, particularly decried the "structural inability of Somali leadership and authorities to prevent these incidents from occurring or to address them when they occur". He concluded that MSF could "no longer safeguard our activities and staff in Somalia".⁷⁴

Release of hostages

36. One positive development was the release of the four humanitarian aid workers who had been held in long-term captivity in Somalia. In April 2014, an employee of CARE held since 2011 by Al-Shabaab was returned to his family in Kenya.⁷⁵ Later in June 2014, three staff members of the INGO International Aid Services were also finally released. They had been held by pirate groups since their abduction in Galkayo in July 2012.⁷⁶

⁷² Interview with United Nations staff member, 19 July 2014, Nairobi; interview with INGO staff member, Nairobi, 10 February 2014; interview with Somali NGO staff member, Nairobi, 19 May 2014.

⁷³ The pull out impacted provision of health services to over 1.5 million Somalis. See, inter alia, Effect of pull out of MSF on health situation in Somalia, Presentation, Health Cluster Coordinator, 26 August 2013, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁷⁴ Interview with MSF General Director, Arjan Hehenkamp, conducted by Somali journalist Hamza Mohamed. Available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4epbsW15z8>.

⁷⁵ Phone interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, 30 July 2014.

⁷⁶ International Aid Services, Press Release, "IAS hostages released in Somalia", 5 June 2014, at <http://www.ias-intl.org/?p=882>.

Annex 7.6: Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)*

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 7.7: Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance: measures to enhance compliance

37. While it is practically impossible to completely avoid diversion inherent in the Somali humanitarian system, various mitigating measures and creative approaches are possible. Some of the the policies and practices being put in place by the humanitarian community to reduce violations and enhance compliance with respect to the prohibition on obstruction of humanitarian assistance are described below.

The international community

38. In September 2013, further to increasing reports of humanitarian diversion from the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), the CHF completed a capacity assessment of its partners, grading them in three risk bands: high, medium and low risk.⁷⁷ One of the outcomes of the review was the reduction of the list of partners eligible for CHF funding to 72.⁷⁸ In addition to capacity assessments, the CHF also employed third party field monitoring, call systems and satellite imagery to help verify project implementation and monitor potential diversion. It is understood that the use of GPS-enabled phones, linked to a website for uploaded of project data, was under consideration.

39. As a whole, the United Nations system in Somalia made efforts to improve coordination and increase internal transparency around identifying risks and devising responses. Beginning in May 2014 a cross-agency risk management working group (RWG) was convened under the Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. The RWG membership comprises the Risk Management Unit (RMU) and Risk Focal Points from the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). The RWG is intended as a forum for discussion of challenges in relation to risk management activities and for the development of recommendations to address strategic and technical issues for the UNCT.

40. The RMU continued to develop its Contractor Information Management System (CIMS) database of information on programming valued at over USD 3.56 billion by mid-year 2014, and in relation to over 2000 partners.⁷⁹ Some United Nations entities, however, were unable to provide the comprehensive and timely information required on contracts and partners for insertion in the CIMS database, impeding its full operationability.⁸⁰ New features of the CIMS database under development included a Civil Servant Salary and Ministry Payment Tool and a Mapping Tool.⁸¹ Further to the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in 2012, advisory reports from the RMU to the OIOS led to full scale investigations in a number of cases (see strictly confidential annex 7.6).

⁷⁷ The bands indicated the level of mitigating or other measures which would be required for the CHF to proceed with engagement.

⁷⁸ See, inter alia, OCHA website at <http://www.unocha.org/somalia/financing/common-humanitarian-fund-chf/capacity-assessment>.

⁷⁹ E-mail, RMU to Monitoring Group, 22 August 2014.

⁸⁰ Interview with United Nations staff member, Nairobi. 20 August, 2014.

⁸¹ This will enable the mapping of projects and programmes undertaken by the UNCT through GPS coordinates and assist with collaborative approaches to project monitoring.

41. The use of third party monitors by both the United Nations and NGOs to report on outputs from project activities and perceptions on the ground, significantly increased. New approaches to programming such as use of money transfer companies and post verification payment for cash transfer projects; monitoring tools such as call centres and text messaging; and new use of technology such as fingerprint readers, expanded.⁸²

42. Although improved, there was still insufficient information exchange amongst United Nations entities, and between United Nations entities and NGOs, which would permit swift and consistent determinations and action when reputational fiduciary or other risks associated with a partnership were identified.⁸³ Legal restrictions certainly operated against information sharing in some areas. The OIOS, for example, is bound by strict rules of confidentiality. At the same time creative approaches are possible. Rather than sharing details of investigations per se, the context, and the various networks and alliances within which diversion and misappropriation is facilitated, could be shared through cross-referencing and exchange of background and other situational information, including that gleaned by third party monitors.⁸⁴ Information on trends in methods and mechanisms of diversion could also be usefully exchanged without breach of confidentiality or other legal obligations.

43. Sharing of information is not only important in terms of identifying risks. It is important that sufficient resources are provided for swift investigations when problems are developed and for careful dissemination of the findings. Rumours regarding individuals or entities can be damaging to both the targets of the allegations and, ultimately, the beneficiaries of humanitarian programs. Good practices surrounding managing responses to findings of diversion and misappropriation might also be shared. There were a number of incidents in the last year, for example, where violence was threatened by individuals who were challenged in relation to diversion.⁸⁵

44. In 2013 the Somali NGO Consortium convened a working group on risk management and accountability and commissioned a study on approaches within the NGO community.⁸⁶ Further to the study, the Somalia NGO Consortium developed a

⁸² These methods may need to be constantly refined and their implementation is not always clear-cut: in one incident local communities reportedly complained about phone monitoring as it implied that their status as a beneficiary of United Nations/CHF aid had been revealed, thus compromising their safety. Interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 28 July 2014.

⁸³ For example, contractors identified in previous Monitoring Group reports as having diverted humanitarian assistance on a systematic scale and NGOs who have been discovered as involved in fraud continue to conduct significant business with United Nations and other entities — both directly and through the establishment of new companies led by the same individuals. In at least two cases, individuals identified as having been connected with serious NGO fraud and diversion were reported to have attempted, or were in the process of attempting, to re-assert their power through new or captured entities.

⁸⁴ As NGOs come under scrutiny, for example, new NGOs are often created or captured as fronts for individuals associated with a ‘blacklisted’ NGO. In a three month period in mid 2013, for example, it was reported that the number of registered NGOs had gone from 420 to 1742. Internal report, Somali NGO Consortium, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁸⁵ Interviews with humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 29 July 2014; and humanitarian NGO staff member, Nairobi, 19 March 2014.

⁸⁶ Somalia NGO Consortium, Study on Risk Management and Accountability practices among NGOs in Somalia, August 2013 on file with the Monitoring Group.

Code of Conduct and Guidelines on risk mitigation for NGOs working in Somalia (the Code).⁸⁷ Intended to be enforced via peer to peer oversight, as of August 2014, 26 NGOs had adopted the Code. Some gaps remain both in the Code itself and in how it is envisaged that NGOs relate to the broader humanitarian community. It is still not clear, for example, how information will be shared with, and by, United Nations agencies. At the end of August 2014, the RMU reported that it was in the process of preparing for the recruitment of a dedicated NGO Liaison officer. Determining how exactly this modality works will be critical.

Somali authorities

45. In Somalia the diversion of humanitarian inputs by state officials, and the need to take action, was acknowledged. In May 2014, for example, the FGS Minister for Interior and Federalism, Abdullahi Godah Barre, in a parliamentary address publically accused officials of humanitarian diversion in the context of efforts to resupply locations formerly controlled by Al-Shabaab.⁸⁸ Later in August 2014 at a press conference the Minister for Information, Mustafa Sheikh Ali Duhulow, vowed that, “those responsible for diversion, obstruction or corruption will be brought to court to face the severest punishment.”⁸⁹ In Puntland in March 2014, the District Commissioner of Xarfo was recalled to Garowe and placed under house arrest while accusations that he had been involved in diverting food aid from Turkey were investigated.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Somali NGO Consortium, Code of Conduct and risk mitigation standards, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁸⁸ He alleged in particular that on the orders of district officials local militia had stolen food aid intended for Bardale and Burhakaba. See inter alia, Shabelle news, “Interior Minister indicates that aid shipments to Bardale and Burhakaba were diverted”, 1 May 2014.

⁸⁹ Weekly press conference on the progress of the Government, 9 August 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group.

⁹⁰ Puntlandi.com, “Puntland government arrests the Commissioner of Xarfo on allegation of food corruption” (unofficial translation), 12 March 2014. Available at <http://puntlandi.com/dowlada-puntland-xirtay-guddoomiyaha-degmada-xarfo-ka-dib-markii-lagu-eedeeyay-musuuqmaasuq/>.

Annex 8

Violations of international humanitarian law

Annex 8.1: Targeting of civilians

Al-Shabaab

1. Attacks by Al-Shabaab against the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in high population density areas resulted in civilian casualties due to choice of weapons and lack of targeting or attempt to confine the impact of the attack.¹ Urban areas where AMISOM, SNAF and their allies had their primary bases, such as Belet Wenye, Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu, saw the worst casualties. On 19 March 2014, for example, four internally displaced persons (IDPs), including two children, were killed when mortars hit a camp in Wardhigley district. The intended target was believed to be a location in the Villa Somalia compound.²

2. Certain categories of civilian premises and civilians themselves were deliberately targeted. Those associated with the expansion of the authority of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) were a particular focus of suicide bombs and IEDs. Five parliamentarians, for example, were killed between January and August 2014. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the assassinations, although in some cases allegations that other actors were behind the killings circulated (see annex 1.3 on Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu). Individuals perceived to be providing even basic support services to officials of AMISOM or FGS, such as translators or even tea sellers, were also killed, although, again, attribution of responsibility to Al-Shabaab in each case was not always clear-cut. On 16 July 2014, for example, unidentified men shot and killed a young man who had been a translator for AMISOM in Ceel Jaale village outside Marka.³

3. In addition to targeted assassinations of Government and elected officials or those associated with Government, others with a public role, such as traditional elders, civil society activists, journalists and judges, were also murdered. On 7 December 2013, the body of a traditional elder, Shire Diriye Osman, was found near El Bur.⁴ He was one of more than 20 traditional elders who had been kidnapped from the area in October 2013. Identification of individual perpetrators and motivations was particularly difficult in the cases of murder of judges and journalists. In addition to Al-Shabaab, other business and political interests may have motivated these killings.⁵ In October 2013, for example, journalist Mohamed Mohamud (Tima'ade) was shot. According to colleagues interviewed by the Monitoring Group he had received threats from *both* Government officials and from Al-Shabaab prior to his death.⁶ The overall number of journalists killed on in 2013 (4),

¹ Thirty children were killed and 51 others injured in incidents involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during 2013, for example, although not all of these were attributable to Al-Shabaab. Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339) at paragraph 118.

² UNHCR, "Mortar attacks kill four displaced people in Mogadishu", 20 March 2012.

³ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the situation in Mogadishu, 16 July 2014.

⁴ Sabahi Online, "El Bur residents terrified by al-Shabaab's brutal murder of traditional elder", 10 December 2014.

⁵ Interview with United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 27 January 2014.

⁶ Phone interview with Somali journalist, 10 August, 2014.

however, dropped from that in 2012 (12).⁷ The safety of judges, on the other hand, deteriorated across Somalia, with four judges killed in November 2013 alone.⁸

4. It was not only categories of civilians connected to the state apparatus who were identified as 'legitimate' targets by Al-Shabaab. Other groups, such as the diaspora were also a declared focus. On 29 December 2013, for example, Sheikh Ali Mohamed Ali Jabal announced that Al-Shabaab would target diaspora Somalis as they spread "evil and atheism" and were servants of "unbelievers and infidels."⁹ A few days later, 3 bombs were detonated at Al Jazeera hotel killing 11.¹⁰

5. With the deliberate retreat of Al-Shabaab from areas targeted by the SNA/AMISOM offensive, direct encounters between the opposing forces were avoided in many cases. The guerrilla tactics favoured by Al-Shabaab against their adversary in their former territories, however, often resulted in harm to civilians. As ACLED noted in its analysis of FGS territorial gains in 2013: "once the Federal Government has regained territory, the non-combatant population remains exceptionally — if not increasingly — vulnerable to Al-Shabaab attacks on soft targets in the wake of the group's departure."¹¹ Civilians were also deliberately targeted in combat operations on some occasions. During an armed encounter in August 2014 between Al-Shabaab and SNAF and allied forces in Toos Weyne in Bay region, for example, it was reported that Al-Shabaab locked four civilians, including one child, in their homes and burned them.¹²

6. Direct attacks on both civilian targets and military targets in which civilians died escalated in May and June 2014, in the wake of the SNA/AMISOM offensive and with the commencement of Ramadan. On a daily basis, members of the SNAF, police and those affiliated with the FGS were individually targeted at their duty stations and homes through sniper fire or explosive devices. On 18 July 2014 in Kismayo, for example, a suicide bomber who blew himself up in the home of a senior Jubba Interim Administration (JIA) official killed 6 people and injured 5 others.¹³

7. Where Al-Shabaab was under military pressure, its tactic was often to incite fear among the population as a method of control, including through use of unpredictable violence as well as through restriction of movement or other rights, such as access to telecommunications. It frequently imposed harsh penalties for violations of its edicts, including execution, in conditions which were contrary to international law.¹⁴ There were public reports of at least 11 summary trials and public executions of alleged "spies" in connection with the conflict against SNA/AMISOM between March and late July 2014, all against the background of

⁷ Information compiled by the Committee to Project Journalists, available at <https://cpj.org/killed/africa/somalia/>.

⁸ Interview with United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 15 January 2014.

⁹ Somanews, "Sheikh Ali Jabal makes a statement on Mujahideen operations in Banadir region", 30 December 2014.

¹⁰ Somalilandsun, "Al Shabaab claims Mogadishu hotel bombings [unofficial translation]", 2 January 2014.

¹¹ ACLED, Conflict Trends No 22, Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, January 2014.

¹² E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the situation in Bay, 4 August 2014.

¹³ Hiiraan Online, "Suicide attack kills at least six in Kismayo", 18 July 2014.

¹⁴ The Group conducted one interview with an individual who had been subject to a summary trial by Al-Shabaab in conditions which lacked the most basic of fair trial guarantees. Interview with former prisoner of Al-Shabaab, location not disclosed for security reasons, December 2013.

increasing pressure on Al-Shabaab's control of territory. In July 2014, for example, it was reported that Al-Shabaab had conducted a public execution of a 13 or 14-year old girl in Dinsoor. She had been accused by Al-Shabaab of receiving training from the FGS in Hudur, which had transferred into FGS control in March 2014.¹⁵

8. Summary violent penalties were also meted out for other violations of Al-Shabaab directives related to its military campaign. As noted in annex 7.1, in the wake of the SNA/AMISOM offensive, Al-Shabaab used violence to deter the movement of food and goods into areas 'recovered' by the FGS.¹⁶ Those who worked to document human rights violations were also victims of attacks. In July 2013, Adan Salah Abdallah, was arrested, interrogated and detained for months by Al-Shabaab. He was killed on 19 November 2013.¹⁷ When Al-Shabaab requested Abdallah's family to collect his body they were informed that computer 'evidence' of his monitoring of their activities had been found.¹⁸

9. Penalties were also imposed for infractions, which, although not directly related to Al-Shabaab's military tactics, were nevertheless a means of asserting and maintaining control of their territory and its inhabitants. In one case documented by the Monitoring Group, a man was permanently crippled when he was beaten and thrown from a moving vehicle by Al-Shabaab fighters after being found in possession of a cigarette.¹⁹ Civilians involved in making a living from the *khat* trade were also targeted and killed. On 24 April 2014, for example, Al-Shabaab forces fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at a vehicle transporting *khat* in Danow village in Lower Shabelle killing one person.²⁰

10. Serious international crimes linked to the armed conflict in Somalia for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility were also committed outside Somalia territory, but where elements of the crimes took place in Somalia.²¹ The attack on the Westgate shopping centre in September 2013, for example, involved elements inside Somalia (see annex 2.1).

State entities

11. Despite capacity-building efforts, structural weaknesses within the Somali National Army (SNA) persisted, including a lack of representativeness of Somalia's population, weak centralised command and control, poorly qualified personnel, and inconsistent payment practices. This situation allowed clan loyalties and external interests to dominate ranks in many instances for both political and criminal purposes. Against the background of an adversary for which violation of

¹⁵ Sabahi Online, "Al Shabaab executes 14 year old girl in Dinsor", 23 July 2014. The Monitoring Group verified through sources on the ground that the execution took place.

¹⁶ In May 2014, for example, there were reports of the beheading of a woman near Garas Jereed village connected with her work as a milk trader in Qoryooley. E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of Lower Shabelle, 27 May 2014.

¹⁷ Interview with Somali human rights activist, Nairobi, 27 March 2014.

¹⁸ Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Communications report of special procedures, 2 June 2014, General Assembly [A/HRC/26/21](#).

¹⁹ Interview with IDP man from Lower Shabelle, location not provided for security reasons, December 2013.

²⁰ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 25 April 2014.

²¹ There are likely to have been a number of other jurisdictions engaged by the instigation, planning and implementation of the Westgate attack, including on the grounds of perpetrator nationality.

international humanitarian law was frequently a deliberate strategy, the SNA were also sometimes responsible for violations in the context of the conflict. These involved either disproportionate or deliberate use of force against civilians in the course of operations, or commission of other violations — such as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (see annex 8.3) — outside direct combat operations.

The war against Al-Shabaab

12. The means and methods of war utilised by Al-Shabaab, including asymmetric tactics and use of local populations as shields or cover for their activities, made both response to attacks by Al-Shabaab and proactive offensive engagement difficult, including in terms of ensuring adherence to international law. During 2013, for example, the United Nations verified at least 334 incidents involving child casualties for which the SNA and allied militias were identified as responsible (98 killed and 26 injured), particularly as a result of cross-fire and shelling.²² The first phase of the 2014 offensive against Al-Shabaab, which began in March 2014, also saw allegations of violations of international law, including in particular in the context of assertion of control in recovered areas. In Baidoa, for example, United Nations agencies received credible reports of the commission of SGBV crimes against IDP women “by armed men” at checkpoints around the town.²³

13. Outside combat operations, there were reports of violations by the Somali security forces and its allies of other applicable international law, including arbitrary arrest and detention, extrajudicial killings and torture. Arrest operations involving the arrest of large numbers of individuals were conducted regularly by Somali security forces (sometimes jointly with AMISOM), or by allied forces. These operations were generally conducted in anticipation, or in the wake, of attacks by Al-Shabaab. While in essence policing operations, they were usually conducted by military or FGS National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) personnel, and rarely pursuant to arrest warrants or other formal directions relating to search or seizure.²⁴ Although many of those arrested were generally quickly released, there were credible allegations of killings and enforced disappearances in the course of these operations received by both the Monitoring Group and other United Nations sources, in addition to allegations of torture in detention. In February 2014, for example, credible information was received from the United Nations and other reliable sources regarding the deaths of 9 individuals, in circumstances arguably amounting to extra-judicial killing, in the course of an operation conducted in the wake of the killing of a senior intelligence official in Kismayo.²⁵

14. The Monitoring Group reviewed a number of allegations relating to torture in NISA custody in Mogadishu, both within the context of the conflict, and more broadly. In one case which received considerable publicity, a well-known journalist,

²² Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 118.

²³ Telephone interview with United Nations staff member, 17 July 2014; and United Nations staff member, 17 August 2014; and more broadly with respect to Bay region, interviews with former consultant expert, Nairobi, 16 April, 2014; and expert with knowledge of Ethiopian operations in Somalia, Nairobi, 24 July 2014.

²⁴ Telephone interview with United Nations staff member, 20 August 2014. There were also questions about the scope of NISA’s jurisdiction to detain.

²⁵ E-mail reliable NGO source, 18 February 2014; phone interview with United Nations staff member, 20 August 2014.

Mohamed Bare, was detained by NISA officials on 11 February 2014 and severely beaten and threatened.²⁶ Not questioned in relation to any alleged crime, it was indicated at one point that his treatment related to his publication of a photograph of the injured Deputy Governor of Lower Shabelle shortly after a car bomb explosion.²⁷ In May 2014, the death in NISA custody was also reported of Farhan Moalim Muhamed, a freelance journalist who had previously worked with Radio Kulmiye in Kismayo. He was reported dead within 48 hours further to his arrest on suspicion of connection with Al-Shabaab.²⁸ In another widely reported and discussed case, Abdirizak Gurey alleged that he had been arrested, detained and beaten severely by members of the NISA at a secret location.²⁹ Although this latter case appeared to have occurred in circumstances unconnected with the conflict it reflects the pattern of conduct alleged. The Monitoring Group also received credible information on the use of torture in Mogadishu Central Prison on at least four instances in 2013, including beatings combined with forced sun exposure and the employment of a form of metal restraint which can be progressively tightened to cause severe pain.³⁰

15. The context of political command in which these incidents unfolded is reflected in comments by the then Mayor of Mogadishu Mohamed Nur in February 2014: “[a]ny captured Al-Shabaab members must be stoned to death on the place they are captured, they don’t need to be taken to custody.”³¹ In June 2014, the head of the Military Court, Abdirahman Mahmoud Tur-yare, was reported to have vowed, “it will never happen again that an arrested Al-Shabaab fighter is released.”³² Within this environment, and notwithstanding the 2011 commitment to declaring a moratorium, there was a rise in the number of executions carried out further to trial and sentence within the military justice system.³³ By mid-August 2014, there had been 14 executions conducted in Mogadishu and Kismayo.

Other territorial, resource, and inter-clan armed violence

16. The offensive by the SNAF, its allied forces, AMISOM and its strategic partners resulted in the opening up of new territories to potential Government control. With ‘government’ itself not a cohesive entity, however, the existence of recovered territory only added to the complexity of the forces and interests at play — both national and foreign — over who would be enabled to assert power. Contestation over control of both the creation of new federal entities and recovered

²⁶ Bare was arrested alongside Ibrahim Mohamed Ali of Radio Haatuf and a radio engineer Abdikarim Fiidow. Reporters without borders, “Security agents still hound journalist after detaining, torturing him”, 25 February 2014.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Radio Kulmiye, “A journalist killed by soldiers from the intelligence section in Mogadishu [informal translation]”, 21 May 2014, republished at Wehliye online. Available at <http://wehliye.com/dhageyso-wariye-ciidanka-nabad-sugida-ku-dileen-magaalada-muqdisho/>. Phone interview with Somali journalist with knowledge of the case, 17 August 2014.

²⁹ Cassimadda on line, “Intelligence establishes torture houses [informal translation],” 6 June 2014, Available at <http://caasimadda.com/sawirro-nabadsugida-oo-guryo-dadka-lagu-jirdilo-ka-sameysatay-muqdisho/>.

³⁰ Phone interview with former prisoner, 21 July 2014.

³¹ Hiiraan Online, “Mogadishu Mayor urges security to kill captured Al-Shabaab members on the spot”, 11 February 2014.

³² Hiiraan Online, “Somalia government announces tougher punishments for rapists”, 16 June 2014.

³³ Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 12 May 2014 (S/2014/330), at paragraph 43.

territory underlay outbreaks of conflict across South Central and interacted with the dynamics of already escalating inter-clan conflicts. These conflicts resulted in attacks on civilians, both in the course of clashes directly related to the federalisation process, and also indirectly. Inter-clan violence, for example, was in some instances attributable to strategic manoeuvres related to the process of state formation. In Baidoa, for example, on 25 March 2014, demonstrations were mounted by some residents against the visit of Member of the Federal Parliament Shariif Hassan Sheikh Adan, a proponent of the three-state administration in the area. Armed men associated with Hassan's delegation opened fire on the protesters and a 16-year old boy was shot.³⁴

17. Killings of civilians in the course of clan, business and resource disputes occurred regularly, and were resolved at a local level, throughout Somalia. However, the retreat of Al-Shabaab during the last two years created a vacuum in which inter-clan tensions reignited into more widespread conflict, sometimes actively encouraged by Al-Shabaab as a means of destabilizing former areas of control. These conflicts were also manipulated for the benefit of business and political interests, including the struggle over the federal structure of the state and capture of new revenue streams in the rejuvenating economy. Elements of the SNA and officials within local political administrations contributed to the conduct of the attacks, whether in terms of the distribution of arms and uniforms or through direct involvement of personnel. In Lower Shebelle in particular the assets and authority of the SNA were progressively hijacked during the reporting period, with the clan make-up of the forces leading to its overwhelming engagement on 'one-side' of the conflict there (see annex 3.2).

18. The confluence of these conditions enabled the commission of large-scale attacks on civilian areas and breaches of international law. Credible testimonies and other information collected by the Monitoring Group described killing and wounding of civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, looting and burning of homes, villages and farm equipment, and forced displacement in three locations: villages around Jowhar in Middle Shabelle, around K50 in Lower Shabelle and Kabxanley in Hiran. Perpetrators of the attacks were described as "clan militia," "SNA" and individuals wearing Government uniforms, supported by 'technicals' with mounted weaponry. The level of central command and control of the SNA varied with allegations ranging from suggestions that units 'deserted' to join their clan militia, to authorisation at higher levels of command. In some of the instances, engagement of SNAF forces was acknowledged and justified by reference to the conflict against Al-Shabaab. In an interview for Radio Kulmiye in August 2014 General Dahir Adan Elmi Indha qarshe, the Chief of the Defence Forces, acknowledged that it was possible that individuals from the SNA could have taken part in some of the attacks. He argued, however, that if the army itself had been involved there would have been much greater casualties.³⁵ In August 2014, it was reported that a senior officer and three of his close staff in Brigade 3 had been put

³⁴ E-mail, human rights defender known to the Group, 26 March 2014. Picture of wounded child on file with the Group.

³⁵ Interview recorded with General Elmi on 6 August 2014. Available at <http://radiokulmiye.com/knn/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/BAR-XOG-WAREYSI-06-08-2014-Y.mp3>.

under house arrest further to their alleged involvement in fuelling the conflict in Lower Shabelle.³⁶

19. The Monitoring Group continues to investigate these allegations. Preliminary findings in relation to one interrelated cycle of attacks carried out in November 2013 on 20 villages north east of Jowhar in Middle Shabelle are presented in strictly confidential annex 8.2. The attacks on Jowhar illustrated the pattern of conduct, perpetrator type, and mode of perpetration which were seen in the other cycles of attacks under investigation. There were no visible measures taken by the authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for these violations, although in some cases preliminary Government enquiries were conducted. This culture of impunity fuelled the conflict cycles, particularly intensifying in Lower Shabelle and Hiran in mid-2014. The violent manifestation by individuals and groups within the SNAF of parallel allegiances not only presented a serious challenge to the exercise of state responsibility for the monopoly on the use of force. It also undermined statebuilding and security through the erosion of public trust in the function and loyalties of the forces.

20. Finally, with road ‘taxation’ a staple business for many armed groups, attacks on civilians during extortion at roadblocks, and conflict over their control, were frequent. The predatory behaviour of the SNA was identified as a factor contributing to rising insecurity in Lower Shabelle in May 2014 with the Secretary-General describing: “criminal activities reportedly carried out by Somali troops, including illegal checkpoints, shootings and armed robberies.”³⁷

Somaliland and Puntland

21. In Somaliland, allegations relating to unlawful use of force outside the context of armed conflict primarily focused on the operations of the Rapid Response Unit. These related to unlawful entry of offices and homes, and assault, in addition to three killings in the context of demonstrations or arrest efforts since early 2013.³⁸ In Puntland, there were also similar reports, including of the death of one man in the context of demonstrations in wake of the announcement of the Presidential election results on 8 January 2014.³⁹ Sool and eastern Saanag were the site of increasing political and armed tensions in the last year, escalating into open conflict on a number of occasions and involving the armed forces of the self-declared Khatumo State and the Somaliland and Puntland administrations, causing heightened tensions between the two regions. In November 2013, an attack on the town of Taleex by a large contingent of Puntland security and allied forces resulted in the killing of at least 6 civilians, the wounding of over 20 and the temporary displacement of communities from the town. Details of this attack are contained in strictly confidential annex 8.2. Armed violence again occurred around the same location in April 2014, with a series of encounters between Khatumo forces and Somaliland forces, and continued at time of writing.

³⁶ E-mail, United Nations staff member, 7 August 2014.

³⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 12 May 2014 (S/2014/330), at paragraph 12.

³⁸ Interviews conducted with United Nations and NGO staff in Hargeisa, January and June 2014.

³⁹ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of security context in Puntland, 9 January 2014; interview with United Nations staff member, Garowe, 10 December 2013; telephone interview with United Nations staff member, 13 August 2014.

International forces

22. As noted above, Al-Shabaab's adversaries operated in highly compromised environments where guerrilla warfare was the norm and where strict adherence to international law was a major challenge. There were frequent incidents in which disproportionate use of force by AMISOM in reaction to unexpected assaults on personnel and convoys resulted in killing and injury to civilians. On 26 March 2014 in Kismayo, for example, further to an RCIED attack, AMISOM soldiers opened fire and four bystanders were killed "as a result of the blast and the ensuing shooting."⁴⁰ Direct military engagements between SNA/AMISOM and Al-Shabaab forces also resulted in civilian casualties. On 14 April 2014, for example, in response to a hit and run attack on SNA/AMISOM positions, heavy gunfire, mortars and RPGs were exchanged and two children were killed when a mortar hit a residential home.⁴¹

23. Allegations relating to the impact on civilian areas of ground and aerial engagement by international forces, including AMISOM's strategic partners in Somalia, were received but could not be verified. On 20 May 2014, for example, a village at Faragurow, 3 kilometres west of Jilib town in Middle Jubba, was attacked by fighter jets. Some reports claimed that among the dead were "2 women, 2 children and an old man."⁴² Further to a series of such attacks in the area it was reported that Al-Shabaab had prevented some of the population from attempting to flee the bombardments.⁴³ The Monitoring Group also received credible information from a number of sources relating to allegations of violations of international law during operations by Ethiopian security forces, in particular forces operating outside the AMISOM framework.⁴⁴ Enquires are continuing.

Attacks on schools and hospitals

24. During 2013, the Secretary-General reported that "fifty-four attacks on schools and 11 attacks on hospitals" had taken place in Somalia.⁴⁵ The perpetrators of these attacks were identified variously as, "the national army (28), Al-Shabaab (18), unknown armed groups (7) and ASWJ (1)."⁴⁶ In the first quarter of 2014, in contrast however, there was only one attack on a school and one attack on a hospital verified by the MRM.

25. In the wake of the pull out of MSF from Somalia, and when retreating from formerly-held territory, Al-Shabaab on a number of occasions removed medical supplies or temporarily halted medical services by occupying or closing facilities.⁴⁷ In 2013, four attacks on schools by Al-Shabaab and an unknown armed group

⁴⁰ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of security situation in Kismayo, 27 March 2014.

⁴¹ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 15 April 2014.

⁴² Shabelle News, "Fighter Jet strikes town near Jilib", 20 May 2014; e-mail, reliable NGO source, 20 May 2014.

⁴³ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of the area, 25 May 2014.

⁴⁴ Interview with expert with knowledge of Ethiopian operations in Somalia, Nairobi, 27 July 2014; interview with former expert consultant, Nairobi, 16 April 2014; phone interview United Nations staff member, 17 July 2014.

⁴⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 120.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ See, for example, with respect to Hudur in March 2014, Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism for Grave Violations of Child Rights (MRM in Somalia), January to March 2014 Update Vol. 6, 2014.

resulted in the recruitment of 34 boys.”⁴⁸ On 18 June 2014, an IED attached to a car belonging to a doctor at Keysaney hospital in Mogadishu exploded in the car park of the hospital killing the doctor and wounding six others. It was not clear who carried out the attack.⁴⁹

26. Parties to the conflict sometimes used schools and hospital facilities for accommodation and other purposes, undermining their civilian character, rendering them subject to attack, and reducing access for the community to basic services.⁵⁰ In Warsheik in Middle Shabelle, for example, it was reported in April 2014 that AMISOM personnel had occupied a health facility and the SNA a primary and secondary school, although some services still managed to operate.⁵¹ Reports were also received by the Monitoring Group of deliberate attacks on, and burning of, schools near Jowhar in Middle Shabelle in the context of inter-clan clashes also involving elements of the security forces in early November 2013.⁵²

Measures to enhance compliance with international law

27. In resolution 2124 (2013), the Security Council called on the FGS to strengthen the SNAF, inter alia, by “establishing clear command and control systems, implementing appropriate procedures, codes of conduct and training.” Subsequently, in resolution 2158 (2014), it further stressed “the need for the FGS to ensure that all perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law are held accountable.” In the last year, training and refresher training for SNA troops were conducted, alongside a specialized train-the-trainers workshop for 23 key SNA officers (including 5 women officers) in international humanitarian law.⁵³ Efforts were also made to streamline payment and other forms of support for the SNA, including through the development of a biometric data base which would assist in the identification and tracking of personnel, as well as facilitating salary disbursement.⁵⁴

28. With respect to AMISOM, a welcome development was the announcement in June 2014 of new Standing Operational Procedures for the Handling of all Persons Detained by AMISOM.⁵⁵ The lack of address of allegations of civilian harm, however, added to the complexities of the theatre, including with respect to

⁴⁸ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 120.

⁴⁹ E-mail, reliable NGO source with knowledge of security related incidents in Mogadishu, 18 June 2014.

⁵⁰ In resolution 2143 (2014) the Security Council, inter alia, requested enhanced monitoring of the military use of schools which deprives children of their basic right to access to education and puts them at risk.

⁵¹ Interview with Somali human rights expert, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014.

⁵² Phone interview with Somali journalist, 6 August 2014. This report was confirmed by an INGO humanitarian assessment reviewed by the Group. The schools were in the Jareer villages of Geddo barakan and Mererey.

⁵³ According to the figures reportedly presented by the SNA command for joint operations with AMISOM in the second phase of the offensive, a total of 4,431 have been certified and a further 1,919 are yet to be certified. E-mail United Nations staff member, 18 August 2014. See also AMISOM, Press Release, “Somali National Army (SNA) gets an initial pool of trainers in international humanitarian law (IHL) and Human Rights”, 28 August 2014.

⁵⁴ E-mail, United Nations staff member, 18 August 2014.

⁵⁵ Standard Operating Procedures for the Handling of all Persons Detained by AMISOM, on file with the Group.

AMISOM being able to analyse incidents and input to tactical guidance. In resolution [2158 \(2014\)](#), the Security Council expressed “concern” that AMISOM had “not yet established a Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response cell” (CCTARC).” By late August 2014, the Monitoring Group had received information, however, that the senior advisor essential to the establishment of CCTARC was due to be recruited.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Phone interview with INGO expert, 19 August 2014.

**Annex 8.2: Targeting of civilians in villages around Jowhar,
Middle Shabelle, and in Taleex, Sool, November 2013
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 8.3: Sexual and gender-based violence

Violations by armed actors

29. As previously documented by the Group (S/2013/413, annex 8.2) by far the most frequently cited perpetrator of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women and girls and men and boys in Somalia was an “armed actor,” sometimes identified as a member of the Somali security forces. The Secretary-General’s report on children in armed conflict in 2014, for example, reported 154 verified incidents of sexual violence against children during 2013, including by “unknown armed elements (65), members of the national army and allied militias (49), Al-Shabaab (31), ASWJ (7) and the Somaliland forces (2).”⁵⁷ The widespread availability of guns and uniforms made identification of the affiliation of the armed actor difficult, exacerbated by the fact that in the last year, particularly in South Central Somalia, the prevailing authority in areas where violations occurred was often unclear.⁵⁸

30. Across Somalia, the majority of rape cases which were reported were perpetrated against internally displaced persons (IDPs). The last consolidated report from United Nations agencies and partners indicated that 78 percent of survivors who reported incidents to service providers were from IDP communities.⁵⁹ Inadequate physical shelter, the need to travel far to make a living, and belonging to a minority, were among the factors which exacerbated vulnerability across the country. Poverty, exclusion and frustration also created a context for both higher levels of intimate partner violence and SGBV committed by relatives or family, including against children when mothers left to search for work.⁶⁰ In February 2014, further to a series of fact-finding missions in the second half of 2013, Human Rights Watch issued a report on SGBV in Mogadishu and Benadir. Based on interviews conducted primarily with IDP women, the report described a situation of widespread commission of SGBV crimes, inadequate support services, failure of the justice system and fear of reprisals by those who reported allegations of SGBV or provided support to survivors.⁶¹ In 2013, the United Nations MRM verified the “rape of 21 children in 19 separate incidents by national army and unknown armed elements inside internally displaced persons camps.”⁶²

31. Inter-clan violence also saw rape used as a tool of revenge. In villages around Jowhar, for example, the Monitoring Group received information on cases of rape

⁵⁷ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 119.

⁵⁸ Multiple interviews with international and Somalia women NGO staff members, October 2013 to July 2014.

⁵⁹ GBV Integrated Management System, Trends and patterns of gender-based violence in Somalia, Consolidated report from July 2012 to June 2013. The most recent consolidated report has not yet been finalized. The data reflects “reported incidents to service providers directly working with GBV survivors” and is “in no way representative of the total incidents nor prevalence of GBV in Somalia.” See also, inter alia, phone interview Somali NGO expert, 5 October 2013; internal INGO report, December 2013, on file with Group.

⁶⁰ Interview with human rights expert, Hargeisa, 6 January 2014.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, *Here rape is normal, a five point plan to address sexual violence in Somalia*, February 2014.

⁶² United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at para 119.

committed by both Abgal/Mohamed Muse and Shidle militia in late 2013.⁶³ As conflicts escalated and intertwined in Lower Shabelle — both the offensive against Al-Shabaab and inter-clan conflict between primarily Haber gadir and Biomaal clans — the Group also increasingly received allegations of SGBV, in particular spiking around May and June 2014, and with the take-over of Marka.⁶⁴

32. In the context of the SNA/AMISOM offensive against Al-Shabaab, credible reports were received of rape committed at checkpoints around towns ‘newly recovered’ from Al-Shabaab.⁶⁵ Due to the lack of United Nations partners or service-providers on the ground in those areas, however, it was not possible to verify these allegations and enquiries are ongoing.

33. Reports from Al-Shabaab-held territories indicated that SGBV continued to be practiced against women and girls, particularly in the form of forced marriage.⁶⁶ The UN MRM reported that 20 girls had been forcibly married further to their recruitment into Al-Shabaab during 2013.⁶⁷ The Monitoring Group confirmed that forced marriage was a common practice in Lower and Middle Jubba and Middle Shabelle.⁶⁸ Forced marriage was not, however, the only form of SGBV committed. The Group also received testimony, for example, of the killing of two men, and the rape of 5 women encountered by Al-Shabaab forces at a checkpoint in early 2013.⁶⁹

The obligation to prevent, investigate and prosecute SGBV and the right to a remedy⁷⁰

34. The Provisional Constitution of Somalia provides that, “every person has the right to personal security and this includes: [...] all forms of violence, including any form of violence against women, torture or inhumane treatment” (article 15 (2)). The interaction of the Somali penal code and *Xeer* customary law system, alongside social and cultural assumptions, however, left most SGBV survivors in practice without any right to a remedy.

35. The work of monitoring and reporting on violations itself — including generating data based on service provision — was viewed with suspicion.⁷¹ In some

⁶³ Interview with rape survivor, Jowhar, 4 June, 2014, notes of interview conducted on behalf of the Group; interview with staff member of human rights NGO, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014.

⁶⁴ E-mail, former NGO staff member, 20 May 2014, information compiled 8 February 2014. The United Nations confirmed these observations. Phone interview with United Nations staff member, 17 August 2014.

⁶⁵ Telephone interview with United Nations staff member, 18 July 2014; interview with expert on operations of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, Nairobi, 27 July 2014.

⁶⁶ Interview with Somali researcher, Nairobi, 24 March 2014.

⁶⁷ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 119.

⁶⁸ Interviews with Somali NGO staff member, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014; Somali NGO staff member, Nairobi, 14 April 2014; and Somali researcher, Nairobi, 23 October 2013.

⁶⁹ Interview with IDP woman survivor of rape by Al-Shabaab, location suppressed for security reasons, 8 January 2014.

⁷⁰ A number of treaties ratified by Somalia oblige the state to prevent, investigate and punish SGBV in certain circumstances. Where SGBV amounts to a war crime in customary international law governing non-international armed conflict, prosecution is also mandated.

⁷¹ Although Government may have a legitimate interest — and indeed an obligation to investigate — where information indicating the commission of SGBV crimes is provided, service providers also must be able to preserve the confidentiality and security of those who approach them for assistance.

places, Government officials were openly hostile with health workers and SGBV focal points often vulnerable to harassment.⁷² Where a survivor of SGBV did make a formal complaint, obstacles in the official process often made it impossible to sustain the claim. Not only was medical assistance considered acceptable only if obtained from a designated hospital and designated doctor, but repeated payments were required to maintain the case in the system.⁷³ Whereas strictly speaking an SGBV allegation triggers state responsibility and does not depend on the capacity of the survivor to support the case, the reality of both attitudes and legal tradition in Somalia is that the matter tended to be viewed as a dispute between two parties. According to a local NGO expert, in one case, for example, the alleged perpetrator and his victim were locked in one cell by a police officer and told to “work it out.”⁷⁴ Even if the elements of a case were clear, the clan affiliation of the perpetrator, or other connections to sites of power, frequently operated to leave victims without redress. Information was received, for example, on a case in Mogadishu in which two perpetrators were clearly identified as responsible for the rape but clan protection trumped prosecution.⁷⁵

36. It was challenges around the conception of SGBV, as an offence against collective honour in the customary system, however, which created the most insurmountable barriers to the process of seeking justice for survivors.⁷⁶ The approach of the customary system is one in which decision making and payment of compensation is between clan groups, women are rarely heard in proceedings, and forced marriage is often an acceptable outcome. In Somaliland, the disturbing phenomenon of gang rape appeared to be even facilitated by the structure of the customary system itself.⁷⁷ In a single perpetrator rape, costs are shouldered by one *diya* paying group. Where there are multiple perpetrators, however, payment of compensation is shared between all the relevant *diya* paying groups. Engaging in a gang rape therefore not only diminished the individual sense of responsibility and accountability, it was also ‘logical’ in cost terms. Individuals perceived to be from communities of lesser value due to their clan or other status — “*looma ooyaan*” or “the un-mourned” — were both much more likely to become victims of SGBV and to be unable to seek justice.⁷⁸ In addition to status vis a vis clan or other marker, the relative ‘value’ of women and men, also influenced approaches to investigation and penalty. One local NGO staff member interviewed by the Monitoring Group, for example, told how the father of one of two young men who had raped a 15 year old

⁷² The Monitoring Group was told, for example, how in some places NGO staff was even fearful of attending meetings with Government officials as it might permit their identity as humanitarian workers supporting SGBV victims to be “revealed”. Telephone interview with humanitarian INGO staff member, 20 March 2014.

⁷³ This requirement was not a matter of law, but of practice. The effect, however, was the same. Interviews with INGO staff member, Nairobi, 12 Feb 2014; and Somali NGO, Nairobi, 15 May 2014.

⁷⁴ Telephone interview with Somali women’s rights expert, 5 October 2013.

⁷⁵ Skype interview Somali human rights activist, 7 March 2014.

⁷⁶ Part IX of the Somalia Penal Code (1964) categorises “crimes of sexual violence”, for example, under the header of “Crimes against morals and decency”. Somalia: Penal Code, 3 April 1964.

⁷⁷ Research by the Strategic Initiative on Women in the Horn of Africa focuses, inter alia, on understanding the dimensions of gang or multi-perpetrator rape as it has emerged in Somaliland, forthcoming September 2014. See www.siha.net.

⁷⁸ Interview with Somali researcher, Nairobi, 23 October 2014.

girl persuaded police not to pursue the case as his son “had a future.” He was a university student.⁷⁹

37. In addition to all these inherent obstacles to prosecution and redress for survivors of SGBV, official postures were adopted which obstructed investigations. The Monitoring Group reported last year in detail on a case in which a number of people connected with a young woman who had made an allegation of rape against a member of the security forces — including the woman’s husband — were arrested and ultimately sentenced to terms of imprisonment (S/2013/413, annex 8.2). The danger of making a public allegation of rape was once again highlighted in the last year in two more cases.⁸⁰ In the first case, a young woman journalist at Kasm Voice Women’s radio accused two individuals, also with connections to the media, of rape in a video interview.⁸¹ Both the alleged victim and the journalist who had recorded her testimony were arrested further to a complaint of defamation lodged by the alleged perpetrators.⁸² On 9 December 2013, the journalist, the director of the media network where he was employed, and the alleged victim were all sentenced to prison or house arrest, although they later paid fines *in lieu*. The two individuals accused of the rape were, however, not charged with any offence.⁸³ In the second case, a woman who alleged she was abducted by security forces and raped by AMISOM personnel in AMISOM’s Maslah camp in August 2013, and the advocates and service providers who supported her, suffered serious harassment and threats.⁸⁴

Violations by international actors

38. Further to its previous report documenting sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) allegations against AMISOM personnel (S/2013/413, annex 8.2), the Monitoring Group this year also received similar allegations, including of rape, attempted rape and sexual exploitation. One case which generated significant international attention was that of a woman who alleged she was taken from the street by Somali security personnel and later raped by AMISOM personnel at Maslah camp in Mogadishu in August 2013.⁸⁵ On 15 August 2013 it was announced that AMISOM and the FGS had formed a “joint team” to investigate the

⁷⁹ Telephone interview with Somalia NGO staff member, 5 October 2013.

⁸⁰ Although figures for the second half of 2013 and 2014 are not yet available, it is notable that the number of reports of SGBV made to service providers showed a “significant decrease” in the wake of the January 2013 case. GBV Integrated Management System, “Trends and patterns of gender-based violence in Somalia, Consolidated report from July 2012 to June 2013”.

⁸¹ Testimony recorded at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=olhrZLRjC_Q.

⁸² BBC News, “Somali woman journalist arrested for reporting rape”, 21 November 2013.

⁸³ The Monitoring Group has confirmed that one of the two accused had considerable influence within the national security services, and was known to carry a pistol. Interview with Somali activist with knowledge of the case, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014; telephone interview with journalist, 6 August 2014; and interview, Somali human rights expert, Mogadishu, 19 December 2014.

⁸⁴ Skype interview with INGO staff member with knowledge of the case, 24 March 2014; interview with diplomat, Nairobi, 3 December 2013. See further discussion of the case below.

⁸⁵ The TV interview which triggered the enquiry can be viewed at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EoHHQDZyQKE>. Human Rights Watch (HRW) found the woman’s testimony and hospital records consistent and credible. Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Deeply flawed rape inquiry: Victim of Alleged Attack by AU Soldiers and Witnesses Harassed”, 11 November 2013.

allegation.⁸⁶ On 5 November 2014, HRW reported that AMISOM had informed them that, “AMISOM and the Somali government had determined the woman’s allegations to be unfounded.”⁸⁷ To date, however, there has been no official public statement from either the FGS or AMISOM setting out the findings of their respective investigations into the matter.

39. The preliminary findings of the Monitoring Group with respect to allegations of SGBV and SEA by AMISOM personnel are contained in strictly confidential annex 8.4. In addition, HRW conducted investigations into SGBV and SEA by AMISOM personnel, interviewing both survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse and mission personnel. As part of its research, HRW documented 10 cases of sexual abuse, including rape and sexual assault, and 14 cases of sexual exploitation, some of minors, by AMISOM personnel, in findings that suggested “a much larger problem.”⁸⁸

Measures to enhance compliance

40. There were significant developments in the last year in terms of both acknowledging and creating an effective framework for prevention and response to SGBV at federal level. As one United Nations staff member put it “we have moved beyond denial.”⁸⁹ On 7 May 2013, a Joint Communiqué signed by the FGS and the United Nations on the prevention of sexual violence (the Communiqué) recognised the, “very high numbers of incidents of sexual violence have been reported consistently” and undertook, inter alia, to develop and implement “a comprehensive strategy to prevent and respond to sexual violence” including “a specialized investigation capacity.”⁹⁰ In mid-2014, a National Action Plan on Sexual Violence in Conflict (NAP/SVC) was agreed. Seven ministries created specific plans of action for their areas of responsibility. The plan developed by the Ministry of Defense and Somali National Army Action, for example, foresees, inter alia, the creation of a specialized complaints unit; reform of military court procedure; and revision of both the Code of Conduct and General Order, alongside the issue of specific operation specific and command orders.⁹¹ Coordinated by the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, a Sexual Offences Bill is also under development, supported by a Gender Legislation Committee.

41. There were a number of positive developments which indicated a shift in the posture of AMISOM in acknowledgment of, and response to, the prevalence of sexual exploitation and instances of SGBV. These were reflected particularly in initiatives focusing on standard setting and prevention. In September 2013, AMISOM disseminated a short ‘easy to read’ guide to the AMISOM Policy on prevention and response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA policy) which

⁸⁶ See AMISOM, “AMISOM will work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to investigate allegation of rape against its soldiers in Maslah”, Press Release, 15 August 2014.

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Somalia: Deeply flawed rape inquiry: Victim of Alleged Attack by AU Soldiers and Witnesses Harassed”, 11 November 2013.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, *The power these men have over us, Sexual exploitation and abuse by African Union forces in Somalia*, forthcoming September 2014.

⁸⁹ Phone interview with United Nations staff member, 19 July 2014.

⁹⁰ Communiqué of 07 May 2013, between the Federal Government of Somalia and the UN on the Prevention of Sexual Violence.

⁹¹ Ministry of Defense and Somali National Army Action plan on sexual violence in conflict, on file with the Group.

declared AMISOM's commitment to "rigorous investigation of complaints" and the taking of "disciplinary action."⁹² On 3 February 2014, the AMISOM Force Commander issued a Legal Directive on operations in advance of the SNA/AMISOM offensive against Al-Shabaab.⁹³ The Directive addressed both "SEA" and "rape", noting that the latter could constitute a war crime and directing that any allegations of SEA should be "investigated and action taken without delay," including submission of a report to Force Headquarters.

42. With respect to prevention, AMISOM pre-mission deployment and in-theatre training continued to include instruction on the prohibition on SGBV and SEA and on conduct and discipline issues.⁹⁴ Preventative measures were also taken under the direction of the Force Commander such as, for example, the imposition of additional restrictions of movement, designation of off-limit areas and the insertion of gender focal point officers into high risk areas. In addition, and in line with an AU-wide effort by the Peace and Security Operations Division, plans were put in place for the deployment of a Conduct and Discipline Unit to the mission.

43. With respect to enforcement, individual troop contributing countries (TCCs) were primarily responsible for investigating allegations against their personnel,⁹⁵ with AMISOM itself responsible for the civilian component of the mission.⁹⁶ In the last year, both Headquarter and Contingent level Boards of Inquiry (BoIs) were established to investigate allegations of SGBV and SEA. Information received by the Monitoring Group indicates that recommendations of AMISOM BOIs led to court-martials, repatriation and criminal prosecutions of offenders. There was, however, no clear, dedicated central mechanism that would safely and independently receive complaints and make preliminary assessments of allegations. The African Union Commission (AUC) has the obligation, for example, to liaise with the TCCs to ensure that states actively investigate, punish as appropriate and compensate of victims. It is not clear, however, the extent to which the findings of contingent level BoIs were forwarded to the SSRC as required. There appeared to be reluctance on strategic grounds to report on the scale of measures taken in response to — as opposed to prevention of — specific incidents of SEA and SGBV. It is apparent that the opacity that surrounds AMISOM's response to specific SEA and SGBV allegations contributes to public concern.

⁹² On file with the Monitoring Group. The emphasis on accountability was reinforced by the inclusion of a special annex to the guide on "conducting effective investigations into SEA".

⁹³ On file with the Monitoring Group.

⁹⁴ See, for example, AMISOM Press release, "AMISOM gender unit conducts workshop on good practices in preventing sexual exploitation and abuse", 1 June 2014.

⁹⁵ Individual troop and personnel contributing countries have primary responsibility for the actions of their personnel acting extraterritorially in Somalia. Burundi, Kenya and Uganda have particularly acute obligations relating to the prosecution of sexual violence under the Great Lakes Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children, 2006.

⁹⁶ AMISOM Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) between AMISOM and Somalia, March 2007, article 55.

**Annex 8.4: Sexual and gender-based violence allegations involving
AMISOM personnel (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)***

* The annex has not been reproduced in the present document because it is strictly confidential.

Annex 8.5: Recruitment and use of children in armed conflict

Violations by Al-Shabaab

44. Children continued to be recruited and abducted by Al-Shabaab in increasing numbers. In the last quarter of 2013, the United Nations documented 248 cases of recruitment and use of children in armed conflict by Al-Shabaab, more than double the number of reported violations in the previous quarter. A “renewed campaign” at “religious institutions such as mosques and madrasas” was cited for the rise in the number of violations, including through the use of peer-to-peer recruiting.⁹⁷ In June 2013, for example, there were public reports that in the preceding period of approximately six weeks, “more than 350 children under the age of 16 ha[d] been taken from Qur’an schools or while playing in the streets of El Bur and surrounding areas.”⁹⁸ By mid-2014, the Monitoring Group had received information of an intensified focus on Qur’anic schools, including evening schools established with a specific indoctrination and recruitment objective, in particular in villages in Lower and Middle Juba.⁹⁹

45. Public reports confirmed that children living in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab were especially targeted for abduction prior to military assaults, including in the run up to the joint SNA/AMISOM and military offensive against Al-Shabaab.¹⁰⁰ The means and methods of asymmetric and guerrilla warfare favoured by Al-Shabaab rendered children particularly appropriate for direct participation in operations, in addition to providing support services, such as domestic work and information gathering. Children recruited or used by Al-Shabaab were also likely to be subjected to other conduct contrary to international law. In one incident, for example, a 16-year-old boy was executed by the Al-Shabaab for attempted desertion in December 2013.¹⁰¹ In July 2014, a young girl, reportedly 13 or 14 years of age, was publically executed for espionage in Dinsoor.¹⁰²

46. The Monitoring Group received reports on the recruitment of children outside Somalia for operations inside Somalia or in connection with the conflict in Somalia. Allegations related to different armed groups or militias in Somalia but primarily to Al-Shabaab. In Kenya it was reported that radicalization of children through a particular madrasa and the use of internet technology to reach children abroad

⁹⁷ Global Horizontal Note (GHN), Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism of Grave Violations against Children in situations of Armed Conflict (MRM), Reporting Period October-December 2013, on file with the Group; also interview, human rights NGO staff member, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014.

⁹⁸ Sabahi Online, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab abducting children from Central Somalia,” 25 June 2013.

⁹⁹ Interview with Somali human rights activist, Nairobi, 14 April 2014, Nairobi. Specific reports were received in this regard with respect to Kalanje, Gaduudeey, Mareer Camp and Faanoole in Middle Jubba and Shongole, Mafuula, Kawan, Jamaame and Bangeeni in Lower Jubba. E-mail, expert on human rights in Somalia, 1 July 2014.

¹⁰⁰ There were 282 violations relating to recruitment by all actors in the conflict recorded and verified by the MRM during the 1st quarter of 2014, with 171 violations relating to recruitment attributed to Al Shabaab. GHN, MRM Reporting Period January-March 2014, on file with the Group; see also skype interview United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 6 August 2014.

¹⁰¹ Report of the Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), paragraph 118.

¹⁰² Sabahi Online, “Al Shabaab executes 14 year old girl in Dinsor”, 23 July 2014. The Group verified the conduct of the execution with three sources on the ground. Phone interview, 8 August 2014.

occurred in both the refugee settlements and in Nairobi.¹⁰³ In mid-November 2013, it was reported that the Tanzanian authorities had “broken up” an Al-Shabaab training centre in Tanga region which had included the participation of, inter alia, children between 4 and 13 years of age.¹⁰⁴

Violations by other groups

47. Although the SNA made efforts to vet recruits and eliminate the use of children in their operations, violations of the prohibition on using children in armed conflict continued to be reported. During 2013 the United Nations documented and verified 209 cases of recruitment and use of children by the SNA.¹⁰⁵ Children accompanied adult SNA soldiers during combat deployments, managed checkpoints and were used for intelligence gathering.¹⁰⁶ Militia allied to the SNA also recruited and used children, with 111 violations by Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) alone recorded by the United Nations in 2013.¹⁰⁷

48. One result of the tactical deployment of children by Al-Shabaab was the targeting of children in turn by the Somali state security forces during arrest and detention sweeps in the wake of Al-Shabaab attacks or advance security alerts. At least 1,009 children were arbitrarily arrested and detained by the SNA during 2013.¹⁰⁸ In the first three months of 2014 incidents of “mass arrest and illegal detention of children” during “security operations” or in the wake of take-over of towns from Al-Shabaab were also reported.¹⁰⁹ Although many were quickly released, these operations sometimes resulted in additional violations of their rights. It was reported for example that in 2013, 11 girls who had been arrested and detained were also raped.¹¹⁰

49. Notwithstanding the increased military operations against Al-Shabaab and recovery of former Al-Shabaab held territory, during the last two years three were few recorded referrals from the FGS of children separated from armed groups encountered by the SNAF. Only 41 children were handed over by the security services to child protection agencies to be provided with community based reintegration support during 2013.¹¹¹ There was therefore little external visibility on the ground on the conditions of reception and treatment of children. It is not clear,

¹⁰³ Interview with Somali human rights NGO, April and May 2014, Nairobi; interview with Somali refugee community member, Nairobi, 23 April 2014, Nairobi; interview with journalist, Nairobi, 10 March 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Sabahi Online, “Tanzania dismantles al-Shabaab child indoctrination camp in Tanga region”, 15 November 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), paragraph 116.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Somali human rights NGO staff member, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 116.

¹⁰⁸ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 117.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism for Grave Violations of Child Rights, January to March 2014 Update, Vol. 6. 2014. Article 29 of the Somali Provisional Constitution provides for the protection of children from mistreatment and detention only as a “last resort, for a limited time, in appropriate conditions”. Provisional Constitution, 1 August 2012.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

for example, to what extent children have been subject to trial for offences related to their involvement in armed groups.¹¹²

50. Fifteen cases of recruitment and use of children were attributed to the Somaliland armed forces by the United Nations during the same period.¹¹³ Children sometimes assumed positions in the ranks of the armed forces when a serving family member died.¹¹⁴ In addition the Monitoring Group received credible reports of an escalation of recruitment and mobilisation, including of children between 15 and 18 years old, by the Somaliland security forces, for participation in the context of increased military activity in Sool and eastern Sanag in 2014.¹¹⁵

51. Traditionally within Somali customary law children under the age of fifteen did not participate in clan hostilities unless there was exigent necessity. This latter prohibition has dissolved, however, during the last twenty years of conflict.¹¹⁶ In the last year, resurgent inter-clan fighting saw increased deployment of children by clan militia, in some cases the same militia involved in joint operations with elements of the SNA. These phenomena were particularly observed in Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and in Sool and eastern Sanaag (see for instance the image below).¹¹⁷

¹¹² Somalia has consistently endorsed the Paris Commitments which provide that children accused of crimes under international law “should be treated in accordance with international standards for juvenile justice, such as in a framework of restorative justice and social rehabilitation. Principle 11, Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups.

¹¹³ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 116; interview with United Nations staff member, Hargeisa, 8 January 2014.

¹¹⁴ Interview with human rights expert, Hargeisa, 7 January 2014. Also see report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 116.

¹¹⁵ Interview with UN staff member, Hargeisa, 8 January 2014; interview UN staff member, Hargeisa, 7 January 2014; interview with NGO staff member, Nairobi, 31 July 2014.

¹¹⁶ Alasow, Omar Abdulle, *Violations of the Rules Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflicts and Their Possible Causes, the Case of Somalia*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010 at page 226.

¹¹⁷ Interview with human rights NGO, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014; report of a UN mission which observed “teenagers with AK47s” in Marka, Interagency mission report to Marka, 9 July 2014, on file with the Group; interview, diplomatic source, 14 May 2014, Nairobi. See, also, GHN, MRM, Reporting period, April to June 2014 Update Vol. 7, 2014.

Young boy being driven through the streets of Mogadishu in a vehicle identified as belonging to the Hawiye/Habar Gedir/Ayr militia leader Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad 'Indha'adde' (photograph taken by an individual known to the Monitoring Group, 9 November 2014)



52. During 2013, there were 14 cases of association of children with AMISOM recorded and verified by the United Nations.¹¹⁸ The Monitoring Group interviewed one eyewitness of a young boy operating a checkpoint in the presence of AMISOM troops at Huriwa in Mogadishu.¹¹⁹ Credible reports were also received of the involvement of Ethiopian forces in recruitment of children between 15 and 18 for Somali militia groups.¹²⁰

Measures to enhance compliance

53. Notwithstanding the difficult situation on the ground, in the last year some efforts have been made to enhance the legal and policy framework for prevention of violations relating to the association of children in armed conflict.¹²¹ During 2013, UNICEF supported “the reintegration of 1,100 children (863 boys and 237 girls) formerly associated with armed forces or groups” at five centres in Mogadishu, Afgoye, Baidoa, Wadajir, Dhusamareb, Guriel and Merka.¹²² In May 2013, an FGS

¹¹⁸ Report of the Secretary-General, Children in Armed Conflict, 15 May 2014 (A/68/878-S/2014/339), at paragraph 116.

¹¹⁹ Interview with human rights NGO, Mogadishu, 29 April 2014.

¹²⁰ Telephone interview with UN staff member, 18 July 2014; interview with expert with knowledge of practices of Ethiopian forces in Somalia, Nairobi, 27 July 2014.

¹²¹ In 2012 the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG) signed two action plans: one relating to Ending the Recruitment and Use of Children in Armed Conflict and the second one relating to Ending the Killing and Maiming of Children. They have since been endorsed by the FGS.

¹²² GHN, MRM, Reporting Period October-December 2013, on file with the Group.

national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaging combatants and youth at risk in Somalia was announced.¹²³ An important step forward in operationalising this programme was the adoption of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Reception and Handover of Children Separated from Armed Groups in late February 2014.”¹²⁴

54. With respect to the SNA, the development of guidelines for determining the age of recruits is underway. On 29 June and 12 July 2014, the first screening of SNA personnel was conducted at the Jazeera Training facility in Mogadishu by a joint United Nations, AMISOM, EU Training Mission (EUTM) and SNAF screening team. Plans were also advanced for the establishment of a Child Protection Unit (CPU) within the SNA with unit personnel already identified at headquarters level.¹²⁵ The obligations of AMISOM towards children escaping or otherwise separated from armed groups were further clarified by the adoption in June 2014 of the Standing Operational Procedures for the Handling of all Persons Detained by AMISOM (AMISOM detention SOPs).¹²⁶ These SOPs contain detailed provisions on the treatment of detainees, including the special treatment that must be accorded to minors.¹²⁷

55. With respect to the potential for holding accountable those who commit violations relating to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, Somali national law does not currently criminalise such conduct.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, the Provisional Constitution provides that every child, defined as a person under 18 years of age, “has the right to be protected from armed conflict, and not to be used in armed conflict” (article 29 (6)). Somalia has also signed but not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

¹²³ National programme for the treatment and handling of disengaging combatants and youth at risk in Somalia, Component 6, “Children Associated with Armed Groups”, on file with the Group.

¹²⁴ Direction 1, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Reception and Handover of Children Separated from Armed Groups, on file with the Group.

¹²⁵ Internal United Nations briefing document, 13 August 2014.

¹²⁶ Standard Operating Procedures for the Handling of all Persons Detained by AMISOM, on file with the Monitoring Group.

¹²⁷ In terms of implementation of the SOPs, a Women and Child Protection Officer was appointed and an additional Child Protection advisor to AMISOM was under recruitment.

¹²⁸ See, inter alia, Articles 8 (2) (b) and (3) of the Rome Statute of the International Court which reflects international customary law in this regard.

Annex 8.6: Forced displacement

Conflict-driven displacement

56. In an increasingly tumultuous political and security environment, both the military offensive against Al-Shabaab and escalation and spread of inter-clan conflict over economic and political resources caused new cycles of displacement. Inter-clan fighting not only resulted in the unlawful killing and wounding of civilians but displaced tens of thousands of people. In June 2014 alone, for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners tracked 8,200 movements of people as a result of inter-clan conflicts.¹²⁹ Forced displacement of the population was not only an indirect consequence of the violence but a key objective in some cases, with allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Lower and Middle Shabelle.

57. The first phase of the joint SNAF/AMISOM offensive against Al-Shabaab resulted in significant new displacement of over 72,000 people as communities either fled in anticipation of the violence or were ordered to leave their homes alongside retreating Al-Shabaab units.¹³⁰ As Al-Shabaab sought to tighten its control of territories and populations, forced confinement was also experienced. This occurred both in advance of the offensive¹³¹ and in its aftermath when Al-Shabaab effectively besieged towns and prevented people from returning to newly Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)/AMISOM controlled areas. Even in the wake of the ‘recovery’ of areas from Al-Shabaab control additional displacement sometimes occurred. Families perceived to be associated with Al-Shabaab, for example, were sometimes forcibly displaced by Government security forces.¹³² At the same time, others who wished to return to the ‘recovered’ area were often reluctant to do so, fearful of the consequences threatened by Al-Shabaab, and, not least, reversal of FGS territorial control.¹³³ The overall protection situation of displaced populations was precarious. A United Nations mission to Belet Weyne at the end of March 2014, for example, estimated that 86 percent of the new arrivals (5,688 people — primarily women and children) were only able to access only one meal, or less, a day: “some children look wasted while the aged and lactating women are quite weak and appear starving.”¹³⁴

¹²⁹ UNHCR, Somali South Central Dashboard (SSCD), 1 June-30 June 2014 at UNHCR, Refugees in the Horn of Africa: Somali Displacement Crisis, Information sharing portal.

¹³⁰ By the beginning of July 2014 UNHCR’s population movement trend analysis (PMT) showed that almost 90,000 movements of people had taken place in 2014, with at least 68,200 of those recorded since the beginning of March 2014. See UNHCR, PMT data, July 2014 available at <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=197>. It is important to note that these figures reflect population trends, however, and not cumulative data as such.

¹³¹ In November 2013, in the wake of a statement by the FGS that it would attack Barawe and other towns in Lower Shabelle, for example, Al-Shabaab officials warned residents that vehicles would be confiscated and passengers fined if they attempted to leave. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 28 November 2013.

¹³² It was reported, for example, that the SNA forced particular families from Ceelcade, near Ceel Gudud in Gedo to leave the town with the threat that they would be killed if returned. E-mail, reliable NGO source, 2 April 2014.

¹³³ Sabahi Online, “Somalia: Somalis displaced by military offensive pressured by government to return home”, 17 April 2014.

¹³⁴ OCHA, Inter-agency assessment, Initial Investigation Report, 31 March, 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group.

‘Development’-driven displacement

58. Against the background of increased land values and a construction boom in Mogadishu, forced evictions from urban areas were carried out by both public and private actors, and sometimes, pre-emptively, by gatekeepers. In the majority of cases evictions were carried out by private actors in relation to public land which had been acquired privately.¹³⁵ The scale of forced evictions increased in the last year with as many as 27,000 people evicted from different settlements in Mogadishu in November and December 2013 alone.¹³⁶ Between January and mid July 2014, 2,483 households (approximately 15,000 people) in Mogadishu received eviction notices.¹³⁷ Already 11,000 individuals had been evicted by early July 2014, the majority of whom were internally displaced persons (IDPs). The circumstances in which forced evictions were carried out also resulted in the violation of other fundamental human rights. On 14 August 2013, for example, an 8-year old boy and a woman, a mother of nine, were killed and many wounded when security forces opened fire in the course of protests sparked by the service of a notice to quit Government land in Hodan.¹³⁸ The killings were never investigated.¹³⁹

59. Although public authorities generally provided sufficient notice when evictions from its own land were ordered, the FGS failed to take effective steps to either prevent or investigate the violations caused by unlawful evictions and related abuses, whether by private or public actors. In September 2013, a Compact for the Protection Against Forced Evictions (the Compact) was drafted with the assistance of UNHCR. Unfortunately the Compact was neither formally adopted nor implemented. Eventually the provisions of the Compact were included in a draft Policy Framework on Displacement within Somalia.¹⁴⁰ Delay in adopting this framework, however, added to the difficulty of challenging and responding to illegal acts.

60. In January 2013, the FGS declared that it was preparing to arrange for the relocation of more than 300,000 IDPs from the centre of Mogadishu to areas outside the city.¹⁴¹ United Nations engagement in support of the plan was rooted in the need to ameliorate the security, protection and sub-standard living conditions prevailing. As problems were experienced with the security of the site and issues around land tenure, however, the plan was put on hold.¹⁴² Meanwhile, in order to pre-empt both official relocation plans and the ongoing evictions, gatekeepers and others began to proactively forcibly relocate IDPs, intent on maintaining control over their income

¹³⁵ Telephone interview with United Nations staff member, 18 July 2014. Serious concerns have been expressed about the management of the land registry which appears to be in private hands. Interview with United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 24 January 2014.

¹³⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2014/140), paragraph 4.

¹³⁷ UNHCR, Forced evictions in Mogadishu Infographic, January to mid July 2014, UNHCR, Refugees in the Horn of Africa, Somali Displacement crisis, Information sharing portal.

¹³⁸ Amnesty International, *No Place like home, Returns and relocations of Somalia's displaced*, 2014, at page 41. Three days later security forces returned and bulldozed the area, destroying homes and means of livelihood.

¹³⁹ Phone interview with researcher who had interviewed and worked with the families, 28 July 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Interior and Federalism, FGS, Policy Framework on Displacement within Somalia, Revised draft (IDP Policy draft), 16 March 2014, section 1, on file with the Group.

¹⁴¹ Office of the President, Statement, “Relocation of Urban Refugees to Officially Designated Camps”, 16 January 2013, on file with the Group.

¹⁴² Interview with former senior humanitarian INGO staff member, Nairobi, 20 March 2014.

streams.¹⁴³ In the new locations (mainly between K7 and K14 on the Afgoye corridor), gatekeepers replicated their grip on communities. It was reported that in some places gatekeepers continued to tax at least 10 percent of inputs received by IDPs, in addition to engaging in diversion higher up the chain.¹⁴⁴

61. The forced movement of families and communities from places where many had resided for decades in the city fragmented social networks.¹⁴⁵ As a result, the protection situation of IDPs deteriorated, affected by reduced livelihoods opportunities on the outskirts of the city, limited humanitarian presence and entrapment by gatekeepers. The situation also led to heightened insecurity. Increasing inward displacement into the area in the second half of 2014 — as a result both of the Al-Shabaab offensive and inter-clan conflict in Lower and Middle Shabelle — greatly exacerbated the humanitarian situation and contributed to further undermining security.¹⁴⁶ By July 2014, malnutrition rates among IDP communities in and around Mogadishu had surpassed emergency thresholds.¹⁴⁷

Forced displacement and the protection against non-refoulement¹⁴⁸

62. There was growing pressure on Somali refugees and migrants from host countries to return to Somalia. Two of the most intense efforts to both screen and remove Somali immigrants and refugees unfolded in the Republic of Kenya and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Instances of both direct, and indirect, refoulement and, in some cases, in further internal displacement of deportees, occurred.

63. In Kenya over the last three years it has been progressively difficult for asylum seekers and refugees to request, assert, and enjoy, lawful residence and protection from non-refoulement. In October 2011, refugee registration was halted in Dadaab refugee camp and urban refugee registration suspended the following year. Since then official registration has only sporadically re-started. As a result of these restrictions, many who were in fact refugees were unable to assert the fact, thus rendered more vulnerable to refoulement. At the same time, there was a strong presumption that many of those fleeing Somalia were refugees, including in the context of Kenya's adherence to the 1968 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.¹⁴⁹ In January 2014, UNHCR issued an updated note on protection considerations from Somali asylum seekers urging that

¹⁴³ The entrenched gatekeeper-run system of aid diversion and exploitation of displaced populations was documented by the Group in previous reports (S/2013/413, annex 7.2); and interview with United Nations staff member, Nairobi, 18 July 2014.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with senior United Nations official, Mogadishu, 23 November 2013; and telephone interview with senior United Nations official, 27 July 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Telephone interview with former humanitarian INGO staff member, 20 March 2014.

¹⁴⁶ For example, between 1 June and 9 July 2014, 8251 people were registered as being displaced into Mogadishu from Lower Shabelle alone. Internal United Nations document, 17 July 2014, on file with the Group.

¹⁴⁷ Food and Agriculture Organisation, Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, "Early Warning Alert: Food Security worsens as Drought looms in Somalia — Emergency unfolding among Mogadishu IDPs", 7 July 2014.

¹⁴⁸ Violation of the prohibition has both a territorial and extraterritorial effect with the impact of the violation being felt in the two jurisdictions engaged.

¹⁴⁹ Organization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, (OAU Convention) 10 September 1969, [1001 U.N.T.S. 45.]

“Somali nationals should not be forcibly returned to Somalia unless the returning state is convinced that the persons involved would not be at risk of persecution.”¹⁵⁰

64. In April 2014, Kenya security forces launched a major immigration verification exercise, intended to both identify undocumented persons or individuals with criminal convictions within the refugee population, and to enforce a new encampment directive. The intensity and scale of the operation, involving the arrest and detention of thousands of Somali nationals and refugees (and occasionally Kenyan nationals of Somali origin), alongside immigrants and refugees of other nationalities, was considerable. Refugees were forcibly relocated to the camps, frequently with no time to gather belongings, reunite family or order their affairs. Thousands of others relocated ‘spontaneously’ to the camps or returned to Somalia. Between 9 April and 20 May 2014, 359 Somalis were detained and officially removed or expelled to Somalia.¹⁵¹ Despite limited access, UNHCR was able to identify that 6 formally recognised refugees or registered asylum seekers had been returned in breach of the prohibition on refoulement, including one refugee woman who had been separated from her three children, and an unaccompanied minor who had never before been to Mogadishu.¹⁵² Negotiations were advanced for the readmission of these individuals to Kenya, although the process had stalled in the past.

65. Serious questions existed, however, as to whether the return of the others in this group — in addition to many others of those induced to leave ‘voluntarily’ — had also violated the prohibition on refoulement and had amounted to forced displacement in violation of international law. The circumstances of the asylum and refugee protection regime in Kenya as a whole at the time included: restrictive registration practices; reduced services and rising insecurity in camps; harassment, assault and arbitrary arrest in urban areas; and exclusionary official rhetoric. Taken as whole this environment was one in within which it was likely that constructive refugee refoulement occurred. Since soon after the beginning of the verification exercise, the number of daily flights to Mogadishu from Kenya had doubled, with between 320 to 480 passengers a day arriving in Mogadishu. Ninety per cent of those arriving were reported by UNHCR to have arrived on “go home” documents issues by the Somali Embassy in Nairobi.¹⁵³

66. Return movements from outside Somalia not only contributed to increasing internal displacement but sometimes rendered returnees particularly vulnerable to other violations of their rights.¹⁵⁴ On 13 February 2014, two deportees from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were killed, and four others were injured, for example, in an attack on a UNHCR convoy on the very day they arrived in Somalia. Many returnees lived in fear, including in relation to perceptions as to their allegiances,

¹⁵⁰ UNHCR, International protection considerations with respect to people fleeing Southern and South Central Somalia, January 2014.

¹⁵¹ Figures provided by UNHCR indicate that 83 individuals were returned on 9 April 2104; 91 on 17 April 2014; 87 on 3 May 2014; and 98 on 20 May 2014.

¹⁵² Information provided by UNHCR to the Monitoring Group, accurate as of 18 July 2014.

¹⁵³ Phone interview with UN staff member, 17 July 2014.

¹⁵⁴ UNHCR has confirmed that, “[m]any of those deported have found themselves in an IDP-like situation in Mogadishu”. UNHCR. “Position on Returns to Southern and Central Somalia,” June 2014. Interview with Somali researcher, Nairobi, 24 March 2014.

having come home from living abroad.¹⁵⁵ Some were susceptible to accusations or suspicions of intelligence gathering, particularly by Al-Shabaab, but also by Government or Government-allied forces.¹⁵⁶ It was reported, for example, that a deportee from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was “accidentally” shot in Baidoa in February 2014 during questioning about possible Al-Shabaab affiliation.¹⁵⁷ Unverified public reports claimed that Al-Shabaab may have engaged in recruitment of those forcibly returned.¹⁵⁸ In its report “No Place like Home”, which reflects research carried out in late 2013, Amnesty International identified the difficulties faced by Somali refugees in contemplating safe and dignified return to Somalia including, “lack of access to land or livelihoods, inability to realize an adequate standard of living, risk of conflict and serious human rights abuses.”¹⁵⁹

Measures to enhance compliance

67. Between August 2012 and January 2014, an IDP Voluntary Return Programme coordinated by UNHCR’s Returns Consortium supported 10,909 families (approximately 40,000 individuals) to voluntarily return to Bay, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Hiraan and Bakool.¹⁶⁰ By mid-2014, there were approximately 5,000 spontaneous returns from Yemen. These returns were mainly to Puntland but also to parts of South Central Somalia.¹⁶¹ In March 2014, a draft Policy Framework on Displacement within Somalia (IDP policy) was drawn up by the Ministry of Interior and Federalism with assistance from the Office of the United Nations Special Rapporteur for IDPs and UNHCR. It has not yet, however, been formally adopted.¹⁶² Critical to finding durable solutions for those displaced was the debate on, and re-conception of, citizenship. A number of initiatives got underway during the last year, including a project to develop amendments to the 1962 Citizenship Act led by the Ministry of Interior and Federalism.

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, Mary Harper, BBC News, “Somalis sent home in fear of al-Shabaab”, 16 June 2014.

¹⁵⁶ In early March 2014 for example UNHCR received reported that a number of deportees from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were among those swept up in a mass arrest of over 150 civilians on suspicion of Al-Shabaab affiliation. E-mail, UN staff member, 14 August 2014.

¹⁵⁷ E-mail, reliable NGO source, 6 February 2014.

¹⁵⁸ Mareeg Online in English, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Reportedly Starts Training of 20 Men Deported From Kenya”, 14 May 2014. As of 18 June 2014 64% of those returned from Saudi Arabia and Kenya since December 2013 were men and boys, with 13% under 18. IOM, IOM Situation Report on Somali returns No. 10, 19th June-11th July 2014 on file with the Group.

¹⁵⁹ Amnesty International, *No Place like home, Returns and relocations of Somalia’s displaced*, 2014, at page 9. See also See UNHCR, International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Southern and Central Somalia, 17 January 2014.

¹⁶⁰ An independent assessment of the programme published in July 2014, however, raised questions about the sustainability of this return, both in terms of ongoing insecurity and access to services in the place of origin. UNHCR/Returns Consortium, “Somalia, Towards Durable Solutions, Achievements and challenges in supporting voluntary returns of IDPs in Somalia,” July 2014, on file with the Monitoring Group.

¹⁶¹ E-mail, United Nations staff member, 14 August 2014.

¹⁶² Ministry of Interior and Federalism, FGS, Policy Framework on Displacement within Somalia, Revised draft, 16 March 2014, section 1, on file with the Group.

Annex 9

Violations of the ban on charcoal

Annex 9.1: Charcoal production, transportation and stockpiling

Charcoal production areas

1. Through December 2012, the most significant charcoal production areas were located north of Kismayo. The main production sites were initially located in the Jilib, Bu'aale and Saakow Districts of the Middle Jubba Region, and in the Jamaame, Afmadow and Kismayo Districts of the Lower Jubba Region. Since the beginning of 2013, the main charcoal production moved southwards towards Badhaadhe District (see [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.2), including areas near Buurgabo and Ras Kamboni close to the Kenyan border, as well as areas closer to the main point of export, the port of Kismayo.¹ These gradual changes in production areas may reflect, by mid to late 2013, evolving trade links with Al-Shabaab and efforts to shift production towards areas under the control of the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), in particular the port of Kismayo area.

2. The production of charcoal in some areas under Al-Shabaab control, such as Bu'aale, Saakow, Jamaame and Jilib has reportedly been reduced somewhat, while it has increased in locations south of Kismayo such as Kudhaa (also spelt "Koday", Lower Jubba, close to Chula and Madhawe islands), Sool Duubo (Afmadow, Badhaadhe-Kismayo triangle, Lower Jubba), Cabdale Biroole (close to Kismayo, inhabited by the Awrmale sub-clan), and Ceel Cad (near Kismayo). Production has also increased in areas further away from Kismayo and closer to Barawe, such as Weelweyn (between Middle Jubba and Lower Shabelle, close to Bay region), which is under Al-Shabaab control.

3. Although large-scale production of charcoal in Badhaadhe district culminated in the months surrounding January 2013, production in the district has somewhat stagnated since, due to competition over profit sharing within the overall business. Al-Shabaab, which de facto controls the surrounding outskirts of the district capital, Badhaadhe, and the rural bush areas, has impeded charcoal production by others in the area. It has effectively tried to reduce the IJA's profit share from charcoal taxation and export duties at the main and most efficient port of Kismayo, and it has introduced higher taxation fees at checkpoints in areas they do control (see further below on checkpoints), in order to reap a greater benefit from the charcoal trade.²

4. Nevertheless, despite Al-Shabaab imposing heavier taxation on the movement and transactions of charcoal in Badhaadhe District, production is still ongoing due to the efforts of charcoal traders to maintain the viability of the trade in the area. When some Al-Shabaab 'Emirs' restrict charcoal production and trading from which they do not directly benefit, charcoal producers tend to transport the wood from the cut trees to other places to burn it into charcoal. One such alternative assembly point for wood and charcoal is between Kudhaa, controlled by Al-Shabaab, and Buur Gabo, controlled by the Ras Kamboni Brigade. Overall, regardless of who is in control of production areas, transport routes or export points, charcoal producers

¹ Information obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group between May and July 2014.

² Information obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group between May and July 2014.

and traders are believed to have signed agreements with each local authority on the ground, enabling the supply chain of the trade to operate seamlessly.³


Satellite imagery of production areas

5. The Monitoring Group was not able to further document changes between 2013 and 2014 in the location of sites and increases or decreases in the scale of charcoal production at each site. Nevertheless, the Group found that despite decreases in some of the main charcoal producing areas, such as Jilib and Badhaadhe, production has continued. The effects of logging, proliferating burning sites and spreading road access can be seen in the analysis of recent high resolution satellite images provided to the Monitoring Group by SWALIM (Somalia Water and Land Information Management).⁴

Sample images of Jilib District

6. The following satellite images illustrate three locations in Jilib District where charcoal production has continued between 2013 and 2014. The images show an increase in the number of production sites (black spots), more bush-road networks and greater environmental degradation.


Area 1, Jilib District on 29 April 2013 and on 13 March 2014




³ At the production sites, the charcoal traders hire men in groups ranging in number from 10 to 20 at each site, and provide them with tools, donkey carts, monthly food rations, medicine, and water, while their families are given money to purchase food. When the charcoal is ready, the traders provide empty bags for the charcoal to be packed. A hired truck will then be sent to the site to transport the charcoal to the storage sites at the export points, such as the port of Kismayo. The charcoal burners are paid after the production has been completed, with a deduction for all the expenses incurred during the production of the charcoal. The payments are mostly insufficient to sustain livelihoods, and the men therefore return to the production sites to earn more. Information obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group between May and July 2014.

⁴ Although SWALIM has the potential to monitor the changes in sites and scale of production, they do not at present have a full system and resources in place to make such comprehensive satellite imagery analyses from which the overall volume of charcoal production can be estimated. The objective of the SWALIM methodology is primarily to document the devastating environmental effects of charcoal production.

Area 2, Jilib District, on 13 February 2013 and on 13 March 2014



Area 3, Jilib District, on 13 March 2013 and on 13 March 2014




Sample images of Badhaadhe District

7. In September 2013, SWALIM conducted a satellite imagery analysis of charcoal production in Badhaadhe District, in which it compared three areas between 2010 and 2013.⁵ The images reveal a shift in the location of production in the district by January 2013, corresponding to the increase in charcoal production at that time. The three areas investigated are outlined in green in the satellite image shown below. The RGB 432 band combination displays in red color the vegetation cover. The blue dots represent the charcoal burning sites in 2010, while the yellow dots represent the charcoal burning sites in 2013.

⁵ Badhaadeh VHR analysis for the detection of charcoal production sites, SWALIM, Nairobi, September 2013.

Shifts in charcoal production areas in Badhaadhe District between 2010 and 2013




8. Notably, in Areas 1 and 3 no more charcoal production activity is detected after 2010. Sites cleared for production before 2010 show little change between 2010 and 2013, and in some places a moderate vegetation regrowth is evident. By 2013, logging activity had shifted to Area 2, where larger trees are more concentrated compared with the other two areas.

9. In the two satellite images of Area 2 below, a considerable increase in the number of production sites can be seen between 2010 and 2013. On the left is a January 2010 image, in which 13 charcoal burning sites, outlined in green, can be detected. A network of new tracks and roads encroaching on the forest has already developed. The coarser grain and the brighter red color indicate trees larger than the ones in the surrounding area. On the right is a January 2013 image showing a dramatic increase in the number of charcoal burning sites (the 26 yellow circles), as well as a well-developed network of tracks and roads.⁶

⁶ The following VHR images were used. Left image: GeoEye-1 (0.5 m spatial resolution) acquired by SWALIM on 11 January 2010. Right image: WorldView - 2 (0.46 m spatial resolution) acquired by SWALIM on 10 January 2013.

Increase in charcoal production sites in one area of Badhaadhe District between 2010 and 2013



Charcoal supply pipeline and value chain

10. The charcoal transportation pipeline stretches from production sites to the stockpiling or storage locations at points of export. These include Kismayo (controlled by IJA's Ras Kamboni Brigade and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) contingent of AMISOM), Baraawe (controlled by Al-Shabaab) and the smaller ports south of Kismayo, such as Buur Gaabo (controlled by the IJA), Anole (controlled by the Harti clan/Al-Shabaab), Koday (controlled by Al-Shabaab) and Koyaama (controlled by Al-Shabaab). The transportation pipeline is run by groups of charcoal traders, often referred to locally as private companies or associations (see [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.1 and annex 9.2).

11. Currently, an estimated average of 20 trucks, each carrying approximately 5 to 12 tons of charcoal, arrives at the port of Kismayo on a daily basis.⁷ However, the exact number of trucks arriving may vary according to the production and monsoon seasons. Depending on the relative number of small trucks (carrying 200 bags) and large trucks (carrying 480 bags), the number of charcoal bags delivered to Kismayo can range between 4000 and 9600 daily. A conservative estimate suggests that at

⁷ Information obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group between May and July 2014. Calculations are based on 25 kilogram bags, which is the average size of charcoal bag, though they can be larger (up to 50 kilograms) or smaller.

least 200,000 bags of charcoal are delivered to the port of Kismayo per month, and perhaps 280,000 bags or even more during peak months.

12. Between the production sites and ports, the charcoal trucks pass at least two checkpoints, where they are taxed by the local armed group. Most of these checkpoints are controlled by Al-Shabaab, as it still controls the majority of the rural areas in Lower and Middle Juba. IJA checkpoints are primarily located at the outskirts of the key towns they control, such as Kismayo, Afmadow and Badhaadhe. When the trucks enter the port of Kismayo, they are covered with plastic sheeting in order to conceal the charcoal load from public view.

13. At present, Al-Shabaab is known to have checkpoints at the following locations where charcoal transporters are being taxed (indicated by yellow pins on the map below): Xagar, Kulbiyow, Kudhaa (Koday), Buulo Xaaji, Cabdala Biroole, Gaduud, Kamasuuma and Jamaame in the Lower Jubba Region, and Bu'aale, Saakow, and Jilib in the Middle Jubba Region.

Map showing checkpoints taxing charcoal trucks



14. Since the Monitoring Group's previous report (S/2013/413), it appears that taxation at checkpoints has become more systematic and standardized by both Al-Shabaab and the IJA. At Al-Shabaab-controlled checkpoints, each truck is charged around USD 120 (at times ranging between USD 100 and USD 125), as well as USD 0.70 for each bag of charcoal (or about USD 140 for smaller trucks and USD 336 for larger trucks).⁸ In Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, charcoal trucks pay the tax only once. At the first Al-Shabaab checkpoint encountered, a receipt is issued as

⁸ Checkpoint taxes are usually paid in Somali shillings, therefore these figures are averages and can vary depending upon the rates of exchange to the USD.

proof of payment for the tax, which can then be presented by the driver at any subsequent Al-Shabaab checkpoints. No further taxes are charged.⁹

15. The principal IJA checkpoint is located outside Kismayo Airport and serves as the primary tax collection point for trucks transporting charcoal from areas south and southwest of Kismayo. Another IJA checkpoint is located on the northern access road to Kismayo, which is the tax collection point for trucks transporting charcoal from areas to the north of Kismayo. Other checkpoints controlled by IJA include Afmadow and Badhaadhe. (IJA checkpoints are indicated by green pins on the map above.)

16. Exiting both Afmadow and Badhaadhe, a truck transporting charcoal first pays USD 150 at the IJA-controlled checkpoint and then pays USD 120 plus USD 0.70 per bag of charcoal at the Al-Shabaab-controlled checkpoint located on the outskirts of the towns. At the Kismayo Airport checkpoint, the IJA charges USD 120 per truck, as well as USD 0.70 for each bag of charcoal. Once the charcoal transports reach the port of Kismayo, the port manager, Abdullahi Dubad (a.k.a. 'Hadun'), charges USD 3 per bag in export duties on behalf of the IJA. This rate has doubled since the previous reporting of the Monitoring Group (see [S/2013/413](#), annex 9.1).

17. Below is a table with examples of the breakdown of costs associated with a 25 kilogram bag of charcoal from production to the point of export at Kismayo, including the cost per bag at the site of production, the truck rental fees to and from Kismayo, the taxation rates at Al-Shabaab and IJA checkpoints, and the Kismayo port tax.¹⁰ These figures indicate that due to more systematic checkpoints and particularly a higher export taxation rate at Kismayo, the cost per bag of charcoal prior to export has increased between 2013 and 2014, and is now USD 8.00 to 10.00. These costs have not necessarily affected the internal consumption market value of USD 5.00 to 6.00 or the sale price overseas of about USD 17.00 per bag of charcoal.

⁹ Information on checkpoints here and below obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group in June and July 2014.

¹⁰ Information obtained from confidential local sources in communication with the Monitoring Group in July 2014.

COSTS PER BAG OF CHARCOAL TO POINT OF EXPORT AT KISMAYO					
Cost Item		From Bu'alle, Saakow, Hagar	From Jilib, Jamaame, and Kamasuma	From Afmadow	From Kulbiyow and Badhaadhe
Cost per bag at production site		USD 2.50 per 25 kg bag	USD 3.00 per 25 kg bag	USD 3.00 per 25 kg bag	USD 2.50 per 25 kg bag
Truck rental to and from Kismayo		USD 1.70 per bag of charcoal	USD 1.50 per bag of charcoal	USD 1.70 per bag of charcoal	USD 1.50 per bag of charcoal
AS	Truck tax (USD 120)*	USD 0.25 per bag- USD 0.60 per bag	USD 0.25 per bag- USD 0.60 per bag	USD 0.25 per bag- USD 0.60 per bag	USD 0.25 per bag- USD 0.60 per bag
	Charcoal tax	USD 0.70 per 25 kg bag	USD 0.70 per 25 kg bag	USD 0.70 per 25 kg bag	USD 0.70 per 25 kg bag
IJA	Truck tax (USD 150)**	USD 0.31 per bag- USD 0.75 per bag	USD 0.31 per bag- USD 0.75 per bag	USD 0.31 per bag- USD 0.75 per bag	USD 0.31 per bag- USD 0.75 per bag
Kismayo Port tax		USD 3.00	USD 3.00	USD 3.00	USD 3.00
TOTAL		USD 8.46-9.25	USD 8.76-9.55	USD 8.96-9.75	USD 8.26-9.05

* Based on USD 120 ÷ 200 bags for small trucks (USD 0.60) and 480 bags for large trucks (USD 0.25).

** Based on USD 150 ÷ 200 bags for small trucks (USD 0.75) and 480 bags for large trucks (USD 0.31), aside from the Kismayo Airport checkpoint, which has slightly different costs.

18. Based on charcoal shipments documented by the Monitoring Group, which is likely to account for only half of the actual shipments between June 2013 and May 2014, a conservative estimate suggests that on average at least 480,000 bags of charcoal were exported from the port of Kismayo each month, though the figure may be double this. Due to the monsoon season, when shipping comes to a near standstill, as well as other factors, the monthly export of charcoal is not evenly distributed. For instance, during March and April 2014 alone, some 2.6 million bags of charcoal were shipped from Kismayo. This massive export appears to be corroborated by satellite imagery of the reduction of stockpiles at Kismayo (see annex 9.1.a). Therefore, at least 5.76 million bags of charcoal, if not double this amount, were exported through Kismayo between June 2013 and May 2014.

19. In the same period, based on the taxation rate at its checkpoints (approximately USD 1.30 per bag), Al-Shabaab would have generated revenues of between USD 7.5 and 15 million from the checkpoints alone. This is separate from the revenue it generated from the overall shareholding profit of charcoal exported from Kismayo, which according to shipments documented by the Monitoring Group amounts to at least 33 per cent of the trade, as indicated in the main section of this report.¹¹ Al-Shabaab's checkpoint revenue is also separate from the revenue it generated from the exports it controls exclusively at Baraawe, from where an estimated between one and two million bags of charcoal have been shipped, and the smaller 'beach ports' south of Kismayo at Anole, Kudhaa (Koday) and Koyaama

¹¹ According to some sources of the Monitoring Group in both 2013 and 2014, the shareholding of Kismayo port is divided 33 percent each for Al-Shabaab, the IJA and the KDF. Other sources have indicated that the shareholding is divided 40 percent for Al-Shabaab and the IJA each, and 20 percent for the KDF. The Monitoring Group both in 2013 and 2014 found that Al-Shabaab representation at Kismayo port accounts for 33 percent of exports. However, given that the Monitoring Group has not identified all shipments, this figure could also be 40 per cent.

island, from where unknown quantities have been shipped. Consistent with the Group's previous findings (S/2013/413, annex 9.1), it would appear that Al-Shabaab continues to generate greater revenue from the current charcoal trade than when it fully controlled Kismayo prior to October 2012, which the Monitoring Group estimated in 2011 to be in excess of USD 25 million (S/2012/544, annex 21, paragraph 4).

20. Meanwhile, again in the same period, based on the taxation rate at its checkpoints and export tax at Kismayo (approximately USD 3.75 per bag), the KDF-backed IJA would have generated revenues of between USD 20 and 40 million from these sources, in addition to the unknown exports at Buur Gabo.

21. Given an international market value of USD 17 per bag of charcoal, and given that the export cost of a bag of charcoal now amounts to between USD 8.00 and USD 10.00, the supply chain including production, transportation and taxation accounts for more than 50 per cent of charcoal costs accruing as revenues to those within Somalia with increasingly vested interests in the export trade in charcoal. The remaining 50 per cent accrues as revenues to the overseas value chain including shippers, brokers and traders with varying joint venture relations with armed groups on the ground.

22. An analysis of satellite imagery illustrating the depletion and replenishment of charcoal stockpiles in 2014 at Kismayo and Barawe appears in annex 9.1.a and annex 9.1.b. The changes in the stockpiles, and the scale of the stockpiles in comparison to the rate of shipments, indicates that the majority of exports are from newly produced charcoal.

Annex 9.1.a: Satellite imagery of charcoal stockpiles at Kismayo

23. In its previous reporting (S/2013/413, annex 9), the Monitoring Group found that between October 2012 and May 2013 the charcoal stockpiles at Kismayo either remained static, increased in size or multiplied in number. This reflected a significant increase in the production of new charcoal as well as the attempt by traders to use the stockpiles politically in an effort to lift the United Nations ban on Somali charcoal exports. In late 2012, the traders argued for a one-time lift of the ban to clear the stockpiles, when in fact thereafter they maintained the stockpiles and exported a stream of newly produced charcoal in aid of perpetuating the trade indefinitely.

24. Between 2013 and 2014, the Monitoring Group has found that the stockpiles at Kismayo have been exploited to a greater extent than in the preceding year. Analysis of satellite imagery, in combination with information from ground sources, indicates that at times the stockpiles were depleted for export and replenished from newly produced charcoal, while new charcoal was also exported directly. Therefore, the stockpiles have been used more to supply the export trade than served as part of a political strategy to lift the ban, since traders found that despite the ban they have been able to export charcoal on a massive scale unhindered either within Somalia or overseas.

25. By way of an example, according to shipping data and ground sources, the Monitoring Group detected a sudden and massive export of charcoal from Kismayo in March and April 2014. Analysis of the satellite imagery in this annex reveals the significant depletion of the stockpiles to supply charcoal shipments between March and June 2014.¹² This is evident, for instance, from a comparison of the area covered by the stockpiles, which on 15 March 2014 was 33,573 m², on 16 May 2014 was 14,228 m², and on 18 June 2014 was 3,203 m², reflecting 90.5 percent depletion of the stockpiles. The following table compares depletion of the southern, central and northern stockpiles in terms of coverage of area.


¹² The satellite images provided by SWALIM that have been analysed are: World View 2 acquired on 15 March 2014; World View 1 acquired on 16 May 2014; and World View 2 acquired on 18 June 2014. World View 1 and 2 are very high-resolution satellite images with spatial resolution of 0.5 meters. The World View 1 sensor has only a panchromatic band while the World View 2 sensor produces multispectral images. This is the reason why the image acquired in May is displayed in black and white.

KISMAYO CHARCOAL STOCKPILE DEPLETION MARCH – JUNE 2014				
Date	Southern Stockpile	Central Stockpile	Northern Stockpile	TOTAL
15 March 2014	20,425 m ² (60.8 %)	4,995 m ² (14.9%)	8,153 m ² (23.3%)	33,573 m ² (100 %)*
16 May 2014	8,274 m ² (24.6 %)	1,897 m ² (5.6%)	4,057 m ² (12.1%)	14,228 m ² (42.3%)
18 June 2014	1,468 m ² (4.3%)	495 m ² (1.5%)	1,241 m ² (3.7%)	3,203 m ² (9.5%)

* Percentages are in relation to the total stockpile area covered in March 2014.

26. The overview image below indicates the charcoal stockpiles, which are the features outlined in red, located in the south, centre and north of Kismayo on 15 March 2014.


Overview of charcoal stockpile locations at Kismayo on 15 March 2014




The southern stockpile

27. The majority of charcoal stockpiled in March 2014 was in the southern area of Kismayo, where therefore the majority of depletion occurred between March and June 2014. On 15 March 2014, the southern stockpile covered an area of 20,425 m², on 16 May 2014 it covered an area of 8,274 m², and by 18 June 2014 it had been reduced to an area of 1,468 m². The following three satellite images illustrate the southern stockpile depletion.

The southern stockpile on 15 March 2014



The southern stockpile on 16 May 2014



The southern stockpile on 18 June 2014



28. The following three satellite images illustrate in greater detail the depletion of the southern stockpile between March and June 2014. In the image acquired in March 2014, the stockpiles appear in a light blue colour.

The southern stockpile on 15 March 2014



The southern stockpile on 16 May 2014




The southern stockpile on 18 June 2014




29. Notably, according to high-resolution satellite imagery acquired from before March 2014, the southern stockpile was an entirely new stockpile that did not exist before November 2013 and was built up thereafter. The following three images compare the site of the southern stockpile, outlined in red, in November 2013, January 2014 and March 2014.


The southern stockpile site on 14 November 2013



The southern stockpile on 13 January 2014



The southern stockpile on 15 March 2014




The central stockpile


30. The central stockpile was the location of the original stockpile in Kismayo and charcoal build-up is already visible in this area in satellite images from 2005. By March 2014, the central stockpile contained less charcoal than at the other locations in Kismayo, but was nevertheless depleted. On 15 March 2014, the central stockpile


covered an area of 4,995 m², on 16 May 2014 it covered an area of 1,897 m², and by 18 June 2014 it had been reduced to an area of 495 m². The following three satellite images illustrate the central stockpile depletion.

The central stockpile on 15 March 2014




The central stockpile on 16 May 2014




The central stockpile on 18 June 2014**The northern stockpile**

31. The northern stockpile is not new and charcoal build-up at the site can be first detected in satellite images from 2006, though it significantly increased in size in 2012 and 2013, and was depleted after March 2014. On 15 March 2014, the northern stockpile covered an area of 8,153 m², on 16 May 2014 it covered an area of 4,057 m², and by 18 June 2014 it had been reduced to an area of 1,241 m². The following three satellite images illustrate the northern stockpile depletion.


The northern stockpile on 15 March 2014



The northern stockpile on 16 May 2014



The northern stockpile on 18 June 2014



Annex 9.1.b: Satellite imagery of charcoal stockpile at Barawe

32. Barawe, located north of Kismayo, remains under Al-Shabaab control and is therefore more inaccessible and difficult to monitor. The charcoal stockpiles at Kismayo are considerably greater in scale than the one stockpile at Barawe because they service a regular deepwater port. Barawe, by contrast, is a natural beach port requiring ships to anchor offshore. Consequently, charcoal is first loaded onto smaller boats that then transfer the cargo to the ships offshore, a more time-consuming process. The stockpile at Barawe has more consistently served to supply export shipments in combination with newly produced charcoal, and was not artificially maintained as the Kismayo stockpiles were between 2012 and 2013. However, prior to the military offensive against Al-Shabaab, the Monitoring Group detected a depletion of the stockpile in Barawe by February 2014. It was subsequently replenished and grew again in size by July 2014. The following figures from analysis of satellite imagery indicate the depletion and replenishment in terms of area covered by the stockpile at Barawe:¹³

25 January 2014	1,079 m ²
27 February 2014	577 m ²
15 March 2014	516 m ²
10 July 2014	6,290 m ²

33. The satellite images in this annex illustrate the depletion and replenishment of the stockpile at Barawe. The overview image below indicates the one charcoal stockpile, which is the feature outlined in red, located at Barawe on 27 February 2014.


¹³ The satellite images provided by SWALIM, with 0.5 meters resolution, that have been analysed are: World View 1 acquired on 25 January 2014; World View 2 acquired on 27 February 2014; World View 2 acquired on 15 March 2014; and World View 1 acquired on 10 July 2014.

Overview of charcoal stockpile location at Barawe on 27 February 2014



34. In the satellite image below, the yellow-outlined polygons indicate the charcoal stockpiled at Barawe on 25 January 2014 and covering an area of 1,079 m².

Charcoal stockpile at Barawe on 25 January 2014



35. In the satellite image below, the pink-outlined polygons indicate the charcoal stockpiled at Barawe on 27 February 2014 and covering an area of 577 m².

Charcoal stockpile at Barawe on 27 February 2014



36. In the satellite image below, the green-outlined polygon indicates the charcoal stockpiled at Barawe on 15 March 2014 and covering an area of 516 m².

Charcoal stockpile at Barawe on 15 March 2014



37. In the satellite image below, the light blue-outlined polygons indicate the charcoal stockpiled at Barawe on 10 July 2014 and covering an area of 6,290 m².

Charcoal stockpile at Barawe on 10 July 2014



Annex 9.2: Cases of known charcoal imports

38. The Monitoring Group documented at least 161 charcoal shipments from the ports of Barawe and Kismayo between June 2013 and May 2014 in violation of resolution 2036 (2012). While it has not been possible for the Group to identify the shippers, consignees and end-buyers of all of these shipments, it has nevertheless documented in fuller detail numerous individual cases and thereby identified key actors involved in the Somali charcoal trade.

39. The Monitoring Group has separated this annex into violations that occurred before the end of the shipping season in late August 2013 and those that took place after the shipping season resumed in October 2013. Shipments before late August 2013 arrived largely in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), notably to Sharjah Creek and Port Rashid. Shipments after September 2013 arrived largely in Omani ports until late January 2013, after which traders shifted their exports towards ports in Kuwait¹⁴ and to Port Rashid in the UAE.

Violations prior to late August 2013

40. During the period between June 2013 and August 2013, the Monitoring Group documented exports of at least 1.16 million bags of charcoal from Kismayo and Barawe, mainly off-loaded in ports in the UAE. Of the 1.16 million bags, approximately 380,000 bags were shipped on four large merchant vessels, with 780,000 bags shipped by 25 wooden dhows.¹⁵ Of these cases, the Monitoring Group documented shipments on two particular merchant vessels, as well as identified key shippers and brokers connected to 19 dhow shipments.

The case of the MV Victoria

41. In early August 2013, the Monitoring Group received information in respect of a merchant vessel, the *MV Victoria* (IMO 7906203), which had docked in Port Rashid, Dubai, UAE, with a cargo of 92,000 bags of charcoal. According to a source at Port Rashid, the vessel had set sail from the Al-Shabaab-controlled port of Barawe on 12 July 2013 and arrived in Port Rashid on 24 July 2013.¹⁶ The consignee of the cargo was established as Bahaya General Trading LLC, belonging to Ahmed Mohamed Barre, and Saleh Da'ud Abdulla of Al Baoon Trading Company.¹⁷ Da'ud has been previously described by the Monitoring Group as a businessman closely associated with Al-Shabaab (S/2011/433, annex 3.1). The *MV Victoria* is managed by Ajman Shipping & Trading and has been identified before by the Monitoring Group (S/2012/544, annex 2.1 and S/2013/413, annex 9.2) for having shipped charcoal from Barawe to Saudi Arabia. (See annex 9.2.a for pictures of the *MV Victoria* in Port Rashid on 4 August 2013.)

¹⁴ Traders have singled out Doha port in Kuwait as the main port of entry.

¹⁵ Calculations based on shipping data obtained from Kismayo port as well as volume of charcoal carried on vessels provided by owners. For vessels where no precise volume of data is available, average figures are used.

¹⁶ A confidential source present at Port Rashid, UAE, informed the Monitoring Group on 2 August 2013 as the vessel prepared to offload.

¹⁷ Information obtained by a confidential source at Port Rashid with access to shipping documentation and provided to the Monitoring Group on 8 August 2013.

42. In a letter to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations dated 23 October 2013, the Monitoring Group requested customs documentation submitted to Port Rashid authorities by the captain of the *MV Victoria*. No response has been forthcoming.

The case of the MV Energy 3

43. In early August 2013, the Monitoring Group received information that the Moldovan-flagged *MV Energy 3* (IMO 7920429) had departed Port Rashid on 17 June 2013 and on 6 July 2013 docked at Mogadishu port, where it off-loaded general cargo. According to Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, the Energy 3 then set sail again for Kismayo, where it arrived on 2 August 2013. At Kismayo, the vessel loaded on board approximately 140,000 bags of charcoal before setting sail for Salalah, Oman, and subsequently travelling to Port Rashid, Dubai, UAE, where it arrived on 12 August 2013.¹⁸ Following a fire on board the vessel a few days later, the crew began offloading the charcoal cargo onto the docks at Port Rashid. (See annex 9.2.b for pictures of the Energy 3 docked at Port Rashid with its charcoal cargo.)

44. The Monitoring Group obtained the bill of lading for the Energy 3 shipment, which identifies the port of loading as Kismayo and the port of discharge as Port Rashid, UAE. The exporter was identified as Hassan Mohamed Yusuf (a.k.a. “Awlibaax”) and the importer as Abdirahman Mohamud Warsame (a.k.a. “Dhaqalayste”). As described in the main section of this report and previously reported by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 9.2), Yusuf is known to have links to Al-Shabaab. (See annex 9.2.c for a copy of the bill of lading.)

45. According to a confidential source with access to Port Rashid, the captain of the Energy 3 submitted documents to authorities in Port Rashid that purported the charcoal cargo to be Iranian in origin. The company reportedly responsible for procuring the Iranian documentation was Al Khattal Group Marine Contracting & Trading, run by Salem Alkhattal Almihairey, who is based in office 16 of the Dubai Customs Building near Hamriya Port and is known by the business community in Dubai as a powerful and politically connected businessman.¹⁹ One owner of a fleet of vessels chartered to Somali charcoal traders also confirmed to the Monitoring Group that Almihairey has arranged falsified paperwork for charcoal imports in the past.²⁰ Separately, a Somali charcoal dealer informed the Group that Almihairey had asked Somali charcoal dealers in Dubai to report to him if they were approached by the Monitoring Group, so that he could request the UAE authorities to deport any

¹⁸ According to signals data obtained by the Monitoring Group, the *MV Energy 3* was in Port Rashid, UAE, between 13 and 17 June 2013, in Mogadishu between 6 and 20 July 2013 (in position 2°1'N, 45°20'E), in Kismayo on 2 August 2013 (in position 0°23'S, 42°32'E), in Salalah, Oman, on 8 August 2013 (in position 16°56'N, 54°0'E), and in Port Rashid, UAE, as of 12 August 2013. Also, a confidential source at Port Rashid first contacted the Monitoring Group on 1 August 2013 indicating that the vessel was due to dock at Kismayo and then load charcoal there for onward delivery to Port Rashid, UAE.

¹⁹ Correspondence with confidential source at Port Rashid on 8 August 2013; interview with Somali businessman, Dubai, UAE, 11 January 2014; and interview with Somali charcoal dealer, 10 January 2014, Dubai, UAE.

²⁰ Interview with owner of a fleet of dhow vessels that regularly transports charcoal from Somalia, Dubai, UAE, 30 May 2014.

member of the Monitoring Group investigating charcoal shipments in Dubai.²¹ (See annex 9.2.d for a copy of Almihairey's business card).

46. The Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations on 12 August 2013, 14 August 2013 and 30 August 2013 by way of updating the customs authorities in Dubai of the movements and off-loading of the Energy 3. These correspondences were copied to the Committee, which encouraged the authorities of the UAE to interdict the vessel and impound the charcoal. The UAE did eventually seize the cargo of the Energy 3.²² However, according to charcoal traders in the UAE, the charcoal aboard the Energy 3 was eventually sold off in a public auction on or about 12 February 2014 by UAE customs authorities. The UAE authorities did not inform the Committee or the Monitoring Group about the sale.²³

47. Meanwhile, no response has been forthcoming to the Monitoring Group's letter of 30 August 2013 addressed to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations, which requested customs documentation in respect of the Energy 3 shipment.

Dhow traffic

48. The Monitoring Group has documented 142 cases of charcoal shipments from Kismayo and Barawe on wooden dhows between June 2013 and May 2014. Out of these 142 cases, 21 dhows exported a volume of at least 780,000 bags from southern Somalia between June and the end of August 2013. Of these 21 known cases, at least 19 dhows shipped charcoal from the port of Kismayo. Charcoal cargo for five of these 19 dhows were shipped by Hassan Mohamed Yusuf (a.k.a. 'Awlibaax') and Ali Ahmed Naaji, who are both noted in the main section of this report as senior business figures in Kismayo connected to Al-Shabaab. Another five cargoes were shipped by Kismayo charcoal dealers Farah Jama Awil (a.k.a. Degdeg), Aden Farah Hassan and Jama "Dhuxul".²⁴

49. The Monitoring Group understands that most, if not all, of these 21 shipments arrived in ports in the UAE. While precise data on how many shipments were delivered to which ports in the UAE is not fully available, the Monitoring Group has received information directly from the owners of two vessels that delivered Somali charcoal to the UAE. The *MSV Isha*, an Indian-flagged dhow carrying 42,000 bags of charcoal from Kismayo arrived in Port Rashid in July 2013, and the *MSV Raj Milan*, a dhow carrying 24,000 bags of charcoal from Kismayo, arrived in Sharjah Creek in mid-August 2013.²⁵ In addition, sources at Sharjah Creek reported the arrival of the Indian-flagged *Nafeya*, which offloaded 24,000 bags of charcoal in early September 2013.²⁶

²¹ Interview with Somali charcoal dealer, Dubai, UAE, 10 January 2014.

²² The Monitoring Group was informed of the seizure during a consultation with senior UAE authorities in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on 7 November 2013.

²³ Multiple correspondence with confidential source with access to Port Rashid, UAE, between 13 and 14 February 2014. The charcoal cargo of the Energy 3 was reportedly sold for approximately USD 2.25 million.

²⁴ Information collated from shipping data compiled by confidential source at Kismayo port.

²⁵ Information provided by vessel owners in October 2013.

²⁶ Information provided by Somali source in Sharjah, UAE, 9 September 2013, and corroborated by two individuals involved in shipping goods from Somalia to Sharjah, 16 October 2013.

50. A representative of the company that owns the *Isha* confirmed that he had received cash payment for the transport of the charcoal from a company in Dubai called Wadi Al Nahar General Trading LLC (see annex 9.2.e for a picture of the company office and a list of shareholders). The owner of the *Raj Milan* confirmed that he had received payment from a Dubai-based Somali broker known as Mohamud Ali Osman “Qonof”, who manages charcoal imports for a number of traders in the UAE.²⁷

51. A representative of the company Wadi Al Nahar General Trading informed the Monitoring Group that one of the partners in the company had in the past been involved in organizing charcoal loadings but refused to disclose further details on whose behalf this partner was operating.²⁸ A separate business partner of Wadi Al Nahar informed the Monitoring Group that the company has acted in the past as a broker for charcoal shipped to Sharjah in the name of Mehdi Da’ud, who is the brother of Saleh Da’ud Abdulla and a main shareholder in a warehouse business, Aflah FZC, located in an industrial area of Sharjah.²⁹ A business partner of “Qonof” confirmed he had organized delivery of charcoal during this period to the Sharjah-based warehouses of Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading LLC, a business that belongs to Egyptian businessman Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”³⁰ (see annex 9.3 and 9.4 for more details on Mehdi Da’ud and Hassan “Masry” and other major charcoal wholesalers).

52. In its 23 October 2013 letter to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations, the Monitoring Group requested all customs documentation in respect of the *Nafeya* and the *Isha*. No response has been received.

Violations after September 2013

53. During the period between September 2013 and mid April 2014, the Monitoring Group documented exports of at least 5 million bags of charcoal from Kismayo and Barawe, with 1.09 million bags shipped on merchant vessels and 4.22 million bags shipped on wooden dhow vessels. While it has not been possible to identify all shippers, middlemen, and consignees related to each shipment, the Monitoring Group has nonetheless managed to identify key individuals involved in many of these shipments.

54. Following the resumption of the shipping season in September 2013, the Monitoring Group received information that charcoal dealers in Somalia were unsure as to whether to export from Somalia to the UAE, fearing their cargoes may be subject to a similar fate as the *Energy 3* impounded in Port Rashid.³¹

55. While several vessels were loading charcoal at Kismayo and Barawe in September 2013, one small dhow, the *Al Karam*, had already completed loading and

²⁷ Information provided by vessel owners in October 2013. Financial transactions running through one single money transfer agency and in the name of “Qonof” have amounted to more than USD 500,000 between 2011 and 2013. The name of his company, according to these financial transactions, is stated as Gedi General Trading.

²⁸ Information provided by representative of Wadi Al Nahar, 30 May 201, Dubai, UAE.

²⁹ Interview with business partner of Wadi Al Nahar, 30 May 2014, Dubai, UAE.

³⁰ Interview with business partner of “Qonof”, 13 October 2013, Dubai, UAE.

³¹ Three Somali individuals previously involved in the charcoal trade contacted the Monitoring Group during the course of September 2013 to ask if the UAE had “banned” charcoal from entering the UAE.

was sailing to the UAE to test whether customs authorities would allow entry of the cargo. The *Al Karam* attempted to off-load in Sharjah, where port authorities turned it away in late October 2013 (see below for full case). However, it eventually off-loaded in the Omani port of Khasab, just across the border from the UAE. The successful off-loading of the *Al Karam* signalled to charcoal traders in Somalia that a new entry point into the GCC region had been found, and shippers redirected their vessels accordingly.

56. Thereafter, the Monitoring Group continued to trace shipments from Kismayo and Barawe, and provided information and photographic evidence of off-loadings to the Omani authorities, which eventually blocked further charcoal imports into the ports of Khasab and Muscat by late January 2014. However, shippers then began finding new methods to smuggle charcoal into other neighbouring countries, notably through ports in Kuwait and again at Port Rashid in the UAE. In spite of several letters written by the Monitoring Group to the UAE and Kuwait providing details of charcoal arrivals, neither Government interdicted any of the cargoes or shared documentation submitted by the captain of any vessel that the Monitoring Group had identified as having transported Somali charcoal. This lack of cooperation has undermined investigations into consignees.

The case of the *Al Karam*

57. This case is significant given that the *Al Karam* was the first vessel to find a way to off-load Somali charcoal in a destination port following the resumption of the shipping season in September 2013. Its successful offloading in Khasab offered to other shippers from Kismayo and Barawe the option of off-loading in Oman.

58. On 23 October 2013, the Monitoring Group received information from sources in Sharjah Creek that the Indian-flagged dhow *Al Karam* loaded with 12,000 bags of charcoal from Kismayo had arrived at Sharjah Creek, where it was held at anchorage.³² Following the refusal of UAE authorities to allow the vessel entry into port, the *Al Karam* charted another course. On 25 October 2013, the Monitoring Group informed the Permanent Missions of the UAE and Oman to the United Nations in writing that the vessel was on its way to Oman. In its correspondence to the Omani Permanent Mission on 4 November 2013, the Monitoring Group confirmed the vessel's arrival in Khasab port, in the Musandam Governorate of Oman. After offloading, the cargo was transported by road from Khasab across the border to warehouses in Sharjah (see annex 9.3 for more details on charcoal warehouses in Sharjah).

59. The Monitoring Group has identified the owner of the *Al Karam* as Abdirashid Issa Noah, a Somali businessman with Belgian nationality who was found facilitating a Somali-Islamic convention attended by radical Islamist leaders in Gent, Belgium. (See annex 9.2.f for ownership document related to the *Al Karam* and Noah's involvement with Islamist associations connected to Al-Shabaab.)

60. Neither the UAE nor Oman provided any response to requests for information and documentation of the *Al Karam*. In its response of 6 January 2014, however, the Oman authorities stated that they had no information on any vessel known as "Al Kamra", which is the incorrect name for the *Al Karam*. The Monitoring Group

³² Information received by two port sources at Sharjah, and one Somali trader in Dubai, UAE, 23 October 2013.

wrote back to the Omani mission on 17 January 2014 re-iterating its request for information on the vessel, correctly named the *Al Karam*, but has received no response to this follow up request.

Deliveries to Oman

Deliveries to the port of Khasab

61. Following the *Al Karam* delivery, the Monitoring Group received comprehensive information on at least five Indian-flagged wooden dhow vessels that successfully delivered charcoal from the Al-Shabaab-controlled port of Barawe to Khasab. These vessels are only a portion of those that delivered Somali charcoal to Oman, though their detailed profiling by the Monitoring Group serves as representative case material regarding principal actors involved in the supply of charcoal to Oman.

62. The Monitoring Group confirmed directly with the owners of the Indian-flagged *Haridham*, *Hari Prasad*, *Asif*, and *Arabian Star* vessels that each of them had chartered their vessels to parties that had loaded charcoal in Barawe and had offloaded in Khasab. The *Haridham* offloaded 25,000 bags of charcoal and appears in photographs in annex 9.2.g docked in Khasab on 18 November 2014. The *Asif* and *Hari Prasad* also offloaded a similar amount around the same time. The *Arabian Star* offloaded 25,000 bags of charcoal in mid-December 2014.³³ Shipping sources also confirmed the loading of the Indian-flagged *Uweesh Karani* in Barawe with 18,500 bags of charcoal and its arrival in Khasab in mid-November 2013.³⁴

63. The owner of both the *Haridham* and *Hari Prasad* informed the Monitoring Group that he had received cash payment from “Qonof” for the transport of the charcoal. The Monitoring Group received further information that “Qonof” brokered the cargo carried on both the *Haridham* and *Hari Prasad* on behalf of Mehdi Da’ud and Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”.³⁵ The owner of the *Asif* confirmed that he had received payment from an Omani broker. However, according to a source in Barawe, the charter of the *Asif* was partly brokered by Abdulwahab Noor Abdi (a.k.a. “Tomato”), a Somali broker who is a shareholder of the Dubai-based company Al Nezam Al Asasy General Trading LLC³⁶ (see annex 9.2.h for details on company shareholders). “Tomato” has confirmed that he is a business partner of Ali Ahmed Naaji.³⁷ In addition, the Monitoring Group documented two transfers totalling USD 40,000 sent by Ali Ahmed Naaji to “Tomato” during the course of November 2013.³⁸ According to local officials and businessmen in Kismayo, Ali

³³ Information collected from owners of these vessels between December 2013 and March 2014. In an official response to the Monitoring Group provided in July 2014, the owners of the *Asif* and *Arabian Star* then changed their narrative by reporting the port of loading as Kismayo, whereas they had originally reported Barawe as the original port of loading. Shipping data in Kismayo does not corroborate the new claims of the owners of the *Asif* and *Arabian Star*.

³⁴ Information provided by three separate shipping sources in Dubai and Oman on 30 November 2013. A source in Barawe also corroborated the vessel’s loading there, interview 1 December 2014.

³⁵ Information provided by two transporters who shipped charcoal from Somalia, 10 January 2014, Dubai, UAE.

³⁶ Interview with businessman based in Barawe, 17 January 2014.

³⁷ A source of the Monitoring Group discussed Ali Naaji directly with “Tomato” in March 2014.

³⁸ The Monitoring Group has received access to the account information of both individuals. The confidential documents are archived at the United Nations.

Ahmed Naaji and “Tomato” are important *zakat* collectors for Al-Shabaab.³⁹ A business partner of “Tomato” says that he also works closely with Mehdi Da’ud.⁴⁰

64. The owner of the *Arabian Star* identified a UAE-based broker as the individual who paid him for the charter. This individual is still under investigation. Romatbhai Jusab Agariya, the registered owner of the *Uweesh Karani*, refused to provide details of who paid his company. Sources in the charcoal business stated that the ultimate consignee of the *Uweesh Karani* was Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”.⁴¹

The case of the Fadhil Rabi/El Castaro

65. On 26 November 2013, the Monitoring Group documented the presence of the Somali-flagged general cargo vessel *Fadhil Rabi* (IMO 7223039) in Khasab and the offloading of 70,000 bags of charcoal, which it had loaded at Barawe in late October 2013.

66. While docked in the port of Khasab, the Monitoring Group observed that the name on the vessel had been changed to ‘*El Castaro*’. Indeed, military reporting earlier confirmed the *Fadhil Rabi* (IMO 7223039), bearing the name *El Castaro*, to be anchored in Barawe on 29 October 2013 and 2 November 2013 (in position 01°05’N, 044°01’E), and to be heading northeast parallel to the Somali coast just north of Mogadishu on 3 November 2013 (at 09:44 UTC in position 02°14’N, 046°01’E). While en route, the vessel was observed loaded with green bags of charcoal (see pictures of loaded vessel en route and of its arrival in Khasab in annex 9.2.i).⁴²

67. The name change, which at the time had not been registered or reported to any maritime authority, was evidently intended to avoid monitoring and tracking of the vessel and its illegal cargo. Indeed, when naval coalition forces queried the captain of the *El Castaro* by VHF radio on 3 November 2013, he provided the following information, which again confirmed the vessel was in fact the *Fadhil Rabi* concealing its identity and the nature of its cargo:

Vessel flag: Somalia
 IMO number: 7223039 (same as the *Fadhil Rabi*)
 Port of Registry: Mogadishu, Somalia
 Vessel owner or agency: Al Aqeed General Trading Company (UAE)
 International call sign: 6OAL
 Last Port of Call: Kismayo
 Next Port of Call: Salalah (Oman)
 Description of cargo: Dry lemon
 Gross Tonnage: 1812 tons
 Number of crew on board: 15

³⁹ Interview with two Interim Jubbaland Administration officials, 15 December 2014 and 6 February 2014, and corroborated by two businessmen based in Kismayo, interviewed on 16 October 2014 and 14 December 2014. Locally, “Tomato’s” operations are known as “Iskaashatada Yaanyo”, which means the “Tomato Association”.

⁴⁰ Interview with business partner of “Tomato”, Dubai, UAE, 30 May 2014.

⁴¹ Information provided by two transporters who shipped charcoal from Somalia, 10 January 2014, Dubai, UAE, and with two former charcoal wholesalers familiar with Hassan Masry’s operations, 10 January 2014.

⁴² Information received from naval coalition forces on 4 November 2013.

68. By falsely identifying the cargo as dry lemons, the Captain of the *Fadhil Rabi/El Castaro* was apparently aware that the charcoal he was carrying was illegal and in violation of the United Nations charcoal ban pursuant to resolution 2036 (2012). In addition, the Monitoring Group had previously identified the stated owner of the *El Castaro*, Al Aqeed General Trading Company, as the owner of the *Fadhil Rabi* (IMO 7223039) when it loaded charcoal at Kismayo in November 2012 (S/2013/413, annex 9.2). On that occasion, the owner claimed to the Monitoring Group that the *Fadhil Rabi* had loaded with cement and lemons, and not charcoal. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group found while tracking the movements of the vessel in 2012 that it was emitting false Automatic Identification System (AIS) positions to obscure its route.

69. On 1 June 2014, when the Monitoring Group visited the offices of Al Aqeed General Trading Company in Dubai, the owner of the vessel, Dahir Sheikh Omar Mohammed, explained that he had sold the *Fadhil Rabi* in December 2012 to a company called Noble Marine Services, and allowed the Group to review the sales contract. However, the sales contract made no reference to any beneficiary in the name of Noble Marine Services. Mr. Omar Mohammed then insisted that Noble Marine Services was represented by an Indian captain and a Somali business partner. After requesting to see evidence of a genuine financial transaction in respect of the vessel and contact details of the new owners, Mr. Omar Mohammed snatched the sales contract back, tore it up and requested the Monitoring Group to leave his office.⁴³

70. The Monitoring Group had earlier noticed in July 2013 that according to maritime intelligence the ownership of the vessel had changed to “Pakistan Breakers”,⁴⁴ suggesting that the vessel had been sold for scrap, while in fact it continued to ship charcoal under the assumed name of ‘*El Castaro*’. The change in ownership continued when on 4 June 2014 the name of the vessel was officially changed to ‘Elcastaro’, shortly after the Monitoring Group visited Mr. Omar Mohammed in his office.⁴⁵ While Mr. Omar Mohammed claims to have sold the vessel to Noble Marine Services, maritime intelligence indicates another change of ownership, this time to “Indian Breakers”, again suggesting the vessel has been sold for scrap and broken up.⁴⁶ According to maritime industry data, Noble Marine Services is in care of Coral Coast Trading, a Dubai-based shipping company with no vessels registered under its name.⁴⁷

71. Following the offloading of the *El Castaro* at Khasab in early December 2013, the Monitoring Group received information that the charcoal was being packed in vehicles with Omani license plates and driven by road past Ras Al Khaiamah to

⁴³ Noble Marine Services is found to be an offshore maritime company registered in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, holding IMO number 1938539.

⁴⁴ As registered in Lloyds List Intelligence on 3 July 2013.

⁴⁵ As registered in Lloyds List Intelligence on 4 June 2014.

⁴⁶ As registered in Lloyds List Intelligence: broken up on 22 June 2014 and dead since 23 June 2014.

⁴⁷ <http://www.wsdonline.com/showcomp2.asp?area=Ship+Owner&country=UAE&officeid=318997>. A 2005 report of the Monitoring Group (S/2005/625) identified Coral Coast Trading and its representative, Abdullahi Ali Mohammed, as being involved in an illegal fishing scheme with the local Somali administration at the port of El Ma’an, north of Mogadishu, and Kenyan-based East Africa Sea Food Ltd as part of the Alpha Group of companies.

warehouses in Sharjah near the cement factory.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, on 26 November 2013, a major news organization broadcast video footage showing the transport of other charcoal on Omani-plated trucks by the coastal road from Khasab towards Ras Al Khaimah.⁴⁹

Use of falsified certificates of origin

72. On 6 December 2013, in response to the Monitoring Group having provided photographic evidence of the offloading of the *Haridham* and *El Castaro*, the Omani authorities wrote to the Group stating that they had taken all measures to implement resolution 2036 (2012). However, the Monitoring Group wrote again to the Permanent Mission of Oman to the United Nations on 12 December 2013, reiterating several prior requests for customs documentation in respect of the charcoal shipments it had confirmed as arriving in Khasab from Somalia. The Omani authorities responded on 6 January 2014, providing Djiboutian certificates of origin for the charcoal off-loaded by the *Uweesh Karani*, *Haridham* and *El Castaro* and therefore maintaining that the charcoal had not been imported from Somalia.

73. The Monitoring Group had already informed the Omani authorities in its correspondence of 27 November 2013 that shippers were providing certificates of origin from countries other than Somalia. Given the evidence the Monitoring Group has acquired from signals data and confirmations by the owners of the vessels themselves, there can be no doubt that the vessels and their cargo originated in Somalia and that the documentation from Djibouti had been falsified.

74. Indeed, the company that certified the cargoes as Djiboutian is called Red Sea Transit and Transport, a Djibouti-based company that the Monitoring Group has previously identified (S/2013/413, annex 9.2) for issuing false documentation to facilitate the import of Somali charcoal at destination ports (full evidence of the companies involved in falsifying documents is provided in annex 9.4).

Deliveries to the port of Muscat

75. Following measures by the Omani authorities to block charcoal imports into Khasab port, the Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of Oman to the United Nations on 17 January 2014 requesting information on eight wooden dhows carrying Somali charcoal that the Group understood had diverted course to Muscat. The Monitoring Group has obtained full confirmation that five of these eight dhows offloaded charcoal in mid-January 2014 at Muscat, namely the *Isha*, *Al Safa*, *Barari*, *Azmat* and *Daudi*.

76. The owner of the Indian-flagged *Isha* and *Al Safa*, confirmed that his vessels originated in Kismayo and off-loaded cargoes of 25,000 bags and 15,000 bags of charcoal in Muscat during the course of January 2014.⁵⁰ Once again the *Isha* had

⁴⁸ Information provided by an eyewitness of trucks crossing the border from the Musandam Governorate towards Ras Al Khaimah. Information reported on 22 December 2013.

⁴⁹ Footage broadcast at <http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/UAE-Charcoal/3e5668a24ad30a91e1bbbe28293421b7?query=somali+charcoal¤t=1&orderBy=Relevance&hits=15&referrer=search&search=%2fsearch%3fstartd%3d%26endd%3d%26allFilters%3d%26query%3dsomali%2bcharcoal%26advsearchStartDateFilter%3d%26advsearchEndDateFilter%3d%26searchFilterHdSDFormat%3dAll%26searchFilterDigitized%3dAll%26searchFiltercolorFormat%3dAll%26searchFilteraspectratioFormat%3dAll&allFilters=&productType=IncludedProducts&page=1&b=3421b7>.

⁵⁰ Information confirmed over several conversations with the owner, between February and June 2014.

been chartered by Wadi Al Nahar General Trading, a known partner of Mehdi Da'ud (see above).⁵¹ The broker who paid for the transport of charcoal on the *Al Safa* was Abdulrahman Ali Warsame aka "BBC", who has been confirmed to be Abdirahman Mohamud Warsame (a.k.a. "Dhaqalayste"), the importer for the *MV Energy 3*.⁵²

77. The *Barari* originated in Barawe and offloaded charcoal in Muscat in mid-January 2014.⁵³ The company that manages the *Barari* is Naseem Al Barari General Trading, based in Dubai and run by Iraqi and Jordanian shareholders (see annex 9.2.j for the names of the shareholders). In June 2014, the Monitoring Group visited the offices of this company, where a representative who only gave his name as "Babu" stated that the *Barari* had been carrying charcoal from Somalia. He refused to provide details of who had chartered the *Barari*.

78. While shipping sources confirmed that the Indian-flagged *Azmat* originated from Kismayo,⁵⁴ the Monitoring Group obtained the bill of lading for this vessel, which purported the 30,000 bags of charcoal cargo to have originated from Djibouti (see annex 9.2.k). The bill of lading was raised by Clarion & Shewall Shipping SARL, a Djibouti-based company which, along with Red Sea Transit and Trading, has routinely issued false bills of lading for Somali charcoal (see annex 9.4 for more evidence on falsified paperwork and those involved). The consignee on the bill of lading for the *Azmat* was noted as Abu Mansour United Company in Muscat, which is a known agent for Hassan Mohamed Ahmed "Masry".⁵⁵

79. According to an eyewitness, charcoal offloaded in Muscat was packed onto trucks with Omani license plates and transported across the Hatta crossing on the Oman-UAE border, and then onward to warehouses in Sharjah.⁵⁶ The eyewitness, who previously worked in the charcoal business, confirmed that some of the charcoal was destined for Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading and for another warehouse belonging to a Syrian charcoal dealer known as Yousef Moussa Sahu "Siri".

80. On 17 January 2014, the Monitoring Group visited a cluster of warehouses near the cement factory in Sharjah where it observed Omani-plated trucks delivering charcoal into several warehouses, including Al Bahi Coals, which belongs to Yousef Moussa Sahu "Siri". (Full details of charcoal wholesalers in Sharjah are provided in annex 9.3.)

81. In its correspondence dated 17 January 2014, the Monitoring Group alerted the Omani authorities that shippers were specifically providing false Djiboutian and Kenyan certificates of origin for importing Somali charcoal. On 12 February 2014, the Omani

⁵¹ Information provided by the owner of the *Isha*, 30 May 2014.

⁵² As provided by the owner of the *Al Safa*, 30 May 2014, and a personal contact of "Dhaqalayste" who confirmed his other alias as "BBC", August 2014.

⁵³ Information provided by a Somali broker operating vessels between Somalia and the UAE, 1 February 2014.

⁵⁴ Information of the *Azmat*'s loading in Somalia has been confirmed by three shipping sources in Dubai and Kismayo, who provided the information between February and March 2014.

⁵⁵ Sources who visited the ports of Khasab and Muscat on behalf of the Monitoring Group in December 2013 and January 2014 confirmed the link between Abu Mansour United Company and Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading.

⁵⁶ The eyewitness present on the Hatta gateway on 8 January 2014, 12 January 2014, 16 January 2014 and 17 January 2014 reported seeing trucks filled with charcoal passing this border crossing on these dates.

authorities wrote back to inform the Monitoring Group that as of 23 January 2014, it had blocked all further imports of Kenyan and Djiboutian marked charcoal into Muscat.

82. The Monitoring Group met with the Permanent Representative of Oman to the United Nations on 25 March 2014 and briefed her and her staff on the need to acquire all customs documentation for vessels it had identified as having offloaded in Oman, in order to investigate the consignees further. It also wrote an official request on 1 April 2014 for documentation on nine vessels, including the *Azmat*, which offloaded in Oman. While the Omani authorities have blocked charcoal imports, responses to requests by the Monitoring Group for customs documentation on all vessels that are known to have offloaded charcoal in Khasab and Muscat during the above time frame remain unanswered.

Deliveries to Kuwait and the UAE

83. Following efforts by the Omani authorities to block charcoal imports into Muscat, the Monitoring Group received information that charcoal traders quickly diverted shipments from Somalia to Doha Port in Kuwait and to Port Rashid in the UAE. The Monitoring Group has obtained confirmations of at least 35 vessels that left Kismayo and Barawe between early February and the end of May 2014, which arrived in either Doha Port in Kuwait or Port Rashid in the UAE. While not all of these shipments have been fully documented, the Monitoring Group can present a few select cases below that illustrate how dhow traffic shifted from Oman to Kuwait and back to the UAE.

Deliveries to Kuwait

84. Three owners confirmed their vessels carrying charcoal as having arrived in Kuwait in February and March 2014. In a letter dated 20 February 2014, the Monitoring Group informed the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations that the owner of the Indian-flagged *Amir Ali* had confirmed that his vessel carrying 45,000 bags of charcoal had sailed from Kismayo to Kuwait (see annex 9.2.l for a picture of the vessel). The vessel offloaded in Doha in early February 2014.⁵⁷

85. Meanwhile, the owner of the Indian-flagged *Sea Star* and *Shane Hind* confirmed that both his vessels offloaded 22,000 and 17,400 bags of charcoal in Kuwait in early March 2014, sourced from Kismayo and Barawe respectively.⁵⁸

86. Shortly after 4 January 2014, pirates hijacked the *Shane Hind* off Barawe, where it had loaded Somali charcoal, and used it as a mother vessel (see annex 9.2.m for a picture of the hijacked vessel with charcoal aboard). International naval forces rescued the vessel two weeks later, on 18 January 2014, and obtained the shipping documents of the cargo from the captain. One bill of lading showed the vessel had loaded its charcoal in Brava (Barawe). Another bill of lading purported the vessel had originated in Mombasa, Kenya, and was due to travel to Muscat, Oman (see annex 9.2.n for copies of conflicting bills of lading). Given the testimony of the owner of the vessel, who confirmed the vessel originated in Barawe and the evidence collected by the naval forces, it is evident that the bill of lading, issued by the Mohash Business Co Ltd in Kenya and stamped by Kenyan port authorities, was falsified (see annex 9.4 regarding falsified documentation).

⁵⁷ Information provided by the owner of the *Amir Ali*, telephone call on 13 February 2014.

⁵⁸ Interview with the owner of the vessels, 16 April 2014, by telephone.

87. The consignee of the *Shane Hind*'s cargo was noted as Abu Mansour United Company, who as described above, is a known agent in Muscat operating on behalf of Hassan Mohamed Ahmed "Masry" of Baroudi Int Coal Trading LLC in Sharjah. Hassan Mohamed Ahmed "Masry" reportedly owns at least one charcoal storage warehouse in Kuwait, where he would have been able to take charge of the cargo following its diversion from Muscat to Kuwait.⁵⁹ When the Monitoring Group contacted Hassan Mohamed Ahmed "Masry" in June 2014, he sent a text message back to the Group from a Kuwaiti number.⁶⁰

88. Another hijacked dhow, the Indian-flagged *Al Nazir*, was also disrupted and boarded by international naval forces on 26 April 2014. Documentation obtained by naval forces from the captain confirmed that the vessel had loaded 880 tonnes of charcoal in Somalia, which was purchased from a dealer in Barawe. The destination on the manifest was specified as Kuwait with the consignee of the shipment named as Farah Hussein Hassan (see annex 9.2.o for a picture of the vessel and manifest), who is known to be a major shareholder in Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC, one of the main charcoal storage warehouses in the Sharjah industrial zone, near the cement factory (see annex 9.3 for more on this company and other warehouses). The *Al Nazir* vessel is registered in India to Hajiamad J. Agariya, a member of the Agariya family that owns a number of vessels involved in the charcoal trade (see annex 9.5 regarding the Agariya family vessels).

89. On 4 April 2014, the Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the United Nations requesting customs documentation on 19 vessels that at the time were understood to have set sail for Doha port, including the *Shane Hind* and the *Amir Ali*, but has received no response.

Deliveries to Port Rashid

90. The Monitoring Group has obtained confirmation from the owners of the Indian-flagged *Shere Nausad* and *Haridwar* that their vessels carried 17,000 and 32,000 bags of charcoal respectively from Kismayo to Port Rashid. In addition, the owner of the *Khaliduni*, who had leased these vessels to Naseem Al Barari General Trading LLC, confirmed that this vessel had also carried charcoal from Somalia into Port Rashid prior to May 2014.⁶¹ As mentioned above, the Monitoring Group visited Naseem Al Barari General Trading LLC, where a company representative who only gave his name as "Babu" confirmed that his company managed several vessels that were importing cargo from Somalia, and said that he would provide written answers to questions by the Monitoring Group. No responses were forthcoming to subsequent attempts by the Group to acquire more information from the company.

91. The Monitoring Group has acquired photographic evidence of several vessels offloading Somali charcoal in Port Rashid between March 2014 and June 2014. In March 2014, the Indian-flagged *Al Rehan* and *Shere Nausad* were photographed offloading in Port Rashid. In May 2014, the Indian-flagged *Hari Prasad* and the *Al Mukhtar* were photographed in Port Rashid, and then subsequently witnessed as offloading charcoal. On 12 June 2014, the Indian-flagged *Haridwar*, *Al Kadri*, and *Rukmavati* were all photographed offloading charcoal in Port Rashid. Shipping

⁵⁹ Information provided by a businessman based in Kuwait, 15 October 2013, and confirmed by a Somali charcoal dealer in Dubai, UAE, 1 June 2014.

⁶⁰ Text message exchange on 18 June 2014.

⁶¹ Interview with owner, 1 June 2014, Dubai, UAE.

information received from Kismayo and from sources at Port Rashid all confirm that all these vessels carried charcoal from Somalia.⁶² One of the trucks that was observed collecting offloaded charcoal in Port Rashid on 16 June 2014 belongs to Al Qaed International Trading LLC, owned by Baba Mansoor Ghayedi (a.k.a. Haji Baba), who was previously identified by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 9.2) as one of the largest importers of charcoal into the UAE. (See annex 9.2.p for photographs of offloading operations.)

92. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group received information from sources at Port Rashid that all these shipments were then transported to the cluster of warehouses in Sharjah⁶³ (see annex 9.3 on warehousing operations). Indeed, the Monitoring Group obtained the manifest for the *Rukmavati*, which noted the consignee as Baroudi International Charcoal Trading (Sharjah), the warehouse of Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry” (see annex 9.2.q). The shipping agent on the manifest was Mohash Business Co Ltd, the same company that issued the false bill of lading for the *Shane Hind*. (More examples of false manifests declaring charcoal deliveries for Port Rashid appear in annex 9.4.)

93. Following a number of unanswered letters from the Monitoring Group to the UAE requesting documentation, at the request of the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations, the Group consolidated its data from its previous letters on 27 March 2014. This email made reference to 14 vessels that had off-loaded in Port Rashid, including the *Al Rehan*, *Haridwar* and *Shere Nausad*, and requested customs documentation for all these vessels. The Permanent Mission of the UAE has not yet responded to this request.

Summary

94. In summary, the above investigations have revealed:

1. A trend of shipping from the UAE, to Oman and Kuwait, and back again to the UAE (detailed in this annex 9.2).
2. Wholesale end users identified as operating warehouses in Sharjah (further detailed in annex 9.3).
3. Falsification of shipping documents, involving companies from Djibouti and purportedly from Kenya (further detailed in annex 9.4).
4. The transport of charcoal appears to mainly take place on Indian-registered dhows (further detailed in annex 9.5).

⁶² Shipping data provided by port sources in Kismayo. Two sources at Port Rashid confirmed the arrivals from Somalia in June 2014.


⁶³ Interview by telephone with two sources at Port Rashid, 18 June 2014.

**Annex 9.2.a: *MV Victoria* offloading charcoal in Port Rashid, UAE,
on 4 August 2013**







Annex 9.2.b: *MV Energy 3* docked at Port Rashid, UAE, with charcoal cargo





Annex 9.2.c: Bill of lading for the MV Energy 3

JAMHURIYADA FEDERALKA SOMALIYA		SOMALI FEDERAL REPUBLIC N° 8031
<p>Bill Of Loading To be used with charter parts</p>		
B/L No: <u>00/125</u>		
Shipper: <u>Hassan Yusuf Ali Libaax</u>		
Consignee: <u>Abdi Rahman Mohamud Warsame</u>		
Vessel: <u>MV ENERGY 3</u>		Port of loading: <u>Kismayo port</u>
Port of discharge: <u>Port Rashid of Dubai</u>		
Shipper's Description of goods: <u>Charcoal</u>		gross weight: <u>140,895 Bags</u>
(Of Which _____ on deck at shipper's risk the center of Used responsible for loss or damage however arising)		
Freight payable as per Charter partly dated: _____ Freight advance Received an account of freight _____ Figure used for loading <u>Six</u> days <u>ninety six</u> Hours	SHIPPED at port of loading in apparent Good Order and condition on board the vessel or Carriage to the port of discharge or so near there to us she may safely get the goods Specified above Weight, measure, quality, condition, comments and value un known In witness where of the master or agent of the said vessel has signed the number of bill of loading indicated below all of this tenor and date any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF	
Freight _____	place and date of issue: <u>01/02/2013</u>	
Number of original B/L <u>Three</u>	Signature: 	

Annex 9.2.d: Business card of Salem Alkhattal Almihairey



مجموعه سالم الختال للتعهدات والتجاره البحرية
SALEM AL KHATTAL GROUP MARINE CONTRACTING & TRADING

Salem Alkhattal Almihairey
 Director
 Mob.: 055-6246969

سالم سعيد الختال المهيري
 مدير تنفيذي
 متحرك: ٥٥-٦٢٤٦٩٦٩

تليفون: ٥٤-٢٣٩٨٩٣٣، فاكس: ٥٤-٢٣٩٨٩٤٩
 ص.ب: ٨١٧٨٥، ميناء الحمريه، دبي - ا.ع.م.

Tel.: 04-2398933, Fax: 04-2398949, P.O. Box: 81785,
 Floor No. 1, Office No. 16, Dubai Customs Bldg.
 Near Hamriya Port, Dubai-U.A.E.

E-mail: salemaikhattalgroup@gmail.com / salemk69@hotmail.com

Annex 9.2.e: Wadi Al Nahar office and shareholders



DATE 23/10/2013

Company Profile

Member Number 200728
Company Name WADI AL NAHAR GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
Nationality United Arab Emirates
License Number 663923 **License Issue Auth.** Department of Economic Development
Registration Date 21/01/2012 **Commercial Reg No** 1088332
Legal Status Limited Liability Company

ADDRESS

Po Box Number 41875
Phone **Fax** **Email Address**
Area **Street**
Building Name N/A
License Issue Date 11/01/2012 **License Expiry Date** 10/01/2014
Membership Renewal Date 26/01/2013 **Membership Expiry Date** 10/01/2014
No Of Employees **Authorized Capital**


ACTIVITIES

General Trading

PARTNERS

		%	
ABDULLA MOHAMAD ALI TAWFIQMAZMI	United Arab Emirates	51.000	Partner
TAHER ALI AHMED	Somalia	17.000	Partner
ABDI MOOSA MOHAMMAD	Somalia	16.000	Partner
HUSSAIN NOOR ALI	Kenya	16.000	Partner

Annex 9.2.f: Ownership document related to the *Al Karam* and Abdirashid Issa Noah's involvement with Islamist associations connected to Al-Shabaab



Abdirashid Issa Noah and SOBSI

The Belgian owner of the *Al Karam*, Abdirashid Issa Noah, has reportedly been a shareholder in the charcoal business since 2009. He fully committed himself to the business by relocating to Dubai, UAE, where in March 2013 he purchased the *Al Karam* for AED 250.000.⁶⁴ He regularly travels between Dubai, Nairobi and Brussels, and around the end of October 2013 he was reportedly in Barawe or Kismayo from where he was calling family and friends in Belgium.

In Gent, Belgium, Abdirashid Issa Noah also runs the subsidized non-profit local community organization SOBSI,⁶⁵ which purportedly organizes sports and cultural activities to encourage exchanges between different communities.

However, on 27 and 28 June 2009, in contrast with the purpose and reported activities of the organization, SOBSI organized the first Somali Islamic convention in Belgium, offering a pulpit to the phenomenon of the “flying imams and clerics” propagating the Wahabi-Salafi ideology.

One of the speakers at the event was Sheikh Ahmed Dahir Aweys, the brother of Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former leader of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AI), Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab, and who is sanctioned by the United Nations.

*Screenshot video footages of the 2009 Somali-Islamic convention organized by SOBSI in Gent*⁶⁶



⁶⁴ 250.000 United Arab Emirates Dirham is the equivalent of approximately USD 68.000.

⁶⁵ Association for Somali-Belgian social integration, established in 2005.

⁶⁶ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uI4dsVk4X30>.



The convention, which took place at the Turkish Tevhid mosque in Gent, was attended by roughly 150 Somali individuals from the Netherlands and Belgium, the vast majority belonging to the Darood/Harti and Hawiye/Abgaal clans.

On the margins of the convention, SOBSI organized a discrete fund-raising effort in support of Hizbul Islam factions. During and following the event, different coordinators of SOBSI, including Chairman Abdirashid Issa Noah, reportedly raised a total of Euros 23,000 in both Belgium and the Netherlands. On 25 July 2009, the funds were reportedly transferred to Mogadishu, Somalia, in support of Hizbul Islam's ARS and Anoole factions.

For the past five years, various Government and other agencies in Belgium have funded SOBSI in support of its social activities. Although, in 2010 the City Council of Gent criticized one of their grant proposals for not being realistic, for not budgeting revenues and for overestimating the costs of their planned activities.

Annex 9.2.g: The dhow *Haridham* offloading charcoal in Khasab, Oman, on 18 November 2013





Annex 9.2.h: Shareholders of Al Nezam Al Asasy General Trading LLC

DATE 23/10/2013

Company Profile

Member Number 196181
 Company Name AL NEZAM AL ASASY GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 Nationality United Arab Emirates
 License Number 658287 License Issue Auth. Department of Economic Development
 Registration Date 24/08/2011 Commercial Reg No 1081418
 Legal Status Limited Liability Company

ADDRESS

Po Box Number 40450 DUBAI
 Phone Fax Email Address mafarax77@hotmail.com
 Area Al Rigga Street Al Rigga Street
 Building Name N/A
 License Issue Date 24/08/2011 License Expiry Date 23/08/2014
 Membership Renewal Date 10/09/2013 Membership Expiry Date 23/08/2014
 No Of Employees Authorized Capital

ACTIVITIES

General Trading

PARTNERS

		%	
IBRAHIM ALI HEMAED ALMARZOOQI	United Arab Emirates	51.000	Partner
ABDI HUSSAIN NOOR	Ethiopia	7.000	Partner
ALI MERY BEER	Somalia	6.000	Partner
abdi mohamed worseme	Ethiopia	6.000	Manager
ABDI YASEEN MOHAMMAD	Kenya	5.000	Partner
ABDULWAHAB NOOR ABDI	Ethiopia	5.000	Partner
MOHAMMAD ABDI OMAR	Kenya	5.000	Partner
MOHAMMAD ABUBAKER ALMY	Somalia	5.000	Partner
NOOR KHALEEF DOL	Ethiopia	5.000	Partner
WSHAQ HASSAN ADEN	Ethiopia	5.000	Partner

Annex 9.2.i: The *El Castaro* en route from Barawe towards Khasab, Oman, and offloading at Khasab



Annex 9.2.j: Shareholders of Naseem Al Barari General Trading LLC

غرفة دبي
DUBAI CHAMBER

DATE 01/06/2014

Company Profile

Member Number 26604
 Company Name NASEEM AL BARARI GENERAL TRADING (L.L.C.)
 Nationality United Arab Emirates
 License Number 230403 License Issue Auth. Department of Economic Development
 Registration Date 04/03/1993 Commercial Reg. No. 46824
 Legal Status Limited Liability Company
 Current Status Active - Renew

ADDRESS

PO Box Number 22927 DUBAI
 Phone 4-2243643 Fax Email Address nbarari@emirates.net.ae
 Area Rigga Al Bateen Street Al Maktoum Street
 Building Name Ad-Dana Centre
 License Issue Date 01/03/1993 License Expiry Date 28/02/2015
 Membership Expiry Date 28/02/2015
 No of Employees Authorized Capital 3,000,000

ACTIVITIES	
General Trading	

PARTNERS			
Name	Nationality	%	Relation
KHALDOON RATEB MAHMOOD ASMAR	Jordan	20.000	Managing Partner
ABDUL SALAM JAFFAR MAHDI	Iraq	15.000	Partner
HASSAN SALMAN NASSER	United Arab Emirates	51.000	Partner
RATEB MAHMOOD AHMAD ASMAR	Jordan	14.000	Partner
-	United Arab Emirates	0.000	Managing Partner



More Business Information on the mentioned company available on Credit Rating Unit .Call 800-CHAMBER (2426237)

Page 1

غرفة دبي
 Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry
 P.O. Box 1457 - Dubai, U.A.E.
 تلف (+971) 4 2280000
 فاكس (+971) 4 2211646
 www.dubaichamber.ae

Annex 9.2.k: Bill of lading raised by Clarion & Shewall for the dhow Azmat

CLARION & SHEWALL SHIPPING SERVICES S.A.R.L
MANIFESTE DE SAILING

REV. L. Azmat
CAPITAINE: P. Salomon
PAVILLON: Oman
PORT OF LOADING: Djibouti
PORT OF DISCHARGE: Orissa
TONNAGE: 650 M.T

DATE OF SAILING: 05.12.2013

B/E NO.	1. Shipper	2. Consignee	3. Notify Party	Marks, Nrs.	No and Kind of packages Description of Goods	Weight in Kgs	Volume in CBM
	CLARION & SHEWALL				30,000 CHARCOAL	25 Kg	780,000
	abu. Mansour Unifed Co Oman Mascot				Bags of Charcoal		

SIGNATURE ET CACHET DE L'AGENT


Clarion & Shewall Shipping S.A.R.L
Avenue St. Laurent Du Var
Tél: 21 35 07 58 FAX: 21 35 07 71
B.P. 233 DJIBOUTI

Avenue St. Laurent Du Var B.P. 233 Djibouti République de Djibouti Tel: 213 350768 Fax: 213 350771 E-mail: clarionshipping.com

Annex 9.2.1: Photograph of the dhow *Amir Ali*



Annex 9.2.m: The dhow *Shane Hind* and photograph of charcoal loaded aboard the vessel



Annex 9.2.n: Bills of lading for the *Shane Hind*

1. *Bill of lading showing loading of charcoal in Barawe (Brava)*

Muktar M. M. Hassan BILL OF LADING
Shipper To be used with charter party (B/L No. 001)

Charterer

Notify address

MSV SHANE HINDI
Vessel Part of lading

BRAWA PORT SOMALIA
Port of discharge

Shippers description of goods charcoal in Gross weight
BAGS EXPORT from Somalia

TOTAL BAGS 17400 BAGS

(Of which ... as chipper ... the charter party ... ASPER CHARTER PER SAID TO BE

Freight payable AS PER CHARTER PARTY SAID TO BE
Charter party details


Freight received

Reserved and account to freight

Time used for loading Day: hour

Freight payable at
Number of original B/L 02

Place the date SOMALIA 04/07/2014
Signature



2. False cargo manifest stating cargo delivered from Kenya ("Mambasa")

MICHAEL BUSH BUSINESS LTD. LTD.
100 GARDNER STREET
TEL: 011 253 1234
011 253 1234

MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

TEL: 011 253 1234
MUNDA, KENYA

DESTINATION: MAMBASA

B/L No	DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	WEIGHT
AL 219023	1. COFFEE 2. TEA 3. SUGAR 4. RICE 5. BEANS 6. MAIZE 7. WHEAT 8. CORN 9. SOYABEANS 10. PEANUTS 11. SESAME SEEDS 12. CASHIWA 13. MUNG BEANS 14. PIGEON PEAS 15. CHICKPEAS 16. LENTILS 17. MILK POWDER 18. BUTTER 19. OIL 20. FLOUR 21. SALT 22. SODA ASH 23. POTASH 24. GYPSUM 25. CEMENT 26. BRICKS 27. ROPE 28. NETS 29. TENTS 30. FISH 31. MEAT 32. BONES 33. HIDE 34. SKIN 35. FEATHERS 36. CORN COB 37. SWEET POTATOS 38. CASSAVA 39. MANGOS 40. PAPAYA 41. GUAVA 42. LEMON 43. ORANGE 44. MANGO 45. PEACH 46. APPLE 47. BANANA 48. PINEAPPLE 49. WATERMELON 50. CUCUMBER 51. CABBAGE 52. CARROT 53. POTATO 54. ONION 55. GARLIC 56. SHALLOT 57. TOMATO 58. PEPPER 59. CILANTRO 60. DILL 61. PARSLEY 62. BASIL 63. MINT 64. CHIVES 65. SPINACH 66. KALE 67. BROCCOLI 68. CAULIFLOWER 69. CABBAGE 70. LETTUCE 71. CUCUMBER 72. ZUCCHINI 73. EGGPLANT 74. PEPPER 75. ONION 76. GARLIC 77. SHALLOT 78. TOMATO 79. PEPPER 80. CILANTRO 81. DILL 82. PARSLEY 83. BASIL 84. MINT 85. CHIVES 86. SPINACH 87. KALE 88. BROCCOLI 89. CAULIFLOWER 90. CABBAGE 91. LETTUCE 92. CUCUMBER 93. ZUCCHINI 94. EGGPLANT 95. PEPPER 96. ONION 97. GARLIC 98. SHALLOT 99. TOMATO 100. PEPPER	1	17,500 Pkg

1. SHIPPER
MICHAEL BUSH BUSINESS LTD. LTD.

2. DESTINATION
MAMBASA

3. DATE
17/05/2014

4. TIME
10:00 AM

5. SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MANIFESTEE OFFICE

6. SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MICHAEL BUSH BUSINESS LTD. LTD.

7. SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MICHAEL BUSH BUSINESS LTD. LTD.

Annex 9.2.o: Photograph and manifest of the *Al Nazir*



**BRAVA SHIPPING AGENCY LTD
CARGO MANIFEST**

MV/MSV AL NAZIR CALL SIGN _____ DATE 09/04/2014
 MASTER NAME M. J. HUSEIN ABDULLAH

PORT OF LOADING BRAVA PORT OF DISCHARGE BRAVA PORT _____

BL NO	SHIPPER	CONSIGNEE	MARKS	DESCRIPTION	WEIGHT
01	GALAD ABDULLAH JIMALE	FARAH HUSEIN HASSAN	///	BAGGED Charcoal	25kg per Bags
				36021652 TOTAL BAGGES	

REMARKS: AS PER CHARTER PARTY SAID TO BE

OPERATIONS DEPART

Annex 9.2.p: Charcoal offloading operations in Port Rashid

1. Al Rehan, March 2014, Port Rashid



2. Shere Nausad, March 2014, Port Rashid



3. Hari Prasad, *May 2014, Port Rashid*



4. Al Mukhtar, May 2014, Port Rashid



5. Haridwar, June 2014, Port Rashid



6. Al Kadri, June 2014, Port Rashid



7. Rukmavati, June 2014, Port Rashid



8. *Al Qaed International Trading LLC truck, June 2014, Port Rashid*



Annex 9.2.q: Manifest of the dhow *Rukmavati*

MOLIASH BUSINESS CO.LTD
 P.O.BOX 4387
 TEL:0113-59182
 FAX:0156691


MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

VESSEL: MSV RUKMAVATI (MNV-2188)
 PAVILION: MANDVI-KUTCH


DESTINATION: PORT RASHID UAE

B.L. No.	MARKS AND No.	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	WEIGHT
KE. 2599337		BAROUDI INTERNATIONAL CHARCOAL TRADING/SHARJAH TEL: +97155222917 1 SHIPPER HASSAN MASRI KENYA- MAMBASA	BASES OF CHARCOALS 32000 800000 KGS

SIGNATURE AND STAMP
 MANIFESTEE EMPREE



KENYA- MAMBASA 12/08/2014



Annex 9.3: Charcoal warehousing in the United Arab Emirates

95. The Monitoring Group visited a cluster of warehouses near the cement factory in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates (UAE), on 17 January 2014 and on 30 May 2014 (see annex 9.3.a for a map of the approximate location of the cement factory). According to transporters and middlemen involved in the charcoal trade, these warehouses all regularly receive Somali charcoal in violation of resolution 2036 (2012).⁶⁷ They are located in close vicinity to each other near the cement factory in a well-known industrial area of Sharjah, and operate freely as registered companies in Sharjah. Sources in the charcoal trade have informed the Monitoring Group that these are the main warehouses from where charcoal imports are distributed to two Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, notably Saudi Arabia.⁶⁸

96. During its visit to the industrial area in Sharjah on 17 January 2014, the Monitoring Group observed a number of warehouses packed full of charcoal. Among these warehouses were those of Al Baroudi Int. Coal Trading LLC, Al Bahi Coals, Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC, and Aflah. As indicated in annex 9.2 these companies are owned by Hassan Mohamed Ahmed “Masry”, Yousef Moussa Sahu “Siri”, Farah Hassan Hussein and Mehdi Da’ud, all of whom purchased charcoal exported from Somalia in violation of resolution 2036 (2012). Photographs of these warehouses appear in annex 9.3.b.

97. During the Group’s visit on 17 January 2014, at least two trucks with Omani license plates carrying charcoal were observed entering the compound of Al Bahi Coals (see annex 9.3.c). At the time, as described in annex 9.2, the Monitoring Group had documented ongoing deliveries of charcoal to Muscat and received information about further transport of the charcoal by road from Oman to Sharjah. The Monitoring Group also observed Omani and UAE trucks carrying charcoal and parked on the highway (see annex 9.3.d). The drivers confirmed to the Monitoring Group that they were headed to Saudi Arabia.

98. In addition, the Monitoring Group observed charcoal stacked in several other warehouses in the same vicinity, notably belonging to GWE General Trading LLC, Al Faham Al Mumayaz Coals Trading LLC and Al Safa Coal Trading. (See annex 9.3.e for photographs of these warehouses.) Middlemen and brokers in the charcoal trade have confirmed to the Monitoring Group that these warehouses also store imported Somali charcoal in violation of resolution 2036 (2012) but in lesser volumes to the four main warehouses featured in annex 9.3.b.⁶⁹

99. Furthermore, the Monitoring Group is aware of at least one other charcoal wholesaler in Sharjah, a company named Najmat Al Mankhool Trading LLC (see annex 9.3.f for a depiction of the company’s logo), which deals in charcoal from Somalia. An eyewitness in contact with the Monitoring Group visited this business

⁶⁷ Interviews with former charcoal trader on 16 October 2013, with charcoal warehouse owner on 17 January 2014, with two former employees of charcoal warehousing operations on 30 May 2014, and with two charcoal transporters on 16 October 2013.

⁶⁸ Interviews with former charcoal trader on 16 October 2013, with charcoal warehouse owner on 17 January 2014, and with two former employees of charcoal warehousing operations on 30 May 2014.

⁶⁹ Interview with two charcoal brokers who accompanied the Monitoring Group to the industrial area on 17 January 2014 and 30 May 2014. All warehouses were also identified by two former charcoal dealers, Dubai, UAE, 13 October 2013.

in an industrial area of Sharjah on 20 November 2013 and was informed by a company representative that the charcoal stock in its storerooms was from Somalia. The company representative subsequently claimed that the charcoal was imported mainly from Djibouti.⁷⁰

100. When the Monitoring Group visited the warehouses in the Sharjah industrial area for the second time on 30 May 2014, it observed all the warehouses still full with charcoal stocks (photographs charcoal at the warehouses appear in annex 9.3.g for photographs). The Monitoring Group was also made aware of another warehousing operation in Ajman, UAE, where it also visited and found large volumes of charcoal in a warehouse belonging to the company Qasr Al Sahra Coal and Firewood Packaging LLC. Brokers and middlemen trading in charcoal in the UAE confirmed that this company is one of the major recipients of Somali charcoal (see annex 9.3.h for photographs).⁷¹

101. On 20 January 2014, the Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations requesting its assistance in obtaining paperwork related to all the charcoal purchases made by these companies since January 2013. The purpose of this request was to enable the Monitoring Group to review customs documentation related to these purchases, and identify consignees of charcoal shipments on vessels known to have originated from Kismayo and Barawe. Such documentation would have also likely revealed the scale of false certificates of origin that are being issued to disguise Somali charcoal as Djiboutian or Kenyan (a fuller assessment of falsified paperwork appears in annex 9.4). The Monitoring Group received no response to its 20 January 2014 request, but was asked to summarize the requests again in an email sent to the UAE Permanent Mission to the United Nations on 27 March 2014. The Permanent Mission provided no answers to the email of the Monitoring Group.

⁷⁰ Information provided by eyewitness on 21 November 2013.

⁷¹ Interview with two charcoal brokers who accompanied the Monitoring Group to Ajman on 30 May 2014. Also, interviews with Somali charcoal trader, Dubai, UAE, 1 June 2014, and with another broker for Somali charcoal, email correspondence on 6 June 2014.

Annex 9.3.a: Map of approximate location of Sharjah Cement Factory Colony in relation to Dubai, UAE



Annex 9.3.b: Charcoal warehouses in Sharjah visited on 17 January 2014 (Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading LLC, Al Bahi Coals, Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC, Aflah)

Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading, warehouse 1



Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading, warehouse 2



Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading, warehouse 3



Charcoal stored at Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading warehouse



Omani plated truck carrying charcoal entering Al Bahi Coals warehouse⁷²



⁷² It was not possible to obtain a photograph of the warehouse itself on this occasion. A photograph of the Al Bahi Coals warehouse appears in annex 9.3.g.

Charcoal stored at Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC



Aflah warehouse



Annex 9.3.c: Omani plated charcoal trucks entering the warehouse of Al Bahi Coals



Annex 9.3.d: Omani and UAE trucks carrying charcoal on the highway to Saudi Arabia



Annex 9.3.e: Charcoal warehouses in Sharjah, UAE, visited on 17 January 2014 (GWE General Trading LLC, Al Faham Al Mumayaz Coals Trading LLC, and Al Safa Coal Trading)





Annex 9.3.f: Najmat Al Mankhool Trading LLC company logo



Annex 9.3.g: Charcoal warehouses in Sharjah, UAE, visited on 30 May 2014 (Al Baroudi Int. Coal Trading LLC, Al Bahi Coals, Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC)

Warehouse of Al Baroudi Int Coal Trading LLC



Warehouse of Al Bahi Coals



Warehouse of Wadi Al Hijaz Coal Trading LLC



Annex 9.3.h: Warehouse of Qasr Al Sahra Coal and Firewood Packaging LLC, Ajman, UAE, 30 May 2014



Annex 9.4: Systematic use of falsified shipping manifests and certificates of origin

102. The Monitoring Group previously reported (S/2013/413, annex 9.2) on the use of false bills of lading to misrepresent to customs authorities Somali charcoal imports as being sourced from third countries.

103. The Monitoring Group has obtained documentation that matches testimonial evidence provided separately by individuals within the charcoal trading industry, which demonstrates that the practice of issuing false documentation is organized by a small number of companies operating in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya and Djibouti. In particular, it appears that two Kenyan companies and at least two Djiboutian companies are systematically involved in the issuing of false bills of lading. The consignees on these bills of lading are invariably companies based in the UAE or other GCC countries.

104. The practice of using false documentation has been ongoing for at least two years, an attempt by charcoal traders to disguise Somali charcoal exports in order to circumvent Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). The Monitoring Group has obtained samples of such falsified documentation from 2012 onwards, which confirms the involvement of key individuals.

False Djiboutian paperwork

105. In November 2012, the Monitoring Group received shipping data from the port of Kismayo identifying the Indian-flagged dhow *Bhumika* as loading charcoal at Kismayo port.⁷³ Documentation for the *Bhumika* obtained during the course of the Monitoring Group's current mandate shows that a bill of lading was presented in the UAE in November 2012 purporting the cargo of 26,049 bags of charcoal to have been loaded by the Djiboutian shipping agent MAG Shipping Services SARL on behalf of a Djiboutian-based shipper, Red Sea Transit and Transport Service. The commercial invoice for this shipment was notarized with the stamp of Mrs. Ismahan Ali Farah, the head of legal affairs and administrative matters at the Prefecture of Djibouti, and was stamped and signed by Zam-Zam Dileita, the then second consul at the Djiboutian embassy in Abu Dhabi. The invoice was also franked with a receipt from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the port of discharge was noted as Sharjah, UAE (see annex 9.4.a for shipping documents). The consignee of the charcoal cargo was noted as High River General Trading, which is also registered as High River Shipping and Cargo LLC, a Dubai-based company run by Abdi Mahmoud Mohamed (a.k.a. "Abdi Yare"), who is known to generate the paperwork in his company's name on behalf of hidden consignees (see annex 9.4.b for company shareholders).⁷⁴ As noted in annex 9.5 the *Bhumika* has continued to ship charcoal in 2014.

106. Another case concerns the Indian-flagged dhow *Nigahe Mukadame*, which was registered in Kismayo as loading charcoal on 12 November 2012.⁷⁵ Documentation for the *Nigahe Mukadame* obtained during the course of the Monitoring Group's

⁷³ Shipping data compiled by confidential source working at Kismayo port.

⁷⁴ Information provided by a Somali broker, 8 August 2013, by a Somali charcoal dealer 13 October 2013, and by a Somali businessman also involved in falsifying bills of lading, 16 October 2013, all located in the UAE.

⁷⁵ Shipping data compiled by confidential source working at Kismayo port.

current mandate shows that a bill of lading was presented in the UAE purporting the cargo of 28,500 bags of charcoal to have been loaded by the Djiboutian shipping agent AGMA Dhow Maritime Agent on behalf of the shipper Red Sea Transit and Transport Service. The date of sailing from Djibouti was noted also as 12 November 2012 and the consignee of the charcoal cargo was noted as Al Bahi Coals Trading LLC in Sharjah (one of the main wholesalers mentioned in annexes 9.2 and 9.3). The commercial invoice was again notarized by the Prefecture of Djibouti and by Zam-Zam Dileita. See annex 9.4.c for documentation on the *Nigahé Mukadame*.

107. In December 2012, the Monitoring Group received shipping data from the port of Kismayo identifying the Indian-flagged dhow *Satya Narayan* as loading charcoal at Kismayo port.⁷⁶ Documentation for the *Satya Narayan* obtained during the course of the Monitoring Group's current mandate shows that a bill of lading was presented in the UAE purporting the cargo of 47,663 bags of charcoal to have been loaded by the Djiboutian shipping agent Clarion & Shewall Shipping Services SARL on behalf of the shipper Red Sea Transit and Transport Service. According to the bill of lading, the consignee of the charcoal cargo was noted as Kismayo General Trading LLC, a company run by Basheer Khalif Moosa, who has been previously named by the Monitoring Group (S/2013/413, annex 9.2) as one of the key individuals involved in organizing false paperwork in Djibouti and generating bills of lading in his company's name on behalf of hidden consignees. The commercial invoice, however, states the consignee to be Al Bahi Coals Trading LLC. The commercial invoice for this shipment was stamped and signed once again by Mrs. Ismahan Ali Farah and Zam-Zam Dileita. The invoice was also franked with a receipt from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the port of discharge was noted as Sharjah, UAE. Port authorities in Djibouti issued a false port clearance document for the *Satya Narayan* (see annex 9.4.d for documentation).

108. In its last report (S/2013/413, annex 9.2.h), the Monitoring Group documented the case of the *Al Yusuf* dhow, which had loaded 47,663 bags of charcoal in Kismayo in December 2012, but presented in the UAE a bill of lading prepared by Clarion & Shewall Shipping Services SARL on behalf of the shipper Red Sea Transit and Transport Service purporting the cargo to have been exported from Djibouti. The Monitoring Group has since obtained the stamps of the commercial invoice, which was again notarized by Mrs. Ismahan Ali Farah and Zam-Zam Dileita. Kismayo General Trading was noted as the consignee for the cargo (see annex 9.4.e).

109. The Monitoring Group has received shipping data from the port of Kismayo identifying the Indian-flagged dhow *Jaya Jamna* as loading charcoal at Kismayo port on 20 April 2013. Documentation for the *Jaya Jamna* obtained during the course of the Monitoring Group's current mandate shows that a bill of lading was generated purporting the cargo of 30,000 bags of charcoal to have been loaded by the Djiboutian shipping agent AGMA Dhow Maritime Agent on behalf of the shipper Red Sea Transit and Transport Service. The date of sailing from Djibouti was noted as 20 April 2013, the same day the vessel was loading charcoal in Kismayo. The commercial invoice for this shipment was notarized by Mrs. Ismahan Ali Farah and Zam-Zam Dileita. The invoice was also franked with a receipt from the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The final consignee was noted as Saudi Arabian, although the port of discharge was noted as either in the UAE or in the

⁷⁶ Shipping data compiled by confidential source working at Kismayo port.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A certificate of origin is notarized by the Djibouti Chamber of Commerce (see annex 9.4.f for documentation).

110. As noted in annex 9.2, the Monitoring Group confirmed a number of vessels to have delivered charcoal from Somalia to ports in Oman in late 2013 and early 2014. Among these, at least three vessels, the *Uweesh Karani*, *Haridham* and *El Castaro* (see annex 9.2 for evidence showing these three vessels originated from Somalia) also presented Djiboutian certificates of origin for their charcoal. These documents once again noted the shipper to be Red Sea Transit and Transport Service (see annex 9.4.g), indicating that the trend of falsification identified from 2012 has continued into 2014.

111. The cases above illustrate a clear pattern, whereby Red Sea Transit and Transport Service appears to be systematically involved in raising false bills of lading with the assistance of shipping agents in Djibouti. While the shipping agents acting on behalf of this company may vary, it appears the one most regularly used is Clarion & Shewall Shipping SARL, which is already cited in annex 9.2 for having raised the bill of lading for the *Azmat*, a vessel which is known to have sailed from Somalia in late December 2013 (see annex 9.4.h for documentation on the *Azmat* and annex 9.4.i for a photograph of Clarion & Shewall). Indeed, the Monitoring Group has obtained a bill of lading that even noted Clarion & Shewall as the shipper for 25,000 bags of charcoal aboard the Indian-flagged dhow *Al Asma*, which loaded charcoal in Kismayo in March 2014⁷⁷ but which purported the charcoal cargo as exported from Djibouti (see annex 9.4.j). The destination of the cargo was noted as Kuwait (see annex 9.2 on charcoal deliveries to the UAE, Oman and Kuwait).

112. During a visit to Djibouti in February 2014, the Monitoring Group telephoned both Red Sea Transit and Transport Services and Clarion & Shewall Shipping SARL. A representative of Red Sea Transit and Transport Services said that it would not discuss the issue of false documentation unless the Monitoring Group first obtained authorization from the Djiboutian Foreign Ministry.⁷⁸ A representative from Clarion & Shewall first acknowledged he worked for the company, but as the conversation unfolded he informed the Monitoring Group that it had dialled a wrong number, and then hung up.⁷⁹

113. As the Monitoring Group previously noted (S/2013/413, annex 9.2), Basheer Khalif Moosa, the director of Kismayo General Trading LLC, is the main individual involved in the falsification of Djiboutian paperwork, and has frequently travelled to Djibouti to organize this. He occupies a shared office in Dubai, UAE, with Dahir Sheikh Omar Mohammed, who is described in annex 9.2 as linked to the shipment of charcoal on board the *El Castaro*. In addition to the one case above, the Monitoring Group has obtained other commercial invoices naming Kismayo General Trading LLC and raised by Red Sea Transit and Transport Services (see annex 9.4.k for sample documentation).

114. The Monitoring Group understands that while Kismayo General Trading LLC is not directly involved in the purchase and sale of charcoal, this company has provided an essential service for charcoal smugglers by obtaining false

⁷⁷ Information provided by a Somali broker on 31 March 2014 and corroborated by two independent shipping industry sources in Dubai, UAE, on 1 April 2014.

⁷⁸ Telephone conversation with Red Sea Transit and Transport Service, 7 February 2014.

⁷⁹ Telephone conversation with Red Sea Transit and Transport Service, 6 February 2014.

documentation and then allowing the company name to be referred to as the consignee, when in fact actual consignees may be different. This is similarly the case with High River Shipping and Cargo LLC.

False Kenyan paperwork

115. The Monitoring Group has received documentation demonstrating that false bills of lading have been notarized using Kenyan Government stamps purporting Somali charcoal to have originated in Kenya.

116. As an example, the Monitoring Group received shipping data from the port of Kismayo identifying the Indian-flagged dhow *Al Rafiqi* as loading charcoal at Kismayo port in December 2012.⁸⁰ Documentation for the *Al Rafiqi* obtained during the course of the Monitoring Group's current mandate, however, shows that a bill of lading was presented in the UAE purporting the cargo of 25,000 bags of charcoal to have been exported from Mombasa, Kenya, on 21 December 2012. The bill of lading was raised by E.A.C.E Business Co Ltd, a shipping company based in "Mambasa", Kenya, and the certificate of origin was notarized with stamps from the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Kenya Revenue Authority, the Kenya Consulate General in Dubai, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nairobi and the Kenya Ports Authority. The consignee of the charcoal cargo was noted as Al Mankhool General Trading LLC, a Dubai-based company. The port of discharge was noted as Sharjah, UAE (see annex 9.4.l). Similar paperwork was previously obtained by the Monitoring Group and appeared in annex 9.2.e of [S/2013/413](#).

117. The Monitoring Group has been informed by sources within the charcoal trading community in Dubai that Al Mankhool General Trading LLC regularly organizes false Kenyan paperwork for charcoal cargoes from Somalia and acts as a consignee for end buyers of charcoal in the UAE.⁸¹ Two shareholders of the company informed the Group that they were aware that one of the company representatives, Abshir Mumin Ibrahim, rents out his company certificates so charcoal cargoes can be imported in its name (see annex 9.4.m for company shareholders).⁸²

118. As documented in annex 9.2, charcoal cargo carried aboard the Indian-flagged dhow *Shane Hind* was notarized as originating from Kenya, when it actually originated from Barawe. The bill of lading was raised by the Mohash Business Co Ltd, which purported the vessel to have originated from "Mambasa", Kenya, and was notarized by a Kenya Port Authority stamp.

119. The Monitoring Group has obtained additional documentation related to a shipment of 18,400 bags of charcoal aboard the Indian-flagged dhow *Nehmatullah* in May 2014. According to shipping data received from the port of Kismayo, the vessel loaded charcoal at Kismayo port in late April 2014.⁸³ However, the documentation purports the charcoal cargo to have been loaded in "Mambasa", Kenya, from where the vessel is noted as having set sail in May 2014. Again, the

⁸⁰ Shipping data compiled by confidential source working at Kismayo port.

⁸¹ Interviews with a charcoal trader, Dubai, UAE, 16 October 2013; a Somali shipping broker, 8 August 2013 Dubai, UAE; and a shareholder of Al Mankhool General Trading, 16 October 2013 Dubai, UAE.

⁸² Interviews with two shareholders of Al Mankhool General Trading LLC, Dubai, UAE, 20 October 2013.

⁸³ Shipping data compiled by confidential source working at Kismayo port.

bill of lading was raised by Mohash Business Co Ltd, though the consignee this time is noted as Al Khittal General Trading,⁸⁴ a company based in Dubai (see annex 9.4.n).

120. The Monitoring Group has also obtained documentation of charcoal manifests generated by Mohash Business Co Ltd for shipments that delivered charcoal to Port Rashid, UAE, in June 2014. The consignees were listed as High River Shipping and Cargo LLC, Baroudi International Charcoal Trading, and Bahaya General Trading LLC, who all have track records in organizing shipments or importing Somali charcoal in violation of resolution 2036 (2012) (see annex 9.4.o for documentation).

Levels of cooperation from customs authorities in the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Kenya and Djibouti

121. The Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the United Nations requesting information from its customs authorities on any charcoal shipments that would have been imported with documents referring to Red Sea Transit and Transport Services, Clarion & Shewall Shipping SARL, Al Mankhool General Trading, E.A.C.E Business Co Ltd and Mohash Business Co Ltd, but received no response. Similar requests addressed to Oman and Kuwait did not receive any response either.

122. The Monitoring Group has obtained copies of letters from Kenyan authorities regarding false charcoal documentation. A first letter, dated 5 June 2014, is from the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade informing its Ambassador in Abu Dhabi of the use of forged stamps of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya consulates and the Kenya Chamber of Commerce and Industry by “unscrupulous business persons to declare Kenya as the country of origin of exported charcoal from Somalia in order to obtain import permits to the Gulf States”. The letter requests the Ambassador to inform the authorities of the UAE. A second letter, also dated 5 June 2014, is from the Embassy of the Republic of Kenya in the UAE informing the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “Kenya documents may have been forged in order to import charcoal into the UAE”. It also states that the export of charcoal in large quantities is not permitted for export from Kenya (see annex 9.4.p for copies of the letters). On 5 August 2014, the Monitoring Group wrote to Kenyan authorities regarding falsified Kenyan paperwork but has not yet received a response.

123. The Monitoring Group wrote to the Permanent Mission of Djibouti to the United Nations on 4 August 2014 informing the authorities of the systematic use of Djiboutian paperwork to disguise Somali charcoal cargoes. On 19 August 2014, Djiboutian authorities requested additional time to respond. In this regard, the Monitoring Group would seek the commitment of Djiboutian authorities to cooperate with the ongoing investigations of the Monitoring Group.

⁸⁴ Other documents refer to the company as “Al Khittal General Trading”.

Annex 9.4.a: Shipping documentation related to the dhow *Bhumika*

1. *Bill of lading*

REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
PORT DE DJIBOUTI

MAG SHIPPING SERVICES SARL.
BP 443 - DJIBOUTI

MANIFESTE DE SORTIE

Vessel : S/K BHUMIKA
PAVILLON : INDE

VOY 001



ARRIVEE : 14/11/2012
SORTIE: 15/11/2012

DESTINATION : SHARJAH

B/L No.	1. Shipper 2. Consignee 3. Notify party	MARKS AND NO.	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	WEIGHT
MAG11DJ110004	MAG SHIPPING HIGH RIVER GENERAL TRADING DUBAI(UAE)	28049	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	651225


DJIBOUTI LE: 15 novembre 2012

SIGNATURE AND AGENT STAMP
MANIFESTE EN 1066

2. Commercial invoice

12-11
1700




MAG SHIPPING SERVICES S.A.R.L.

Adresse: Warehouse N°: LIJ11-17, P.O.BOX: 443, Djibouti-Republic of Djibouti
Tel : 00253 34 20 33, fax : 00253 34 20 33, email : mag_shipping@istat.dj


Ref No: MAG/20/NOV12. Date: 26 - Nov -2012

COMMERCIAL INVOICE
No. MAG0020/NOV/2012


Shipper MAG Shipping Services S.A.R.L. Tel. +253 2134 2033 Republic of Djibouti	Method of Payment T/T or CAD Final Destination : SHARIAH(UAE)
Consignee HIGH RIVER GENERAL TRADING (L.L.C.) TEL: +971 4 2282049 FAX: +971 4 2947417 DUBAI TOWER, FOURTH FLOOR, OFFICE NO. 446, NASSAR SQUARE/BANIYAS SQUARE, DEIRA, DUBAI-U.A.E	

Sno.	DESCRIPTION	Origin	QNTY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL PRICE USD
3	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	ETHIOPIA	26049	2.3 PER BAG	59912.7
				TOTAL	59912.7
					FIFTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWELVE AND SEVEN CENT

STAMP & SIGNATURE




Secrétaire Générale Adjointe



3. Certificate of origin

101
130

**CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE
DE DJIBOUTI**



ORIGINAL

Certificat d'Origine N° 8164

شهادة منشأ

Nous certifions d'après les connaissements et autres documents qui nous ont été présentés que les marchandises désignées ci-dessous :
This is to certify according to bills of lading and other documents produced that the following goods, viz :
استناداً إلى بولصة الشحن التي قدمت لنا، بأن البضاعة المذكورة أدناه

Marques - Brands - الماركة	Nature de la Marchandise - Description of Good - نوع البضاعة	Poids - Weight - الوزن
BAGS OF CHARCOAL	XXXXXX 26049 BAGS OF CHARCOAL	651225 KGS

Chargées par / Loaded by: **MAG SHIPPING SERVICES SARI** / شحنت بواسطة

A destination de / Destination: **SHARJAH** / **CHABSAH**

Sont déclarés d'ORIGINE / Are declared of ORIGIN: **ETHIOPIA**

Djibouti, le 27/11/2012


نشهد بصحة كل البيانات أعلاه
Nous certifions la sincérité de
toutes les indications ci-dessous
حسب الأقرار رقم: 27/11/2012

Le Président de la Chambre de Commerce
Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce
رئيس الغرفة التجارية


جيبوتي

جوسيدا

4. Official notarization found on the reverse of the commercial invoice



Annex 9.4.b: Shareholders of High River Shipping and Cargo LLC



 غرفة دبي
 DUBAI CHAMBER

DATE: 01/07/2014

Company Profile

Member Number: 10176
 Company Name: HIGH RIVER SHIPPING & CARGO L.L.C
 Nationality: United Arab Emirates
 License Number: 527659
 Registration Date: 07/07/2001
 Legal Status: Limited Liability Company
 Current Status: Active - Renew

License Issue Auth.: Department of Economic Development
 Commercial Reg. No.: 1033885

ADDRESS

PO Box Number: 42523 DUBAI
 Phone: 4-2282093 Fax: [Blank]
 Area: Al Ras
 Building Name: Noora Hamad Alhidan Bldg.
 License Issue Date: 07/07/2001
 Membership Expiry Date: 06/07/2014
 No of Employees: [Blank]

Email Address: alaycomp@emirates.net.ae
 Street: Al Khor Street
 License Expiry Date: 06/07/2014
 Authorized Capital: [Blank]

ACTIVITIES	
Customs Broker	
Sea Cargo Services	

PARTNERS			
Name	Nationality	%	Relation
ZAKI MOHAMED ALI	Ethiopia	12.000	Partner
HUSSAIN ABDI MOHAMED	Canada	12.000	Partner
ABDULRAHMAN MOHAMED HASSAN	Ethiopia	13.000	Manager
ABDI MAHMOUD MOHAMED	Norway	12.000	Partner
JABER KHALFAN MOHAMAD BIN SUHAIL	United Arab Emirates	51.000	Partner



 DUBAI CHAMBER
 11
 1970


More Business Information on the mentioned company available on Credit Rating Unit .Call 800-CHAMBER (2426237)

Page 1

غرفة تجارة وصناعة دبي
 Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry
 P.O. Box 1457 - Dubai, U.A.E.
 Tel (+971) 4 2280000
 Fax (+971) 4 2211646
 www.dubaichamber.ae

Annex 9.4.c: Shipping documentation related to the dhow Nigahe Mukadame

1. Bill of lading



MANIFESTE DE SORTIE

DATE OF SAILING : 12/11/2012

1 Shipper

RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE
(DJIBOUTI BRANCH)
TEL : +253-21-344614
REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI

2 Consignee

3 Notify party

Marks, Nrs

28500

**No and Kind of packages
Description of goods**

BAGS OF CHARCOAL

Weight in Kgs

712500


Volume in CBM

712500

3

AL BAHY COALS TRADING LLC
(SHARJAH U.A.E)

TOTAL 28500 712500



1 NIGAHÉ MUKADAME

2 SHOUDA : TURAK ABDUL RAJAK MAMID


3 PAYS : INDIA

4 LIEU DE CHARGEMENT : DJIBOUTI

5 LIEU DE DÉCHARGE : SHARJAH/AJMAN U.A.E

6 MONTANT : 1100 T

2. Commercial invoice



RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE

ORIGINAL

Ref/*RS/00103./2012 Date/12/11/2012

COMERICAL INVOICE
N°00103/2012


Shipper RED SEA TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT SERVICE TEL:+253 21 34 46 14 Republic de Djibouti,	Method of Payment T.T. OR CAD
Consigner Name: AL SAHI COALS TRADING (L.L.C) TEL:+ 971 42294622 MOB:+971 506539281 SHARJAH AJMAN (U.A.E)	Final Destination SHARJAH AJMAN (U.A.E)

N°	DESCRIPTION	ORGIN	QNTY	UNITE PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
1	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	ETHIOPIA	28500	2.3 PER BAG	65550 USD


E-mail: redseatransit@hotmail.com

SAY: SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLAR ONLY PARTIAL SHIPMENT ALLOWED OUR BANK ACCOUNT : RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE USD 1003371380	TOTAL 65550 USD US DOLLARS
--	--------------------------------------

RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT
 Stamp & Signature
SERVICE
 Tel: 21 34 46 14 Fax: 21 34 46 13



 E-mail: redseatransit@hotmail.com

3. Notarization of the reverse of the commercial invoice



Annex 9.4.d: Shipping documentation related to the dhow Satya Narayan

1. Bill of lading





CLARION & SHEWALL SHIPPING SERVICES S.A.R.L.
MANIFESTE DE SAILING

DATE OF SAILING: 01/12/2012

M/V. SATYA NARAYAN
 CAPTAIN: JUNAS ESMAIL HODA
 PAVILLON: INDIA
 PORT OF LOADING: DJIBOUTI
 PORT OF DISCHARGE: AMMAN/SHARJAH U.A.E
 TONNAGE: 1004.40 M.T


B/L NO.	1. Shipper Party	2. Consignee	3. Notify	Marks Nrs	No and Kind of packages Description of goods	Weight in Kgs	Volume in CBM
CSS/DJ/SHRJ/AJM/8399	1. RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE (DJIBOUTI BRANCH) TEL : +253-21-344614	2. KISMAYO GEN TRD L.L.C Bintyas Road Al Kuwait Building, office No 305 Tel : +971 42294622, Mobile : +971 506539281			47,663 Bags of Charcoal	25Kg	1.191,575
	SIGNATURE ET CACHET DE L'AGENT						1191,58 T





Avenue St. Laurent Du Var B.P. 233 Djibouti, République de Djibouti Tel : 253 350768 - Fax : 253 350771 E - mail : djibouti@clarionshipping.com
 www.clarionshipping.com

2. Commercial invoice



RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE

Ref: *RSTs/00111/2012 Date: 01/12/2012


COMMERCIAL INVOICE

N°: 00112/2012

Shipper RED SEA TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT SERVICE TEL: 253 21 34 46 14 Republic de Djibouti,	Method of Payment T.T. OR CAD Final Destination AJMAN/SHARIAH (U.A.E)
Consignee Name AJMAN/SHARIAH (U.A.E)	


N°	DESCRIPTION	ORGIN	QNTY	UNITE PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
1	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	DJIBOUTI	47663	2,3 \$ PER BAG	109625 USD
SAY: ONE HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE US DOLLAR ONLY PARTIAL SHIPMENT ALLOWED OUR BANK ACCOUNT: RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE USD 1003371380					TOTAL 109625 USD US DOLLARS

Stamp & Signature




Tel: 21 34 46 14
Fax: 21 34 46 13

Secrétaire Générale Adjointe




e-mail: redseatransit@outlook.com

3. Notarization on the reverse of the commercial invoice



4. False port clearance

 **PORT OF DJIBOUTI** **AUTORISATION D'APPAREILLAGE**
(PORT CLEARANCE)

(Dhow's name) SATVA NISSAYEOL

(Gross tonnage) 1004.42 MT

(Captain) JUNAS ESMAIL HODA

(Flag) INDIA


(Next Port) SHARJAH (U.A.E.) / KUMHAT

Le bateau ci-dessus est autorisé à appareiller.
The above mentioned Dhow is allowed to sail

51

Djibouti
LE COMMANDEMENT DU PORT

**Annex 9.4.e: Notarization for documentation related to the dhow
Al Yusuf**



**Annex 9.4.f: Shipping documentation related to the dhow
Jaya Jamna**

1. *Bill of lading*

BILL OF LADING B/L N°: AG 1074

CODE NAME : "CONGEBILL" EDITION 1994
Shipper

RED SEA TRANSPORT & SERVICE
(DJIBOUTI BRANCH)
TEL: +253 21 34 46 18

Réf.No.: AG/ 1074/2013

Djibouti - REPUBLIQUE DE DJIBOUTI
Consignee


HASSAM ABDUL FATEH AL QEEM JEDDAH EST.

Notify address : SAME ABOVE

VESSEL NAME: MSV JAYA JAMNA (PBR 3339)

Port of Loading : DJIBOUTI PORT

Port of Discharge: SHARJAH U.A.E OR DAMMAM K.S.A.



AGMA
DHOW MARITIME AGENT
AGMA SHIPPING DJIBOUTI

Shipper's description of goods	Quantity/Pcs	Gross Weight/Kgs
BAGS OF CHARCOAL	30000	750000

Prepaid as per CHARTER-PARTY dated.

FREIGHT ADVANCE
Received on account of freight:
..... 20/4/2013

Time used for loading Day 95 hrs

Number of original B/L: **THREE (3)**

SHIPPED at the port of loading in apparent good order and condition on board the vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near there to as one may safely get

Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown.


IN WITNESS where of the Master or Agent of the said vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of this tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.

FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF

Freight payable at: "PREPAID"	Place and date of issue: Republic of Djibouti 20/4/2013
---	---

AS AGENT ONLY
DJIBOUTI

2. Notarized commercial invoice




3. Certificate of origin

جى جى جى

شركة تجارية

ديبوتي

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE DE DJIBOUTI



Certificat d'Origine N° 0179

شهادة منشأ

Nous certifions d'après les connaissements et autres documents qui nous ont été présentés que les marchandises désignées ci-dessous.
 This is to certify according to bills of lading and other documents produced that the following goods, viz:
 استناداً إلى بوليصة الشحن التي قدمت لنا، بأن البضاعة المذكورة أدناه.

Marques - Brands - الماركة	Nature de la Marchandise - Description of Good - نوع البضاعة	Poids - Weight - الوزن
BAGS OF CHARCOAL	3000 BAGS OF BAGS OF CHARCOAL	750000 KGS

Chargées par **RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE**
 Loaded by **DASIRAM S.A / SHARIAH U.A.E**

شركة بوسطة

Djibouti, le **30/02/2015**

Djibouti, le 30/02/2015

Pour le Président de la Chambre de Commerce
 For Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce
 رئيس الغرفة التجارية

Nulle certifions la sincérité de toutes les indications ci-dessus

150

Annex 9.4.g: Djiboutian certificates of origin for the vessels *El Castaro*, *Uweeshi Karani* and *Haridham*, noting the shipper as Red Sea Transit and Transport Service

16/10 2013 11:31 FAX 0067031

**CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE
DE DJIBOUTI**

Certificat d'Origine N° 3090
Certificate of Origin شهادة منشأ

Nous certifions d'après les connaissements et autres documents qui nous ont été présentés que les marchandises désignées ci-dessous :
This is to certify according to bills of lading and other documents produced that the following goods, are:

نحن نشهد على ما يلي من البضائع التي قدمتها، بأن البضائع المذكورة أدناه:

Marques - Brands - العلامات	Netto de la Marchandise - Description of Good - صفة البضاعة	Poids - Weight - الوزن
WOODEN CHARCOAL IN 25 KG PER BAG MV ELCASTARO	70000 WOODEN CHARCOAL IN 25 KGS PER BAGS	1750000 KGS

RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE
Chartered by / شحنت بواسطة **MUSCAT OR KHASAB OMAN**

Sont bien réellement d'ORIGINE DJIBOUTI Djibouti le 28th OCT 2013
Are really **PRODUCT OF** أرض سفانا الأصل من

Vo: Déclaration de / نحن نشهد على البضائع المذكورة أعلاه
Dédoublons form / Nous certifions la sincérité de
toutes les indications ci-dessus

Pour le Président de la Chambre de Commerce
For Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce

5000
CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE

9/12 2013 11 16 FAX

D917/031

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE
DE DJIBOUTI



شهادة منشأ

Certificat d'Origine N° 1217
Certificate of Origin شهادة منشأ

Nous certifions d'après les déclarations et autres documents qui nous ont été présentés que les marchandises désignées ci-dessous :
This is certified according to bills of lading and other documents produced that the following goods are:
إستناداً إلى وثيقة الشحن التي قدّمناها بأنّ البضاعة المذكورة أدناه

Marques - Brands - الماركة	Nature de la Marchandise - Description of Goods - نوع البضاعة	Poids - Weight - الوزن
WOODEN CHARCOAL IN 25KG PER BSS LOADED BY UWEESH KARANI	18500 WOODEN CHARCOAL IN 25KG PER BSS LOADED BY	4825500 KGS

RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE
Chargées par / Loaded by: **OMAN SALALAH OH SHIR JAH UAE**
Sont bien réellement d'ORIGINE / Are really PRODUCT OF: **البحرين**
Djibouti, le 14 NOV 2013

Y: Déclaration de l'exportateur / Declaration from: **UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**
Pour le Président de la Chambre de Commerce / For Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce
0633870

18/12 2013 11:03 FAX

022/629

CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE
DE DJIBOUTI



Certificat d'Origine
Certificate of Origin شهادة منشأ

N° 0364

Notations: Le présent certificat est délivré en vertu de la législation qui régit les exportations des produits originaires de Djibouti.
Remarks: This certificate is issued in accordance with the legislation governing the exportation of products originating in Djibouti.

Marque - Brand - العنبر	Nature de la marchandise - Description of goods - نوع البضاعة	Poids net - الوزن
WAGE OF CHARCOAL HARI'DHAM	28000 BAGS OF BAGS OF CHARCOAL	625000 KGS 625000 KGS



CHAMBRE DE COMMERCE DE DJIBOUTI
LALAH DR QASAB OMAN & GCC



DUCT OF
Sous-certificats à destination de
tous les pays tiers

8 9 OCT 2013

pour le Président de la Chambre de Commerce
the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce

Annex 9.4.h: Bill of lading raised by Clarion & Shewall for the dhow Azmat

CLARION & SHEWALL SHIPPING SERVICES S.A.R.L.
MANIFESTE DE SAILING

NAV. L. Azmat
CAPTAIN: M. Suleiman
PAVILLON: Ouzou
PORT OF LOADING: Djibouti
PORT OF DISCHARGE: Ouzou
TONNAGE: 450 MT

DATE OF SAILING: 05/12/2013

BL NO.	1. Shipper	2. Consignee	3. Notify Party	Marks, Nrs	No and Kind of packages Description of goods	Weight in Kgs	Volume in CBM
	1. CLARION & SHEWALL						
2	Abu Mansour United Co Ouzou Mascot				30,000 CHARCOAL Bags of Charcoal	25 Kg	780,000
							T

SIGNATURE ET CACHET DE L'AGENT

Clarion & Shewall Shipping S.A.R.L.
Régistrée au Tribunal de Commerce de Djibouti
TEL: 21 33 07 68 FAX: 21 33 07 71
B.P. 233 DIBOUTI



[Signature]

Avenue St. Laurent Du Var B.P. 233 Djibouti République de Djibouti Tel: 233 350768 Fax: 233 350771 E-mail: dubs@clarion.com
www.clarionshipping.com

Annex 9.4.i: Clarion & Shewall offices in Djibouti




Annex 9.4.j: Bill of lading for the dhow *Al Asma*⁸⁵ raised by Clarion & Shewall

 CLARION & SHEWALL SHIPPING SERVICES S.A.R.L. MANIFESTE DE SAILING		DATE OF SAILING: 20.03.2014	
M/V. L. ASHMA CAPTAIN: KAREL ABUBAKAR JAKAB PAVILLON: 2063 PORT OF LOADING: DJIBOUTI PORT OF DISCHARGE: KUWAIT TONNAGE: 1882.12...M.T			
1. Shipper 2. Consignee 3. Notify Party 1. CLARION & SHEWALL 2. SHUALAT TEEMA TRADING KUWAIT TEL : 0096594400156		Marks, Nrs	No and Kind of packages goods 25,000 Bags of Charcoal
		Weight in Kgs 25 Kg	Volume in CBM 625.000
		SIGNATURE ET CACHET DE L'AGENT  Clarion & Shewall Shipping S.A.R.L. Avenue St. Laurent du Var TEL: 21.35.07.68 FAX: 21.35.07.71 globe@clarionshipping.com	
Avenue St. Laurent Du Var B.P. : 233 Djibouti République de Djibouti Tel : 253 350768 - Fax : 253 350771 E - mail www.clarionshipping.com			

⁸⁵ The manifest notes the vessel as “Ashma” but uses the same registration number 2063 as is officially registered by India’s sailing federations for the *Al Asma*.

Annex 9.4.k: Other commercial invoices showing collaboration between Red Sea Transit and Transport and Kismayo General Trading LLC

1500



RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE

Ref/*RS/00107/2012 Date: 25/11/2012

COMERCIAL INVOICE
N°00107/2012

Shipper
RED SEA TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT SERVICE
TEL: +253 21 34 46 14
Republie de Djibouti

Consigner Name:
KISMAYO GENERAL TRADING LLC
TEL: +971 4 2294622
FAX: +971 4 2294621
SHARIAH/AJMAN (U.A.E)


Method of Payment:
T.T. OR CAD

Final Destination:
SHARIAH AJMAN (U.A.E)

N°	DESCRIPTION	ORGIN	QNTY	UNITE PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
1	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	ETHIOPIA	35200	2.3 PER BAG	80960 USD
TOTAL					80960 USD
US DOLLARS					

SAY: EIGHTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY US DOLLAR ONLY
 PARTIAL SHIPMENT ALLOWED
 OUR BANK ACCOUNT : **RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE**
USD 1003371380

Stamp & Signature




REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI

[Handwritten Signature]

01/11/2012

E-mail: redseatransit@hotmail.com

TEL: 21 34 46 14, FAX: 21 34 46 13



RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE

ORIGINAL

Ref/*RS/00101./2012 Date/10/11/2012


COMERCIAL INVOICE

N°00101/2012

Shipper RED SEA TRANSIT AND TRANSPORT SERVICE TEL:+253 21 34 46 14 Republic de Djibouti,	Method of Payment T.T. OR CAD
Consigner Name: KISMAYO GENERAL TRADING (L.L.C) TEL:+ 971.42294622 MOB:+971 506539281 SHARJAH (U.A.E)	Final Destination SHARJAH (U.A.E)


N°	DESCRIPTION	ORGIN	QNTY	UNITE PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
1	BAGS OF CHARCOAL	ETHIOPIA	26049	2.3 PER BAG	59912.7 USD
SAY: FIFTY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWELVE POINT SEVEN US DOLLAR ONLY PARTIAL SHIPMENT ALLOWED OUR BANK ACCOUNT : RED SEA TRANSIT & TRANSPORT SERVICE USD 1003371380					TOTAL 59912.7 USD US DOLLARS

Stamp & Signature



20 NOV 2012


Chef de Service
 Information et des Prises Enchantages



TELL:21 34 46 14 ,FAX: 21 34 46 13 E-mail: redseatransit@hotmail.com

Annex 9.4.1: Shipping documentation related to the dhow Al Rafiqui



1. Bill of lading

CODE NAME: DUNGEON, EDITION		BILL OF LADING B/L No. KE.588895 TO BE USED WITH CHARTER PARTY	
SHIPPER E.A.C.E. BUSINESS CO LTD P.O. BOX 40001, NAIROBI, KENYA TEL: 011-254204240		E.A.C.E. BUSINESS CO LTD P.O. BOX 40001, NAIROBI, KENYA TEL: 011-254204240	
REPUBLIC OF KENYA			
CONSIGNEE AL MANKHOOL GENERAL TRADING LLC			
NOTIFY ADDRESS SAME AS CONSIGNEE			
AL MANKHOOL GENERAL TRADING LLC			
VESSEL: AL RAFIQI QOE-2874	PORT OF LOADING MOMBASA		
PORT OF DISCHARGE SHARJAH UAE			
Marks Number	SHIPPER'S DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	GROSS WEIGHT	
	BAGS OF CHARCOALS	625000.00 KGS	
SHIPPED ON BOARD OF MOMBASA		20/12/2012	
Weight in Age Total: 625000.00 KGS ORIGINAL			
(of which on deck of Shipper's risk; the Charterer being responsible for loss or damage hereon covering)			
Freight payable as per CHARTER PARTY dated 20/12/2012 FREIGHT ADVANCE Received on account of freight: Time used for loading _____ days _____ hours		SHIPPER (at the port of loading in apparent good order and condition of board the vessel for carriage to the port of discharge or so near thereto as they may safely get the goods specified above) Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown IN WITNESS whereof the master or agent of the said vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below at this tenor and one per copy of which bills accompanied the others shall be void.	
Freight payable at _____ Number of Original B/L _____		Place and date of issue: MOMBASA 20/12/2012 Signed: 	
FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF			


2. Certificate of origin

18


CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN

See overleaf for condition of issue		No: 134212 ORIGINAL			
1. Exporter's Name & address E.A.C.E. BUSINESS CO. LTD P.O. BOX 21072-0110, NAIROBI, KENYA TEL: 01122222 FAX: 2233118		 <p style="text-align: center;">The Kenya National chamber of commerce & industry Fidelity shield insurance B.L.G. Ratings P.O. box 806035, 80100 Nairobi TEL: 254 41 22167151 Cell: 254 773 1273343 Email: info@kenya-chamber.co.ke Website: www.kenya-chamber.co.ke Approved and designated as an Issuing Authority by Government of Kenya</p>			
2. Consignee's Name & address Almarkheel general trading LLC		5. Country of origin		6. Country of destination	
3. Mode of shipment (sea, Air, Rail, Road)		7. Customs Exporter Code No.		8. PIN code	
9. Trading license No.		10. Bill of lading / airway Bill No. KE688885			
11. Marks/Number of packages	12. Tariff No.	13. destination	14. Gross weight	15. invoice No.	16. value
25000 BAG OF	440790 00 00	INDIA	62500.00KG	002555	557500.00
CHARCOAL					
17. DECLARATION BY EXPORTERS I/We the undersigned declare that all particulars given here are true and correct and that the supply supporting documents are genuine & equivalent. Signature: _____ Designation: _____ Company stamp seal: _____ Date: _____			18. ENDORSEMENT BY KNCCI Signature: _____  Date: _____		

3. Reverse of certificate of origin



Annex 9.4.m: Shareholders of Al Mankhool General Trading LLC



DATE 01/07/2014


Company Profile

Member Number 40954
 Company Name AL MANKHOOL GENERAL TRADING (L.L.C)
 Nationality United Arab Emirates
 License Number 243900 License Issue Auth. Department of Economic Development
 Registration Date 19/10/1996 Commercial Reg. No. 1020347
 Legal Status Limited Liability Company
 Current Status Active - Amend


ADDRESS
 PO Box Number 5324 DUBAI
 Phone 50-6942476 Fax Email Address mankhool@gmail.com
 Area Al Daghaya Street Umer Ibn Al Khattab Street
 Building Name MOHAMAD ABDULGHAFOOR AWADHI BLDG.
 License Issue Date 19/10/1996 License Expiry Date 18/10/2014
 Membership Expiry Date 18/10/2014
 No of Employees Authorized Capital

ACTIVITIES	
General Trading	

PARTNERS			
Name	Nationality	%	Relation
HASSAN JAMA MOHAMED	Canada	12.000	Partner
ABASHAR MUMIN IBRAHIM	Ethiopia	12.000	Managing Partner
ISMAIL JAAME IBRAHIM	Somalia	11.000	Partner
ABDJURAHMAN HERSI FARAH	Ethiopia	14.000	Managing Partner
MOHAMMAD SAEED MUSABBIBH DARWISH BELQAIZI	United Arab Emirates	51.000	Partner



More Business information on the mentioned company available on Credit Rating Unit .Call 800-CHAMBER (2426237).


 غرفة تجارة وصناعة دبي
 Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry
 P.O. Box 1457 - Dubai, U.A.E.
 تلف (+971) 4 2280000
 فاكس (+971) 4 221 1648
 www.dubaichamber.ae

Page 1

Annex 9.4.n: Shipping documentation related to the dhow *Nehmatullah*

MOLASHI BUSINESS CO. LTD
 P.O. BOX: 62972
 TEL: 0412253432
 FAX: 0456324


MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

VESSEL: **NEHM TUALAH**
 PAVILLON:

DESTINATION: **U.A.E.**

B/L No	CONSIGNEE	MARKS AND No.	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	WEIGHT
KE. 259313	AL KHITTAJ GENERAL TRADING LLC 1. SHIPPER MOLASHI BUSINESS CO. LTD.		BAGS OF CHARDONIS 18,400PKG	460,000KG

SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MANIFESTEE ENTREE



KENYA - MAMBA
16/05/2014
12 MAY 2014
K.O. Box 9555

MOHASH BUSINESS CO.LTD

P.O.BOX41872, MAMBASA, KENYA
 TEL:0413253482 FAX:056324

CREW LIST

SAILING FROM MAMBASA , KENYA TO ANY PORT OF (U A E)

No	CARD NO:-	CAPTAIN & CREW	NATIONALITY	M/TONE	RIGESTAR
		NEHM TUALAH	INDAIN	475.63	11975
1	4340	ASIF KASAM JUNEJA			
2	6390	MUSTAK NURMAMAD JUMANI			
3	4520	IQBAL JUSAB SUP			
4	8445	MAMAD SHARIF ABDULA			
5	8566	MOHSIN SINDHIK CHANDA			
6	8671	BHAYA ABDUL GHANI JAFAR			
7	8194	JUBEJA IMRAN HASAM			
8	22531	OSMAN GHANI JAKU THAIM			
9	5503	HARUN MAMAD JUNEJA			
10	4589	SIDIH TURAK			

HARBOUR MASTER OFFICE

AGENT STAMP AND SIGNATURE



Annex 9.4.o: Bills of lading raised by Mohash Business Co Ltd on behalf of other shippers and consignees

MOHASHI BUSINESS CO. LTD
 P.O. BOX 4937
 TEL: 0113 59432
 FAX: 0156 214


MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

VESSEL: MSV RUKMAVATI (MNV- 2188)
 PAVILION: MANDVI-KUTCH


DESTINATION: PORT RASHID UAE

B/L No	QUANTITY	MARKS AND DESCRIPTIONS	WEIGHT
KE. 2599331	32000	BARUDI INTERNATIONAL CHARCOAL TRADING/ SHARJAH TEL: +971552222917 1 SHIPPER HASSAN MASRI KENYA- MAMBASA	800000 KGS

SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MANIFESTEE ENTREE



KENYA - MAMBASA 12/08/2014



MOILASHI BUSINESS CO. LTD
P.O. BOX 4372
TEL: 0113 53432
FAX: 0156 294

MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

VESSEL: HARI DHAM (MNV-1449)
PAVILLON: MANDVI-KUTCH

DESTINATION: PORT RASHID UAE

B/L No.	MARKS AND No.	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	WEIGHT
KE. 2598351		BAHAYA GENERAL TRADING LLC TEL: +971506256521 I-SHIPPER AHMED MOHAMED BARRE KENYA-MAMBASA	26600 665000 KGS



SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MANIFESTEE ENTREE

MOLASHI BUSINESS CO LTD

P.O BOX 6992
TEL: 0113 69139
FAX: 0113 69139

MANIFEST WAREHOUSE

VESSEL: MV FAZZA (MNV - 340895)

PAVILION: MANDVI-KUTCH

DESTINATION: PORT RASHID UAE

B/L No.	CONSIGNEE	BILL OF LADING No.	DESCRIPTION OF GOODS	WEIGHT
KE 2599317	HIGH RIVER SHIPPING & CARGO LLC TEL: +971555366513 1. SHIPPER ABDI MOHAMUD MOHAMED (ABDI YARE) KENYA- MAMBASA		MATS OF STRAWBERRIES 42000	1050000 KGS


SIGNATURE AND STAMP
MANIFESTEE EMPREE



KENYA - MAMBASA 20/06/2014



Annex 9.4.p: Correspondence by Kenyan authorities



EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA

76

Tel.: (02) 6666300
Fax: (02) 6652827
E-mail: kenyaemb@emirates.net.ae
Website: www.kenyaembassy-uae.org
When replying please quote



P.O. Box 3854
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

Ref.:
and date

048/2014

The Embassy of the Republic of Kenya in Abu Dhabi presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, and has the honour to inform that Kenya documents may have been forged in order to import charcoal into UAE. The Embassy wishes to inform that Kenya has strict regulations on export of charcoal and large quantities of the commodity are not permitted for export.

The Embassy would appreciate if this information is communicated to the relevant UAE authorities especially at the Port Rashid in Dubai.

The Embassy of the Republic of Kenya in Abu Dhabi avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of United Arab Emirates, the assurances of its highest consideration.

Abu Dhabi, 5th June 2014

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Abu Dhabi

Annex 9.5: Charcoal transporters

124. At least 84 out of the 142 dhows (roughly 59 percent) that the Monitoring Group identified as having shipped charcoal from Somalia between June 2013 and May 2014 are Indian flagged.

125. On 27 December 2013, the Monitoring Group visited Mumbai, India, where it held a meeting with various owners of dhows and representatives of maritime associations in India. The meeting was hosted and chaired by Hiren Desai, the Vice President of the Federation of all India Sailing Vessels Industry Associations, an umbrella group for regional maritime associations. At the time the meeting took place, the Monitoring Group had already acquired sufficient information indicating that most of the Indian-flagged dhows were registered by regional maritime associations which were part of Mr. Desai's umbrella group.

126. During the meeting in Mr. Desai's office, the Monitoring Group informed vessel owners and association heads that the transport of charcoal from Kismayo and Barawe represented a violation of resolution 2036 (2012). As such, the Monitoring Group informed the attendees of the meeting about the risks of their continued involvement in the charcoal trade pursuant to Member States' implementation of resolution 2036 (2012). In addition, in aid of its investigations, the Monitoring Group requested the cooperation of vessel owners by providing information on the individuals who had chartered their vessels, as well as information and documentation on shippers and consignees. The vessel owners and association heads acknowledged that they had indeed been shipping charcoal regularly from Somalia. The attendees of the meeting further agreed to provide information on individuals brokering shipments aboard their vessels, as well as details of the volumes of charcoal carried and the ports of call.

127. Following this meeting, the Monitoring Group wrote to Mr. Desai on 30 December 2013 requesting dhow owners of the different associations to identify themselves and provide details and available documentation related to charter parties, shippers, consignees, ports of call, and charcoal cargo volumes. However, as time passed, the Monitoring Group received minimal information from dhow owners, while they continued to charter out their vessels for charcoal shipments from Somalia to Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see annex 9.2 for further information on these shipments). During this period, the Monitoring Group made numerous telephone calls to Mr. Desai and other vessel owners who stated that they were unable to obtain documentation for the charcoal cargoes as only the charter parties kept duplicates of original documentation, which the captains of vessels submitted to customs authorities in ports of arrival. They also claimed that brokers who normally pay them for the charter of their vessels are often an intermediary and not the bona fide charter party. Some vessel owners did however cooperate by providing details of their ports of call in Somalia and cargo volumes for charcoal cargo carried. A few owners provided details of the individuals who brokered the charter of their vessels, but claimed these individuals (mostly Somali middlemen and brokers in Dubai) paid them in cash and left no trace of documentation behind. Often they only provided the first name of the broker.

128. On 18 February 2014, the Monitoring Group received a list of members from the Salaya Association of dhow owners on instruction from Mr. Desai. When compared against the Monitoring Group's database of vessels, the Group was able to

confirm that several Salaya members had transported Somali charcoal since the 27 December 2013 meeting in Mumbai, but had not informed the Monitoring Group as per their commitment to do so. On 4 March 2014, the Monitoring Group received a list of members from the Mandvi Association, which enabled the Group to confirm that dozens of vessels from this association continued to ship Somali charcoal and their owners had not informed the Monitoring Group despite agreeing to do so during the 27 December 2013 meeting.

129. On 26 May 2014, the Monitoring Group was received in Mumbai by the Government of India's Directorate of Shipping, which hosted a round table meeting with Mr. Desai, representatives of the Salaya and Mandvi associations and other dhow owners. During this meeting, the Directorate of Shipping asked Mr. Desai to transmit written requests submitted by the Monitoring Group to owners of 37 dhows and to provide feedback within 21 days of their submission. These requests formally asked vessel owners to provide the following information on shipments:

1. Confirmation of port of loading of charcoal;
2. Confirmation of port of discharge;
3. Dates of loading and discharge;
4. Volume of charcoal shipped;
5. Full details, including name, company name and contact details of the individual broker who paid for the transport of charcoal;
6. Full details of consignee, including company name and point of contact; and
7. Bill of lading, cargo manifest and all other documentation related to the shipment, including payment receipts.

130. The dhow owners and association heads were also warned by officials at the Directorate of Shipping to cease shipping charcoal from Somalia and to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group.

131. On 18 July 2014, the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations contacted the Monitoring Group with responses from vessel owners. Owners of 16 vessels stated that they had indeed loaded charcoal from Somalia. Owners of 14 vessels denied ever having loaded charcoal in Somalia, although at least six owners of vessels have provided false information. They are the following:

1. Hajiamad J. Agariya is the registered owner of the *Al Nazir* and has stated that his vessel has only loaded sesame seeds from Mogadishu. However, his vessel has been photographed carrying green charcoal bags, and was inspected by naval forces who observed charcoal on board, who were told by the captain that the vessel loaded cargo in Barawe, and who obtained paperwork showing the owners of the vessel as members of the Agariya family (see evidence in annex 9.2).
2. Romatbai Jusab Agariya is the registered owner of the *Uweesh Karani* and has stated that his vessel only runs from India to Mogadishu and Mombasa. However, the *Uweesh Karani* has been identified by shipping sources as having loaded in Barawe (see evidence in annex 9.2) and has used Djiboutian certificates of origin raised by a company routinely

involved in the falsification of bills of lading (see documented evidence in annex 9.4).

3. Fakirmamad Agariya is the registered owner of the *Bhumika* and has denied loading charcoal from Somalia. However, the Monitoring Group received shipping data identifying this vessel as having loaded charcoal at Kismayo port in November 2012,⁸⁶ but the bill of lading for the shipment was raised by companies in Djibouti that have routinely been involved in the falsification of documents (see evidence in annex 9.4). In addition, the Monitoring Group has received shipping data directly from Kismayo port showing the *Bhumika* as having loaded charcoal there in June 2014.⁸⁷ The Monitoring Group has also received information from shipping sources that identified the *Bhumika* as having shipped charcoal from Somalia in February 2014.⁸⁸
4. Hajihasan Ramzan Agariya is the registered owner of the *Al Asma* and has stated that his vessel has not loaded in Somalia. However, the Monitoring Group has been reliably informed that the vessel loaded charcoal in Kismayo in March 2013.⁸⁹ Although, the manifest for this shipment, which was raised by a company that has routinely been involved in the falsification of bills of lading, notes that the charcoal cargo was exported from Djibouti. The destination of the cargo was noted as Kuwait, where several vessels have transported Somali charcoal (see documented evidence in annex 9.4).
5. Hajiumar Jusab Agariya is the registered owner of the *Al Yusuf* (MNV 2171)⁹⁰ and has stated that his vessel has not loaded charcoal in Somalia. The Monitoring Group previously documented (in S/2013/413, annex 9.2.h) the case of a dhow called *Al Yusuf* with a captain by the name of “Abdul Haji Agaria”, which had loaded charcoal in Kismayo in December 2012, but presented a bill of lading organized by a company routinely involved in falsifying documentation and purporting the cargo to be sourced in Djibouti. During 2014, the Monitoring Group received information from port sources in Kismayo that the *Al Yusuf* (MNV 2171) was present in Kismayo in February, March and April 2014.⁹¹
6. Shree Kutch Marine Shipping is the registered owner of the *Yasin* and has stated that its vessel has not loaded charcoal from Somalia. However, shipping data received from Kismayo port places the *Yasin* in Kismayo loading charcoal in February 2014.⁹² Separate independent sources confirm its delivery of charcoal to the UAE in March 2013.⁹³

⁸⁶ Shipping data provided by confidential sources at Kismayo port.

⁸⁷ Shipping data provided by confidential sources at Kismayo port.

⁸⁸ Information provided by three separate charcoal traders and shipping sources in the UAE, March 2014.

⁸⁹ Information provided by a Somali broker on 31 March 2014, and corroborated by two independent shipping industry sources in Dubai, UAE, on 1 April 2014.

⁹⁰ Another vessel called “*Al Yusuf*” exists but with a different registration number (MNV 650). “MNV” is the prefix for vessels that are registered with the Mandvi Association.

⁹¹ Information provided by confidential sources at Kismayo port.

⁹² Shipping data provided by confidential sources at Kismayo port.

⁹³ Three separate sources, a charcoal dealer, transporter and shipping source in the UAE provided this information in March 2014.

132. In addition, the Monitoring Group did not receive any response from the following two vessel owners:

1. Jusab Umar Agariya is the registered owner of the *Al Zuber*, which shipping sources have stated shipped charcoal from Kismayo in January or February 2014.⁹⁴
2. Siddik Suleiman Chauhan is the registered owner of the *Al Yasin-1*. Shipping sources have informed the Monitoring Group that this vessel shipped charcoal from Kismayo in March 2014.⁹⁵

133. Separately, the Monitoring Group contacted one UAE-based company, Naseem Al Barari General Trading, which was mentioned in annex 9.2 as transporting charcoal cargoes from Somalia. This company has also refused to cooperate with the investigations of the Monitoring Group.

134. The Monitoring Group sent an email to the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations on 31 July 2014 thanking the Indian authorities for their cooperation, but also reminding the Indian Government of its obligation to implement resolution 2036 and to notify all transporters that they should cease shipping charcoal. Many transporters have claimed that they have shipped charcoal under duress, and if so, the Monitoring Group has advised the Indian authorities to inform the transporters not to send vessels to Somalia if they expect to be forced to load up charcoal on their return journey. The Monitoring Group has recognized that some of the transporters who have frequently transported charcoal have cooperated with Monitoring Group investigations, and as such, they remain unnamed. However two operators and one family of operators, notably the Agariya family, appears to have disregarded all attempts by Monitoring Group and the Indian authorities to seek their cooperation while knowingly and continually violating resolution 2036.

⁹⁴ Information received in March 2014, from transporter, charcoal dealer and shipping source in UAE.

⁹⁵ Information received in March 2014, from transporter, charcoal dealer and shipping source in UAE.