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Letter dated 10 October 2022 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, and in accordance with paragraph 41 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021), I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.

The Committee would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Fergal Mythen

Chair

Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia

* Reissued for technical reasons on 18 October 2022.



**Letter dated 1 September 2022 from the Panel of Experts on
Somalia addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee
pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia**

In accordance with paragraph 41 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021), we have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia to be submitted to the Council by 15 October 2022.

(Signed) Ahmed **Himmiche**
Coordinator/arms expert

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Summary

Al-Shabaab remains the most immediate threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia. Despite ongoing efforts by Somali and international forces to curb Al-Shabaab's operational capacity, the group's ability to carry out complex, asymmetric attacks in Somalia remains undiminished. In addition, Al-Shabaab's cross-border offensives into Ethiopia and Kenya in 2022 underscore the group's longstanding interest in expanding its external attack capabilities and highlights its regional ambitions. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab continued to control large areas of central and southern Somalia and exert its influence even over areas where security forces are deployed, making it challenging for security forces to clear and hold towns under Al-Shabaab control. In this manner, Al-Shabaab retained its freedom of movement, allowing it to conduct ambushes and lay improvised explosive devices, hampering the deployment of public services and administration by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states.

Investigations by the Panel of Experts on Somalia into Al-Shabaab's finances continue to build the international community's understanding of the group's revenue base, including diverse and myriad extortion methods across several sectors such as livestock and property. The Panel assesses that Al-Shabaab remains in a strong financial position, capable of sustaining its insurgency. Moreover, Al-Shabaab continues to showcase its ability to generate revenue and exert control over businesses and individuals in areas they do not physically control, especially in large urban centres like Mogadishu. This is enabled through threats of violence against individuals or communities, as well as a lack of persistent pressure applied against the group's financial apparatus. The Panel has come across little reporting to suggest that the Federal Government of Somalia and its financial bodies have attempted to curb Al-Shabaab's extortion strategy outside of traditional military operations by its security forces.

A biometric identification system has been put forward to tackle anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism issues. Although this is a significant step in the right direction for improving know-your-customer systems, the absence of adequate monitoring, reporting and investigative capacities and practices will likely continue to stymie progress in the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism sector. A holistic multi-agency approach to disrupting Al-Shabaab finances is needed.

Analysis of captured improvised explosive devices, weapons and ammunition from Al-Shabaab indicates that the group continues to have access to an uninterrupted illicit supply, as some of the ammunition captured was manufactured as recently as 2020. Identifying the exact origin and the chain of custody of those weapons and ammunition remains a challenge for the Panel as most of its requests for tracing were inconclusive and some of the items may have imitation markings and serial numbers. Smuggling from the sea via Puntland continues to be the only route identified by the Panel.

The Federal Government of Somalia continued to make progress in developing weapons and ammunition management processes though the operationalization of procedures for captured weapons from Al-Shabaab is still pending. Proper handling and analysis of captured weapons is critical for identifying risks of diversion and illicit smuggling networks necessary for developing potential disruption techniques.

Despite robust instruments within the Somalia arms embargo and implementation processes developed by the Committee in relation to the partial lifting of the embargo, the Panel continues to find indications of non-compliance by Member States involved in operations or training in Somalia.

Against the backdrop of a deepening humanitarian crisis, parties to the conflict in Somalia, notably Al-Shabaab, did not exert efforts to facilitate humanitarian operations. Most areas under Al-Shabaab's control remain off-limits for humanitarians, while the group mobilized its propaganda machine to boast its own response to the drought and against international and local humanitarian relief actors in Somalia.

Civilians' life and property came under constant attack, particularly when clashes among parties involved in the conflict in Somalia took place in civilian populated areas, as a result of relentless economic blockades imposed by Al-Shabaab in Bay and Bakool regions, and through the use of indiscriminate weapons. While Al-Shabaab continues to be responsible for the highest number of violations of international humanitarian law involving the targeting of civilians, incidents of international humanitarian law and human rights violations perpetrated by federal and regional security forces also occurred, particularly in Puntland and Galmudug. The Panel noted the lack of investigations into these violations. Child recruitment and abduction, specifically by Al-Shabaab, and other grave violations against children, including sexual violence, continue to constitute a distinctive feature of the conflict in Somalia.

The Panel recorded the first major export of charcoal from Somalia since 2018, in violation of the charcoal ban. Despite measures implemented by Member States with charcoal destination markets, as well as ongoing monitoring of the charcoal trade at sea by international actors, including the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atalanta of the European Union Naval Force, and the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), gaps remain in the ability of the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states to restrict large-scale exports of charcoal.

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* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

A. Background

1. The present report contains the findings of the Panel covering the period from 16 December 2021 to 7 September 2022.¹ An overview of the Somalia sanctions regime, mandate, appointment of the Panel and countries visited during the reporting period can be found in annex 1.

B. Methodology

2. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (see [S/2006/997](#)) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on information sensitivity, classification and handling ([ST/SGB/2007/6](#)). The evidentiary standards and verification processes include:

- (a) Collecting information on events and topics from multiple sources, where possible;
- (b) Collecting information from sources with first-hand knowledge of events, where possible;
- (c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
- (d) Obtaining physical, photographic, audio, video and/or documentary evidence in support of the information collected;
- (e) Analysing satellite imagery, where applicable.

3. In addition, the Panel, in accordance with paragraph 28 of the above-mentioned report of the Informal Working Group, provided the opportunity to all parties to review, comment and respond during the report drafting process, where and when necessary.

4. The Panel has committed itself to maintaining and fostering its relationship with the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure cooperation and transparency in fulfilling its investigative mandate, within the framework of applicable methodological standards.

II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia

A. Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab)

Update on Al-Shabaab membership and structure

5. The Panel continues to update information on the structure of Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe.001) and to identify potential leadership changes to deepen its understanding of the group. Ahmed Diriye, also known as Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah (SOi.014), continues to serve as Al-Shabaab's emir. His most recent audio message was released by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media during Eid al-Adha celebrations on 8 July 2022, where he addressed humanitarian and political issues in Somalia, issued a warning to African countries

¹ The Panel continued to pursue all pending investigations introduced in [S/2021/849](#).

that contribute forces to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and stated that the group does not recognize the Federal Government of Somalia as a legitimate government.² In mid-June 2022, Channel 4 in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland aired an interview with the reported deputy leader of Al-Shabaab, Mahad Karate (SOi.020), in which he warned that the group remained strong and unified, while purporting the benefits of living under Al-Shabaab rule.³ While some non-governmental organizations have written on the merits of seeking dialogue with Al-Shabaab,⁴ in his interview Karate excluded the idea of negotiating with the Federal Government of Somalia.

6. The Panel continues to gather additional information on listed individuals that could be used by the Committee to update its sanctions list.⁵ In paragraph 8 and annex 2.1 of the its 2021 report (S/2021/849), the Panel indicated that eight Al-Shabaab operatives, out of the 18 listed, were suspected to be active. On 18 February 2022, Ali Mohamed Rage (SOi.021), the movement's spokesperson, was also listed.

7. In late July 2022, the Panel noted claims by Ethiopia that it had neutralized several Al-Shabaab operatives, including Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, also known as Fuad Shongole (SOi.005). However, on 4 August 2022, Shongole dismissed rumours of his death in an audio message.⁶ The Panel also noted that a prominent Somaliland-based Islamic scholar, Adan Abdirahman Warsame Sune, reportedly joined Al-Shabaab on 15 March 2022, according to a video the sheikh posted of himself in Jilib, an Al-Shabaab-controlled town.⁷

Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia

8. The pattern of attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab during the reporting period indicates that the group maintains a presence and the capacity to conduct operations throughout most of Somalia, including Mogadishu. As previously reported by the Panel, Al-Shabaab's sphere of influence extends beyond areas it physically controls.⁸ Furthermore, the Panel did not record any significant degradation of the group's ability to carry out asymmetric attacks in Somalia during the reporting period.

9. During the reporting period, Al-Shabaab demonstrated its ability to carry out large-scale and complex attacks. However, most of Al-Shabaab's attacks were smaller in nature, using different types of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings and indirect fire attacks to maintain its presence on the ground and in the media.

Al-Shabaab's use of improvised explosive devices

10. The Panel noted no significant or sustainable change in improvised explosive device activity in 2022 compared to 2021. Specifically, improvised explosive device threats in Somalia have not substantially decreased over the last year and the number of casualties from improvised explosive devices has increased year-by-year since 2020. In 2021, 669 Somalis were killed by improvised explosive devices and

² Al-Shabaab leader cites United States losses in Afghanistan as warnings to ATMIS, rallies fighters in Eid al-Adha speech, 8 July 2022, <https://calamada.com/daawoamiirka-mujaahidiinta-oo-jeediyay-kalimad-muhiim-ah/>.

³ Jamal Osman "Inside Al-Shabaab: The extremist group trying to seize Somalia" Available at: <https://www.channel4.com/news/inside-al-shabaab-the-extremist-group-trying-to-seize-somalia>.

⁴ International Crisis Group, "Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia" Africa Report No. 309, 21 June 2011.

⁵ See www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials.

⁶ Somali Dispatch, "Sheikh Fu'ad Shongole dismisses rumors of his death", 4 August 2022. Available at <https://www.somalidispatch.com/latest-news/sheikh-fuad-shongole-dismisses-rumors-of-his-death/>.

⁷ <https://goobjoog.com/english/missing-somaliland-cleric-traced-to-al-shabaab-hotbed/>.

⁸ See S/2018/1002, para. 83.

explosives remnants of war, up from 501 in 2020.⁹ In the first six months of 2022, there have already been at least 855 casualties¹⁰ from improvised explosive devices.¹¹

11. Furthermore, the Panel noted no significant or sustainable change in vehicle-borne improvised explosive device activity. However, that type of incident in the first half of 2022 were more than twice as lethal than in the second half of 2021. Between January and June 2022, the Panel recorded eight vehicle-borne improvised explosive device incidents, resulting in 209 casualties.¹² The substantial increase in casualties from vehicle-borne improvised explosive device incidents is largely a result of Al-Shabaab's attack on Ceel Baraf, detailed further below in paragraph 17. In this attack alone, Al-Shabaab reportedly employed three vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.

12. The use of person-borne improvised explosive devices or suicide vests remained a concern during the reporting period. Al-Shabaab relied on this type of device to disrupt the electoral process and the transition to the new government. However, the Panel noted a decrease in person-borne improvised explosive device incidents and a significant decrease in the number of casualties from these incidents after the end of the election cycle on 15 May 2022. In the second quarter of 2022, the Panel recorded two incidents of person-borne improvised explosive devices, compared to five in the first quarter. Casualties from person-borne improvised explosive device incidents decreased from 113 in the first quarter of 2022 to 44 in the second quarter.

13. As at early August 2022, and with the transition to a new government complete, Al-Shabaab is continuing to target government officials using vehicle-borne and person-borne improvised explosive devices. In the first three weeks of the third quarter, the Panel recorded one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and two person-borne improvised explosive device incidents. On 17 July 2022, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted a major hotel used by the regional administration in Hirshabelle. On 27 July 2022, Al-Shabaab used a person-borne improvised explosive device to target District Commissioner Abdullahi Ali Waafow in Marka, Lower Shabelle.¹³ On 29 July 2022, Al-Shabaab killed the South-West State Minister of Justice, Hassan Ibrahim Lugbur, along with his son and several other people, in a suicide attack in Baidoa.¹⁴

Al-Shabaab attacks targeting Government premises

14. On 17 July 2022, Al-Shabaab members conducted a suicide attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device against Hotel Nur Dob in Jowhar, Hirshabelle, killing five and injuring more than a dozen others, including current and former federal and regional ministers.¹⁵ The hotel is near the presidential compound and served as a de facto regional government headquarters.

15. On 23 March 2022, Al-Shabaab conducted a suicide attack against the local Government headquarters in Belet Weyne, Hirshabelle, killing opposition lawmaker Amina Mohamed Abdi, who was campaigning to retain her seat in the House of the People. Later, a suicide bomber drove an explosive-laden vehicle into a crowd of people who had gathered at the local hospital to help those wounded in the first attack.

⁹ Confidential United Nations report, April 2022.

¹⁰ This casualty figure includes civilians, members of armed forces of Somalia, as well as ATMIS forces.

¹¹ Confidential United Nations reports, 2020, 2021, 2022.

¹² Confidential United Nations reports, January to July 2022.

¹³ Omar Faruk (Associated Press), "Suicide bombing in Somalia kills 11 including local official", *The Washington Post*, 27 July 2022.

¹⁴ "Somali Prime Minister condemns killing Southwest state minister of justice", Hiiraan Online, 30 July 2022.

¹⁵ "Car bomb kills five at Somalia hotel: police", *The Defense Post*, 18 July 2022. Available at: <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/07/18/car-bomb-somalia-hotel/>.

The attacks occurred on the same day that Al-Shabaab conducted an attack against Halane Camp, in which Aden Adde International Airport is situated, whereby two gunmen disguised as airport workers attempted to breach the gates of the base when they were confronted by security forces.¹⁶ At least six people died in that assault.

Complex attacks

16. During the reporting period, the Panel noted four complex attacks by Al-Shabaab. The first occurred in mid-February 2022 when Al-Shabaab launched simultaneous attacks on two different locations 14 km apart. Al-Shabaab launched one attack against a police station in Kadha, Benadir region, and the other against the residence of the District Commissioner of Heliwa in Darusalam, Benadir region. During the two attacks, Al-Shabaab launched additional assaults on surrounding security posts to prevent the deployment of quick reaction forces.¹⁷ These dual attacks clearly demonstrate the group's continued intent, freedom of manoeuvre and ability to strike in the periphery of Mogadishu, instilling little hope in the ability of the Somali security forces to counter the threat posed by Al-Shabaab in Benadir, and in Lower and Middle Shabelle in general.

17. The second complex attack occurred on 3 May 2022, when Al-Shabaab attacked an ATMIS forward operating base in Ceel Baraf, approximately 130 km north of Mogadishu, manned by Burundian forces. The attack, which commenced with the detonation of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, and was followed by an on-foot assault, resulted in at least several dozen Burundian casualties. Claims by Al-Shabaab that it killed 173 Burundian soldiers were exaggerated.

18. On 19 August 2022, Al-Shabaab launched a coordinated suicide attack on the Hayat Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia.¹⁸ The attack, which lasted nearly 30 hours, constituted the longest hotel siege in the group's history, resulting in at least 21 people dead and more than 100 injured.¹⁹ Al-Shabaab initiated the siege with two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices before an assault team breached the perimeter and entered the hotel. As security and emergency personnel arrived on the scene, a third suicide bomber reportedly attacked first responders, according to pro-Islamist media.²⁰ This is the group's first hotel assault in the capital since its attack against the Afrik Hotel in January 2021, which involved a similar modus operandi and killed nine people.²¹

19. Information on Al-Shabaab's July 2022 cross-border attack in Ethiopia can be found in paragraph 21 below.

Indirect fire attacks

20. On average, there have been approximately six mortar attacks per month in Somalia over the last two years. Most of these attacks target African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) camps and Halane Camp in Mogadishu. Many of the mortar attacks in 2022 occurred in Mogadishu, likely in an effort by Al-Shabaab to disrupt electoral proceedings. On 27 November 2021, Al-Shabaab launched several mortar rounds in the direction of the AMISOM-protected area in Baidoa, where the United

¹⁶ See <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-surge-in-somalia-s-suicide-attacks-change-of-tactics-experts-say/6503450.html>.

¹⁷ See <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-on-mogadishu-police-stations-leave-at-least-5-dead/6444293.html>.

¹⁸ See <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/world/africa/somalia-hotel-attack-shabab.html?>

¹⁹ See <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62621205>.

²⁰ See <https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/HayatHotel.jpg>.

²¹ See <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/31/somalias-al-shabab-rebels-attack-hotel-in-the-capital-city>.

Nations compound is also located. Five mortar rounds landed inside the protected area. No casualties were reported. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it had targeted the adjacent South-West State presidential palace and the Baidoa airport area to coincide with the initial day of the House of the People elections in Baidoa.²² On 14 April 2022, multiple suspected mortar rounds reportedly landed in the Afisyoni area of the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu. The attack targeted an area where new lawmakers were scheduled to be sworn into office.²³ On 17 April 2022, Al-Shabaab conducted a mortar attack against the Parliament of Somalia that injured at least six people during a joint session.²⁴

Al-Shabaab regional capabilities

Ethiopia

21. In its midterm update to the Committee, the Panel noted attempts by Al-Shabaab to expand its area of influence by increasing recruitment and training activities in Ethiopia. Initially estimated to be approximately 100 to 250 fighters in size,²⁵ further information obtained by the Panel suggests that the size of Al-Shabaab's presence in Ethiopia is closer to 1,000 fighters.²⁶

22. On 21 July 2022, Al-Shabaab began its first multi-day campaign inside Ethiopia by attacking at least three, possibly four, Ethiopia-Somalia border towns. Al-Shabaab claimed to have overrun two of the towns, Aato and Yeed, reportedly killing several members of the Ethiopian Liyu Police, a regional paramilitary force based in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. Those attacks, however, were likely a diversionary effort to allow approximately 500 Al-Shabaab fighters, divided into multiple groups, to enter Ethiopia from other towns.²⁷ On 25 July 2022, Al-Shabaab launched a second incursion through Feerfeer district of Somali Regional State's Shabelle Zone in Ethiopia, which borders Hiran and Galgadud regions in Somalia.²⁸

23. The Panel suspects that Al-Shabaab had been planning for this offensive for months, possibly even going back to 2021. In May 2022, for example, Al-Shabaab targeted Ethiopian convoys in southwestern Somalia with roadside improvised explosive devices at least 10 times. Of those 10 attacks, 8 specifically targeted convoys travelling between a border town and Somali National Army or Ethiopian military bases.²⁹ Moreover, in the same month, Ethiopian security services twice intercepted Al-Shabaab members trying to smuggle weapons into the country, highlighting a possible effort by the group to establish supply lines for the July 2022 incursion.³⁰

24. Al-Shabaab's cross-border offensive underscores the group's longstanding interest in expanding its external attack capabilities and highlights its regional ambitions. While the recent incursions may not necessarily result in a persistent insurgency, Al-Shabaab is aware of the growing threats faced by Ethiopia on multiple

²² Interview with sources in Baidoa, January 2022.

²³ Confidential United Nations reports, April 2022.

²⁴ See <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-claims-mortar-attack-on-somali-parliament/6534121.html>.

²⁵ Interviews with security officials in Nairobi and Mogadishu, April 2022.

²⁶ Interviews with security officials in Nairobi, July 2022.

²⁷ Confidential United Nations report, July 2022.

²⁸ Interviews with security officials in Somalia, July 2022.

²⁹ See <https://radioisaaala.com/255712-2/>; see also <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16397/Ciidamo-Xabashi-ah-oo-weeraro-jidgal-ah-iyo-qaraxyo-lagula-beegsaday-deegaanno-katirsan-Bakool-Warbixin>; see also <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16423/Ciidamo-Itoobiyaan-ah-oo-lagu-weeraray-deegaanno-katirsan-Gedo-iyo-Bakool>, see also <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16438/Ciidamo-Itoobiyaan-ah-oo-qaraxyo-lagula-beegsaday-duleedka-Ceelbarde>.

³⁰ See <https://sonna.so/en/2022/05/12/ethiopian-forces-foils-al-shabaab-attempt-tp-smuggle-arms-to-the-country/>; and https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/May/186044/al_shabaab_members_captured_attempting_arms_smuggle_to_ethiopia.aspx.

fronts and will likely use its momentum to further exploit anti-government grievances in the Somali Regional State, pitting itself as a more viable alternative to the Ethiopian Liyu Police, which are accused of human rights violations.³¹

Kenya

25. Al-Shabaab continues to pose a significant threat in Kenya by conducting hit-and-run attacks against Kenyan security services and installations, as well as civilians, along the border. Al-Shabaab conducted at least seven attacks in Kenya in 2022, all consistent with patterns noted by the Panel in 2020.³² Namely, the group targets specific individuals, including “non-locals”, and security forces, while using indiscriminate weapons, notably improvised explosive devices.

26. In January 2022, Al-Shabaab conducted two attacks with improvised explosive devices, one in Kiunga, Lamu County, and the other along the Arabia-Mandera highway in Mandera County, killing 11 civilians.³³ In the same month, the group attacked a police patrol, killing four police officers, in the Milihoi area of Lamu County.³⁴ The group also claimed responsibility for an attack against a construction site in Lamu County on 11 March 2022, which killed five individuals.³⁵

27. Separately, the Panel noted the abduction of a clinical officer from Fino, Mandera County, on 18 February 2022, by armed men believed to be Al-Shabaab militants.³⁶ This new abduction adds to that of two Cuban doctors, taken near Mandera, Kenya, on 12 April 2019, and whose whereabouts remain unknown.³⁷ The medical officer was taken to Somalia with other two abductees, identified as “locals”, who were later released unharmed.

Al-Shabaab’s relationship with other Al-Qaida affiliates

28. The Panel has not been able to corroborate claims of any tangible or new linkages between Al-Shabaab and other violent Islamist groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo or Mozambique. However, the Panel has noted the release of propaganda by Al-Shabaab that shows the group’s fealty to Al-Qaida. The President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, stated on 7 July 2022 in Türkiye that the Federal Government of Somalia had “evidence that the money collected by Al-Shabaab is used in financing terror groups in Mozambique and Nigeria with some going to Al-Qaeda”.³⁸ However, the Panel has found no evidence to support this claim. Separately, a Member State reported to the Panel that its services have information of stronger cooperation between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; however, the Panel has not substantiated this claim (see para. 82 below for more information).

Women in Al-Shabaab

29. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted interviews with female Al-Shabaab defectors from Bay and Bakool regions, South-West State. These

³¹ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/ethiopia-police-unit-unlawfully-killing-people-must-be-stopped/>; see also S/2019/858, footnote 139.

³² See S/2020/949, paras. 55–58.

³³ Confidential United Nations reports, January 2022.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ “Three workers injured in Mandera IED attack”, 14 March 2022, *The Star* (Nairobi).

³⁶ “We hope he’s safe, says family of abducted Mandera clinician”, 21 February 2022. *The Star* (Nairobi).

³⁷ Reuben Kyama and Elisabeth Malkin “Cuban doctors abducted in Kenya, and officials point to Al-Shabaab”, 12 April 2019, *The New York Times*.

³⁸ See: <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-financing-a-qaeda-groups-in-mozambique-and-nigeria-president>.

interviews resulted in additional information on the role women play in Al-Shabaab. Specifically, female defectors shared with the Panel that while women are generally relegated to support roles, they contribute to Al-Shabaab's governance system by serving as zakat collectors, madrasa teachers and preachers, and security guards in prisons. In addition, women also support the group's operational activities by serving as cooks and cleaners for Al-Shabaab fighters, storing weapons and operating as spies.³⁹

30. Female Al-Shabaab defectors interviewed by the Panel lamented the dire economic and humanitarian situation, the general lack of health and education facilities, except for pharmacies and madrasas, in Al-Shabaab controlled areas, and the strict control on their life and behaviour. However, they consistently mentioned that the protection of their children from recruitment was a key factor motivating their defection, as well as the fact that they had lost their husbands in Al-Shabaab operations. Rehabilitation programmes for defectors and the support of families or relatives in Government controlled territories were important pull factors mentioned by the interviewees.

B. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant faction in Somalia

31. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) faction in Somalia remains intent on conducting operations in Somalia. However, the Panel judges that the group is limited to conducting operations in Puntland only. Despite the reported involvement of ISIL-Somalia in the 24 January 2022 vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that targeted a businessperson's vehicle in the Bakara market in Mogadishu, the Panel has not been able to substantiate the group's claim.

32. Separately, in late July 2022 ISIL-Somalia released a new propaganda video in Amharic focusing on Ethiopia, featuring mostly recruits from that country attending an unidentified training camp, likely in Puntland.⁴⁰ In 2019, the group announced it would release jihadist materials in Amharic, likely in an effort to bolster recruitment in Ethiopia.⁴¹ The group, as far back as 2017, stated that some of its members hail from Ethiopia. The Panel has no information to suggest that ISIL-Somalia is operationally active in Ethiopia but believes that the timing of the group's July 2022 announcement, which coincides with Al-Shabaab's incursions along the Ethiopia-Somalia border, is likely not a coincidence.

Finance

33. During the reporting period the Panel continued to investigate the movement of money by ISIL-Somalia and uncovered a financial facilitation network that stretches from Somalia to South Africa. Specifically, after the arrest of Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi Jimale in August 2021, the Panel began to learn more about his past financial transactions on behalf of ISIL. Jimale, who also previously worked for Al-Shabaab, transferred \$400,000 between 2019 and 2020,⁴² and is accused of transferring money between unidentified individuals in Somalia and South Africa using a company called Heeryo Trading Enterprise.⁴³ Additionally, Jimale, who is now serving a 15-year sentence in Mogadishu, was in contact with Puntland-based Bilal al-Sudani, a leader

³⁹ Interviews with female Al-Shabaab defectors were conducted between February and April 2022.

⁴⁰ <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1553452770526740482>.

⁴¹ See https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_under-pressure-militants-somalia-look-ethiopia/6174166.html.

⁴² See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/is-somalia-financier-slapped-with-15-year-imprisonment-by-military-court>.

⁴³ Ibid.

of the ISIL-faction in Somalia.⁴⁴ The Panel sent letters to the Federal Government of Somalia and to the Republic of South Africa in February 2022 for more information, but has yet to receive a response.

C. Relations between the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states

Military operations against Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a

34. From late 2021 to approximately May 2022, Galmudug State forces aided by the Federal Government of Somalia clashed with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a on several occasions. While the Federal Government of Somalia under the former President, Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo, avoided integrating Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a elements into the national security apparatus, recent attempts by Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a to increase its influence in Galmudug during the election period have also been met by resistance. Specifically, in late May 2022, after clashes between Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a and Galmudug State forces in Dhusamareb, the Galmudug Armed Forces Court issued an arrest warrant for 18 members of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a.⁴⁵ Despite what Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a leadership told the Panel in 2021 about their willingness to reach an agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia so the former's militia can fight Al-Shabaab, no such discussions were entertained in the latter half of former President Farmaajo's presidency. In the meantime, Al-Shabaab has exploited the security vacuum in Galmudug, increasing attacks in the State against local and government security forces, while possibly eyeing the border that Galmudug shares with Ethiopia to expand its territorial ambitions. In early June 2022, the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, announced his government's intent to start an offensive against Al-Shabaab, citing the importance of Galmudug State forces in any future military operations that the Federal Government of Somalia may pursue against the group.⁴⁶

D. Security sector

Possible return of Eritrea-trained Somali recruits

35. In its 2021 final report (S/2021/849), the Panel highlighted that the Federal Government of Somalia under the former President possibly recruited up to 5,000 Somalis to receive unspecified military training in Eritrea.⁴⁷ In July 2022, the President travelled to Eritrea to visit the aforementioned recruits and establish plans to return them to Somalia. A timeline for the soldiers return remains unclear, as well as plans on how the Federal Government of Somalia intends to integrate these new soldiers into the existing Somali security structure. Security Council resolution 2628 (2022) strongly urges Somalia to prioritise the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan, which established three benchmarks for force generation, the first of which includes 3,850 new forces by December 2022.

Military operations against Al-Shabaab

36. Since the conclusion of the electoral calendar in Somalia, in May 2022, as well as the decision by the United States of America to send troops back to Somalia,

⁴⁴ Information from Puntland police.

⁴⁵ See <https://goobjoog.com/english/gamudug-military-court-issues-arrest-warrant-for-18-members-of-alhu-sunna-waljamaa/>.

⁴⁶ See <https://hiiraan.com/news4/2022/Jun/186472/hassan-sheikh-mohamud-urges-galmudug-to-lead-the-fight-against-al-shabaab.aspx>.

⁴⁷ See S/2021/849, para. 45.

Somali-led military operations against Al-Shabaab have increased. As reported by the Panel in its 2021 final report (S/2021/849), election-related events highlighted fissures within the Somali National Army; however, recent statements by the President show a new commitment by the Federal Government of Somalia to pursue Al-Shabaab.

37. For example, since June 2022, the Somali National Army Danab forces have conducted at least 14 offensive operations against Al-Shabaab.⁴⁸ Additionally, the United States launched four kinetic airstrikes – from June to August 2022 – the first since the announcement by the United States of the return of its service members to Somalia.⁴⁹

III. Al-Shabaab finance

38. Al-Shabaab continues its relentless taxation of businesses and individuals in Somalia. The Panel has consistently detailed the effectiveness of Al-Shabaab's extortion strategy within Somalia. The group's ability to implement its extortion strategy throughout Somalia, including in areas not under its direct control without having to significantly change its tactics, is in part because of the absence of any substantial pressure being applied by the Federal Government of Somalia to Al-Shabaab's financial apparatus during this reporting period.

39. During the current mandate, investigations indicate that Al-Shabaab's extortion system remains firmly in place. The prolonged election cycle resulted in the Government's decreased focus on degrading the group, thus providing room for Al-Shabaab's illicit taxing and extorting activities to continue unabated. The group remains in a healthy financial position generating enough revenue to sustain its insurgency. The Panel noted coverage of increased activity by Somali special forces in May 2022, in the areas of Leego and Jameo in Lower Shabelle, destroying Al-Shabaab extortion centres.⁵⁰

A. Funding streams

40. Al-Shabaab domestic revenue generation continued to be derived from four main illicit taxation systems focused on different economic areas. These are agriculture (dalag), vehicles (gadiid), commercial goods (badeeco) and livestock (xoolo). Al-Shabaab also continues to diversify its methods of extortion within these areas.

Checkpoint revenue

41. In its 2021 report, the Panel highlighted Al-Shabaab's revenue generation through its network of checkpoints throughout Somalia.⁵¹ The checkpoint network remains robust and is an integral source of Al-Shabaab's income. The group continues

⁴⁸ Confidential United Nations reports, January to August 2022, as well as interviews with Somali government officials, June 2022.

⁴⁹ <https://africom-web-app.azurewebsites.net/pressrelease/34456/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>; <https://africom-web-app.azurewebsites.net/pressrelease/34612/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia> and Analysis of media reports June–July 2022; <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34660/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>; and <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/34670/somali-us-forces-engage-insurgents-in-support-of-the-federal-government-of-somalia>.

⁵⁰ See <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/amid-eid-celebrations-sna-destroys-al-shabaab-extortion-centers>.

⁵¹ See S/2021/849, paras. 54–58.

attempts to expand the network, with the Panel noting in May 2022 that Al-Shabaab had set up a new checkpoint to extort vehicles and the commercial goods they were transporting along the main supply route, approximately 50 km northeast of Belet Weyne town in Hiran region.⁵² The group imposes initial illicit taxation rates of between \$300 and \$1200 per truck, according to the types of livestock or commercial goods being transported by trucks along the route.⁵³ The group continues to expeditiously issue receipts for its extortion practices. The Panel obtained receipts for one vehicle travelling from Kismayo to Dhobley in February 2022, which shows a payment of \$975 for the commercial goods carried (badeeco), categorized as a full load of general merchandise.⁵⁴ The second receipt, for the same vehicle, shows a payment of \$450 for the physical transit of the vehicle (gadiid). In total, Al-Shabaab received \$1,425 in cash from a truck driver who moved commercial goods approximately 245 km by a single axle 10-wheeler truck. Annex 2 (strictly confidential) contains examples of Al-Shabaab receipts.

42. On 17 July 2022, the Somali National Army Danab Special forces with United States air support targeted an Al-Shabaab checkpoint located at Labakuus village, in the Lower Juba region near Kismayo,⁵⁵ that was being used to illicitly tax commercial vehicles in transit. At least four militants were killed and one captured in the operation, with various weapons and financial paraphernalia recovered.⁵⁶ The checkpoint was documented as one of the Al-Shabaab network of over 100 in the Panel's 2021 final report.⁵⁷

Illicit taxation of residential property

43. Another method of illicit taxation used by the group is the taxation of residential properties, which the Panel noted in Afgoye, South-West State. Initiated from a notice circulated to households, each household is advised of taxation of \$150 for a stone house, \$300 for a multi-story house and \$100 for an iron sheet house. Households are asked "if you receive this, respond within 24 hours" and "for more information or complaint" to contact the group on the number provided. Annex 3 contains the decree and its translation into English.

44. The Panel recorded illicit taxation of households in some villages within Jowhar and Mahaday districts in Middle Shabelle in May 2022. Illicit taxation was first implemented on local businesses, who were ordered to disclose their wealth and taxed at 2.5 per cent.⁵⁸ The group then imposed a \$30 flat rate illicit taxation on each household regardless of their income and the size of the family.⁵⁹

Extortion of new development properties in Mogadishu

45. Al-Shabaab also extorts the owners of buildings and properties being constructed within the Mogadishu area. Interviews with developers and owners within the Mogadishu area revealed that when construction was in progress the group would call the owner with an illicit taxation demand, usually 25 per cent of the final value of the development, which the group knew.⁶⁰ The property owners then negotiated in a meeting held with the group towards Qoryoley, outside Mogadishu, to agree a final

⁵² Confidential United Nations report, May 2022.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Al-Shabaab receipts obtained by the Panel of Experts during its current mandate.

⁵⁵ See <https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2022/July/government-forces-killed-five-al-shabaab-militants>.

⁵⁶ See https://mobile.twitter.com/1_Danab_media/status/1548759241904750592.

⁵⁷ See S/2021/849, annex 3.1 (strictly confidential), checkpoint located near Yaaq Bulle, Kismayo, Somalia; checkpoint is in Labakuus.

⁵⁸ Confidential United Nations reports, May and June 2022.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Owners did not know who had informed Al-Shabaab of the value of the development.

amount. After negotiating, one developer paid \$10,000 in cash to the group for property developments worth \$170,000.⁶¹

Rationale for payment to Al-Shabaab

46. A question the Panel has frequently asked during its mandate is why individuals and businesses continue to pay Al-Shabaab extortion money. The core reason is the lack of security provided to individuals and businesses by the Government to enable them to say no to Al-Shabaab.⁶² Individuals and businesses do not feel able to report or identify Al-Shabaab due to the group's network of operatives, informants and high level of infiltration.⁶³ In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab uncompromisingly extorts businesses and individuals through fear, without controlling the city militarily. An anonymous tip line to report Al-Shabaab extortion was set up in 2021 by the Financial Reporting Centre. However, owing to the above-mentioned security concerns, the line has had little utilization.⁶⁴

47. The Panel noted some pockets of resistance to Al-Shabaab extortion demands with immediate consequence, in both urban and rural areas. In June 2022, in Tabelaha, Sheikh Ibrahim market south-eastern Benadir, one business refused to pay Al-Shabaab which resulted in an improvised explosive device being detonated within the business premises.⁶⁵

48. The Panel received reports from Baxdo, Galmudug, where herders, under pressure from the current drought, rejected Al-Shabaab extortion demands, resulting in the group attacking the community, abducting and killing herders and looting their animals in 2022.

49. In rural areas that are well governed and where elders and clans have built inclusive administrations, Al-Shabaab finds it much more difficult to impose its extortion strategies. A united, reinforced security sector throughout southern and central Somalia, including Mogadishu, is key to ending Al-Shabaab's ability to relentlessly extort the population and businesses.

B. Storage and onward transfer of funds

50. Al-Shabaab is pragmatic in how it moves money and exploits the most effective means available, namely cash, mobile money, money transfer operators and banks. The group operatives open bank accounts to store and withdraw the money they make and utilize the mobile money system to pay for expenses and distribute some wages. Cash, however, is the predominant means of the group's financial mobilization, with most extortion money collected in cash and deposits and withdrawals made in cash. This reliance of the group on cash is an area that could be targeted by the Federal Government of Somalia, the private sector, and partners for disruption purposes.

51. The Panel has seen some rudimentary efforts by the group to avoid triggering suspicion of authorities and being reported to the Somali Financial Reporting Centre.⁶⁶ A bank account used to deposit funds from extortion activities in Mogadishu showed a concatenation of withdrawals of \$9,500 cash from various banks daily. Keeping the amount under the \$10,000 reporting limit avoids triggering a large cash

⁶¹ Interviews with Somali developers, intelligence personnel and officials, Mogadishu July 2022.

⁶² Series of interviews carried out with individuals who are extorted by Al-Shabaab.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Interview with government officials in Mogadishu, July 2022.

⁶⁵ Confidential United Nations report, June 2022.

⁶⁶ Transactions over \$10,000 are required to be reported to the Financial Reporting Centre by the bank under anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism law.

transactions report being created and sent to financial intelligence authorities.⁶⁷ However, deposits into the account from extorted individuals often exceeded \$10,000 which would trigger a report anyway.

C. Expenditure

52. Human resources are a constant expense for Al-Shabaab. The Panel conducted investigations into Al-Shabaab salary payments in Lower Shabelle for low-ranking fighters and recorded earnings of between \$60 and \$100 a month. Finance officers, who are higher ranked, were paid more with monthly incomes recorded between \$150 and \$250 a month.⁶⁸ The Panel did not find information on the earnings of the upper echelons of Al-Shabaab; however, the recently released the Federal Government of Somalia National Risk Assessment on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism stated that Al-Shabaab's emir earned \$25,000 per month.⁶⁹

53. Al-Shabaab has an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters,⁷⁰ considering a ratio of 75 per cent lower ranked and 25 per cent mid-level operatives with an average salary of \$75 and \$200 respectively, the group would need between \$531,250 and \$1 million a month to sustain salaries alone.

54. During the reporting period the Panel identified that Al-Shabaab distributed a form titled "census to households". The Panel has documented these forms being distributed in Lower Shabelle. The forms are distributed by the political and provinces department (Wilayat Maktab) and the Panel understands this information is utilized by the finance department to levy related taxes on individuals and their families. The document gathers detailed information on the status and wealth of families, including household source of income, number of children, their skills and education, assets, cattle numbers and remittances from abroad. The Panel does not have an indication of the overall extent of the distribution of the document. However, it highlights the methods the group uses to gather information on families and households, which the group uses to assess the amount to be extorted. Annex 4 contains a copy of the census form.

IV. Public and private financial management

55. Somalia continues working towards the completion point within the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 15 May 2022 Somali elections were held just prior to the 17 May deadline of the Initiative, meaning the Federal Government of Somalia narrowly avoided the possible derailment of the Initiative process.⁷¹ Most of the Initiative triggers and structural benchmarks are on track and expected to be completed by mid-2023.⁷² However, some triggers are dependent on bills being enacted by the Parliament of Somalia which were delayed owing to the most recent election.⁷³ Upon reaching the completion point, the external debt of Somalia should decrease from 56 per cent to 6 per cent and the country will likely be categorized as "moderate risk of debt distress".⁷⁴

⁶⁷ Patterns of transactions in Al-Shabaab accounts reviewed by the Panel, March 2022.

⁶⁸ Interviews with former Al-Shabaab personnel, Somali intelligence personal handling defectors and confidential United Nations reports reviewed by the Panel.

⁶⁹ See <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf> (page 106).

⁷⁰ See <https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-harakat-al-shabaab-al-mujahideen-al-shabaab> and <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-08/somalia-5.php>.

⁷¹ See <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/03/07/pr2262-imf-staff-completes-mission-to-discuss-reviews-of-extended-credit-facility-to-somalia>.

⁷² Meeting with Somali Ministry of Finance, Mogadishu, July 2022.

⁷³ These include the targeted financial sanctions law and issuing of related regulations.

⁷⁴ Interview with World Bank official, March 2022.

56. With the positive progress made on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative process, the Ministry of Finance announced a budget for 2022 of \$918 million, increase from the \$671 million allocated for 2021.⁷⁵

57. In July 2022, the Central Bank of Somalia issued licenses to two international banks, Ziraat Katilim of Türkiye and Banque Misr of Egypt, which became the country's first foreign banks to have branches in Somalia.⁷⁶ This is a positive step for Somalia in terms of domestic financial competition and access to correspondent banks and international payment services.

A. Identification documents

58. One barrier to effective know-your-customer⁷⁷ compliance for the financial industry in Somalia is the lack of national identity documents. Entities in the public and private sector have identified this as a barrier to tackling Al-Shabaab finance.⁷⁸ The country's lack of a national identity document is cited as one of the three highest level vulnerabilities in the National Risk Assessment with regards to anti-money-laundering and terrorism financing.⁷⁹ Globally, Somalia has the highest population percentage of individuals without national identity cards, with 77 per cent of the population lacking an official proof of personal identification in 2018.⁸⁰ The practice of Al-Shabaab obtaining personal identification documents shortly before opening bank accounts was highlighted in the Panel's report in 2020.⁸¹ Al-Shabaab's ability to subvert the Somali financial system by opening and operating bank accounts is aided by the current lack of a centralized personal identification database. Individuals can obtain identification documents from regional municipal offices with different criteria for issuance.⁸²

59. The current vulnerability of the identification system makes it more difficult for financial institutions to carry out effective know-your-customer practices and compliance with anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regulations. One financial entity reported to the Panel that individuals had presented on occasions three different identification documents in different names in order to open bank accounts, a problematic situation for private institutions to manage.⁸³ Government officials have noted to the Panel that the national identity documents must therefore be biometric to mitigate the risk of manipulation.⁸⁴ In Somaliland, the Government has issued a successful identification card to most of the population that can be linked in the future to other government services.⁸⁵

60. Although it would represent a significant step forward, a biometric identity document alone will not solve the current deficiencies in disrupting Al-Shabaab

⁷⁵ See <https://mof.gov.so/index.php/publications/appropriation-act-2022-budget-draft>.

⁷⁶ See <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-04/foreign-banks-issued-licenses-in-somalia-for-the-first-time>.

⁷⁷ "Know-your-customer" is the process of a business verifying the identity of its clients through documents, such as a passport.

⁷⁸ Interviews with Financial Reporting Centre, Somali Bankers Association, Ministry of Finance and private sector and reported by the Panel of Experts in its 2021 report, see S/2021/849, para. 73.

⁷⁹ See <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf>.

⁸⁰ See World Bank, Identification for Development (ID4D) Dataset from 2018 available at <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/identification-development-global-dataset>.

⁸¹ See S/2020/949, para. 30.

⁸² A government official noted to the Panel they could gain 20 different birth certificates in one day, Mogadishu, July 2022.

⁸³ Interview with Somali financial services executives in March 2022.

⁸⁴ The Central Bank of Somalia is working with the World Bank to establish an electronic verification system for the financial sector.

⁸⁵ Visit by the Panel of Experts to Somaliland in May 2022.

finance if it is not combined with comprehensive monitoring, reporting and investigations into money-laundering and terrorist financing to be effective. Identifying patterns, sharing information, and freezing assets within a multi-agency approach are key. The Financial Reporting Centre, for example, has not yet conducted significant investigations into Al-Shabaab's finances.

B. National risk assessment on money-laundering and terrorist financing

61. In May 2022, the Somali Financial Reporting Centre released a 120-page national risk assessment document to identify, assess and understand the money-laundering and terrorist financing risk in Somalia and putting forward coordinated actions to ensure risks are mitigated effectively.⁸⁶ The report paints a candid picture of the current vulnerabilities within the Somali financial sector.⁸⁷ The report covered 18 areas, with multiple recommendations for each industry area.⁸⁸

62. The national risk assessment states that Somalia cannot expedite investigations into money-laundering and terrorism financing because of the disjointed nature of the interaction between agencies and lack of capacity to investigate within the Financial Reporting Centre and other agencies. The only court that has prosecuted terrorist financiers is the military court, which has provided a form of justice to financiers and other Al-Shabaab operatives. However, Somali military courts are sometimes accused of falling short of international fair trial standards of being independent and impartial and operating beyond their jurisdiction.⁸⁹

63. There was opposition to the release of the national risk assessment within some domestic Somali institutions, which felt the paper was too broad with too many recommendations.⁹⁰ The report was also not endorsed by the National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee of Somalia's Lower House of Parliament, but was endorsed by the Minister of Finance.

C. Domestic revenue collection

64. The Federal Government of Somalia continued to develop its own revenue collection systems, with increased domestic revenue generation being a top priority.⁹¹ However, clan dynamics could complicate the efforts by the Government to collect revenue, with taxpayers suspicious that the clan in power will direct disproportionate resources to their own clan. Since the signing of the National Revenue Bill in 2019, domestic revenue has increased from \$142 million in 2019 to an estimated \$250 million in 2022. In the future, domestic revenue generation efforts will focus on banks, hawalas and telecoms to increase revenue.⁹² Tax authorities remain poorly resourced and are unable to detect, prevent and effectively enforce tax laws. This, combined with most economic activity in the country being informal, means

⁸⁶ As per Financial Action Task Force recommendation 1, assessing risks and applying a risk-based approach.

⁸⁷ On terrorist financing the report states "Al-Shabaab has its claws in every sphere of the country's economic system, including the judicial system and the countries intelligence services. This has allowed Al-Shabaab to exercise their powers to generate revenue and maintain control".

⁸⁸ Interview with Financial Reporting Centre director in Mogadishu in July 2022.

⁸⁹ See <https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-fears-somalia-s-military-court-judge-says-/6397204.html>.

⁹⁰ Interviews with government officials in Mogadishu in July 2022.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Interview with Minister of Finance, Mogadishu, July 2022.

Al-Shabaab's extortion system will continue to operate effectively.⁹³ With increased domestic revenue collection comes increased competition with Al-Shabaab for financial resources on an already financially constricted population, a scenario that could see increased tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia, Al-Shabaab and the business community.

D. Information sharing within the formal banking sector

65. When a bank identifies or is alerted to an Al-Shabaab bank account, investigations are carried out and the bank eventually closes the account. Firstly, the bank will alert in writing the account holder that the account will be closed within a certain period. That banks are identifying some suspicious accounts internally is a positive step. However, a flaw in this process is the lack of sharing of this information with any other entities. The reason for this independent action is that the banks are apprehensive sharing this information with both the government financial institutions and other private institutions due to fear that it could lead to reprisal attacks against their premises and employees by Al-Shabaab. Currently, there are no specific mechanisms available for banks to share information between themselves securely,⁹⁴ and Somalia does not have data protection laws. The recent Somali national risk assessment on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism notes that banks and money transfer bureaux are still not reporting suspicious transaction reports and large cash transaction reports in proportion with the money-laundering and terrorist financing risks.

E. Mobile money

66. Mobile money access and use in Somalia is vital for the population and the economy. Over 70 per cent of the population utilize mobile money services and more than two-thirds of all payments in Somalia are made via mobile money platforms, accounting for 36 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).⁹⁵ Especially for individuals with no access to formal financial systems⁹⁶ and small and medium sized enterprises, the use of mobile money has a significant influence on access to further finances and growth.⁹⁷ However, in its 2020 and 2021 reports, the Panel highlighted the use of mobile money by Al-Shabaab, which has continued throughout the current mandate. Mobile money is the quickest and most accessible form of money transfer for both Al-Shabaab and the individual paying the group.

67. Some mobile money providers have capped limits on daily transactions to mitigate some risk, others have unlimited transaction limits.⁹⁸ Mobile money wallets can also be linked to personal and business bank accounts providing interoperability of funds and unlimited transfer volumes.

⁹³ The Somali National Risk Assessment on money-laundering and terrorism financing reports that 60 per cent of the economy is informal, see <https://frc.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NRA-Report-2022.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Information from the Central Bank of Somalia, July 2022.

⁹⁵ See World Bank report at <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/replacement-public-somalia-economic-update-3-final.pdf> and Somali National Risk Assessment, para. 84.

⁹⁶ Only 15 per cent of Somalis have access to formal financial systems.

⁹⁷ Abdinur Ali Mohamed, Mohamed Ibrahim Nor, "Assessing the effects of the mobile money service on small and medium sized enterprises: study on EVC-Plus Services in Somalia", *American Journal of Industrial and Business Management*, Vol. 11, No. 5 (May 2021).

⁹⁸ Under the 2019 Mobile Money Regulations, section 24, the Central Bank of Somalia can set transaction limits for mobile money providers.

68. Regulation of the industry continues and falls under the purview of the Central Bank of Somalia. Its officials see bringing the sector under full regulatory control as a top priority. Licenses have been issued to the two biggest mobile money operators and one payment service provider, Hormuud Telecommunications received the first license in early 2020.⁹⁹ The Central Bank is implementing a two-phase process for regulation. The first involves the development of a robust regulatory framework. The current licenced entities were given 24 months from the date of the licencing to comply with 44 specific regulatory requirements and the Central Bank expects by the 3rd quarter of 2023 full compliance will be reached.¹⁰⁰ The second phase involves ensuring that mobile money operators are fully interoperable.¹⁰¹

69. Resources are needed for the Central Bank to regulate the mobile money sector in Somalia. The World Bank reported that mobile money conducts an estimated 155 million transactions worth about \$2.7 billion a month,¹⁰² a huge number of transactions for the Central Bank to monitor and investigate as the regulations continue to be enforced.

70. Identifying consumers for know-your-customer purposes within the mobile money industry remains difficult, subsequently the risk of manipulation is high. A mobile phone SIM card obtained with an individual's name and date of birth is all that is needed to access mobile money services.

71. The private financial sector has continued to develop its systems to obtain international certification, with Hormuud Telecommunications gaining its Global System for Mobile Communications Association mobile money certification in January 2022, the first in Somalia and one of 17 globally.¹⁰³

Federal Government of Somalia, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Panel of Experts financial disruption plan

72. Paragraph 2 of resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) requests the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Panel of Experts to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's finances and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's finances and exploitation of the licit financial system.

73. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime delivered an initial 12-week disruption planning methodology course in 2021 to the Financial Reporting Centre. This disruption planning methodology is used as the basis for identifying current gaps and opportunities to disrupt. However, only representatives of the Financial Reporting Centre took part in the disruption planning methodology. The process should be a multi-agency approach to enable a broader scope to the outcomes of disruption. Annex 5 contains information on the training activities delivered.

74. The Panel receives updates on the status of the disruption plan from the Federal Government of Somalia and UNODC but is not an active participant in the process owing to the investigative nature of its mandate and the current process being focused on capacity-building.

⁹⁹ Information provided by the Central Bank of Somalia in July 2022.

¹⁰⁰ This will fall beyond the initial reprieve period of 24 months.

¹⁰¹ Information provided by the Central Bank of Somalia in July 2022.

¹⁰² See World Bank <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975231536256355812/pdf>.

¹⁰³ A copy of the Global System for Mobile Communications Association certificate has been shared with the Panel and is recorded on file March 2022, also see <https://gsmamobilemoneycertification.com/certified-mmpps/>.

V. Arms embargo

75. The Panel continues to monitor the evolution of weapons used by Al-Shabaab through the analysis and tracing of weapons and ammunition captured by Somali and international forces and the analysis of propaganda footage in the group's affiliated media. The Panel aims to identify the origin of those weapons and ammunition, as well as networks involved in their illicit supply to Al-Shabaab, ISIL in Somalia and other armed groups and militias. Al-Shabaab claims in their propaganda that its weapons and ammunition are captured from Somali National Army and international forces. However, as it will be illustrated below, Al-Shabaab has most likely used mainly smuggling networks to build its arsenal.

A. Weapons and ammunition used by Al-Shabaab

Weapons observed in Al-Shabaab propaganda videos

76. In a video posted by Al-Shabaab¹⁰⁴ showing the group's training camp "Qasim Al-Rimi"¹⁰⁵ in Somalia, the Panel noted the employment of assault rifles and small machine guns, most with characteristics similar to Chinese-made type 56-1, type 56-2 and type 80 (a version of the Soviet style PKM 7.62×54) and a Bulgarian PG-7M round manufactured in 2005 (see annex 6).

Tracing of weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab

77. While AMISOM, and later ATMIS, have started providing the Panel with valuable information on a regular basis on captured weapons from Al-Shabaab, the Federal Government of Somalia has yet to share information on several reported captures during Somali National Army operations. AMISOM and ATMIS shared a list of 55 weapons with identified serial numbers, nine rifles without markings and five rocket propelled grenade launchers, as well headstamps markings of 7.62x39 ammunition for small arms.

Assault rifles captured or diverted from Somali security forces

78. The Panel has identified that one pistol and 12 assault rifles have serial numbers matching, or very similar to, those delivered to the Federal Government of Somalia, which represents about 20 per cent of the captured weapons. See further details in annex 7. The Panel observed that three of these weapons had National Intelligence and Security Agency markings, two had Somali National Army markings, and five had Al-Shabaab markings.¹⁰⁶

Recently manufactured ammunition

79. The Panel received pictures from ATMIS of small arms ammunition, calibre 7.62x39, captured on 27 April 2022 by ATMIS from Al-Shabaab fighters during an operation in Lower Juba, Somalia. The Panel noted that some ammunition had been manufactured very recently, see figure below with details on additional older headstamps at annex 8.¹⁰⁷ The Panel sent letters to Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Romania and the

¹⁰⁴ Media downloaded from a Facebook account; the Panel is not sharing the link to avoid the dissemination of violent extremist media.

¹⁰⁵ Yemeni and former Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula leader listed by ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (QDi.282).

¹⁰⁶ The Panel, after a review of captured weapons from Al-Shabaab, noted that the group has its own markings. Specifically, the group uses "XSH" (Harakat Al-Shabaab) to mark its weapons. The Panel observed five markings in circulation: XSH-43337; XSH-43361 (15003386); XSH-43359 (60013158); XSH-43354 (15005828); and XSH-14058 (563526021).

¹⁰⁷ Years of production: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019); China (2009, 2015, 2017, 2019 and 2020); Romania (2018); Russian Federation (2015, 2018 and 2019).

Russian Federation for tracing purposes. The Panel also sent a letter to ATMIS requesting whether any of its contingents are using cartridges with those headstamps.

80. The Panel received information that cartridges with headstamps SADU 09 were exported to a West African country and to the United States while the ones with RSD 18 were delivered in 2018 and 2019 to the United States Department of the Army. The Panel sent a letter to the United States requesting information whether this ammunition has been supplied to United States, Somali or international forces operating in Somalia.

81. China informed the Panel that “since the markings on the cartridges carry limited features, we cannot confirm the requested information. Meanwhile, we think there is a high possibility of imitation due to the unsophisticated process of bullet production.” The Panel believes that cartridge headstamp marking remains a reliable tool of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons adopted by the General Assembly in 2005 in support of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.¹⁰⁸ In paragraph 11 of its resolution 2020 (2015), the Security Council urges Member States to share information relevant to the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation or misuse of small arms and light weapons, inter alia with experts groups assisting sanctions committees.

Figure: Headstamps of cartridges 7.62x39 produced after the adoption of the Programme of Action

			
811 20 China 2020	811 19 China 2019	IK 19 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2019	3 19 Russian Federation 2019
			
RSD 18 Romania 2018	3 18 Russian Federation 2018	811 17 China 2017	311 17 China 2017
			
811 15 China 2015	7.62x39 15 Russian Federation 2015 ^a	61 09 China 2009	

^a Consistent with marking of Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, see <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/solved-identified-7-62x39-mm-klimovsk-russia/22495>.

¹⁰⁸ A/CONF.192/15. For more background see <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/>.

Use of heavy weapons by Al-Shabaab

82. A Member State informed the Panel of a recent increase in cooperation between Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The source informed the Panel that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen is currently hosting about 80 fighters from Al-Shabaab for training courses in explosive manufacturing, military management, and the use of heavy weapons. The same source informed the Panel that an equivalent number of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula fighters from Yemen are currently operating alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia. However, the source has not shared any evidence supporting this claim. The Panel will monitor any change of tactics or weapons used as a result of this potential development.

Potential smuggling of Fagot and Metis anti-tank guided missiles to Somalia from Yemen

83. The Panel received information indicating smuggling of anti-tank guided missiles and their launchers from a third country to Somalia through Yemen. The Panel obtained pictures from Puntland security services of smuggled weapons, including three anti-tank guided missiles and two launchers. The launchers had markings similar to those of anti-tank guided missiles launchers 9M135 and 9M135M and the anti-tank guided missiles had markings similar to those of 9M115 Metis (see annex 9). The Panel of Experts on Yemen has reported that the Houthis have generally received anti-tank guided missiles variants of 9M113 Konkurs and 9M133 Kornet. As 9M11 Fagot and 9M115 Metis anti-tank guided missiles were part of Yemeni arsenal before the arms embargo mandated by resolution [2216 \(2015\)](#), those missiles could have been diverted by Yemeni arms traffickers for delivery to Somalia. The Panel sent a letter to the Russian Federation to request its assistance to confirm whether these missiles and their launchers have been supplied to Yemen.

Use of 107 mm rocket or Type 63

84. The Panel noted the launch of seven 107 mm rocket shells in a residential area in Mogadishu, on 9 June 2022, during the presidential elections. The launch was assessed by international forces to be from the vicinity of Km 13, about 10 km from Aden Adde International Airport, which is the operational range of the 107 mm rocket. If Al-Shabaab intended to target the Afisyoni area, where the Parliament was meeting to elect the President, the rocket fell 3.5 km short of its intended target.

Heavy weapons captured from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

85. Al-Shabaab has also captured a ZU-23 mm and two 120 mm mortar launchers from the ATMIS base at Ceel Baraf. The Panel received information that Al-Shabaab used the same mortars against the Somali National Army and ATMIS bases in Dhusamareb during the attack on Baxdo on 17 June 2022, a tactic the group uses during complex attack to deny the movement of a quick reaction force. The attack was later repelled by local militia, on 19 June 2022, and Al-Shabaab suffered a huge loss and a capture of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, see paragraph 106 below.

B. Compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo

Weapons and ammunition management

86. The Panel participated in a weapons and ammunition management conference held in Mogadishu on 19 and 20 March 2022. The Panel visited Halane Central Armoury on 20 July 2022 for the first time since 25 August 2018, in conjunction with

the United Nations assessment team.¹⁰⁹ Though the time did not allow for a thorough analysis of the handwritten logbooks, the Panel assesses that the process was in place for the recording and registration of the reception and distribution of weapons and ammunition. The Panel viewed forms and logbooks demonstrating a centralized reception and distribution under the authority of the Chief of Defence Forces to all Somali National Security Forces units (i.e., Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, National Intelligence and Security Agency and Custodial Corps). The Council, in paragraph 39 of its resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) requested the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the Federal Government of Somalia in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission. The Panel will submit this information in a thematic report incorporating the views of the Federal Government of Somalia once the transition to the new Government is completed.

87. The Panel noted significant progress in terms of physical security and stockpile management measures. Onsite visits allowed the Panel to observe the re-configuration of Halane Central Armoury with safer storage of ammunition, as well as the building of a new storage facility for ammunition outside Aden Adde International Airport, in the vicinity of the TURKSOM camp in Jazeera. The Mine Action Service and HALO Trust played a major role in supporting this effort.

88. While on site, the Panel observed indications on the marking of more than 6,000 weapons held by the Somali Police Force in Benadir in totality, despite some misses in smaller units.¹¹⁰ The Panel also observed the operationalization of the Fulcrum database, giving a good visibility on the deployment of weapons to the Somali Police Force. As reported in the Panel's midterm update, the marking of weapons held by Somali Police Force in Jubbaland and Puntland, Somali National Army units, National Intelligence and Security Agency, and the Custodial Corps has yet to be initiated.

89. Similarly, a full implementation of the standard operating procedure on the management of recovered small arms and light weapons in Somalia has yet to materialize.¹¹¹ AMISOM, and now ATMIS, has shared information and pictures of captured weapons and ammunition from Al-Shabaab regularly with the Panel. Initial information on more than 600 weapons and other military items captured from Al-Shabaab by AMISOM between early 2019 and March 2022 did not include full markings and serial numbers that could have allowed the Panel to conduct a proper tracing request to the manufacturing countries.¹¹² As noted in paragraph 77 above, subsequent information shared by ATMIS allowed a better analysis and tracing. The Panel has agreed with ATMIS on a regular update on captured weapons.

90. The Panel also recorded reports from media affiliated with the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali security forces indicating that more than 600 Al-Shabaab operatives have been neutralized or defected between October 2021 and 28 August 2022 (see annex 10). The Panel assesses that as a result of these operations more than 600 weapons could have been captured from Al-Shabaab. The Panel regrets that despite several written and oral requests, the Federal Government of Somalia has

¹⁰⁹ In paragraph 42 of resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 15 September 2022, and following the completion of a technical assessment of the weapons and ammunition management capability of Somalia, recommendations to improve it further and to articulate options for clear, well-identified and realistic benchmarks.

¹¹⁰ A specialized Somali Police Force unit visited by the Panel had a storage of less than a dozen of these rifles; none of them was marked.

¹¹¹ Standard operating procedure agreed between AMISOM and the Office of National Security of the Federal Government of Somalia on 29 June 2021.

¹¹² Only one rifle, whose picture was shared, could be exploited for tracing purposes to identify its origin.

not shared any information showing markings or serial numbers of weapons and ammunition captured. The Panel also has not seen any evidence of these weapons being integrated with proper marking, recording and registration, in Somali National Security Forces arsenals.

91. The Federal Government of Somalia has established a nascent captured weapons database, which is currently configured to accept data on weapons, ammunition and improvised explosive devices, and components thereof. The system was established with the support of Conflict Armament Research and is intended to act as a central resource that multiple branches of the Somali Security Forces, as well as ATMIS, can potentially contribute towards and derive value from, facilitating the process of information exchange and analysis. Currently, the Federal Government of Somalia has populated the database with information and imagery of captured weapons transferred to the Federal Government of Somalia by ATMIS.

Notifications of weapons and ammunition deliveries

92. Since the submission of the Panel's 2021 final report (S/2021/849) on 6 September 2021, three consignments of weapons and ammunition were delivered from Türkiye to the Federal Government of Somalia. Annex 11 (strictly confidential) displays the details of notifications, including those linked to these consignments.

93. The Panel and the joint verification team continue to update a comprehensive database pertaining to weapons and ammunition officially imported by the Federal Government of Somalia since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013.¹¹³ According to this database, the Federal Government has officially received approximately 27,000 weapons and 80.1 million rounds of ammunition, including around 70,000 RPG-7 rounds, since 2013.¹¹⁴

94. During the reporting period, no delivery of military equipment was notified apart from trucks and vehicles from China. The Federal Government of Somalia initially informed the Panel that, though the vehicles were delivered to the Somali National Army, they had characteristics similar to commercial vehicles and should therefore not be considered as part of annex B of resolution 2607 (2021) as "Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use". The Panel noted that this definition could be subject to misinterpretation.¹¹⁵

95. During meetings with the Panel, officials of the Federal Government of Somalia Ministry of Defence and the Office of the National Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Government expressed their frustrations that the arms embargo continued to hinder efforts by Somalia to equip its security forces with heavy weapons and air assets to fight Al-Shabaab effectively. Yet, the Panel has not noted any request submitted by the Federal Government of Somalia to the Security Council Committee on Somalia for approval of the import of heavy equipment. The latest request of approval for heavy equipment was submitted by Bulgaria on 13 January 2021 and paused by the Federal Government on 19 January 2021.¹¹⁶ As previously reported, the Panel was awaiting the result of an expected Federal Government audit on the transaction signed by the then Minister of State for Defence with the Bulgarian broker, allegedly without consultation of relevant Somali authorities (S/2021/849,

¹¹³ S/2021/849, para. 91.

¹¹⁴ Based on Federal Government of Somalia and Member State notifications submitted to the Committee, combined with information provided by the weapons and ammunition management focal point of the Federal Government of Somalia and the joint verification team.

¹¹⁵ This language could be interpreted as broader than "Category I: battle tanks" and "Category II: armoured combat vehicles" of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms; see <https://www.unroca.org/categories>.

¹¹⁶ S/2021/849, paras. 92–94.

para. 94). The Panel was concerned that the end-user certificate signed by the Minister included Qoryoley, a town contested by Al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle, as the location for storage.¹¹⁷ The Panel finds it worrying that end-user certificates are handled without appropriate official approvals and vetting.

Potential delivery of Bayraktar without notification

96. The Panel noted indications of potential delivery to Somalia, without request of approval, of Turkish-made unmanned combat aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB-2. On 6 July 2022,¹¹⁸ social media posted pictures of an aircraft, flying overhead in Mogadishu, with characteristics similar to those unique to the Bayraktar TB-2. According to confidential reports, those unmanned combat aerial vehicles were delivered to Mogadishu on 6 December 2021 by two Turkish Air Force Airbus A400M.¹¹⁹ The Panel has seen pictures on social media of Somali officers allegedly undertaking training in Türkiye on the Bayraktar TB-2.¹²⁰ The Panel sent letters to Türkiye and the Federal Government of Somalia requesting clarification on this matter as well as information on the nature of cargo delivered by the two A400M without notification to the Security Council Committee on Somalia, but has not yet received a reply from Somalia. Türkiye informed the Panel that it has not delivered any type of unmanned combat aerial vehicles to the Somali authorities and that the systems in question are assigned to be used by Türkiye in the fight against terrorism in Somalia. As Türkiye is not exempted in the arms embargo, the Panel considers that the delivery of these systems to Somalia is not compliant with the arms embargo. The Panel noted that Türkiye has never publicly reported on any airstrikes in Somalia. As noted in its previous report, the Panel already raised the occurrence of unclaimed drone strikes in Somalia (see S/2021/849, paras. paragraphs 126 and 127).

Standardized template for notifications

97. The Panel submitted to the Committee for approval an updated Implementation Assistance Notice 2: “Summary of procedural approvals and notification requirements related to the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia”. The Notice, which was approved by the Committee on 31 May 2022, includes templates for approval requests, advance notifications, and post-delivery notifications.¹²¹

C. Compliance by Member States and international organizations with the arms embargo

Standing exemption for international forces for force protection

98. In paragraph 34 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Security Council reaffirms that the arms embargo shall not apply, inter alia, to supplies of weapons or military equipment for UNSOM, AMISOM,¹²² AMISOM strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM and the European Union Training Mission in Somalia. The Panel noted that other international entities are not specifically mentioned in the standing exemption list, including the TURKSOM Turkish military training centre, in

¹¹⁷ The Panel met with the broker in Bulgaria and with the Minister of State for Defence in Mogadishu. The latter claimed that the transaction was discussed with Somali authorities.

¹¹⁸ See https://twitter.com/Free_Somaliweyn/status/1544776089070776320; see also tweet of 20 July 2022 <https://twitter.com/MIGX999/status/1549842458669944840?t=mpvbDLvCvDiYdkW3uMQPRw&s=08>.

¹¹⁹ See also <https://mobile.twitter.com/DailyJubba/status/1469443855296704519>.

¹²⁰ See https://m.facebook.com/WararIyoWarbixino/posts/733913153816849?locale2=so_SO&_rdr&_

¹²¹ Approved on 31 May 2022, see www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/notices.

¹²² Replaced by ATMIS.

Mogadishu, the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia,¹²³ the British Forces Somalia Operation Tangham¹²⁴ and United States troops in Somalia.¹²⁵ The Panel noted that notifications to the Committee by Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the European Union Capacity Building Mission related to weapons and ammunition for use by these entities may not fall within the scope of procedural requirements of the arms embargo as explained in updated Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2. Literally, should such entities be considered as ATMIS strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, then there is no requirement for notification. Otherwise, there is no provision in the arms embargo on Somalia for these entities to be supplied with arms and ammunition.

Compliance for delivery of weapons to Somali security sector institutions other than those of the Federal Government of Somalia

Puntland Security Forces

99. The Panel is investigating a compliance case following the discovery of remnants of mortar shells fired by elements of the Puntland Security Forces during clashes in December 2021, within the town of Bosaso, Puntland, Somalia. (see also para. 123 below). Remnants showed markings of characteristics of ammunition similar to those manufactured in the United States between 2009 and 2014, see details in annex 12.¹²⁶

100. Both 120 mm mortars and 60/81 mm mortars are part of annex A and annex B of resolution 2607 (2021), respectively. As such, their delivery to Puntland Security Forces, considered a Somali security sector institution, requires a request of approval and a notification to the Committee by the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organization. The Panel sent a letter to the United States requesting information on whether those weapons have been notified and supplied by the United States.

Puntland Maritime Police Force

101. In its 2020 report, the Panel highlighted a delivery of military equipment to the Puntland Maritime Police Force based in Bosaso, Puntland, by the United Arab Emirates without any notification.¹²⁷ A request of approval for delivery of weapons to Puntland Maritime Police Force by a Member State was submitted to the Committee on 13 August 2021. The Committee informed the Member State that it stands ready to consider the notification if the Member State confirms to the Committee that it has informed the Federal Government of Somalia of the notification and will inform the Committee of the delivery at least five working days in advance. A company brokering the shipment approached the Panel and provided all documents necessary to submit a request of approval including an end-user certificate, dated 15 February 2022, co-signed by the President of Puntland and the Minister of Internal Security of the Federal Government. This end-user certificate, signed by a Federal Government official, could have been used as a proof that the Federal Government was aware of the notification. The Member State which made the notification informed the Panel that it had not approved an export licence and hence the notification and related delivery were terminated.

¹²³ <https://www.eucap-som.eu/>.

¹²⁴ <https://twitter.com/ukforcessomalia>.

¹²⁵ Authorized by the President of the United States on 16 May 2022, see <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3033345/us-to-resume-small-persistent-presence-in-somalia/>.

¹²⁶ Manufactured by Day and Zimmerman, East Camden, Arizona; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arizona and Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania, (currently Nammo Pocal Inc).

¹²⁷ S/2020/949, paras. 107–108.

Jubbaland Security Forces

102. The Panel noted pictures of Jubbaland security forces, supported by United States-trained Danab, using small arms equipped with modernized kits with characteristics never notified to the Committee.¹²⁸ The Panel is investigating to identify the marking and serial numbers of the weapons in order to trace their origin and identify potential non-compliance.

Weapons used by private security companies in Somalia

103. The Panel noted footage of security details, providing a close protection escort to the President of Galmudug, equipped with submachine guns with characteristics similar to the Advanced Police Carbine APC-9 K manufactured by B&T (formerly known as Brügger & Thomet) in Switzerland or in the United States.¹²⁹ The footage could not provide enough details to trace the weapon. The Panel could not identify in the Committee's database any notification for delivery of APC-9 to Somalia. Several private security companies are operating in Somalia and provide premises security or escort to international organizations in Somalia. The Panel received information that private security companies are licenced by the Federal Government of Somalia or federal member states and have either imported their weapons or are supplied with weapons locally.¹³⁰ The current arms embargo in Somalia does not have provisions for delivery of weapons to private security companies.

D. Illicit flow of weapons into Somalia

Seizure at sea

104. The Panel inspected a shipment of weapons and ammunitions seized from a stateless dhow at sea by the United States USS *Tempest* and USS *Typhoon* naval vessels, on 20 December 2021.¹³¹ The shipment comprised 1,406 assault rifles of characteristics similar to Chinese manufactured type 56-1. Analysis of the rifles serial numbers revealed that they are almost evenly distributed along two batches of 140,000 factory serial numbers (batch 1 from 61000000 to 61130000 and batch 2 from 62000000 to 62130000) (see annex 13.1). The shipment also included 220,000 ammunition cartridges for small machine gun, calibre 7.62x54, most of which have characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured by State Factory 71 in China (see annex 13.2). A reply from China to the Panel's tracing request indicated that it was hard to identify whether the rifles and ammunition are made in China with the information provided. Working jointly on this investigation, the Panel on Somalia conducted the inspection, and the Panel of Experts on Yemen interviewed the crew under custody in Yemen. The crew informed that the cargo was destined for Yemen. The Panel noted that ATMIS reported a seizure of a rifle bearing serial number 61129414 on 22 March 2022. This serial number is 312 apart from 61129726 of a 56-1 rifle among those seized by the United States (see annex 7). It is therefore very likely that the weapon captured from Al-Shabaab has the same origin as the weapons seized by the United States and that it was part of a consignment that made it to Somalia.

¹²⁸ <https://twitter.com/GaroweOnline/status/1517154595251781633?t=jI3o2xfubQ1QPhAwgFqCqg&s=09>.

¹²⁹ <https://twitter.com/SomaliaWeapons/status/1472694783546216453>.

¹³⁰ Interview of managing directors of two private security companies operating in Somalia.

¹³¹ <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2882679/us-navy-seizes-1400-assault-rifles-during-illicit-weapons-interdiction/>.

Arms smuggling to Somalia

105. Information gathered by the Panel continues to confirm the patterns of smuggling between Yemen and the Puntland and Galmudug coasts of Somalia. On 25 June 2022, two dhows landed in Bandarbeyla, Puntland, following bad weather at sea. On 29 June 2022, the Panel interviewed some members of the crew of the dhows, mostly Yemeni, who are under Somali police custody. They claimed that they were from Hays and that the cargo was loaded in Dhubab. Both localities are under the control of forces affiliated with the Government of Yemen. The cargo was intended for Hobyo, Galmudug, Somalia and very likely for networks known for supplying Al-Shabaab (see annex 14). The Panel received aerial imagery showing the unloading, on 25 October 2021, in Hobyo, of a cargo under the protection of armed individuals likely affiliated to smuggling networks. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 41 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Panel is tasked to submit a thematic report to the Committee on smuggling and trafficking of weapons and military equipment. Elements of this report are included in annex 15.

E. Improvised explosive device components ban

Improvised explosive devices used by Al-Shabaab

Home-made explosives

106. On 17 June 2022, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a local militia captured a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device containing 35 yellow plastic oil containers filled with home-made explosive of black colour.¹³² This is consistent with several captures of improvised explosive device from Al-Shabaab using charcoal as a constituent of their home-made explosive. The Panel has not yet obtained forensic analysis to determine whether Al-Shabaab is using charcoal-based home-made explosive or the charcoal was used as a combustible with other oxidizers.¹³³ This forensic analysis could allow to identify critical chemical products, a ban of which could disrupt the manufacturing of home-made explosives by Al-Shabaab.¹³⁴

Electronic components used in improvised explosive devices

107. Al-Shabaab has used mainly two electronic components to arm and trigger electric detonators of improvised explosive devices deployed in Somalia. Namely, learning code receivers used to activate the improvised explosive devices through a remote control and a motorcycle alarm as a switch activated by vibrations produced by the intended victim (see annex 16). The use of this sophisticated system has allowed the group to replace pressure plates and activate the improvised explosive devices remotely once the intended target is closing to it.

108. Data shared by the United Nations with the Panel showed that most learning code receivers and motorcycle alarms have characteristics similar to those manufactured in China. The Panel sent a letter to China sharing markings of the found

¹³² This represents an equivalent of 600 to 700 kg of explosive as each container holds 17 to 20 kg of home-made explosive.

¹³³ Charcoal has been used to manufacture explosive in association with saltpetre and sulphur as early as the 13th century. Since the invention of dynamite by Alfred Nobel in 1869, charcoal has been used as combustible mixed with nitroglycerine and sodium nitrate or potassium nitrate as oxidizers. Charcoal represents, in this case, about 8 to 15 per cent of the mixture; literature on explosives, undisclosed to public.

¹³⁴ These chemical products widely used in civilian applications include ammonium nitrate; potassium nitrate and urea nitrate, as well sulfuric and nitric acids used for nitration, see Implementation Assistance Notice No. 3, available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/notices>.

components in order to identify potential networks associated with their import to Somalia. China replied that their authorities were unable to provide a reply based on the information provided by the Panel.

Export of explosive and related materials and technology to Somalia

109. The Panel continues to monitor the import of commercial explosives and related material into Somalia. In 2022, a second shipment of 165 tons of ammonium nitrate fuel oil was delivered on 5 March, to Garcaad Port, Puntland, for the construction of that port. The Turkish exporting company shared with the Panel all details of the shipment, which also contained 6,150 non-electric detonators and 150 electric detonators. As detonators are included in part I of annex C of resolution 2607 (2021), Türkiye submitted a notification to the Committee in line with paragraph 10 of the same resolution. The Federal Government of Somalia also submitted the same notification, though it is not required to do so by resolution 2607 (2021).

VI. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

110. Throughout the mandate, calls from the humanitarian community in Somalia concerning the worsening drought crisis and the looming famine have increasingly become more alarmed. At the time of writing, humanitarian reports indicated 7.1 million people to be food insecure in Somalia, 918,000 have been displaced from their homes in search of food, water and pasture, and 34 districts across various regions to be home to people facing catastrophic levels of food insecurity.¹³⁵ In parallel with this deepening humanitarian crisis, the Panel recorded worsening humanitarian access constraints linked to Al-Shabaab activity in Hirshabelle and in the Bay region, and in Galmudug due to clashes between Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a and Somali National Army-Galmudug forces, notably in Dhusamareb, while it registered no substantial changes concerning the humanitarian access situation in other parts of southern-central Somalia. After Al-Shabaab took over Ceel Baraf and the closure of the Hansheikh forward operating base, humanitarian sources expressed concern to the Panel about the possible collapse of additional ATMIS bases, which could add additional challenges to humanitarians' access to the population.¹³⁶

111. Al-Shabaab continued to restrict access and circulation of goods and people, including relief and humanitarian assistance, through an extended network of checkpoints, the implementation of blockades, and the use of violence and threats, across key locations and main supply routes in southern and central Somalia.¹³⁷ Moreover, the Panel noted the group's use of propaganda media and affiliated outlets to cast negative messages against relief actors.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ According to humanitarian reports, this represents half of the Somali population and double the scale of the food insecurity crisis as to when the United Nations declared famine in Somalia in 2011. See International Rescue Committee, "Unnatural disaster in East Africa", available from <https://www.rescue.org/report/watchlist-crisis-alert-unnatural-disaster-east-africa-0>. See also United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia: Drought response and famine prevention – Situation Report No. 8 (as of 30 June 2022), available from <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-drought-response-and-famine-prevention-situation-report-no-8-30-june-2022>.

¹³⁶ Interviews with humanitarian actors, June and July 2022, and confidential United Nations report, July 2022.

¹³⁷ Interviews with humanitarian actors and security sources, January to July 2022.

¹³⁸ See <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/shabaab-leader-cites-u-s-losses-in-afghanistan-as-warning-to-atmis-rallies-fighters.html> (content available to subscribers only).

Obstruction of humanitarian assistance by Al-Shabaab

112. In its midterm update to the Committee, as well as in its third thematic report, the Panel highlighted how Al-Shabaab quickly mobilized in response to the drought. Through the constitution of a drought relief committee¹³⁹ and using its propaganda channels, the group appeared determined to show its authority, win support, defuse criticism, and further its narrative. Between January and April 2022, Al-Shabaab propaganda media appeared to depict the image of a group intent on responding autonomously and effectively to the crisis.¹⁴⁰ However, during the second quarter of 2022, the Panel noted that Al-Shabaab's media coverage of the group's distributions of relief to drought-affected populations became sporadic, possibly indicating that the humanitarian challenges posed by the drought are beyond Al-Shabaab's capacity.¹⁴¹

113. Although the drought affected areas under the control of the group, Al-Shabaab did not change its hostile stance towards humanitarian organizations and deployed its propaganda media wing, Al-Kataib, against international relief efforts. In a message released on 10 July 2022, Al-Shabaab's emir accused humanitarian organizations of using "the recurring droughts and poverty as a weapon against the Muslims of Somalia".¹⁴² Despite this message, the Panel noted that Al-Shabaab has allowed populations living in areas it controls to displace to government-controlled areas to access humanitarian relief, contrary to previous practices employed by the group during the 2011 drought.¹⁴³

Attacks targeting humanitarians

114. During the reporting period, the Panel observed a decline in the number of attacks against humanitarian workers, a trend that the Panel also observed in its 2021 final report to the Committee.¹⁴⁴ The Panel recorded no incidents directly targeting staff from non-governmental organization in 2022. However, according to security and humanitarian sources interviewed by the Panel, this trend is mainly attributed to a decrease in the number of movements conducted by humanitarian personnel because of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which continued throughout the election period, and is not a result of improved security conditions.¹⁴⁵

115. Consistent with the above analysis, a persistently volatile security environment, marked by Al-Shabaab attacks using improvised explosive devices, the establishment of new checkpoints and reinforced blockades on government-controlled towns, and clashes between Galmudug forces supported by the Somali National Army and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a, collaterally impacted humanitarian operations. In Belet Weyne, Hirshabelle, three national humanitarian workers were among the victims of two suicide attacks targeting electoral candidates perpetrated by Al-Shabaab respectively

¹³⁹ See <http://calamada.com/hoggaanka-al-shabaab-oo-guddi-usameeyay-abaaraha-kana-hadlay-khilaafka-ka-dhex-jira-madaxda-df/>; <https://somalimemo.info/articles/15746/Hoggaanka-Al-Shabaab-oo-Guddi-Usameeyay-Abaaraha-Kana-hadlay-Khilaafka-Ka-dhex-Jira-Madaxda-DF>.

¹⁴⁰ See, for example, <https://calamada.com/sawirro-magaalada-xarardheere-iyoguddiga-gurmadka-abaaraha-shabaabul-mujaahidiin/>; <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16239/Deegaano-ka-Tirsan-Gobolka-Sanaag-oo-Laga-Sameeyey-Gurmad-Raashiin-Qeybin-ah-SAWIRO>; <https://calamada.com/gurmad-raashin-qeybin-ah-oo-laga-fuliyay-deegaanka-damaay-ee-sh-hoose-sawirro/>; <https://calamada.com/sawirro-dad-ku-saamoobay-abaaraha-oo-gurmad-raashin-qeybin-ah-loogu-sameeyay-deegaano-hoostaga-luuq-iyoo-doolow/>.

¹⁴¹ Analysis of Al-Shabaab propaganda media, April to June 2022.

¹⁴² See "Not equal are the Evil and the good", an address by Sheik Abu Ubeydah Ahmed Omar, transcript available from <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/documents/jihadist-threat/1597-site-shabaab-aidadha1443/file.html> (content available to subscribers only).

¹⁴³ Interviews with humanitarian sources and confidential United Nations reports, January to June 2022.

¹⁴⁴ See S/2021/849, para. 132.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with humanitarian and security sources, covering attacks from January to June 2022.

on 19 February 2022 and 23 March 2022.¹⁴⁶ In May 2022, after Al-Shabaab attacked the ATMIS base in Ceel Baraf, and ATMIS vacated their forward operating base in Hansheikh, Middle Shabelle, Al-Shabaab took control of Bacda, a village between Mataban and Belet Weyne, a key humanitarian logistic route, consolidating its presence in Hirshabelle. The group established new checkpoints and charged \$800 to \$900 to the vehicles transiting on the road. As a result, humanitarian convoys and supplies along the Mogadishu-Jowhar-Mahaday axis and the Mataban-Belet Weyne road are compromised.¹⁴⁷ In May 2022, in Dhusamareb, clashes between Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a elements and Galmudug/Somali National Army forces resulted in civilian casualties, damage to civilian buildings and disrupted humanitarian activities. In the context of these clashes, the Panel noted on 13 May 2022, the brief occupation of the premises of an international non-governmental organization by Somali National Army forces, who used the compound as a defensive position.¹⁴⁸

VII. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law

A. Violence to life and person perpetrated by Al-Shabaab

116. As the electoral calendar in Somalia stretched through mid-2022, Al-Shabaab maintained a high tempo of attacks targeting civilians associated with the elections, in a clear attempt to disrupt the electoral process, engaging in widespread violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁴⁹ The attacks included targeted killings of election delegates, candidates, government authorities and officials, and clan elders. Incidents were more intense in the first quarter of 2022,¹⁵⁰ but those categories of civilians remained at risk after the elections ended.¹⁵¹ To carry out these attacks Al-Shabaab resorted to assassinations by handgun, particularly in Mogadishu, but also to indiscriminate means and methods, notably improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, which resulted in a high civilian casualty toll. Al-Shabaab conducted its deadliest attack against civilians on 19 February 2022, resulting in over 150 casualties, including 48 deaths, among them a vocal female parliamentarian, Amina Mohamed Abdi.¹⁵²

117. In areas bordering government-controlled towns under blockade, Al-Shabaab continued to engage in a strict limitation of economic and livelihood activities and used threat and violence to punish those who defied the group's authority.¹⁵³ In the context of the current drought and international crisis, this strategy contributed to the increase in the price of commodities, adding to an already dire humanitarian situation.¹⁵⁴ In Dinsor, Bay region, South-West State, from February 2022 onwards, the group repeatedly attacked the military and AMISOM/ATMIS bases and exerted increasing pressure on the population with threats and actual violence.¹⁵⁵ This led the

¹⁴⁶ Interviews with humanitarian sources, January to April 2022 and confidential United Nations reports covering January to March 2022.

¹⁴⁷ Interviews with humanitarian sources, June 2022, and confidential United Nations report, July 2022.

¹⁴⁸ Humanitarian and security reports, May 2022.

¹⁴⁹ Analysis of confidential United Nations reports from January to June 2022.

¹⁵⁰ Attacks against civilians, including civilian government officials, represented 22 per cent of the total of Al-Shabaab perpetrated attacks (392) between January and March 2022, and decreased to 12 per cent of the total of Al-Shabaab perpetrated attacks (479) between April and June 2022.

Interview with security source and confidential United Nations reports, April and July 2022.

¹⁵¹ Analysis of media and confidential United Nations reports April–June 2022.

¹⁵² Media and confidential United Nations reports, February 2022.

¹⁵³ Humanitarian reports, February to July 2022.

¹⁵⁴ See Somalia Joint Market and Supply Chain Updates for the period January to July 2022.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with local sources, February 2022. During this period Al-Shabaab attacked the AMISOM base in Dinsor with mortars, resulting in a dozen civilian casualties, including women and children. Interview with Dinsor Deputy District Commissioner, March 2022.

population to temporarily vacate the town in March 2022, and displace to Baidoa or surrounding villages, some of them under Al-Shabaab control.¹⁵⁶ When civilians started returning to Dinsor, Al-Shabaab requested them to obtain a “farming permit” in order to be able to tend to their farms, otherwise banning movements to and from Dinsor (see annex 17). The Panel documented seven separate incidents where civilians were harmed, or their properties were destroyed or confiscated by Al-Shabaab in villages surrounding Dinsor for defying the ban.¹⁵⁷

118. The Panel observed that the intensification of security incidents in Dinsor coincided with the arrival, around January 2022, of a newly appointed Al-Shabaab governor, Mohamed Omar Mohamed.¹⁵⁸ He was consistently indicated to the Panel as the leader of the Al-Shabaab group responsible for several incidents corroborated by the Panel in 2020 and 2021 in Toosweyne area, including forced displacement, attempted recruitment of children into Al-Shabaab, and abductions.¹⁵⁹

Al-Shabaab exploits the impact of the drought to consolidate its influence

119. Showing adaptability and opportunism, Al-Shabaab continued to exploit the impact of climate change, to consolidate its influence, affecting the security of civilians and their economic rights. The Panel observed how the group imposed blockades on businesses in Jowhar and Kismayo at the end of February and beginning of March 2022, respectively. According to sources interviewed by the Panel, the local Al-Shabaab leadership in Adan Yabal summoned businesses owners from the Hantiwadaag market in Jowhar, in order to impose new taxations to support the group’s drought response capacity.¹⁶⁰ To punish the local Hirshabelle administration, which tried to stop businesses from attending, and those who missed the meeting, Al-Shabaab ordered the closure of the main market for three days.

120. On 15 March 2022, the Panel received reports from Kismayo indicating that Al-Shabaab had imposed a blockade on the movement of goods into and out of Kismayo.¹⁶¹ Sources mentioned that the group wanted to force businesses in Kismayo to reduce the price of essential commodities, such as rice and sugar, which had increased in the previous weeks. As a result of this blockade, Kismayo suffered a shortage of wood, milk, vegetables and other goods coming from villages and rural areas around the town.

121. The Panel also carried out interviews with members of the displaced Banaaney community from Toosweyne area, Bay region, who entered in negotiations with Al-Shabaab in April 2022 in order to be able to return to their land.¹⁶² The mass displacement of the Banaaney community from Toosweyne took place between 2020 and 2021, after several villages were attacked and six traditional elders abducted by Al-Shabaab. As the humanitarian conditions of the displaced community in Berdale deteriorated with the drought, Al-Shabaab reached out to negotiate their return, trying to impose conditions on the community, including allegiance to the group and payment of taxes.

122. In June 2022, in Qansax Dhere district, Bay region, the Panel documented the destruction of water points near Benadir by Al-Shabaab, reportedly in an attempt to

¹⁵⁶ See <https://somalimemo.info/articles/15985/Maamulkii-iyo-Shaqaalihii-DFS-ee-degmada-Diinsoor-oo-Raxan-Raxan-Isu-Soo-Dhiibaya-SAWIRO>.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with local sources in Dinsor, March to April 2022.

¹⁵⁸ Telephone interviews with local sources, February and March 2022.

¹⁵⁹ See S/2021/849, annex 5.1; and S/2020/949, annex 7.2.

¹⁶⁰ Interviews with local and security sources, March 2022. Confidential United Nations report, March 2022.

¹⁶¹ Interviews with local sources in Kismayo, March 2022. Interview with a security source, April 2022.

¹⁶² Interviews with local sources, April, May and June 2022.

deprive state security forces access to water supplies.¹⁶³ The group also took control of water points in Buula Fulay area, Burhakaba district, Bay region, and began taxing local pastoral communities for the consumption of water.¹⁶⁴

B. Puntland state armed forces commit violations of international human rights law during security crisis in Bosaso

123. During the reporting period, a security crisis in Bosaso escalated in several episodes of armed confrontation involving three different State armed forces, namely Puntland Security Forces on one side, and Darwish force and Puntland Maritime Police Force elements on the other. The civilian population in Bosaso bore the brunt of these tensions, with at least 19 civilians killed, including five children, and over 120 injured, extensive damage to civilian property, and a mass displacement of population during the peak of the crisis in December 2021.

124. The crisis started when, on 24 November 2021, the president of Puntland, Said Abdullahi Deni, appointed a new Director General of the Puntland Security Forces, Amin Haji Khayr, replacing General Mohamoud Osman Diyano. When Diyano refused to hand over the command of the Puntland Security Forces, traditional leaders intervened to mediate the dispute but their proposal was rejected by the Puntland administration. This standoff has resulted in a factional division of the Puntland Security Forces, an elite force trained, equipped and supported by the United States until February 2021, to fight Somalia insurgent groups, particularly Al-Shabaab and ISIL-Somalia. Despite renewed mediation efforts, tensions were still latent at the time of reporting, as demonstrated by sporadic episodes of armed violence registered in June and July 2022.

125. The Panel investigated the armed confrontation between PSF, Darwish and Puntland Maritime Police Force elements between 21 to 23 December 2021. Based on the accounts of victims and witnesses and the evidence gathered, the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the clashing parties' made an indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, in violation of international human rights law. Annex 18 contains further details of the Panel's investigation.

C. Grave violations against children in armed conflict

126. During the reporting period, the Panel continued to record incidents of grave violations against children in armed conflict, including recruitment and use of children by armed actors, mostly Al-Shabaab, killing and maiming, attacks on hospitals and sexual and gender-based violence.

127. The Panel notes that child recruitment remains the most recurrent grave violation against children in Somalia, accounting for 31.9 per cent of all verified cases.¹⁶⁵ Further, Al-Shabaab continues¹⁶⁶ to figure as the main perpetrator of child recruitment incidents (177 cases, 78.9 per cent).¹⁶⁷ The group is also the main perpetrator of child abduction incidents (192 cases out of 194 verified),¹⁶⁸ which

¹⁶³ Interview with security source, June 2022.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ 225 cases over a total of 705 incidents verified by the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting in Somalia from January to March 2022.

¹⁶⁶ Analysis of the data of the Secretary-General's annual reports and the Secretary General's reports on children and armed conflict in Somalia between 2006 and 2020.

¹⁶⁷ United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting in Somalia for the period January to March 2022.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

humanitarian reports have indicated as closely associated with recruitment.¹⁶⁹ Investigations by the Panel into child recruitment patterns have highlighted that communities' coping mechanisms against Al-Shabaab recruitment consist of paying off the group or sending children to live in government-controlled areas, usually with relatives. Loss of livelihood for drought-affected communities could therefore translate in an increase in child recruitment and/or displacement of unaccompanied minors.¹⁷⁰ The Panel notes that of the 918,000 internally displaced persons who moved in search of water, food and pasture in 2022, over 80 per cent are women and children.

128. The Panel notes that about half of the child fatalities recorded by the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting in Somalia from January to March 2022 were the result of explosive weapons (mortars, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnance, etc.). Being inherently indiscriminate when used in areas inhabited by civilians, these weapons demand a careful assessment of the principles of proportionality and distinction by the fighting parties.¹⁷¹ On 8 March 2022, clashes between AMISOM forces and Al-Shabaab militants took place in Siigale Degta, a village controlled by Al-Shabaab in Qoryoley district, located about 20 km north of Marka town, Lower Shabelle region. Three mortar rounds, possibly fired by Ugandan forces under AMISOM command in response to Al-Shabaab mortar fire, landed on civilian buildings resulting in casualties. The Panel noted that the incident was picked up by Al-Shabaab affiliated media for propaganda against AMISOM/ATMIS and foreign forces in general. The Panel verified with local and humanitarian sources, that at least three people were killed, namely two girls and their mother, and seven were injured, including six children.¹⁷² The Panel sent an official communication to ATMIS on 11 April 2022, requesting details of the incident and of the ATMIS post-strike assessment. A response was still pending at the time of writing of this report. Local sources reported to the Panel that, on the same evening of the incident, Al-Shabaab militants stormed Siigale Degta and retaliated against the villagers whom they accused of collaborating with ATMIS, abducting 24 men and 9 women. Details of the Panel's investigation can be found in annex 19.

129. The Panel also documented the occupation of a hospital in Galmudug by Al-Shabaab fighters.¹⁷³ On 17 June 2022, following a failed complex attack on the Somali National Army and Galmudug forces, Al-Shabaab stormed a hospital in El Bur, Galgadud, ordered all the patients, including malnourished children and pregnant women, out of the hospital and forced the medical staff to treat 80 of their injured fighters. The Panel confirmed with local and humanitarian sources that local residents attempted to re-open the hospital to the public a few days later but were stopped by Al-Shabaab.

130. The United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting in Somalia verified 64 sexual violence incidents involving child survivors between January and March 2022. The Panel's interviews with humanitarian sources highlighted gender-specific aspects of the impact of the current drought crisis on children.¹⁷⁴ As

¹⁶⁹ Compare with the sixth report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, (S/2022/397).

¹⁷⁰ See also Somali Young Doctors Association and Somalia Child Protection Area of Responsibility "Summary Report on Child Protection Assessment"; September 2021. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cadale_child_protection_assessment_report_soyda_october_2021.pdf, p 23.

¹⁷¹ See <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>.

¹⁷² Interviews with local and humanitarian sources, April and June 2022. Confidential United Nations reports, March 2022.

¹⁷³ Confidential United Nations report and interview with local and humanitarian sources, June 2022.

¹⁷⁴ Interviews with humanitarian sources, April, May, and June 2022.

humanitarian conditions in drought-affected communities deteriorate, humanitarian actors are concerned that this will have a negative impact on women and girls, further exposing them to gender-based violence, such as early and forced marriage, including to members of Al-Shabaab. Other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, particularly rape and sexual exploitation, could also increase owing to displacement and loss of livelihood. The Panel noted that child protection actors were registering an increase in the number of children accessing services dedicated to sexual violence survivors, mental health and psychosocial support.¹⁷⁵

D. Sexual violence in conflict

131. The 69 sexual violence incidents reported to the Panel during the reporting period underscore a link between inter-clan conflicts and exposure of women and girls to sexual violence, particularly in Galmudug, as well as the vulnerability of women from marginalized or minority groups, and girls (see para. 128 above). This is consistent with the Panel's previous observations.¹⁷⁶

132. In its 2021 final report,¹⁷⁷ the Panel highlighted that underreporting of cases constitutes an obstacle to effectively addressing sexual violence in relation with the conflict in Somalia. Underreporting, according to humanitarian sources interviewed by the Panel, remains a concern in 2022, driven by a number of factors including continued insecurity, the fear of retaliation, the stigma associated with being a sexual violence survivor, impunity of perpetrators and a weak justice system.

133. While the extended electoral process paused relevant legislative and policy initiatives, the appointment of the new cabinet in July 2022 represents an opportunity for Somalia to renew its commitment to the 2013 joint communiqué on ending sexual violence in conflict.¹⁷⁸

VIII. Natural resources

A. Implementation of the charcoal ban

134. During the reporting period, the Panel recorded the first major export of charcoal from Somalia since 2018.¹⁷⁹ Despite measures implemented by Member States with charcoal destination markets, as well as ongoing monitoring of the charcoal trade at sea by international actors, including the Combined Maritime Forces, Operation Atalanta of the European Union Naval Force, and UNODC, gaps remain in the ability of Somalia to restrict large-scale exports of charcoal.

Stockpile analysis

135. Following an invitation by the Office of the President of the Jubbaland State of Somalia, the Panel visited Kismayo from 5 to 7 September 2022, to meet with local authorities and with charcoal stakeholders, and to inspect charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo. The inspection allowed the Panel to update¹⁸⁰ the amount of charcoal in five areas in and around Kismayo estimated at total of 516,386 bags or

¹⁷⁵ Confidential United Nations reports, June 2022.

¹⁷⁶ S/2021/849, annex 5.3.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Available from <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/joint-communiqu%C3%A9-federal-republic-somalia-and-united-nations-prevention-sexual>.

¹⁷⁹ S/2019/858 and S/2019/858/Corr.1, para. 169.

¹⁸⁰ The Panel previously assessed that the volume of charcoal ready for export at the stockpile locations in Kismayo and Burgabo stands between 15,000 and 22,500 tons.

12,900 metric tonnes of charcoal (see annex 20.1). This assessment has been shared with and agreed to by UNODC.

136. Based on the above estimates, the current stockpiles could be worth around \$12 million in international markets.¹⁸¹ Jubbaland authorities and charcoal owners' representatives asked for the Panel's assistance in identifying modalities to request a one-time waiver from the Security Council on the ban on charcoal exports. This would allow them to export the current stockpiles and clean up the designated areas in and around Kismayo (see annex 20.1). The Panel believes that a one-time partial lifting of the ban on charcoal exports – and the establishment by the Committee of procedural requirements for export, including a request of approval and notification of export – could facilitate monitoring by the Committee and the Panel on the ban on charcoal in the future and improve visibility on any charcoal-associated revenue.

MV *Fox* investigation

137. On 25 January 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia shared documents with the Panel alleging that the MV *Fox* (IMO 9108659) illegally exported 4,425 metric tons¹⁸² of charcoal from the Port of Kismayo.¹⁸³ On 14 April 2022, authorities from Oman informed the Panel that the MV *Fox* had an emergency off the coast of Salalah on 22 January 2022. The Panel travelled to the Port of Salalah from 28 May to 1 June 2022 to inspect the vessel and conduct interviews with the crew and Omani officials (see annex 20).

138. In late July 2022, the Panel travelled to Mogadishu and, in accordance with its obligation to offer an opportunity to reply, met with the owner of Sitti Trading, which was listed as the consignee of the January 2022 export in documents provided by the Federal Government of Somalia to the Panel. The owner admitted that the charcoal on board the MV *Fox*, which remains off the coast of Oman, was loaded in Kismayo, Somalia.

139. The Panel sent a letter to the Government of Oman in late July 2022 conveying its readiness to cooperate with Oman in regard to Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1. In resolution 2607 (2021) the Security Council “encouraged further development of Somalia’s National Policy on Charcoal, which aims to develop the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use, to address disposal of stockpiles.” In this context the Panel informed the Federal Government of Somalia that it stands ready to start collecting information and views from the Federal Government, Jubbaland authorities, and other stakeholders in relation to charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo and provide options to the Committee in a subsequent report.

IX. Recommendations

140. The Panel recommends that, in its upcoming resolution on the Somalia sanctions regime, the Security Council:

(a) Request, while noting the delay in furthering the Al-Shabaab financial disruption plan, that the Federal Government of Somalia review the approach and assess the feasibility of developing under its leadership a comprehensive plan aiming to disrupt Al-Shabaab financing and indicate to the Security Council Committee

¹⁸¹ At \$1,000 per ton, see <https://www.indexbox.io/blog/wood-charcoal-price-per-ton-april-2022/>.

¹⁸² Official correspondence from the Federal Government of Somalia from 25 January 2022 on file with the Panel.

¹⁸³ The Panel last recorded a substantial export of charcoal in 2018, when a cargo vessel transported 4,750 tons of charcoal from Kismayo to Khawr al-Zubayr port, Iraq.

pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia its needs in terms of support to develop and implement such a plan;

(b) Include, in the section on the standing exemptions to the arms embargo, strategic partners that are operating within the latest Somalia Transition Plan and those that have a status-of-forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the Federal Government of Somalia on training and mentoring Somali forces, such as European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, TURKSOM, British Operation Tanager, United States forces in Somalia, and any new partners indicated to the Committee by the Federal Government;

(c) Include language referring to Security Council resolution 2020 (2015) that encourages Member States to assist the Panel in tracing weapons and ammunition captured from Al-Shabaab and other armed groups and militias, allowing the Panel to identify avenues to disrupt illicit networks from supplying the aforementioned actors;

(d) Include language encouraging Member States to prevent the transfer of electronic items, including learning code receivers and motorcycle alarms, used in Al-Shabaab's improvised explosive devices, to Somalia, and potentially to request factories manufacturing such items in their territories to identify technological ways so that these components cannot be easily used in improvised explosive devices;

(e) Include language expanding the listing criteria for sanctions in Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) in order to include "planning, directing, supporting, or committing acts involving economic blockades of Somali towns";

(f) Include a one-time partial lifting of the charcoal ban to allow the clean-up of stockpiles identified by the Panel, conditioned by procedural requirements including a request of approval and notification to the Committee and export of that charcoal within the next mandate.

141. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to improve its monitoring, reporting, and investigations into money-laundering and terrorist financing while ensuring that financial entities transmit suspicious transaction and large cash transaction reports in proportion with the money-laundering and terrorist financing risks of Somalia, as required under the anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism law;

(b) Encourage Member States to support the Federal Government of Somalia to expeditiously develop a secure national identification system with government issued biometric identity documents that can be issued by either national or local authorities and adhere to anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism standards;

(c) Encourage ATMIS and its strategic partners to employ diverse security efforts to disrupt Al-Shabaab's illicit cash collection and facilitation/movement of money by targeting the group's judicial court system and checkpoint network and conducting interdictions and seizures;

(d) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to endeavour to improve collaboration and coordination among regulatory and law enforcement agencies, and encourage coordinated and joint approaches to tackling terrorism finance investigations;

(e) Request the Federal Government of Somalia to share with the Panel:

(i) A list of licenced private security companies operating in Somalia that are allowed to import weapons, ammunition, and military equipment required for static and mobile protection;

- (ii) An updated list of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment currently held by the aforementioned private security companies operating in Somalia, including the model, ammunition markings, and weapons serial numbers;
- (f) Request the Federal Government of Somalia, ATMIS and international forces, including British, Ethiopian, Turkish and United States forces, as well as the European Union Capacity Building Mission and the European Union Training Mission operating in Somalia to share with the Panel pictures showing headstamp markings of ammunition currently used by them in order to allow the Panel to effectively trace weapons captured from Al-Shabaab;
- (g) After consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia, clarify the meaning and produce a list of Somali security sector institutions other than those of the Federal Government of Somalia, and identify mechanisms so that the Federal Government has visibility or oversight over the delivery of weapons, ammunition, and equipment to these security sector institutions, including the issuance of end-user certificates, and update Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2 accordingly;
- (h) Send a letter to the Office of Disarmament Affairs:
 - (i) Highlighting the challenges encountered by the Panel during the reporting period when submitting tracing requests of weapons and ammunition to Member States, owing to information from manufacturing States about imitations or replicas of weapons' markings, serial numbers and ammunition headstamp by third parties to disguise their origin;
 - (ii) Requesting to identify improved ways for the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects to assist all United Nations Panels of Experts in effectively identifying weapons smuggling networks as they pertain to each respective mandate.
- (i) Recall the obligations of Somalia under international law as outlined in paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) and urge the Federal Government of Somalia to task its relevant organs to conduct investigations on the clashes in Bosaso and Dhusamareb, and, as appropriate, prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and invite UNSOM to provide advice and support, within its mandate and capacities, to the Federal Government of Somalia authorities in these tasks;
- (j) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to expand humanitarian access to people in need, and to this end, to continue to work towards securing the major supply routes and the holding of forward operating bases;
- (k) Update Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1 to include recommendations on the steps Member States may follow before or after interdictions of vessels suspected of carrying charcoal from Somalia pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions and taking into consideration lessons learned from the MV *Fox* case;
- (l) Encourage the Federal Government of Somalia to establish a list of suspected dhows involved in smuggling weapons, improvised explosive device-associated material and charcoal, and transmit this list to federal member states and international forces.

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Annex 1: Mandate and appointment of the Panel

The mandate of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (“the Panel”) is contained in paragraph 38 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021). The Panel’s mandate includes the tasks as set out in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), which referred to tasks as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014), paragraph 23 of resolution 2036 (2012) and paragraph 29 of resolution 2444 (2018) as they relate to Somalia.

In accordance with paragraph 41 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Panel provided the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia with a midterm update on 28 April 2022. The Panel also submitted three thematic reports to the Committee on 23 March, 24 June, and 19 July 2022. The fourth thematic report on smuggling and trafficking of weapons and military equipment will be submitted after drafting this report.


The Panel, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya, was appointed by the Secretary-General in his letter S/2021/1108, dated 16 December 2021. During the mandate, the Panel travelled to France, Germany, Somalia, the Sultanate of Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States in order to conduct meetings with officials and confidential sources. Within Somalia, the Panel travelled to Mogadishu, Baidoa, Bosaso, Kismayo, and Hargeisa,

Lastly, General Assembly resolution A/RES/67/254 regarding the 16-day advance booking of tickets, has resulted in a Secretariat policy of requiring a prior notice of 25 calendar days for any Panel travel, with waivers to the rule granted only under exceptional circumstances. Due to the unique nature of the Panel’s work within the UN system, which requires significant flexibility in meeting with existing sources, as well as identifying new ones, satisfying this travel requirement is often challenging.

Annex 2: Al-Shabaab financial receipts (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Annex 3: Al-Shabaab notice for domestic property payments

Figures 1 and 2: An Al-Shabaab notice indicating taxation rates for domestic properties in Afgoye on the left with accompanying translation on the right.¹



ISLAMIC PROVINCE OF AL SHABAAB

May piece, mercy and blessings be upon you!

After the above greetings:

Notice, Notice, Notice

You are being informed as follows:

Sno.	House	Value
1.	Stone house	\$150
2.	Story house	\$300
3.	Iron sheet house	\$100

Thank you

If you receive this, respond it within 24 hours.
For more information or complaint, please contact me through the following telephone: 01 [REDACTED]

Governor: Sh. Ab [REDACTED]



Signature of the governor (Wali): _____

Source: Confidential

¹ All translations completed by an official Panel provider.

Annex 4: Al-Shabaab information collection forms

Figure 1: An Al-Shabaab form titled “census to households” with accompanying translation.



Source: Confidential

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PROVINCES
CENSUS FORM

Date: _____ Serial NO: 10 [redacted]

Father of the Household: _____ Age: _____ Tel: _____
 Tribe: _____ Clan: _____ Sub-clan: _____
 Mother of the Household: _____ Tel: _____
 Number of Children: _____ Male: _____ Female _____

No.	Name of the Child	Age
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

A. Health of the Child

Number of healthy children: _____ Number of disabled children _____
 Number of children abroad: _____ Number of children in the Country: _____

B. Level of Education

No.	Illiterate	Quran	Primary	Secondary School	University

No.	Name of those with Skills	Type of skill
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		
6		
7		

Province: _____ District: _____ Village: _____

If the mother has other children, number of children: _____
 If there are other households, their number: _____

Source of the livelihood of the household 1. Business: _____ Type of Business: _____
 Asset: _____ 2. Farm Number of Hectares: _____ Owned: _____ Leased: _____
 3. Livestock keeping: Camel: _____ Cattle: _____ Goats: _____
 4. Remittance from abroad 5. Salaried _____ 6. Casual work _____

C. Who is the breadwinner of the Household.

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____

Clan Elder: _____ Tel: _____

Annex 5: Activities delivered under the financial disruption plan

Following the disruption planning methodology meeting in 2021, UNODC designed and delivered operational analysis training to the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) of Somalia from 20 to 23 March 2022 in Mogadishu. The training covered topics including: the data collection cycle, analysis, and dissemination. The Panel's Finance Expert delivered a session on Al-Shabaab financial methodologies.

UNODC commenced mentoring of the FRC in early 2022 to assist the analysts with specific cases. This support continues to be provided through case-based mentoring, including cases that involve human trafficking, with the goal to work with the Attorney General's office to move these cases towards a judicial finish.

A senior level briefing to the FGS, originally planned for September 2021, was postponed due to election delays. The briefing is being rescheduled with the new administration.

Due to budget constraints and a lack of available funds, UNODC support to the FGS, and in particular the Financial Reporting Centre, through its Global Programme against Money Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism will end in mid-August 2022.

Annex 6: Weapons observed in Al-Shabaab propaganda footage

Figure 1: Assault rifles with characteristics similar² to Chinese manufactured model 56-1 rifle



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Figure 2: Al Hisba fighter carrying rifle with characteristics similar to Type 56-2



Source: Al-Shabaab associated media, Eid Adha, 9 July 2022.

Figure 3: Rifle with characteristics similar to Meridian Defence Corporation MDC-47 "VOLK"



Source: Al-Shabaab associated media, Eid Adha, 9 July 2022.

² Without proper tracing of markings and serial numbers, "Characteristics similar to" doesn't intend to identify the origin of the weapons.

Figure 4: Small machine gun with characteristics similar to Chinese model Type 82



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Figure 5: RPG round with characteristics similar to Bulgarian PG-7M manufactured in 2005



Source: Video on Qasim Al Rimi training camp, 10 July 2022

Annex 7: Tracing of weapons captured by AMISOM from Al-Shabaab between 2019 and April 2022

The Panel compared markings and serial numbers of weapons captured from Al-Shabaab with serial numbers of all known weapons in the JVT database.³ Four weapons (rows 1 to 4 in table below with serial numbers 6884, 58201808, 18110 and 404803) were found to have been owned by SNA soldiers. Nine weapons (rows 5 to 13 with serial numbers 12967, 69549, 411212, 2865, 48014325, 60013158, 60006094, 3054 and 60012023) though not known in the JVT database have serial numbers very close to a weapon within that database. The Panel believes that these nine weapons are very likely part of shipments donated to the FGS but the serial number might have been wrongly recorded. One weapon in row 14 with serial number 17104861 is 4500 apart from the closest serial number (17109361) within the database. The latter is part of a shipment donated by Uganda to the FGS in 2013. The weapon could have been captured by Al-Shabaab from a Ugandan contingent of AMISOM.

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
1	Apr 22	1		6884	0	6884	SO-XDS-2017	1600	SNA	2017	Djibouti
2	Jan 22	1		58201808	0	58201808	SO-XDS 2015		SNA		
3	2019	1		18110	0	18110		3000	SNA	2014	UAE
4	Oct 21	1	56-2	404803	0	404803			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
5	2022	1		12967	1	12966		6000	SNA	2017	China
6	Mar 21	1		69549	4	69545		6000	SNA	2017	China
7	Sep 19	1		411212	5	411207			SNA	2013	Ethiopia
8	2019	1		2865	6	2859		200	PSF	2013	Yemen
9	2019	1		48014325	7	48014332		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
10	Nov 21	1		60013158	36	60013194	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
11	Sep 19	1		60006094	76	60006170	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
12	2019	1	AB	3054	170	AB 3224		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
13	Oct 21	1		60012023	247	60012270	SO-NISA-2018	204	NISA	2018	Djibouti
14	Feb 21	1	56-1	17104861	4500 ⁴	17109361		1000	SNA	2013	Uganda
15	Mar 22	1		61129414	312	61129726 ⁵					
16	2019	1	UPDF 56	5403264 ⁶							
17	2019	1		167553							
18	2019	1	ry	2522							
19	2019	1	BP	2916							

³ For background on JVT database, see Annex 4.2: Weapons and ammunition management of S/2021/849.

⁴ Beyond numbers of weapons donated.

⁵ Serial number of Assault rifle Type 56-1 seized by US on 20 December 2021, see Annex 13, table 13.1, page 2.

⁶ Weapons starting from row 16 could not be linked to weapons database known to the Panel and their tracing is not conclusive.

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
20	2019	1	IC	12052							
21	2019	1	EB	4093							
22	2019	1	V	2299							
23	2019	1		502							
24	2019	1	AX	2546							
25	2019	1	83LC	7406							
26	2019	1	00	2299							
27	2019	1	00	5372							
28	2019	1	FMP	133650							
29	2019	1		36038858							
30	2019	9		No marking							
31	Sep 19	1	PM	1451							
32	Sep 19	1	S-AY	1512							
33	Sep-19	1	TFG AMG	4384							
34	Sep 19	1		No marking							
35	May 20	1	G3 C	56421							
36	May 20	1		372624							
37	May 20	1		636093							
38	May 20	1	G3 A3	6050185							
39	May 20	1	G3-	ry-rryys D							
40	Mar 21	1	D	17403							
41	May 21	1	56-2	722634							
42	Jun 21	1		7260306							
43	Oct 21	1	56-1	62779							
44	Nov 21	1		15005828							
45	Nov 21	1	386 56	3526021							
46	Dec 21	1		3463							
47	Mar 22	1		63071650							
48	Apr 22	1	M70B1	1984							

Ser	Date capture	number	Marking	Serial number	Variation	Closest serial number	FGS marking	Total donated	Beneficiary units	Year of donation	Donor country
49	Apr 22	1		110992							
50	Apr 22	1		384801							
51	Apr 22	1		431596							
52	Apr 22	1	M70B1	431712							
53	Apr 22	1	56	626685							
54	Apr 22	1	EM	1701146							
55	Apr 22	1		66769998							
56	Apr 22	1	1955								
Total		64	Total serial								

Annex 8: Headstamps of cartridges captured from Al-Shabaab during the reporting period and earlier mandates

			
811 20 China 2020	811 19 China 2019	IK 19 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2019	3 19 Russia 2019
			
RSD 18 Romania 2018	3 18 Russia 2018	811 17 China 2017	311 17 China 2017
			
811 15 China 2015	7.62x39 2015 Russia ⁷	60 09 China 2009	323 03 ⁸ Romania 2003
			
539 99 Russia 1999	71 99 China 1999	27 84 ⁹ Egypt 1984	270 78 Ukraine 1978
			
351 78 China 1978	10 78 Bulgaria 1978	10 76 Bulgaria 1976	211 76 China 1976

⁷ Consistent with marking of Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, see <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/solved-identified-7-62x39-mm-klimovsk-russia/22495>.

⁸ Headstamp identified in the Panel's report S/2017/924.

⁹ Headstamp identified in the Panel's report S/2019/858.

			
61 76 ¹⁰ China 1976	61 74 China 1974	270 73 Ukraine 1973	31 71 China 1971
			
60 66 Kyrgyz Republic 1966			

Source: Panel

The Panel sent tracing requests for ammunition manufactured since 2005 in line with record -keeping requirements in the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) in 2005.¹¹ The result of the tracing requests is as follows:

Markings	Last known custodian	Reply to tracing request
IK 19	Igman d.d. Konjic, Donje Polje 42, Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019)	Pending
811 15, 811 17, 811 19, 811 20 311 17	Factory 811, China (2015, 2017, 2019 and 2020) Factory 31, China (2017)	“Based on the analysis of specialized agencies, such weapons and ammunition referred to in the letter are not difficult to imitate, but it's hard to identify whether they are made in China with the information provided.”
RSD 18	Department of the Army, USA (2018) ¹²	Pending
3 18	JSC the Ulyanovsk Cartridge Works, Russia (2018)	Pending
 2015	Klimovsk Specialized Ammunition Plant, Russia (2015). ¹³	

¹⁰ Headstamp identified in the Panel's S/2019/858.

¹¹ <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/International-Tracing-Instrument-six-official-languages.pdf>.

¹² Manufactured by Uzina Mecanica Sadu, Gorj, Romania.

¹³ See <https://forum.cartridgecollectors.org/t/klimovsk-7-62-x-39mm-carton/17493> and <https://new.kspz.ru/product/9-h-39-mm-patron-ohotnichij/>.

Annex 9: ATGM 9M115 “METIS” and ATGM launchers 9П135 and 9П135M potentially smuggled from Yemen to Al-Shabaab

The Panel received from the Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) information on smuggling cases, including pictures of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and their launchers. PMPF assessed that the weapons systems were smuggled from a third country to Yemen via Somalia. The Panel identified that those items have characteristics similar to the following:

- i. Two ATGM launchers **9П135** (with markings as **9П135010000 03-86-MK4244**) and **9П135M** (with markings as **9П135M 1 07-86-MK 6155**) capable of launching 9M11 "FAGOT" and 9M115 "METIS" ATGM, see figures 9.1 and 9.2 below; and
- ii. Three ATGM **9M115 "METIS"** with markings as **9M115 08-86 1703 08-86 0568-06-86**, see figures 9.3 and 9.4 below.

PMPF assessed that the ATGMs and launchers were smuggled from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Yemen via Somalia, and were intended for the Houthis in Yemen, based on the information that ATGMs are not used in Somalia. However, the Panel of Experts on Yemen has indicated in a number of its final reports that the Houthis have generally received ATGM variants of 9M113 Konkurs and 9M133 Kornet. As 9M11 "FAGOT" and 9M115 "METIS" ATGM were part of Yemen's arsenal before the arms embargo was imposed by resolution 2216 (2015) on Yemen, the Panel of Experts on Somalia considers that these missiles could have been diverted by Yemeni arms traffickers for delivery to Somalia. Sources informed the Panel of Experts on Somalia that AQAP in Yemen is currently hosting fighters from Al-Shabaab for training on the use of heavy weapons. As the Puntland coast has been allegedly used for smuggling weapons from Yemen to armed groups in Somalia, the Panel of Experts on Somalia is investigating whether AQAP Yemen is trying to supply ATGMs to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.¹⁴ The Panel of Experts on Somalia sent a tracing request to the Russian Federation to identify whether those items have been delivered to Yemen by the Russian Federation before the imposition of the targeted arms embargo on Yemen.

Figure 1: ATGM launchers 9П135 and 9П135M smuggled to or via Somalia



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

¹⁴ A number of cases have been recorded, see annex 15 on smuggling of weapons to Somalia.

Figure 2: Markings and serial numbers on the two launchers



Figure 3: ATGM 9M115 "METIS" smuggled to or via Somalia



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

Figure 4: ATGM 9M115 "METIS" with markings as 9M115 08-86 1703 08-86 0568-06-86



Source: PMPF, Puntland, Somalia

Annex 10: Reported defection and neutralization of Al-Shabaab operatives by FGS media from October 2021 to August 2022

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
1	04-Oct-21	Janaale, L. Shabelle	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1444951933773623296
2	04-Oct-21	Mahas, Hiiraan	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1444951398932787201
3	06-Oct-21	Janaale, L. Shabelle	3	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1445839389943373830
4	09-Oct-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects ¹⁵	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1446818577827381254
5	17-Oct-21	Wajid, Bakool	1	AS leader defects ¹⁶	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1449695357210959874
6	20-Oct-21	Wajid, Bakool	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1450789493703839747
7	28-Oct-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects ¹⁷	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1453745113365159937
8	06-Nov-21	Buulamareer, L. Shabelle	2	AS neutralized	https://mobile.twitter.com/SNAForce/status/1456907862781878276
9	10-Nov-21	Awdheegle, L. Shabelle	22	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1458341468750422018
10	12-Nov-21	Qoryoley, L. Shabelle	1	AS defects ¹⁸	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459252824424992773
11	12-Nov-21	Afurur, Puntland	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459139790184587270
12	14-Nov-21	Xudur, Bakool	11	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1459967754375737351
13	15-Nov-21	Mogadishu	3	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1460278191973675010
14	23-Nov-21	Afgoye	3	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1463055441219534851
15	28-Nov-21	Wajid, Bakool	3	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1464939607255142407
16	02-Dec-21	Mogadishu	15	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1466302739349135363
17	03-Dec-21	Bula Hajji, L. Juba	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1466682868118216705
18	12-Dec-21	Gambarey, L. Shabelle	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470000888068685824
19	13-Dec-21	Operation Spider	7	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470458576300916738

¹⁵ Adan Shiniyow Ibrahim.

¹⁶ Mohamed Kulow Ali.

¹⁷ Abdi Rahman Ali Hussein.

¹⁸ Mohamed Hassan, aka Abu Ali, head of the Al-Shabaab court in Kuntuwarey.

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
20	13-Dec-21	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470412686592823297
21	14-Dec-21	Sham, L. Shabelle	1	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1470809464500588546
22	30-Dec-21	Baidoa, Bay	6	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1476526294456274948
23	09-Jan-22	Bariire, L. Shabelle	25	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1480278705230471168
24	10-Jan-22	Barawe, L. Shabelle	1	AS defects ¹⁹	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1480560382611701761
25	18-Jan-22	Mubarak, L. Shabelle	13	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1483410216712556549
26	23-Jan-22	Guricel, Hiiraan	6	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1485133351841378308
27	26-Jan-22	Dhusamareb	20	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1486294865977749511
28	28-Jan-22	Balcad, M. Shabelle	28	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1486993557810552832
29	06-Feb-22	Sanguni, Kismayo	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1490358412831559680
30	22-Feb-22	Fidow, Hiiraan	60	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1496180394332495880
31	25-Feb-22	Bariire L. Shabelle	29	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1497205384217436165
32	27-Feb-22	Bal'ad, M. Shabelle	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1497957120431513604
33	01-Mar-22	Yontoy, L. Juba	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1498659821721169920
34	01-Mar-22	Xudur, Bakool	5	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1498582956423663617
35	09-Mar-22	Jamaame, L. Juba	16	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1501473404863533062
36	13-Mar-22	AAIA, Mogadishu	2	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1506563625032601603
37	17-Mar-22	Kismayo area	7	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1504556184463941640
38	17-Mar-22	Halgan, Hiiraan	2	As defect ²⁰	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1504424633910636546
39	26-Mar-22	Baidoa, Bay	1	AS defects	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1507714917914271748
40	27-Mar-22	Af-urur, Bari, Puntland	12	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1508011173702258695
41	27 Apr 22	Garbaharey	1	AS arrested ²¹	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1507986853038899200
42	3 Apr 22	Wasil, Mudug	9	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1510593929682554881

¹⁹ Adan Gurow Isak.

²⁰ Abdifitah Ibrahim Mohamud and Osman Ibrahim Daud.

²¹ Hassan Abdi Muhammed (Guleed).

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
43	9 Apr 22	Luq, Gedo	2	AS defect ²²	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1512742201054449664
44	14 Apr 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ²³	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1514356762731851787
45	18 Apr 22	Jubaland	1	AS defects ²⁴	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1516124706390392834
46	29 Apr 22	South West	1	AS defects ²⁵	https://twitter.com/GaroweOnline/status/1519971668378234880?t=wUBw94ihlbl52517YIRG5g&s=09
47	17 May 22	Baidoa	5	AS defect	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1526630774300192769
48	22 May 22	Marka	1	AS arrested ²⁶	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1528133923544473612
49	27 May 22	War-Ise, M. Shabelle	9	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1530125803148673024
50	31 May 22	Berhani, Kismayo	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1531733474260004864
51	3 Jun 22	Yaq-Halul	10	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1532700531063414786
52	4 Jun 22	Tiyeglow, Bakool	1	AS neutralized ²⁷	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1533025638105464833
53	6 Jun 22	Toratorow, L. Shabelle	6	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1533718246121160704
54	8 Jun 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ²⁸	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1534494103475474434
55	13 Jun 22	Qabdho, Mataban, Hiiraan	12	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1536252031442329604
56	14 Jun 22	Wanlaweyn, L. Shabelle	1	AS neutralized ²⁹	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1536621776343650304
57	16 Jun 22	Jameeco. L Shabelle	1	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1537480464293941248
58	17 Jun 22	Bahdo, Galmudug	70	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1537685810639683584
59	22 Jun 22	Berhani	4	AS neutralized ³⁰	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1539660142022922240
60	24 Jun 22	Lafoole	2	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1540344173106176002

²² Mohamed Tawane and Deqow Ibrahim

²³ Mohamed Mohamud Fanah

²⁴ Abshir cusmaan jiirow

²⁵ Isse Omar Derow.

²⁶ Aweys Mayow in charge of making explosives.

²⁷ Mohamud Nur Ga'al, (Sheikh Al-Sima).

²⁸ Mustaf Ishak Ali (Mutaf).

²⁹ Hassan Suleiman Ali.

³⁰ IED captured.

Ser.	Date	Area	Individuals	AS neutralized or Defected	Source
61	2 Jul 22	Ali-Fool-Dhere, M. Shabelle	40	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1543259654947586050
62	6 Jul 22	Banaadir	5	AS arrested	https://twitter.com/RadioSna/status/1544673659792539648
63	12 Jul 22	Bukure, Mahas, Hiiraan	25	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1546904877003165696
64	15 Jul 22	Afgoye	1	As neutralized ³¹	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1547989276117241857
65	17 Jul 22	Jubba valey	2	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1548603510450683904
66	17 Jul 22	Labi-Kus, Kismayo	4	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1548757427482394626
67	30 Jul 22	Tosweyne, Bardale, Bay	3	AS neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1553325358061178880
68	2 Aug 22	Baidoa	1	AS defects ³²	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1554429788911198208
69	3 Aug 22	Bukure, Mahas, Hiiraan	30	As neutralized	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1554520743798575104
70	14 Aug 22	Mahas, Hiiraan	13	AS neutralized ³³	https://twitter.com/sntvnews1/status/1558866334506778627
Total			623	28 defectors	

³¹ Moalim Hashi.

³² Ibrahim Moallim Yusuf.

³³ Including senior operative Mohamed Weheliye Wasuge.

**Annex 11: Notifications to the 751 Committee on Somalia of consignments of weapons and ammunition during the current and the previous mandate
(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)**

Annex 12: Ammunition potentially delivered to Puntland Security Force (PSF) without complying with the procedural requirements of the Somalia arms embargo regime

The Panel has investigated the use of mortar shells on civilians and civilian objects inside Bosaso during clashes from 21 to 23 December 2021. These clashes were triggered following a decision, on 24 November 2021, by President Said Abdullahi Deni of Puntland to appoint Brigadier General Mohamed Amin Abdullahi Haji Khair as Director of PSF in replacement of General Mohamud Osman Abdullahi (Diyano).³⁴ The latter with the support of his family members contested the decision considering and opposed the handover of authority over PSF to the new Director, see figure 12.1.³⁵ The Panel met in Bosaso with Asad Diyano the former Director of PSF who admitted that their remaining forces within PSF opposed an attack by forces loyal to President Deni for political motives and against the will of clan elders representing Bosaso. He informed that about 150 fighters have left PSF and were working in a newly constituted unit.³⁶ The Panel understands that the US is no longer supporting the PSF and once the financial package offered dries up, lack of salaries could transform the unpaid fighters into militiamen with possible acts that could threaten the peace and security in the area.³⁷

The Panel met with General Mohamed Amin whose new force called Puntland Intelligence Security Force (PISF) was working closely with PMPF. Both PMPF and PISF directors informed the Panel that the force remaining under Diyano is working against national authority.³⁸ According to unconfirmed information, the remaining force under Diyano is renamed Puntland Security Commando Force (PSCF).³⁹

This investigation has a human rights dimension as well as an arms embargo compliance angle. The Panel is investigating, within its mandate, to identify potential non-compliance with the arms embargo procedures for delivery of arms and ammunition to Puntland Security Forces (PSF) should the unit be considered as an SSSI other than those of the FGS.⁴⁰ As such, delivery of weapons, ammunition and military equipment included in annex A and B of resolution 2607 (2021) to PSF, requires a request of approval and a notification to the Committee by the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organization.

The Panel obtained pictures of remnants of 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm mortars, allegedly fired by PSF during the clashes,⁴¹ with markings of characteristics similar to those found in the United States ammunition lot numbering and ammunition data cards (MIL-STD-1168). From the markings, the Panel identified types of mortars used and years of manufacture between 2008 and 2014, see table 12.1 below with details in figure 12.2. 120 mm mortars and 60/81 mm mortars are part of annex A and annex B of resolution 2607 (2021), respectively. The Panel could not identify in the Committee's database any notification or request of approval for delivery of such items to PSF. The Panel send a letter to the United States requesting information whether ammunition with similar markings has been supplied to Puntland and to confirm the last known beneficiary security units of those items as well as information on the EUC related to such supply. A reply is still pending.

Table 1: Identification of mortars fired in Bosaso

Marking	Type	Year of production	Manufacturer
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³⁴ <https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/puntland/somalia-puntland-president-s-move-to-fire-psf-boss-sparks-munity>.

³⁵ PSF has been since its constitution under the leadership of the Diyano family with Osman Abdullahi Diyano as the first Director, replaced in 2010 by his son Asad Osman Diyano as director till 2018 when he stepped down as candidate for Puntland presidential election giving his place to his brother Mohamed Osman Diyano.

³⁶ The initial strength of PSF was about 500 fighters according to Asad Diyano.

³⁷ Asad was hoping that the unit could be assimilated as a Danab unit potentially under the direct authority of FGS.

³⁸ Following negotiations with clan elders, President Deni reinstated Gen. Mohamud Osman Diyano.

³⁹ Asad informed the Panel that he heard about this appellation but has not seen any official document.

⁴⁰ It is to be noted that Asad, the former PSF Director informed the Panel that PSF has never been under the authority of Puntland Government and never benefited from its support as it was funded and equipped by the United States to fight Al-Shabaab and ISIL Somalia.

⁴¹ The pictures were provided by Puntland security services with location of impacts indicating the origin of firing as PSF locations, see figure 12.3. The Panel sent a letter to Puntland requesting information on units equipped with mortars, a reply is still pending.

DAE 10H001-012	Practice 60 mm mortar round	2010	DAE: Day & Zimmerman Inc Lone Star/Camden Operations; East Camden, Arizona, USA
PB 10L 106-001	81 mm illuminator mortar round	2010	PB: Pine Bluff Arsenal; Pine Bluff, Arizona, USA
POL08L308-005	120 mm mortar ignition cartridge M1020	2008	POL: Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
POL 09G502-008	81 mm mortar ignition cartridge M299	2009	
POL13A308-002	120 mm mortar ignition cartridge M1020	2013	
NPL14J402-004	60 mm mortar ignition cartridge M702	2014	NPL: Probably Nammo Pocal, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA

Source: Panel based on analysis of pictures provided by Puntland security services.

Figure 1 PSF press statement contesting the change of PSF leadership



PRESS STATEMENT

Date: 26th Nov, 2021

In regards to the events that unfolded in the past couple of days PSF HQ have released the following statements:

1. The officers and officials of the PSF are committed to fight terrorism and the enemies of Puntland.
2. The work and administration of the PSF has been interfered without any accordance with the existing laws and constitutional clauses with regards to the co-operation between the PSF and the Government. This harassment and interference of ongoing works has been going on for a long time and for that we have been patient.
3. At this time our comrades in the other Puntland armed forces are being asked to join an operation that's objective is to harm and attack PSF soldiers in their HQ. They will not attack us nor will we harm them either.
4. The PSF will not take orders from those who worked with the enemy yesterday. Instead we will continue to defend our people and our land.
5. The PSF and its officers are well trained and sufficient for the security of their people insha'Allah
6. The PSF is a non-partisan military organization and has never worked on politics, be it multiparty system or otherwise. Instead the latest decisions and interferences made by the Puntland government has been wholly **politically motivated**.



contact@psf.so

Source: <https://twitter.com/PSFForces/status/1464268796848447488>.

Figure 2: Pictures of ignition cartridges of mortars recovered

Picture	Marking	Manufacturer
	NPL14J402-004	Probably Nammo Pocal, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA
	POL09G502-008	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
	POL08L308-005	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)
	POL13A308-002	Pocal, Moscow, Pennsylvania (currently Nammo Pocal Inc, Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA, since 2013)

Figure 3: Mortar firing base and points of impacts within Bosaso during elements between 21 and 23 December 2021



Source: Panel based on information provided by Puntland security services.

Annex 13.1: Assault rifles with characteristics similar to Type 56-1 seized by US forces from a smuggling dhow

Figure 1: Sample of the 1406 Type 56-1 assault rifles inspected



Source: Panel

Figure 2: Model Type 56-1 seized



Source: Panel

Figure 3: Marking: 7.62mm Type 56-1; logo (26 inside a triangle); 16 – CN; Serial 61103920



Source: Panel

Figure 4: Samples of serial numbers identified (highlighted in the list at table 1)

16- 61089552	16 - 61104554	16- 6110747
17 - 62039574	17 - 62107561	17 - 62118520

Table 1.1: Page 1, Serial number 500 rifles of batch 1 (ordered from 61000281 to 61092896)

61000281	61069857	61080410	61083815	61085043	61086169	61087239	61088540	61089708
61000312	61069929	61080494	61083834	61085051	61086191	61087247	61088553	61089712
61000329	61070065	61080603	61083868	61085055	61086218	61087264	61088557	61089759
61000532	61070096	61080605	61083955	61085120	61086231	61087302	61088598	61089762
61003234	61070115	61080696	61083995	61085138	61086255	61087341	61088607	61089788
61003990	61070459	61080700	61083995	61085146	61086256	61087390	61088620	61089789
61006237	61070739	61080701	61084073	61085159	61086303	61087401	61088623	61089834
61008996	61070987	61080702	61084102	61085171	61086354	61087612	61088647	61089851
61008997	61071206	61080706	61084118	61085197	61086360	61087718	61088678	61089854
61017588	61071235	61080729	61084145	61085224	61086373	61087720	61088687	61089907
61038339	61071356	61080735	61084154	61085324	61086389	61087733	61088766	61089919
61040462	61071380	61080800	61084157	61085338	61086435	61087764	61088773	61089923
61044380	61071429	61080983	61084158	61085341	61086441	61087779	61088790	61090161
61047341	61071528	61081219	61084160	61085367	61086449	61087810	61088793	61090272
61048624	61071574	61081227	61084195	61085383	61086450	61087833	61088815	61090305
61054712	61071661	61081429	61084197	61085399	61086513	61087847	61088830	61090375
61056959	61071710	61081520	61084227	61085412	61086519	61087866	61088839	61090402
61057023	61071778	61081740	61084232	61085438	61086520	61087878	61088874	61090421
61058956	61071842	61081745	61084259	61085442	61086530	61087882	61088877	61090423
61058993	61071883	61082092	61084290	61085457	61086574	61087888	61088884	61090426
61059684	61071921	61082501	61084367	61085471	61086579	61087901	61088909	61090432
61059750	61071941	61082512	61084370	61085485	61086583	61087918	61088939	61090470
61059843	61076830	61082644	61084387	61085489	61086608	61087923	61088952	61090660
61060000	61077703	61082658	61084394	61085498	61086652	61087994	61088966	61090747
61064156	61077743	61082672	61084396	61085505	61086676	61087995	61088980	61090776
61064654	61077920	61082701	61084502	61085531	61086759	61088009	61088991	61090854
61064776	61078217	61082836	61084557	61085545	61086776	61088076	61088994	61090909
61064793	61078580	61082940	61084590	61085555	61086787	61088086	61088999	61090932
61064932	61078599	61082950	61084593	61085565	61086863	61088155	61089042	61091130
61064940	61078706	61083018	61084603	61085631	61086888	61088165	61089078	61091189
61065027	61078717	61083155	61084649	61085644	61086903	61088222	61089081	61091225
61065028	61078831	61083203	61084675	61085695	61086908	61088232	61089126	61091255
61065056	61079022	61083338	61084694	61085704	61086963	61088235	61089188	61091409
61065073	61079227	61083339	61084709	61085713	61086997	61088245	61089419	61091542
61066799	61079238	61083345	61084727	61085744	61087011	61088250	61089433	61091611
61066924	61079255	61083381	61084737	61085751	61087015	61088256	61089440	61091765
61066959	61079331	61083434	61084747	61085752	61087016	61088267	61089496	61091950
61067478	61079400	61083484	61084756	61085782	61087018	61088356	61089537	61091952
61067752	61079412	61083516	61084798	61085829	61087029	61088360	61089552	61091958
61068078	61079422	61083529	61084801	61085864	61087047	61088415	61089554	61092150
61068251	61079463	61083562	61084827	61085937	61087075	61088417	61089565	61092155
61068335	61079567	61083582	61084833	61085942	61087090	61088437	61089566	61092239
61068422	61079627	61083586	61084907	61085943	61087093	61088461	61089585	61092248
61068914	61079979	61083611	61084938	61085992	61087116	61088462	61089592	61092392
61069419	61080066	61083656	61084956	61086008	61087127	61088463	61089616	61092429
61069424	61080118	61083688	61084971	61086032	61087145	61088468	61089663	61092515
61069613	61080186	61083749	61084991	61086064	61087169	61088475	61089666	61092531
61069704	61080237	61083777	61085010	61086097	61087189	61088479	61089694	61092617
61069718	61080361	61083781	61085026	61086156	61087229	61088510	61089695	61092688
61069749	61080395	61083785	61085034	61086156	61087237	61088521	61089703	61092896

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.4

Table 1.2: Page 2, Serial number 500 rifles of batch 1 (ordered from 61092957 to 61106708)

61092957	61095093	61096704	61098189	61099640	61101086	61102986	61104190	61105212
61092961	61095106	61096726	61098201	61099641	61101089	61103025	61104241	61105222
61093098	61095140	61096727	61098264	61099665	61101103	61103040	61104246	61105258
61093257	61095200	61096740	61098325	61099688	61101117	61103148	61104259	61105278
61093258	61095224	61096755	61098327	61099741	61101121	61103184	61104287	61105294
61093293	61095226	61096762	61098341	61099746	61101160	61103201	61104305	61105295
61093342	61095276	61096768	61098486	61099764	61101164	61103211	61104332	61105388
61093364	61095279	61096796	61098553	61099798	61101172	61103216	61104333	61105450
61093487	61095442	61096801	61098565	61099811	61101182	61103217	61104336	61105452
61093520	61095514	61096803	61098566	61099829	61101270	61103221	61104350	61105466
61093545	61095516	61096866	61098587	61099884	61101347	61103254	61104357	61105507
61093564	61095538	61096869	61098598	61099894	61101493	61103271	61104375	61105551
61093583	61095571	61096911	61098604	61099903	61101552	61103282	61104380	61105554
61093595	61095627	61096926	61098620	61100026	61101573	61103289	61104385	61105560
61093678	61095628	61096941	61098692	61100032	61101586	61103339	61104475	61105569
61093732	61095632	61097009	61098715	61100033	61101602	61103440	61104485	61105570
61093734	61095711	61097019	61098770	61100074	61101617	61103446	61104487	61105572
61093756	61095758	61097027	61098807	61100180	61101661	61103458	61104494	61105575
61093770	61095770	61097050	61098819	61100259	61101670	61103467	61104502	61105593
61093900	61095773	61097067	61098832	61100272	61101747	61103518	61104529	61105684
61093901	61095804	61097072	61098850	61100311	61101758	61103546	61104550	61105694
61093907	61095847	61097096	61098946	61100361	61101882	61103557	61104554	61105725
61094000	61095904	61097114	61098972	61100432	61101890	61103568	61104558	61105731
61094004	61095915	61097164	61099017	61100437	61101909	61103587	61104571	61105774
61094127	61095916	61097167	61099037	61100481	61102027	61103605	61104573	61105778
61094237	61095958	61097169	61099097	61100528	61102029	61103631	61104624	61105788
61094290	61096093	61097172	61099133	61100591	61102039	61103637	61104632	61105793
61094364	61096110	61097183	61099144	61100616	61102060	61103640	61104670	61105880
61094484	61096147	61097245	61099210	61100636	61102082	61103712	61104675	61105885
61094515	61096154	61097249	61099215	61100650	61102114	61103722	61104677	61105890
61094545	61096157	61097285	61099222	61100669	61102122	61103733	61104733	61105897
61094562	61096161	61097314	61099259	61100672	61102150	61103734	61104762	61105972
61094650	61096188	61097333	61099338	61100680	61102182	61103738	61104768	61106000
61094702	61096227	61097335	61099382	61100703	61102191	61103794	61104770	61106065
61094705	61096322	61097338	61099389	61100751	61102200	61103857	61104780	61106075
61094712	61096351	61097384	61099431	61100756	61102207	61103894	61104781	61106097
61094745	61096392	61097450	61099449	61100774	61102213	61103920	61104843	61106177
61094784	61096407	61097647	61099496	61100776	61102217	61103955	61104869	61106181
61094804	61096417	61097648	61099500	61100801	61102227	61103965	61104910	61106185
61094813	61096447	61097672	61099521	61100809	61102325	61103989	61104918	61106199
61094831	61096450	61097703	61099534	61100934	61102483	61104035	61104997	61106205
61094912	61096451	61097746	61099536	61100939	61102502	61104038	61105007	61106225
61094978	61096522	61097884	61099557	61100971	61102533	61104040	61105010	61106233
61094980	61096529	61097888	61099578	61100975	61102543	61104041	61105037	61106241
61094987	61096553	61097905	61099579	61100977	61102581	61104042	61105053	61106368
61095048	61096556	61097931	61099588	61100991	61102600	61104102	61105175	61106372
61095050	61096570	61097972	61099591	61100997	61102641	61104106	61105180	61106402
61095073	61096571	61098092	61099608	61101006	61102666	61104111	61105200	61106490
61095081	61096597	61098104	61099614	61101027	61102730	61104120	61105202	61106654
61095088	61096617	61098109	61099618	61101073	61102785	61104173	61105205	61106708

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.1.4

Table 1.3: Page 3, Serial number 48 rifles of batch 1 (ordered from 61106729 to 67707218)

61106729	61108825	61111233
61106809	61108864	61111458
61106810	61108873	61111515
61106811	61108940	61111549
61107040	61108965	61111574
61107049	61108967	61111654
61107067	61108995	61111715
61107072	61109003	61111721
61107073	61109004	61111729
61107118	61109062	61111733
61107119	61109255	61111746
61107129	61109343	61111887
61107131	61109401	61111897
61107194	61109423	61111898
61107225	61109426	61111901
61107267	61109472	61111924
61107282	61109579	61111950
61107317	61109590	61111958
61107364	61109591	61111960
61107470	61109621	61111962
61107540	61109630	61112049
61107590	61109770	61112092
61107611	61109906	61120049
61107613	61109989	61120256
61107619	61110053	61120275
61107656	61110121	61120369
61107809	61110235	61120374
61107820	61110239	61120482
61107836	61110244	61120500
61107852	61110253	61120509
61107855	61110288	61120536
61107856	61110292	61120556
61107871	61110311	61120557
61107887	61110363	61120576
61107903	61110378	61120668
61107920	61110492	61120677
61107932	61110547	61120753
61108070	61110595	61120754
61108133	61110726	61127101
61108145	61110822	61129726 ⁴²
61108443	61110840	61129872
61108454	61110842	61130877
61108461	61110867	61131427
61108476	61110870	61131568
61108491	61110879	61131596
61108593	61110883	61132070
61108594	61111041	61132296
61108599	61111092	61132473
61108643	61111102	
61108801	61111176	

⁴² Close to serial **61129414** of rifle seized by ATMIS from Al-Shabaab on April 2022, see Ser 46 at table of annex 7.

Table 1.4: Page 4, Serial number 358 rifles of batch 2 (ordered from 62000168 to 62132135)

62000168	62017344	62027089	62036967	62041683	62094557	62115493	62129506
62000267	62017435	62027208	62037160	62041752	62094573	62115622	62129645
62000281	62017673	62027470	62037166	62041786	62094721	62115635	62129842
62000328	62018213	62027643	62037172	62041802	62094839	62115669	62129856
62000424	62018214	62027689	62037357	62041878	62094861	62115996	62130195
62000430	62018247	62027719	62037397	62041943	62094890	62116728	62130688
62000431	62018296	62027956	62037535	62041951	62095105	62117216	62131184
62000492	62018563	62028020	62037558	62042080	62096748	62117528	62132135
62000569	62018802	62028061	62037789	62042192	62100651	62117930	
62000717	62019013	62028083	62037862	62042213	62101188	62117973	
62000965	62019157	62028517	62038077	62042226	62101741	62118035	
62000971	62019229	62028613	62038130	62042493	62101747	62118042	
62001226	62019302	62028675	62038167	62042603	62101961	62118122	
62001282	62019320	62028847	62038190	62042819	62102108	62118258	
62001490	62019332	62028918	62038272	62043030	62102136	62118263	
62001519	62019354	62028927	62038486	62043098	62102343	62118389	
62001538	62019446	62029309	62038514	62043115	62102531	62118520	
62001635	62019538	62029427	62038793	62043137	62102532	62118632	
62001660	62019540	62029501	62038818	62043147	62102587	62118649	
62002159	62019549	62029597	62038864	62043168	62102593	62118831	
62002421	62019567	62029599	62038991	62043319	62102633	62118899	
62002474	62019599	62029665	62039198	62043591	62102692	62119060	
62006044	62019665	62029760	62039261	62044073	62102711	62119085	
62006097	62019678	62029917	62039312	62044207	62102719	62119237	
62006106	62019698	62030476	62039574	62046797	62103343	62119370	
62006122	62019728	62031151	62039757	62047742	62103427	62119381	
62006152	62019770	62031295	62039766	62064746	62107561	62122100	
62006164	62019842	62031516	62039793	62068225	62109763	62123208	
62006175	62019966	62031595	62040028	62068417	62110053	62123672	
62006179	62020053	62031601	62040040	62068497	62110170	62123674	
62006217	62020242	62032046	62040041	62068506	62110192	62123694	
62006253	62020273	62032107	62040164	62068529	62110198	62123723	
62006318	62020551	62032570	62040190	62068826	62110216	62123738	
62007914	62020642	62032943	62040345	62068970	62110236	62123834	
62008220	62020787	62033097	62040385	62069138	62110322	62123848	
62008368	62020826	62033141	62040386	62069773	62110424	62124006	
62009420	62020840	62033876	62040560	62079440	62110437	62126045	
62010092	62020985	62034639	62040569	62082117	62110513	62126757	
62010893	62023538	62035391	62040719	62085790	62110529	62127387	
62011121	62023659	62035848	62040728	62089528	62110594	62127628	
62011850	62023801	62035948	62040781	62090745	62110863	62127835	
62011890	62025004	62036074	62040838	62092334	62110893	62128055	
62012925	62025221	62036081	62040852	62093141	62111124	62128063	
62014240	62025477	62036124	62041004	62093513	62111698	62128096	
62016955	62025775	62036189	62041017	62093862	62112450	62128590	
62017001	62026034	62036274	62041046	62093958	62112609	62128636	
62017041	62026106	62036337	62041051	62094016	62115287	62128912	
62017241	62026109	62036425	62041084	62094333	62115290	62129032	
62017269	62026112	62036716	62041235	62094382	62115458	62129101	
62017270	62026290	62036942	62041371	62094492	62115490	62129282	

Note: highlighted serial numbers are of pictures at Figure 13.1.4

Table 2: Distribution of 1048 serial numbers of Type 56-1 with marking 16-CN

Serial numbers			Total markings	Total seized	Percentage seized
61000000	to	61009999	10,000	9	0.09
61010000	to	61019999	10,000	1	0.01
61020000	to	61029999	10,000	0	0
61030000	to	61039999	10,000	1	0.01
61040000	to	61049999	10,000	4	0.04
61050000	to	61059999	10,000	8	0.08
61060000	to	61069999	10,000	29	0.29
61070000	to	61079999	10,000	42	0.42
61080000	to	61089999	10,000	318	3.18
61090000	to	61099999	10,000	251	2.51
61100000	to	61109999	10,000	311	3.11
61110000	to	61119999	10,000	48	0.48
61120000	to	61129999	10,000	19	0.19
61130000	to	61139999	10,000	7	0.07
Total			140,000	1048	0.75

Table 3: Distribution of 358 serial numbers of Type 56-1 with marking 17-CN

Serial numbers			Total markings	Total seized	Percentage seized
62000000	to	62009999	10,000	37	0.37
62010000	to	62019999	10,000	42	0.42
62020000	to	62029999	10,000	45	0.45
62030000	to	62039999	10,000	54	0.54
62040000	to	62049999	10,000	48	0.48
62050000	to	62059999	10,000	0	0
62060000	to	62069999	10,000	10	0.1
62070000	to	62079999	10,000	1	0.01
62080000	to	62089999	10,000	3	0.03
62090000	to	62099999	10,000	18	0.18
62100000	to	62109999	10,000	20	0.2
62110000	to	62119999	10,000	48	0.48
62120000	to	62129999	10,000	28	0.28
62130000	to	62139999	10,000	4	0.04
Total			140,000	358	0.26

Annex 13.2: Ammunition 7.56x54 mm cartridges seized by US forces from a smuggling dhow

Figure 13.2.1 Ammunition cans with black paint to disguise the markings



Source: Panel

Figure 2: Markings on ammunition cans with markings: 11/ 86 10 (Bulgaria)




Source: Panel

Figure 3: Markings on ammunition cans with markings: 46/69-25 ; 52-77-71 (China)



Source: Panel

Figure 4: Headstamps of ammunition 7.62 x 54 seized



Source: Panel

Annex 14: Weapons smuggling dhows landed in Bandarbeyla, Puntland

Figure 1: Dhow known as “Boat Oman” captured by Somali security forces



Source: Puntland police

Figure 2: Wrecked dhow



Annex 15: Elements of thematic report on weapons smuggling

During the mandate the Panel gathered information on cases of weapons smuggling to Somalia for the purpose of compiling a thematic report on smuggling and trafficking on weapons and military equipment, as requested by paragraph 41 of resolution 2607 (2021). Analysis of reports of both the Panel of Experts on Somalia and on Yemen, as well as information from cases during the reporting period, indicate three methods of smuggling used in the illicit supply of arms, ammunition, and IED components and products. These methods include smuggling through regular airports and seaports of entry in Somalia; smuggling by sea with large vessels mooring or drifting along Somalia's coast; and smuggling by dhow, mainly from Yemen. While smuggling through regular ports remains anecdotal and hard to corroborate,⁴³ the Panel confirmed smuggling by sea along coastal areas where maritime security is almost non-existent. There was no report from Member States of interdiction at sea, of dhows smuggling weapons, ammunition, or IED components destined for Somalia during the reporting period.⁴⁴

A. Smuggling by vessels mooring along the Somali coast

The Panel continues to follow suspicious movements of vessels of interest along the coast of Somalia. The Panel had noted, in 2020 and 2021, three cases of suspicious vessels mooring at a distance between 500 and 2,000 metres from the coast where Al-Shabaab or smuggling networks are active. Figure 1 shows the locations of these suspicious activities.

B. Smuggling by dhows beaching along the Somali coast

During the reporting period, the Panel received information on two cases of dhows smuggling weapons to Hobyo port in Galmudug on 25 October 2021⁴⁵ and at Bandarbeyla in Puntland on 25 June 2022.

Unloading of suspicious cargo on 25 October 2021 in Hobyo, Galmudug

The Panel received information and aerial imagery showing the unloading of suspicious cargo from a dhow in Hobyo on 25 October 2021. The imagery showed armed militia providing security during the unloading of the dhow, see figure 2. The Panel has unconfirmed information that a smuggling network was active in that area.⁴⁶

Neutralization of two dhows smuggling weapons and ammunition on 25 June 2022 in Bandarbeyla, Puntland

The smuggling case of 25 June 2022 involved two dhows carrying weapons and ammunition from Dhubab, Yemen, and destined for Hobyo, Galmudug, allegedly for networks supplying Al-Shabaab.⁴⁷ The dhows made it to Bandarbeyla, Puntland, due to weather conditions preventing them to reach their initial destination. One dhow was stuck in the beach and the second was captured by Puntland security services. The cargo comprised small arms, boxes of ammunition, rocket propelled grenades and barrels of fuel. The Panel was not able to inspect the seized items and received information from Puntland security services that the cargo of one dhow was looted by locals as there were not enough security forces to take control of the two dhows.

On 29 June 2022, the Panel interviewed some members of the crew of the dhows who were under Somali police custody in Bosaso. The captain of one dhow, Abdu Ismail Sayfi, claimed that the crew comprised two Somalis and five Yemenis mostly from Hays⁴⁸ and that the cargo was loaded in Dhubab⁴⁹ on 24 June 2022. Both localities are under the control of forces affiliated with the Government of Yemen. The captain claimed that he received instructions from Mohamed Essaghir to unload the cargo in Hobyo and then proceed to Mogadishu to take other cargo back to Yemen. Two Yemeni crewmembers identified themselves as Bassem Mohamed Omar Al Zahaari and

⁴³ The case of smuggling of charcoal by MV FOX from Kismayo without being reported by Somali and international security forces is an illustration on the possibility of using regular ports for illicit activities.

⁴⁴ The only reported seizures at sea were by the United States with the interdiction on 20 December 2022 of a dhow carrying weapons and ammunition (see <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2882679/us-navy-seizes-1400-assault-rifles-during-illicit-weapons-interdiction/>) and the interdiction, on 18 January 2022, of a dhow carrying 40 tons of urea fertilizer (see <https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2908216/us-navy-interdicts-stateless-vessel-previously-caught-smuggling-weapons/>). Both dhows had Yemen as a destination.

⁴⁵ The information was received after the submission of S/2021/849.

⁴⁶ The arrival of this cargo coincided with reports of mobilization and building-up of ASWJ militias prior to fighting with FGS and Galmudug forces around Dhusamareb.

⁴⁷ According to information received from Puntland intelligence services.

⁴⁸ Coordinates 13°55'51"N, 43°28'43"E, about 30 km East of al Khawkha port.

⁴⁹ Yemeni port at Bab Al Mandab straight, coordinates 12°56'36"N, 43°24'35"E.

Ali Mohamed Omar Al Zahaari.⁵⁰ The Panel shared the names and pictures of the crew with Yemen and requested their authorities to share the identification of the dhows, personal identification of the crew, and whether any of them is affiliated with AQAP or other armed groups in Yemen. A reply is still pending.

C. Update of smuggling networks active in Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland coastal areas

Smugglers neutralized or known to intelligence service in Puntland during the reporting period

The Panel received information that Puntland security services arrested in Bosaso, on 28 June 2021, an arms smuggler under the name of Ahmed Mohamed Nur in possession of 10,000 cartridges (7.62x39) for AK-47 rifles. The received information also included a phone number and coordinates in his GPS with stored coordinates of waypoints along the coast of Bari, as well as in Yemen.

Update on smuggling networks in Galmudug and Puntland

The Panel also received names and phone numbers of smugglers and individuals supporting them in Somalia and Yemen. The Panel identified phone numbers that were part of call data records (CDR) of phones numbers known to be owned by individuals associated with smugglings networks and ISIL operatives in Puntland.⁵¹ Figure 15.3 shows the connection between the major actors while the details of these networks will be included in the confidential thematic report on smuggling.

Known beaches and ports used by smuggling networks in Galmudug and Puntland

The Panel updated the list of suspicious activity in order to identify trends and patterns, as well as beaches used for unloading and potential routes likely used to supply Al-Shabaab with weapons and ammunition. Table 1 gives the names and coordinates of beaches that have been used and where smuggling activities have been reported. Figure 4 shows the location of these beaches, as well as areas where Al-Shabaab and FGS and FMS forces are present.

⁵⁰ Pictures of these individuals will be in the confidential thematic report on smuggling.

⁵¹ Details of these networks are included in confidential annexes of S/2016/919, S/2017/924 and S/2018/1002 and in Panel's archives including information analyzed and shared with the Panel by C4ADS.

Figure 1: Suspicious mooring of vessels close to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab




Figure 2: Unloading of suspicious cargo under armed guard in Hobyo, 25 October 2021


Unloading of the dhow at Hobyo anchorage

Source: Confidential
Nature of the cargo

Source: Confidential
Armed militia providing security for unloading operations

Source: Confidential

Figure 3: Links between identified smugglers operating in Galmudug and Puntland⁵²



⁵² Full names and phone numbers will be in the thematic report on smuggling.

Table 1: Main beaches identified in Galmudug and Puntland

Date	Locality	Coordinates	Activity reported
25 Jun 22	Bandarbeyla	N 9°29', E 50°48'	2 dhows intended to Hobyo landed with arms and ammunition
25 Oct 21	Hobyo	N 5°20', E 48°32'	Dhow unloads suspicious cargo ⁵³
7 Jun 20	Habo (Xabo)	N 11°47', E 50°31'	Suspicious cargo unloaded from a dhow
15 May 20	Mareero	N 11°19', E 49°17'	Weapons from Al-Mukallah Umu Bahri 2012
15 May 20	Illig	N 7°46', E 49°50'	Tanker vessel took smuggling personnel
10 Apr 20	Buru'	N 11°28', E 49°41'	Weapons from Yemen to ISIL ⁵⁴
18 Apr 20	Laasqoray	N 11° 9', E 48°11'	Weapons from Al Mukalla
23 Mar 20	Dhurbo	N 11°38', E 50°21'	Umu Bahri 2020, weapons from Al-Mukha, Yemen
26 Feb 20	Faah (Fax)	N 4°49', E 48° 9'	Foreigners disembark from a dhow
27 Dec 19	Berbera	N 10°26', E 44°58'	Transfer of weapons to Dhows for the Houthis
9 Dec 17	Alula	N 11°58', E 50°45'	Suspicious cargo from 3 dhows
Jan 17	Dufttenli	N 11°15', E 48°20'	
Oct 15	Maydh	N 10°58', E 47° 4'	Weapons and ammunition delivered ⁵⁵

⁵³ See figure 15.2⁵⁴ Allegedly coordinated by Abdi Dhoofaaye and Isse Yulux.⁵⁵ See paragraph 122 and confidential annex 8.5 S/2016/919.

Figure 4: Smuggling beaches and potential smuggling routes used by Al-Shabaab



Annex 16: Electronic components in IEDs used by Al-Shabaab

The Security Council, in paragraph 9 of resolution 2607 (2021), noting the increase in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, decided that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices. Part I of annex C includes inter alia “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paras. 1 & 2. of the same part.

The Panel with the support of UNMAS gathered information on items and products used by Al-Shabaab to manufacture and operate the IEDs. The Panel noted that most of the IEDs captured by FGS and international forces used mainly two electronic components:

- (i) Learning Code Receivers (LCR): an electronic relay activated via a remote control by the IED operator;
- (ii) Motorcycle (MC) alarm: a switch activated by vibrations produced by the intended victim, figures 1 and 2 show how these items are wired.

The Panel has gathered information on these two types of items in order to trace their origin and their supply chain, see table 1 below and figures 1 to 6. The Panel noted a seizure of a large quantity of LCR by the FGS at Mogadishu airport, probably at the end of 2021, see figures 7 and 8. Figure 9 shows a seizure by the SNA of five IEDs with explosive in sections of 13 inch steel tube with batteries, MC, LCR and remote control.

Table 1: Identification of electronic components found on captured IEDs

Item type	Items captured	Manufacturer of items or components
LCR	66609613, 66609690 to 66609699 and 66609705	Henan Honest IOT Technology Co. Ltd ⁵⁶
MC	Name scratched probably Yamaha	Relays by KE YONG ⁵⁷
MC	LTM	

Figure 1: Illustration of wiring

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

Figure 2: Sketch of wiring of LCR and MC in IED

(STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL)

⁵⁶ With address at NO C7E3, The National University Science Park; Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone, Zhengzhou, Henan Province, China (<http://en.honestdz.com/contact/contact.aspx>)

⁵⁷ By Ningbo Zhenhai District Chengbeizhang Keyong Hardware Factory with address at No.331, Hongnan, Nanhong Village, Jiaochuan Sub-District Ningbo, Zhejiang, China.

Figure 3: Learning code receiver model Honest number 66609613 found in captured IED



Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 4: LCR probably Yamaha



Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 5 LCR LTM



Source: United Nations.

Figure 6: KEYONG relays found in MCs



Source: Confidential UN report.

Figure 7: LCR type Honest seized at Mogadishu airport at the end of 2021



Source: Somali TV channel

Figure 8: LCR type Honest seized at Mogadishu airport at the end of 2021



Source: Somali TV channel

Figure 9: Five IEDs with explosives in sections of 13 inch steel tube with batteries, MC, LCR and remote controls



Source: <https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FPa1KuKXoAIZ8i8?format=jpg&name=medium>.

Annex 17: Farming permits issued by Al-Shabaab to the population

Figure 1: An Al-Shabaab farming permit (warqadda fasaxa beerah) issued on (taariikh) 24-9-1443 (in the Islamic calendar), which corresponds to 25 April 2022 (in the Gregorian calendar) in Diinsor District (Degmada Diinsoor) to an individual from the Dabare clan living in the area of Diinsor. The form contains the name of the farmer (Magaca), age (Da'da), telephone number (Tel), clan (Qabiilka), location of the farm (Deegaan), the name of the clan elder/chief (Malaag) responsible for the farmer (Mas'uulka majmuucada), and his telephone number (Telkiisa). Image redacted for security reasons.

WARQADDA FASAXA BEERAH

محافظة دينسور
DEGMADA DIINSOOR

Taariikh: 24 / 9 / 1443

Magaca: [REDACTED] Da'da: 50

Tel: [REDACTED] Qabiilka: Dabare [REDACTED]

Deegaan: [REDACTED]

Malaag: [REDACTED]

Mas'uulka majmuucada: [REDACTED]

Telkiisa: [REDACTED]

Saxiixa:

Source: Confidential


Annex 18: Clashes between AMISOM/SNA and Al-Shabaab result in civilian casualties and trigger Al-Shabaab retaliatory attack

In paragraph 16 of resolution 2607 (2021), the Security Council called upon all parties to the conflict in Somalia to comply with international humanitarian law and urged them to continue conducting prompt and full investigations when reports of civilian casualties resulting from military operations arise.

The Panel received reports of civilian casualties arising from clashes between AMISOM/SNA forces and Al-Shabaab on 8 March 2022 on the outskirts of Janaale, Lower Shabelle.⁵⁸ The SNA and AMISOM maintain a presence in Janaale since the town was liberated from Al-Shabaab in March 2020. However, Al-Shabaab reportedly remains present in the area near Ugunji (1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E).⁵⁹

The Panel conducted interviews with eight civilians, including victims and relatives of victims, from Siigale Degta, a village located four kilometres from Ugunji along the main road connecting Janaale to Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle. The Panel also examined publicly available material about the incident, and corroborated the information gathered with a variety of sources, including humanitarian and human rights organisations.

Figure 1: Location of Siigale Degta, Lower Shabelle (1°51'14.0"N 44°42'30.2"E)



Source: The Panel, using Google Maps

On 8 March 2022, between 60 to 80 armed Al-Shabaab militants engaged in clashes with AMISOM and SNA forces in the surroundings of Siigale Degta. The inhabitants of Siigale interviewed by the Panel acknowledged that the militants had been gathering around the village since the previous day, and that Al-Shabaab had visited Siigale regularly to collect illegal taxes from the population. However, they categorically excluded a permanent presence of the group in Siigale.⁶⁰

The Panel's investigations found that at least two girls and their mother were killed, and seven civilians were injured, including six children. The Panel confirmed that five of the injured civilians were evacuated to Mogadishu for treatment on 9 March 2022.

Witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported the firing of mortars during the clashes. A woman told the Panel: "bullets and bombs were landing in our village, there was a lot of noise. I saw two houses burning. The bombs were fired from AMISOM side. People were fleeing or hiding where they could". Medical sources confirmed to the Panel that three survivors, including

⁵⁸ Confidential security report, 9 March 2022, on file with the Panel.

⁵⁹ See S/2021/849, Annex 5.1.

⁶⁰ In its 2021 final report, S/2021/849, Annex 5.1 the Panel reported that the regional Al-Shabaab administration for Lower Shabelle had moved from Janaale to Ugunji, 7 kilometres northeast of Janaale (coordinates 1°52'24"N, 44°43'21"E) following an SNA military operation to liberate Janaale in March 2020.

two children, evacuated to Mogadishu, had suffered multiple blast injuries consistent with the reported use of mortars during the Sigaale Degta clashes.⁶¹

While its investigation could not establish a clear responsibility for the civilian casualties, the Panel considers that the use of explosive weapons, which are inherently indiscriminate, such as mortars, demands a careful assessment of the principles of proportionality and distinction by the fighting parties when used in areas inhabited by civilians.⁶² For example, global data from Action on Armed Violence indicates that over the last decade, when mortars were used in populated areas, 97.6% of those killed or injured were civilians.⁶³ Moreover, the Panel notes that about half of the child deaths recorded by the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting in Somalia for the period January to March 2022 (18 out of 41, i.e. 44%) were the result of explosive weapons (mortars, IEDs, unexploded ordnances, etc). Accordingly, the Panel sent an official communication to AMISOM/ATMIS on 11 April 2022, requesting details of the incident and of AMISOM/ATMIS post-strike assessment. A response was still pending at the time of writing of this report.

Figures 2 and 3: Damaged homes in Sigaale Degta with characteristics similar to impact by mortar rounds



Source: Al-Shabaab media

Al-Shabaab retaliates against the population of Sigaale Degta and uses the incident for propaganda against AMISOM/ATMIS

After being confronted by AMISOM/SNA forces, Al-Shabaab withdrew from Sigaale Degta but returned to the village later the same day. Al-Shabaab accused the community of spying and collaborating with AMISOM and killed at least one man and abducted 33 villagers, including nine women. The whereabouts of the abducted villagers remain unknown at the time of writing of this report.⁶⁴

This kind of attack is not uncommon for Al-Shabaab, particularly when the group suffers losses following military operations. For example, in its 2021 final report, the Panel documented how communities living near “liberated areas” were particularly exposed to retaliatory attacks from the group.⁶⁵ These incidents underscore the protection needs of the civilian population, which extend beyond the immediate outcomes of military operations against Al-Shabaab.

The Panel further noted that the Sigaale Degta incident was leveraged by Al-Shabaab-affiliated media for propaganda against AMISOM/ATMIS and foreign forces in general.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Interviews with victims and medical sources in Mogadishu, June and August 2022.

⁶² See <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>.

⁶³ See <https://aoav.org.uk/2021/an-anatomy-of-a-mortar-attack-global-trends/>.

⁶⁴ Interviews with eight members of the community of Sigaale Degta, June and July 2022.

⁶⁵ See S/2022/754, Annex 5.1.

⁶⁶ See <https://somalimemo.info/articles/16170/SAWIRRO-AlShabaab-oo-u-Gurmaday-dad-ay-duqeeyeen-ciidanka-Uganda>.

Annex 19: FGS and FMS’s failure to investigate allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law perpetrated by their security forces

Paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 2607 (2021) “calls upon the FGS and FMS to enhance civilian oversight of their security apparatus, to continue to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, and to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, and in this context recalls the importance of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to Somali security forces and AMISOM”.

During the reporting period, the Panel noted two different incidents of armed clashes involving elements of the Somalia Security Forces, and particularly special units trained by international partners to fight the threat of extremist groups. Initial reports received by the Panel indicated that these clashes resulted in civilian casualties, including children, the substantial destruction of civilian property, and displacement of people.

For example, from 21 to 23 December 2021, Puntland security forces clashed in Bosaso, firing mortars, and reportedly exchanging fire in indiscriminate fashion. Reports emerged of mass casualties, displacement, and damage to civilian buildings.

Additionally, the Panel received reports of clashes in and around Dhusamareb on 13 May 2022 between ASWJ, a militia group, and SNA special operations forces, including Danab and Gorgor. The Panel’s sources reported that the premises of an NGO were temporarily occupied and used as a defensive position by Somali forces. These clashes reportedly resulted in one civilian death and four injuries, as well as damage to civilian property.

The Panel noted that neither the FGS nor FMS authorities pursued an investigation, in either of the abovementioned cases, into possible violations of international humanitarian and human rights law perpetrated by members of its state armed forces or other armed actors. The Panel further noted that the victims of these clashes did not receive reparations for their losses.

Panel’s investigation into allegations of violations of international human rights law in Bosaso⁶⁷

A background of the security crisis in Bosaso is provided in annex 12.

Tension in Bosaso began to build in late-November 2021, when mediation attempts by elders and traditional leaders failed.⁶⁸ In early-December 2021, the Panel started noting several media reports alerting of a mobilization of both Puntland Security Forces (PSF) elements and Puntland government forces⁶⁹ arriving in Bosaso, and received allegations of recruitment of militias by the PSF from the Bari region. On 21 December 2021, clashes between PSF elements and Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) /Darwish forces started in Bosaso. Sources interviewed by the Panel consistently reported that no warning or order to evacuate was given to the population of Bosaso prior to the commencement of the clashes.⁷⁰

Parties involved in the clashes blamed each other for the suffering inflicted on the civilian population of Bosaso – see figure 6. On 22 December 2021, the region’s security minister, Abdisamad Mohamed Galan, announced a cease-fire after

⁶⁷ The Panel visited the areas affected by the December clashes between PSF and PMPF/Darwish forces during a mission in Bosaso from 17 to 21 July 2022. It conducted interviews with six civilians, including two women, who were victims or relatives of victims of the clashes, met with the Governor of Bari region, the Commander of the Darwish in Bosaso, the PMPF Commander and Director General, and two community leaders involved in mediation efforts. The Panel examined publicly available material about the incident and received confidential security, civil society and medical reports. The Panel corroborated the information collected with two independent sources, namely an international and a national human rights organisation. The Panel sent an official communication to Puntland on 30 July 2022, requesting details of the incident. A response was still pending at the time of writing of this report.

⁶⁸ See Somali Wire, Issue 280, 30 November 2021, available on subscription only.

⁶⁹ See <https://twitter.com/Maregonline/status/1465789760434327560?t=F-G8dLdX358p8zLVvXLF9A&s=03>.


⁷⁰ Interviews with local sources in Bosaso, July 2022.

intervention from traditional elders, scholars and business leaders.⁷¹ However, heavy clashes broke out again, including mortar shelling, and continued intermittently until 23 December 2021, as evidenced by media reports,⁷² and the continuous influx of injured civilians to the local hospitals and witnesses and victims' accounts gathered by the Panel.⁷³

The Panel verified that at least 19 civilians were killed, including five children, and over 120 were injured, including 14 children.⁷⁴ Medical sources mentioned to the Panel that most of the patients had suffered either gunshot wounds or injuries from explosive weapons, consistent with the use of mortar shells reported by all sources interviewed by the Panel. The director of Ayaan Hospital, which suffered extensive damage during the clashes, reported to the Panel that patients, including women who had just delivered and their babies, had to be evacuated overnight as the hospital was continuously hit in the crossfire, including by mortar shells.⁷⁵ One witness interviewed by the Panel reported that he could not take his son to the hospital due to fear of being caught in the crossfire. The Panel noted reports from several media and independent sources about the mass displacement of population from Bosaso. A human rights source based in Bosaso mentioned to the Panel that at least 10,000 households were displaced by the clashes.⁷⁶

The Panel corroborated, through on-site visits and reports from different sources, that civilian properties, including a private hospital providing free maternal health care, were extensively damaged. Estimates compiled by civil society representatives state the damages exceed \$1 million.⁷⁷ Sources interviewed in July 2022 further mentioned to the Panel that they had not received compensation or reparations for their losses. The Panel observed marks on civilian buildings consistent with the reported use of mortars and heavy machine guns. The affected buildings were not concentrated in one specific area. Instead, the pattern of shooting appeared random and extended to a vast perimeter. See Annex 12 for a detailed assessment of the weapons used during the clashes.

Figures 1 and 2: Damage to Ayaan Hospital from the December clashes in Bosaso.



Source: Ayaan Hospital

⁷¹ See

https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2021/Dec/184896/puntland_says_it_is_ready_for_talks_to_end_the_conflict_in_bossaso.aspx.

⁷² See <https://www.mtv Somali.com/fighting-erupts-again-in-bossaso-this-evening/>.

⁷³ Interview with medical and local sources in Bosaso, July 2022. See also media reports, <https://www.mtv Somali.com/pictures-civilians-flee-as-conflicts-erupts-again-overnight-in-bossaso-puntland/>.


⁷⁴ Interview with medical sources and Emergency service reports on file with the Panel. A medical source told the Panel that between 21 to 23 December 2021 one hospital registered 63 injured patients, mostly civilians, including 14 children. However, the source also mentioned that these were only partial figures, as the emergency service could not cope with the influx of injured people and register all entries.

⁷⁵ Ayaan hospital is located between the Presidential palace and the PSF headquarter. The Director of Ayaan estimated the damage to the hospital at US \$55,000. Report on file with the Panel.

⁷⁶ See <https://www.mtv Somali.com/pictures-civilians-flee-as-conflicts-erupts-again-overnight-in-bossaso-puntland/>

⁷⁷ Report on file with the Panel.

Figures 3 and 4: Mortar damage to the roof of a civilian house (left); and an RPG impact point on the wall of a civilian house (right).



Source: Panel

Based on the analysis of information gathered, the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the state agents involved in the 21 to 23 December 2021 clashes in Bosaso violated article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁷⁸, which protects the right to life against arbitrary deprivation. Specifically, the Panel considers that the state agents involved in the December 2021 clashes in Bosaso did not respect the principles governing the use of lethal force, including for law enforcement purpose, notably necessity, proportionality, and precaution.⁷⁹ Further, Paragraph 1 of article 6 of the Covenant lays the foundation for the obligation of States parties to provide effective remedies and reparation to all victims of violations of the right to life, implying an obligation to investigate allegations of excessive use of force with lethal consequences and, where appropriate, prosecute such incidents.⁸⁰ The Panel considers that no effective remedies and reparation to the victims of the Bosaso incident were provided.

In its assessment of “arbitrariness”, the Panel makes reference to paragraph 12 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, to the 1979 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and to the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Somalia has ratified and is a state party to the Covenant since 1990.

⁷⁹ According to para 13 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the right to life, states parties are expected to take all necessary measures intended to prevent arbitrary deprivations of life by their law enforcement officials, including soldiers charged with law enforcement missions. See also the Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, A/HRC/26/36, 1 April 2014, paras 59–73.

⁸⁰ See para 27 of the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life.

⁸¹ The 1979 Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials was adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. In para 1 of the same resolution, the Assembly decided to

Article 3 of the 1979 Code of Conduct stipulates that law enforcement officials may use force ‘only when strictly necessary’. The accompanying official commentary emphasizes that any use of force by law enforcement officials should be ‘exceptional’. While it is commendable that the parties firstly attempted with non-violent means to resolve the stand-off on the PSF leadership, the agreement reached in March 2022 demonstrates that adherence to negotiation attempts could have avoided the loss of human life and the material destruction that occurred in December 2021.

With reference to the assessment of proportionality, and particularly on the deployment of mortars,⁸² RPGs and machine guns with impact showing random shooting in urban populated areas of Bosaso, the Panel considers that their use was apparently disproportionate as to the legitimate objective to be achieved.⁸³

According to 1990 Basic Principle 5(b), whenever lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials must ‘minimize damage and injury’ and ‘respect and preserve human life’. The Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that all parties engaged in the December 2021 clashes in Bosaso failed to act in a manner consistent with the need to minimize the risk posed to human life, including by failing to issue a warning to the population and breaking a publicly announced ceasefire.

‘transmit it to Governments with the recommendation that favourable consideration be given to its use within the framework of national legislation or practice as a body of principles for observance by law enforcement officials’. The Basic Principles were adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, 27 August to 7 September 1990. In its Resolution 45/166, adopted without a vote on 18 December 1990, the UN General Assembly welcomed the Basic Principles and invited governments to respect them (§4).

⁸² See <https://www.un.org/disarmament/explosive-weapons/>

⁸³ Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 5(a).

Figure 5: Statement of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on the humanitarian impact of the December 2021 clashes in Bossaso



STATEMENT

Statement by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. Adam Abdelmoula, on the situation in Bossaso, Puntland State

Mogadishu, 23 December 2021- I am extremely concerned about the impact of ongoing hostilities in Bossaso, Puntland State, on civilians.

With the fighting in Bossaso town continuing into a third consecutive day, more than half of the city's population has reportedly been displaced from their homes. According to humanitarian partners and local authorities, some 40 per cent of 70,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) hosted in Bossaso town are also reported to have experienced secondary displacement.

The closure of shops has limited the possibility of vulnerable people, including IDPs and drought-affected communities, to redeem their vouchers for basic supplies.

I am further concerned that fighting has negatively affected the ability of humanitarian partners to reach the displaced people who are in urgent need of humanitarian and protection assistance.

I urge all parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure unfettered access for humanitarian workers to all people in need of assistance.

Source: <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/statement-deputy-special-representative-secretary-general-un-resident-and-0>

Figure 6: PSF statement issued on 22 December 2021. The statement denounces two days of aggressive attacks from the Puntland Government which refused to submit to the decision of elders called to mediate the dispute regarding the PSF leadership.



WAR-MURTIYEED

Date: 22/12/2021

Assalamu calaykum,

Waxaa nalagusoo qaaday oo aan iska difaacnay muddo labo beri ah weeraro gardaro ah oo lagu jabiyey xeerarkii sharciga ahaa oo dhan, oo u dhaxeeyay PSF iyo Dowladda Puntland, waxay diideen gartii si wadajir ah aan ugu dhiibanay Isimadda iyo go'aank-oodii.

Intaasna kuma aysan ekaane weerar iyo barakicin bulsho bay sameeyeen, dhinacayagu marna ma hurinayn colaadda iyo dhibaataaynta shacabkeena.

Waxaan aad uga xunnahay dhibta bulshadeenna soo gaartay, runtii raali kama nihin wixii sameeyayna way qaadayaan masuuliyadooda.

Ciidanka PSF waxay u taaganyihiin la dagaalanka argagixisadda, amni daradda iyo cid kastoo ku lug leh.

Dadkii ayagu argagixisadda ka tirsanaa ee aan bulshadeenna ka difaacaynay, haatana ku gabanaya xasaanadda dowladda marnaba nama eedayn karaan, Puntland naba-deeda iyo horrumarkeeda geed walba waan u harsannay, waana kasii shaqeyn doonaa eebbe idinkiis.

IDINKA ALLE GUUL

PSF



contact@psf.so

Annex 20: Charcoal stockpiles in Kismayo

On 6 September 2022, following an invitation by the Office of the President of the Jubbaland State of Somalia, the Panel visited Kismayo to meet with Jubbaland authorities, as well as with representatives of businesspersons who have equity in the charcoal stockpiles in and around the city. In the invitation, the Office of the President expressed the desire to discuss with the Panel solutions to the existing charcoal stockpiles harvested prior to the imposition of the ban by the Security Council in 2013, which they claim have had negative environmental effects, at times causing harm to the local community's health.

During the visit, the Panel was able to inspect and take pictures of stockpiles in three locations inside and around Kismayo: areas 1, 2 and 3N in figure 1 below. The Panel could not inspect area 3S and area 4 due to security reasons. The pictures taken allowed the Panel to assess the volume of charcoal in coordination with UNODC using satellite images from 7 September 2022. Figures 3, 4 and 5 show pictures of 26 charcoal piles in areas 1, 2 and 3N, while pile 1B doesn't contain charcoal. The volume of seven piles 3F, 3G, 3H, 3I, 4A, 4B and 4C was assessed using satellite images and comparing piles from other pictures. Figure 1 gives the characteristics of charcoal bags, each of 50 Kg size but containing 25 kg of charcoal. Table 1 shows the number of bags per each pile and area, for a total of 516, 386 bags or 12,900 metric tonnes of charcoal.

The Panel met with eight individuals presented by Jubbaland authorities as members of the Kismayo association of charcoal owners (KACO). They indicated to the Panel that they were representing four groups constituted by hundreds of rural families who own numbers of sacks of charcoal. They claim that these groups own 1.2 million bags of charcoal that they harvested before the imposition of the charcoal ban by the Security Council. They informed the Panel that they were looking for modalities to request to the Security Council a one-time waiver to the ban on charcoal to allow the export of the current stockpiles and clean-up of the designated areas in and around Kismayo. Reportedly, they have agreed with Jubbaland authorities, particularly the Mayor of Kismayo, to use a portion of the proceeds to clean up the city from the effects of the charcoal, support projects to plant trees for reforestation, and contribute to create environmental awareness on the effects of de-forestation. They welcome the support of relevant UN agencies and guaranteed that should the waiver be granted, they would be fully transparent allowing the Panel to monitor the export process.

The Panel met with representatives of the office of the President of the Jubbaland State of Somalia and with the Mayor of Kismayo who asserted that Al-Shabaab is not currently benefiting from the charcoal business or from any other business that is transacted in Kismayo. They informed the Panel that the charcoal stockpiles are a source of challenges to the community in term of risks of fire hazard, impact on the environment, and unpaid rent by charcoal owners for land occupancy. They indicated to the Panel that Jubbaland is willing to cooperate with the FGS and relevant UN agencies to find lasting and sustainable solutions to the charcoal accumulated in Kismayo before the imposition of the ban. The Panel has informed the FGS before and after the visit on its intent and the outcomes of the discussions.

The Panel welcomes the cooperation by Jubbaland authorities and charcoal stakeholders in relation to the assessment and monitoring of charcoal stockpiles. The Panel believes that a one-time suspension of the ban on charcoal by the Security Council submitted to procedural requirement by the Committee, including a request of approval and notification of export, could have multiple beneficial effects. These include an efficient monitoring of the ban on charcoal and a political climate for cooperation between Jubbaland and the FGS to allow further development of Somalia's National Policy on Charcoal for the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use in line with paragraph 7 of resolution 2607 (2022).

Figure 1: Locations of stockpiles




Figure 2: Types and dimensions of charcoal bags (50 Kg size containing 25 Kg of charcoal)



Source: Panel for all pictures in this annex

Table 1: Estimates number of bags in the three stockpiles locations

Serial	site	Number of bags in length	Number of bags in width	Number of bags in height	Total bags.
1	1A	25	20	16	8000
2	1B				0
3	1C	20	20	15	6000
4	1D	20	20	20	8000
5	1E_1	40	20	23	18400
6	1E_2	30	30	23	20700
7	1F	30	40	20	24000
8	1G	20	40	20	16000
9	1H	20	30	20	12000
10	1I	20	30	20	12000

Serial	site	Number of bags in length	Number of bags in width	Number of bags in height	Total bags.
11	1J	20	30	20	12000
12	1K	20	30	20	12000
13	1L	20	30	20	12000
14	1M	20	30	20	12000
15	1N	20	30	20	12000
Total bags Area 1					185100
16	2A	7	11	18	1386
17	2B	20	30	20	12000
18	2C	20	15	23	6900
19	2D	20	30	19	11400
20	2E	30	40	20	24000
21	2F	25	30	20	15000
22	2G	20	30	21	12600
Total bags Area 2					453486
23	3A	20	30	20	12000
24	3B	20	30	20	12000
25	3C	40	30	20	24000
26	3D	40	30	20	24000
27	3E	40	30	20	24000
28	3F*	20	20	20	8000
29	3G*	40	30	20	24000
30	3H*	40	30	20	24000
31	3I*	40	30	20	24000
Total bags Area 3					176 000
32	4A*	40	40	20	32000
33	4B*	40	30	20	24000
34	4C*	40	20	20	16000
Total bags Area 4					72 000
Total bags					516 386

Source: Panel and UNODC

*: area with no pictures taken by the Panel

Figure 3: Stockpiles area 1






Figure 4: Stockpiles area 2






Figure 5: Stockpiles area 3N



Figure 6: Stockpiles area 3S



Figure 7: Stockpiles area 4



Annex 21: Violation of the Somalia charcoal ban by MV Fox

On 25 January 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) shared information with the Panel concerning allegations of violations of the charcoal ban by a vessel MV FOX (IMO 9108659). The information included: i) a cargo manifest and ii) a certificate of clearance for the MV FOX. According to these documents, the MV FOX, a cargo vessel, carried 4,425 metric tons of charcoal from Kismayo and was destined for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see figures 20.1 to 20.7 below).

The Panel noted that the MV FOX sailed from the Port of Zanzibar, Republic of Tanzania, on 2 January 2022 with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) off until it reached Salalah port, Sultanate of Oman, on 22 January 2022.

On 14 April 2022, Omani authorities informed the Panel that the MV FOX had an emergency on 22 January 2022, near the Port of Salalah. As a result, the Omani authorities assisted in the evacuation of the ship's crew and subsequently discovered that there were approximately 4,425 metric tons of charcoal in the vessel's hull. Further, Omani authorities discovered that captain Mohamad Mostafa Besso (Syrian national) and his assistant, Ammar Khader Safiya (Syrian national), falsified records of the ship's route.

The Panel travelled to the Port of Salalah, Sultanate of Oman, from 28 May to 1 June 2022, to inspect the vessel and conduct interviews with the crew and Omani officials. The Panel received extensive cooperation from Omani authorities in Salalah. The visit allowed the Panel to gather evidence and make the following findings:

- i. The MV FOX had not called to any port nor been in the territorial waters of South Africa in 2022 and hence the shipping documents claiming the origin of the charcoal as South Africa are counterfeit;
- ii. The MV FOX called to the port of Kismayo on 6 January 2022 at 11H50 and left that port on 12 January 2022 at around 7H30 UTC;
- iii. The MV FOX when it reached Salalah had black colour paint on its IMO number and its name "FOX", keeping the name "LOME", its port of origination, visible. This was likely an attempt by the crew to conceal the vessel's identity from potential witnesses while loading the charcoal in Kismayo.

The Panel noted from the shipping documents that the consignee of the charcoal was Sitti General Trading. The Panel has information that Sitti General Trading is registered in Djibouti and owned and managed by Mr. Bashir Khalif Musse (see figure 20.). This individual was mentioned in paragraph 6, annex 12.2.2 of the Panel's 2017 final report (S/2017/924) for his role in using false documents to export charcoal from Somalia.⁸⁴

In accordance with its obligation to offer an opportunity to reply, the Panel met in Mogadishu on 20 July 2022 with Mr. Bachir Khalif Muse, whose companies - Sitti General Trading L.L.C. and Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C were, respectively, the charter party for the MV FOX and the consignee of the charcoal onboard the vessel. Mr. Bachir admitted that the charcoal on board the MV FOX originated from Somalia and was loaded in Kismayo port. The Panel also gave opportunity to reply to all other individuals and entities listed in the table below (table 20.1) due to their involvement or the link to the MV Fox case.

The captain of MV Fox Mohammad Mustafa Besso maintained that the vessel took the charcoal from Richards Bay, South Africa. On the companies from South Africa, see Table 20.1, the Panel got information that those entities never existed in that country and documents used in their names, including stamps and signatures were falsified. The Panel also corresponded with the owner of the vessel MV Fox to offer him an opportunity to reply to its findings.

In June 2022, the Panel provided a thematic report to the 751 Somalia Committee of the Security Council on the violation of the charcoal ban by MV FOX. In its report the Panel highlighted possible options for reducing risks of further illegal shipments of charcoal through possible solutions of the management of charcoal stockpiles in southern Somalia. The Panel presented options to the Committee with regard to current charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo.

⁸⁴ See paragraph 6, annex 12.2.2 of S/2017/924.

Table 1: Individuals and entities involved in or with links to the MV FOX case

Name	Place of business/Identity	Link
Bashir Khalif Musse	Djibouti national; business in Dubai	Owner and Director of Sitti General Trading; signed the charter agreement of the MV FOX
Sitti General Trading L.L.C.	Djibouti registered; business in Dubai, license (533917)	Consignee of the charcoal Same business address as Bushra Bachir
Mariam Barreh Omar	Djibouti national	Director Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C
Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics Services L.L.C.	Djibouti registered Business in Dubai, license (894208)	Party to the charter agreement of the MV FOX Same business address as Sitti
Ncokumane General Trading L.L.C.	Richards Bay, South Africa	Alleged shipper of the charcoal
Godana Shipping Services L.L.C	Unknown	Agent of the MV FOX
MV FOX	Registered in Togo	Carried the charcoal
Omar Faris Al Shamari	Iraqi national	Director
Oscar Middle East Ship Management	Dubai	Owner MV FOX
Mohamad Mustafa Besso	Syrian national	Captain MV FOX

Figure 1: Bill of Lading allegedly issued by Godana on behalf of the MV FOX's captain

Page 2

FORM NAME: "CONTAINER" LEATH: 01/1994

Shipper

NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
 12 DWARF RUSH, BRACKENHAM,
 RICHARDS BAY, 3900,
 Tel: + 27 35789 0802
 SOUTH AFRICA

Consignee

SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 AL NOKHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P.O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 Tel: +971 4 2699015
 DUBAI- U.A.E

Notify address

SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 AL NOKHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P.O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 Tel: +971 4 2699015
 DUBAI- U.A.E

Vessel **MV FOX** **Port of loading** **RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA**

Port of discharge **FUJAIRAH OR RAS AL KHAIMAH OR KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI, U.A.E.**

Shipper's description of goods **Gross weight**

177,000 BAGS CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS **4,425.00 METRIC TONS**
PACKING: IN BAGS
HS CODE: 440200

NON
NEGOTIABLE

CLEAN ON BOARD
FREIGHT PAYABLE AS PER CHARTER PARTY

(of which on deck at Shipper's risk, the Carrier not being responsible for loss or damage howsoever arising)

<p>Freight payable as per CHARTER-PARTY</p> <p>FREIGHT ADVANCE Received on account of freight:</p> <p>Time used loading days hours.</p>	<p>SHIPPED at the Port of Loading in apparent good order and condition on board the Vessel for carriage to the Port of Discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get the goods specified above. Weight, measure, quality, quantity, condition, contents and value unknown.</p> <p>IN WITNESS whereof the Master or Agent of the said Vessel has signed the number of Bills of Lading indicated below all of the tenor and date, any one of which being accomplished the others shall be void.</p> <p>FOR CONDITIONS OF CARRIAGE SEE OVERLEAF</p>				
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 5px;"> Freight payable at AS PER CHARTER PARTY </td> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 5px;"> Place and date of issue RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA 07.01.2022 </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 5px;"> Number of original B/L THREE (3) </td> <td style="width: 50%; padding: 5px;"> Signature GODANA SHIPPING SERVICES L.L.C. AS AGENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MASTER OF MV FOX CAPT. MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESO </td> </tr> </table>	Freight payable at AS PER CHARTER PARTY	Place and date of issue RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA 07.01.2022	Number of original B/L THREE (3)	Signature GODANA SHIPPING SERVICES L.L.C. AS AGENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MASTER OF MV FOX CAPT. MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESO	<p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">Godana</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 0.8em;">Shipping Services L.L.C 25 CENTIMENTS Reg No 3591690-97</p>
Freight payable at AS PER CHARTER PARTY	Place and date of issue RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA 07.01.2022				
Number of original B/L THREE (3)	Signature GODANA SHIPPING SERVICES L.L.C. AS AGENT FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MASTER OF MV FOX CAPT. MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESO				

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 2: Commercial invoice allegedly issued by Ncokumane General Trading

NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.

COMMERCIAL INVOICE

Invoice No. SB/740-K/22

Date 07/01/2022

SHIPPER:
NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
 12 DWARF RUSH, BRACKENHAM
 RICHARDS BAY-SOUTH AFRICA
 TEL: +27 35789 0802

CONSIGNEE:
SITTI GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
 AL NOKHITHA BLDG, OFFICE NO. 222,
 P O BOX: 80367, HAMRIYAH PORT
 DUBAI- U.A.E
 TEL: +971 4 2699015

DESCRIPTION	QTY	GROSS WEIGHT (MT)	NET WEIGHT (MT)	UNIT PRICE (USD/MT)	TOTAL AMOUNT (USD)
CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS PACKING: IN BAGS HS CODE: 440200 INVOICING: ON ACTUAL WEIGHT BASIS	177,000 BAGS	4,425.00	4,425.00	250.00	1,106,250.00
TOTAL	177,000 BAGS	4,425.00	4,425.00		1,106,250.00
TOTAL AMOUNT IN WORDS: USD ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY					

DELIVERY TERM	: CFR LO KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI, U.A.E.	PAYMENT TERMS	: 100% CASH IN ADVANCE
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	: SOUTH AFRICA	MODE OF TRANSPORT	: BY VESSEL
VESSEL NAME	: MV FOX	VOYAGE NO.	: 7/2022
PORT OF LOADING	: RICHARDS BAY, SOUTH AFRICA	PORT OF DISCHARGE	: KHALIFA PORT ABUDHABI, U.A.E.

FOR, NCOKUMANE GENERAL TRADING L.L.C.
AUTHO.SIGNATORY



Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 3: Customs document allegedly issued by South African customs via Godana

TRANSIRE-FOR A DESTINATION IN THE REPUBLIC			DA 4
Port of issue- Richards Bay		Date	07.01.2022
1. Customs code		Transire number:	38618 28
2. Name of ship		MV FOX	
3. Vessel official registration number		910869	
4. Nationality and port of registry		TOGO	LOME
5. Name and nationality of master		MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESSO // SYRIAN	
6. Name and nationality of owners		OSCAR DUBAI SHIPPING S A // HONGKONG	
7. Date and time of arrival		1400 HRS 04.01.2022	
8. Nature of voyage		COMMERCIAL	
9. Expiry date of safety certificate		19 MAY 2022	
10. Expiry date of this transire			
11. Where from (all places to be mentioned in the order called at) ZANZIBAR			
12. Nature of cargo and tonnage thereof for this place NIL			
13. Where bound (all places to be mentioned in order of intended voyage) KHALIFA PORT, ABU DHABI – U.A.E.			
14. Nature and tonnage of cargo taken from this place LADEN 4.425 MT CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS			
15. Have any goods ex-customs and excise warehouses, goods on which a drawback of customs and exciseduty is due on export, imported goods on which duty has not been paid and excisable goods, exported orremoved in bond to a place outside the Republic NO			
16. Intended date and time of departure 1700 HRS 07.01.2022			
I declare that the above-mentioned particulars, and the particulars shown on the enclosures hereto, are true and correct			
 SIMPHIWE NZUZA Name		 SHIPS AGENTS Capacity SHIPS OPERATOR Rank	
Myeza		Inspctr	
Customs officer (name)		Rank	
		Signature	

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 4: Certificate of clearance for the FOX allegedly issued by South African customs via Godana

CERTIFICATE OF CLEARANCE FOR SHIPS FOR A DESTINATION OUTSIDE OF THE REPUBLIC		ORIGINAL DA 3 DATE 07 01 2022
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 	Port of	RICHARDS BAY 38618
	Name of ship	MV FOX Voy No. 7/2022
	Nationality and Port of Registry	TOGO LOME
	Registered mass (net)	3701
	Name and nationality of master	MOHAMAD MUSTAFA BESSO SYRIAN
Name and nationality of owners	OSCAR DUBAI SHIPPING S.A	HONDURAS
Where bound (all places to be mentioned in order of intended voyage)	KHALIFA PORT, ABU DHABI – U.A.E.	
State whether laden or in ballast	LADEN 4,425.00 MT CHARCOAL IN 25 KG BAGS	
The above-mentioned ship has been duly entered and cleared for the places mentioned.		
 Controller of Customs and Excise		

Source: MV FOX, gathered by the Panel during its visit to Salalah

Figure 5: Masking of the name of the vessel by black colour paint. On the left, the vessel's name and IMO number are masked in January 2022. On the right, the vessel's name is repainted, as of May 2022.



Source: Omani maritime safety services, January 2022.



Source: Panel, 29 May 2022.

Figure 6: Charter agreement between Oscar Middle East Management LLC and Bushra Bachir Shipping and Logistics services LLC

PLACE & DATE : 20/12/2021 - DUBAI ,UAE

- M.V FOX
- OWNERS: OSCAR MIDDLE EAST SHIP MANAGEMENT L.L.C
- CHARTS : BUSHRA BACHIR SHIPPING & LOGISTIC SERVICES L.L.C
- UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
- LAST RICE CARGO: CEMENT / CEMENT /
- VESSEL POSITION : PORT PAKISTAN,
- ALL NEGOTIATIONS AND TERMS TO REMAIN STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL AND RESTRICTED TO BOTH OWNERS AND CHARTERERS ONLY.
- THE OWNERS CONFIRM AND GUARANTEE THAT THE VESSEL'S HOLDS AND HATCHES ARE CLEAN 100 % WATER TIGHT CLEAR, WASHED AND DRIED CONDITION, FREE OF LOOSE RUST FLAKES/SCALES, INSECTS AND RESIDUES AND/OR ODOURS AND THE VESSEL IS FULLY FITTED AND SUITABLE TO LOAD, CARRY AND DISCHARGE THE CARGOES.


-ULD OR HOSE TEST WILL BE PERFORMED BY AN INSPECTION COMPANY AT CHARTERER AT LOAD PORT RICHARD BAY /SOUTH AFRICA AND SHOULD THE HATCHES FOUND LEAKY, FOAM TO BE APPLIED BY OWNERS TO SEAL ALL HATCHES PROPERLY TO THE INSPECTION COMPANY SATISFACTION.

- OWNERS TO GUARANTEE BOTH SEAWORTHINESS AND CARGO WORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL.
- SHOULD VESSEL BE REJECTED BY CHARTERS ' SURVEYOR, THEN ALL TIME LOST FROM HOLDS FAILING TILL MASTER NOTIFICATION THAT HOLDS RECTIFIED, LAY TIME SHOULD NOT COUNT.
- OWS WARRANT THAT THE VESSEL IS FULLY COVERED WITH A P&I CLUB FOR THE DURATION OF THIS C/P.
- OWNERS/CHARTERS CONFIRM FIXTURE RECAP DETAILS TO BE TOP P&C.
- OWNS GUARANTEE TT VESSEL'S HOLDS CLEAN/DRY BEFORE ARRIVAL VESSEL'S HOLDS TO BE PROPERLY SWEEP DRIED, CLEANED FREE OF ANY RESIDUES OF PREVIOUS CARGOES AND RUST SCALES, HOLD CLOSING SYSTEM BEING IN PERFECT WORKING CONDITION WITH WATERTIGHT HATCHES AND VESSEL TO BE IN EVERY RESPECT READY TO LOAD THE INTENDED



Source: Confidential

Figure 7: Mapping of individuals and entities with links to the charcoal ban violation



Source: Panel based on documents in annexes above.

Annex 22: List of acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AAIA	Aden Adde International Airport
ADN	Advance Delivery Notification
AML/CFT	Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANFO	Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
AQAP	Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama
ATGM	Anti-Tank Guided Missile
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CBS	Central Bank of Somalia
eKWC	Electronic Know-Your-Customer
EUC	End User Certificate
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EUTM in Somalia	European Union Training Mission in Somalia
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	federal member states
FRC	Financial Reporting Center
GSMA	Global System for Mobile Communications Association
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
HME	Home-Made Explosive
IAN	Implementation Assistance Notice
ID	Identification
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
JVT	Joint Verification Team
Km	Kilometre
KYC	Know-Your-Customer
LCR	Learning Code Receiver
LCTR	Large Cash Transactions Report
MC	Motorcycle
MMO	Mobile Money Operators
ML	Money Laundering
ML/TF	Money Laundering Terrorist Financing
MTB	Money Transfer Bureau
MTO	Money Transfer Operators
MV	Merchant Vessel
NAMLC	National Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency
NRA	National Risk Assessment
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
PBIED	Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Device
PDN	Post-Delivery Notification
PMPF	Puntland Maritime Police Force

PoA	Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects
PSF	Puntland Security Force
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management Measure
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SME	Small and Medium sized Enterprise
SNA	Somali National Army
SNSF	Somali National Security Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPF	Somali Police Force
SSSI	Security Sector Institutions other than those of the FGS
STR	Suspicious Transaction Report
TF	Terrorist Financing
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
XSH	Harakat Al-Shabaab
YPOC	Yellow Plastic Oil Container
