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President: Mr. HENRÍQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic).

Present: The representatives of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, France, Iraq, New Zealand, Thailand, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Opening of the session

1. The PRESIDENT declared the eighth session of the Trusteeship Council open. Before taking up the provisional agenda (T/806 and T/806/Add.1), he extended a welcome to Prince Wan Waithayakon, representative of Thailand, which was now a member of the Trusteeship Council. He was sure that Thailand's participation in the Council's work would prove most fruitful.

2. Prince Wan Waithayakon (Thailand) thanked the President for the welcome just extended to him. He assured the members of the Council that his country considered it an honour to be able to serve the cause of the Trust Territories; it would contribute to the success of the Council's work to the fullest extent of its powers.

3. He took the opportunity to pay a tribute to Mr. Sayre, representative of the United States, which had given his country valuable help when it had undertaken the modernization and development of its economy.

Question of the representation of China in the Trusteeship Council

4. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the important question of the Council's membership during the current session should be settled before the provisional agenda was considered.

5. He recalled that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had officially notified the United Nations (A/1123) that it did not recognize the representatives of the Kuomintang as the legal representatives of China in the Organization, and that it insisted on their being excluded from the various organs of the United Nations.

6. The USSR delegation, and particularly its representative in the Trusteeship Council, associated itself specifically with the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China that the representative of the Kuomintang should be excluded from the Trusteeship Council. At the same time, the Soviet Union delegation urged that the representatives of the People's Republic of China should be invited to represent China in the Trusteeship Council and its organs, so that they could take part in their activities. Accordingly, he proposed that the Council should adopt the following draft resolution (T/L.115):

"The Trusteeship Council resolves

"1. To consider inadmissible the participation of representatives of the Kuomintang group, who are not the representatives of China, in the Trusteeship Council and its organs;

"2. To invite the representatives of the People's Republic of China appointed by the Central People's Government to take part in the work of the Trusteeship Council and its organs."

7. He asked that his draft resolution should be put to the vote before the provisional agenda was considered.

8. The PRESIDENT recalled that, on 14 December 1950, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 396 (V) concerning the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State. Consideration of that resolution by the Trusteeship Council was provided for under item 20 of the provisional agenda (T/806 and T/806/Add.1); hence he wondered whether the Council would not feel it necessary to study the resolution before coming to any decision in such specific cases as the USSR representative had just raised.

9. Mr. SAYRE (United States of America) supported the President's suggestion, but wished nevertheless to comment on the draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union.

10. Once more, the Council was faced with a USSR proposal that the representatives of the communist Chinese régime should be admitted to the Trusteeship Council. Since the Council's seventh session, at which the matter had already been raised (1st meeting), the

General Assembly had taken several very important decisions on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations.

11. In the first place, on 19 September 1950, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 490 (V), establishing a Special Committee of seven members to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report back, with recommendations, to the fifth session of the Assembly. The resolution prescribed that, pending a decision by the General Assembly on the Special Committee's report, the representatives of the National Government of China should be seated in the General Assembly with the same rights as other representatives.

12. On 14 December 1950, while considering the question of the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 396 (V), to which the President had already referred. According to that resolution, whenever more than one authority claimed to be the government entitled to represent a State in the United Nations and the question became the subject of controversy, it should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the General Assembly was not in session. The resolution further recommended that the attitude of the General Assembly or its Interim Committee on any such question should be taken into account by other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies.

13. Mr. Sayre drew the Council's attention to the fact that the question before it had not yet been settled by the General Assembly. Accordingly, it would, in his opinion, be ill-advised for the Council to take an immediate decision on the representation of China in the Trusteeship Council.

14. As regards the substance of the question, he once again stressed that, in the United States delegation's opinion, the representatives of the communist Chinese régime should not be admitted to any organ of the United Nations or any specialized agency so long as that régime was engaged in hostilities in Korea against the United Nations. Furthermore, there could be no doubt that the General Assembly would take that factor into account in taking a decision on the question of the representation of China.

15. In conclusion, he formally proposed that, in view of General Assembly resolution 396 (V) of 14 December 1950 on the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State, the Trusteeship Council should decide to postpone further consideration of the USSR draft resolution until the General Assembly had taken action on the question of Chinese representation.

16. He explained that, while he was not opposed to deferring consideration of the USSR draft resolution until the Council considered item 20 of the provisional agenda, he would personally prefer the solution he had just indicated.

17. Mr. Shih-shun LIU (China) considered it unnecessary to refute the USSR representative's statements, which were devoid of foundation. The facts were well known to all, particularly since the First Committee had been examining the question of Korea.

18. To claim that the communist government at Peking represented the Chinese people was an almost incon-

ceivable distortion of the facts. Everyone knew that the Peking régime was not the result of the freely expressed wishes of the Chinese people, but a puppet régime established by armed force by the Soviet Union, whose interests it served and for which it formed an instrument of aggression for the conquest of the world.

19. Moreover, the attitude and the line of conduct of the Peking Government were such that it could not be said to represent the Chinese nation. The Chinese people loved peace and condemned resort to force for the settlement of international or domestic disputes, whereas the Chinese communists had proved by their aggression in Korea and by their deliberate attacks against the United Nations forces how far they were from being peace-loving.

20. Even in the interior of China, the Chinese communists appeared as oppressors. Reports from Chinese territory showed that they had instituted a reign of terror, and that explained the people's growing opposition to the communist régime.

21. Moreover, it was to be expected that a government which claimed to represent the Chinese people would protect the legitimate interests of the nation. But the whole world knew that the Chinese communists had not only agreed to play the abject role of a satellite and instrument of the USSR, but had even made concessions to the Soviet Union which caused them to renounce their natural rights before a foreign aggressor. Thus, if the United Nations accepted the Chinese communists as the legal representatives of the Chinese people, it would be taking a very unjust action towards a people who were fiercely opposing the régime imposed on them.

22. With regard to the attitude of the Chinese communist régime towards the United Nations, everyone knew that the National Government had always shown its desire to defend the United Nations, in particular by including in the organic laws on which the government was based specific recognition of the binding force of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Mao Tse-tung régime, on the other hand, had not ceased to defy the United Nations and express its contempt for it. It was not necessary to quote all the proofs which might be cited in support of that statement; it was because of those irrefutable proofs that the First Committee was about to state in unequivocal terms that the Chinese communist régime was an aggressor. Once more, he wished to say that it would be unjust and illogical to admit such a régime to the United Nations.

23. Recalling the provision in Article 4 of the Charter that membership in the United Nations was open to all "peace-loving States", Mr. Liu quoted an article in *The New York Times* which said that communist China could in no event be called a peace-loving State. According to that newspaper, to admit communist China to the United Nations would be to allow it to impose its will by force on an organization whose aim was to ensure international peace and security. He further recalled *The New York Times'* warning that, if the United Nations yielded to force, it would be in danger of meeting with the same fate as the League of Nations. He was convinced that the opinion of *The New York Times* was that of most countries in the world.

24. In his opinion, it was clear from what had just been said that the communist Chinese régime not only was not representative of the Chinese people but was even contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

25. He then pointed out that the USSR draft resolution was inadmissible for procedural reasons. As the United States representative had rightly recalled, the General Assembly on 14 December 1950 had adopted resolution 396 (V), to the effect that it was for the Assembly to take a decision on the matter; and it had not yet done that. In addition, he considered that, in accordance with the Charter, the Council was an executive organ of the General Assembly and required to implement the Assembly's resolutions. As the General Assembly had not yet taken a decision on the matter, it was not for the Council to do so.

26. Finally, the terms in which the USSR delegation had submitted its draft resolution automatically rendered it out of order. There was no organ or delegation which represented the Kuomintang, and so long as the existing representatives of China were present in organs of the United Nations they were, like the representatives of other Member States, representatives of a Member State and not of a political party. The manoeuvres of another Member State could not suddenly deprive them of their ability to represent the State in question and make them the representatives of a political party. Thus, by terming the existing representatives of China "representatives of the Kuomintang", the USSR delegation made its own draft resolution completely illegal. In his opinion, the draft resolution called for no action on the Council's part.

27. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) recalled that, when the General Assembly's *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had considered the question of the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State,¹ various opinions had been expressed with regard to the criteria for recognition. However, there had been no difference of views as to which organ of the United Nations should settle the question. In that connexion, he recalled paragraph 3 of the operative part of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1950, recommending that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly "should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations".

28. It had been proposed that examination of the USSR draft resolution should be deferred until the Council took up item 20 of its provisional agenda. In those circumstances, he did not see why the Council should not take up item 20 immediately; it was a mere question of procedure. The fact of taking note of the General Assembly resolution would enable the Council to settle both the question of procedure and, provisionally the more important question of Chinese representation.

29. In addition, the question of Chinese representation was directly related to that of credentials, which would be discussed as soon as the provisional agenda had been adopted. For that reason also, it would be logical to take up item 20 of the provisional agenda without delay.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 18th to 24th meetings and 58th to 60th meetings.

30. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the United States representative, in explaining the reasons for his opposition to the USSR proposal, had said that the Council should not admit the People's Republic of China because it had been guilty of aggression in Korea. Furthermore, the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people had been slandered by a person who was the representative not of the Chinese people but merely of a reactionary Chinese political clique which the Chinese people had expelled. Mr. Soldatov therefore felt it was his duty to clarify the true facts before speaking on the proposal he had submitted.

31. Reviewing the history of the happenings in Korea, he recalled that on 25 June 1950 the armed forces of South Korea had attacked North Korea; the attack had been the result of preconceived plans. The existence of those plans was well known, as was shown both by the statements of Mr. Syngman Rhee himself and by the information submitted to the General Assembly, the Security Council and other United Nations organs. For example, on 19 June 1950, a week before the events in Korea, Mr. Syngman Rhee, speaking before the South Korean National Assembly and in the presence of Mr. Dulles, consultant to the United States Secretary of State, had said that if the cold war was not enough to defend democracy, then recourse would have to be had to actual warfare. It was also known that the United States had given the South Korean forces powerful support. On 19 May 1950, a month before the events in Korea, Mr. Johnson, at that time United States Secretary of Defense, had said that 100,000 officers and men of the armed forces of South Korea equipped and trained by the United States were ready to begin hostilities. Mr. Johnson, General Bradley and Mr. Dulles had gone to see General MacArthur; after their meeting, Mr. Dulles had made a tour of inspection in the region of the 38th parallel. In addition, a week before the events in Korea, Mr. Dulles had said that the United States was prepared to render possible moral and material aid to South Korea, which was fighting against communism. Those facts spoke for themselves.

32. As to the question of determining who was the aggressor in Korea, the purpose of the United States representative's slanderous statements was to conceal the act of aggression committed against China by the ruling circles of the United States.

33. After Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) had pointed out that the events in Korea bore no relation to the question before the Council and that it would therefore be better to shorten the review of them, the PRESIDENT asked the USSR representative to make his statement more specific.

34. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) reminded the Council that it was the United States representative who had first raised the Korean question. The slander to which the Chinese people had been subjected required an answer, and he was attempting to give it.

35. Returning to the history of the question, he recalled that the United States Government had ordered its troops to intervene in Korea even before the Security Council meeting of 27 June was called. That had been done without regard to any decision the Coun-

cil might take at its meeting, thus confronting the United Nations with an accomplished fact. Moreover, everyone was acquainted with the statement made by the President of the United States regarding his country's intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people. All those facts were undeniable and no one had been able to refute them. They made it clear that the United States had been the aggressor in Korea and that the decisions taken subsequently by the General Assembly and the Security Council had only served to cloak that act of aggression under the flag of the United Nations.

36. Furthermore, to decide who was the aggressor, it was sufficient to ask how the Chinese people, who lived 5,000 or 6,000 miles away from the United States, could threaten the security of that country. Had the Government of the People's Republic of China occupied the territory of the United States? The facts showed they had not. On the other hand, the United States Government had occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan (Formosa), which could not in any way constitute a threat to the security of the United States in view of the distance separating the two territories. The lack of foundation for the accusation that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the aggressor was clear to the members of the Trusteeship Council as well as to world opinion which, for its part, knew who had been the aggressor in Korea.

37. He would not reply to the speech of a representative of a clique which the Chinese people had repudiated, for it had been merely a repetition of the arguments which had already been put forward by the United States representative in the Trusteeship Council and in other organs. After a historic struggle which had lasted twenty-seven years, the Chinese people had liberated themselves, expelled a venal political clique and themselves taken over the conduct of their internal affairs. The representatives of the Kuomintang group, who were holding on in Taiwan thanks to United States support, wished to involve the world in war and sacrifice millions of Chinese, if necessary, for the sole purpose of returning to power in China. The argument that the present régime in the People's Republic of China had been forced upon the Chinese people was not worth considering. How could any kind of régime be imposed from abroad on a nation of more than 475 million people? Only someone who had nothing more to lose, and who cared little whether millions of Chinese perished if their death ensured the return of the clique he represented to power, could use such arguments.

38. Turning then to the question of procedure, Mr. Soldatov emphasized that, contrary to what some representatives had alleged, the USSR draft resolution was completely admissible. Under the provisions of rule 14 of the Trusteeship Council's rules of procedure, the credentials of representatives on the Trusteeship Council were examined by the Secretary-General, who submitted a report on the subject for the Trusteeship Council's approval. It was clear, therefore, that the Council approved the credentials of representatives accredited by their Governments and it was on that provision that the USSR draft resolution was based. The purpose of the proposal was to have the Council reject the credentials of the representatives of the

Kuomintang, who in no way represented the Chinese people, and to have it approve the credentials of the representatives of the People's Republic of China appointed by the Central People's Government. There was no reason to refer to resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject of the representation of a Member State, for it was clear from rule 14 of the rules of procedure that the Trusteeship Council was competent to approve the credentials of the representatives on the Council. The USSR draft resolution was in keeping with the letter and the spirit of the rules of procedure as well as of the Charter, and he urged that it should be put to the vote and that it should be voted on before the United States proposal, which had been submitted after the Soviet Union text.

39. The PRESIDENT observed that, under sub-paragraph 1 (g) of rule 56 of the rules of procedure, motions to postpone discussion of a question to a certain date or indefinitely had precedence over all draft resolutions or other motions relative to the subject before the meeting. The object of the United States proposal was to postpone the discussion on the representation of China until the General Assembly had taken action on the question. That proposal should therefore have priority over the USSR draft resolution.

40. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that the United States proposal concerned the actual substance of the problem of China's representation in the Trusteeship Council, not a point of procedure; its text referred to the General Assembly resolutions and its purpose was to provide a solution to the very substance of the problem. The proposal was therefore not a procedural motion and could not have priority over the USSR draft resolution.

41. Mr. SAYRE (United States of America) considered it unnecessary to disprove the description given by the representative of the USSR of the events in Korea. The United Nations Commission on Korea had prepared a report² on the subject and the facts it had brought out were sufficient to dispel all doubts.

42. With regard to the question of procedure raised by the representative of the Soviet Union, the United States delegation agreed with the President that the provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (g) of rule 56 of the Council's rules of procedure were applicable in the case of the United States proposal.

43. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that sub-paragraph 1 (g) of rule 56 concerned motions to postpone discussion of a question to a certain day or indefinitely. Under the terms of the United States proposal, however, discussion would be postponed pending a decision on the matter by the General Assembly. That provision was not in accordance with sub-paragraph 1 (g) and it was therefore wrong to say that the United States proposal came within the terms of rule 56 of the rules of procedure.

44. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) did not clearly understand the nature of the objection raised by the representative of the Soviet Union. The date when the General Assembly would take its decision was not

² *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 16.

known so that it was, in fact, indefinite, as specified in sub-paragraph 1 (g) of rule 56.

45. Mr. LAURENTIE (France) pointed out that the President had ruled in the matter. If that ruling was challenged, the Council would determine by vote whether or not the question was one of procedure. Its decision would settle the problem and also the question of priority.

46. The PRESIDENT noted that, as the United States proposal was to postpone discussion of the USSR draft resolution until the General Assembly had taken a decision on the question of China's representation, the date in question would clearly be indefinite and rule 56 would therefore be applicable.

47. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) observed that both the USSR and United States proposals were related to item 20 of the Trusteeship Council's provisional agenda concerning recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State. Immediate consideration of that agenda item and, at the same time, of the two proposals would seem to be the logical course of action.

48. Moreover, paragraph 3 of the operative part of the relevant General Assembly resolution referred to the "attitude" of the General Assembly and did not use the word "decision". By not taking a decision on the question of China's representation, the General Assembly had therefore thus far adopted a negative attitude on the substance of the problem. The Trusteeship Council should accordingly confine its action to taking note of the General Assembly resolution on the question.

49. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was unable to share the President's view that the United States proposal should be voted on first. It was a substantive, not a procedural, proposal and should therefore be put to the vote after the USSR draft resolution which had, besides, been submitted first. Two substantive proposals were before the Council, for the effect of the United States proposal would be continued recognition of the Kuomintang representative as the representative of China, while the Soviet Union draft resolution provided for recognition of the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as the legal representative of China.

50. Moreover, resolution 396 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1950, was of primary importance both from the political and legal points of view. Reference to that resolution in the United States proposal was further evidence that the proposal was clearly one of substance. Recourse should not be had to procedural devices to prevent the qualified representative of the Chinese people from taking his seat in the Council as the representative of his country.

51. The PRESIDENT stood by his interpretation of the rules of procedure; if any member of the Council disagreed with that interpretation, it was his right to challenge the President's ruling.

52. He explained, however, that rule 56 indicated clearly the circumstances in which certain types of motions took precedence over draft resolutions under

consideration, regardless of whether the proposals concerned substance or procedure.

53. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that it would have been far simpler to have put the USSR draft resolution to the vote as soon as it had been presented. In that connexion, he recalled that when the same question had been raised at the first meeting of the General Assembly's fifth session,³ various proposals had been presented, some of which had dealt with the substance of the question, while one, of a procedural nature, had dealt with the establishment of a committee; nevertheless, those proposals had been put to the vote in the order of their presentation, and the USSR substantive proposal had been voted on before the procedural proposal. It would therefore appear that, in the present case, the USSR draft resolution was being dealt with in an arbitrary way.

54. The PRESIDENT affirmed that his ruling was the result of an entirely objective interpretation of the rules of procedure.

55. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) observed that the rules of procedure were perfectly clear with regard to the case under consideration, which did not even require a ruling by the President. The dispute would therefore appear to concern the actual content of the rules of procedure.

56. Mr. SAYRE (United States of America) did not understand the meaning of the USSR representative's reference to a procedural device. In point of fact, the situation seemed perfectly clear as regards procedure: the Council had before it a USSR draft resolution and a United States proposal to the effect that consideration of that draft resolution should be postponed. Rule 56, sub-paragraph 1 (g) of the rules of procedure provided for motions of precisely that nature, and there was no question of the President having to decide whether it was a matter of substance or of procedure.

57. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) regretted that the Soviet Union representative should have complained of an allegedly arbitrary ruling by the President on the USSR draft resolution. In his view, the President had done no more than apply the rules of procedure, and any appeal against his ruling should be put to the vote without further delay.

58. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) explained that he had not appealed against the President's ruling; he had merely said that the USSR draft resolution should be put to the vote first.

59. His request was based on the following considerations: first, the United States proposal referred to the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1950 regarding the recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State, a question which was on the Council's agenda and which the Council must therefore examine. Consequently, he did not see how the Council could adopt a proposal referring to a General Assembly resolution which was before the Council, but which the Council had not yet considered.

60. Secondly, the United States proposal raised the question of the representation of a Member State, a

³ *Ibid.*, Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings, 277th meeting.

question which was undoubtedly of considerable political and legal importance and could not be regarded as merely procedural.

61. Lastly, the United States proposal mentioned the USSR draft resolution on the same question, which the President had regarded as a proposal of substance. In deciding to postpone the consideration of the latter proposal, the Council would therefore be taking a decision of substance as it would in effect be depriving the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China of the seat to which his country was entitled.

62. In view of the above considerations, it was clear that the United States proposal was one of substance and, that being so, must be put to the vote after the USSR draft resolution.

63. Since the President was, however, maintaining his ruling, the Soviet Union delegation formally moved that its draft resolution should be put to the vote first. Thus, the Trusteeship Council had two procedural motions before it.

64. The PRESIDENT noted that the Soviet Union representative's motion amounted to a proposal that the USSR draft resolution should be given precedence; adoption of that motion would mean that the provisions of rule 56 of the rules of procedure were being waived.

65. He put to the vote the procedural motion of the Soviet Union representative.

The motion was rejected by 11 votes to 1.

66. The PRESIDENT put the United States proposal to the vote.

The proposal was adopted by 10 votes to 2.

67. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) said that his delegation had opposed that proposal because the United Kingdom Government did not regard the Trusteeship Council as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; it was one of the main organs of the United Nations and was fully competent to decide independently on all questions of representation. The proposal which had just been adopted was therefore inappropriate; furthermore, the provisions of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1950 were not mandatory.

68. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that his delegation had voted against the resolution of 14 December 1950⁴ because it had felt that that resolution violated the United Nations Charter. For the same reason, his delegation could not agree to the Council's taking the resolution into account and thus refusing to recognize the representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as the only rightful representative of China, while recognizing as such the representative of the Kuomintang.

69. The Trusteeship Council was one of the chief organs of the United Nations and, as such, must itself decide on questions pertaining to credentials or to the representation of its members.

70. Mr. Shih-shun LIU (China) said that his delegation had voted in favour of the United States propo-

sal in order to speed up the Council's work. Its favourable vote did not mean that it approved the substance of the proposal; it could not agree that the Council should take into account the USSR draft resolution, which had no valid basis.

71. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) said his delegation had voted for the United States proposal because it thought the Trusteeship Council should not decide on the question of Chinese representation before the General Assembly itself had taken a decision on the subject. The Trusteeship Council was indeed one of the principal organs of the United Nations, but, so far as the specific question of the representation of a Member State was concerned, it must take into consideration the attitude of the General Assembly.

72. Mr. LAURENTIE (France) explained that no political significance should be attached to his delegation's vote in favour of the United States proposal. His delegation thought that the Trusteeship Council should not assume any political position in the matter but should wait until the General Assembly had taken a decision, thus carrying out the wish expressed by the General Assembly itself.

73. Mr. DE MARCHENA (Dominican Republic) emphasized that his delegation would have liked to vote against the USSR draft resolution, since it was formally opposed to recognition by the United Nations of the communist Chinese régime.

Adoption of the agenda

74. Mr. SAYRE (United States of America) called attention to the fact that the annual report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands⁵ had been transmitted to the Secretary-General on 4 January 1951 and had been circulated to members. His delegation therefore hoped that the Trusteeship Council would be able to place the examination of that report on the agenda for its current session; he recalled, in that connexion, that at its third special session (1st meeting), the Council had expressed a wish to finish the examination of the report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands during its winter session, in order to lighten the agenda of its summer session. In accordance with the Council's wish, the United States had taken the necessary steps to ensure that the special representative of the Administering Authority would be at the Trusteeship Council's disposal on 19 February 1951.

75. If the Council decided to examine the report during its current session, it would be advisable for its members to submit, not later than 12 February 1951, the written questions they wished to put to the special representative.

76. The PRESIDENT emphasized that the United States representative's suggestion could be adopted only if the Council agreed to suspend the application of rule 72, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, which stated: "Each report of an Administering Authority shall be considered by the Trusteeship Council at the

⁵ See *Report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, transmitted by the United States to the United Nations pursuant to Article 88 of the Charter of the United Nations*, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., 1950 (OPNAV P22-100-J).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 325th meeting.

first regular session following the expiration of six weeks from the receipt of the report by the Secretary-General".

77. However, as the report in question had been distributed on 8 January 1951, it might be considered that the six-week period had been observed if the Council began examination of the report on 19 February 1951.

78. There being no objection, he would consider that the Council accepted the suggestion that it should begin examination of the annual report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands on 19 February 1951, it being understood that written questions would be submitted not later than 12 February 1951.

It was so decided.

79. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked whether the Council could not examine at the present session the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru⁶ and New Guinea,⁷ since those reports had just been distributed.

80. The PRESIDENT said the same procedure might perhaps be followed for the examination of those reports as for the report on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, in other words, the application of rule 72 of the rules of procedure might be suspended, provided the Administering Authority could take the necessary steps for its special representatives for those Territories to be present during discussion of the report.

81. Mr. HAY (Australia) said that if it was the Council's wish to examine at its current session the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, his delegation would raise no objection. His government would make every effort to have special representatives made available. But owing to the administrative difficulties, accentuated by a recent volcanic eruption, the Australian Government would be unable to send its special representatives for some time, in any event not before 1 March.

82. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) observed that the reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea had only just been distributed. Members of the Council should have sufficient time to study them, and their governments also might wish to examine the documents. Moreover, it was dangerous to establish a precedent by failing to observe the rules of procedure.

83. The report on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was a different case. The report had already been available to members of the Council for some time and they had been able to study it.

84. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) understood the scruples and hesitations of the representative of Iraq. But the Council had decided at its third special session (1st meeting) to consider at its summer session all the reports on the Trust Territories in Africa, and

if it did not examine at its current session the reports on the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, Nauru and New Guinea, the agenda for the summer session would be overburdened. Moreover, the Council was to examine at its current session the reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific on the Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, and it should, if possible, be able to examine at the same time the annual reports of the Administering Authority for those Territories.

85. The PRESIDENT proposed that the Council should first adopt the provisional agenda and then consider the question of including in the agenda the examination of the reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea.

The provisional agenda (T/806 and T/806/Add.1) was adopted.

86. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) thought the Council should consider as many items as possible at its current session for it appeared that the summer session would have a very full agenda.

87. The PRESIDENT thought the Council might perhaps prolong its current session for that purpose.

88. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) supported the President's suggestion. That procedure had already been followed in the past. It would give more time for the examination of the reports. But it was not desirable to suspend the application of the rules of procedure merely in order to accelerate the Council's work.

89. Mr. HAY (Australia) did not wish to urge in any way that the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea should be examined during the current session. He had merely indicated his government's desire to comply with the Council's wishes if the difficulties he had already pointed out made that possible.

90. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) requested that the matter should not be put to the vote; a majority should not be opposed to a minority on that point. It was only if there was no objection on the part of the members of the Council that a decision could be taken to examine the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea at the current session.

91. Mr. SOLDATOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that if the Council did not examine those reports during the current session, it would have great difficulty in getting through the agenda of the summer session. Rule 10 of the rules of procedure authorized the Council to revise its agenda and, if necessary, to add certain items to it. Since the representative of Australia had said that it would be possible for the special representative for the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea to take part in the work of the Council towards the end of the current session thus anticipating the Council's wishes he hoped that the representative of Iraq would not oppose the examination of the annual reports on the administration of those Territories.

92. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) persisted in his belief that the objection he had raised was valid. If, however, the Council wished to make a formal examination of the annual reports on the Trust Territories of Nauru

⁶ See *Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the Territory of Nauru from 1st July, 1949 to 30th June, 1950*: Commonwealth of Australia, 1950.

⁷ See *Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the Territory of New Guinea from 1st July, 1949 to 30th June, 1950*: Commonwealth of Australia.

and New Guinea during the current session, he would not oppose that wish in any way, although he would deplore the precedent that would be created.

93. The PRESIDENT thought that if the record of the meeting made it clear that the Council's decision on that point did not constitute a precedent, the fears of the Iraqi representative would be put at rest.

94. He proposed that the examination of the annual reports on the administration of the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea should be included as additional items in the agenda.

It was so decided.

Programme of work

95. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that the special representative of New Zealand for the Trust Territory of Western Samoa was the High Commissioner himself, who was on his way to New York. He asked the Council to begin its examination of the report on the administration of the Trust Territory of Western Samoa on 2 February, suspend the discussion during his own absence, and resume it on 12 February.

96. The PRESIDENT said that that would be done if the members of the Council had no objection, but thought that a time limit should be fixed at once for the submission of written questions on the report, so that the special representative would be able to reply in time for the discussion.

97. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) wondered whether it might not be preferable to speak of "additional information" rather than "questions". Questions might give rise to written replies which would be set out in documents to be translated by the Secretariat. Written material should be reduced to the minimum.

98. Mr. LAURENTIE (France) asked whether the Council could not deal first with the matter raised in item 14 of the agenda, namely, rural economic development of the Trust Territories, since the report on the administration of the Trust Territory of Western Samoa was not to be examined until 2 February. Item 14 concerned a very important matter which many agencies had been and would in future be called upon to deal with. By discussing that matter, the Council could give those agencies valuable help.

99. He thought that it would be advisable to set up a committee to study the question as soon as possible, so that the Council's work would not overlap that of the Economic and Social Council.

100. The PRESIDENT agreed fully with the representative of France.

101. There were other urgent and important questions on the agenda. They were the matters raised in

item 23, transmission of the Provisional Questionnaire to the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of Somaliland; item 24, revision of the rules of procedure, which had been made necessary by the recent appointment of an Administering Authority not a Member of the United Nations; and lastly item 5, arrangements for the visiting mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, which was due to leave shortly and must have instructions from the Council.

102. Mr. HAY (Australia) would have liked more time to study the question of the revision of the rules of procedure.

103. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the item would not be examined by the Council immediately.

104. Mr. MUÑOZ (Argentina) asked whether the revision of the rules of procedure was not to be limited to matters raised by the administration of Somaliland.

105. The PRESIDENT said that that was so.

106. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) said the dates for the examination of the annual reports should be determined so that the special representatives of the Administering Authorities could be present in time. The adoption of the agenda naturally did not mean that the order in which the items were listed could not be altered.

107. The PRESIDENT was in full agreement with the Belgian representative. That was why he was asking the members of the Council to indicate what agenda items were to be examined first.

108. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) asked whether, in order to speed up the work of the Council, it would be possible for the Secretariat to prepare a plan of work taking into account the opinions which had just been expressed.

109. The PRESIDENT, after consulting the Secretary of the Council, said that that would be done and that the first items to be examined by the Council would be items 14, 23 and 5.

110. In reply to a question from the PRESIDENT, Mr. HAY (Australia) said that the earliest date by which the special representatives of Australia for the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea could arrive would be the first of March.

111. Mr. KHALIDY (Iraq) suggested that the Council should meet at 2 p.m. instead of 3 p.m.

112. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) thought that the time for the Council's meetings might be fixed at 2.30 p.m. exactly.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.