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New York

Provisional

President: Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Bolivia (Plurinational State of))

Members:

China	Mr. Xiao Yuxin
Egypt	Mr. Mahfouz
Ethiopia	Mr. Negash
France	Mrs. Jarrot
Italy	Mr. Romussi
Japan	Mr. Kaneko
Kazakhstan	Mr. Kuatbekov
Russian Federation.	Mr. Lukshin
Senegal	Mr. Sene
Sweden	Ms. Coyet
Ukraine	Mr. Leschenko
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	Mr. Dixon
United States of America.	Mr. Lee
Uruguay.	Ms. García Moyano

Agenda

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

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The meeting resumed at 2.10 p.m.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Malaysia to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Emmanuel Roux, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting.

I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than four minutes in order to enable the Security Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber.

I now give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

Mrs. Yalçın (Turkey): Turkey aligns itself with the statements made on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) and on behalf of the European Union. I will make the following statement in my national capacity.

Let me begin by thanking you, Sir, for organizing today's open debate as President of the Council and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Last year, the Committee completed the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) (see S/2016/1038). During that process, Turkey worked closely with the Committee and its Group of Experts. Turkey's updated national matrix, which is on the Committee's website, clearly shows our meticulous implementation of the resolution.

The report on the comprehensive review and the subsequent adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) — co-sponsored by Turkey — in December 2016, has given impetus to the implementation of that instrument, which plays an important role in the efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, we wish to thank Spain for its leadership as the previous Chair of the Committee, as well as the founder of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004).

Resolution 1540 (2004) established a central non-proliferation mechanism at the nexus of the risks posed by weapons of mass destruction and their

means of delivery. The global threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime and our nations' growing reliance on international free trade represent some of the conflicting dynamics in that equation. In that regard, I would like to reiterate Turkey's strong commitment to the full implementation of the resolution and its readiness to continue to cooperate with the Committee.

Turkey has the relevant toolbox needed to fully implement its obligations under the provisions of the resolution, namely, all-encompassing national legislation and comprehensive international legal instruments on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The present proliferation concerns, coupled with large-scale global commerce, financial transactions and cyber risks, place unprecedented responsibilities on Member States. In all parts of the world, transit trade and trans-shipments are usually the most vulnerable links in the chain of export control in terms of diversion. Reinforcing transit inspections will continue to remain high among Turkey's priorities with a view to strengthening export controls. However, it would be unfair to impose the burden of such controls on transit countries alone. Here, genuinely fair burden- and responsibility-sharing by source countries is needed.

As a country that has never pursued a weapons-of-mass-destruction programme, Turkey firmly opposes the development, production, stockpiling and use of such weapons by States and non-State actors. In that regard, the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria cannot be considered in isolation, as it is fully consistent with the regime's chemical -weapons programmes. And the gaps, discrepancies and inconsistencies in its declarations to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are a testimony to the regime's intentions.

The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism established that culpability for the use of chemical weapons against civilians lies with the Syrian regime's armed forces and Da'esh. The use of toxic chemicals, the most recent example of which was the Khan Shaykhun attack on 4 April this year, is a brutal reminder to the international community that, unless the perpetrators of such attacks are held accountable for their crimes, the attacks will continue unabated. In that regard, we call upon the Security Council to take measures in accordance with its relevant resolutions.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I give the floor to the representative of Belgium.

Mr. Buffin (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): Belgium shares the views expressed in the statements made on behalf of the European Union and on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Belgium would also like to make the following remarks in its national capacity.

First, let me thank the Bolivian presidency of the Security Council and Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for convening today's debate.

As mentioned in my country's statement to the Council in December 2016 on this very topic (see S/PV.7758), the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is no longer a working hypothesis but rather a reality in various countries and regions. The allure and accessibility of certain weapons of mass destruction and of related chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear technologies and resources have increased among non-State actors in their quest for the means to carry out large-scale and indiscriminate attacks. It is therefore essential to continue to work towards the most effective implementation of existing provisions and instruments used to combat the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear resources. The comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) (see S/2016/1038), carried out in 2016 under the Spanish chairmanship of the 1540 Committee, is an excellent starting point. Everyone's vigilance and the proper collaboration and transparency between States are necessary.

With regard to chemical weapons, Belgium, which is preparing to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the first large-scale use of mustard gas in the Ypres region in 1917 during World War I, strongly supports the work carried out by the OPCW. The multilateral approach to the control of chemical substances must be preserved, as it has demonstrated throughout the OPCW's 20-year lifespan that it is able to considerably reduce exposure to chemical weapons. Belgium supports the work of the OPCW and regularly reviews its own chemical facilities. The use of chemical weapons cannot go unpunished, whether carried out by States or by non-State groups. In that regard, it is essential that the Fact-finding Mission and the United Nations-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism be able to continue their work without external interference so as to shed light on all of the chemical incidents that have occurred in Syria and determine who was responsible. We firmly believe that the Security Council should be unanimous

in its condemnation of each chemical-weapons attack in Syria, both by the so-called Islamic State and by the Syrian regime.

As regards the fight against nuclear proliferation, Belgium has taken measures to secure existing sensitive materials and to reduce their quantities, often thanks to the support of new technologies. It is also acting to raise awareness among industry professionals. Our experts are also heavily involved in research that is geared towards the development of nuclear fuel that has a lower risk of proliferation than traditional fuel. Belgium remains vigilant in its control of medical and industrial radioactive sources and works to reduce the risk of proliferation around the world, particularly through its support for scientific research.

Despite the difficulties involved in implementing the Biological Weapons Convention, progress is possible in combating the proliferation of biological resources. The peer-review approach, to which Belgium contributed through the Benelux countries' peer review in 2015, has proved useful both in strengthening mutual trust in implementing the Convention and in building the capacity of the various States and experts participating in such reviews. Belgium takes this opportunity to pay tribute to Morocco, which successfully organized a peer review in May this year, with financial support from the European Union. We should also note the development of industrial standards in the biotechnology sector, as well as codes of conduct — developments that can strengthen that sector against the unwanted proliferation of biological resources.

Belgium believes that the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction into the hands of non-State actors can be effective only if it combines various approaches and includes a higher number of actors. Where multilateral initiatives exist and have proved to be effective, they must be strongly supported, and we must continue to adapt them to future challenges, in particular technological challenges. However, such multilateral and State-centred initiatives are not sufficient. Regional approaches, both formal and informal, can also play a fundamental role in the fight against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferation. Approaches such as those supported by Council Decision 2017/809 of the Council of the European Union in support of resolution 1540 (2004) can indeed help to strengthen cooperation, build trust and transparency, foster the strengthening of expertise and disseminate best practices.

In conclusion, Belgium would like to stress that the role of economics in the implementation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear safety and security norms is key to non-proliferation. State regulation and voluntary standards and certification by commercial entities can be mutually strengthening. However, given the amount of uncontrolled material at risk of proliferation and the limited amount of available public resources, we should favour an approach that involves all sectors of society in combating proliferation.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

Mr. Laassel (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): My delegation welcomes the initiative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, as President of the Security Council, in organizing this open debate and expresses its appreciation for the leadership of that delegation as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

My delegation aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004).

Addressing today's theme on ways to prevent the catastrophic humanitarian, political, economic and environmental consequences of the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, in particular terrorists, is not an easy task. It involves both topical and complex issues, in particular the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, which generates its particular relevance.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to international peace and security. But the dramatic proliferation of terrorist actors and their expanding activities represent an even greater threat. Unfortunately, we are helplessly witnessing an endless spiral of terrorist attacks striking everywhere and in various forms. Those attacks increasingly demonstrate that terrorists are not holding back and are ready to spread terror by any means, including by using weapons of mass destruction, so as to generate the maximum number of victims and create chaos.

Terrorist groups are assisted in the execution of their macabre plans by the rapid development of new information technologies and various industrial advances that enable them to recruit from a distance, train remotely and even carry out remote attacks. If terrorists are determined to carry out their macabre

plans, we must also be determined to preserve peace, to save lives, to fight against the terrorists and to prevent their access to new information and technologies. We must prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and from developing, trafficking or using them.

The United Nations has addressed the challenges of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in several ways, including through the process initiated by the Security Council in resolution 1540 (2004), adopted unanimously on 28 April 2004. Located at the intersection of the fight against proliferation and the fight against terrorism, resolution 1540 (2004) complements the international non-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures adopted by States in addressing the specific threats posed by non-State actors.

Resolution 1540 (2004) is original in that it is the first international law provision to take into account the collusion between the two main threats to world peace and security, namely, weapons of mass destruction and non-State actors. However, its originality concerns not only its content, but also its goal, ambition, strength and scope. Unlike other multilateral disarmament instruments, resolution 1540 (2004) was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and is, therefore, binding on all States Members of the United Nations. It must be acknowledged that since its adoption, Governments around the world have endeavoured to implement its main provisions by adopting many laws and implementing a wide range of appropriate measures.

In addition, several States have provided additional information on a voluntary basis or at the request of the 1540 Committee. Furthermore, a matrix common to all States to facilitate the collection of information relevant to assessing the implementation of the resolution has also helped to maintain a link with States.

Nevertheless, the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) remains a major challenge for many States, especially in Africa, owing to the precise nature of its requirements and the complex measures needed to address them. However, it is true that the 1540 Committee is making commendable efforts through the assistance mechanism to effectively assist States, which are, in most cases, not fully aware of their shortcomings and have difficulty identifying their needs in implementing the resolution.

The 1540 Committee also encourages States to report on legal systems and authorities, as well as civil and criminal measures adopted to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

However, there is little information for the assessment of the true effectiveness of the official measures. The submission of a report does not guarantee the correct implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), as some reports are more a statement of intent than a detailed account of genuine State action. Consequently, accurate accounting of the number of national reports submitted is not a reliable criterion for assessing the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by States and the outcomes of their engagement. Hence the need for further efforts to improve the evaluation of State action in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

The 1540 Committee would, therefore, benefit from a greater focus on assisting States in identifying their shortcomings, without relying on the necessary but insufficient counting of the number of legal norms adopted, by analysing in depth the extent to which the standards were applied and their real impact on the sensitive areas identified in the resolution, such as the storage, transport and export of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and their means of delivery.

Convinced that coordination through the exchange of information, especially at the subregional level, is dictated by the importance of proximity and shared borders in the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use by non-State actors, the Kingdom of Morocco will organize an information workshop in November aimed at African national contact points, in the framework of seeking effective universal application of the provisions of the resolution.

The meeting will facilitate confidence-building among African States, thereby facilitating possible partnerships in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It will also provide an opportunity to take stock of the regional situation, including the status of threats and persistent gaps in the mechanisms available to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to non-State groups. The development of contacts and a deeper knowledge of the situation as a result of regional conferences are far from negligible.

I cannot conclude without reiterating that the international community must accelerate efforts to achieve the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate guarantee against their use and acquisition by non-State actors. In that context, Morocco will continue to fulfil its obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) and pursue fruitful cooperation with the 1540 Committee.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I give the floor to the representative of South Africa.

Mr. Zaayman (South Africa): South Africa welcomes the convening of this open debate. Since the dawn of our democracy in 1994, South Africa has been steadfast in its commitment to multilateralism in addressing the peace and security challenges facing the global community, including the horizontal and vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. South Africa reaffirms that no cause could ever justify the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction anywhere, by anyone or under any circumstances.

Nuclear weapons remain the most indiscriminate and inhumane weapons ever to have been developed. Together with the vast majority of the international community, we believe that all efforts should consequently be made to ensure that those weapons are never used again, under any circumstances. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament is, therefore, not only a legal obligation, but also a moral and ethical imperative.

It is in that context that my delegation welcomes the convening of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons. My delegation would like to stress that the instrument being negotiated is not a proverbial silver bullet that can cure all ills. Its main purpose is to encourage progress towards the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by stigmatizing and delegitimizing such weapons on a global scale.

We share the concern of the international community about the threat posed by non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction and in this regard remain committed to the strengthening of transfer controls as called for in resolution 1540 (2004). We recognize the need for international assistance and cooperation, especially for States that may not have the requisite resources to give effect to their obligations. In our view, accomplishing the full implementation of resolution

1540 (2004) requires continuous and sustained efforts at the national, regional and international levels.

At the national level, South Africa has over the years strengthened its implementation capacity through comprehensive national legislation focusing on WMDs and their means of delivery. Our domestic legislation is subject to continuous review, taking into account new technological developments and experiences in national implementation.

While dealing with the aforementioned challenges, it is imperative that unwarranted restrictions not be imposed on the inalienable right of Member States, particularly developing countries, to use any related materials, equipment and technologies for peaceful purposes. In this regard, the opportunities provided by nuclear technologies in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly in areas such as food security, public-health technologies and clean energy, cannot be overlooked.

Furthermore, the exchange of scientific information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes is greatly needed in Africa to deal with the spread of infectious diseases, which could derail socioeconomic growth and development if not adequately addressed.

South Africa's experience with the implementation of control regimes has demonstrated that the challenges of WMDs and their delivery systems can be addressed by, first, strengthening national legislation and implementation capacities; secondly, accelerating the provision of capacity-building and technical expertise, especially to developing countries, including in Africa; thirdly, strengthening international cooperation with other related international organizations; fourthly, ensuring adequate and predictable funding for the relevant international organizations and implementation support structures so as to enable them to implement their mandates; fifthly, strengthening cooperation between regional organizations and the relevant multilateral organizations; and, sixthly and finally, enhancing cooperation with civil society and the private sector.

In conclusion, the threat of WMD proliferation can be dealt with effectively only through increased international cooperation and assistance as well as the strengthening of the relevant multilateral instruments and institutions. What is required is a faithful and balanced implementation of the various international legally binding instruments.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Austria.

Mr. Charwath (Austria): Let me thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this very timely open debate.

Austria, of course, fully aligns itself with the statement delivered earlier by the observer of the European Union. Let me therefore offer just a few additional remarks from my national perspective. I should like to talk about three issues.

First, in recent years, two of the most significant international security challenges of our time — terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — have increasingly come to overlap and thereby compound each other. Recent instances of the use of chemical weapons not only by the Syrian regime but also by the Islamic State have increased public attention to this danger. In the current situation, resolution 1540 (2004) is becoming ever more relevant, and, with last year's resolution 2325 (2016), we now have a new instrument to further improve the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the face of these growing threats.

Secondly, Austria is firmly committed to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. My country is party to all relevant international treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Austria considers export controls as an important tool to prevent proliferation and therefore actively participates in the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Importantly, Austria has in place legislation aimed at implementing effectively, at the national level, its international non-proliferation commitments, such as the relevant articles of the Austrian penal code and of our Foreign Trade Act. Let me also mention that Austria serves as the Executive Secretariat of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. We also participate in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

But, thirdly, the most horrific scenario of all, namely, the acquisition of nuclear material or, even worse, a nuclear weapon by terrorists can, unfortunately, not be dismissed as unrealistic today. It is clear that there are

actors with a firm intention to achieve exactly that, and there is evidence that some are working systematically to overcome the remaining obstacles. The humanitarian and other consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack would be catastrophic.

While we have to redouble our efforts within the existing nuclear non-proliferation regimes to prevent such an occurrence, we also have to reinforce these regimes. One of the major obstacles, of course, is the continued existence of nuclear weapons as such. The greater their number and the greater the number of possessor States, the more difficult it is to secure them against theft, hacking or other forms of unauthorized access by non-State actors.

Equally importantly, so long as a number of States possess such weapons, others will be tempted to develop or to get hold of them as well. And the greater the number of States that possess nuclear weapons and related material, the more opportunities there will be for non-State actors to get their hands on them.

Inversely, the smaller the overall number of nuclear weapons in the world and of States possessing them, the smaller the risk that non-State actors will achieve their nefarious objectives. That is why real progress on nuclear disarmament is crucial, not least in the context of our discussion here.

The convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons that is currently under negotiation at the United Nations — downstairs in this very Building — is aimed at facilitating such progress. Let me emphasize that this initiative is fully in line with the existing non-proliferation regime, with the NPT at its centre, and that its aim is to strengthen, not weaken, the regime. Moreover, the initiative has already delivered some other positive results, as the multilateral disarmament machinery, both here in New York and in Geneva, seems to have geared up recently compared with recent years.

In our view, we must work in both directions to ensure greater security for all, strengthening the existing non-proliferation and control regimes and seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Guatemala.

Mr. Skinner-Klée (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me at the outset to congratulate the delegation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and on its

outstanding leadership at the helm of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), of which you, Sir, are the Chair. We also welcome the presence of and the timely presentations by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, and the representative of the Office of Strategy and Policy of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Mr. Joseph Ballard. We also appreciate the concept note circulated by your delegation, Mr. President, which serves as our guide for today's debate.

I also associate myself with the statements to be made by the delegation of Spain as Chair of the Group of Friends of the 1540 Committee and the delegation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as Chair of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

There can be no doubt that terrorism is one of the main challenges facing the world today. Likewise, the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially by non-State actors, and the threat that their proliferation poses to international peace and security are a priority issue for us all.

In recent years, the face and the methods of terrorism have changed. Furthermore, advances in the area of science, technology and international trade, which in many ways have improved our daily lives, have brought with them a series of new threats to security through their potential use as instruments by radical groups and individuals who seek to wreak havoc on civilization. Sadly, many recent examples show that the threat of terrorism knows no borders and that no country or region is immune to attack. Hence it is imperative that all Member States comply with our obligation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials so as to prevent their acquisition by non-State actors, and ensure that States have the resources and the capacity necessary to do so.

For my delegation, resolution 1540 (2004) has pride of place in the international non-proliferation regime. We would like to emphasize in particular the preventive and cooperative nature of that important resolution. The aim since its adoption has been the establishment of an instrument to strengthen the approach to non-proliferation commitments without directly affecting Member States' compliance with their obligations with respect to the other pillars

of disarmament, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

We fully agree with the concept note prepared for today's debate, which stresses the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) as a platform for cooperation, but which also warns that it would be counterproductive for that spirit of cooperation to be turned into a coercive or punitive mechanism.

We also recognize the need to strengthen the international non-proliferation framework in general, and resolution 1540 (2004) in particular, as well as the need to adapt them to the reality of the threat that they seek to prevent. We believe that the recent comprehensive review process of resolution 1540 (2004). The adoption of resolution 2325 (2016) achieved that delicate balance, taking into account the evolving nature of the risk of proliferation, the technological advances and new obligations to address the threat, while recognizing the importance of providing States with the resources and capacity necessary to achieve the full implementation of the resolution.

We also noted that the review process recognized the important role of the Expert Group Meeting on the Development of a Training Module on the International Legal Framework against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism and the importance of regional organizations in the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Universal, comprehensive and balanced implementation of the resolution is possible only if all Member States play a central role, and have the resources to do so. Regional organizations are ideal partners for that, having the knowledge of the specificities and realities of each of their member States, as well as of the region as a whole. We welcome the role played in our own region by the Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Guatemala is aware of the significance of this important resolution and is committed to complying with its obligations in this area. We have also made additional commitments by requesting technical assistance from the Committee so as to develop a national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and also have several ongoing legislative processes under way. Following the initial visit to my country by several members of the Committee's Group of Experts to begin formulating the national action plan

in Guatemala, efforts are continuing at the national level with various Government entities to work on the main elements of the Plan.

Finally, we recall that the only guarantee for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing them from falling into the hands of non-State actors is that they no longer exist. We therefore welcome the conference currently under way to negotiate a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. We are convinced that a ban on those deadly weapons will bring us closer to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Mr. Falouh (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this important meeting on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). This meeting is of particular importance given the threat represented by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, their components and delivery systems by terrorist groups.

The worst violations of resolution 1540 (2004) today are the insistence of certain countries and certain intelligence services on supporting and training terrorist groups, even going so far as to provide them with toxic chemical weapons that are then used against both the military and civilians. The representatives of those same countries are seeking to deviate today's meeting from its goals by raising topics that are not on the agenda, in order to impede our efforts and prevent the Security Council from holding a genuine, serious debate on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

In that regard, we would like to recall that it is those countries that opposed the draft resolution (S/2016/847) submitted by Russia and China aimed at impeding the acquisition of chemical weapons by terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. It is those same countries that opposed the efforts and attempts to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction; they did that for the sole purpose of protecting Israel's chemical, biological and nuclear arsenal.

The Israeli representative made a statement that included a tangle of baseless accusations and lies. It is almost comical, even pitiful, that the members of the international community must sit in the Council

Chamber and listen to such allegations and lies coming from a representative of an occupying Power that continues to occupy Arab territories and support terrorists groups, in particular the Al-Nusra Front, in the area of separation. That country has a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons arsenal, with the consent and protection of Western countries that are permanent members of the Council.

The support that Israel provides to terrorist groups in Syria has been proved by the extensive evidence that we have provided to the Council. For those who are still doubtful, I encourage them to read the report published by *The Wall Street Journal* on 19 June 2017, which is punctuated by terrorist confessions.

My Government has for some time and in a consistent manner warned of the danger of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaida. To date, we have sent more than 108 letters to the Council, to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to the Joint Investigative Mechanism and to all of the relevant committees and bodies of the Security Council. Our letters include documented information implicating countries that have provided such chemical products as chlorine, mustard gas and sarin gas to terrorist groups to be used against civilians.

I would also like to say that Turkish intelligence service transferred sarin gas to terrorist groups in Syria after the product arrived from Libya in 2013. The regime of President Erdoğan facilitates the transfer of such substances to Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist groups in Syria, and that is a flagrant violation of the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004).

My country is still waiting for the bodies and special mechanisms of the United Nations to react to that information and to treat it with the seriousness it deserves. We are also waiting for that information to be reflected in the reports on chemical weapons and their use by terrorist groups. This is no longer a matter of merely making a statement in international forums. Such chemical weapons are in the hands of terrorists and are being used in many regions of Syria, most recently in Khan Shaykhun. The attacks were premeditated and were driven by regional and international forces in order to tarnish the image of Syria and to justify attacks against the Syrian forces who are fighting terrorism.

The accusations and allegations that we have heard over the past two days from Western representatives, as well as from the persons representing those countries today, all of those declarations are part of the political blackmail war — the very low war — that now systematically accompanies every success of the Syrian army and its allies as they fight terrorism. Those lies are also being systematically presented in the negotiations among various Syrian parties, both in Astana and Geneva, in order to impede the efforts made by the Syrian Government to arrive at a political solution without outside interference.

We have a consistent position of principle. We condemn the use of chemical weapons and any and all weapons of mass destruction. Their use is a crime against humanity that is unacceptable, immoral and unjustifiable, regardless of the surrounding circumstances. On that basis, my country ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and we have implemented all of our commitments. My country ended its chemical-weapons programme in record time, which is unprecedented in the history of the Organization. That achievement was noted in the report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Mission for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic and was brought to the attention of the Council in June 2014.

In conclusion, my country has always rejected all allegations by certain Western Administrations concerning the use of chemical and toxic weapons by the Syrian armed forces. In line with our commitments, we have fully cooperated within the framework of the investigation carried out by international bodies since 2014. We have provided all the needed information in order to facilitate the investigation and ensure that it is credible and impartial. However, some Members of this Organization will never tell the truth, for reasons that are well known to Council members.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Cho Tae-yul (Republic of Korea): I would like to begin by commending the Bolivian presidency of the Security Council and the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for organizing this important debate. The fact that this is

the third open debate since August of last year on the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-State actors clearly demonstrates the urgency and gravity of the threat and challenges before us.

Indeed, the seemingly unthinkable scenario of terrorist organizations or other non-State actors gaining access to WMDs has become a reality, as illustrated by the identified uses of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria and Iraq. The assessment of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or Da'esh, may have the capacity to produce chemical weapons is more than worrisome. At the same time, there is simply no guarantee that nuclear and biological materials are safe from the hands of such malicious actors.

That is the reason that the Republic of Korea fully aligns itself with the joint statement to be delivered by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). Given the fact that such non-State actors are taking advantage of transboundary networks enabled by rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce, I would like to make additional remarks in my national capacity, with a focus on the following three points for further consideration in our joint efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

First, with regard to building a multilayered prevention mechanism, our response to non-State actors must be as transboundary and tech-savvy as theirs is. In addition to export and border controls at the domestic level, mechanisms provided by the 1540 system provide a rallying point for our regional and global efforts to prevent the illicit acquisition of WMDs. On top of that, as the representative of the country currently holding the chairmanship of both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, I would like to stress the importance of active participation in initiatives taken by multilateral export-control regimes to add one more layer of sharing proliferation-related information, such as on updated dual-use items and recent techniques used by non-State actors.

Secondly, with regard to creating a cascade effect in awareness-raising, resolution 2325 (2016) calls for more regional conferences and 1540-points-of-contact training sessions. As terrorist groups' networks are

becoming wider-spread, we should invest more in mobilizing public-and private-sector focal points so that they can reach wider constituents of our society. In that regard, last year, the Government of the Republic of Korea successfully hosted the first of the regional Wiesbaden conferences for industry outreach in the Pacific region. The Republic of Korea will continue to support 1540-points-of-contact training sessions in various regions through its contribution to the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities.

Finally, national capacities should be scaled up through tailor-made matchmaking. Two years of the chairmanship of the 1540 Committee, from 2013 to 2014, taught Seoul that matching offers and requests for assistance is most challenging, but we also learned that through such matching we can close gaps in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) against the wishes of ill-disposed non-State actors.

In conclusion, it would be remiss of me not to mention the threat posed to the global non-proliferation regime by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's continued pursuit of WMD and missile capabilities. Considering that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is one of the weakest links in our joint endeavours to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical materials and their means of delivery to non-State actors, I would like to underscore the importance of the full and effective implementation of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), in tandem with the relevant Security Council sanctions resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, by the international community as a whole.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam.

Mrs. Nguyen Phuong Nga (Viet Nam): I would like to express my appreciation to the Bolivian presidency and chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for convening this open debate on global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by non-State actors. I also thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the Senior Officer from the Office of Strategy and Policy of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for their informative briefings.

Viet Nam aligns itself with the statement to be delivered later by the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The extraordinary and rapid advances in science and technology create enormous benefits for humankind, but they also bring about the risk of misuse, enabling non-State actors to take advantage of such advances to gain access to WMDs and making it harder for States to put in place adequate controls over proliferation activities. The risk of non-State actors acquiring, developing and using WMDs and their means of delivery poses a grave threat to global peace and security and is even more alarming in cases when terrorists and their supporters have shown their intent and capability to develop and use WMDs. Toxic chemicals have been reportedly used as weapons in Syria and Iraq by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, causing serious casualties and devastating socioeconomic consequences for civilians and their livelihoods.

The United Nations has been playing an active role in tackling the threat of the proliferation of WMDs by non-State actors. It has promoted multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, raised public awareness and assisted Member States in building and strengthening their capacities to prevent non-State actors from acquiring and using such lethal weapons. In that regard, my delegation wishes to commend the 1540 Committee for its findings and conclusions in the comprehensive review report (see S/2016/1038), as well as the Security Council for adopting resolution 2325 (2016), which has mapped out a global agenda for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We acknowledge the positive contributions made by Member States to the success of the open-ended working group during the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We also welcome the increased cooperation and coordination at the national, regional and international levels in global non-proliferation activities involving the United Nations and other stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and the private sector, with, as appropriate, their States' consent.

Viet Nam is strongly committed to WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and actively advocates for the peaceful use of related technologies. Viet Nam is a party to, and complies fully with, its obligations under all key WMD disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the Safeguards Agreement of the International Atomic Energy

Agency and its Additional Protocol. Viet Nam fully implements the relevant Security Council resolutions and actively participates in related initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. At the national level, we have adopted and enforced appropriate legislation and have established domestic controls to impede non-State actors from undertaking, assisting or financing such proliferation activities.

Viet Nam believes that addressing WMD proliferation must be coupled with substantive progress on WMD disarmament. We welcome the ongoing United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. We also believe that our efforts towards the establishment and promotion of nuclear-weapons-free zones also contribute to the existing global non-proliferation regime. At the same time, non-proliferation efforts should not hinder the legitimate rights of States to acquire, produce and use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. It is also important to avoid placing an undue burden on States with regard to such efforts. Rather, States, especially developing countries, should develop their own effective strategies for countering new types of crime.

In conclusion, I want to say that we believe that it is high time for us to redouble our efforts, along with united political will and strong determination, to take collective action against the grave security challenge posed by WMD proliferation. In order to fully implement the global non-proliferation agenda, we need the active participation and large-scale cooperation both within and among States.

You can rest assured, Mr. President, of Viet Nam's commitment to striving for a world free of all weapons of mass destruction.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

Mr. Bin Momen (Bangladesh): I thank you, Mr. President, for your presence throughout our deliberations today. Bangladesh also thanks the presidency of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for organizing this high-level open debate. We thank the briefers for sharing their insights.

We recall the implementation of the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) under the leadership of the delegation of Spain last year. We reiterate our conviction that the action-oriented and balanced approach of resolution 2325 (2016) will help Member States further consolidate their respective 1540-compliance regimes.

The growing use of illicit financing, new technologies and the dark web by non-State actors, including terrorists, continues to pose new challenges to Member States. Those trends require us to devise more innovative, well-coordinated and fool-proof national mechanisms, especially for securing the production, use, storage and transport of materials related to chemical and biological weapons. It also remains of paramount importance to ensure cross-border controls against the illicit transfer of arms, ammunition, weapons of mass destruction and their means of production and delivery. In order to build on the progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and address the emerging gaps, we would reiterate the following four points.

First, the concept note for this debate aptly recognizes that the task of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term undertaking. It would therefore be crucial to support its implementation in a coordinated and consistent, yet context-specific manner. The regular sharing of best practices, including through the national points of contact network, would be particularly useful. In that regard, we recall Bangladesh's participation in the training course for points of contact held in Qingdao, China, in September 2015, and we look forward to participating in the upcoming one in August this year.

Secondly, the wide divergences in implementation among Member States will continue to persist unless meaningful financial and technical assistance is provided to overcome the structural constraints faced by many States. We would expect Member States and the relevant entities in a position to do so to redouble their efforts to provide concrete, needs-based assistance to interested States upon their request. The 1540 Committee's Group of Experts can continue to help Member States to better identify and articulate their needs and match them with a relevant offer of support and expertise by States and other stakeholders.

Thirdly, resolution 2325 (2016) makes a strong case for further enhancing the 1540 Committee's cooperation and interface with the relevant international, regional and subregional entities. We reaffirm the need to avoid

duplication and to facilitate assistance and the sharing of expertise on a regional basis.

Fourthly, we take note of the rapid advances in science and technology that are susceptible to abuse or risks of proliferation by non-State actors, including terrorists. We call upon the 1540 Committee to help enhance our information and knowledge base about the evolving risks, especially those requiring our pre-emptive action.

The threat of WMDs falling into the hands of unauthorized non-State actors has rightly been identified as a looming catastrophe. As a responsible member of the international community, Bangladesh remains committed to further strengthening its efforts to help prevent any such situation and its grave consequences. We continue to work to make our voluntary reports to the 1540 Committee more informative and comprehensive.

In conclusion, we affirm that we associate ourselves with the statement to be delivered by the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Botswana.

Mr. Ntwaagae (Botswana): At the outset, allow me, Mr. President, to join other delegations in commending your delegation most sincerely on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. I also wish to commend you for convening this important open debate focused on the global effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

Botswana aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Botswana also welcomes this open debate, which seeks to consider practical measures to implement resolution 1540 (2004), and applauds your country, Sir, for drawing global attention to the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors. The rise of terrorism and insurgent groups increases the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The advent of international terrorism has had adverse effects on our efforts to establish and sustain a tranquil and peaceful international order. Moreover, in the recent past, terrorist groups have employed weapons

of mass destruction against innocent and unarmed civilian populations. Ensuring that such actors do not have access to those devastating weapons should be a lesson and a challenge for us all.

Botswana fully supports resolution 1540 (2004), which urges all States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors seeking to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes.

Weapons of mass destruction are a serious threat to global peace and security, and their use has devastating consequences for humankind and all forms of life on our planet. In that regard, it is imperative that the Security Council, Member States and international organizations spare no effort in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. In that regard, Botswana reaffirms its commitment to international instruments that ban weapons of mass destruction, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Botswana also fully supports the ongoing United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. Should that effort come to fruition, it would be an enormous step towards a nuclear-free world, for which we all yearn.

Before I conclude, let me highlight some of the measures that Botswana has adopted to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). To strengthen national capacities to deal with emerging global security challenges, Botswana, among other things, adopted a counter-terrorism act, a chemical-weapon prohibition act and a proceeds-and-instruments of crime act. Botswana also continues to train agencies, such as the financial intelligence agency, and other safety and security entities to effectively deal with the crimes of terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering and the monitoring and tracking of the movement of chemicals in the country that have the potential to contribute to the proliferation of chemical weapons.

There are a number of challenges and opportunities available to us in order to effectively deal with this matter. Botswana firmly believes that deepening international cooperation and strengthening existing mechanisms should form the basis of our efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We are gravely concerned that, while there

is general consensus on the escalation of international terrorism, the difficulty in agreeing on a common definition of terrorism will continue to undermine our efforts to fight that global scourge.

Also problematic is the phenomenon of dual-use and the use for peaceful means. The inherent right of sovereign States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, for instance, must be respected. Anything to the contrary undermines existing multilateral instruments, the Charter of the United Nations and all others efforts to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

In conclusion, I wish to reaffirm Botswana's unwavering commitment to support the international community by playing its part in ensuring that terror organizations do not have access to any weapons of mass destruction. We need sustainable peace and security in order for the human spirit to thrive and develop.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, I am pleased to see you, Ambassador Sacha Llorentty Solíz, a son of Bolivia — our liberator's favourite country — presiding over the Security Council this month. You have done an outstanding job and we wish to congratulate you.

It is an honour for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to speak on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

First of all, allow me to convey, on behalf of the member States of the Movement, our best wishes to the delegation of the Plurinational State of Bolivia for a successful month in conducting the work of the Council, as well as our appreciation for its efforts in the drafting of the concept note for this meeting, which serves as a basis for guiding our discussions today.

We also take this opportunity to acknowledge the dedication with which the delegation of Uruguay led the work of this organ during the month of May.

During the seventeenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in September 2016 on Margarita Island, Venezuela, the Heads of State and Government reiterated their ongoing concern about the difficult and complex situation in the area of disarmament and international security, and called for the redoubling of

efforts in order to break the current stalemate in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. On that occasion, the Heads of State and Government also reaffirmed the Movement's principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains its top priority, and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, while emphasizing the importance of ensuring that efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation are concurrent to efforts towards nuclear disarmament. They also expressed concern about the threat posed to humankind by the existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use or threat of use.

Similarly, in relation to chemical weapons, the countries of the Movement that are States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) note with satisfaction its effective operation as the only comprehensive multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, establishing a system of verification and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. With regard to future priorities, the countries of the Movement that are States parties to the CWC consider that the primary objective should remain the complete elimination of all categories of chemical weapons, with the firm conviction that all pillars of the Convention will be treated in a balanced way.

Similarly, with respect to biological weapons, the countries of the Movement that are States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention are of the view that the Convention represents an important component of the international legal architecture related to weapons of mass destruction, but recognize that the lack of a verification system continues to undermine the effectiveness of the Convention, and urge parties that reject the resumption of multilateral negotiations on a legally binding protocol to reconsider their policy.

In reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterates its determination to promote multilateralism as a fundamental principle of disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations.

On the other hand, the member States of the Movement stress that the most effective way to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is the total elimination of such weapons, while emphasizing the need to urgently make progress in the

area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to boost global counter-terrorism efforts. That issue is of particular concern to us, given the fact that terrorist groups have used chemical weapons in the past, including in countries that are part of the Movement.

In that regard, we call on all Member States to support international efforts to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists, and urge Member States to adopt and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, so as to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and materials and technologies related to their production.

The member States of the Movement encourage cooperation between the international community and the relevant international and regional organizations to strengthen national capacities, in line with General Assembly resolution 70/36, with a view to strengthening the national capacities of States and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including to non-State actors and terrorist groups — in keeping with the relevant obligations in the framework of the international legal architecture related to weapons of mass destruction.

Also, in noting the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011), we stress the need to ensure that no action by the Security Council undermines the Charter of the United Nations and the existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction and the international organizations established in that regard, as well as the role of the General Assembly. We also caution against the recurring practice of the Security Council to use its authority to define legislative requirements for Member States to implement the decisions of this organ. In that regard, we want to emphasize the importance of ensuring that the issue of non-State actors' acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is addressed in an inclusive manner by the General Assembly so that the views of all Member States are taken into account.

The Movement also welcomes the successful conclusion of the third session of the Open-ended Working Group on the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. We would like to stress the importance of convening such a special session, which would provide us with an opportunity to

consider the most critical aspects of the disarmament process from a perspective that is more in line with the current international situation, and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in support of eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and controlling and reducing the availability of conventional weapons.

In conclusion, in maintaining its commitment to banning the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the Non-Aligned Movement reiterates its adherence to the objectives and principles outlined in General Assembly resolution 69/27, entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament”.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands.

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): I would like to thank you, Sir, for presiding over this afternoon’s resumption of the meeting in person, which we greatly appreciate. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to Bolivia for convening today’s important open debate on a crucial and urgent issue.

The Netherlands aligns itself with the statements delivered earlier by the observer of the European Union and by the representative of Spain, on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540, as well as with the points made by the representative of Italy in the context of our split term on the Security Council. In addition, the Kingdom of the Netherlands would like to make the following remarks.

Unfortunately, the use of chemical weapons by terrorists has become a dreadful reality. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) has used chemical weapons in Syria and is trying to expand those capabilities. We firmly condemn the use of chemical weapons both by ISIS and by the Syrian Arab Republic. Those horrendous acts have reminded us of the importance of resolution 1540 (2004), and this open debate continues the work it requires. The comprehensive review carried out under Spain’s presidency of the Council and adopted under resolution 2325 (2016) in December was an important step in that process. As I have said before, we are grateful for Spain’s transparent and inclusive conduct of the review.

I would like to focus on three issues today — implementation, nuclear security and the threat of biological weapons. The first of these is the importance of ensuring the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). We have come a long way since the resolution was adopted, but reaching full worldwide implementation by 2021 will still require a tremendous effort from all of us — first and foremost from Member States, but also from international and regional organizations and industry. With so many actors, considerable coordination will be needed to ensure efficient and effective implementation and to prevent overlapping or competing efforts by different organizations. In that regard, the work that has been done by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Panel of Experts is indispensable. And where implementation is concerned, we also have a great instrument at our disposal — our national action plans. They help Member States approach implementation comprehensively and can also improve the effectiveness and efficiency of international technical assistance. This is a truly forward-looking instrument that can help us put the emphasis on action rather than reporting. We therefore strongly encourage other Member States to use national action plans.

That brings me to my second point, nuclear security. Of course, we are all aware of the horrific effects that a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological weapons would have. Nuclear security is key to addressing that threat. It is a prime example of how the implementation of resolution 1540 can count on solid international organizations, above all the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its work is indispensable and deserves the international community’s full support. We would like to stress the importance of close cooperation among the IAEA, Member States and the 1540 Committee in strengthening nuclear security worldwide.

My third point is about biological weapons. The possibility of a biological attack by non-State actors is real, and the need to address this threat is more pressing than ever. That is why we should make the most of the existing international framework for addressing the threat of biological weapons. Its implementation must be improved and its existing framework strengthened, especially given the rapid pace of technological development in the biological sciences. All States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention should pursue those ends in good faith, as well as working to universalize the Convention.

In conclusion, we need full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and better cooperation with the IAEA on nuclear security. We also need to strengthen the existing framework on biological weapons. The Netherlands will continue to be a partner to the Security Council in further work on this important topic.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the United Nations.

Mr. Roux: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, in your capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), for inviting INTERPOL to present its strategy for combating the global threats represented by chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism by non-State actors, as well as to discuss the policing capabilities we provide to our member States and the global community.

The use of CBRN materials by terrorist groups such as Da'esh and by criminals and other non-State actors has become one of the most significant challenges to global security today. In 2010, INTERPOL made a strategic decision to launch a comprehensive CBRN terrorism-prevention-and-response capability in support of its 190 member States. The INTERPOL methodology for countering CBRN threats specifically from non-State actors has four main pillars that respond to the needs of member States — intelligence and operational data services; capacity-building; investigative and operational support; and working in partnership. CBRN threats are also a key element in INTERPOL's counter-terrorism strategy, which was endorsed by its entire membership very recently, in November 2016.

First, through our intelligence and operational data services, we facilitate the secure exchange of information among member countries and identify criminals and criminal organizations through intelligence analysis, which represents the foundation of INTERPOL's work and mandate. INTERPOL collects and analyses information on CBRN incidents and conducts threat assessments, and shares intelligence and analysis regarding CBRN threats and incidents with INTERPOL's member countries and partner agencies through monthly and ad hoc reports. Specialized databases such as Geiger and Watchmaker provide operational and specialized support to member countries through the sharing of INTERPOL notices and warning messages on individuals involved in illegal CBRN activities by non-State actors.

The second pillar is capacity-building. Given the gravity of a potential CBRN terrorist attack and its consequences, prevention and countermeasures constitute an essential element in both national and international strategies. INTERPOL engages in efforts to increase the level of CBRN awareness in law-enforcement agencies, delivers training sessions designed to increase law-enforcement capabilities and provides prevention methodologies for use by member countries. Major INTERPOL CBRN capacity-building programmes include workshop training courses and tabletop exercises.

The third pillar is investigative and operational support. Strictly at the request of member States, INTERPOL can provide operational support to them in the form of incident response teams. In the event of a terrorist attack, staff with expertise in CBRN matters can be deployed to these teams. In addition, INTERPOL runs a number of initiatives, projects and operations that support the international law-enforcement community in tackling the illicit trafficking of CBRN materials.

Fourthly, and lastly, is working in partnership. Due to the complex nature of CBRN prevention and response, a multidisciplinary approach is essential. Action needs to be coordinated at the national Government level, while also ensuring close cooperation and information exchange among the various ministries, agencies and institutions involved. This inter-agency approach needs to be extended on an international level.

INTERPOL works in this global arena, connecting our worldwide network of member countries and maintaining close partnerships with other international agencies and initiatives that are specialized in the CBRN field, such as the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and others. I stand ready to provide additional information to any interested actor or Mission.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Colombia.

Mr. Morales López (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): I join the previous delegations that have congratulated you, Mr. President, on your work in the Security Council this month and on your leadership as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General

Nakamitsu and Mr. Joseph Ballard of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for their briefings.

Following the concept note for today's debate, I will focus on sharing practical, concrete measures from my country's experience, with a view to facilitating and improving States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). For Colombia, national legislation is a key element in addressing the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. However, efforts aimed at adopting national legal norms must be accompanied by efforts aimed at strengthening cooperation between States and institutions and addressing the issue from the perspective of prevention.

Beyond strengthening legal norms and the capacity to respond, Colombia has repeatedly suggested in different forums improving particular aspects, such as safety and chemical, nuclear and radiological protective measures in order to prevent the diversion of hazardous materials into the hands of non-State actors, while also ensuring their security and protection at all stages of their life cycle, from research, development and manufacturing to transport through the supply chain, storage and waste disposal. The strengthening of security measures and chemical, nuclear and radiological protection will prevent non-State actors from acquiring these types of materials.

The OPCW and the International Atomic Energy Agency, through their verification activities and safeguards systems, respectively, have played a leading role in monitoring the peaceful uses of chemistry and nuclear energy. These systems of control have guaranteed that all legally constituted actors within States comply with the established controls. Accordingly, these industries ensure adequate monitoring of hazardous materials when they are on their radar. However, the importance of strengthening the identification and tracking of end users, both within States and abroad, has been emphasized. Similarly, importance has been given to strengthening border controls to prevent illegal trafficking in hazardous materials, controls in ports and airports to prevent the diversion of such materials, and oversight on the import, export, transit, transshipment and re-export of chemical, radiological and nuclear products.

On the international scene today, the emergence of new threats and irregular wars have served to highlight

the imperative need to ensure that weapons and their components, as well as the technology and processes for manufacturing them, are not likely to fall into the hands of non-State actors and terrorist groups. For this reason, strategic trade control has become an irreversible trend at the international level.

Customs is a crucial link for strategic trade control. Colombia therefore considers it essential to make strides in the implementation of modern standards stipulated by the World Customs Organization in order to meet the challenges required by both resolution 1540 (2004) and an increasingly interconnected and globalized world, thereby improving the foreign trade processes related to imports, transit, transshipment and exports. That is why my country is seeking to make progress in learning and awareness-raising in its institutions with respect to working on strategic trade issues, given their direct implications for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

Proof of the foregoing is the country's recent participation in the first regional conference in Latin America of the Wiesbaden Industry Process, entitled "Private sector engagement in strategic trade controls for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)", which took place in Mexico City at the beginning of this month and where the need to strengthen ties between the public and private sector and to work jointly to fulfil our country's commitment to resolution 1540 (2004) and strategic trade control of strategic trade was made evident.

Finally, in order to make further progress in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), at the end of July, Chile and Colombia will carry out the first on-site peer-review visit to assess the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and share experiences, procedures and best practices at the national level. This exercise was made possible thanks to the support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the 1540 Committee Group of Experts and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia.

Mr. Djani (Indonesia) Following my Dutch colleague, let me also honour you, Mr. President, by saying in Spanish,

(spoke in Spanish)

“many thanks for your presidency and for convening today’s important debate.”

(spoke in English)

We also thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the other briefers for their statements.

Indonesia associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, and having ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Indonesia welcomes today’s focus on the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-State actors.

Although Indonesia fully supports resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016), I will not list all the steps that my country has taken to safeguard against the WMD proliferation threat. Suffice it to say, we have instituted comprehensive measures to counter the development, acquisition, manufacture, possession, transportation, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Regionally, too, Indonesia participates actively in the various Association of Southeast Asian Nations forums on export controls and non-proliferation.

All States must fulfil their responsibilities to ensure that the WMD threat from non-State actors is dealt with effectively. It is therefore encouraging that the latest five-year comprehensive report (see S/2016/1038) by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), presented last December observed that most States had undertaken enhanced measures on the prohibition of non-State-actor activities relating to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. It also acknowledged greater reporting by States. While the report also pointed out gaps, it rightly noted that the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) is a long-term task that requires continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels with intensified support.

International cooperation and assistance are critical when it comes to resolution 1540 (2004), especially when taking into account countries’ varied economic and industrial abilities. Indonesia underlines the 1540 Committee’s role in facilitating matchmaking and extending extra support, in particular to those countries that lack capacities in furnishing technical-assistance proposals. There needs to be a proper response to the decrease in the number of requests for assistance submitted to the 1540 Committee during the five-year period ending in 2016 as compared to the five-year period ending in 2011. Greater support from the Committee and its Group of Experts, including close cooperation with national 1540 points of contact, along with adequate support from other relevant parts of the United Nations system and the international community, will be extremely important.

It also goes without saying that the presence of peace and stability will foster increased focus by conflict-affected countries on thwarting any WMD activity by non-State actors in their countries and regions, thereby not only making the success of the sustaining peace agenda even more imperative, but also that of the deeply interconnected 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Thirteen out of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals have direct relevance to nuclear science and technology, and it is crucial that the discourse on WMD proliferation by non-State actors does not impinge on the inalienable right of States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. My delegation also stresses that the issue of WMD acquisition by non-State groups should be considered by all United Nations States Members in an inclusive manner, and our actions should flow from multilaterally negotiated instruments.

As the Security Council tackles threats to global peace, it must be principled and clear. The risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear and other WMDs is only one among a list of serious global security problems. A key challenge that remains is the insistence by some States to possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. There is no such thing as right and moral hands for holding such wrong and immoral weapons. Furthermore, my delegation remains concerned about the fact that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force.

The international community can be proud of having adopted legally binding instruments and banned biological and chemical weapons through its clear moral imperative and dedicated multilateral efforts.

Yet, confronted with the horrors that Hiroshima and Nagasaki endured and the abundant research confirming the absolute destruction that nuclear weapons, by design or accident, can wreak, it is deeply disturbing that some States have hindered the same approach on nuclear weapons, as is also mandated by article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

However, with the ongoing multilateral endeavour in the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, the recent meetings of the Open-ended Working Group for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, and the disarmament activism by global civil society, Indonesia sees some signs of hope. We therefore have joined the overwhelmingly large number of countries in urging reluctant States to heed the calls for banning nuclear weapons and achieving their total elimination.

Let us be on the right side of history when it comes to the survival of humankind from the menacing threat of nuclear explosions, either by design or accident. It is our earnest hope that the Council, just as it is rightly seized by the WMD proliferation concern, will display the same vigour with regard to nuclear disarmament from which the legitimacy for non-proliferation is born.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Paraguay.

Mr. Arriola Ramírez (Paraguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of the Republic of Paraguay expresses its gratitude for the briefings by the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the representative of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in connection with the international effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, and commends the Bolivian presidency of the Security Council for holding this open debate.

The Republic of Paraguay works closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the delegation of which headed by its Executive Director visited our country in March and held meetings with the highest-ranking officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and those dealing with homeland security, the prevention of money laundering and customs. During its visit, the Committee was able to see at first-hand the efforts undertaken by the Republic of Paraguay to adhere to international norms in combating terrorism in all its

forms, as well as the implementation of public policies aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors, especially in the border areas of the country.

During its visit, the Committee was able to note the need for technical assistance and specialized teams in Paraguay so as to effectively and efficiently implement mechanisms and policies aimed at preventing all forms of terrorism and cross-border criminal activity linked to it. Consequently, at the request of the Paraguayan Government, the Committee is considering a follow-up mission this year during which it will hold meetings with officials from the legislative and judicial branches. Furthermore, the Republic of Paraguay participates actively in training activities, as it did in the regional training course for the points of contact of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), held recently in Chile.

The delegation of Paraguay reaffirms its conviction that the fight against terrorism in all its forms must contribute to the maintenance of international stability and security; encourage cooperation and friendly relations between States, while respecting their national sovereignty; and be based on the rule of law, respect for human rights in the broadest terms and the fundamental freedoms of individuals under international law.

In conclusion, the delegation of Paraguay calls on the States Members of the United Nations to reallocate the resources budgeted for the modernization of their stockpiles to efforts aimed at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular target 4 of Sustainable Development Goal 16 — to significantly reduce illicit arms flows and combat all forms of organized crime.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Schieb (Germany): I would like to thank you, Sir, for convening this open debate on a very pressing issue.

I align myself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union and the statement to be made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). I would like to make the following four points.

First, the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is a growing threat. Since 2013, the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, particularly by the Syrian regime but also by Islamic State in Iraq and

the Levant (ISIL), as well as ISIL's use of chemical weapons in Iraq, has dramatically exacerbated concerns about the use of those universally condemned weapons. However, holding the perpetrators accountable for those heinous acts remains a major challenge. We believe that preventing non-State actors from accessing chemical weapons and their precursors is the most effective way to prevent non-State actors from ultimately using them.

For that reason, Germany supported the international community's efforts to remove and destroy the remaining stocks of chemical-weapon precursors in Libya. The German Government is contributing to those efforts by allowing the precursors to be destroyed at a specialized facility in Germany. To address these growing risks, it is crucial that the international community continue to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and support capacity-building in countries in which proliferation risks exist. The Group of Seven's global partnership plays an active role in that area, and Germany contributes to those activities through its partnership programme on biological and health security.

Secondly, together with its partners, Germany is pushing for a treaty to end fissile material production. By limiting the pool of available fissile material, such a treaty could significantly reduce the risk of non-State actors acquiring those highly dangerous materials. We congratulate Canada for the progress that it has made towards that goal while chairing the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group.

The international community has also made great progress in the field of nuclear security. The Nuclear Security Summit process has not only drawn worldwide attention to the risks of nuclear terrorism, but has also triggered concrete actions and initiatives to close existing gaps. We encourage all Member States to adopt existing legal norms such as the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Furthermore, those Member States that require assistance to fully implement those norms must be able to turn to the international community for sustainable support. Germany is one of the major donors to relevant organizations and bodies. For example, Germany contributes substantially to the Nuclear Security Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which supports nuclear security capacity-building projects. We count on others to follow our example.

Thirdly, in our globalized world, the private sector has an important role to play in non-proliferation. After all, it is the private sector that must implement export controls and adhere to non-proliferation legislation. In recognition of this fact, Germany initiated the Wiesbaden process with the support of many other Member States and in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The process seeks to increase private sector engagement in the context of resolution 1540 (2004). The next Wiesbaden conference, in late November, will focus on due diligence by private sector companies and questions related to cross-border development and production. We have initiated a similar dialogue with industry through the Nuclear Security Contact Group.

Fourthly, last year's comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) proved to be a useful exercise. Germany especially supports the aim to reinforce the role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in facilitating technical assistance, particularly by improving the matching mechanism. We welcome all other initiatives that seek to strengthen resolution 1540 (2004) in the long term, such as the work of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540, in which Germany actively participates. Together with partner nations and international organizations, Germany will continue to play its part in reducing the global risk of terrorism perpetrated with weapons of mass destruction.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Spain.

Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I am delighted to see you, Sir, presiding over today's meeting of the Security Council.

(*spoke in English*)

On behalf of 51 — may I repeat, 51 — members of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004), I would like to stress the relevance of today's debate. I will now highlight the main elements of our statement, as the full version has been circulated.

Resolution 2325 (2016) reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. We see proliferation taking place in the Middle East and in Asia. We condemn proliferation in all possible forms by anyone and we will make every effort to prevent it.

In that connection, we condemn in the strongest terms the nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile-development activities conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions.

That threat is more pressing than ever because of the risk that terrorists and other non-State actors might acquire and use such weapons, in addition to the rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce. Unfortunately, we have seen that that threat has materialized in Syria, Iraq and Malaysia. The use of chemical weapons undermines the hard-won taboo of those atrocious weapons, contrary to the norms established by the international community and upheld by the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPCW).

We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Syria, as confirmed by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. In order to stem the risk of further chemical-weapon use by any party in Syria, we urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with OPCW to fulfil its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

(spoke in Spanish)

In that regard, we support the global approach that advocates the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), established pursuant to resolution 2325 (2016). First, a specific approach must be adopted so as to allocate resources to areas where they are most needed, all the while taking into consideration the circumstances unique to each State. In more concrete terms, we believe that the chemical and biological sectors require greater attention, in particular in terms of inventory control procedures, the protection of related materials and the relative accessibility of such materials, including formulating a more urgent response to the issue.

Secondly, it is important for States, at the very least, to criminalize the reckless funding of activities that lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regardless of whether or not they are linked to terrorist activities, and to establish national control mechanisms to prevent them.

Thirdly, the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) demands not only the adoption of legislation, but its enforcement and the establishment of national controls. A good example is the compilation of national

lists to monitor and control materials that can be used for proliferation purposes. We encourage those States that have not yet done so to develop such controls. It is also important to strengthen cybersecurity, in particular in sensitive sectors.

Fourthly, it is imperative that resolution 1540 (2004) be fully implemented. We encourage States that have not done so to submit their first report. We also encourage States to provide additional information on implementation and good practices, consider developing voluntary national action plans, identify effective focal points and maintain ongoing dialogue with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits by the Committee. In that regard, we welcome Morocco's initiative to host a training session for African contact points. We underscore the importance of assistance and welcome capacity-building through bilateral contributions to the trust fund managed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. We stand ready to assist States at their request in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)

(spoke in English)

We welcome increased cooperation between the United Nations and relevant international and regional organizations, as well as among the relevant Security Council committees, in combating proliferation. In that effort, parliamentarians and civil society, in particular industry and academia, also have a role to play.

Finally, we acknowledge the key role played by Bolivia as it leads the 1540 Committee and highlight the importance of transparency. A good example of such transparency is today's open debate. In view of the current threats and challenges, we believe that the Committee needs to have in place an adequate support structure so that it can assist States and more efficiently monitor implementation.

Rest assured, Sir, of our continued support to the work of the Committee and to your chairmanship.

The President *(spoke in Spanish)*: I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba.

Mrs. Rodríguez Abascal (Cuba) *(spoke in Spanish)*: We thank Bolivia for having convened today's open debate and through you, Ambassador Llorentty Solíz, I congratulate your entire team on its excellent work in presiding over the Security Council.

Cuba supports the statement made by the representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Our country shares the legitimate concerns of the international community about the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Limiting international efforts to the horizontal non-proliferation of such weapons is insufficient. The only effective way to stop the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, including by terrorists, is through the prohibition and total elimination of such weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Our country does not possess, nor does it intend to possess, weapons of mass destruction, and it has adopted a series of measures to guarantee strict compliance with the commitments and obligations it undertook as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and as a member State of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Cuba participates actively in ongoing negotiations at the General Assembly on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. We support the adoption, entry into force and implementation of such an international instrument. Similarly, we will continue to advocate the adoption, as soon as possible, of a broad-based convention that encompasses the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time frame and under strict international verification. We reiterate the need to start negotiations, without delay, on a legally binding protocol that would effectively, comprehensively and equitably strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. The meeting of the States parties to that Convention to be held in December should include among its priorities the adoption of a clear mandate for resuming the negotiating process in that regard.

In a year in which we commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as one of the first signatories and a State party to the Convention, Cuba reiterates its firm rejection of the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances. We reject, and call for the immediate elimination of, those unilateral measures designed to prohibit or limit the legitimate right of States to access and use nuclear energy, biological agents and chemicals for peaceful purposes, as well as the relevant technologies and know-how.

In the light of the danger posed by the existence of weapons of mass destruction and their possible use, cooperation on the part of the international community must be strengthened.

The fight against terrorism must be based on the effective implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in strict compliance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The efforts of the Security Council cannot undermine the existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction, the international organizations established in that regard, or the role of the General Assembly.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Ms. Mac Loughlin (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, for having proposed this open debate on a particularly topical subject, namely, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

My delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004).

I would like to say how pleased we are to see a brotherly country chairing the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), given our region's unwavering commitment to non-proliferation. Latin America and the Caribbean were pioneers in establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, we welcome the adoption of the declaration of the States members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) on the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

There are many highly distressing cases in which international terrorism has shown ample proof of its destructive capacity. The use of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors in recent years has ceased to be an abstract or theoretical problem and has served to highlight the need for Member States to redouble their efforts to prevent terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, their related materials and means of delivery.

For Argentina, by its scope and nature, resolution 1540 (2004) represents the clearest response by the United Nations to the problem of weapons of mass

destruction and their access by non-State actors. Since its adoption, 13 years ago, Argentina has addressed the resolution by striving to preserve the balance between its traditional commitment to non-proliferation and a reaffirmation of the sovereign right to the peaceful use and development of advanced technologies such as nuclear, chemical, biological, pharmaceutical and nanotechnology. Both principles are enshrined in the text of resolution 1540 (2004) as well as in resolution 2325 (2016), co-sponsored by our country and adopted only six months ago. In that context, on 26 October 2004, the Republic of Argentina submitted its first national report, together with successive updates, thereby demonstrating its unwavering commitment to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and becoming an active member of the five non-proliferation regimes, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Member States should redouble efforts to strengthen and update our national export control systems, which we believe should be based on four fundamental pillars: a transparent and standardized national licensing system; effective compliance with current legislation applicable to export controls, including brokering and trans-shipment aspects; increased corporate awareness of the importance of such systems for industrial development and for the security of international trade; and close regional cooperation.

With regard to regional cooperation, I wish to emphasize that Argentina provides assistance under resolution 1540 (2004) and has developed training activities on identifying sensitive items at subregional and regional levels, as well as through South-South cooperation with African countries.

Argentina considers it essential to ensure that dual-use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials are properly protected, and out of the hands of those who would not hesitate to use them to terrorize others and sow panic and destruction. It is illusory to believe that we live in security while there are such materials lacking the proper protection, and without the implementation of international regulations at the global level.

In particular, for Argentina, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material has been in force for more than a year. Last April in Buenos Aires, together with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the

National Institute of Industrial Technology, we organized the second Regional Course on Chemical Safety and Security Management in Laboratories.

Argentina is convinced that, beyond the protection of materials that we can guarantee at the national level, we must work constructively to foster dialogue between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon countries, with the understanding that the only guarantee that such weapons or related materials will not be acquired by non-State actors would be their total elimination.

Lastly, Argentina reiterates its call for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear military programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council. Those programmes represent a threat to international peace and security.

The Argentine delegation would also like to say that the call for the complete elimination of chemical weapons is a key element of its position on non-proliferation and disarmament. In that context, Argentina firmly reiterates its absolute condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and the use of chemicals as weapons by any actor and under any circumstance.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. Lal (India): I thank you, Sir, for convening this open debate. In the interests of time, I will read out only parts of our statement.

Terror networks and non-State actors by themselves do not have any capacity or access to advanced and sensitive technologies and materials. However instances of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not unknown to us all. The possibility of such collusion remains a real cause for concern. That grave threat can only be contained through effective and sustained international cooperation and monitoring.

As a country with advanced nuclear technologies, India is fully conscious of the responsibilities that come with their possession. India is a party to all of the 13 universal instruments accepted as benchmarks for a State's commitment to combat international terrorism.

India participated at the ministerial level in the 2013 and 2016 International Conferences on Nuclear Security organized by the International Atomic Energy

Agency, which plays a central role in promoting nuclear security efforts. Our Prime Minister has participated in all of the four Nuclear Security Summits held since 2010. India also participates actively in the Nuclear Security Contact Group. India has contributed to the goals and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention and participates actively in the inter-sessional process on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Since 2002, India has introduced at the General Assembly draft resolution entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, which has been adopted by consensus every year, most recently in 2016 as resolution 71/38, co-sponsored by more than 70 Member States. The resolution offers a consensus platform to strengthen international dialogue and cooperation.

India has harmonized its legislative and regulatory framework with the control lists, guidelines and best practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. India’s admission to the MTCR, a year ago, is a recognition of India’s non-proliferation record and its ability to contribute to global non-proliferation efforts. Last year, India also joined The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

We appreciate the efforts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and collaborate with the 1540 Committee to organize capacity-building and awareness-raising events. India is currently planning to host an international workshop in cooperation with UNODA and the 1540 Committee in New Delhi.

We have taken note of the requests for assistance put forward by countries to the 1540 Committee and remain ready to provide technical assistance and training to any interested Member State. Details on the technical expertise offered by India can be accessed through our latest report submitted to the 1540 Committee this month.

India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership has conducted more than 30 international and regional programmes, involving more than 300 participants from around 30 countries. In February, India hosted the meeting of the Implementation and Assessment Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It was attended by more than 150

representatives from over 40 partner countries, as well as by the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the European Union and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

An early conclusion to the negotiations on the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism would be helpful. We support universal adherence to, and the full implementation of, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as its 2005 amendment.

Unmasked clandestine proliferation networks have shown that non-State actors can exploit weak links in global supply chains. All States must therefore assume their responsibilities to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. The measures undertaken by India in that regard are consistent with the highest international standards and are highlighted in India’s latest national report to the 1540 Committee. We must remain vigilant, strengthen cooperation, build capacity and encourage the full assumption of national responsibility by States, in accordance with their international obligations.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Armenia.

Mr. Mnatsakanyan (Armenia): We thank the Bolivian presidency for the inclusion of this important agenda item in the programme of work of the Security Council and for the comprehensive concept note.

Armenia attaches great importance to the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and has been submitting regular reports on the measures taken by national authorities to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). An important development in strengthening the implementation of, and compliance with, the provisions of that resolution was the adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), in December 2016, which we co-sponsored together with other 76 States. We also commend the initiative of Spain to establish a Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004).

There is widespread recognition of the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and non-State groups, heightened by the rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce that could give rise to a risk of the misuse of scientific developments.

Capacity-building and the strengthening of institutional arrangements at the national level are the necessary prerequisites to address the existing and emerging threats associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to counter the growing risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and non-State groups.

The Government of Armenia has been consistent in reinforcing the implementation of the provisions of resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016) at the national level. We have been enacting a broad range of legislative and administrative measures aimed at safeguarding radioactive and nuclear material, strengthening border security against the smuggling of hazardous materials and enhancing capacities to investigate and prosecute any such incidents. Rigid legislative safeguards have been put in place for the licensing and physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material. The criminal code has been amended with a view to significantly increasing the term of sentences for the illicit trafficking, import, export or re-export of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials.

Significant steps have also been taken in the field of biological security. In particular, in 2016 Armenia adopted a national programme on the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The programme aims at increasing awareness among the population, ensuring the accreditation of existing laboratories in accordance with international standards, establishing a network of such laboratories, as well as securing adequate professional competence of employees working with biological agents. Furthermore, the Government has set up an inter-agency working group to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Convention.

In November 2016, Armenia also adopted a national strategy related to chemical, biological, radiological materials, which outlines the threats and risks in the field and respective measures to address the emerging challenges.

With a view to strengthening the international legal framework in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Armenia has supported the initiative to establish an international legal instrument for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism.

We encourage the 1540 Committee to continue its cooperation with relevant international and regional organizations based on comparative advantages

and best practices developed on the ground. In that respect, an effective response to the specific needs of States, upon their request, could bring together the efforts of all actors on the ground, including donor States. We recognize and support the role of regional organizations and multilateral initiatives in promoting the comprehensive implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in particular has been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by its participating States.

The Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as a partnership of 88 States to promote global nuclear security, has been an important and useful platform to facilitate cooperation aimed at nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, response and mitigation of threats.

We condemn the use of chemical weapons by anyone and in any part of the world and highlight the importance of verifiable, transparent and internationally mandated investigation of any alleged use of chemical substances banned under international law.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. Bonser (Canada) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Bolivia for convening this debate on the grave threat posed to international peace and security by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors.

Canada is pleased to align itself with the statement of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004), and would like to make the following additional three points.

First, Canada fully supports resolution 1540 (2004) and its successor resolutions as essential to the international non-proliferation architecture. Indeed, we all need to step-up our efforts to achieve its full and universal implementation as quickly as possible.

(*spoke in English*)

As a co-sponsor of resolution 2325 (2016), Canada particularly welcomed measures aimed at strengthening assistance requests and mechanisms. To support those measures, we are pleased to announce funding to the Stimson Center to implement a 1540 assistance support initiative. This initiative will create a new website with a comprehensive list of assistance providers and help to develop more detailed and strategic requests

for assistance. It aims to provide the Office for Disarmament Affairs and committed States Members of the United Nations with an action plan for more effectively transmitting assistance requests through the 1540 Committee. We are also providing new funding for several other projects related to resolution 1540 (2004), including continued support for a Caribbean Community regional 1540 coordinator, and further assistance to partner countries in Latin America and the Caribbean for legislative implementation.

Secondly, we recognize that fast-evolving proliferation risks and advances in science, technology and commerce demand dynamic and flexible responses. Domestically, Canada is strengthening its counter-proliferation capabilities by increasing funding and amending legislation to better control brokering activities, and weapon-of-mass destruction-related exports. We continue to monitor advances in science and technology and promote responsible innovation. Through targeted outreach, we are educating stakeholders about the proliferation risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sensitive technologies and dual-use goods. Internationally, under Canada's chairmanship, the Nuclear Security Contact Group is working to identify and address new and emerging challenges to nuclear security.

Thirdly, Canada is pleased to chair the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group to prepare the way for negotiating a treaty to end fissile material production for nuclear weapons. A fissile material cut-off treaty would reduce the risk of non-State actors acquiring these materials, thereby enhancing global nuclear security and reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.

In conclusion, Canada stands ready to partner in relevant and constructive ways with all interested national and regional parties to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Greece.

Mr. Kalamverzos (Greece): Allow me, at the outset, to stress that Greece aligns itself with the statement made earlier by the observer of the European Union, which highlighted the unwavering support for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

I would like to express my appreciation for the timely discussion initiated by the Bolivian presidency,

in particular you, Ambassador Llorentty Solíz, which allows us to take stock of what we have so far achieved and to discuss how we will navigate in future in keeping with resolution 2325 (2016), which was the result of the 2016 comprehensive review of the resolution 1540 (2004), a pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture.

I would also like to thank Ms. Nakamitsu and Mr. Ballard for their excellent briefings.

In brief, Greece maintains the view that, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the world finds itself in a situation of constant change and has been confronted with multiple challenges. All of that is happening within a volatile global security environment and in a fragile and unstable political and socioeconomic landscape in strategically important regions.

The proliferation of the threat of weapons of mass destruction that we are discussing today is a very complex challenge. Volatility, instability and regional crises and conflicts, as well as a galloping rate of technological advances in science and global commerce, render more alarming the risk that non-State actors, namely, terrorist groups, may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Specific resolutions to address that threat do not exist, and might not be the answer. With that in mind, we stand, first and foremost, for reducing the root causes of instability, strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, supporting relevant multilateral institutions, mainstreaming non-proliferation into broad policies and fully implementing resolution 1540 (2004). We also stand for vigilance and inclusivity at the national, regional and international levels in coping with that challenge so as to enable us to embark upon more coherent and holistic ways to combat it further on.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Namibia.

Mr. Gertze (Namibia): First of all, I would like to express my appreciation to you, Sir, for convening this open debate on the question of non-proliferation. This debate promotes transparency and inclusivity. Let me also congratulate the delegation of the State of Bolivia for its successful work of presiding over the business of the Security Council during the month of June.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of the Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

On many occasions, the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, has expressed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international peace and security. That was demonstrated when the Security Council sent out a strong message in 2004 by adopting resolution 1540 (2004), which offers a response to the growing risk that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of, and be used by, non-State actors and terrorist groups.

Resolution 1540 (2004) provides an opportunity to deepen cooperation among the countries of the world so as to access technology and the required capacity to respond to the threat posed by terrorist groups and other illegal armed groups. The physical protection of nuclear materials and installations and adequate guarantees for the peaceful use of nuclear material and technology are fundamental to establishing a favourable environment for developing nuclear energy that benefits humankind.

Namibia understands the relevance of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as, first, to ensure the right of all Member States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the development and advancement of technology, and, secondly, to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, as well as their means of delivery and related technologies. In that regard, we reiterate the sovereign right of Member States to the development of advanced technologies, such as nuclear, chemical, biological and pharmaceutical ones, so as to achieve industrial development.

Namibia continues to participate in the activities of the international community in the area of disarmament with a view to achieve a world free of weapons of mass destruction and the complete prohibition of their acquisition, development, stockpiling, transferring and modernization. It is our belief that cooperation between Member States and the relevant regional and international organizations will strengthen national capacities to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including their acquisition by non-State actors and terrorist groups.

As a State party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), Namibia welcomes the implementation of that Convention, which is the only comprehensive

multilateral treaty banning the whole group of weapons of mass destruction, while also providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. Namibia believes that the main focus of the CWC should remain the complete elimination of all categories of chemical weapons.

Similarly, Namibia considers the Biological Weapons Convention as representing an important component of the international legal architecture related to weapons of mass destruction, while noting with concern that the lack of a verification system continues to pose a challenge to the effectiveness of that Convention.

All pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be treated in a balanced approach. The failure of the 2015 NPT Review Conference has raised serious questions about the future of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The reaffirmation of deterrence doctrines, modernization plans and long-term investments in nuclear-weapon programmes only serve to undermine the legitimacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Those trends pose serious challenges to disarmament initiatives.

In conclusion, my delegation welcomes the successful conclusion of the Open-Ended Working Group for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD IV). We underscore the importance of convening SSOD IV, as it would offer an opportunity to review the most critical aspects of the disarmament machinery and mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It would also enhance the total control and reduction of conventional weapons, which can be easily acquired by non-State actors.

We also welcome the ongoing conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. We note with appreciation the successful outcome of the first session of the conference and look forward to another successful outcome of its second session.

Let me assure you, Sir, that Namibia continues to stand fully behind this important global effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria.

Mr. Bande (Nigeria): I thank the Bolivian delegation for convening this important debate on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I also commend the briefers for their remarks.

I align my delegation with the statement made by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

I wish to reaffirm Nigeria's commitment to the ideal of a nuclear-free world. We regard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as a grave threat to our collective security. The risk of non-State actors, including terrorists, acquiring, developing, manufacturing and using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remains a serious threat to global peace and security. Terrorists and their sponsors have shown the intent and, at least in the case of chemical weapons, some capability to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them.

The adoption of resolution 1540 (2004), 11 years ago, signalled the determination of the Security Council to respond robustly to the threat posed to international peace and security by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. While the three main treaties on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons address non-proliferation, it is evident that they do not take into account the possibility of such weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors. Therein lies the significance of resolution 1540 (2004) in its complementarity to the three global treaties on weapons of mass destruction. The emergence of extremist groups has introduced a sense of urgency to the need for the international community to take stock of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and close the gaps that could be exploited by such groups to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction.

An appraisal of the mandate of this significant resolution shows a measure of commitment on the part of Member States. Numerous countries have adopted laws and regulations that comply with a substantial number of the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004). They are reference points and useful mechanisms for confidence-building measures, including those that could assist in addressing actions that could promote the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as the menace of smuggling and money-laundering

activities in all regions. That is as a result of the need to relentlessly address the yawning compliance gap often encountered by Member States with limited resources and technical capabilities.

Nigeria believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones across the world is a potent tool to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Success in that direction would promote transparency in non-proliferation, which is the second pillar of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nigeria will continue to support efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in parts of the world where they currently do not exist. We recognize the right of any party to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme. However, it must be pursued within the ambit of the NPT and other relevant international instruments. We stress that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should tally with simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament.

Nigeria is concerned about the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the task of the total elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. We call on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their multilateral legal obligations on nuclear disarmament.

We appreciate the role of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in assisting States and international institutions in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially by considering requests from States regarding the provision of technical assistance in the energy and extractive industries. That allows States and institutions to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Nigeria wishes to stress that resolution 1540 (2004) and its effective implementation remain a key component of the global architecture for countering the danger posed by the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced that the establishment of effective precautionary measures and systems to address potential nuclear, chemical or biological proliferation is a collective responsibility incumbent upon all Member States, and we must all take the lead.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate Nigeria's conviction of the validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. We must remain especially vigilant to issues that may threaten international peace and security. We shall therefore

continue to advocate for multilateralism as the core platform for negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Slovenia.

Mr. Logar (Slovenia): First, I would like to thank the delegation of Bolivia for convening today's important debate and for preparing the concept note on reinforcing the preventive system to avoid the different kinds of catastrophes that could result from the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons by non-State actors, particularly terrorists.

Slovenia fully subscribes to the statement made by the observer of the European Union and to the statement made on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). I would like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.

Slovenia has been supporting the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes by, first, joining the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004) to help contribute to better transparency and the resolution's implementation; secondly, submitting four national reports on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); and, thirdly, expanding the Slovenia-led Western Balkan counter-terrorism initiative, which links up individual initiatives in that area into a joint comprehensive effort — the integrative internal security governance concept — that includes the prevention of violent extremism, fights terrorism and takes measures to combat organized crime and enhance border security.

Fourthly, Slovenia also contributes by attaching great importance to nuclear security through the involvement of several ministries in nuclear security matters in order to fight the illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials and, lastly, by playing an active role in the work of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the third time since our independence.

Slovenia had informed the Council about the practical measures it adopted to prevent non-State actors from accessing weapons of mass destruction technology in the open debate on resolution 1540 (2004) in December 2016 (see S/PV.7837). Let me just briefly mention the most recent ones.

In March, we joined the Nuclear Security Contact Group, through which we will contribute to global efforts in that area to achieve and enhance nuclear security. We also took over the co-rapporteur role to Montenegro as it aspires to become a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which deals with promoting transparency and greater responsibility in the transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, as well as with the prevention of the acquisition of those items by terrorists. This year Slovenia also chairs the General Working Group of the Wassenaar Arrangement to help contribute to that goal.

In conclusion, there is a growing link between terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and cyberthreats. Cyberterrorism is perhaps the most prominent emerging threat in the nuclear realm, based on rapid advances in science and technology. That is why Slovenia is reviewing our national legislation and measures in that area of endeavour and we will report on the review when it has been concluded.

Let me reassure you, Sir, that Slovenia will continue to implement resolution 1540 (2004), as well as the recommendations of the comprehensive review, and we call upon all States to do the same.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. Kim In Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Let me express my appreciation to you, Sir, for convening today's important debate.

We join with previous speakers to support the statement of the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

At the outset, I condemn in the strongest terms and categorically reject the reckless remarks made by hostile forces, including the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and the Republic of Korea. Taking the opportunity offered by today's open debate, they once again called into question the measures taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to bolster its self-defence capabilities, and referenced the use of chemical weapons that have never existed, while branding the Republic as a threat to world peace and regional security and a country that violates Security Council resolutions.

This is nothing but an outrageous breach of the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea. Everyone recalls that, in February this year, the hostile forces tried to use the death of a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to step up their human rights racket against the Republic and spread rumours about its use of chemical weapons or weapons of mass destruction, in a bid to create an atmosphere of international criticism against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Once again, I hereby strongly denounce the reckless remarks against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by hostile forces, for the dangerous political purpose of tarnishing the dignified image of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and weakening its social system by spreading such ruinous rumours on the international stage.

On the occasion of today's open debate on the theme of global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors, once again, I would like to clarify and emphasize the policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un, in his remarkable statement made at the historic seventh Congress of the Worker's Party of Korea, clearly affirmed before the world that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a responsible nuclear-weapon State, would not use nuclear weapons first, unless the forces of aggression that are hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea violate its sovereignty with their nuclear weapons; and would faithfully observe its commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, which it agreed to before the international community, and strive for global denuclearization.

We are seriously concerned by the fact that the United States and its vassal forces again picked a fight with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over its self-defence strengthening measures under the pretext of non-proliferation. I would like to clarify the principled position of my Government.

It is clear that the main root cause of the grave situation on the Korean peninsula, which is inching to the brink of war and is shrouded in nuclear war clouds, is the hostile outdated policy and manoeuvres of the United States aimed at provoking a war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Needless to say, as everybody witnessed, the joint military exercises Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 2017, which were carried out by the United States on the Korean peninsula over 60

days in March and April this year and which introduced the largest-ever mass aggressive forces and sufficient strategic assets to wage another full-scale war, are very dangerous and reckless aggressive war drills that constitute grave threats to the peace and security on the Korean peninsula and beyond in the region and are acts of State-sponsored terrorism against a sovereign State. Those kinds of extreme, provocative military manoeuvres by the United States continue even after the end of the joint military exercises.

The United States staged the madcap pre-emptive nuclear strike drills against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after deploying two nuclear carrier strike groups in the East Sea of Korea and introducing B-1B strategic bombers from the Guam Island. They even brought a nuclear submarine into the Port of Busan in South Korea and held a missile interception test simulating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile attack on 30 May. On 20 June, the United States introduced two B-1B nuclear strategic bombers into the airspace of South Korea to conduct simulation bombing exercises, and it is openly arguing that it would send strategic bombers to the Korean peninsula more than once a month. Now it has introduced the monster-like Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defence system in South Korea in order to aggravate the tensions and turn the Korean peninsula into a radioactive zone. On 1 June, the United States publicly imposed unilateral sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, on 3 June, it spearheaded the fabrication of another sanctions resolution through a vote of the Security Council.

The United States is stepping up its military buildup, including modernizing its nuclear weapons, just in order to obtain exclusive and permanent possession of the most sophisticated weapon system in the world, but other countries are not allowed to test or launch any nuclear- or ballistic-related object. It is really the height of shameless arrogance, self-righteousness and double standards. That the United States forced others to agree to the sanctions resolution, which had been fabricated in a back room at its own pleasure, and described the resolution as the will of the international community is a flagrant example of high-handedness and of its trampling upon international justice and an arbitrary act in pursuit of its own interests.

It is a fatal miscalculation if the countries that had a hand in the frame-up of the sanctions resolution think that they can delay or keep in check the open

development of the nuclear forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea even for a moment. They will clearly see that their means and indiscreet acts run counter to their objectives.

The buildup of nuclear forces by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a natural exercise of its sovereignty to thwart the nuclear threat imposed by the United States against our country in an unprecedented way. It is also an effort to ensure genuine international justice and peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the region.

To this day, the United States continues to talk about dialogue, but it does not make any sense to talk about dialogue when unjust preconditions are attached and extreme pressure is applied. Having undergone rigorous trials, the Korean people have arrived at the conclusion that the only way to defend their vital rights and sovereignty is to react to the nukes in kind. No matter what others say and whatever sanctions, pressure and military attacks may follow, we will not flinch from the path of building up our nuclear forces, which are used to defend the sovereignty of our country and our right to national existence.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's self-reliant nuclear force serves to guarantee and strengthen the peace of the Korean peninsula and the world.

I reaffirm my Government commitment to strengthening its national nuclear deterrent in every possible way to eliminate the source of nuclear threat and blackmail of the United States, which grows more desperate day by day, and to safeguard the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the world.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Georgia.

Mr. Imnadze (Georgia): Let me thank the Bolivian presidency of the Security Council for convening this debate and for its successful chairmanship of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

My country aligns itself with the statements made by the observer of the European Union and by the representative of Spain on behalf of the Group of Friends of resolution 1540 (2004). In my national capacity, I would like to add the following remarks.

The risks of nuclear terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the related

materials and technologies have become a serious threat and one of the major challenges to our common security. The chances of these weapons falling into the hands of unauthorized actors is particularly worrisome and alarming in view of the rapid advancements in science and technology.

Increasing threats emanating from terrorist groups make the exploitation of security vulnerabilities with criminal intent highly possible. Some actors have already demonstrated readiness to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, as demonstrated in the reports by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism.

The threats posed by the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and materials, as well as weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, remains a subject of serious concern for my country, not least due to the fact that we neighbour the regions with a risk of proliferation. In recent years, several attempts to smuggle nuclear and radioactive materials through Georgia's occupied regions were recorded. They were duly prevented by law enforcement agencies. However, in the absence of international presence inside those regions, it has become virtually impossible to conduct any type of verification activities on the ground, which increases the risk of proliferation of WMD-related materials.

Political commitment is crucial in developing the policies, strategies and systems to strengthen security at all levels. In that regard, full compliance with the obligations under the international arrangements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016) and others, must stand as a priority for the international community.

Georgia believes that resolution 1540 (2004) remains the main pillar and overarching legal instrument in the multilateral non-proliferation architecture. We co-sponsored the new resolution 2325 (2016), unanimously adopted on 15 December, which clearly reaffirms that the proliferation of these weapons constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security and sets the basis for the pathway to achieve the full implementation of the obligations of resolution 1540 (2004).

Georgia has been taking various measures to that end. The Government established the National CBRN

Council, which, in consultation with the European Union, the United States and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), elaborated a national CBRN threat-reduction strategy and a CBRN national action plan for 2015-2019. Georgia is actively cooperating with the European Union and UNICRI within the framework of the CBRN Centres of Excellence to promote an integrated CBRN approach across South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine. A CBRN regional secretariat has been opened and is now functioning in Georgia with the aim of contributing to the success of this project.

With support from our partners and in close cooperation with international experts, Georgia has developed a new legislative base, in force since 2014, for regulating its strategic export controls in full compliance with European standards. The relevant department in the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources Protection has been transformed into a public legal entity so as to increase its effective independence of the regulatory body, and a new department of radioactive-waste management has been created, putting radioactive-waste storage and disposal facilities under full State control nationwide, and supported through the development of a relevant legal framework.

To promote CBRN-related topics at the United Nations, the Governments of Georgia, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of the Philippines have established the United Nations Group of Friends of CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance. The Group of Friends is a consultation and dialogue forum with the goal of integrating a CBRN component into the international security architecture, raising States' awareness of the importance of mitigating CBRN risks and fostering regional cooperation on CBRN challenges. It also promotes activities aimed at building capacity and developing capabilities between and among partner States, as well as implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). It is our belief that by promoting such joint efforts we can advance a robust preventive system against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Azerbaijan.

Mr. Musayev (Azerbaijan): At the outset, I would like to thank the Bolivian delegation, Mr. President, for convening today's important meeting to exchange

views on global efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through non-State actors, as well as for the concept note on the topic.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery continues to pose a serious threat to international peace and security. Azerbaijan shares the international community's concern about the growing dangers and risks of that threat, and our strategic documents on national security and defence cite the proliferation of WMDs as a key security challenge.

For many parts of the world, including the South Caucasus, the direct relevance of resolution 1540 (2004) is obvious. The work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is still vitally important. Azerbaijan greatly appreciates its activities, particularly its close interaction with Member States and increased cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations. As the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of the resolution's implementation noted, the rate of progress shows that achieving its full implementation is a long-term task that will require continued effort at the national, regional and international levels. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council re-emphasized the importance of ensuring that all States implement resolution 1540 (2004) fully and effectively.

Azerbaijan has consistently contributed to global efforts to promote peace and security, including in non-proliferation. Countering that menace is a priority area for our bilateral relations and international cooperation. Azerbaijan has always been a staunch supporter of the quest for a world free from weapons of mass destruction, including through the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of WMD-free zones.

Trans-border threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs demand that States pay special attention to the security of their borders. Both at the national level and through close cooperation with neighbouring countries and international partners within its bilateral security programmes, as well as with international organizations, Azerbaijan is doing its utmost to maintain comprehensive national border controls and management, along with export control systems. Its relevant State agencies are constantly working to enhance their counter-proliferation

capacities and physical protection measures and to improve inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

Areas where there is armed conflict, and especially those under foreign military occupation, often create conditions conducive to exploitation by terrorists, separatists and other criminal groups and increase the risk of illicit cross-border activities. It is critical to ensure that all States comply strictly with their international obligations, particularly those relating to respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of their international borders. However, that can hardly be achieved if those obligations are misinterpreted, made conditional or implemented with reservations, if not ignored altogether. When discussing efforts to prevent non-State actors from acquiring, developing, manufacturing, trafficking or using WMDs, therefore, attention should also be given to countering the policies and practices of States that instigate, support and direct such actors.

At a time when challenges to international peace and security continue unabated, more concerted action and synergy are required at all levels. By striving to implement resolution 1540 (2004) fully and effectively, Member States can contribute significantly to global non-proliferation efforts. Beyond that, there is still an acute need for international assistance to help individual Member States implement their obligations under the resolution, as well as for sustained support to cooperation and capacity-building.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that in order to ensure the effectiveness of strategies that have been collectively agreed on, we should first and foremost uphold fundamental principles and adhere to the uniform application of international law. Azerbaijan will continue to contribute to international efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to support the work of the 1540 Committee.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of Malaysia.

Mr. Mayong Onon (Malaysia): I thank the Security Council and its Bolivian presidency for convening today's open debate. I would also like to commend the briefings by Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative of Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Joseph Ballard, of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, for their keen interest in and insights into the various areas where our engagement with resolution 1540 (2004) and its implementation can be further enhanced.

We also align ourselves with the statement delivered earlier by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

I believe it is important today to recognize the progress that the Security Council has made in enhancing the global framework designed to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, we commend Spain for its leadership in steering the 2016 comprehensive review exercise of resolution 1540 (2004). As a result, we then witnessed the Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2325 (2016), and I would therefore like to stress that we will continue to spare no effort to work with the relevant stakeholders to strengthen and promote the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

For its part, Malaysia continues to meet its international obligations by further enhancing the enforcement and effectiveness of measures aimed at improving domestic controls preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. Malaysia also made amendments to strengthen its strategic trade act of 2010, which provides control over the export, trans-shipment, transit and brokering of strategic items, including arms and related materials, and other activities that could facilitate the design, development and production of WMDs and their delivery systems. The amended act was passed by the Malaysian Parliament on the 21 June 2017.

Among the amendments to the act were enhancements related to definitions and scope of implementation and on penalties designed to dictate serious repercussions for violations. Commensurate penalties are now provided for each offence under the strategic trade act; indeed, committing an offence under the act carries very severe penalties in the form of harsh fines and prison terms.

We reaffirm our commitment to engaging and working together with all Member States and the international community to collectively strive to maintain international peace and security by strengthening all global non-proliferation efforts, in cooperation with our partners here at the United Nations.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Safaei (Islamic Republic of Iran): First of all, I would like to praise the Bolivian presidency of the Security Council and thank it for organizing today's open debate.

I would also like to align myself with the statement made by the representative of Venezuela on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. I would like to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.

Iran is indeed one of the most serious victims of the use of chemical weapons in recent decades. Our people will never forget that they were exposed to hundreds of chemical attacks by the Saddam Hussein regime, while the Security Council remained silent. We strongly condemn the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone anywhere.

Let me also react to the statement made this morning by the representative of the Israeli regime (see S/PV.7985). That statement contained unsubstantiated allegations against my country, fabricated to advance an Iranophobic agenda and, through that, to cover for and justify its aggressive and unlawful policies and practices committed against the whole region. I categorically reject all those allegations and wish to bring the following to the Council's attention.

It is very interesting to see the Israeli regime, an icon of total disregard for dozens of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, including resolution 2334 (2016), and the principles of international law, a regime famous for its atrocities and apartheid policies with a well-known record of developing, producing and stockpiling different kinds of inhumane weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, gesticulating to complain about Iran's legitimate and conventional defence capabilities. The Israeli regime blatantly and flagrantly continues to flout all international regimes governing weapons of mass destruction by refusing to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. It is therefore the only obstacle to the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of the regime pose the most serious of threats to the security of all States in the Middle East and to the NPT regime. The Security Council has the responsibility to effectively address this threat. Moreover, it is now an established fact that Israeli agents are providing care to Da'esh operatives active in Syrian territory, proof of which is abundant.

As a country living in an unstable and volatile region, Iran is fully entitled to build a credible conventional capability to defend against any aggression. Iran's missile systems are part of its legitimate defence capabilities against the threats and intimidations that we are facing on an almost daily basis, especially by the Israeli regime. In that regard, I refer you, Mr. President, to our letter dated 19 May 2015 (S/2015/353). These systems are an exercise of our right to self-defence in the event of any armed attack against us. Iran will not start any war. We do not intend to attack any country, but if we come under attack, it is our legitimate right, under the Charter of the United Nations, to be able to use our national conventional defence capabilities to counter any aggression against our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Iran will not tolerate actions that endanger its national security. We have always warned against terrorism and its expansion in the region. Our policies are based on cooperation with regional countries and the international community with a view to uprooting terrorism and extremism in the region and world.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): The representative of Turkey has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.

Mr. Denktaş (Turkey): I will not dignify with a reply the ridiculous allegations made by the representative of the Syrian regime. I refute them in their entirety. Turkey has a well-established record on compliance with the weapons-of-mass-destruction non-proliferation regime. The use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law, Security Council resolutions and the Chemical Weapons Convention. It constitutes a crime against humanity. Its perpetrators must be held accountable. And the Syrian regime cannot and will not be held exempt from that.

The President (*spoke in Spanish*): There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers.

On behalf of the Security Council, I would like to thank all participants in today's open debate for their input, which will be very important for continuing the work, not only of the Council but also of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on the topic that has brought us together for today's debate.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.