

Provisional

**4118**th Meeting Thursday, 23 March 2000, 3.15 p.m. New York

President:	Mr. Chowdhury	(Bangladesh)
Members:	Argentina Canada China France Jamaica Malaysia Mali Namibia Netherlands Russian Federation Tunisia Ukraine United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America	Mr. Fowler Mr. Shen Guofang Mr. Levitte Mr. Ward Mr. Hasmy Mr. Ouane Mrs. Ashipala-Musavyi Mr. Hamer Mr. Gatilov Mr. Ben Mustapha Mr. Yel'chenko Mr. Harrison

## Agenda

Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building

Report of the Secretary-General on the role of United Nations peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (S/2000/101)

The meeting was resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Indonesia in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Wibisono (Indonesia) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of New Zealand. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Powles** (New Zealand): I should like to say at the outset, Sir, how pleased my delegation is to participate under your presidency in a debate of the Security Council on this crucially important subject. We believe that the complexities of post-conflict peace-building and the challenges posed to the United Nations and the international community generally deserve thorough consideration.

New Zealand has had recent experience of the challenges of post-conflict peace-building during the current operation in East Timor, as well as during our ongoing substantial role in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and elsewhere.

An important point to be made, we believe, is that obviously no two post-conflict peace-building situations are the same. It would not be helpful for the Council to seek to define very detailed policy approaches which would be applicable in all situations. Nevertheless, my delegation believes that there are some key principles which do have general application and deserve greater recognition.

Most important of all, we would place timeliness of response at the top of any list of key principles.

In the case of East Timor, New Zealand and others moved quickly, under effective Australian leadership, to provide the military force necessary to re-establish security, as mandated by the Council. United Nations agencies, led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), responded reasonably promptly with humanitarian relief. The World Bank and other major donors also responded at an early stage with the implementation of a donor coordination programme. These responses were delivered in a reasonably timely manner.

There has also been an urgent need to re-establish a basic civil administration, a legal system, and the foundation for a functioning economy. This has been done with greater difficulty. Bureaucratic procedures such as those used for recruitment for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) seem to underlie some of the unfortunate delays.

While it would not be realistic to expect the international community to rebuild East Timor's shattered economy overnight, we have already seen many signs of the social stresses inevitable in the period before employment-generating projects get under way. We believe this is recognized by UNTAET, the World Bank and other international donors, but we would emphasize the important contribution that timely responses in this field, going beyond emergency humanitarian aid, make to the peace-building effort.

One practical area that my delegation believes requires more attention relates to the provision of civilian police. Inevitably, appropriate numbers of civilian police cannot be found as quickly as can military forces; countries simply do not keep civilian police detachments available for rapid deployment overseas. But the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of excombatants can be fatally impaired if sufficient numbers of civilian police cannot be deployed rapidly. We believe that options for improving the availability of police to the United Nations need to be urgently explored. However, a timely response is possible only if good quick-response systems for deploying key personnel, such as civilian police, and for delivering the means to rebuild basic civilian administration are already in place. Such arrangements do not yet exist across the United Nations system. This is the challenge that the United Nations needs to address as a priority.

Identifying appropriate post-conflict roles for former combatants is inevitably one of the most challenging tasks in peace-building. Obviously, each situation will require its own unique solutions. Our experience in both East Timor and Bougainville underlines, however, the importance of the early involvement of the local population in the reconstruction process. Community

development can be instrumental in providing an atmosphere in which hostile factions can work together. Of course, women and men must participate equally in that process.

In Bougainville, New Zealand has been pleased to provide, by means of our Development Cooperation Programme, support for the peace process, including the restoration of civil authority and a variety of vocational training programmes with a focus on reintegration. We have found it possible to offer various training programmes in which former antagonists learn new skills side by side. But even so, in Bougainville the former combatants retain their arms although, to their credit, those arms have not been used against the uniquely unarmed peacekeeping force, the Peace Monitoring Group. In this situation, further political progress is clearly necessary to encourage complete disarmament.

We have studied the comprehensive report the Secretary-General has provided on this important subject. Inevitably, his report focused on the subject from a global perspective, while my comments today have been from the perspective of my country's ongoing involvement on the ground in East Timor and Bougainville. But I would like to take this opportunity to particularly endorse the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding the dreadful use of child soldiers, and we would also emphasize the need to address the specific situation of girl soldiers.

I would like to conclude by strongly endorsing the final comment of the Secretary-General in his report:

"The international community's key role in this process is to provide clear, consistent and determined support to an overall peace process and to offer long-term assistance with development." [S/2000/101, para. 119]

If there is one point we would add to that, it is the crucial importance of timeliness of response.

**The President**: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Mongolia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia): It is a great honour for me to have the opportunity to participate in this open debate of the Council on this item. At the outset, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to you, Mr. President, for this timely initiative to follow-up last year's open debate of the Council on this important issue

with the participation of the wider membership of the Organization.

My delegation's thanks and appreciation also go to the Secretary-General for his report to the Council in response to last year's open debate held under Malaysia's presidency. My delegation welcomes the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report on the question of increasing the role of United Nations peacekeeping in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants as an integral part of overall United Nations peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building.

My delegation fully agrees with the view that effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are instrumental in building lasting peace and security in post-conflict societies. In this respect, the set of recommendations proposed by the Secretary-General in his report are crucial in identifying the appropriate principles and guidelines for a practical disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in a peacekeeping environment. Therefore we hope that today's consideration of this item will prove useful for future peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding activities.

My delegation has on numerous occasions made statements in the Council's open debates on the issues related to the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as on post-conflict peace-building. Today, I would like to touch upon some elements that seem to be essential, from Mongolia's perspective, to effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures in post-conflict situations.

First, any post-conflict peace-building programme should include short-term measures, such as the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and the social integration of political rivals into post-war society on the basis, of course, of their goodwill and mutual confidence. Furthermore, these short-term measures need to be followed-up by long-term programmes and strategies aimed at strengthening national institutions, good governance and civil society; promoting democracy and human rights; eradicating poverty; and, of course, ensuring sustainable development.

Secondly, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, in our view, should form an interrelated and integrated programme within the mandate of a specific peacekeeping mission that is supported by sufficient

financial and human resources and other necessary facilities. It is our belief that only such a peacekeeping mission would be able to fully cope with the tasks assigned.

Thirdly, overall disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should lay the foundation for a comprehensive peace agreement that is to end the conflict. In our view, the plan of measures to be taken, both nationally and internationally, to implement the tasks of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should be clearly reflected in that peace agreement.

Fourthly, ensuring the participation of international organizations and Member States and the coordination of their activities are very important factors in tailoring those specific peace-building measures and programmes. In our view, the international community and regional organizations should play an important role in addressing the problems of various post-conflict groups on the basis of new power-sharing or other agreed arrangements. We believe that, bearing in mind their nature, obligations and interests, regional organizations have a special stake and role to play in post-conflict peace-building — a role that no other international body can effectively fulfil. We hope that this will be borne in mind.

Fifthly, as far as disarmament is concerned, we attach great importance to the United Nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects that is to be convened in June and July 2001. In this respect, my delegation agrees with others in urging the international community to spare no effort in bringing the conference on this crucial issue to a positive outcome.

Sixthly, my delegation would like to support the Secretary-General's special focus on the problem of child soldiers and their integration into society.

Today, about 300,000 children under the age of 18 are involved in armed conflicts around the world. This is a truly challenging problem facing the international community at the dawn of this new century. Therefore, Mongolia strongly endorses the Secretary-General's proposal that the question of child soldiers' disarmament, demobilization and reintegration be fully included in overall peace-building programmes. In this connection, we also welcome the agreement recently reached in the Working Group on a draft optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, raising the minimum age for participation in conflict from 15 to 18, and setting the age limit for

compulsory recruitment to 18 and the minimum age for voluntary enlistment to at least 16.

Lastly, my delegation would like to underline that, while the United Nations undertakes peacekeeping and peace-building activities, the principles of political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity are to be fully respected and all States should comply with their obligations under international law, as is rightly noted in the draft presidential statement on this issue. My delegation finds this draft document useful and practical and hopes it will be adopted soon.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate once again my delegation's support for United Nations efforts aimed at conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building in different regions affected by armed conflicts. We expect concrete input from today's discussion of this important issue.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Croatia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Šimonović (Croatia): I am pleased to greet you, Sir, as the President of the Security Council for the month of March and welcome your initiative to hold an open debate on the centrality of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants to the restoration of stability and sustainable peace. Croatia understands well the importance of the role United Nations peacekeeping has played in the past and could play in the future in this regard. Hence, we wish to thank and commend the Secretary-General for his thorough, systematic and comprehensive report on the topic under our consideration.

The report represents a major contribution to furthering the awareness of the importance of DDR to the cause of consolidating peace in post-conflict societies in several ways. First, it offers useful definitions of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in a peacekeeping environment and a reminder that the success of these activities depends on their comprehensive, mutual and continuous reinforcement. Secondly, the report contains a very useful compendium and critical assessment of the ways and means in which the various United Nations, regional and other actors have dealt with DDR in the past within the context of some peacekeeping operations and follow-on missions. Thirdly, the Secretary-General identifies a number of challenges for future implementation of DDR in all segments of the peace-

setting, peacekeeping and peace-building agendas. Fourthly, he puts forward a number of innovative proposals for further pioneering action or refinement by the Security Council and other institutional actors with a vested interest in assuring irreversible peace.

Croatia has hosted five distinct United Nations peacekeeping operations in the last nine years. We have gained experience that entitles us to reflect upon the lessons learned in peacekeeping and peace-building. I wish to briefly restate three points from the lessons learned from the successful United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). These three points are: the disarmament model that was used during the UNTAES mission; follow-on security assistance and political missions that ensued upon the successful completion of this United Nations Mission; and national strategy and policy measures regarding the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants.

UNTAES was created in an environment favourable to its ultimate goal of the peaceful reintegration of the formerly occupied Croatian territory. There was agreement of the parties to the conflict. Recourse to the military option was unattractive to all interested parties and the political goal of peaceful reintegration was clearly set and known, as well as supported by the political will of the host Government, the international community and the skilled United Nations leadership in the field. And yet, the process of reintegration was, of course, more than politically challenging. It represented major technical and bureaucratic difficulties for the civilian aspects of reintegration.

Critical to the orderly implementation of the civilian timetable for reintegration, however, was the process of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. Importantly, this process was not only launched early on in the operation, but also completed swiftly and in parallel with an innovative manner of a weapons buy-back scheme.

The firearms buy-back programme lasted approximately 10 months and was jointly conducted by the Croatian Government and UNTAES. Under the programme, almost 10,000 firearms were collected, for which approximately \$1.6 million were paid. Since August 1999, any further illegal possession of arms has been penalized. We do recognize that, in some other environments, similar weapons buy-back programmes produced undesired consequences, but I wish to stress that in Croatia such a programme worked quite well.

Another important element in UNTAES was the role played by the Transitional Police Force, which was made up of 40 per cent Croats, 40 per cent Serbs and 20 per cent other ethnic groups present in the region. The international community provided training assistance for a number of the Transitional Police Force members, which proved crucial for establishing a high level of professionalism. This building of local capacity was vital to the proper reintegration of former combatants and the maintenance of law and order.

The critical importance of economic and social policy measures to speeding up reconciliation and the overall post-conflict recovery cannot be overemphasized. In Croatia, we tried to stimulate the reintegration of excombatants in several ways, including by adopting an amnesty law that exonerated former rebels, except for those who had committed war crimes. Other measures included priority access by veterans to higher education and employment in the public sector; preferential lines of credit for new business ventures or agricultural leases; special unemployment benefits, including health care; and early retirement benefits.

Such economic, social and development policy measures have proven taxing on the national budget of an economy burdened with reconstruction, low investment and real growth rates and high unemployment, as is always the case in a post-conflict society. The new Croatian Government, which has also recently mounted a major refugee return programme, has recognized the challenges of the practical implementation of a comprehensive reintegration policy. While offering its unwavering commitment to implementing such a policy, it has called for much needed international assistance in resurrecting an economy that could sustain development needs. At the same time, we recognize that the contribution of institutional donors might be limited, as it is also urgently needed elsewhere. Hence, we are placing particular emphasis on the potential of the private sector and direct business-to-business cooperation.

In this regard, we wholeheartedly support the Secretary-General's emphasis on the potential role to be played by the business community and his call on the Security Council

"to explore the creation of mechanisms through which it could enhance its capacity to enter into dialogue with business". (S/2000/101. para. 111)

Of equal and timely relevance is his call issued to Member States to re-examine bilaterally the various development and trade policies that favour employment within post-conflict economies.

Although reconciliation is not emphasized in the Secretary-General's report, we continue to hold that it constitutes one of the cornerstones of a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Above all, establishing the truth about what happened during a conflict — particularly establishing responsibility for war crimes that have been committed — is critical to healing and reconciliation. The goal of the reintegration of former combatants thus cannot be attained without this element of justice. Croatia is aware of its own responsibilities and obligations in this regard.

It is therefore Croatia's intention to fully implement a policy of responsible cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. For the sake of justice, the historical record, reconciliation, and peace and stability in the area, it is vital that the Security Council use all its power and influence to ensure that all those indicted, including those from the Republika Srpska and from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are finally brought to trial.

**The President**: The next speaker is the representative of Bahrain. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Buallay** (Bahrain) (*spoke in Arabic*): I wish, Sir, to congratulate you and your delegation on your election to membership of the Security Council, and on the excellent and wise way in which you are presiding over the work of the Council this month. Our thanks go to you also for having organized this meeting.

During its tenure as a member of the Security Council, Bahrain contributed to the consultations on post-conflict peace-building; we welcomed the outcome of those consultations. That is what has prompted us to participate in today's meeting, in the hope that we would be able to contribute further to the debate.

Post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations are of great importance in stabilizing situations, reducing the probability of new violence, and facilitating the transition of societies from conflict to normal life and development. For that reason, it is very important that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes be included in any post-conflict

peace agreements. Such agreements must specify the responsibilities of leading national institutions and other actors, along with the measures that they need to take with respect to this issue; they must define both the strategies and the timetables for these programmes.

We endorse the definitions contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, but we stress that if such post-conflict operations are to succeed, we must focus on the following nine elements.

First, the parties to the conflict must provide precise information about the size, staffing, location, nature, number and location of stockpiles of weapons.

Second, the framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be defined in the peace agreement marking the end of a conflict.

Third, the States Members of the United Nations must provide the political momentum necessary to encourage negotiators to take the difficult, but necessary, decisions.

Fourth, ex-combatants must be reassured that their safety and security will be fully guaranteed prior to and during the disarmament phase.

Fifth, the expertise and resources necessary for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be provided, with a view to implementing the peace agreement.

Sixth, illicit arms flows must be halted.

Seventh, all parties must be persuaded of the futility of a resumption of hostilities.

Eighth, civil society must be prepared to accept the reintegration of ex-combatants; this includes the need to find appropriate jobs for them once they have been rehabilitated.

And ninth, international efforts to promote disarmament, demobilization and reintegration must be coordinated and fostered.

Most of the elements of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, of course, are quite clear. But certain issues must be given more careful consideration. These include the deployment of United Nations personnel to neighbouring countries with a view to forging links with their national counterparts, and to monitoring arms flows in the region. But this must not compromise the principles of State sovereignty and of noninterference in the internal affairs of States.

There is an inextricable link between the maintenance and the building of peace. Areas in which conflict had taken place must not experience the resumption of conflict.

There must be cooperation and coordination between tow organs of the United Nations: the Security Council, which is responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, and the Economic and Social Council, which is responsible for the building and consolidation of peace, along with the related specialized agencies. In that connection, we are pleased to see that there have been signs of such cooperation and coordination between the two organs, as in Haiti for example. We would like these links to be strengthened, as they were when the Presidents of the two Councils met recently. Why, then, should there not be a joint meeting of members of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council to consider strategies that would clearly define the activities of each organ with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security.

I cannot fail in conclusion to stress that peace is an integral whole, no component of which must be neglected. Peace requires cooperation among all members of the international community, whether it is a matter of the maintenance of peace or of post-conflict peace-building.

**The President**: I thank the representative of Bahrain for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Costa Rica. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Niehaus** (Costa Rica) (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and to thank you for convening this meeting.

Peace is not merely the absence of armed conflict; peace is harmony among the various sectors of society, equitable relations among individuals and peoples, and the rejection of violence and hatred in human relations.

War often leads to other wars. Armed conflicts fuel deep-rooted hatreds and provoke reprisals. Armed violence

is an ongoing offence against the dignity and the rights of individuals. Genuine peace requires the commitment of all, ex-combatants and civilians alike, in the task of rebuilding and restoring normalcy to society. Peace requires active brotherhood among all men. In short, peace can exist only to the extent that we all recognize that, as human beings, we are part of the same family.

This goal is not easy to attain. Normalizing human and international relations after armed conflict phase is an arduous undertaking. A ceasefire does not halt the dynamic of violence; hatred and the lust for vengeance still remain. The temptation to use weapons and military contingents remains latent. The logic of violence and military strategy persists. Unless the combatants are disarmed and demobilized, the prospects of peace will be darkened by the ever-present threat of the resumption of hostilities and violent crime.

In Central America we have witnessed first-hand the importance of the tasks of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. On the one hand, we have seen the achievements of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Unquestionably, these missions were key actors in restoring normalcy and peace to those societies.

On the other hand, in Central America we have also witnessed failed processes of demobilization and disarmament. We have seen cycles of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary groups that continue to cause suffering for innocent people. We have also seen the overabundant supply of weapons that, at the end of an armed conflict, like an epidemic, infects neighbouring countries with violence, crime and destruction. In Costa Rica we are well aware of the vital need to disarm combatants and to destroy their weapons.

The stockpiling of arms and ammunition is a real obstacle to peace processes and a direct threat to all countries neighbouring a conflict zone. Costa Rica calls for the destruction of these weapons and a ban on the transfer of weapons to anyone who does not comply with a set of strict international standards of conduct. In this regard, my Government firmly supports the draft international code of conduct on arms transfers, prepared by the former President of Costa Rica, Mr. Oscar Arías Sanchez, and endorsed by 19 other Nobel Peace Prize laureates, both individuals and institutions. At the request of my delegation, this draft code of conduct has been distributed in document S/2000/146.

In addition, while peacekeeping operations can and must provide valuable support to the tasks of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, Governments and groups involved in the conflicts must assume the primary responsibility. Political and military leaders of the warring parties must show their commitment to peace by taking concrete measures to demobilize and disband their military contingents. If these tasks are carried out simultaneously on both sides, they will help reduce tension, promote stability and build confidence.

My delegation is particularly pleased to welcome the emphasis placed in the report on the plight of children. It is alarming that 300,000 boys and girls are now taking part in armed conflicts. We believe that the participation of minors under the age of 18 in armed conflicts, be they combatants or support staff for armed forces, is in all circumstances unacceptable. Children are the first and the most defenceless victims of war. All Governments need to demobilize those minors immediately, whether they are members of the armed forces or support staff. Similarly, Governments must actively promote the reintegration of boys and girls who have been demobilized from opposition armed forces. It is essential to provide psychological and social help to these children in order to enable them to make a full physical and emotional recovery and to be reintegrated into society.

In particular, we believe that it is necessary to give greater help to the families of demobilized children so that they have an emotional support network and a structure of ethical and moral values that will enable them to become constructive members of their communities. In short, we call for a society where families take precedence — not barracks.

Finally, we cannot ignore the economic aspect of peace processes. The reintegration of combatants requires the establishment of employment opportunities and development. If no alternatives are offered to war and crime as economic activities, then military personnel will not have a real incentives to demobilize. Extreme poverty, hunger and discrimination are often sources of hatred and violence. Equity, justice and solidarity are essential, fundamental elements for the building of real and lasting peace.

**The President:** The next speaker is the representative of Singapore. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Mahbubani** (Singapore): We congratulate you, Mr. President, on your initiative to have a second debate on

the role of United Nations peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). We would also like to thank Malaysia for introducing this item in the Council last July. We hope that over time, with the discussion of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, when United Nations delegates see the term "UN-DDR" they will no longer associate it solely with the United Nations Delegates' Dining Room.

The fact that we are talking about DDR today as a normal aspect of peacekeeping operations shows how far peacekeeping has evolved. In the early days of peacekeeping, the sole purpose of a peacekeeping operation was to provide a buffer between two combating countries after they had decided to make peace. If these combatants attempted to breach the peace, the United Nations peacekeeping operation would merely report the breach without seeking to enforce the ceasefire. Indeed, the pride of traditional United Nations peacekeeping forces was that they could do their job without using force and, often, without arms. The Blue Helmets served as a true symbol of peace.

It is truly amazing how much things have changed since those halcyon days. Indeed, United Nations peacekeepers have been deployed in such a variety of roles that it may be legitimate to ask whether the term "peacekeeping" has a distinct or singular meaning. The Secretary-General's initiative in creating a new panel under the leadership of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to study all aspects of peacekeeping is therefore timely. Significantly, this project is called "peace operations". The use of this term implicitly acknowledges that the concept of peacekeeping may no longer be adequate to cover all the work that the United Nations is doing now under the umbrella of peacekeeping. We would like to note here that peacekeeping operations are traditionally launched under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, but sometimes under Chapter VII or in between. It may be useful for Mr. Brahimi's panel to assess the criteria for creating peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI or Chapter VII, because at this stage we are not clear as to what the criteria are.

DDR is, therefore, clearly a new dimension of peacekeeping. However, when we compare this new dimension with the traditional work done by the Blue Helmets in the past, we must acknowledge that disarmament and demobilization are inherently difficult and dangerous operations. Most people who have been carrying guns for years have either been shot at or have been shooting at others. Guns have become an essential

part of their existence. Indeed, many feel naked without them. They will not part with their guns easily. One clear example of this can be found in Sierra Leone. In his new book, *Deliver Us From Evil*, William Shawcross writes:

"The RUF [Revolutionary United Front] was part of a post-cold-war phenomenon — a non-ideological guerrilla movement. As elsewhere in Africa, AK-47s gave dispossessed young men more money and more raison d'être — even if it was only senseless violence — than peace."

But it is not only the United Nations that has had problems with disarmament. Even peace processes outside the United Nations framework — for example, the Northern Ireland peace process — have had similar difficulties with disarmament.

In reviewing these problems, we asked ourselves one simple question: which United Nations operations have successfully carried out disarmament or demobilization? The failures are of course, well known. Somalia is the best example, although there the United Nations has been unfairly blamed for serious errors in judgement by a major Power acting independently of United Nations control. Cambodia has rightfully been hailed as a peacekeeping success story. In an article entitled "The Nightmare is Over", which appeared in the *New York Times* on 12 October 1993, William Shawcross wrote: "Let there be no doubt about it. Success is the right word" to describe the United Nations operation in Cambodia.

And indeed, a recent conference on peacekeeping in Singapore made the following observations:

"From the start, UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] was conceived as a comprehensive and ambitious operation, with a good mix of both peacekeeping and peace-building elements, including human rights, the return and rehabilitation of refugees, civil administration, civilian police and electoral assistance."

However, the same conference in Singapore also observed that

"UNTAC was, however, not a complete success. Ceasefire was not fully realized."

And these are the crucial words:

"Disarmament and demobilization of soldiers did not take place. This was a major reason why the ability to implement the other aspects of the mandate was eroded."

Clearly, even in relatively successful peacekeeping operations, DDR can be a problematic element.

Indeed, if one reads the report of the Secretary-General carefully, the only clear example of success that is frequently mentioned is Mozambique, although in some aspects this, too, was seen or described as a qualified success. There may be other success stories, but we must confess that we did not find them in the report. What we did find in the report, however, was sound commonsensical advice on the key factors that could lead to success in disarmament and demobilization. These included the political will of parties to the conflict to abide by the peace agreement; full cooperation of the whole affected population, including both combatants and non-combatants; a clear and robust mandate for DDR in the peacekeeping operation; strong political support from the Security Council and the international community; the swift provision of ample resources for DDR; and the swift deployment and considerable deterrent capacity of the peacekeeping operation.

There is one particular paragraph of the Secretary-General's report is worth reading in full:

"The ability of an operation to reassure demobilizing combatants of their security may require considerable deterrent capacity; this should be available as swiftly as possible with deployment of an operation. If an operation arrives in the field without the necessary capacity, this not only hobbles its practical effectiveness, but undermines its political viability. Credibility becomes a wasting asset unless support is forthcoming to sustain it, and where an operation is called upon to discharge a robust role in ensuring security, it is particularly important that well-equipped elements be deployed quickly. A mission that has been perceived as strong from the beginning of its deployment is far less likely to be tested than one which is perceived as initially vulnerable or ineffective." (S/2000/101, para. 67)

Therefore, the Secretary-General's report essentially indicates that a long list of factors are required for a successful DDR process. The logical conclusion that emerges from the report is that the success of DDR

depends on the overall conceptual soundness and viability of the peacekeeping operation that is launched. DDR on its own cannot be the crucial variable to determine a peacekeeping operation's success. A conceptually unsound peacekeeping operation cannot be rescued by good DDR, but a conceptually sound peacekeeping operation can be assisted by DDR.

A simple analogy may help explain this point. Each time the Council launches a new peacekeeping operation, we should compare it to the launch of a new sailing boat. Preferably, of course, it should be launched in propitious or favourable weather, but we are sure that the Council is aware of this. Whether the boat sinks or sails after the launch will depend on the conceptual and practical soundness of its construction. Poorly designed boats are more likely to sink. They are handicapped even before they are launched.

The elements of DDR serve as three additional sails on such a boat. On a well-designed boat, with favourable winds, they can help. On a poorly designed boat, even the best sails will make no difference. Hence, one key point that we hope to put across today is that each time we discuss DDR, we should do so in a holistic manner: look at the total picture of the boat and not just the sails.

We make this point here because the record of the Security Council in launching peacekeeping operations has been a little mixed. Many successful operations have been launched. The success stories are well known and lauded, but there have also been failures. This is normal. The Security Council is a human institution. Like all human creations, it has also erred, but, unlike other human institutions, it does not freely or frankly discuss its failures.

Take the two most recent peacekeeping operations that have been launched: in Kosovo and East Timor. The operation launched in Kosovo clearly appears to be conceptually unsound. The reasons are obvious. No explanation is needed. The daily reports we read of the trials and travails of United Nations and other peacekeepers in Kosovo confirm that all is not well. The current phase of the East Timor operations, by contrast, appears to be a conceptually sound operation, even though we have to concede that the initial phase under the United Nations Mission in East Timor had flaws. We hope that the rest of the East Timor operation will continue to do well.

Our role here is not to be negative. We are acutely aware, as are most in this Chamber, that most peacekeeping operations are not launched under perfect circumstances.

Given the nature of the problems that they have to deal with, they are inevitably launched in messy and often difficult situations. But these obvious difficulties make it even more imperative for the Council to identify the critical factors that will create success stories rather than failures out of new peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations, as we indeed noted in our previous statement to the Council, are once again becoming a growth industry. The number of peacekeepers reached a high of about 80,000 in 1994, but then declined to around 10,000 in 1998-99. The number is now on the verge of going up significantly again. In the mid-1990s, we went through one wave of disillusionment that led to a sharp cutback in peacekeeping operations. How do we prevent another wave of disillusionment? This is the underlying concern that explains the remarks we are making to the Council today.

Hence, we applaud the greater attention that the Council is paying to many key dimensions of peacekeeping operations, including DDR. We also value the attention that the Council is paying to the demobilization of child soldiers in this context. In this regard, we welcome the progress made in child protection and note that senior child protection advisers have been included in two recent peacekeeping operations in Africa to help ensure that protection of children's rights remains a priority throughout. We hope that the Secretariat and other key United Nations agencies, like the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund, will provide greater support to the office of Under-Secretary-General Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

We believe that all this attention needs to be woven into a holistic approach that the Council should take towards new peacekeeping operations. Political realities often dictate both the location and nature of the new peacekeeping operations that are created. But these political realities have to be balanced with a careful, professional evaluation of the soundness of the operations that are to be launched. Most of us would be alarmed if sailing boats were built and launched without professional advice having been heeded. We should be equally alarmed if new peacekeeping operations are launched in a similar manner.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Colombia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Valdivieso** (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to participate in this debate. At the same time, I should like to acknowledge the report of the Secretary-General and to thank him for it, as well as for the introductory comments that he made this morning.

I should like to begin by highlighting the important role of the Security Council in the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) through its peacekeeping operations. It is clear from the statements made during this debate that there are two essential prerequisites for such a process to be successful in a peacebuilding environment. On the one hand, the conditions for the DDR process must be set out in the peace agreements signed by the parties to a conflict, while, on the other, the financial means required for the implementation of the process must be assured. These two prerequisites are essential for any DDR process, but they are not sufficient to ensure its success. It is worthwhile to point out, however, that there have been some successful cases of DDR in which neither the Security Council nor any peacekeeping operation has been involved.

In his report, the Secretary-General clearly presents the experience of peacekeeping operations in the processes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. We share in particular his suggestions about the need for the United Nations to have at its disposal sufficient information about experts who could provide assistance to the Organization when the United Nations is called upon to participate in DDR activities. Furthermore, we consider his comments about the need to provide training to participants in peacekeeping missions on practical aspects of the DDR process to be relevant. However, we should like to make our own assessment with regard to the involvement of the United Nations in this area.

The signing of a peace agreement putting an end to an armed conflict should be seen as an achievement deserving the broadest support of the international community. However, the stage of managing peace is much more difficult and tends to take place without much fanfare and without making great headlines in the press. Hence, there is a risk of losing the initial international support that was generated for peace. When this happens and the support of the international community falls off, or when the international community is slow to react to a post-conflict situation, the risk of a return to conflict increases.

We therefore recognize the importance of giving the United Nations effective tools to enable it to provide

continuous and uninterrupted support for post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. Peacekeeping missions are important instruments for that purpose, but we must not lose sight of the real causes of conflict, which may be many and may require a long-term response.

One area of great concern for Colombia is the wide availability of weapons in conflict zones and the illegal traffic in weapons. We believe that the international community has now become aware of the need to exercise stricter control over the trade in small arms. The upcoming Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons will provide a great opportunity for us to respond to this factor, which destabilizes peace.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process requires great trust to be established between the parties. Post-conflict reintegration, in particular, can call for economic rehabilitation or the establishment of new governmental institutions, which might exceed the limits of a peacekeeping operation. In such cases, we need to turn to the modalities of cooperation for development of other United Nations bodies, and we must respect their mandates.

In this context, we wish to highlight the work carried out by other bodies of the United Nations system in the process of reintegration, and we welcome the evergrowing participation of the World Bank. This is a stage that requires considerable investment to generate permanent sources of employment, rebuild the social fabric and establish new institutions. The broad participation of various international actors is therefore required at this peace-building stage. The calamities caused by war have worsened the living conditions of millions of people throughout the world. Let us ensure that indifference or an improvisational approach on the part of the international community to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes does not reverse progress on the road to peace.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Guatemala. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

**Mr. Rosenthal** (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): Guatemala could not fail to take part in this debate in the Security Council on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Ours is one of the countries that is fortunate enough to be a

success story in this regard, a success that unfolded under the auspices of the United Nations.

We are grateful for the lucid report introduced by the Secretary-General. We believe that it highlights some of the issues that have been part of our own experience since December 1996, when an internal conflict that had lasted for almost 40 year was brought to an end. In the case of Guatemala, the three elements that form the subject of today's debate — disarmament, demobilization and reintegration — have received distinct, but interrelated treatment, in my country's Peace Accords. I am happy to report today on considerable progress in all three areas: total compliance in disarmament and demobilization and significant progress with regard to reintegration.

Since I am one of the last speakers, I can add little of a conceptual nature to what has already been said. I can, however, contribute concrete, real-life experiences. In that respect, there are two aspects to which I would draw attention.

The first concerns the way in which domestic actors interact with the international community, and the second the link between peace-building operations and humanitarian assistance on the one hand, and development on the other.

Let me turn to the first aspect. The international presence, in particular that of the United Nations, was noteworthy both during the negotiation of the Peace Accords and during their implementation. But at no time did that international presence replace the domestic actors as a determining force. Indeed, we believe that one of the lessons of the Guatemala peace process relates to the key importance of the domestic actors being in the proverbial driver's seat. When I speak of domestic actors, I am not referring only to the Government and the ex-insurgents but to civil society as a whole, since the peace process in Guatemala has been quite participatory. The fact that the international presence was not perceived to be excessively intrusive is due to a large degree to the respect that the United Nations engenders thanks to its impartiality and neutrality. In fact, it was the United Nations that coordinated, at least partially, the presence of other international actors — the so-called Group of Friends of the Guatemalan Peace Process — in the areas of the consolidation of peace and of external cooperation.

That brings me to my second point. Activities to consolidate peace in Guatemala are intimately connected to the development effort. Indeed, the bulk of the specific commitments contained in the Peace Accords involves economic and social development. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala monitors development and humanitarian aspects, and it maintains very close ties with the United Nations Development Programme and the rest of the United Nations system. All parties understand that for demobilization and reintegration to be successful, the economic environment must be favourable.

Finally, many of the issues raised in the Secretary-General's report have found concrete expression in Guatemala's experience, be it in the area of addressing the needs of children who are victims of conflict, in the area of disarmament or in that of promoting respect for human rights. The activities of the Organization in the field are providing many lessons that can facilitate our collective actions in other parts of the world, in compliance with the overarching objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. For this reason, my country is truly grateful to the United Nations.

**The President:** The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Indonesia. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Wibisono (Indonesia): Sir, my delegation wishes to extend its congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of March. We have full confidence that under your wise guidance, progress will be made in dealing with the issues on its agenda. Let me also extend felicitations to your predecessor, Ambassador Arnoldo Listre of Argentina, for his skilful stewardship of the Council's activities last month.

Indonesia wishes to commend the delegation of Bangladesh for its initiative to have the Council consider the agenda item before us. We believe that it is both timely and appropriate and that it will be beneficial not only to the international community but also to the countries directly concerned.

The report of the Secretary-General has rightly focused our attention on the complexities of the interrelated issues involved and on the role of peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The report also makes clear the crucial role of international assistance in ensuring the effective implementation of the agreements reached and the marshalling of resources needed to advance the peace process.

The international dimension of these activities should focus on the role of the United Nations and of regional organizations in their respective spheres of competence. Their involvement within a framework for cooperation will have a salutary impact by bringing a measure of stability, which, as experience has shown, has led in some instances to the restoration of normalcy in troubled areas. But first and foremost, the success of these endeavours depends ultimately on the willingness of the parties involved to abide by the terms of the peace agreements and to give up the use of force, which is a *sine qua non* for launching the three-pronged approach of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Moreover, the handing over of weapons to competent authorities and the ensuing demobilization have positive implications for security in post-conflict situations, especially in ensuring and promoting the peace process. We recognize the importance of creating an atmosphere conducive to security by disarming the combatants and collecting armaments from civilians within the framework of an overall weapon-collection programme, so as to promote an environment in which weapons are no longer perceived to be necessary.

It is poignant to note that 300,000 children under the age of 18 have been used as soldiers in conflicts around the world. It is alarming to note that such activities are on the increase, which calls attention to the need for their demobilization and reintegration into society. Their future is in jeopardy due to limited educational opportunities, which alone can prepare them for productive careers. It is self-evident that more needs to be done to ensure them a rightful place in society through adequate support programmes.

Special attention should be paid to child soldiers in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. Bearing in mind the vulnerability of children, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers should be pursued in a specific manner. As conflicts are resolved, their rights, as stipulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, should immediately be restored, protected and promoted. Their reintegration into their family and society is crucial. First priority should be given to school education for them.

Another important issue is curbing the flow of arms across national borders through clandestine means after disarmament is achieved, as it would have a profoundly negative impact on security and portend a potentially explosive situation. Determined and coordinated efforts at

the national, regional and international levels can stem the cross-border flow of weapons.

Finally, the question of adequate financing needs to be addressed to ensure the implementation of programmes for the reintegration and reconstruction of a damaged economy. This calls for the distribution of financial assistance on a fair and equitable basis between the excombatants and the civilian population, many of whom also face extreme economic hardship.

The complexity and multidimensional nature of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of excombatants call for political will, which is of the utmost importance in bolstering the role of the United Nations through the modality of peacekeeping. We believe that, based on the Organization's experience in various conflicts, it is time to approach these issues on the basis of guidelines to be drawn from the Secretary-General's report.

**The President**: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his kind words addressed to me and my country.

The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): The delegation of Egypt has read the report of the Secretary-General on the role of peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, contained in document S/2000/101, which was submitted at the request of the Council pursuant to the presidential statement of 8 July 1999 on this subject. We would like to extend our thanks to the Secretary-General for preparing the report and to offer some observations on the handling of this question in the Security Council.

First, the delegation of Egypt takes note of the enhanced mandates given to peacekeeping operations by the Council in the area of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. In this respect, we would like to state that any mandate of this kind should be carried out with the full cooperation and agreement of the parties to the conflict, as their agreement is the sole basis on which the implementation of these activities can begin. Such agreement is an indication of the necessary political will to proceed with the implementation of these activities. We cannot impose the

implementation of these activities without the agreement of the parties concerned.

Secondly, my delegation believes that in cases where the Security Council gives special mandates to peacekeeping operations to carry out these activities, it should ensure the adequacy of the resources provided to the Members of the United Nations and their forces who are asked to implement the mandate and supervise such activities. This is particularly necessary with regard to the disarmament and demobilization component if we are to avoid any dangerous problems that may arise from a lack or insufficiency of resources. In this connection, I cannot fail to mention the reference in paragraph 64 of the Secretary-General's report to the failure to demobilize combatants in Angola during the United Nations Angola Verification Missions because of the inadequacy of human and material resources at the time.

Thirdly, we recognize the danger by small arms, which are widely used in internal conflicts and civil wars. We are also aware that the Security Council sometimes faces cases in which it must tackle the spread of these weapons in conflict zones. However, we believe that this question should primarily be dealt with in the relevant forums, particularly the General Assembly. Addressing the issue of small arms in the Security Council should therefore be limited to the operational aspects related to the disarmament of combatants within the framework of peacekeeping operations; it should not extend into other aspects arising from central and conceptual aspects of the problem of small arms.

Along these lines, I would also like to point out that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of excombatants are long-term programmes that are part of a continuum, as the Secretary-General's report indicates. Many United Nations bodies and agencies working in the post-conflict peace-building process also deal with these matters, including the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The peace-building process should be tackled comprehensively, given the interrelated nature of its elements. In this regard, I must refer to the importance of coordination between all United Nations bodies and agencies working in this field in avoiding any conflict where negative results might affect the successful implementation of a mission's mandate.

Fourthly, it is important to pay tribute to the important role played by some non-governmental organizations in carrying out the demobilization and reintegration of excombatants in some States. Egypt welcomes that role as long as those organizations abide by the basic conditions of their work in this sensitive area, seeking the agreement of the Government concerned and respecting its national rules and regulations.

I would now like to move from general points to two more specific examples: the cases of Congo and Sierra Leone. I would like to point out that the problem of armed groups in eastern Congo that are not parties to the Lusaka Agreement represents a great source of destabilization in the Congo and neighbouring countries. They add a dangerous dimension to the already complicated, difficult and multifaceted conflict in that country. The international community cannot support the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement without reaching a permanent solution to the problem of these armed groups. The United Nations cannot establish and deploy an entire peacekeeping operation without drawing up and implementing a general comprehensive programme to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate these groups into civilian life.

It is our hope that the Joint Military Commission will be able to set up a plan in cooperation and coordination with the United Nations to proceed with the implementation of this part of the Ceasefire Agreement in the near future, so as to help pave the way for the other military aspects of the Lusaka Agreement. Agreeing on an ambitious plan to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the so-called negative forces in eastern Congo will not contribute in itself to solving the dangerous problem posed by those armed groups. What is required is the coordination of the efforts of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Joint Military Commission and the parties to the conflict themselves to ensure the successful implementation of such a plan after its drafting and ratification. Undoubtedly, the World Bank can play a pivotal role in preparing and implementing such a programme in cooperation with the United Nations and other parties concerned. This will, of course, require vast financial resources, which we hope the donor countries will provide.

Finally, we would like to say that the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone, which will be the largest peacekeeping operation in the world once it is fully deployed, is a clear example of the pivotal role that the international Organization could carry out in the field of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, particularly child soldiers. The successful implementation of this programme in Sierra Leone will undoubtedly contribute to a great extent to laying the

security, political, economic and social basis that is necessary to achieving peace and stability in that country, which has suffered the scourge of civil war since 1991. While we call upon all parties to participate in the disarmament and demobilization of combatants and upon the leaders of the Revolutionary United Front and the former military regime to cooperate fully with the efforts of the United Nations and the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Sierra Leone in this respect, we hope that the donor countries will start providing the financial

resources necessary to implement this programme, particularly through their contribution to the Trust Fund established by the World Bank for that purpose. We hope that the international conference to be held in London on 27 March will lead to positive results in this respect.

**The President:** There are no further speakers inscribed on my list.

In accordance with the agreement reached, the next meeting of the Security Council to continue the consideration of this item on the agenda will take place immediately following the adjournment of this meeting.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.