



Security Council

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ENGLISH

PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED AND TWELFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 11 May 1993, at 5.40 p.m.

President: Mr. VORONTSOV

(Russian Federation)

Members: Brazil
Cape Verde
China
Djibouti
France
Hungary
Japan
Morocco
New Zealand
Pakistan
Spain
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Venezuela

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. JESUS
Mr. LI Zhaoxing
Mr. OLHAYE
Mr. MERIMEE
Mr. ERDOS
Mr. HATANO
Mr. BENJELLOUN-TOUIMI
Mr. O'BRIEN
Mr. MARKER
Mr. YAÑEZ BARNUEVO

Sir David HANNAY
Mrs. ALBRIGHT
Mr. ARRIA

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The meeting was called to order at 5.40 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

LETTER DATED 12 MARCH 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/25405)

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/25445)

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (S/25556)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pak (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and Mr. Yoo (Republic of Korea) took places at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/25745, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following documents: S/25576, letter dated 9 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/25581, letter dated 12 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25593, letter dated April 13 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25595, letter dated 15 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/25734, letter dated 4 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/25747, letter dated 10 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

The first speaker is the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and I now call on him.

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I should first of all like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. My thanks also go to your predecessor, Mr. Jamsheed K.A. Marker, Permanent Representative of Pakistan.

As this is the first time that I have spoken in this Council, I wish to extend my greetings to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Before I make my statement, I should like to remind members of the Security Council that I have officially requested the Security Council, through its President, to consider at this meeting issues related to the abuse by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA. I hope that my request, contained in document S/25747, will be considered as a formal agenda item, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the problems in implementing the safeguards agreement cannot be considered to wreck world peace and threaten the security of other countries.

No legal or technical grounds can be found to discuss the so-called "nuclear problem" at the United Nations Security Council.

The withdrawal of our country from the NPT was based on our full right under the Treaty, a right that belongs to every sovereign Member State. Our refusal to allow the special inspection of military installations unrelated to nuclear activities that was demanded by the United States and some IAEA Secretariat officials cannot be regarded as so-called "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is therefore opposed to discussion of the so-called "nuclear problem" at the United Nations Security Council.

The draft resolution introduced by the United States is aimed at infringing upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a State Member of the United Nations, and at stifling its socialist system.

Though the adoption of this draft resolution by the Security Council is forced by the demand of the nuclear super-Power, it will be rejected absolutely, since it is unreasonable and in contravention of paragraph 4, Article 2, Chapter I of the United Nations Charter and of paragraph d, Article 3 of the IAEA Statute, which call for respect of the sovereignty of the member States.

As to our withdrawal from the NPT, it is a self-defence measure based on a State's right to withdraw from the Treaty in the exercise of its national sovereignty, in case a State party to the Treaty decides that its supreme interests are threatened.

As clearly noted in the statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued on 12 March, we declared that we were unavoidably withdrawing from the NPT because of an abnormal situation in which the United States, those forces hostile to us and some officials of the IAEA secretariat are abusing the NPT so as to stifle our socialist system.

The major reason that forced us to withdraw from the NPT was the fact that the United States kept increasing nuclear threats against us and manipulated some officials of the IAEA secretariat to open our military bases and disarm us.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Firstly, the United States has escalated its nuclear threat against us while maintaining its nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea, contrary to the fact that we joined the NPT and have since fulfilled our obligations under the NPT in good faith. The United States resumed the suspended "Team Spirit" joint military exercises while we allowed IAEA inspections, thereby increasing the nuclear threat against us. Such American nuclear threats against us constitute a flagrant violation of the NPT as well as of resolution 255 (1968), adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968.

Secondly, the United States and its followers fabricated the "inconsistencies in principle". We have in good faith discharged our obligations under the safeguards agreement. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after signing the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992 - which went into force on 10 April 1992 - provided the IAEA with an initial report on nuclear materials subject to the safeguards and on the design information of its nuclear facilities on 4 May 1992, far in advance of the set time, which had been the end of May.

With a view to bringing into the open all its nuclear activities, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea even provided the IAEA with lists of those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of its scientific research institutes.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

We invited the IAEA delegation, led by its Director General, to come from 11 to 16 May 1992 and we showed the nuclear facilities which the IAEA delegation requested to see, and all other projects which the Agency found suspicious.

We exerted made sincere efforts, in cooperation with the inspectors, during their six rounds of visits to our country from May 1992 to February 1993. The head of the IAEA inspection team repeatedly thanked our operators for their active cooperation, which was explicitly mentioned in the reports submitted by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, since the safeguards agreement came into effect, has sincerely discharged its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the six rounds of inspections have proved that its nuclear activities have a solely peaceful purpose.

The United States and some officials of the IAEA Secretariat fabricated the "inconsistencies in principle".

The fourth ad hoc inspection team, which visited our country from 2 to 14 November 1992, attempted to threaten us, saying that "more nuclear materials should be declared", that this would be "the last chance to modify the initial report" and that "a tragic consequence would follow if the chance were passed up". However, after having become acquainted with the conditions of the Nyongbyon nuclear facilities and having held consultations with the operators, they admitted that most of their views had been based on a hasty conclusion.

The sixth ad hoc inspection team visited our country from 26 January to 6 February 1993 and claimed that they found two "inconsistencies in principle". The first of the "inconsistencies in principle" was that the composition and

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

quantity of plutonium we declared to the IAEA did not correspond to what had been calculated by the IAEA. The second of the "inconsistencies in principle" was that the isotopic composition of plutonium did not correspond to that of the liquid waste.

During the negotiations with the fourth, fifth and sixth ad hoc inspection teams and at the talks with the IAEA Secretariat in Vienna in December 1992 and February 1993, we elucidated, in a scientific and technological way, the mistakes in calculation made by the IAEA on the composition and quantity of plutonium, and explained that the difference in the composition of plutonium and liquid waste arose when the solution from the basic plutonium-extraction experiment in 1975 was put together in the waste tank.

At the talks, the IAEA Secretariat admitted its mistakes in the calculation and proposed that another negotiation be held.

The sixth ad hoc inspection team flew back to Vienna on 8 February; it did not even have time to do the promised recalculation.

At the meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA held on 9 February 1993, the Director General demanded a "special inspection" of our two "suspicious locations", under the pretext of the "inconsistencies in principle" - in accordance with the scenario already worked out. The inspection of "suspicious locations" is part of United States manoeuvring aimed at opening our military sites. The United States attempted to abuse the north-south nuclear control subcommittee for its purpose of opening our military sites. It tried again through the IAEA inspection. Since all such attempts proved to be unsuccessful, it resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises to threaten us.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

With a view to achieving its aim of opening our military sites, the United States cooked up delusive "intelligence information" and "satellite photos" which falsified our military sites as being nuclear-related, and then turned the "information" and "photos" over to the IAEA and its followers.

In September 1992 the IAEA Director General demanded access to the two "suspicious locations". Out of respect for his position as Director General we allowed the IAEA inspectors authorized by him to visit the two "suspicious locations" on 12 and 14 September. One location was a civilian object and the other was a military one. The two inspectors authorized by the Director General visited these locations twice - even with monitoring devices - claiming that they "asked to see them again so that other people would not need to see them again". However, they misused the visit to confirm the correctness of the intelligence information provided by the United States.

On 22 December 1992 the IAEA Director General again asked for permission to "visit", drill and take samples at the already-visited military installation and another military installation.

At the bilateral talks held in Pyongyang from 20 to 22 January 1993, the IAEA delegation, led by the director of the foreign relations department, insisted on visiting those locations, saying that "there is reliable evidence from intelligence information and satellite photos that the locations are related to nuclear materials", while recognizing that the Agency had no legal ground to use any intelligence or satellite information provided by a third country. Those remarks of the IAEA officials proved that the IAEA takes the directives of the United States as its law or regulations, instead of the safeguards agreement, the IAEA statute, resolutions of the Board of Governors, and so forth.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors held on 1 April 1993 characterized our refusal of the inspection of the "two locations" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. This is absolutely unjustifiable. The "two locations" are not related to nuclear activities. The Agency's Director General has doubts about these two locations, on the ground that they are "nuclear facilities" according to the satellite information provided by the United States. This "intelligence information" and "satellite information" is fabricated, and it is impermissible to use it in the inspection.

The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" are the motives for the "special inspection" faked by some officials of the Agency Secretariat, including the Director General, under the directives of the United States. The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" are matters of different characteristics, apart from the safeguards agreement.

The Agency experts admitted that the "inconsistencies in principle" arose from the miscalculation and agreed to clarify the matter at the future negotiations, and that the two "suspicious locations" were fabricated on the basis of the false satellite information provided by the United States, a belligerent party vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The "inconsistencies in principle" and the two "suspicious locations" revealed the unreasonable inspection activities of the Director General and some officials of the Agency Secretariat.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Some officials of the Agency Secretariat, including the Director General, discarded the principle of impartiality and became servants implementing the policy of the United States. Although they fully understood that the intelligence or satellite information could not be used in the inspection, they did not hesitate to act like servants, saying that the satellite and intelligence information was "reliable" as it was provided by the United States. By doing so they blocked the way to clearing up the "inconsistencies in principle".

Thirdly, some officials of the IAEA Secretariat derailed from the function of officials of the international organization and became servants of the United States.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat systematically turned over the information on the inspection results to hostile forces, including the United States.

On 6 May 1992, the IAEA Director General told the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Vienna that,

"in accordance with its Statute, IAEA cannot disclose to the third parties the contents of the DPRK's initial report. In my view, the DPRK may just as well inform them of the contents of its initial report as much as it sees fit, in order to bring earlier the improvement of the DPRK's relations with the United States and Japan".

On 10 June 1992, a high-ranking IAEA official called an informal meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. That official briefed them on his visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on the course of the first ad hoc inspection and disclosed the details of the capability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

On 13 November 1992, south Korea's Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation declared that the

"U.S. Administration is now in the process of close analysis of information on the inspections of north Korea obtained from the IAEA." The same broadcasting corporation reported on 8 November 1992 that IAEA was known to be planning to send a high-level delegation to Pyongyang immediately after the fourth ad hoc inspection.

The Director General informed us of his intention to send a negotiating mission to our country on 16 November, eight days after the report.

The information on the replacement date for the reactor core should belong only to us and IAEA.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Washington Post reported on 13 January 1993 that the

"IAEA information director disclosed in the telephone interview that north Korea indicated the reactor core is to be replaced in mid-1993, and accordingly, the Agency is waiting for it".

The United States manipulated the IAEA inspection.

The United States was informed of our nuclear plan by the Agency's Director General, who called for a joint hearing of the United States Congress, held on 22 July 1992, which forced him to conduct a "special inspection" and a "surprise inspection".

The United States cooked up the delusive information with regard to our nuclear activities and offered it to IAEA. The IAEA Director General took this intelligence information as a good excuse for a "special inspection" call at the meeting of the Board of Governors held in February 1993.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency stated in 1992 that

"the United States must include its trustworthy persons in the 'special inspection' group".

Under this directive of the United States, the Director General attempted to designate inspectors whose countries have no diplomatic relations with our country, even after he had been notified of our position that we would not accept such IAEA officials as members of the inspection team.

The Washington Post disclosed on 13 January 1993 that

"some U.S. officials argued north Korea has hidden radioactive waste produced at the Nyongbyon nuclear reactor".

This became a signal urging the inspection of the two "suspicious locations".

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Japanese Central Report reported in June 1992 that the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense who attended the high-level talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States said, "North Korea moved its nuclear-weapon facilities into the underground" and "North Korea attempted to disguise the nuclear-weapon development project". This facilitated IAEA's "special inspection" and "surprise inspection".

Fourthly, our refusal to allow the Agency's unlawful inspection of the "suspicious locations" is nothing but a sovereign State's full exercise of a fair right, and it can never be considered non-compliance with the safeguards agreement.

The safeguards agreement and the IAEA Statute do not stipulate that all sites which the Agency finds suspicious should be open to inspection. In his report submitted in December 1991 to the Board of Governors, the Director General requested the right to use intelligence and satellite information provided by the third country in its inspection process, while admitting the Agency's right for inspection in accordance with the safeguards agreement was not a legal ground for special inspection.

At that time many non-nuclear-weapon States rejected the Director General's suggestion lest the Agency fall prey to the super-Power. At the joint hearing of the United States Congress held on 22 July 1992, the Director General deplored that

"the Agency is unable to exercise the right of special inspection stipulated in the safeguards agreement",

and that

"the Agency has no legal foundation and means to implement special inspection".

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Agency is given the right to special inspection only when agreement is reached between us and IAEA, according to Articles 73 and 77 of the safeguards agreement. The special inspection under the safeguards agreement can be conducted only when the belief arises, in the process of inspecting the declared nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, that nuclear materials exist in certain places. There is by no means a stipulation that all the objects which the Agency finds suspicious should be open for special inspection.

The United States, a belligerent party vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, cooked up the delusive information, as well as satellite information, with regard to our nuclear activities and transmitted it to the IAEA secretariat and other countries in order to stifle our socialist system. Some officials of the IAEA secretariat, under the directive of the United States, attempted to inspect our military facilities with fabricated intelligence and satellite information.

The refusal to allow the inspection forced by the belligerent State and based on the intelligence and satellite information is a sovereign State's proper right to self-defence, and it can therefore never be regarded as non-compliance with the safeguards agreement.

Fifthly, the United Nations should not argue about our "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreements.

The resolution adopted at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the charge of "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreements is an unjustifiable one which distorted the facts, under the manipulation of the United States.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The "inconsistency in principle" and "suspicious sites" are made up by the United States, a belligerent party to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It has been proved that the "inconsistency in principle" was caused by a mistake in the calculating methods of the Agency and that the "suspicious sites" are based on satellite information provided by the United States.

We have faithfully implemented the safeguards agreement. It is in conformity with the safeguards agreement and the Statute of the Agency that we rejected the Agency's request to inspect "suspicious sites" that are not related to nuclear activities.

There is no legal ground for the United Nations to deal with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the NPT.

The United States labelled our rejection of the inspection of "suspicious sites" as "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement with the aim of imposing collective sanctions on us.

It was an intentional act by the Director General of the Agency when he said that he could not provide verification, since the inspection by the Agency was in its initial stage. In his report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in meetings with officials of our country, the Director General said that IAEA's inspection of our country was in its initial stage and would take a long time.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The Agency did not even conclude its inspection of our nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Only subsidiary rulings on three facilities were made; those on four other facilities are yet to be made. Although Agency scientists called for negotiations with us, admitting that "inconsistencies in principle" were due to mistakes in their calculations, the Director General blocked even negotiations.

The "suspicious sites" suggested by the Director General are conventional military bases that have nothing to do with nuclear facilities.

The United Nations has no right to debate our country's withdrawal from the NPT. Signing, accession to, termination of and withdrawal from the Treaty are legal actions within the sovereign rights of an independent State, and no one is entitled to interfere in these. There are no international norms that allow sanctions with regard to the signing and withdrawal from the Treaty. The signing and withdrawal on the part of a sovereign State in accordance with the relevant Treaty are recognized to be lawful.

The United Nations should not discuss our "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement. The ringleader of "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement is not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but the United States and some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA. Some officials of the IAEA secretariat intentionally invented this "inconsistency" under manipulation by the United States.

The United Nations should give an impetus to the IAEA secretariat so it can implement the safeguards agreement in accordance with the terms of the

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

agreement and the Agency statute. The United Nations should prevent international scientific and technical organizations from becoming involved in carrying out the policy of the big Powers.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat are gravely violating the sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty - a non-nuclear-weapon State - by applying a double standard at the behest of the United States. Its application of a double standard to my country attains the highest perfection in terms of its injustice.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the Treaty in accordance with the ideal and purpose of withdrawing United States nuclear weapons from south Korea and of removing the nuclear threat to us.

It is none other than the United States that continues to modernize its nuclear arsenals, increase the nuclear threat to our country - a non-nuclear-weapon State - and help South Africa and Israel in their nuclear armament in contravention of the fundamental ideal and purpose of the Treaty. The IAEA is conniving at a violation of the Treaty by the United States without saying a word. And the IAEA is not taking any action against Japan, which is now hastening to enter the ranks of nuclear Powers by stockpiling more plutonium than necessary, or against south Korea, which is feverishly accelerating the development of nuclear weapons under the United States nuclear umbrella. If the double standard employed by some officials of the secretariat is tolerated, the nuclear Powers will not hesitate at will to make a mockery of the fate of non-nuclear-weapon States and to encroach on their sovereignty. Today they are threatening our sovereignty by applying a double

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

standard to my country, but tomorrow another non-nuclear-weapon State will be the target.

The Security Council should not deviate from international justice and principle of equity. The Security Council should not allow the application of a double standard that condones the acts of the injurer, which is trying to threaten with nuclear weapons and disarm my country, while making an issue about my country, which is the victim.

If the Security Council intends to consider the implementation of NPT and safeguards agreement impartially, it should discuss without fail the acts of the United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat who obey it, actions which encroach on the sovereignty of a State party to the Treaty by abusing the statute of the IAEA and the safeguards agreement.

The Security Council is trying to adopt a draft resolution encroaching upon our sovereignty, when an agreement was made to hold negotiations between my country and IAEA, when negotiations are in the offing between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. This action permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear Power and ignores the requirements of the Charter of the United Nations, the statute of the IAEA and the norms of international law, that disputes should be resolved through dialogue and negotiations. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that the parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall seek a solution by negotiation.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The very convening of the Security Council blocks the efforts towards dialogue, at a time when there are positive signs regarding the efforts towards negotiations to solve our so-called "nuclear problem" and the nuclear question of the Korean peninsula.

If the Security Council adopts the draft resolution introduced by the United States demanding forcible inspections of our military installations, this would be tantamount to encroachment on the sovereignty of my country and, furthermore, would result in heightened tension in the situation on the Korean peninsula and would pose a threat to the peace and security of the world.

If the Security Council permits the strong-arm tactics of a nuclear Power, the non-nuclear-weapon States and the small countries of the third world will no longer trust the present Security Council.

My delegation considers that if the Security Council wants to contribute to peace and security on the Korean peninsula in conformity with its mission, it should not put pressure on us but should seek ways of solving fairly the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula and should take measures that would actually be helpful. I hope the Security Council will not follow in its own footsteps of mistakes in dealing with the Korean question; I hope it will rather act in conformity with the requirements of the present situation and international justice.

If the Security Council adopts an unjustifiable draft resolution putting pressure on my country and ignoring the principle of equity, we will be compelled to take corresponding effective measures in self-defence.

We do not speak empty words.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

Our so-called nuclear problem is not an issue to be discussed by the Security Council; even if it is discussed, it cannot be solved without comprehensively resolving nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula. The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula can be resolved only through negotiations between our country and the United States. This is because the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula began with the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in south Korea; it was created also by means of the "suspicious sites" fabricated by the United States.

The United States is a belligerent party vis-à-vis our country. History shows us that pressures and sanctions applied against one party at the request of a belligerent party do not solve the problem but, on the contrary, help aggravate the disputes and finally cause armed conflicts.

Adoption of a draft resolution encroaching upon our sovereignty with the help of the strong-arm tactics of the United States would only serve to aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula, leading to unpredictable events.

Recently, we responded positively to overtures by the United States with respect to holding high-level talks; there has been working-level contact in that regard. At this time, we cannot but have doubts concerning the intentions of the United States, which has introduced the present draft resolution. Under these circumstances, the proper act would be for the United States to withdraw the draft resolution.

Finally, I would like to express my hope that the Security Council will act in accordance with its mission.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his kind words addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of the Republic of Korea, on whom I now call.

Mr. YOO (Republic of Korea): I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to address this meeting.

Let me first congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. In light of your extensive diplomatic experience and outstanding ability, I believe the Council will benefit greatly from your able guidance. Allow me also to express our appreciation of the superb performance of your predecessor, Ambassador Marker of Pakistan, during his term as President of the Council for the month of April.

Having listened to the statement by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a moment ago, I cannot suppress a deep sense of regret and sadness over the fact that the representatives of the two halves of Korea have to be present here before this international forum at the discussion of a matter concerning the security of our Korean people, and express such divergent views on how a question of developing weapons of mass destruction would affect the future of the same people. However, it is my sincere hope that today's meeting of the Council will prove to be a major departure away from this sad situation towards one where reason and common sense prevail.

During the past few years, despite some regional and ethnic discords, we have witnessed positive changes sweeping across the world. They understandably raised expectations that we are entering a new era of world

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

history. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's rejection of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) special inspections, coupled with the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have put to the test the will of the international community to create a safer world.

Today, as a State Member of the United Nations with a direct stake in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issue, the Republic of Korea would like to express its grave concern over the state of affairs and call on the international community to take determined action.

When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, we sincerely welcomed the step and looked forward to the early signing of a safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA. But it took as long as seven years for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond to the calls of the international community. Nevertheless, we all welcomed the long-delayed step and hoped that the implementation of the safeguards agreement would bring transparency and openness to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear programme. Contrary to our hopes, however, six rounds of ad hoc inspections conducted by the IAEA have only revealed discrepancies between the IAEA's findings and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declarations. In his report to the Board meeting of February 1993, the Director General of the IAEA outlined five main areas of inconsistencies. The most serious of them involves the number of possible clandestine reprocessing operations and the quantity of plutonium undeclared and unsafeguarded, which in our view is central to the issue.

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Instead of responding positively to the request for special inspections by the IAEA on 25 February 1993, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea surprised the world by announcing on 12 March its intention to withdraw from the NPT. What concerned us most was that this announcement came at a time when the IAEA was seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report on nuclear materials.

Having exhausted all means available under its Statute to resolve the issue, the IAEA consequently referred the matter to the Council by reporting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Agency also brought attention to its inability to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Let me make some brief observations on the reasons offered by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for rejecting the IAEA's special inspection and for its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

First, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea asserts that the inspection of the two facilities, which it claims are military sites, would constitute a violation of sovereignty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's characterization of the two sites as military sites in no way immunizes them from inspection. It is the right of the IAEA under the Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to inspect locations which it has bona fide reasons to believe are nuclear-related, regardless of whether they are military or not. Furthermore, the Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly expressed willingness to discuss arrangements to minimize the security concerns of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Secondly, with regard to the claim that the "Team Spirit" Exercise is a nuclear war rehearsal, we reiterate that the exercise is purely defensive in nature and involves conventional weapons only. This has been confirmed by observers from more than a dozen countries, including member States of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea.

Thirdly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has charged that some officials of the IAEA secretariat are partial and are influenced by an unfriendly party. This allegation is completely unfounded. We would like to point out that the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed its full confidence in the secretariat in the resolution of 18 March.

The reasons offered by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are without foundation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT and its refusal to allow inspections of two suspected nuclear sites, in addition to the many other facts that have become known by now, only serve to deepen our suspicion that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is indeed engaged in a nuclear weapons programme.

Allow me to take a look at this issue from a broader political perspective. By refusing IAEA inspections of suspected nuclear sites and by deciding to pull out of the NPT, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses a serious threat to international peace and security, in both the global and regional contexts.

First, there is the threat to the NPT regime and the IAEA safeguards systems in particular. Nuclear non-proliferation and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are foremost among the concerns of the post-cold-war world. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT runs directly counter to the international

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. True, every party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty. However, the Treaty also stipulates that this right be exercised only when extraordinary events jeopardize supreme national interest. If States parties to the NPT could withdraw from the Treaty whenever they found it politically expedient, we could not expect the non-proliferation Treaty regime to function effectively.

The NPT system has global imperatives. But nowhere else in the world is an effective NPT regime needed more urgently than on the Korean peninsula where military tensions still run high even four decades after the war ended. If the NPT fails on the Korean peninsula on its first test, it does not have much hope elsewhere. Specifically, we are concerned that the IAEA is not able to verify the correctness and completeness of the inventory. Any failure by the IAEA to fulfil its legal responsibility of undertaking a special inspection under Articles 73 (b) and 77 of the safeguards agreement will harm the IAEA's credibility and thus undermine the very raison d'être of the safeguards system. In this regard, I cannot fail to recall that the IAEA reaffirmed its right to undertake special inspections during its Board of Governors meeting in February 1993.

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Secondly, the steps the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken have serious implications for the security and stability of North-East Asia. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear suspicions are not removed, it could result in a costly and dangerous arms race in North-East Asia and beyond.

Thirdly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's measure deals a serious blow to our past achievements in easing tension on the Korean peninsula. The inter-Korean dialogue will become very difficult if not impossible, given the intimidating environment that would prevail should north Korea come to possess nuclear weapons of any sort. We simply cannot accept possession of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If there is no shift in the attitudes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we may be compelled to review our policies towards the north in their entirety.

We believe that denuclearization is the most important and fundamental prerequisite for a stable and peaceful Korean peninsula. In this conviction, the President of the Republic of Korea made in October 1991 a Special Announcement of a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. This served as the basis for the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which took effect in February 1992. In the latter Declaration, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities and to conduct mutual inspections to verify the implementation of the agreement. We believe that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula will rest on the twin pillars of IAEA inspections and mutual inspections between the south and the north. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's actions, however, threaten to reduce this Declaration to empty promises.

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

At the conclusion of the summit meeting on 31 January 1992, the Security Council declared that:

"The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA". (S/PV.3046, p. 145 (a-z))

This declaration reflects the unequivocal stance of the international community against the threat of nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, I believe that the primary obligation to stop nuclear-weapons development by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rests with the international community as a whole and particularly on the Security Council, which is entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter. As the country which would be most threatened by a nuclear-armed Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea will join the efforts of the international community and do its best to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

I appeal once again to the reason and conscience of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the non-proliferation Treaty; to remedy its non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement by receiving special inspections as called for in the IAEA resolution of 25 February 1993; and to agree to mutual inspections in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The Republic of Korea believes that the time has come for the international community to act on the troubled situation surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development. We are of the view that the draft resolution now before the Council is appropriate and well-balanced and that its adoption will reaffirm the united stance of the international community on this issue. I hope that the draft resolution the

(Mr. Yoo, Republic of Korea)

Council will act on today will be the last measure that the international community needs to take to resolve any suspicion about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear development.

If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea comes forward sincerely to resolve the issue on a fundamental basis, it will certainly have the corresponding positive responses from the international community. For its part, the Republic of Korea is prepared to engage in talks with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the nuclear issue, if that would contribute to finding a solution. While renewing its commitment to do whatever is in their capacity for a peaceful and satisfactory solution of this matter, the Government and the people of the Republic of Korea will be awaiting with earnest anticipation this Council's acts of leadership, which will turn the current crisis into an opportunity for the future.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the representative the Republic of Korea for his kind words addressed to me.

Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America): I should like to make some brief remarks in response to the statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Saturday is my birthday. Although I am sure that this was not his intention, I would like to thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for putting us into a time-warp and making me feel 40 years younger. I would, however, like to address some of the ridiculous charges he has made in the worst cold-war rhetoric.

The issue under discussion concerns north Korea's failure to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a subsequent announcement that it intends to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I wish to emphasize that these disputes

(Mrs. Albright, United States)

concern international agencies and the international community, and not any single country. The United States, like a number of other nations, provides information and technical support to the IAEA at the Agency's request to support the implementation of safeguards on nuclear materials and facilities. The IAEA comes to its own conclusions about whether countries are complying with safeguards requirements, drawing primarily from information obtained by its own inspectors but taking into account information provided by member Governments.

Based on their visits to north Korean nuclear facilities, IAEA inspectors have identified discrepancies in north Korea's declaration of the amount of plutonium it obtained from reprocessing nuclear fuel. Consequently, the IAEA Board of Governors has determined that north Korea is not in compliance with its safeguards agreement and has referred the matter to the Security Council.

The adoption of this draft resolution today will reflect concerns shared by a number of countries about actions taken by one in contravention of the principles of an international organization. Charges that the United States poses a nuclear threat to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are totally unfounded. Our policy has been and will continue to be consistent with that announced by then south Korean President Roh Tae Woo in late 1991 that there are no nuclear weapons in south Korea. Moreover, since 1978, the United States has publicly offered assurances on the non-use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices except in the case of an attack on the United States,

(Mrs. Albright, United States)

its territories or armed forces, or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

North Korea has claimed on a number of occasions that the United States-Republic of Korea military exercise called "Team Spirit" is nuclear and offensive in nature. This claim is also unfounded. As the north Koreans are fully aware, "Team Spirit" is a purely defensive conventional exercise conducted in an East-West rather than a North-South axis. I would also note that military observers of "Team Spirit" exercises, including representatives from Poland and the former Czechoslovakia - members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission - have publicly verified the defensive nature of the exercise. We and the Republic of Korea have invited north Korea to send military observers to "Team Spirit" for many years. North Korea has not accepted this invitation.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I consider it necessary to clearly state our stand once again concerning the accusations made against us by the representatives of the United States and south Korea over the issues of our withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and our so-called "non-compliance" with the safeguards agreement.

Our decision to withdraw from the NPT was a self-defence measure taken in connection with the extraordinary situation created by the United States, a nuclear State, against us and with an unjustifiable resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a result of manipulation by the United States, threatening the supreme interest of our country.

Our country's accession to the NPT on 12 December 1985 was intended, with the help of this Treaty, to remove the nuclear threat against our country and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. However, the danger of nuclear war continued to exist on the Korean peninsula, and a tense military situation still prevailed there. Under such circumstances, we could not conclude the safeguards agreement to the NPT. Therefore, we demanded that the United States and the south Korean side create conditions and an environment on the Korean peninsula suitable to concluding a safeguards agreement. Belatedly, however, during the period from September 1991 to January 1992, the United States and the south Korean side made some positive statements and showed some positive signs, including "withdrawal of nuclear weapons", a "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" the "suspension of the 'Team Spirit' military exercise", in response to our demand.

We trusted these positive signs by the United States and south Korean side and signed the safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992. The Supreme People's Assembly of my country approved the safeguards agreement on 9 April

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

last year on the condition that none of the depositary States of the NPT deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and threaten us with nuclear weapons.

After the entry into force of the safeguards agreement, we made the utmost effort to faithfully comply with the agreement. It is already well known to the world that we submitted an initial report on our inventory of nuclear material to the secretariat of the IAEA far in advance of schedule and, up until 19 February 1993, submitted to six rounds of ad hoc inspections in good faith.

During this period, we handed over hundreds of documents on accounts and operation records to the IAEA inspection team and assisted in the work of sealing 80 locations, installing observation equipment at six locations and sampling 90 pieces.

We saw to it that the general provisions of the subsidiary arrangements became effective; we agreed on the subsidiary arrangements on three facilities; and we held final-stage discussions of the subsidiary arrangements at other facilities. In addition, we showed facilities and other nuclear-related facilities under construction to the IAEA inspection team and enabled it to visit "suspicious sites" loudly advertised by the Western media in the past.

As for our displaying a highly cooperative spirit, even the Director General of the IAEA himself mentioned it on several occasions. Despite this, an abnormal situation was created by the IAEA that branded us, who had faithfully complied with the safeguards agreement, as in "non-compliance", and it adopted at its Board of Governors meeting an unjustifiable resolution

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

transferring the so-called nuclear problem of our country to the United Nations.

A behind-the-scenes plot exists, that demands clarification. It is related to manoeuvres by the United States and south Korean side aimed at opening up our conventional military bases with a view to stifling the socialist system of our country. The United States and south Korean side, unable to open our military sites through the meetings of the North-South Joint Committee on Nuclear Control, declared the resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise as a way of pressuring us. The resumption of this exercise, openly declared by the United States and the south Korean side this year, posed a new threat to the security of our country and the nation.

At the same time, the United States manipulated the inspection of our country by the IAEA. As is already known, the United States forced the Director General of the IAEA to undertake "special inspection" and "surprise inspection", fabricated the "espionage satellite photos" with the aim of opening up our military sites and distributed them systematically to the secretariat of the IAEA and satellite States of the United States. It even conducted the analysis of the samples by receiving the results of the inspections.

The grounds for the "special inspection" that some officials of the secretariat of the IAEA came up with consisted of so-called "non-compliance with the safeguards agreement". That "non-compliance", according to them, is that we do not recognize the "inconsistency in principle" and that we do not agree with the demands of the IAEA for access to the two sites.

That being the case, who originated them? They were originated by the

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

United States and some officials of the IAEA secretariat as a result of the manipulation of the United States. The "inconsistency in principle", as was made clear in consultation with us, was originated by the IAEA's "principled mistakes in counting", and the "two sites" were originated by "espionage satellite photos" provided by the United States.

According to the present safeguards system, the IAEA has no right to use "intelligence information" and "espionage satellite photos" provided by a third party in its inspection work. However, at the secretariat meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in January this year created suspicion over our military sites, connecting them with nuclear-related facilities through a slide show of "espionage satellite photos" provided by the United States, and as a result, the resolution on special inspection was adopted.

The United States is a belligerent party to our country and is the culprit that has fabricated and distributed "espionage satellite photos". We did not accept the IAEA proposal for access to the two sites, considering that this proposal by some officials of the secretariat was not in line with the statutes and safeguards agreement but an unjustifiable demand based on "espionage satellite photos", which it is forbidden to use in an inspection, and this, if allowed, could set a precedent.

As I mentioned earlier, if we who have made efforts to faithfully comply with the safeguards agreement are branded as in "non-compliance", if the creation of "inconsistency" by counting mistakes and the utilization of "espionage satellite photos" in inspections are recognized as justifiable, then we could not but be doubtful of such an international order.

We were compelled to withdraw from the NPT under paragraph 1, Article 10

(Mr. Pak, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea)

of the Treaty for self-defence. Our withdrawal from the NPT is intended to safeguard the supreme interest of our country and its people and at the same time represent the aspirations of third-world countries to establish an international order based on independence and to oppose domination and subjugation.

The nuclear threat of the United States against us and its attempts to enforce a "special inspection" today may be applied to other countries tomorrow. The Western media have not made a big issue of Japan, which has recently openly been stockpiling plutonium. Instead, they are loudly alleging that such countries as Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Iran, Libya, Pakistan and Syria either possess nuclear weapons or are attempting to acquire them.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

We believe that this is part of the plot by the United States to create doubts about the nuclear activities of these countries.

Today our country is in a confrontational state with a United States military force of 40,000, with a constant nuclear threat against us. No other countries in any part of the world are under a United States nuclear threat as our country is. Some countries are demanding that we "revoke" our measure of withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in collaboration with the United States. Since this measure of withdrawal constitutes a sovereign right decisively exercised for self-defence, no country is entitled to trample upon this right of ours.

In particular, the United States is the culprit that has imposed a nuclear threat against us and has manipulated the IAEA inspection. Therefore, the United States should not demand that we "revoke" our measure of withdrawal. Instead, it should publicly apologize to us for creating the situation which compelled us to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The south Korean side betrayed the agreement with us, participated in the nuclear war exercise against its nation, and tried to impair the supreme interests of the nation by leaving the issue - which should be solved within the framework of the nation - to the outside. As a result, the south Korean side is not entitled to talk about the "cancellation" of our measure.

Before concluding, I should like to recommend to those representatives that have charged us with the issue of our withdrawal and "non-compliance" that they behave in an independent spirit and with contemplation.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): It is my understanding that the Security Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that that is the case.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

Mr. LI Zhaoxing (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of all, allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. I am confident that with your talent and extensive diplomatic experience, the Security Council will successfully complete its tasks for this month. I should also like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Marker of Pakistan, who impressed us all with the remarkable skill and efficiency with which he conducted the Council's work last month.

China, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has all along opposed nuclear proliferation and supported denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China does not wish to see nuclear weapons on the peninsula, whether in the north or in the south, or to have them introduced there by a third party.

In our view, the nuclear issue concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is mainly a matter between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, and between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. It should therefore be settled properly through direct dialogue and consultation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the three other parties

(Mr. Li Zhaoxing, China)

concerned, respectively. In this connection, China opposes the practice of imposing pressures.

China has indicated from the very beginning that it is not in favour of having this issue handled by the Security Council, let alone having a resolution adopted on this issue by the Council. This is because the Council's involvement will not contribute to the appropriate settlement of the issue; on the contrary, it might easily complicate the matter and lead to the intensification and escalation of the contradictions.

Based on the foregoing position, we shall abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

The nuclear issue concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has now reached a crucial and sensitive stage. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA have already conducted consultations on the issue of nuclear verification and made certain arrangements regarding the question of inspections. At the same time, the United States has expressed its willingness to hold bilateral talks with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the relevant issues, and contacts on this matter have already begun. All these are welcome developments. We hope that the parties concerned will adopt a practical, flexible and constructive attitude that will enable the talks to yield positive results.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the representative of China for the kind words he addressed to me.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/25745.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Brazil, Cape Verde, Djibouti, France, Hungary, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela

Against: None

Abstaining: China, Pakistan

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): The result of the voting is as follows: 13 votes in favour, none against, and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 825 (1993).

I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. HATANO (Japan): May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. I should also like to express my sincere appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Marker. Under his able guidance, the Council achieved positive results during the month of April.

After the two long presentations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is not necessary to dwell upon the history of the problem before us. But let me say that in early 1992 Japan, and the international community as a whole, welcomed the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea had issued a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after persistent appeals by the international community

(Mr. Hatano, Japan)

over a number of years, had finally concluded the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I must say that it is all the more deplorable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea subsequently refused to accept the inspections stipulated in the agreement with the IAEA and has decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

These new developments have deepened concern throughout the international community regarding the possible development of nuclear weapons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and have serious implications for the peace and security of the region as well as of the entire world. Indeed, the withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a challenge to the non-proliferation regime itself.

For those reasons, Japan cannot but join the international community in expressing grave concern.

(Mr. Hatano, Japan)

On 8 April the President of the Security Council issued a statement on this matter. Since then there have been signs of improved cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA, but we note that the key issues remain unresolved. Japan therefore urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully, unconditionally and immediately with its obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We also urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract its announcement to withdraw from the NPT contained in its letter of 12 March.

Let me respond very briefly to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's reference to Japan's plutonium programme. Japan maintains the principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not introducing them into its territory. Japan is a party to the NPT and fully honours its obligations, including that of inspection under the safeguards agreement. Japan has fully cooperated with the IAEA and is counted as one of the countries where full safeguards are smoothly conducted. This reference by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is therefore regarded as a futile attempt to divert the attention of the international community from its own possible development of nuclear weapons.

Time is limited. Two months have already passed since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. We call upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take concrete steps, without delay and to heed the voice of the international community, as expressed in this resolution. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea fails to respond positively and soon to the resolution we have just adopted, I am afraid the Security Council will be obliged to take up this matter again to consider further action.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. MERIMEE (France) (interpretation from French): One month ago, the members of our Council clearly expressed, in the form of a presidential statement, their concern over the situation upon which we were briefed in this forum on 6 April by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We must take note that since that time, there has been no fundamental change in the situation.

Despite the urgent appeals of the international community, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues, as is indicated by the various communications received by the Council, in its refusal to fully comply with the commitments undertaken under the safeguards agreement entered into with the IAEA. At the same time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not yet announced its intention to revoke its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

This state of affairs makes it necessary today for the Council to manifest, clearly and unambiguously, its determination to see the emergence of an early settlement for this grave situation which seriously jeopardizes both the stability of the Korean peninsula and, to an even greater extent, the future of non-proliferation regimes.

The resolution we have just adopted, in the drafting of which my delegation took an active part, attests to this resolve to settle a disturbing situation which, it should once more be noted, represents an important disagreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the whole of the international community and not, as some would sometimes portray it, a simple bilateral crisis.

(Mr. Mérimée, France)

The above notwithstanding, the text of the resolution is not intended to be threatening, and it does take into account some of the prospects opening up in parallel to our multilateral framework. Now that we are at last seeing readiness on the part of the Pyongyang authorities to enter into a special bilateral dialogue with one of the members of the Council, a depository State of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, this resolution represents, above all, a solemn and firm appeal by the Council for reason - that is to say, an appeal for respect for commitments freely entered into and for keeping the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the international community. This text is not, therefore, an end in itself.

However much importance is attached in this forum to the primacy of dialogue, my delegation believes that the Council cannot much longer be acquiescent in the face of the procrastination of the Pyongyang authorities. They should be fully aware that the patience of the international community is not unlimited.

This coming 12 June, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty becomes effective, is a date that is today very much on our minds. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must realize that the passing of that deadline will not exonerate it and that it will prompt our Council, as is provided for in the resolution we have adopted, to draw all the appropriate conclusions.

Mr. ERDOS (Hungary) (interpretation from French): Yesterday, in a room adjacent to this Chamber, delegations of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began a lengthy process of preparation for the 1995 Conference at which the functioning of the Treaty will be subjected to a detailed review. The work accomplished there in recent

(Mr. Erdős, Hungary)

days has shown the crucial importance the signatory countries attach to the Treaty and its future in our world full of uncertainties.

One must note that those signatory countries are today faced with an extraordinary situation. Two months have passed since the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. Throughout that period of time, the relevant organs of the international community - the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council - and a great number of States have expressed their views on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's decision and their hope that it would reverse its decision and respect its obligations under its safeguards agreement with IAEA. Hungary, for its part, also found it necessary to declare that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's decision was worrisome in that it could undermine the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime, jeopardize international security and have unfavourable effects on inter-Korean dialogue, and that the decision would thus work against the fundamental interests of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself.

(Mr. Erdős, Hungary)

Recently, great efforts have been undertaken by the United Nations and by individual Governments to make the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reconsider the announcement contained in its letter of 12 March 1993. The present meeting of the Security Council and the resolution we have just adopted on the matter are integral elements of the efforts aimed at further facilitating improved cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA, and at seeking a positive solution to the issue. Hungary's co-sponsorship and vote in favour of resolution 825 (1993) signify our unreserved support for the efforts of the Director General of the IAEA and for the activities undertaken by States Members of the United Nations intended to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respond positively to the resolution.

Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America): The United States is pleased that the Security Council has passed this resolution. It is now clear that the international community is united in its grave concern over North Korea's non-compliance with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is also clear that the international community is dedicated to making every effort to convince North Korea to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT by retracting its announcement of 12 March and to comply fully with its IAEA safeguards agreement as specified in the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 25 February 1993.

I would repeat what I said on 8 April, after the Council President had issued a statement on these issues:

(Mrs. Albright, United States)

"My Government joins other members of the Council in expressing full and complete support for the IAEA and the NPT. We view the IAEA and the NPT as cornerstones of international peace and of nuclear non-proliferation. Along with the Council's other members, the United States also fully supports the North-South joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Complete implementation of its freely taken responsibilities under this declaration by North Korea is critical for peace and security on the peninsula. This includes its pledge not to possess nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities".

The United States notes that the Council President's statement of 8 April "welcome[s] all efforts aimed at resolving this situation" (S/25562), and that the resolution passed today urges Member States to facilitate a solution. My Government is prepared to play its part in this process in order to help achieve the objectives of the international community. We have announced publicly that we would be willing to meet with North Korea to help resolve, as part of the international community's efforts, the situation resulting from actions North Korea has taken in the nuclear area.

We welcome the recent visit to North Korea by IAEA inspectors to perform routine monitoring and maintenance functions and hope that such cooperation will continue. By fulfilling its nuclear-related responsibilities, North Korea can take significant steps towards improved relations with the rest of the world.

Sir David HANNAY (United Kingdom): The matter we are considering needs to be seen in a wider context. The threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction was underlined in the statement of the President of the Security Council at its meeting at the level of Heads of State or Government on 31 January 1992, when he said that

"'The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security'". (S/PV.3046, p. 145)

We all have an interest in strengthening international efforts to stop proliferation. At the heart of the effort to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This successful Treaty now has 157 parties. It is my Government's belief that we should work for universal membership of the Treaty, and that it should be indefinitely extended at the 1995 extension and review Conference.

Critical to the continuing success of the Treaty is the IAEA's ability, through its safeguards agreements, to verify that parties honour their commitments. My country is working, notably with our European partners, to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime.

Against this background, we welcomed the accession of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 and the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992. We also welcomed the six inspections which the IAEA has carried out in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

What we regret is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea suspended this cooperation by refusing to permit further inspections of two sites which the Agency considers necessary to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded. Despite the Agency's persistent efforts,

(Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom)

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to refuse inspection of these sites. On 1 April, the IAEA's Board of Governors decided by an overwhelming majority that this placed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in breach of its safeguards agreement, which it had voluntarily entered into.

In addition, on 12 March the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My delegation does not question the right of States to withdraw from treaties if such withdrawal is in accordance with the provisions of the treaty concerned. Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires that in exercising its national sovereignty a party withdrawing from the Treaty shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council three months in advance, and that such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, which it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests

In their statement of 1 April, the three co-depositaries of the Treaty - the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom - questioned whether the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's stated reasons for withdrawal in fact constitute extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty. I note also that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains bound by its obligations under its safeguards agreement.

It is therefore entirely right in our view that this matter has now been referred to the Security Council as required by article 12 (c) of the statute of the Agency, and in accordance with article 19 of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's safeguards agreement. We therefore supported the

(Sir David Hannay, United Kingdom)

statement of the President of the Council on 8 April, in which he expressed the concern of the members of the Council at the situation which had arisen.

The resolution we have just adopted is a further necessary step by the Council in seeking a solution to this situation and in underlining the serious view the Council takes of it.

It is, in the view of my Government, absolutely essential that this issue be treated multilaterally as well as bilaterally. We accept that there is an important role to be played by bilateral contacts, but we also underline that what we are talking about here are multilateral disciplines maintained by multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is therefore absolutely right and proper that this Council should play its role in handling that aspect.

We do not seek confrontation. What we would like to see is a satisfactory solution by which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea honours its non-proliferation obligations and reverses its intention of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We welcome the continuing efforts of the IAEA to carry out its work in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and we note that some improvement has occurred recently. We also welcome the prospect of contacts between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other States, which we hope will lead to a satisfactory outcome from which all concerned could benefit. Meanwhile, the Council must remain seized of the matter. It may need to be prepared to consider further action as necessary.

Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I wish to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and on the achievements already accomplished since the beginning of the month. A heartfelt word of recognition is also in order to your predecessor, Ambassador Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan, for the remarkable skills he displayed in conducting the deliberations of the Council in the month of April.

As a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Brazil supported the resolutions adopted by the Board on 25 February, 18 March and 1 April 1993 on the situation that has arisen between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the Security Council, Brazil joined in supporting the presidential statement on the same subject issued on 8 April 1993.

Brazil participated in the deliberations that led to the adoption today of resolution 825 (1993), bearing in mind our commitment to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are pleased to note that the spirit of cooperation displayed by the sponsoring delegations during these negotiations permitted the adoption, with our support, of a resolution which adequately takes into account the concerns we had expressed with regard to the references in the text to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on which our position is well known.

Brazil welcomes the fact that developments are taking place which tend to facilitate a satisfactory solution to the question addressed in the resolution we have just adopted, and we encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and others concerned to respond positively to the resolution.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I thank the representative of Brazil for his kind words addressed to me.

Mr. ARRIA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Venezuela has been following with particular concern the developments triggered by the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We refuse to accept a debate which tries to restrict the discussion, presenting it as if it were a conflict between two or three countries. On the contrary, this is a matter that, by its very nature, is of profound concern to all countries of the world and not only, as has been claimed, to the nuclear Powers; and it is very important that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea understand this. It is appropriate at this point for my country to state that it recognizes the importance of the statement made by the depositaries of the Treaty and takes note of the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 1 April 1993.

We reiterate today the presidential statement of the Security Council of 8 April, after it had seen the report of the Director General of the IAEA. That statement reaffirmed that it was important that the parties to the Treaty comply with it, and it urged that efforts be continued to find an early solution to the nuclear verification issue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which cannot be ignored. This was particularly called for by the non-nuclear countries, such as my own, which represent the majority of the States Members of the United Nations.

Venezuela concurred with those views, which were also clearly set forth in the statement by Heads of State or Government of the States members of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, to the effect that at the present time

(Mr. Arria, Venezuela)

"There are new favourable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ..." (S/PV.3046, p. 141),

and that compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards regime is of critical importance in this regard.

It is clear that the implications of withdrawal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Non-Proliferation Treaty are extremely serious and are of concern to the entire international community. Such withdrawal has grave implications for international security in a region which is barely beginning to recover from the traumas and divisiveness of the cold war. For this reason, my country cannot but be in favour of the prompt and effective defusing of a situation which seems to be moving towards a resurgence of tension in this area. In this exceptional historical and regional context, all the countries of the region and all those that have special links with its security bear the primary responsibility for bringing about conditions conducive to the relaxation of tensions and to disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has the highest responsibilities in this respect - responsibilities which, in our opinion, give that country's participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards system very particular significance. The exercise of the right - clearly recognized by the Treaty itself as belonging to all parties - to withdraw from the Treaty is not what is in dispute. But that Republic cannot fail to take into account the context of its decision, which, I would repeat, is of particular interest to the entire international community.

(Mr. Arria, Venezuela)

My country believes that it is only on the basis of a process of consultations between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it will be possible to find a lasting solution. For this reason, we urge both parties to do their utmost and to exercise maximum prudence in this respect. We are convinced that no measure that could be taken by the Security Council could take the place of the indispensable climate of understanding and trust which needs to prevail if the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are to be strengthened.

Lastly, we should not lose sight of the fact that all these efforts must be seen in the context of the process of reunification and reconciliation in the Korean peninsula which was agreed to by its leaders in December 1991 and which is of such far-reaching significance, particularly for the security of north-eastern Asia in the coming years. There is no place there for so-called nuclear diplomacy or a nuclear presence.

Mr. O'BRIEN (New Zealand): New Zealanders have strong feelings about nuclear weapons. We are greatly concerned at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We regard the Treaty as constituting a fundamental plank in the international disarmament and arms control regime. We consider adherence to the Treaty as substantive proof of a State's commitment to nuclear weapons control.

Like others who have spoken this evening, New Zealand fully subscribes to the statement made by the Security Council on 31 January 1992 at the level of Heads of State and Government that

"The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security." (S/PV.3046, p. 145)

(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

When he addressed the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, the New Zealand Prime Minister emphasized the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the need to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards regime.

Accordingly, New Zealand strongly supports and was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution. We call earnestly on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abide by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to rescind its notice of withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

Such action would, we believe, have positive benefits for global and regional security and for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself. Many in the international community and in the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand among them, may be prepared to consider a new and more positive chapter in relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea if concerns about its nuclear programmes are adequately addressed. Conversely, if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues on its current path, we are concerned that this will have worrying consequences for both international and regional stability and will severely compromise the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's prospects of being accepted as a partner in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. YAÑEZ BARNUEVO (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation co-sponsored and voted in favour of the resolution that has just been adopted by the Security Council.

Spain believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to world peace and security and that universal compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the complete fulfilment of the obligations it imposes are the best guarantee of the non-proliferation of such weapons.

The Spanish Government wishes to place on record the profound concern it has already expressed on other occasions at the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, reported to the Security Council and the depositary States on 12 March 1993, to withdraw from the non-proliferation Treaty, a step which, if not revoked before as we would wish, would take effect three months after notification in accordance with Article X of the Treaty.

We are also concerned about the lack of full cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the full implementation of the safeguards agreement that came into force on 10 April 1992. The acts and decisions of the IAEA, which were taken in accordance with its Statute and the safeguards agreement itself and in which Spain participated, have my country's full support. I should like to point in particular to the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 1 April 1993, which states, as reflected in the resolution we have just adopted, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is in non-compliance with the safeguards agreement now in force.

(Mr. Yañez Barnuevo, Spain)

The resolution we have just adopted sends a clear message from the Security Council and calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its withdrawal from the non-proliferation Treaty and to honour its obligations to the IAEA in accordance with the safeguards agreement, as specified in the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 25 February 1993. Spain trusts that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will give careful attention to the content of Security Council resolution 825 (1993), that it will understand the gravity and import of the appeal being addressed to it by the Security Council and that it will accordingly take the appropriate action to respond to the concerns of the international community.

The Spanish delegation expresses the hope that, in the next few weeks, the Security Council will have good news concerning the results of the consultations to be pursued by the Director General of the IAEA with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We offer our full cooperation to that end with a view to achieving an appropriate solution preserving the integrity and effectiveness of the international non-proliferation régime.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Pakistan reaffirms its abiding commitment to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly within the context of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, I would also wish to reiterate that, despite our reservations which stem from the flawed nature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan has been willing to adhere to the Treaty, provided that our concerns about the threat of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region could be met in a non-discriminatory, equitable and credible manner.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

We acknowledge the importance not only of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty but also of regional non-proliferation arrangements. We therefore fully endorsed the Joint Declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Pakistan attaches the utmost importance to scrupulous adherence to all aspects of international agreements by all the parties concerned. It is for this reason that we supported the resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on the implementation of the safeguards agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Since, in our view, the problem that has arisen between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA was referred to the Security Council, under paragraph C of Article XII of the IAEA Statute, in a rather precipitate manner, we abstained in the voting on the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of 1 April 1993. However, the Security Council statement of 8 April 1993, which marked a prudent step to revert to consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA, was fully endorsed by Pakistan. We continue to support the efforts and consultations between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for resolving the problem through negotiations. We also welcome the efforts being undertaken by various countries to contribute towards a negotiated solution of the issue.

The original draft resolution presented by the sponsors contained a number of elements on which we had serious reservations. We accordingly suggested a few amendments. We are grateful to the sponsors for accommodating some of our suggestions. However, we regret that our difficulties with regard to the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 1 could not be resolved.

(Mr. Marker, Pakistan)

Article X of the non-proliferation Treaty clearly recognizes the right of a State Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the Treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests. This decision has been left entirely to the State party concerned. The seventh preambular paragraph is therefore, in our view, inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Article X of the non-proliferation Treaty, particularly when read in conjunction with operative paragraph 1 of the resolution.

We support the consultations and contacts between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which are aimed at resolving this issue. Thus, steps which would complicate both the process of negotiations between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other interested parties should best be avoided. It is because of these factors that my delegation was constrained to take the decision to abstain in the voting on the resolution which has just been adopted by the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Russian): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation received with profound concern the announcement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 March of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As a depositary of that Treaty - one of the key instruments aimed at ensuring peace and security - we cannot remain indifferent to steps tending to undermine the nuclear non-proliferation régime, no matter who may take them. The withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty would be a serious threat to regional and international security and would undermine efforts to implement the Joint Declaration of the south and north on

(The President)

the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. This step by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a source of particular regret in that it has been taken at a time when the international community has expressed doubts concerning the nature of its nuclear programme.

In this context, we feel the consideration of this problem in the Security Council to be of particular importance. In our view, multilateral efforts should work in tandem with a search for a solution to this problem through bilateral channels between interested parties. That is why we supported the adoption of the relevant IAEA resolution.

(The President)

We view as justified the adoption of the draft resolution submitted to us, which is a reflection of the concern of the world community at Pyongyang's actions.

In our view, the resolution is balanced and non-confrontational, clearly indicating the concern of the Security Council regarding the existing situation and its desire to find a political solution to the problem.

We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract its announcement and to abide fully by its obligations under the Treaty and also the obligations under the safeguards agreement, which remain in force. In this connection, we firmly support the efforts of the IAEA aimed at the implementation of this agreement.

We are convinced that strict observance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is, above all, in the interests of the north Korean party itself and is also in the interests of stability and security on the Korean peninsula.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

There are no further names on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.