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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 15 June 1988 at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. DELPECH

(Argentina)

Members: Algeria
Brazil
China
France
Germany, Federal Republic of
Italy
Japan
Nepal
Senegal
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
United States of America
Yugoslavia
Zambia

Mr. DJOUDI
Mr. NOGUEIRA-BATISTA
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. BLANC
Count York von WARTENBURG
Mr. BUCCI
Mr. KAGAMI
Mr. JOSSE
Mr. SARRE
Mr. BELONOGOV

Mr. BIRCH
Mr. WALTERS
Mr. DJOKIC
Mr. MFULA

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF THANKS TO THE RETIRING PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first meeting of the Security Council in the month of June, I should like, on behalf of the members of the Council, to pay a tribute to Mr. Hocine Djoudi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations, for his services as President of the Security Council for the month of May 1988. I am sure I speak for all the members of the Council in expressing to Ambassador Djoudi deep appreciation for the great diplomatic skill, tact and unfailing courtesy with which he conducted the Council's business last month. In my capacity as representative of Argentina, I also wish to express my personal thanks to him because of the close bonds of friendship that exist between us and our two countries.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS
(S/19927 and Add.1)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Zepos (Greece) and Mr. Turkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Ozer Koray in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1987 to 31 May 1988, contained in documents S/19927 and Add.1. Members of the Council also have before them a draft resolution contained in document S/19936, which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put it to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia, Zambia

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 614 (1988)

The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I should like at the outset to congratulate you warmly, Sir, on your assumption of the high post of President of the Security Council. We are particularly pleased to see that a most talented and seasoned diplomat of Argentina is presiding over this important meeting. Having been accredited for the past six years as Ambassador to your beautiful country, I find it an opportune time to reiterate our full satisfaction at the friendliest relations and co-operation that exist between our two countries and peoples.

I should like to commend you, also, for the excellent manner in which you conducted the consultations on the draft resolution that has just been adopted renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months.

Our congratulations are extended also to my valued colleague and friend Ambassador Hocine Djoudi, Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations, for the outstanding leadership he provided in presiding over the deliberations of the Council during the month of May.

I should like to take the opportunity to express our warmest appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, for his untiring efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. We fully support his mission of good offices on Cyprus and express the hope that his efforts will lead to a just and lasting solution. We again pledge to him our full and sincere co-operation. I should be remiss if I were not to record our appreciation and thanks for the important contributions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

Mr. Oscar Camilion, as well as Mr. Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General, and to Messrs James Holger, Gustave Feissel and Giandomenico Picco. Special thanks also go to the Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Major-General Greindl, and to his officers and men, who continue to carry out their duties with objectivity, dedication and commitment to the cause of peace, as well as to all the Governments which, through their voluntary contributions in personnel and funds, continue to support the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations in Cyprus.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The Council has just adopted another resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), a renewal to which my Government had given its prior consent. We welcome this resolution and express support for all its provisions.

Fourteen years have elapsed since the Turkish invasion and occupation of nearly 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. Our people still remain forcibly divided by occupation troops and barbed wire; our lands are being distributed to settlers from Turkey; our people are denied their basic and inalienable human rights; our refugees are prevented from returning to their homes and lands; the fate of 1,619 missing persons is still unknown; and the call of this august body to transfer the town of Varosha to United Nations administration still remains unheeded.

Meanwhile, the process of Turkification of the occupied areas continues unabated through the change of geographical and place names and the destruction of our religious and cultural heritage. The report of the Secretary-General in document S/19927 of 31 May 1988 contains ample references to those developments in paragraphs 27, 28 and 29.

I do not intend to elaborate here on all the aspects of the question of Cyprus, a problem which is well known to the members of the Council from previous statements in this and other competent forums. The Cyprus problem is in its essence, a major international problem of invasion, continuing military occupation, and gross violation of human rights. This is how the General Assembly and this august body have all along perceived and described it, and hence their decision to remain permanently seized of this grave problem. Against this grim background and record of events - well documented by repeated, unanimous or nearly unanimous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions - I shall understandably limit my

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

remarks to certain developments which took place during the six-month interval between the deliberations of the Council and the present.

Since the beginning of the new year, Turkey has continued its policy of promoting the secession and division of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish provocations climaxed on 15 April 1988 with the decision of the illegal entity in the occupied areas to demand that persons wishing to enter those areas produce passports to be stamped by the so-called TRNC.

This new illegality is a serious development, because it violates the United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus and more specifically Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). The Secretary-General, in his report, fully shares this view. This serious development constitutes also an affront to the very authority and prestige of this body, which has unequivocally condemned the attempted secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus, termed it invalid, demanded its withdrawal, and called on all States not to recognize or give any assistance to this offspring of aggression.

The obvious intent to undermine the ongoing good offices mission of the Secretary-General should of course be clear to all. All too clear also is the fact that Turkey bears full responsibility for this and all other actions taking place in the occupied areas. The presence of 35,000 Turkish troops and 65,000 Turkish settlers renders Ankara's guilt manifest.

The demand for the stamping of passports and the introduction of so-called "State borders", taking place at a most sensitive period, obviously aim at undermining the favourable climate that has been created in the area and internationally with regard to the solution of the problem of Cyprus and purport to "establish ... procedures appropriate to an international frontier" (S/19927, para. 26), as the Secretary-General so cogently puts it in his report now before the Council.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

It is by now a pattern that each time Turkey is called to order by international authorities and reminded of its obligation to respect the United Nations Charter and international law, and specifically to comply with United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus - such as that of the European Parliament, which calls on Turkey to present a precise time-table for the withdrawal of its troops and settlers and the restoration of a state of justice in Cyprus - the reaction of the Turkish Government is typically negative, resorting to statements such as, "Turkey does not succumb to pressure."

Characteristic examples of such intransigence are the statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Yilmaz, who said on 18 April of this year in a meeting of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, "It is out of the question for the Turkish armed forces to withdraw from Cyprus"; and that of Mr. Ozal that "not a single Turkish soldier will leave Cyprus under pressure". The Turkish Government's notion of "national" pride, I am afraid, appears to be more construed as persisting to violate United Nations resolutions rather than as complying with them.

It should be recalled that Security Council resolutions have called repeatedly for the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops. No qualifications were provided with regard to their withdrawal other than that the withdrawal had to be immediate. Because of the Turkish pretext of so-called security reasons, the international community is asked to accept elements which are not within the provisions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus.

How else could one describe the statement of the Foreign Minister of Turkey on 11 June 1988 that "the Turkish troops will remain in Cyprus as long as they are needed" and that "it is nobody's business but Turkey's to determine the degree of this need"? Is that not clear evidence of Turkey's complete disregard of United

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

Nations resolutions and a negative reply to the Secretary-General's call on Turkey to start by reducing its troops in Cyprus, as stated in paragraph 60 of the Secretary-General's report?

It clearly follows that the litmus test for Ankara's willingness and sincerity to agree to a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem should be none other than its readiness to solemnly declare and commit itself to withdraw all its troops and settlers from the Republic of Cyprus.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The Turkish occupation is compounded by the forcible segregation of our people and the division of our island through the Attila Line. Ankara rejects the universal and sacrosanct right of the people of Cyprus, irrespective of ethnic background, to move about freely in their own country. This inalienable right is exemplified and best spelt out in the form of the three freedoms, that is, freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and freedom of ownership of land.

It should not escape our attention that the bulk of the Turkish Cypriots, and in particular daring political leaders, continue severely to criticize Turkey's separatist policies in Cyprus and recently called on the Turkish Cypriot régime to abandon efforts to achieve recognition of the separatist state and to revoke the attempted secession as soon as possible. Mr. Alpay Durduran strongly criticized the policies of the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, and called on the Turkish side to abandon its intransigent stand and, instead, work on measures to increase trust between the two communities on the basis of a federal solution in Cyprus.

Turkish propaganda presents the Turkish Cypriot community as a monolithic entity that does not wish to live in harmony with the Greek Cypriot community, and on this distorted premise tries to justify Turkey's divisive and anachronistic policies. Turkey, on the one hand, pays lip service in international bodies to its support of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, which provide for a territorially integral Federal Republic and, on the other hand, it ruthlessly pursues policies on the ground aimed at the partition of our island and the separation of our people.

I would like now to dwell on the menacing issue of settlers, which we consider as one of the most serious aspects of the Cyprus problem.

"[Their] presence", as the Secretary-General reports, "... continues to be a matter of great concern to the Government of Cyprus..." and he urged "that nothing be done to change the demographic composition of the island."

(S/19927, para. 25)

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

In this regard I wish to remind the Council of the recent Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in New York from 5 to 7 October 1987, which, after expressing concern over the substantial increase of the occupation forces and the continued influx of foreign settlers in the occupied territory,

"demanded the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces and colonist settlers as an essential basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem".

(A/42/681, para. 102)

The importation of settlers has been deplored not only by a series of United Nations resolutions and non-aligned declarations, but also by the Turkish Cypriots themselves. This is natural because the over 65,000 settlers and the 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus are now equal in number to the Turkish Cypriot population, which, tellingly enough, has been reduced from 120,000 in 1974, the year of the Turkish invasion, to less than 100,000 today.

The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Kibris Postasi recently wrote in a front-page editorial that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots are being trampled upon. The day will come, it continued, when we will not be able to see Turkish Cypriots in the Assembly just as we no longer see Turkish Cypriots in the streets.

The Turkish Cypriot opposition leader, Ozker Ozgur, has recently warned that the integration with Turkey of the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkish troops since 1974 is continuing and the ideal of a Federal Cyprus Republic will gradually fade away if this process is not stopped. Mr. Ozgur, speaking at a seminar held in Munich between 29 and 31 January 1988, said that if the process of integration with Turkey is not ended, the demography of the occupied areas would change in favour of the settlers imported from Turkey and given citizenship, and warned the Turkish Cypriots that their identity would be destroyed.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The Cyprus problem is, in this seemingly encouraging world climate, ripe for a just and lasting solution. My Government believes that we must grasp the present opportunity offered by the amelioration in the international climate and use it as a springboard for positive results. It was in this spirit that the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. George Vassiliou, proposed to meet, without any preconditions, as soon as possible, with the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Ozal, at a place and on a date of his choice. It was also in the same spirit that the President proposed to meet, without preconditions, with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktash, provided that suitable preparations and a reasonable timetable were envisaged for the completion of the negotiation process. The objective of any new negotiation process should be a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, as envisaged by United Nations resolutions. Dialogue must not be for the sake of dialogue but must be substantive and result-oriented and must deal with the central elements of the problem of Cyprus.

The solution of the international aspect of the Cyprus problem is of utmost urgency. In this context we reiterate that we support the convening of an International Conference within the framework of the United Nations.

Furthermore, President Vassiliou, speaking on 2 June 1988 in the General Assembly on the occasion of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, solemnly declared the Governments's position for the complete demilitarization of Cyprus.

"We propose" - he stated - "to dismantle the military forces of the Republic of Cyprus if all Turkish troops and settlers withdraw from the island and the armed elements they have fostered are disbanded. Part of our proposal concerns the establishment of an international peace force, under the auspices of the United Nations, the composition and terms of reference of which would be agreed upon and endorsed by the Security Council.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

"The acceptance and implementation of this proposal would be the greatest single contribution towards the unity, prosperity and security of Cyprus and would have wider positive repercussions in the region. I strongly believe that such a course would also serve Turkey's own best interests.

"...

"If we bear in mind that the Turkish occupation forces on the island are several times larger than the forces of the Republic of Cyprus, in terms both of manpower and of equipment, the total savings from the demilitarization of Cyprus would run to hundreds of millions of dollars per year. ...

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

"Demilitarization would not only create the conditions for resolving the Cyprus problem but also offer a further opportunity. One of the negative consequences of the continuing occupation of part of Cyprus has been the lagging behind of the Turkish Cypriots in economic development, despite the fact that they have been concentrated by the Turkish occupation forces in the part of Cyprus which before 1974 had the greatest resources and production potential.

"We therefore undertake now to use the funds to be saved through the demilitarization of Cyprus for the development of areas of Cyprus which have fallen behind economically and primarily for projects the benefits of which will be derived mainly by the Turkish Cypriots. Part of the savings could also be used for financing the international peace force to be established."

(A/S-15/PV.4, pp. 8-11)

We reiterate that solemn proposal before the Council today.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cyprus for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is the representative of Greece, upon whom I now call.

Mr. ZEPOS (Greece) I wish first to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the current month and express our deepest conviction that your wide experience and diplomatic skill will be of enormous benefit to the work of this body. It is pertinent for me to add that the close ties of friendship and co-operation which exist between Greece and Argentina include the special dimension of their participation in the Six-Nation Initiative for Peace and Disarmament, an issue which in its wider concept is most relevant to the subject of this debate.

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

I wish equally to congratulate warmly Ambassador Hocine Djoudi of Algeria for his leadership and the excellent and efficient manner in which he discharged his duties as President of the Security Council during the past month, and to assure him equally of the close ties of friendship and co-operation Greece maintains with his country.

My Government concurred in the renewal for another six months of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), following the agreement to that effect of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which retains exclusive jurisdiction in the matter.

The Secretary-General in his report gives ample reasons to support his recommendation for the renewal of the mandate. He eloquently reminds us of the tensions and hopes which exist at this time with regard to Cyprus. The continuation of the presence of Turkish occupation forces on the island is the primary cause of the tension. But equally, what gives hope to the Secretary-General adds to the importance of his appeal to Member States to rescue UNFICYP from the financial difficulties it is facing. It has been stated time and again that there is no greater cost than that of war. And if the Cyprus problem has been before the Security Council for a quarter of a century, as the Secretary-General pertinently reminds us, it is because the military threat of an imminent invasion and finally its realization have been the dominating elements during the last 25 years as far as Cyprus is concerned. A final settlement of the problem, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations, has not been reached as yet. More than ever, we should take into serious consideration the Secretary-General's appeal to place the financing of UNFICYP on a more equitable basis and share the costs of the Force through assessed contributions.

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

At this juncture, I take the opportunity to reiterate my Government's deep appreciation to the countries which, by providing military and civilian personnel, equipment and financial support throughout previous years have made possible the continuation of the peace-keeping operations of UNFICYP. I wish also to pay a tribute in particular to Major-General Greindl and to the officers and men of UNFICYP who, often under difficult circumstances, have been carrying out their delicate duties.

I would not wish to comment extensively upon issues or points which have been amply and clearly dealt with by the representative of Cyprus and with which I fully concur. I shall confine myself to comment on just one crucial issue, which for the Greek Government remains the first priority, that is, the imperative question of the total and definitive withdrawal of all Turkish forces from Cyprus. I cannot stress enough that this issue, as I have previously implied, does not only relate to the credibility of the United Nations in its ability to implement fundamental principles of the Charter and provisions of relevant resolutions. It also relates to the success of the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General - a mission which has the full support of the Greek Government. Finally, it affects fundamental aspects of security, as far as my country is concerned.

But beyond that aspect, I wish also to underline the international dimension of the requirement that no solution of any regional problem arising out of a conflict, the cause of which has been the military intervention in and the occupation of the territory of a sovereign State, can be envisaged without the withdrawal of all foreign troops. In this context, and consistent with the same requirement, my Government firmly supports the proposal of the Government of Cyprus for the complete demilitarization of the territory of the Republic and the establishment of a joint police force under the auspices of the United Nations,

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

which should be in a position fully to meet the security concerns of both the Greek and the Turkish communities. This proposal, which has been amply presented by the President of the Republic of Cyprus at the current special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, will, if accepted, also certainly meet the security concerns of all countries in the area.

I should not fail also to note that after the appointment of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camilion, certain specific suggestions were presented to the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

According to the Secretary-General's suggestions, the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 should form the basis of an overall settlement. This is the right approach. I should add, however, that it is self-evident that the relevant decisions and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly form equally the basis of such a settlement, and it would certainly be preferable if this had been explicitly stated in the report.

The report submitted by the Secretary-General in its main observations should be further commended because it reflects an awareness of the new possibilities that exist for a breakthrough of the existing impasse. Indeed, developments in the relations between Greece and Turkey which should positively influence the course of events, but mainly the will of the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Vassiliou, for a new departure to a just and viable solution, have prompted the Secretary-General to place new emphasis on building confidence between the two communities. It is only consistent with these expectations that the Secretary-General, in the framework of his mission of good offices, should state that:

"great benefits would be derived if Turkey would make a start by reducing its troops in the northern part of the island." (S/19927, para. 60)

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

Still, the picture given by the Secretary-General's report remains bleak, and I cannot fail to stress the gravity of the problem created by the settlers in Cyprus from the Turkish mainland, in an attempt by Turkey to change the demographic composition of the island. The presence of the Turkish troops, whose armaments, as the report itself confirms, remain at the same high levels - indeed most of the tanks that were to be withdrawn are still on the island - continues to be a source of deep concern.

Finally, without wishing to prolong this statement, I cannot fail to express deep concern at the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership continues to engage in various illegal practices aimed at changing the status quo, such as its requirement for the stamping of passports, pretending to establish procedures appropriate to an international frontier - which does not exist. The Secretary-General's report rightly reminds us in this instance of Security Council resolution 541 (1983), which again has been ignored and met with utter contempt by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The Greek Government has not failed to contribute, through initiatives recently taken for a rapprochement with the Turkish Government - in actual fact the Prime Minister of Turkey is concluding today an official visit to Athens - to the creation of the best possible conditions for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, in particular by the acceptance of the proposal for the demilitarization of the territory of the Republic, a proposal which is in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the relevant decisions and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The gesture made by Athens was clear; it was just and friendly. It remains to be seen whether Ankara will respond with equal willingness to find a just and viable solution to this international problem.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Greece for the kind words he addressed to me.

The next speaker is Mr. Ozer Koray, to whom the Security Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. KORAY: I should like to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for giving me this opportunity to address the Council on the question of the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and on other matters of primary significance in the context of the Cyprus question.

The Secretary-General is trying to arrange a meeting between the leaders of the two sides in order to see if the negotiations for the establishment of a bicommunal, bizonal federation can be resumed. We, as the Turkish Cypriot side, stand for a peaceful settlement and coexistence between the two sides. That is why we accepted the proposals made by the Secretary-General on 29 March 1986 for a comprehensive settlement. The evasion and the rejection of those proposals by the Greek Cypriot leadership brought the negotiating process to an impasse. That is the situation with which the Secretary-General is trying to deal. Let me note here that his recent suggestion for a new summit meeting has already been accepted in principle by President Denktas.

Against that background, I should like to turn to the current state of affairs in Cyprus and to the present status of the search for a negotiated settlement.

There are in Cyprus two separate and independent States, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction over their own respective territories. That is a fact, regardless of the political attitude of third parties. The acknowledgement of that reality, however, is a must since a federation in Cyprus can be established only by two political entities enjoying equal status vis-à-vis each other. The

(Mr. Koray)

political equality of the two peoples is a fundamental condition for a just and lasting solution in Cyprus.

The latest stalemate in the negotiating process was created by the fact that the Greek Cypriots did not accept the Secretary-General's draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, which envisaged the establishment of a bizonal, bicomunal federal structure in Cyprus. That document clearly outlined, as an integrated whole, the parameters of a settlement in a balanced and workable framework which was formulated as a result of extensive talks between the two sides under the auspices of the United Nations.

To overcome the difficulties arising from the Greek Cypriot side, some circles had pinned their hopes on a possible change in the Greek Cypriot leadership as a result of the elections held in South Cyprus last February. Those hopes at first were enhanced by the elimination, in the first round of the elections, of Mr. Kyprianou, who had pursued for the last decade a hard-line and intransigent policy throughout the negotiating process and had in fact at least twice during the last four years rejected United Nations initiatives for a settlement.

Following the election of the new Greek Cypriot leader, President Denktas called upon Mr. Vassiliou to meet him at the Ledra Palace. This invitation, which was made in sincerity and with good will, was rejected by Mr. Vassiliou, who chose to pretend that he was the "President of the whole of Cyprus", that he could receive Mr. Denktas only as the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community at his presidential palace and that he was prepared to negotiate instead with the Prime Minister of Turkey. That reaction lacked political realism or wisdom and clearly fell short of all initial expectations. Furthermore, after being sworn in, Mr. Vassiliou declared that the Turkish Cypriots were his subjects. That was simply a

(Mr. Koray)

provocation. I need hardly emphasize that under a bizonal, federal solution, neither people will be the subjects of the other.

The Turkish Cypriot side, with a view to facilitating the re-establishment of trust and confidence between the two sides, proposed on 3 March 1988 a set of good-will measures containing various areas in which possibilities of co-operation might be explored. The areas to be explored, on an ad hoc basis, included trade, municipalities, environmental and health issues and cultural, sports and scientific exchanges, as well as co-operation between the two police organizations on related issues. The full text of the Turkish Cypriot good-will measures may be found in document S/19578, dated 3 March 1988.

(Mr. Koray)

The object of those proposals was to build good-neighbourliness, based on mutual trust and confidence between the two sides. However, the Greek Cypriot side rejected those proposals as well, and forfeited yet another opportunity for establishing purposeful contact between the two sides.

Substantial amounts of money have been spent by the Greek Cypriot administration over the years on new military equipment, including helicopters, armoured vehicles, personnel carriers and modern anti-aircraft guns, on the pretext of increasing its defence capabilities.

The Greek Cypriot daily, Cyprus Mail, of 6 May 1988 reported that:

"According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies based in London ... the number of the [Greek Cypriot] National Guard forces is 13,000 with 60,000 reservists ... The Institute also says there are now 3,000 Greek soldiers on the island, 500 more than 1987. A total of 750 Greek officers from the 3,000 man the [Greek Cypriot] National Guard ...".

The Turkish Cypriot side is closely monitoring recent reports that the Greek Cypriot administration is planning a joint venture with Greece for the production of arms in South Cyprus. That would further aggravate the already potentially dangerous situation created by the accumulation of troops and weaponry in southern Cyprus.

Although President Denktas, in his letter dated 6 June 1988 addressed to the Secretary-General and distributed as a United Nations document (A/S-15/33), stated clearly the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the views expressed by Mr. Vassiliou regarding the demilitarization of Cyprus, I nevertheless find it pertinent to reiterate our position on this issue.

The bicommunal republic established in 1960 was already demilitarized with the exception of a mixed Greek and Turkish Cypriot army of only 2,000 men and a similar

(Mr. Koray)

police force. Greece and Turkey had military contingents of 950 and 650 men respectively. For all practical purposes this was a demilitarized State.

It was the Greek Cypriots and Greece who unilaterally militarized Cyprus. They first formed secret armies composed of former gangs advocating the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and used those forces from 1963 onwards against the Turkish Cypriots. After the partnership between the two communities had collapsed, they established a so-called national guard. That unconstitutional military force was placed under the command of Greek Officers - as it still is - and armed with weapons purchased from abroad - as is still done today. Under a secret agreement with the Greek Cypriot leadership Greece sent an army of 20,000 men to Cyprus in 1964. These unlawful acts led to a grave security problem for the Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974. UNFICYP was formed and sent to the island in 1964, but that did not resolve the security problem of the Turkish Cypriots.

That is how Cyprus was militarized by the Greek camp. The use of military force against the Turkish Cypriots became a daily affair, and on 15 July 1974 reached a climax when Greece engineered a coup in Cyprus in order to annex the island. Turkey had no alternative but to react, under its treaty rights and obligations, to that state of affairs, after years of restraint.

Now, those who militarized the island preach demilitarization. We would only have rejoiced if that had signified a change of heart and mentality on their part, but the rejection of the Secretary-General's proposals while reinforcing the military build-up in South Cyprus hardly reflects any such inclination.

Only the two sides can decide through negotiations how to reconcile their interests, including the security aspect of their relations, within a federal partnership; but the Greek Cypriot side is not entitled to decide how much security the Turkish Cypriots should enjoy.

(Mr. Koray)

During the last two weeks we have been witnessing a new trend, a new approach on the part of the new Greek Cypriot leader. This trend has been to project everything in terms of economics, gains or losses, dollars, and so on. That may be only too natural for Mr. Vassiliou, who is an economist and a businessman, but he should know that there are certain things that cannot be traded - among them are the right to life and security. I should like to assure the new Greek Cypriot leader that he cannot find even a single Turkish Cypriot who would trade his or her right to life and security for all the money in the world.

The reasons for the economic disparity between North and South Cyprus are well known. They are, first, the economic embargo imposed on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot administration for the past 25 years and, secondly, the usurpation by the Greek Cypriot administration of all the foreign aid given to Cyprus as a whole and its utilization in South Cyprus only. Mr. Vassiliou should not seek any other reason for this disparity.

I should like now to refer to a sensitive issue which is of crucial importance to the Turkish Cypriot side and which has a direct bearing on the efforts being exerted to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. This concerns the basic and most important principle of the impartiality which is expected from UNFICYP and from the countries which contribute troops to that force. Needless to say, the success of the peace-keeping efforts of UNFICYP depends largely on the conduct of its relations with the two sides on an equal footing.

I regret to say, however, that two recent fatal incidents in the no man's land have raised many serious questions about the conduct of UNFICYP in the discharge of its duties and obligations in this respect.

The first incident involved two UNFICYP soldiers who shot and killed a Turkish Cypriot citizen who was at the time attending to his daily farming activities on his own property located in the no man's land. It is disturbing and unacceptable

(Mr. Koray)

that UNFICYP should engage in police activities incompatible with its mandate. Such conduct met with the strongest protest from the Turkish Cypriot authorities and aroused a deep sense of resentment among the Turkish Cypriot people.

The second incident involved the slaying of a Turkish soldier by the Greek Cypriot National Guard inside the no man's land and in the presence of UNFICYP troops, who refrained from taking any action to prevent that atrocity. The local UNFICYP commander had previously been informed and requested to co-operate with the Turkish Cypriot authorities in an effort to locate a missing Turkish soldier and to guide him safely to the North. UNFICYP failed to do that. When in fact the missing soldier was located UNFICYP failed to inform the Turkish Cypriot side and stood by and watched the cold-blooded murder of that Turkish soldier by the Greek Cypriots, instead of taking the necessary measures to prevent the Greek Cypriot armed elements from entering the no man's land and taking armed action. It is regrettable that UNFICYP has confessed that it has no power to prevent such intrusions by the Greek Cypriot side.

We find UNFICYP's behaviour during those incidents deeply disturbing, to say the least. It is our ardent hope that the Secretary-General will take all the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of such deplorable incidents.

These two incidents and the reaction and decision of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Government on them have been explained orally to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, both by President Rauf Denktas and by Foreign and Defence Minister Kenan Atakol, and our views have also been conveyed to the Secretary-General in writing. I wish to state here that the Turkish Cypriot side stands by those views and that position.

(Mr. Koray)

We have seen that there are certain important omissions in the present report of the Secretary-General. In expressing the need that:

"every effort must be made to overcome existing distrust and to build confidence between the two sides" (S/19927, para. 60),

the report disregards President Denktas' offer to meet the Greek Cypriot leader soon after his election, and above all fails to make mention of the good will proposals made by the Turkish Cypriot side on 3 March 1988.

Furthermore, paragraph 59 of the report refers to:

"the impasse which has blocked [the Secretary-General's] mission of good offices for the last two years" (S/19927, para. 59),

without pin-pointing the well-known reasons for the current deadlock. The responsibility for the lack of progress in negotiations lies with the Greek Cypriot side which has failed to accept the document of 29 March.

We have some other serious observations about the report of the Secretary-General, but in order not to take more of the Council's time we shall communicate these to the Secretary-General separately.

Turning now to the issue of the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP, I should like to underline once again that the resolution which has just been adopted by the Security Council in this regard is totally unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side for the same established and fundamental reasons. The resolution ignores the existing realities in Cyprus and undermines the principle of political equality between the two sides. The Turkish Cypriot side unequivocally rejects any resolution which purports to endorse the Greek Cypriot side as the so-called "Government of the Republic of Cyprus", whereas this illegitimate entity totally lacks the competence and authority to represent the whole of the island.

(Mr. Koray)

Notwithstanding its unavoidable rejection in toto of the present resolution for the reasons outlined, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is nevertheless favourably disposed to accept the presence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in December 1987. Thus, our position continues to be that the principle, the scope, the modalities and procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions to be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

In concluding, allow me to reaffirm our support for the continuation of the good-offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General entrusted to him by the Security Council under resolution 367 (1975). In this connection, we continue to support a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal framework as stipulated by the 29 March 1986 draft framework agreement of the Secretary-General, which also contains every other aspect of a final settlement in Cyprus. The reactivation of intercommunal negotiations depends largely on the commitment to, and respect for, the agreements reached between the two sides since 1975. I will not go into the details of these agreements, which provide the foundations of a possible comprehensive solution. Suffice it to say that a solution should take into full account the equal political status of the two national peoples in Cyprus and the security requirements of the Turkish Cypriots. The efforts of the Greek Cypriot side to single out certain aspects of the Cyprus question for discussion runs counter to the mutually agreed integrated whole approach of the United Nations Secretary-General and the 29 March 1986 document, which is still on the table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Turkey, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and the other members of the Security Council for this opportunity to participate in the discussion of the situation in Cyprus.

I should like to extend to you my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June, and my best wishes for success. We are happy to see as President of the Security Council the representative of a country with which Turkey has traditionally maintained excellent relations and we know we can fully rely on your diplomatic skills, wisdom and constructive spirit.

I also wish to pay a tribute to Ambassador Djoudi of Algeria, who guided the Council with dedication and diligence during May.

The procedural resolution just adopted by the Council unfortunately continues to contain a number of controversial elements to which we have fundamental objections. We are therefore unable to consent to a renewal of UNFICYP's mandate on this basis. Mr. Koray has just explained the position of his Government on the modalities of UNFICYP's presence in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. That position enjoys our support.

This debate comes at the aftermath of two sad incidents which have taken place in the buffer zone. Both incidents have resulted in tragic loss of life which we and the Turkish Cypriot authorities believe could have been avoided. The way UNFICYP conducted itself during and after these two incidents calls for serious examination and appropriate action. Both incidents are under investigation. But many regrettable facts have already surfaced. One cannot but feel that there is something utterly wrong when a Turkish Cypriot civilian can be shot on his own

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

property by UNFICYP and left to die with seven bullets in his body while UNFICYP casually calls this self-defence. There is something wrong when UNFICYP remains totally ineffective and helpless as Greek Cypriot National Guard and police violate the buffer zone and execute a Turkish soldier by repeated shots while he was, it transpires, in the act of surrendering.

The attitude of the Greek Cypriot side in the second incident is an ominous sign of sanguinary tendencies. The fact that these reflexes could be let loose under the observation of UNFICYP only compounds the situation. There are valid grounds to take a very serious look into this deeply disturbing episode. Whatever the outcome of the ongoing investigations, it is obvious that a question of credibility and confidence has arisen in the island in the aftermath of these incidents as a result of the attitude of the UNFICYP command. We hope, therefore, that the Secretary-General will take the appropriate measures necessary to restore the spirit of confidence that the UNFICYP Command has enjoyed for so long in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I wish to reaffirm the firm support of my Government for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for taking the initiative of arranging an informal meeting between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. It will be recalled that this was in fact President Denktas' idea. In February, he called on the newly elected Greek Cypriot leader for an informal meeting on the basis of equality and without prejudice to the respective positions of the two sides. This offer was then rejected in a very disappointing manner. We hope now that the Greek Cypriot leader, despite the questions he has created about his consistency, will have the wisdom to accept the Secretary-General's call.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

There is a positive atmosphere in the circumstances surrounding Cyprus. I am referring to the development in Turkish-Greek relations. As my Greek colleague has pointed out, the Turkish Prime Minister is at present in Athens. We hope that this and subsequent meetings will lead to a growing understanding and co-operation between the two countries. But the influence of such an evolution on the Cyprus problem can only be indirect. The Cyprus question has to be resolved between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. However, it is clear that both Turkey and Greece should encourage the two parties to make greater efforts to reach a solution under the good offices mission of the Secretary-General.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

To hope to take advantage of the new atmosphere in Turkish/Greek relations for unilateral gains in Cyprus would only be indulging in self-deception. What should be done is to take advantage of this positive atmosphere for sincerely working towards a comprehensive political settlement within the parameters which have already been established in the course of the negotiations since 1974. We hope that the Greek Cypriot side under a new leader will leave the intransigence and propaganda rhetoric prevalent during the term of office of his predecessor behind and adopt a reasonable position which will enable the two sides in Cyprus to normalize their relations on the basis of mutual respect and to strive for a federal partnership. Now is the time for the Greek Cypriot leadership to commit itself to a path of reconciliation and compromise with the Turkish Cypriot side. Such a genuine change of heart would certainly not remain unacknowledged.

It is always useful to stress basic facts and positions, even at the expense of being repetitious. I will therefore briefly recall where we stand with regard to the negotiating process which the Secretary-General hopes to revitalize.

I wish to note that regarding most international problems there are documents which define the framework within which a negotiated settlement can be sought. It is not possible to conceive of a settlement to such problems by discarding these basic documents which are the products of serious and impartial efforts for a peaceful solution. In the Cyprus question, the Secretary-General has been entrusted with a mission of good offices since 1975. After years of negotiations between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, proposals have been exchanged and agreements reached, some of which have been implemented while others have led to new rounds of talks and new documents. In August 1984, the Secretary-General undertook, with the agreement of both sides, a major initiative based on these

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

previous efforts. The Secretary-General's initiative resulted in the drafting of a framework agreement which incorporated all the elements of a comprehensive settlement as an integrated whole. This is the 29 March 1986 Draft Framework Agreement.

It is easy to prove that the document is not just another piece of paper in an endless process. On the contrary, that proposed framework agreement has a very particular status as the basis for final negotiations.

First, each point in the document is the result of detailed discussions over a period of two years between the Secretary-General and the representatives of the two sides.

Secondly, while preparing the document the Secretary-General briefed Security Council members and received their strong support. The Council, through a presidential statement issued on 20 September 1985, called upon all parties to make a special effort, in co-operation with the Secretary-General, to reach an early agreement. The result of that special effort was the Draft Framework Agreement of 29 March 1986.

Thirdly, after presenting the draft agreement to the two sides on 29 March 1986, the Secretary-General took the unusual step of giving the Draft Framework Agreement and his covering letter to the Security Council President with a request that copies be given to the members of the Council. In his own words, the Secretary-General took this step "because of the significance of the stage we had reached". (S/18102, Add.1, para. 8) Furthermore, at the invitation of the President of the Council, the Secretary-General briefed Council members on 24 April 1986 on the status of his efforts.

I ask the indulgence of the Council to read out once again from the letter of presentation the Secretary-General addressed to President Denktas and Mr. Kyprianou on 29 March 1986. He said:

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

"I wrote to you on 24 January with my assessment of the point we had then reached and my proposals about how we should proceed. I have now carefully studied reports on the discussions that took place with each side during the lower-level meetings. It is evident that both sides have made a real effort to overcome the remaining differences. I would like to take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation for the constructive approach taken by your representatives.

"The talks that took place with each side in Geneva and in Nicosia proved most useful in bringing into clearer focus their respective concerns and indicated points of convergence on the substance of the issues which remained to be resolved. This has made it possible to draft a framework agreement which preserves all that has been achieved since August 1984 and endeavours to reconcile the outstanding differences in a manner that protects the interests of both communities.

"I am pleased to present to you herewith the draft framework agreement as it has emerged from our joint efforts. When considering this text, I would urge both sides to keep the following in mind:

"This framework agreement is an indispensable step in an ongoing process. Both sides have agreed on the matters that will be negotiated after the framework agreement is accepted, and to do so in good faith and with a willingness to consider each other's concerns.

"These negotiations will provide each side with ample opportunities to assure itself of the good intentions of the other. While the text commits the two parties to proceed towards an overall solution within an agreed framework, its ultimate implementation will depend on both sides being able to negotiate to their mutual satisfaction the matters on which agreement has yet to be achieved.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

"Acceptance of the draft framework agreement will allow, for the very first time, all the outstanding issues to be tackled in earnest and in a decisive manner as an integrated whole." (S/18102/Add.1, annex III, p. 18)

The 29 March document was accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side. It was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. That is where the negotiating process was left off. There is a twisted logic which attempts to portray the side which has accepted the 29 March document as intransigent and the side which has rejected it as conciliatory. To accept such logic will lead us nowhere and will throw the parties into confusion whenever they have to react to proposals by the Secretary-General.

The rejection of the 29 March document is a problem for the Greek Cypriot side. It does not affect the position of the Turkish Cypriot side or the fact that this document remains on the table. The 29 March document contains and compiles all the points of agreement that had been developed between the two sides through long years of efforts under the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. It is not possible selectively to approach these points of agreement while at the same time disregarding the general framework within which they have been formulated. It is only obvious that these have to be taken into account as a whole in order to arrive at a comprehensive settlement.

I wish now to take up a few points raised by the representative of Greece and Ambassador Moushoutas.

Much has been said on the so-called settlers issue. I think it will be useful if I repeat here what I said to the Council at its last meeting.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

I quote what I said then:

"May I remind [Ambassador Moushoutas] that for many years the Greek Cypriots had forgotten this issue. They had not raised it during the two years of discussions with the Secretary-General that led to the draft agreement of 29 March 1986. Since then, nothing has happened to sharpen the Greek Cypriot concern. Therefore, this lamentation over so-called settlers is totally artificial.

"But there is one fact which should not be forgotten. Turkey has a population of approximately 55 million. If the Turkish side had indeed wanted to change the demographic structure in Cyprus, it could have easily done that long ago. It is clear from the population figures in Northern and Southern Cyprus that the Turkish side has not pursued such a policy. Indeed, we do not need such a policy, because the political approach of the Turkish side to the Cyprus problem has never been based on numerical considerations but on the concept of the political equality of the two sides, regardless of the population ratio.

"The Greek Cypriots know very well that throughout the past years immigration to Northern Cyprus has remained at an insignificant number. The fact that the population ratio between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots has not changed during all these years testifies to the falsity of Greek Cypriot propaganda.

"To conclude my remarks on this issue, I have to emphasize that the acceptance by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus of immigrants or labour from abroad is not subject to any restriction but, rather, to its own laws and regulations in this regard. Pending a settlement which will ensure a shared sovereignty, the Turkish part of the island is as sovereign as the Greek side." (S/PV.2771, p. 57)

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

Let me add, in this regard, that we know that there is a large immigration in the south of the island. We know it because of the repeated acts of political violence caused by this influx. As the Turkish Cypriots do not raise any objections to this immigration, the Greek Cypriots should equally stop this nonsense about the settlers in the north. They know that the population in the north has remained more or less stable for the past 10 years, but it is true that the political violence in the south and the support given by the Greek Cypriot administration to terrorists of all kinds and nationalities have given concern to the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and this might be one of the reasons which have led to the adoption of more stringent control measures at the border.

I should like also to comment on the proposal for demilitarization, presented as the only cure for all the problems in Cyprus. Mr. Koray has already clarified the subject, but I wish to add a few comments.

In our opinion, this is not an issue that can be discussed in isolation. It directly concerns the security interests of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots within a prospective federation. Therefore it can be meaningfully addressed only within a comprehensive settlement. Anyone listening to the statements made in the General Assembly at the current special session on disarmament could not have missed a very salient point underlined by many speakers. Disarmament by itself is not a means of resolving regional problems. On the contrary, such an approach can bring disastrous consequences. The underlying causes of political differences and confrontation have to be addressed in order to find peaceful solutions to such problems. Prime Minister Ozal stressed in his statement:

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

"Regional problems have to be peacefully resolved and international understanding has to be improved in order to rely on disarmament measures for enhanced security and stability." (A/S-15/PV.6, p. 7)

A similar point was made by Sir Geoffrey Howe, who eloquently underlined the connection between security and disarmament. He said:

... "disarmament cannot proceed in a vacuum. It is simply no good talking about it as an abstract end in itself. Disarmament is inextricably tied up with security. Nobody is going to discuss disarmament seriously if he already feels insecure. That is why it is crucial to tackle the root cause of military confrontation: the tensions that foster insecurity. Disarmament by itself cannot bear the weight of resolving these tensions." (A/S-15/PV.10, pp. 28-29)

Besides this fundamental principle, there is a historical experience which cannot be lightly disregarded. The bicomunal Republic established in 1960 in Cyprus was already demilitarized, but the Greek Cypriots and Greece unilaterally militarized Cyprus. President Denktas has drawn attention to that historical fact, in his recent letter to the Secretary-General. It should come as no surprise to the Greek Cypriots that when the side which is responsible for militarizing Cyprus starts preaching demilitarization its words may not sound so convincing to the other side. In short, demilitarization under the present circumstances would mean total insecurity for the Turkish Cypriots and supremacy for the Greek Cypriots because of their numerical superiority. It would signify the elimination of the deterrent which prevents the Greek Cypriots from re-establishing forcefully their previous oppressive monopoly of political power. Mr. Vassiliou should understand that, for the Turkish Cypriots, in the light of the ordeal they have suffered from 1964 to 1974, the vital issue is security.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

They are not likely to be swayed by the offer of Mr. Vassiliou to use the funds to be saved through the demilitarization for the development of areas which have fallen behind economically. True, the Greek Cypriots' standard of living is considerably higher than that of the Turkish Cypriots, but it would be naive to assume that the Turkish Cypriots will exchange their freedom, security and dignity for a doubtful promise of a greater prosperity. How can they forget the well-known saying about the need to beware of the man bearing gifts?

Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the appeal of the Secretary-General for a reduction in the Turkish forces in Northern Cyprus.

It should first be pointed out that the Turkish forces are not the only non-Cypriot forces on the island. If the Turkish forces are larger, the reason is that the need for them is greater in view of the inability of the Turkish Cypriots to defend themselves against the Greek Cypriot military threat.

In the south, the size of the Greek mainland forces is smaller, though substantial, because the Greek Cypriots have built up their armed forces, both in quantity and quality for many years and are continuing to supply them with offensive capabilities. Therefore the fact that a unilateral appeal has been made does not, in our view, reflect a balanced approach.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government has always indicated that the level of its forces stationed in Northern Cyprus is proportionate to the assessment that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey are making regarding the military potential and threat against the Turkish Cypriots from the south. It is for this reason that the level of Turkish forces has fluctuated over the past 14 years.

It is also on record that the Turkish Government firmly supports negotiations between the two sides on the basis of the Secretary-General's draft framework

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

agreement of 29 March 1986. This document envisages the establishment of a time-table for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces within the framework of a comprehensive settlement. Since 1974 the negotiations between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots have always been carried out on the assumption that the non-Cypriot forces would be withdrawn if the two sides could agree on a settlement. At no time was a prior withdrawal of forces contemplated or negotiated. It should be clear that, as much as Turkey supports a negotiated settlement in Cyprus, it cannot in any circumstances agree to jeopardize the security of the Turkish Cypriots by a premature reduction or withdrawal of its forces.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I thank the representative of Turkey for the kind words he addressed to me.

The representative of Cyprus has asked to be allowed to speak, and I call on him.

Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Ambassador Turkmen sticks to the March 1986 document as though it were the beginning and the end of the negotiating efforts of the Secretary-General on Cyprus. He forgets that the Secretary-General's mission of good offices is an ongoing process based on mutual acceptance of his ideas and that the Secretary-General is mandated to continue to produce suggestions and ideas for the solution of the problem of Cyprus. He was in fact given such a mandate even today.

As the Secretary-General put it in his report in document S/18491:

"as long as the Security Council maintained my mandate, I could not allow my mission of good offices to be frozen either because one side found a particular suggestion unacceptable, or because the other side, having accepted a suggestion, insisted that my effort could not proceed until the other side had done the same." (S/18491, para. 54)

Not only do we agree with the Secretary-General but we remind the Permanent Representative of Turkey of their rejection of the April 1985 document - they seem to forget it - of their rejection of the Secretary-General's suggestion for parallel talks as late as 1987; and, of course, their utter - I would say contemptuous - disregard of all United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus.

We believe that the Secretary-General's efforts must go on and we fully support him.

Our proposal for demilitarization - which, by the way, is contained in the 1979 high-level agreement - does take into account the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and, here I must add, the security of all Cypriots.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The pretext of a security gap, used by the Turkish side, is a ploy which cannot be interpreted other than to find a pretext in support of its policy to perpetuate the presence in Cyprus of the Turkish occupation troops.

If the Turkish side is interested in a solution, it must decide: there is before it a proposal by the Secretary-General for the resumption of talks; there is before it our proposal for demilitarization; and there are the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops.

Ambassador Turkmen denied the existence of settlers. I think he chose a very bad time to do so. The presence of settlers is confirmed in the present report of the Secretary-General, who states specifically:

"The presence of settlers from Turkey in the northern part of the island continues to be a matter of great concern to the Government of Cyprus."

(S/19927, para. 25)

Still, I would remind my Turkish colleague of our proposal for the establishment of a committee of legal experts to investigate this grave matter. If Turkey has nothing to hide, why not accept our proposal? I shall spare him the ironic statement that Mr. Ozgur addressed to a certain Gurler, who was trying to tell him that these are returning Turks. For the benefit of the new members of the Security Council, I shall quote:

"Are you trying to deceive us, too, by saying things you say to the foreigners? Be a little serious, Mr. Gurler."

Ambassador Turkmen spoke of my side's taking an economic view of the matter. Our side's economic progress was described in a magazine as "half a miracle", considering that Cyprus, owing to the invasion and occupation, has been cut in two. We did it by hard work and out of a desire to survive. We did not and do not

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

impose an economic embargo on our Turkish Cypriot brethren. What we do is, legally through international courts, try to protect their properties that at present are under occupation, usurped by the Turkish occupation troops and settlers.

The Turkish side spoke of "peoples" in Cyprus. There is one people in Cyprus, and the Constitution so states. Indeed, there are two communities: some of us are Greeks and some are Turks; some of us go to the church and some to the mosque. But there is only one people. There are no borders in Cyprus. There is no such thing as stamping of passports within any country; and no such thing will be accepted in Cyprus.

There was a question of arming ourselves. Imagine, little Cyprus, occupied by a giant, and they are afraid if we buy a couple of helicopters. That is really something for Ambassador Turkmen to reconsider.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): The representative of Greece has asked to be allowed to speak, and I call on him.

Mr. ZEPOS (Greece): I shall not comment on all the points made by my learned colleague, Mr. Turkmen, but must make certain things clear.

Demilitarization is an extension of the principle of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of a sovereign State. When we refer to this notion, we must be absolutely clear in our minds about what is international legality and what is the rule of law. No solution can be found by ignoring that basic, fundamental principle. The maintenance of peace and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of any country cannot admit of any exception by acceptance of any form or presence in or military occupation of a sovereign State by a foreign country. That is one point.

The other point is that there should be a distinction between this rule and the security rule. It is the obligation and right of any country to organize its own security within its own frontiers. The presence of foreign troops in another country is unacceptable, both legally and historically.

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

We have lived the experience of foreign military occupation. We cannot obliterate certain memories. That is why we insist on the rule of the inadmissibility of the presence of foreign military forces in a sovereign State.

An extension of this would be to reach a satisfactory level of security for both Cypriot communities. That is why we support the proposal for the total demilitarization of Cyprus - which, it has been said, holds a very unfortunate record of having the highest proportion of military forces per square meter on its territory. If that is true - and I am afraid it is - it is a very sad fact.

(Mr. Zepos, Greece)

The other point I wanted to make is that we should be absolutely frank when we use the notion of accepting a solution for a federal State while at the same time we speak of two legal States at this stage. We must be very clear. I refer to comments made by Mr. Koray. Let us be absolutely clear not to confuse the issues. We have the sovereign, internationally recognized State of Cyprus, which is rightfully seeking to liberate part of its territory from the presence of foreign troops and this is why we fully support the proposal by President Vassiliou that he should meet with Prime Minister Ozal to tackle that problem of major importance to him.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Turkey.

Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey): I wish to reply very briefly to the representative of Greece. He mentioned the question of the rule of law with regard to the presence of Turkish forces in Cyprus. I hate to do this at a time when my Prime Minister is in Athens and we are trying to develop a better atmosphere between the two countries, but I have to remind him that if there was one country that broke international law in Cyprus it was Greece itself. Between 1964 and 1977 it sent over 20,000 troops to Cyprus illegally, and it attempted to annex the island in 1974.

Now of course the Greek representative will say, "Yes, but this was done under the dictatorship in Greece." But it is also a principle of international law that countries are responsible for their actions, whatever their Governments.

The other question on which I would like to throw some light is that of two States. Nobody is against one State in Cyprus. There will be one State in Cyprus if there is an agreement between the two sides, but as long as there is no agreement there are two States in Cyprus. This is a fact. This is a de facto situation and nothing can change this reality.

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

I want to say something else with regard to the insistence on the withdrawal of the Turkish forces. I think we should reflect on this, that if the Greek Cypriots had accepted the 29 March 1986 agreement, which was almost two and a half years ago, the Turkish forces would have been withdrawn by now. They have only themselves to blame for their continued presence.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I have a question to put to the representative of Turkey. The Turkish forces, he said, would have been withdrawn. Does he mean all the Turkish forces?

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Greece.

Mr. ZEPOS (Greece): Just one phrase. I think that Mr. Turkmen was certainly misquoting me or is mistaken if he thinks that I would ever support any argument by what conspirators and traitors have done to my country. I never base my argument on that. I base my argument on the fact that, since the independence of Cyprus was established in 1960, the presence of military forces in Cyprus was done with the acceptance of, and agreement between, two sovereign States - that is the great difference - while at this moment the presence of Turkish forces in Cyprus is without that agreement. They are there under a military occupation operation, which is unacceptable and has been condemned by this Organization in very clear terms.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Turkey.

Mr. TURKMEN (Turkey): One very brief clarification. The 29 March 1986 Draft Framework Agreement perceives the negotiation of a time-table for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, all of them, not just the Turkish ones. What I

(Mr. Turkmen, Turkey)

meant to say is that if the 29 March 1986 Draft Framework Agreement had been accepted and negotiations had proceeded, it is very possible that by now there would have been an agreement, a settlement that would have permitted the withdrawal of Turkish forces and also of other forces.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): I just wanted to remind members of the Council that in Mr. Denktash's statement as to the withdrawal of the troops he referred to them as the Turkish troops except for those that are to remain.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish): There are no further speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.