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# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**2484<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 24 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 2484th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 24 October 1983, at 3 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2484)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
  - (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
  - (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
  - (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
- (b) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
- (c) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bouguerra (Vice-President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.*

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2481st and 2483rd meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kenya, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Dos Santos (Mozambique), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Coronel de Rodriguez (Venezuela), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The first speaker is the representative of Botswana, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

6. Mr. LEGWAILA (Botswana): Sir, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the

presidency of the Council for the month of October. We are confident that, under your enlightened leadership, the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia will not be fruitless. Your predecessor also, in no small measure, deserves our congratulations and gratitude for the skilful manner in which he acquitted himself as President of the Council last month.

7. The Secretary-General has faithfully and diligently discharged his mandate pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983). He has, as enjoined, been in consultation with all the parties directly concerned, and, as evidenced by his report [S/15943], all the parties are agreed and have confirmed that all outstanding issues pertinent to Council resolution 435 (1978) and its implementation have been resolved. We have been assured that South Africa will in due course—at any rate, before the Security Council convenes to adopt the enabling resolution—announce its choice of electoral system. Even the nagging issue of United Nations impartiality is said to have been given the quietus it has so richly deserved for so long.

8. In other words, five long and frustrating years since the adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978), we are at long last able to pride ourselves on having achieved what not long ago could be regarded only as an impossible dream: the creation of a workable plan for peaceful change in Namibia. Never before have we been so close to finding a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem of Namibia. A plan designed to realize such a solution is in place and we have a golden opportunity to implement it without delay.

9. And yet, sadly, we are gathered here not to effect the implementation of the plan, but to debate the reasons why it should be implemented. We are gathered here, as we were four months ago, to debate an artificial impasse created by those who, for reasons best known to themselves, have sought to hold the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia hostage to the resolution of issues which have been judged to be totally extraneous to the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination.

10. Let us face facts. The Secretary-General's report carries a message which can be described only as extremely ominous. The report makes it clear, particularly in paragraph 25, that to South Africa the linkage is a permanent reality which cannot be ignored out of existence—or can be ignored only with risk to Council resolution 435 (1978). The representative of South Africa confirmed this in his statement to the Council. He stated, with all the arrogance of the power at his country's disposal, that "the Government of South Africa is irrevocably committed" to linkage [2481st meeting, para. 149].

11. So we must ask where we go from here, particularly since neither the front-line States nor the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) are prepared to allow themselves to be drawn into the negotiation of an issue they not only hate but regard as totally irrelevant. Having listened to South Africa's statement, does the Council need any other reason to be persuaded to accept the fact that the United Nations plan for Namibia, which it adopted with so much hope and promise five years ago, is

facing a very serious crisis? Does the Council need to be persuaded to face the fact that, by its insistence on linkage, South Africa is virtually decreeing that the birth of Namibia's independence will be a Caesarean one rather than one brought about by the peaceful implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978)? Yes, it is the very existence and/or survival of the United Nations plan for Namibia which is at stake. The plan's survival and implementation are incompatible with insistence on the linkage.

12. We have steadfastly rejected every argument that has been advanced in support of the linking of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. No amount of cold-war slogans and fabrication of facts pertaining to the situation as we see it in southern Africa will convince us that there is any organic relationship between the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and the presence of foreign troops in another country.

13. We have also rejected, not without contempt, the theory or view that the independence of Namibia must of necessity be predicated on the existence in advance in southern Africa generally of a political and security climate specifically tailored to give comfort and confidence to South Africa, while leaving the rest of the countries of the region destabilized into submission. We cannot accept the insinuation that the onus is on the majority-ruled countries of southern Africa to demonstrate their peaceful intentions towards South Africa. We reject the suggestion that it is incumbent upon South Africa's neighbours to make southern Africa safe and secure for South Africa if South Africa is to be expected to co-operate in the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The onus is on South Africa first to abandon the violent politics of racism inside South Africa itself and create in that country conditions in which conflict will find no fertile ground on which to grow and flourish. The onus rests squarely on South Africa to demonstrate to the countries of southern Africa that it seeks nothing but peaceful relations with them.

14. We dare not forget that we are talking here about a country whose troops have been ensconced, uninvited and unwanted, in the southern part of Angola since 1981, about a country which now insists that its victim, Angola, must, in addition to being occupied, also allow itself to be stripped naked and exposed to the vagaries of Pretoria's politics of intimidation. It is Angola which has every right to seek redress from this Council, because it is Angola which, since the very eve of its birth as a free and independent country, has never ceased to be the playground of South African troops.

15. Yet we are told that before we can be allowed to implement Security Council resolution 435 (1978) an agreement on "the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal" [*ibid.*] will have to be reached. Nothing is said about the fundamental requirements of withdrawal of South African troops from the territory of Angola.

16. In any case, how long are we expected to continue the permissiveness with which we have in the past five years treated South Africa's addiction to negotiation by

blackmail and brinkmanship? The linkage must stand rejected, not only because we see the issue as part of a not-so-sophisticated plot hatched by South Africa and its friends to reshape the political landscape of our region in their own image, but principally because to accept that the issue can be part of the United Nations plan, which it cannot, would be tantamount to extending an open-ended invitation to South Africa to introduce more linkages and enjoy the unearned liberty to dictate callously, with impunity, peace terms to the rest of the African subcontinent.

17. Right from 25 April 1978, when Prime Minister Vorster declared South Africa's acceptance of the plan, Pretoria's track record shows unmistakably a persistent penchant for bad faith. How else can we explain acceptance of the plan by South Africa in April 1978 and the brutal massacre of hundreds of innocent Namibian refugees at Cassinga the next month, in May, followed in June by a proclamation setting the stage for the holding of provocative, nonsensical internal elections, followed from then on by endless frivolous arguments about the size of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola and Zambia, followed by persistent casting of aspersions on the integrity of the United Nations and its chief executive on the question of impartiality, and insistence on the adoption of constitutional principles in contravention of the plan? And now we are told that in further supplication for South Africa's co-operation we should acquiesce in the linking of Namibia's future to the fate of Cuban forces in Angola. Where will it end?

18. The Council is called upon to reject the intrusion of the linkage issue into the United Nations plan for Namibia, for the issue poses a provocative challenge to the authority of the Council. As the Secretary-General says, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*S/15943, para. 24*]. And we agree. The plan is ready for implementation. It has been ready since 1982.

19. The attempt to hold the future of Namibia hostage to South Africa's continuous excuses, somersaults, contortions, fabrications and distortions of reality must, we have reason to expect, also confront our colleagues in the Western contact group with a very frightening, if not sobering, moment of truth. Throughout the five long years of the existence of the United Nations plan—which originated as the Western plan—we have never ceased to remind the Western nations that within their grasp lies a golden opportunity to play a meaningful, constructive role in the decolonization of Namibia. Today, I must submit, we cannot but expect them to watch in horror as this golden opportunity disappears into the sunset.

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Kuwait. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. ABULHASSAN (Kuwait) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Kuwait is pleased and proud, Sir, to see you presiding over the Council this month, for in that high post you do honour to sisterly Jordan and to the entire Arab world. We are confident that, with your well-known

wisdom and ability, you will guide the Council this month to the success for which we all hope.

22. I should like also to express our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair, for the wisdom with which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

23. At first sight, it might seem to any observer that it has not been a long time since the last meetings of the Council to consider the question of Namibia, after which the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983). But, as far as we are concerned, this is not a question of time—whether long or short—but rather one of a problem that, unsolved for too long, has become exacerbated, with all the negative developments which that entails. The delay has also opened the way for the introduction of new, extraneous and irrelevant elements into the question. These elements stem from the escalating conflict between the two super-Powers and from the state of relations between them, which is approaching that of the cold-war years.

24. But we believe that the question of Namibia is a question of the illegal occupation of a Territory for whose administration the United Nations is responsible. That occupation by South Africa is a breach of international law, of the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations and a glaring act of defiance of the international will.

25. The question of Namibia is and remains also a question of the racist régime's insistence on pursuing a policy of repression and terrorism against the indigenous population, against the true owners of the land and of the power. It is, furthermore, a question of aggression carried out against neighbouring African States, which poses a threat to international peace and security.

26. It is on that basis and on that basis alone that this issue must be considered, and it is in the context of those premises that all efforts must be focused. It must be recognized that this respected Council and the great majority of the States of the world agree on the same diagnosis. But it is a source of disappointment—nay, of grave concern—that, despite the clarity of its vision, the Council has been unable to take practical steps towards the implementation of its resolutions. That is because certain quarters, which are able to bring effective influence to bear on the Council's ability to act, are insisting on the inclusion of elements that are extraneous to the essence of the problem and insisting on discussion of these elements as a pre-condition for the resolution of the problem of Namibia.

27. The Secretary-General's diagnosis of the situation we are facing is correct and was set out clearly in his report prepared pursuant to Council resolution 532 (1983) and after his visits to the parties concerned. In that report the Secretary-General stated that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*ibid., para. 25*]. Elsewhere in his report the Secretary-General added that he

had repeatedly made it clear that he did not accept the so-called linkage.

28. Kuwait believes that the time has come to face this reality and to concentrate on it, because it is neither just nor fair to impose a new extraneous element that stems from the escalating struggle between the super-Powers on this issue. We believe that the illegal linkage advocated by the United States, which is being used by the Government of South Africa as a pretext for it to continue its occupation of Namibia and to go on bleeding it of its wealth, is actually aimed at serving American strategic interests in the long term.

29. The United States must realize that forcing this new element into its strategic equations runs counter to the responsibilities it has assumed together with other Western States to resolve the problem in accordance with Council resolution 435 (1978).

30. The price of that strategy is great indeed. It is being paid by the Namibian people because they are being subjected to racist policies of oppression and inhuman measures of repression. They are deprived of the most fundamental human rights. All this is taking place because of the competition between the super-Powers for zones of influence, as though the destinies of peoples, in the opinion of those States, were not worth a grain of salt.

31. My delegation believes that linking Namibian independence with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola is in contravention with the letter and spirit of Council resolution 435 (1978). In our opinion, such linkage is an intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, a State that has of its own free will decided how to defend its territorial integrity against South Africa's repeated attacks. It is therefore necessary at this critical juncture in the Namibian question to emphasize strongly again the total responsibility of the United Nations as regards Namibian independence.

32. Since the Council has a moral responsibility to implement its resolutions, and since the Council is the main organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, it must carry out its commitments; it must take the necessary measures within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We believe that Pretoria's racist régime will not grant independence and justice to the Namibian people and will not respect international legitimacy unless it is forced to do so by the international will, the source of legitimate rights. Only the imposition of strong sanctions against the régime will force it to do so.

33. Kuwait believes that, at its present meetings, the Council should take a step forward in implementing its previous resolutions by setting a reasonable time-frame for the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978) and ensuring that forces are joined to ensure its respect. In this we are encouraged by the Secretary-General, who in his report stated that:

"However, no one is more aware than I that we cannot claim real progress until an actual date is fixed for

the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and the cease-fire comes into force. I have no doubt that further disastrous consequences will result if we do not reach this stage quickly." [*ibid.*, para. 28.]

34. Kuwait avails itself of this opportunity to renew its full support for SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in its legitimate and just struggle to achieve independence. Kuwait supports the front-line States in their stand *vis-à-vis* the problem. Kuwait condemns all acts of aggression against them by the Pretoria racist régime.

35. Kuwait calls upon the Council to confront the challenges to its efforts to defend the principles and achieve the objectives set by the international community.

36. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Sri Lanka. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

37. Mr. FONSECA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, at the outset let me thank you and through you the other members of the Council for affording me this opportunity of addressing the Council on the question of Namibia. Sri Lanka extends its sincere congratulations and good wishes to you, Sir, on your assuming the presidency of the Council, and its thanks to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for his guidance of the Council in September.

38. We are meeting at the bidding of the African Group of States and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. It is good to remind ourselves therefore that this debate, then, is not a casual occasion. It was not the intention of the sponsors of this debate that it be conducted for debate's sake or prolonged unnecessarily. I shall therefore be brief.

39. The visit of the Secretary-General to southern Africa in response to resolution 532 (1983) was a major event and an opportunity for the United Nations to ascertain through the person of its highest executive the true situation regarding the question of Namibia. We are most grateful for the Secretary-General's excellent report [S/15943]. Even the representative of the Government of South Africa was constrained to concede that the report represented the correct position regarding the state of progress towards Namibian independence. If the report is in its final analysis rather pessimistic, it has the virtue also of being realistic and will therefore enable us in the present debate not only to take stock accurately of the situation but also to identify, without illusions, what precisely is hindering movement towards Namibian independence.

40. Council resolution 435 (1978) was an unusual show of unity on a major issue. It promised much because all the permanent members of the Council acquiesced in the independence plan it outlined. SWAPO, the national liberation movement of Namibia, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the non-aligned countries—indeed, the entire international community—accepted, at least for a time,

the bona fides of the Government of South Africa when it declared its agreement to implement the plan. The many false starts, the feints and the deliberate procrastination to which the independence plan has been subjected are only too well known to us; they have been described in this debate as well.

41. The Secretary-General reported that his prolonged and intensive consultations have resulted, so far as UNTAG is concerned, in resolving "virtually all the outstanding issues". He came to the conclusion that, in fact, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid.*, para. 24]. Surprisingly enough, the representative of South Africa said just as much at the 2481st meeting. What is, then, obstructing Namibian independence is clearly something totally out of the context of, if not irrelevant to, resolution 435 (1978), upon which the entire international community, including South Africa, predicated Namibian independence.

42. South Africa talks of securing the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition to be fulfilled before it gives the independence plan a real chance to work. The South African representative told us on 20 October that "the South African Government's position on the question of Cuban withdrawal is acknowledged and has support within the international community" [*S/PV.2481, para. 149*]. Perhaps we are entitled to ask whom South Africa has in mind when it speaks of having support within the international community. Cuban troops were present in Angola well before the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). The question of these troops did not figure in negotiations leading to the resolution. It is difficult not to question the South African Government's bona fides when time and again we find that whenever the Namibian question is on the verge of solution the South African Government invariably finds a fresh excuse to defer its co-operation.

43. South Africa has also cast doubt on the impartiality of the United Nations and its capability of supervising Namibia's march towards independence. Now we find that South Africa's complaint is confined to this: that certain United Nations bodies are biased in favour of SWAPO. It has been South Africa that has reneged on all its promises. The United Nations can do no more than create conditions under which an act of self-determination can be exercised as a pre-condition for independence. The imputation that the United Nations is biased is an insult to all its Members as well as to its Secretariat of independent international civil servants. The United Nations truly cannot tilt in favour of South Africa—for it appears to be this that South Africa wants.

44. The Council's message to South Africa should be clear and unequivocal: that a linkage cannot now be made between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and implementation of resolution 435 (1978). That resolution is self-sufficient and the provisions in it are all that is required for the exercise of the right of self-determination for the Namibian people, the creation of appropriate con-

ditions for such an exercise, the logistics for elections, and the eventual independence of the Namibian people.

45. If I keep my assurance to the Council that this statement would be brief, that does not imply any less a commitment on the part of Sri Lanka to the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO. I should like to reiterate Sri Lanka's solidarity with the struggle of the Namibian people for the establishment of a free, unified and independent Namibia. We appeal to those States that are of greater consequence than we to prevail upon South Africa to heed not merely the voice of the international community but also the voice of reason by permitting the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without delay and without the imposition of extraneous pre-conditions and obstacles.

46. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): May I begin this our first intervention this month by congratulating you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency, and by expressing my Government's confidence in your judgement, integrity and objectivity—all of which we know have already been and will continue to be evident in your conduct of the Council's business. I would also express our approval and gratitude—already abundantly expressed here—to the representatives of Guyana for their most expeditious and excellent conduct of the Council's affairs last month.

47. The tragic events in Beirut yesterday testify to the dangerous point to which international issues can grow if left to fester unresolved. Unfortunately, the people of southern Africa are no strangers to such unhappy—indeed, tragic—scenes. It is our special responsibility as members of this august body to confront the problems of our world in a timely, realistic and responsible manner. This is not easy, for many factors work against anyone who assumes seriously the task of peacemaker.

48. Certainly the members of the Council and the leaders of the front-line States, as well as those of the contact group, have expended great effort in the search for a way to bring Namibia to a peaceful independence. We have come very close to our goal, but we have not yet succeeded. Meanwhile our frustrations mount, and the call for violent solutions grows louder. In times like these I believe that a special value attaches to clear assessment, to the skills of diplomacy and statesmanship, of our political leaders. It is our responsibility to help the people of the world to see better where we are and how far we have come so that they will renew their commitment to the goal of a prompt and peaceful settlement of this terribly troubled and important issue, and not from despair cast aside the agreements already so painfully reached.

49. It is for these reasons that the United States especially welcomes this opportunity for the Council once again to exercise its responsibility for Namibia and to review developments in the negotiations being conducted pursuant to Council resolution 435 (1978) since the Council's last discussion in May. On that occasion, the Council was able to hear directly from the principal parties to the

negotiations regarding the progress that had been achieved and to address frankly what remains to be done in order to bring about implementation of the United Nations settlement plan. On that basis the Council was able to act unanimously through the adoption of Council resolution 532 (1983) to ask that the Secretary-General lend his personal good offices to consultations with the parties aimed at identifying a basis for the movement toward Namibia's rightful independence. My Government welcomed the Secretary-General's sincere, constructive and skilful approach to his mandate under resolution 532 (1983). I should like once again to express the deep appreciation of the United States for the dedication and objectivity shown by the Secretary-General and his staff, which have so thoroughly characterized their commitment to the Namibia settlement process and which have in fact—and very significantly—gained the confidence of all sides to that conflict.

50. The Secretary-General's achievements have been noteworthy. My Government welcomes his interest and his continued involvement in our efforts to reach our common goal. In his report to the Security Council [S/15943], the Secretary-General described in detail his discussions in South Africa, Namibia and Angola, underscoring both the very significant achievements of his trip and the obstacle that still stands in the way of a settlement. The United States attaches the highest importance to the results of the Secretary-General's discussions with the South African Government. In the course of those talks very real progress was made on issues that had until then remained unresolved over the years. Notably, all questions regarding UNTAG that had a direct bearing on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have now, as we understand it, been cleared up. The South African Government has also affirmed its commitment to indicate at an early date, prior to implementation, its choice of an electoral system. We regard this as important forward progress. The South African Government has also stated unequivocally that it now has no question or reservations regarding the impartiality of the United Nations in the settlement process. These are significant accomplishments which have contributed in important ways to building a climate conducive to a peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict.

51. Similarly, my Government welcomes the Secretary-General's report that SWAPO President Nujoma, in his meeting with the Secretary-General in Luanda, reaffirmed that his organization was ready to sign a cease-fire and to move forward on implementation on the basis of the agreements that have been reached [*ibid.*, para. 21].

52. Although the Secretary-General's initiative in southern Africa measurably advanced the negotiations, his report to the Council also made clear that there does remain one issue standing in the way of implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978): South Africa's position regarding the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. This put into focus the frustration widespread in Africa, felt most sharply among the front-line States that have worked so hard and so long on the Namibia process. That an issue outside the scope of resolution 435 (1978) is delaying our common objective is obviously a matter of frustration. The United

States and its partners in the contact group share that frustration. However, my Government remains firmly convinced that this obstacle can and should be resolved, that this can be done with perseverance and good will, that we will be able to overcome this obstacle. The United States remains firmly committed to the objective of Namibian independence pursuant to resolution 435 (1978). Our attachment to freedom, manifested in our foreign and domestic policies since our own independence struggle more than two centuries ago, permits no other course. Our continuing concern in these negotiations has been that this goal be approached realistically, practically. We must recognize that, as a practical matter, implementation of resolution 435 (1978) will take place only if the fundamental concerns of all parties are addressed. To that end, we have devoted our energy to the search for a solution based on reciprocity, with full mutual respect for security and sovereignty on all sides, with Namibia's independence as its only acceptable result. We will remain engaged in this effort as long as it appears that there is a chance for a peaceful solution.

53. The problem of cross-border violence in southern Africa is of deep concern to us all. We are working toward a peaceful resolution of the region's differences and have urged and will continue to urge military restraint. We do not believe there are military solutions to the conflicts afflicting the States of this troubled region. Our policies are premised on the belief that negotiated solutions are both possible and essential. As we have said in the past, cross-border violence cannot be condoned, whether it be in the form of a bomb placed in a crowded square in Pretoria by externally-based organizations or in the form of the continuing violation of the territorial integrity of Angola by South Africa's forces.

54. Many speakers in this debate have stated their concern over the amount of time it has taken to move the negotiations as far as they have come. The truth is that the complex issues directly relating to the United Nations plan have required the most delicate negotiation. With the results of the Secretary-General's trip there is today virtually complete agreement on the basis for implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is also equally clear that there can be no final resolution of the Namibia question without the co-operation of the parties most directly involved.

55. During the May debate, the position of my Government regarding these negotiations was made clear to the Council. There has been progress since then. As the Secretary-General's report makes clear, at the same time our basic position has not changed, and I will restate that position today.

56. The United States neither seeks nor desires any special advantage or position for itself in the negotiations. It is not our intention, nor is it within our power, to impose our views or wishes on the parties whose interests and aspirations are most directly involved. We fully respect the fact that the political decisions needed to proceed with implementation of the United Nations plan are sovereign decisions that can be taken only by the Governments most immediately and directly concerned. We further recognize

that those who must take those decisions will wish to assure themselves that their own interests and security will be respected and protected. Our sole objective has been to assist the parties in overcoming the difficulties that have to date prevented the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and the attainment of Namibia's long-deserved independence.

57. While Namibian independence is not yet within our grasp, it is within our sight, doubling our impatience but also redoubling our commitment. The United States is convinced that the will for a settlement is present on all sides, in no small part based on recognition of the imminent dangerous alternative of an escalating cycle of destructive violence. The future of the people of Namibia, for which the United Nations and the Council bear unique responsibility, depends on our working together to keep the negotiating process firmly on track. The United States continues to stand ready to work closely with other members of the Council and with other parties to hasten the day when an independent Namibia can take its place among us as a sovereign State. Until that day, it is to each of us to think how best we can contribute to that achievement.

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Zambia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia): Sir, when I addressed the Council at the 2481st meeting, I conveyed to you the congratulations of the United Nations Council for Namibia on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I now have the pleasure of conveying to you the congratulations of the Zambian delegation. We are pleased to see you presiding over the Council because you represent a country, Jordan, which is a staunch supporter of the cause of the people of Namibia.

60. May I also, on behalf of the Zambian delegation, pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who presided over the work of the Council last month with distinction.

61. My delegation is grateful to the Security Council for allowing us to participate in this important meeting on Namibia. We do so subsequent to important statements made by eminent African and other non-aligned spokesmen. Those who preceded me, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, have ably articulated the issue at hand and indicated what the international community in general and the people of Namibia in particular seek in this debate. I do not intend to repeat in detail the ground already covered by them.

62. The point of departure in this debate is the report of the Secretary-General [*ibid.*], which he submitted to the Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of its resolution 532 (1983). That Council resolution was yet another attempt to accelerate the independence of Namibia through the imple-

mentation of the United Nations plan under resolution 435 (1978).

63. The international community's concern for the delay in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was very strongly stressed at the Council meetings last May, which resulted in the adoption of resolution 532 (1983). The mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Council in its resolution 532 (1983) was in response to that international concern.

64. We note from the Secretary-General's report on his visit to South Africa, Namibia and Angola that all outstanding issues relevant to Council resolution 435 (1978) have virtually been resolved. That statement by the Secretary-General was confirmed by the representative of South Africa in his statement of 20 October 1983 before the Council. In his statement, the representative of South Africa clearly stated that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General in order to attempt to resolve "the remaining outstanding issues to be addressed in the context of resolution 435 (1978), namely, the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG." [2481st meeting, para. 146.] Referring to the report of the Secretary-General, the representative of South Africa confirmed that those two issues had now been resolved as far as South Africa was concerned. He added that certain outstanding matters regarding the agreement on the status of UNTAG had also been resolved. [*ibid.*, para. 147.]

65. It is significant that the representative of South Africa made it clear in his statement that the remaining outstanding issues, in his words, "in the context of resolution 435 (1978)", had been the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG. Equally significant and welcome was the confirmation by South Africa that these issues had now been resolved.

66. The South African representative also said that his Government remained firmly committed to seeking a peaceful settlement of the question of Namibia on the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978) "within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western contact group". He added that it was in furtherance of that commitment that his Government had agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General. [*ibid.*, para. 146.]

67. We do not know what the "understandings" referred to by the South African representative are. Whatever they are, if they are outside the framework of resolution 435 (1978), they certainly cannot commit the United Nations. In any event, it is gratifying that the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa resulted in resolving those matters within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) relevant to the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. That indeed is our interest. We are concerned with and must deal only with matters that are within the scope of resolution 435 (1978) leading to the attainment by the Namibian people of their long-delayed independence.

68. Given the progress recorded in the report of the Secretary-General and confirmed by South Africa in the statement of its representative in the Council in relation to the outstanding issues remaining for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), it stands to reason that we should now prepare for the launching of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

69. Prior to the commencement of the plan, however, it is only logical that South Africa should be asked to indicate, without delay, its choice of the electoral system to be used in Namibia. The position of SWAPO on the question of the electoral system is well known. It has shown great flexibility in this regard, all in the interest of the speedy implementation of the United Nations plan.

70. On the other hand, the South African position on this matter has remained a secret. As it is necessary that the electoral system should be known before the Council adopts an enabling resolution for the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia, South Africa's hitherto secret choice should now be revealed. It is only fair that all the Namibian people, and indeed the United Nations, should be informed of South Africa's preferred choice of electoral system. South Africa should no longer keep the international community guessing as to what its intentions are on this matter. The secret must be unveiled without any further delay.

71. This brings me to the disturbing question of the linkage being insisted upon by South Africa between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. While South Africa states, on the one hand, that issues "in the context" of resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, it insists, on the other, "that it will not be possible to put into practice any settlement plan unless a clear agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal". South Africa tells us that it is "irrevocably committed on this issue" and that its position on the question of Cuban withdrawal "is acknowledged and has support within the international community" [*ibid.*, para. 149.]

72. This position of South Africa is self-contradictory. It is a graphic demonstration of the mentality of the South African régime. As my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Goma, stressed in his statement in the general debate at the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the claimed linkage being insisted upon by South Africa is unquestionably illegal, irrational, irrelevant and diversionary.<sup>1</sup>

73. It stands to reason, therefore, that Zambia finds the South African position totally unacceptable. Moreover, the claim that the position of South Africa enjoys support within the international community is ridiculous. It is well known that the overwhelming majority of the world's countries and peoples have rejected the linkage issue with the contempt it deserves. Only one country is known to share publicly this position of linkage with the racist régime of South Africa. It would appear that the South African régime has a distorted conception of the term "international community", which it evidently defines

within the confines of its relations with the United States Administration.

74. The continued stress on linkage between Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in fact raises serious questions concerning South Africa's sincerity in its purported commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Linkage may well turn out to be a treacherous negation by South Africa of its professed commitment to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

75. Zambia maintains that the insistence on the non-issue of linkage, or parallelism, constitutes blatant interference in the internal affairs of Angola. It is highly ironic that this linkage, which was not envisaged in resolution 435 (1978), should now be introduced in order to stall further progress towards Namibia's independence. As is well known, the linkage issue was not the brain-child of South Africa; rather a member of the Western contact group, which initiated the plan for the independence of Namibia under resolution 435 (1978), contrived the linkage issue, the effect of which has been to prevent the implementation of that plan, thus delaying the independence of Namibia. By actively colluding with South Africa on the linkage issue, a member of the contact group has worked to prevent the implementation of the United Nations plan it had helped to initiate.

76. The position of the United States on the linkage issue is disturbing, to say the least. It is most unfortunate that a super-Power should seek to inject its own strategic and ideological preoccupations into a purely decolonization matter. The independence of Namibia must not be held hostage to super-Power geopolitical concerns. The question of Namibia must be dealt with purely in the context of decolonization. It should not be confused with irrelevant and extraneous issues which have absolutely nothing to do with the Namibian people.

77. Zambia calls upon the Council to reject categorically the non-issue of linkage, as it is incompatible with resolution 435 (1978). We hope that, for their own credibility and, indeed, in the interest of justice and fair play, the members of the contact group on Namibia will have the courage of their convictions, re-examine their position on this matter and identify themselves fully with such a Council position.

78. The representative of South Africa in his statement had the audacity—nay, the arrogance and impudence—to declare: "Therefore, it would be futile for the Security Council to attempt to set any deadlines or time-frames for implementation until the matter of the Cuban presence in Angola has been resolved, and it should be understood that South Africa would not accept any such deadlines." [*ibid.*, para. 156.]

79. What could be futile about setting a deadline or a time-frame for the implementation of the plan in view of the fact that South Africa has conceded that the remaining relevant issues have been resolved? Is it not the next logical

step for the Council to take? Does South Africa really expect the Council to embrace the extraneous issue of linkage, sit back and wait for the resolution of a matter over which it has no jurisdiction? That, in the view of my delegation, would constitute failure by the Council to live up to its responsibilities. Under no circumstances must the international community acquiesce in the designs of South Africa to place responsibility for the non-implementation of the United Nations plan on Angola. That responsibility lies squarely on the shoulders of the Pretoria régime and its supporters, and it must remain so.

80. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate Zambia's condemnation of the racist régime of South Africa for the perpetration of a dastardly act of aggression against Mozambique on 17 October 1983. Repeated South African acts of aggression against and destabilization of front-line and other independent African States in the region clearly demonstrate the threat to international peace and security that the *apartheid* system represents. The aggressive posture and designs of the Pretoria régime cannot and will not be concealed by its often-repeated protestations against the so-called spread of communism in southern Africa.

81. The crimes of the *apartheid* régime against the oppressed people and sovereign and independent African States in the region only strengthen the resolve of our peoples to eradicate, once and for all, the scourge of *apartheid* and racist minority rule. South Africa's alarmist rhetoric about the spread of the communist bogey will deceive no one. The problems of our region do not stem from communism. The absence of peace and security in southern Africa is a direct consequence of the policies and practices of *apartheid* of the South African régime.

82. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the German Democratic Republic, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

83. Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like at the outset, Sir, to express its congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. Your great diplomatic skills will no doubt contribute to discharging the responsible tasks facing the Council.

84. Our thanks go also to your predecessor, the President of the Council for the month of September, the representative of Guyana.

85. Once again the Council has to deal with the question of Namibia. We are confronted with the fact that no progress has yet been made in finding a solution to this issue. My delegation has closely followed the important debate held so far. The statement at the 2481st meeting by the representative of SWAPO, Mr. Peter Muesihange, clearly demonstrated the disastrous consequences for the Namibian people of the fact that they are denied independence and the right to self-determination. At the same time, the dangers to the stability of the situation in southern Africa as

well as to world peace and international security have been very impressively pointed out to the Council.

86. The underlying reasons for this extremely dangerous situation are well known. They are the policy of aggression and terror pursued by the *apartheid* régime in South Africa, and at the same time the ever more overtly practised complicity of certain imperialist countries, above all the United States, with the *apartheid* régime. In shrewdly schemed co-ordination, all kinds of efforts are made to deny the Namibian people, struggling courageously under the leadership of SWAPO, their legitimate rights. The transparency of the manoeuvres to this end is revealed time and again. The main feature is distinct delaying tactics, accompanied by a deceptive, purposive optimism.

87. As early as 1976, the Council, in its resolution 385 (1976), had proposed a programme for the solution of the question of Namibia. Resolution 435 (1978), which was adopted two years later, was praised by Western States as a "success" of the self-appointed contact group. However, the moment concrete steps towards the implementation of the resolution had to be taken, one member of the group, in conspiracy with South Africa, raised artificial obstacles. Suddenly, insurmountable difficulties seemed to come up as regards the election system and the composition of UNTAG, and the competence of the United Nations was called into question. The solution to the question of Namibia was made dependent on issues having nothing to do with the matters laid down in resolution 435 (1978). The unjustified linkage was almost unanimously rejected during the general debate of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

88. There is no lack of attempts by the closest partners of Pretoria to block the implementation of decisive measures to be taken by the United Nations against the terror régime in South Africa and even to divest the Organization of its responsibility for finding a solution to the Namibia issue and confront it with a *fait accompli*. This fully accords with South Africa's efforts to achieve so-called internal settlements. Five years ago there was the holding of pseudo-elections. They were declared null and void in Council resolution 439 (1978). Today, when the "Turnhalle Alliance" has come to a shameful end, the Administrator-General plans to set up a Council of State, whose only function would be to maintain the currently prevailing conditions of exploitation and South Africa's hegemony over Namibia. The German Democratic Republic strongly condemns such attempts to undermine the United Nations plan for a solution to the question of Namibia.

89. All manoeuvres undertaken by the United States and other Western countries to delay the granting of independence to Namibia are determined by their wide interests in southern Africa. What matters to them is the preservation, and possible strengthening, of the *apartheid* régime as a bastion of imperialist policy in that region, as well as the continued exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia. This constitutes an open affront to world public opinion, and at the same time does harm to the reputation of the Council, as the respective States act arbitrarily against resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

90. Such an approach, together with the unworthy attempts to whitewash the crimes of *apartheid*, simply encourages Pretoria to continue, and even escalate, its aggressive policy towards neighbouring States. Regrettably, there is ample proof of that: the continued occupation of Namibia and large parts of the territory of Angola; the increasing number of acts of aggression against that country, as well as against Mozambique and Lesotho; and the expanding economic sabotage of other front-line States.

91. The people and Government of the German Democratic Republic vigorously condemn Pretoria's most recent barbaric attack, against Maputo, the capital of Mozambique.

92. The diplomatic collusion of imperialist States with South Africa is accompanied by overt political, economic and military complicity. Let me recall the fifty-million-dollar deal that was concluded only a few weeks ago between United States corporations and Pretoria with the express approval of the United States Administration. That deal enables the racists in South Africa to step up further their plans to acquire nuclear weapons. We also notice with great concern that, as can be seen from documents provided by SWAPO, the puppets retained by Pretoria will be directly financed under the cover of so-called Western European development aid to Namibia.

93. Considering all the problems in connection with the whole issue, the question must be put of how the right of Namibia to independence can be exercised. We hold the view that, in its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), the Council has provided a clear programme to that end. It is imperative that the United Nations—and particularly the Council—meets its full responsibility for the solution of the question of Namibia and for the implementation, in letter and in spirit, of the resolutions, adopted.

94. In addition to this, the immediate termination of all collaboration with Pretoria, the strengthening and strict observance of the arms embargo, and the imposition of effective sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations would constitute decisive steps towards the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. It is, furthermore, important to provide extensive assistance to SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, in its courageous struggle.

95. Furthermore, in the documents adopted at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983 and at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April 1983, it was stated that it is not the few imperialist countries that will bring about a solution to the Namibian problem, but the joint action of the Members of the United Nations.

96. In the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the

Warsaw Treaty, held recently at Sofia, the participating States reaffirmed their solidarity with the peoples struggling for freedom, independence and the right to choose freely the path their development should take, in conditions of peace and without outside interference.<sup>2</sup>

97. That is a substantial aspect of socialist foreign policy. In the future, the German Democratic Republic will continue as in the past to side with the Namibian people and to provide political and material assistance to their liberation organization, SWAPO. The German Democratic Republic will, furthermore, continue to support all United Nations activities aimed at granting independence to Namibia and the right of self-determination to its people.

98. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Tunisia who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of Arab States. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

99. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to make a statement in my capacity as representative of Tunisia and as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of Arab States.

100. The fact that the Council's consideration of the question of Namibia—that is, of the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of a people to independence and freedom—is taking place under your presidency, Sir, is both reassuring and comforting to us. You are one of us: the representative of a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, of a fraternal Arab country which also finds itself on the front lines, faced by a colonial situation and supporting a struggle for right and justice. No one could understand better than you the struggle of the Namibian people or could better lead the Council to put a final end to the aims of the occupier, the designs of the oppressor and the arrogance of the aggressor. Your personal qualities as an experienced diplomat well-versed in international affairs, as well as your reputation in the Council, reassure us as to the outcome of the present deliberations.

101. Allow me also to convey to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, our warmest gratitude for the exemplary way in which he conducted the Council deliberations during the particularly busy month of September.

102. In referring to the question of Namibia before the General Assembly on 28 September last, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia stated the following:

“On the African continent there still persists an anachronistic problem which threatens ultimately to become the most resounding failure of this Organization, of the principles it advocates and indeed of international legality itself. This is the question of Namibia, which is still under the yoke of illegal occupation and the worst type of colonialism.

"After so many concessions by the Namibian people and its sole representative, the South West Africa People's Organization, after proofs of impartiality and balance by the United Nations, no pretext or subterfuge—certainly not one which would make of the sacred struggle of the Namibian people an East-West issue—is any longer acceptable. We expect of those who bear special responsibility for the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and who so far have not been able to keep the promises they have made us, explanations and indications of their intentions."<sup>3</sup>

103. It is in this spirit that we have come to the Council today. It is not our intention to plead an unknown cause, because the cause of the Namibian people and their battle for dignity and freedom has reached everywhere and become known to everyone. We seize this opportunity to ask their sole representative, SWAPO, to convey to the Namibian people once again our admiration and our solidarity.

104. In his remarkable report, the Secretary-General, whose objectivity, clear-sightedness and courage deserve our praise, brought up an important point when he said that "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a precondition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [S/15943, para. 25.] In the very same report the Secretary-General adds that he will not accept linkage of the two questions. That is clear and unambiguous.

105. Thus we find ourselves faced with a new obstacle deliberately placed in the way of the persistent efforts undertaken to implement resolution 435 (1978). What so far has been the reaction to this new challenge of "linkage"?

106. At the nineteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, held at Addis Ababa in June 1983, Africa condemned that concept. The non-aligned countries denounced that concept at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at New Delhi in March 1983. At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly rejected the concept. One of the members of the contact group and a permanent member of the Security Council, France, has categorically rejected it. We expect the other members of the contact group to put an end to the ambiguity that has been maintained on this extraneous element with regard to the settlement plan that they themselves initiated. We expect those who within the contact group have made the freedom of peoples a profession of faith to match words with deeds, and principles with realities. Freedom is indivisible and can never be selective.

107. The present deliberations of the Council present an opportunity for decisive clarification of the responsibilities of each party.

108. For our part, we wish to restate here our total rejection of this form of bargaining whereby an attempt is made to establish a link between the legitimate accession

of Namibia to independence and the implementation of the no less legitimate right of independent and sovereign States to choose their allies.

109. In this respect, it is important to note that this artificial concept of linkage has cropped up after other equally artificial pretexts have been used long enough to delay settlement of the Namibian problem. This stems from the now well-known delaying techniques used and recognized in southern Africa, as also in the Middle East, which, under the pretext of some strategic role, enable the occupier and the aggressor to act with ever-increasing impunity and to side-step or neutralize any criticism that may appear in the West.

110. In passing from hand to hand the well-known recipes that guarantee the connivance if not the blessing of their allies, the Tel Aviv and Pretoria régimes every day increase their oppression of the Palestinian and Namibian peoples under the pretext of fighting against what they call the terrorists, meaning the Palestine Liberation Organization and SWAPO. They try and outdo each other in their aggressions against the peoples of southern Africa and the Middle East, striking in Angola and Mozambique at one time, in Lebanon and Iraq at another. Using the pretext of security, they occupy parts of the territories of sovereign States Members of the United Nations, as, for example, Angola, Syria and Lebanon. Yet again, within independent countries, they carry out manoeuvres aimed at destabilization by fanning antagonisms and handing out arms to their rival factions. Both régimes have used the same combat, the same strategy, the same techniques and the same language of force under the fallacious pretext that their security has been threatened.

111. This is a curious concept of security invoked by the very ones who in their respective regions seek and boast of military supremacy, who receive from their allies massive amounts of armaments and who even receive assistance in the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons. This eccentric notion gives rise to the question: Why is this concept of security not to be applied to the other countries which maintain a peaceful attitude in both regions?

112. The report of the Secretary-General, which is now before the Council, among other things draws our attention to the critical economic and social situation of the Namibian people. One must therefore ask oneself if this is one of the reasons behind the delay of Namibian independence. But where are Namibia's natural resources? While it is known that Namibia is the world's fourth largest producer of uranium and the sixth largest producer of diamonds, that its land holds immense reserves of petroleum, lead, copper, zinc and silver, and that it has an agricultural surplus, we also know that the gap between the gross domestic product and the national income in Namibia stems, *inter alia*, from the outgoing capital in the form of profits. This is the most apparent indication of the extent the pillage of this Territory has reached, despite Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia.<sup>4</sup> Can one not then say that the delay in granting

independence to Namibia is due to the existence of uranium and to the considerable profits to be made by multinational and South African companies?

113. How many violations have we seen committed? How many violations of principles and of law? How many violations of the rights, resources and territories of human beings? How long will we go on tolerating this situation? How long will it take for the Council—the guarantor of peace and security and the guarantor, according to its own resolutions, of Namibia's independence—to shoulder its responsibilities and adopt the necessary measures?

114. After the failure, in January 1981, of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting, caused by South Africa's fallacious pretext about partiality by the United Nations, angry Africa turned to the Security Council in April 1981 and called for sanctions and reparation. At that time, the Council demonstrated particular partiality by using the veto under the pretext that Africa and the non-aligned were seeking confrontation.

115. In May 1983, at the request of both the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries and the OAU, recourse was again had to the Council, with the fullest possible sense of measure and moderation and with the hope of being heard. It is true that the Council adopted resolution 532 (1983). But what has South Africa's reaction been to that show of moderation? The Secretary-General's report clearly shows us that there has been no change whatsoever in South Africa's attitude.

116. Today we come back to the Council, with the Secretary-General's report in hand. That report says, among other things, that "we have never before been so

close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*ibid.*, para. 24.]

117. What will the Security Council's attitude be this time? Will it make the necessary effort to bring South Africa to the negotiating table? What will be the attitude of the various members of the contact group? Will some continue to support the untenable? Or will they bring to bear the required pressure that we expect from them—if necessary, resorting to the only method of taking away from South Africa the means by which it pursues its policy of defiance and arrogance, meaning the imposition of sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations?

118. In reaffirming once again our endorsement of resolution 435 (1978) and in calling again for its implementation without any further delay, we expect the Council to reject categorically any artificial element that is extraneous to this resolution and to set a clear and final time-limit for South Africa to begin co-operating sincerely in the application of the independence plan for Namibia. Once that time-limit had run out, the Council would automatically have recourse to the sanctions provided for in the Charter.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*

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NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 12th meeting, para. 112.

<sup>2</sup> See A/C.1/38/6, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 10th meeting, paras. 221 and 222.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.



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