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2218th MEETING: 24 APRIL 1980

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2218)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in the Middle East:	
Letter dated 10 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13885);	
Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/13888 and Corr.1 and Add.1-3)	1

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2218th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 24 April 1980, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Porfirio MUÑOZ LEDO (Mexico).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2218)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in the Middle East:
Letter dated 10 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13885);
Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/13888 and Corr.1 and Add.1-3)

The meeting was called to order at 12.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 10 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13885);

Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/13888 and Corr.1 and Add.1-3)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions taken at previous meetings [2212th to 2215th and 2217th meetings], I invite the representative of Lebanon to take a place at the Council table and I invite the representatives of Fiji, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tuéni (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Vunibobo (Fiji), Mr. Mulloy (Ireland), Mr. Blum (Israel), Mr. La Rocca (Italy), Mr. Nuseibeh (Jordan),

Mr. van Buuren (Netherlands), Mr. Clark (Nigeria), Mr. Allagany (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Mansouri (Syrian Arab Republic) and Mr. Terzi (Palestine Liberation Organization) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 22 April from the representative of Tunisia [S/13903], which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request the Security Council to invite Mr. Hammadi Essid, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, to participate in the discussion of the item entitled 'The situation in the Middle East', in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure."

Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to accede to that request.

It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to the following documents: document S/13898, containing the text of a letter dated 18 April from the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the Permanent Mission of Tunisia addressed to the President of the Council; document S/13899, containing the text of a letter dated 18 April from the representative of the United Arab Emirates addressed to the President of the Council; and document S/13901, containing the text of a letter dated 21 April from the representative of Ireland to the Secretary-General.

4. Mr. ESSAAFI (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): The Security Council has once again resumed its consideration of the situation in southern Lebanon, a peripheral problem which has crystallized to the point of becoming a problem in and of itself. Our brief agenda fully expresses the dimensions of the fundamental problem concerning the entire situation in the Middle East.

5. There will be little hope of a lasting solution to the difficulties facing Lebanon if we confine ourselves to the provisional measures that the Council has already defined and implemented over the last three years. The same causes which have engendered suffering

and want for the people of the region quite naturally apply to Lebanon as well. They will produce the same effects as long as fundamental responses to these fundamental causes have not been found by the Council.

6. The United Nations has tried to find a solution to the special problem which is a challenge to the right of Lebanon to political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, through the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In its context, and without prejudging an overall solution to the problem, that solution gave some hope of ensuring the peace and security of the State of Lebanon and of curbing the tendency of the Israeli authorities to rampage at will from one end of the region to the other. With regard to the root of the problem, an overall solution is by its nature what is required, United Nations resolutions having not always been implemented. On that score, inestimable contributions have been made by Member States which were convinced that they would more directly serve the cause of maintaining peace, put an end to the deterioration of the situation in the region and thus offer better conditions for the promotion of an overall solution. In so doing, they were counting, on the one hand, on Israel's commitment to respecting its international obligations and, on the other hand, on the commitment of the United Nations to implementing an overall settlement that would bring about the advent of peace in the Middle East. What has happened to those two commitments?

7. Without having to recall the responsibilities of the Israeli authorities and their obligations *vis-à-vis* United Nations resolutions, in general, and *vis-à-vis* UNIFIL, in particular, it is sufficient for us to refer to the Secretary-General's special report and the addenda thereto [S/13888 and Add.1-3] to see that from 24 March, at least, provocations and wanton military harassment by the so-called Israel Defence Forces have opened the way to direct violation of UNTSO observation posts and to a vast plan of obstruction and destruction, which has been ceaselessly intensified from 24 March to this day, when the Security Council is still in session.

8. In his statement before the Council, the representative of Israel openly declared that the Israeli forces had taken "certain limited measures" [2213th meeting, para. 73] to penetrate into Lebanon and that as of 14 April all Israeli soldiers had been withdrawn. Was he referring to the plan the execution of which began on 24 March? By what right has Israel chosen to take such measures, whether limited or not, to pour into Lebanese territory? And by what authority does that Israeli general demand that UNIFIL evacuate At-Tiri?

9. UNIFIL had every justification for assuming all responsibilities within its area of operation. Why,

then, did it not do so? Why were its observation posts shelled, as was stated in the Secretary-General's report? The Council is entitled to draw the appropriate lessons from this first aspect of the situation.

10. Moreover, despite the undeniable progress made by the United Nations towards the implementation of a comprehensive settlement, we must note that that progress has not yielded many positive effects. The affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian people, which has been clearly recognized by the overwhelming majority of Member States as the keystone of the edifice of peace, is still subject to the veto. To justify this, we are asked to listen to a speech about peace, a peace in which the Palestinian people has no right either to the status to which it is entitled by history and by its immemorial past or to the status conferred upon it by the present, a status that is recognized by more than two thirds of the Member States—or even to the status it deserves by virtue of its aspirations, its dynamic movement and the inevitable victory that justifies all national liberation struggles.

11. Any speech about peace is hollow if it fails to recognize that basic element; stop-gap solutions are destined eventually to become, in their turn, not catalysts of peace but sources of specific problems. The United Nations has been diverted from its aims, while the bodies for maintaining peace—those whose mission it is, moreover to pave the way for peace—are becoming the target of the principal parties to the conflict, who are supposed to be the first to benefit from the peace and security of which those organs are the guarantors.

12. The Tunisian delegation will lend its full and unreserved support to the efforts you are making, Mr. President, to conduct our debate to a responsible decision, and will go along with any initiative likely to promote a positive and constructive conclusion through the adoption of a resolution having the broadest possible support in the Council.

13. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Fiji, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

14. Mr. VUNIBOBO (Fiji): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing me to participate in your deliberations. Since the Council first met to discuss Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon, this is the first time that Fiji, a participant in UNIFIL, has asked to participate in the discussion of issues concerning southern Lebanon.

15. Before I comment on the substantive issue before the Council, it is appropriate for me to observe that my country, as one of the countries contributing troops to UNIFIL, has, during its contingent's service with the Force, recorded, unfortunately, the highest

number of peace-keeping casualties in the history of UNIFIL. As we are concerned with the large number of casualties we have suffered, I should like to state once again my country's firm commitment to the ideals underlying the establishment of the Force. Nine deaths may represent a very small number in a populous country. Yet, for a country with 600,000 people, that is a very high figure. The Deputy Prime Minister of Fiji, during his talk with the Secretary-General last month here in New York, reaffirmed that Fiji's soldiers would continue to serve in southern Lebanon as part of UNIFIL in its role as peace-keeper as long as they were required there.

16. While reaffirming our commitment, my country is also, at the same time, acutely aware of the difficulties the Force has been experiencing. Events in the last few weeks amply illustrate those difficulties. The continued harassment of UNIFIL troops by the *de facto* force in the south and, at times, by armed elements from the north does not make their job any easier. *De facto* forces drove through the Irish checkpoints and took command of the village of At-Tiri; as a result an Irish soldier was fatally wounded. Two Saturdays ago, the same forces began shelling UNIFIL headquarters at Naqoura, cutting communications and again fatally wounding a Fijian soldier. This was followed last week by the murder of two unarmed Irish soldiers. My Government deplores these actions of the *de facto* forces and the senseless killing of the four UNIFIL soldiers.

17. In the same way, it deplores the attack and senseless killings at the Kibbutz Misgav Am by Palestinian armed elements. The recent incursion into Lebanon by Israel Defence Forces, apart from violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, in our view, contributed nothing constructive to the settlement of this dispute in the region. If anything, it merely served to heighten the already tense situation existing along the borders. Their withdrawal would be a welcome move and a relief to UNIFIL. My Government is conscious of Israel's concern for its security; at the same time, it does not believe that any durable peace will be achieved by the tacit support accorded to Major Haddad's *de facto* forces or the resistance opposed to UNIFIL in the latter's attempt to extend its area of operation as defined in its mandate. We call upon the Israeli Government to bring its influence to bear on the *de facto* forces, whose activities could, if not curbed, lead to irreparable damage not only in southern Lebanon but in the region as a whole.

18. My country believes that, if the role of UNIFIL is to be fully realized, then there must be a very real and genuine effort now on the part of all the parties to co-operate fully with the Force so that it may be able to carry out its mandate effectively. We are agreed that UNIFIL personnel have been serving under very trying and at times dangerous conditions. They have seen in the past year a gradual but steady

encroachment on their area of operation by the *de facto* forces and armed elements. It is clear that, as long as those forces remain inside the UNIFIL area of operation, they will continue to be a threat to the Force and to peace in the area. For UNIFIL to carry out its mandate unimpeded, it is absolutely imperative that the *de facto* forces and the elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization that have encroached on the Force's area of operation be withdrawn.

19. It is equally important to review the mandate concerning the use of force by UNIFIL troops. In calling for such a review, we are mindful that UNIFIL's central character as a peace-keeping force should neither be compromised nor brought into question. At the same time, my Government is concerned at the seeming ease with which the *de facto* forces appear to have moved into UNIFIL's area of operation and taken up positions without any apparent reaction from UNIFIL until too late. We believe that we have long passed the point beyond which UNIFIL should not be expected to tolerate the harassment, both verbal and physical, to which it has been subjected, especially in recent weeks. What has happened in recent weeks has weighed heavily in my Government's mind and has prompted the above observation.

20. For the long term, the Lebanese Government must be assisted as much as possible to enable it to re-establish its presence and assert its sovereignty on its entire territory. Only then can one hope that UNIFIL can be withdrawn with some confidence that peace will be maintained.

21. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is Mr. Hammadi ESSID, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

22. Mr. ESSID (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and to all the other members of the Council for having allowed me to speak and I thank you.

23. As members of the Council may suspect, I have not come here to repeat what my colleague, Mr. Maksoud, our representative, said to the Council [2214th meeting] when he stated the position of the League of Arab States both with regard to the Lebanese matter and with regard to the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries.

24. Nor have I come to repeat the representative of Lebanon's precise and exhaustive statement or to add a new paragraph to the book by Ambassador Tuéni on the experiences of Lebanon and the Security Council—*Peace-Keeping in Lebanon*—a book which is as comprehensive as it is dangerous because by reading it one might lose faith in the international community,

so ineffective does any effort seem to be to bring about justice by legal means, and be tempted to conclude that only arrogance and intransigence can be successful.

25. I am here in my capacity as the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and, on his instructions, to underscore in this debate the unanimous support of the Arab States for the just cause of Lebanon and to remind the Council of their solemn commitments to the Lebanese people and Government.

26. Having for months personally experienced the Lebanese tragedy as a member of the committee entrusted with ensuring the implementation of the resolutions of the Arab Summit held in Tunis in November 1979, I believe that I can give first-hand testimony regarding the misfortunes of a people that had succeeded in creating one of the most original and exemplary societies yet today, a people which, in spite of admirable courage and tenacity, is helplessly watching its own disintegration, just as the international community is watching what a journalist has called the "Lebanonization" of the United Nations, which has become victim of the contempt and, through its peace-keeping forces, of the criminal manoeuvres of that long-spoiled child of the West, Israel.

27. But first I should like to express to Mr. Kurt Waldheim the tribute which the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States has asked me to renew to him, both on his behalf and on that of the Arab Governments, for the clear-sightedness, courage and firmness that he has always demonstrated in support of legality and justice. The Arabs realize how difficult it still is to win any struggle against Israel when one is armed only with justice and legality and when one has only international consensus as one's ally.

28. I should also like to express once again our gratitude to the United Nations forces, which come from such diverse regions as Ireland and Fiji with a message of peace and today are falling victim to the pride and hatred upon which a State has built its legitimacy. The Arabs salute those who have fallen so that international order and law may prevail in the area and that Lebanon may remain Lebanon.

29. Of course, we salute with the same respect the millions of victims of nazism. But how long will these victims continue to serve as an alibi for Israel, allowing it to continue to act as an outlaw State and shamelessly exploit the guilty conscience of the West in order to impose terrorism and blackmail? For how long are the souls of these dead to be disturbed in order to bring about the triumph of an unjust cause? And how much more Arab blood will have to be shed on Lebanese soil for the just cause of our people to be recognized?

30. International opinion, which is poisoned by the media so effectively manipulated by Israel, attributes

the Arab blood flowing in Lebanon—Christian and Moslem, Palestinian and Lebanese—to internal causes which it is made to accept under the label of "Palestinian-Lebanese confrontations" and of "Islamic progressive forces struggling against rightist Christians". For my part, I can affirm to the Council that my experience of Lebanon and the solid friendships I entertain there both with Christians of the extreme right and left and with conservative and progressive Moslems, as well as with Palestinians who have taken refuge in that land of asylum, are constant proof that every victim, whatever the label applied to him and regardless of the hand that slays him, is a victim of Israel and of Israel alone.

31. Can there be among the Members of this Organization a single Government—even among those who give their support to the Zionist enterprise—which is still duped as to the true designs of Israel? In any event, we Arabs know, and we know that everyone else knows, that the expansionist, terrorist and racist policies carried out by Israel have in the end but a single objective: to continue to extend Israel's hegemony over Arab lands. Israel's best friends and certain of its closest allies know this but they continue to shut their eyes and ears; and if, at times, they open their mouths, it is to mumble some vague criticism, which is immediately swallowed again.

32. I shall not dwell on matters of which the Council is perfectly aware, but there is one fact which the international community must realize before it is too late: we Arabs do not feel called upon to be victims and we shall not wait to react until the genocide of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples is completed and south Lebanon annexed. We shall not consent to living off the exploitation of our dead.

33. At their meeting in Tunis in November 1979, the Arab Heads of State expressed their active and unconditional solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples who are united by their blood, shed on Lebanese soil, united in their common desire to establish a just and lasting peace in Lebanon and throughout the region and united also in their common commitment to respect the resolutions of the Council aimed at restoring Lebanese sovereignty over its entire territory. The Arab Heads of State declared that south Lebanon was Arab land and that its profanation was felt equally in Bahrain and in Mauritania.

34. What Arabs expect of the United Nations and of all its agencies is not merely that they should act to ensure that the Israeli army should end its savage and murderous raids, but also that Israel should obey the Council resolutions and cease all direct or indirect military action.

35. The Arabs are aware of their international responsibilities. In article 5 of the document adopted at the Tunis summit conference, they stressed the need fully to implement the Council resolutions on

south Lebanon and to allow international forces to discharge the functions and obligations incumbent upon them.

36. No one can deny the patience and level-headedness that the Arabs have shown in the face of Israel's excesses and the abetting silence of its protectors. All the Governments and peoples of the League of Arab States stand by the Government and people of Lebanon in their struggle to re-establish the organic unity of their territory and their people. The Arab Governments are committed to doing everything they can to serve their cause in south Lebanon until the State's legal authority extends over all Lebanese territory, until the legal army can fulfil its national responsibilities and until the re-establishment, in conformity with resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions, of a régime of international law represented by the General Armistice Agreement of 1949,¹ which guaranteed the inviolability of Lebanon's international boundaries.

37. If the words legality and justice no longer weigh very heavily on the collective conscience, they are still, for us Arabs, linked with our interests. We remain attached to these principles. I hope that we shall never be forced to impose them by any means, even means that would harm the interests of others.

38. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

39. Mr. ALLAGANY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, I wish to thank you for giving my delegation the opportunity to participate in these proceedings, and to extend to you my warmest congratulations and expressions of esteem on your assumption of the tasks of President, the functions of which office my delegation is certain you will carry out with the utmost degree of competence and objectivity.

40. I wish also to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Mills of Jamaica, who ably presided over the Council during the month of March.

41. Once more the Council is occupied with the most chronic, the most recurrent and the most dangerous problem of Israel and Israeli behaviour. I am aware that the item before the Council is entitled "The situation in the Middle East", but I would rather call it "The problem of Israel".

42. I believe that if one were at this stage to reflect on the record of debates and resolutions over the past 31 years, and in particular since 1967, by both the General Assembly and the Security Council, one would find that the constant preoccupation of the United Nations has been with Israel and Israel's defiant and belligerent attitude towards the world community as

represented in the United Nations and towards the Charter and the relevant provisions of international law. One cannot but ask what the attitude of the world Organization would have been had another State been guilty of all the acts of aggression committed by the Government of Israel against the territorial integrity of its neighbours, against civilian towns, villages and refugee camps and even against the United Nations peace-keeping forces. What action would the Council and the Assembly have taken if another State had not only failed, but defiantly and contemptuously refused to implement repeated resolutions over a span of 31 years?

43. It is clear that Israel would not have dared to pursue this irresponsible aggression, this gangster-like and most reprehensible policy, but for the unlimited support it has been receiving from its allies: support in arms, in financial assistance and in the exercise of the veto power in the Security Council. In the face of this, one cannot but ask how the United Nations can effectively maintain peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and protect the territorial integrity of a Member State like Lebanon. Israel cannot, on any pretext, accuse Lebanon of having perpetrated armed aggression against Israel to justify Israel's constant armed incursions into that country. Finding no valid reason, Israel blames the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon, the presence of Arab League deterrent forces, the alleged factional strife in Lebanon and the alleged ineffectiveness of UNIFIL.

44. Israel deliberately ignores the facts, which are that it has long coveted the south of Lebanon and the waters of the Litani River, that it invaded the south of Lebanon in 1978 and that it took a serious effort on the part of the Security Council to push back the Israeli forces—and that only after Israel had ensured the presence of a Lebanese force under the command of a Quisling major who is under the total control of Israel. Israel has never allowed UNIFIL to gain control of the whole area of the south or to operate effectively within the terms of resolution 425 (1978). Israel has continued to hamper the effectiveness of UNIFIL directly and through what have become known as the *de facto* forces.

45. My Government views with great concern the continued lawlessness of Israel and its new aggression on southern Lebanon, as well as its flouting of resolution 425 (1978) and of the provisions of the Charter. Israel's repeated encouragement of the *de facto* forces to harass UNIFIL constitutes a wilful and calculated attempt to undermine the authority of the Security Council and to perpetuate the aggression against Lebanon. This is part of the notorious policy of Israel in the Middle East: invasion under the pretext of defending Israel's security, followed by mass destruction of life and property, followed by settlement and creeping annexation. Obviously, the resolution adopted immediately by the Security Council in 1978

providing for the establishment of an interim force to ensure the withdrawal of Israel did not give Israel time to implement that policy, but Israel has not given up: it continues to circle in the air like a vulture awaiting the kill. It is all the more incumbent upon the Council to take firm action condemning Israel's military incursion into Lebanon and its violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to compel the direct and indirect withdrawal of Israel's forces and its hegemony over the area.

46. My Government considers it of the utmost urgency that peace be restored to southern Lebanon and that resolutions 425 (1978) and 459 (1979) be fully implemented. We also find the shelling of the UNIFIL hospital and the continued acts of harassment of UNIFIL and UNTSO staff most abhorrent.

47. In closing, my delegation urges the Council, in the light of the latest Israeli aggression against the territorial integrity of Lebanon, to condemn unanimously the recent armed invasion of that country and the constant attacks on a peace-loving Member State and to adopt a resolution that would provide for forthright measures against the Israeli aggression. My delegation urges also the condemnation of Israel for its naked aggression by sea and air against, and massive shelling of, the Sarafand area in southern Lebanon, which led to the loss of the lives of 15 civilians and the injuring of several persons, including children, women and older people, and the destruction of several houses and other property. Israel's continuous harassment of UNIFIL and UNTSO peace-keeping personnel and its systematic attacks on the towns in southern Lebanon, including the area of operation of UNIFIL and UNTSO, cannot be interpreted except as a means for Israel to reoccupy the area.

48. In those circumstances, the Council must demand that Israel scrupulously respect the territorial integrity of Lebanon and that it cease in particular lending its assistance to the illegal armed group in southern Lebanon.

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish now to make a statement as the representative of MEXICO.

50. The Council has come to the end of a long debate which has frequently been interrupted and resumed. My delegation has not yet had an opportunity to state its position on the substance of the item before us.

51. Over the past few days serious incidents have taken place in the problem area and there have been complex negotiations in the Council, which has the full responsibility of adopting decisions in this case.

52. The Council's unanimous reaction to the shameful events of 18 April was praiseworthy. The response of the contributing countries and the steps taken by the Secretary-General to facilitate compliance with the

mandate we have given United Nations forces deserve our full support.

53. Now we must take more far-reaching action and, with political consistency, we must convert our reproaches into measures binding upon the Member States capable of guaranteeing the peace and security of the area.

54. The establishment of UNIFIL has gone a long way towards reducing tension and preventing the crisis from spreading. The decisions we have adopted have particular political importance because they reflect a consensus among the members of the Council and have been supported by the majority of the community of nations.

55. Israel's violation of Lebanon's border and the illegal forces' harassment of and attacks on our contingents are open acts of defiance of the authority of the Council, as well as of the international conscience. The representatives of the contributing countries agree on at least three points: they have no doubt about the fact that the illegal forces are receiving direct assistance from Israel; they regret that, as a consequence of the harassment to which it is subjected, UNIFIL cannot do more than prevent incursions, and they consider it necessary for the Force to be deployed in the entire area of operation under its jurisdiction.

56. The Force is an essential element in the creation of conditions conducive to the negotiated settlement of the problem of the Middle East; therefore, it is reprehensible that the narrow views of a warlord and its allies should stand in the way of the completion of this vital task. The violence against the Force must come to an end and, under resolution 425 (1978), it is our duty to ensure and confirm the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory.

57. We established that UNIFIL would use force only in self-defence because we supposed that the parties to the conflict were prepared to comply with resolution 425 (1978). But the Secretary-General's reports convincingly demonstrate that quite the contrary is true. The assumptions that led to the definition of the limits of military action by the Force have been changed to such an extent that the mandate cannot be fully implemented and the restrictions we have placed on our Force are now putting it in a very vulnerable position.

58. We must ensure that all the parties concerned will co-operate towards placing the Force in a position of being able to carry out this task, and we must make it perfectly clear that it is legitimate for it to use force against any attempt to prevent it from carrying out its functions.

59. In various cases the Security Council has resolutely condemned violations of the territorial

integrity and sovereignty of States. On this occasion, we are faced with irrefutable facts which have been recognized even by the accused State.

60. Our decision should match the gravity of the facts, if we wish to ensure that there will not be an indefinite repetition of this type of transgression. This is, quite clearly, a matter of principle which we shall confront, I am quite sure, setting aside special interests or matters of temporary convenience. The future of United Nations peace-keeping operations is at stake.

61. I now resume my functions as PRESIDENT of the Council.

62. Members of the Council have before them in document S/13905 the text of a draft resolution which was prepared in the course of consultations. I understand that the Council is now prepared to vote on this draft resolution. If I hear no objection, I shall put it to a vote.

63. First, I shall call on the members of the Council who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

64. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): With regard to the situation in Lebanon, the Chinese delegation pointed out in its statement of 18 April [2217th meeting] that the serious deterioration of the situation in southern Lebanon was brought about entirely by Israel's armed incursions into Lebanon and the incidents and conflicts provoked by the Israeli-backed Lebanese secessionist forces. The Israeli acts of aggression have grossly encroached upon the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The Chinese delegation holds that the resolution adopted by the Council should strongly condemn Israel's acts of aggression and firmly support the Lebanese Government and people in their struggle against the Israeli aggression and for the defence of their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

65. On the basis of the aforementioned position, the Chinese delegation holds that although we consider that the draft resolution contained in document S/13905 has some serious deficiencies, it is on the whole conducive to support for the Lebanese and Arab peoples in opposing Israel's aggression and to the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. The Chinese delegation will therefore support it.

66. As for the reference to UNIFIL contained in that text, the Chinese delegation clearly stated its position when the Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) [2074th meeting], and 426 (1978) [2075th meeting] and the subsequent relevant resolutions, and we will not repeat it here.

67. Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): It has been proved that

Israel has perpetrated and continues to perpetrate acts of aggression against the Republic of Lebanon, a Member of our Organization. With the assistance of the Haddad gang, Israel has even raised its hand against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, and that act was severely condemned at the Council meetings at which southern Lebanon was discussed. A unanimous demand was voiced that the Council take effective measures against Israel's aggression; the need to disarm and disband Haddad's gang was emphasized.

68. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic notes that the draft resolution in document S/13905 unequivocally condemns Israel's aggression against the Republic of Lebanon, Israel's support for the Haddad gang and the acts of hostility of those circles against UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. Unfortunately, the draft resolution does not contain effective measures which would prevent further acts of aggression by Israel in the region.

69. In view of certain misgivings that we have about UNIFIL's mandate connected with the recruitment and financing of the Force, matters that have been repeatedly mentioned by my delegation in various United Nations bodies—for example at the eighth special session of the General Assembly on 21 April 1978²—we shall abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

70. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): The situation in southern Lebanon remains a grave threat to peace in the Middle East and a grave threat to the lives of innocent human beings in the area, whether in southern Lebanon or indeed in northern Israel. The United States will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution which is before us, because it does not deal with the grave problems in a balanced and comprehensive way. We would have preferred a resolution which concentrated on constructive proposals rather than a resolution which concentrated on condemnation.

71. It is important for the Council to mince no words about exactly what the problem is. The lack of authority and discipline in the area permits lawless elements to attack each other, to attack and murder United Nations soldiers, to harass them and to engage in acts of violence and terrorism against innocent civilians across international borders. Because of the inability of any authority to impose the necessary discipline and control, the southern Lebanon-Israel border region has been a focal point of infiltration, terrorism, intimidation and confrontation. Violence has produced counter-violence and a rising scale of dangers to all the innocent inhabitants of the area. We cannot allow a return to the terrible violence of last summer.

72. Two years ago the Council adopted resolution 425 (1978) setting up UNIFIL to help to provide discipline and to extend the authority of the Lebanese Government to the area. The United States fully supported

the creation of UNIFIL, and it regards the strengthening of UNIFIL today as critical in the effort to establish order in the area. The attacks on UNIFIL headquarters and the indiscriminate attacks and even murders of individual soldiers are abhorrent to the entire international community and can neither be condoned nor allowed to continue.

73. At the same time, it was the purpose of resolution 425 (1978) that southern Lebanon should not remain a staging base for attacks across the Lebanese-Israeli borders against innocent civilians in northern Israel. In the recent attack on Misgav Am, where babies were held hostage, harmed and killed, those attacks reached the depths of inhumanity. In this situation the United States regards this draft resolution as an unbalanced and inadequate response to the problem. The important objective is to agree on practical measures to improve the conditions for UNIFIL's operations and to ensure full co-operation with UNIFIL.

74. Furthermore, the draft resolution does not directly acknowledge the fact of cross-border terrorism against Israel, which is one of the essential elements of the threat to peace in that area. Tragedies like that at Misgav Am are not referred to even by implication, and therefore the United States will abstain.

75. The policy of the United States in this area has been guided by three principles: that all parties must respect Lebanon's territorial integrity; that the authority of the Government of Lebanon must be restored up to the international border; and that a cease-fire should be respected in all quarters, including the cessation of all attacks against Israel from Lebanese territory.

76. To that end, in March 1978 the United States strongly supported the establishment of UNIFIL. Since then, in close co-operation with the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council and the Secretary-General, we have worked intensively to assist UNIFIL in carrying out its mandate. As the Secretary-General has reported to the Council, UNIFIL is now confronted with a grave challenge to its authority. Indeed, the existence of the Force may well be at stake.

77. In recent weeks, United Nations personnel, both the men of UNIFIL and the unarmed military observers of UNTSO, have been subjected to attacks from militias operating in the border area. In recent weeks, those attacks have increased in intensity. A member of the Fiji battalion and members of the Irish battalion have been killed, and on 12 April UNIFIL headquarters and the hospital at Naqoura were heavily shelled by militia artillery. This followed a succession of attacks, fully catalogued by the Secretary-General, by militia forces against UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel, against UNTSO positions and vehicles. These attacks must be brought to an end, once and for all.

78. At the same time, UNIFIL faces a grave challenge from another quarter. UNIFIL's reports indicate that there has been an increasing number of attempts by Palestinian and other elements to infiltrate its area of operation. This, too, represents an unacceptable threat to UNIFIL and to the authority of the Council.

79. It is also essential that there be an end to the use of Lebanese territory as a base for attacks against Israel. The United States shares with the people of Israel the sense of shock and outrage over the attack at Misgav Am. No objective can justify violence. We condemn such acts, and the Council should condemn that act as well. We—and, we are confident, the other members of the Council—share Israel's desire for peace on its northern border. We agree that the best way to achieve this important objective is to bring about a restoration of Lebanese authority in south Lebanon. One of the main reasons for UNIFIL's presence is to bring about a cessation of all attacks across the Israeli-Lebanese border from any quarter whatsoever. Israel itself can contribute to the achievement of these objectives by co-operating fully with UNIFIL.

80. In this connection, it is imperative that UNIFIL be able to move freely, without hindrance, in southern Lebanon in order to carry out the important duties with which it has been charged. All parties must support UNIFIL in carrying out its mission. UNIFIL must not be frustrated by the illegal militia forces. While UNIFIL faces many challenges, the most serious threat of all comes from the militias. If left unchecked, their behaviour will cause still more needless bloodshed and will threaten UNIFIL's continued ability to carry out its mandate. This, in turn, will divert UNIFIL's attention from the efforts to deal with illegal infiltration into its area of operation and across the international frontier and, ultimately, from UNIFIL's effort to assist the Government of Lebanon in the restoration of its authority.

81. As the Secretary-General has reported, UNIFIL's freedom of movement has been severely curtailed by the closure of roads in the border zone controlled by the militias, and thus UNIFIL's headquarters has been isolated from the troops under its command. Helicopters used by UNIFIL in the enclave to evacuate wounded personnel have been damaged. The increasingly harassed observation posts in the border area have been cut off from outside communications.

82. The United States is prepared, in conjunction with the Secretary-General, the nations that contribute troops to UNIFIL and with other concerned nations and members of the Council, to explore how UNIFIL can be strengthened so as to enable it to defend itself effectively when it is attacked. We will exert every effort to use our influence to see that those who attack UNIFIL and UNTSO personnel are brought under control.

83. My Government would also like Council members to consider whether a high-level meeting of some of the principal parties would be useful and productive, perhaps under the auspices of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission. Such a meeting of interested parties under those auspices or under the chairmanship of the United Nations might offer a means of resolving some of the current difficulties.

84. As another possibility, the members of the Council might wish to consider asking the Secretary-General to work closely with a commission composed of States contributing to UNIFIL to discuss and formulate new ways to help to ensure the security of the Lebanese inhabitants of the region and forestall acts of violence across the border, assisting UNIFIL in fulfilling its mandate. The members of such a commission might include, in addition to representatives of the troop-contributing States, third States which have so far not involved themselves directly in the southern Lebanon situation except by supporting the peace-keeping responsibilities of the United Nations. Any such commission would have to have a mandate broader than one of mere fact-finding. It should be charged with the responsibility of actively seeking long-range solutions to the serious threat to the peace which the unresolved situation in the southern Lebanon border area presents. It should come up with concrete proposals which ultimately might be presented to the Council and to other concerned parties.

85. Finally, I want to commend the brave men of UNIFIL for their restraint and their firmness. There is no higher calling than peace-keeping. Those who attack peace-makers attack us all. On behalf of the United States, I extend the deepest sympathy of the American people to the Governments of Fiji and Ireland and to the families of all the brave men who have shed their blood in the cause of peace. UNIFIL will continue to have the strong support of the United States in carrying out the mandate entrusted to it by the Council.

86. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/13905.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Bangladesh, China, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: German Democratic Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America

The draft resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (resolution 467 (1980)).

87. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call upon the representative of the Soviet Union for an explanation of vote after the vote.

88. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): During the debate in the Council in connection with the complaint by Lebanon of Israeli aggression, the overwhelming majority of delegations condemned Israel for its armed incursions into the territory of Lebanon and its attacks on Lebanese towns and Palestinian camps. The responsibility borne by Israel for the premeditated murder of two Irish soldiers of the United Nations forces in Lebanon was emphasized. By their policy of maintaining a tense, explosive situation in southern Lebanon and by their policy of encouraging and inciting the separatist units under Haddad's command and in their pay, the ruling circles of Israel are attempting to implement their expansionist aims and gradually to annex the lands of the neighbouring Arab States, as well as to hamper the attainment of a genuinely comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East problem, including the Palestinian problem.

89. We feel particularly indignant and outraged because Israel has not only not demonstrated any intention of heeding the opinion of the international community, but has, on the contrary, demonstrated its flagrant disdain for Security Council resolutions and appeals. This is proved by the fact that, during the present consideration of this item in the Council, Israel not only did not stop its acts of aggression against Lebanon but continued to perpetrate them, thus facing the Council with a most serious challenge.

90. The Soviet delegation notes that the resolution just adopted by the Council contains a condemnation of Israel's armed intervention in Lebanon, as well as of its support by Haddad's separatist forces. At the same time, we consider that that condemnation should have been more clear-cut and definite and that the resolution should have included effective measures to achieve a complete cessation of all the acts of aggression being perpetrated by Israel against Lebanon, both directly and indirectly.

91. The delegation of the Soviet Union abstained in the vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/13905 in accordance with its position of principle on the United Nations forces in Lebanon. That position is based on the need to defend the victim of Israeli aggression and to secure the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the entire territory of Lebanon, without any infringement of the sovereign rights of the Government of Lebanon. The Soviet delegation would like to reaffirm that position at this point, including our position on the Security Council's administration of the United Nations forces in Lebanon, on the principles governing the selection of national contingents and on the method of financing the forces.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of Israel has asked to speak. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

93. Mr. BLUM (Israel): The deliberations of the Council on the matter before us, as well as the resolution it has just adopted, have again been marked by a striking lack of balance and also by a selective conscience.

94. Some awareness, it is true, was shown of the background to the limited Israel action inside Lebanon following the outrage at Kibbutz Misgav Am on 7 April and following the receipt of information that the PLO was planning to launch similar attacks on civilian targets in Israel. But generally speaking, even that display of awareness was little more than a prelude to criticism of Israel, as if the outrage at Misgav Am was an isolated event and not part of a terrorist campaign which has been going on for many years and has continued since the establishment of UNIFIL in March 1978. The Misgav Am outrage is not even mentioned in the resolution.

95. The same selective conscience also characterized the Council's meeting held last Friday night [2217th meeting].

96. Israel condemned and continues to condemn unreservedly and unequivocally the indefensible murder of two Irish soldiers by villagers in southern Lebanon last week. But the Council's meeting last Friday night was held in an atmosphere of complete certainty about who had perpetrated that unconscionable crime. Likewise, it was asserted time and again that it was "unprecedented" in the history of United Nations peace-keeping.

97. With all due respect to the Council and the Secretariat, I would only point out that on the following morning newspapers such as *The New York Times*, reporting from Beirut, indicated that the affiliation of the killers was far from clear. Despite the unqualified assertion made here last Friday that the local Lebanese forces were responsible, the UNIFIL spokesman at Naqoura was quoted as saying that the culprits were members of the families of the two Shiite youths who had been killed by Irish soldiers in the shooting incident the previous Saturday. Likewise, according to *The New York Times* of 19 April, the UNIFIL spokesman specifically stated that the Irish soldiers had been shot in what was termed a reprisal for the death of the two Moslem youths concerned. Similarly, *The Washington Post* reported on 21 April that a family of Shiite Moslem villagers had claimed responsibility for the murder of the two Irish soldiers and declared a blood feud, pending the customary reconciliation, in revenge for the death of a member of the family.

98. The Secretariat and the members of the Council must have been aware that in these unpardonable

killings there was an element of blood revenge. None the less, there was no inclination on the part of anyone here to refer to that aspect. Instead, most used the occasion for an onslaught—either direct or by implication and innuendo—against Israel.

99. The sad fact is and remains that Israel repeatedly apprised the UNIFIL command of the possible implications arising from the deaths of the two Shiite youths. Tragically, our pleas for caution went unheeded.

100. It is not for me to elaborate on the norms and customs which still exist, not only in Lebanon but indeed in various parts of the world, with regard to requiting the blood of one's kin. If some members of the Council are unfamiliar with these customs, and if—like Israel—they find them both intolerable and repugnant, perhaps the representative of Lebanon would care to explain them, at least in so far as they are practised in his country. That perhaps may be more difficult than to inject cynical and snide remarks, as he did last Friday night, in the midst of a meeting which he himself said "must be shrouded in great solemnity" [*ibid.*, para. 22]. In any event, the facts cannot be obscured by resort to the perennial expedient of blaming every calamity on Israel.

101. Then there is the assertion that what happened in southern Lebanon last Friday is "without precedent" in the history of United Nations peace-keeping. This assertion is inaccurate, and essentially reflects the double standards which are applied in any matter connected with the Arab-Israel conflict, including the functioning of UNIFIL. As all of us know, the vast majority of the casualties sustained by UNIFIL in the line of duty have been caused—directly or indirectly—by the terrorist PLO. Just over a year ago, on 3 February 1979, the PLO deliberately ambushed two Fijian soldiers and killed them in cold blood. Somewhat exceptionally, United Nations spokesmen at the time laid the blame for that outrageous act where it belonged: that is, squarely on the PLO. And a day after that event, the PLO itself declared that it had killed the two Fijian soldiers because UNIFIL had "executed" one of its terrorists a short time before—as reported, for instance, in *The Wall Street Journal* of 5 February.

102. When, may I ask, was the Security Council ever convened for the purpose of condemning these and all the other killings of UNIFIL's men by the PLO?

103. Let me reiterate that in making these remarks Israel is in no way condoning the murder of the two Irish soldiers last Friday or seeking to derogate from the extreme gravity of that act. As I said earlier, Israel stands by its unqualified condemnation of that crime.

104. The same selectivity has characterized other aspects of this debate. Nothing has been said by most speakers about the 700 or so terrorists who have been

allowed to enter UNIFIL's area of operation and to deploy themselves in about 40 positions in that area. Similarly, nothing has been said about the Force's exclusion from the "Tyre pocket", which reaches to within eight miles of Israel's northern border and contains some 1,500 terrorists. It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL was to be deployed in the "Tyre pocket". The PLO prevented UNIFIL's entry into Tyre by force, and the commander of the French unit concerned was badly wounded in the legs by the PLO. Had UNIFIL gone ahead with its deployment in the Tyre area as originally planned, the situation in the whole of southern Lebanon would be very different today.

105. The failure to withstand the PLO's design to frustrate UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its mandate has from the very start led to a progressive deterioration in the situation on the ground.

106. The common denominator in all this selectivity is an unwillingness on the part of the Council, the Secretariat and UNIFIL even to criticize the PLO, let alone take effective steps against it. Thus, for example, as reported in the press on 19 April, five PLO terrorists were apprehended trying to enter UNIFIL's area of operation and they were escorted out of the area. This apparently is the most that UNIFIL is capable of or willing to do. It involves no risk to the PLO. The worst that can happen to it is that its operatives may have to try their luck again in making their entrée. If UNIFIL had been more forthright from the very beginning in its dealings with the PLO, many other problems confronting it today could well have been avoided.

107. Then there are those who see the panacea for all UNIFIL's ills in the now-defunct Israel-Lebanon General Armistice Agreement of 1949. Israel's position with regard to that Agreement is well known and remains consistent. It was set out in some detail in my statements before the Council on 12 June [2147th meeting] and on 19 December 1979 [2180th meeting].

108. It is surely bizarre, especially for the Government of Lebanon, to invoke that Agreement now, when by its declarations and actions it has made it clear that it considers the Agreement to have come to an end; and, more particularly, when, in violation of that Agreement, it has tolerated for years a terrorist presence on its territory with the accompanying freedom to conduct warlike and hostile acts against Israel. One of the key provisions of the Armistice Agreement is summed up in article III, which, *inter alia*, prohibits terrorists from operating on or from the territory of either party. Paragraph 2 of that article lays down that:

"No . . . paramilitary forces . . . , including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or paramilitary forces of the

other Party, or against civilians in territory under the control of that Party."

To make matters worse, the Government of Lebanon even concluded agreements with the PLO allowing that terrorist organization to operate in southern Lebanon—the so called "Cairo agreement" of 1969 and the subsequent "Shtura agreement" of 1975—both utterly incompatible with the Armistice Agreement, which it is now trying to re-invoke.

109. This debate has also had its grotesque moments. We listened to the two spokesmen of the new Arab League making lengthy and specious analyses of what they assert to be Israel's strategic objectives in and through southern Lebanon. In his flights of fantasy into the realm of the absurd, Mr. Maksoud claimed, among other things, that Israel's aim is to debilitate the Arab States and even "to impugn Arab national existence" [2214th meeting, para. 23].

110. It is preposterous for these armchair strategists to talk in these terms when everyone knows that, for reasons totally unconnected with Israel, Arab unity is at a low ebb and the new Arab League, which Mr. Maksoud and his colleague represent, is incapable of reconciling the manifold tensions and frictions between its members. All of us witnessed the débâcle at the emergency meeting of the Arab League held in Tunis in February of this year with a view to patching up the differences between Tunisia and Libya. Since that proved impossible, the customary expedient was adopted of converting the meeting into yet another anti-Israel carnival.

111. And then we listened to the representative of the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan making one of his typically tedious statements. It surely would have been more appropriate for him to explain the difficulties which Jordan encountered when, in the three years after the Six-Day War of 1967, the PLO established a State-within-a-State on his country's territory. It would have been helpful too if he had described the steps which Jordan took in September 1970 to remedy the threat to its existence posed by the PLO at that time. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

112. But what is more serious is that once again a conscious attempt has been made in this debate to focus narrowly on the problems of southern Lebanon and to take them out of both their domestic and their regional context. Such a narrow view of these problems can only produce a warped and distorted result.

113. Southern Lebanon is part and parcel of Lebanon as a whole. As the Secretary-General has observed in several of his reports, it cannot be arbitrarily detached from the rest of the country and what goes on there. Indeed, southern Lebanon is marginal to Lebanon as a whole; and its problems will not disappear until the larger problems of Lebanon are resolved. Those larger problems include the continued occupation of the

country by Syria and the presence on its soil of upwards of 15,000 PLO terrorists.

114. In this context too the Council has revealed yet another aspect of its selective approach and its selective conscience. It seems to have been of no consequence that, in the days immediately prior to the Council's meeting last Friday night, there were bloody clashes in Beirut between PLO terrorists backed by Iraq and local Shiites. Artillery and heavy weapons were employed in the clashes. Dozens of people were killed and wounded on both sides, while many innocent passers-by also suffered injury. The fighting and turmoil in the north of Lebanon has also continued this week. Only two days ago, on 22 April, two cars loaded with explosives blew up, one in the centre of Beirut and the other in the area of Al-Mattan. Syrian troops killed a local Shiite and, in reprisal, six Syrian soldiers have been kidnapped. Moreover, terrorists at a roadblock south of Beirut have kidnapped two members of the local Lebanese gendarmerie and in Tripoli terrorists have killed a local resident, with the result that the city is now in a state of considerable tension.

115. All that and more has been going on while the Council has been seized of the question before us. But these matters apparently do not merit mention, let alone discussion.

116. Over and beyond the artificial attempts to detach southern Lebanon from the country as a whole, there has been a marked unwillingness to recognize that the Arab States implacably opposed to peace with Israel—the so-called rejectionist camp—regard southern Lebanon as an extension of their “eastern front”.

117. Should the Arab rejectionist States be tempted to launch another war of aggression against Israel, attempts will undoubtedly be made by Syria and its allies in the eastern front to attack Israel also through southern Lebanon.

118. In the meantime, the rejectionists have allocated to the PLO the task of launching acts of indiscriminate terror against Israel from Lebanon in general, and from southern Lebanon in particular.

119. In this connection and *en passant*, I should point out that those in the Council's meeting on Friday evening, 18 April, who chose to mention the action taken the previous night by the Israel Defence Forces against a PLO terrorist base at Sarafand were in no way inhibited from deliberately misleading the Council. The Israeli forces acted against a terrorist base at Sarafand because we had solid information that a PLO attack of the Misgav Am type was about to be launched from there. As reported both by the Associated Press and Reuters on 18 April from Beirut, the facilities and the buildings destroyed by our forces belonged to the so-called “Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-

estine—General Command” (PFLP-GC), which is one of the constituents of the PLO. The Associated Press, basing itself on information from the Office of the Governor of Sidon, reported that a number of motor boats equipped with machine-guns were blown up, as well as two buildings used by PFLP-GC men. According to the Associated Press, in that operation at least 14 PLO terrorists were killed.

120. In addition, the rejectionists have allotted to the PLO the task of building up the military infrastructure in the area, which will be required in the event of another Arab war against Israel, and all the information available to us shows that the PLO is actively engaged at this very moment in carrying out that task—also within UNIFIL's area of operation.

121. As I have had occasion to observe in other debates, certain States may be able to ignore these hard military and geo-political facts. Israel cannot.

122. Be that as it may, the rejectionists' intentions are well known and undeniable. And, as if those were not bellicose enough, there also exists the so-called “steadfastness front”, whose warmongering goes even further. Only last week, that front, composed of Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO, met in Tripoli and on 15 April issued a final communiqué, the first point of which was an outright rejection of any settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967), for the simple reason that it implies recognition of Israel. The same communiqué announced the creation of a joint military command to be established in Syria and to be headed by a senior Syrian officer. If there were any doubts on anyone's part before, there certainly can be no doubt now about the longer term objectives of the Syrian and PLO presence in Lebanon today.

123. According to Radio Monte Carlo on 14 April, Yasser Arafat declared in the course of the meeting at Tripoli:

“Qaddafi's speech, in which he called for . . . the eradication of Israel from the map, will serve as a guideline to the PLO and as a working programme to which the PLO will be fully dedicated . . . The PLO will adhere from now on to the resolutions of the steadfastness front and it will reject all European initiatives which are based on the Camp David accords.”

124. Moreover, lest there be any illusions about the PLO's intentions, George Habash, one of Arafat's chieftains, in preparing the ground for the Tripoli meeting, was quoted, also by Radio Monte Carlo, on 31 March as follows:

“The Palestinians will not lay down the rifle in return for mere recognition of the PLO; . . . they will continue to struggle until the destruction of the Jewish State: complete destruction and nothing less.”

125. The same communiqué issued by the steadfastness front last week contained a call for closer ties with the Soviet Union. It has thus exposed again the Soviet Union's role as the guiding hand behind the PLO and its supporters. It also throws into true and proper perspective the statements made in this and other debates by the Soviet Union and its satellite on the Council.

126. If we take a wider view of the situation, as Israel is bound to do, the strategic facts are incontrovertible. Let me quote a few lines from a far-sighted article published in *The New York Times* on 17 February 1979—that is, over a year ago:

“What is happening in Lebanon is an organic part of a grand strategic encircling movement that has been unfolding for years.

“The encircling subject is the Soviet Union and the encircled object is the entire Middle East, with its unique strategic position and its immense natural resources.

“The events in Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, Lebanon, . . . as well as the Arab opposition to the Camp David accords, all belong to the same encircling phenomenon.”

These incisive comments, written, as I have said, in February of last year, were made by none other than Professor Charles Malik, a predecessor of Ambassador Tuéni in this Organization, a former Foreign Minister of Lebanon and a former President of the General Assembly.

127. This debate and the resolution adopted by the Council again totally ignored the wider dimensions of the developments in southern Lebanon, to which I have just alluded, and were thus surrounded by an air of unreality.

128. Israel, for its part, cannot and will not take a blinkered view of the situation in southern Lebanon.

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The next speaker is the representative of Jordan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

130. Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): I do not believe that the representative of the racist Zionist entity in occupation of Palestine deserves the waste of one minute of the Council's precious time. How can illegality deserve an answer in legal terms? He is, as the members of the Council are well aware, a tape cassette on which are stored the tedious repetitions of the distortions to which I have repeatedly replied in the past and to which I feel it would be redundant to reply again. These distortions are compiled by him with the main design of diverting the Council's attention from the subject at hand on which the Council

has just passed a resolution. He should be taken for what he is: the true representative of a universally condemned aggressor, in violation of all norms of international law.

131. I have, however, taken note of his serious statement that he regards the Lebanese-Israeli permanent Armistice Agreement as being defunct. Now, this is a revelation to me, for I know that the permanent Armistice Agreement, as it pertains to Lebanon, is valid, and that it is only Israel's aggression which has prevented it from functioning. This is the reason why the UNTSO personnel are still stationed in their various posts along the international borders of Lebanon with the Zionist entity.

132. I must confess that deep in my heart I am gripped by the most serious misgivings about the usefulness of making a statement before the Council concerning the unmitigated lawlessness and brazen aggression against sisterly Lebanon which have been continuing with virtually assured immunity.

133. Rarely has the Council been reduced to such total paralysis in the face of blatant and ill-disguised Israeli aggression. This is no reflection upon the members of the Council who are dedicated to their sacred duty of safeguarding peace and security whenever or wherever they are placed in serious jeopardy. This has been categorically demonstrated in the pride-inspiring, courageous and forthright condemnation of Israeli lawlessness by the President in the statement he made on 18 April on behalf of the Council [2217th meeting, para. 15].

134. And yet, through the abuse and exploitation of a special linkage to one of the major pillars of the Council in issues pertaining to the Middle East, no matter how clear-cut and unequivocal things may be, it has become an exercise in futility, an ill-conceived act of self-deception, for any country in the region to place its security, let alone its survival, in the hands of the Council. Mere condemnation, no matter how deeply felt and fearless, is hardly adequate to persuade the Israelis to stop their acts of aggression against the territorial integrity of Lebanon, or give solace to the victims of such wanton aggressions. It is for the Council not merely to deplore and implore, but to act.

135. Indeed, I have equally grave reservations—notwithstanding my deepest concern over the daily agony of the valiant brotherly Lebanese people—regarding the efficacy of expecting that the Lebanese people's ordeal will be redressed by verbal expressions on the part of this Council.

136. For reasons well enough understood, peace-loving and innocent Lebanese citizens—men, women and children—are daily fodder for Israel's huge military arsenal. They must therefore necessarily bring their agony before the Council. Only recently,

at 4 a.m., before the break of dawn, the village of Sarafand lost 15 of its inhabitants, including children, to Israeli ground-shelling and infiltration, helicopter gunships and fighter bombers—indeed, none of the Israeli services was denied a share in Israel's murderous spree. Other Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees have also been harvested by Israel's instruments of death, including bombardment from the sea. It has become almost a daily routine, as every resident of Lebanon knows all too well—and I myself have many relatives living in Lebanon.

137. I can very well understand the immensity of the feelings generated by these wanton attacks against civilians, in what is tantamount to an undeclared and ceaseless war. The Security Council is the highest executive organ of the United Nations for arresting an aggressor's penchant for murder.

138. And what has the aggression against Lebanon to do with the attack on Misgav Am? It has been the tradition of the Council to seek reports from the personnel of UNTSO on whether or not there had been an infiltration. In the present case the Lebanese Government has presented almost incontrovertible evidence that there had been no such infiltration. As a matter of fact, the observers—and I spoke about this at a previous meeting—know a footprint when they see one. They have not submitted a single report in which they testify that there was infiltration across the Lebanese border. So we must view Israel's attack and aggression against Lebanon in another light.

139. The time has come—if indeed it has not long since passed—for the peoples of the region and of the world to recognize that the Council, with all the best intentions in the world, has been incapacitated in the performance of its duty. My delegation deeply appreciates the tireless efforts which the Council has been expending over the past week in its attempt to tackle this problem. We deeply appreciate even the resolution the Council has just adopted, watered down and mild as it is. But I am talking now about the incapacitation of the Council, as it is envisaged in the Charter.

140. The resolution just adopted by the Council has been so critically watered down that it is unlikely to be heeded. In future weeks and months the truth of what I have just said will be proved.

141. It is strange indeed that Misgav Am should be an excuse for an attack on the territorial integrity of Lebanon, when no evidence whatsoever has been produced that any infiltration had occurred across the Lebanese border. As a matter of fact, 40 observer posts were wrecked 24 hours before this incident occurred.

142. Indeed, if the Security Council has found itself in the unenviable position of not being able to protect its own flag, its sanctity, its personnel, its premises, its equipment, and even its hospitals and clinics—as

the shelling and destruction of the Norwegian hospital has shown—how could anyone in the area trust his right to life to a deliberately paralysed United Nations apparatus?

143. UNTSO as well as UNIFIL personnel are still being threatened with abduction, killing and assaults in broad daylight; there has been no commitment at all to discontinue these grave violations. I do hope that this story about the villagers' vendetta will be taken for the fabrication it is. If one or two villagers were involved, we know that they are part of the band of that traitor Major Haddad, operating against the territorial integrity and independence of his own country. If they were indeed involved, they must have acted at his specific orders because he has vowed that he will not allow either UNIFIL or UNTSO to remain in south Lebanon. He has said that publicly.

144. United Nations personnel must be seriously, and justifiably, wondering what has happened to the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, which has all the powers required to protect at least its own people, if not the peoples that are victims of aggression.

145. I am speaking candidly and truthfully when I state—and I may be tedious, as the representative of the Zionist entity has said, but at least I am not hypocritical—that what is happening in south Lebanon today is not without purpose. The purpose, in my delegation's modest judgement, is to harass UNIFIL and UNTSO to the point where they would choose to withdraw rather than endure sustained humiliation. I am proud that the contributing countries have given a courageous answer to the challenge by Major Haddad by insisting that in no circumstances will they withdraw their contingents from the area.

146. If the Israeli objective were to be achieved, that would be the signal for a much larger onslaught against not only Lebanon but other neighbouring countries; it would be an onslaught which would be launched undetected and the blame for which would then be placed on some fabricated excuse, which has always characterized Israel's ubiquitous aggressions over the past three decades.

147. The Israelis, determined not to concede any Palestinian rights—and currently they are facing the moment of truth and reckoning—need action to divert attention from the centrality of the Middle East conflict, namely, the question of Palestine. They are inflicting their heedless wrath upon Lebanon.

148. The peoples of the region are awakening to the fact that their survival depends upon their individual and collective self-reliance. There is no other viable avenue left. Time is fast running out, and their response should be commensurate to the dangers which lie ahead. I must confess that our worst enemy is our artificial and totally unjustified discord, which I assure

representatives, in no way reflects the deeply-rooted feelings of solidarity and oneness amongst our leaders and peoples in the region.

149. I wish the representative of Israel were here, to feel more comfortable about what I have just said.

150. In the mean time, while hoping against hope that the Council will shoulder its responsibilities as outlined in the Charter, the least we should have rationally expected was for the Council to have taken practical measures as spelled out in the Charter, if only to ensure its safety, inviolability and standing in the eyes of the world, rather than wait for the grievously aggrieved Lebanon to do what the Council itself is in duty bound to do. Needless to say, Jordan wholeheartedly supports our Lebanese brethren in their view of what is minimally acceptable.

151. A gathering storm and ever-darkening clouds are hovering above our region. Nobody can foretell what lies ahead, but I am sure of one thing: no matter what happens, we shall struggle for our survival with all the means at our disposal, and in concert, in spite of all the artificial differences. An indifferent world would share with us an intolerable price for any complacency, timidity or masterly inaction. Action-oriented measures must be taken before it is too late. What price Israel?

152. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization has asked to be allowed to speak. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

153. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): The Council has just been informed that when the neo-fascists, the Zionists of Tel Aviv, attacked Sarafand the other day, they did so because they had information that the Palestine Liberation Organization had plans to attack Israel. While speaking, their representative informed the Council that they had information that at this moment the PLO was planning a similar attack. I wish I could verify that—I do not have the statement—but if what I think I heard is correct, then the Council should be prepared to hear of another outrage, another crime, against a convalescent home or a refugee camp, under the guise of a pre-emptive attack. So I want to alert the Council to an impending attack on the Palestinian people in their Diaspora.

154. In referring to Sarafand the other day we stated very clearly, and there was no way of hiding facts, that the convalescent home was destroyed as a result of a dastardly attack and that a medical officer and two medical assistants were murdered as a result of that attack. So there was no misleading information. We also said that there were civilians in houses near the convalescent home who were also killed as a result of that attack.

155. Apparently, the representative of Tel Aviv takes pleasure in using some shady sources for his quotations. He repeatedly told the Council—and even circulated a document [S/13872]—that Chairman Arafat had made a statement to a certain paper in Caracas, Venezuela, called *El Mundo*. Through your good offices, Mr. President, and those of our good friend from Tunisia, we circulated a paper denying that Chairman Arafat had ever given that interview [S/13898].

156. The representative of Tel Aviv is now reporting things from Radio Monte Carlo, but I do not understand why he does not get the official statements since he quoted the official communiqué that came out of Tripoli after the meeting of the steadfastness States.

157. There has been a lot of talk about Misgav Am. First and foremost, we are told by the Government of Ireland, in its statement of 20 April:

“They emphasize, however, that there is no evidence that the infiltrators who carried out this attack came through the area where UNIFIL had been allowed to exercise effective control.” [S/13901, annex.]

The Government of Ireland is, apparently, not very well informed. Therefore, I leave it to the Council to decide whether there is any proof that the people who carried out that attack were infiltrators.

158. In its issue of 13 April, *The Jerusalem Post*, a weekly publication, says:

“Two of the fences were cut to allow a man to walk through upright, and the break in a third would have required them to crawl through.”

I am sure that the Government of Ireland was not made aware of that opening that would allow a person to walk upright through it.

159. With reference to what really happened at Misgav Am, I again quote the following from *The Jerusalem Post* reporting what one of the night-watchmen said:

“There were two children under a year old in one room, and four in the ‘three-plus’ group in another room. Two nurses were also in the building . . .

“Peretz said he felt shock at first but did not panic. When he ‘recovered’, he was sure ‘they wanted to get rid of’ him. They tied him to the bed.

“One of them”—that is to say, one of the attackers, speaking of the “infiltrators”—“showed him a leaflet and explained that they were demanding the release of 100 [of their friends] imprisoned in Israel and a plane to fly them out of Israel.”

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, the babies were still asleep; but there was some shooting: "The shots woke the infants, who started crying." What did those "infiltrators" do? They loosened the bonds of Peretz and asked him to calm the babies and reassure the children that they were not there to kill them. People who think of freeing a watchman to enable him to look after two babies are not there to kill the children or the watchman. The article continued: "One proposed to kill them all, but another argued that this was *haram*"—which means "forbidden". One does not kill children. It was reported in that article that the "infiltrators" felt it was forbidden to kill children. They were not there to kill children. They were there to demand the release of a hundred of their colleagues. The article continued: "Again they took Peretz to the window and ordered him to shout in English" to the attackers "not to shoot"—which he did. Nine hours later an explosion was heard, which signalled the attack by the soldiers. The article continued:

"To protect the two children Peretz rolled off the bed with them, he said. Shielding them with his body, he crawled towards the door and out of the building."

I am not trying to dramatize, I am just quoting what *The Jerusalem Post* wrote about the children who were in the building. According to the military authorities of Israel, and again I quote from *The Jerusalem Post*:

"Military sources believe that the terrorists entered the children's house by chance, and not because they had previously chosen a building or because they had intimate knowledge of the kibbutz's layout."

What was Begin's answer? He said:

"... vengeance for the blood of a child has not been created. We are no longer in exile, and we are not defenceless. We have a magnificent army, as was proved adequately."

They have a magnificent army, which shelled and attacked Sarafand, killing a medical doctor and two medical assistants, in addition to civilian women and children.

160. Terrorism in our part of the world has its roots among the Zionists who planted bombs in the streets of the Old City of Jerusalem, in Jaffa and in Haifa, who planted bombs in piles of watermelons to kill Palestinian peasants and civilians. Their crimes make up a long list, including acts committed in such places as Qibia, Kafar Kasem and Deir Yassin, where 253 men, women and children, all innocent civilians, were killed. Deir Yassin was not a military outpost. It was just a peaceful village with civilians living in it.

161. I should now like to refer to the *Congressional Record* of the United States House of Representatives,

dated 13 February, which contains a list of the people killed as a result of Israeli attacks during the year 1978/79. During that period there were 26 women, 278 men and 40 children killed, of whom 157 were Palestinians and the rest Lebanese. The United States has expressed shock at what happened at Misgav Am, and I can understand them if they want to express shock. But they could really express some shock at this wholesale murder and annihilation of the Palestinians and the Lebanese, and they could stop supplying Israel with arms, bombs, 175 mm artillery and cluster bombs.

162. I think that the worst crime is to deny an entire people the right to return to its home. As I appealed to the Council the other day, please help us and enable us to return to our homes on the highway, and do not force us to take the mountain paths because those mountain paths are planted with mines and many innocent-civilian lives will be lost. We shall have more debates on the denial of our rights, but I want to assure the Council that it is not our intention to continue the bloodshed. Please help us to return to our homes, to exercise our rights and to enjoy the same rights as any people.

163. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Lebanon, who has asked to be allowed to speak.

164. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): We now have a resolution. For 10 or 11 days the Council has continuously held consultations, negotiations or debates. It has displayed sufficient patience and at times has undergone sufficient abuse. I do not feel that I am at liberty to abuse the privilege that the Council has granted me, now that we are concluding the debate. I shall therefore be extremely brief and shall speak only for the record on a few minor points. I shall not follow the representative of Israel in the art of quoting, misquoting and self-quoting, in which he is, of course, a master. However, I do want to state the following.

165. First, the reference of the representative of Israel to a statement by the United Nations spokesman is false. The spokesman related what he was told by the Israeli sources. That was made explicit in the statement of the United Nations spokesman.

166. Secondly, with respect to the Lebanese vil-lagers, for the record the Council might be interested to know that the family referred to has held a press conference and stated that those who murdered the Irish soldiers in cold blood were acting for Israel and not for the family.

167. It is very difficult to speak for a victim country and it is indeed very strange that our position here should be in defence of an armistice agreement which is presented by the other party as an act of war. I shall not quote from the articles of the Armistice Agreement, but the Council will certainly be interested

to know that, even if my country wanted to denounce that Agreement, it would not be at liberty to do so because those of us who have examined that Agreement know that it is an act of the Council and that it can be abrogated only by a decision of the Council. I have spoken about that before in the Council. We have always claimed that it is still in effect and we sincerely hope that it will be enforced.

168. I should like to say one thing further. The distance in time between our request to the Council and the moment when this resolution was adopted is such that we cannot view the resolution as the expression of an exercise in rhetoric, but merely as a resolution that is oriented towards the future. We beg the Council to accept this attitude.

169. We should like to thank those members who voted for the resolution, and in particular the delegation of China, which joined those that voted in favour of previous resolutions on Lebanon. We should like also to thank those that abstained. I should like to make particular note of the efforts made by you personally, Mr. President, by my brother the representative of Tunisia and also by the representative of Norway in making it possible for the Council to display a sense of consensus on this issue of Lebanon.

170. My final point is the following: what is at stake in Lebanon—or in this resolution, if it is viewed as a future-oriented resolution? Of course Lebanon is at stake. But also at stake are a concept of peace and the credibility of UNIFIL, the only serious, ongoing enterprise undertaken by this body to establish peace in one part of the Middle East. It is not any part of the Middle East but one very crucial and axial part, which has been referred to, even by those who abstained in the vote, as being of such paramount importance that the consequences of a failure of peace-keeping there could be so far-reaching as to provoke a general war in the area. We therefore propose and submit that any erosion of UNIFIL, from whatever source, is indeed not only a challenge to the Council but also a challenge to peace: a challenge to a serious, dedicated effort which has produced marvellous results, but which has not been allowed to continue.

171. In conclusion, I should like to say that one might look at Lebanon in two ways: one could look

at it from the south, “upwards”, or from the north, “downwards”. One might say, of course, that the problems that my country has been tragically experiencing will not all be miraculously solved if UNIFIL is enabled to carry out its task. But I should also suggest that the problems in the north have probably been artificially created by various parties, particularly Israel, that have utilized southern Lebanon as an instrument of destabilization and have held hostage the people of the south.

172. I hope that I may affirm, in all solemnity, that by UNIFIL, with UNIFIL and with the Governments which support it, we are interested in transforming southern Lebanon into an area of peace and security and not into an arena for future wars.

173. I should also like to say that we in Lebanon, with our traditions and our consistent, peace-loving policy, have no addiction to barbed-wire countries or ghetto States. Our vision of the future of the Middle East is not one of a collection of ghetto States and barbed-wire countries.

174. Finally, Mr. President, I know how much you love Lebanon. I know the concern that has been displayed around this table for Lebanon. It is very difficult indeed to speak for a victim country, very difficult and very painful. I do, however, beg for one thing: that my country should not be held accountable for what it has not done. We in Lebanon are only accountable for what the legitimate authorities of the land do in the name of the Lebanese people.

175. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Since there are no further speakers, the Council has concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 2.45 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.*

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2nd meeting.*

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