

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-FIFTH YEAR

2192nd MEETING: 30 JANUARY 1980

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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2192nd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 30 January 1980, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Jacques LEPRETTE (France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2192)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

The meeting was called to order at 5 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform the members of the Security Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Botswana, Cuba, Egypt, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Viet Nam in which they request to be invited to participate in the Council's discussion of the item on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tlou (Botswana), Mr. Roa Kourí (Cuba), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Dennis (Liberia), Mr. Muwamba (Malawi), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Sharif (Somalia), Mr. Mkapa (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mrs. Nguyen Ngoc Dung (Viet Nam) took the

places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I wish also to inform the members of the Council that I have received two letters, dated 30 January 1980, from the representatives of Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia. The first of those letters reads as follows:

"We, the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council, pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, extend an invitation to Mr. Tirivafi J. Kangai, representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, to participate in the Security Council's consideration of the item 'Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia'." [S/13770].

3. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to accede to the request that it extend an invitation to Mr. Tirivafi J. Kangai, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

It is so decided.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representative of the United Kingdom wishes to speak, and I now call on him.

5. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): My delegation does not intend to raise an objection to the proposal that the Patriotic Front be invited to address the Security Council, but I feel obliged to draw to the Council's attention the fact that by the decision it has just taken it has agreed to give a hearing to only one group from among a number of parties that are contesting the free and fair elections that we all wish to see held in Rhodesia. I trust that if any of the other parties were to ask for a hearing, the Council would similarly grant their request.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Due note will be taken of the statement just made by the United Kingdom representative.

7. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I am rather surprised at the statement we have just heard. Indeed, in all the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, the role of the Patriotic Front and its representatives is very definitely appraised and defined. A clear-cut definition has also

been given of the role of those who have just been called the "other parties". I think that the point made by my neighbour, Mr. Parsons, constitutes the first occasion on which we see that the representative of the United Kingdom has begun to have doubts about the decisions adopted earlier by the General Assembly and the Security Council on the significance and role of the Patriotic Front. I do not accept the second part of the statement. I do not have with me the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but if I did have them and if I were to read them out, they would show that these "other parties" whom the United Kingdom has in mind have never had a good word said about them by the Assembly or the Council.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The statement just made by the representative of the Soviet Union will appear in the record of this meeting.

9. The second letter from the representatives of Nigeria, Tunisia and Zambia reads as follows:

"We, the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council, pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, extend an invitation to Mr. Johnstone Makatini, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa, to participate in the Council's consideration of the item 'Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia' " [S/13771].

10. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to accede to the request that it extend an invitation to Mr. Johnstone Makatini, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

It is so decided.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council is meeting today at the request of the African group in the United Nations. That request is contained in the letter of 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

12. The first speaker is Mr. Cecil Dennis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, who wishes to make a statement on behalf of the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

13. Mr. DENNIS (Liberia): The events in Southern Rhodesia concerning which the Security Council has been convened today are viewed with the utmost gravity by all the States of independent Africa. That is why, as the representative of the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity and the President of Liberia, Mr. William R. Tolbert, and in my own

capacity as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of that organization, I have come with others of my colleagues to New York at this time, so that we may lay bare before the Security Council and the whole international community Africa's deep concern at the serious violations of the Lancaster House Agreement¹ which have taken place and are still continuing in Rhodesia. It is an irony that the very administering Power, the United Kingdom, which has primary responsibility for upholding the Lancaster House Agreement should itself be the violator of that sacred accord.

14. Permit me therefore, while expressing gratitude to the Council for consenting to convene this urgent meeting at Africa's request, to recall, also with gratitude, that the Security Council's interest in the peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian problem has been deep and sustained. Having grappled painstakingly with the problem for more than 14 years, now that victory is in sight, the Council cannot afford to be silent when the internationally accepted agreement for the peaceful decolonization of Zimbabwe is being placed in serious jeopardy.

15. But more important than the natural desire which the Council must entertain for the peaceful decolonization of Zimbabwe is the urgent attention that events in that war-weary and troubled land cannot but rightfully claim from it, for the violation or repudiation of the Lancaster House Agreement would defeat the achievement of self-determination by the people of Zimbabwe in the peaceful manner envisaged in the Agreement. Worse yet, a breakdown of the Agreement would lead to the resumption of the war of liberation, the ending of which was a principal achievement of the Agreement. If that tragic war, which has already claimed more than 20,000 lives and caused untold damage to property, were to be resumed, situations fraught with great dangers for international peace would quickly develop, because Zimbabwe lies within a charged and volatile region of the world and because the resumed war would be occurring at a time when the international community was experiencing a dangerous period of heightened tension.

16. Paragraph 8 of annex D of the Lancaster House Agreement that provides for the pre-independence arrangements in the Territory states:

"... In the first place, the purpose of the pre-independence arrangements is to allow the parties to put their case to the people under fair conditions. The pre-independence period should not be concerned with the remodelling of the institutions of Government. This will be a matter for the independence Government elected by the people of Rhodesia. The essential requirement is that all parties should be free to put their policies to the people and should commit themselves to abide by the people's choice. The purpose of the interim period should be a peaceful competition for power."

The purpose of the independence period, I repeat, as clearly stated in the agreement, "should be a peaceful competition for power".

17. Last month when the Security Council met and decided [*resolution 460 (1979)*] to lift the mandatory sanctions that had been imposed by it against the rebellious British colony, many delegations were naturally concerned at the situation prevailing in the Territory as the electoral process was about to get under way. It was clear to all—and much stress was placed on this in the debate [*2181st meeting*]*—*that in order for suitable conditions to exist in which a peaceful competition for power could take place, all South African forces and mercenaries had to be withdrawn. These same concerns were felt, more significantly, far beyond the confines of this chamber. Indeed, in the talks at Lancaster House in London, a stalemate had earlier developed regarding the cease-fire arrangements on this very point; and it was only after firm assurances had been given by the British authorities that the intimidating operations of all troops, including South African troops, would be stopped and that those troops would be withdrawn that the leaders of the Patriotic Front finally agreed to sign the cease-fire agreement.

18. I personally recall that on 4 December 1979, when news reports reached President Tolbert of statements made by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, that the British Government intended to proceed with the implementation of the independence plan for Zimbabwe with or without the participation of the Patriotic Front, President Tolbert, together with President Julius Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania and President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, who were at the time visiting Liberia, called in the British Chargé d'affaires resident in Monrovia and collectively expressed to him their grave concern at the trend which the talks had taken, and, among other things not less important, they sought clarification of the revelation that South African troops were present in Rhodesia.

19. With reference to Lord Carrington's reaction, conveyed through me by the British Chargé d'affaires in Monrovia of 5 December, to the concerns expressed by the three Presidents, and with particular reference to the question of the South African troops, I quote the following from the note handed me by the British Chargé d'affaires:

"... On the point about South African troops, Lord Carrington's reply is that there can be no question of intervention in Rhodesia by South African units or by the forces of any other Government while there is a British Governor in Rhodesia."

20. Later, when the troops still remained in the Territory after Lord Soames had assumed residence, Lord Carrington promised that the South African troops would be withdrawn on the signing of the accord.

The accord was signed on 21 December of last year, but as we address the Council today, the South African troops are still present in Zimbabwe. How can it be expected that Africa will even tolerate such a deliberate and flagrant violation of the Agreement? It was against the background of assurances from the Government of the United Kingdom—a great country which prides itself on integrity, honour and fair play—that OAU, the Security Council and international opinion were persuaded to support the Agreement reached at Lancaster House.

21. African leaders who visited London during the negotiations, as well as others from their respective capitals, did all they could to prevail upon the parties to do everything in their power to bring the war in Zimbabwe to a negotiated end. In their desire to see the Lancaster House Agreement concluded, they did not seek the betrayal of the noble cause for which African freedom fighters had fought for so long and so hard; rather, their actions were motivated by their faith and trust in the sincerity and noble intentions of all the parties to the negotiations, including the British Government.

22. But now it has been revealed that the British Governor, Lord Soames, has not been implementing the Lancaster House Agreement in an even-handed manner. More than that, there is proof positive that he has most lamentably violated numerous provisions of the Agreement.

23. It is not for any outsiders, most especially not for the colonial administering Power, whose impartiality should be unimpeachable, to seek to determine how the Zimbabweans should conduct their politics. Certainly the British Governor should not allow himself to attempt to influence the electoral process in Zimbabwe or to favour or give the appearance of favouring one or another of the political groups in the country over any of the others. Because such a biased course of conduct is being pursued by the administering Power in Zimbabwe at the present time, the Lancaster House Agreement is in danger of collapsing.

24. It will be recalled that not least among the reasons why the so-called elections in Zimbabwe some months ago by which the illegal Ian Smith régime was replaced by the equally illegal Smith-Muzorewa régime were never accepted by the international community was the fact that those elections took place in a climate of intimidation and while martial law and a state of emergency obtained in the Territory. Just as such conditions were not conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections then, they are not so now. The decision of the British Government to renew the state of emergency for another six months and to maintain martial law in the Territory is, in our opinion, a serious violation of the spirit and intent of the Lancaster House Agreement, and that decision should therefore be rescinded.

25. The question of the presence of South African troops in Zimbabwe, which I mentioned earlier, is one in respect of which the actions and explanations of the British authorities are most disturbing. Complaints that South African troops and mercenaries are at present operating aggressively in Zimbabwe have been countered by statements from the British that there are not many such troops in the Territory and that the few that are there are present only for the purpose of safeguarding the Beit Bridge. Such an explanation is a clear admission from the British themselves that the Lancaster House Agreement has been breached in spirit and intent. Our understanding of the Agreement does not allow for the presence of South African troops in Rhodesia for any purpose whatsoever. Moreover, we have been informed that South African troops are not only on the Rhodesian side of the Beit Bridge, on the pretext of providing security, but also in other parts of the country. South Africa's right to protect its interest in that portion of Beit Bridge falling within its territory can be exercised legitimately only from South African territory and not from Rhodesia. Whatever protection might be needed by Rhodesia in regard to Beit Bridge cannot be provided by South African troops.

26. In the last day or two the United Kingdom has announced South Africa's readiness to withdraw its troops from Zimbabwe once alternative security arrangements have been made for the bridge. The whole question of security in Rhodesia is a matter for the Governor, and South Africa, which is present in the colony illegally, cannot condition the termination of its illegal presence on actions to be taken by the Governor.

27. Beyond points of detail of the kind just mentioned, important though they are, we are greatly amazed that the United Kingdom, given its great familiarity with the essential issues in Rhodesia and particularly with the problems of racism that have bedevilled the decolonization of that Territory for so long, should be advancing arguments of the kind which have come to our knowledge. One can more easily understand racist elements of the type which flourishes in Pretoria boasting that a single contingent of crack troops of *apartheid* would be sufficient to keep the African freedom fighters and all the people of Zimbabwe at bay and deter them from being a challenge to minority white rule. Thus, to stress, as the British have done, that South African troops in Zimbabwe are not many has the effect of inflaming African sensitivities rather than allaying them. The presence in Zimbabwe of even a single South African soldier or mercenary harassing and murdering innocent Zimbabwean citizens and otherwise meddling in the affairs of that country is unacceptable, and it is offensive to all those who had placed their trust in the Lancaster House Agreement and in the readiness of the United Kingdom to implement it impartially.

28. The crux of the tragedy of Zimbabwe and all of southern Africa is diabolical racism and the outdated

and ill-founded theories of racial superiority propagated and enforced by the inhuman *apartheid* system. That is what the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe is all about and no one, least of all the British, who know better, should expect free Africa and African nationalists anywhere ever to compromise on these matters. We Africans are not inferior to any other human beings. Those who expect Africans to abandon so basic a position—something they themselves would never consider doing—for material advantage or for meaningless peace must know—and, if they do not know, let them be told now—that such an expectation smacks of the worst sort of racism.

29. But the statement that there are not many South African troops and mercenaries in Zimbabwe is simply not true. Our sources indicate that there is a massive deployment of up to 6,000 South African soldiers and policemen in various parts of Zimbabwe. In addition, we are reliably informed that there are South African troops on secondment to the Rhodesian forces, wearing Rhodesian uniforms and using Rhodesian-painted vehicles. Confirmed estimates indicate that there are four infantry battalions plus squadrons of armour with supporting artillery, headquarters and support units. We have learned further that, in addition to allowing the deployment of South African troops and paramilitary police in Zimbabwe, the British Governor, Lord Soames, has integrated the former private army of Bishop Muzorewa into the regular Rhodesian army while disbanding and harassing the forces of the Patriotic Front. A large number of civilians, we understand, are also being molested.

30. If the British or any others are seeking to deceive the people of Zimbabwe by efforts to cheat them in the exercise of their right to self-determination, those efforts will fail. The issue in Zimbabwe, as in all white-ruled southern Africa, is simple: racism must go; majority rule and independence must be established. There can be no other basis upon which peace and justice can be brought to that troubled region of the African continent. The Lancaster House Agreement was welcomed and supported by Africa because it signified that, as a consequence of the supreme struggle and sacrifices of the African freedom fighters of Zimbabwe, the establishment of a democratic multi-racial society appeared to be accepted by those who had been resisting it for so long. Because the Lancaster House Agreement is very carefully balanced, and a solution painstakingly arrived at to a complex and delicate problem, the international community, led by the Security Council, must not allow it to fail. If that happens, grave dangers for the peace of the world will ensue.

31. That is why we have come to the Security Council at this time urgently asking it to do everything within its power to cause the British faithfully to discharge their solemn duty and responsibility to the whole international community under the Lancaster House Agreement.

32. We in OAU regard the just, speedy and, we hope, peaceful decolonization of Zimbabwe as a matter of principle too basic to be compromised. Therefore, we call upon the British Government immediately to take the following actions in order to ensure that all Zimbabwean nationals freely participate in the forthcoming electoral process: first, to expel all South African troops and all mercenaries forthwith from Zimbabwe; secondly, to confine forthwith the Rhodesian security and auxiliary forces to their bases; thirdly, to release all political prisoners; and fourthly, to allow all Zimbabwean exiles to return home without threat, intimidation or arrest, in conformity with the Lancaster House Agreement.

33. We also call on all countries, especially the Western countries which have considerable influence in southern Africa and which in recent days have bravely raised a clarion call in defence of peace and principle in Asia, to do no less in Zimbabwe.

34. Finally, I shall conclude my remarks by reading a message that was sent on 14 January by Mr. William R. Tolbert, the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity and President of Liberia, to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher. That message and its repetition here are not prompted by a feeling that the Lancaster House Agreement cannot be saved; on the contrary, our faith in the British sense of justice and fair play makes us expect that the Agreement under the supervision of the United Kingdom can still lead to a peaceful resolution of the situation in Zimbabwe. President Tolbert's message to the British Prime Minister reads as follows:

"I am compelled to communicate with you once again regarding the state of affairs in Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia). You may recall that in my earlier message to you I had expressed grave concern about the continued presence of South African forces in Zimbabwe. Since then the situation in Zimbabwe has been further compounded and beclouded by the disturbing and alarming reports of the murder of a number of troops of the Patriotic Front by the Rhodesian security forces. Whatever the circumstances surrounding these unsettling developments in Zimbabwe, they have aroused serious concerns across the continent of Africa, reverberations of which I am certain have reached you. You will recall that the question of the role of Rhodesian forces during the transitional period in Zimbabwe and the presence of South African troops in the Territory were key issues of contention which caused a deadlock during negotiations on the cease-fire arrangements. That impasse was broken only when firm assurances were given by your Government that Rhodesian forces would be confined to bases and that South African troops would be withdrawn with the resumption of British control over Zimbabwe. We are therefore greatly surprised and distressed by the apparent contradiction in the actions of the British Governor in hastily deploying

Rhodesian forces and maintaining the presence of South African forces in Zimbabwe, especially where a clear threat of military intervention in Zimbabwe has already been made by South Africa. The nations of Africa, in whole-heartedly supporting the Lancaster House Agreement, have always insisted on fair and equal treatment of all the parties involved in the Zimbabwe problem. We are therefore concerned that any semblance of partiality or bias favouring one faction in Zimbabwe or indications that the Patriotic Front has been placed at an undue disadvantage *vis-à-vis* other political factions could seriously erode the base of Africa's support for the process of transition now under way in Zimbabwe and results emerging therefrom. Because of these concerns and apprehensions, I am taking this opportunity again to urge you to do all within your power to ensure that agreements reached in London are implemented fairly and impartially and that assurances given are fulfilled during this delicate period of transition which is being supervised by your Government in order that the goodwill and momentum for peace in Zimbabwe thus far generated may not be lost."

35. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): I reserve the right to intervene later in the debate to reply to fresh allegations against my Government contained in the statement of the Foreign Minister of Liberia and any other allegations which may emerge during the debate.

36. Today, I address myself to the letter sent to the President of the Council on 25 January 1980 by the Chairman of the African Group. That letter, which has led to the calling of this meeting, refers to "the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia". My Government does not recognize that there is a deteriorating situation in Rhodesia. Anyone who compares the situation in that country today with the situation of five weeks ago must conclude not only that there has been no deterioration but that, on the contrary, the situation has improved to a degree that is truly remarkable. Five weeks ago, Rhodesia was racked by a full-scale civil war which had been raging for over seven years, with appalling loss of life, misery and destruction from the continual encounters between the forces of the authorities in Salisbury and the forces of the Patriotic Front. Tens of thousands of Rhodesian civilians were refugees in neighbouring countries. The political and military leaders of the Patriotic Front, too, were in exile. The régime in Salisbury was recognized by no other Government. Sanctions had been enforced against Rhodesia for 13 years. The country was virtually cut off from the outside world.

37. But, after a mere five weeks, there have been quite extraordinary changes for the better. Last weekend, Mr. Robert Mugabe returned to Rhodesia and addressed a vast crowd of his supporters in Salisbury. Mr. Nkomo had already been afforded a

similar reception on his return to his country. The nature of the statements made by the leaders of the Patriotic Front, by Bishop Muzorewa and other political leaders and the peaceful way in which their huge crowds of supporters conducted themselves at the political rallies can leave no one in any doubt that all are committed to a full-scale election campaign. There are, of course, continuing problems, mainly problems of law and order. There have been serious breaches of the Lancaster House Agreement,¹ and there are still risks and dangers ahead of us. I shall return to these matters later in my statement. But it is the positive achievements in the days since the signing of the Agreement on which I first and foremost wish to concentrate.

38. Everywhere in Rhodesia there is mounting evidence of a return to normal life after the ravages of the long and bitter civil war. Major road links have now been reopened with Mozambique via Umtali and with Zambia via Chirundu. The rail link with Zambia is open, and work is going ahead to open other rail and road links with Mozambique. Five national airlines now operate scheduled air services into Rhodesia, three of these from black Africa. Over 4,000 refugees have so far returned from Botswana. Planning is at an advanced stage for the reception of refugees returning from Zambia and Mozambique.

39. The overall human rights picture has improved remarkably during the six weeks since the Governor's arrival in Salisbury. All 81 detainees held under order of the previous régime and commonly referred to as political prisoners have been released. The cases of other detainees, including all those held under martial law, are being reviewed and many are being released. An amnesty has been granted for all acts in furtherance of, or resistance to, the illegal declaration of independence. Martial law courts have been suspended. Sentences of execution have been commuted.

40. Almost 22,000 men of the Patriotic Front forces have presented themselves, as agreed, at the assembly points. The combined efforts of Patriotic Front commanders, the monitoring force and the police enabled large numbers of men of the Patriotic Front forces who had not reached the assembly places before the date for completion of the assembly period—4 January—to do so afterwards.

41. As problems arise, the Governor continues to deal with them through the machinery established in the Lancaster House Agreement—that is, the Cease-fire Commission and the Election Council. This machinery is functioning effectively with the full participation of representatives of the Patriotic Front. Patriotic Front liaison officers have played a major role in securing compliance with the cease-fire and in dealing with related difficulties. Co-operation and liaison continue between the Patriotic Front commanders at all levels, the police and the monitoring force over the security of the Patriotic Front assembly

places. The team of Commonwealth election observers set up in accordance with the Agreement has now arrived in Salisbury to begin its important task.

42. In the specific context of electoral preparations, all the political parties have been allocated equal free time on Rhodesian radio and television for party political broadcasts during the election campaign. All the parties are, in addition, free to purchase time, below a given ceiling, on radio and television at normal rates for political broadcasts and announcements and to place advertisements in the press. Furthermore, the Governor has lifted prohibitions on three newspapers which formerly were banned.

43. All this has been achieved in a few weeks in a country which had been brought to chaotic dislocation by 10 years of civil war, in an atmosphere in which it is inevitable that deep fears and suspicions continue to exist on all sides. I put it to the Council that progress has, in a word, been much more rapid and encouraging than any of us could possibly have hoped.

44. Of course it has been impossible to resolve instantly all the problems engendered by the years of illegal independence and civil war. But my Government is deeply disappointed that the African delegations, whose Governments did so much to create the circumstances in which agreement at Lancaster House became possible, should have seen fit to insist on a meeting of the Security Council at this stage in order to criticize in strong terms the British Government's performance. I do not wish to prolong this debate any further than is necessary. But, since the Chairman of the African Group has made the allegations contained in his letter to you, Mr. President, I have no alternative but to respond to them. I shall therefore go through the list of what are described in the letter as "gross violations of the Lancaster House Agreement" by my Government.

45. I start by rejecting the overall accusation most firmly. I have already stated that there have been serious breaches of the Agreement. But they have not been committed by my Government. They have been the subject of strong complaint to the Governor and to the various relevant commissions established under the Agreement. The complaints have come from all parties to the Agreement and they have been fully and properly investigated.

46. I have already emphasized that the machinery set up under the Lancaster House Agreement for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire and activities that could adversely affect the holding of free and fair elections is operating satisfactorily with the co-operation of all concerned. It is surely right that the Cease-fire Commission and the Electoral Council should be helped and encouraged to deal with the problems that arise. It is these bodies, functioning on the ground in Rhodesia, which are best qualified to weigh the various relevant complex factors, to sift

the evidence and propose the appropriate remedial action.

47. The first detailed point raised in the letter from the African Group—and I believe from our consultations that it was the most important point to the authors—was the presence of a company of South African troops at the Rhodesian end of Beit Bridge. I should like to put this into perspective. That was a small number of troops used to protect a vital life-line. They were deployed in the immediate vicinity of the bridge. There was no question of their intervening in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. It was inconceivable that this small detachment could in any way have affected the course of the elections. Their activities were, in any case, strictly monitored by the monitoring teams.

48. We have, however, been alive to the sensitivities of African Governments whose objections to the presence of the South African company were based on feelings and emotions which we understand. We always made it clear that the Governor would keep the position of that force under review. As the Council knows, a joint statement by the South African and British Governments was released last weekend confirming the decision to withdraw the troops from the Rhodesian side of the bridge as soon as satisfactory substitute arrangements could be made by the Rhodesian security forces to safeguard the bridge. I now inform the Council that the South African detachment has been withdrawn today. This dispute, then, is behind us.

49. It should nevertheless be realized more widely than it is that the British Government and the Governor have a difficult task to allay the very different fears and anxieties of all the parties involved. It is not only the concerns of the Patriotic Front and the African nations that must be met, but also, if the settlement is to work, the concerns of the internal parties and the white minority. It must not be forgotten that it was Bishop Muzorewa who gave up at Lancaster House the office to which he had been appointed as a result of elections which, however imperfect, reflected the views of over 60 per cent of the population. It was the white minority that gave up its blocking powers in Parliament so that a constitution could be agreed on that provided, at long last, for genuine majority rule. Those were very major concessions. I know that my words will not appeal to some delegations, but they are true, and it is in this context that we should view the original decision to allow the presence of a small South African force at Beit Bridge.

50. The letter from the Chairman of the African Group goes on to make a number of other allegations. In its most intemperate passage, the letter accuses the Governor of deploying Rhodesian forces "to kill and harass Patriotic Front forces on their way to assembly points". I assume that this incredible allegation refers to the most unhappy incident, which we

profoundly regret, that occurred at Lupane three weeks ago. This was fully investigated by the Cease-fire Commission, on which—as I have already said—the Patriotic Front is represented. This was the sole really serious incident involving Patriotic Front forces on their way to assembly points. The Cease-fire Commission found that the killings resulted from a breach of the cease-fire by forces of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). This judgement and the need for action to deal with the breach were accepted by the ZIPRA representative on the Cease-fire Commission. In all the circumstances it is quite remarkable that the Patriotic Front forces—and remember there were nearly 22,000 men—were able to go to their assembly points without further major difficulties and incidents. The implication that the Governor in some sense intended the killings at Lupane is frankly unacceptable—to put it mildly—and deeply resented by my Government.

51. I turn next to the question of the deployment of the auxiliary forces. The auxiliaries are part of the Rhodesian forces and were declared as such at Lancaster House. As part of the Rhodesian forces they are deployed, in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement, to help the police to contain breaches of the cease-fire. They are monitored. There have been various blanket allegations of intimidation by the auxiliaries. These have been investigated and have been found to be not proven. I would remind the Council at this point that the report of the Pearce Commission of 1972,² which was widely accepted, made clear how very difficult it is to assess charges of this kind and to determine whether the degree of intimidation involved is inhibiting a free electoral choice.

52. The monitoring force has so far brought one breach of the cease-fire agreement by the auxiliaries to the Cease-fire Commission, together with two cases of alleged intimidation, which are being pursued by the police. Other specific complaints have been thoroughly investigated and dealt with through the Election Council. In many important ways, the auxiliaries' activities are increasingly related to the re-establishment of civilian administration in the tribal trust lands where they are engaged in attempts to promote the inhabitants' return to normal life. They are not there to conduct any form of political campaign. I do not deny that there may have been lapses, but I can assure the Council that the activities of the auxiliaries are being closely scrutinized and that, as and when incidents of indiscipline and political partiality are reported, they are being thoroughly investigated and the offenders disciplined. If any delegation wishes to make allegations against the auxiliaries, let it support them with detailed facts. As I say, we have already heard enough blanket accusations that have turned out to be of no substance.

53. The third paragraph in the list of criticisms contained in the letter from the Chairman of the African

Group refers to the renewal of the state of emergency, the maintenance of martial law, the continued detention of political prisoners and the return of refugees. Let me take these in order.

54. On 18 January 1980, the Governor renewed the present state of emergency for a further six months. The existing laws, validated on his assumption of authority—as stipulated in the Lancaster House Agreement—would have lapsed on 26 January unless the Governor took action before then to renew them. The Governor's decision was taken in view of the level of lawlessness and violence in the country as a whole. This led inexorably to the conclusion that a state of emergency does in fact still exist. I should add that the regulations under emergency powers are not uniformly restrictive.

55. Some of their provisions are essential in order to facilitate the holding of next month's elections: for example, those which permit the authorities to take over premises for use as polling stations. The emergency powers regulations have also been used recently to permit the requisitioning of premises as refugee reception centres. The Governor has used the provision of the emergency powers regulations to facilitate the transport of Patriotic Front forces from rendezvous points to assembly places by civilian buses. These regulations do contain a number of provisions which are held by some observers to be objectionable, especially those relating to restriction and detention without trial. But revocation orders had been signed before the renewal of the present state of emergency in respect of all remaining detainees held by Ministerial order under the emergency powers regulations. By then all the 60-day detention orders which were in force at the time of the Governor's arrival in Salisbury had lapsed. The Governor's administration continues to apply itself to the task of reducing as far as possible unnecessary restrictions imposed by the emergency powers regulations. The Governor has revoked, and will go on revoking, such restrictive regulations as are no longer justified by circumstances.

56. Next, the related question of the maintenance of martial law. Paragraph 20 of annex D of the Lancaster House Agreement which deals with the pre-independence arrangements states that "in the event of an effective cease-fire, the necessity for martial law will disappear". The Governor is committed to lifting martial law as soon as the situation permits this. He has been obliged to continue the application of martial law over a large area of Rhodesia and to renew the emergency provisions in response to the security situation as it is now. Every day in Rhodesia at present there are incidents of armed robbery, murder and the theft of cattle by armed men on a scale which is well beyond what is normal in a peaceful society. Contacts continue on a disturbing scale between the police and armed individuals or groups, in particular those guerrilla

forces which have refused to comply with the cease-fire agreement and with the order of their commanders to assemble. There have been several cases of political violence, and one parliamentary candidate has been murdered. In these circumstances, it would be irresponsible for the Governor to take steps which might increase the risks to which the peaceful and law-abiding majority of the people are exposed by a lawless and violent minority. Nevertheless, the situation has improved since the signing of the cease-fire agreement and the Governor has proceeded progressively to relax restrictive measures where it is safe to do so. Martial law courts are no longer functioning. Many martial law detainees have been released. This process of relaxation will continue to the full extent justified by improvements in the security situation. What I have just said in no way contradicts my opening remarks about the astonishing improvement in the overall situation since the resumption of legality. It would have been too much to expect Rhodesia to return to perfect peace within a few weeks of the end of a harsh and long drawn out civil war.

57. As I have already stated, there are no political prisoners still in detention in Rhodesia. The last one was released on 17 January. It took rather longer to procure the release of the 71 members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) imprisoned in Mozambique by Mr. Mugabe, but I am glad to say that they are now free to return to their country.

58. We also reject the allegation that we have denied "the fundamental right of return to all Zimbabwean refugees". As I said at the beginning of my statement, some 4,000 refugees have already returned from Botswana, and arrangements are in hand for this flow to continue. We hope to set a date very soon for the return of refugees from Zambia and Mozambique. We do not deny that the repatriation of refugees has not gone as smoothly as we would have hoped; there are various reasons for that. First of all, it is in no one's interest to repatriate refugees faster than they can be absorbed. We have been in close touch with the Government of Botswana and with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who has agreed to co-ordinate the repatriation exercise. There have been difficulties. To be frank, there have been occasional misunderstandings which have resulted in more refugees crossing the border than could be immediately absorbed in Rhodesia. Of course, there have been practical problems. At one stage we had to halt the flow because there was too little drinking water at a reception centre. In some cases sites already chosen for reception centres turned out to be unsuitable. The difficulties on the Botswana border have led to a diversion of resources and some delay in getting the repatriation of refugees from Zambia and Mozambique off to a smooth start. It goes without saying that the continued violations of the cease-fire, particularly in the eastern part of the country, will make it very difficult to ensure the prompt repatriation

of refugees from Mozambique. But we are committed to doing everything we can to ensure that as many voters as possible will return by the election date.

59. I come now to the allegation that the British Governor has refused to accord equal treatment to the Patriotic Front forces and that officials and supporters of the Patriotic Front are being harassed. This is a vaguely worded accusation and it is not the first time the Governor has been accused of bias. Indeed, he has quite frequently been accused of it by the internal parties and by the white minority, including the military commanders. I put it to the Council that Lord Soames has taken on a quite extraordinarily difficult task. It can be argued that the very fact that he has been accused of bias on all sides is evidence of his impartiality. Here at the United Nations the tendency is to concentrate on the rights and concerns of the Patriotic Front, which have always been the preoccupation of the majority of delegations. But the Governor has to deal with the realities of life in Rhodesia, the tensions and the fears and prejudices of all parties who were equal signatories of the Lancaster House Agreement.

60. Certainly there have been breaches of the cease-fire. All parties have been found in breach of it on occasions. What follows are facts. The overwhelming majority of breaches of the cease-fire since it came into effect on 28 December 1979 involving shooting or the threat of shooting have been attributed to the Patriotic Front forces, and of those, 85 per cent have involved the forces of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). For example, the Cease-fire Commission met yesterday afternoon and considered 43 alleged breaches. Consideration of seven was deferred so that further evidence could be obtained. Of the remaining 36, the Commission agreed that 27 did constitute breaches of the cease-fire and attributed them as follows: two to ZIPRA; two to unidentified armed men in the ZIPRA area of operations; 18 to ZANLA; four to unidentified armed men in the ZANLA area of operations. One was considered unattributable.

61. Since the Cease-fire Commission started its work, it has considered 121 allegations, although, of course, this represents only a small proportion of the total number of incidents reported. Of those 121 allegations, the Commission has agreed that 78 were breaches and has attributed them as follows: security forces, one breach; ZIPRA, eight breaches, with two more breaches in the ZIPRA area of operations; ZANLA, 34 breaches, with 20 further breaches in the ZANLA area. There have been five further breaches by people armed with the type of weapons used by the Patriotic Front forces and eight further unattributable breaches. I must stress that the ZANLA representative has been present at all of the Commission's meetings and has accepted all its findings.

62. During the period of assembly and disengagement between 28 December and 4 January, there was a

large-scale, highly organized cross-border movement by ZANLA. Three to four thousand crossed from Mozambique in that period, in direct violation of the Lancaster House Agreement that cross-border movement must cease with effect from 21 December. It has been confirmed by various ZANLA personnel that a significant proportion of ZANLA forces were instructed to remain outside the assembly places in order to exert pressure on the population to vote for ZANU. ZANLA arms caches have been discovered in the tribal trust lands in the eastern provinces. There have been several incidents involving the continued laying of mines by ZANLA forces. At public meetings in the rural areas, there have been repeated statements by ZANLA that if they do not win the elections, they will continue the war. There has been intimidation in the tribal trust lands, by which I mean threats to shoot people who do not vote for Mr. Mugabe's ZANU. This party has continued to try to disseminate propaganda material containing open incitement to violence.

63. I have no doubt that there will be those who will seize on these last remarks of mine in order to claim that the British are once again trying to discredit Mr. Mugabe and his forces. That is not our motive, but it is only right that the facts should be spoken aloud, and it is only fair that both sides of the case should be put. It must be remembered that the activities of ZANLA are of deep concern to all those who are determined that free elections should take place—and that includes Mr. Nkomo's party.

64. It is all too easy for the supporters of one side or another to accuse us of bias, or to attempt in effect to reinterpret the Lancaster House Agreement; but I ask the Council to concentrate on the positive achievements in the last few weeks. I say this to the members of the Council and to all delegations, especially the very distinguished representatives of African States here today. We the British have been set a task which we are closer to achieving than any of us could ever have imagined. I urge my friends and colleagues to say nothing here which will make the problems in Rhodesia harder to solve, or to initiate action here which might imperil the Agreement itself, the last hope for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. I put it to you that you must trust us even though you may not approve of all the decisions we take. You must trust us, that is to say, to remain faithful to our commitment to do everything within our power to ensure that conditions are right for elections which are truly free and fair and which will lead to a peaceful and prosperous independence for Zimbabwe. We, for our part, reaffirm that commitment today.

65. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Benjamin Mkapa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

66. Mr. MKAPA (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I wish to express gratitude to you and to the other members of the Security Council for allowing my delegation to participate in this debate on the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

67. The signing of the Lancaster House Agreement¹ on Southern Rhodesia constituted a solemn undertaking by the British Government to ensure true majority rule through free and fair elections. It was also a pledge to the international community by the British Government that it was ready to assume its role as the administering colonial Power over that Territory, which had defied its authority for many years. The United Republic of Tanzania took that commitment very seriously and expected the British Government and the transitional authority in Southern Rhodesia to observe the letter and the spirit of the Agreement. For we believed then, as we still believe now, that whether the Lancaster House Agreement could hold depended largely upon the scrupulous and impartial compliance with it by the colonial Power.

68. My Government and those of other front-line States worked diligently towards the realization of this Agreement, which we believed would minimize bloodshed and suffering in Zimbabwe. For the same reason, Africa, the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations lent their support to the accord.

69. The 15 weeks of negotiation were punctuated by a series of crises. On several contentious issues the Conference came to the brink of collapse. But with the interest and counsel of several members of the Security Council, of OAU, of the non-aligned countries and of the United Nations, failure was averted and compromise provisions were agreed to by all the parties.

70. It has therefore been with great shock and dismay that we have followed fundamental breaches of the Lancaster House Agreement on these very contentious issues by the administering Power since the Governor was installed in the colony in mid-December. We were astonished to see that the British authorities that had chaired the negotiations leading to this delicate and sensitive Agreement were the first to dishonour it.

71. They have set the Agreement off to a bad start, because even before the conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference, the British Government precipitately sent a Governor to Salisbury; and, before the ink on the Agreement was dry, Her Majesty's Government took an illegal, unilateral action to lift sanctions which had been collectively imposed by the United Nations. In spite of that bad omen, we remained hopeful that that over-zealousness on the part of the British authorities would be corrected.

72. Unfortunately, no such self-restraint has been evinced by the Governor and his Administration. Rather, we have witnessed calculated and more bold actions by him in breach of the most important and

sensitive provisions of the Agreement. With arrogance, the Governor is embarked upon a dismantling of the transitional arrangements, imperilling the cease-fire and, by inviting South African troops and condoning their presence, sanctioning external intervention in the transitional and electoral process.

73. Given those ominous developments, Africa was left no choice but to come before the Security Council to protest in the strongest possible terms against the breach of the Lancaster House Agreement. Because this body has been seized of the Rhodesian question from the time of the 1965 rebellion, we feel that it should consider the grave and far-reaching implications of the gross violations of the Agreement for Zimbabwe's independence and for peace in that region.

74. I have heard the assurances of the representative of the British Government that South African troops have now been withdrawn from Rhodesia and his opinion that this difficult point is now behind us. I must say that, in my view, it is not behind us and I shall therefore still refer to it, because as I said it explains the character and thinking of the transitional Administration in Rhodesia, which must affect the course of events during the next four decisive weeks.

75. The troops of the *apartheid* régime have been in Rhodesia at the sufferance—indeed, at the invitation—of the British Governor. That is contrary to the letter of the Agreement and assurances given in London by the British authorities. But most disturbing is the fact that Governor Soames has spoken approvingly of and hence sanctioned that presence. First, he told us that they would not interfere with the electoral process; but now we are told that those troops are withdrawing from Rhodesia. How are we expected to believe that? In London we were assured that they would leave the minute the Governor arrived. Today we are being assured that they have left. What will we be assured two weeks from now?

76. Those troops constituted a big threat and were intended to intimidate Zimbabweans, especially the supporters of the Patriotic Front. It must be clear that their aim was to serve notice that the South Africans would prepare a *coup* against a duly elected Zimbabwe Government and then set up a puppet régime in the territory as a buffer.

77. The continued presence of South African and other mercenary troops nearly broke up the Conference in London. It was only when the British Government gave an undertaking that their presence would not be countenanced upon the Governor's assuming office, that it was possible to proceed to other issues. Lest there be any doubt about this point, I shall quote from the official record of the crucial session where the issue was settled.

78. Mr. Mugabe of the Patriotic Front said:

"As you know, we remain concerned about the disposition of the forces, the grounding of the Rhodesian Air Force and the presence of the South African forces."

79. Lord Carrington, the British Secretary of State and Chairman of the Conference, replied:

"In relation to your concerns, I can assure you again that there will be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The position has been made clear to all Governments concerned, including South Africa."

80. That was an unconditional undertaking which has been unilaterally and clandestinely abrogated.

81. The Governor was expected to head an impartial interim administration, but by his acts of commission and omission, Governor Soames has spiritedly come out in favour of the Smith-Muzorewa group and relentlessly against the Patriotic Front. Ironically, it was the Patriotic Front, through armed struggle, that made it possible for the Lancaster House negotiations to take place and the Agreement to emerge. It was the Patriotic Front, through immense sacrifice, that enabled the British to resume authority in Rhodesia. The achievements for which Governor Soames now claims credit—and which have been enumerated here this evening—have been brought about by Zimbabweans who have shed their blood under the banner of the Patriotic Front. However, the fighters of the Patriotic Front are now pejoratively referred to as the "rebels", while the Smith-Muzorewa forces are glorified as the "Government forces" and the "security forces". And it could not have escaped representatives this evening that the representative of Her Majesty's Government continues to refer to the forces of the former rebel régime as the "security forces"; I ask, then, which are the forces of insecurity?

82. Under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, Patriotic Front forces were to report to and be confined at 16 designated assembly points, while the forces of the former rebel régime of Smith and Muzorewa were to be confined to 40 designated bases. The Patriotic Front forces have assembled; but Governor Soames has, by his own repeated affirmations, permitted the forces of the former rebel régime to remain at large. He and his Administration refer to them as "Government forces", casting an unacceptable aspersion upon the legitimacy of the Patriotic Front forces.

83. The deployment of the forces of the former rebel régime is contrary to the letter of the Agreement and constitutes a grave provocation of the assembled Patriotic Front forces. The forces of the former rebel régime should be confined to the 40 designated bases. That is what the Lancaster House Agreement stipulates.

84. I am glad that the representative of Her Majesty's Government has confirmed this evening that those forces have been deployed and are assisting in the maintenance of law and order. That is contrary to the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement. In that Agreement it is stipulated that the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is that of the Rhodesian police, and it was with extreme reluctance that this concession was made by the Patriotic Front, because even the police were an instrument of the former rebel régime. And so it is adding insult to injury now to deploy the armed forces in addition to the police for the purpose of maintaining law and order.

85. The attachment to the cease-fire agreement stipulates the provision of additional assembly places should the number of men of the Patriotic Front forces assembled exceed the 16,000 envisaged by the British Government. Some 22,000 men of the Patriotic Front forces are now assembled. To date Governor Soames has not given additional sites.

86. Under the Lancaster House Agreement the forces of the Patriotic Front and those of the former rebel régime are given equal treatment by the Governor and his Administration. This equality of treatment is written into the Agreement; it had to be in order to destroy any notion in the minds of the international community and, specifically, of the Governor that the Rhodesian army would be the legal army during the interim. It was an issue so vital that, again, it almost caused the Conference to break up. But Governor Soames has elected to ignore it. Not only has he deployed the Smith-Muzorewa forces, he has also employed them to harass and intimidate Patriotic Front leaders and supporters. Those troops have killed, in cold blood, Patriotic Front forces on their way to assembly points in two incidents. The Governor has attempted to justify those murders by claiming that the Patriotic Front forces in those incidents refused to surrender their arms. They had every right to refuse to surrender those arms. Nowhere in the Lancaster House Agreement is it provided that the Patriotic Front is to surrender to the rebel army. In a statement on 11 December 1979, Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, affirmed the following:

"... There can be no question of surrender by either side. All the forces which comply with the Agreement, which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will retain their arms and equipment, will be treated honourably and will be lawful."

But Governor Soames, in using rebel forces to kill freedom fighters, has nullified this understanding of his Secretary of State.

87. I am sure that it has not escaped the Council's notice that it has not been told this evening that the Patriotic Front, which is equal, under the Governor,

to the Rhodesian forces, has been asked to enforce law and order anywhere. It has not. Repeatedly, the Rhodesian forces have. That is the kind of equality that is being enforced.

88. In addition to deploying the Smith-Muzorewa troops, the British Governor has further deployed the so-called auxiliaries, which are nothing but a band of ill-trained, armed political thugs of Muzorewa and Sithole. Under the Agreement they, too, were expected to be confined to base. The representative of Her Majesty's Government has confirmed to the Council this evening that they are in the tribal trust lands. They are not confined to base; they are supposed to be enforcing law and order—ill-trained, armed political thugs of one group. Those private armies have now been a major factor in Governor Soames' breach of the cease-fire agreement. He has said: "They are doing a lot of work that needs doing." That work is to take over positions vacated by the Patriotic Front forces and to surround them. Once again the statement of 11 December 1979 by the Chairman of the Conference has been violated with impunity. The assurance that there would be no question of any Patriotic Front forces being encircled is being rendered meaningless. Instead of confining the Smith-Muzorewa forces and Muzorewa's auxiliaries to base as the Lancaster House Agreement envisages, the Governor has used them to terrorize Patriotic Front forces and the general population.

89. Furthermore, and in spite of what has been said here this evening, we believe that the British Governor has ignored the machinery established by the Lancaster House Agreement, where it is provided that, if there are breaches of the cease-fire, it will be for the commanders to deal with them through the machinery of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the Monitoring Force. As far as we know, to this day the Governor has not invoked or spoken of this machinery. There has not been one occasion on which the Governor has said that he acted on the advice of the Cease-fire Commission—or, indeed, against its advice.

90. Another grave breach of the Lancaster House Agreement is the recent renewal of the state of emergency and martial law for another six months. Whereas the Agreement says the necessity of martial law will disappear in the event of an effective cease-fire, the Governor, in his wisdom, deemed it fit to extend the emergency unnecessarily. We have been told that the cease-fire is holding reasonably well. So we wonder, if the machinery is working well, what is the reason for renewing this state of emergency? It is precisely because the interim Administration has not respected the machinery established by the Agreement that it has had to resort to martial law. And it is in the midst of this martial law that the parties are expected to campaign in the elections and to exercise freedom of speech. That is an unusual setting, to say the least, in which "free and fair elections" are to be

held. This travesty becomes even more offensive when it is remembered that the Lancaster House Agreement gave the British authorities the mandate to end martial law. Instead, they have decided to renew it.

91. My delegation could cite more violations and instances of biased action on the part of the administering Power. But I believe that we have said enough to underscore the persistent disposition of the colonial Power to place the Smith-Muzorewa group at political and military advantage relative to other groups and, in particular, the Patriotic Front.

92. We deplore the barrage of calumny emanating from Governor Soames' office aimed at the Patriotic Front as the violator of the Agreement and the cease-fire. How can we believe that the forces of the rebel army have overnight turned into angels? How can we believe that none of the more than 100,000 armed white civilians has caused breaches of law and order? Indeed, why is it that, in the violations allegedly committed by the Patriotic Front forces, it is members of the Patriotic Front forces only that get killed? Why is it?

93. We deplore the lies uttered from Governor Soames' office against the neighbouring front-line States to the effect that they have allowed the infiltration of freedom fighters since the Agreement was signed. We commend the Patriotic Front for exercising restraint and sticking to the Agreement despite Governor Soames' provocations and vilifications of them. The Patriotic Front is the injured party in all this campaign of lies, but it has so far conducted itself magnanimously and with great restraint. We pay a tribute to the front-line States of Mozambique and Zambia for resisting the vicious propaganda campaign of Governor Soames and his collaborators. We salute them for the immense sacrifices they have made in material and human terms for the freedom of Zimbabwe.

94. For our part, we have said that we shall accept any Government that is elected through free and fair elections. But those elections do have to be free and fair. This is an unqualified condition which we attach to our acceptance of the election results.

95. We and many other countries support the Patriotic Front, and we are proud of that support. It was well that someone supported the Patriotic Front through the years, otherwise Governor Soames would not today be in Government House in Salisbury, and the Security Council would be seized of the issue of Southern Rhodesia in very different terms.

96. But our support for the Patriotic Front does not disqualify us from an impartial observation of the decolonization process. In addition, we are not the decolonizing Power. Nor does our sympathy for the Patriotic Front entitle the Administering Authority to change the provisions of the Lancaster House

Agreement. In spite of our sympathy for the Patriotic Front, we are not asking the Governor to aid and abet its election. Nor are we asking him to aid any other party in the election. It is not his role to decide who should win. His cardinal role is to see to it that free and fair elections are held.

97. It is obvious that if the colonial Power persists in implementing the Lancaster House Agreement only partially, free and fair elections cannot take place. The situation is precarious. The South African presence, invited and condoned by the colonial authority, is a dangerous precedent of external intervention. The cease-fire is extremely fragile and will not hold, so long as the monitoring force monitors only one group of forces, namely, the Patriotic Front forces. The deployment of the so-called auxiliaries is an endorsement of political thuggery.

98. These are genuine and legitimate concerns of Africa, of my country and of the international community about which the Security Council has to take action to save this last chance of a peaceful process to Rhodesian independence. We call upon the Council to safeguard the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe by taking appropriate action to ensure that Britain enforces impartially the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement. Otherwise, the opportunity for peaceful transition in southern Africa will be lost, with imponderable and ghastly consequences.

99. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. José Oscar Monteiro, Minister of State for the Presidency of the People's Republic of Mozambique. I bid him welcome and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

100. Mr. MONTEIRO (Mozambique) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this important United Nations body and to express to you, and through you to the other members of the Security Council, our thanks for giving us this opportunity to take part in the Council's deliberations.

101. About a month ago we had the honour to represent our country in this important body [2181st meeting], which was meeting to discuss the problems relating to the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. Under consideration were the Agreement signed at Lancaster House¹ with the design of leading Zimbabwe to independence through free and democratic elections. Within the terms of the Agreement, the United Kingdom, carrying out its responsibilities as a colonial Power, was to guarantee the process of decolonization. It appeared that peace would come to our area in general, and to Zimbabwe in particular.

102. Aware of our special responsibility in the search for peace, we attended the meetings at Lancaster

House. We came to the Council to support the lifting of sanctions, since we were convinced that the rebel régime had been destroyed and that peace and democracy would triumph.

103. Fourteen years ago, settlers rebelled against the British Crown and took power, unilaterally proclaiming independence. Great Britain silently and passively witnessed that serious violation of the rights of the majority. For the people of Zimbabwe there was no alternative but to organize resistance, a people's war. It was in that way that the patriots of Zimbabwe achieved decisive victories in the armed struggle which led to the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement.

104. The people of Zimbabwe have the historic merit of having resisted oppression and intimidating manoeuvres. It is to their credit that they took up arms to build peace, freedom and independence. Those were the objectives of the struggle and the reason for the support of Africa and the support of the entire international community for their just struggle. For democracy, peace and independence are aspirations which are dear to all peoples. Those common objectives of mankind can be attained in Zimbabwe today through elections, but for that to happen, the elections must be free and democratic.

105. We are meeting here at a time when there are serious threats to this process. The dangers that would arise from a halt in the march towards peace are particularly serious. It is the duty of the international community to prevent such an eventuality. In particular, that is the task of the Security Council.

106. Bearing this in mind, what is the situation in Zimbabwe? Do conditions exist for the holding of elections in complete freedom and without threats? We would say, no. The administering Power has not implemented with the required strictness and exactitude the Agreement that has been signed.

107. We are seriously concerned by developments in the Rhodesian situation. Everything indicates that since Lancaster House there has been a desire to legalize the rebellion, to turn yesterday's oppressors and aggressors into law enforcement officers and, even more serious, to turn freedom fighters into outlaws. The Patriotic Front forces, which fought the rebels, are themselves being portrayed as rebels and violators of the Agreement. And the Smith-Muzorewa forces, which promoted the rebellion and supported it, which killed defenceless people in Zimbabwe and in our countries, have been given the task of supervising the cease-fire.

108. The forces of the *apartheid* régime, which have internationally been recognized as having sown terror and death in southern Africa, have been called upon to guarantee peace and security in Southern Rhodesia.

109. The mercenaries are free to move about the Territory, whereas the nationalist forces are kept

together at designated points. Taking advantage of that situation, the so-called auxiliary forces of Muzorewa, which were to be regrouped together with the Rhodesian forces, have occupied zones that elements of the Patriotic Front have abandoned. They are harassing the population, and that has been confirmed. The fact that those auxiliary forces have not been confined to their posts, as specified in the Lancaster House Agreement, has been confirmed here in the course of this meeting. White civilians armed with all kinds of weapons, including pistols, carbines and machine-guns, circulate freely and create a dangerous atmosphere filled with tension.

110. In the Agreement it was clearly established that Zimbabwean political prisoners were to be released and that refugees in neighbouring countries were to be free to return to their homes to take part in the electoral process. But here again the administering Power not only has not liberated all the political prisoners, but it has raised obstacles to the return of more than 250,000 refugees who are in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. We are less than a month away from the elections, yet the number of refugees who have actually returned is infinitesimal. As far as my country is concerned, I would add that the difficulties stem from the fact that the local authorities in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia have agreed to only two entry points for about 150,000 refugees, requiring some of them to travel hundreds of kilometres.

111. By extending martial law, the Governor of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia is using an instrument of repression of the rebel régime that prevents elections from being held in a climate of complete freedom.

112. The Patriotic Front saw the return of its leaders to their homeland delayed unjustifiably. They were thus at a disadvantage in the electoral campaign. All kinds of pretexts have been used to make the nationalists appear the violators of law and order. The Governor has allowed the rebel forces to see to the application of martial law, which has been extended for six months. One wonders why six months.

113. The task of the British Government has been and remains to guarantee a climate of freedom throughout the entire transitional period; that is Great Britain's mandate. The Governor's role is not that of a colonial governor. His task is decolonization by means of free democratic elections. That was the understanding of the Council in its resolution 460 (1979), which states that the United Kingdom:

“... as the administering Power is committed to decolonizing Southern Rhodesia on the basis of free and democratic elections, which will lead Southern Rhodesia to genuine independence acceptable to the international community in accordance with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)”.

114. In adopting resolution 460 (1979), the Security Council wisely decided to keep the situation in Southern Rhodesia under review until the Territory attained full independence. That is why we are meeting here today: because the situation does entail dangers for the peace we wish to preserve.

115. The fight for peace in southern Africa, and in particular in Zimbabwe, means an uncompromising struggle for just and free elections.

116. We of the People's Republic of Mozambique, the neighbouring countries and the countries of the region are particularly concerned. Only strict respect for the Agreement that has been signed can guarantee peace.

117. This is not a legalistic exercise regarding the correctness of the elections; what is at issue is peace itself, and that should prompt us to rise above passing problems and electoral tactics and to concentrate our attention on essentials.

118. The international community, then, has the full responsibility. We must be constantly vigilant. At every step of the way we must see whether the conditions exist for the elections to take place in a climate of freedom and confidence. It is necessary for the Security Council to determine whether its decisions have in fact been respected.

119. It is not by chance that in resolution 460 (1979), the Council requires the administering Power to ensure that no South African or other external forces, regular or mercenary, will remain in or enter Southern Rhodesia. The presence of such troops is a flagrant violation by the British Government of the declarations of the British Governor himself, of the Lancaster House Agreement, and of decisions of the Council. It is a threat to peace not only in Zimbabwe but in southern Africa as a whole. It means—and this is a serious matter—that the British Government accepts South Africa's role as policeman in the region.

120. Within the terms of the Agreement reached, as my colleagues have already said, the forces of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian forces have the same status. We cannot agree to the British Government's arbitrarily using the Rhodesian forces to maintain order. However, if order has been disrupted, we believe that the forces of the Patriotic Front are in a better position to restore it than the institutionalized violators of legality, those who proclaimed the unilateral declaration of independence, the rebels against the international community.

121. In Zimbabwe, it is the Patriotic Front that has full moral and political authority. It is the Patriotic Front that has always defended the fundamental interests of the people of Zimbabwe and Africa and the international community. It was even the Patriotic Front that defended the British Crown against the

rebels who flouted it. It was the fight waged by the Patriotic Front that made it possible for Great Britain to assume its responsibility as administering Power.

122. But what are we actually witnessing? It is not the rebels, the outlaws, the real terrorists who have caused so much death and suffering that have been regrouped at assembly points; it is, rather, the patriots, the freedom fighters and those who have fought rebellion that are being neutralized.

123. The African countries, the non-aligned movement and all peace-loving peoples have made it perfectly clear that they will recognize Zimbabwe as independent only when its people has expressed its will in complete freedom. That is a fundamental condition.

124. The United Kingdom must guarantee that all South African forces, including South African mercenaries, who have joined the Rhodesian army, will withdraw from the Territory immediately. It must guarantee that Rhodesian auxiliary forces will be regrouped within the clear terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. The forces of the Patriotic Front must assume the responsibility they have won in the maintenance of law and order.

125. Martial law must be abrogated. The refugees must be allowed to return without delay. All parties must have the same facilities for reaching public opinion at all levels. It is only then that we can guarantee a climate of impartiality, that would make possible free elections and thereby peace.

126. The People's Republic of Mozambique and the other front-line countries have made great sacrifices to liberate Zimbabwe. Our President Samora Machel stated: "It is the privilege, the honour and the right of every people freely to choose its leaders and its path of development".

127. Our peoples have stood by the Patriotic Front in its national liberation struggle. The United Nations has stood by the Patriotic Front in its just struggle, and that is indeed to the Organization's credit; and today we are all standing together in the search for peace—peace meaning freedom and independence. We believe that the Security Council must discharge its responsibility in the question of Rhodesia.

128. *A luta continua.*

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Malawi, who wishes to make a statement as Chairman of the African Group for January. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

130. Mr. MUWAMBA (Malawi): Mr. President, on behalf of the African Group, I should like to congratulate you on the able and dedicated manner in

which you have presided over the deliberations of the Security Council since the beginning of the current month. Since you come from a country that is well acquainted with problems of colonialism and are yourself well known for your commitment to matters appertaining to decolonization, my Group is pleased to see you presiding over this debate concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia since the Lancaster House Agreement¹ was concluded last month. It is the considered view of my Group that you will, as in the past, spare no effort in concluding this debate in a very constructive and positive manner.

131. Before continuing with my statement, I should like to refer to one or two points raised by the representative of the United Kingdom. The first one is his inference that there is, in fact, a tendency here at Turtle Bay for the African Group to single out the Patriotic Front for special favours. I make bold to submit here and now that the case I am presenting here on behalf of the African Group has nothing to do with the Patriotic Front as a political organization in Southern Rhodesia, but refers to the discerned violations of the Lancaster House Agreement.

132. We have also been asked to quote specific authority on which we might base the various accusations or allegations—or complaints, if you like—that we might make; and I suggest, in all humility, that in fact such authority is clearly found in the quotations made here by the Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania who himself had occasion to attend the deliberations at Lancaster House.

133. In reference to the case that we should like to make here, I do not know whether the representative of the United Kingdom is aware of the fact that, around 24 January 1980, 34 drivers, under instructions of a very well-known Commonwealth Government, were detailed to carry loads of refugees. But when they got to about Plumtree at the border, they were arrested and detained with their passengers aboard their buses. As far as the African Group is aware, those drivers were carrying out instructions issued under the Lancaster House Agreement, which requires the Government of the Republic of Botswana, the Government of Zambia and the Government of Mozambique to facilitate the return of all refugees belonging to Southern Rhodesia. Now if it should be the intention of the Council that we should provide evidence of what I have submitted, my Group will be prepared to do so.

134. The request of the African Group for this meeting is the result of an instruction issued by OAU following a meeting of the Liberation Committee, held at Dar es Salaam in the United Republic of Tanzania from 21 to 25 January. In this connection, I wish to recall that the Liberation Committee reviewed the current situation in Southern Rhodesia subsequent to the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement last month by the Government of the United Kingdom, the then Government headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and

the Patriotic Front. That review was necessitated by the apparent continued violations of that Agreement, violations that seemed to be deliberate and possibly calculated to influence the outcome of the forthcoming national elections in Southern Rhodesia.

135. I wish to recall that one of the most important ingredients of the Lancaster House Agreement—at least from the viewpoint of the African Group on whose behalf I speak—is the immediate creation by the administering Power, with the co-operation of all parties concerned, of a suitable political climate in Southern Rhodesia that would facilitate the forthcoming national elections scheduled for next month. Unfortunately, this does not seem to have happened, and it is for this reason that the Security Council has been asked, not only to review the internal situation there, but also to call upon the administering Power, the Government of the United Kingdom, to honour its side of the Agreement without any unilateral variations such as seem to be negating that Agreement now.

136. The African Group has been informed that since the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, a series of continual violations not only has been committed, but also carefully catalogued, and it is these that will constitute a formal complaint against the British Government for consideration by the Council.

137. In this connection, reports filed by the front-line States, the secretariat of OAU and the Patriotic Front reveal that some of the following violations have been and continue to be made: first, the deployment by the British-appointed Governor of Southern Rhodesia of Rhodesian and auxiliary forces, which are assisting the police in the maintenance of law and order, but which have also been committing wanton murder and harassing Patriotic Front sympathizers, along with systematic press and radio propaganda aimed at discrediting the Patriotic Front—one of the parties which will take part in the forthcoming elections; secondly, the unwarranted and uncalled-for systematic press and radio propaganda by South Africa, again aimed at discrediting the Patriotic Front; thirdly, the employment of deliberate delaying tactics by the British Administration in Southern Rhodesia in refusing to facilitate the early return of all Rhodesian refugees to their country in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement; fourthly, the continued deployment in various parts of the country of large numbers of South African troops and mercenaries, contrary to the assurance given earlier by the British Government that it would expel all foreign forces in Southern Rhodesia; fifthly, the decision by the British Government to renew the state of emergency for another six months and to maintain martial law in the Territory; sixthly, the apparent manoeuvres by the British Government to ensure the continuance in power of the Smith-Muzorewa group in the Territory; seventhly, the continued detention of all political prisoners; eighthly, the deliberate refusal by the

British Governor in Southern Rhodesia to accord the Patriotic Front forces equal treatment and the continued harassment of the officials and supporters of the Patriotic Front; ninthly, permission for the deployment, particularly in rural areas, of auxiliaries of the United African National Council, which are now under the command of the Rhodesian forces and which have been described as being deployed in those areas for the purposes of electioneering; tenthly, the tendency of the British Government to put great emphasis on the importance of what it perceives as stability in the region instead of on the implementation of the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement.

138. That is the case which I have been detailed to put to the Council. However, in putting that case I wish to add that my Group has in its possession information which describes Lord Soames as a “prisoner” of the Muzorewa-Smith régime—hence the violations catalogued above.

139. My Group has information which reveals that the Commonwealth Observer Force, currently deployed in Southern Rhodesia in keeping with the injunction of the Lancaster House Agreement, is for myriad reasons finding it difficult to obtain adequate information on the activities of the South African forces in that beleaguered country. However, the African Group has received the following data based on a conservative estimate of South African combat force deployment in Southern Rhodesia: five infantry battalions of about 3,500 men, which might include one or two South African police battalions; one parachute battalion of about 600 men; two artillery regiments of 1,000 men, six armoured squadrons of 750 men, and so on.

140. The African Group has been advised by fairly reliable sources that not only have South African troops and airmen been in Southern Rhodesia in large numbers, but that they have also been actively engaged in operations in that country for at least two years. In that respect we wish to recall that on 30 November 1979, the South African Prime Minister admitted for the first time that South African security forces were in fact in Southern Rhodesia. According to him, those forces were there for two reasons: first, to protect the rail routes through Southern Rhodesia; and secondly, to prevent South African nationalist guerrillas from infiltrating South Africa from the south of Rhodesia.

141. In recent weeks, the British Government has gone on record as saying that the South African troops were invited into Southern Rhodesia by Lord Soames in order to provide protection for the Beit Bridge across the Limpopo River. Clearly, this was and still is a downright violation of the Lancaster House Agreement, which did not envisage such an invitation. As far as we are concerned, there is nothing in the Lancaster House Agreement which suggested that Lord Soames as Governor of Southern Rhodesia had

the latitude to bend the rules unilaterally as he has done.

142. The African Group has been led to believe that either the South African units have been integrated with the Rhodesian forces or they may still be operating independently and are now deployed throughout the entire country. We have been advised that South African units can be found in the north, the north-east and around Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia.

143. In this connection, we wish to recall that in the ongoing negotiations on Namibia, the Government of the Republic of South Africa has been known to object very strongly to whatever it has perceived as variations in whatever it and the "gang of five" here at Turtle Bay may have agreed upon. If this is its attitude, why would South Africa accept an invitation which was not sanctioned by the Lancaster House Agreement? The Government of the United Kingdom is already aware of South Africa's relations with black Africa and the international community, not only with respect to Namibia but also as regards its domestic policies concerning the status of the black majority of its population. In these circumstances, the African Group wishes to discover why South African security forces were in the first instance invited for duty in a country that has been bleeding for more than a decade.

144. The African Group has also been informed that at Lancaster House, the United Kingdom declined to requisition either Commonwealth or United Nations security forces. If this assertion should be authentic, what would be justification of Lord Soames for extending an invitation to a country that quit the Commonwealth of Nations several years ago and that remains suspended from the activities of this international body?

145. It is the wish of my Group that I draw the attention of the Council to the fact that, although the Lancaster House Agreement makes provision for a Cease-fire Commission, there nevertheless appears to be nothing on record to suggest that Lord Soames has had occasion to refer to that Commission any violation that might have taken place since the implementation of that Agreement.

146. Finally, in bringing this case before the Council for consideration, the African Group hopes that the Council will proceed to call on Her Majesty's Government: first, to lift the state of emergency and facilitate free and fair elections in Rhodesia; secondly, to comply with and implement fully and impartially the Lancaster House Agreement; thirdly, to confine the Rhodesian security and auxiliary forces to their barracks; fourthly, to remove all foreign troops, including mercenaries, from Southern Rhodesia; fifthly, to release all political prisoners in Southern Rhodesia, including those persons who are said to be held by the Government of Southern Rhodesia and

who are nationals of the Republic of South Africa; sixthly, in keeping with the Agreement, to permit all Zimbabwean exiles to return home without fear of threats, intimidation or arrest; seventhly, to facilitate the participation of every Zimbabwean national in the forthcoming national elections, scheduled for next month.

147. In conclusion, I wish to place on record the desire of the African Group to reserve its right to ask for the authority to speak again if the occasion to do so should arise.

148. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Egypt. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

149. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): Once again the Security Council has been convened urgently, at the request of the African Group, to discuss the situation in Southern Rhodesia. We had welcomed the Lancaster House Agreement¹ and hoped it would constitute the corner-stone for a final and comprehensive solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia compatible with the legitimate rights of the people of Zimbabwe and consistent with the relevant resolutions of OAU and the United Nations.

150. However, we have witnessed with great concern the latest developments in Zimbabwe. Certain violations of the Lancaster House Agreement have been reported. Among these violations are: first, the continued presence in Southern Rhodesia of South African troops; secondly, the deployment and use of Rhodesian forces, particularly the Selous Scouts and the auxiliaries, against the forces of the Patriotic Front; thirdly, the unnecessary renewal of the state of emergency for another six months and the maintenance of martial law in the Territory; fourthly, the continued detention of political prisoners and the denial to all Zimbabwean refugees of their fundamental right to return; and fifthly, the unequal treatment accorded the Patriotic Front forces, officials and supporters.

151. In this context I should like to state that Egypt strongly condemns the collusion between the racist régime of South Africa and some dissident radical elements inside Southern Rhodesia with a view to wrecking the Lancaster House Agreement. It is with great concern that we witness the mischievous role of South Africa in this respect. It is not surprising that the racist régime in South Africa is pursuing such a policy, as we are witnessing its arrogant and negative attitude in yet another part of Africa—namely, Namibia.

152. Such developments prompted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt to issue in Cairo the following statement on 26 January 1980:

"The Arab Republic of Egypt is following with great concern the developments surrounding the

transitional period leading to the February 1980 elections in Zimbabwe.

“It is in this context, and pursuant to Egypt’s constant consultation with the African liberation movements, that the Ambassador of Egypt to Zambia has left for Salisbury to examine the situation on the spot. Furthermore, Egypt has informed the United Kingdom Government of its concern that the upcoming elections in Zimbabwe should be conducted in an atmosphere of freedom, neutrality and justice conducive to the scrupulous implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement, so as to enable the people of Zimbabwe to choose their genuine representatives.

“Egypt has also instructed its Ambassador in Lusaka to pursue his contacts with the Patriotic Front with a view to co-ordinating positions in order that resolutions ensuring Zimbabwe’s independence be adopted at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of OAU, thereby allowing Zimbabwe to occupy its well-deserved status among the independent African nations.”

153. True and democratic elections for the establishment of an independent Government in Zimbabwe should be held under strictly objective and neutral supervision by the administering Power.

154. I should like to state here that we followed with deep appreciation the efforts of the United Kingdom Government to achieve the Lancaster House Agreement, although the negotiation was very difficult. Furthermore, Egypt, more than any other country, pays a particular tribute in regard to the efforts deployed by all other parties, the front-line States, and especially the Patriotic Front—which has courageously come forward, showing a statesmanlike attitude, fighting with one hand and negotiating with the other, without losing sight of the real rights and needs of the people of Zimbabwe.

155. The valiant people of Zimbabwe have long been subjected to an illegal occupation and it is because of this that Egypt has been and is one of the strongest supporters of the efforts of the national liberation movements in Africa, and first and foremost the Patriotic Front, to put an end to that illegal occupation and to reach a peaceful and honourable solution and attain independence for the people of Zimbabwe. Egypt hopes that the attainment by the people of Zimbabwe of independence will enhance the chances of stability in southern Africa and in our whole continent.

156. We are sure that the Government of the United Kingdom will implement in good faith the spirit and the letter of the Lancaster House Agreement and that the process will take its due course of free and fair elections. The stakes are great and any further deterioration in the situation in Zimbabwe will undermine

the Agreement itself and throw the region again into another round of devastating war and human suffering.

157. In conclusion, Egypt will continue to shoulder its historic responsibility by extending its full support to the Patriotic Front and the front-line States, which are playing a heroic role in the legitimate struggle of the people of Zimbabwe.

158. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The last speaker today is the representative of Botswana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

159. Mr. TLOU (Botswana): Mr. President, I thank you and your colleagues in the Security Council for affording my delegation an opportunity to participate in this important debate on the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, a country whose birth as the free nation of Zimbabwe Botswana looks forward to with high hopes.

160. Botswana and France enjoy the most cordial relations, and it is especially gratifying therefore that you, Mr. President, a distinguished son of that great country, are presiding over these deliberations. I wish you well in steering this debate to a successful conclusion.

161. On 21 December 1979—that historic day on which the Lancaster House Agreement¹ was signed—this body which had met [2181st meeting] primarily for the purpose of lifting the mandatory sanctions against the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia also pronounced itself unequivocally on what ought to be done in that colony to ensure a smooth transition to genuine majority rule through free and fair elections. A key paragraph in the resolution adopted by the Council [resolution 460 (1979)] on that day called for strict adherence to the Agreement and for its full and faithful implementation by the administering Power and all the parties concerned.

162. During the debate in that Security Council meeting, speaker after speaker expressed great satisfaction at the fact that, at last, the United Kingdom had assumed its full responsibility over its colony of Southern Rhodesia. There was general, if cautious, optimism that finally all might be well in Zimbabwe. No one expected that so soon after, this body would be meeting again to perform a post-mortem on the situation in Rhodesia in the light of very disturbing and very serious developments there, for we had hoped that good faith and fair play on the part of those concerned would ensure scrupulous adherence to the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement.

163. Two important meetings in Africa have preceded this Council meeting: on 10 January 1980 the front-line States met at Beira, Mozambique, followed soon thereafter by a meeting of the Liberation Committee of OAU at Dar es Salaam. Both those meetings

expressed grave concern at actions by the administering Power that constituted a breach of certain provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement. It is this concern, the concern to safeguard the Lancaster House Agreement—the sure way to peace in Zimbabwe—the concern to see fair play and strict implementation of the Agreement that has caused Africa to come to the Council both to highlight our areas of concern and to seek a way forward so that together we can achieve a smooth transition to genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe.

164. For Botswana, as indeed for other States neighbouring on Rhodesia, the question of genuine majority rule through free and fair elections is not an academic one; it is a matter of serious concern. Our fortunes are inextricably bound by history and geography with those of Zimbabwe. Peace in Zimbabwe means peace in Botswana and in the other front-line States; and upheavals there spell doom and disaster for us all, as the recent troubled history of that British colony has shown.

165. That is why over the years Botswana and the other front-line States have spared no efforts to help the people of Zimbabwe to achieve genuine majority rule, thus contributing to peace and stability in our region. It is for this reason, too, that we will always express great displeasure at and disapproval of any actions that threaten the chances for the peace that is within our grasp in Zimbabwe.

166. Zimbabwe has been torn by several years of war. An atmosphere of mistrust has inevitably developed among various sectors of the population, and more especially between the oppressed and their oppressor. It is important, therefore, that an atmosphere of confidence and trust be created to allow for free political activity, which is an important prerequisite for free and fair elections. This is the task of the administering Power, and yet the partial actions of the Governor in Salisbury do not help in this regard. Failure to create an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, an atmosphere in which the trust and confidence of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole can be won, could result only in charges and counter-charges that the elections were not fair and free and so unacceptable to the international community.

167. Scrupulous implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement is the best, nay the only way of creating the desired atmosphere. Only in this way can the administering Power win the trust and confidence of the people of Zimbabwe as a whole.

168. So far, one cannot say that the Agreement has been implemented as scrupulously as one had expected. The following, among others, are the areas of grave concern to us.

169. Despite the undertaking given by the British Government that all foreign troops would leave Rho-

desia as soon as the newly appointed Governor was in place in Salisbury, we have a situation where, with only about four weeks left before the elections, those undesirable elements are still in Rhodesia. In fact the Governor asserted, to our consternation, that the South African troops were remaining at his invitation to guard essential routes such as Beit Bridge. This was a clear violation by the administering Power of the Lancaster House Agreement. The violation was inexcusable and totally unnecessary, because the Governor has under his command various forces within Rhodesia that he can deploy for such purposes. What this action has done is to undermine the credibility of the Governor in the eyes of many.

170. We take note of the belated announcement just made by the British representative that the South African contingent at Beit Bridge was withdrawn today. But did it require an outcry from Africa to have Britain rectify its violation of the Lancaster House Agreement? This violation would not have occurred in the first place had the British been faithful to the Agreement. One hopes that, in deploying forces to guard Beit Bridge, the colonial Administration now in Salisbury will remember that it also has the Patriotic Front forces, not just the Rhodesian security forces, at its disposal. We want a firm undertaking about when the rest of the South African troops reported to be elsewhere in the country, including mercenaries, will be withdrawn. Time is not on our side; the elections are only four weeks away, so we urge the administering Power to act with haste on this matter. In the war conditions which have prevailed in Rhodesia for so long, it is understandable that the implementation of the cease-fire could be difficult. From time to time, the Governor will be called upon to enforce law and order. No one can take issue with that.

171. What is at issue in the enforcement of law and order and in dealing with breaches of the cease-fire is the exclusive use of Rhodesian security forces, including the so-called auxiliary forces. If the Governor is unable to keep the peace with the civilian police force as provided for in the Agreement, then we expect him, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Agreement, to use all the forces that have placed themselves under his command, and that includes the Patriotic Front forces which are now confined to base and watch with great amazement as the Governor relies exclusively on the bloodthirsty Rhodesian colonial forces. That does not accord with the letter and the spirit of the Agreement, which gives both forces equal status. The exclusive use of one force at the expense of the other constitutes an act of partiality that can only undermine the authority of the British Government.

172. This matter calls for urgent rectification. The Rhodesian forces, including the auxiliary forces which now roam the countryside at will, should be confined to base as agreed. Failure to do this expeditiously

can only lead to such incidents as the one in which the Rhodesian forces killed in cold blood a number of Patriotic Front soldiers who were on their way to an assembly point. We condemn this kind of action. Even *The New York Times*—a newspaper which cannot remotely be said to be partial to the Patriotic Front, on 28 January 1980 had this to say about the Rhodesian auxiliary forces:

“A serious issue for the Patriotic Front is posed by the Rhodesian auxiliaries, a Salisbury-trained paramilitary force that numbers about 25,000. Under the cease-fire accord, the auxiliaries, referred to by Bishop Muzorewa’s opponents as the ‘Bishop’s private army’, are supposed to remain within one-half mile of their bases, a stipulation that is widely ignored.”

173. The creation of an atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust, an atmosphere conducive to the holding of free and fair elections on which so much depends, demands that all those forces be confined to base immediately.

174. In order to enable as many Zimbabweans as possible to participate in the forthcoming election, no effort should be spared to enable the thousands upon thousands of displaced persons now living in neighbouring countries to return. The colonial Administration should make arrangements for the speedy and unimpeded return of those refugees. Unfortunately, our recent experience in Botswana with the repatriation exercise has demonstrated some unwillingness on the part of the Rhodesian authorities to expedite the programme of repatriation, if not outright deliberate frustration of this exercise.

175. As members have probably read in a statement released on 24 January 1980 by the office of our President and circulated here, the Rhodesians arrested our truck drivers—34 of them—and embargoed the trucks which the Government of Botswana has assigned for the repatriation exercise. Only after strong representations to the British Government were our people released with their trucks. I am glad to inform the Council that repatriation has resumed and we hope that, unless the Rhodesians resort to their dilatory tactics again, about 22,000 persons in all will have returned to Rhodesia by the time of the elections.

176. I mention that incident not because we want to make an issue of it at this point but, rather, as an illustration of the fact that reliance on the former Rhodesian Administration, if not properly checked by the administering Power, can lead to unfortunate and fraudulent actions throughout this transitional period.

177. We see the attempts to slow down repatriation as a deliberate strategy to deny the Patriotic Front the votes they are likely to get from the returnees. We call upon the British Administration to exercise

control over the Rhodesian Civil Service, which is known for its bias against the Patriotic Front.

178. It is not necessary for me to enumerate all the areas of concern in the situation in Rhodesia. That has been done amply and eloquently here by those who have spoken before me. Suffice it to stress that in this whole exercise, a spirit of fair play, impartiality and even-handedness must prevail. A high degree of good faith is called for, if we are to succeed. None of the Rhodesian parties should legitimately feel that it is not treated fairly—as, indeed, the Patriotic Front has reason to feel. We have heard charges by the Patriotic Front that obstacles were placed in their way to delay their return to Rhodesia in good time to catch up on the election campaign that the internal parties had long started. Only by sticking to the letter and the spirit of the Agreement can such charges be avoided.

179. For our part we stand on our word that Botswana—as, indeed, the other African States—will abide by the verdict of the people of Zimbabwe in fair and free elections. That is why we are anxious to ensure that the forthcoming elections will indeed be free and fair, so that their results will be acceptable to the international community. Thus the observations we have made are intended to safeguard the Lancaster House Agreement as a way of ensuring peace in Zimbabwe and in our region. The British Government, the people of Zimbabwe and all of us here want to see peace in Rhodesia. That is why we are critical of any actions that can threaten that peace.

180. To the British Government, I should like to say this: We—meaning the African States—have worked together for a settlement in Rhodesia over a long period of time, through the Anglo-American proposals, the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held at Lusaka from 1 to 7 August 1979 and, finally, the Lancaster House phase. Durable peace is now within our grasp, though the situation is precarious. Let no one destroy the chances for real peace. We are not unmindful of the start that has been made towards the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement. We are glad especially that the Patriotic Front has commendably fulfilled its part of the Agreement, much to the astonishment of the prophets of doom who had maliciously insinuated that the Patriotic Front did not want peace. We congratulate the members of that Front on their mature statesmanship in this case, statesmanship that they have consistently demonstrated through the long years of war and the long months of negotiations.

181. If we have dwelt at length on the areas of grave concern, it is only because we want the exercise in Rhodesia to succeed. We urge the Security Council to arrive at a decision that will make this possible. Botswana for its part will play its full role to help in the scrupulous implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement. The British Government should

be called upon by the Council to implement the Agreement fairly and even-handedly.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.

NOTES

¹ See *Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979*, Cmnd. 7802 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).

² *Rhodesia: report of the Commission on Rhodesian opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972), Cmnd. 4964.

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