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THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

2096th MEETING: 6 NOVEMBER 1978

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NOTE

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2096th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 6 November 1978, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Léon N'DONG (Gabon).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2096)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
 - (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
 - (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
- (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2092nd, 2094th and 2095th meetings, I invite the representatives of Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Huq (Bangladesh), Mr. Houngayou (Benin), Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Boaten (Ghana), Mr. Sinclair (Guyana), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hussen (Somalia), Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) and Miss Konie

(Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Algeria, in which he asks to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bouayad-Agha (Algeria) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to be seated at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Miss Konie (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite Mr. Gurirab to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gurirab (Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization) took a place at the Council table.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council now have before them the following documents: S/12913, containing the text of a letter dated 2 November from the representative of Czechoslovakia to the President of the Security Council, and S/12914, containing the text of a letter dated 2 November from the representative of Sri Lanka to the Secretary-General.

6. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): Mr. President, the delegation of Kuwait expresses its sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. Kuwait and Gabon are fellow members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and our bilateral relations have grown enormously in the last few years. We pledge our co-operation with you during your presidency.

7. I should like also to thank the outgoing President, Ambassador Leprette of France, for the remarkable skill which he coupled with his famous French style, a combination that contributed to the success of the Council's deliberations during the month of October.

8. The central issue of Namibia is the principle of self-determination and genuine independence for the Namibian people. All United Nations efforts have revolved around this basic issue. All special meetings and assemblies, international gatherings, private meetings, bilateral and multilateral contacts have been devoted to the attainment of this principle. First and foremost, the struggle of the Namibian people led by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has been waged with this goal. The initiative of the Five Western members of the Council is also an attempt to attain Namibian self-determination and independence by peaceful means. The speakers who have so far participated in this debate have defended this principle. We meet here in order to examine ways and means to achieve it. The confrontation between the international community and South Africa on the question of Namibia stems from South Africa's refusal to accept the application of this principle to Namibia. This cardinal principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is so sacred that it makes it impossible to tolerate the behaviour of South Africa in its defiance of the will of the world as represented in the authority of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

9. There is unanimity on the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and genuine independence. Yet there are differences on the approach and on the methods to be used to wrest from South Africa this unquestionable right. Self-interest and other considerations are important factors in preventing unanimity in the Council on the future course of action. It seems that we are wedded to the cause of self-determination for the Namibian people but not united on what should be done to confront South Africa's disdain for this sacred principle. The problem with the Council is that it cannot act decisively unless the majority, including the permanent members, agree on the general guidelines for action. What is important at this stage is how to compel South Africa to accept resolution 435 (1978), based on the proposals of the five Western members of the Council.

10. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, who spoke at the Council's meeting on 29 September, after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978), said:

"We know that the approval of the report of the Secretary-General is not sufficient to enable him to go ahead with the plan of action just adopted. South Africa, which is illegally in Namibia, has the physical power to prevent UNTAG [United Nations Transition Assistance Group] from reaching the Territory or, even if UNTAG is admitted, has the same power to prevent the freedom of movement necessary for the discharge of its functions. It is therefore important for the success of the plan of action to compel South Africa to co-operate in the present undertaking." [2087th meeting, para. 122.]

That is exactly what happened. South Africa has scoffed at the plan of action and has displayed provocative defiance in the face of the Council. It may be argued that the Western Powers' efforts are an attempt to wean South Africa from its inveterate intransigence.

11. Almost all speakers, including the representative of SWAPO, have called for the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter as a punitive measure to combat the blatant defiance of the Security Council by South Africa. The Government of Kuwait supports this policy. The fear is that South Africa, whose capacity for doing an about-face is unlimited, may partition Namibia because it is confident that the bogus elections to be held in December will produce demands for the partition of the Territory. We voice our fears in the light of the mission of the five Western members of the Council, which brought meagre results that are not commensurate with the efforts and the prestige of the five Foreign Ministers. The danger lies in the fact that South Africa is convinced that its nominees will be put in a position of *de facto* power in Namibia before there is any question of elections supervised by the United Nations. This fear is confirmed by the statement of South Africa's Prime Minister who was quoted in *The Guardian* of 30 October as saying that the elections sponsored by South Africa are "an internal process to elect leaders" and that "the next step would be to consider ways of achieving international recognition for the new régime". In the light of such a statement one cannot help but endorse the suspicion of the African Group that the Five virtually acquiesced in South Africa's determination to get its own way in Namibia.

12. There is a great deal of truth in the statements of previous speakers that the inability of the Council to act decisively against South Africa has encouraged the Government of that country to go beyond limits in its defiance of the United Nations. We think there is no extra time left in which the Council may wait for some signs of goodwill from South Africa. South Africa has exhausted all the "time outs" and the end of this unpleasant game is long overdue. There is no doubt that there is a set-back in Namibia and that the hopes aroused by the adoption of resolution 435 (1978) have been shattered. In this atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and disbelief, the Council has to do something. The question that haunts us is what is to be done? One answer is that the struggle of the Namibian people against foreign occupation must be intensified. This does not await the approval of the Council as it is the inherent right of the Namibian people to resist alien domination. Therefore, bilateral assistance to SWAPO is essential for the intensification of the struggle.

13. The second answer is that the Security Council must play its role in taking measures to assert its authority. We know that the policy of South Africa is not to assist the people of Namibia to achieve self-determination, as its spokesmen allege, but to undermine their right to the application of this principle and to sponsor an obedient bunch of people who are ready to comply with its design for the partition of Namibia or, at best, acquiesce in the bantustanization of the Territory. One may ask what are the measures the Council may contemplate? Admittedly, they are few if there is no agreement among the permanent

members, but they are many if there is agreement among the overwhelming majority. So, amid the uncertainties of the present, we should not lose sight of this fact. The ghost of the triple veto, so much mentioned in this debate, has not yet left this chamber. The difference among members of the Council is about approach and strategy but not necessarily about the final goal. An independent Namibia led by SWAPO scares South Africa and may scare others, but all, with the exception of South Africa, realize the inevitability of an independent Namibia led by SWAPO. It is immaterial whether some of us like this fact or not. What is important is that all of us are resigned to accepting it.

14. My delegation is convinced that fair, free and unfettered elections will bring in SWAPO at the head of the elected government. The question is what can the Council do to bring about fair elections in Namibia? The farcical elections which will take place in December, with the sponsorship of South Africa, should be contained, confronted and rejected. Nothing has exposed the true nature of the internal settlement of Smith in Rhodesia more than the international rejection of it. It will be the height of irresponsibility if we allow the result of this debate to remain inconclusive. We must not forget that it is advisable sometimes to tame the desirable in order to bring it into line with the obtainable. The distance between what we want and what we can obtain is still unbridgeable, although it is true that all of us are in earnest about the achievement of independence for Namibia.

15. My delegation views the present debate with the seriousness it deserves and warrants. It cannot accept an inconclusive debate or a debate that ends in making more remote the attainment of genuine independence by Namibia. On the question of Namibia, the international community has achieved some remarkable success. It would not be forgivable to part company at this crucial hour.

16. In the course of the consultations, negotiations and exchanges of view, the African Group, and especially SWAPO, has shown a sense of realism. But we must not forget that a continuous display of realism could undermine credibility. We must be careful what we do lest we lose credibility. The crucial issue is how to combine realism with the preservation of that valuable credibility. The demand by SWAPO that the December internal elections should be condemned, rejected and challenged is legitimate and in line with the policy of my Government. This demand is not over-ambitious and no delegation is expected to balk at it. The other demand—that South Africa should implement resolution 435 (1978)—does not constitute a departure from what has been accepted. That resolution was adopted on 29 September in the presence of an unusually distinguished parade of Foreign Ministers.

17. The other point raised in the course of our contacts relates to the situation in Namibia as a threat to international peace and security. To us there is nothing new in this proposition. On numerous occasions the General Assembly has determined that the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to world peace and security and that therefore the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter is valid and legitimate. Some of us may disagree, and such disagreement highlights the difference between the voice of

the majority in the General Assembly and the ruthless approach of the Council.

18. There is also a demand that the Council should call upon South Africa to abandon the phony elections scheduled for December in Namibia. The problem in this connexion is not created by the Council but arises from the fact that in their attempt to accommodate South Africa the Western members accepted the holding of those elections. In paragraph 5 of annex I of the letter of 21 October from the Ambassadors of the five Western countries to the President of the Security Council [S/12902], those countries say that "any such unilateral measure in relation to the electoral process will be regarded as null and void".

19. On the face of it, this commitment sounds honest and promising but there is no commitment that such internal settlement will be dealt with politically, economically and by other means if, after the elections, South Africa does not agree to elections supervised by the United Nations. The paragraph in question contains an expression of a state of mind about the internal elections but does not promise any action thereafter. It is in many ways reminiscent of the vaguely worded documents of the ambiguous diplomacy pursued in the early years of this century.

20. My delegation is also baffled by paragraph 4 of the same document, which states that South Africa

"will thereafter use its best efforts to persuade them seriously to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General".

This paragraph confirms the fears of the international community that South Africa is not committed to fair elections in Namibia. It contains a promise to persuade their protégés, but not to compel them. In other words, the veto power will remain in the hands of the elected henchmen of South Africa. What will happen if the henchmen are not persuaded? The Western Powers have not given an answer regarding this possibility. Will the architects of this agreement accept the imposition of punitive measures if such a situation arises? And what will be the situation if South Africa declares that its powers of persuasion have been exhausted to no avail?

21. The present situation is extremely serious, and the approach of the Council should reflect this seriousness. It is shocking that the Council cannot stop the internal elections. It is also distressing for us to realize that some members have acquiesced in the holding of those elections, although they are not committed to the outcome. But the danger is that that outcome will gather sufficient strength to impose a fait accompli. A realistic approach might be to address a serious warning to South Africa expressing the determination of the Council, in the event of South Africa's failure to comply with resolution 435 (1978) within a given time-frame, collectively to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter. My delegation believes that we have reached the limit of our patience. There is no time for vacillation. This is the hour of decision. We must make South Africa realize the inevitability of sanctions if it continues to behave in this manner. Once South Africa realizes that it has no

choice and that the jig is up, as the Americans say, it will reconsider its policy.

22. Nothing could be more damaging to the cause of the Namibians than seeing the Council stalemated in a linguistic scrimmage. My delegation is willing to support any draft resolution that sets a time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), with sanctions to be imposed on South Africa in the event of its failing to comply with the suggested time-frame. Our main concern is the people of Namibia, who are entitled to complete independence—politically, territorially and in every other respect. My delegation will earnestly seek the application of this principle until that is achieved.

23. Mr. HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction that you, the representative of an African country, are conducting the proceedings of the Security Council in a month during which we are dealing with questions of such vital importance for your continent, and not for your continent alone. At the same time I should like to take the opportunity to point out that relations between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Republic of Gabon have been friendly ever since your country attained independence in 1960. They have been developing in a mutually advantageous and positive direction since 1976, when our countries established diplomatic relations and exchanged diplomatic representatives.

24. I should also like to thank the representative of France, Ambassador Leprette, for the skilful and experienced way in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council in October.

25. The many years of discussion of the Namibian question in the Security Council and in other bodies of the United Nations have repeatedly compelled us to reach the same conclusion: South Africa will never voluntarily agree to a settlement in Namibia in accordance with the numerous decisions of the United Nations calling for the immediate cessation of the illegal occupation of that rich but sorely tried and long-suffering Territory. The tactics of the South African authorities change, but their ultimate goal clearly remains the same: the perpetuation in one form or another of colonial and racist domination of Namibia.

26. In order to secure that objective, the representatives of the South African authorities have recently even been declaring their alleged readiness to react favourably to a settlement in Namibia which would be in line with the just demands of the international community, but the facts, the concrete political administrative measures taken by the South African authorities in Namibia, simply demonstrate that the Pretoria régime has never even really considered going along with the serious negotiations with regard to a genuine settlement of the Namibian problem. As we all know, even while the various kinds of diplomatic negotiations recently held were proceeding, South Africa was constantly strengthening its military potential in the Territory, expanding its network of military bases, creating various military and paramilitary formations and training detachments of mercenaries. The racists have been stepping up their repression of the Namibian people and its

universally recognized representative, SWAPO, and carrying out bloody acts of aggression against neighbouring independent African States. The list of such illegal and criminal acts by the racists is endless, and such acts are all designed to prepare the ground for the imposition on the Namibian people, at the right moment, of a so-called internal settlement by means of the establishment of a puppet régime in order to keep Namibia under neo-colonialist control.

27. This goal of the racists of South Africa has once again been clearly and visibly demonstrated in the decision to hold unilateral elections in Namibia in December this year, and, in general, in their attitude towards the basic provisions of the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/12827. The implementation of the results of the most recent talks of the five Western countries with South Africa, as submitted to the Council in document S/12900, would lead to a situation in which it would be impossible, even formally, to say that the process of a political settlement of the Namibian problem would be taking place under the control and supervision of the United Nations. The demands of the South African authorities, even in the form in which they were accepted by the five Western countries, as set out in document S/12902, boil down to this: the process should take place, in actual fact, under the total control of South Africa, while the United Nations would have allotted to it only the role of a passive onlooker. Can anyone therefore be surprised, in view of this situation, that SWAPO, by a telegram from its President dated 23 October [*see S/12913*], rejected the results of the talks at Pretoria as unacceptable, and asked the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against the South African racist régime.

28. Czechoslovakia supports that position of SWAPO and also its demands, which enjoy the support of African and a number of other countries. At the moment, the necessary conditions do not exist for the proposed journey of the Special Representative of the United Nations to Namibia.

29. At the present time it is not sufficient simply to condemn the actions of South Africa or merely to make statements to the effect that its unilateral measures with regard to the electoral process will be viewed as devoid of juridical validity. The duty of the United Nations, which bears direct responsibility for Namibia until such time as the Territory attains genuine self-determination and national independence, is to bend every effort to thwart the implementation of the treacherous plans of the South African régime.

30. The road to ensuring a just solution of the Namibian problem has been indicated in numerous decisions of the Organization, as set out in the Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determination and National Independence for Namibia adopted on 3 May 1978 by the General Assembly at its ninth special session [*resolution S-9/2*]. At this stage of the discussion of this item, we believe it indispensable to focus attention on the fact that the General Assembly stated that it rejected

"the idea that South Africa, as the illegal occupier of Namibia, has any legitimate interest in Namibia about which the South West Africa People's Organization should be pressed to make concessions in any negotiated and internationally acceptable settlement" [*ibid.*, para. 18].

31. In accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has always favoured, and continues to favour, the immediate exercise by the people of Namibia of its inalienable right to self-determination and independence on the basis of the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the country, and we are in favour of the immediate and total withdrawal of the forces and the administration of South Africa and the transfer of power to SWAPO, which has been recognized by the United Nations as the sole legitimate and genuine representative of the people of Namibia.

32. The liberation of Namibia from colonialist, racist occupation has become a task which brooks no further delay, and until that task has been carried out and as long as the South African authorities continue to maintain and strengthen their domination in Namibia, all Members of the United Nations must not only abide by the United Nations decisions but also increase their efforts to produce effective measures which will force the racists to bow to the will of the international community. It is our belief that the policy of the racists of South Africa with regard to Namibia, as has repeatedly been stressed in United Nations resolutions, represents a serious threat to peace and security in the southern part of the African continent and beyond it.

33. On the basis of what I have said, my delegation believes that the Security Council must, and speedily, take a decision which would actually and in practice force South Africa finally to bow to the will of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by its organs.

34. Mr. ROLON ANAYA (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to express to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. We wish you every success in your difficult task and assure you of our resolute co-operation. The convergence of the national aims of Gabon and Bolivia lies in their similarity of circumstance. As far as personal relations are concerned, my delegation holds you in the highest regard.

35. I must say again that Bolivia is firm and resolute, together with all the dependent peoples of the world, not only because of anti-colonialist and anti-racist principles but because it has itself suffered from every excess of territorial and economic depredation. As a native people of despoiled Latin America, we Bolivians suffered the most from colonialist and even racist pillaging.

36. I wish also to convey our appreciation of the excellent and intelligent work carried out by Ambassador Leprette, representative of that great nation, France, which is so highly regarded by Bolivia.

37. Just when we thought that we had finally managed to set this long-standing problem of Namibia on the right

course with resolution 435 (1978), which followed a number of resolutions that have been referred to many times, and when we had placed our trust in the efforts of the five Western countries and welcomed those efforts, many difficulties have arisen and the Pretoria régime has made mock of us.

38. There is nothing really to add to all that has already been said. This is a subject that has been dealt with exhaustively. None the less, it is a problem that is farther than ever from solution, through the historical objective stated in paragraph 2 of resolution 435 (1978), to wit:

"the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations".

39. In order not to repeat everything that has already been said and heard and end up, perhaps, by confusing the Council, my delegation wishes to mention only two preoccupations. The first relates to the responsibility that we must assume for our own resolutions. The worst kind of negation is that of oneself. We must be consistent with what we have ourselves said. The second relates to the many ways in which the authority of the Security Council is being eroded.

40. We sincerely welcome, as a positive contribution, every effort to achieve peace in different parts of the world, because we are aware that world peace has to be objectively affirmed by regional peace. Therefore, Bolivia is a resolute advocate of the declaration of zones of peace, in the regional sowing of seeds of partial peace, the fruitful harvest of which will be world peace, the aim being the ultimate humanization of our humanity, which is rather doubtful at this stage because of colonialism and racism. My delegation welcomes all initiatives aiming at peace and has supported every effort to foster peace. But it now expresses its disquiet, because those efforts are aimed not only at making a contribution but at frustrating the carrying out by the Security Council of its important responsibilities under the Charter.

41. With these two preoccupations, my delegation believes that we must act in accordance with our ineluctable powers and our important responsibilities to recover the authority that we can lose only at the cost of seriously frustrating the United Nations, the establishment of which Bolivia supported and in whose defence Bolivia has always been and will continue to be unswerving.

42. We must be resolutely consistent with our own resolutions. We must make a final strong appeal for compliance with resolution 435 (1978), and, after a stated period of time, proceed to apply the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

43. As regards practical action in the search for a specific solution to this problem, the delegation of Bolivia considers that it would not be right for a representative of the United Nations to remain in Namibia because this could be interpreted as an endorsement of unilateral illegal elections, which violate Security Council decisions. My delegation reiterates that, because of our own decisions and in order to

maintain the authority of the United Nations through the Council, it agrees with sanctions and will vote for them. However, our aim is not to apply sanctions, but to maintain peace. Sanctions are a method of achieving this in extreme instances of obdurate refusal, such as that which we are confronting now.

44. Coming back to the aim, I think it would be appropriate, instead of sending a representative of the Secretary-General, for the Secretary-General himself to go to Namibia to serve notice on the illegal régime of South Africa of its duty to comply with the Security Council's resolutions in one last attempt at a genuinely democratic solution to the problem of the independence of Namibia, a matter in which we have so long been involved and with such anguish. Once this final measure has been attempted, if there is an equally definite refusal, sanctions should be applied. It could never then be said that the Council had not made every effort, with the fullest consideration and prudence, but with firm authority, to achieve a peaceful solution of the problem.

45. An initiative of this type would help us to achieve the objectives we are seeking. We are ready to embody it in a draft resolution if there is agreement on this, particularly among the countries of the African Group, with which Bolivia wishes to express once again its solidarity.

46. Mr. HARRIMAN (Nigeria): Mr. President, I join others before me in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of this Council for the month of November. It is fitting that an African is in the Chair when the Council is continuing its deliberations on the situation in Namibia.

47. I also extend the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Jacques Leprette of France for the exemplary manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during the month of October, when this debate commenced.

48. Permit me to utilize some of the most recent developments concerning Namibia in order to bring into sharp focus recent events in the Territory. Until early in 1977 three principal elements or parties were involved in this whole process: first, the international community as represented at the United Nations; secondly, SWAPO, representing the aspirations of the Namibian people; and thirdly, South Africa, the usurpers of the Territory.

49. In 1977 the five Western members of the Security Council came into the picture. We believed that they would use their special relationship with South Africa to facilitate the implementation of resolution 385 (1976), which they had unanimously supported. Even at that stage I was perturbed personally, and my Committee, the Committee against Apartheid, felt the same way, by the play on words by certain Western delegations, which preferred imprecise language in resolution 385 (1976), like "supervisory control" in place of "supervision and control". And I might remark in passing that even today this aspect of control is being gradually left out of much of the rhetoric by certain of those same delegations. I hope this is an oversight.

50. We co-operated with the Western Five and gave support to them so as to evolve a peaceful solution to the problem of Namibia. We noted with appreciation that SWAPO was persuaded to lend its full co-operation in this process. Resolution 385 (1976) was in effect modified to form the general framework for the proposals of the Western Five. Those proposals became the basis for resolution 431 (1978), of which resolution 435 (1978) sought the implementation. This scenario led us to believe, I hope not in mistaken euphoria, that we were at last about to decolonize Namibia and rid that unfortunate people and Territory of the racist usurpers, of victimization and repression.

51. During this process, South Africa threatened to call off the negotiations from time to time. The racists double-talked about "acceptances" and they alleged that SWAPO wanted power handed over directly to it. This we all know was not a correct reflection of the facts. The level of their genocidal and offensive incursions deep into neighbouring independent territories during the period of negotiations is well documented. They lied that those incursions were a matter of "hot pursuit" into guerrilla camps and bases. We have all the information depicted, in this very building, on film and in photographs, to show that almost invariably they actually massacred hundreds of women and children in refugee camps. All this was obviously in an attempt to derail the process of the transition of Namibia to genuine independence. SWAPO gallantly stood fast and firm, in the conviction of its responsibilities and obligations to ensure the aspirations and long-term welfare of their people.

52. Let us again recall that the proposals of the West fell short of the letter and spirit of resolution 385 (1976). SWAPO made concessions on the number of South African troops to be retained in Namibia during the transition period. This went beyond the resolution, which called for the removal of all South African troops. SWAPO has accepted the presence of the South African paramilitary police force in Namibia, although they are to be monitored by the United Nations. The recent statements of the South Africans and the Western Five are not very succinct and therefore not clear on this point. To crown it all, SWAPO also agreed to a cease-fire, which I have always described as a surrender, in order to participate in free and fair elections which would also involve all those who had been against them. It accepted in good faith resolution 432 (1978) and, most important, it proved that, given free and fair elections, as the legitimate and authentic representative of the Namibian people, not just because it is so described by the Security Council and the General Assembly but because it is so in fact on the ground, SWAPO would triumph. On the other hand, all action to date by South Africa is to block such elections, which they know they will lose, and to do all they can to exclude SWAPO from those elections.

53. One is forced to ask: what concession has South Africa made in all this process? If my memory serves me right, I would say none. Perhaps the only concession was their condescension in sitting and negotiating on the proposals of the Western Five, especially on the eve of the ninth special session of the General Assembly on Namibia, believing that their acceptance of them would pre-empt the

work of the special session and that SWAPO would reject all the proposals; when in fact, as we all recall, SWAPO did stay behind to continue the dialogue with the Western Five in New York.

54. The South Africans moved into Kassinga and caused all the bloodshed which we saw on film, again in this building. They hoped that this would be the final straw for SWAPO and that they would reject the convening of another meeting, thus giving the impression that South Africa had the upper hand.

55. To follow this up, when the Security Council—including the Five—accepted the report of the Secretary-General which was to move the process forward to elections, we thought we had seen the light at the end of the tunnel; but in its psychogenically devious approach, South Africa frustrated the process by deliberately disagreeing with the Secretary-General's implementation of the proposals. Our profound consternation petered out when the five Western members pronounced that the report, based on expert appraisal by the Secretary-General's team of experts, civilian and military, conformed with the letter and spirit of the proposals of the Five. This made no difference to the scheming South Africans, but we were also glad to learn that, in spite of South Africa's recalcitrance, the Foreign Ministers had gone to Pretoria to secure acceptance by South Africa of the decision of the international community as reflected in resolution 435 (1978). Obviously this was what we thought they had gone to do. The results anticipated were very clear to all of us. The actual outcome fell far short of our reasonable expectations. None of us—and I dare say not even the principal actors among the Five—could have imagined that the Five, represented at the level of Foreign Ministers, would go to Pretoria for any other reason than to secure compliance by South Africa with resolution 435 (1978). It would be rather sadistic if I went further and described how they spent the three days in South Africa, waiting in the corridor for Botha to finish his consultations with his surrogates from Namibia, before talking to them at all. The West was comfortably placed for this, with its often-pronounced commitment to solving the problems of southern Africa, and the inherent leverage emanating from the might of the Western Powers; furthermore their honour and prestige were at stake, in particular in salvaging the situation in Rhodesia and in Namibia and, in addition, they had the complete and total support of the international community.

56. But as I said earlier, the outcome of the Pretoria meeting was disturbingly hazy and incoherent. In its main thrust and substance, it was contradictory to resolution 435 (1978), for the following reasons.

57. First, the South Africans saw fit to give their own interpretation of the United Nations plan. They asserted the primary role of their own police force in the maintenance of law and order during the transitional period. One is confused by the form of words used: nothing is said about supervision and control and the role of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in this sector is rendered subject to contradictions which will have to be cleared up. Clearly the South African police force in

Namibia will continue to intimidate SWAPO. This has been their principal occupation in the past and will be even more so regarding SWAPO's supporters during the election campaigns.

58. The role of monitoring and controlling South African security forces must be a primary responsibility of UNTAG, and the Western Five will no doubt be kind enough at some point to explain to us what the formulation of words used in their joint statement means when it talks about the paramount role of the South African police in civilian control.

59. Secondly, in the joint statement the Western Five appear to have reneged on their original commitment to the UNTAG figure of 7,500 men—"appear to", I say. A reduction of the military troop level of 7,500 would be unrealistic, taking the size of Namibia into consideration. Account has already been taken of the 2,600 men to be deployed on logistic duties, thus further depleting the actual number of men available for such vital duties as the all-important role of monitoring the residual South African forces supposedly confined to two locations in northern Namibia.

60. Here again, my delegation hopes that our reading of this is wrong, for it calls into question the earlier acceptance of the Secretary-General's report by the Security Council, including the Western Five, and the good judgement of General Philipp, all of whom consider this troop level the barest minimum. It will also discourage SWAPO and all those who join SWAPO to allow South Africa to retain any troops whatsoever in Namibia during the transitional period. Unless the Council intends to assist South Africa in its plans to sabotage one of our objectives, the creation of conditions conducive to free and fair elections, we should reject South Africa's objections to the size of UNTAG, and South Africa should be clearly so informed.

61. Finally, and most disturbingly, Pretoria has reaffirmed its intention to proceed with internal elections in December without guaranteeing elections supervised by the United Nations next year. In spite of resolution 435 (1978), South Africa merely agreed to make efforts, as many speakers before me have underlined, to "persuade" its surrogates who are to be elected in the December "elections" to seek international acceptability. Indeed, this is true to the tradition of that country. No one can believe that such leaders will agree to their own self-dissolution four months later in order to facilitate elections supervised and controlled by the United Nations, which they know they will certainly lose.

62. The Western Five cannot now insist, in the terms of their joint statement of 19 October [S/12900, annex II], that resolution 435 (1978) is still the vehicle for the genuine independence of Namibia, for in paragraph 4 of that statement South Africa is allowed to reaffirm its intention to hold internal elections in Namibia. Attempts by the Western Five to balance that paragraph with their own paragraph 5 are superfluous and redundant, since resolution 435 (1978) had already determined that any electoral process outside the United Nations plan would be null and void. Thereby the Western Five have allowed an

impression to be created that internal elections could secure legitimacy at some point in the future, especially by allowing that paragraph 4 to be written into a joint statement. Again we hope that we are wrong, but that is what paragraph 4 clearly indicates.

63. Having said all that, it is reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the *démarche* with South Africa was basically unsuccessful, even though that *démarche* in itself was very commendable. It is clear that the internal elections are in contradiction to all United Nations resolutions relevant thereto, culminating in 435 (1978). Such elections, if they took place, would be a travesty of free and fair elections; they would be on tribal and racial lines and would seek to consolidate these. South Africa has no good faith to offer, and we must treat with it accordingly. This all accords with the track record of South Africa at home, in particular during the last few weeks. I hope you will allow me to go into this, Mr. President, although it is not directly relevant, because it illustrates what I described earlier as the psychogenic traumata with which we are dealing and the South African mental problem.

64. The intentions of the *apartheid* régime and its master plan are obvious. It has made it clear that it seeks to bantustanize the whole of southern Africa under South African domination. A few weeks ago that régime staged an election in the South African bantustan of Vendaland. Its puppets were totally routed in the elections. Thereafter the régime detained the newly-elected members and stacked the so-called legislative assembly with puppet chiefs who would accept the sham so-called independence of Vendaland. Think about this. Think about Namibia.

65. A few months ago so-called elections were staged in Soweto. The régime detained all the genuine leaders of the people of Soweto before the elections, as it had done in the Transkei, using the local chiefs there. In spite of all their intimidation, only 6 per cent of the voters went to the polls. The régime then declared the candidates rejected by the people to be the leaders of Soweto.

66. It plans to enact the same farce in Namibia; I certainly have no doubt about that. The so-called elections in December are rejected by all the popular organizations allowed to speak in Namibia and by all the churches. But the South African régime is proceeding with its plans in order to foist the thoroughly discredited Democratic Turnhalle Alliance on the people as the so-called leaders of the Territory.

67. We are not in the least surprised at the manoeuvres of the racist régime, which hopes to secure the acquiescence of the Western Powers by raising a scare about communism and by propagating the myth that SWAPO is a Marxist organization because it receives support from socialist States, among others.

68. We were not surprised to read the statement of the racist Prime Minister P. W. Botha at the meeting with the five Western Ministers, which has been given sanction as a document of the Security Council. That shameful distortion of the facts is in document S/12900. It is very interesting to read that document, and I am sure that even

the Western Five, who will have read it, will agree that there is a basic problem with the South African leaders. But we have not yet had any response from the Western Powers on these issues which have been set before the Council. We should like to know their attitude on this matter also. For our part, we categorically denounce the defamation of SWAPO and of those African States that support SWAPO. The issue is the freeing of Namibia from the racist usurpers, in line with the resolutions of the United Nations, and nothing else.

69. At this stage, therefore, it is logical that certain steps should have to be taken in relation to Namibia. If it were my duty to dictate those terms, I would say immediately that we should bring the full weight of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to bear on South Africa to get it to bow to the general wish of the international community and southern Africa as a whole, but ours is a democratic group and I believe that the spectrum of opinion in the Security Council and in the United Nations is very broad indeed. I am certain that in making these recommendations I am not compromising my own position, the position of my Government or that of Africa.

70. First, we must condemn the internal elections and, in a very clear resolution, call for their renunciation by South Africa. Secondly, there must be clear and unequivocal acceptance of resolution 435 (1978) by South Africa before any other action is taken, except that under Chapter VII of the Charter, in respect of a threat to the peace. Thirdly, the date for the arrival of UNTAG should be fixed. South Africa has stalled on this matter for over a month now and no clear solution is in sight. The date of 29 September, when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted, was, we understood, D-Day for the commencement of the UNTAG exercise in Namibia. Fourthly, the date for the elections to be supervised and controlled by the United Nations should be fixed. That is also overdue.

71. We should be able to consider a deadline for this exercise by which time South Africa should give a full response to all the preceding questions; that period should not exceed two weeks after a relevant resolution has been adopted.

72. As I have said, this is only a proposal that we might consider. Even though I have made the proposal and am convinced that that is what should be done, I am greatly concerned about it.

73. Many delegations recommend that the Secretary-General should undertake the necessary *démarches* during that period. That possibility could be considered, as long as thereafter the Council does not dump the problem on the Secretary-General, as it tends to do when it has failed. Should South Africa fail to comply with the proposals outlined, there should be automatically a Council meeting to consider the appropriate steps under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that would call for a report by the Secretary-General on these matters within the two-week deadline.

74. The actions of South Africa, whether they are its defiance of the United Nations on the Namibian question, its aggression against its neighbours in southern Africa,

committed either directly or indirectly through its agents in Rhodesia and elsewhere, and its domestic policies, have long constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. The Western Powers have always parried the question of action under Chapter VII of the Charter and I do not believe that the international community can accommodate them in that any longer. I do not think that, in the circumstances now prevailing in Namibia, we can give South Africa any further opportunity or time to continue to defy the world. We hope that the West on this occasion will find no excuse not to co-operate with us.

75. The reason for that is the clear trend we see evolving in Namibia. By now, the Council is only too aware of the implications of attempts to legitimize the internal settlement in Rhodesia. It has rejected that. It should not allow itself to be hoodwinked and led into a position at some future date where it will have no option but to ask for all-party conferences or other palliatives in Namibia similar to those we have seen in Rhodesia. The stage is now clearly set for free, fair, supervised and controlled elections in Namibia. We must not and cannot afford to move backwards.

76. For its part, Nigeria will continue unequivocally to support SWAPO and to provide it with moral and material assistance to enable it to step up its armed struggle against the illegal administration in Namibia. If the peaceful option fails, we shall pursue the only option left with greater vigour.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Guyana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

78. Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): It is appropriate for my delegation first of all to extend to you, Mr. President, and through you to the other members of the Security Council our sincere gratitude at having been accorded this opportunity to participate in the present deliberations. My delegation would also like to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of this high office and to express its firm hope that under your presidency the Council will adopt such measures as will serve to accelerate the realization of genuine independence and freedom for the people of Namibia.

79. The past 19 months in particular have witnessed a flurry of diplomatic and other activity in relation to southern Africa, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe—activity occasioned by various and varying motives and perceptions. Colonialism in its global context is on the retreat, but the stratagems formulated and initiated in an attempt to thwart the process of decolonization and the onward march to genuine national liberation and independence are nowhere more in evidence than in southern Africa itself. The citadels of racism which yet stand at Pretoria and Salisbury will, however, not survive the course of history, for even they, embattled and increasingly isolated as they are by the ranks of progressive forces the world over, have been forced to respond to tremors that will shake them from their very foundations.

80. Although we have indeed convened here to consider ways and means whereby the Security Council can most

effectively fulfil its pertinent responsibilities in relation to the grave situation in Namibia, we must not be deluded into thinking that Namibia and the future of that international Territory can be discussed and analysed in isolation. For the correlation of forces which continue to influence the pattern and the course of events in southern Africa in itself requires that Namibia be viewed within the wider context of the geopolitical situation that at present obtains in that troubled region of the world. It has been observed in several forums—and my delegation associates itself with the observation—that central to the ongoing problems of southern Africa is South Africa itself. The manoeuvrings and the consistent intransigence of the South African racist régime are reflected in the antics of the rebel Smith at Salisbury. The international community, in its consideration of the present state of affairs pertaining to Namibia, needs to be cognizant of Smith's anxiety to convince certain influential sectors of the global community that his vision of an internal settlement merits support, wherever that support might emerge. The most recent utterances of the Botha régime indicate quite clearly that that racist is determined that his régime will continue in the course charted by his predecessors in an attempt to retain South Africa's illegal stranglehold on the Territory of Namibia.

81. When the General Assembly convened in special session in 1967, we agreed upon modalities and mechanisms through which the United Nations could best discharge its responsibilities with regard to Namibia so as to expedite the attainment of genuine independence by the people of that Territory. Today, 11 years after that historic decision, the responsibility and the preoccupation of the United Nations remain the same, and this must be the pre-eminent area of our concern today, that is, to ensure the early independence of Namibia under the auspices of the United Nations. We must not waver in fulfilling that solemn undertaking. Yet the successful exercise of that responsibility by the United Nations was based upon a very important premise: a willingness on the part of the South African régime to comply with the prescriptions of the General Assembly and to co-operate in the transfer of the administration of the Territory to the United Nations Council for Namibia, which is the legal Administering Authority of the Territory, until the achievement of genuine independence.

82. During the course of the past 19 months, initiatives have been undertaken both within and without the United Nations in an effort to expedite the granting of genuine independence to the people of Namibia. Today we are met to consider the results of some of those initiatives. The record of South Africa's response is clear and unambiguous, and well known to all of us. That response has been characterized by nothing but defiance and intransigence. There are few indeed who have ever believed that there was any genuine willingness on the part of South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations on Namibia.

83. The Security Council now has an opportunity and a solemn obligation to decide that the moment has come for it to make the fullest use of those measures at its disposal that were designed during the drafting of the Charter to be employed when the totality of the global community and, indeed, the Council itself, deemed that all other measures had been exhausted. That decision must necessarily be

informed by our awareness not only of South Africa's continued defiance of the Organization, but also of the nefarious activities carried out by the illegal régime in Namibia, activities which the Council has already acknowledged constitute a threat to international peace and security.

84. Most recently, in response to resolution 435 (1978), the South African régime has indicated that it will not comply with the provisions of that resolution and that it intends to go ahead—might I say impudently—with its plan for the holding of illegal so-called elections during the month of December of this year, that is, next month. This resolve by the illegal South African régime has been communicated to the Security Council in terms that are clear to us.

85. It was in fact this consistent defiance by the South African régime that caused the General Assembly, the Council for Namibia, the non-aligned movement and the Organization of African Unity to call upon the Council to adopt the most rigorous measures against South Africa, including the sanctions provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter, so as to compel South Africa to effect a change in its conduct and comply with the United Nations prescriptions on the situation in Namibia.

86. My delegation in reiterating that call, feels that the Council now has no alternative but to invoke such sanctions. This is a decisive stage, and decisive measures must now be employed. The South African régime must not be allowed the opportunity to buy more time for manoeuvring, gimmickry and the formulation of stratagems designed to confound the international community, while it presses ahead with its own pet scheme. The future, indeed the fate, of Namibia and of southern Africa must not be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. The need for continuous and so-called exhaustive consultations with the South African régime must not be invoked as a tactic to stave off appropriate and timely action by the Council. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) signalled the cut-off point. We agreed that time had run out for South Africa. The Council cannot now afford to place its credibility further in jeopardy by allowing itself to fall victim once again to the manoeuvrings and the caprice of the South African régime, which has already contributed so much to undermining the authority of this most important organ of the United Nations.

87. There remains one final and important observation. Throughout the period of negotiations, SWAPO has consistently and steadfastly demonstrated its willingness to negotiate and to make concessions. The compromises to which that valiant organization has agreed cannot be called in question. Indeed, one is left wondering whether the process of decolonization was intended to be implemented by placing pressure on the people struggling for freedom rather than on the alien occupier. This is but another important consideration that must inform the decision to be taken by the Security Council.

88. SWAPO's willingness to make concessions and its demonstrated sincerity during the course of the negotiations serve as an indication, among other things, of the

confidence which the liberation movement has reposed in the authority of the Organization and its capacity to take appropriate action in a situation in which international peace and security are manifestly imperilled. If the Council should once again fail the people of Namibia and frustrate their confidence in its ability to take action, then we should be contributing in no small measure to the perpetuation of illegality and institutionalized racism in a Territory concerning which the United Nations has taken upon itself the responsibility for administration until the attainment of genuine independence and freedom.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Algeria. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

90. Mr. BOUAYAD-AGHA (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I would first of all convey my most sincere congratulations to you in your capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of November and as representative of a brotherly and friendly country which, like mine, supports the advancement of the African peoples, particularly those still subjected to the colonial yoke, racism and the *apartheid* régimes. I hope that under your presidency the work of the Council will be productive and successful.

91. My delegation also wishes to congratulate Ambassador Leprette, who conducted the business of the Council during the month of October with great competence, thanks to his personal qualities derived from the ancient diplomatic traditions of France.

92. Throughout this year the situation in the whole of southern Africa has been characterized by a series of events in which acts of aggression have alternated with periods of calm which the racist régimes of the subregion have used to advantage to consolidate their alliance and to engage in a great many manoeuvres of all kinds aimed at delaying the liberation of the peoples.

93. The case of Namibia is a tragic example of the many variations noted in the consideration of this question by the United Nations. In this connexion, my delegation would like to point out that the time-wasting tactics of South Africa, like the hesitation that has characterized the action of the international community, have unduly prolonged the sufferings of the Namibian people, the victims of daily acts of aggression by one of the most retrogressive régimes of the world. It wishes once again to recall that the Organization has had full responsibility for and duties *vis-à-vis* the Namibia people ever since it adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), on 27 October 1966, thereby committing itself to lead Namibia to independence in conditions in conformity with the ideals of justice and progress.

94. In the Algerian delegation's opinion, the present debate in the Security Council must strengthen and confirm the prime responsibility of the United Nations and be viewed as the consolidation of its efforts to achieve the decolonization of the Territory by the implementation of the internationally acceptable plan, in accordance with resolution 385 (1976) taken as a whole, and resolutions 431 (1978), 432 (1978) and 435 (1978), subsequently adopted.

95. We dare to be firm in the hope that in this respect the Council will not fail to face up to its obligations at a time when South Africa, in defiance of the African continent, the United Nations and the five Western countries themselves, has just taken initiatives of extreme gravity, which undoubtedly constitute a threat to international peace and security.

96. The illegal occupation of Namibia, as well as all the forms of oppression and aggression perpetrated by the illegal Pretoria régime, still continues because, unfortunately, this régime still receives from certain Western countries unacknowledged obliging help, if not open support, which has had the effect of delaying specific action by the international community against the South African racists.

97. My country believes that a healthy reaction to the Fascist arrogance of Pretoria is now more pressing than ever, as is the imposition—and not merely the contemplation of that imposition—of binding sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The African Group has had in this connexion an opportunity to prepare a draft resolution, expressing all the apprehensions of the African continent as a whole in the face of the threat which South Africa represents for the independent African peoples and those still colonized.

98. Thus far all the parties concerned have unequivocally expressed their readiness to see the plan for a peaceful settlement implemented, with the exception of South Africa, which is an illegal occupier seeking to prolong its domination over the Namibian people and the exploitation of the natural resources of the Territory.

99. My delegation wishes to recall that the organization of elections in Namibia, provided for by the settlement plan in conformity with resolution 431 (1978), must be undertaken under the supervision and control of the United Nations. That implies both the drawing up of the electoral rolls by the United Nations and the guaranteeing of security and order throughout the period provided for the political

campaign preceding the elections themselves. My delegation wishes to stress here that the Algerian Government here and now categorically rejects the results of the electoral masquerade decided upon by Pretoria and refuses to grant legitimacy to any group of puppets, the product of rigged elections, traitors to their people and manipulated by the illegal racist Pretoria régime, for it is true that the concerns of that régime are not so much to promote or to prepare a democratic tradition in the Territory but, on the contrary, to perpetuate and consolidate its economic and strategic advantages in the country and, above all, to perpetuate the policy of *apartheid*, the system of slavery officially instituted in 1910. I should like in this respect to recall the description of this ignoble manifestation by Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*:

“A world divided into compartments, a motionless, Manicheistic world, a world of statues: the statue of the general who carried out the conquest, the statue of the engineer who build the bridge; a world which is sure of itself, which crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips: this is the colonial world. The native is a being hemmed in; *apartheid* is simply one form of the division into compartments of the colonial world.”¹

I should like to ask Mr. Leslie Harriman, the representative of Nigeria, to accept the gratitude of the Algerian delegation and of the whole African Group for having successfully organized a day of commemoration in tribute to the late Frantz Fanon for his contribution to the struggle against racism in South Africa.

100. In conclusion, the Algerian delegation wishes to reiterate its total solidarity with SWAPO, the sole genuine representative of the struggling Namibian people, and to assure it of Algeria's total support until genuine independence in a united Namibia has been attained.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

¹ New York, Grove Press, Inc., 1966, p. 41.