



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

**2095<sup>th</sup>** MEETING: 2 NOVEMBER 1978

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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## 2095th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 2 November 1978, at 4 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Léon N'DONG (Gabon).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2095)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Namibia:
  - (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
  - (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### The situation in Namibia:

- (a) Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) (S/12903);
- (b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12906)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2092nd and 2094th meetings, I invite the representatives of Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Huq (Bangladesh), Mr. Hourgavou (Benin), Mr. Simbananiye (Burundi), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Boatén (Ghana), Mr. Sinclair (Guyana), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hussen (Somalia) and Miss Konie (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cuba, Mozambique and Yugoslavia, in which they ask to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Lobo (Mozambique) and Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to be seated at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Miss Konie (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.*

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2092nd meeting, I invite Mr. Gurirab to take a seat at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gurirab (Permanent Observer of the South West Africa People's Organization) took a place at the Council table.*

5. Mr. JAIPAL (India): Mr. President, I would extend to you the warm felicitations of my delegation on your assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of November and express the hope that under your presidency the Council will take effective action on African questions that have been outstanding for too long a time.

6. As you know, the Council is currently meeting at the request of the African Group to consider the continued South African defiance of the decisions of the Council and the General Assembly in relation to Namibia. This open defiance of the United Nations by South Africa is not a new phenomenon. It has existed ever since 1966 when the Assembly terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations for that Territory. However, South Africa refuses to withdraw its presence from Namibia and continues to behave as if its Mandate were still valid. And it also

continues to subject the people of Namibia to its racist discriminatory laws and policies.

7. South Africa's latest act of defiance is particularly revolting, because it is an act of betrayal. It had given the Council adequate reason to believe that it would fulfil the terms of resolution 385 (1976), which calls for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control. At any rate, South Africa had clearly encouraged the five Western members of the Council to think that there was a fair chance of holding United Nations supervised elections, and to that end intensive diplomatic efforts have been exerted by them. In fact, their efforts led to the Council's adoption of resolution 435 (1978), which approved the Secretary-General's plan for the United Nations supervision of the elections.

8. Since then, further diplomatic efforts have been made at the level of Foreign Ministers by the five Western countries. However, the upshot of all this, curiously enough, is South Africa's firm decision to go ahead with its own elections without United Nations supervision or control. In deciding to do so, South Africa is disregarding the judgement of the five Western countries—and, indeed, that of the United Nations—that its unilateral elections will be considered null and void. The purpose of its elections is plainly set out in the proclamation of 20 September of the South African Administrator-General in Namibia. His proclamation provides for the election of a 50-member assembly to draw up a constitution leading to independence. There is really nothing more to say than that these elections would lead to the unilateral declaration of independence by a minority in Namibia, as was done in Southern Rhodesia.

9. It is revealing to read the statement made by the new South African Prime Minister to the Foreign Ministers of the five Western countries on 16 October this year [S/12900, annex I]. Mr. Botha's statement is truly extraordinary, even for a politically prehistoric monster who claims to be civilized. At no point did Mr. Botha refer to the United Nations, except once to say that South Africa was in a state of dispute with the United Nations over Namibia. Mr. Botha's apparent concern is to secure international recognition for an independent Namibia under the leadership of persons elected at the December elections. The fact that those elections are null and void and will be boycotted by SWAPO and several other political parties is evidently of no consequence or concern to Mr. Botha and his Government.

10. In these circumstances, there can be no question at present of having consultations with South Africa or its Administrator-General in Namibia about the modalities of elections to be held under United Nations supervision and control. In our view, there is no point in sending the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Namibia, as long as South Africa is determined to proceed with its own elections, the purpose of which is false independence. The issue is not whether the Secretary-General's representative should or should not go to Namibia now; the real issue is whether there can be free elections under United Nations supervision and control in the new illegal situation in Namibia that will be created by the December elections.

The answer to that cannot be in the affirmative unless South Africa cancels its unilateral elections and offers to co-operate in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

11. If the Secretary-General's representative does not go to Namibia now, nothing will be lost. At least we can be sure that he will not be blamed for the failure of South Africa. The Secretary-General is not a sort of general scapegoat; his role and the integrity of his office should be protected at all times in the interests of this Organization. Furthermore, legal responsibility for Namibia is vested in the United Nations. In other words, the General Assembly and the Security Council together share responsibility for the future of Namibia, and I would add that there are limits beyond which the Council cannot proceed without first making sure that it is in tune with the Assembly.

12. In my delegation's view, the present situation calls for a draft resolution which, in its operative paragraphs, would call upon South Africa to cancel its December elections and co-operate in the implementation of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). It should also warn South Africa that unless it indicates to the Council its willingness to co-operate within two weeks, the Council would be obliged to initiate appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

13. To that end, we might commence forthwith the drawing up of contingency plans for the implementation and monitoring of such mandatory sanctions as will be sufficient to compel South Africa to comply with the Council's decision. I would say that my delegation appreciates very much the diplomatic initiatives taken by the five Western members of the Council. They have indeed done a very great deal, and if they have failed it is not due to want of effort or will. It is due simply to the open defiance by the Pretoria régime of the authority of the United Nations and its refusal to quit the international Territory of Namibia. There is nothing more left for the Western Five to do than to join forces with the other members of the Council in applying the full range of options available under Chapter VII of the Charter. Any other course of action might call into question the good faith as well as the motives of the Council.

14. The choice before the Council is really limited to imposing sanctions, either before the December elections or after the unilateral declaration of independence in Namibia. In either case, our target surely should be South Africa. My delegation will be prepared to submit a draft resolution along the lines that I have mentioned, together with like-minded members, and might I add that it is clear to us that it will be desirable not to wait until there is a unilateral declaration of independence by a minority in Namibia before initiating mandatory sanctions against South Africa. The experience of Southern Rhodesia should have made this point clear enough. Perhaps we all draw different lessons from that dismal experience.

15. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

16. Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): I wish to thank the Security Council for having enabled me to set forth the views of the Yugoslav delegation on the present phase of one of the most acute and urgent issues of decolonization, namely, the question of the liberation of Namibia. To you personally, Mr. President, I wish much success in carrying out your responsible duties.

17. All of us here, as well as the whole international community, are well acquainted with the problem of Namibia, which is characterized by the illegal occupation of the Territory, by racist repression against the Namibian people and by South Africa's constant aggression against free and independent African countries, primarily the front-line States. This poses a constant threat to international peace and security. We are also aware of the responsibility of the United Nations with regard to Namibia and with the role that the world Organization has assumed under resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). The non-aligned countries have also assessed the situation in Namibia and adopted a clear stand with regard to this problem at the recent ministerial conference at Belgrade.

18. We are now confronted, in and regarding Namibia, with a situation which, although reflecting the old and unchanged policy of South Africa, nevertheless contains some new elements posing a direct challenge to all of us and making it imperative to adopt clear options. The consensus achieved by the international community embodied in resolution 435 (1978) to ensure, on the basis of the plan of the five Western countries, a peaceful transfer of power in a democratic and legal manner to the genuine representatives of the people of Namibia—with the United Nations playing the central role in this process—constitutes undoubtedly a positive development.

19. This important achievement of the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, its only legal representative, as well as steady international solidarity have provided a solid basis for the attainment of independence by Namibia. In the course of conceiving and adopting this plan, SWAPO asserted itself, in spite of the immense sacrifices made by the Namibian people, as a constructive factor which, in its noble endeavour to prevent any further bloodshed and to defuse tension in the region of southern Africa, has made it possible to open the door to the peaceful solution of one of the most serious problems in southern Africa. Actually, both SWAPO and the front-line States have made substantive concessions in order to create conditions for a peaceful solution.

20. And where are we today, after all this? When it was rightly expected that prospects for an internationally negotiated settlement of the problem of Namibia would be opened, which would have affected positively the solving of other problems in southern Africa as well, South Africa, by resorting to acts of repression against SWAPO and the people of Namibia and by taking unilateral measures, deprived the United Nations plan of any substantive value, preventing its implementation. The decision of South Africa to conduct elections under its patronage and apparatus of repression is obviously in flagrant violation of resolution 435 (1978) and constitutes an unacceptable step

which is bound to exacerbate still further the situation in that part of the world. There is no doubt that the South African régime opposes to the United Nations plan the so-called internal solution, which is directed in the first place against the liberation forces of Namibia personified in SWAPO. There is also no doubt that South Africa has constantly used the negotiations for the purpose of preparing the so-called internal settlement. It is obvious that the basic aim of these manoeuvres is to thwart the genuine independence of Namibia. In this way the South African régime not only has rejected the basic principles of the plan of the Security Council but has begun arrogantly to pose new conditions whose acceptance would amount to the legalization of the occupation and perpetuation of the colonial status of Namibia through the establishment of a quisling régime of the Turnhalle group.

21. We know very well from history—both ancient and more recent—that no genuine solution could ever be achieved anywhere by relying on alliances with forces imbued with a puppet mentality. All such attempts in the world have failed in the past and will fail in the future as well, in the same way as it has proved impossible to arrest the process of decolonization and prevent further development of the national liberation struggle.

22. The purpose of such conduct by South Africa is clear. The racist régime is endeavouring to preserve its dominant role in southern Africa and to deprive the Namibian people of its inalienable national rights. The United Nations must strongly oppose this. The acceptance of any variant of "internal" settlement imposed by South Africa even by implication would be tantamount to endorsing the system of illegal occupation of Namibia. These attempts by South Africa should be checked by the United Nations, as this is the only way to preserve peace and security in that region. There can be no permanent solution without satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people, and this can be achieved only through dialogue with SWAPO as its legitimate representative.

23. South Africa is once again giving proof of its intransigence and persistent defiance of the decisions of the United Nations. The present situation regarding the problem of Namibia constitutes in many respects a test for all of us, and I would even say a "moment of truth", particularly for the countries that initiated the plan which was adopted by the Security Council as a way conducive to a peaceful solution.

24. The United Nations has, in the view of the Yugoslav delegation, no choice but to maintain a firm stand, which will prevent South Africa's attempt to circumvent and sabotage our endeavours. If we showed weakness, we would then be confronted later by catastrophic consequences, as we would have encouraged South Africa to entrench its neo-colonial and racist control of Namibia and increase the danger to international peace and security in Africa. We must also do so because all the genuine national liberation forces have already rejected South Africa's manoeuvres. The United Nations must bear this fact in mind. Otherwise, we would become inadvertent accomplices to further aggravation of the situation. And we can avoid this only by taking direct action against the instigator of such a

situation. We cannot remain passive and indifferent in the face of South Africa's action.

25. To be even more precise, we must reject South Africa's manoeuvres aimed at preventing the implementation of the United Nations plan for a peaceful solution and at perpetuating the illegal occupation of Namibia. This means that we must, in the view of my delegation, reaffirm the responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and its central role in the search for a solution to this problem.

26. We must strongly condemn South Africa for its continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the holding of illegal elections, by proclaiming all unilateral measures to be null and void, and emphasize that the well known plan of the Security Council provides the only basis for a peaceful solution.

27. We must lend full moral, political and material support to the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO. The lending of such assistance is actually in harmony with the substantive aims of the United Nations. We must further extend support and assistance to the front-line States, as a matter of urgency, with a view to helping them to resist aggression and overcome the economic difficulties created by their special geopolitical situation.

28. We have to establish full co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, primarily with the front-line States, in the search for ways conducive to the liberation of Namibia.

29. We must, first and foremost, find the most suitable ways and means to prevent South Africa from imposing the so-called "internal" solution and to compel it to comply with the decisions of the United Nations. There is no doubt that we are faced with a situation that comes within the purview of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter. This means that it will be necessary to take against South Africa all the necessary measures at the disposal of the Security Council and to exert all forms of pressure that will prove to be effective. The Charter and the decisions of the General Assembly and the Council provide us with a political and legal basis for undertaking such measures, while the repeatedly expressed will of the international community provides the broadest basis for concrete and effective action against the permanent aggression of South Africa.

30. Such a development causes us grave concern. Our concern stems from our awareness and conviction that the question of Namibia does not constitute a regional or simply a local problem, because—by its substance and as a component of the southern African complex—it represents part of a strategy aimed at preserving colonialism and discrimination in that part of the world. This is also proved by the aggressive acts committed by the racists almost daily against the neighbouring countries; this is also shown by their intention to prevent the genuine independence of Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. The conduct of South Africa in Namibia and the assistance given to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia are a substantive part of a plan aimed at perpetuating domination in that economically rich and strategically important part of Africa.

31. We are not without an alternative. We consider that it is still possible to find a peaceful solution, first, if we all take action on the basis of resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), secondly, if the liberation movement of Namibia—SWAPO—participates as the main and only partner in the search for a solution, and, thirdly, if all the factors involved continue, firmly and with a deep sense of responsibility, their action aimed at finding a peaceful and just solution.

32. Yugoslavia is prepared to support every action based on United Nations resolutions and on the recommendations of meetings of non-aligned countries conducive to a peaceful solution. In the same way, it will continue to support the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, because it is not only the struggle of the Namibian people for independence that is involved, but also the struggle for peace and stability in that dangerous hotbed of crisis in Africa. Failure to settle this crisis in Africa would result, as stated by the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the general debate,<sup>1</sup> in new grave disturbances in international relations and would open new areas for the rivalry and conflicts of foreign interests and confrontation. We cannot tolerate any longer the insolent challenges and manoeuvres of racist régimes, which imperil the peace and security of all of us.

33. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Mozambique, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

34. Mr. LOBO (Mozambique): Sir, on behalf of the front-line States—Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia—I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. You have taken over this important responsibility at a time of critical events concerning Namibia. I know only too well how dear the question of Namibia is to Gabon and to you personally, as, indeed, to the rest of the African continent. It is the hope and expectation of the front-line States that, under your wise guidance, the Council will be able to respond unambiguously and decisively to the latest in a series of South African challenges to the authority of the United Nations.

35. This meeting of the Council is a logical sequel to that held a few weeks ago at which the Council took a momentous decision, reflected in resolution 435 (1978), concerning the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control to herald the termination of South Africa's illegal occupation and the accession by Namibia to genuine independence. This development, which was formerly believed felicitous and hopeful but had now taken a turn towards frustration, was the result of almost 18 months of painstaking and complex negotiations to which the front-line States, together with all of Africa, made a considerable contribution.

36. In its resolution 435 (1978), the Council approved the report of the Secretary-General [S/12827] for the fulfil-

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 7th meeting.

ment of the United Nations objective of free and fair elections in Namibia, and requested him to report to it by 23 October 1978 on progress made to this end. On behalf of the front-line States, I should like to express to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, our warmest congratulations and acknowledgement for the indefatigable efforts he has been making with a view to the implementation of the principles of self-determination and real independence with regard to Namibia.

37. This is an occasion for a candid assessment of the situation. We must realistically answer the question whether or not the Secretary-General has been able to implement resolution 435 (1978). His report [S/12903] which the front-line States have studied carefully, leaves no doubt that the Secretary-General has been unable to fulfil his mandate because of South African intransigence. It was this intransigence of South Africa which prompted the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Council to proceed to Pretoria in an attempt to impart sense and reason to the South African régime.

38. Assuming that the intentions of the five Western countries were indeed good, their efforts none the less have resulted in a futile exercise. The joint statement issued at Pretoria on 19 October by the Western Foreign Ministers and the South African régime [S/12900, annex II] is a sad document. There can be no question that the Foreign Ministers failed to salvage the situation. South Africa has rejected resolution 435 (1978) and once again, as it has done for the last 12 years, has treated with contempt the authority of the United Nations. The Pretoria racists and Fascists are bent on going ahead with the so-called internal election in Namibia, through which they intend to install their puppets to power and accord sham independence to the Territory.

39. The front-line States supported and encouraged the Western initiative on Namibia because we believed in the *bona fides* of those countries. We thought they were, at long last, ready and willing to use their influence and leverage over South Africa and bring it into line with the values and democratic principles which they have always made the world believe they espoused and professed in their respective countries.

40. For us, it is discomfiting to be certain once more that the five Western countries are still very much the traditional allies of South Africa and countries in whose name the Pretoria régime has, as indeed has the régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, perpetuated its subjugation of the black majority in Namibia and South Africa. These are the same countries which have, over the years, collaborated with South Africa in the political, economic and military spheres, and have given it moral encouragement to persevere in its policies.

41. Within this context, we had understood the visit of the Foreign Ministers of the five Western countries to Pretoria as intended solely to extract South African acceptance of and compliance with resolution 435 (1978). As the African Group has eloquently stated, the visit could not properly be for the purpose of reopening negotiations or seeking compromises with South Africa. The stage of negotiations is over, and the current phase is that of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

42. In spite of the fact that it has no right to be in Namibia, South Africa procrastinated and prevaricated in the negotiations. In spite of the fact that it is under obligation to withdraw completely from Namibia unconditionally, South Africa got away with a lot of concessions during the negotiations. For instance, the question of Walvis Bay was literally shelved, and unilateral actions such as the appointment of the so-called Administrator-General were tolerated.

43. Furthermore, in an attempt to create a future fait accompli, the South African régime went ahead with unilateral registration of voters, and there were even some people who were saying that, by and large, further infraction should be tolerated.

44. During the same period of negotiations, South Africa intensified its repression and oppression of the Namibian people and committed acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia, intended, *inter alia*, to undermine and frustrate the negotiations.

45. SWAPO, on the other hand, in spite of its overwhelming support in the international community, took political risks and co-operated admirably and fully in the negotiations.

46. South Africa is now attempting to get away with the so-called internal elections in Namibia. This is no doubt the culmination of its carefully conceived and executed plan for Namibia. Thus, while SWAPO has been negotiating in good faith, South Africa has used the negotiations as a cover for carrying out its diabolic scheme for Namibia. The Pretoria statement is disquieting in that it seeks to conceal and divert attention from the real problem that has occurred in the efforts to give effect to resolution 435 (1978).

47. The question that must be resolved first and foremost is that of the so-called internal elections. This is an illegal exercise which must be condemned and rejected in no uncertain terms. It is an act of defiance of the authority of the United Nations that must be stopped. In no circumstances or guise must South Africa be allowed to get away with the internal elections, which indeed make a mockery of resolution 435 (1978) and the entire United Nations system. It takes no more than common sense to realize that any of those persons who will be "elected" in the so-called internal elections will not opt for other elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations with the risk, of losing power to others.

48. It is significant in this regard that South Africa has not even made a commitment that the free and fair elections envisaged under the United Nations plan would take place, beyond saying it would "use its best efforts to persuade" the so-called elected leaders "to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition through the good offices of the Special Representative and the Administrator-General" [*ibid.*, para. 4]. Since it has always pretended and claimed to champion the right of the Namibian people to choose and have authorized spokesmen, South Africa must not deceive the international community into

believing that it would go against the "wishes" of the hand-picked so-called leaders.

49. The contradiction between pretending to uphold the aspirations of the Namibian people, as expressed by their elected leaders, and vowing not to be bound by their wishes, as stated to the Western Foreign Ministers and enshrined in a recent so-called proclamation, is glaring to say the least. Contrary to the belief that South Africa would go along with the United Nations-supervised elections in Namibia, paragraph 4 of the Pretoria statement seems to suggest that the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be used to seek international recognition for the so-called leaders emerging from the internal election ploy. Any visit by the Special Representative to Namibia in the present circumstances would serve no useful purpose and would be ill-advised.

50. The problem that exists is political. There is an absence of the political breakthrough so necessary for the present exercise to go forward. This cannot be achieved at the level of the Secretary-General or his representative, who must merely implement the decisions made at the political level. The front-line States do not see how the Special Representative can be expected to succeed where the Foreign Ministers of the five powerful countries with leverage, allies of South Africa indeed, have failed. The Western countries concerned surely do not need Mr. Ahtisaari to test the sincerity of South Africa. They should have established this themselves in their three days of meetings at Pretoria. At any rate, if the issue is simply to establish South Africa's so-called sincerity, it does not really require a special visit of the United Nations representative to Namibia to do so. We have a duty to preserve the integrity of the office of the Secretary-General by avoiding actions that would only bring that office into disrepute. In the present exercise, it is vitally important that the Western members of the Security Council should not shift the burden to the Secretary-General and make him responsible for their failure.

51. The so-called introductory statement made by P. W. Botha at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the five Western members of the Security Council at Pretoria on 16 October [*ibid.*, annex I] says it all. South Africa is determined to present the international community with a fait accompli in Namibia, by reviving the Turnhalle arrangements. It intends to put the United Nations in a position where it will have to deal with the so-called internal leaders in Namibia to the detriment of SWAPO, which is anathema to the Pretoria Fascists. South Africa is not prepared to tolerate SWAPO's accession to power in Namibia, whether through democratic elections or by any other means. Thus, through the promotion of the Turnhalle Alliance in the so-called internal elections, South Africa is hoping to undermine international support for and solidarity with SWAPO and make impossible the accession of Namibia to genuine independence. Yet, at the beginning of the Western initiative 18 months ago, we were told by the five Western countries that South Africa had agreed to abandon the discredited and illegal Turnhalle plan. Now we know this is not the case.

52. The United Nations must not be fooled by the so-called willingness of South Africa not to shut the door to a solution of the question of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978). The concrete and practical actions of South Africa matter more than a categorical "No", which can never be forthcoming from the régime. The Pretoria régime will continue to give the impression that it is prepared to keep the door open in order to buy time for its devious plans in Namibia.

53. We in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia are amazed that in the Pretoria statement the five Western Foreign Ministers virtually conceded veto power to South Africa by unduly stressing consultations in paragraph 2 regarding the composition of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). This is all the more surprising since the Western countries have all along maintained that the question of the composition of the Group should appropriately be left to the Secretary-General. We do not see any necessity whatsoever for stressing consultations with South Africa in this public document. Why should the West always seek to appease South Africa?

54. South Africa has once again defied the United Nations. Concrete and effective measures must be taken by the Security Council to compel it to comply with the demands of the international community. The situation in Namibia and related developments have clearly demonstrated that South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

55. The front-line States trust that the Council will live up to its responsibilities in this grave situation. At issue is the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). South Africa has defied that resolution. SWAPO has accepted it. The Council's responsibility, therefore, is to take all effective measures to ensure compliance with its own resolution. The Council cannot afford to prevaricate on such a clear question, for it must not only act in order to arrest the deteriorating situation which is a clear threat to international peace and security; it must also act, and decisively so, lest its credibility become a laughing-stock.

56. In conclusion, on behalf of the front-line States, I wish to renew our unequivocal support for and solidarity with SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. We salute them for their bravery in combat and for their statesmanship and reasonableness in the negotiations. It is no longer contestable that even SWAPO's worst defectors cannot accuse them of failing to do everything possible to facilitate a negotiated solution. We hope that the Western five in particular will bear that in mind.

57. The front-line States, along with the other African States, are determined to give all the necessary support to the people of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa until they are completely free from colonial domination, neo-colonial imposition and racial discrimination. We will only consider ourselves free after these peoples have acquired their human dignity. These are our valued principles. For them we are ready to endure any sacrifices required to

make effective our solidarity with the people of Namibia and their sole representative, SWAPO. The struggle continues.

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

59. Mr. ROA KOURI (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation on your presidency of this important United Nations organ.

60. My delegation has asked to speak at this meeting to reiterate once again the solidarity of the people and Government of Cuba with the heroic struggle of the Namibian people for independence and self-determination, under the enlightened leadership of its sole legitimate representative, SWAPO.

61. A brief account of the effort made by SWAPO to achieve the freedom and independence of Namibia reveals the consistent, but also flexible, attitude of those who beyond doubt head the liberation struggle against the oppression of the racist South African régime which illegally occupies their territory. Comrade Sam Nujoma has not, in fact, been remiss in seeking negotiated solutions which could have saved valuable lives of a people subjected to a most brutal and pitiless exploitation, assassination, torture, imprisonment and exile. Only Nazi barbarism is comparable to the barbarism unleashed by the South African racists to maintain the reprehensible régime in southern Africa.

62. As has been affirmed more than once by President Fidel Castro:

“Cuba is not opposed to any peaceful solution for the peoples of Africa, particularly of Zimbabwe and Namibia, or their independence, as long as it is accepted by the legitimate representatives of those peoples, the Patriotic Front and SWAPO, and by the African States which support them. At the same time we must say that the greatest responsibility for the failure to achieve a peaceful solution so far lies with the Anglo-American rulers, who, while they speak of peace, pretend to achieve it by maintaining intact the repressive and reactionary structures created by Smith and Vorster to impose their odious régimes of white minority rule and *apartheid*.”

One need hardly be a great oracle to realize that that is precisely why nothing has been done towards the attainment of independence for Namibia and Zimbabwe.

63. It is, furthermore, evident that the game played by the South African racists and their Western partners and keepers has as its objective not the acceleration of independence for Namibia but the gaining of time in order to forge a solution in keeping with their sordid economic, commercial and political interests. It is an open secret that the transnational corporations of those countries, mainly North American and British companies, have violated all the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly in regard to the embargo against the racist régimes. It is also well known that it is not only a matter of

guaranteeing their vast profits, extorted from the peoples who are under the boot of *apartheid*, but also to ensure continued exploitation of Africa by imperialism in years to come.

64. Should anyone still maintain illusions about the close links which unite the South African racists with their partners in the “civilized, Christian and Western” world, as the apostles of the capitalist new order like to call it, the barbarian Botha has brutally dispelled them in the so-called statement which he made by way of welcome—and why not recall it—to his friends of the five Western Powers at Pretoria. After all, Herr Botha will think, and rightly so from his narrow, rapacious and allegedly “civilized” point of view, that the truth is the truth even though it may not come out smelling like roses.

65. For the imperialists, the question of southern Africa is one and indivisible: to maintain the capitalist system, with all its consequences. For them it is essential that the power structures in South Africa should remain immutable and that their racist tentacles should imprison Zimbabwe and Namibia through vassal and obsequious Governments, if need be with an African façade, as Smith has attempted to do in Zimbabwe and as Herr Botha will try to do in December with the so-called “internal elections” in Namibia. Hence their Western partners hesitate, because of the dilemma they face as a result of countless resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, to put an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia and the racist régime of Ian Smith. The implementation of those resolutions is quite clearly not part of the “Western plan”.

66. In taking up the question of Zimbabwe and Namibia—and also the important question of South Africa itself—one cannot lose sight of the unity of the problem. Today we are considering the undeniable failure of the negotiations undertaken, without consultation, by the five Western Powers in connexion with Namibia. But can one separate what has been happening in Namibia from the development of the situation in Zimbabwe or in South Africa? To do so would be a grave error, although perhaps that is what Mr. Botha’s friends are trying to do. On the contrary, the struggle in southern Africa is but one, just as the imperialists’ policy in the region is but one, and, even though the scenarios are different, the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia will strengthen that of the South African people against the racist white minority which upholds the system of exploitation established by colonialism and imperialism in that part of the continent.

67. Unequivocal proof of that is found in the recent manoeuvres of the Western Governments. On the one hand they encourage the establishment of a puppet régime in Zimbabwe, allowing its spokesmen to travel to the United States in clear violation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and 423 (1978), to promote their infamous creature and win the support of the so-called conservative Congressmen and of public opinion, so that the sanctions imposed by the international community against the illegal régime of Ian Smith may be lifted. On the other hand, they would have SWAPO, the African States which support its just cause and the United Nations itself break bread with the monster recently created at Pretoria which does away

with everything that has been agreed to and violates the spirit and the letter of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978) and 435 (1978).

68. While all this is going on at the diplomatic level—we have to find some description for this tortuous process of deceit and delay—the Ian Smith racists continue their aggression against Mozambique and Zambia, and at the very time of his North American tour, while South Africa directly participates with counter-revolutionary bands in the attack on Kassinga in the People's Republic of Angola. These are no fortuitous deeds. This is part of a well-coordinated policy of striking at the liberation movement and the countries which give them their unwavering support, while at the same time attempting to undermine the progressive neighbouring régimes which have emerged in the former Portuguese colonies.

69. At its 2087th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), in which it reiterated that its objective was the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations. It declared that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and 435 (1978), were null and void.

70. No one, no Member of the Organization, far less those States which have special obligations as members of the Security Council, has the right or the authority to ignore resolutions adopted by the Council. If the five Western Powers were really desirous of finding a peaceful solution to the question of Namibia, all they would have to do would be to withdraw their support for the Pretoria racists and compel them to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

71. The international community must energetically reject any attempt by sleight of hand to rob Namibia of its independence and to install a puppet régime there. It must reaffirm the right of SWAPO as the sole legitimate

representative of the Namibian people and oppose the electoral manoeuvres of South Africa designed to rob SWAPO of that status. The international community must also reiterate its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Namibia. But above all, at this time, the international community must demand that the Security Council should live up to its obligation and use every means provided for in the Charter, including the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII, to force the racist South African régime to comply with its decisions.

72. As we see it, the Council must also be careful not to approve the journey of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Namibia, which in the present circumstances would be tantamount to implicating the high office of the Secretary-General in a manoeuvre intended to endorse South Africa's designs.

73. It is true that the prestige and moral authority of the Organization are at stake. But there is much more to it than that. What is involved is the destiny of a people that has fought hard for its freedom and independence, a people that cannot be abandoned to the arbitrariness of an international delinquent like Mr. Botha. It is more than high time to proceed from words to deeds. Resolutions abound, all reflecting the firm will of Member States to support Namibian independence. Whether independence is obtained by peaceful means or otherwise now depends on the decisions the Council will adopt. In one way or another the people of Namibia will be free and will expel the South African occupiers from their country.

74. The freedom fighters of SWAPO, in their heroic battle for a free, independent and sovereign Namibia, will always have the Cuban revolution at their side. At the United Nations we shall give all necessary support for a peaceful solution that respects the true interests of the Namibian people. We shall continue to give our fraternal assistance to all those who in Africa have raised the banners of independence and social progress and who resolutely oppose imperialism, *apartheid* and any other form of domination or oppression.

*The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.*