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2060th MEETING: 17 FEBRUARY 1978

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2060th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 17 February 1978, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Oleg A. TROYANOVSKY
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2060)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Complaint by Chad:

Letter dated 8 February 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12553)

The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Since today we are holding our first official meeting of the Security Council in February, I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the members of the Council, to pay a tribute to the Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria, His Excellency Mr. Joseph Garba, and the Permanent Representative of Nigeria, Mr. Leslie Harriman, for their services in the post of President of the Council for the month of January. I am sure that I am expressing the feelings of the whole Council when I say that they have earned our unreserved gratitude for the great skill with which they conducted the work of the Council last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complaint by Chad:

Letter dated 8 February 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12553)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to inform members of the Council that letters have been received from the representatives of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the

Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kamougué (Chad) and Mr. Kikhia (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The Council will now take up the item inscribed on the agenda at the request of the Government of Chad as contained in a letter dated 8 February 1978 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Council [S/12553].

4. I should also like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following documents: the letter dated 6 February 1978 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Council [S/12554]; the letter dated 8 February 1978 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Council [S/12555]; the letter dated 13 February 1978 from the representative of Chad to the President of the Council [S/12558]; the letter dated 14 February 1978 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the Council [S/12560]. I have, furthermore, just received a letter dated 17 February 1978 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [S/12565], which will be circulated to the members of the Council in the course of the meeting.

5. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad. I welcome him and give him the floor.

6. Mr. KAMOUGUÉ (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, before I deal with the question before us, I should like to express on behalf of the people of Chad as a whole our gratitude for your diligence in convening this meeting of the Council.

7. We should also like to thank all the members of the Council who responded promptly to the appeal made by my country. In particular, we wish to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to President Omar Bongo of Gabon, the current President of OAU, President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri of the Sudan, President Seyni Kountché of the Niger and President Obasanjo of Nigeria, who have spared no effort to find a peaceful settlement to the dispute before the Council today and who, furthermore, have effectively contributed to the positive results that we have obtained in terms of national reconciliation.

8. We felt compelled to ask for a meeting of the Council as a matter of urgency—the Council which, under the Charter, is the main body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security—because we believe that the situation currently prevailing in our country is extremely dangerous and is one which is likely to endanger that peace and security of which the international community has such need.

9. The situation which obtains in Chad, as I have said, is serious and causes us concern because of the aggression committed by a neighbouring country, that is, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. That country, carried away by its own power, the result of the enormous resources it obtains from oil which enable it to acquire more arms than it needs, has in fact deemed itself entitled, in disregard of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity as well as of the relevant resolutions of those organizations and of the principles of international law, to commit aggression against Chad by occupying a part of its territory, Aouzou, in the northern part of the country and by openly fighting on the side of the rebels.

10. It was in implementation of the Treaty of friendship and good-neighbourliness between France and Libya, concluded at Tripoli on 10 August 1955,¹ that the present border between Chad and Libya was defined. That Treaty clearly provides in article 3 that:

“The two High Contracting Parties recognize that the borders which separate the territories of Tunisia, Algeria, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, on the one hand, from the territory of Libya, on the other hand, are those which stem from the following international instruments in force on the date of the constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya. . . .”

The instruments in question are the following: the Franco-British convention of 14 June 1898; the declaration of 21 March 1899 additional to the preceding convention; the Franco-Italian agreements of 1 November 1902; the Franco-British convention of 8 September 1919; the Franco-Italian settlement of 12 September 1919.

11. That Treaty was approved by the French National Assembly on 22 November 1956. Law No. 56-1235 of 12 December 1956 authorized the President of the French Republic to ratify it. The exchange of instruments of ratification took place on 20 February 1957. The Treaty was published and came into force through decree No. 57-436 dated 26 March 1957, signed by the President of the French Republic, Mr. René Coty, and countersigned by the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Guy Mollet, as well as by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Christian Pineau.

12. We should make clear that the letters exchanged on the day of the signing of the Treaty constitute the annexes and comprise detailed and indisputable provisions concerning the definition of the border between Chad and Libya. Thus the border is defined by two straight lines: (a) the first begins at Toummo and goes to the intersection of the

Tropic of Cancer with the 15th meridian east of Greenwich; it reaches Chad only in the north when it intersects with the border with the Niger; (b) the second begins at the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer and the 16th meridian east of Greenwich and goes to the point of intersection of the 24th meridian east and the parallel at 19° 30' north; it is at this latter point that the three frontiers of Chad, Libya and the Sudan meet.

13. In conclusion, the Treaty: first, established indisputably the invalidity of the Laval-Mussolini treaty of 7 January 1935 on which Libya bases its claims; secondly, it also confirmed the definition of the borders laid down by the additional declaration of 21 March 1899, the letters exchanged between Barrière and Prinetti on 1 November 1902 and the Franco-British convention of 8 September 1919, all of which are international documents that up to the time of our independence bound two permanent members of the Council, namely, France and Great Britain.

14. Furthermore, during the debates on the ratification by France of the Treaty of 10 August 1955, Mr. Maurice Faure, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made the following statement before the Council of the Republic on 29 November 1956:

“This Treaty provides for the definitive surrender by Libya of claims which at the time of Mussolini, and by virtue of the agreements signed with Pierre Laval, Italy had been able to make to the region of Tibesti.”

It is therefore unthinkable today that Libya should invoke such a document to justify its claim to Aouzou.

15. Furthermore, Libya voted without reservation in favour of resolution AHG/16 (I), adopted at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964. By that resolution, “all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”.

16. Since 1960, Chad has never disputed the border separating it from Libya. It is, to say the least, surprising that, after 22 years of independence for Libya and 13 years of independence for Chad, Libya should dispute its frontier with Chad and should have sent troops since 1973 to occupy Aouzou, an integral part of the territory of Chad.

17. Despite this clear case of aggression by Libya, Chad has, since the establishment of the new régime on 13 April 1975, shown unusual patience in seeking to resolve this unfortunate affair through peaceful means. We therefore deem it necessary to recall the steps we have taken. At the bilateral level, meetings took place at Tripoli and N'Djamena between the authorities of the two countries with a view to finding common ground of agreement in obedience to the higher interests of our two peoples. However, they all failed because the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, carried away by its expansionist policy and its desire to treat only with a Government of Chad that would be subservient to it, has always refused to deal with the substance of the problem, preferring rather to speak of a seductive “co-operation”. Now, Chad is not ready to trade its sovereignty or its territory in exchange for subsidies of any kind.

¹ See *Journal officiel de la République française, Lois et décrets*, eighty-ninth year, No. 83.

18. In this connexion I should like to stress an interesting aspect of the method adopted by Tripoli in opening negotiations with us. At the time when the delegations of Chad and Libya began the talks at N'Djamena on 23 June 1977, unprecedented attacks were launched by the rebels, on orders from Tripoli and with the support of Libyans, against the Chad military posts at Bardai, Ounianga Kébir and Zouar, areas close to Aouzou. Weapons of mass destruction were used and many persons were killed or wounded. The towns of Bardai and Zouar were taken by a detachment of the Libyan Army which was commanded by Captain Ali Hireimi and included a section of foreign specialists armed with heavy weapons. Those towns are today jointly administered by Libyan forces and their mercenaries. All the civilian and military inhabitants of these localities were sent to Libya, where they are living in deplorable conditions. Libyan radio itself confirmed this when it announced the deaths which had occurred among the prisoners of war and appealed to the International Red Cross to take an interest in their fate.

19. Faced with that situation, the Government of Chad deemed it appropriate to place the question before OAU during the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held at Libreville, Gabon, at the beginning of July 1977. A unanimous decision was taken there to establish a mediation committee of six members: Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal. That Committee was given the task of finding a solution to the problem and reporting thereon to the Assembly.

20. The Committee met at Libreville on 10 August 1977 and adopted a recommendation counselling moderation by the two parties. But, ignoring that resolution, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has, since 21 October 1977, been allowing the Chad rebels to use part of the daily schedule of its national radio, from 1800 to 1900 hours, for hysterical campaigns to denigrate Chad. These broadcasts are specially prepared by the Director of Chad Affairs recently established in the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All that has been done for the sole purpose of discrediting the Chad Government, taking attention away from the military occupation of Aouzou and torpedoing the national reconciliation under way in the country. At this very hour, that pernicious campaign is being waged by Radio Tripoli with renewed vigour. These are medium-wave broadcasts on a frequency of 828 kilocycles, or 352 metres, with 300 kilowatts of power.

21. Moreover, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in mid-January 1978, refused to take part in a meeting of the Sub-Committee of Experts, made up of jurists and cartographers, that the current President of the Council of Ministers of OAU, Mr. Martin Bongo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Republic of Gabon, convened at Libreville. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya tried to justify that arrogant and scornful attitude towards OAU by alleging that it could never participate in a meeting at which representatives of the Chad Government were present, and it cited as the reason for this the so-called acts of provocation committed by the Chad authorities against Libyan nationals and interests.

22. The fact is that there is only an ordinance—Ordinance No. 13/P.CSM of 19 July 1977—governing the movement

of Libyan nationals and their goods in the Republic of Chad. That Ordinance has the following provisions:

“Article 1. Any movement outside the place of residence is forbidden to Libyan nationals residing in Chad, until further notice.

“Article 2. All Libyan nationals residing in Chad are forbidden to engage in any lucrative activities, to sell, cede or rent their movable and immovable goods. Their assets in accounts with local banks, the CCP and the *Caisse d'épargne* are frozen.

“Article 3. The activities of the Chad-Libyan Arab Joint Bank, of the Libyan Cultural Centre and of schools are suspended.”

These restrictive measures have been taken in the interest of the Libyan nationals and for their security.

23. Continuing his diversionary manoeuvres, the Libyan head of State, during his recent official visit to the Niger, stated on 22 January that he was prepared to open his frontiers with Chad and to follow a policy of co-operation with that country. He added, in effect, that there was no dispute between his country and Chad. We are, then, entitled to wonder what he is seeking in Aouzou and for what purpose he is giving assistance to the Chad rebellion.

24. At the very time when the delegation of Chad, led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, was getting ready to go to Niamey for the meeting scheduled to take place on 7 February 1978, the situation in the north of Chad suddenly worsened. Military operations more violent than any that had taken place for the past 12 years were unleashed in the area of Faya-Largeau, the administrative seat of the BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti) Prefecture, and in the area of Fada, the administrative seat of the Ennedi Sub-Prefecture. This was done on the orders of Tripoli; eloquent proof is furnished by radio broadcasts. It was obvious that there were Libyan troops with the Chad rebels. The attacks were waged with sophisticated weapons, including rockets, which shot down two aircraft of the Chad squadron that were engaged in normal airlifts of food and supplies. Many people, above all civilians, lost their lives.

25. Such military operations obviously require enormous means, both in men and *matériel*, and persons using this technical equipment must be highly qualified. Certainly, the Chad rebels operating in a vast region covering half of the country do not have such qualifications.

26. There can be no doubt but that the intensity of the fighting taking place at this very moment in the BET is the result of the presence of Libyan troops in the area. Hence, no one can be fooled by the so-called determination of the Libyan President to reach a peaceful settlement of the situation.

27. It is evident that the limit of Libyan interference in Chad's internal affairs has long since been exceeded. Thus, no one can claim that something positive could result from the envisaged meeting at Niamey, nor that it is still

necessary for Chad to have normal diplomatic relations with a country whose annexationist ambitions are so obvious.

28. Yesterday, it was Bardaï, Zouar and Ounianga Kébir; today Faya and Fada are being attacked. Tomorrow, perhaps, it will be Kanem and other regions already marked on the Libyan map of expansion. Mr. Hisseine Habre, President of the Command Council of the Armed Forces of the North, who has just concluded an agreement with the Supreme Military Council and who is perfectly familiar with this region, pointed out the following in a communiqué published on 15 February:

“The stateless traitors Goukouni Oueiddei and his followers have agreed that the BET and Kanem should be attached to Libya as provisionally autonomous Libyan provinces.”

29. These sombre prospects for the future of Chad require urgent action on the part of all peace-loving countries and in particular the permanent members of the Security Council.

30. In addition, I would draw it to the Council's attention that Chad asks nothing more than the restoration of all its legitimate rights as a sovereign and independent State and that, at this very moment, it is acting towards that end by sending to Khartoum a delegation to consult with President Nimeiri, who has played and continues to play a very positive role in the process of national reconciliation and peace. But Libya, secure in its power and wealth, does not wish to hear this. It sticks to an ultimatum in which its head of State demands: first, an end to foreign intervention in Chad; secondly, a prohibition against Chad's receiving military aid from any country, and from Egypt in particular; thirdly, an indication of the good intentions of the Chad Government in pursuit of its efforts at reconciliation; fourthly, the reopening of embassies, and a warning to the Government of Chad to desist forthwith from harassment or hostile statements. If the Government of Chad does not comply with these Libyan demands, no hope should be entertained and there will be open war.

31. The Members of the Council are in a position to assess the gravity of those intentions. Nevertheless, I wish to stress that, as regards national reconciliation, the efforts of the Supreme Military Council, which has given that matter top priority in its political programme of action, have never been to the taste of Tripoli. In effect, contrary to some allegations by Libyan authorities in this regard, Radio Tripoli daily denounces those of its opponents who have agreed to respond to the call for national reconciliation. Furthermore, the régime of Colonel Al-Qadhafi has committed itself to making available to the rebels all the assistance necessary to fight the nation of Chad and the Libyan army is entirely in charge of the training of recruits. The Tripoli régime has even opened a special fund for the recruitment of Chad nationals living abroad, who are taken to the training camps at Benghazi and Tarhouna, near Tripoli in Libya, and Gouro and Aouzou in Chad. Lastly, the Tripoli régime has decided to stir up trouble again in the centre and the south of the country in order to facilitate the mission of the Libyan mercenaries in the BET.

32. Whom does the Libyan Government think it is deceiving? Certainly not the people of Chad, which would by no means cede an inch of its national territory. We cannot agree to Libyan presence on our soil, nor to Libyan intervention in our internal affairs that causes the death of nationals of Chad and pits them one against the other to achieve imperialist ambitions.

33. The statement I have just made fully proves, if proof were necessary, the seriousness of the situation at present prevailing in my country. As the Council is aware, Chad is one of the countries least favoured by nature in the whole world. Its poverty is well known to international public opinion. It is enduring the darkest hours of its history because of the expansionist designs of its neighbour to the north, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This situation not only endangers the very existence of Chad as a sovereign State and a member of the international community but could seriously jeopardize peace and security in that part of the African continent, which is already troubled by the existence of other hotbeds of tension.

34. That is why, moved by the desire to settle the problem through peaceful means, Chad today addresses the Security Council, seeking its assistance so that it may regain its territorial integrity and live in peace within the borders it inherited from colonial times. As its leaders have repeatedly stated, Chad has no belligerent designs against anyone. It has given sufficient proof of its will to live in peace and harmony not only with its immediate neighbours but also with all nations that love peace and justice. This determination to coexist peacefully has always been demonstrated by Chad in the positions it has taken on the major problems of our times, particularly within the Organization of African Unity, the movement of non-aligned countries and the United Nations. Once again the people of Chad, a peaceful people, asks nothing more than to live in peace within its borders, because it knows as well as anyone else that peace is a *sine qua non* for its development.

35. Consequently, Chad asks the Security Council to adopt all necessary measures so that: first, Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity, won on accession to independence on 11 August 1960, may be scrupulously respected; secondly, the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya immediately and unconditionally withdraws its troops from the territory of Chad, and in particular from the Aouzou region, halts all assistance of any kind, particularly military, financial, political and radio-broadcasting assistance to the Chad rebels, ends its interference in the internal affairs of Chad, and releases all military and civilian prisoners now detained in Libya; thirdly, urgent action is taken by the Security Council to ensure that the fierce fighting which began on 1 February 1978, thanks to foreign support for the rebels, ceases immediately and that the necessary conditions are created for the OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee to carry out the mission entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of Africa at the fourteenth summit meeting at Libreville; fourthly, both parties participate effectively in the efforts of OAU to find a just and equitable settlement of the dispute between them without recourse to violence.

36. As I have just pointed out, it is the seriousness of the situation in my country, more and more of whose innocent

sons are falling on a battlefield of foreign creation, which has led us to come before this important body.

37. Just as I conclude my presentation of the facts, a most disturbing message had reached us from N'Djamena to the effect that missile-carrying tanks and armoured vehicles have appeared on the rebel side and are proceeding in the direction of Faya. Clearly it is no longer the Chad rebels who are employing this equipment against their compatriots—equipment that is far beyond their resources from the human as well as the technical and financial point of view—but foreign elements.

38. This is extremely serious. It seems to me that the Council must speedily face its responsibilities otherwise there is a danger of seeing a people, a State Member of the United Nations, annihilated. We repeat with the firmest conviction that the people of Chad will not accept the fait accompli of a war imposed upon it and which does not bear a name. It has already made clear its determination to preserve its independence and its territorial integrity and to defend them to the last drop of its blood.

39. I would add that arrangements have been made for the International Red Cross, in co-operation with the Chad Red Cross, to carry out the evacuation and return to their homes of persons taken prisoner during the Bardai attack last June. We now learn that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya refuses to grant transit visas through Tripoli to these members of the Red Cross so that they can get to the areas concerned. That is a message which I have just received from N'Djamena and which it was necessary to read to you on completing my presentation of the complaint which the Government of Chad has brought before the Council.

40. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on whom I now call.

41. Mr. KIKHIA (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the task of President of the Council for the month of February. I should like also, since this is the first time I have addressed the Council since my country left it, to extend my congratulations to my colleagues who have been elected non-permanent members of the Council with effect from January 1978. I take this opportunity also to express my personal thanks and those of my delegation to my colleagues on the Council for the co-operation shown us by them during the two years in which we were a member of the Council, representing the African Group.

42. I have not prepared a statement because I did not know what our brother from Chad, Mr. Kamougué, was going to say in his statement. It is difficult to understand the situation because, at the same time as the Foreign Minister of Chad is attacking my country, my régime, my President and my Government, at the same time as he is accusing Libya of being expansionist and Libyans of being arrogant, there is a delegation from Chad at Tripoli that has been there since yesterday and that came to our capital as a result of the intervention of our brother President Nimeiri of the Sudan. I will read the dispatch from the Libyan press agency, JANA, which I have just received:

“17 February, Colonel Al-Qadhafi received on Friday morning the special envoy of President Nimeiri of the Sudan, Abu Bakr Othman Salah, who handed him a message from the Sudanese President. The message is described as fraternal and cordial. The delegation of the Republic of Chad then joined the talks. The delegation is composed of Mr. Gouara Lassou and Mr. Mahamoud Abderamane, Members of the Supreme Military Council. The delegation of Chad transmitted to Colonel Al-Qadhafi a verbal message from President Félix Malloum of the Republic of Chad. These direct contacts between President Al-Qadhafi and the Presidents of the Sudan and Chad are the result of their concern at the foreign interference in the internal affairs of Chad. JANA learns that a communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the talks among the three countries setting out the principal results achieved. JANA also learns that these talks make possible a direct meeting between Colonel Al-Qadhafi and President Malloum and that there is no obstacle to its taking place very soon. We remind you that the delegations from Chad and the Sudan arrived at Tripoli yesterday evening.”

43. I have also sent a letter to the President of the Security Council, which he mentioned, drawing the attention of the members of the Council to the efforts made by a number of presidents, friendly and fraternal heads of State, in an attempt to resolve the dispute between Libya and Chad. Since that letter has not yet been circulated, I shall read it:

[The speaker read out the letter subsequently circulated as document S/12565.]

44. We are expecting a communiqué which is to be issued any moment on the discussions between the delegations of Libya and Chad at Tripoli.

45. As I said, it was not too clear to us why the Foreign Minister of Chad insisted on a meeting of the Security Council or why he should begin by attacking Libya and making charges against us that he knows are not true.

46. The problem is really unfortunate, because it pits two fraternal countries of Africa against each other, and it is particularly distressing for us in Libya because Chad is a very important country for the whole of Africa owing to its situation at the geographical centre of the continent. It is of great importance for communications and relations between all African countries to the north, south, east and west. It is a cross-roads and it is perhaps for that reason that there has been no peace or stability in Chad for 20 years. There are forces which do not want to see peace and stability in Chad, forces with which Foreign Minister Kamougué is perhaps familiar.

47. The present Government of Chad has accused Libya of fomenting disturbances and encouraging rebels. The Minister even said that those rebels were in Libya's pay. I am not sure whom he is addressing here—members of the Security Council, Members of the United Nations or even the public at large? Everyone knows that the revolution in Chad is something that has existed for 20 years and that it already existed under the colonial administration. Our friends, the French, could tell us about that. It existed

before Libya became independent and even before the Libyan revolution. I do not think, in view of the purely formal independence of the former royalist régime, the foreign bases—in particular British and American—in its territory and the foreign influence to which King Idris was subject, that the Foreign Minister of Chad can accuse that régime of helping or financing the rebellion or of sending Libyan troops in Chad. It was not possible politically, nor was it possible financially, because Libya had not yet discovered the oil, whose revenue the Minister of Chad accuses us of using to foment trouble in that country.

48. We have heard that kind of accusation elsewhere—even in the United States Congress it is being said that Libya is using its oil revenues to encourage terrorism in the world. That is an old refrain. We have been hearing it for a long time now and we are very familiar with it. Libya is attacked because it is a progressive country. It is a country which tries, in so far as it can, to help the struggle for liberation in Africa and elsewhere. We have never attempted to conceal our intention of helping people who are fighting against Zionism in Palestine, against racism in South Africa and against colonialism.

49. I do not want to dwell too long on this matter, which is an internal affair of Chad's. I can assure you, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you cannot force the Security Council to focus on one aspect of this problem—an aspect which is only a small part of the dispute between Libya and Chad—and forget about what is happening in Chad. The essential problem above all is that of the revolution of the people of Chad against its régime, a revolution which has been going on continuously for 20 years. No one can stop it except the people of Chad themselves, that is, the Government of Chad. If you are unable to come to terms with your people, no one can help you. It is not a question of frontiers. There may be a frontier problem, but we have scores of frontier problems in Africa. That is not the point here. I do not want to dwell too long on this internal problem of Chad's, because we know the position of Chad and we know that its situation as a crossroads country creates problems. We know that when the European countries carved up Africa and divided the African cake they drew frontier lines and created provinces and colonies without taking into account geographical, historical, human or tribal realities. There are internal problems in most of our countries because of that. But most of our countries, thank God and thanks to the courage of the people and their leaders, have been able to overcome those problems. We all had them after independence—regional problems, ethnic problems and problems of language and religion. We in Libya also had them and all African countries had the same problems. Most were able to solve them, some with great difficulty, but they did solve them.

50. What is happening now in Chad is that the minority which inherited the colonial administration is still clinging to power and it has a problem with the majority. If the people in Chad have taken up arms it is obviously because there are difficulties. But do not blame the Libyans. We know that this is not the first time that you have attacked Libya. You are always looking for a scapegoat. You accused Libya in 1971 and even before then. You accused the Sudan and you suspended diplomatic relations with the

Sudan in 1966, 1967 or 1968. I shall quote from *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* of 1968:

“Relations between Chad and the Sudan, which had improved following a crisis in mid-1965, when President Tombalbaye accused the Khartoum Government of harbouring an ‘Islamic Government-in-exile’ alleged to be plotting against the Chad Government . . . , once again deteriorated in August 1966, but a settlement was reached at the end of September.”^{2, 3}

I do not want to read out the whole article, but you have been accusing your neighbours one after the other.

51. Furthermore, the revolution in Chad is not something that is just happening in the north, which is a sparsely populated area with about 100,000 inhabitants, but also in the east and the west. Negotiations are at present taking place in Nigeria. A man claiming to be the leader of the western army is supposed to have kidnapped a Frenchman and a Swiss. This did not take place near the Libyan frontier, but near Lake Chad, near the frontier with Cameroon, Nigeria and the Niger. Then there is the so-called second army at Ouaddai in the west, which also has nothing to do with Libya or with the Libyan frontier. It is quite far from Libya.

52. I do not think it is wise right now, when we are doing everything in our power to resolve differences, for you to come here and attempt to make Libya a scapegoat for your internal problems. I could quote hundreds of sources that would shed some light on what is happening in Chad. Perhaps there are many people who do not know what is happening there. I shall quote from Europa Publications Ltd. of London, which will give Council members some basic information on what is happening in Chad:

“The Saharan territories of Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti were traditionally ungovernable and they therefore remained under French military administration until 1965. Then tension between senior Chad officials and the French army resulted in the recall of the troops at Chad's insistence. In their place, the Sarh civil and military régime was autocratic, corrupt and . . . cruel, and aroused intense local bitterness.

“In imposing his exclusive authority through the single-party system and by expelling his French advisers from the north, Tombalbaye stifled every form of legal opposition and drove opponents underground or into exile. Shortly after the institution of the PPT [*parti progressiste tchadien*] as the single authorized political party, Tombalbaye ordered the arrest of a number of prominent politicians on charges of plotting to raise the Muslim north against the Christian south. Riots in Fort-Lamy (now N'Djamena) in September 1963 caused about twenty fatalities and led to the arrests of a former mayor of Fort-Lamy and a former Prime Minister. But dissidence continued, breaking out in October 1965 into rebellion with a tax riot at Mangalmé, 500 kilometres east of Fort-Lamy, in which several thousand people are

² See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, vol. XVI, 1967-1968, p. 23073.

³ Quoted in English by the speaker.

estimated to have been killed. There were local clashes in the Ouaddaï region, which caused serious border tension with the Sudan. Terrorism and banditry were renewed in the Salamat region in 1967, and moved into the Saharan regions of the north in August 1968. . . .

“Substantial pockets of rebellion also existed near the borders with the Central African Republic and Cameroon.

“Banditry, which had long been prevalent in eastern Chad even under the French, had clearly evolved into guerrilla warfare. Many of the dissidents were controlled by the Chad liberation front (FROLINAT), founded in 1966 by exiled politicians and led by Dr. Abba Siddick, a former Minister of Education and a founder member of the PPT. FROLINAT claimed that it opposed secession but insisted on a specific identity for the north, the promotion of the teaching of Arabic and a bilingual educational system.

“Anti-guerrilla operations were supported by a substantial French military force—1,600-strong, according to French official sources—between 1968 and 1971. A contingent of 1,000 men had been permanently stationed at Fort-Lamy, but in August 1968 Chad invoked the 1960 Franco-Chad Defence Pact in requesting additional French assistance. . . .

“Throughout 1972 clashes between FROLINAT guerrillas and French and Chad armed forces continued. FROLINAT’s active membership seemed to have increased and its weaponry to have become more sophisticated. In June 1972 guerrillas staged a commando attack on the capital. About 1,000 people were subsequently arrested by security forces.”³

53. This information proves that it was not the Libyans who invented the Chad rebellion. We are suffering from the consequences of this state of affairs in Chad.

54. The following is from *The Africa Guide 1977*, edited by the Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., page 103:

“The northern two thirds of Chad is desert encroaching on savannah; stock-breeding provides a living for a nomadic, Muslim population. The southern third, which has a population equal to that of the north, is cotton-growing country; the people there mainly follow traditional beliefs with a large Christian minority (20 per cent) and some Muslims; of a number of ethnic groups, the Sarh, Tombalbaye’s own, is the largest.

“Tombalbaye followed a policy of favouring the Sarh, who gradually came to dominate the civil service, army and gendarmerie. Sarh tax collectors in the north levied three or four times the correct amount from the people. The army behaved like the occupiers of a foreign country. Acts of rebellion were harshly repressed in 1966 only to re-emerge and gather momentum.”³

55. Those were foreign sources. The White Paper of 1963-1975, issued by the Second Republic of Chad after the coup d’état which brought the present régime in Chad to power gives some idea of what has been happening in

Chad and sheds light on the roots of the problem. I shall quote some passages. On page 9, it says:

“There were arrests in March and April 1963, bloodshed in September 1963 at N’Djamena and there were the events of Mangalmé, in the east central region of the country, from which originated the troubles which we are still experiencing. This was a crying injustice which had to be redressed: taxes had indeed been levied twice in the same year. Tombalbaye replied to the protests by repression and arrests.

“The dissidence and the troubles extended to other parts of the country: Ouaddaï, Batha, Guéra, Salamat, BET and Chari-Baguirmi, whose populations also suffered from harassment and injustice at the hands of the administration and the political apparatus of Tombalbaye.

“It should be pointed out that the people of these areas are largely Arabic-speaking and Muslim and were seeking relief from the troubles that had been inflicted upon them by the Tombalbaye administration.”

I shall quote another passage from the White Paper issued by Chad in 1975, from page 15:

“After the liquidation of the uninitiated, the ex-President wanted to create an army of fanatics which was to attack by force, conquer the Muslims and proclaim Chad a kingdom.”

56. Those are the roots of the problem, which the Chad Government should have the courage to face up to and solve as other African countries have resolved their problems without looking for scapegoats abroad—the Sudanese at one time and now the Libyans.

57. The Chad Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of the rebellion, but the Government of Chad has recognized the rebels. They have had several contacts and have even asked us to act as mediators between them and the so-called rebels. The White Paper itself, on page 52, gives us an idea of these so-called rebels:

“In 1966 somewhere in Africa”—not in Libya—“the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) was set up. This organization brought together various leaders and others who sympathized with the Chad political parties that had been dissolved for their opposition to the Tombalbaye régime. The eight-point programme of FROLINAT, drafted on 22 June 1966 and published by the red *L’Humanité*, a political newspaper in France with left-wing sympathies, was:

“I. To struggle by all means to overthrow the neo-colonialist régime, the dictatorship which France has imposed on our people since 11 August 1960, after having brought to power and maintained a clique of docile puppets who carry out its new policy designed to perpetuate the extremist domination, oppression and exploitation of our people in a new form more subtle and more dangerous and more barbarous, but which is nevertheless neo-colonialist, in order to reconquer the national and total independence of our country.

"II. To evacuate all foreign bases and troops that have been established on our country's soil, which are a great permanent danger to the internal and external security of our people and an abrogation of our sovereignty, as well as a permanent threat and danger to the other fraternal African countries—as was so clearly shown by the dispatch of these troops from Chad during the events in Cameroon and elsewhere.

"III. To establish a national democratic people's coalition government. To bring about a large measure of progressive democracy by promulgating freedom of the press, of speech, of association, of religion, of movement, and so forth. To amnesty all political detainees.

"IV. To pursue a consistent agricultural policy. To carry out radical agrarian reform. On the basis of the principle of 'the land to those who work it', to distribute land to poor peasants without cost. To give effective aid and support to the peasants in all spheres: political, economic, social and cultural. To increase, ensure and stabilize the prices and the marketing of agricultural produce.

"V. To increase by one third the salaries of workers, to raise the salaries and wages of civil servants and soldiers, to eliminate all arbitrary taxes and fines, to reduce personal taxes, to ensure work for the unemployed. To bring about equality of the sexes, to ensure free care for the sick. To ensure a constant improvement in the people's living conditions.

"VI. To encourage small businesses and protect them from large foreign firms, to eliminate the economic monopoly of the imperialist countries and particularly of the EEC, to nationalize the key sectors of the national economy. To build an independent national economy. To pursue a policy of reasonable and equitable taxation.

"VII. To build a democratic, progressive, national system of culture and education. To adopt Arabic and French as official languages, to struggle effectively against illiteracy until it is completely eradicated.

"VIII. To establish diplomatic relations with all countries except Israel and South Africa, on the basis of the 10 principles of the Bandung Conference and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. To pursue a foreign policy of positive neutrality, to support the national liberation movements, to defend world peace actively."

58. I have just cited the White Paper edited and published by the Government for the present régime at N'Djamena. So the Foreign Minister of Chad should not come here and say that it is Libya which is fomenting trouble in Chad and that it is Libya which created the so-called rebellion. A revolution has been going on for 20 years, a real revolution, whose consequences we have suffered in our countries.

59. One wonders, then, why our brothers have come here to the Security Council. Perhaps they think that this is a good time for them, since Libya is being attacked from all sides: in the Western press, in the Western mass media, in the United States Congress it is being called a terrorist

country. Perhaps they thought that we were in a weak position and that we could therefore be attacked at the international level.

60. Once again they claim that Libya has become a Soviet base, very dangerous for peace in Africa. The Foreign Minister of Chad spoke of "foreign elements". I should like to know who these foreign elements are which allegedly are fighting at our side in Chad. Are they mercenaries? I believe that our friends from Chad are experts in recruiting mercenaries. I do not know whether he has in mind European mercenaries. I do not know whether he was alluding to other Powers.

61. All this is propaganda. I think that those who perhaps encouraged Chad to attack us at the international level were not very good advisers. We know full well why they are attacking us. We have no problems as Libyans. We are a small country, but we remain at the side of our brothers who are fighting all over the world against imperialism, colonialism and racism. We ourselves were the victims of colonialism and racism. We fought, and we lost more than 40 per cent of our population. It is our turn to help our struggling friends and brothers.

62. Perhaps Chad is looking for a scapegoat, to involve the Security Council in Chad's internal affairs. I do not know whether the Council could do something to stop this genocidal war against certain peoples in Chad. If it could establish a precedent for intervening in a country's internal affairs in order to do something, we would be most pleased, because we know what is happening in Chad.

63. The Minister of Chad put forward some precise charges against us. Unfortunately, I cannot reply to his statement point by point because I do not have the text. But he did say that Libyan troops were taking part in fighting near Largeau, which is mentioned in various newspapers.

64. He spoke of machine-gun carriers, rocket carriers—heavy equipment, in other words. In the French newspaper *Le Figaro* I read that the authorities in Chad said there were a thousand Libyans fighting in Chad. Unfortunately, there is no map here to show the Council and our friends and brothers here the distances involved. Largeau and Fada, which have just been mentioned, are about 800 or 1,000 kilometres from the Libyan frontier, and one must travel through the worst kind of desert in the world. There are more than another 1,000 kilometres between the Libyan frontier and inhabited regions on the coast. In other words, one must transport a thousand men through such country. Commandant Kamougué is a soldier. A thousand men: that is a battalion, four companies. Can you imagine the logistical problems involved in moving a thousand men across desert, the cruelest desert in the world, with the resources at our disposal? It would be impossible to conceal them. The satellites which spy on our desert and our continent can even detect the camels. Our friends who have satellites say they can photograph the desert and establish whether there is any movement in a given region. You could ask them—you know who they are—whether we have transported a battalion of Libyan soldiers more than 1,000 kilometres inside Chad. What you say does not make sense. It is not true.

65. The Foreign Minister of Chad talked about the frontier question and gave us some of the background to the international agreements on that matter. He drew up a list of such agreements. In Africa we are very well aware of frontier problems. But they are problems that are discussed between neighbours and friends. It is not enough to say that certain places are not Libyan and that the Libyan administration should withdraw from them and expect us to say, "Yes, you are right. We shall leave." This is true for all the countries represented around this table. We do not think there is a serious frontier problem. These frontier problems are mere pretexts. Our friends from Chad tell us that, since 1973, Libyans have been occupying Aouzou. We had the same problem before 1973: Chad accused us, and broke off diplomatic relations. Even after our revolution, under the presidency of Mr. Tombalbaye, Chad encouraged Libyan dissidents of the old régime to organize a mercenary attack against Libya from Chad. This happened between 1970 and 1971. And Mr. Tombalbaye said, "I am ready to provide a base for all Libyans who want to attack Libya from Chad". The representative of Chad accused us of having occupied Aouzou in 1973, but that is not true. We did not occupy anything. It is just a pretext.

66. If there is a Libyan administration now in Aouzou, or anywhere else in Libya, there is a simple explanation. After the revolution people began to take an interest in the interior and to construct hospitals, schools, administrative centres and police buildings throughout the country's interior and in the regions on the frontiers between us and Chad and other neighbouring countries. Those are among the areas in which we began to build roads and create an infrastructure in our country.

67. If there is a frontier problem, we would be very pleased to discuss it with you. We say we are in our country, you say we are in yours. You say it is Chad. We say it is Libya. This is a classic frontier problem. You say there is aggression and occupation by Libya. But this kind of problem exists on frontiers throughout the world, particularly in regions that are underpopulated.

68. In the literature of the Western world, people talk of vast wealth in these regions. But this is just to add fuel to the flames. People talk of wealth, of riches, but let them remember Fezzan. In order to convince the French public and persuade it to support the French occupation, the then French Government began to make a big fuss about the mineral and oil riches of the area. At the time, very responsible newspapers said it had more oil than the entire oil reserves of the Middle East. Now, we have found oil—not in Fezzan but in other parts of Libya. So this is an old song. We know it. It is very old. But this propaganda in capitalist countries and in the Western mass media should not be believed. What they want is that we should feud.

69. If we have a frontier problem, we have agreed to discuss it within the context of the Organization of African Unity. Chad brought the problem to Libreville and then suddenly attacked us. We were not even aware that the problem was going to be raised in that forum. In an attempt to solve the problem and bring the two parties together, a committee was set up. We recognized that *Ad Hoc* Committee. We co-operated with it. But then the Chad

Government took measures against the Libyan community in Chad. This is not the first time that has happened. I personally have been following relations between my country and Chad for a long time now, and whenever we are almost at the point of getting somewhere, Chad creates another problem at the last minute. There is now a Chad delegation at Tripoli, yet Chad has insisted upon having this meeting here. If they think this meeting will facilitate what is happening at Tripoli, that is their business. We do not think it will help. But since we are in the dock here, we have to defend ourselves and try to enlighten world public opinion and the members of the Security Council.

70. We agreed to co-operate with Chad, and then it took measures against our community in Chad. And you, Mr. Kamougué, conceded this when you said that Chad had confiscated their belongings, prevented them moving and stopped them selling, but that, apart from that, it had done nothing to them!

71. Then our Chad brothers said that a better atmosphere must be established so that we could discuss the differences between us. Frontier problems are not easy to resolve. Nobody, be it Colonel Al-Qadhafi or anyone else, can sign a paper saying that Chad is right. It is impossible. And we well understand that General Malloum cannot do that for Chad. And that is true for all countries. But those are things that must be examined and discussed.

72. I do not know if there will be other opportunities for me to speak, but I am going to study the text of the speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad and try to reply to it point by point either before the Council or in a document to be circulated to members of the Council. However, before concluding, I should like to say to our brothers from Chad and to the international community that we must be logical. It is not possible for Libya to foment trouble in Chad because the stability, peace and prosperity of Chad are the prosperity and peace of our own regions in the south and the east. The Libyan oases depend upon trade, the movement of men and goods; these are our ties with the whole of Africa. Chad is the bridge between us and the rest of Africa. It is we who suffer if there is trouble in Chad.

73. You know quite well, Mr. Kamougué, that as far as trade between the Mediterranean and Africa is concerned it is the Libyan merchants who have lost through this war because everything is paralyzed, beginning with the ports of Benghazi and Tripoli. Everything that we import from Europe we re-export to Africa because of the infrastructure we have as an oil-producing country. It would be illogical for us to ruin our own chances by war and disturbances. Our trade with the Sudan across the Sahara Desert has been paralyzed because of the troubles in Chad. Bandits have been attacking the caravans that are largely composed of Libyan merchants.

74. Therefore it would not be logical for us to create problems in those areas. But it is we who pay the price, we who receive the refugees. We have not created a problem; we do not come to the United Nations to see the High Commissioner for Refugees and say to him: "We have a refugee problem; come and help us." For 20 years now we

have been receiving refugees. Fortunately, in recent years we have been able to absorb some of them because we have needed manpower. And we have provided them with schooling.

75. I well remember that just before I left my job in the Government I received a telephone call after midnight advising me that 800 children had arrived at an oasis. Members of the Council can understand what a problem 800 children present for an oasis such as Arknu a Ouenat, situated in the triangle formed by the Sudan, Libya and Chad. These communities called "oases" are made up of 15 or 20 families, that is to say about 60 persons. One can imagine what it is like when refugees arrive in this way, particularly if they are children. And then, among them, there are wounded people who have been tortured. We welcome them and we try to help them; we make a humanitarian effort.

76. We have refrained from embarrassing the Government of Chad or our friends the people of Chad, under both the former and the present régime. We will be told that

Mr. Tombalbaye was at the root of it, but it seems to me that, since the people have not laid down their arms and are still fighting, even if Tombalbaye has disappeared, that is not the case for "Tombalbayism". Nevertheless, some of the people of Chad themselves say that there is "Tombalbayism" without Tombalbaye. It is not enough to change the person; the policy must be changed. And, in saying that, we do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of Chad. We assure Chad that we want peace and prosperity in the area and good relations with that country. As regards frontiers, we are ready to accept the decision of the Organization of African Unity. But we ask Chad to establish a good atmosphere between us and to stop accusing Libya of fomenting the revolution, helping the revolutionaries and taking part in the fighting. I can assure Chad that no one really believes this because everybody knows very well that this war has been going on for 20 years and has nothing to do with us. And when it comes to getting arms anywhere in the world, it is not difficult; there are plenty of good addresses.

The meeting rose at 6.00 p.m.