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# 2053<sup>rd</sup>

MEETING: 9 DECEMBER 1977

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NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 2053RD MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 9 December 1977, at 3.30 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Radha Krishna RAMPHUL (Mauritius).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Benin, Canada, China, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Venezuela.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2053)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The question of South Africa:

Letter dated 5 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Cameroon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12470)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

**The question of South Africa:**

Letter dated 5 December 1977 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Cameroon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12470)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council at its 2052nd meeting, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia and the United Republic of Cameroon to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Oyono (United Republic of Cameroon) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 9 December 1977 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, Mr. Leslie O. Harriman, representative of Nigeria, which reads as follows:

“I have the honour, as Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, to request the opportunity to participate in the meeting of the Security Council devoted to the item under the Council’s consideration.”

3. On previous occasions, the Council has extended invitations to representatives of other appropriate United Nations bodies in connexion with the consideration of matters on its agenda. It accordingly seems appropriate for me to proceed, if there is no objection, to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

4. In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I invite the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Harriman (Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.*

5. Miss LOPEZ (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, Mr. President, may I offer you our most cordial congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December. We also wish to extend our congratulations and our thanks to Ambassador Kikhia of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for his conduct of the Council’s affairs in November. We fully endorse what has been said by previous speakers, all of whom have recognized his skill during the official meetings of the Council and during the equally important unofficial consultations that took place last month.

6. In the course of this year, the racist régimes of southern Africa have redoubled their repression of the peoples they subject and have had to resort to all sorts of manoeuvres to try to contain the growing opposition being mounted against them. The grave events that took place recently in South Africa have once more underlined the need to accompany expressions of horror and censure with concrete action directed against the Pretoria régime.

7. The overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations have always believed in the adoption of measures including various kinds of sanctions against the authorities of South Africa. This was once again made manifest in the course of the debate held by the Council a few weeks ago. Although at the time, for reasons of which all members are aware, it was not possible to agree on broader measures, the Council did take a significant step with the adoption of resolution 418 (1977), by which a binding arms embargo was, for the first time, applied against South Africa. At that time, we expressed the hope that that decision was only the first step towards ultimate adoption of more vigorous action, and we shared the

concern expressed by a number of African delegations regarding the importance of ensuring implementation of that binding arms embargo by establishing an *ad hoc* committee.

8. Since then, a number of intense negotiations have taken place, leading to the preparation of the resolution that the Council adopted this morning [*resolution 421 (1977)*]. The Venezuelan delegation wishes to express its satisfaction with the decision taken, which represents the corollary necessary to ensure the full implementation of resolution 418 (1977). We wish to express our determination to co-operate in the work of the Committee to monitor the implementation of that resolution. We trust that the establishment of the Security Council Committee will serve as an impetus for the approval of a comprehensive programme of practical action aimed at eliminating the *apartheid* system.

9. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Venezuela for the kind words she addressed to me. Miss María López is not only a lady of great personal charm but also combines Latin beauty with a natural diplomatic skill and great talent combined with a rare intelligence.

10. The next speaker is the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. Accordingly, I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

11. Mr. HARRIMAN (Chairman, Special Committee against *Apartheid*): On behalf of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, I wish to express my satisfaction at the adoption of the resolution establishing a Security Council Committee to follow the progress of the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. We appreciate the fact that it is a procedural resolution, but we regard it as an indispensable complement to resolution 418 (1977). I assure you that this is the mildest statement that has ever come from me as Chairman of the Special Committee, because I believe that this represents a good step forward. I am particularly glad that this resolution was adopted under the presidency of the distinguished representative of Mauritius, who has contributed, with his usual energy and dedication, to the efforts towards securing unanimous support for the resolution.

12. The World Conference for Action against *Apartheid*, held at Lagos last August, solemnly called for action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter to ensure the full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. It also recommended the setting up of a watchdog committee to follow up the observance of the arms embargo. We are happy that both steps have been taken.

13. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* welcomed resolution 418 (1977)—though it was rather belated and limited—as an important step by the Security Council towards the elimination of *apartheid*. The Special Committee had looked forward to the establishment of the necessary machinery to secure the full implementation of that resolution without any delays, equivocations or restric-

tive interpretation. I believe that later, when the new Committee starts its work, this question of interpretation will be well taken care of.

14. The *apartheid* régime has been engaged in frantic efforts to overcome and frustrate the arms embargo. As we all know, the régime issued a proclamation, dated 11 November—virtually the week after resolution 418 (1977) was adopted—authorizing it to compel companies to produce and to deliver arms and strategic materials. This is evidence that there is pressure on that régime. The Special Committee has, however, noted with grave concern and indignation the plans of some transnational corporations to manufacture military equipment in South Africa. We are watching this development very closely and we hope that the Committee on the arms embargo will also follow it very carefully.

15. On 14 November, I addressed letters, on behalf of the Special Committee, to a number of Governments which have in the past supplied South Africa with military equipment, components and/or licences for the manufacture of military equipment. I stressed the great importance of the immediate implementation of all provisions of resolution 418 (1977).

16. I should like to express appreciation to the Governments which have sent replies to the Special Committee and reports to the Security Council. But I must note with concern that several arms-exporting countries have not yet reported on actions taken by them, or have failed to provide full information. In this connexion, I wish to recall the request of the Secretary-General on 4 November [*2046th meeting*] for the “most complete” information from all States, Members and non-members on the measures taken by them in compliance with the binding decision of the Council.

17. I wish to assure the Council that the Special Committee, in the discharge of its mandate, will lend its full co-operation to the Council and to the newly-established Committee in securing the full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa.

18. We sincerely hope that the Committee will begin work without delay, for the Special Committee already has a number of matters to bring before it.

19. The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* for his kind words addressed to me. I also thank him for the co-operation he has offered to the Council on behalf of the Special Committee.

20. The next speaker is Mr. M. J. Makatini, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at its 2052nd meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

21. Mr. MAKATINI: Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to extend to you, in the name of the African National Congress, the warmest fraternal congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council during the last month of this eventful year and on the eve of what

we believe will be declared International Anti-*Apartheid* Year by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session. Indeed, we are singularly happy that you, a tested brother and comrade-in-arms, whose experience, dedication and skill as the doyen of the African ambassadors and the representative of a country whose active commitment to our struggle is well known, should assume this office at a time when the Council at long last appears to be poised for action against the *apartheid* régime.

22. The unanimous adoption of the resolution on the setting up of a Committee to monitor the implementation of resolution 418 (1977) marks the first but an extremely important point on our joint scoreboard. We are mindful and highly appreciative of the fact that this is the result of the magnificent and indefatigable role played by your two immediate predecessors, Mr. Jaipal of India and Mr. Kikhia of Libya, under whose able guidance the Council, depending on the political will of all parties concerned, has made considerable progress towards performing the task expected of it by the international community for decades now. Your outstanding qualities as a diplomat and freedom fighter have helped us to achieve the goal of our unanimous decision this morning. And as we approach International Anti-*Apartheid* Year, during part of which the Council will be presided over by Mr. Harriman, the Chairman of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and representative of Nigeria, whose illustrious head of State, General Obasanjo, has recently and solemnly committed his country to action not only against the *apartheid* régime but also against its collaborators, we are convinced that today's decision is yet another landmark in ever-escalating international action towards the total ostracism of the Vorster régime.

23. I thank you most heartily for allowing me to speak on behalf of the African National Congress. Our position on resolution 418 (1977) is well known. We maintain that the content of that resolution is too little and has come too late, and this has been confirmed by a series of statements by the Pretoria régime's authorities. But, as we said on the day it was adopted [2046th meeting], we welcome it as constituting the basis for future and more meaningful action, such as economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter and strict observance of the limited arms embargo it sets out to impose.

24. On the subject before us today, since our position has been repeatedly confirmed by the Fascist Pretoria authorities, who openly boast of self-sufficiency and the assurance of continued supplies of war equipment, as the representative of China said this morning, quoting Botha, the Minister of Defence, we hold the strong view that this resolution is the last test of the sincerity of the Western countries.

25. The gravity of the military collaboration between some Western countries, of which the Council has been seized since 1963, was ably expressed by our late President Albert Luthuli when, in a statement addressed to the international community in general and to Britain in particular—then the major supplier of arms to South Africa—he said:

“To the nations and governments of the world, particularly those directly and indirectly giving aid to this

contemptible régime, I say: Cast aside your hypocrisy and deceit; declare yourself on the side of oppression if that is your secret design. Do not think we will be deceived by your pious protestations so long as you actively support the tyranny in our land. The test is your stand on the principle: No arms for South Africa. No expression of concern, no platitudes about injustice will content us. The test is action—action against *apartheid*.”

26. That statement was made in 1961 by Chief Luthuli, after winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Later, he was assassinated in what we maintain and will soon prove were mysterious circumstances. Particularly now that the world is receptive to information about the brutal crimes committed by the *apartheid* régime since the Steve Biko case, we shall soon prove that Albert Luthuli, a man of great stature, was not hit by a train. We have been making a study of the case and we maintain that he was killed and then put on the railway line so that it could be declared that he had been killed in a train accident.

27. It is important to recall that, since Luthuli made that appeal, there has been a great deal of action in support and in defence of *apartheid* in the form of economic, diplomatic, military, cultural and nuclear collaboration, despite the countless General Assembly resolutions and the 1963 Security Council voluntary arms embargo. As the racist régime frantically stepped up its arms race in preparation for full-scale internal repression and external aggression, so did some Western Powers step up the delivery of sophisticated military hardware and the furnishing of licences to ensure the régime's self-sufficiency and the perpetuation of *apartheid*, that unique racist system and instrument for super-exploitation which has now become an integral part of international imperialism.

28. So great is the scale of this collaboration that there is only one way for some Western countries to escape the verdict of first-degree active complicity, at what might very well be a South African Nuremberg after the holocaust the neo-Nazi Pretoria régime is being armed for by some of those Western countries. That way is to give their full co-operation in ensuring that the supervisory Committee established under the resolution adopted this morning is made fully effective. Although this would not absolve them completely from the charge of systematic collusion in the criminal acts of the *apartheid* régime, we maintain that it would serve as a strong mitigating factor, strengthened by the fact that in most cases those agreements were concluded by the administrations and Governments that preceded those represented at the Council meeting today.

29. We stress the need for clear and meaningful terms of reference, which we hope will be given to the Committee concerned, because we have in the past been duped by these guilty Powers, which have mastered the technique of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. We could quote so many instances, including that of the 1963 voluntary arms embargo, after which the supplies of genocidal weapons continued unabated, either overtly or covertly, and despite our protests and condemnations, this was either denied or defended with such arguments as were often heard in certain Western circles, for example: if we do

not do it, the Americans will do it; if we do not do it, the Germans will do it, and so on.

30. The most important example of the deceit we have been subjected to relates to the measures adopted against the Ian Smith régime, and it is at this juncture that I should like to express our disappointment at what I heard from several representatives this morning who maintained that the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had set a precedent. We maintain the contrary, that if the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia is to serve as a guide, it should be only if we agree that it was riddled with so many loopholes that it was never intended to be effective. If we are serious—and we believe the members of the Security Council are at last serious—we shall, we hope, make sure that the loopholes that are to be found in the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia are not repeated in the envisaged Committee. When the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was made a closed committee that takes decisions on the basis of consensus, it was tied hand and foot right from the beginning. Let us be frank: in such a situation the principle of decision by consensus is tantamount to giving veto powers to all members. The holding of closed sessions by that Committee also, in our view, enables the guilty parties to pursue their policies of deception and covert complicity.

31. If we sound over-pessimistic, it is because of our past experience. We are none the less encouraged by the sense of urgency manifested by the members of the Council following the adoption of resolution 418 (1977). The unanimous adoption of today's resolution designed to set up a Committee to monitor the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa is indeed encouraging. Since it coincides with the intensification of repression by the Vorster régime, on the one hand, and the growing resistance by the South African people under the leadership of the African National Congress, on the other, we have reason to believe that, this time, the Western members of the Council intend to make this belated and limited mandatory arms embargo effective.

32. It is for that reason that, when the time comes—in the immediate future, we hope—for the Council to define the terms of reference of the new Committee, we hope there will be unanimity in ensuring that the shortcomings to be found in the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia will not be repeated. To this end, we hope that the envisaged Committee will hold open public hearings of experts in the various fields and that decisions will be taken by vote. We maintain that this would help to ensure the education of public opinion in Western countries, thereby strengthening the position of those convinced of and committed to the urgent need to ostracize the South African régime in all fields, in the same way as the community of nations ostracized the Hitlerite Nazi régime in response to the appeals of world statesmen, including eminent figures like President Roosevelt.

33. Finally, and in support of the position taken by the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon, who spoke on behalf of the 49 African Member States, I wish to appeal to the members of the Council to consider immedi-

ate action with a view to the imposition of economic sanctions against the South African régime under Chapter VII of the Charter and the extension of the recently adopted mandatory arms embargo to cover oil and petroleum products, as it is clear to all and is confirmed by South African legal and military experts that oil is a strategic product. No one can deny that the South African and Rhodesian planes and tanks and other vehicles used by those régimes to commit genocide in southern Africa would in no time be grounded if and when the Council took the appropriate decision to help to curb the threat to peace and international security constituted by the two régimes.

34. Mr. JAIPAL (India): Mr. President, my delegation is very glad to see you preside over the Council for the month of December and to extend to you our congratulations and good wishes. We have every confidence that, with your broad experience, diplomatic talents and contacts, you will always guide our difficult deliberations to successful conclusions. Your dedication to the cause of Africa is well known and it is therefore fitting that, under your presidency, the Council should have decided this morning to establish a Committee to monitor the arms embargo against South Africa.

35. It is clear by now that there is no one in the Council who supports South Africa. But it remains to be seen whether the arms embargo is too small a measure and has come too late, as suggested by Mr. Makatini, the representative of the African National Congress.

36. It is, of course, quite possible that the mandatory arms embargo may not have any effect at all on the policy of *apartheid*, except perhaps to reinforce the determination of the Afrikaners to pursue *apartheid* with even greater zeal and vigour; but, in our view, that does not constitute sufficient reason for minimizing the significance of the arms embargo. As we see it, the arms embargo is only the first step in the mandatory process under Chapter VII of the Charter that the Council has to take in its comprehensive programme of action against South Africa, in order to eliminate *apartheid* and thereafter enable the people of South Africa as a whole to enjoy to the full their human and national rights and fundamental freedoms.

37. For the present, the Security Council has only determined that the acquisition of arms by South Africa constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is not just the acquisition of arms that is the problem; it is rather the purposes for which arms are required and their uses to which we take strong exception. The arms are being used to maintain the policy of *apartheid*, to whose abolition the Council is fully committed. If the arms embargo does not take us nearer our goal, we shall have to consider other forms of action, such as additional embargoes. We must never lose sight of our final goal while considering further measures that may be needed.

38. It is with that long-range perspective in mind that my delegation has agreed to the establishment of a Committee to monitor the effectiveness of the mandatory arms embargo. Of course, the Committee cannot do more than discharge its own mandate, but the Security Council may

go beyond that, always keeping in mind our progress towards the elimination of *apartheid* in relation to the measures now being enforced.

39. We would expect the Secretary-General to seek and to obtain from all Member States complete information regarding the steps and measures taken by them to comply with the provisions of resolution 418 (1977) and to furnish that information to the Committee that has been established. The Committee would examine that information, as well as all other information it may receive independently, either from Member States or from any other source, regarding allegations of violations of the arms embargo, and then make recommendations to the Council.

40. Some observations have been made about the Committee's work and functioning. Our own view is that the Committee should observe the Council's provisional rules of procedure in the conduct of its business, subject to such variations as it may agree upon, having regard to the special nature of its work.

41. Mr. President, I should like to conclude by placing on record my delegation's tribute to the excellent work done by your predecessor, the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as President of the Council last month.

42. Mr. KIKHIA (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya): Sir, I should like first to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of December. I am sure that under your wise and able guidance the work of the Council will go forward successfully. I should like to assure you of the high esteem of my delegation and to pledge our complete co-operation in your efforts in the coming month. We are particularly happy, of course, that the presidency should fall to an African brother in a month when we face problems which are of deep concern to our continent.

43. I also express our sincere thanks to those of our colleagues who voiced in the Council kind words to my delegation and to me personally in regard to my presidency for the month of November.

44. We are meeting here to discuss the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa voted by the Council on 4 November. This is not an inconsequential matter, even if it is only a procedural one. There is no need to elaborate here on the fact that, in adopting resolution 418 (1977), the Council took a historic step: it was the first time that the United Nations had taken action against a Member State under Chapter VII of the Charter.

45. That action was not taken lightly. The question of an arms embargo had been under discussion for a long time; the Council was fully aware of the implications of its decision to call for a mandatory embargo. Now that a decision has been taken and a precedent set, we must make sure that the embargo is properly carried out. To allow it to fail would be to do the United Nations itself great harm. However, proper implementation of the embargo is necessary, above all, for practical reasons: we are trying to curb South African aggression. South Africa has, over the last few years, behaved in an arbitrary and aggressive manner

towards neighbouring States. Continued aggressiveness on the part of the Vorster régime could precipitate a general war in the southern African region. The South Africa régime must be denied the means to carry out acts of aggression. The imposition of a mandatory arms embargo is an important step towards the achievement of that goal and towards the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

46. I am sure every member of the Council will agree that resolution 418 (1977) must be effectively implemented as soon as possible. This will not be an easy task. My delegation is aware of the difficulties which we confront in implementing the embargo. The Council, by its resolution of this morning, created a Committee which will have the necessary power to monitor the embargo and to bring possible violations to the Council's attention and to the attention of the international community. Appropriate machinery which can carry out the variety of tasks needed for the service of the Committee will undoubtedly be established within the Secretariat.

47. The United Nations has already had some experience with the administration of an embargo. We must learn from the failures and the successes of that experience.

48. We all know that, under a series of resolutions, notably resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970), the Security Council established a Committee for the implementation of sanctions against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. As we know too, certain machinery was established to enable the Committee to do its work. In the view of my delegation, however, the Committee has had only limited success. The original mandate was quite restrictive and it was never properly widened. The Secretariat staff proved dedicated and hard-working. None the less, the Committee did not really have the powers it needed. It was therefore unable to carry out its task satisfactorily. I speak from experience, since I had the honour to preside over that Committee in 1977.

49. The proof is in the fact that that Committee has had to assume a relatively passive role in the operation of the embargo against Southern Rhodesia. It has consequently not been in a position to impede the flow of vital commodities and arms to the illegal Smith régime. It is well known that oil has been flowing to Southern Rhodesia through the South African subsidiaries of transnational corporations since 1965, and it is clear from recent publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute that important weapons systems, including aircraft, helicopters and tanks, have been reaching the illegal régime through a variety of channels.

50. These facts underline the difficulties we have been confronting since we took up the question on the agenda this morning. We must be sure that the machinery created for the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa is more effective than that created for the implementation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

51. We are in the midst of a deepening crisis: southern Africa is at war, the racist régime in South Africa has abandoned any pretence of reasonableness and it is far

more dangerous than the Smith régime. It is creating a garrison State; it is extremely powerful and belligerent; it is pursuing an aggressive and expansionist policy in an effort to shore up the crumbling system of *apartheid*. As the circle closes around the Vorster régime, we can expect more and more aggressive action on its part.

52. However, to pursue its present policies, the South African racist régime must be able to buy foreign arms and military technology. There should be no mistake about South Africa's dependence on overseas military supplies. *Contrary to the opinion prevailing in certain countries, South Africa is not able to provide for its own military requirements. It simply does not have the capacity to do so economically.* According to the most recent defence White Paper from Pretoria, the régime spends 55 per cent of its military budget on foreign purchases, and some American studies indicate that South Africa has been spending in excess of \$1 billion per year on foreign arms and military equipment for the last several years. Such expenditure reveals an enormous dependence on foreign suppliers.

53. Council members must be aware that there is already a highly dangerous military imbalance in southern Africa. South Africa has by now achieved a formidable military capability. Its neighbours are poor and militarily weak. The Pretoria régime now possesses a large stock of modern arms of all sorts. If we continue to allow the sale of arms to that régime, we will be courting disaster. A failure to implement the new arms embargo and to stop the flow of weapons would be an invitation to Mr. Vorster to pursue increasingly aggressive policies. South Africa has already attempted an invasion of Angola; it has attacked Zambia, and it has provided the oil and weapons used by the Smith régime to attack Mozambique.

54. The international community cannot afford to wait passively. We all know that the Vorster régime has prepared an aggressive "forward defence" policy. It would be exceedingly dangerous to wait to see what that régime will do. We know what it will do, and once certain things are done it will be much more difficult than it is already to contain the conflict in southern Africa. We cannot afford to wait for the first air strikes against Maputo. We cannot afford to wait for the first attack on Lusaka or Luanda by airborne commandos. If the South African régime is denied new weapons, new technology and spare parts by concerted international action now, it will think twice before embarking on such adventures.

55. As things now stand, Pretoria evidently believes that it can use its military superiority to inflict punishment on neighbouring States. Members of the Council are, I believe, more or less in agreement on the dangers of the situation. I shall not dwell on the internal situation in South Africa and the policy of oppression against the black majority because other colleagues have done so in detail.

56. Some circles and certain Powers are clearly not very happy about the establishment of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by resolution 418 (1977) and the creation of a new machinery to ensure its implementation. They point out that the Council requested a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa in 1963.

Subsequent to that request, each State created machinery for the implementation of a national embargo against South Africa. On the whole, it is said, that system has worked well. In particular, those members claim that the major arms-producing countries of the West have scrupulously observed the 1963 embargo, that shipments of arms and equipment to South Africa have been stopped. According to that view, there is no need for additional United Nations machinery today. The machinery set up by individual States after 1963 could be used to implement the mandatory arms embargo quite effectively.

57. The trouble with that view is that the voluntary arms embargo has been far from successful. In fact, it appears to have broken down some time ago. There is, first of all, the obvious evidence. It is a documented fact that the South African régime has been spending hundreds of millions of rand per year on the purchase of foreign arms and equipment. One has only to look at the annual defence White Papers to see how important such purchases have been over the years. Furthermore, authoritative sources have shown that that money has been spent on foreign weapons, more particularly on weapons from the major Western countries. A number of well-known military and trade sources have published lists of major weapons in the South African arms inventory, and it is clear from those lists that South Africa has acquired many modern weapons systems in the last decade—that is, long after the imposition of the voluntary embargo. There is, consequently, strong *prima facie* evidence of the widespread violation of the 1963 embargo. South Africa could not have acquired the weapons that it now possesses if suppliers had not been violating it.

58. In recent months, new and detailed evidence of the breakdown of the 1963 embargo has come to light. At a hearing before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the United States House of Representatives in July, an expert witness testified that large quantities of arms had been secretly sold to the South African régime after 1963. They included hundreds of aircraft, helicopters, tanks and other armoured vehicles. The witness added that the weapons in question had reached South Africa through channels known only to a small circle of government officials and arms dealers in certain countries.

59. The testimony presented to the Sub-Committee on Africa on 24 July caused considerable controversy, for it went beyond allegations that the 1963 embargo had been violated from time to time. According to the witness, the violations had been widespread and continuous. As a result, South Africa had been able to acquire a large "secret" arsenal; in fact, the witness stated, the South African régime had acquired overwhelming military power in Africa. Thus, according to the testimony presented to the Sub-Committee, the military imbalance in southern Africa is the direct result of the widespread violation of the 1963 embargo by arms suppliers.

60. For those reasons, we express our hope for a sincere, full and effective implementation of resolution 418 (1977) and for a strong, effective appropriate machinery, as decided on this morning by the Council. That is, in our view, the only way to ensure that the embargo is

administered in accordance with the considered interests of the international community and of peace and justice in the world.

61. The PRESIDENT: Ambassador Kikhia has expressed some important views regarding, *inter alia*, the *modus operandi* of the Committee which we have established today and he has drawn on his personal experience as the Chairman of the Committee on Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

62. There are no more speakers inscribed on my list. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of MAURITIUS.

63. The draft resolution we have adopted today is a consequence of resolution 418 (1977), by which a worldwide mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was decided upon. The Security Council Committee which we have just created will have one of the most important tasks in the history of the United Nations. It will have to ensure the full co-operation of the States members of the Council and, indeed, of all States, Members and non-members of the United Nations, in the task of implementing the arms embargo.

64. I am confident that the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this resolution, will do his utmost to make the application of Chapter VII of the Charter successful to the highest degree possible.

65. I am pleased to note that the Chairman of the Special Committee Against *Apartheid*, Mr. Harriman, is of the opinion that the new Committee should start its work without undue delay. My Government stands firmly behind resolution 418 (1977) and will co-operate fully with the Committee in the discharge of its great responsibilities.

66. I now resume my function as PRESIDENT of the Council.

67. The representative of Saudi Arabia has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

68. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): The bantering sarcasm which was evident in the reference by my good friend Ambassador Ivor Richard to the statement I made this morning calls for a reply and a rectification so that the record may be set straight.

69. First of all, Mr. Richard said that my statement took half an hour and consisted of my reminiscences. In fact, I hardly took 20 minutes to make that statement. I have always known my British friends to be noted for precision. Why did Mr. Richard inflate the time I took? Is it in keeping with the currency inflation that is rampant in Europe and elsewhere? That is why I referred to his remarks as bantering sarcasm.

70. Secondly, I did not single out the United Kingdom when I referred to the smuggling of narcotics all over the world, notwithstanding the measures that were taken by Governments after the narcotics Convention came into

force. But perusal of the records of Ambassador Richard's remarks will show that he misunderstood my reference to that question and thought that I had singled out the United Kingdom. I made that statement about the smuggling of narcotics in the context of the arms smuggling, inasmuch as Governments everywhere are against narcotics.

71. Likewise, inasmuch as the Council means well and is to be lauded for the resolution that it adopted creating a Committee to monitor the arms shipments to South Africa, I cannot agree more with what my good brother and colleague from India said in his statement this afternoon, to the effect that—I am, of course, paraphrasing—this was the maximum that could be obtained from the Council in the form of agreement, without opposition.

72. Therefore, it is not fair for my good friend, Ambassador Richard, because I was citing certain examples from my personal experience, also to say that it shows how good, shall I say, the British are in enforcing things when they do not want to have any arms exported. This was in reference to what I said when the Ambassador of Ethiopia said to me “Ah, if we could only find a source of arms so that we could fight Mussolini”. Since I was active in the City of London—not in the arms industry or export, but in chemical projects—I happened to know someone who wanted to dispose of surplus Greek arms. He told me about it and I passed on the information to the Ethiopian Ambassador, who in turn told the late Emperor Haile Selassie.

73. Then again, to set the record straight, I was active in Red Cross matters and appeared on a platform in order to collect money for the Ethiopians. It was an International Red Cross affair and I believe the British Red Cross was involved too. On the platform, without my knowledge, was Sylvia Pankhurst, who passed the information to me that Mr. Chamberlain was writing to his sister-in-law at Rome. Incidentally, she must have been a channel between the British Government and Mr. Mussolini. That was not unusual. If we go back to the Congress of Vienna, we know about the Stuarts, Lord Liverpool, Castlereagh and what happened in those days. Some used women friends as channels. Thus, we know that the Duchesse de Sagan, who was a friend and almost a mistress of Metternich, played a role in politics. It is not unusual. Mr. Chamberlain allegedly wrote to his sister-in-law that she should tell Mussolini that the British Government would close its eyes to what he was doing in Africa provided he did not align himself with Hitler.

74. Is it not better to draw from my experience than to read from books? Why should I read from books when I lived in that era and happened to live through two World Wars, and in particular the aftermath of the Second World War? Is there anything wrong with that?

75. Mr. Richard, I believe, was not born in 1937, or if he was born he must have been a babe on the knee of his mother. Should I produce reminiscences only of times that he could discuss? He was a baby then; it is not my fault that he was a baby and could not possibly check on what I said. But this does not vitiate our good relations and the friendship I have for him.

76. When I made remarks in this very Council on another question—I do not want to exacerbate matters and say what it was—he said that I was engaging in something that sounded like anti-Semitism. I had to remind him the next day in my right of reply, how can a Semite be an anti-Semite—and I happen to be an arch-Semite?

77. Bantering sarcasm, as I call it, does not have a place here in the Security Council. I was making a serious analysis of the situation when I said that a monitoring committee, no matter how efficient, might not be in a position to stop the smuggling of arms. I cited a few examples from the past which bear repetition—for instance, the case of Luxembourg in the First World War. During that war, Luxembourg, which was neutral, was selling steel—necessary for the arms industry—to the Allies, that is, France and Britain, and to the Central Powers, that is, Germany and Austria. And this was going on during the war, not merely before or after it. Those who were making money out of this in Luxembourg were not stopped either by the Allies or by the Central Powers.

78. What I meant—and I said this in quite a mild manner, I think—was that, much as we laud the efforts of the Security Council to find a common denominator of agreement to ensure that arms do not go to South Africa, the efforts will be ineffective. This will not be the fault of the members of the Council; it is simply that mammon always wins in the end; people sell their souls to the devil, to use a metaphor. Jesus of Nazareth said 2,000 years ago: Ye cannot serve God and mammon; either you will hate the one and love the other, or hold to the one and despise the other. I think that mammon is still being worshipped. And do not think that I am referring only to Europe; this is true in my part of the world too, as in all other parts of the world. I would not want anyone to think that I was throwing mud at my good British friends. I have a great deal of admiration and respect for them.

79. Nor was I trying to admonish my brothers from Africa. I was being frank with them. Perhaps I displeased some of them when I said: Be careful when you take power, lest you run the risk of being overthrown for not knowing how to run the industries and the mines. Their ineptness in this respect is certainly not the result of a lack of intelligence; it is merely that they lack experience.

80. Does frankness have no place at the United Nations? Has it no place in the Council? Should we cover things up with platitudes? As I said this morning, 30 draft resolutions have been adopted on disarmament and related subjects—platitudes, too many words and very little action. People smile at each other in Moscow, Washington and elsewhere. They profess friendship. They talk about

détente. And all the time, intelligence services are subverting one another—if not in their own countries, then in countries under their spheres of influence.

81. What is wrong in my pointing out these things? Could it irk any honest man? Are we afraid of our so-called leaders? I fear that some of them are unwittingly misleading their people.

82. I have to raise my voice before I die. I have nothing to lose. Should I play the game of conformity? Why should I? Conformity did not get us anywhere in two world wars. Should we not be innovative? Should we not draw from our experience and stand to be corrected if we are wrong? I certainly stand to be corrected if I am wrong. If I sometimes seem to be probing in my speeches, it is because I want the younger generation to be a little more creative than the old fogies of my generation have been. That is my object.

83. Having set the record straight, I am sure that the representative of the United Kingdom who is deputizing for Mr. Richard at this meeting will convey to him the message that I have a great deal of respect and admiration for him; but, for heaven's sake, if he wants to engage in bantering sarcasm, I think I am a good match for him.

84. The PRESIDENT: As one of my predecessors in the Chair—Ambassador Jaipal of India—said on a previous occasion, it is always wise to read the statements of Ambassador Baroody before commenting on them. I hold no brief for the representative of the United Kingdom, but Ambassador Richard was speaking off the cuff and on the spur of the moment and I do not believe it was his intention to offend in any way Ambassador Baroody, who has always commanded the respect of us all. Ambassador Baroody's anecdotes, which he draws from his long experience, and his frankness have always been a source of enlightenment and guidance to members of the Council.

85. Mr. FIFOOT (United Kingdom): I am sure, Mr. President, that my Ambassador will be grateful for what you have just said. The representative of Saudi Arabia is well aware of the regard in which he is held by my Ambassador. Mr. Richard would not have wished any statement of his to have put Ambassador Baroody to the trouble of addressing the Council a second time today.

86. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council has thus completed the present phase of its consideration of the question of South Africa.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*

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