

UNITED NATIONS 0068980



SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

UN LIBRARY

THIRTY-FIRST YEAR

JUN 24 1985

UN/SA COLLECTION

1979th MEETING: 14 DECEMBER 1976

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1979)	1
Welcome to Mr. Jacques Leprette, representative of France	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Cyprus:	
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12253 and Add.I)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/...) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1979th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 14 December 1976, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Ion DATCU (Romania).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1979)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12253 and Add.1)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

**Welcome to Mr. Jacques Leprette,
representative of France**

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Before coming to the item on the agenda, I should like to perform an agreeable duty at this meeting of the Security Council. I should like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of France, Mr. Jacques Leprette. I wish him every success in his important work in the service of his country, France, here in the United Nations. I should like to assure him of our friendship and our wish to co-operate actively with him in promoting together the purposes of the United Nations. We are convinced that Mr. Leprette, a distinguished diplomat, will make an outstanding contribution to our work, as did his brilliant predecessors, the last of whom, Mr. de Guiringaud, now occupies the important post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/12253 and Add.1)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I have received a letter dated 13 December 1976 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, in which he

requests to be invited to participate in the Security Council's discussion and indicates the composition of the delegation which he heads.

3. I therefore propose in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, as well as the usual practice of the Council, and if there are no objections, to invite the Cyprus delegation to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Christophides (Cyprus) took a place at the Security Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The representatives of Turkey and Greece have also addressed letters to me in which they request to be invited to participate in the Council's discussions without the right to vote, pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Charter and the provisional rules of procedure of the Council.

5. I therefore propose, in accordance with the usual practice and with the consent of the Council, and if there are no objections, to invite the representatives of Turkey and Greece to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Türkmen (Turkey) and Mr. Papoulias (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like now to remind the Council that, in the course of consultations which took place yesterday, members of the Council agreed that, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, the Council would invite Mr. Vedat A. Çelik. If I hear no objections, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Çelik, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

7. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): At the appropriate time, I shall request Mr. Çelik to take a place at the Council table to make his statement.

8. The Security Council will now consider the item on its agenda.

9. I should like to draw attention to the report of the Secretary-General, which was distributed last Friday. Today the Secretary-General has submitted an addendum to his report, which has just been circulated to the members of the Council.

10. As members are aware, the Council has before it the text of a draft resolution arrived at during the course of broad consultations in which all members of the Council participated [S/12256]. In the course of consultations which were held this afternoon before the beginning of the meeting, it was agreed that the Council would vote on that draft resolution before hearing statements.

11. If I hear no objections, I therefore propose to put the draft resolution to the vote immediately.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none (resolution 401 (1976)).

Two members (China and Benin) did not participate in the voting.

12. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like first to call on the Secretary-General, who has expressed the desire to make a statement.

13. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The Security Council has just adopted a resolution extending once again the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The resolution also, among other things, requests the Secretary-General to continue the mission of good offices entrusted to him by paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975). I wish to assure the Council that I shall do my utmost to give effect to its decisions.

14. In particular, I shall continue my efforts to bring about a resumption of the negotiations between the representatives of the two Cypriot communities at an early date. I and my Special Representative will be making contact with the parties concerned with a view to ensuring that such negotiations will be meaningful and will concern themselves with the basic issues of the Cyprus problem. As I said in my report, I continue to believe that the best hope of achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem is through negotiations between the representatives of the two communities. I am also convinced that if the present impasse is prolonged, the basic issues will inevitably become more and more intractable. I shall, of course, keep the Council informed on my efforts in this regard.

15. I have already mentioned my concern over the financial situation of UNFICYP, both in my report and in consultations with the members of the Security Council. I wish here to stress once again the urgent necessity of making progress in solving the financial

difficulties of UNFICYP. I and my colleagues in the Secretariat will do our best to find ways of improving the present critical financial situation. I would be grateful for the co-operation of the members of the Council in solving this problem. It involves both the collective responsibility of the Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security and the heavy burden which falls, in present circumstances, upon a small number of States.

16. I hope that I shall be in a position to report progress to the Council on those and other aspects of the Cyprus problem in the coming year.

17. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I thank the Secretary-General for that important statement.

18. The first speaker is the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

19. Mr. CHRISTOPHIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, may I at the outset offer you my warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Your wide experience and your diplomatic skill, as well as your deep knowledge of United Nations matters, augur well for a successful outcome of this debate. My delegation and I take particular pleasure in seeing you in the Chair, since you are the representative of a country with which Cyprus maintains very friendly relations.

20. I wish also to express to Mr. Kurt Waldheim, on behalf of the Government of Cyprus and on my own behalf, sincere congratulations on his well-deserved reappointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations and to express to him again our deep appreciation for his untiring efforts in the search for a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. In this respect, I acknowledge also the significant contribution of Under-Secretaries-General Roberto Guyer and Brian Urquhart and their collaborators in the Secretariat.

21. May I say also how grateful we are to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, for the very efficient, indeed exemplary, manner in which he carries out his onerous and delicate responsibilities. On the occasion of Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand's relinquishing his duties as Commander of the Force, duties which he has carried out for the past seven years with great devotion and conspicuous ability, I wish on behalf of my Government and the people of Cyprus to pay the highest tribute to him. May I at the same time congratulate General James Joseph Quinn of Ireland on his appointment as the new Commander of UNFICYP. We wish him every success and, for our part, we pledge our full co-operation as he carries out his difficult task. To the Governments which, through their voluntary contributions in personnel and funds, enable UNFICYP to continue its peace-keeping role,

as well as to the officers and men serving in the field, we express once again our gratitude.

22. The Security Council has just decided to renew the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, pursuant to Council resolution 186 (1964). It took that decision in the light of the Secretary-General's report. Obviously, this subject cannot be considered in isolation from the general situation prevailing in Cyprus, which, as is clearly shown in the report, continues to be grim and potentially explosive, thereby constituting—as was confirmed only recently by the General Assembly in its resolution 31/12 of 12 November 1976—a danger to international peace and security.

23. In my statement before the Council on 11 June 1976 [1925th meeting], I drew the Council's attention to the continuing tragedy of the people of Cyprus, as a result of the Turkish aggression and occupation, and to certain ominous developments which were aggravating the situation and which, if they continued unchecked, could lead to the worsening of the situation, thus endangering peace in the island and in the sensitive Eastern Mediterranean region.

24. Those developments were the deliberate creation of *faits accomplis* by Turkey, which, as a prelude to partition, had embarked on a process of systematically expelling the remaining Greek Cypriots from the occupied area and of colonizing that area by the importation of tens of thousands of mainland Turks, in an obvious attempt to change the demographic composition of Cyprus. Another set of problems, equally disturbing, arose from the obstacles placed by the Turkish occupation army in the way of the Force carrying out its mission in the occupied part of the island.

25. From the report of the Secretary-General, which is before us, it is abundantly clear that there has been no improvement in the situation in Cyprus since last June. On the contrary, there has been a turn for the worse with regard both to expulsions and the colonization of the occupied area and to the process of negotiation and the freedom of movement of the United Nations Force. A new and very disturbing development, which is extensively dealt with in the Secretary-General's report, is the effort of Ankara to interfere with the mission of the United Nations Force and through intimidation, blackmail and the exercise of force to change the *status quo* in the buffer areas between the military lines.

26. The expulsions of the Greek Cypriots from the occupied area have assumed the dimensions of a human drama. Living under constant threats, and being subjected daily to all kinds of deprivations, physical violence and psychological brutality, these Greek Cypriots are forced to abandon their ancestral homes and properties and to join the more than 200,000 Greek

Cypriot refugees who were uprooted in the course of the invasion in 1974 and whom the invader continues to prevent by force from returning to their homes despite the repeated calls for their safe return in United Nations resolutions. The number of those expelled is daily increasing, and it is now abundantly clear and evident even to those who might have had some doubts as to the true intentions of Ankara that all Greek Cypriots will soon be uprooted from the occupied area.

27. Referring to the subject of expulsions, the Secretary-General observes in paragraph 72 of his report:

“The situation of Greek Cypriots in the north is a matter of special concern. The greater part of those Greek Cypriots have now left for the south for the stated purpose of seeking security and better living conditions, and this development has further heightened tension. It had originally been expected that this problem would be considerably alleviated by the agreement reached in this regard at the third round of the Vienna talks on 2 August 1975 [see S/11789] and, in particular, by the granting to UNFICYP of free and normal access to Greek Cypriot habitations in the area. Regrettably, it has not been possible to implement that agreement adequately and the exodus of Greek Cypriots from the north continues.”

28. As the Secretary-General observes, the exodus—as it is called in the report—of the Greek Cypriots becomes unavoidable “for the... purpose of seeking security and better living conditions”. Being insecure, deprived of medical care, educational facilities and freedom of movement, and living in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, the only option left to them is exodus. The Turkish Cypriot leadership calls this forced exodus “voluntary departure”, and pieces of paper signed by those unfortunate people with trembling hands are being called “voluntary applications” in an effort to mislead the world. The reply to this baseless contention is given by the Secretary-General in paragraph 31 of his report:

“The agreed procedure for screening Greek Cypriot applicants for transfer to the south [see S/12031 of 31 March 1976, para. 5] has not been implemented effectively. In most cases, UNFICYP has not been able to establish whether the Greek Cypriots concerned wanted to leave the north, as had been agreed when the matter was discussed at the Cyprus talks in Vienna in August 1975.”

29. The brazen violation by the Turkish side of the humanitarian agreement of 2 August 1975, to which the Secretary-General repeatedly makes reference in his report, is yet further clear evidence of Ankara's duplicity and of its true intentions towards the Greek Cypriots living in the occupied area. Ankara, having secured the implementation of those provisions of

the agreement which were to its advantage, not only ignores the rest of them but also blatantly violates them. Instead of giving every facility to the Greek Cypriots in the occupied area for a normal life, as provided for in the agreement, Ankara and its instruments in Cyprus facilitate their departure by applying a combination of oppressive tactics, harassment and brute force. Also, instead of allowing UNFICYP freedom of movement in the Greek Cypriot villages, as agreed at Vienna, Ankara and its agents have further restricted the movement of the Force and its contacts with the Greek Cypriots in the occupied area.

30. The Secretary-General's categorical statements and the facts to which I have referred convincingly disprove the Turkish allegations that the Greek Cypriots leave the north of their own free will. If, however, the Turkish side were to persist in its unfounded allegations, the need for the Security Council to investigate this intolerable state of affairs for itself would become self-evident. My Government declares its readiness to co-operate with any investigative committee which the Council might wish to send to Cyprus with a view to establishing whether the accelerated exodus, as it has been called, of the Greek Cypriots from the occupied area is due to various forms of unbearable pressure and intimidation practised by the occupation forces and the colonizers from Turkey, or whether the Greek Cypriots opt to leave their ancestral homes and properties of their own free will, as Turkey wants us to believe.

31. The question of expulsions is, as the Secretary-General says in paragraph 28 of his report, "a matter of grave concern". Therefore, establishing the true facts in this respect becomes imperative and urgent. Thus I address myself to the representative of Turkey and invite him to declare in turn that the occupation forces of Turkey will co-operate with such a committee of the Council. If Turkey has nothing to hide, he should have no difficulty in giving such an undertaking. Nor can he claim that the co-operation of Turkey is not required, for it is well known that in the occupied north of Cyprus, it is Ankara that commands.

32. The continuing expulsions and the refusal of Turkey to allow the return of the more than 200,000 refugees to their homes in violation of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949¹ and the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, coupled with the abhorrent policy of colonization pursued by Ankara, to which reference is made in paragraph 30 of the Secretary-General's report, have no other purpose than to alter the age-long demographic composition of Cyprus. These unilateral actions of Turkey, illegally perpetrated, serve to promote its partitionist plans and aim at the destruction of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State.

33. It is within the framework of this constant objective of Ankara that one should view the attitude of the Turkish side at the negotiating table—an

attitude of negativeness, procrastination and broken promises.

34. More than 20 months have elapsed since the adoption of Council resolution 367 (1975), which established the process of the talks and gave to the Secretary-General his mandate. There have been five rounds of talks in Vienna and New York under the auspices and direction of the Secretary-General. Yet, for one reason or another, with one excuse or another, under the shield of one pretext or another, the end result remains that the Turkish side, almost two and a half years after the invasion of Cyprus and more than 20 months after it solemnly undertook to participate in meaningful negotiations, has managed to evade giving any indication whatsoever of its intentions on the all-important aspect of the Cyprus problem, that of territory. Even the solemn commitment to present concrete proposals in respect of territory, undertaken at the fifth round of the intercommunal talks, in February 1976, by the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator, has not been honoured to this date.

35. The Turkish attitude in the talks proves beyond any reasonable doubt that Ankara, which dictates to the Turkish Cypriot negotiator his course of action, is not genuinely interested in finding a solution through the talks. The Turkish side simply wishes to seem to go through the motions of negotiating; it is interested in preserving an empty shell at the negotiating process, to be used as a shield against any pressure by world opinion for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus as the means for the solution of the problem or against friendly persuasion from third parties for conciliation and flexibility—and this shield has so far served the Turkish side well in misleading well-meaning third parties.

36. We have noted with interest the Secretary-General's observations in paragraphs 75 and 76 on the question of the intercommunal talks. We share the Secretary-General's view that the intercommunal talks under his auspices and personal direction continue to be the most appropriate procedure, of those so far made available, for finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. The talks, however, as the Secretary-General points out, must be meaningful and productive. This is what the United Nations resolutions call for. This is what common sense requires. This is what reality dictates. However, no meaningful talks can be held unless the two sides are willing to reach a just agreement through negotiations; unless both sides have the political ability to take the right decisions for a settlement; unless both sides view the procedure of the talks as a means to an end and not an end in itself; and unless both sides adhere to the agreements reached at all previous rounds of talks, a point well emphasized both by the Secretary-General in his report of 5 June 1976 [S/12093] and by the Security Council in its resolution 391 (1976) and in the resolution that has just been adopted.

37. The same defiance as that which Ankara has been showing towards the United Nations resolutions it is now demonstrating towards the United Nations Force by impeding its freedom of movement and by endangering the lives of its men. The Secretary-General speaks eloquently on these issues in paragraph 16 of his report: "On three occasions, shots have been fired in the direction of UNFICYP troops by members of the Turkish forces". Again, in paragraph 24 the report states:

"On 10 September, 36 Turkish-Cypriot farmers moved south, attempted to work land previously under Greek-Cypriot cultivation and eventually attempted to collect Greek-Cypriot fruit crops. That led to two scuffles between UNFICYP troops and the Turkish-Cypriot farmers, and some injuries were sustained by both sides; following the second scuffle, Turkish troops in Avlona fired some 50 shots over the heads of the UNFICYP troops."

Further, in paragraph 28, the report states: "UNFICYP access to Greek-Cypriot habitations and freedom of movement in the area remain restricted". Again, in paragraph 42, one reads:

"UNFICYP freedom of movement in the northern part of Cyprus continues to be restricted and is limited to access to UNFICYP camps and liaison posts in the north, use of the new Famagusta Road by UNFICYP vehicles to a limited extent, and daily resupply convoys to the north, which are restricted as to number of vehicles and are escorted by Turkish Cypriots. Similar restrictions apply to UNCIVPOL teams distributing social welfare payments to the Greek Cypriots in some 13 villages in the Karpas. Weekly visits to Greek Cypriots remaining in the Kyrenia area are carried out by UNFICYP liaison teams, and these are likewise accompanied by Turkish Cypriot police, who are present during any encounters with the villagers."

38. Another matter of grave concern to my Government is that of the buffer areas. This problem is extensively covered in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the Secretary-General's report and is indicative of Ankara's arbitrariness and greediness. After keeping under its aggressive occupation 40 per cent of the territory of the Republic in continuing violation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, Ankara is now trying to seize more lands belonging to and cultivated by the Greek Cypriots who try to make a living out of what has been left to them by the invader.

39. The arbitrary and provocative Turkish behaviour in these areas could lead to serious consequences not only for peace in Cyprus but also for one of the cardinal principles on which the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations are based. My Government, therefore, fully shares the view expressed in this respect in paragraph 19 of the Secretary-General's report, which reads:

"it is an essential element of the cease-fire that neither side can exercise authority or jurisdiction beyond its own forward military lines or make any military moves beyond those lines. It follows that, in the area between the lines, the *status quo* (including innocent civilian activities and the exercise of property rights) is maintained, without prejudice to an eventual political settlement concerning the disposition of the area."

In this respect, the Government of Cyprus justifiably expects that UNFICYP will continue to uphold that principle.

40. Ankara's behaviour towards UNFICYP, as described in the Secretary-General's report, is aimed at turning the role of the Force into that of a passive observer of its arbitrariness, a role which, I am certain, is contrary to the position of the Council and that of the UNFICYP Command. It is, therefore, our view that matters of this nature directly and closely connected with the mission and functions of the Force cannot be ignored by the Council or considered unrelated to the renewal of the mandate.

41. My Government is fully cognizant and highly appreciative of the useful, and indeed essential, role being played by UNFICYP in the cause of peace in Cyprus and—this should also be remembered—in the interest of international peace in the eastern Mediterranean region. We have therefore consented to the renewal of the mandate of the Force for another six-month period, as suggested by the Secretary-General. We have done so on the understanding that such renewal carries with it the implication that UNFICYP is thereby authorized to take all steps necessary for the due exercise of its functions to the full extent required under its mandate. This includes the effective protection of the buffer zone and the discharge of the role assigned to UNFICYP under the Vienna humanitarian agreement of 2 August 1975 for the protection and well-being of the indigenous Greek Cypriots in the occupied area. It is our firm conviction that the Council itself would wish to strengthen the hand of the Secretary-General in directing UNFICYP operations in those specific respects indicated in the report where the Force had met with resistance or encountered difficulties, since it is to the Council that the Secretary-General can turn for support and guidance when encountering insuperable obstacles.

42. I now wish to refer to an eminently humanitarian issue that keeps in anguish a large segment of the population of my country. I speak of a very painful aspect of the Cyprus tragedy—that of missing persons. In so doing, I do not intend to enter into the question of how many of those missing persons are still alive, nor do I wish to make recriminations or allusions or to try to apportion blame concerning the events which led to the creation, among other unfortunate situations, of the one to which I am now referring. My concern is purely humanitarian.

43. It may be recalled that in its resolution 3450 (XXX) the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to "exert every effort, in close co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assist in tracing and accounting for persons missing... in Cyprus". Yet, the Secretary-General observes in paragraph 74 of his report that

"is is a matter of deep concern that despite the continued efforts of my Special Representative and of the International Red Cross, there has been no progress so far in making arrangements to trace persons missing since the events of 1974, or discovering their burial places."

44. I wish to assure members of the Council that my Government offered its full co-operation to the Secretary-General in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to him under the aforementioned resolution. I regret to say, however, that the response of the Turkish side, even on this purely humanitarian issue, has been completely negative. Today, two and a half years after the cessation of active hostilities and one year after the adoption of resolution 3450 (XXX), we are still faced with the living drama of relatives of the missing persons seeking information about their loved ones.

45. I do not think that anyone can fail to recognize the basic human need of families to be informed about missing relatives. And who can fail to agree that all evidence should be unearthed so that the fate of each missing person may be established? For it would be better for the relatives to know the truth—the whole truth, bitter though it might be—and learn to live with it than to remain anguished in uncertainty and doubt. I am certain that no one could argue against this line of reasoning and, indeed, I think that no one could find it easy to do so, for human suffering knows no frontier or nationality.

46. The Secretary-General, in his report of 30 October of this year [S/12222], stated that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was willing to designate members of an investigatory body for the tracing of those missing or the discovery of their burial places, provided that it was requested to do so by both parties and that such body be given full co-operation.

47. I wish to reiterate on behalf of my Government its solemn pledge of full and unconditional co-operation with such an investigatory body, and I invite the representative of Turkey, in the name of humaneness, to come forward and pledge his Government's co-operation in this specific, purely humanitarian endeavour.

48. I should like to add that this body should be entrusted with the investigation of all cases submitted to it by all sides and that it should be allowed the required freedom of movement, both in the areas

controlled by the Government of Cyprus and in those controlled by the Turkish army, as well as in Turkey, where many Cypriots were transported following the invasion of 1974.

49. The prolongation of the Cyprus crisis as a result of the contemptuous disregard shown by Turkey towards United Nations resolutions should be as much a source of serious concern for the Council as it is for the people of Cyprus, for the situation in Cyprus and its implications, which extend beyond the confines of Cyprus and the suffering of its people, endanger international peace and security and at the same time pose a serious challenge to the effectiveness of the Organization. I believe that the point has been reached when further passive toleration of the Turkish military occupation and of gross interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus is unacceptable and seriously prejudices the whole edifice of international law and order.

50. As is known, the General Assembly, on 12 November, conscious of its responsibilities under the Charter, by an overwhelming majority adopted resolution 31/12, by which it reaffirmed its resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX), demanded their urgent implementation and expressed the hope that the Security Council would consider appropriate steps for the implementation of its own resolution 365 (1974), by which it had endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). I wish to draw the attention of the Council to this latest resolution of the Assembly and to state that the people of Cyprus, and indeed the world community, consider that they are entitled to expect that the Council will discharge to the full its responsibilities under the Charter in this regard, for it remains our conviction that the most appropriate and effective way to a peaceful, just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem is through the effective implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

51. We trust, therefore, that the Security Council will soon have the opportunity to give serious consideration to taking effective measures for the implementation of its own mandatory resolution, in accordance with the Charter and the Council's own responsibilities and self-respect.

52. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is Mr. Çelik, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

53. Mr. ÇELİK: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and each and every member of the Security Council for having given me the opportunity to address the Council and to present the Turkish viewpoint on the current state of the Cyprus conflict. I should like to thank you, too, for the great effort and diplomatic skill you have displayed during the past week to ensure the extension of the mandate, and agreement on the resolution that has just been adopted.

54. Allow me also to express, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, our gratitude to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, for his dedicated and tireless efforts in the search for a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem and to congratulate him once more on his reappointment for a second term.

55. We are also grateful to Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, and to the staff of the Secretariat for the exemplary, impartial and efficient manner in which they have discharged their important duties. I should like to take this opportunity also to express our gratitude to Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand, the outgoing Commander of UNFICYP, and pay tribute to him for the efficient and impartial manner in which he has carried out his difficult duty for the last seven years. I take this opportunity also to welcome the new Force Commander, Major-General James J. Quinn, and to assure him of our fullest co-operation in the difficult task that lies ahead of him. Finally, I should like to express appreciation to all the officers and men of UNFICYP for their peace-keeping efforts, as well as to all those countries that have generously contributed men and funds to the Force in Cyprus.

56. Before I start on my statement, I would like to comment on the resolution just adopted.

57. Besides other points which we might justifiably comment upon, the resolution makes reference to "the Government of Cyprus", a non-existent entity, and therefore, is unacceptable to us *in toto*. As is well known, there is no Government in Cyprus, either *de facto* or *de jure*, representing the whole of the island or administering control over it. In fact, there are two distinct administrations—that of the Turkish Cypriot community in the north, and that of the Greek Cypriot community in the south. A misleading reference, therefore, to a "Government of Cyprus" is not acceptable to us.

58. I have been instructed, however, by Mr. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, who had been officially consulted on the matter through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar to convey his approval for the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months. Needless to say, the Turkish Cypriot side is, as always, ready and willing to resume intercommunal dialogue.

59. We express full support for, and our readiness to co-operate with, UNFICYP, and hope that the procès-verbal which has been negotiated and is ready for signature will become final as early as possible, thus removing any difficulty that might exist at present regarding the stationing, functioning and deployment of UNFICYP in the north.

60. I should also like, since this is the first opportunity I have had to address the United Nations since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 31/12 on 12 November 1976, to comment on that resolution. As is well known, when the Cyprus problem was debated at full length in the General Assembly only a month ago, one of the two principal parties to the Cyprus dispute, the Turkish-Cypriot community, was unfortunately not accorded an equal or adequate opportunity to participate in that debate. I should like to take this opportunity, therefore, to make a few comments on the latest resolution adopted by the Assembly in connexion with the Cyprus question and to state briefly why that resolution is not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side in its entirety.

61. I shall state at the outset, however, that we do not wish to appear as a small community or a little federated State which is trying to defy the United Nations. On the contrary, we have great respect for the Organization and the resolutions adopted by it. We are in full agreement with the main principles outlined in the United Nations resolutions for a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem. We believe that Cyprus must remain an independent, sovereign and non-aligned State. We support the intercommunal talks and are convinced that they are indeed the best and only method for finding a permanent solution to the dispute. Our quarrel, therefore, is not with the United Nations but with the Makarios Administration.

62. Nevertheless, we are unable to accept the latest resolution of the General Assembly for the following reasons.

63. First, the Turkish Cypriot community was denied participation on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriot community at the debate. This is a point to which we take strong exception. In view of the fact that there is no central authority in Cyprus authorized to speak for and act on behalf of Cyprus as a whole; considering that the Turkish community of Cyprus is an equal partner and co-founder of the Cyprus Republic; and, furthermore, bearing in mind the fact that we are one of the two main parties to the Cyprus dispute, we consider that we should be accorded an equal opportunity to participate fully, whenever and wherever the Cyprus question is debated. Unfortunately, that opportunity was denied us at the thirty-first session of the Assembly. In the circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot community cannot be reasonably expected to associate itself with a resolution adopted in its absence.

64. Secondly, we regard the General Assembly resolution as being seriously outdated and, therefore, unrealistic. It fails to take into account significant developments which have occurred since the adoption of the earlier resolutions of the Assembly; more specifically, it completely disregards agreements actually reached at Vienna and subsequently implemented in Cyprus.

65. Thirdly and finally, we believe that in the context of the question of Cyprus, the resolutions of the Assembly should not attempt to influence or prejudge the deliberations of the Security Council as paragraph 5 of that resolution purports to do.

66. The undeniable fact is that, although the Greek Cypriot side may have reason to conceal it, there has been considerable progress on certain aspects of the Cyprus problem, while others have been virtually settled.

67. That is true of the question of refugees, more particularly the recurrent refugee problem faced by the Turkish Cypriot community in the past, which has been in effect settled in accordance with the agreement for a voluntary exchange of populations reached at the third round of the Vienna talks [see S/11789 of 5 August 1975]. The Turkish Cypriots are now living in safety and security in the north; similarly, the bulk of the Greek Cypriot population is living in their region in the south. Less than one quarter of 1 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population remains in the north, and those people have also come to realize that there exist in Cyprus two separate regions and that any final solution will be based on that reality. The applications submitted by the Greek Cypriots for transfer to the south are indicative of their desire to be among their fellow Greeks. Thus the return of all displaced persons to their former homes would not only be unrealistic in view of the voluntary exchange of populations that has already taken place, but would also impede a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem. The remaining aspects of the refugee question can and will be dealt with within the framework of an overall settlement of the political problem.

68. Substantial progress has also been achieved on the constitutional and territorial aspects of the problem. Though later denied by the Greek Cypriot side, at the third round of the Vienna talks there was wide understanding in principle on a bi-zonal federation and a central government with agreed powers in which the two communities would be equally represented.

69. As regards the withdrawal of foreign forces from the island, it is worth noting that there has already been a substantial withdrawal of troops, both during 1975 and this year. It will be appreciated, however, that, before a final solution to the Cyprus problem is found effectively guaranteeing the security of life and property of the Turkish Cypriot community, a complete withdrawal of Turkish forces is impossible. Today the presence of the Turkish forces on the island is the only effective guarantee safeguarding the life and property of the Turkish Cypriot community, which was the sole victim of relentless Greek armed attacks between the years 1963 and 1974, when the island was under virtual occupation by about 20,000 Greek mainland troops which had clandestinely entered the island to assist the Greek Cypriots in their enosis campaign. We very much look forward, how-

ever, to the day when there will be no need for any forces of any kind on the island.

70. In view of the foregoing, the Turkish Cypriot side considers certain aspects of resolution 31/12 to be totally unrelated to the realities in Cyprus and, therefore, unacceptable.

71. At this point I should like to comment on a few of the issues raised by Mr. Christophides in the statement just made by him.

72. The question of missing persons is a humanitarian issue which has unfortunately been the target of Greek Cypriot exploitation for propaganda purposes. The problem of missing persons is common to the two communities. Indeed, as far as the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, the problem first arose after the Greek Cypriot onslaught against the Turkish Cypriot community in December 1963. During that month and the years of Greek Cypriot oppression that followed it, many Turks were indiscriminately abducted from their places of work, from roads and even from hospitals. In paragraph 117 of the Secretary-General's report of 11 March 1965 [S/6228] and paragraph 76 of his report of 10 June 1966 to the Security Council [S/7350] confirm that over 200 Turkish Cypriots were missing following the events of 1963. Scores of letters written at the time by Mr. Denktas to Mr. Clerides about the fate or whereabouts of those people remain unanswered to this date.

73. After the Greek-inspired *coup d'état* of 15 July 1974, another 600 Turkish Cypriots were added to the list of missing persons. By far the great majority of those people were civilians, and included babies at the breast and elderly persons. Lists of the names of those people were circulated to all relevant international bodies whose assistance was sought in tracing them. Unfortunately, however, the Greek Cypriot administration has to this day declined to account for their fate. In view of the fact that mass graves of hundreds of Turkish Cypriots have been discovered at Aloa, Sandallaris and Maratha, it is not too difficult to guess the tragic fate of those people. Permission for the opening of another mass grave in the south, the existence of which is known to UNFICYP, has been refused by the Greek Cypriot authorities. That is a mass grave that we know exists at Tokhni (Tashkent), another Turkish village in the south of Cyprus. Thus President Denktas was left with no alternative but to tell the relatives of those Turkish Cypriot missing persons that those still unaccounted for must, unfortunately, be presumed dead. That was the only way in which their agony could be alleviated.

74. Although everything about the missing persons has been presented to the Greek Cypriot side, unfortunately, they persist in exploiting the question of missing persons, adding needlessly to the agony of the relatives of those persons. The problem of missing persons was the subject of numerous discussions

between President Denktas and Mr. Clerides, both locally and during the intercommunal talks held at Vienna. During those discussions President Denktas made it clear to Mr. Clerides that there were no "missing persons" or detainees or both in the hands of the Turkish authorities. And the International Red Cross has finally confirmed that prisoners of war who were taken to Turkey during the war have all been handed over to the Greek Cypriot authorities. That confirmation was made by Mr. Hoffman, the head of the International Red Cross in Cyprus.

75. It has been suggested to the Greek Cypriot side, with ample justification, that instead of looking for their missing persons in the Turkish Cypriot region, they should hold those who were guilty of the 1974 *coup d'état* responsible for accounting for them. The fact that 2,000 Greek Cypriots were killed in the *coup* of Nicos Sampson between 15 and 19 July 1974, that is, before the Turkish intervention ever took place, has been confirmed by foreign and Greek Cypriot press reports and eyewitness accounts.

76. As far as the Turkish Cypriot side is concerned therefore, the question of missing persons is a non-issue.

77. Regarding the issue raised with respect to the buffer zone, I should like to summarize our position as follows. As stated in the correspondence exchanged between President Denktas and Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar on 22 July 1976, the legal and political status of the buffer zone, or no-man's land as we call it, will be determined by mutual agreement between the parties, through the intercommunal talks.

78. We are trying, purely on humanitarian grounds, to facilitate agricultural activities in the area, to the extent permitted by security considerations; but we definitely cannot allow the practices of the Greek Cypriot side to which objections have previously been made to be consolidated into a *status quo ante*. Needless to say, we shall continue to co-operate with UNFICYP in this regard.

79. This is yet another artificial crisis created by the Greek Cypriot side in order to present Cyprus as a boiling pot and thus justify its recourse to the United Nations and other international forums.

80. Another often repeated allegation by the Greek Cypriot side is the so-called colonization of the north of Cyprus. The true facts on this subject are already on record with the United Nations. It suffices to state here that people who are coming to the north of Cyprus are either Turkish Cypriots returning home for settlement now that conditions of security and economic development have become suitable, or people who are imported temporarily as skilled or unskilled labourers and are in Cyprus only temporarily, as I stated. It is relevant to state here that some who came to Cyprus in late 1974 or early 1975 have already left the island.

81. Another matter which is constantly being exploited by the Greek Cypriot community for purely propaganda purposes is the movement of Greek Cypriots from the north to the south. I wish to state most emphatically that there is no forcible expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the north. All Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus enjoy the same rights as Turkish Cypriots and have freedom of movement subject only to minimal security precautions.

82. It will be recalled that at the third round of the intercommunal talks in Vienna an agreement was reached for an exchange of populations, in accordance with which the Greek Cypriot side would allow Turkish Cypriots living in the south to move to the north, while the Turkish Cypriot side would permit those Greek Cypriots who wished to go to the south to do so. Therefore, it has been the policy of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to allow those Greek Cypriots who have made application for transfer to the south, either through the United Nations and the International Red Cross, or to the Turkish Cypriot authorities directly, to move in accordance with their wishes. This is also confirmed by the latest report of the Secretary-General. Yet, baseless Greek Cypriot allegations on this matter continue *ad nauseam*. Indeed, having run out of material, the Greek Cypriot representative to the United Nations, Mr. Rossides, has recently gone so far as to ridicule himself—we feel unnecessarily—by alleging that Greek Cypriots were being forced to go south, of all things, by marriage proposals by the Turks. This is contained in document S/12243. Really, there should be limits even to propaganda.

83. The fact is that Greek Cypriots are moving south of their own free will, having come to the conclusion that this would be in their best interest for the following reasons. First, they see separation as a reality. They realize that any final solution to the Cyprus problem will be on the basis of a bi-zonal federation and therefore, perhaps, they see a better future among their people in the south. Secondly, they wish to join their families and fellow Greeks in the south, with whom they have common cultural, social and economic ties. Thirdly, Makarios' call for a long struggle and the setting up of militia forces in the south are causing them anxiety and prompting them to move to their own region, where they would feel more secure should anything happen again in Cyprus. In short, they are going to the south for the very reasons that the Turks came to the north. This is merely the natural outcome of many years of hostility between the two communities, nurtured by the Greek Cypriot policy of *enosis* and of regarding the Turkish Cypriots as enemies, to be hated and despised.

84. It is worth noting that the grouping of the two communities in two distinct regions today is no more than the natural and inevitable conclusion of an evolutionary process which began as long ago as the beginning of the century.

85. In 1911, for example, Turkish Cypriots lived in 230 mixed villages and 85 purely Turkish villages. By 1946 the number of mixed villages in which Turkish Cypriots lived had fallen to 162, while the number of purely Turkish villages had risen to 110. By 1960, the year in which Cyprus became independent, the number of mixed villages in which Turkish Cypriots lived had been reduced to 102, while the number of purely Turkish villages had risen to 130. Following the Greek Cypriot onslaught against the Turkish Cypriot community in 1963, during which Turkish Cypriots were expelled from 103 villages, the number of mixed villages was further reduced to 48, while the purely Turkish villages numbered 105. Those statistics indicate that the position today, where the Turkish Cypriots live in one region in the north and the Greek Cypriots in another region in the south, is merely the conclusion of a trend which began many years ago. The *coup* of 1974 further intensified the regrouping of the two communities; hence the two distinct regions which we have today.

86. Despite the voluntary movement of the Greek Cypriots to the south, statements are made alleging to the contrary that pressure was exerted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. In actual fact, the following are the reasons for the movement of Greek Cypriots to the south and for the statements thus made.

87. First, the Greek Cypriots are under pressure from the Greek Cypriot administration to remain in the north, perhaps for internal political reasons. Thus, on arrival in the south, lest they be branded as traitors, these people feel obliged to state that they left under pressure from the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Indeed, we are sometimes placed in a difficult position, as the case of the three priests of St. Barnabas Church illustrates. These three priests applied to go to the south both directly to us and also through international ecclesiastical organizations, yet the Greek Cypriot press is still printing headlines to the effect that these people are being forced to leave for the south. The Greek Cypriot leadership may not want these people to go south for political reasons, but for that reason we cannot imprison them in the north against their will.

88. Secondly, in view of the policy of the Greek Cypriot administration to deny rehabilitation credits and other benefits to Greek Cypriots who leave the north voluntarily, they have no alternative but to state that they were forced to leave by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Despite this and other direct and indirect pressures and intimidation employed by the Greek Cypriot administration, as will be observed from paragraph 31 of the recent report of the Secretary-General, almost a quarter of those who left the north applied directly to the United Nations and the International Red Cross.

89. However, in view of the allegations constantly being made regarding the expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the north, we should be only too happy for the

voluntary applications of the Greek Cypriots to be investigated and verified by independent and impartial authorities. As confirmed in paragraph 33 of the Secretary-General's report, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has agreed to the establishment of an enlarged UNFICYP Liaison Team Centre in Yialousa and to arrangements that would enable UNFICYP personnel to speak freely and in private with any Greek Cypriot applying for transfer to the south, to verify the voluntary nature of the applications and to provide transport assistance where necessary. Furthermore, until the agreement is actually signed, we have authorized the International Red Cross to carry out such investigations and verify the voluntary nature of the migration.

90. As far as the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots still in the north are concerned, the Greek Cypriot allegations are totally unfounded. Greek Cypriots living in northern Cyprus are accorded the same rights as Turkish Cypriots, including freedom of movement subject only to minimal security precautions. As confirmed by paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General's latest report, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has improved freedom of movement and travel for Greek Cypriots and is providing better facilities for education and health.

91. In the field of education, as confirmed by paragraph 35 of the Secretary-General's report, all elementary schools, including a nursery—which, by any standards, is a luxury for villages—are open and functioning normally. There is one teacher for every 30 pupils, a ratio which is far better than the international standard, not to mention those prevailing in the Greek Cypriot controlled region in the south.

92. In the field of health, the fact that Greek Cypriots are provided with all necessary medical facilities is again confirmed by the report. Over 1,000 Greek Cypriot patients have been given free medical treatment in health centres and hospitals in the north.

93. With respect to agriculture, as confirmed by the Secretary-General's report, in paragraph 39, the agricultural produce of Greek Cypriot farmers is being purchased by Turkish Cypriot authorities at current market prices applicable also to Turkish Cypriots.

94. It can be clearly seen that the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has done everything possible to improve the living conditions of the Greek Cypriots in the north. The same could not be said, however, of the Greek Cypriot administration, whose treatment of the Turkish Cypriots at the time when they were unfortunate enough to be living in the south was far below acceptable minimum standards. The following is what two Greek Cypriot party leaders had to say on the subject when they appeared on a television panel discussion on 29 May 1975.

95. Mr. Clerides—whom we all know well—said:

“We must, in a practical way, solve the problems of the Turkish Cypriots in the south. This we should have done long ago.

“The budget of the Republic, for example, should include a provision for improving the living conditions of the Turks living under ‘government’ control. This was not done in the past. The Turkish Cypriots must feel that they enjoy security of life and property. But this is not enough. They must also work. They must be given an opportunity for economic development. They must enjoy freedom of movement in the region under the control of the Republic, because they should be able to sell their produce.

“The State should solve these fundamental problems of the Turks. We should educate our National Guard soldiers so that they should not look upon the Turkish Cypriots as the national “—or natural—” enemies of the Greeks.”

96. The other leader, Mr. Papaianu, the leader of AKEL, had the following to say:

“Turks in the south should be given a feeling of security, so that they consider themselves as equal citizens of the Republic.

“We must begin, as a State, to treat them in the same way as we treat the Greek Cypriots...

“The Turks must enjoy the same rights as the Greeks. When their security is endangered, those who violate the laws, those who are involved in the activities against the Turkish Cypriots, must be severely punished.”

Such treatment never materialized.

97. Moreover, while the Greek Cypriots were moving to the south at a time of their own choice and after having wound up their businesses and sold their produce, the Turkish Cypriots in the south were given a time-limit of only one month within which they had to move north. The exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the south in such a short time obviously caused us severe humanitarian as well as administrative problems. Had we set a similar deadline for the Greek Cypriots in the north, almost all of them would have left by now.

98. Furthermore, as confirmed by paragraph 34 of the Secretary-General’s report, the Greek Cypriots moving to the south are permitted by the Turkish Federated State to take their personal belongings with them, while the Turkish Cypriots who left the south were not permitted to do so. All they could carry was a small suitcase of clothing and the minimum of personal belongings. Even property left by Turkish Cypriots

in the British Sovereign Base area cannot be returned to their Turkish Cypriot owners because the Greek Cypriot administration will not permit British authorities to hand over such property. In spite of the Vienna agreements, the Greek Cypriot administration does not permit the return of Turkish Cypriot owned property, and as a result millions of dollars worth of Turkish Cypriot property and equipment is decaying and rotting away in the British bases in Cyprus. Recently, an application was made, both through the United Nations and the British authorities in Cyprus, at least for the return of Turkish Cypriot lorries stranded in the bases for the purpose of transporting emergency relief aid to the earthquake victims in Turkey. Even under those exceptional humanitarian circumstances, however, the return of our lorries, which we so desperately needed, was refused by the Greek Cypriot authorities. Likewise, a request for permission to remove from the enclaved Turkish village of Erenköy prefabricated houses which would have been speedily sent to the earthquake victims in Turkey, has also been denied. And these are the people who are here now complaining about humanitarian problems in the north.

99. However, I do not think this is the time to apportion blame. I shall now turn to the substance of the Cyprus conflict.

100. The period since the last meeting of the Security Council on this subject six months ago, in June [1925th meeting], has been characterized by Greek Cypriot endeavours to avoid intercommunal negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, through constant recourse to international forums, false and malicious propaganda campaigns against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, and attempts to distort the intercommunal nature of the problem. The net result of all this has inevitably been a lack of progress in the intercommunal talks.

101. Despite the fact that the Cyprus dispute is manifestly an intercommunal problem, between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, and although in particular the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus problem is primarily the concern of the two communities, Mr. Christophides, the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot administration, had the audacity to claim in the General Assembly last month that “the Cyprus problem is not a difference between the two communities”.² With all respect to my counterpart, I must say that I do not agree with that.

102. How can there be progress in the intercommunal talks if one party to the dispute insists on not recognizing the other party even as its counterpart? How can there be any hope for a settlement if one party persists in engaging in a monologue at international forums while, at the same time, it pretends to favour a meaningful intercommunal dialogue?

103. Ignoring the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community and its administration, and engaging in

false propaganda and futile rhetoric, is not the right way to go about solving the Cyprus problem. We sincerely hope that the Greek Cypriot side will come to realize the futility of such an approach and will, instead, return to the negotiating table for serious and meaningful negotiations. Needless to say, the Turkish Cypriot side is always ready to resume the negotiations. In fact, we have never left the negotiating table.

104. Why has there been no solution to the problem so far? It takes two to make an agreement, and I am sorry to say that our Greek friends have not yet even decided who their partner is. As long as they insist on regarding the Cyprus problem as an international problem to be solved between Turkey and the so-called Government of Cyprus, there can be no possibility of a solution. The Cyprus problem, as is well known, did not start with Turkey's intervention in July 1974. A return to the *status quo* existing immediately before the events of 1974, as the Greek Cypriot side seems to demand, will not, therefore, solve the problem.

105. Indeed, it is only since 1974 that, as a result of the Turkish intervention and the presence of the Turkish forces on the island, there has been peace and stability on the island for the first time in many years. This fact is confirmed by impartial foreign observers. Mr. McLean, the Secretary of the Fleet Street branch of the National Union of Journalists of the United Kingdom, has stated in an interview which he gave on 4 November 1976 that

“the present situation in the whole of the island—not just the north but the whole of the island—is more stable and secure today than it has been for many years, including a large part of the period when the British Government was responsible for the island, when you had the EOKA. This is a fact; one only has to come here and see for oneself.”

106. Because of the equilibrium established, today there is no fighting in Cyprus, for the first time in years. Today there are no indiscriminate killings of Turks on the roads; there are no surprise attacks against the Turkish community; there is no domination by the Greek Cypriot community over the Turkish Cypriot community, unlike the situation throughout the past two decades. Today, at long last, there exists a basis—a real basis—for the permanent and peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem.

107. As confirmed by various resolution of the United Nations, the Cyprus problem can be solved only through negotiations between the two communities of Cyprus. We do not believe that constant recourse to international forums can do much to solve the Cyprus problem. On the contrary, as the past two years have shown, such action serves only to disrupt and stifle the negotiating process, for serious and meaningful negotiations are incompatible with one-sided debates and unilateral actions in international forums.

108. Unfortunately, all our appeals to the Greek Cypriot side for moderation and realism have fallen on deaf ears. The resolution of the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, adopted on 5 November 1976 [see S/12240], calling for, *inter alia*, the setting up of sub-committees, in accordance with the Vienna agreements and the Brussels accord, and the speedy resumption of the intercommunal talks without further delay, has received no response whatsoever from the Greek Cypriot side. Our repeated proposals for a joint transitional federal government, which we believe would go a long way towards normalizing the situation in Cyprus and would prevent the further separation of the two communities, have also received no positive response from the Greek Cypriot side.

109. While we, as the Turkish Cypriot side, have indicated our willingness and readiness that the intercommunal talks should resume, the Greek Cypriot side is bent on internationalizing the problem and has gone out of its way to undermine the very negotiating process itself. We fail to understand why so much of their time and energy are spent on running off to international forums, and so little on the intercommunal dialogue so necessary for the solution of the Cyprus problem. If the time thus wasted in acrimonious debates had instead been utilized in fruitful intercommunal dialogue, it would have been time much better spent, and most probably many of our outstanding difficulties would have been settled by now.

110. Every time the interlocutors at the intercommunal talks have come close to an agreement, the rapprochement achieved has been sabotaged by Archbishop Makarios and his collaborators. At the third round of the intercommunal talks at Vienna, for example, there was a wide understanding on bi-zonality, a loose federation, equal participation in the central government, and an exchange of maps on the territorial aspects of the problem, as well as a voluntary exchange of populations as a first step towards the establishment of a bi-regional federation. Indeed, at the time there was a real possibility of an early solution. But all hopes were completely dashed as a result of Archbishop Makarios' stubborn refusal to accept and implement agreements made by his representative at the talks. The various methods and tactics pursued by the Greek Cypriot leadership to frustrate progress towards an early solution are well known.

111. Following the third round of the intercommunal talks, held at Vienna, Mr. Clerides was so harshly attacked in the Greek Cypriot press, before he even returned to Nicosia, that he had to deny that any agreement in principle or otherwise had been reached with the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor, and he had to state that he had no map to submit on territory. It was that negative attitude adopted by the Greek Cypriot side, therefore, that led to the failure of the fourth round

of the intercommunal talks, held in New York on 8 and 9 September 1975.

112. It was not until months after the deadlock in New York that new hopes appeared for the resumption of the talks, following the Brussels accord reached between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece on 12 December 1975. At the fifth round of the talks at Vienna, agreement had been reached, within the framework of the Brussels accord, for an exchange of proposals and the setting up of experts' committees to tackle the constitutional as well as the territorial aspects of the Cyprus problem. Once again, however, determined to undermine the talks and block any progress towards a solution, Archbishop Makarios created an artificial crisis, which finally led to the resignation of Mr. Glafcos Clerides as the Greek Cypriot interlocutor and, subsequently, to his complete ousting from the political scene.

113. What is required at present is an atmosphere conducive to constructive and meaningful negotiations. The continued call of the Greek Cypriot leadership for a long struggle; the recurring news reports in the Greek Cypriot press regarding the formation of militia forces; the exploitation of governmental authority by the Greek Cypriot side; the policy of isolating the Turkish Cypriot community and, what is more important, the demand of the Greek Cypriot side for a return to its pre-1974 position if and when negotiations start—that is, the position in which it was insisting on majority rule with minimal rights of local administration for the Turkish Cypriot community, at a time when the Turkish Cypriot community was under Greek Cypriot domination and oppression—all that is certainly not helping in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of the talks.

114. The Greek Cypriot daily *Fileleftheros* of 24 November 1976—and that newspaper, incidentally is, the official organ of the Makarios Administration—and *Gnōmi* of 29 November, to mention only two publications, have been strongly advocating reversion to the pre-1974 Greek position. This new development is not only discouraging but alarming and dangerous, and if pursued it will destroy all hopes of a negotiated settlement. This attitude of the Greek Cypriot side is certainly not realistic. Unless the Greek Cypriot side ceases to consider Cyprus a Greek island, unless it is willing to share governmental authority with us, unless it is prepared to treat us as equals, there can be no solution.

115. Unfortunately, for the present, the Greek Cypriot leadership continues in its old ways. It seems to have learned nothing from its past mistakes, and those of its leaders who have had the foresight to point out the futility of its ways—those like Mr. Glafcos Clerides, who have publicly stated that many opportunities for a settlement have been missed due to the extreme nationalism, petty political interests and demagoguery of the Greek Cypriot leadership—have been

expeditiously ousted. Those among the Greek Cypriots who have had the courage to speak out against the obsolete policies of their leaders—persons such as Mr. Zenon Stavrinides—have been promptly silenced and arbitrarily prosecuted, as we were authoritatively informed by Mr. Christophides himself during the recent debate on Cyprus in the General Assembly.

116. Regretfully, today, as in the past, we are once again missing opportunities for the early settlement of the Cyprus conflict as a result of the retrograde policies of the Greek Cypriot leadership. Apparently the Greek Cypriot side does not desire a realistic settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Apparently, it does not even desire an early settlement of the Cyprus crisis. It may be pertinent at this point to examine just what the Greek Cypriot side is really aiming at.

117. First, it intends to keep the Cyprus problem in the limelight in order to prolong the issue in the hope that it will ultimately succeed in bringing pressure to bear on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. Thus the object of its constant resort to international forums is not to facilitate a solution but, on the contrary, as Archbishop Makarios recently admitted:

“I would not say that the new United Nations resolution in favour of Cyprus would provide a solution to the Cyprus problem. But, besides moral vindication, our recourse to the international Organization and its relevant resolutions keep our problem in the limelight.”

Those comments were published in *The Cyprus Mail* of 9 September 1976.

118. Prolongation of the Cyprus conflict may help Archbishop Makarios and a few of his close associates to prolong their political lives, but it is definitely against the interests of Cyprus as a whole.

119. Secondly, the Greek Cypriot side is trying to strangle the Turkish Cypriot community by denying its very existence and isolating it from the rest of the world through an economic blockade. Its attempts to disrupt international trade with the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, its endeavours to obstruct tourists from visiting northern Cyprus and its efforts to prevent recognition of passports and stamps issued by the Turkish Administration—these are but a few examples of Greek Cypriot designs in this regard, aimed at forcing us to submission. This attitude is not only delaying the resumption of the talks but is inevitably leading to further separation and compelling us to take new measures in order to avert the serious consequences of the policy followed by the Greek Cypriot side.

120. Surely the Greek Cypriot leaders must realize that it is they themselves who, through their efforts to isolate the Turkish Cypriot community, are respon-

sible for the separation which is unfortunately becoming deeper and more permanent every day. If this state of statelessness to which we have been condemned is allowed to continue, and if the existence, let alone the equal status, of the Turkish Cypriot community is denied, hopes of a settlement will remain slender.

121. The Greek Cypriots are trying to preserve their illegitimate status as the so-called Government of Cyprus by denying any participation to the Turkish Cypriot community in the Government. Hence their refusal to accept our offer for a joint transitional government. In this way they hope to maintain their monopoly in international forums and to be in a position to prevent the participation of the Turkish Cypriot community on an equal footing, thereby suppressing the Turkish Cypriot viewpoint in the international arena, as has been the case at Lima, at Colombo, and, unfortunately, during the recent debate in the United Nations General Assembly.

122. The attempts of the Greek Cypriot side to deprive the Turkish Cypriot community of its legitimate right to participate in international conferences, however, are serving to prolong the dispute. As long as Makarios is regarded as the legitimate head of State—a State which, incidentally, he has been trying to destroy for more than two decades—the prospects for a solution will not be favourable; because as long as his Administration is recognized as the legitimate Government of the whole of Cyprus, he will continue his well-known rhetoric about the “invasion” and “occupation” of Cyprus and the presence of “illegal forces” on his island. He will continue to give the false impression that when Turkey came to Cyprus in 1974, Cyprus was a “paradise” in which the two communities lived together in peace and friendship. He will continue to allege that, if the Turkish troops withdrew, everything would once again be well with Cyprus. Maybe he is right from the Greek Cypriot point of view, but, as far as we are concerned, the realization of his objectives would be tantamount to the total elimination of the Turkish Cypriot community as a distinct entity on the island. Unless actual and physical guarantees can be found within the framework of a bi-zonal settlement, unless effective measures can be taken to prevent the recurrence of the past, a second Lebanon tragedy may be created on the island.

123. The Cyprus problem can be solved only through a realistic approach. There are two national communities which have been in a State of conflict since the mid-1950s. Today the problem is how to find a solution which will end that conflict and enable the two communities to live side by side on the island in peace. It is a matter of rearranging our home in such a way that one party will not be able to dominate or oppress the other.

124. What are the realities on the island which must be taken into account in a search for a solution?

First, the Cyprus Republic was established in 1960 by the two communities in exercise of their common right of self-determination. The Republic was created as a bi-national State based on the partnership and equality of those two communities. Unfortunately, however, the Greek Cypriot community, as it later transpired, did not regard the independent State as an end in itself but merely as a means to an end—namely, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Thus, scarcely three years after independence, the Greek Cypriot community under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, in flagrant violation of the very principles in accordance with which the Republic had been created and in complete disregard of the legitimate rights of its co-partners, set in motion the series of well-known events which were aimed at the dissolution of the independent Cyprus State together with the elimination of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a political entity.

125. The Turkish intervention of 1974 was not an aggression but an attempt to prevent the consolidation of an aggression which had been taking place since 1963 and had culminated in the *coup* of July 1974. The Turkish intervention, therefore, is not the cause of the Cyprus problem but its result. In other words, it is the result of the policy of the Greek Cypriots and Greece to unite the island with Greece at the expense of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Had it not been for the timely intervention of Turkey in 1974 and the courageous resistance put up by the Turkish-Cypriot community for the 12 years preceding the *coup*, today there would have been no Turkish-Cypriot community, let alone an independent State of Cyprus.

126. Since the Greek aggression against the Turkish Cypriot community in 1963, there have existed, and there continue to exist in Cyprus, two separate administrations each having exclusive control and authority over its respective community and region. The existence of two national communities and their separate administrations on the island has also been recognized by the three guarantor Powers, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, by their Declaration in Geneva on 30 July 1974 [S/11398], as well as in various resolutions of the United Nations. It is that reality which necessitated the signing of the procès-verbal between the United Nations and the Turkish Cypriot side last December at Brussels.

127. After 1974 the restructuring of the Turkish Cypriot administration as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus had become indispensable for meeting the growing administrative requirements of the Turkish region, the Constitution of the Federated State was submitted to public referendum on 8 June 1975 and endorsed unanimously by the Turkish Cypriot community. As a result of the recent general elections held in northern Cyprus, the Turkish Federated State has attained a new and important legal basis. The Turkish Cypriot community will under no circumstances return to the degrading situation in which it tried to survive prior to 1974.

128. The sooner, therefore, the Greek Cypriot leadership recognizes as a reality the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community and its administration, the sooner there will be progress towards a settlement. Those are the realities which must necessarily be taken into account in any settlement of the Cyprus problem.

129. The Turkish Cypriot community is not making extravagant demands. We do not want anything in excess of our legitimate rights. All we want is to live in our homeland as decent human beings, free from oppression, the discrimination and the suffering which we have had the misfortune to experience in the past. After all, that is our right, just as it is the right of all peoples. We have had more than our share of suffering in the past. We know what it feels like to be under domination. We know what it feels like to be homeless and destitute, and we do not want the injustices committed against us in the past to be repeated also in the future. That is what we are striving for.

130. The Turkish Cypriot community was forced to fight for its right of self-determination. We are confident that the United Nations will confirm our right of self-determination and that the Security Council will not allow itself to be exploited by those who are trying to deny us that right.

131. The Turkish Cypriots have struggled for the independence of their country. As a community, we are indeed proud of the fact that we have succeeded in preserving the independence of Cyprus, at great sacrifice and loss of life, in the face of criminal designs for the elimination of our community and the annexation of our country by another State. We did not tolerate such attempts to annex our country in the past; we shall not do so in the future.

132. The Turkish Cypriot community has struggled against those who have abused their governmental authority and tried to destroy the constitutional equality of our community. We are determined to defend our equal status, for our very existence, as well as the independence of the island, depends on that equality.

133. The Greek Cypriot side often accuses us of not having submitted concrete proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem, when it is they themselves who have failed to put forward tangible or even remotely realistic proposals. Contrary to the Greek Cypriot accusations, the Turkish Cypriot proposals are perfectly precise and clear, as well as being thoroughly realistic. The Turkish Cypriot proposals were circulated on 5 June last [*S/12093, annex II*] and are available for everyone to examine. On the constitutional aspect of the problem, we have proposed the establishment of a bi-regional federation composed of a Turkish Federated State and a Greek Federated State and a central Federal Government with agreed powers. In view of our past experience, we believe that only under such a set-up can the independence of Cyprus

as well as the security and legitimate rights of the two communities be effectively guaranteed. Regarding the territorial aspect of the problem, our position has again been made abundantly clear. We do not regard the numerical strength of the two communities or even the actual ownership of land, which incidentally is in our favour, as being the only relevant factors in the determination of the areas to be administered by the two Federated States respectively. The security and the economic requirements of the two communities are two important factors to be taken into account. Accordingly in our proposals we have stated that the Turkish Federated State must be economically viable, to give to the Turkish Cypriot community the opportunity which was denied to it previously to develop economically in freedom. We have stated that our State must be militarily defensible in order to prevent the recurrence of the repeated attacks which the Turkish Cypriot community had to suffer in the past. As for the details of the problem, we have agreed, in accordance with the Brussels agreement, to the setting up of committees of experts to investigate the intricate issues involved and to report to the political interlocutors.

134. And what proposals do we have from the Greek Cypriot side? Just a dry figure of 20 per cent territory for the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. But why not 35 per cent? Why not 25 per cent? Why not X per cent? What are the criteria? Apart from a simple arithmetical figure there is nothing concrete in the Greek Cypriot proposals. Has the Greek Cypriot side said, for example, whether it would accept a bi-zonal federation—a necessary prerequisite for any headway in the talks? Has it accepted the principle of political equality in the central federal government that is inherent in any federation? It obstructs the setting up of the sub-committees and continues to reject the Turkish Cypriot community as its true, indeed only, counterpart. In these circumstances, can the Turkish Cypriot side really be accused of not making any proposals? Can we really be blamed for the impasse in the intercommunal dialogue?

135. By its very nature the negotiating process involves reciprocity, mutual good will and accommodation. Yet the Greek Cypriot side expects the Turkish Cypriot side to be more specific on the territorial aspect without receiving anything concrete on the other aspects of the problem. The problem must be tackled as a whole.

136. We are being criticized for following a separatist policy. The physical separation on the island is not of our making. It has been imposed on us by the Greek Cypriot leadership. But, while on this subject, I feel that I should put on record once more that the Turkish Cypriot side opposes the partition of the island. We believe that Cyprus must remain an independent, sovereign and non-aligned State. We believe that this can be achieved only through a bi-zonal federation with the effective national guarantees of

Turkey and Greece. Today, the basis for such a settlement, which would enable the two communities to coexist peacefully on the island, already exists. All that is required is the agreement of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, through negotiations conducted between the two sides on an equal footing.

137. However, the success of the negotiations depends on the statesmanship, good will and mutual respect of the parties. We are a co-founder and co-partner community. The problem and the Cyprus crisis cannot be resolved without us, and this is of paramount importance. We hope that the Greek Cypriot leadership will abandon its policy of a "long struggle", will recognize the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island, will return to the negotiating table for talks on an equal footing and will refrain in future from acting in such a manner as to frustrate the intercommunal dialogue.

138. Let us, instead, sit down together at the negotiating table and discuss our differences frankly and in a spirit of good will. The Turkish Cypriot side is ready to resume negotiations at any time. In fact, why do we not follow the example set by the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, who, immediately after the debate in the Council on the Aegean question last August, met to discuss the matter? Why do we not do the same? Why do not my counterpart from the south of Cyprus, Mr. Christophides, and I walk into the next room and start negotiations straightaway and without any further delay? That is the only way that we can resolve our problem.

139. I extend my hand in friendship to my distinguished friend, Mr. Christophides, and hope that he will respond favourably to this earnest and sincere offer.

140. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Greece.

141. Mr. PAPOULIAS (Greece): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to extend to you the warmest congratulations of my delegation upon your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. Your prestige, your well-known competence and your high qualifications and skill are fully appreciated by all Members of the United Nations and constitute a guarantee that our debate will be successfully concluded. My delegation and I personally take great satisfaction at seeing in the presidency of the Security Council the representative of a neighbouring and friendly country with which Greece is linked by historical ties of close friendship and co-operation.

142. At the same time, I wish to thank the members of the Council for allowing me to participate in the debate.

143. May I also address to the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, my Government's and my own

warm and sincere congratulations on his re-election to his high office.

144. The Security Council, on the proposal of the Secretary-General, has just decided to renew the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. This resolution, to which the Government of Cyprus has agreed, is supported by my Government.

145. I take this opportunity to express our profound appreciation to the Member States that have provided contingents to UNFICYP and to those that are making voluntary contributions for its maintenance. We also express our sincere thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, and to the outgoing Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand, and his officers and men, who have carried out their peaceful and humanitarian task under conditions of personal danger. We wish to join, too, in the special tribute paid to Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand of India, who has served for a considerable length of time in Cyprus and who, through his dedication, his unswerving courage and his other high qualifications, has rendered invaluable services to peace and to the humanitarian task which the Force, under his command, was called upon to perform in Cyprus.

146. We welcome the new Commander of the Force, Major-General James Joseph Quinn of Ireland, and wish him success in his difficult and important mission.

147. As the Cyprus question was fully debated recently in the General Assembly, it is perhaps not necessary to go over again what the Council already knows. It knows that the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority of 94 votes to only 1,—that of Turkey—adopted resolution 31/12, which reaffirmed resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX) and demanded their urgent implementation, namely, respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus; abstention from unilateral actions and interventions directed against it in contravention of resolution 3212 (XXIX), including changes in the demographic structure of Cyprus; withdrawal without further delay of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs; the return of all refugees to their homes in safety; and the resumption of meaningful and constructive negotiations between the representatives of the two communities under the auspices of the Secretary-General.

148. The General Assembly, voicing also through resolution 31/12 its deep concern over the prolongation of the Cyprus crisis which endangers international peace and security, called upon the parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions,

expressed the hope that the Security Council would consider appropriate steps for the implementation of its resolution 365 (1974) endorsing General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), and requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the representatives of the two communities.

149. This is the context in which the Council has been called upon to extend for another six months the mandate of UNFICYP. Relevant to our debate are also resolution 391 (1976) and preceding resolutions and, of course, the reports of the Secretary-General on Cyprus of 30 October [S/12222] and of 9 December [S/12253] which are now before the Council.

150. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Christophides, has already presented his Government's views as regards both the situation prevailing in the island in the light of the Secretary-General's reports and the wider implications of the Cyprus problem. He has done this so ably and convincingly that I do not need to be repetitive. I shall, however, beg the Council's indulgence if I draw its attention to the most distressing and alarming facts contained in these reports, which make even grimmer reading than the Secretary-General's report of June last [S/12093], which led the President of the Council, on 15 June 1976, to declare on behalf of the majority of the members of the Council "a deep concern for the future of the indigenous people of Cyprus". [1927th meeting, para. 4]

151. Inasmuch as the Secretary-General's reports speak for themselves and are fully revealing, I shall confine myself to referring to their salient points.

152. According to paragraphs 10 and 42 to 49 of the report before us, the freedom of movement of UNFICYP and its Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) continues to be restricted under various pretexts, and they have been able to carry out humanitarian work only on a limited scale.

153. Under the heading "Law and order", paragraph 47 of the report States: "It has been reported that appreciable quantities of commercial commodities... have continued to be removed from Greek Cypriot-owned business houses and other premises in the Famagusta area".

154. According to paragraph 10 of document S/12222 and paragraph 48 of the report before us no progress on the issue of missing persons has been made since the Turkish side has rejected the suggestion of the ICRC for the designation of an investigatory body.

155. On the humanitarian question, paragraph 8 of document S/12222 states:

"The situation regarding the implementation of the agreement recorded in the communiqué of 2 August 1975 at the end of the third round of talks in Vienna remains as outlined in my report of 5 June 1976 [S/12093, paras. 22-24 and chap. III]. The condition of the Greek Cypriots in the north continues to be a matter of serious concern, not only on humanitarian grounds but also because it constitutes a highly contentious issue between the two communities. They continue to be restricted to their respective villages and to the immediate surroundings thereof. Medical, educational and religious facilities have declined."—I stress this point.—"No Greek Cypriot physicians are practising in the north."

156. Paragraph 28 of the report we are considering States: "As indicated in my report of 30 October 1976 [S/12222, para. 8], the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in the north have not improved, their exodus to the south has accelerated and this situation continues to be a matter of serious concern. UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriot habitations and freedom of movement in the area remain restricted".

157. The Secretary-General also makes the following observation in paragraph 72 of the same report:

"The situation of Greek Cypriots in the north is a matter of special concern. The greater part of those Greek Cypriots have now left for the south for the stated purpose of seeking security and better living conditions, and this development has further heightened tension. It had originally been expected that this problem would be considerably alleviated by the agreement reached in this regard at the third round of the Vienna talks on 2 August 1975 and, in particular, by the granting to UNFICYP of free and normal access to Greek Cypriot habitations in the area. Regrettably, it has not been possible to implement that agreement adequately and the exodus of Greek Cypriots from the north continues."

158. On the issue of the alteration of the demographic pattern of the island through the uprooting of the indigenous Greek Cypriot population and the systematic colonization by migrants from the Turkish mainland, the report could hardly be more explicit. I quote paragraph 29:

"From 7,371 on 5 June 1976, the Greek Cypriot population in the north decreased to 3,631 on 6 December, representing a total evacuation of 3,740. Seventeen Greek Cypriots remain in Kyrenia, a decline of 160, and 3,614 in the Karpas, a decline of 3,580. The present rate of evacuation is averaging some 41 persons daily. In the period June to December 1976, 10 villages in the north were depopulated of Greek Cypriots, of which three were in Kyrenia and seven in the Karpas. Not included in the above totals are 38 medical evacua-

tions carried out by UNFICYP ambulance from the Karpas to the south."

159. Of relevance, also, is paragraph 30, referring to the massive expulsion of the inhabitants of the Greek Cypriot town of Yialousa.

160. No wonder that the number of refugees, instead of declining, has further increased, reaching a total of 195,991, as stated by the Secretary-General in paragraph 53 of the same report.

161. As regards the Turkish argument that the Greek Cypriots voluntarily leave their ancestral homes in order to go to the south, I shall refer to paragraph 31 of the report, which indicates: "The agreed procedure for screening Greek Cypriot applicants for transfer to the south has not been implemented effectively".

162. I submit that this clear evidence removes any credence from the arguments to the contrary employed by the Turkish authorities. It is also not without significance that a proposal by UNFICYP to send a fact-finding team to the Karpas to ascertain conditions was not accepted by the Turkish side, again under various pretexts.

163. The statistics contained in the Secretary-General's report indicate in the clearest terms the measure and the imminence of the danger threatening the remaining Greek Cypriot inhabitants in the area under Turkish occupation, and place a heavy responsibility upon the Council to prevent the total elimination from its ancestral home of an autochthonous population which throughout the long history of mankind has made its contribution to civilization.

164. As I stated during my statement to the Council on 11 June, and I will repeat today:

"The wholesale eradication of an entire indigenous population and the confiscation of all its property are contrary not only to specific provisions of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to provisions of international treaties like the fourth Geneva Convention¹ regarding the treatment of the inhabitants of occupied territories and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but they are... flagrantly contrary to the Charter and to everything the United Nations stands for." [1925th meeting, para. 63.]

165. Apart from the distressing facts I have just mentioned, the Secretary-General's report contains a very disturbing new element concerning the attempts made by the Turkish forces of occupation to tamper with the *status quo* of the cease-fire lines.

166. From paragraphs 19 to 27 of the report it becomes unfortunately evident that, despite the fact that the Turks continue to occupy 40 per cent of the Republic's territory and 70 per cent of its resources,

including the most fertile land, in the name of a minority community that does not exceed 18 per cent of the total population of the island, and despite the further fact that a significant part of the land snatched from its Greek Cypriot owners in the north remains uncultivated, the Turkish military authorities have attempted to encroach upon the buffer zone by evicting Greek Cypriots from the fields owned and cultivated by them on the basis of established agreements and by transferring Turkish farmers to them.

167. These attempts have resulted in regrettable incidents between the Turkish side and UNFICYP, as recorded in paragraph 24 of the report. I am sure that the Council will agree that such unwarranted actions by the occupying Power are not only contrary to General Assembly and Security Council resolutions—specifically to paragraph 3 of resolution 391 (1976) and previous resolutions—but are fraught with grave dangers as regards the maintenance of international peace and security in the area. The Secretary-General, in paragraph 71 of his report, underlines the importance of maintaining the *status quo* of the cease-fire lines and of not turning the area into a wasteland. We draw the Council's serious attention to the matter.

168. Section V, on the Secretary-General's good offices, in pursuance of paragraph 6 of resolution 391 (1976), causes us grave concern, as it reflects the total lack of progress towards a solution.

169. Let me say immediately how much my Government appreciates the painstaking and untiring efforts made by the Secretary-General in seeking a peaceful solution for Cyprus. I take this opportunity to convey to him and his collaborators—the Under-Secretaries-General Mr. Guyer and Mr. Urquhart, and their assistants—our most sincere thanks.

170. May I again assure the Council that the Greek Government will continue, as in the past, to lend its full support to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. There can be no doubt that the best hope for achieving a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem, as called for by the Council, is, as the Secretary-General observes in paragraph 76 of his report, through negotiations between the two Cypriot communities.

171. However, the Council has recognized through its successive resolutions that, for the negotiations to be serious and meaningful, the agreements reached at all previous rounds of the talks held under the auspices of the Secretary-General should be respected. This has not been the case either with the agreement reached at Vienna during the third round of talks on humanitarian matters or with the agreement signed at the fifth round regarding the intercommunal negotiations. Both continue to be violated by the Turkish side, on different pretexts each time.

172. The Security Council resolutions also stipulate that unilateral actions likely to affect adversely the

prospects of the negotiations or actions that increase tensions between the two communities should be avoided. I am sure that the Council shares the view that the non-implementation of the agreements reached during the Vienna talks, the continued flagrant violation of the human rights of the Greek Cypriot population in the area under Turkish control, the systematic expulsion of the indigenous Greek Cypriot population and the colonization of the north with migrants from the Turkish mainland, the interference with UNFICYP's freedom of movement and the threats to change by force the *status quo* of the cease-fire lines and certainly not the proper means to pave the way for negotiations. Furthermore, the other side has systematically avoided coming forward with concrete proposals concerning the territorial aspects of the problem. We are still awaiting those proposals from them.

173. Therefore, we are obliged to stress again that a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem which we all desire can be found only through serious, sincere and meaningful negotiations, in conformity with the basic principles of the Charter and through the implementation of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

174. We would also emphasize to the Council the imperative need not to allow the negotiating process to degenerate into delaying tactics to perpetuate *faits accomplis* and create so-called irreversible situations. The United Nations has had bitter experience of the results of such tactics.

175. The Cyprus problem urgently awaits a settlement. That is the only way to eliminate the danger that threatens international peace and security, as the General Assembly in its wisdom has recognized in its resolution 3212 (XXIX).

176. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

177. Mr. TÜRKMEN (Turkey): Mr. President, I should like most warmly to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and to express our deep appreciation of the diligent and enlightened efforts you have undertaken in dealing with the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP. I should also like to pay a tribute to your country, Romania, with which Turkey enjoys constantly developing friendly and mutually beneficial relations.

178. I wish to seize this opportunity to reiterate to the Secretary-General that we highly value his sustained efforts in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. We reiterate our appreciation to the countries providing troops and contributing financially to UNFICYP.

179. May I pay tribute to the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Pérez de Cué-

lar, and the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Urquhart and Mr. Guyer for their devoted efforts in the fulfilment of their functions. My delegation would also like to commend Lieutenant General Prem Chand, who is retiring after a long period of service in Cyprus. We wish him all the best in the future. We should also like to extend our best wishes to the new Force Commander, Major-General James Joseph Quinn.

180. As the report of the Secretary-General recalls, the function of UNFICYP was originally defined in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 391 (1976).

181. The Force has now been in operation in Cyprus for more than 12 years. Notwithstanding the dedication of its officers and men, it has not been able to prevent the recurrence of fighting and violence; similarly, it has not been able to thwart several attempts to endanger international peace and security through action designed to liquidate the independent Republic of Cyprus from 1963 to 1974. During that period several crises erupted on the island entailing actual fighting, loss of life, severe hardship and suffering for the numerically weaker community. Nevertheless, the mandate of the Force has been continually renewed because it was estimated that its presence was, though in a limited way, a contributing factor in preventing the escalation of violence. But, in 1974, UNFICYP was powerless with regard to the *fait accompli* of 15 July and its consequences. It was the intervention of the Turkish forces, in conformity with the Treaty of Guarantee,³ that saved Cyprus from annexation by Greece.

182. The Secretary-General points out in paragraph 7 of his report that since July 1974 a number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council "have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required [it] to perform certain additional or modified functions". It was nevertheless clear in 1974 from the very outset that the Force could not continue to perform its mission adequately, let alone its additional or modified functions, unless the requirements of the emergent situation were fully taken into account. It was self-evident that UNFICYP had to reach an understanding with both the Turkish and Greek administrations for its stationing, deployment and functioning. In fact, a *procès-verbal* was signed

exactly a year ago between President Denktaş and the Force Commander with a view to arriving at mutually acceptable arrangements for the stationing, deployment and functioning of UNFICYP in the territory under the authority of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. As the Secretary-General points out, an agreed text of the exchange of letters to record those arrangements has been drawn up. Yet the exchange of letters still remains to be finalized. The delay encountered in that process is most regrettable.

183. The absence of an agreement between the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus and UNFICYP has, of course, been an impediment in overcoming the difficulties referred to in the Secretary-General's report. Most of the issues mentioned in that report have been elaborated upon by the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Mr. Çelik, in his rebuttal to the distortions of Mr. Christophides. Indeed, all those questions fall under the authority and competence of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The Turkish forces in the territory of that State are not involved in the decision-making processes relating to any of those issues. The sole mission of the Turkish forces is, by their mere presence, to safeguard the security of the Turkish community, and to deter any attack against it until a peaceful solution acceptable to both communities can be reached. This, I think, is an adequate answer to Mr. Christophides, who erroneously addressed his questions to me.

184. In its resolution 391 (1976), the Council noted from the Secretary-General's report that one of the tasks of UNFICYP was to facilitate the continued search for a peaceful solution. As we believed this was indeed the case, we have in the past consistently concurred with the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP. The Force cannot, however, through its mere presence contribute to the search for a negotiated settlement. Such a quest is incumbent upon the two parties directly concerned. It is in realization of this fact that the Security Council has in its resolutions combined the renewal of the mandate with a call for substantial negotiations and has expressed the hope year after year that at the end of each six-month period there would be no need for yet another renewal. This call should not be allowed to remain simply the expression of a pious hope ritually repeated.

185. My Government welcomes and endorses the very constructive call for negotiations just made by the Turkish-Cypriot representative. It is our ardent hope that the negotiating process will be resumed in the nearest possible future and that a just settlement will enable the healing of the wounds of the past and open the way to fruitful co-operation between the Turkish and Greek communities. In this regard, we have been very much encouraged by the statement of the Secretary-General at this meeting. We wish him every success in the endeavours he will undertake to ensure a prompt resumption of the intercommunal talks.

186. Having said that, I should like to state the position of my Government on the draft resolution which has been adopted. The Council is familiar with our basic and unchanged position concerning the representation of Cyprus. We cannot concur with any document which refers to the so-called Government of Cyprus. We are more insistent than ever in our view that the Greek-Cypriot representatives have no right whatsoever to speak on behalf of Cyprus, that there is at present no government which represents Cyprus and that the two communities are entitled to speak with equal voice in all forums. The reference to a "Government of Cyprus" in the resolution renders it, therefore, unacceptable to us in its entirety.

187. As far as operative paragraph 2 is concerned, the position of my Government is on record. We concur with the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. In doing so, we take note of the statement of Minister Çelik who has informed the Council of the agreement of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus to the renewal of the mandate.

188. We whole-heartedly support the call in the sixth preambular paragraph for a resumption of intercommunal talks. We urge the Secretary-General to convene a meeting between the representatives of the two communities at the earliest possible date.

189. As we conceived it, the purpose of the present meeting was twofold: to renew the mandate of UNFICYP, on the one hand, and to give a new emphasis to the negotiating process between the two parties under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the other. This, we believe, is the only useful contribution that the Security Council can make to the question of Cyprus. This aim has been achieved. Therefore, I am very reluctant to participate in a repetitive exchange of arguments which the representative of the Greek Cypriot community seems to enjoy passionately. I do not enjoy it, and it certainly does not serve any useful purpose.

190. My colleague from Greece read out numerous excerpts from the report of the Secretary-General, interspersed with subjective judgements and surreptitious distortions which have completely changed the true meaning of the paragraphs of that report. I understand that, as the representative of Greece; he has a heavy conscience, but I think he was ill-advised to try to project himself as the angel of peace and human compassion. I had expected that he would refrain, as I have done, from participating in the regular polemics of these debates.

191. Mr. LAI Ya-li (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): During the general debate on the Cyprus question in the current session of the General Assembly, the Chinese representative already expounded in a comprehensive way the Chinese Government's position on the question. And I am not

going to repeat it here. In view of the fact that the draft resolution contained in document S/12256 mainly concerns the question of the United Nations Force, on which China's position is known to all, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution.

192. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): It was with great satisfaction and relief that my delegation a couple of hours ago voted for the prolongation of the mandate of UNFICYP for another period of six months—satisfaction and relief because it is obvious to my delegation that the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus is an indispensable factor for maintaining peace and security in the island. The Secretary-General states in his report that the continued presence of UNFICYP is essential. We agree. The Secretary-General points out that the withdrawal of United Nations troops from the island in the present circumstances would certainly heighten tension between the two communities, endanger the cease-fire and further reduce the prospects of achieving a just and lasting peace in Cyprus.

193. The task entrusted to UNFICYP is not an easy one. One of the main problems is to assist in keeping the cease-fire lines intact in a situation where attempts are made in some areas to move those lines forward. UNFICYP has tried to keep the areas between the two cease-fire lines open for innocent civilian activities, especially farming. Those areas, comprising approximately 3 per cent of the total area of Cyprus, can thus be used for beneficial and constructive purposes. But there is the risk that military actions may turn them into a contexted and wasted no man's land. It is therefore important that the parties fully co-operate with UNFICYP in keeping intact the military *status quo* in this respect.

194. Another serious problem exists in connexion with the situation in the northern sector of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots still living in that area. Here UNFICYP has had special difficulties in exercising the freedom of movement which is a necessary prerequisite for the carrying out of its responsibilities. Undisturbed, free and normal access for UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots habitations has not been fully achieved, and this hampers its humanitarian activities and also has a detrimental effect on the efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to a just and lasting settlement.

195. UNFICYP's operational problems are of course a mere reflection of the complexities in the present overall situation in Cyprus. The difficulties in creating a negotiating process are obvious and must be deeply regretted. The prolonged difficulties in bringing about intercommunal talks under the good offices of the Secretary-General give rise to serious concern. The only way to find a peaceful, stable and just solution of the Cyprus question is through an agreement between the two communities, and the best hope for such a solution is through bilateral intercommunal talks.

196. Sweden does not believe that any lasting solution can be found through one-sided actions by one party or the other. The consequences would almost certainly be counter-actions, increased suffering and tension. The Swedish Government therefore appeals to both parties to resume negotiations under the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, with a view to reaching a settlement which safeguards the legitimate interests of all concerned. In this context, we also hope that it will be possible to resume the talks on the humanitarian problems, in order to achieve relief as soon as possible for the many suffering Cypriots uprooted since the events of 1974.

197. In joining today's Council decision, my delegation is obliged to point to the fact that the UNFICYP reimbursements have run years behind their actual payment schedules, owing to the shortfall in voluntary contributions. Since 1970 the deficit in UNFICYP's budget has increased from \$7.5 million to approximately \$45 million. The growing deficit is causing great concern also to my Government. It is in fact the troop-contributing countries, of which my country is one, which are financing the deficit, besides directly bearing a considerable percentage of the cost themselves. A solution of the problems of reimbursement to the troop-contributing States is therefore a matter of vital importance.

198. I should like on this occasion to express the deep appreciation and gratitude of my Government to Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, the Force Commander, for his distinguished service and very able leadership during a trying period. The Swedish delegation extends its very best wishes to him as he relinquishes his command after several years in the service of the United Nations. I should also like to express to the men and the officers of UNFICYP the Swedish Government's deep appreciation of their outstanding services in a very difficult task.

199. Finally, my delegation wants to express its sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General, as well as to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, for their untiring and devoted work in the cause of finally bringing peace to Cyprus. These thanks also go to the staff supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

200. I should not like to conclude today without expressing, on behalf of the Swedish Government, the deep appreciation of my Government and of the Swedish people to the Secretary-General for the untiring efforts which he is deploying in the search for peace and conciliation in Cyprus and elsewhere. We congratulate him on his re-election; but even more we congratulate the United Nations. We wish him success in his future work and we pledge the continued and unstinted support of the Swedish Government and people for his efforts.

201. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I should like in turn to address a few words to the representative of Sweden.

202. It seems that this is the last time that our colleague from Sweden, Mr. Olaf Rydbeck, has spoken in the Council. I should like to tell him how we have all appreciated his very distinguished participation in the work of the Council during the past two years and how happy we all are to have worked closely together in this body and in the United Nations in general. I should like to wish him every success in his new duties as Ambassador of his country to London.

203. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): Mr. President, as you have been kind enough to address me personally, I should very much like to respond.

204. Not only am I leaving tomorrow but my country is also leaving the Council at the end of the year. This may or may not be the last meeting of the Council for this month but, as you said, this is the last time that I shall appear here. This gives me an opportunity to express my appreciation, as well as that of my collaborators in my delegation, to all members of the Council for the fruitful co-operation and, I dare say, friendship which we have enjoyed with all our colleagues during the past two years. It has been an exceptionally active period and we have faced crucially important questions. For us in the Swedish delegation, the experience of working closely on these matters with other members of the Council—permanent or non-permanent—has been an extremely rewarding one, and we want to thank you, Mr. President, and all our colleagues on the Council for your friendship and co-operation.

205. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like first of all to welcome here at the Security Council table the new representative of France to the United Nations, Mr. Jacques Leprette, and to wish him success in this responsible position. It is with particular satisfaction that we see Mr. Leprette heading the French delegation here in the Security Council, since he is no newcomer to United Nations affairs. We are therefore sure that his knowledge and experience will be useful to the entire Council.

206. I should like to take this opportunity to say how grateful we are to the representative of Sweden to the United Nations, Mr. Rydbeck, who is leaving us, for the useful and constructive contribution which he and his country have made to the work of the Security Council, and we wish him success in his new post.

207. The Security Council has once again been considering the question of extending the mandate of UNFICYP. But this question cannot be considered in isolation from the important political aspects of the Cyprus problem as a whole. For the situation in Cyprus remains complicated and tense.

208. Almost two and one half years have passed since the time when the Republic of Cyprus, an independent, sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, fell victim to flagrant military interference from outside in its internal affairs. The results of that interference are still being felt today. Foreign troops are still stationed on the territory of Cyprus. Far from ceasing, the attempts to partition Cyprus and eliminate the united Cypriot State are being intensified. Certain circles, in disregard of United Nations decisions, are trying to subordinate Cyprus to their own militarist ends and to turn the island into stronghold of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Eastern Mediterranean.

209. As a result of the events that took place in the summer of 1974, the traditional economic and other links between the various parts of the island were disrupted. They have still not been restored. Many thousands of Cypriots have been turned into refugees in their own country. The talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in the island have not led to any tangible results; in fact, they have reached a deadlock.

210. In recent years the Cyprus problem has been repeatedly considered by the United Nations, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Just a month ago the Assembly, by an overwhelming majority, adopted resolution 31/12, in which it reaffirmed its resolutions 3212 (XXIX) and 3395 (XXX) and demanded the urgent implementation of those resolutions.

211. The situation in Cyprus has been repeatedly considered by the Security Council. During the past two and one-half years, the Council has adopted 14 resolutions on Cyprus.

212. These United Nations decisions clearly define the fundamental principles for a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. Above all, this means that there must be respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and resolute opposition to any attempts to partition the island. This means, furthermore, that there must be a speedy withdrawal from the island of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel and that all foreign interference in the affairs of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus must stop. This means that urgent measures must be taken to enable the refugees to return to their homes. This means that the success of the talks between the representatives of the two communities on Cyprus, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, must be ensured, with a view to a political settlement. This means, finally, that there must be an injunction on the interested parties to refrain from any unilateral actions which might aggravate the situation and jeopardize the talks between the two communities, whose outcome—as is particularly stressed in Security Council resolution 360 (1974)—should not be impeded or prejudiced

by the acquisition of advantages resulting from military operations.

213. Unfortunately, it must be noted that, far from being put into practice, those fundamental principles are constantly being violated.

214. The delay in settling the Cyprus crisis and the fact that United Nations decisions on Cyprus have not been implemented are leading to an escalation of the military confrontation on the island and are increasing the alienation between the two communities and exacerbating the tension in that part of the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a situation is intolerable; it cannot be accepted. The Security Council must do everything possible to ensure implementation of the United Nations decisions on Cyprus. That would enhance the authority of the United Nations and would be in keeping with the interests of the Cypriot people, as well as the interests of ensuring international peace and security.

215. The position of the Soviet Union with regard to questions related to a settlement of the Cyprus crisis is clear and consistent. The Soviet Union has always argued, and still argues, that the solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on the principle of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and on the principle that the internal affairs of Cyprus must be decided by the Cypriots themselves, due account being taken of the interests of both communities and without any attempt to impose on the Cypriots from outside decisions that are not their own.

216. An important condition for a lasting settlement is the demilitarization of the island, including the withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of all foreign military bases on the island.

217. The Soviet Union is categorically against attempts to seek a settlement of the Cyprus situation behind the backs of the Cypriot people, in disregard of the United Nations, and in the narrow interests of this or that group of countries or military bloc. The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of the immediate and comprehensive implementation of United Nations decisions on Cyprus.

218. The States Parties to the Warsaw Pact, at the recent meeting of the Political Consultative Committee at Bucharest on 25 and 26 November 1976, came out

firmly in favour of the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the principles I have outlined [see S/12255, annex I]. These principles for the settlement of the Cyprus crisis were also confirmed at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at Colombo. They were confirmed, too, during the debate on the question of Cyprus at the present session of the General Assembly.

219. In the present circumstances, the Soviet proposal for the consideration of the Cyprus problem at a representative international conference within the framework of the United Nations is especially timely. The present deadlock testifies eloquently to the fact that there is no alternative to such a solution if the question of Cyprus is to be approached from the standpoint of the interests of the people of Cyprus, the interests of security in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the aim of easing international tension. The present report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the island testifies to the timeliness of another Soviet proposal as well—namely, the proposal to send to Cyprus a Security Council mission with a view to learning at first hand whether the United Nations decisions are being carried out and, if not, why they are not being carried out.

220. The Soviet delegation was not against extending the mandate of UNFICYP for another six-month period, since it believes that such an extension has the required agreement of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. In this respect, we have in mind the fact that the stationing of the Force in Cyprus will, as in the past, be financed on a voluntary basis.

221. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to stress that the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP does not in itself mean progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. The Security Council should intensify its efforts to put an end to the unjustified delay in the settlement of the Cyprus crisis. It should not countenance any developments that would lead to a further exacerbation of the situation in that part of the world.

The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.

Notes

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 973, p. 287.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings*, 61st meeting, para. 173.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 3475, p. 5.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
