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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

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1909th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 14 April 1976, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1909)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Timor:
Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 384 (1975) (S/12011)

The meeting was called to order at 4.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Timor:

Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of Security Council resolution 384 (1975) (S/12011)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 1908th meeting, I shall now invite the representatives of Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Portugal to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Anwar Sani (Indonesia) and Mr. Galvão Teles (Portugal) took places at the Council table and Mr. Harry (Australia) and Mr. Yango (Philippines) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I should like also to draw attention to document S/12049, which reproduces the text of a letter addressed to me by the representative of Indonesia in which he requests that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. In the light of the similar requests on which the Council took action at its last meeting, I assume the Council wishes to follow the same procedure. Accordingly, I propose, if I hear no objection, that the Council decide to extend this additional invitation as requested.

It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The first speaker is the representative of Indonesia, on whom I now call.

4. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): Mr. President, permit me on behalf of my delegation to thank you and the other members of the Council for allowing us to participate in the deliberations on the item on the agenda. Having had the honour to work with you for two years in the Council during Indonesia's term as a non-permanent member, may I also be permitted to express my conviction that under your guidance the Council will be able to contribute constructively to the solution of the question of East Timor.

5. The Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General [S/12011], to which the report of the Special Representative, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, on his mission to East Timor has been annexed. My delegation would like to express its high appreciation to the Secretary-General for the continued interest he has shown in the East Timor question and the contribution he has made and continues to make towards its solution, and to Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi for the manner in which he endeavoured to execute the task entrusted to him by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 384 (1975). Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi visited East Timor under difficult conditions, including the weather. He arrived during the rainy season, one of the heaviest in recent years, which made communications a nightmare.

6. My delegation agrees with the view that a report on the kind of mission which Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi undertook on behalf of the Council cannot be expected to satisfy everybody. Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi has tried to be as factual as possible, in reporting about his meetings and activities, on what he has heard and seen. The report should be seen as reflecting the prevailing situation in East Timor at that time. The situation in the Territory has evolved during the two months—in fact, nearly three months—since his visit to East Timor.

7. My delegation can support the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in paragraph 8 of his report, in which he says:

“as the parties concerned have expressed their readiness to continue consultations with my Special Representative, I suggest that these consultations

should be continued for the time being on the understanding that any developments will be reported to the Council”.

Of course, Indonesia has its own views with regard to the manner in which the suggestion should be implemented. It remains my delegation's view that the solution to the question of East Timor must be found on the basis of the wishes of the people in the Territory. Therefore, if the suggestion of the Secretary-General is adopted by the Council, consultations with the people in East Timor should be the most important part of the efforts of the Special Representative, as only their views are decisive as to how the remaining stage of the process of decolonization in East Timor should be implemented. Indonesia is certainly available for consultations with Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi any time he considers it useful, but I should like to emphasize that, whereas Indonesia's views are relevant only in the context of the principle of the exercise of the right to self-determination, which Indonesia would like to see exercised in a peaceful and orderly manner, in the first and last instance the views of the people in East Timor remain the decisive factor.

8. It is the intention of my delegation in this statement to restrict itself to the report of the Secretary-General. Indonesia's position with regard to the return of Indonesian volunteers to their respective places of origin and with regard to the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of East Timor is already reflected in the report. My delegation would also like to refer to the statement made by the representative of the Provisional Government of East Timor, Mr. Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, on those important matters [1908th meeting]. I should like to stress, however, that meanwhile the Provisional Government had agreed to allow the armed volunteers to return to their places of origin. I do not want again to elaborate on the justification for the Indonesian presence in East Timor. I explained it at length, during the Council's debates in December. For the rest, the statement of the representative of the Provisional Government has also clarified that position as seen from the point of view of the people and the developments in East Timor itself. I would like only to draw the members' attention to the fact that the Indonesian presence in East Timor was upon the specific request of the large majority of the people, to prevent their liquidation by FRETILIN [*Frente Revolucionária Timor Leste Independente*] armed elements only because they wanted to be integrated with Indonesia. Overwhelming proof of mass murder and atrocities committed by those elements have been provided to the Council by the representative of the Provisional Government.

9. Organized fighting in East Timor has stopped. The Provisional Government is now in control of the Territory, and life is gradually returning to normal. The majority of the former FRETILIN supporters have

returned to their original communities and have declared themselves in support of the Provisional Government, which stands for complete integration with Indonesia. In fact, two former prominent FRETILIN members are now representing the Provisional Government in the present Council debate. It is also our conviction that the process of reconciliation in Timor which has already begun will be accelerated in the atmosphere of normality now prevailing in East Timor. Administrative services have started to function, economic reconstruction has begun, schools have reopened, roads are being rebuilt, and communications re-established. In short, the Territory is returning to normal. In view of the lack of sufficient cadres, Indonesian volunteers are now assisting the Provisional Government in their various efforts to restore normal life in the Territory, in rehabilitation and reconstruction.

10. With regard to the call for “withdrawal”, it would be useful to keep in mind its psychological impact as felt by the people of East Timor. One should not forget that the people consider themselves already Indonesians and their territory an integral part of Indonesia. In their view, the call for withdrawal is unjust, for why should Indonesians be requested to leave what they already consider Indonesian territory, especially if the people of the Territory themselves wish them to remain? Nevertheless, the armed volunteers started to leave the Territory in February 1976.

11. Though organized fighting has stopped, there are still small groups—remnants of FRETILIN armed elements—who had fled to the hills. Their effective number is insignificant. Some of the groups have taken hostages with them, whom they threaten to kill if they are attacked. Their ruthlessness and the fact they are capable of committing atrocious killings have been proved by the hundreds of people they have liquidated in a beastly manner. These vicious criminals are now afraid of the revenge of the people. But as this threat is gradually being neutralized, the Provisional Government and the people of East Timor have decided to allow the armed volunteers to return to their places of origin. As stated by the representative of the Provisional Government, they are already leaving the Territory, and it is expected that the process will be completed within a short time.

12. With regard to the exercise of the right to self-determination, the Indonesian position is clear. It is reflected in paragraph 43 of the Special Representative's report. What is much more important, however, is the position of the Provisional Government of East Timor as communicated by its representative and reported by the Special Representative in paragraph 42 of his report and elaborated by the representative of the Provisional Government in his statement to the Council. As far as the people of East Timor are concerned, in their view they have already formally decided to become independent through complete

integration with the Republic of Indonesia. They now consider themselves as much Indonesian as any Indonesian from any other part of Indonesia and their territory as much part of Indonesia as any other province of Indonesia.

13. I need not remind the Council of Indonesia's contribution to the decolonization process, of its role in the fight to uphold the principle of self-determination, of its support for the fight for independence waged by authentic liberation movements everywhere in the world. The Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955 was an important milestone in the decolonization process; it has been a decisive factor in stimulating and accelerating the struggle for independence everywhere. Indonesia's actions and role, in close co-operation with other non-aligned members of the United Nations, in the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 1514 (XV), and afterwards in the efforts of the Committee of 24¹ for its implementation, are too well known for us to be suspected—even remotely—of denying the exercise of the right to self-determination to the people of East Timor. Indonesia defended its right to self-determination in a bloody revolutionary war waged by its people over the entire length and breadth of the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia has no intention of denying the same right to self-determination to others. I might remind the Council that Indonesia has repeatedly stated that it has no claims on Timor. In this context it can be said that it is the people of East Timor themselves who claim Indonesia as their country.

14. It is because of its respect for the right to self-determination that Indonesia has stated time and again that, though the Indonesian people welcome the decision for integration with Indonesia made by the people of East Timor, we should none the less like to see whether that decision, proclaimed on 30 November 1975, will subsequently be confirmed by the people in the exercise of their right to self-determination. The Indonesian Government will also have to consult the Indonesian Parliament as to whether it accepts the decision for integration of the people of East Timor.

15. It is also the view of the Indonesian Government that the United Nations should be involved during the remaining stage of the decolonization process of East Timor. My delegation is happy to note that the Provisional Government of East Timor has decided to involve the United Nations in the process. My delegation would suggest that the appropriate organ of the United Nations should consult with the representatives of the Provisional Government as to the kind of role the Organization would play during the remaining stage of the decolonization process in East Timor.

16. Meanwhile the few FRETILIN supporters who are now living outside Timor and who have no contact with the people of East Timor have made the most fantastic claims and launched the wildest and most

absurd accusations against Indonesia and the Provisional Government of East Timor—familiar tactics of those who want to hide the facts. I have too much respect for the Council to go into them. Members of the Council have all listened to the statement of the representative of the Provisional Government. In its telegram of 17 March 1976 the Provisional Government invited the Secretary-General, if it is the wish of the Council, to send his Special Representative, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, for a second visit to East Timor. I should like the Council to take particular note that an invitation to visit the Territory has also been extended to the Council and the Committee of 24 by the representative of the Provisional Government in his statement, when he said:

“If the United Nations, this Council or the Committee of 24 desires to send a mission to the Territory to witness the real situation in East Timor, it is welcome to do so. The Provisional Government will do its utmost to facilitate such a visit.” [1908th meeting, para. 154.]

17. To accept that invitation, either by requesting the Secretary-General to have his Special Representative visit East Timor again or by sending a United Nations mission—whichever the Council may prefer—would be the easiest way to find out whether the claims and accusations made by FRETILIN are based upon facts or whether they are all lies fabricated by a handful of self-styled leaders who left East Timor after they had unleashed the tragic fighting in the Territory and who have since lost contact with the people and developments in East Timor. A visit by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or by a United Nations mission would provide the opportunity to obtain first-hand knowledge of the real situation in the Territory and of the wishes of its people.

18. Before I conclude, allow me to reply briefly to the statement made by the representative of Portugal at the previous meeting.

19. I shall not reply in detail to his statement, as the various accusations have been answered by the representative of the Provisional Government of East Timor in his statement at the same meeting and in the earlier part of my own statement. We have stated our views with regard to the return of Indonesian volunteers to their places of origin; we have explained our position with regard to the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of East Timor. Also, the matter of the 23 Portuguese detainees has been explained by the representative of the Provisional Government in his statement.

20. I should like to inform the Council that, upon instructions of my Government, I have been the intermediary for an informal meeting between an emissary of the Portuguese Government and the delegation of the Provisional Government and for

meetings between relatives of the detainees and the delegation. These meetings took place recently in New York.

21. It had originally been my intention to restrict my statement to the report of the Secretary-General and not to engage in any kind of acrimonious contest with the representative of Portugal or, for that matter, with any other delegation. I thought that in that way my delegation would be able to contribute positively to the Council's deliberations. However, the representative of Portugal left me no alternative but to oblige him, however reluctantly and with the maximum of restraint.

22. I am not surprised that the representative of Portugal tried to the best of his ability to whitewash the ignominious role that his Government played in the tragedy that befell the people of East Timor—in fact, I can appreciate his efforts. But I could not fail to be dismayed when in this Council he adopted a holier-than-thou attitude as he tried to present Portugal as the perfect innocent, as a paragon of colonial decency and uprightness, while blaming others for the tragic developments that Portugal itself has kindled in Timor.

23. The representative of Portugal seems to forget that Portugal absconded from Timor and from its responsibilities as the administering Power, a status which he continues to claim for his country. But if Portugal claims that it is still the administering Power it will also have to accept the responsibilities inherent in that status. It surely cannot be excused from those responsibilities just by running away from them, by allowing hell to break loose in the Territory under its administration. If Portugal insists upon its status as the administering Power, as it does, then by the same token it should accept the blame for being so blatantly negligent in its responsibilities towards the people of East Timor. By running away it cannot wash its hands in innocence. It would not have been necessary now for Portugal to condemn all the crimes and atrocities of which the people of Timor have been victim if it had lived up to its responsibilities as administering Power and acted to prevent them rather than running away. Portugal, in my view, remains responsible for what has happened in Timor.

24. The representative of Portugal reminded the Council that his country has already given the international community sufficient proof of its impartiality, sincerity and determination in the difficult task of decolonization, which it has endeavoured to complete successfully. Indonesia sincerely welcomed the Portuguese change of heart, though in justice to the liberation movements in the former Portuguese colonies we believe that the gallant fight and the successes of those movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau against the Portuguese colonial troops are not entirely irrelevant to that change of heart. In fact, the successes of the liberation movements were one of the most important factors, if not the decisive factor,

in the Portuguese change of heart. But whatever the reasons, we are glad that Portugal has decided to break with its colonial past. That is why Indonesia was prepared to co-operate with Portugal in facing the Timor question. However, our efforts did not seem to be acceptable to Portugal. In the early stages we were ready to send ships with food to Dili, but Portugal would not co-operate. We had also offered to evacuate the Governor, Colonel Lemos Pires. This offer was politely put aside by the Portuguese. We continued, however, to maintain contact with the Portuguese and tried to co-operate with them until they decided to break diplomatic relations and to accuse us before this Council. In any case, we wish that Portugal had done a better job in East Timor.

25. Portugal has reminded the Council that it is still the administering Power in East Timor. At the same time, the people of East Timor, both those supporting the Provisional Government and the remaining adherents of FRETILIN, as we have also heard here, categorically refused to recognize Portugal as such. It is this reality which, in our view, will have to be taken into account by the Council as it tries to contribute constructively to the solution of the East Timorese question.

26. I should like to reiterate the assurance of my Government that it will continue to do its best to co-operate as far as possible with the United Nations, always taking into account the wishes of the people of East Timor and the existing realities in the Territory. In conclusion, allow me, Mr. President, to express once again the earnest hope of my delegation that the Council under your wise and able guidance will indeed be able to contribute constructively to the remaining stage of the decolonization process in East Timor in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory.

27. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of Australia. I therefore invite him to take his place at the Council table and to make his statement.

28. Mr. HARRY (Australia): Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to address the Council once again on the subject of East Timor, and I wish to assure you, Sir, of my delegation's desire to co-operate fully with you in the Council's efforts to find a solution to this question.

29. We likewise welcome the reports of the Secretary-General and of Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, and I wish on behalf of my Government to congratulate the latter on the task he performed under the terms of resolution 384 (1975). His report is a significant addition to our knowledge of the situation in East Timor.

30. The Secretary-General and his Special Representative were both in Australia at the beginning of

February. As a result, they each have gained an appreciation of the intense Australian public interest in the Timor question. Indeed, the events as they have unfolded in East Timor since the middle of last year have caused deep public distress in my country. My Government feels keenly the need for peace in the Territory and for progress and prosperity for its people.

31. The Special Representative expended much effort in his endeavours over a period of some weeks to determine the views of the parties and to promote the conditions necessary for the parties to discuss differences among themselves. His task was not always easy, but he clearly went to great lengths, in the face of considerable difficulties, to establish comprehensive contacts with the various parties and Governments as required under the terms of his mandate.

32. The Indonesian Government assisted with the Special Representative's visit to Dili, whence he travelled to areas of Timor administered by the "Provisional Government of East Timor". While in Dili, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi was able to have discussions with members of all parties which have decided to join the "Provisional Government".

33. In response to his request, the Australian Government was pleased to welcome Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi in Darwin, where he attempted to arrange a visit to FRETILIN-held areas. But while he was able to meet FRETILIN representatives at several places in the course of his mission, including Darwin, he was unable to reach FRETILIN-held areas in Timor. This was a matter of regret to my Government, which, contrary to some suggestions which have been made, agreed to provide the Special Representative with facilities to assist him to establish contact with the FRETILIN forces in Timor.

34. We do not regard his mission as being necessarily finished. The Special Representative has been able to clarify the positions of the parties on the spot with respect to the future of East Timor. Clearly there remain great differences between them as to how the situation in the Territory should develop and as to how the people should express their views. The Special Representative, however, senses that despite these differences there is some common desire for further consultations, and the Secretary-General has proposed that time should be allowed for the Special Representative to continue these consultations.

35. The Special Representative has also spoken of the situation in the Territory as continuing to evolve. This would suggest that there is still a requirement for information on developments there. A further visit to Timor by the Special Representative could help in this regard. We note from Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi's report that the "Provisional Government of East Timor" has invited him to make a further visit to

East Timor, and we welcome their assurances that he would be able to visit areas to which he had not been able to travel on his earlier visit to the Territory.

36. The Australian position on the Timor conflict has been clearly stated. It accords with the resolutions adopted in December by the General Assembly [3485 (XXX)] and by the Security Council [384 (1975)]. We support the main thrust of both resolutions, notably their call for a withdrawal of outside forces and a process by which the people of East Timor can determine their own future.

37. We were glad to read in the official statement issued by the Indonesian Government in Djakarta on 20 March that the "Provisional Government" had notified Indonesia that it would shortly be repatriating some of the Indonesian forces from the Territory. It appears, moreover, that some may already have returned to Indonesia—and we have just heard a statement in this connexion by the representative of Indonesia. Australia welcomes these developments, and we look forward to further moves in this direction in line with our policy of seeking the withdrawal of all outside forces.

38. In my last statement to the Council on East Timor [1865th meeting] I emphasized that the Australian Government and people were most conscious that a stable settlement in East Timor could rest only on the free choice by the people concerned. It remains the firm policy of the Australian Government that the people of the Territory should exercise freely and effectively their right to self-determination, and, if their decision is to have any validity, it must be made in the full knowledge of the alternatives from which they are to make their choice. My Government does not, however, presume to lay down any precise formula or modalities for self-determination. We should prefer to respond to the wishes of the Timorese people themselves as to the best means by which they might genuinely exercise their right of self-determination.

39. We note from the Special Representative's report that the parties principally concerned are also agreed on the need for United Nations involvement in self-determination in the Territory. While we recognize that the question of United Nations assistance in this area would need to be subject to separate consideration and examination, we nevertheless believe that some form of United Nations participation would be appropriate, desirable and in the best interests of the parties concerned.

40. We have noted the remarks of the representatives of the "Provisional Government" and their proposals for self-determination in the Territory. At first glance these proposals would appear to bear some relation to an earlier programme of decolonization announced by the Government of Portugal. While we believe they are interesting and deserve further study, there would

be a need to ensure that the election of a people's assembly or parliament was conducted in such a manner as would allow the people of East Timor freely to express their views.

41. The Australian Government continues to regard as important an early resumption of international humanitarian aid to the Territory. The conflict has brought hardship and suffering to much of the population. We appreciate the work of the Indonesian Red Cross, but this is a task in which others, including, of course, the International Red Cross, would be glad to participate. Australia has already provided humanitarian assistance not only within East Timor itself but also to the Timorese who last year took refuge in Indonesian Timor. Australia remains ready to contribute again to humanitarian aid for East Timor.

42. Our wish is to see an end to the suffering in Timor and to encourage all moves designed to resolve the conflict. It appears that, although the situation in the Territory has evolved since the Council last considered the question, some fighting may be continuing there. We believe that the Council's best course at this stage would be to extend the mandate of the Special Representative to allow him to make a second visit to the Territory to assess the situation afresh and to ascertain the prospects for consultations among the parties. Out of his renewed efforts, we would also hope to get a clearer picture of the means by which the people of the Territory may freely and effectively express their choice about their future.

43. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of the Philippines, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

44. Mr. YANGO (Philippines): Mr. President, allow me to begin by expressing my delegation's congratulations to you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Council for the month of April and to thank you and the other members for allowing my delegation to participate in this important debate. In view of the warm relations between our two countries, marked by our recent initiation of diplomatic relations, it gives my delegation particular pleasure to see you presiding over the Council's deliberations. I am confident that under the skilled leadership of so distinguished a statesman as you, the Council will be able to deal successfully with the questions which confront it. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Boya of Benin, for his leadership of the Council during the eventful month of March.

45. As a founding Member of the United Nations, the Philippines has from the beginning consistently supported the sacred right of colonial countries and peoples to self-determination. My Government has steadfastly supported the implementation of this process throughout the world as it is embodied in

resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) since the adoption of these historic decisions by the General Assembly more than 15 years ago. It is in the context of this firm commitment to the principles of decolonization, and in the hope of making a contribution, however modest, to the peaceful resolution of the question of Timor, that my delegation has asked to be allowed to participate in this debate.

46. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate the position of the Government of the Philippines with regard to that question. As my delegation stated during the debate on agenda item 88, "Question of Territories under Portuguese administration", in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 11 December last year,² the Philippines unalterably supports the exercise of the sacred right to self-determination by the people of East Timor. My Government also supports the idea of a United Nations presence in the Territory in order to determine that the people does in fact exercise that right. Finally, the Philippines strongly believes that the process of self-determination in the Territory must take place in a manner consonant with the wishes expressed by the people of East Timor. My delegation believes also that the solution to the question of Timor should not only contribute to the enhancement of stability, peace and security in the region in the interests of the peoples of Timor and South East Asia but should also uphold the fundamental principles of the Charter.

47. In that light, my delegation has noted with appreciation the stand taken by the Indonesian Government on the question of East Timor, as enunciated by Ambassador Anwar Sani and other members of his delegation on various occasions, that Indonesia supports the exercise of self-determination by the people of East Timor, that it has no intention of attempting to impose any solution on them, and that it hopes that the United Nations will participate in the process of decolonization in the Territory. That is in keeping with its record of support for decolonization during its many years of membership in the United Nations, as attested by its active membership in the Committee of 24,¹ in the United Nations Council for Namibia, and, together with my country, in the Special Committee against *Apartheid*.

48. It is relevant to recall that Indonesia entered East Timor at the request of those parties representing the majority of the East Timorese and did so only after efforts to find a peaceful solution to the strife in the Territory had failed. The Council must recognize that Indonesia, no less than other countries in other regions, has an interest in and concern for the security and stability of South East Asia. Be that as it may, my Government welcomes the fact that peace and order have been largely restored in the Territory and that Indonesian volunteer forces have begun the process of withdrawal from East Timor with the consent of its Provisional Government. My delegation cannot fail to note that the people of East Timor have expressed

the wish through the four parties—APODETI [*Associação Popular Democrática Timorense*], UDT [*União Democrática de Timor*], KOTA [*Klibur Oan Timor Aswain*] and Trabalhista—to be integrated with Indonesia and that Indonesia has refused to accede to their request except in so far as the people of East Timor themselves shall have expressed their wishes in a formal act of self-determination. To our mind, that action on the part of Indonesia attests to its goodwill and desire to co-operate with the United Nations. The establishment of the Provisional Government of East Timor should facilitate that expression of the popular will.

49. The report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, annexed to document S/12011, testifies to the effectiveness of the Provisional Government in restoring services to the people and to the substantial amount of aid given by Indonesia to promote this vital task.

50. My delegation appreciates the objectivity with which Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi approached his task and the problems that he faced as a result of weather conditions and communications difficulties. We note that all the parties concerned are agreed on the need to consult the people of East Timor on their future political status. The differences apparently stem from the means of determining the wishes of the people. Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi himself said, in paragraph 44 of his report, that there is a "common assumption that the people of East Timor should be consulted on the future status of the Territory". My delegation believes, in this connexion, that the modalities of the act of self-determination should also take into account the wishes of the people, paying particular attention to the existing socio-cultural institutions in the Territory. Statesmanship and patient negotiations could do much towards reaching an agreed solution.

51. My delegation has noted with appreciation the action taken by the Provisional Government in inviting a mission from the Security Council or the Committee of 24 to examine conditions in the island. The invitation was reiterated by the chairman of the delegation of the Provisional Government of East Timor, Mr. Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, in his statement to the Council [*1908th meeting*]. This is yet another proof that the Provisional Government desires to have its actions and decisions scrutinized by the international community.

52. My delegation believes that the members of the Council should note that the international community itself recognized the unusual nature of the East Timor situation during the General Assembly's debate and vote on the draft resolution that became resolution 3485 (XXX). In consequence, the vote itself, 72 to 10, with 43 abstentions, revealed that many nations felt the provisions of the resolution were not entirely appropriate to the conditions existing in the Territory. My delegation submits that subsequent events have

demonstrated that many of the fears expressed by those who voted in favour of the resolution in December were in fact unfounded and that the process of decolonization is proceeding in a manner eminently suited to the needs and desires of the people of East Timor.

53. The concern of the Philippines over the question of East Timor has been brought about by considerations of a common geography and history of colonial rule and above all by reason of goodwill for a neighbouring people for whose future development and progress the people and Government of the Philippines entertain the most cordial good wishes. It is our earnest hope that the people of Timor will be enabled to embark upon a political future which they themselves have chosen and that they will decide what is best for themselves without undesirable outside interference or pressure or influence. Such a course of development will be in full accord with the provisions of the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

54. My Government strongly reaffirms its support for the principles of the historic Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, hosted by Indonesia. At that Conference, it will be recalled, the emerging newly independent countries of the third world enunciated a number of precepts which were to form the foundation of the non-aligned movement. Among those precepts was the declaration of non-interference in the affairs of others and, implicitly, the acceptance of the idea that consideration should be given to regional interests in the solution of questions which are primarily regional in nature. The acceptance of that principle by the international community as a whole has promoted peace and security throughout the world and has greatly facilitated the work of the United Nations itself.

55. It is in the light of those considerations that the Philippines has carefully observed Indonesia's conduct during the developments in the Timor situation. My Government has no doubt that throughout this process Indonesia's actions have been motivated by a scrupulous regard for the wishes of the people of East Timor and for the opinions of the international community. Indonesia has exercised its responsibility with objectivity and, in doing so, has contributed to the solution of the problem of East Timor and to the promotion of the peace and security of the region, in which the Philippines has a vital interest.

56. In conclusion, my delegation expresses the hope that the Council will take into account the goodwill expressed by the chairman of the delegation of the Provisional Government of East Timor in extending an invitation to the Council or the Special Committee on decolonization¹ to visit East Timor for a factual assessment of the conditions there. My delegation, cognizant of the inalienable right to self-determination of the people of East Timor, whole-heartedly supports that proposal.

57. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): It will be recalled that the Council agreed at its 1908th meeting to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Ken Fry, as requested in document S/12047. As Mr. Fry is the next speaker on my list, I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to address the Council.

58. Mr. FRY: Mr. President, members of the Security Council: I thank you for your courtesy in allowing me to address the Security Council on the difficult problems confronting the people of East Timor. I came to New York from Australia at the request of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, but I present my views to the Council as an independent observer who has followed the events in Timor with a great deal of interest and, I must say, with a great deal of sadness at what has taken place.

59. In my search for the truth of what was happening in Timor—and I must emphasize how elusive the truth can be from a distance—I and some of my colleagues from the Australian Parliament visited East Timor twice during 1975: the first time in March, during the period of the coalition between FRETILIN and UDT; and then, on the second occasion, in mid-September, when FRETILIN was firmly in control, following the abortive UDT show of force in August.

60. Whilst my views are those of an independent observer, I would assure members of the Council that they generally coincide with the views of those of my parliamentary colleagues—over 50 of them—who last week signed a petition to the United Nations calling for the early withdrawal of Indonesian forces from East Timor. The majority of those signing the petition are members of the Australian Labour Party, at present in opposition, but it was also signed by several members of both of the coalition parties of the Government.

61. I would claim, too, that my views would generally coincide with the views of the many private citizens and organizations in Australia that support the cause of the independence of East Timor. These include organizations which have been set up in every state in the Commonwealth for this specific purpose, as well as church and overseas aid organizations. It includes the Australian Council of Churches and the Australian Council of Trade Unions, both of which have expressed support for Timorese independence to the United Nations, and I can assure members that there is a growing body of support for the Timorese independence movement amongst the public of Australia.

62. I believe that the Timorese people have been, and in fact continue to be, the victims of a cruel and blatant miscarriage of justice based on a series of misperceptions, bad judgements and misguided, irrational ideological bias. The misperception has been that of Indonesia and other nations of the relative strengths of the political parties which had emerged in East Timor.

There was also a misperception of the determination of the people to resist aggression and to fight for their independence. The bad judgement I refer to was the decision of UDT to stage a show of force following what I believe to be ill-advised encouragement from the Indonesian Government, whilst the irrational ideological bias, I believe, was that shown by Indonesia in its persistent efforts to create a communist bogey out of FRETILIN.

63. It is not possible to get a clear picture of the number of casualties in East Timor, but they are undoubtedly quite extensive as a proportion of the total population, and the conflict in East Timor must be regarded as one of the most sordid, most tragic and most unjustified episodes in the history of modern decolonization.

64. When I first visited East Timor in March 1975 the Portuguese Administration was still in firm control, with officers of the armed forces movement carefully nurturing the orderly development of political parties as a stage in the move towards independence. When we arrived we invited all parties to meet with us publicly and separately to discuss their aims and their aspirations. We had responses from three parties only, and I believe that they were then, and are now, the only three parties with any real measure of support in the Timorese community.

65. At the first meeting we met APODETI, and there were about 50 people present. At the second meeting we met with UDT officials in a hall in Dili, and we had about 150 people present; and our final meeting was with FRETILIN, when there were 4,000 people estimated to be present. These figures for the meetings in Dili gave us an indication of the extent of support for each group, and this was broadly verified by other gatherings at regional centres which various members of our party visited by helicopter.

66. At the conclusion of the meetings the consensus of opinion of our members was that, at a generous estimate, APODETI would have a maximum support of about 5 per cent, UDT would have a support of 10 or 15 per cent, with the overwhelming mass support of at least 80 per cent for FRETILIN. This is as we saw it in East Timor. We agreed, too, that the APODETI and UDT support, although relatively small, represented powerful minorities—property owners, commercial interests and top administrators—who, naturally, had a vested interest in maintaining a relatively privileged status in the community.

67. At that stage FRETILIN and UDT were working in coalition, as they were both advocates of independence, and they differed only on the question of timing and on the nature of the future relationship with Portugal. It was the breakdown of this coalition which ultimately led to civil war.

68. In view of Indonesia's well articulated hostility to FRETILIN and the fact that the breaking of the

coalition and the abortive UDT show of force followed soon after a visit of UDT leaders to Djakarta, it was generally assumed that Indonesia was largely responsible for this ill-advised decision to stage the coup. This was later confirmed when we interviewed UDT leaders who were held prisoner in hospital in Dili during our second visit.

69. During our first visit to East Timor we particularly sought evidence to support Indonesia's claim that FRETILIN was, in fact, a communist or Marxist Party. No such evidence was forthcoming, and the lack of support on the ground for FRETILIN from any other country in the subsequent fighting, apart from limited humanitarian aid through normal channels, gives the lie to these allegations.

70. I again visited Timor with two parliamentary colleagues in mid-September of 1975, soon after FRETILIN had taken control following the abortive show of force by UDT. I understand that the report on that visit may have been seen by members of this Council, and I would merely reiterate briefly that we visited four widely separated centres of our own choice by chartered aircraft and inspected prisoners at Dili, Baucau, and Viqueque. Wherever we went FRETILIN was in full control and there was not the slightest evidence of continued conflict. We were completely satisfied that there was not, in fact, any civil war taking place in East Timor in mid-September 1975. The only conflict was in minor border clashes with forces operating from West Timor, near Batugade.

71. We found the FRETILIN administration to be responsible and moderate, and it obviously enjoyed strong support from the East Timorese people. The prisoners were being well cared for, and it is worth noting that the prisoners included some FRETILIN supporters who had been apprehended for breaches of discipline. The FRETILIN member with whom we travelled always impressed on the gatherings and on his troops the need for discipline, claiming that independence was more important than revenge.

72. Although the FRETILIN administration faced serious supply and economic problems, order had been restored and the people were going back to the villages to tend their crops. The civil war had ended, and there was no need or justification for Indonesian intervention to restore order. Like all other Australians who visited Portuguese Timor during this period, I came away full of admiration for the Central Committee of FRETILIN. I was tremendously impressed by their moderation, by their integrity and by their intelligence in dealing with a very difficult situation.

73. I wish to comment briefly on the elusive question of casualties. From my inquiries and observations during the September visit I was satisfied that about 400 people had died in Dili and possibly up to 1,500 in other areas during the two phases of the civil war. Even at that stage the presence of mass graves was

known to International Red Cross and other aid personnel in East Timor. They were believed to contain the bodies of victims from both sides of the conflict. With the Indonesian reports of more recent mass graves, there is no evidence whatever to show whether they in fact died by Indonesian or FRETILIN bullets. With regard to the Provisional Government's brochure, which many members may have seen, it should be noted that some of the victims listed as being killed or missing are reported to be still alive, and it should be noted also that many names are said to be misspelt, which, I suggest, casts serious doubt on the credibility of that publication.

74. Lopes da Cruz told a news conference on 12 February 1976 that 50,000 to 60,000 people had been victims of the fighting and added, "Excesses often occur now as revenge for FRETILIN cruelty". Indonesian sources later claimed that the figure of 50,000 to 60,000 included 40,000 refugees, but soon after that statement Lopes da Cruz again repeated the original figures, claiming that 50,000 to 60,000 people had been murdered by FRETILIN, without making any reference to refugees. There have also been a number of press reports from Djakarta that some particular units of the Indonesian army have been withdrawn from East Timor because of excesses in the field of battle.

75. I should like briefly to refer to statements made by Mr. Syddell. I never met Mr. Syddell when I went to East Timor, but some of my colleagues did. At that stage he was bitterly opposed to Indonesian interest and concern with East Timor. My colleagues say that he never impressed them as a reliable or satisfactory witness. He was certainly not in a position to follow or to judge events from his isolated situation under house arrest. He appears to be a person with a vested interest in the attainment of Indonesia's objectives, and I believe he is merely repeating information fed to him from Indonesian sources.

76. In the limited war there were undoubtedly excesses on both sides, but in considering the casualties it should not be forgotten that UDT started the bloodletting, not FRETILIN. In this situation there were bound to be reprisals before FRETILIN established full control and enforced a strict discipline. After the Indonesian invasion, there would have been no point in indiscriminate killing by FRETILIN, when they needed the good will and support of the ordinary people to survive against vastly superior Indonesian forces.

77. I should like to mention that I was able to bring to New York a film of the conflict around Balibo. This film was taken by an Australian television news crew, all of whom were killed shortly after it was made. The film is available to the Council to use at it sees fit.

78. From my observations during my two visits, five most important points emerged. First, I am convinced

there has been a serious and persistent misperception of the strength of the mass support for FRETILIN. There has also been misperception of the strong desire for independence by the large majority of the East Timorese people. Secondly, I believe that this misperception led to grave errors of judgement by Indonesia, by UDT and by APODETI, and possibly by other nations, in assessing their attitudes towards the conflict. Thirdly, the civil war was started by UDT and some APODETI supporters and encouraged by Indonesia. It was not started by FRETILIN. Fourthly, there was no civil war in progress after mid-September 1975, when Indonesian forces began their aggression in the border areas. Fifthly, the Provisional Government of East Timor does not represent the will of the majority of people in East Timor. It represents majority groups that are concerned with protecting their own vested interests rather than the long-term interests of the Timorese people as a whole.

79. So much for the past, but today we are more concerned for the future of East Timor. If the Indonesians withdraw and leave the present Provisional Government in charge, I have no doubt that further bloodshed will take place, because that Government does not represent the people.

80. I would hope that the Council might consider setting up an alternative administration assisted by representatives of the three main parties for the purpose of carrying out a genuine act of self-determination, to be followed in due course by democratic elections.

81. I believe very strongly that without Indonesian interference there is room for reconciliation between the various groups under the auspices of the United Nations. I am not able to speak on behalf of the Australian Government, but I am confident that if a stable situation were established by the United Nations there would be very prompt and very substantial support from Australia to help our near neighbours on the road back to recovery and to the orderly development of their country.

82. I come to the Council as an individual citizen in the hope that even at this late stage the members will see the gross injustice of the East Timorese episode and that they will not stand by and see a virtually defenceless and small nation brutally crushed by an irrational and misguided aggressive neighbour without any real justification.

83. I appeal to Indonesia to pull back its troops and to recall its own early struggle for Indonesian independence and national liberation.

84. If there is to be any hope for the virtues of right against might, I appeal to you with all the sincerity at my disposal to have the courage to see that justice is done for the people of East Timor who, even now as we speak, are fighting and dying for their independence and national liberation.

85. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is Mr. Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite Mr. Gonçalves to take a place at the Council table and to make an additional statement.

86. Mr. GONÇALVES: I have asked to speak again in reply.

87. In his statement to the Council [1908th meeting] Mr. Horta made a number of wild and extravagant charges concerning developments in East Timor. While for the most part they are so absurd that they do not require refutation, my delegation would not wish its silence on these matters to be taken as agreement with Mr. Horta's contentions. Accordingly, I wish to reply to certain of his allegations.

88. To begin with, Mr. Horta has accused the volunteers of having resorted to chemical and biological warfare, including the dropping of napalm on villages and of biological bombs in the region of Los Palos. It is well known that only big Powers can afford the great investment necessary to produce chemical and biological weapons. It is therefore absurd to accuse Indonesia, with its very limited resources, of having employed such weapons.

89. As for the situation in East Timor, I should like to state here that the Provisional Government will fully co-operate should the Council deem it necessary to send an expert to determine the truth of Mr. Horta's accusations, on the understanding that Mr. Horta will provide more details concerning where these weapons are supposed to have been used. I understand that an expert should be able to detect the traces left by the use of napalm and chemical and biological weapons.

90. Mr. Horta has also alleged that "the Indonesian blockade has prevented any medical help, food-stuffs or other humanitarian assistance from reaching our people" [*ibid.*, para. 27]. In so far as Indonesia's actions are concerned, we can only say that the people of East Timor are very grateful for what the Indonesian people gave us when they were requested to help. The world knows that the Indonesian Government was the only foreign Power to send humanitarian aid in the form of medical personnel and supplies, food and other necessities to the refugees and victims of FRETILIN terrorism. At this very moment, thousands of Indonesian volunteers are active in East Timor. Doctors, nurses and teachers, and technicians to repair bridges, roads, irrigation systems, communications and airports and to assist in the promotion of urban and rural development, the construction of low-cost homes and school buildings and so on—all have been sent. Their presence has become necessary because of the characteristic legacy of colonialism—the total lack of education and the absence of skilled personnel. Under the Portuguese régime, men had to be brought from Portugal even to keep the water running. When

FRETILIN was in power they once or twice received medical supplies from Australia. What did they do with this aid? They sold part of the supplies, worth at least \$2,000, to a Chinese merchant in Baucau named Vong Vun Fi for a mere \$200.

91. Concerning the mass graves discovered in East Timor, Mr. Horta stated, "After killing hundreds of people and throwing them in common graves, they made a film of it and presented it as a FRETILIN atrocity." [*Ibid.*, para. 30.] My delegation has delivered to the Secretariat the film in question and photographs of the mass graves as documentation for the Council. I hope that the members of the Council would take the brief time necessary—only 6 minutes—to view the film so that they can ascertain for themselves the truth of Mr. Horta's charges.

92. It is unfortunate that Mr. Horta found it necessary in his statement to slander Mr. Arnaldo Araujo, the head of our Provisional Government. Everyone in Timor knows that Mr. Araujo did not collaborate with the Allies against the Japanese during the Second World War, as did many other leaders of the people elsewhere in Asia. The colonial peoples of that time looked upon Japan as their liberator and ally against their European oppressors. Mr. Horta's record itself does not stand comparison with Mr. Araujo's, for Mr. Horta himself was a paid informer of the Portuguese secret police. Many Timorese seeking freedom from colonial rule were thrown into prison because of his activities. As for Mr. Araujo's escape from death at the hands of FRETILIN, it occurred during the attack on Dili as his captors were attempting to transfer him secretly from Dili to join other hostages held elsewhere. In the confusion caused by the attack of the joint forces on the capital, he managed to escape. If he had not, he would have received the same treatment as did his son and the rest of his unfortunate countrymen massacred by FRETILIN.

93. Among those still listed as missing is indeed Mr. Arsenio Horta, the brother of José Ramos Horta. I can easily understand Mr. Horta's concern for his brother, but there is no need for him to tell lies and to cover up his brother's activities. Arsenio Horta was an active member of the joint forces and fought bravely in many engagements with them against FRETILIN. He was captured by FRETILIN in September 1975 at Maubara and put into prison in Dili. He was among the many prisoners of FRETILIN who were secretly transferred from Dili to the countryside before the capital was liberated by the joint forces. Unfortunately, the Provisional Government has been unable to determine the fate of this young man. We are deeply concerned that he may be one of the many patriots who have fallen victim to the FRETILIN massacres.

94. FRETILIN certainly has a permanent firing squad, or death squad, in their structure. The Provisional Government has never had one. The traditional position of the elderly and of women in our tribal

society is a highly respected one, and we are proud of that. Therefore there is no need for me to burden the Council by responding to the many absurd insinuations of Mr. Horta on that score.

95. In his effort to mislead the Council, Mr. Horta has once again cited a toll of 60,000 dead in East Timor as a result of the civil war. The Provisional Government, in its telegram of 25 March 1976, gave the following clarification:

"The 60,000 victims of the civil war during the last six months since the outbreak of hostilities in the former Portuguese colony, as mentioned by Mr. Lopes da Cruz, was the total number of victims, including the more than 40,000 refugees who had fled from FRETILIN's... high-handed rule of Dili and other places in East Timor." [*S/12041, annex, para. 1.*]

In the early part of the civil war, during which FRETILIN held the upper hand and ruthlessly pursued its opponents, outside observers estimated that 3,000 deaths occurred in addition to the tens of thousands of victims who suffered injuries that were not fatal.

96. In his statement two days ago, Mr. Horta claimed that his party still controls more than 80 per cent of the territory and 95 per cent of the population of East Timor. Mr. Horta evidently likes large figures, but he should not insult the intelligence of Council members. Assuming that the Provisional Government controlled only the towns of Dili, Baucau, Los Palos, Viqueque, Bobonaro, Atabai, Maliana, Liquisa, Ermera, Same, Betano, Ainaro and Aileu, it would control at least 200,000 people—about 30 per cent of the population. How can Mr. Horta claim that 80 per cent of the territory is under his control when he could not point to even one spot where the Special Representative of the Secretary-General could land safely in his effort to contact the FRETILIN leadership?

97. Mr. Horta, who left Dili on 5 December 1975, evidently is suffering from a lack of current information about East Timor. At the present time only a few pockets of desperate FRETILIN remnants remain in remote corners of my country. Mr. Horta should wake up. It is because of these positive developments and the gradual return to normality that the Indonesian volunteers began returning to their homes last February, with more following in March. It is expected that the return of the armed volunteers will be completed within a short time.

98. While I am speaking, I should like to comment on the statement of the representative of Portugal. He mentioned, among other points, that neither our four political parties—UDT, APODETI, KOTA and Trabalhista—who represent the majority of the people of East Timor nor the Provisional Government have the right to ask for assistance from Indonesia. Again, the representative appointed himself to the bench and decided who has rights and who has not.

99. It really hurt my feelings and insulted my dignity as a Timorese when the representative from Portugal stated:

"Portugal has no political, strategic or economic interest as regards Timor, a Territory of which we continue to be the administering Power. Portugal, furthermore, has already given the international community sufficient proof of its impartiality, sincerity and determination in the difficult task of decolonization, which we have endeavoured to complete successfully." [1908th meeting, para. 105.]

That statement obviously shows how treacherous and naïve is the attitude of the present Government in Portugal. If it is true that Portugal does not have any political, strategic or economic interests in East Timor, how was it possible for the Portuguese to remain in East Timor for 500 years, exploiting the people to the utmost? And if the Portuguese were really impartial, why should they support FRETILIN, a party which represented only a small number of the people of East Timor, with arms and munitions? Because of the so-called impartiality of Portugal, thousands of innocent people were slaughtered by the FRETILIN terrorists.

100. What right does he have to speak about the destiny and future of the East Timorese people except in so far as they are his former slaves?

101. Let me tell the representative from Lisbon this: we East Timorese love the Portuguese people and we respect their culture, but please stop trying to teach us what is right and what is wrong. The East Timorese people of today is the product of the Portuguese colonial system. Had the Portuguese taught us differently in the past, East Timor would certainly not be in this chamber today.

102. In my first statement [1908th meeting] I tried to present to the Council the facts, developments and prevailing conditions in East Timor. I explained the relations between the Provisional Government and the Indonesian people. I also communicated the sacred wishes of the majority of the people of East Timor to the Council members. I touched upon the positive developments in the maintenance of peace and security and law and order in East Timor while rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are progressing. I drew the Council's attention to the return of the armed volunteers to their places of origin. This should be seen as a follow-up of the aforementioned developments and as a symbol of our respect for the United Nations. I even mentioned the preparations undertaken by the Provisional Government to facilitate the determination of the future political status of East Timor. I also suggested that the traditional value systems of East Timor be seriously considered by the Council as a modality in the implementation of the exercise of the right of self-determination. Last but not least, I stated the positive response of the Provisional Government

to the suggestion of a second visit of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, if the Council wishes him to make such a visit. In addition, let me repeat that if the United Nations, the Security Council, or the Committee of 24¹ desires to send a mission to the Territory to witness the real situation, they are welcome to do so. The Provisional Government will do its utmost to facilitate the success of such a mission.

103. Let the sun shine in East Timor again!

104. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is Mr. Rex Syddell, to whom the Council agreed, at the outset of this meeting, to extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, as requested in document S/12049. I therefore now invite him to take a place at the Council table in order to address the Council.

105. Mr. SYDDELL: I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for the courtesy extended to me by this body in providing me with an opportunity under rule 39 to supply you with additional current relevant information on the situation in East Timor. In addition to my earlier association of more than 30 years with East Timor, I spent the last three years as a resident of the Territory with formal Portuguese title of residence, until being evacuated for urgent medical treatment on 5 March 1976. Thus, the information I will present to you is only six weeks old.

106. Before reading my statement, I should like to make clear to you that I am here of my own volition as an independent witness to recent developments in the Territory. My expenses and those of my wife, who has accompanied me and is sitting opposite me, are being covered by our respective families. I have come out of retirement resolved to clarify developments in the Territory and to help to obtain international aid for its unfortunate people. Despite most tempting offers from a section of the international press and television for exclusive rights to the account of our experiences, we are determined not to capitalize on human suffering and instead have elected to provide simultaneously an account to the United Nations, the Government of Indonesia and the Government of Australia. My erstwhile compatriot, Mr. Fry, has obviously been speaking from presumption or assumption, since he has not been in Timor since last September. The conclusions he has drawn from such speculation are not consistent with my own observations of conditions in the Territory.

107. I should now like to read my sworn statement without prejudice, duly subscribed to before the competent Australian legal authorities, as is my birthright as an Australian citizen.

108. My initial contact with Timor took place more than 30 years ago. In 1968, at the invitation of the Portuguese Government, I began to make monthly

visits, each of which lasted approximately one week, in connexion with various business interests in the colony. Finally, in 1973 I settled on a 10-hectare plantation at Tutuala, in the Los Palos district at the eastern end of the island, with other holdings totalling 200 hectares spread throughout the whole colony. I lived there for three years with my wife, Jane, spending the period from mid-September to 7 December 1975 under conditions of increasing restriction and living under close house arrest imposed by FRETILIN forces from 7 December until rescued by Indonesian volunteer forces on 23 February 1976. Our house arrest was enforced by a 24-hour armed guard surrounding the property. Our only visitors for two and a half months were FRETILIN officials, who came to hear the morning, afternoon and evening news transmissions by Radio Australia, which I truthfully translated for them in a mixture of Portuguese and the local dialect, they understanding no English. My experiences throughout the Territory have given me a broad familiarity with the social and economic conditions in which the Timorese people live.

109. For those unfamiliar with the Territory, it should be stressed that the Portuguese took no steps at all to develop their colony politically, socially or economically. Although supplies of a major export product, sandalwood, for instance, were exhausted, the Government took no steps to develop further industries, though the high-grade Timorese coffee had the potential for great development as an export product, as did the hardwood industry, copra and conch shells. The Territory's sole useful function from its rulers' point of view has been to serve over the centuries as a penal colony. It thus became a dumping ground for many of Portugal's own civilian and military undesirables. Under these circumstances, the Portuguese naturally felt no compulsion to improve the lot of the people of East Timor.

110. This policy of studied neglect had various serious consequences for the Timorese. Under the colonial régime medical care for the people was virtually non-existent. There were only two private doctors and one dentist in the entire Territory to provide care for a population of 650,000. Other medical staff were available only to the military. Infant mortality ran at a rate of approximately 45 per cent. Nutrition was gravely inadequate for most of the people, who particularly suffered from protein deficiency and its attendant lethargy, and this rendered them susceptible to a number of serious endemic diseases which were allowed to rage uncontrolled. A programme of malaria control was never instituted, for example. Malaria, typhoid fever and tuberculosis carried off thousands annually. During our last six months at Tutuala, my wife and I helped to bury over 400 people who had died of disease, malnutrition and other natural causes.

111. The educational situation was as poor as the medical one. Functional illiteracy runs in excess of 95 per cent of the population. With no *lingua franca*,

with totally different dialects spoken in each separate administrative region, with few schools, no compulsory education requirement, and teachers speaking pidjin Portuguese whose own instructional training in "the three R's" consisted of a 40-days' course instituted less than a decade ago in the provincial regions, it is not surprising that only a handful of people could do more than count to ten or sign their own names.

112. This miserable state of affairs was reflected in the educational attainments of the East Timorese. The Territory has never produced a single professional, in sharp contrast to the situation in Indonesian West Timor, which has produced doctors, lawyers and members of the diplomatic service. In East Timor the highest educational level attained by any native was a vocational school diploma awarded after two years of study at the secondary level.

113. All of this has had predictably serious effects upon Timor and the Timorese. The Territory and its people have remained in a very primitive, isolated state. For example, most do not even know what the United Nations is. Local functionaries, lacking the necessary training, were often incompetent, and the administrative system can only be described as rudimentary and also thoroughly corrupt. This corruption was aggravated by the total failure of the colonial administration to pay its functionaries' salaries for the past two years, though they continued to collect a poll tax on each male between the ages of 18 and 60, amounting to 230 escudos—approximately \$7 Australian—annually. As an example of the widespread administrative incompetence, our local police chief, who had held office for over 20 years, was incapable even of taking a direct census of his district.

114. The traditional tribal system remains the predominant influence in the people's lives. They are very much dependent upon authority figures, ordinarily the tribal chiefs or subchiefs, to make basic decisions for them. Even these men find it difficult to make decisions on unusual or important matters. Such questions often require lengthy discussions and negotiations with their peers. The election of five chiefs from among their number to the legislative-administrative council, for example, required a year's discussion and negotiation.

115. This dependence upon others was also illustrated by the attitude displayed by our workers, who would frequently ask for our advice and constantly required repeated directions, even in dealing with very ordinary matters. They were incapable of following anything but very elementary instructions. Complex operations had to be broken down into the simplest possible steps, and successive steps required successive instructions.

116. In order to realize the rich potential of the Territory it is essential that prompt measures be taken to instil self-reliance and a sense of responsibility in

the people. This alone can repair the damage done by generations of a deliberate colonial policy of suppression, when "a little learning was a dangerous thing" so far as the authorities were concerned and the encouragement of dependence as well as of ignorance was a tool of colonial repression. Even the leaders of FRETILIN summoned us to their district headquarters on two occasions to ask us for help, assistance or advice.

117. It is most important to grasp that the vast majority of these people are virtually incapable of dealing with new situations effectively or understanding matters that are presented to them on an abstract level. They are only used to dealing with the concrete realities of their daily lives. Terms like "democracy" have no meaning for them because those terms are unrelated to their ordinary concerns and activities.

118. The isolated, conservative character of Timorese society has been strongly reinforced by the difficulty of communication between various parts of the Territory. Roads, where they exist at all, are often impassable during the six months of the two wet seasons. From our house at Tutuala to the district seat at Los Palos was a distance of only 30 kilometres, but even in the best weather it took nearly five hours to make the trip. These conditions led to fragmentation of the population, and intense localism as well as suspicion of strangers and new ideas are common characteristics of the Timorese. Many years will be required to change the physical conditions alone, to say nothing of the psychological ones.

119. During the last seven months of our residence in East Timor, we had many opportunities to observe at first hand the way FRETILIN members conducted themselves. In addition to those acts which we personally witnessed, during our two and one half months of close house arrest the FRETILIN officials who visited us daily often boasted of the atrocities they had committed. This was done at least partly to intimidate us and in an attempt to elicit our co-operation. I should add that even during my volunteer service in the Spanish Civil War or my mission to Kenya at the time of the Mau Mau uprising I never witnessed such atrocities, brutalities or inhumanity committed by one group of people against another. FRETILIN groups constantly used the threat of arrest, imprisonment and execution by decapitation to keep the people in line. Those who refused to give the FRETILIN comrade salute were shut up in the local hotel without access to sanitary facilities or bedding, and fed on a diet of maize and water for months at a time. Carlos and Alexio da Fonseca, half brothers of the acting chief, who were employed by us, suffered two months' imprisonment under these conditions. Others, charged with more serious infractions of the rules, were taken to Los Palos, where the Regional Central Committee was empowered to impose more severe sentences, including that of summary execution.

Reports of these executions were made to us both by the relatives of the victims living in Tutuala and by the local FRETILIN officials, who boasted of them on their visits. An example of the type of offence considered serious enough to be dealt with by execution was that of listening to any radio programme not disseminated by FRETILIN through Radio Dili.

120. My wife's and my own experiences when called before the FRETILIN officials also illustrate their methods. On 25 September 1975 we were summoned to Los Palos by an armed guard and brought before the combined committee of the political and military units in the district. The entire garrison, then in excess of 1,000 men, was paraded before us, and attempts were made to convert us to FRETILIN's support. As inducements to join their cause I was offered as much additional land as I wanted gratis throughout the island, financial support, a prominent place in the government of an independent East Timor and other extravagant gifts. As Australian citizens with official Portuguese residency, we replied that we must remain neutral and that we did not recognize the authority of any of the three parties—FRETILIN, UDT or APODETI—then contending for power.

121. It was during that visit to Los Palos that I noticed open cases of small arms and ammunition which we had previously seen unloaded one day at dusk from a fishing vessel in our landing cove in the early part of September. After our rescue we discovered in Baucau that the wood used to manufacture the cases and the stenciling used to mark them were indistinguishable to those of Australian aid crates of drugs and medicines sold by FRETILIN to Vong Vun Fi, a merchant in that town.

122. A week later, the "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces", Rogiero Lobato, expressed a wish to interview me in Los Palos. On the previously stated grounds of neutrality, I declined to meet him.

123. As FRETILIN power began to erode, however, their methods grew harsher. On 10 December, three days after we had been placed under strict house arrest and while I was confined to bed following a heart attack, we were again taken, under heavily armed escort, to Los Palos. That was done in reaction to the landing of Indonesian volunteers in Baucau. The villagers of Tutuala gathered around the vehicles crying and wailing that they had been officially told by the local FRETILIN delegation that my wife and I were being brought to Los Palos "to have our heads cut off". That was not denied to the assembly by Commander Victor of FRETILIN.

124. We were taken to Los Palos through pouring rain in an open truck without protective clothing and went before the Central Committee. Some of those in attendance were unknown to me, but I heard them speaking amongst themselves in Kiswahili and in Spanish, both languages with which I am familiar. They

insisted that we advise them tactically, as their leaders had abandoned them and fled the country the previous week, leaving them without technical instructions, medical supplies or other aid. Despite further threats of reprisal, insults and attempts at intimidation, I refused to co-operate, advising them only to fly a white flag as I had done since 7 December or "to put up the bloody hammer and sickle".

125. On several recent previous occasions at public meetings called in the villages and repeated during the Sunday market days, "Regional President" Alfonso Savio had threatened to execute all prisoners then held by throwing grenades into the area of their confinement upon any advance by Indonesian volunteers toward Los Palos. These prisoners consisted of members of the other parties as well as persons who displayed an unsympathetic, neutral or negative attitude toward FRETILIN and its programme. They were held in the Los Palos gaol, which was part of the military barracks. To our knowledge, there were in excess of 600 people incarcerated there. This count had been taken by the villagers, who had submitted names to us of brothers, father, sons and other relatives gaoled by FRETILIN, in an effort to enlist our help in improving their food and obtaining medical supplies for them from the Red Cross. These persons, including one woman who had walked 50 miles from Baucau to Dili in an effort to obtain milk for her babies, were told that all aid was reserved first for FRETILIN officials and then for their armed forces and supporters, and that none whatsoever would be given to others, however great their need.

126. In anger at the FRETILIN threats and in expectation of imminent execution I insisted that we share the fate of these prisoners and be incarcerated with the others about to die, adding that FRETILIN's treatment of us as neutrals was contrary to international law and that while Australia had given refuge to their leaders who had abandoned them the week before the invasion of Dili, Australia would certainly take reprisals against them if they should harm its subjects. Hearing this, the Committee became divided and, after hours of discussion, decided to send us back to Tutuala under strict house arrest. All fresh water and food were cut off from that time and all visitors were forbidden, on threat of decapitation.

127. We had previously heard that, as its position grew more precarious in other regions, FRETILIN had begun seizing civilian hostages in an attempt to secure its own safety. On 3 February, the day Los Palos itself fell to the volunteer forces, the entire population of Tutuala—approximately 3,000 men, women and children—was forcibly removed to the mountains and remote plateaus by the FRETILIN forces. Despite threats of execution on the spot, we refused to join them, and in their haste and confusion they retreated in panic, sparing us but wantonly destroying all civic property in the village. Now, most of those hostages still remain in the jungle,

without food, without clothing, without medical supplies or housing, in the middle of the wet season, and the condition of those who have survived must now be very, very desperate.

128. This type of behaviour, particularly the killings and the seizure of hostages, aroused tremendous opposition and hatred among the people. It is certain that, left to themselves, the people who suffered under FRETILIN rule would seek revenge for their injuries. The resulting vendettas could literally go on for generations if no outside power capable of restoring law and order was present. Certainly, if Indonesia were to withdraw at this juncture, vicious fighting would break out as the people seek revenge for their murdered brothers, sisters, parents and cousins.

129. The Timorese themselves have shown great fear that they will be abandoned by the Indonesians as they were abandoned by the Portuguese. They know that any such abandonment would lead to a resumption of great civil disorder and that in such an event they would suffer even more greatly than they have already. As we were leaving the Catholic Mission in Los Palos after our rescue, people there clung to us weeping, insisting that we promise to come back. Now, their experiences have left them completely demoralized, confused and broken in mind and in body and in spirit.

130. This demoralization was further aggravated by irresponsible and unfactual reporting by Radio Australia on the situation in Timor. The reporting was so distorted, based as it was on false information fed by FRETILIN to Radio Australia, that people throughout the region turned to the BBC and the German Radio Service for accurate, though delayed, reports via Antara and Reuters. While we will always be grateful to Indonesia for our rescue, in which no lives were lost or casualties incurred, we strongly feel that Indonesia should have taken steps to counteract that false propaganda, thus averting much unnecessary misery and despondency among the people, who would have been helped so much by a little encouragement and the knowledge that they had not been wholly abandoned. They feared that our departure meant the end of the protection that the newly arrived troops provided and that they would be forced to join the other hostages abducted by FRETILIN in the hills.

131. Their feelings towards the Indonesian soldiery were ones of gratitude for saving them from further degradation, depredations and death at the hands of FRETILIN. They do not regard the Indonesians as foreigners, which is not surprising, since there has been considerable intercourse between the two halves of Timor for years. In 1967 the Portuguese virtually abandoned the border posts between the two sections, and this speedily led to a free flow of traffic from one side of the border to the other, which the Indonesians did nothing to impede. There has even been inter-marriage between families from East and West Timor,

and this has strengthened the already important bonds of a common blood and culture which have existed from pre-colonial times.

132. During my entire time in East Timor, I neither saw nor learned of any atrocities, misdemeanours or indiscipline towards the Timorese attributable to the volunteer forces. Indeed, on at least one occasion, I witnessed remarkable restraint on the part of an Indonesian volunteer commander. As we were about to leave Tutuala, some of the hostages who had been driven into the hills attempted to join us. As they descended from the hills, the president of the local FRETILIN delegation rode out of the jungle on his horse, which was well known to us from his previous visits, and waved his sten gun in a menacing fashion at the women and children, forcing them back into the jungle. The commander of the rescuing forces gave orders to his troops to hold their fire, despite having the FRETILIN official in their sights, for fear of injuring many innocent civilians.

133. After being released from house arrest in Tutuala, I had the opportunity to observe conditions in nearly 80 per cent of East Timor, as, accompanied by a doctor, I travelled by light plane and helicopter and talked to people known to me throughout the Territory. I can only say that I have the highest praise for the efforts of the Indonesian Red Cross and the other teams of trained personnel sent in to provide food, medical care, schooling and other vitally needed social services.

134. As a Royal Engineers veteran of the last world war, I am qualified to state that there was no evidence of any large-scale bombardment or any use whatsoever of any chemical or biological methods of warfare—despite contrary reports received via Radio Australia, the only news medium to which we had access during our time in Timor. Instead, progress is clearly being made towards restoring East Timorese society, shattered by months of civil war, and towards building a base from which further progress is now being made. We were impressed with the modern equipment introduced by Indonesia, as well as the buoyancy to be seen at all ages and all levels of the population, from young children on their way to school to their grandparents—and in a country that was too small for revolution and not large enough for war.

135. I feel that I cannot end this statement without commending the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, and his party for the remarkable courage and initiative which they displayed in attempting to discharge their mission in East Timor, and particularly in their many efforts to reach the FRETILIN leaders in our area. Their example also further induced me to lay these facts concerning the plight of the Timorese people before the international community, in the hope that a speedy end may be brought to their needless suffering,

and in the spirit of the principles of humanity which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

136. Having concluded the text of my sworn statement, I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate most emphatically that at no time during our residence in Tutuala or during our enforced visit to Los Palos did either my wife, an internationally trained health professional, or I observe any evidence of the use of chemical or biological methods of warfare. Our attention had been drawn to this question by the broadcasts of Radio Australia, which had reported widespread use of such inhumane weapons in Los Palos and Tutuala on numerous occasions. These broadcasts caused bewilderment among the local FRETILIN militia and Regional Central Committee, as well as widespread alarm, despondency and abject misery amongst the population.

137. With your indulgence, Mr. President, and further to clarify conditions there, I should like to read a brief report on the medical situation in East Timor compiled by my wife at the end of our stay in the Territory—again, less than six weeks ago—on 15 March 1976:

“I am a triple certificated nursing sister with experience gained from working in many countries around the world. For the past three years, I have lived in Tutuala, Los Palos district, having previously travelled over a large proportion of East Timor. I thus had the opportunity to observe closely the medical and health conditions prevailing amongst the people. I feel the facilities available in Timor were definitely inferior to any that I have observed in other parts of the world, including those in under-developed areas of central Africa twenty years ago. On the basis of this experience I feel that I am qualified to express an unbiased opinion on the medical services at present in operation in East Timor.

“First of all you must appreciate that the population are truly primitive, slow to learn and exceedingly suspicious of anything new. The Indonesian Red Cross has made remarkable strides in a short space of time in allaying their fears, remedying their inhumane lack of health facilities which has existed for generations and establishing the foundation of a modern health care system.

“Already in the cities and provincial centres, the hospitals have been refurbished and treatment brought up to the standard of any British or Australian hospital. There are general practitioners and expert physicians and surgeons, with modern X-ray and laboratory equipment; also services equivalent to that of the flying doctor service, with evacuation by helicopter in jungle areas where necessary. All this is available free to both the Indonesian volunteers and the local population equally.

"I was most impressed by all we saw of the Indonesian Red Cross—highly skilled and truly dedicated, one and all. They are already teaching elementary hygiene and first aid in the schools and also providing milk for the schoolchildren. They are taking voluntary workers of all ages to work with them at all times—under constant guidance and supervision. In this way it is hoped that eventually some of the knowledge thus gained will be absorbed back into the villages for the future improvement of health and hygiene. The boy scout and girl guide movement has also been inaugurated for the first time in the history of Timor, with further upgrading of standards in the villages as the ultimate aim.

"The Red Cross clinics are in effect a complete medical service in themselves and really excellently organized—giving free treatment, medicines, vitamins, etc., to all who need them. The staff also have the patience and find the time to instruct each patient in the rudiments of cleanliness, diet, etc., providing soap, milk, food or clothing where necessary, and believe me, I just can't tell you what soap meant to us, having had to wash ourselves, our clothes and our dishes with either lemons or ashes for so long.

"Already the people have medical facilities far in excess of anything received during their many years under Portuguese rule, when only two private doctors and one dentist were available for a population of 650,000. Already the Indonesians"—this was six weeks ago—"have 25 doctors, two dentists and

over 1,000 skilled paramedic personnel, and this number is increasing all the time.

"Who could do better than the Indonesians in providing this service? They are ideally suited ethnically, being blood brothers to the Timorese, and also have past experience of overcoming similar problems in their own country following their occupation by the Portuguese and then the Dutch.

"All sections and grades of staff have had field experience in other disaster areas, including the floods in Bangladesh.

"The Indonesian organization is unique and certainly superior to either the British, Australian or even the International Red Cross, for they truly understand the root of the problem and are relentless in the pursuit of their aims. They are dedicated, patient and compassionate and completely impartial in their treatment of all parties.

"In conclusion, I should like to mention that all aid administered by the Indonesian Red Cross has been paid for by voluntary subscriptions given by the people of Indonesia."

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

Notes

¹ Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Fourth Committee, 2188th meeting.*

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