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THIRTY-FIRST YEAR

1904th MEETING: 30 MARCH 1976 **UN LIBRARY**

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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1904th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 30 March 1976, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Thomas S. BOYA (Benin).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Benin, China, France, Guyana, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Republic, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1904)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Complaint by Kenya, on behalf of the African Group of States at the United Nations, concerning the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola:
Letter dated 10 March 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12007).

The meeting was called to order at 4.35 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complaint by Kenya, on behalf of the African Group of States at the United Nations, concerning the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola:

Letter dated 10 March 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/12007)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with the decisions adopted earlier [1900th to 1903rd meetings], I shall invite the representative of Angola to take a place at the Council table and the representatives of Cuba, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, Guinea, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, the United Republic of Cameroon, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. In accordance with the decision taken at the 1902nd meeting, I shall also invite the President of the

United Nations Council for Namibia and the members of his delegation to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Luvualu (Angola) took a place at the Security Council table and Mr. Alarcón (Cuba), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Neugebauer (German Democratic Republic), Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cissé (Guinea), Mr. Jaipal (India), Mr. Maina (Kenya), Mr. Rabetafika (Madagascar), Mr. Kanté (Mali), Mr. Harriman (Nigeria), Mr. Jaroszek (Poland), Mr. Blyden (Sierra Leone), Mr. Hussen (Somalia), Mr. Allaf (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Mwangaguhunga (Uganda), Mr. Oyono (United Republic of Cameroon), Mr. Petrić (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kamana (Zambia), President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, together with the members of his delegation, took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Furthermore, I should like to inform the Council that I have just received letters from the representatives of Congo, Saudi Arabia and South Africa in which they request to be invited, under Article 31 of the Charter, to participate without the right to vote in the Council's debate. If I hear no objection, I propose, in accordance with the usual practice of the Council and with rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to invite those representatives to participate, without the right to vote, in the debate.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mondjo (Congo), Mr. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. Botha (South Africa) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The first speaker is the representative of Madagascar. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

5. Mr. RABETAFIKA (Madagascar) (*interpretation from French*): Recent weeks have been particularly marked by a new awareness in the countries of the third world of the multifarious manifestations of aggression and occupation, whether in southern Africa or in Palestine. It would have been easy to ignore that by putting forward arguments purporting to be realistic because they support appeasement, without working for the achievement of true peace. That is why

we should like to pay a tribute to the Council, which has not shirked the heavy duties placed upon it by the Charter and which has made it possible to discuss questions which some most willingly would have liked to avoid because of poorly defined interests or perhaps because of interests too well defined to be revealed.

6. This tribute is particularly addressed to you, Mr. President, who in the discharge of your duties have honoured the People's Republic of Benin, Africa and the third world in general, all of us who continue to believe that a world in which justice and law are constantly flouted by those who are too easily made light-headed by power, arrogance and a lack of responsibility would be doomed to destruction.

7. It is perfectly normal for the aggression committed by the racist régime of South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola to be of concern to African countries, because passivity or indifference would only be criminal if it resulted in strengthening the misconception of the South African leaders in believing that they can continue with impunity to trample underfoot the sovereignty of free and independent States of Africa.

8. The position of my delegation with regard to that aggression is well known, because at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly we submitted, together with six friendly delegations, a text¹ under agenda item 53 concerning the policies of *apartheid* of the Pretoria régime. As stipulated in our proposal, the General Assembly was to condemn the direct intervention of the South African armed forces in Angola as a new manifestation of the decision of that régime to pursue and strengthen its policy of domination and racial discrimination in the region, to the detriment of the security of neighbouring African States. The General Assembly was also to call for the immediate withdrawal of South African military and paramilitary personnel, including mercenaries, from the territory of the independent State of Angola.

9. Within the context of events at that time, our action flowed from our concern for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the new Angolan State. Another of our major concerns was the resurgence of the imperialist and capitalist reaction which, mingling with South African expansionism, was exacerbating the already explosive situation throughout southern Africa. It was necessary to doom those retrograde forces to failure, to oppose any consolidation of their position in Namibia, Rhodesia, Azania and the independent Angolan territory and finally to denounce them before international public opinion as being the sole and true enemies of Africa.

10. We regret that this initiative, which was founded on such unquestionable bases, was not accepted by the General Assembly. The reason, it will be recalled, was that we rejected any compromise with regard to the condemnation of South African intervention. We were also unwilling—as we still are—to treat

equally the legitimate assistance of socialist countries in their commitment to the African progressive forces and South African adventurism encouraged by Western reactionary forces.

11. Any discussion of that question, that is, the so-called Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola, was neither timely nor justified in the eyes of my delegation. We continue to believe that all the socialist countries are natural allies of Africa in its struggle against exploitation, racism, colonialism and imperialism. Those countries know very well that we shall continue to seek their co-operation at all levels and that the only prior condition that we set is our opposition to the establishment or extension in our region of any sphere of influence on the part of any Power. We also reject any attempt to coerce us to choose our friends and partners for a political expedient that is not our own.

12. It would be wrong to believe that the situation caused by South African aggression against Angola has lost its grave and urgent character since that time. The decision of the Pretoria régime to submit a bill in Parliament which would authorize it to send expeditionary forces to any point in the African continent is directly related to this situation. This holds true for the decision to double the size of its defence forces. We considered those measures when we studied the recent declarations of the racist régime concerning the withdrawal of its troops from Angola.

13. Those declarations are characterized first by a desire to mystify in that the South African racists are trying to convince international public opinion that the aggression they have committed against Angola since 9 August 1975 is justifiable and justified, even if only slightly so. The Pretoria régime was guilty, in our eyes, of a territorial violation, an act which is condemned on the international level and which is fully comparable to the actions of which Hitler was guilty in his time. We cannot agree to have that régime set itself up as a policeman and arrogate to itself the right to interfere as it wishes in the internal affairs of an African State on the false claim that it is re-establishing public order or to interfere without taking into account the true interests of the people involved.

14. These declarations are also distinguished by their misleading character. The explanation given by the Portuguese Government in document S/12023 leaves no doubt whatsoever about the fact that at no time did it request assistance from South Africa to maintain order in Angola and demonstrates that it raised many objections against its illegal intervention in Angolan affairs.

15. What can be gleaned from all of this, if it is not that South Africa has behaved and continues to behave towards Angola with the same impudence that it has already demonstrated in its intervention

in Rhodesia, by its illegal occupation of Namibia and by its repeated attacks on neighbouring African countries?

16. Pretoria is trying as best it can to hide what it is really after in its aggression, and it is succeeding poorly rather than well. To affirm that South African troops occupied the area of the Calueque dam to protect the workers and to preserve the facilities there is in fact a pretext which cannot hold up. One need only to turn to the statement of the representative of the People's Republic of Angola to become convinced of this [1900th meeting]. The operation of the installations at Cunene and Ruacaná will be carried out to benefit the Angolans and the Namibians, and the Angolan leaders are responsible enough to do everything that they can in order to discharge their duties towards the Namibians as brothers and partners in battle.

17. It seems to us, therefore, that we must look at other levels for the true reasons for South African intervention in Angola.

18. Economic considerations surely have considerable weight in this situation. Among them one might mention the existence of sizable South African and Western interests vested not only in the Cunene dam but also throughout all sectors of the Angolan economy. All these investments, it would appear, were imperilled by the change occurring in the Angolan political system. And mention should be made also of the concern to promote the illegal exploitation of Namibia by foreign economic interests to which sufficient water and electricity must be supplied for industrial uses.

19. However important these interests may be, we cannot accept that their defence could in any way enhance respect for the principles of international law. No country, including South Africa itself if it were to make the test, would ever accept that an investment—in which, incidentally it has participated financially—in its territory made by another State could confer upon that State the right to occupy militarily the region in which the investment is found. No State would accept that such an occupation, abusive at the very least, would give the occupier the right to flout the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of the host country. To act otherwise would mean submitting oneself to the worst possible manifestation of fascism according to which there could exist a kind of sovereignty which might be made subject to the sovereignty of those who preach the supremacy of strength and of race.

20. In this case, where no consideration seems to have been given to the permanent sovereignty of the Angolan people over the natural resources of its country, South Africa wishes to place itself in the position of the thief who would himself lay down the conditions in which the stolen goods will be returned. By

this topsy-turvy procedure it perhaps wishes to ensure the recognition of those who have invested in the Cunene dam, obtain some kind of international approval for its pseudo-humanitarian enterprises and draw a curtain of forgetfulness over its act of international banditry, which would thus go unpunished.

21. Political considerations also were not absent from South African concerns. First, what is meaningful is the insistence of the racist régime on obtaining guarantees with regard to the respect for the border of the international Territory of Namibia, the defence of which is to be carried out by a costly and sophisticated system. This demand, which the South Africans are not legally able to make, is particularly astonishing when it is known that the Angolans have declared that they do not wish either to attack or to annex Namibia. In this light, the only plausible explanation would be to say that all this is directed against the liberation movements, particularly SWAPO [*South West Africa People's Organization*], some elements of which have found refuge in Angola. Thus one can satisfy the strategy that the front-line defence of South Africa must be in Angola, or perhaps even on the equator. Secondly, by opposing the taking of power by the MPLA [*Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola*], South Africa had already demonstrated that the scope of its aggression against Angola considerably surpassed the need to defend investments, as it is attempting to do now.

22. To the racist régime of Pretoria the arrival of a progressive régime in Luanda has been perceived as a threat to the system of *apartheid* and exploitation whose foundations are not solid enough to resist the progress of revolutionary ideas of justice and liberty. And because they wished to have a certain viable racial and racist presence in Angola and southern Africa, the South Africans have enmeshed their Western allies, who are always eager to oblige them, in an adventure which included their attempt to establish an Angolan government of their choice, the unhesitating co-operation of which would be necessary to them so that they might use the Angolan people and the resources of the country. Had circumstances permitted, they would not have hesitated to establish in the south of Angola a buffer State, of expatriates and puppets, which might possibly have given them a final solution to the problems posed by the geographic location of the Cunene dam.

23. Finally, South Africa continues today to use the so-called refugees of Cuangar and Calai to manifest a hostile intent vis-à-vis the Government of the People's Republic of Angola. Even when that Government has proclaimed several times its desire to work to promote national reconstruction and reconciliation and when it has said that it will take back into the nation those who have strayed, South Africa for its part continues to make use of these so-called refugees either as hostages or else as subversive elements for the future.

24. One could not too strongly condemn the massacres and the acts of banditry and gratuitous destruction which only give further factual evidence of the hostile intentions which we have denounced, because even if the South Africans did leave Angola on 27 March, this withdrawal cannot divest them of any reproach or condemnation.

25. We cannot be duped and we do not believe that this withdrawal in itself implies the end of multifarious aggression directed by Pretoria against the new Angolan State. To announce that the South African army is withdrawing from Angola means nothing whatsoever if this army is only stopping on the other side of the border to entrench itself in the international Territory of Namibia, from which it can constantly threaten the People's Republic of Angola and from which it can contribute to strengthening South Africa's illegal presence there. Who can give credence to the commitments of a régime whose hostility towards Africans is well known and which has just demonstrated that it does not hesitate to use lies in order to defend its interests? We must therefore see to it that, as requested by the representative of Angola, the withdrawal is verified by the Security Council.

26. We have listened with great attention to the comments and statements which have been made by Ambassador Luvualu. I am very pleased to welcome him among us as the first representative of the People's Republic of Angola to participate in the work of the Security Council.

27. Our delegation fully associates itself with the request he put forward on behalf of his Government with regard to the withdrawal of South African troops, respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Angola, the return of property and compensation for damages. Circumstances fully justify the adoption of such measures, and if circumstances were not sufficient, the international community as a whole should recognize that when Angola obtained independence it was a country of gigantic economic potential. It could have resolutely committed itself to rapid development if the recent plot of imperialists and capitalists had not succeeded in destroying its economic infrastructure.

28. Angola does have the right to turn to us to ask for guarantees against the renewal or continuation of South African aggression. Angola also has the right to demand compensation from South Africa, the aggressor, even though such compensation cannot wipe away the suffering nor make good the loss of human life, nor teach us to forget the way in which South Africa has affronted the dignity of Africa and of Africans.

29. We hope that those who still believe that aggression ceases to be a matter of concern to the international community once a withdrawal has been

announced will remember the time when some of them were caught up in the redress of crimes which had been perpetrated during the last war. The sense of justice knows no boundaries and cannot be tailored to suit circumstantial considerations, particularly when these are inspired by the preservation of unjustifiable alliances or interests which can only with difficulty be reconciled with the demands of our modern international conscience.

30. At the beginning of my statement I mentioned the sudden awakening of the third world in the face of aggression and occupation. In our view, a veil of modesty should not be drawn across this normal reaction of defence and assertion of natural rights. It is right for us to wait until the sense of responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security outweighs those theses which can be justified only by erroneous understanding of the will of peoples to ensure respect for their rights and their freedom of decision in economic and social spheres.

31. This is the case of Angola which we submit to the Council.

32. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, as President of the Security Council this month you have been fated to perform a difficult task. This is already the third question to be considered in the Council under your leadership. We all hope that this third question will be resolved in the interests of the Angolan people in a constructive manner.

33. At the same time, on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union, I warmly welcome here the delegation of the legitimate Government of the People's Republic of Angola, the only full-fledged and sovereign master of its country. The presence of this delegation in the Security Council and the reliance which it has placed on the discussion of the question shows that it believes in the United Nations. We believe that Angola will become a Member of the United Nations and will make its positive contribution to the work of the Organization.

34. Now, with regard to the substance of the question under consideration, when the question of aid to Angola arose it was in very complicated circumstances. There was the matter of the proclamation of independence. At that time, in August of last year, armed columns from South Africa equipped with tanks and armoured trucks carrying mercenaries were advancing from the south towards Luanda. One had no need of satellites to know this. There were other columns of mercenaries from the north who were supplied and armed by one Power which is now silent about this. This Power, in fact, gave them arms. A critical situation arose. The mercenary forces from the north were very close to the capital, and if anyone has any doubts as to what a mercenary is, he can, if he has any extra money, go to London where the mercenaries

were recruited. But if he does not have any spare money, he can simply take the subway here in New York to the place where he will also find that mercenaries, white mercenaries, are being recruited for the same purpose.

35. In such circumstances the question arose: will Angola be free and independent or will Angola once again become a colony? Will it return to the yoke of colonialism or will it become an independent State? Who could have come to the aid of Angola at that time? Perhaps China? Why did it not do so? Let the representative of China answer. China sent armed mercenaries to Luanda. Perhaps South Africa went to Luanda for that purpose? Nothing of the kind. Everyone knows that it was there in order to prevent the proclamation of the independence of the People's Republic of Angola.

36. Of course, in this complicated and difficult situation our country and all socialist countries could not remain indifferent to the fate of the Angolan people, and not because we had any interests in Angola. There are riches in Angola. There are minerals and oil. But we have more of them at home. There is a coast along the ocean there, but we do not need it. What is there is the Angolan people, and our Government decided really to help this people achieve independence. Another country also helped it, which, unfortunately, the representative of a Power that calls itself a revolutionary Power refers to as "mercenaries". But when I closed my eyes and listened to him, I thought that I saw the headlines of Hsinhua or the newspapers of NATO [*North Atlantic Treaty Organization*], so similar were his words. Then when I looked, I saw that it was in fact the Chinese representative speaking. I can only regret that this came from the Chinese representative.

37. I will now speak on the substance of this question. The Security Council is considering the question of the aggression by South Africa against Angola. There is an announcement that South Africa has allegedly withdrawn its troops from Angola. As has been correctly pointed out, this should be verified, all the more so since these troops were withdrawn not to the territory of South Africa but to the illegally occupied Territory of Namibia, which is in immediate proximity to Angola. At any time these troops could again be used against the People's Republic of Angola. This is what is involved here.

38. So we are talking about the aggression of South Africa, and the question raised by the Group of African States before the Security Council goes far beyond the framework of a local question concerning South Africa. The events in Angola show once again and confirm the criminal role of the leaders and racists of Pretoria who are playing policeman with regard to the people of South Africa. When they went into Angola they were not thinking of defending the hydroelectric project or dams on the rivers neighbouring Namibia.

They went into Angola so that Angola would be no more, so that it would revert to being a colony, so that the different kinds of companies could continue to exploit the wealth of Angola. That is why they went, but that is not the only reason. They went into Angola to use it as a base against neighbouring young, independent African States. One cannot escape that fact. If Angola had not been able to repel this aggression, all Africa would have been in a bad position. We would have been forced to deal for many years to come with the question of the liquidation of colonialism.

39. For many years now, the Pretoria régime has been committing one act of aggression after another against the peoples and States of Africa. Long before the incursion into Angola the South African racists, along with the Portuguese fascists, carried out a bloody struggle in Mozambique against the liberation forces there. They have engaged in such a struggle in Zimbabwe. They have carried on and continue to carry on this struggle in other territories. The Pretoria gendarmes have arrogated to themselves the right to interfere in the affairs of any African people. Members of the Security Council are familiar with the bill now being prepared, and they know that if that bill is adopted, dozens of African States will come into the sphere of activity of South Africa's armed forces. What does that mean? Is this liberation from colonialism? No, this is a serious threat which will have an influence on whether Africa becomes free or the colonialists return to their former territories. That is the issue before us here.

40. That is why South Africa's aggression against Angola was not fortuitous. There could be no basis for such aggression on the part of a country hundreds of miles away from Angola, with no common border with it. We cannot regard Angola's border with Namibia as Angola's border with South Africa, for will we never admit that South Africa has the right to regard Namibia as its territory and its frontiers. The fact of the matter is that the Government of South Africa decided to establish a buffer zone to try to save its régime and its domination of the neighbouring territories.

41. The United Nations cannot in any circumstances agree to a situation in which the Pretoria régime arrogates to itself the right to interfere in the affairs of African countries and peoples. Hence, we cannot agree with those who allege that once South African forces have been withdrawn from Angola—and this is still to be verified—there will be no basis for condemning the aggression by the Pretoria racists against the People's Republic of Angola.

42. In that connexion we support the legitimate demand of the representative of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, as set forth in the Council by Ambassador Luvualu [*1900th meeting*], that the independence and territorial integrity of Angola be guaranteed. South Africa does not have the

right to use the Territory of Namibia as a base for aggression against neighbouring countries. I shall cite only one fact, of which members of the Council are probably already aware: the largest air base in all of Africa has been built in Namibia. Against whom has that base been built? Who is threatening South Africa? Who intends to commit aggression against South Africa? Perhaps my neighbour from Sweden? I do not think so. Perhaps Switzerland wishes to attack South Africa—again, I do not think so. I think that there is something much deeper in all of this. The fact is that, while our country and other socialist countries were helping the people of Angola, struggling for their freedom and independence, the NATO countries were helping not the MPLA but the factional groups, which helped the South African interventionists against Angola. That is the issue. If these bases are being built, they are to be used for aggression, not for security or defence.

43. Bearing all these facts in mind, we resolutely condemn the South African racists for their aggression against Angola and for their use of Namibia for aggression. In their aggression against Angola the South African racists were not alone. It was part of a multifarious alliance of the most reactionary forces in the modern world, which used the services of mercenaries who would kill anyone anywhere in the world for dollars or pounds sterling.

44. The question of mercenaries has been raised during our discussion here. I do not think that the person who used the word “mercenaries” with regard to Cuba is a historian, a philosopher or even a politician. He has a complete misunderstanding of history, philosophy and politics. If persons giving aid to peoples struggling for their freedom are to be called “mercenaries”, then what are we to call the Chinese, who helped Korea at one time? This is utter nonsense. Indeed, to use such slanderous terms in the Security Council in reference to those who really helped the Angolan people in their struggle for freedom and independence, is worse than nonsense.

45. I have said that the South African racists were not alone in committing aggression against the People's Republic of Angola. In the struggle against the people of Angola the neo-colonialists and racists wanted to preserve South Africa's bastion against the young, independent States of southern Africa that are pre-occupied with strengthening their economies and raising their cultural level in order to catch up with the more developed countries. Hence, we resolutely support the demand—and it is a demand, not a request—by the representative of the People's Republic of Angola that his country be compensated for all the harm done to it by this intervention.

46. The Security Council debate has very clearly shown the solidarity with Angola of not only the African countries but also of other Members of the United Nations, which have spoken out unconditionally in favour of an immediate cessation of the aggression against Angola.

47. The General Secretary of our Party, Leonid Brezhnev, said the following about Angola very recently:

“Newly born, this progressive State has become an object of foreign intervention. This is the work of imperialism and of the South African racists, the sworn enemies of the independence of Africa, as well as of those who assumed the distasteful role of being their lackeys. Therefore, the struggle carried out by Angola in defence of its independence has been supported by all progressive forces throughout the world, and the success of that struggle has become one more indication that peoples' aspirations to freedom cannot be denied by anyone.”

48. The Angolan people and their legitimate Government are at present an important link in the national liberation struggle on the entire African continent, not only in the south. Angola has embarked upon the path which has been taken by many other African countries. Relying on decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity on questions of decolonization and the elimination of racism and *apartheid*, the Angolan people are marching forward. Each day brings us new evidence of the growing support for the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, which has now been recognized by the majority of the States of the world, including 13 of the members of the Security Council. Who has not yet recognized Angola? The country of a representative here; his Government did not want this question discussed here. It is his Government, his country that does not recognize the People's Republic of Angola.

49. Why is the fate of the people of Angola of concern to the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community? The position of the Soviet Union on this matter is not based on any fleeting motivations; it has been and remains a principled position. From the outset, the struggle of the patriotic forces of Angola for their liberation from the colonial yoke has had the full support and understanding of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has extended and continues to extend moral, political, diplomatic and other types of aid and support. This aid and support, however distasteful it may be to some, is determined by our devotion to the cause of the just struggle of peoples against colonialism and neo-colonialism. Although we helped the Angolan people to defend its independence, the hero of the struggle is the Angolan people itself and no one else. No aid solved this problem; the people of Angola resolved the question of its statehood and of its independence, and we should not forget this.

50. At the twenty-fifth Party Congress it was said:

“Our Party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does

not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions."

We are proud that the aid and support of the Soviet Union, of the other countries of the socialist community and of Cuba have been highly praised by the Angolan people. In this connexion, allow me to recall the words of the President of the People's Republic of Angola, Mr. Agostinho Neto, who stated:

"At the very beginning of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and now as well in our struggle against imperialism, our natural friends have been and continue to be the progressive countries of Africa and of the whole world. From them we receive moral, material, political and diplomatic support in our struggle. The most basic and extensive aid that we have received in the struggle from the very beginning has been from the countries of the socialist community."

It cannot be expressed better than that, and it is true.

51. At the twenty-fifth Congress of our Party, a member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Comrade Alves Batista, described it as follows:

"The selfless aid of the countries of the socialist community, their solidarity with and support for the peoples of Africa and other continents have played a really decisive role in our victories over imperialist aggressors. We shall not name all the countries that have given and continue to give us moral and material support, but we would like to point out in particular the generous aid of the Soviet Union and the practical action of our Cuban brothers."

52. I think that this appraisal and the statements of the representatives of the People's Republic of Angola here in the Security Council, to the effect that the Government of their country had the right to appeal to any country for aid when it felt it necessary, and that any concern in this regard cannot be qualified as interference in the internal affairs of the People's Republic of Angola, is a convincing reply to those who try here to spread other versions of this affair.

53. The major trend in the present-day world situation, with all its complexity and contradictions, is towards détente. But the lessening of international tensions does not mean freedom of activity for aggressors or the preservation of opportunities for colonialists or racists to continue their plundering of the wealth of nations and peoples, nor, when this is brought to an end, does it mean that they can try to use force to regain their lost positions. Such action, in fact, gives rise to tension and merely exacerbates the situation.

54. In resolutely condemning the aggression of South Africa and in demanding its immediate withdrawal and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola, in addition to material compensation for the harm done by the South African régime, the Soviet delegation feels that peace in that area can be achieved only if there is no intervention and no aggression against Angola or any other African peoples who struggle against racism and *apartheid*.

55. The basis of the policy of the Soviet Union in its relationship with the countries freeing themselves from colonialism is co-operation, friendship, mutual understanding and the granting of comprehensive aid in strengthening their national sovereignty and independence. It is hardly colonialism, as was stated here by the representative of one country, who read headlines from Hsinhua. Our Party, in accordance with its communist convictions, is giving comprehensive support to peoples in their struggle for national and social liberation. This, as I pointed out earlier, has been clearly set forth in the position taken by the Soviet Union in support of the just liberation struggle of the Angolan people against foreign interventionists and their lackeys.

56. The recent twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union gave great attention to questions of the Soviet Union's relations with the developing countries. The Congress noted with great satisfaction the successful development of Soviet relations with the developing and newly liberated countries. The political content of such relations has been enriched. This has been promoted by the considerable progress in the domestic life and foreign policy of these countries. The national liberation movement in many countries of Asia and Africa has been able to grow into an all-out struggle for social liberation. The role of the developing countries in world politics has increased significantly, as has their participation in the anti-imperialist struggle. There has been a strengthening of the determination of young States fully to eliminate foreign dependence and to dispose of their national wealth themselves.

57. The first half of the 1970's, as is well known, was marked by the unfolding of the last stages in the collapse of the colonial system on the African continent. An important international task is the full elimination of all vestiges of the system of colonialism, of oppression and of inequality, the attainment of the independence of peoples and the elimination of all hotbeds of racism and colonialism.

58. This is the principled position of the Soviet Union with regard to colonialism and racism—and not what is vainly announced and endlessly repeated with slanders in the meetings of the Security Council, and the whole United Nations.

59. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of Uganda.

I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

60. Mr. MWANGAGUHUNGA (Uganda): Let me add the sincere voice of my delegation to the voices of those who have already congratulated you, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Security Council for this momentous month in our continent's struggle against minority domination in southern Africa.

61. I should like to welcome Ambassador Luvualu, the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Angola, and his delegation. I want to assure him, the Government and the gallant people of Angola of Uganda's total support in their struggle against the aggression of the racist régime of South Africa.

62. The Security Council is meeting here to discuss a serious issue regarding South Africa's aggression committed against the People's Republic of Angola, a full member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Uganda, as an ardent supporter and current Chairman of the OAU, views that aggression with extreme seriousness, as it considers South African presence on Angolan territory not only an aggression against Angola but also a violation of its territorial integrity and a real threat to its internal security. Because of its policy of *apartheid*, South Africa has been identified by Africa as its enemy number one. It has persistently refused to respond to the recommendations of the United Nations and the OAU on Namibia. It has stubbornly refused to heed the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on Namibia. It has also been helping the rebel régime of Ian Smith to beat the sanctions against Rhodesia. Since the whole of Africa is opposed to South Africa's policies of *apartheid* and rebel Smith's minority Government of Rhodesia, any aggression by South Africa against Angola is an aggression against Africa and a threat to international peace and world security.

63. South Africa's argument that its troops are in Angola to protect its interests in the Cunene dam does not hold water. South Africa's right to protect its interests there lapsed with Portugal's departure from Angola on 11 November 1975, when Angola became independent. Its incursion in Angola on 9 August 1975 was unwarranted and illegal, and Portugal protested against it. As Angola is now an independent State, the South African presence on the Cunene dam is unilateral rather than bilateral.

64. The representative of Angola told the Council last Friday, 26 March, "It is hardly our intention to deprive the people of Namibia of the electricity... or the water they need." [1900th meeting, para. 27.] If South Africa intends to use the Cunene River hydroelectric scheme which spans the Angola-Namibia border for the welfare and benefit of the Namibians, it should comply with United Nations resolutions on

Namibia and end the illegal occupation of that Territory so that the Namibians and the Angolans can work out arrangements for the use of the project for their mutual benefit.

65. Failing that, one wonders whether South Africa does not want to provide power on a large scale to the mining industries to plunder the mineral resources of Namibia and also to make water available for white towns and farms in southern Namibia. We wonder whether the interests in the Cunene scheme that South Africa speaks of protecting are those of the Namibians or of the minority racists living in southern Africa. The real reasons for South Africa's aggression against Angola are well known to us, and we dismiss its flimsy excuses for what they are worth.

66. The regular South African army committed premeditated aggression against Angola, and the Security Council should condemn South Africa in the strongest terms. Uganda, for its part, strongly condemns that shameless aggression by the South African racists. The representative of Angola has very eloquently elaborated in detail on the destruction and plunder perpetrated by the aggressors. Not only did they kill men, women and children; they also slaughtered cattle, destroyed industrial plants, bridges, roads, airports, radio stations and so on; they looted cars, furniture and other property and stole money from banks. The Council should demand that South Africa pay for this wanton destruction and plunder, as well as the economic dislocation caused the people of Angola by the South African aggression.

67. The Chairman of the African Group has analysed the Angola issue in detail and emphasized in the Council [1900th meeting] the fact that the question of aggression by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola is simple and clear. We join him in appealing to the Council to pronounce its position by adopting a suitable resolution when the time comes.

68. South Africa is a ruthless aggressor which has no scruples about the destruction of life and property, as has been shown by its actions in Angola, an independent, young sovereign State with no common border with South Africa. This is a pointer to Africa as to how arrogant the Pretoria racist régime is—but we are ready to meet them. South African troops should be driven not only out of Angola but out of Namibia also. South Africa has announced to the world that it has withdrawn its troops from Angola. But why did it not take them to South Africa? Why are they staying in Namibia, which it illegally occupies? They should withdraw unconditionally.

69. South Africa used the subterfuge of the Cunene dam to commit aggression against Angola while trying to hide its true motives behind a smoke-screen. It would be naïve of it to imagine that we are not sure of its true colours and its nefarious intentions. It has

felt the immense pressures of the liberating forces as the northern buffer zones that shielded it are eroded by the anticolonialist forces. It committed its aggression against a member of the OAU and aroused the fury of the African forces of liberation. To compound its folly it staged its aggression from an African country which it illegally occupies. That was an hysterical last attempt to perpetuate white racist minority domination in southern Africa.

70. South Africa, having been convicted by its own folly, tried to save face by searching for an honourable way to withdraw, and yet it sought sanctuary in Namibia, which it still illegally occupies. South Africa should know that its days of *apartheid* and white-minority aggression are numbered. We are convinced that the day is not too far off when African armies will overrun racist régimes in southern Africa and restore the dignity of the black man in that region. The war for the restoration of humanity calls for all progressive and peace-loving forces to rally behind Africa. We call on all countries to co-operate with Angola and give it all possible material and financial aid so that it can withstand and repel aggression from the racist régime of South Africa. We pledge our solidarity with the gallant people of Angola and with all liberation forces for the total liberation of southern Africa so as to ensure peace and security in that area.

71. Mr. KIKHIA (Libyan Arab Republic): On 10 March our brother the representative of Kenya, in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group, requested, on behalf of the Group, the convening of a Security Council meeting to consider the act of aggression committed by the racist régime of South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola [S/12007]. This is a significant fact that my delegation would like to stress: the Council was requested to act by all the African peoples and Governments without a single exception. Africans wanted to express and to show their solidarity in their sacred fight against the Colonial and racist aggression of the Nazi régime of the South African white minority, because we know who is our real enemy and where our foes are. We wanted to say to all, and to our friends before our enemies, that when it comes to facing colonialism and racism we are united; we are one solid bloc. This is the meaning, the real meaning, the deep meaning, of the letter signed by the Ambassador of Kenya on 10 March.

72. The inalienable rights of peoples, including the right to self-determination and independence, have been secured mostly through bitter struggles and ferocious fights. Peoples of colonial territories have resorted to armed struggle to achieve liberation and independence. The people of Angola struggled many years and sacrificed countless lives and resources to achieve their liberation and independence. When Angola finally succeeded in the long and bloody struggle to secure its independence, which lasted nearly 15 years, the racist régime of South Africa

committed a serious aggression against that newly independent African nation.

73. It is very interesting to note the statement the South African representative made on 27 January to the Council [1881st meeting], in which he attempted to create valid reasons necessitating his Government's interference in Angola. In employing the pretext that the South African Government must protect its workers who travel to the Calueque dam on the Cunene River inside Angola, that racist Government hoped to quell the growing furor in the international forum against its aggression.

74. The question under discussion is very clear. The racist Government of South Africa committed aggression against an independent African State, the People's Republic of Angola. The minority régime in South Africa defied United Nations resolutions, as well as world public opinion. The imperialist Powers, as usual, supported the racist régime in order to protect their imperialist and colonialist interests—because we know that, for those Powers, the interests of corporations involved in the exploitation of natural resources and manpower within this racist régime and society outweigh the importance of eliminating illegal intervention and aggression.

75. I should like to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, at its ninth extraordinary session, in April 1975, focused on the racist régime of South Africa as an obstruction to the total independence of Africa in the following clear terms: "the southern African problem is firstly South Africa as a colonialist Power, and secondly South Africa as a racist society".

76. In its resolution 385 (1976), the Security Council condemned the South African military buildup in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on the neighbouring countries. The South African military aggression has also been strongly denounced by the African people of South Africa itself. The Special Committee against *Apartheid* has received statements by the two liberation movements—the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania—condemning the aggression. Moreover, SWAPO has demanded the withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola and Namibia, while denouncing South Africa's use of Namibia as a base for operations in Angola. The Black People's Convention of South Africa has also joined its voice to those condemning South Africa's illegal aggression in Angola by warning the racist régime against involvement in Angola and declaring the MPLA the sole legitimate Government of Angola.

77. The story of the aggression by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola is well known. The problem and the facts are very clear and have

been the subject of several communications brought to the attention of the Security Council. This is not the first aggression committed by South Africa against the peoples and States of Africa; Namibia is illegally occupied by the South African Nazi régime and is used as a base for further aggression and incursions against Angola and other African countries. Zimbabwe and Zambia have suffered from South African aggression.

78. The racist régime of South Africa is inherently aggressive, expansionist and terrorist. It is condemned to violence and wars until it achieves its total self-destruction. It is indeed no accident that the Security Council should have met twice within this month to consider acts of aggression against African peoples and against African States by the racist and minority régimes of southern Africa. It is clear that peace and security in Africa are continually threatened by the existence of white-minority racist régimes. These odious régimes are determined to keep the peoples of the region under eternal subjugation. They are trying desperately to contain the rising tide and to stop the sweeping wave of national liberation and social revolution. We must do all we can to prevent them from doing irreparable damage and hurting the independent States and peoples in the southern part of Africa through their panic-stricken acts. That is why the consolidation of African solidarity is a vital necessity in this crucial and decisive moment, as well as the solidarity of the progressive and democratic forces in the world as a whole.

79. The resolution on Angola adopted by the Council of Ministers of the OAU at its twenty-sixth ordinary session last February reiterated this solidarity of African countries with the struggle of the southern African people and declared that the aggression against Angola was directed at all OAU member States. The Council of Ministers stated that it was an imperative duty of the OAU member States to contribute effectively to the defence of the national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Angola. The Council of Ministers reiterated also its condemnation of South Africa for its policy of *apartheid* and its illegal occupation of Namibia and reaffirmed the major role that Angola should play in the intensification of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. In the operative part of the resolution the Council of Ministers requested the African Group at the United Nations to call for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola.

80. It is abhorrent and appalling that the aggressive racist and fascist régime of South Africa is still receiving economic and military aid from many Powers, despite the repeated calls for an arms embargo against South Africa. Those who are helping South Africa must know that they are helping our enemy, our bitterest and worst enemy in Africa. This interna-

tional hypocrisy must come to an end. They must choose between Africa and the enemies of Africa.

81. On this occasion I should like to pay tribute to those progressive and democratic countries that are supporting our struggle in Africa, especially the socialist countries and peoples.

82. The Libyan Arab Republic reaffirms its pledge to support any effective and relevant action taken by the Council against the South African aggression. We assure the people of Angola that we will do the utmost to support them in their sacred struggle against the imperialist and racist régime of South Africa, and we call on the other Member States to do the same and, especially, to adopt the following points: first, condemnation of the aggression committed by the racist régime of South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola and the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity; secondly, condemnation of the utilization by South Africa of the international Territory of Namibia to commit that aggression; thirdly, that South Africa must respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola; fourthly, that South Africa must refrain from the utilization of Namibia to initiate provocative acts of aggression against Angola; and fifthly, that South Africa must pay full compensation for the damage inflicted on Angola as a result of the aggression and immediately restore to the people of Angola the equipment and material seized and looted by the invading forces.

83. Despite the pressing appeal of our Angolan brothers that the entire discussion be focused on the problem of the aggression committed by the South African minority racist régime rather than on anything unrelated to the issue and to the interests of the Angolan people, in spite of the express request of all the African States voiced by the representative of Kenya in his capacity of Chairman of the African Group, when he, on behalf of the African Group, launched an appeal

"to all friends of Africa to respect the People's Republic of Angola and the specific case and the issues that the delegation of Angola has raised by restricting their contribution to the debate to the specific questions before the Council" [1900th meeting, para. 37],

and in spite of your appeal, Mr. President, the debate was sidetracked to embrace other, irrelevant subjects.

84. As a representative of an African State and of an African and Arab militant country and also as a representative of an African State member of the Security Council whose Government and people maintain the best relations with our friends from the socialist States, I should like to express our regret and disappointment that the discussions did not evolve as we should have liked them to. We further regret that the deception was initiated by our friends and

allies, not by the enemies of Africa. Indeed we want our friends to join us in the fight against our common enemies: colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, racism and under-development. We want our friends to fight with us rather than to fight each other among us on our own land and in our own house, because inevitably in the end it is we who shall suffer. Our struggle against our enemies will cost a high price. There is an East African proverb that says, "When two elephants fight, the grass will suffer." We do not want the green and young political, economic and social revolution in Africa to be crushed by this fight. We know our enemy and we are ready to face him in decisive battle, but our division would give him an extra breath in his last desperate fight.

85. Since I have touched upon this delicate and sensitive subject, I should like to place on record that my delegation subscribes to all the points expressed here by our brother of Tanzania [1900th meeting], with his customary and brilliant eloquence, especially regarding the fact that we refuse to accept any hint that South Africa's racist aggression will find any justification.

86. Taking into account that I represent an Arab country in the Council, and since it was mentioned here that a certain super-Power "sowed discord among Arab countries", and also since some delicate aspects of Arab politics were referred to in here, I should like to place on record that the Arab nation is a developing nation constituting 20 States, most of them having begun from zero when they won their independence, following long and bitter struggles against four major colonial Powers. When Arabs started to accede to independence they had to face a racist colonialist invasion in Palestine, supported by colonialist and imperialist Powers. We had to struggle against our own weaknesses inside our own countries and society as well as outside forces that have vested interests in preventing our unity and progress. We Arabs know who are our real and traditional enemies who want us to remain weak and divided so that they can continue their exploitation of our resources and our strategical facilities, thus guaranteeing a longer life for the racist and terrorist entity implanted in our midst by force and aggression.

87. I can assure the Council that our real enemy could not be any socialist country, especially our great friend and ally the Soviet Union. The socialist countries as well as the progressive and democratic forces in the world have supported the Arab liberation movement and Arab unity, because they justly consider that unity to be a decisive factor in the world-wide struggle for liberation and human progress. Those countries supported the right of the Arab nation to self-determination, freedom and unity, together with its right to raise the living standards of the Arab peoples. They view the movement of Arab unity as a legitimate national movement providing a positive factor in the struggle against backwardness, imperialism and colonialism.

88. We are certain that with the support and solidarity of progressive and democratic forces we shall achieve victory and unity. We are thankful for and grateful to those who have supported us and continue to support us in realizing those goals. We sincerely believe that it is high time for unity and solidarity among the progressive and democratic forces in joining together in order to defeat our common enemy.

89. I should not like to conclude without expressing, on behalf of the Libyan delegation, my sincere and brotherly congratulations to our Angolan brothers for their decisive victory against the forces of evil and darkness. I also sincerely welcome the delegation of Angola and Ambassador Luvualu in our midst, and I hope that we shall receive them very soon as full members of the Organization, when they will join us in the continuing fight for justice, liberation, peace and progress.

90. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

91. Mr. BOTHA (South Africa): Mr. President, I am grateful for the opportunity of addressing the Security Council. I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on the honour accorded you of presiding.

92. What the Council witnessed when the representative of the Soviet Union spoke a little while ago can only be described as one of the most hypocritical tirades which has perhaps ever been presented in this chamber. But it was more than a tirade. It was also an indication of the length to which certain members will go to cover up not only their own actions but also their ambitions. It is said that the truth hurts, and seldom has this been more clearly demonstrated than here in this very chamber this afternoon. Even the pounded table bears witness to this fact!

93. As I speak, South Africa has no forces on Angolan territory. At this moment there is not one single South African soldier in Angola. The international press has documented the final departure of South African units. The Luanda authorities are at liberty to invite any independent inspector to confirm that this is the case. Why then is the Council meeting? And how is such a meeting justified by the Charter, especially when at this moment there are other flash-points in the world which should demand the urgent attention of the Council?

94. Let me ask, on the other hand, how many troops from foreign States are on Angolan soil today, now at this moment? Troops from a far-away country armed and supported by a huge foreign Power on another far-away continent? If the Council seeks to identify the real threat to the peaceful evolution and stability of the African continent, it need look no further. An alien army, manipulated in the interest of the global ambi-

tions of a super-Power is to blame for the events in Angola. We all know that. Not South Africa but that super-Power ought to account to the people of Angola and to the peoples of Africa for the brutal aggression they have committed in Angola.

95. That Power has sought to build up an image of selflessness and disinterestedness in regard to its co-operation with Africa in general, and more especially in the territory we are discussing. That concern is, however, transparently contrived and hypocritical. It is founded on the thesis that in its attempts to force its own ideology on the rest of the world, minimal co-operation with one of the three parties contending for power in a foreign country before independence justifies massive support of that faction against the others after independence. In the interest of the country as a whole, they will say. Of course! Totally selfless. Of course! A new international Santa Claus, whose sleigh is drawn by war-starved wolves.

96. We are accused of aggression at a time when not a single South African soldier is still in Angola, although thousands of Cubans remain. Once again we find certain countries levelling my Government accusations and distortions of fact in an attempt to substantiate their trumped-up charges. I am consequently obliged to set out the true facts of the limited involvement of South Africa in Angola.

97. South Africa, unlike Soviet Russia and Cuba, has played a very limited role in the recent events in Angola. Moreover, again unlike Soviet Russia and Cuba, its role was motivated by essentially protective and humanitarian considerations. It sought to protect a hydroelectric project which was constructed at great cost for purely peaceful purposes, and it was forced to undertake the purely humanitarian task of caring for thousands of displaced persons fleeing from the Russian and Cuban onslaught. Any involvement of South Africa beyond that, as I shall show, was the direct result of the intervention by the Soviet Union and Cuba in an African country thousands of miles away from those two countries.

98. I shall start by very briefly giving the background against which South Africa was constrained to assume responsibility for the protection and security of the hydroelectric scheme at Calueque on the Cunene River. The diversion of the waters of the Cunene River has been the subject of three international agreements concluded between South Africa and Portugal in 1926—the first agreement was concluded as far back as 1926—1964 and 1969. Because of the shortage of water in southern Angola and Ovamboland—the north central part of South West Africa—the harnessing of water of the Cunene is of the utmost importance to the economic and social development of Angola and Ovamboland. Therefore, in accordance with the terms of these agreements, large installations requiring technical skills and equipment of the highest order have been constructed, or are in the course of

construction, in order to regulate the flow of the Cunene River to supply hydroelectric power and to provide water for irrigation for human and animal consumption and other essential purposes. Upon completion of all the projects envisaged, the regulation of the flow of the Cunene River will extend over more than 70 per cent of its total length, the major portion of which lies in Angola. Already a perennial flow of water is for the first time in history available for purposes of irrigation.

99. In this connexion a regulating dam has been constructed at Gove in Angola, and another at Calueque, also in Angola, has almost been completed. Both dams, as I said, are situated in Angola. A hydroelectric power station at Matala—also in Angola—already provides power to the towns of Sá da Bandeira, Serpa Pinto and Moçâmedes, as well as power for mining and industrial development in the southern part of central Angola, not South Africa. Another three such power stations to be constructed between Gove and Calueque are in the planning stage. Substantial progress has been made with the construction of the hydroelectric installations at Ruacanã on the South Africa side of the border on the Cunene River. The Ovambo people in the northern part of South West Africa benefit considerably from this great scheme. Water for human and animal consumption is now distributed by way of a 175-mile network of canals which together with pipelines traverse the more densely populated areas of Ovamboland. This network, completed in 1971 at a cost of over \$8.5 million, receives water pumped at Calueque and conveyed by a canal across the Angolan border into Ovamboland. The provision of this permanent water supply now paves the way for the industrial development of Ovamboland—not South Africa—which has already commenced. A greater measure of urbanization than hitherto has now become possible. I wish to emphasize that, although it is estimated that the final cost of this project to South Africa will be some \$235 million, South Africa itself receives no benefit from this scheme. I challenge anyone to prove the opposite. Not a drop of water from the dam at Calueque passes beyond the borders of Ovamboland. The scheme benefits Angola and Ovamboland exclusively. May I point out that the people living in Ovamboland constitute almost half of the total population of South West Africa.

100. It was against this background that on 16 April 1975, when it was realized that both the workers and the installations at Calueque required urgent protection as a result of the civil unrest in Angola, the South African Government took up the question of the safety of the workers and installations with the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda. Through him the Portuguese authorities were requested to take urgent steps to provide the necessary protection. Allow me, because this matter has been repeatedly raised in this debate, to read out a few pertinent excerpts from the aide-mémoire handed to the Portuguese High Commissioner on that date:

"In terms of the intergovernmental agreement concerning the Ruacan  Hydro-Electric Scheme, the right of workers to move, live and work within the joint project area is laid down. On the Angolan side there are no measures to control access to the joint project area by unauthorized persons. On 2 April 1975 armed UNITA [*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*] troops visited the Calueque area, assumed control and ordered the South African workers and their families living there to move. They temporarily occupied the evacuated homes of the workers. Furthermore, UNITA elements hold meetings in the joint project area and propagate the taking over of the project by UNITA."

That was handed to the Portuguese High Commissioner on 16 April 1975, irrespective of what the Portuguese representative now states. I quote further from that aide-m moire:

"Adherence by the Angola authorities to the terms of the Ruacan  Hydro-Electric Project Agreement would be welcomed, particularly in so far as they relate to a guarantee of safety to workers and families who use joint recreation amenities on the Angolan side of the project area... South Africa desires to maintain good relations with Angola and it is trusted that the Angolan authorities will give attention to the matters referred to above in order to prevent the possibility of incidents which would not be helpful for the maintenance of good relations".

101. While, thereafter, the situation improved temporarily, marauding parties were again harassing workers and threatening the installations by the end of July. Consequently, on 8 August the South African ambassador in Lisbon was instructed to ask the Portuguese authorities urgently to arrange proper security of the project area to protect both the workers and the equipment.

102. During the next few days the situation greatly deteriorated, and on 12 August the Portuguese ambassador in Pretoria was informed of the serious situation and told that South Africa had been forced to provide the necessary protection itself, but, at the same time, was asked to inquire urgently whether and when the Portuguese authorities could arrange the necessary protection.

103. A week later the South African ambassador in Lisbon was called to the Foreign Ministry and told that, whilst the Portuguese Government regretted the South African Government's action at Calueque without consulting the Portuguese on the intended action, they understood the need for protecting the workers and equipment. They had been hoping to send in troops to afford the necessary protection, but then found that they were unable to do so. It was further implied that "the present situation must

be accepted, but that they"—the Portuguese—"requested that everything possible be done to avoid any direct confrontation".

104. On 21 August the Portuguese ambassador called on the Foreign Office in Pretoria and referred to the discussion with the South African ambassador in Lisbon that had taken place a few days earlier. He expressed the view that it would actually not be easy for Portuguese troops to reach this destination over land and that ways of doing this were still being explored.

105. On 2 September the South African ambassador in Lisbon was handed a note which was also repeated to the United Nations. In regard to the presence of the South African forces it was stated, in paragraphs 4 and 5, that

"4. If at the start it was not immediately possible for the Portuguese authorities to transfer military units to the above-mentioned area, they meanwhile had direct contacts in Windhoek between representatives of the High Commissioner in Luanda and the Pretoria Government. At present the Portuguese are in Calueque.

"5. In the circumstances, the Portuguese Government hopes that on the South African side the necessary steps will be taken for the removal of the South African force sent there and at the same time expressed the wish that the authorities in South West Africa (Namibia) will render all possible co-operation and assist with supplies, etc., in order to facilitate the Portuguese presence in the protection of the operations for pumping water to Ovamboland."

I might just mention, in order to avoid confusion, that the last sentence of paragraph 4 referred to a party of two or three Portuguese sent to Calueque to discuss the implementation of paragraph 5.

106. The following day the South African ambassador in Lisbon was instructed to inform the Portuguese Government that we appreciated and welcomed their decision to provide the necessary protection and we wished as soon as possible to suspend measures taken by us and, in co-operation with the Portuguese commander, withdraw the personnel concerned. In this connexion I wish to read out to the Council the complete text of the letter I addressed to the Secretary-General on 5 September, which was based on that communication to the Portuguese Government but which was not circulated as an official document of the United Nations:

"The South African Government has been informed by the Portuguese Government that the latter was conveying to you the text of a communication to the South African authorities in regard to the presence of South African military personnel at

Calueque dam as well as reports that unidentified mercenaries and others had entered Angola from the south. Accordingly I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention my Government's reply to the Portuguese communication:

'As previously conveyed to the Portuguese authorities and understood by them, the South African authorities took measures for the sole purpose of protecting works and workers at Calueque. At that time the South African authorities requested the Portuguese authorities to take steps to protect both such works and workers. The South African authorities appreciate and welcome the Portuguese decision that Portuguese troops were now in a position to protect workers in the area concerned.

'The South African authorities will as soon as possible suspend measures taken by them and in co-operation with the Portuguese commander withdraw the South African personnel concerned.

'The South African authorities assume and expect that the works and workers will be adequately safeguarded. They are going further into the question of possible provisioning from South West Africa and will advise the Portuguese authorities thereof in due course.

'As is well known, South Africa's policy is one of non-interference and it allows no mercenaries or other troops to operate from its territory or territory under its control. The South African Government is therefore surprised at the suggestion that mercenaries and others might have penetrated southern Angola from South West Africa. The South African Government rejects this possibility and would appreciate it if the "reliable reports" could be made available to it.'

107. As can be seen from the letter I have just read, South Africa had already expressed readiness to withdraw from Angolan soil on 5 September 1975, in other words before Angola became an independent State. Because of the Portuguese Government's inability to provide the necessary protection, we had no choice but to protect the workers and the construction work at the Calueque dam.

108. In the event, nothing came of this Portuguese undertaking, and some weeks later we were told that it had become physically impossible to send the required forces to the area. Furthermore, in the last week of September an emissary from the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda informed the South African authorities that the High Commissioner had asked him to say that the Portuguese authorities would like our troops to stay until a take-over by the new Government of Angola, and he implied it would be the MPLA. This I consider of the greatest importance for the discussion of the item on the agenda. We were

further told that it was not possible for Portuguese troops to be sent to Calueque, as they were in the process of being withdrawn from Angola and would be out of the country by 11 November 1975.

109. Certainly, from this exposition it must be clear that South Africa took the steps it did for the sole purpose of protecting both the works and workers at Calueque. South Africa has on many occasions, both before and after the independence of Angola, declared that it would terminate its protective measures as soon as Angola was in a position to take over this task.

110. I wish to state emphatically and categorically that arrangements were indeed made with the Portuguese authorities for them to assume protection of the Calueque dam and for South Africa to carry out the task until they arrived.

111. I have already emphasized the importance of this hydroelectric scheme to the peoples of Angola and South West Africa. The benefits to be derived from it are tremendous. The cost to South Africa, which itself derives no benefit at all therefrom, has been enormous. Nor is the scheme yet complete. Completion is expected only in mid-1977. Should the construction work be destroyed or not completed, the economic consequences to the people of Angola, as well as to those of South West Africa, would be tragic indeed. Is it then any wonder that South Africa took what steps it could to assure protection of the scheme until a stable government in Angola was able to take the task over? Nobody else was in a position to afford that protection, and, given the recent chaos and disorder in Angola, nobody can say what might have happened had South Africa not afforded that protection. That is why on 27 January [188st meeting] I proposed that this Council should assume responsibility until such time as a government in Angola could handle the situation satisfactorily. Surely these are facts known to members of the Council.

112. The events leading up to the withdrawal of South African troops were dealt with in three letters which I addressed to the Secretary-General on 21 March, 23 March and 25 March respectively [12019 and Add.1 and S/12024]. I respectfully refer Council members to these communications.

113. In my first letter, I communicated to the Secretary-General the text of a statement made that day by my Prime Minister, who said that South Africa was at Calueque

"only for the protection of the workers and the works and would withdraw from the area as soon as assurances were received that no harm would come to the workers, that the work would continue and that the flow of water to Ovambo would be assured" [S/12019, annex I].

My Prime Minister added:

"We have during the past few days received, through a third party, assurances which in general terms appear to be acceptable to us. We are checking whether we are interpreting these assurances correctly, and if this is so, South Africa will withdraw its troops from the Calueque area not later than 27 March." [ibid.]

114. This statement followed on and may be read in conjunction with statements by the South African Minister of Defence on 12 and 15 March in connexion with the two refugee camps at Cuangar and Calai near the South West Africa-Angola border. He reported that despite the fact that the Portuguese Government had repatriated those refugees which it had found acceptable, a number remained. These unfortunate persons had been gathered in camps at Cuangar and Calai, as I have mentioned, where the International Red Cross was caring for them. The South African Defence Force was, however, still assisting with medical treatment and food supplies. In his statement of 15 March, the Minister added:

"The South African Defence Force has done more than its duty in connexion with refugees. We shall provide no further services at the two refugee camps after Saturday, 27 March." [ibid., annex III.]

115. To clear up some confusion, wilful or unwitting, I sent a further letter to the Secretary-General on 23 March in which I said:

"I wish to confirm that the reference to the Calueque area in my Prime Minister's statement applies to the northern portion of the Ruacaná construction site which falls within Angola and to any other part of Angola." [S/12019/Add.1.]

116. In short, South Africa intended withdrawal of its troops from all parts of Angola once the clarification South Africa sought had been received.

117. On 25 March the Minister of Defence made a statement in the South African Parliament in which he said, with regard to the assurances already received:

"Since then we have obtained the necessary clarification through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Seen as a whole, the assurances by the Government of the People's Republic of Angola amount to this—that it will not damage the hydroelectric project concerned or endanger the works and that it will respect the international boundary. That Government has already indicated that it does not wish to harm the people of South West Africa by depriving them of their electricity supply.

"In these circumstances, the Government has decided that all our troops will be out of Angola by Saturday, 27 March 1976." [S/12024.]

Once again the Minister of Defence categorically stated South Africa's position, namely, that its "only interest is that the Calueque and Ruacaná schemes, in both Angola and Ovambo, should be secured" [ibid.]. The Minister also said that:

"It is expected that after our withdrawal and when conditions in the area are again normal, it will be feasible to arrange practical matters concerning the scheme with those concerned." [ibid.]

118. It is clear from these announcements, taken in conjunction with South Africa's subsequent withdrawal, that South Africa has beyond any shadow of doubt established its *bona fides*. Its actions are fully consonant with its search for peace in southern Africa. The developments leading to the withdrawal of South African troops are an example of what can be achieved if the parties concerned display a willingness to resolve a potentially explosive situation. I urge this Council not to do anything which might upset the delicate nature of these peaceful initiatives.

119. As I mentioned earlier, besides the provision of protection for the hydroelectric scheme at Calueque, and protection and care for displaced persons, a matter with which I shall presently deal again, it was as a result of the massive Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola that South Africa became involved on a very limited—I repeat: a very limited—scale. South Africa played its limited role in the hope that it would secure for the people of Angola the necessary time to reach a peaceful political settlement for themselves around the conference table, or, failing that, an opportunity for the Organization of African Unity to find a political solution without interference from outside. South Africa's objective was simply to gain time for the fulfilment of these goals. What is wrong with that? At no stage did South Africa become involved, nor did it desire to become involved, in the civil war as such—again, unlike the Russians and the Cubans. Throughout, South Africa would have withdrawn immediately had this blatant foreign interference ceased.

120. Unlike those two countries, at no time did South Africa attempt to impose its will on the people of Angola. Nor did South Africa seek by naked aggression to obtain a foothold in Angola for its own purposes, nor did it seek to introduce into Angola a new and dangerous imperialism—an ideological neo-colonialism far worse in its implications than any the world has known.

121. It was never the intention of South Africa, except in so far as was necessary to protect the hydroelectric scheme, to continue to play its limited role in Angola once the January meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa had taken place. In fact, immediately after that meeting, South Africa started to recall its forces to the southern border area. It did so of its own volition and under no military pressure, and from

that time onwards South African forces have not been engaged in any military activity whatsoever.

122. It is well known, of course, that enormous quantities of Russian arms were poured into Angola well before the limited involvement of South Africa to which I have just referred. It is well known too that some 15,000 Cuban troops, transported by Russian aircraft, arrived in Angola and ruthlessly annihilated thousands of Angolans with Russian weapons. Despite their pious protestations to the contrary, it is not at all the interests of the people of Angola they seek to promote by their undisguised aggression, but their own interests—their own sphere of interest—and what the representative of Cuba has called, in his letter dated 23 February, “the unshakable solidarity of the community of socialists and revolutionaries throughout the world” [S/11992.] It has not passed unnoticed that in vilifying South Africa’s involvement in Angola they say little or nothing about their own role there. This is a stratagem old as time, which seeks to distract attention from their own inexcusable acts of aggression by attempting to place the blame elsewhere. Unfortunately for them their conduct on this occasion has been so blatant that they deceive nobody. Even now, as we sit here in the Council, the questions remain. Why are the Russians and the Cubans still in Angola? What is their real reason for being there, for having 15,000 armed troops? Are they willing to withdraw, and, if so, will they say when?

123. It is not only South Africa that is concerned with Russian and Cuban aggression in Angola. Many African States in particular have watched their activities with grave misgivings and have called for their withdrawal, as we saw at the meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa in January and subsequently.

124. It was not my Government that addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 19 January [S/11936] in which the following was stated:

“I have the honour to inform you that on 1 January 1976 the Soviet and Cuban forces which are fighting in Angola on the side of the... (MPLA) blew up the rail and road bridges which link the frontier centre of Dilolo (in the Republic of Zaire) with that of Teixeira de Sousa (in Angola). These bridges are situated on the Kasai river, which forms the natural frontier between the Republic of Zaire and Angola.”

125. It was not the South African head of State who, towards the end of January, declared a state of emergency “to counter any move to destroy our country” and who added: “We are at war: make no mistake, there is foreign interference in our country” and “a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs is coming in through the back door”. It was not the South African Head of State who said that; it was another African Head of State.

126. I can well understand the chagrin of the Soviet Union and Cuba that the role which they are playing and have played in Angola was exposed and highlighted by South Africa’s involvement, for it is obvious that what they wanted was to hide from the world as far as they possibly could their real intentions in Angola.

127. Right up to and even after the independence of Angola on 11 November 1975, the African States energetically endeavoured to promote a compromise between the three Angolan groups competing for leadership of that country with a view to arranging a government of national unity in which all three would be represented. These efforts were reflected in numerous initiatives by the OAU in an attempt to bring the parties together and to reconcile their differences. South Africa, although not involved in these efforts, was in favour of the solution advocated by the OAU, because it was a peaceful solution which could only be of benefit to the whole of southern and central Africa, whereas the alternative would give rise to armed strife which could destabilize the whole of this vast region and be disastrous for all of us in Africa. However, as we all know, attempts at reconciliation came to nothing, largely because one faction was assured of massive military support from a massive imperial country far removed from Africa.

128. As intimated earlier, it was not only South Africa but also other Africans who were aware of the dangers of the situation. In a statement by way of a press release on 8 November 1975, three days before the departure of Portugal from Angola, the African Group—while, I concede, condemning South Africa for its alleged aggression in Angola—also said very clearly that it further condemned “all forms of invasion of Angola by forces of any country”—that was after they got at South Africa. The statement added:

“The African Group also strongly condemns any form of foreign intervention both African and non-African, use of mercenaries, and all arms supplies aimed at disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the territory. The African Group appeals to all States not to take any action which will frustrate efforts being made with a view to finding a lasting solution to the Angolan problems.”

129. Subsequently, on 5 December, an amendment was submitted to a draft resolution before the General Assembly which sought to condemn “the direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola”.¹ However, an African-sponsored subamendment emerged which would have condemned “all foreign intervention in Angola”.² After the better part of three meetings had been devoted to the discussion of this matter, the amendment, together with the subamendment, was withdrawn—a decision which clearly took account of the earlier failure by supporters of the amendment to secure the acquiescence of a majority of the Assembly in their attempt to achieve closure of the debate.

130. The meaning of the foregoing events, I submit respectfully, is quite clear: no majority in the General Assembly could be found singling out South Africa for condemnation for its limited role in Angola. The reason is also quite clear: the majority—indeed, everyone—was fully aware that the real intervention, the really massive intervention, the intervention by foreign infantry in a direct role, supported by the largest infusion of modern weapons of destruction Africa has ever known, was by a super-Power of another continent, through its surrogate from yet another part of the world.

131. The situation in Angola had not changed when the OAU met on Angola this year at Addis Ababa from 10 to 13 January. African States know what transpired at that meeting. Although a substantial number of African States were intent on having South Africa condemned for its involvement in Angola, there was an equal number of African States which insisted on a resolution aimed at all foreign intervention in Angola.

132. Shortly after the Addis Ababa meeting, and long before general recognition of the MPLA or admission to membership in the OAU of Angola, South African forces were withdrawn to the border area in the southern part of that country, where our presence was limited, as I said, solely to providing protection to the Calueque area and food and sustenance to thousands of refugees. From that time onward, South Africa was involved in no fighting at all. Why then are we suddenly now accused of aggression?

133. At a later stage the MPLA was recognized by a substantially greater number of States and has become the effective Government of Angola. It is now a member of the OAU. We are aware of this reality. And it was from the MPLA we sought the assurances that we did; having received them, we finally withdrew all our forces from Angola.

134. South Africa has always acknowledged that Angola has the fullest right to choose any form of government its inhabitants wish to choose. Can every Member around this table say the same? Can they?

135. But the argument has been advanced that Angola had the right to ask for assistance from any country in the world in order to resist the so-called aggressive racist régime of Pretoria. Apart from the fact that no African Government has ever had reason to fear any aggressive designs from my Government, I ask: who was resisting whom in Angola? Which foreign Powers intervened to wreck the provisional Government in which all three national movements took part?

136. Even at the meeting of the Security Council at the end of January, there was no disposition to table a condemnation of South Africa. Why not? I suggest that the answer to this question is well

known to my African colleagues. I have no intention today here of attempting to derive any advantage from differences of opinion which might have existed within the ranks of fellow African countries, because I am only too aware of the counter-productive potential of such attempts. But there comes a time when we should use straight talk with one another, especially when my Government is brazenly and hypocritically singled out as the culprit for what took place in Angola. Then we must talk face to face.

137. As the representative of an African country, and as an African myself, may I say that the act of singling out my Government as the aggressor in Angola—when we all know that barely two months ago no majority of African States could be found to support that view—brings our continent into disrepute and damages its credibility. Those who seek to do this might be unaware of the consequences of their acts, but they are inflicting wounds upon themselves and upon all of us in Africa.

138. What has altered since 10 December, or 13 January, or 30 January, suddenly to change South Africa into an aggressor, as is now being alleged? Nothing, nothing at all. The facts as they existed as at those dates are a matter of history and cannot be changed retroactively. Moreover, since then South Africa's involvement has been reduced to zero. The conferral in the meantime of recognition on the Government in Luanda by a large number of the Members States cannot in any way transform the truth of past events.

139. The representative of Angola talks of physical damage in his country: damage to roads, bridges and installations. Surely, we all know that conditions of war have been prevailing in Angola for more than a decade. Surely, we all know that three movements were combating the Portuguese there for 10 years, that those movements then conducted a civil war among themselves and that finally one of them enlisted the aid of 15,000 foreign troops, supported by \$300 million worth of weapons of great destructive power. South Africa is accused of employing sophisticated weapons, but just look at the weaponry used by the Cuban forces—as deadly an arsenal as has ever been seen in Africa, which should serve as a sober warning to any who may still have any illusions as to Soviet aspirations in Africa. It includes: multiple-barrel 122 mm rocket launchers; 122 mm rocket launchers; 122 mm field guns, 100 mm mortars, 82 mm mortars; 88 mm recoilless guns, 75 mm recoilless guns, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers; Sagger anti-tank missiles, T34/85 and T34 tanks, mobile bridging equipment, BTR-52 infantry-fighting vehicles, MIG-21 aircraft, MIG-17 aircraft, Fiat G-91 aircraft, Alouette 3 with air-to-ground missiles, Harvard T-6s, SAM-7 ground-to-air missiles, 14.5 ZPU anti-aircraft guns, and so on.

140. Angola has been in turmoil for years, and never more so than in the past 12 months. The breakdown

in administration has enabled all sorts of marauding bands to wreak havoc in the countryside, quite apart from the destruction wrought by those directly involved.

141. In his statement the representative of Angola called for compensation for a number of items which South Africa has allegedly removed from Angola. Let me deal with these charges.

142. It is contended that South Africa had taken "a considerable part of our fleet..., trucks, thousands of prime quality cattle, household and hotel furniture" [1900th meeting, para. 26].

143. As regards the cattle, I wish to point out that the important livestock industry in South West Africa is protected by strict regulations governing the export and import of cattle into the Territory, and by some 5,000 kilometres of stock/game fencing, including a fence along the Angolan border. The chances of contamination and consequent decimation of the cattle population, currently about half a million in Ovambo alone, are far too grave to allow any latitude in the implementation of the regulations. Even the transfer of cattle across the border, in terms of traditional practices in the case of marriages, is strictly controlled. Thus it would have been neither possible nor profitable for "thousands of prime quality cattle" to be rustled across the border. I assure you of that.

144. It is true, however, that trucks and household furniture were brought across the border—that is true—by many of the thousands of refugees who fled from the war in Angola, mostly Portuguese citizens, and no South African citizens. How does one identify and classify the possessions of a refugee who arrives at a border post? Does one order him to unload them and leave them in the veld before proceeding? When those refugees whom Portugal found acceptable were repatriated, many of their personal possessions remained behind in South West Africa—it is conceded—and a custodian has been appointed to take charge of these items. The claim that South Africa is responsible for the removal of the foregoing articles from Angola is thus totally unfounded. I would suggest that the Angolan and Portuguese authorities might wish to go into the matter further. We would endeavour to render assistance, but do not hold us responsible.

145. Let me also deal with the accusation that South Africa had taken a considerable part of the Angolan Navy. The South African Navy was never at any time involved in any fighting and no contact was ever made with any Angolan naval vessel. This reference is, therefore, presumably to the boats used by Portuguese refugees to reach Walvis Bay from certain Angolan ports. It will be recalled in this connexion that, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 22 January, the South African Foreign Minister indicated that "some 2,200 refugees sought entry into South West Africa by way of the South African port

of Walvis Bay" [S/11938, annex]. Subsequently, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 6 February, the Foreign Minister indicated that

"... the Portuguese authorities having accepted responsibility for some 1,920 of them who were Portuguese citizens, the latter were allowed to disembark and were provided by the South African authorities with food, shelter and transportation from the time of disembarkation until their subsequent departure from Windhoek to Portugal. Of the remainder, 205, comprising mostly owners and crews of the boats and their families, will proceed to Portugal by sea." [S/11970, annex.]

We informed the Secretary-General of this; it is on record; it is known to members of the Council.

146. Our latest information is that, of the vessels which fled from Angolan ports, one tug and 42 fishing boats remain in Walvis Bay. These vessels are all privately owned, to the best of our knowledge, by Portuguese citizens, who are on board. As far as we are concerned they are free to leave whenever they wish. We do not know, of course, and cannot be expected to know, where all the vessels which were removed from Angolan ports during the struggle there may have gone and may be today, nor whose property they were in the first place. But we had nothing to do with their flight. The question of any South African responsibility therefore simply does not arise. Any other country one might choose to name would be just as liable. In so far as most of the persons involved were Portuguese citizens, again it would seem that the Angolan Government should approach the Portuguese Government in this connexion.

147. Some of the other allegations which have been made in this regard relate to the removal of fixed property, including such fixed institutions as hotels. If the Council is to entertain charges such as these, I see no end to the list which might eventually emerge. I can assure the Council categorically that no booty, in the sense of items of civilian property, was removed by South African forces from Angola. Specifically, no cattle, furniture, household goods or money was removed by them. We do not, of course, know what various factions or local marauding groups might have done, but neither can we accept any responsibility for their actions.

148. The representative of Angola also made the serious charge that South Africans "took... thousands of individuals" [1900th meeting, para. 26] to the border of South West Africa. I must confess that I find it difficult to comprehend the convoluted thinking behind this allegation. It is not clear to me why South Africa should be considered likely to wish to abduct 15,000 or 20,000 people, even if it were physically possible. Not only all the logic but also all the evidence contradicts this suggestion.

149. There has been a war in Angola. Every war ever known has produced its quota of refugees and displaced persons, and this one has been no exception. The first country which would have rejoiced had this war proved to be the exception to the rule and produced no refugees would have been South Africa, for it was South Africa that bore almost the entire brunt of caring for these people, and it was South West Africa that was confronted with the resulting problems at the frontier.

150. We have done everything in our power to interest the world through the appropriate international institutions—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Secretary-General—in the plight of the refugees. With the exception of the positive response of the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the limited facilities at its disposal, we have had little success—so little in fact that it eventually proved necessary for South Africa to withdraw its assistance from the refugee camps, to the disappointment and resentment—I unfortunately have to add—of the remaining refugees themselves.

151. I am sure that members of the Council have all seen the article concerning the withdrawal which appeared in *The New York Times* of 28 March. *Inter alia*, the correspondent said:

“Hundreds of Angolan refugees, black and white, were reported to have fled into South West Africa as the troops completed their withdrawal.

“...

“Officials said that the refugees apparently swam or canoed across the crocodile-infested Kavango River, leaving most of their possessions behind.”

That, gentlemen, looks like some kind of abduction?

152. I am in a position to inform the Council that, of the approximately 5,000 refugees in the camps at Cuangar and Calai immediately before South Africa's withdrawal just recently, only several hundred apparently now remain. Two thousand have crossed into South West Africa in the past few days, where they are creating severe problems for the local authorities. In the meantime, we are endeavouring to assist them as best we can, but my Government cannot be expected to shoulder this burden. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Secretary-General have appealed to us to urge my Government not to force them back and to allow the refugees to cross the border. I may add that hundreds more have dispersed into the bush and may well attempt to cross the border soon.

153. Need I stress the irony of the situation? On the one hand we are accused of abducting these unfortunate people, despite the fact that we have repeatedly,

albeit unsuccessfully, called for the appropriate international bodies to relieve us of their care. On the other hand, no sooner do we withdraw our assistance than the refugees follow us in their thousands and we are urged to continue caring for them. I am at a loss to understand how such double standards can be entertained and so blatantly applied in the Council. Is there really no limit to hypocrisy anywhere?

154. It is important to note that it was as early as 12 September 1975 that a letter entirely devoted to the problem of refugees was addressed to the Secretary-General. This happened two months prior to the date of Angolan independence. It is thus quite clear that the question of refugees—those people whom South Africa is supposed to have abducted from Angola—arose long before the establishment of the present Government in Luanda. It is clear that these people left their homes and sought refuge elsewhere because of the civil war in Angola. And if I am not believed, why not ask the Portuguese Government, which has received thousands of them?

155. I am completely at a loss to understand how our assistance to these refugees and displaced persons—a purely humanitarian undertaking—could become a contentious issue. It must surely be realized that we were caught up in a situation where these people attached themselves to us. Our presence at Calueque to protect the installations there resulted in large numbers of refugees, whose lives were threatened by the escalating war, seeking and finding a haven of safety with the South African authorities there. In other areas too those refugees came to us in their multitudes. That is how we became involved in the refugee problem in southern Angola. What were we to do? On purely humanitarian grounds we could not drive them away; we could not simply sit back and say to them, “We can give you no help; we want nothing to do with you”, and accordingly we have done all we can to alleviate their unhappy plight. We have already spent more than \$6 million on assistance. We have assisted in the repatriation to Portugal of nearly 16,000 persons accepted by the Portuguese Government as Portuguese nationals. We have supplied all necessary provisions and facilities to over 12,000 persons at a time.

156. On this subject let me also refer to my Foreign Minister's letters dated 22 January [S/11938], 6 February [S/11970] and 13 February [S/11980]. As I have mentioned, statements on the question of refugees were also made by the South African Minister of Defence on 12 March [S/12019, annex II], 15 March [*ibid.*, annex III] and 25 March [S/12024].

157. I confess that I am profoundly disappointed, I am shocked, by the obvious disregard for the plight of these unfortunate people. I am shocked that South Africa, which has assisted the refugees, has been so vilified and callously accused of abducting

Angolans. Surely we can leave technical and tactical matters aside, because, when a man is dying, what does it matter who is technically in charge of a country? What does it matter to destitute human beings whether a certain government has the right to save them from starvation? Surely our efforts are worthy of something better than condemnation. I reject the allegation by the representative of Angola. I reject it emphatically. It is not only without foundation; it is also a gross misrepresentation of the facts.

158. A previous speaker has sought to employ scare tactics on the Council, and on others who care to heed, by referring to legislation recently adopted by the South African Parliament to clarify the position concerning precisely how and where South Africa can defend the country's security in the event of war, conflict, threat and so on. All that legislation did was to clarify the circumstances under which South Africa's forces could be used to defend its security. This legislation is in line with the position in many countries of the world. It also confirms past practice and history. Perhaps the Council would do better to look at Cuba, whose forces are apparently free to go anywhere in the world—not in defence of their country but to export armies, military missions and sedition to other continents.

159. On this subject, a further allegation was made suggesting that South Africa's future actions could be deduced from its history of alleged aggression. Well, I would consider it well worth while if Council members would indeed consult their history books. They will find that South Africa has always been ready to defend its own freedom even against great odds, and, in the Second World War, the freedom of certain African countries. Can it be suggested that South Africa's participation in two world wars was an act of aggression?

160. It was suggested that the Council should not accept the hypothesis that South Africa is entitled to take the necessary steps to protect itself against a threat to its security occasioned by intervention in Africa by an extra-continental Power. By some spurious reasoning, such action on South Africa's part was said to represent a threat not to the interventionists but to African States. The Council and African States will recognize the danger of accepting reasoning of this kind which, through extension to themselves, will leave them defenceless and without recourse when they themselves are threatened by the appearance of an alien force near their borders. Moreover, South Africa has at no time in its history engaged in an aggressive war. Neither in Angola nor elsewhere has it ever had, nor does it have now, any aggressive intentions. On the contrary, it believes implicitly in the way of peace.

161. In conclusion, I recall that on 24 October 1974 I referred in the Council to a statement made by my Prime Minister in the South African Senate. He said, and I would like to quote his words:

"... southern Africa has come to the crossroads. I think that southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that that choice lies between peace on the one hand or an escalation of strife on the other. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it will be too high for southern Africa to pay. If one adds to that the threatening economic problems which could assume major proportions, then Africa and southern Africa should guard against heading for this possible chaos.

"However, this is not necessary for there is an alternative, there is a way. That way is the way of peace, the way of normalizing of relations, the way of a sound understanding and normal association. I believe that southern Africa can take that way. I have reason to believe that it is prepared to prefer to take that way, and I believe that it will do so in the end." [1800th meeting, para. 135.]

Those prophetic words, hailed by some, including some Africans, at the time as the voice of reason, are perhaps more apposite today than they were at that time.

162. An unrealistic resolution of the Council does not contribute one iota to the solution of the problems on the spot. The problems do not simply go away. The countries and the peoples of southern Africa and their problems will not simply disappear from the map. South Africa nevertheless will continue to seek peaceful progress regardless of the negative attitude of those who cannot or will not contribute to that cause at the United Nations. But—and this is no threat—if it should come about that all voices of reason become silent one day, let it then not be forgotten at that moment that my Government assiduously sought a peaceful solution to our differences of opinion. For there is one basic and over-riding element on which we are not now and will not in the future be prepared to bargain—and I might as well state this clearly—and that is our right of existence and the right to govern ourselves. We have earned that right the hard way through 300 years of toil and struggle and love for the soil of our African motherland, the only home we know. That is why we extend a hand of friendship to all African countries and peoples. That is why we can play a meaningful role in the development of our part of Africa. That is why we are accepted as a nation of Africa.

163. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

164. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): It is a happy occasion for me to greet the illustrious representative of Angola, and the least I can say is that I join others in wishing his people peace and prosperity.

165. I am constrained to make a few remarks to two of my colleagues who happen to represent major Powers. These two are none other than my colleagues from China and the Soviet Union. Although I am a monarchist, I do not seem to be at all happy to see two neighbours belonging to the same ideology exchange invective. Someone said to me, "You should be happy, because you don't seem to be in favour of communism." I rebutted that comment by saying, "We belong to the United Nations and we have many ideologies, and we would like to see peace prevail among all nations, regardless of their ideology or way of life." If our colleagues from China and from the Soviet Union have differences, I hope they will solve them privately—I think they have ambassadors in Peking and Moscow—but if they fail to do so many of us would be happy to assist in trying to find a solution. If, on the other hand, they think that their differences should be aired, why not submit a specific item to the Security Council or to the General Assembly and we will address ourselves to it? Let us not beat around the bush and try to hurt one another as representatives of States and as persons representing our countries. Therefore I appeal to both of them to exercise a little more restraint in the future if they think that they can perhaps gain something by bringing out their differences in the Security Council or any other body of the United Nations.

166. The silence of the Western States seems quite ominous to me. I have not heard any of them say they have been watching things. I know what they are thinking: let those Africans and Asians get things off their chest, and they will feel better after that. Then perhaps, to use an American phrase, they have something cooking—something which might be delicious or might be bitter. We shall find out what they are cooking in due time.

167. With regard to aid that comes from the outside, I must say that the struggle for independence of the United States after 1776 was aided by the French. Who can forget Lafayette? Somebody might say it was because the French were revolutionaries, but this was before the Revolution. Lafayette was not a revolutionist. Of course, the French had their Bourbons, and the British had their kings. It was a question of helping one emerging State against another big State, for the simple reason that they thought it was serving self-interest. On the other hand, there are always people who are imbued with high ideals—like Lafayette, I believe. I read his biography and found that he was a real idealist. On the other hand, many British historians thought that Lafayette came here in order to see to it that the British would be weakened in their colony. But who aided the Western allies in Europe during two world wars? The United States. Of course they said, "We are helping the Western allies in Europe to preserve democracy." There was less democracy after the First World War than before the First World War. Democracy was ritualized after the First World War. I do not see why some States

should not assist other States; if they have no ulterior motive, or no immediate ulterior motive. However, I must say that in our era there must be some ulterior motive, because we still predicate our policies on balance of power and spheres of influence, and it stands to reason that, for instance, the Soviet Union thought this was a good cause to help the Angolans, and of course our good friends from the West thought it was interference in what they would like to consider their own sphere of influence. Be that as it may, helping a people to liberate itself is worthy, regardless of the source of the aid or assistance. For example, who aided the Greeks in 1824, when they got their independence? The British sent Lord Byron, the poet, to Greece to liberate them from the Ottoman Empire, and many extolled the British for that matter. Of course, the Turks did not like that, but those who believed that liberty should be served thought that the British did something good. Who helped the Turks when the Western allies wanted to dismember what was left of the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia? The Russians—the Soviets. They sent mules laden not with provisions but with gold, with bullion, to help whom? The Turks, although the Turks were not Communists. Why? Again balance of power and spheres of influence. There is no new approach in international affairs, which should pain every one of us and should encourage us to see to it that the next generation will have that new approach.

168. Now I come to the statement of our colleague Mr. Botha—we cannot call him by any other name, no matter how despicable some of us think the policy of South Africa is. He spoke of hypocrisy. Mr. Botha of all people speaking of hypocrisy. Good Lord, it is ludicrous. He also spoke of selflessness. Then he used such terms as "the protective and humanitarian considerations". I was all ears to learn whether he was going to speak about the liberation of some of the people under South Africa's yoke. It turned out to be a hydroelectric project, and about 10 pages were about the hydroelectric project. They spent \$275 million on that project and did not want anything in return. Now if we are short of money in the United Nations we know where to go. We will balance our budget. You laugh about it. It is ludicrous. As we say in Arabic, for the face of the generous God they paid that \$275 million. Then he spoke of South Africa's limited involvement in Angola. Why should they be more involved when they saw that they had lost the game? I think they were wise there. I am talking objectively. The balance was tipped against them. It was the better part of wisdom to salvage the troops they had in Angola. He pats himself on the back for that. Now if he knows that some of us analyse statements, he should not venture to say those things.

169. I return to the hydroelectric project. I assure him that our African brothers prefer to suffer from thirst and live in darkness after sunset than to be robbed of their freedom. Do you hear that, Ambassador Botha? Man does not live by bread alone. The

Africans lived before there were hydroelectric projects on that continent. What kind of travesty is this? When the Crusaders came to our region they learned agriculture. You know one of the reasons that the Crusaders came was to delay the national movements, because all the kings and princes were vassals of the Pope, who was the spiritual as well as the temporal power of Europe. There was a dearth of crops and he said to them in 1087—and none other than Peter the Hermit was his propagandist—"Go to the Holy Land, wrest the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the infidel", meaning from the people of Palestine. If he knew the Koran—and I am sure he was a learned man—he would know that Christ is mentioned in the Koran as being of the spirit of God. Then those Crusaders soaked their hands in the blood of the indigenous people of Palestine and said, "Here Jesus, we came to avenge thee."

170. Now of course we are living not in the era of sabres and knights-at-arms; we are living in the industrial, technological age, and we have what? Hydroelectric projects. The proverb in our part of the world was: "It is better to eat the tares of your land than the golden grain of the Crusaders". The tares are bitter and are not as nourishing, and the Africans would rather live in darkness after sunset than have others lord it over them because they happen to be industrialized. In turn the Africans will be industrialized, and perhaps they will engage in some archaic nostalgia about the time when they did not have hydroelectric projects. What do hydroelectric projects get us? Weak eyes, an unnatural life, staying up until midnight. Some of us are getting to be playboys and playgirls at night, whereas people lived naturally before all those appurtenances of so-called civilization.

171. Why do we not come to the real causes of the interference of South Africa, not only in Angola but surreptitiously in many parts of Africa. They are afraid, and some of the Western Powers—I do not want to lump them all together—are afraid that the Africans will eventually chase the white man out. I feel sorry for the innocent whites, because after all they are human beings. They will be the prey; they will be the people who will pay the price of war.

172. But tell me, my good friend Ambassador Botha, why are you still in Namibia? They launched their campaign—I do not know whether it was a large or limited one, I am not a militarist—but I know that their troops came from Namibia. Namibia was declared a Mandate of the League of Nations, and a Mandate had certain terms and conditions—that the people who lived in the Mandated Territories should be prepared for independence. The Papuans were liberated. We saluted the Australians and the New Zealanders for having accelerated the political education and the liberation of people who were not very far from their own territories. Why do they not liberate Namibia as a gesture towards the Africans?

173. I am not going to talk about *apartheid*. My African brothers here are always tempted to bring in everything. Everyone puts in his pinch of salt—racism, *apartheid*, South Africa—and then we do not know what salad or what food we are eating because it contains so many spices. Why does South Africa not liberate Namibia? Let them tell us why. Is it because of the chiefs of the tribes that they protect there or because there are certain interests? We went through all that in the past. I spoke here in the Council perhaps 10 times, and 20 times in the Assembly. I had occasion to talk to Mr. Muller the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, several times about accelerating the self-determination process of the Namibians. There is procrastination. How are we expected not to lose confidence in South Africa. Now I am not talking about *apartheid* and racism; I am talking specifically about Namibia, from which they launched the aggression. Why? Why? Why? Why? A thousand times why? Tell us why they have not until now liberated Namibia, which is not their property and from which they launched their aggression. Why?

174. What assurance do the Angolans have that in the future South Africa will not use Namibia as a spring-board for further aggression? They have no assurance whatsoever. The South Africans have no right to Namibia and no place in Namibia. I note from the map that the Secretariat furnished me with that Namibia and Angola have common frontiers and that there is a small strip of land that also connects Rhodesia with Namibia. What assurance do our African brothers have that there will not be a pincer movement when it suits the South Africans for some reason or other to close in on Angola another time? We have no assurance. Therefore, if they want to assure us of their goodwill, let them not talk about hydroelectric power and \$275 million. Let them liberate Namibia forthwith and then we shall begin to believe that they are seeing the light. You cannot fool us any more.

175. But, unfortunately, the South African whites are still living with a nineteenth-century colonial mentality. This is finished; this is passed.

176. Namibia is *de jure* a Mandate that has been declared free by the United Nations. But this is just like me declaring myself the Emperor of China *de jure*; *de facto* I am Baroodi sitting at this small table here. *De facto* the South Africans still lord it over Namibia, and we sit as false witnesses here. Certain Western Powers are silent. When they mentioned sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa, I said to my African brothers: "You are wasting your time. Sanctions did not work in the First World War and neither did they work in the Second World War."

177. What can we do? Coerce, compel South Africa to see the light? No. I should like to appeal to them, because their years in Africa as whites are numbered. I would not say decades but years—perhaps five, or six or seven. I am not a prophet; that is from my own

analysis, and in many cases it has come true. I feel sorry for them because, after all, there are innocents among them. It is the leaders that should have some sense knocked into their heads. I appeal to their leaders to see the light.

178. There are 220 million or so real Africans. And how many whites? I was told that there are 4.2 million whites, who want to have their own way. They are an alien element that is causing an abscess in the body politic and body social of the African continent, and, if they do not adjust to the majority, that abscess will be lanced and the pus will be squeezed out. This will entail a lot of suffering to the Africans themselves and to the whites who, figuratively speaking, will like pus be squeezed out of the African continent. I am using a figure of speech. Two hundred and twenty million Africans against, say, 5 million whites—I do not know whether they are taking the pill in order to stop procreation. Even if they take a fertility pill, the Africans do not need a pill, they are procreating like wildfire.

179. Let the South Africans withdraw from Namibia and show us their goodwill. I have talked to Mr. Muller, though Mr. Botha. This is the tenth—perhaps the twentieth—time I have mentioned it. “If you do not change, you will collapse. It is a question of years.” Again, it bears repetition.

180. Mr. Botha has just referred to himself as an African. But they are Afrikaners, not Africans. What was Rhodesia? Rhodesia was a fief for Cecil Rhodes. And then he asked the British Government to take over, just like the East India Company also asked the British Government to take over India. Graciously the British finally left the subcontinent—India and Pakistan—and they are free and happy and they are friends. Why do South Africans not make friends with the Africans and you will enrich yourselves more. All right, you say that you cannot help it, that man is a creature of habit and that, because of your white skin and blue eyes—or whatever the colour of your eyes—you want to be isolated. You remind me of the Samaritans in Palestine. They would not mix with the Jews in those days, and do you know what happened to the Samaritans? At the last count they numbered something like 87; their number dwindled because they did not want to mix or intermarry. If you do not want to mix with the Blacks—as the Portuguese rightly did in Brazil and elsewhere, and I salute the Portuguese Brazilians because, whatever you say about them, they were not racists to the same extent, although perhaps some of them were racists; but they were a multiracial society—then get out. Go and we shall ask our friends from the United States, if they perhaps need gold-miners, to open up Alaska and Texas for those who do not want to mix. And then their property would be put into the custody of none other than the United Nations. Those who do not want to mix with the Blacks can clear out to Texas, Alaska, Canada and Australia. I do not know what kind of Government

Australians have these days, but I think that they would take them. They are whites and if you put white with white it equals white. White and black equal mulatto. They do not like mulattoes, though they like *chocolat au lait*. It is really pathetic.

181. I want to ask the South Africans a question: Do they believe in self-determination in so far as Namibia is concerned? If they do believe in self-determination, they should liberate Namibia forthwith. We have been telling them this for 10 on 15 years. Nine years ago I participated in a special session of the General Assembly, and on the question of South-West Africa we asked that Co-Administrators be appointed from neutral countries to administer the Territory with South Africa so that in a few more years South West Africa—or Namibia, as we call it now—would be free.³ Instead, in 1976 what do they do? The South Africans launch aggression from a Territory that does not belong to them, and they come here and talk about double standards. Did not the members of the Council hear Mr. Botha speak of double standards? Who is creating double standards?

182. Somebody referred to the fact that they are a Member State and that they should respect the principle of self-determination, which was elaborated by some of us, including myself, into a full right. The right of self-determination is referred to by the erst-while colonial Powers in their parliaments. I recall my good friend Sir Samuel Hoare. When we were debating this question of self-determination in the Third Committee, Sir Samuel used to tell me “My good friend, self-determination is a collective right and we are dealing with individual rights.” I said: “We are not hermits; what about the rights of the family, the right to worship, the rights of the labour unions? We are not dealing with man as a separate entity from society but as a cell in the body politic and body social of every community of every nation.”

183. The hour is late, but I have not talked for an hour, as did the representative of South Africa, half of it about hydroelectric power. I have spoken about self-determination. I have spoken about the liberation of a people. I have spoken about the number of years that can be counted for the whites there. Get out gracefully. Or if you do not want to get out gracefully, then live in cantonments that are all white, but at any cost get out of Namibia, you South Africans, lest the whole of Africa, bolstered by the Asians, the liberals of Latin America and, I dare say, people with enlightened minds like the new British, the new French and the new Italians who have seen the light, march on you, not perhaps to eject you by force of arms but to clamour for the freedom of Namibia until your eardrums are pierced and you cannot stand it any more. And if you become deaf, then we will treat your deafness.

184. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the United Kingdom who has asked to speak on a point of order.

185. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): The representative of Saudi Arabia started his discourse by wondering what the silence of the Western Powers denoted. Would it not be nice if just once we had to ask that question of the representative of Saudi Arabia?

186. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I like such remarks. I have been told that I speak too long and too often. In reply I would say that those who wield world power—and I believe that our British colleagues are still strong—do not have to speak for a long time, but we who cannot wield power have, as our only solace in this United Nations until it changes its policies and adopts a new approach, to keep hammering away with words and not with bullets, hoping that by repetition we may finally not intoxicate you but influence you to be more humane with the Africans and with others.

187. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of China, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

188. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Because the time is late, the Chinese delegation does not intend to reply now to the slanders against China contained in the statement of the Soviet representative today.

189. However, I wish to point out the following: before Mr. Baroody took the floor, the two aggressors made a defence of their crimes of aggression and intervention in Angola. One aggressor depicted itself as the saviour of the Angolan people and even vowed that it did not harbour any selfish designs. The other aggressor depicted itself as a philanthropist who was concerned with the interests of the Namibian people, particularly the people of Ovamboland. However, these are all absurd and ludicrous lies which cannot change the facts that they, the South African white racists and the Soviet social-imperialists, have left behind, written with the blood of the Angolan people.

190. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

191. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Members of the Council will have noticed, no doubt, that in the Council and at committee meetings our delegation has never begun any polemics with the Chinese delegation. This is something that can be checked right now with the tapes and verbatim records of this as well as of earlier meetings. Polemics have always been begun by the Chinese delegation.

192. So today a rather curious event occurred. The arguments which were put forth by the South African representative, who has fled, were similar to those used by the Chinese representative in his speech. To the Chinese representative, I can reply by saying, "With only two legs, one cannot straddle three boats."

193. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of China to exercise his right of reply.

194. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): I have already stated that the two aggressors are also the two liars. I need to say no more.

195. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to exercise his right of reply.

196. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I think that the discussion in the Council would proceed much faster and be much more business-like and constructive if slander and crude lies of an anti-Soviet character were not brought up here by the representative of China.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.

Notes

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 53, document A/L.784.*

² *Ibid.*, document A/L.786.

³ *Ibid.*, *Fifth Special Session, Annexes, agenda item 7, document A/L.517.*

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