

UNITED NATIONS



**SECURITY COUNCIL  
OFFICIAL RECORDS**

UN LIBRARY

THIRTIETH YEAR

FEB 29 1984

UN/SA COLLECTION

**1853<sup>rd</sup>** MEETING: 6 NOVEMBER 1975

NEW YORK

---

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1853) .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	1
The situation concerning Western Sahara .....	1

**NOTE**

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## 1853rd MEETING

Held in private in New York on Thursday, 6 November 1975, at 12.15 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Yakov A. MALIK  
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Mauritania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1853)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation concerning Western Sahara

*The meeting was called to order at 12.25 a.m.*

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Before the Security Council proceeds to the substance of the issue which it is to discuss, I should like to call upon all those persons present here who are not members of the delegations of States members of the Council, or of the delegations of Morocco, Spain and Algeria, to leave the Council chamber, as the meeting we are about to hold is to be private. From this I conclude that only representatives and delegations of States members of the Council and of the three parties concerned and interested—Morocco, Spain and Algeria—are present in the Council chamber. We shall now continue the meeting.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation concerning Western Sahara

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council [1849th and 1850th meetings], I intend, with the agreement of the Security Council, to invite the representatives of Spain, Morocco and Algeria to participate without the right to vote in the Council's discussion of the situation concerning Western Sahara.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Slaoui (Morocco), Mr. Arias Salgado (Spain) and Mr. Rahal (Algeria) took places at the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Members will recall that on 2 November [1852nd meeting], the Security Council continued its examination of the question of the situation concerning Western Sahara and adopted resolution 379 (1975), which contains an urgent appeal to all concerned and interested parties to avoid any unilateral or other action which might further escalate the tension in the area.

4. Considering how serious the situation is in Western Sahara, as President of the Security Council I declared, in summarizing the results of the meeting, that the Council would continue to follow closely the development of events in respect of the situation in Western Sahara and would meet immediately if it seemed necessary to do so, as provided for in resolution 379 (1975), in order to take any further measures required. At the request of a number of members of the Council, who manifested their concern at the reports that the situation in the region was becoming complicated and more serious, I called a consultative informal meeting of the members of the Council at 10 p.m. yesterday; there we heard a report by the Secretary-General, who told us, on the basis of the information at his disposal, that the situation in the region was becoming more tense and that the march envisaged by the Government of Morocco was proceeding and that the intention was to cross the border of Western Sahara this morning.

5. A number of members of the Security Council expressed themselves in favour of holding a closed meeting and, in order to obtain fuller information about the situation in this region, the members of the Council intend to ask questions of the representatives of the parties concerned and interested. After receiving answers to these questions the Council will examine the situation which has arisen and will take whatever decision is necessary. That is the situation.

6. Now I would request the members of the Security Council who intend to ask questions of the representatives of the concerned and interested parties who have been invited to participate in the present closed meeting to ask the questions that they want to ask in order to obtain further information in addition to the information which the members of the Council have at their disposal on the basis of the communication given to them by the Secretary-General. Who among the members of the Council has questions

for the representatives of the parties concerned and interested?

7. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): I think that our brothers from Morocco and Algeria, as well as our friends from Spain, know what is the purpose of this meeting. I believe that they have prepared statements to make on this subject. Perhaps it would be more useful to call on each in turn and hear what they have to say, and then put questions, if necessary.

8. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): To take up the suggestion of my very good friend and neighbour to the right, I was under the impression that this part of the meeting was not to be taken up by statements, but to be devoted to questions on the part of Council members, and I think it is a better use of our time.

9. I am going to put one question to the representative of Morocco, because it is a very crucial question and I think it has been in our minds ever since this morning at least. We have been led to believe, or been told, that the march—which is the crux of the matter as far as the meeting of the Council today and the informal meeting earlier are concerned—is symbolic. First of all, I want to know if this is a correct representation through the media of the intentions of the Moroccan Government, that it is symbolic.

10. Secondly, being symbolic, does that mean that it is not going to be a sort of quasi-occupation of part of the Territory of Western Sahara, meaning that once the claim—which I understand the Moroccan Government is putting forward—has been made by means of the march, the participants in the march would be withdrawn back into Moroccan territory? Those are the two questions that I should like to put to the representative of Morocco.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Before calling upon the representative of Morocco to answer the questions of the representative of Sweden, I should like to give an explanation in connexion with the remarks of the representative of Mauritania. At the consultative meeting, we agreed that the closed meeting of the Security Council would above all be for the purpose of collecting additional information about the situation in the area itself.

12. We have heard a rather detailed account from the Secretary-General, and on the basis of that, we all have the impression that the situation is becoming very tense in that area, and that the intention is to cross the border by morning, even though symbolically and conditionally. According to existing information the Spanish side has laid mines along the border. This, of course, means that the crossing of the border involves a serious risk of future complications even if the march and the incursion are purely symbolic. The members of the Security Council, after hearing this information, and seeing how serious the existing situa-

tion is, decided to hold a closed meeting of the Council, with the participation of the parties, in order to clarify certain issues, in order to obtain more comprehensive information, and to have a better picture of the situation with regard to the question under discussion.

13. If we now renew a discussion, calling upon each party to make a statement on the substance, this could go on for hours, and we would lose a lot of time. According to the radio, the march is going to start in about half an hour. We do not have time for discussion. We have to have answers from the representatives of the parties in order to be able to examine the matter under discussion urgently and take a decision.

14. I call upon the representative of Morocco to answer the questions of the representative of Sweden.

15. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The problem of the march is intimately linked with and inseparable from the substantive problem. I would have wished to make a brief preliminary statement so as to place the problem of the march within its proper context. If you will permit me, Mr. President, I shall make that statement, which will take only a few minutes. If not, I shall reply to the questions put by the representative of Sweden.

16. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): In answer to the representative of Morocco, the members of the Security Council had agreed to meet in order to put questions to the representatives of the parties concerned and interested and to obtain specific answers. Your exposition of this problem has already been heard by the Council, at three meetings [1849th, 1850th and 1852nd meetings], and it is scarcely possible now, at this late hour, when we have literally only minutes before the beginning of the march, to hear comprehensive explanations of the background and substance of this question, especially when we have heard them already. I would therefore ask the representative of Morocco to answer the questions of the representative of Sweden as quickly and as briefly as possible.

17. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The peaceful march which has been decided on by His Majesty King Hassan II is not in the least aggressive in character, and is not inspired by any feeling of hostility towards anyone. Furthermore, His Majesty the King, in the statement he made last night, actually called on the participants to observe strict discipline and to show the greatest friendship towards the Spaniards. It is a "Green March", made up exclusively of unarmed civilians, men and women. This being so, I must say how pleased we are to note that actually the climate in the region is rather one of détente.

18. That is indeed how we should interpret the wise decision taken by the Government of Spain to draw back the defence lines by 12 kilometres inside the

geographical frontier which separates Morocco from the northern part of Western Sahara. In these circumstances, the parties concerned, on both sides, are determined to avoid incidents. Therefore, there is no risk of disturbances to peace and security in the region.

19. We sincerely hope that this climate will be maintained along with the procedures initiated under United Nations auspices to find a solution to this matter in the context of respect for the right of Mauritania and Morocco to their national unity and territorial integrity. At any rate, my delegation assures the Security Council that Morocco will not commit any act likely to disturb peace and security.

20. I should like to say, too, that it would be to the honour of the Security Council to interpret this march as it is interpreted by the 350,000 Moroccans, both men and women, who have been selected from among those who volunteered to participate. Those volunteers regard it as a pilgrimage to places where the roots of their civilization came into being; they wish to communicate with a people with whom they share the same land, the same history, the same culture, the same way of life and the same civilization.

21. Mr. President, I believe that this solemn declaration I have just made before you and the members of the Council should provide you with all the necessary reassurances.

22. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Are there any other questions?

23. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): The Council will appreciate, of course, that as a representative of an African State it is not so easy to be in the situation in which I now find myself, but because the very rationale behind this meeting was to try to establish facts and find out as much information as possible with a view to defusing the situation and finding a peaceful solution to the process of decolonization, I consider it necessary to follow up more specifically the point raised by the representative of Sweden, which has been partially answered by the representative of Morocco.

24. I should be dishonest with myself if I did not preface my question by saying that we find it very difficult to accept any rationalization involving the crossing of the borders, or frontiers, of a Territory or State. In this particular case, our main preoccupation and concern—whether in the negotiations we have had in the Council, in the informal consultations, in the negotiations we have had with our brothers of Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, or in the meetings of the African Group or in other forums—has been, as we have always emphasized, the necessity of not doing anything that would create *faits accomplis* in the area.

25. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept the logic that, in the light of the resolutions already adopted by the Security Council—which had specifically requested all parties concerned and interested to exercise moderation and restraint and to refrain from taking any unilateral action—the march could still go on and cross the frontiers of Western Sahara, a Territory which is now under consideration by the General Assembly.

26. But, besides the opposition to mere acceptance of a situation of that nature, we want at least to find out from our colleague from Morocco what actually happens after the marchers get into the Territory. Can the representative of Morocco give us any assurances—or, at least, inform us—whether subsequent to this pilgrimage—because he used the word “pilgrimage”—all the 350,000, or 200,000 marchers, if that is the number, will be withdrawn from the Territory, or is there any intention, following the symbolic march, to preserve any symbolic presence in the Territory?

27. Furthermore, I ask these questions because I want to make it clear that, as far as we are concerned, there are two problems involved. There is the problem of the tension in the area, about which we are very concerned, but there is also the problem of the Territory itself and the rights of the people in the Territory, and the determination by the United Nations of what can be done or should be done in the Territory, a determination which was jointly concurred in before it was established by all the parties concerned and interested.

28. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): As we agreed, the representative of Morocco will answer each question, or we will ask him a number of questions, if other Council members have questions, so that he may answer all of these questions at once. I call on the representative of Morocco to answer the questions put to him by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

29. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, I should like to reaffirm that Morocco remains determined to participate in the working out of any solution for the decolonization of Western Sahara within the framework of the United Nations. We welcome the mission which the Council has entrusted to the Secretary-General. We are prepared to continue our co-operation with him and we wish him complete success in the pursuit of his mission.

30. Morocco will not overlook any possibility of negotiation or talks between the parties and the administering Power. Meetings have already been held both at Marrakech and at Madrid. Morocco remains attached to the principle of negotiations and is prepared to take up negotiations at any time and without any prior conditions. Therefore, there is no question of a *fait accompli*.

31. I understand very well the concern of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania, particularly since he is Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. I have been asked what the 350,000 pilgrims who will participate in this march will do. I must tell you that the decision was taken at 6 p.m.; I am therefore awaiting additional information from my Government, and I shall be prepared to reply as soon as I receive the necessary information. For my part, I believe that from now on everything will depend on an absence of tension, or more specifically détente, in which I firmly believe and which I think should emerge in the region.

32. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I note that the Soviet delegation has a question. Does the Government of Spain, as the administering Power, concur with the crossing of the border by the members of the march, and does it agree to this incursion of the members of this march for 12 kilometres into the Territory of Western Sahara? This question is directed to the representative of Morocco. Does the Moroccan side have any agreement from the Spanish side on this?

33. And now, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Morocco.

34. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): There is perhaps no formal agreement but, if we refer to all the information provided by the press, the interpretations which have been given to this withdrawal of Spanish troops to 12 kilometres from the border in Western Sahara obviously can have no other explanation—an offer made to this peaceful march, to allow this pilgrimage, to use the word I used earlier, to be made to this land which, I repeat, is the cradle of our whole civilization and of our fatherland.

35. It is not a matter of the Spanish frontier. This is a Non-Self-Governing Territory which is not under Spanish sovereignty and, accordingly, even from a formal point of view, it would be difficult for Spain to authorize or not to authorize Morocco to go beyond this parallel 27° 40', which in fact is merely a line drawn on a map which cannot separate two population groups that have in fact always been united by a common destiny.

36. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): In the light of the statement made by our brother from Morocco and without, of course, accepting his interpretation of Spain's responsibility as an administering Power in the Territory, I should like to put the same question to the representative of Spain that you, Mr. President, put to the representative of Morocco: What is the attitude of the Government of Spain on this?

37. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I give the floor to the representative of Spain.

38. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Spain's position in this matter has been presented clearly and officially at open meetings of the Council. Spain's position remains the same. In fact, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my great astonishment at the interpretations of the official Spanish position given in the presence of the representative of Spain.

39. In this matter, I believe it is fitting to bear in mind all—and I mean "all"—statements made here in the Security Council, on instructions from the Government of Spain, since 18 October. I mention 18 October, the date on which the representative of Spain brought before the Council [*see S/11851*] the serious situation that would be created if the march announced by the Government of Morocco were to cross the frontier of Western Sahara. Violation of a frontier is an internationally illegal act when it fails to comply with the requirements of international law. If these requirements are not met, one cannot speak of a peaceful crossing of a frontier.

40. I should therefore like to reply briefly to the question of the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the effect that Spain's position has not altered since the last public meeting of the Security Council. All that was said then remains valid.

41. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I wonder if I could ask two questions, one of the representative of Spain and one of the representative of Morocco. It would be helpful to the Security Council to know from the representative of Spain whether it is in fact accurate that Spanish forces have withdrawn, as we have just been told, approximately 12 to 15 kilometres from the frontier. And it would be very helpful, I think, to the Council to know from the representative of Morocco whether it is the intention of the Government of Morocco that the march should stop before it reaches the new line to which the Spanish forces have been withdrawn.

42. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I give the floor to the representative of Spain for his reply.

43. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I believe that there is some confusion in the terms being used at the present time to define decisions which, from a tactical or strategic point of view, the military authorities of the Territory of the Sahara may take. "Withdrawal" is not the right word. There has been no withdrawal. What probably happened was—and I am not an expert in military matters—that, for tactical or strategic reasons, the Spanish military authorities took certain decisions. One must take into account the nature of the terrain there; in that respect, surveillance of the frontier can

very well be carried out with mobile patrols. Therefore, there is no legal significance at all, nor can one derive any implication from decisions taken by Spanish military authorities in order better to defend the Territory.

44. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Before the representative of Morocco answers, might I clarify the question I put to the representative of Spain. What I am really concerned about is this proposition. We in the Security Council are obviously very concerned about the possibility of Spanish forces and the march coming into conflict. Now, without using "withdrawal" in any kind of pejorative sense or as denoting any kind of legal consequence at all, I think it would be helpful to know whether the Spanish authorities—very properly perhaps, from everybody's point of view and from the point of view of peace generally—have disposed their forces in such a way as to try and avoid any possibility of a military clash with the marchers who are coming in from Morocco.

45. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Spain for his reply.

46. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Obviously nobody has a greater interest than my country in averting any useless bloodshed. Therefore, the reply is obvious: we trust that there will be no clash—which the representative of the United Kingdom says might occur. In the context of my earlier reply to him, that is one of our major concerns.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco to answer the question put to him by the representative of the United Kingdom.

48. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): It is clear from all the information that has reached New York since yesterday afternoon that in fact our Spanish friends, as I said earlier, decided to move their defence lines back 12 kilometres inside the border in order to avoid any incident. The representative of Spain has just confirmed that.

49. As far as Morocco is concerned, I believe it is obvious that we are not running the risk of allowing 350,000 unarmed Moroccans to confront a conventionally equipped army.

50. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Does any other member wish to ask questions?

51. Mr. JACKSON (Guyana): My delegation has listened very attentively to the questions and answers. We are very concerned about the gravity of the situation. We should like to ask a question, against a background that is informed by two considerations. The first consideration is the nature

of our statements in the Council on two previous occasions when it considered this matter [*1850th and 1852nd meeting*]. The second consideration is the relations of friendship existing between my country and the concerned and interested parties in Africa, as States members of the non-aligned movement.

52. I should like to preface my question by saying that what I ask is totally without prejudice to any position that my Government may take when the Council comes to determine what action, if any, should now be taken. In saying that, I think it would not be premature if I pointed out that we are disturbed that what has been described to us as a symbol is in the process of being transformed into a pilgrimage.

53. We have listened very carefully to the replies given by my brother from Morocco. It would greatly assist my delegation if I could, through you, Mr. President, ask my brother from Algeria whether he has any pertinent comments to make on the questions and answers that we have heard in the Council.

54. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Algeria for his reply.

55. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I hope you will allow me, in order to help the Council rapidly to take the decisions required by a situation that is itself developing very rapidly, to make as concise replies as possible.

56. For us, the problem is not to ascertain whether the march—not only planned but decided upon by the Government of Morocco, and now undoubtedly already under way—is a symbol, a pilgrimage or an invasion. For us, the problem—whatever title may be given to this initiative—remains the crossing of a frontier and the invasion of a territory. Hence, I think that it is not and cannot be a question of a dispute over words. What is involved is to determine the nature of an act and, once that has been done, to evaluate the consequences of that act. And that brings me also to the replies given by the representative of Spain.

57. We have learned from the information media that Spanish troops have moved back somewhat inside the Territory, but we have also read about the very serious warnings given by the Spanish authorities...

58. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco on a point of order.

59. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): At the beginning of this meeting the representative of Mauritania requested the Security Council to allow representatives of States not members of the Council to make preliminary statements before any questions were put. In its consultations, the Council had decided that questions would be put to

representatives of States not members of the Council, questions which those representatives would be requested to answer.

60. Now I note that a question was not put; a request was made for comments on the statements made previously by the representatives of Spain and Morocco. The Council took a decision to allow members of the Council to put questions to representatives of non-member States, and I think that that decision should be complied with.

61. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of Guyana, a member of the Security Council, put a question to the representative of Algeria. The representative of Algeria was in the process of answering that question. I call on him to continue.

62. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): I was saying that it is of interest to ascertain the nature of the act now being prepared, and also to assess the consequences. I was saying that the withdrawal of Spanish troops did not mean at all that the dangers entailed in that act could in any way be regarded as reduced or as non-existent—particularly when we take into account the very clear warnings given by the Spanish authorities concerning the attitude they will take if the frontier of the Territory of the Sahara were to be crossed.

63. Thus, I think, to reply very briefly—and I assure my colleague from Morocco that I shall not take advantage of this opportunity by embarking on lengthy comments—that a deliberate act is in the process of being committed. That act automatically entails very clear dangers. I think also that the replies given by the representative of Morocco to the specific questions put to him did not contain the clarifications that had been requested. We still do not know in what way this march is symbolic; we still do not know how this march is going to avoid incidents; we still do not know what these marchers will do in the Territory of the Sahara; we still do not know in how much time they will withdraw, if indeed they will ever withdraw. I think that answers to those questions are essential for a determination of what action the Council should in principle take right away. I believe that that reply will be satisfactory to the representative of Guyana, who was so good as to put the question to me.

64. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to put a specific question to the representative of Morocco. On 2 November 1975 the Security Council adopted resolution 379 (1975). During our informal consultations the Secretary-General was unable to tell us what specific reply the Government of Morocco had given to that resolution, what its reaction is.

65. I should like to put this question to the representative of Morocco: What is the attitude of his

Government to this resolution and, in particular, to paragraph 1?

66. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco.

67. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): Paragraph 1 says that the Security Council: "Urges all the parties concerned and interested to avoid any unilateral or other action which might further escalate the tension in the area".

68. As I said earlier, it seems to me that the march in itself has not escalated the tension; rather the circumstances in which it is being carried out are at present such as to bring about a lessening of tension. I said, in fact, that two days ago a new development occurred which was decisive, and that was the statement of the President of the National Assembly of the Sahara. The President of the National Assembly, after having recalled the will of the population of the Sahara to be integrated into their respective home countries, expressed the wish of the National Assembly to have the question of Western Sahara solved by peaceful means. And according to the press reports, Mr. Lewin himself, the special envoy of the Secretary-General, described this statement of the President of the National Assembly as being a most important factor. He considered that it was a matter of reconciling, as it were, United Nations procedures with the recent developments in the region.

69. It follows then that there is a trend towards a solution which we hope will come about very soon and which consequently should make détente possible. The fact, I repeat, that our Spanish friends have decided, and I regret to have to repeat it, to draw back their defence line by 12 kilometres is also an act which indicates that there is no risk of conflagration in the region.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Are there any other questions? I call on the representative of Sweden.

71. Mr. RYDBECK (Sweden): I am not going to enter into the arguments here as regards the claims on this Territory because I think the Council is now most concerned, and solely concerned, for the moment, with defusing a situation, if possible, that could entail very grave consequences. In this context, since mention was, I think, very rightly and properly made by the representative of Morocco of the efforts of the Secretary-General, I want to say, and it is my—and I am sure the Council's—sincere hope that the consultations that the Secretary-General has been asked by us to undertake, and which have not been concluded, will give results; meanwhile, however, we are faced with a situation which is very acute.

72. Deducing from the answer to my first question, I conclude that the symbolic character of the march

will not mean that once the symbol has been, so to say, made or placed, the participants in the march will withdraw and the field will be given to other means of negotiation and settlement. So my question now is: Having penetrated, as the intention seems to be, into a certain area of the Territory, is the march going to stop there or are we going to have further marching into the Territory?

73. I am asking this question simply because what I am concerned with—and I think everybody is now—is that the situation is extremely inflammable. You cannot have hundreds of thousands of people in this situation of confrontation—even if nobody wants a confrontation, there is a fact of confrontation—without running tremendous risks of incidents. And I think that they could be incalculable if somebody's nerves or judgement snapped.

74. So I think it is very important for the Council to take its decision, to know what is the meaning of "symbolic march"? How far does it go! Is there a fixed conclusion somewhere, when the symbolic gesture will have been made? I think we are in an extremely dangerous situation.

75. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco so that he may reply to the representative of Sweden.

76. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The question put by the representative of Sweden is the following: Will the march, having penetrated into the Territory beyond the symbolic parallel 27° 40', stop there? The question was raised as to whether or not risks existed, or dangers existed likely to threaten the lives of many thousands of people.

77. I repeat, it is a peaceful march organized by unarmed civilians. I think we must therefore reach the obvious conclusion: there is no possibility of unarmed civilians being able to attack an army. But we must also recognize—and I repeat this—that since Spain has decided to go back 12 kilometres, and that the Spanish military authorities themselves have said that they would not fire on the marchers within this narrow strip of territory, then there cannot possibly be any chance of shooting or confrontation because the Moroccans are all civilians.

78. I believe the organization is perfect. Furthermore, in his address His Majesty the King called upon all Moroccans to observe strict discipline and to attack no one. Since the Spanish, for their part, have decided not to shoot, one can objectively conclude that there is no risk.

79. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Are there any further questions from members of the Security Council? I call on the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

80. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): This is not really a question. It is a matter of record, and, unless my colleague from Morocco corrects me, both in my question and in the question raised by the representative of Sweden, we wanted specifically to know, irrespective of the merits and demerits of the crossing of the frontier, whether, after the crossing, the marchers will move out of the Territory. That was the question of the representative of Sweden, and it is my question. I should really appreciate it if the representative of Morocco would reply to that question if he is in a position to do so, just for the record.

81. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco to reply to the question put to him by the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

82. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I solemnly reaffirm Morocco's desire to have this problem settled within the framework of the United Nations. The task has been begun under the aegis of the Council and through the Secretary-General's good offices. Morocco, having undertaken scrupulously to observe the terms of the solution arrived at by the United Nations, has firmly and solemnly agreed to continue along the path of dialogue and consultation within the framework of the mission of the Secretary-General.

83. I believe that the elements to be considered in seeking a solution should include the problem of the withdrawal or non-withdrawal of the Moroccans who have gone to that part of the Territory which all Moroccans consider to be a part of their country. Unfortunately, I am unable to say that they will withdraw tomorrow or the next day. But objectively this raises problems, at least of a material character, which will affect the final outcome, and I believe that will be one of the questions to be settled within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission.

84. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): I apologize for speaking again, but we are dealing with a serious matter. This is not a question; it is a comment. I think that, to be quite candid, it does not help the Secretary-General's mission to create an additional problem, so that in the process of finding a solution he has a problem that did not exist before.

85. I fully welcome the statement made by our brother from Morocco that they would like to find a solution within the United Nations. I am one of those Africans of the Organization who have been intimately involved in this problem with him, among others, and have been trying to find a solution. We have sent a United Nations Visiting Mission to Western Sahara. We have asked for the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,<sup>1</sup> and the General Assembly is about to proclaim its position on this matter. We are supposed to have a meeting of the

Special Committee today with a view to adopting the recommendations and conclusions of a report<sup>2</sup> which received the maximum co-operation of all the Governments of the parties concerned and interested.

86. Frankly, I do not see how the crossing of the frontier can in any way help the Secretary-General in his mission of trying to defuse the situation. With all due humility, I want to submit that this further complicates his mission and, of course, further erodes the possibility of the United Nations taking an effective stand. In fact, I may go further: it may even make a mockery of the very recommendations of the Visiting Mission we are going to adopt.

87. I am being very sincere and frank in this matter, and my brother from Morocco will appreciate my candour. Let me, for the sake of argument, assume that 350,000 people will be in Western Sahara for one reason or another—I do not want to start arguing about the nature of their mission. The Secretary-General, involved in a process of negotiating which may take one month, two months or three months, is not in a position to decide whether or not these people should return.

88. One of the recommendations made by the United Nations Visiting Mission was that the people be allowed to exercise self-determination—a sort of referendum. What sort of referendum would there be, when there is a population of 70,000 people and there are 200,000 or 250,000 marchers in the Territory? How does that help the United Nations to resolve the problem? I am asking this question in absolute sincerity, and I should appreciate a very sincere comment from my brother from Morocco in this connexion.

89. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Morocco in order that he may reply to the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania.

90. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I have said and repeated several times that Morocco seriously considered the solution of the problem within the context of the United Nations. Earlier I said that the path of negotiation was still open and that Morocco would contribute to it. I also said that it was within the context of the United Nations that a solution to the problem must be found. We therefore remain attached to negotiation.

91. I must add that the aspirations of the population have made themselves felt in recent days through different organizations and that the new elements that have appeared will have to be taken into account in the negotiations. The United Nations is closely connected with the decolonization of the Territory. I must recall that as early as 1966 the United Nations, in General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI), taking note of national links between Ifni and Morocco,

for example, requested the administering Power "to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, hearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)".

92. This precedent clearly is proof that implementation of the Declaration contained in resolution 1514 (XV) is not confined to a referendum. In order to arrive at genuine decolonization, implementation can take other forms. But what is essential and fundamental, I repeat, is that Morocco will make every effort to ensure that it is the United Nations which takes the final decision in respect of decolonization and its processes.

93. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Has anyone else a question to ask? Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I have a question for the representative of Morocco. Does he consider that the measures taken by the Government of Morocco, that is to say the organization of this "Green March", will in fact help the General Assembly to decide on the question of the future status of Western Sahara and allow it to take that decision?

94. As PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Morocco for his reply.

95. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I said that the Moroccan Government agrees that the solution should be reached within the framework of the United Nations. We believe, as I said earlier, that this situation will help in the search for a solution. Now it is not for the Moroccan representative to say whether or not this action will help matters. I hope it will make it easier for the General Assembly to act. But it seems to me that it is for the General Assembly to say whether or not this new situation facilitates its task or, on the contrary, complicates it.

96. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I would like to know the opinions of the other two parties, Algeria and Spain: namely, do they think that this sort of unilateral action by Morocco will in fact facilitate a proper solution by the General Assembly of the question of the future status of Western Sahara?

97. And now, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, I shall call upon the representatives of Algeria and Spain to answer this. I call first on the representative of Algeria.

98. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Without going into any major developments,

I think, in the light of the answers given by the representative of Morocco, that first of all the action of Morocco is going to create a new problem, which will be that of the introduction into the Territory of the Sahara of 350,000 Moroccans, who are going to stay there and whose withdrawal will have to be negotiated with the Government of Morocco.

99. I think that this first fact will make a solution of the problem more difficult rather than easier. The second point is that really to simplify a search within the United Nations for a solution to the problem of the Sahara, it is necessary to rid it of claims which have been rejected.

100. If those who make such claims think still that they have not been sufficiently rejected, nothing prevents them from asserting the claims again. But I do not think that the method for doing this is that of invading the Territory and then to say: "You see, I was right after all." Thus, without taking into account the question of the element of additional tension which the Moroccan action is going to introduce into the region, and without taking into account the possibility of the unleashing of violence in this region these very factors themselves, even if taken in the most favourable light, make it quite clear that, far from simplifying the solution of the problem, we would find ourselves instead confronted with an entirely inextricable situation after all.

101. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call upon the representative of Spain.

102. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On the basis of Spain's official position as stated by the Spanish delegation at the last meeting, I shall reply to your question by quoting, among the points which summarize the Spanish position, the first, which says that "halting the march on the Sahara announced by the Government of Morocco is a *sine qua non* for finding any peaceful solution of the problem of decolonizing the Sahara" [1852nd meeting, para. 23].

103. Obviously, the decision of Morocco to violate the Sahara frontier, if it does take place, as everything that we have heard here presages, will very much complicate the rapid and urgent decolonization of the Sahara and the debate in the Fourth Committee. And of course, in the opinion of my delegation, this action might create obstacles, which it would be most difficult to overcome, to any solution of the problem and to the laudable initiative of the Secretary-General.

104. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): And now, speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I should like to put another question to the delegation of Morocco on behalf of the Soviet delegation. The representative of Spain, as representative of the

administering Power in Western Sahara, has just spoken of a frontier violation by the participants in the march announced by the Moroccan Government. I should like to know whether the representative of Morocco considers it normal, or whether he expects that the Security Council, as the principal organ for maintaining peace and security, can sanction frontier violations.

105. As PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Morocco for his reply.

106. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I endeavoured at the beginning of this meeting to point out that the problem that you raise is indivisible from the rest. Basically, how can we speak of frontier violations when it is a question of travelling into the interior of the same Territory? The International Court of Justice did state in its advisory opinion<sup>1</sup> that there were ties of allegiance and territorial links between Western Sahara on the one hand, and Mauritania and Morocco on the other. Consequently, the Moroccans legitimately can and must believe that in going beyond that frontier, which was drawn by hand in pencil on a map—this parallel 27° 40'—they are still in their own land.

107. A little while ago I recalled the statement of the President of the National Assembly of the Sahara. That Assembly, composed of 103 members, has been considered both by Spain and by the Visiting Mission to represent the wishes of the population of the Sahara. That Assembly is composed of representatives of tribes from the southern and northern parts of the Sahara; therefore, its members represent the wishes of all the tribes. Those members have in fact stated that they have always belonged to one or the other of the States to the north and to the south of the Sahara. Therefore, if any legal questions are raised, we consider, in terms of what is legitimate, that we are in our own country when we cross parallel 27°40', which, as I said, was drawn by hand in pencil on the map of Morocco when the dismemberment of the region began.

108. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I note that the conclusion of the International Court of Justice, whatever it may have been and however it may be interpreted, has been submitted to the General Assembly for its final decision. It is the General Assembly which, as the court of last resort, must interpret the opinion of the International Court of Justice and take a decision concerning Western Sahara.

109. Thus the question arises: Why is it necessary for the Moroccan Government, before the General Assembly examines this issue and renders a decision, to take such unilateral action? Each member of the Security Council and every other person may quite legitimately ask himself this question, since this unilateral measure does complicate the situation on the

spot, and makes difficult the final decision on this question by the General Assembly, within whose competence it falls in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and all other decisions of the General Assembly with respect to Western Sahara.

110. Therefore, would it not have been more advisable not to hurry into such unilateral action but instead to wait until the final discussion of this question by the General Assembly and the adoption by it of its decision on this issue?

111. And now, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Mauritania on a point of order.

112. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): I am sorry to ask for the floor on a point of order, but I have the feeling that the Council is going considerably beyond the purpose of this meeting. I believe that the countries here—Morocco, Algeria and Spain—are not before an international tribunal. We came here to ask some specific questions, and we have done so. This is a political organ; the answers have been given. As to whether they are satisfactory or not, we shall draw our own conclusions, but I do not think it is wise for the Council to continue this sort of debate, since it goes beyond the Council's role and, in my opinion, does not fall within its competence.

113. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Speaking as the representative of the UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, I note that the Soviet delegation asked that question on the basis of the fact that the ultimate decision of this issue belongs to the General Assembly. Thus the question naturally arises whether it is advisable for any such unilateral measures to be taken before a final decision. If the representative of Morocco does not wish to answer this question, I shall of course not insist on it. We only have to take our decision.

114. And now, in my capacity as PRESIDENT, I call on the representative of Morocco for his reply.

115. Mr. SLAOUI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): I thank you, Mr. President, for having said that it was the delegation of the Soviet Union which put the question, and I am grateful to you for having specified this, because it had been forgotten. I must say, that, despite the goodwill which Morocco has consistently manifested, the process of decolonization, which had made progress, unfortunately came up against an impasse—a situation more or less similar to the one we are experiencing now. Ultimately we hope that the impasse will be only temporary, a momentary setback, and that the process of decolonization will be resumed as soon as possible.

116. Mr. SALIM (United Republic of Tanzania): I really think that we have asked the questions we wanted to ask, and we have received the replies that could be given—either satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily, as the case may be—and I think that, in the light of the lateness of the hour and the need for the Council to consider this problem, it would perhaps be wiser at this stage to revert to what we were doing before we called this meeting, in other words to begin another informal meeting of the Council to continue our informal consultations with a view to trying to find what sort of decision we hope to arrive at.

117. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania came to the conclusion I had reached. I myself intended to make such a proposal to the Security Council, namely, that we close our meeting—or perhaps end it—and immediately resume after a short interval. I do not want representatives to go too far away, since experience shows that moving here takes up a good deal of time. But we could easily go quickly into the next room for unofficial consultations on the situation and on the question of what decision to take. Then, after such consultations, I have been told that there will no longer be any interpretation available, but we might get along without interpretation, as we usually do. At such informal consultations we could agree to take a decision and then we could have an official meeting and take the decision.

118. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): I am not sure that it will be necessary physically to move about. I think it would be sufficient to invite the parties to leave. We are all members of the Council and we can continue our discussions among ourselves here. We would then have simultaneous interpretation, which will enable us to proceed faster.

119. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I have no objection to proceeding along these lines, especially in the way that our French colleague has suggested. Before doing so, however, I wanted to put a question, if I may. Before putting my question, to which I should like all parties concerned and interested here present to reply, if they are in a position to do so, I would say first of all, if I may, that from the replies we have already heard I draw the conclusion that all the parties concerned and interested are still ready to co-operate with the United Nations in order to find a peaceful solution to this problem.

120. Now, from what we heard from the representative of Morocco—he spoke of a peaceful initiative, a peaceful march—the word “symbolic” has been used. “Symbolic” usually means something which is not very large, but there has been mention of some 300,000 marchers. I would suppose that when the representative of Morocco speaks of “symbolic” that does not mean 300,000 persons but rather a small

number representing the 300,000. That is the first question I would put.

121. The word "pilgrimage" was also used. Usually, "pilgrimage" means going to one place—a holy place or a patriotic place—visiting and then coming back. Does that mean that this "pilgrimage" or march is provisional? If that is so, I should like, if possible, to know the reactions of the representatives of Spain and Algeria. What do they think about it?

122. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Spain for his reply.

123. Mr. ARIAS SALGADO (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At this stage of the debate on this question, after three meetings [1849th, 1850th and 1852nd meetings] and two resolutions, resolutions 377 (1975) and 379 (1975), on this item, the fact that we have before us the problem raised representative of Italy seems really incomprehensible. The delegation of Spain has with complete clarity, firmness and on several occasions expressed what its concern is in respect of this problem. The news we have at this time is that the peaceful, symbolic nature of this march is far from true. There is practically the certainty that armed elements are part of the march. Therefore, I think that this is something that is known to members of the Council. It seems to me that the problem has been sufficiently elucidated. Our concern is so serious that we should not at this stage be entertained with questions that have been superseded.

124. I should like to insist once again on what the position of Spain is. It is a very difficult situation. We would have liked—and this is logical—to resolve this extremely difficult situation without any incidents of any kind. But I believe that the first condition for the Council to assume its responsibility is to understand and accept present and future events. Without a realistic approach to the situation, there will be no way of finding a peaceful solution.

125. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Algeria for his reply to the representative of Italy.

126. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Let me at the outset reply to the first question of the representative of Italy and say that I think exactly as he does. It is very difficult for me to think that the march, which causes 350,000 persons to be on the move, can be considered as a simple, symbolic march, for it is a very heavy symbol. I would not even want to think what a symbol of this nature really represents. To think that this march is a pilgrimage would signify several things. It would signify, as the representative of Morocco so well put it, that this mass of 350,000 persons, while symbolic, is going to a territory which it considers to be its own. That means that the Government of Morocco,

while saying that it is inclined to entrust the solution of this problem to the United Nations, considers the problem already resolved because, as far as Morocco is concerned, this is Moroccan territory and 350,000 Moroccan citizens are going to visit it as if it were their own country. So to say that this march is a pilgrimage is simply to say that the problem is resolved as far as the Moroccan side is concerned.

127. I believe that there is, other than the serious danger I mentioned in respect of the volume of this mass of humanity on the move, a serious contradiction between the fact that this action indicates the problem is considered solved and the statement by the Moroccan representative that he is ready to entrust the United Nations with the solution of the problem of the Sahara. Those are the reactions of the Algerian delegation to the questions which the representative of Italy has asked.

128. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): That, I think, is the end of the questioning. I think the proposal of the representative of France is a reasonable one. We will interrupt this closed meeting and continue, here in the Council chamber, our informal consultations with respect to adopting a decision. In this connexion, I request the delegations of Algeria, and Morocco and Spain to leave the Council chamber.

*The meeting was suspended at 2.10 a.m. and resumed at 3.15 a.m.*

129. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I now invite the representatives of Morocco, Spain and Algeria to take their seats again at the Council table.

130. According to information received from the Secretariat, we are in some difficulty. It does not appear possible at this hour to arrange at short notice to hold a public meeting of the Security Council. For that it would be necessary to call on the services of teams of verbatim reporters, and they are not available but would have to be brought in. I would think therefore, that we should confine ourselves to resuming the closed meeting and take a decision at that closed meeting. This will not change the substance of the matter. In accordance with established practice a communiqué will be issued, and I would ask the Under-Secretary-General to read out the proposed text.

131. Mr. SHEVCHENKO (Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs): The draft communiqué reads:

"At its 1853rd meeting, held in private on 6 November 1975, the Security Council continued its consideration of the situation concerning Western Sahara. The representatives of Morocco, Spain and Algeria, as the parties concerned and interested,

were invited, by decision of the Council, to take part in the discussion.

“In the ensuing discussion statements were made by the representatives of members of the Council, as well as by the representatives of the three invited parties.

“After a suspension of the meeting, the Council decided to authorize its President to issue, on its behalf, the following appeal to His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco.”

And then will follow the text of the appeal.

132. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Thus, if there are no objections, we are taking a decision that an appeal shall be addressed to His Majesty the King of Morocco, over the signature of the President of the Security Council, in the following words:

“The Security Council has authorized me to address to Your Majesty an urgent request to put an end forthwith to the declared march into Western Sahara.”

*It was so decided.*

133. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Rule 51 of the provisional rules of procedure states: “The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone”. However, if the Council agrees, we can follow an alternative course, which is to decide that the verbatim record of this meeting shall not be confidential but shall be published in the same way and have the same status as the record of a public meeting.

134. What are the views of members on this point? Shall we have a record in one copy only as a record of our closed meeting, or shall we have the kind of record that is usual for a public meeting.

135. Mr. MOYNIHAN (United States of America): I would propose the usual procedure.

136. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): If there are no objections we shall, then, take

it that we have decided that the verbatim record of the 1853rd meeting shall be prepared and distributed in the same way as the record of a public meeting.

137. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I just wished to say that, while we have taken certain decisions, I think the draft communiqué is not faithful to them. In other words, we speak of statements made by parties concerned and interested, and statements made by members of the Council. It was, rather, a series of questions and answers. We had decided on those lines—“questions put to and answers given by”.

*There was a further informal discussion of the wording of the communiqué.*

138. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The Council has adopted the following text:

“At its 1853rd meeting, held in private on 6 November 1975, the Security Council continued its consideration of the situation concerning Western Sahara. The representatives of Morocco, Spain and Algeria, as three of the four parties concerned and interested, were invited by decision of the Council to take part in the meeting.

“The members of the Council put questions to the representatives of parties concerned and interested and received answers to them.

“After a suspension of the meeting, the Council decided to authorize its President to issue, on its behalf, the following appeal to His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco:

“ ‘The Security Council has authorized me to address to Your Majesty an urgent request to put an end forthwith to the declared march into Western Sahara.’ ” [See S/11869.]

*The meeting rose at 3.30 a.m.*

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.*

<sup>2</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 23, vol. III, chap. XIII, annex.*

...the ... of ...

---

### كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

#### 如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

#### HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

#### COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

#### КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

#### COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o dirijase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.

---