

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTIETH YEAR

UN LIBRARY

OCT 1 1975

1813th MEETING: 20 FEBRUARY 1975

UN/SA

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1813)	1
Statement by the President	1
Adoption of the agenda, *.....	1
The situation in Cyprus:	
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11625)	1

—
This

—
Room

Pleas

on —

S/PV.1813

-NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions *and Decisions* of *the Security Council*. *The* new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

1813th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 20 February 1975, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. **HUANG** Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Byelorussian Soviet Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Guyana, Iraq, Italy, Japan, **Mauritania**, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1813)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Letter dated 17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/ 11625)

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

Statement by the President

1. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): This being the first formal meeting of the Security Council to be scheduled since the start of the term of office of five new members of the Council, I should like to take this opportunity to extend a cordial welcome on behalf of all of us to our new colleagues, Mr. Jackson of Guyana, Mr. Plaja of Italy, Mr. Saito of Japan, Mr. Rydbeck of Sweden and Mr. Salim of the United Republic of Tanzania. We look forward with pleasure to co-operating with them in the coming months in the work of the Security Council.

2. I should like at the same time to mention the sincere appreciation felt by all members of the Council for the contribution made during their term of office by the outgoing members of the Council, Mr. McIntyre of Australia, Mr. Jankowitsch of Austria, Mr. **Anwar Sani** of Indonesia, Ambassador **Maina** of Kenya and Ambassador Perez de **Cuéllar** of Peru.

Adoption of the Agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Letter dated **17 February 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations** addressed to the President **of the Security Council** (S/11625)

3. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): As I had the occasion to inform the members of

the Council during our consultations yesterday, the Secretary-General has received a letter signed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus requesting that Cyprus be invited to participate in the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council. This letter stated also that the delegation of the Republic of Cyprus is composed of five members, headed by Mr. Glafcos Clerides. This request for participation is based on the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

4. In conformity with the usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I therefore propose to invite the representatives of Cyprus to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Clerides (Cyprus) took a place at the Council table.

5. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): As I have also already informed members of the Council, I have received letters from the representatives of Turkey and Greece in which they request that they be allowed to participate, under the relevant provisions of the Charter, in the current debate by the Security Council on the situation in Cyprus.

6. In conformity with the usual practice, and with the consent of the Council, I therefore propose to invite the representatives of Turkey and Greece to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places, at the Council table.

7. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): At this stage I wish to recall also that in the course of our consultations yesterday the members of the Council agreed that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Vedat A. Celik. I propose, if I hear no objection, to take it that the Council agrees to invite Mr. **Çelik** under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and, accordingly, at the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Celik to come to the Council table to make a statement.

8. **The PRESIDENT** (*translation from Chinese*): The agenda lists the letter which I have received

from the representative of the Republic of Cyprus dated 17 February 1975, requesting a meeting of the Security Council in view of certain events which have taken place in Cyprus. In addition to that letter, members have before them the special report of the Secretary-General [S/11624] on developments in Cyprus.

9. The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

10. Mr. CLERIDES (Cyprus): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to place before the Security Council the views of the Republic of Cyprus on certain matters that are very pertinent to its existence.

11. In December 1963, because of certain regrettable cases of intercommunal violence in Cyprus caused by an unworkable Constitution imposed on the people of Cyprus by the 1959 Zurich and London agreements, because of threats of military intervention by Turkey, because of repeated violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces, a delegation of the Government of Cyprus, placing its faith in the world Organization, appeared before the Security Council, in this very chamber, urging it to protect Cyprus from the threats of Turkish invasion and thus save the independence of a small State.

12. Twelve years have passed since December 1963 and today, despite the many resolutions unanimously adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council calling on all States to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, Cyprus appears before you again, no longer for the purpose of seeking to have the Organization prevent threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, nor of reporting or establishing the fact that Turkish forces have occupied 40 per cent of the Republic's territory and have turned 200,000 Greek Cypriots into suffering refugees, but to demand that measures be taken urgently and firmly, for unless they are taken the independence of Cyprus will be destroyed. In fact, all that will remain will be the haunting echoes of long debates in the General Assembly and the Security Council and piles of unimplemented resolutions in the files of the Secretariat.

13. I ask, Mr. President, for your indulgence if I seem to speak with some emotion. But the cry you hear is not mine: it is the cry of suffering Cyprus. Do not let it be a cry in the wilderness of conflicting international interests, of global strategic positioning, of defined and undefined spheres of influence and of chauvinistic nationalism. Hear it and know it for what it is: it is a cry to stop unbearable pain and suffering, to restore trampled-upon human dignity and to prevent the

destruction of an independent small State. I ask you to take now the necessary effective measures and provide the needed remedies to make the United Nations resolutions effective through implementation, restoring thus our confidence and that of the world in the United Nations, in which so many high hopes have been placed for peace and security, for a world of human dignity, for a better tomorrow.

14. It is not my intention in this address to 'play the role of the accuser of Turkey or of my compatriots the Turkish Cypriots, nor will I pretend that mistakes have not been made by all sides. I will not reopen old wounds, nor will I attempt to, apportion blame for what has happened or why it has happened. Such matters have been discussed *in extenso* in repeated debates on the Cyprus problem "before the Security Council and the General Assembly and with particular emphasis last November, when the representatives of all the countries making up the United Nations, having heard arguments and views and having considered the Cyprus problem in the General Assembly in all its aspects, unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX), which: 'was subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974).

15. I deliberately choose this course in the sincere desire to be constructive and not obstructive. What the Government of Cyprus is interested in is helping to find a just solution of the Cyprus problem, and our delegation; in order to achieve this end without malice or rhetorical venom, proposes coolly and calmly to confine itself to examining whether the resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council have been implemented; whether in the meantime actions have been taken by either side contrary to the letter and the spirit of those resolutions; whether the existing procedures, in view of what has happened in the meantime, are any longer adequate or capable of bringing a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

16. Finally, at the proper stage, the Cyprus delegation will explain its views with regard to the urgent measures needed to bring about compliance with and implementation of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Cyprus and of the necessary new procedures to be adopted without delay for the solution of the problem.

17. I hope that the representative of Turkey will join issue on these questions for I will not be sidetracked from them. Should he, however, wish to sidetrack me by attempting to establish cause and effect, he will find me brief, but not short of proven facts and convincing arguments; returning always after a short deviation to the main issues that I have already placed before the Council today.

18. On 1 November 1974 the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was voted upon **affirmatively** by Turkey also and which **contains** in its operative part certain cardinal principles for the solution of the Cyprus problem. About four months have passed since 1 November and it is pertinent at this stage to examine whether Turkey has **complied** or even made an attempt to comply with the provisions of that resolution. This analysis is very necessary and important because it not only will demonstrate whether Turkey, a Member of the United Nations, respects the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, but also will clearly establish the real intentions of Turkey with regard to the future of Cyprus. It will bring into focus Turkey's inflexible determination to dictate and to impose a solution on the Republic of Cyprus by using its military forces-which it has not withdrawn or even made an attempt to reduce-for the purpose of creating **faits accomplis** in Cyprus, thus getting the solution it had planned at gunpoint, instead of through free negotiations conducted by representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, as provided in the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

19. Whether Turkey has complied or has shown any intention of complying with the relevant resolutions of the **General** Assembly and the Security Council is, on the one hand, an issue of the utmost importance for 'Cyprus, because without such **compliance** it is possible neither to conduct meaningful negotiations nor to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem; while, on the other hand, it **constitutes** a major challenge to the world **Organization**, undermining' its very foundation and leading **us back** to the regrettable era of gun-boat diplomacy followed by the use of force.

20. I **would** ask' the, President and the members of the Council to permit me to summarize the cardinal principles in the operative part of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). It is necessary to examine them briefly in order to establish that Turkey, has not complied with a single one.

21. The first cardinal principle was respect for the sovereignty, 'independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and abstention from all acts and **interventions** directed against it. Turkey, regrettably, has shown utter disregard for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic, because it continues to keep under **military** occupation 40 per cent of the territory of Cyprus. The pretext for this continued occupation is the alleged need to protect the Turkish Cypriots from the danger of attacks by the Greek Cypriots. This is really a flimsy excuse to cover the real intention of Turkey, which is the continued occupation of Cyprus by Turkish forces,

22. We have offered repeatedly to the Turkish side, both at the Geneva conference and subsequently, to withdraw all Government forces, including the police force, from all areas of the island inhabited by Turkish Cypriots and to place the Turkish Cypriot population of the island under the protection of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, a force that would be enlarged in order to cope with this task effectively. This fair proposal, which still stands, was rejected without discussion by Turkey.

23. The second cardinal principle of resolution 3212 (XXIX) was the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel **from** the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its **affairs**. Not a single Turkish soldier has 'been withdrawn since the adoption of the resolution, nor has there been any attempt by Turkey to show any intention of complying with the call for a speedy withdrawal of its forces from Cyprus or, at least, as a first step, to reduce **substantially** its 40,000 troops in the island and withdraw military forces from certain areas, thus allowing refugees to return to their homes. On the contrary, statements have been made, both at the Geneva conference and after resolution 3212 (XXIX) was adopted, that Turkey does not intend to withdraw its forces from the territory of the Republic, but only to reduce them, without any commitment either as to the size or the time of such reduction. Does this show respect for or compliance with the resolutions of **the** General Assembly and the Security Council?

24. Turkey has used its forces since the date of the resolution to advance beyond the lines of the **de facto** cease-fire in order to occupy or raid factories, homes and properties belonging to Greek Cypriots. It has used its forces to expel forcibly from their homes Greek Cypriots who remained in villages under Turkish occupation, in order to make room for Turkish Cypriots who have, been moved from areas in the south to the north, and it has, contrary to **every** principle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and the relevant Geneva Conventions; restricted to the absolute minimum the freedom of movement of Greek Cypriots who live in areas under its military occupation, at the same time permitting the Turkish Cypriots to seize and exploit houses, factories, industries and other properties not belonging to them.

25. The third **cardinal** principle of **the** resolution was that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus **concerns** the Greek **Cypriot** and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Turkey, although professing to comply with this principle, in reality is dictating to the Turkish Cypriots the **nature** of the constitutional solution of the Cyprus problem and affording them the opportunity, by its military

presence in Cyprus, to take such unilateral arbitrary action as that of declaring a separate State in the area under Turkish occupation, thus creating situations which prejudice the very outcome of the negotiations.

26. The fourth cardinal principle of resolution 3212 (XXIX) provided for negotiations to be conducted freely, and on an equal footing, by the representatives of the two communities in order to find a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights.

27. On the advice of the Secretary-General on the eve of the adoption of the resolution, the representative of the Turkish community, Mr. **Denktaş**, and I had commenced talks on humanitarian matters. After the adoption of the General Assembly resolution the scope of these talks was enlarged to cover negotiations on the substance of the Cyprus problem. Despite my efforts to begin talks on the substance of the problem as soon as possible, this was rendered impossible because of objections from the Turkish side, which demanded that, before any talks began, the Greek Cypriot side accept the principle of a bizonal federation.

28. As a result of diplomatic contacts and efforts, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, though maintaining his country's position with regard to a bizonal federation, agreed not to insist on preconditions for the commencement of the talks, and 19 December was fixed as the date on which talks would commence between the representatives of the two communities on the substance of the matter.

29. From 19 December onwards, I repeatedly requested Mr. **Denktaş** to commence such talks, and although he agreed and the subject of the powers and functions of the central Government in a federal State was placed on the agenda, up to this very day it has not been discussed.

30. Having repeatedly informed him that I was ready, and in order to facilitate progress in the talks, I proposed that in the meantime we should begin examining the areas which would come under Turkish administration, the total extent of such areas, the return of refugees to their homes, and other considerations relevant to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Again, I met with the same monotonous reply from Mr. **Denktaş**, that he was not ready to discuss this subject either.

31. In view of the fact that no discussion on any subject touching on the substance of the Cyprus problem had taken place from 19 December 1974 to 7 February 1975, I informed Mr. **Denktaş** that at our next meeting, which was to be held on Monday, 10 February, I would be submitting proposals in writing for the solution of the Cyprus problem. On the same date-that is to say, on

7 February-Ambassador Weckmann-Mufioz, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, issued a communique approved by Mr. **Denktaş** and myself, which contained, inter *alia*, the following:

“Mr. **Denktaş** informed Mr. **Denktaş** that at the next meeting, he will give him in writing proposals for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Mr. Clerides and Mr. **Denktaş**, together with Ambassador Weckmann-Mufioz, will meet again on Monday, 10 February.”

32. On the morning of 10 February-that is, the day on which it had been agreed that the meeting with Mr. **Denktaş** was to take place-I was informed that at the request of Mr. **Denktaş**, the meeting had been cancelled and that perhaps we might meet on Friday, 14 February, or on Monday, 17 February.

33. In view of his cancelling our meeting “and having promised to give the proposals of my side to Mr. **Denktaş** on 10 February, I forwarded my proposals to him on that date. The proposals of my side were as follows:

[The speaker read out annex I to document S/11624.1

34. The objectives of these proposals were to expedite the commencement of negotiations on the substance of the Cyprus problem and to let Mr. **Denktaş** realize that certain possibilities existed of narrowing the differences between the two sides. The proposals, though based on a multiregional federation, accepted that a substantial area in the north would be under Turkish Cypriot administration and that the Turkish Cypriots would have a substantial majority in that and in other areas: Further, it was proposed that the Government would undertake the financial responsibility of building houses for Turkish Cypriots who might finally decide to settle in areas under Turkish Cypriot administration.

35. It is pertinent at this stage, in order to establish whether the Turkish side had any serious intention to negotiate, to examine what steps it has taken immediately after receiving the proposals of the Greek Cypriot side and before submitting its own proposals.

36. On 13 February the Turkish side decided on and actually declared a separate State in the Republic of Cyprus and elected Mr. **Denktaş**, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator at the talks, as the first President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

37. In the document purporting to set up a separate Turkish State in Cyprus, a number of reasons are given but two of them are worth considering carefully, because they betray the real motive for this action. It is stated in the document that the Turkish Cypriots have come to the conclusion that

the only way to solve the Cyprus problem is to create two respective regions. The document further states that the Greek Cypriot community has not made any constructive response to the proposal for the establishment of an independent federal State based on two regions and proceeded to proclaim a separate State.

38. Before the proposals which I submitted were discussed at the intercommunal talks, the Turkish Cypriot side, acting arbitrarily and unilaterally, declared a separate State in Cyprus, leaving us, **very** generously, the option to decide whether to accept it or not. Can one claim that such conduct is consistent with good faith or with free negotiations on an equal footing, as provided for by resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council? Does it not amount to a public statement, or a public declaration, that the Turkish side will not negotiate but impose, because of the presence of Turkish military forces in Cyprus, the solution which it wants? Can it be denied that this is an attempt to dictate and impose a solution at gun-point?

39. This action by itself would have been enough to destroy the goodwill that was so necessary if meaningful negotiations were to take place. It would have been enough to shake the confidence of the staunchest supporter of the intercommunal talks. In fact, it has. It has destroyed the confidence of the people of Cyprus in the talks, that of the Government of Cyprus and that of the Greek Cypriot representative at the talks. As a Greek Cypriot representative at the talks, even at the most dismal hours when everybody else gave up hope for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem, I staunchly defended the procedure of the intercommunal talks-and this is publicly known both in Cyprus and abroad. With all sincerity, bearing in mind my duty to Cyprus, my obligations to the Security Council, which repeatedly recommended this procedure, at this critical hour I state frankly, honestly and openly that the Turkish action to impose unilaterally a solution of the Cyprus problem makes the talks useless and unnecessary, and that new procedures must be sought for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

40. The Turkish side, as if the action of declaring a separate State were not enough completely to destroy the intercommunal talks, went even further in its efforts to impose its own solution on Cyprus. It has purported to enact a law by virtue of which the 40,000 Turkish forces of occupation can settle permanently in Cyprus, bringing also their families. They will be settled, of **course**, in the north of the island, in the homes from which 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees have been forced out by the Turkish forces.

41. It is an act to **colonize** Cyprus and to change the ethnic composition of the population of Cyprus.

The Turkish side decided that it must have a region of its own. In order to get it, it employed the simple but cruel method of forcing the Greek Cypriot population out, turning them in their thousands into destitute refugees. In order to fill the vacuum created, it moved Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north, and as the total population of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus is only **110,000—200,000** Greek Cypriots having been expelled-it is now importing Turks from Turkey to fill the gap. According to confirmed information, this plan is already being implemented and the first 100 families of Turks from Turkey have already been settled in Greek properties in Cyprus.

42. Yet there are certain people who hold the view that what the Turkish side has done should be ignored or should be glossed over by merely deploring this Turkish action, and that the intercommunal talks should continue as if nothing had happened. The theory behind such a way of thinking is that Turkey must not be pressed beyond a certain point because it will become even more unco-operative in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. I do not doubt that such people are **well** meaning, but, at the same time, I cannot agree with their reasoning.

43. If Turkey is pressed to comply with resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, we are told, **it** becomes more inflexible, more unco-operative, more obstinate. If it is left alone, it is obsessed with the idea of imposing its own solution. Yet, in the face of this intolerable situation, we are advised to continue talking.

44. If the purpose of free negotiations on an equal footing was merely to affix our signature to a Turkish plan for the solution of the Cyprus problem, then there is no need for such negotiations to continue. We are not prepared to put our signature to any agreement dictated by Turkey and based on facts **accomplis**. This was not the purpose nor what the General Assembly and the Security Council had in mind in commending negotiations between representatives of the two communities for a freely reached and mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. In fact, General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) provided even for the eventuality of such a situation 'as the one which we are facing now.

45. The fifth cardinal principle of resolution 3212 (XXIX) was that all refugees should return to their homes in safety and that urgent measures should be taken to achieve that end. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership have not permitted any of the refugees to return to their homes, using the pain and suffering of thousands of people as a lever to gain political advantages for their solution of the Cyprus problem. Not only have they shown utter disregard for this part of the resolution but, **further-**

more, they have gone beyond. it and used both physical and psychological pressure on the 9,000 Greek Cypriots who remain **enclaved** in the north in order to break their spirit and make them evacuate their homes.

46. It is characteristic that, although in the areas under the control of the Government full freedom of movement has been given both to 'the Peace-keeping Force and to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Turkish side, in **spite** of repeated appeals by both the United Nations- and the **International Committee of the Red Cross**, has failed to provide the necessary facilities and 'continues to refuse to do so. This refusal, apart from everything else, makes difficult any effort to trace and rescue 2,700 Greek Cypriots who have been missing since **August 1974** without any information as to their fate.

47. Furthermore, in other areas in the north where Greek Cypriots have remained, the Turkish side has forcibly ejected those Greek Cypriots **from** their homes, concentrated them in empty school buildings under guard and failed to provide for them even the rudimentary amenities for sustaining life, including medical services, so that those people, who were once happily living in their homes, are now in a state of complete **collapse** and despair.

48. At this point I wish to read out a report which Mr. Kelly, the representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees, made before Mr. **Weckmann-Muñoz**, Mr. **Denktas** and myself, during the meeting of 7 February 1975.

"Mr. Zuger: The people who were brought from villages to Morphou have been placed in a school building, in crowded conditions, under guard. They have no freedom to go outside the school building; they are mostly elderly men and women and young children. The situation is similar to that which existed in Vonní, Cypsou and Vitsadha. They want to go south because they are not allowed to go back to their homes. We have not noticed any signs of physical pressure on them, but it is true that after six months of confinement they feel that there is no hope for them. Even the Morphou people are not allowed to live in their homes, -with the exception of one family. Our doctors fear for the life of these people. Most of them have given up; they are lying on the floor; they are completely uninterested in everything that goes on around them and the only thing they do is cry. The Red Cross gives them what aid it can in medicines, but this is not enough. On humanitarian grounds we urge that they should be transferred to the south.

"Mr. Kelly: One must distinguish their present situation during the last two months from that which they were in before they were removed from their villages. Before they were moved from the villages they did not want to go south. They wanted to

remain in their homes. Now that they have been moved to Morphou, they wish to go south because the physical conditions in which they live are 'deplorable. They are confined in a school building; they are **not** allowed to move out of the building, 'their spirit has broken; they are lying on the floor crying. As far as we know, they were moved by the Turkish Army without any explanation.. They were not allowed to take their furniture or their personal belongings except for a few clothes. I had **visited** them 'before and they were happy in their homes **and** their villages.'?"

Then I put the following questions to **both** Mr. Zuger and Mr. Kelly:

"Mr. Clerides: Mr. Kelly and Mr. Zuger, do you have freedom of movement in the Greek areas?"

"Mr. Kelly and Mr. Zuger: Yes.

"Mr. Clerides: Have you visited all the Turkish villages in the south?"

"Mr. Kelly and Mr. Zuger: Yes.

"Mr. Clerides: Have you seen in the south Turks living in such conditions, that is, confined in school buildings, under guard, not living in their own homes, underfed or undernourished, with broken spirits?"

"**Mr. Kelly and Mr. Zuger:** Definitely no."

49. I think I have established beyond **reasonable** doubt that Turkey has not complied with the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX), that in fact it has not withdrawn any of its forces on Cyprus, that it has not permitted the Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes, that it did not enter into negotiations between the two communities with **any** real **intention** of seeking a freely reached and mutually acceptable solution, that it has used delaying tactics in the talks for the purpose of gaining time to create **faits accomplis** and to impose at gunpoint the solution which it has always had in mind.

50. The resulting situation is such that, unless the Organization, and in particular the Security Council, acts firmly now and takes the necessary measures in conformity with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), neither can the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus be saved, nor can a solution be reached.

51. It is obvious that no freely agreed **solution** can be arrived at as long **as** the Turkish forces of occupation remain in Cyprus, thus permitting, the Turkish -side to create **faits accomplis** in the area under its control. We therefore see an urgent **need** for the Security Council to **fix** a period of time within which

Turkey will have to comply with resolution 3212 (XXIX), which provides for the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic of Cyprus, for the adoption of urgent measures for the return of the refugees to their homes in conditions of safety, so that meaningful negotiations can take place in order to find freely a mutually acceptable solution.

52. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus seeks the strict and effective implementation of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) and of Security Council resolution 365 (1974), which have been so persistently and grossly violated by Turkey. Only through determined and effective action by the Security Council to enforce the implementation of the said resolutions, coupled with the provision of new procedures for negotiation, can there be progress towards a just and peaceful solution of the problem within the recognized norms of international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

53. On the issue of new procedures, however, I shall not state our views at this juncture. We have come here in a sincere effort to help in a constructive way, without any preconceived ideas, and will be ready, after hearing what representatives will suggest, to state our views. What experience has taught us, however, is that the Cyprus talks alone, with the presence of **the** Turkish military forces in Cyprus, cannot lead to the solution of the Cyprus problem, a solution which has now assumed great urgency.

54. I should like to close my address by reminding representatives that in the preamble of resolution 3212 (XXIX) the General Assembly recognized **the** urgent need for a solution of the Cyprus problem and expressed its grave concern about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

55. Not only has Turkey failed to comply with the provisions of resolution 3212 (XXIX) and all the Security Council resolutions, it has taken action contrary to their letter and spirit. As a result, the situation has worsened and it is in fact far more critical now than the situation which existed on 1 November 1974, when resolution 3212 (XXIX) was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. This is an additional reason why urgent and determined measures are needed now without further delay.

56. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): I call upon the representative of Greece.

57. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): The Greek Government is facing with the utmost seriousness the present situation in Cyprus. It is also facing it with a clear conscience. Indeed, there are few, if any, cases in the history of **this** Organization in which a country has made greater efforts, given proof of greater good will and unselfishness, shown greater

readiness to **pay—to** pay for its own mistakes and for the mistakes of others—in order to help the international community, in order to help you distinguished members of this Council to save peace. Unfortunately, the saving and restoration of peace depend upon more than one party.

58. We have had our fanatics, as Turkey and Cyprus have had theirs. But over the years Greece has never failed the Organization. **It** has never betrayed its resolutions or the votes my Government has cast on those resolutions. Our record in this chamber is clean, and I intend to make my voice heard on the strength of that record.

59. When I joined you in this Council last July, I was not afraid to admit the mistakes of a military dictatorship. I frankly disclosed that Greece was prepared to pay for the mistakes of a few Greeks. **I am** now authorized to inform this Council that we are not prepared to **pay** whatever price is **asked**, especially when that price is to be borne by the Greek C y p r i o t s .

60. I shall spare the Council the ordeal of the difficult cease-fires and the tragedy of the two Geneva conferences. I have already exposed them on previous occasions, and they are on record. Recent cease-fire violations by Turkish armed forces figure in the latest report of the Secretary-General before the Council [S/11624]. I must stress, however, that what happened when the cease-fires were violated and the conference was torpedoed were not isolated cases; they were the expression of a preorganized long-term aggressive policy initiated by Turkey against my country. Relations between Turkey and Greece entered a completely new era some time ago. Let us face it. They are **characterized** by two different mentalities, by two opposite approaches: intimidation and **faits accomplis**, on the one hand, and constructive compromise and effort for accommodation, on the other. This situation does not relate to Cyprus alone; it relates to everything. Throughout our long history we have learned the value of compromise, moderation and understanding. We have also learned their limits. We believe we have reached those limits.

61. It has always been Turkey's aim to find a solution to the Cyprus problem directly with Greece, **behind** the backs of the Cypriots. Before the invasion, the aim was to negotiate with us a solution from which both countries would draw advantages. We refused. After the invasion, the aim was to impose a solution on us, again behind the backs of the Cypriots—a solution based, of course, on Turkish victory and Turkish intimidation. We again refused. That is how the Cypriots came to the second half of the second Geneva conference. As will be remembered, the Cypriots did not participate either in the first Geneva conference or in the first part of the second conference. It was, however, in their presence that

the conference was torpedoed. No wonder it left bitter memories. No wonder the General Assembly indicated another framework.

62. Indeed, on 1 November 1974, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the question of Cyprus. It was the product of an honest effort by the non-aligned countries. That resolution was adopted unanimously. A few minutes before the vote, I made a wish. I said:

“I make the wish that the draft resolution [the non-aligned countries] produced will be supported by the affirmative votes of the whole Assembly and that all those who will vote ‘yes’ will mean ‘yes’ ”.1

All voted “yes”, but Turkey did not mean “yes”.

63. Paragraph 4 of that resolution; referring to the Nicosia talks just initiated at that time through the good offices of the Secretary-General, reads as follows:

“*Commends* the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good offices of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights”.

I have to make three comments on that paragraph. They have already been made by Mr. Clerides, but I insist that I myself make them too. First, the negotiations never took place on an equal footing; they were **all** the time conducted at gunpoint. Secondly, never was there any intention to reach freely a political settlement; the intention was to impose one. Thirdly, a political settlement unilaterally decided by a fait accompli cannot by any standards be a mutually acceptable settlement.

64. Even the kind of talks I have just described were not easy to start and keep moving. Only humanitarian matters were discussed until the end of the year, and it was only after repeated Greek efforts that it was finally decided to deal with political and substantive matters. Political negotiations started on 14 January. They survived not even a month, and they were torpedoed just like those of Geneva. The first problem was the airport. The Turkish Cypriot representative made the mistake of agreeing to have the Nicosia airport operated by the United Nations. Ankara stepped in and vetoed that idea; the airport should be operated on a fifty-fifty basis by the two communities. The fifty-fifty principle had to be the rule in all future arrangements. The bigger part of the **island**, the port of Famagusta, was to be operated **100** per cent by the Turkish Cypriots. That was not negotiable.

65. In an effort to break the stalemate thus created, Nicosia and Athens offered a complete frame of principles on which a federal State could be based. That plan went far beyond any Turkish claim or expectations prior to the invasion. It ensured separation of the Turks from the Greeks. It ensured a Turkish majority in the Turkish areas and financial means for having ail Turks who wished to **live** in the areas in the north moved into houses to be built for that purpose, instead of having them moved into Greek houses. The plan offered the substance of everything the Turkish Cypriots have asked for until now, and, furthermore, it was proposed as a basis for further negotiations. The plan was flatly rejected. The leading Ankara newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, reported that the plan had been studied by the Turkish Foreign Ministry and had been found unacceptable. Mr. **Denktas** stated that Archbishop Makarios had no intention of solving the Cyprus problem and that the recent Greek Cypriot proposals were unacceptable. And in order to avoid any further negotiations on this plan the occupied territory was **proclaimed** a separate State.

66. The Turkish side has argued in various official statements that nothing has been changed in the *status quo* by this proclamation. That might be true. But the *status quo* is a total partition, and we are supposed to be against partition. Turkey is supposed to be against partition-r at least so it **proclaims**. If we are negotiating, it is precisely in order to change the present status of partition and unify the island, even if it is to be in the frame of a federal State with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots separated. If Turkey's idea is to **legalize partition**, we do not need negotiations.

67. Greek Cypriots have never rejected any Turkish proposals prior to negotiations. They only expect that their own proposals be given the same chance. The Turkish Cypriots say now that they would be prepared to consider also the Clerides proposals as a basis **for** negotiations. But that is not what they said when the proposals were submitted. I have the very words of Mr. Denktag. He stated-and I quote from his declaration to the press: “The **recent** Greek Cypriot proposals were unacceptable”. How can one negotiate seriously after such statements? **The** Greek Cypriots have always been ready to examine and negotiate on any proposals in good faith, understanding and moderation. Their requirement is, however, that whatever is going to be finally decided should not be contrary to General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). I think that that is a perfectly legitimate requirement. They are not and we are not prepared to accept a violation of the resolution.

68. Resolution 3212 (XXIX) was adopted unanimously and subsequently, on 13 December 1974, was endorsed, also unanimously, by the Security Council in its resolution **365** (1974). Paragraph 5 of

resolution 3212 (XXIX) states that the General Assembly

“*Considers* that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end”.

Turkey voted in favour of that paragraph. It is true that the then Foreign Minister of Turkey formulated some reservations after the vote. I quote from the original text of the verbatim record of the plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 1 November 1974 . . .

“No principle appearing in the resolution adopted runs contrary to the policy pursued by Turkey as far as the **question** of Cyprus is concerned”.*

And then came the reservations on paragraph 5 of the resolution:

“As far as paragraph 5 is concerned, I should like to state that this is a political paragraph, as well as being a humanitarian one. It is very closely linked—and this is quite well known to all those concerned—with the political solution of the problem”.*

That means that the refugee problem could not be solved prior to a political solution; the solution to the refugee problem should be found in the framework of the political settlement.

69. But even if the refugee problem was not to be solved before there was a political solution, may I ask my Turkish colleague how he intends to solve it in the framework of the proclaimed so-called separate Turkish Cypriot State? Mr. Clerides' proposals were precisely intended to take that into account and went a long way towards meeting Turkish desires and combining them at the same time with this necessity. Greek Cypriots were willing to examine other proposals as well, provided they did not violate paragraph 5 or any other paragraph of the General Assembly resolution, the resolution accepted by Turkey.

70. The representative of Turkey has always made a remarkable effort to convince us that Turkey's aim is not partition. As far as the past is concerned, I shall refer to more objective persons than I am. And what person could be more objective than the Mediator for Cyprus appointed by the **Secretary-General**, Mr. Galo Plaza? I quote from his report to the Secretary-General dated 26 March 1965:

“[The Turkish-Cypriot community] envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy a separate part of the island.

* Quoted in French by the speaker.

The dividing line was in fact suggested to run from the village of Yialia on the north-western coast through the towns of Nicosia in the **center** and Famagusta in the east. The zone lying north of this line was claimed by the Turkish-Cypriot community; it is said to ‘have an area of about 1,084 square miles, or 38 per cent of the total area of the Republic’—they now have 40 per cent—“An exchange of about 10,000 Greek families for about the same number of Turkish families was contemplated”. [S/6253, para. 73.]

71. But I know by now how much my Turkish colleague dislikes Mr. Galo Plaza, so why not hear some other opinions, why not go further back in the past?

72. Lord Radcliffe, British Constitutional Commissioner for Cyprus, conducted an inquiry on Cyprus in 1956. I shall now read from The Review of the International Commission of Jurists, issue No. 13, of December 1974:

“... From the time of Lord Radcliffe's enquiry in 1956, it has been a Turkish goal to partition the island along [the Attila line Lefka-Famagusta] and to create a federal Cyprus with an autonomous Turkish state to the north. Such a division of the island would be grossly unfair to the Greek Cypriots. It would give the Turkish community, who constitute only 17 per cent of the population, one third of the island comprising its most productive areas and richest natural resources... It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Turkey is seeking, through the forced exchange of populations causing untold misery and suffering to both sides, to present the Greek Cypriots with a fait accompli.”

73. As for the present, I shall venture to present my own arguments and I invite your judgement.

74. On 6 February Mr. Denktag made a declaration to the Turkish press agency. A passage of that declaration was quoted by the newspapers as follows:

“The Turkish Cypriot community brought to the knowledge of Ankara that the time was ripe for the Turkish side to create a Cypriot **Confederation**”—I underline the word “Confederation”—“and to declare a Turkish Cypriot State member of it.”

75. On 7 February, “The Turkish Cypriot Parliament” voted a new law **recognizing** persons of various categories as citizens of the “Turkish Cypriot community”. That decision not only creates a separate citizenship for the northern part of Cyprus but aims as well at changing the composition of the population in Cyprus and the “Turkization” of the island, since it gives rights of so-called Turkish Cypriot citizenship to Turks from Turkey. Now, according to that law the following are considered citizens of the Turkish

Cypriot community in Cyprus and, consequently, of the so-called Turkish Cypriot State after its proclamation: first, all Turks married to Turkish Cypriot women—that is not too bad; secondly—this was mentioned by Mr. Clerides—all Turkish soldiers having served in Cyprus since 20 July 1974. That means a total of 40,000 persons and, with the rotations that have taken place, plus their families, the total would be a number of more than 100,000, thus doubling the Turkish Cypriot population of the island; thirdly, wives, children and parents of all soldiers killed during the military operations against Cyprus; fourthly, all Turks from Turkey who have served in Cyprus or in Turkey in what is called the TMT—which is the Turkish Cypriot equivalent of the National Guard—since 1 August 1958, that is, for almost 15 years. That may be another 50,000.

76. What I am reading to the Council are not opinions, judgements or estimates; they are adopted Turkish Cypriot laws. And I ask: can anybody doubt that, on the basis of those adopted laws, Turkey has already undertaken to transform the ethnic composition of the island population on a very large scale, thus creating conditions for the partition of the island? Obviously, the decision of the so-called Turkish Cypriot Cabinet to establish honorary consulates and commercial agencies in various cities in Turkey and in other countries is a step in the same direction.

77. Finally, we come to the famous proclamation of a so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. On 13 February 1975 the former Vice-President of Turkey, Mr. Erbakan, commenting on this proclamation, expressed his satisfaction at the decision and said that the Turkish Cypriot side should immediately form its own Government and its own Parliament—by the way, they are now doing so. He added:

“The two federated States ‘can be linked in a federation. The latter must have a federal house of representatives but not a central government. The Turkish Cypriot Federated State will very shortly be recognized by all countries.”

That is what the former Vice-President of Turkey is thinking of, a unilateral action which I am certain will be described to us by my colleague from Turkey as “an internal organization of the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus”.

78. On the basis of this argument other Turkish officials have been critical of the initiative taken by the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in having recourse to the Security Council. On this they agree with the press in their own country and in its newly acquired colony. Three days ago the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Bozkurt* vigorously condemned the appeal of Cyprus to the Security Council and warned the Greek Cypriots that if they continued on this path one of two things might happen: the proclamation of the complete independence of the occupied territory; or

its annexation to Turkey. So annexation is one of the possibilities, though for tactical reasons and for the present it is denied. But what I fail to understand is Turkey's allergy to the Security Council. Turkey is, however, a Member of the United Nations. Turks should not feel this way if, as they say, they have a case.

79. It is interesting to notice in various Turkish statements the interchange of the words “federation” and “confederation”. We all know the difference, but Turkish officials have every reason to minimize it. They obviously like the word “confederation”—that is clear—and they use it to test the international reaction. Whenever this reaction is strong, they retreat to the more diplomatic expression “a loose federation”. Mr. Erbakan is probably: not a very good diplomat, but he is certainly representative of Turkish thinking and philosophy. He actually said: “a confederation without a central Government”. Do members of this Council know a country in this Organization, or even outside of it, without a Government?

80. In today's issue of *Newsweek*, an interview with the present Foreign Minister of Turkey; Mr. Esenbel, is published. He did not use the word “confederation”. He certainly is a better diplomat than Mr. Erbakan. But *Newsweek* uses it in the conclusions it draws: “confederation, that is what they are asking for”.

81. The United Nations has a good and, at the same time, a bad record with respect to the Cyprus issue. Few problems discussed in the Organization have ever produced more and better resolutions. At the same time, few have been the cases in which so many resolutions have been ignored and violated in so short a period of time. It would not be advisable for the Security Council, for the United Nations or for any single Member of the Organization to allow a precedent to be created whereby an 18 per cent minority would be forcibly concentrated by an invasion army in a part of the territory of an independent State Member of the Organization and a separate State unilaterally proclaimed. It would be a bad precedent. It would be a bad precedent for other States which could have analogous misfortunes, a bad precedent for encouraging similar foreign interventions, a dangerous precedent for the non-application of other resolutions concerning the same sensitive region of the Middle East.

I

82. The resolutions before the Council offer ways and means to satisfy all Turkish demands and at the same time to prevent this precedent; all Turkish demands, except one: partition.

83. I respectfully submit that the Security Council has the duty and the means to implement the resolutions. We feel that never was there a better chance for the Council to save a small, non-aligned and

unprotected Member State from dismemberment. We feel that there is no graver responsibility for the Council than the responsibility that consists in safeguarding the liberty, the lives and the very existence of small countries. The problem is **critical** for us, critical for us Greeks in Greece, **and** we do not only need resolutions. We need to know the position of every Member State, especially of those with greater influence and responsibilities, regarding the attempt by Turkey to abolish the Cyprus Republic, and regarding the unprecedented manner in which it has deliberately conducted negotiations so far in order to achieve this purpose. We have friendly relations with each one of the Council's members and we need and we are determined and we have to evaluate and adjust our position in accordance with theirs.

84. As far as we and the Greek Cypriots are concerned, we are committed to the United Nations resolutions and we are determined to stand by them. We sincerely desire a settlement and we have proved our readiness for compromise and sacrifice. But we can also live without a settlement. Greece has always maintained that it is going to accept any solution the Greek Cypriots will accept. I have, however, to inform the Council, in view of the blackmail procedure we have been faced with, that my Government would not be prepared to accept a solution, even one accepted by the Greek Cypriots, if we were not convinced that it had been accepted of their own free will. Paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) requires a freely reached and mutually acceptable political settlement. We intend to stick to it.

85. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

86. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to say that I consider it an honour to be taking part in a Council meeting under your distinguished presidency. Your qualities are an assurance of its success.

87. At this stage of our debate, I hope I can be brief, and I shall reserve my right to ask to speak again after the members of the Council have expressed their views.

88. We have just heard the Greek point of view expressed twice by the honourable Greek personalities who have spoken before me. I shall not dwell at length on what has just been said by the representative of the Greek Cypriots, the distinguished Mr. Clerides. I would simply like to recall that the very composition of the delegation-which for complex legal reasons that it would be difficult to analyse in detail here you yourself, Mr. President, described a moment ago as the delegation of the Republic of Cyprus-would suffice to indicate how representative it is of Cyprus as a whole. However, it does

represent a certain **situation** in Cyprus. I see in it two Greek Foreign Ministers, a President of the Greek Parliament, a Greek Ambassador, and assistants who are all Greek. Furthermore, the head of this so-called Cypriot **delegation has** that gift that I admire in Greeks of acting with **mercúrial** agility and subtlety, sometimes representing the Greek community and discussing the future constitution of its State, and at other times representing the Greek State as a whole,

89. This -delegation, in keeping with its traditional policy, comes to New York not directly from Cyprus **but** via Athens; where it has duly received its latest instructions; this is something that does not seem to us illogical or unnatural but, in our view, it constitutes the root of the problem. Besides, a communique from the press and information secretariat of the Republic of Greece leaves no doubt, if any still remained in **anyone's** mind, as to the collusion between Athens and Nicosia-which, I repeat, is something I consider neither illogical nor unnatural. I shall read out the text. "It was announced that the Greek Government, in concert with the Cypriot Government;" decided that the Republic of Cyprus will have recourse to the United Nations Security Council. " * .

90. If this is not a mistake, it seems to me rather strange that a Government which, in our view, is, to say the least, a foreign Government **vis-à-vis** Nicosia should decide that the Republic of Cyprus -and I am quoting the **text-should** "have recourse to the United Nations".

91. That is why, Mr. President, I should like to request you this time, if you will be so kind--and, of course, if they so wish-to call on the Turks of Cyprus who, in our view, are alone entitled to reply 'to their counterparts the Greeks of Cyprus.

92. As for me, since I have not asked for this meeting of the Council, the usefulness of which is still not apparent to me, I would prefer to speak again later, in order to be able perhaps to reply to the representatives who may deem it necessary to speak on this subject and so try as far as I can to explain to them the attitude of my country with regard to the grave problem of Cyprus in its present stage. I should also like to take that opportunity to reply in full detail to my distinguished colleague and friend, the Ambassador of Greece, on the points he made with regard not only to the attitude of my country towards Cyprus but also to my country's foreign policy as a whole, and to dissipate certain doubts he has raised as to our intentions.

93. That is all I wish to say for the present. **But**, I would request you, Mr. President, to be so kind as to call on me again at a later stage.

* Quoted in English by the speaker.

94. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Chinese*): The next speaker is Mr. **Çelik**, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. In accordance with the decision taken at the outset of the meeting, I invite Mr. **Çelik** to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

95. Mr. **ÇELIK**: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and all the members of the Council for having given me the opportunity to speak today in order to present to the Council the views of the Turkish side on the Cyprus problem.

96. The fact that I have been allowed to speak is in itself proof that the Turkish side is not being represented by the so-called Cypriot delegation which spoke before me.

97. Through its illegal and unconstitutional actions the Makarios administration has disqualified itself from the title and moral right of representative of Cyprus, and the Greek Cypriot delegation to the United Nations cannot, therefore, claim to represent the whole of Cyprus. They are Greek Cypriot representatives, and they speak only for the Greek Cypriots and their administration.

98. Why are we here? Why has the Security Council been called to an emergency meeting? Why are the Greek Cypriots here **criticizing** a situation which they themselves caused? Why are they complaining about a state of affairs for which they themselves are wholly responsible and for which they can blame no one but themselves? Why are we here and not in Nicosia carrying out intercommunal talks?

99. Was it not Makarios who forcibly ousted the Turkish Cypriots by armed force from all branches of government in 1963 and never allowed them to return? Was it not Makarios who insistently refused in 1964 and 1965 proposals by Mr. **Küçük—the then Turkish Cypriot Vice-President—for** joint meetings of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Ministers to discuss normalisation with a view to rectifying the anomalous situation existing on the island? Was it not the Greek side that refused permission to the Turkish Cypriot Members of **Parliament**, elected representatives of the community, to attend the meetings of **the House**?

100. The Turkish representatives were presented with an ultimatum to the effect that, unless they agreed to the abrogation of the Constitution and endorsed the unconstitutional laws enacted in their absence by their Greek Cypriot counterparts, their return would be prevented by the use of physical force. This incident was related in the **Secretary-General's** report of 29 July 1965 to the Security Council [*S/6569 and Add.1*].

101. We never wanted separation. Separation was forced on us by the Makarios administration. There is no crisis and there is no reason for alarm. The whole thing is a specially prepared **plan** by the Makarios administration to influence world public opinion. It is part of a plan to kill **intercommunal** negotiations, internationalize the Cyprus problem and prevent a solution based on the political **reality** in the island.

102. The Cyprus problem was fully **discussed** both in the General Assembly and in the **Security Council** only a few months ago. The **representatives** of both communities were allowed to **present** their views, and the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 3212 (XXIX) on 1 **November** 1974.

103. What was the spirit of the General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was later **endorsed** by Security Council resolution 365 (1974)? It was that: there are two equal national communities in Cyprus; the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus primarily concerns the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. The political settlement should be sought and found in **Cyprus** through intercommunal negotiations taking place on an equal footing.

104. As progress is made towards a **peaceful** settlement, as a feeling of security is re-established and as the danger of renewed fighting and **bloodshed** is removed, all foreign forces will be withdrawn and the humanitarian problem, including the problem of the refugees, which is common to both communities, will be solved.

105. I said "as progress is made" **because**, as I said during the statement I made before **the Council** on 13 December 1974 [*1810th meeting*], both the question of refugees and the question of **withdrawal** of forces are political problems, in view of the security risk involved, and can only be solved **within** the framework of the final political settlement.

106. There is no need to be a prophet **to** be able to anticipate what could and would happen if the Turkish forces were to be withdrawn tomorrow or if 150,000 Greek Cypriot refugees were **to** return to the north. The United Nations archives are full of records of what the Greek Cypriots can **and** will do to us if and when the opportunity arises.

107. Even the Turkish military intervention of July 1974 did not prevent the massacre of **the** innocent Turkish Cypriot civilian population. **Mass** graves unearthed in the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and foreign correspondents at Murataga, Atliar and **Sandallar** in which the bodies of whole village **populations**, including small babies, women and 90-year-old people were discovered, are ample proof that **needs no**

further comment. This is not to mention mass executions at Taskent, Aydin, Ayios Ioannis, Limassol and other places.

108. What has happened in Cyprus since the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council of late last year? Makarios' intransigence, which was so openly manifested during the statement he made in the plenary meeting on 1 October 1974, unfortunately continued after his return to the island. Constructive proposals put forward and efforts made by the Turkish Cypriot community for a peaceful and just settlement of the Cyprus problem did not receive a positive response from the Greek Cypriot side.

109. We agreed to the reopening of the Lefkose (Nicosia) International Airport to international traffic under a neutral foreign airport manager, with a Turkish Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot assistant. We consented to the initial return of about 13,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to Athienou, Akhna and Troulli villages in the area under Turkish control. We **declared** the Magosa (Famagusta) port open to Greek and Greek Cypriot ships.

1.10. And what was the response of the Greek Cypriot side to these Turkish proposals and gestures? The Greek side showed no interest in our proposal to open Lefkose International Airport. Our consent for the return initially of about 13,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to the Turkish-controlled northern part of Cyprus did not please them. And the declaration by the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration that the Magosa port was open to Greek and Greek Cypriot ships was taken as an insult. It has thus been ascertained beyond any doubt that any concessions whatsoever by the Turkish side which fall short of reducing the Turkish Cypriot community to a simple minority and confirming the Makarios administration as the unconditional Government and authority in Cyprus **will** fail to satisfy the Greek Cypriot side.

111. Makarios, who unfortunately cannot yet see the suffering, misery and calamity which he has caused to Greeks and Turks alike in 'Cyprus and who persistently continues to disregard the reality on the island, chose to respond to the Turkish proposals by provocative and irresponsible speeches which cannot in any way contribute to an early peaceful settlement of the problem. For instance, "We shall not lower the standard of fighting ... We shall pursue our struggle to the bitter end." That is taken from his speech at Lakadamia on Sunday, 9 February.

112. His frequent allusions to an all-out struggle for "national restoration" and for "the survival of the Hellenism of Cyprus" have given rise to serious misgivings among the Turkish-Cypriot community. He has made public statements to the effect that he would solve the national problem in accordance with Greek national interests and in close co-operation

with the national centre, Athens. What is the meaning of this statement? What is Makarios' national interest? The whole world knows by now both about his sacred oath to accomplish **enosis** during his lifetime and about his national aspiration.

113. Through wilful cease-fire violations, official statements and propaganda; constant efforts have been made to create the impression that no progress had been made or could possibly be achieved during the talks. They created an artificial feeling of high tension on the island. The purpose was twofold: first, to bring outside pressure to bear on Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, for example, by influencing the United States Congress through the Greek lobby, whose existence is acknowledged by the whole American press and by the press of the world, to cut off military aid to Turkey; and secondly, to take the Cyprus problem outside its proper context of intercommunal talks and make it an international issue, and to prevent a solution in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which **recognized** the existence of two equal national communities and confirmed that intercommunal talks were the best way of solving the Cyprus problem.

114. Recourse to Geneva at a time when the **intercommunal** talks were going on, the use of the Commission on Human Rights as a forum for the exploitation of the political question of Cyprus under the pretext of humanitarian issues and the call for the appointment of a fact-finding mission are ample proof of the sincerity and the faith the Greek Cypriot side had in the peace talks.

115. And why is the appointment of a fact-finding mission necessary? The fact-finding mission, they say, will trace the missing persons. Which missing persons? The thousands of people who were brutally murdered during the **coup** of 15 July 1974 by the Greek National Guard, by the Greek mainland officers, by EOKA-B, and by Sampson's armed bandits.

116. We do not say **that**. **Makarios** said it, and the Greek Cypriot press wrote it. During the statement he made before the Security Council on 19 July 1974, Makarios said: "The **coup** caused much bloodshed and took a great **toll** of human lives" [*1780th meeting, para. 21*]. "I am afraid that the number of casualties is large and that the material destruction is heavy" [*ibid., para. 16*]. Immediately after the **coup** the Greek Cypriot press unanimously rated the number of Greek Cypriots **killed** during the **coup** to be as high as 3,000 to 4,000.

117. But now, unfortunately, as usual, the various factions within the Greek community have once more joined forces to blackmail the Turkish side, and they are trying to attribute their losses' to the Turkish armed forces. I am sure no one will take those lies and unfounded allegations very seriously.

118. This is part of the well-known Greek scheme to **internationalize** the Cyprus problem. The attempt to send a fact-finding mission to Cyprus, allegedly on humanitarian grounds, which they tried to achieve in Geneva last **week** but failed, is a first step towards a wider political international conference on Cyprus, to which we are strongly opposed for the well-known reasons we have made public on many occasions in the past.

119. So the rush by the Greek Cypriots to bring the Cyprus problem to the Security Council is not a surprise to us. Mr. Kyprianou, who headed the Greek Cypriot delegation to the United Nations during the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, who seemed dissatisfied with resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was adopted by the Assembly unanimously, publicly declared during his statement before the General Assembly that:

“... we shall try to bring the matter before the General Assembly, even at an extraordinary **session**, if developments so **require**, because we believe that today . . . is not **only** the beginning of the involvement of the United Nations in Cyprus, for it has been involved for a long time, ‘but the beginning of specific actions’”.

That is why we are here—not because the circumstances so warranted, but because the Greek Cypriot plan so demanded. The intention was there; it had to be so.

120. Well, we are here. But although we are here as a result of a plan cunningly implemented by the Makarios administration, **it has been** made to appear as if we are here to discuss a so-called emergency situation that has arisen as a result of the **proclamation** of the Turkish Federated State of the **Republic** of Cyprus. That was only an excuse. The plan and the intention was to bring **the** Cyprus problem to the Security Council. Had it not been for that proclamation, **Makarios** would **have** declared the talks dead and would have come to New York all the same. But most probably he would have done that not in the middle of February, as he has now, but some time next month. We sensed that all along, and tried to prevent it. But all our goodwill proved insufficient to lead the peace talks to success. It takes two to make an agreement, and here the second party does not seem very anxious for an agreement.

121. What is the **purpose** and intention of the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus? What are the reasons that prompted the Turkish Cypriot community to take such an action? What does that decision aim to achieve?

122. With your indulgence, I shall read out the original text of the proclamation so as to put on record the true facts regarding the decision of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration and to

remove any misunderstandings and speculation that might possibly exist. The joint resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly of, the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration adopted on 13 February 1975 **reads** as follows:

[The speaker. read out annex II to document S/1 1 6 2 4 . 1

123. The Council of Ministers and **the** **Legislative** Assembly, after adopting their joint resolution on the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of the Republic of Cyprus, further resolved **unanimously** that the president of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration, Mr. Rauf **Denktas**, should forthwith assume the presidency of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

124. It will be **observed** from the **self-explanatory** text I **have** just read out that the Greek Cypriot administration has intentionally misinterpreted, grossly exaggerated and harshly exploited this Turkish Cypriot decision, which is purely an internal matter of the Turkish Cypriot community and has nothing whatsoever to do with the Greek Cypriot community..

125. Archbishop Makarios, since his return to the island in December 1974, has taken decisions **that** are more provocative+ and more unconstitutional in nature than this proclamation. He **has** set up a national council “to further the national cause”, **in** **the** same way as we have formed the constituent assembly, which is nothing more than the reinforcement of our already existing House, of Representatives. He **has** formed a new Cabinet, constituted **purely** of **Greek** Cypriots. Contrary to the Constitution of **the** **island**, there is not a single Turk in the Cabinet.

126. Why all the panic, therefore? What **is** all the excitement about? Nothing has changed on the **island** between the last meeting of the Security Council and today. The proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has not changed anything. What has really happened is a reorganization of the internal structure of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration to cope with the increasing social, administrative and **political** needs of the Turkish Cypriot community. There is nothing in the proclamation that is contrary to the General **Assembly** and Security Council resolutions, which we respect. This is a state of affairs that has existed, **in** reality, since July 1974.

127. On the same day that the Turkish Federated State of **Cyprus** was proclaimed, Mr. **Denktas** announced in most clear terms that the **inter-communal** talks would continue, as scheduled, and submitted to Mr. **Clerides**, through the **Special** Representative of the **Secretary-General** in **Cyprus**, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, a document containing principles proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side on

the constitutional problem of the island. The Turkish proposals were as **follows**:

[The speaker read out annex III to document S/11624.]

128. Unfortunately, instead of considering our proposals and carrying on the negotiations, the Greek Cypriot side chose to declare the peace talks "dead", rushed to Athens, where they received their visas for the United Nations, and then came to New York and called, to our mind unnecessarily, for an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

129. I should like to put on record once more that we believe in the intercommunal talks. The Turkish side is waiting at the table, with all goodwill and good faith, ready to resume negotiations with the Greek Cypriot side, if and when they decide to return-and I hope they will.

130. The Turkish Cypriot position on the Cyprus problem is well known. We stand for a biregional, independent, non-aligned federal State. We need this not for its own sake but for the sake of our security, for our very existence. Experience and past record have proved that the two national communities cannot live peacefully together. The only way to bring peace and quiet to the island is for the two communities to live side by side, free to develop and prosper socially and economically, without any pressure, discrimination or domination of one by the other.

131. As national feelings, which are at present very high, cool down and as mutual respect and co-operation develop between the two national communities, we may hope for and expect the gradual emergence of a common identity..

132. As regards the internal structure, organization and other details of the biregional federation, we are ready with all good will to discuss mutual compromise and accommodation at the negotiation table.

133. At the risk of repeating myself, I should like, with the Council's indulgence, to quote from the statement I made before the Special Political Committee on 29 October 1974:

"Three times"-in 1955-1959, in 1963-1967 and in 1974—"the Turkish community in Cyprus was subjected to terror, mass murder, and heavy material losses. Three times the Turkish [Cypriot] community ... was ... uprooted from its homes and villages and forced to become refugees. Three times the Turkish community in Cyprus was dispossessed of its property and belongings; and three times the Turkish [Cypriot] community was deprived of its income. There must be no fourth time. There shall be no fourth **time**."

134. This is not political talk nor is biregional federation the decision of the Turkish Cypriot political leadership. It is the unanimous wish of the whole Turkish Cypriot community freely manifested and actually implemented, despite all efforts and inhuman measures taken by the Greek Cypriot administration to prevent it. Even brutal murder of women and children for money by Greek Cypriot taxi-drivers did not and cannot stop the Turkish Cypriots from going to the north.

135. Turkish Cypriots caught by the so-called Greek Cypriot **police** or security forces trying to escape to the north lose **all** their money and valuables, they are beaten and tortured and then, if not killed, sent back to, their villages. The House of Representatives of the Greek Cypriot administration enacted legislation prohibiting the transportation of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot-owned taxis. The fines are constantly being increased, and such crimes-if crimes they are-have been made the subject of appeals to the High Courts, and penalties have been increased to as much as six months' imprisonment for each offence. But all those and other inhuman measures have failed to prevent the Turkish Cypriots from going to the north.

136. About 35,000 of a total of 45,000 Turkish Cypriots living in the south in July 1974 have already taken refuge in the northern Turkish-controlled part of the island, leaving behind everything they owned and cherished. I am sure that the remaining unfortunate 10,000 Turkish Cypriots too will, despite everything, **find** a way to come to the north and live the rest of their lives as free people and not as hostages or virtual prisoners of the Greek Cypriots.

137. The free census carried out at the British sovereign base at Episkopi among the 10,000 Turkish refugees which showed 100 per cent of those refugees opting in favour of going to the north is ample proof of how insecure, how miserable and how desperate those people feel. It is also indicative of how wrongly, to say the least, the **Turkish** Cypriots have been treated by those who pretend to be the Government of Cyprus and seek United Nations support to continue to torture and indiscriminately to kill innocent people for their unrealistic political aims.

138. They are here claiming to be "the **Government**", but they have forfeited that title and they have proved that they are no longer worthy of it by their very actions and treatment of the Turkish Cypriot community-a part of their people. They are here seeking support for the maintenance of the independence of Cyprus, but they are unique in the world as a so-called Government which has armed itself to the teeth not to protect but to destroy that independence and to unite with another country.

139. It is the Turkish Cypriot community which is the real fighter and the real defender of the **inde-**

pendence of Cyprus. Had it not been for the Turkish Cypriot community there would be no independent Cyprus today. The events of the past 12 years have proved beyond any doubt that the salvation of the independence of Cyprus depends on the ability of the Turkish Cypriot community to defend both itself and that independence.

140. The Greek Cypriots are here speaking against biregional federation and asking support for the preservation of the demographic status of the island, but they have 'managed to chase all the Turkish Cypriots to the north, where they ran for their lives. They are here complaining about the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State, which is really nothing more than an internal reorganization of the 'Turkish Cypriot community; but for 12 years they unheedingly violated the Constitution, forcibly ousted the Turkish Cypriots from government, tried to make Cyprus a Greek island, reduced the Turks to second-class citizenship and failed to give the Turkish Cypriots that feeling of security, that feeling of being wanted, that is so essential for peaceful coexistence.

141. All we can say is that even at this late hour, we hope that the Greek Cypriots with their President, leadership and people, will realize their mistakes, co-operate towards a realistic solution which will save further trouble and suffering, and help to rebuild a new, peaceful, prosperous Cyprus.

142. We have been **criticized** by the Greek Cypriot delegation today for having passed a bill allegedly granting Turkish Cypriot citizenship to 40,000 Turkish soldiers and their families. This is untrue. There are definitely not 40,000 troops on the island, and the bill under reference does not purport to give Turkish Cypriot citizenship to any soldier. What the bill aims to give is more psychological than real.

143. It is meant as a token of appreciation for the families of those who fell fighting for the independence of Cyprus. It is an honorary title for those concerned. We are not an independent country. We have not declared an independent Cyprus. We are not asking for political recognition. We are not a separate country. Therefore, there should not be, I presume, a separate Turkish Cypriot citizenship. How can we give away what does not exist, let alone the fact that, legally, it is not possible, according to Turkish mainland laws, to give Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot nationality to any Turkish nationals, because the Turkish Nationality Law does not **recognize** dual nationality. But that is, I think, beside the point.

144. I should like to repeat once more that this is only a psychological way of expressing our gratitude to the families of those who fell fighting for the independence of Cyprus.

145. Incidentally, and for the information of the Council, I should like to put on record that a similar

law, with a wider coverage, has been enacted by the Greek Cypriot House of **Representatives**, in the absence of Turkish members, granting Cypriot citizenship to mainland Greeks and Greek mainland army personnel. This has been verified by the dual nationality identity cards discovered on Greek mainland soldiers caught during the July and August fighting of last year.

146. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks of mainland Greece should 'not worry over this point. There are more Turkish Cypriots abroad who either have Cypriot nationality or can acquire Cypriot **citizenship** under the Constitution as it stands than we can possibly accommodate on the island. There is no need to draw on Turkish mainland nationals.

147. It has been claimed today that the **Zurich** and London agreements have been imposed on Cyprus. I should like to put on record that at the London conference, which was attended by both communities, as well as by Greece, Turkey and Britain, the Greek Cypriot side was represented **by** a very large delegation, and the agreements were signed freely and accepted. What has been really imposed on the Greek side is not the agreements but independence, which was never wanted because what was actually wanted was the union of Cyprus **with** Greece.

148. The decision of the Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration to proclaim the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was taken freely by the Turkish Cypriot community and was not in any way imposed on us from outside. Mr. **Denktas**, who is our negotiator at the intercommunal talks, is negotiating freely, in consultation with his **colleagues**, with the members of his Cabinet, and whatever we decide he takes to the negotiation table. We shall not deny that we do consult with the Turkish **Government** at times. But we do not in any way receive directions and we are definitely not **pressured** or given orders as to what to do or what **to** choose, what not to accept or to accept during the talks.

149. I am sorry to observe that the Greek Cypriot side has not come out honestly with the fact that it is in touch with Greece and that in fact it receives orders from Greece. Archbishop Makarios, returning to Cyprus from New York, where he attended the General Assembly, could not go back **to** Cyprus before he called in at Athens. The **negotiations** did not start before the summit meeting was **held** at the national centre, Athens. The Greek Cypriot delegation that is here today did not come here before it went to Athens. I shall not comment any further **o n t h i s**.

150. It has been claimed that the Turkish side has kept putting off and postponing negotiations and discussions of the substance of the political problem during the talks. I should like" to put on

record that the agenda of the negotiations was mutually agreed upon by both representatives of the communities—Mr. Clerides and **Mr. Denktas**—in the following order: the Nicosia airport, the Famagusta port and, the third item, the political talks. And the negotiations started in that order. If there has been no progress whatsoever, it is because we have not yet reached agreement on the two issues that precede the political substance of the matter, and, naturally, both sides having exchanged proposals for the talks, I hope that when negotiations resume the negotiators will come around to the political issues, as well.

151. A multicantonal solution—which has been advocated—is one which has been tried and failed. Cantons existed since 1963. All Turkish Cypriots living in the cantons or enclaves were treated as prisoners or virtual hostages until, ultimately, in July 1974 all of them had been broken up, and there are no enclaves and no cantons to return to today.

152. As regards the proposals, nothing in them should be interpreted as being the last word. Naturally, since negotiations are going on, proposals and counter-proposals will be negotiated, and the final settlement will be mutually agreed upon. We do not agree with the view that the proclamation of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has made talks either useless or unnecessary. This being an internal reorganization of the Turkish Cypriot community, it should not in any way affect the talks, which we consider as continuing.

153. It is suggested that paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) should be enforced by the Assembly and that a fixed period of time should be set during which Turkey should comply with its provisions. We share the feeling of urgency about finding a solution for the problem. But we differ on how to go about solving it. The Turkish forces on Cyprus are there at our invitation and in accordance with international agreements in order to prevent bloodshed and to maintain the independence of the island. As I stated earlier, the complete withdrawal of troops, in view of the security risk involved, can only go on in parallel with or after the solution of the political problem and a feeling of security is achieved.

154. Speaking of the withdrawal of troops, I am sorry that the question of the illegal presence of Greek mainland forces on the island has not been referred to. And again I should like to note that for the past 11 years during which we have been negotiating a peaceful solution on Cyprus at gunpoint and under pressure from Greek-mainland forces **illegally on the island** no one spoke of the urgency of solving the problem and there was no call for fixing a date for its solution. None the less, we believe in the urgency of solving the problem and we shall do everything possible to contribute towards that end.

155. It has been claimed by Mr. Carayannis that Mr. **Denktas** accepted the reactivation of the Nicosia

International Airport, but that upon directions from Ankara, Mr. **Denktas** had to go back on his decision. I should like to put the record straight by saying here that such an agreement was not reached in Nicosia. Our position, as our most recent proposals indicate—and they still stand—is to reopen the Nicosia International Airport to international traffic under a neutral foreign airport manager with two assistants, one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot.

156. Ankara supports only what Mr. **Denktas** and his colleagues accept and agree upon, and I must state most emphatically that there are no directions or interventions from Ankara.

157. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Today the Security Council meets for the first time in the current year, 1975, at an official meeting. This year 1975 is a special year. In May, the Soviet people, the peoples of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the peoples of the whole world will be celebrating the great historical event of the thirtieth anniversary of the victory over fascism. The great patriotic war of 1941-1945 was for the Soviet people one of the sternest tests ever undergone by our country.

158. The Soviet Union, its people and its valiant armed forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, defended its freedom and independence and carried out a great mission of liberation and honourably discharged its international duty. Our country played a decisive role in the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. It was not a cheap victory; it cost 20 million lives; **1,890,000** million roubles was the cost of the war over four years, and 675,000 million roubles was the cost of the damage caused in the enemy-occupied territory.

159. A major contribution to the common victory over the enemy was made by the peoples and armies of the States of the anti-Hitler coalition. The possibility of effective co-operation of States with different social and political systems was thus demonstrated.

160. The thirtieth anniversary of the victory over Fascist Germany is an outstanding political event in the life of the Soviet people and the whole of progressive mankind. The 9th of May 1975 will be celebrated in our country as a great national holiday. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, at a luncheon in the Kremlin in honour of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson, on 14 February 1975, stated the following:

“The present day of our planet on which we are living as ever closer neighbours is hallmarked by a struggle for dedication to the memory of those who gave their lives in the battle against aggression and for the right of people to live in condi-

tions of peace, independence and liberty. It would, I believe, be no exaggeration to say that never before have such vigorous efforts been made on a broad international scale to strengthen peace and peaceful co-operation among States. But a great deal remains to be done."

161. In the flames and sufferings of the Second World War the idea of creating the United Nations was born, and the Organization itself was created. The major purpose of the Organization, as is stated in its Charter, is to maintain international peace and security and to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

162. In 1975 the peoples of the United Nations will also be celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the Organization at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly. This, too, will make 1975 a memorable year.

163. As is well known, the defeat of Hitler's Germany and its henchmen in Europe and the Far East promoted the powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement and the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism. Many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America liberated themselves from colonial slavery and set forth confidently on the part to independent development. Proof of this is the emergence of many new independent States which became, as they were entitled to, Members of the United Nations, the membership of which has almost trebled. Here today, around the Security Council table, there are a number of representatives whose countries achieved independence in the post-war period. The Soviet delegation takes great pleasure in welcoming the new members of the Council.

164. We welcome the United Republic of Tanzania and Guyana in the persons of their Permanent Representatives, Mr. Salim and Mr. Jackson. Everyone knows the active role which is being played by both of these States in the non-aligned movement and in the United Nations. The Soviet Union has enjoyed many years of friendly relations and co-operation with the United Republic of Tanzania, relations which embrace the political, economic and cultural spheres. We are ready to develop relations of all kinds also with the young non-aligned State of Guyana. The representatives of those countries are well known in the United Nations for their great diplomatic experience and authority, and there is every reason to believe that they will make a very important contribution to the work of the Council in ensuring international peace and security.

165. The delegation of the Soviet Union welcomes and congratulates the new members of the Security Council, Italy, Sweden and Japan, in the persons of their Permanent Representatives, Mr. Plaja, Mr. Rydbeck and Mr. Saito, upon the election of their countries as members of the Security Council. In

recent years there has been a particular strengthening of the comprehensive and businesslike relations and co-operation between the Soviet Union and those States. Those countries have often been represented in the Council and have made their contribution to its work.

166. The delegation of the Soviet Union cannot fail to express its gratitude to the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, Austria, and Australia, whose terms of office in the Council expired at the end of 1974. We very much appreciate the spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation which their representatives displayed in the Security Council in the discharge of the responsible tasks facing the Council, and also the contribution which they made to the Council's work.

167. Today's meeting of the Security Council is the first one after the conclusion of the work of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the results of which are of importance, and, I think one can say without exaggeration, of historical significance, both for the future of the United Nations itself and for the maintenance and strengthening of peace and international security and the development of international co-operation as a whole.

168. The Assembly unambiguously pronounced itself in favour of expanding and intensifying the easing of international tension and in favour of the process of detente becoming irreversible. The Assembly adopted a number of important decisions designed to complete the process of decolonization and also prepared and laid down in the historic Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States the fundamental principles of international economic co-operation and the development of young States. Thus it consolidated the decisions adopted at the sixth special session of the General Assembly on the creation of a new international economic order. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties laid down such politically progressive principles and provisions as the principle of peaceful coexistence, the principle that international trade should be based on the basis of mutual benefit, equal advantage and the mutual granting of most favoured nation status, the provision on the inadmissibility of discrimination in trade and in other forms of economic co-operation based upon differences in political, economic and social systems, the obligation on all States to promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the provision on the link between disarmament and development; and the need to eliminate colonialism and aggression, and mentioned a number of other principles and provisions.

169. The Assembly adopted a number of important decisions designed to bring about a peaceful and just settlement in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter of such urgent international

problems as the Middle East problem and the Cyprus question. The Assembly made an appreciable contribution to the limitation of the arms race, having adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes, upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, an important resolution prohibiting action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes. The practical implementation of this decision of the Assembly will lead to the prohibition of new means of mass destruction and the limitation of the arms race.

170. The delegation of the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the decision of the Assembly designed to prepare a world disarmament conference. This decision makes it possible to proceed to the practical work of preparing that conference, and the task that lies ahead of us is to accelerate the preparations and the convening of the first world conference on disarmament in the history of the United Nations.

171. An other important decision taken at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly was the adoption of the definition of aggression. The initiator of that proposal, as is well known, was the Soviet Union as far back as in the days of the League of Nations. It continued to fight for the adoption of that proposal within the United Nations also. Those efforts reached a successful culmination at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. The unanimous adoption by the Assembly of a definition of aggression is a major international political event in the work of the United Nations.

172. The Assembly resolution on that question contains a special provision directly relating to the Security Council. The Assembly recommends that the Council should take account of the definition as guidance in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression. It is the duty of the United Nations as a whole, and in particular of the Security Council, to use the useful results of the work at the twenty-ninth and previous sessions of the General Assembly as a foundation for making a new important contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament, the development of international economic co-operation and the process of decolonization.

173. Action must be taken to ensure that the Security Council plays an important and effective role in the process of expanding and intensifying the relaxation of international tension. In this regard, it has become extremely important and necessary for the Security Council to adopt a decision which would give legal force to General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

174. Pursuant to the decisions adopted at the twenty-ninth session of the Assembly on problems

of development and decolonization, it has also become imperative to focus attention at the forthcoming thirtieth anniversary session of the General Assembly on solving the problem of disarmament.

175. The Soviet delegation wishes to express its gratitude to the President of the Security Council for last month, the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Tchernoutchenko. His country, which lost a quarter of its population during the war owing to Fascist aggression, made a great contribution to the fight against fascism and the consequent founding of the United Nations.

176. We should also like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency and wish you success in your work and in particular success in the adoption by the Council under your presidency of positive decisions for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

177. The Security Council is meeting at the request of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in order once again to consider the Cyprus question in connection with events that have occurred there and the further exacerbation of the situation which has occurred in recent days as a result of the unilateral actions of the leadership of the Turkish community, which has taken steps to create a separate state structure on the part of the island controlled by Turkish troops.

178. As a result of repeated consideration of the Cyprus question last year, the Security Council is well aware that because of external intervention the Cyprus crisis has become one of the most serious hotbeds of international tension in the eastern Mediterranean. As has been stated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev:

"In many parts of the world a struggle is at present going on between opposing trends: the trend towards international détente, the strengthening of peace and the development of co-operation among States, and the trend towards revival of the cold-war spirit, a new intensification of the arms race and interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples".

179. In Cyprus we have a flagrant example of external intervention in the internal affairs of the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, a full Member of the United Nations and an active participant in the non-aligned movement. The fact that there has been no settlement of the Cyprus crisis and the fact that it has deteriorated even further are consequences of the failure to implement the resolutions of the Security Council or resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the question of Cyprus, unanimously adopted at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. As has already been pointed out, that resolution was subsequently

unanimously endorsed by the Security Council, and thus became binding upon all States Members of the United Nations. As is well known, in those decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, provision was made for a settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, respect for its policy of non-alignment and the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from its territory, non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and the early return of all refugees to their homes in safety.

180. Those fundamental decisions on the settlement of the Cyprus problem have not yet been implemented. On the contrary, unilateral actions have been taken which are in direct contravention of decisions of the United Nations, and which have caused the situation in and around Cyprus, which was already complicated and explosive enough, to deteriorate even further.

181. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to acquaint the Security Council and its members with an official statement of TASS, made on 16 February 1975, in connection with the recent events on Cyprus. It reads:

[The speaker read out the statement contained in document S/11627.]

182. The delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to express its serious concern over the unilateral actions I have mentioned, which have been taken by the leadership of the Turkish community in Cyprus. It is quite clear that such actions threaten the prospects for the achievement of agreement in the **intercommunal** talks. The steps taken by the leadership of the Turkish community in Cyprus will inevitably lead to a separation of the Cyprus communities from each other and to their estrangement. Those steps, which will lead to the *de facto* partition of the Cyprus State, are in direct contravention of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly aimed at preventing partition of the Republic of Cyprus and confirming its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

183. Such actions may be used for their own narrow purposes by those circles that have **long** since been hatching plans to eliminate Cyprus as an independent and sovereign State with territorial integrity, in spite of the interests of the Cypriot people. They contradict the repeated appeals of the Security Council to the parties to the Cyprus conflict to show the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action that could cause the situation to deteriorate even further.

184. The responsibility for the events in Cyprus and for the further exacerbation of the situation in that area lies, as has been repeatedly pointed out

in the Council, with certain circles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that are attempting to use Cyprus for their military and strategic **purposes**. The current events in Cyprus amply demonstrate that those circles are **stubbornly** continuing to pursue their policy of consolidating the partition of the island and converting the territory into a bulwark of this bloc in the eastern Mediterranean. Attempts are still being made to solve the Cyprus problem within the narrow circle of membership of NATO, and there is still resistance to the consideration of the Cyprus problem in a broader international forum.

185. What we are witnessing is a deliberate attempt to keep the United Nations out of direct, active participation in a settlement of the Cyprus crisis on the basis of the lofty principles and provisions of the Charter and the decisions on Cyprus taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is quite clear that these circles have not abandoned their intentions or their attempts to impose upon the people of Cyprus a solution to the Cyprus problem prepared in the closed, narrow circle of the Atlantic Powers. The essence of such a decision could **not fail** to be in conflict with the genuine national interests of the people of Cyprus, because it would be designed to supplant the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and ensure the dominance in the island of a military bloc, thus burying **the** policy of non-alignment pursued by that State.

186. Such actions and such plans for solving the Cyprus problem have nothing whatsoever in common with the genuine national interests **of** the people of Cyprus and, furthermore, constitute an **attempt** to bypass the unanimously adopted 'resolution of the General Assembly and the decisions taken by the Security Council on Cyprus. These documents of the United Nations unambiguously call for a halt to **all** foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus, the earliest possible withdrawal from the island of all foreign troops and the **immediate** return of the refugees to their homes.

187. The Soviet Union has firmly and consistently supported and continues to support the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It is against the partitioning of **the island**; it is against *enosis*, and also so-called double *enosis*. Since the very beginning of the tragic events in Cyprus the Soviet Union has put forward a number of concrete, constructive proposals that, if implemented, could bring about a speedy and: just settlement of the Cyprus crisis, in the interests of the people of Cyprus. The people of Cyprus would cease to be the pawns of those who have no regard for their freedom or independence. It **is** not the Soviet Union's fault that those proposals have not been adopted or acted upon. The responsibility for the continuation of the tragedy of the Cypriot people lies fully with those who have resisted the effective

participation of the United Nations in a settlement of the Cyprus problem and have taken action to place the solution of this problem within the narrow confines of a certain group of countries.

188. In all important international talks with the Governments of other countries the Soviet Union has raised and will continue to raise the question of the need for an early solution of the Cyprus problem. As the Soviet delegation has already pointed out, the Cyprus question occupied an important place in the talks held last November in the Vladivostok region between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, and the President of the United States, Mr. Ford; and in the talks held with the President of France, Mr. **Giscard d'Estaing**, at the time of Comrade Brezhnev's visit to France in December 1974. I should like to take this opportunity to recall the provisions relating to the Cyprus question that are contained in the Soviet-American and Soviet-French **communiqués**. Those provisions are still relevant today, and they are fully in keeping with the decisions on Cyprus taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly. They are of particular importance in connection with the recent events in Cyprus.

189; In the joint Soviet-American communique of 24 November 1974 the two parties made the following declaration:

“Having discussed the situation existing in the eastern Mediterranean, both sides state their firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and will make every effort to that end. They consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus question must be based on the strict implementation of the resolutions regarding Cyprus adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.**

190. Similarly, in the Soviet-French communique of 7 December 1974, the mutually agreed position of the two sides on Cyprus was set forth as follows:

“The Soviet Union and France express their concern regarding the continuation of the dangerous situation in Cyprus. They proceed on the premise that the settlement of the Cyprus question should be achieved through negotiations and should be based on full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and on strict implementation of the decisions on Cyprus of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

“The Soviet Union and France are in favour of the earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Republic of Cyprus and the return to their homes of all refugees, in conditions of security.”

191. The question of Cyprus and the recent events on Cyprus were referred to also in the joint Soviet-British statement signed on 16 February 1975 in Moscow by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Wilson. The relevant part of the statement reads:

“In connection with recent events in Cyprus the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom reaffirm their support for the principle of the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They support the implementation of the relevant resolutions on Cyprus of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom recognize the one lawful Government of Cyprus, headed by President Makarios.”

192. I should like to refer now to another more recent document. In the joint communique on the talks they held at Geneva on 16 and 17 February this year, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Kissinger, once again proclaimed the **firm** support of the Soviet Union and the United States for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and its lawful Government. The document states:

“As a result of ‘the exchange of opinions on the Cyprus problem, both sides confirm their strong support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. They recognize the present Cyprus Government as the lawful **Government** of the Republic of Cyprus. Both sides continue to hold that a just solution of the Cyprus problem must be based on strict implementation of the resolutions on Cyprus of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.”

193. The position expressed in **those** joint communiqués and statements on Cyprus by four permanent members of the Security Council, based upon decisions of the Council and the General Assembly on the Cyprus question, ‘together with those United Nations decisions, constitute a good basis for a settlement of the Cyprus question.

194. In this regard it is appropriate to recall that at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and of Greece also stated, on behalf of their Governments, that their countries were against the partition of Cyprus.

195. The Foreign Minister of Turkey said the following in his statement to the General Assembly: “On behalf of the Government of Turkey, I condemn any idea of partition, whether in the past or in the **future...**”³

196. The Foreign Minister of Greece made a similar statement in the General Assembly. He said: "I am glad to be given the opportunity to solemnly reiterate from this rostrum, that Greece has no ulterior aims in Cyprus. As a signatory of the Nicosia agreements, it is committed against *enosis* and against **partition**."⁴

197. In considering the Cyprus question in connexion with recent events on Cyprus, the Security Council is entitled to expect that four permanent members of the Security Council will act in accordance with their positions officially stated in the above-quoted joint communiques; and that the representatives of Turkey and Greece will, for their part, confirm the statements made by the Foreign Ministers of their countries at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. In this way the doubts of the members of the Council and of the general public can be dispelled, as it has been officially confirmed that neither the Government of Turkey nor the **Government** of Greece is pursuing the goal of partitioning the island on any pretext or under any cover whatsoever.

198. As has already been pointed out, the appeal for respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus is contained in the unanimously adopted decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly with whose aims the Governments of Turkey and of Greece have agreed.

199. The Soviet Union continues to consider that these decisions should serve as a basis for a **settlement** of the Cyprus question. Guided by that position of principle, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to state that the Soviet Union **recognizes** the only lawful Government of the Republic of Cyprus headed by President Makarios. This is in keeping with the decisions of the Security Council in its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974 and 364 (1974) of 13 December 1974. This was once again confirmed in the Soviet-British declaration that I have mentioned and in the Soviet-United States communique.

200. In view of the seriousness of the situation now prevailing in Cyprus, the delegation of the Soviet Union considers that the Security Council should, in its resolution, confirm the need to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. It must also clearly and unambiguously express its opposition to any actions leading to the partition of the Republic of Cyprus and take measures to implement the Council's decisions with regard to the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Cyprus.

201. A study of the report submitted by the **Secretary-General** to the Security Council on the question of

Cyprus gives us grounds for concluding that it **was** impossible for the intercommunal talks, **in** the conditions in which they were conducted, to **yield** positive results and **in** the **final** analysis they **were** subverted by the unilateral actions of the leadership of the Turkish community. It is understandable why, the Secretary-General stated to correspondents in Athens, as emerges from United Press agency reports: "I believe that it would be useful if we could find a new approach to the process of talks." Indeed, there is need now to seek formulae for the talks that would ensure a speedy and just settlement of the Cyprus question in accordance, with the decisions of the Security Council and resolutions **of** the **twenty-ninth** session of the General Assembly.

202. Recent events in Cyprus and the whole tragedy of the Cyprus people, as has already been repeatedly pointed out, demonstrate the totally unfounded nature of the system of **guarantees** imposed upon Cyprus. The course of events and experience have once again amply confirmed that a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem, with a guarantee of a durable existence for Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and territorially integral State, cannot be sought within a narrow circle of countries which are guided only by their bloc and strategic interests.

203. In view of what has occurred in **recent** days exacerbating the 'situation in Cyprus, the Soviet Union once again confirms its 'well-known position: the most effective way to solve the Cyprus problem would be to consider it at a representative **international** conference, within the framework of the United Nations and with the participation of members of the Security **Council** and a number of other States, in particular from among the non-aligned countries. Such a conference should prepare and implement effective measures to ensure the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of **the** Republic of Cyprus. The present situation in Cyprus highlights the need to intensify efforts to convene **such** a representative conference. The Soviet delegation is firmly convinced that, if the non-aligned countries were to take a firm position with similar determination and unanimity on the Cyprus matter, as 'they did on a number of questions **of** concern to -them during the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, then by their joint efforts with members of the Security Council the Cyprus **problem could** be solved on a lasting and just basis and it would be possible to ensure the continued existence of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, **territorially** integral and non-aligned State.

204. In conclusion, the delegation of ³the Soviet Union considers it appropriate also **to** remind the Council of the previous proposal of the Soviet Union to dispatch a Security Council mission to Cyprus. In connection with the present aggravated situation in Cyprus that requires the adoption of urgent

measures, the **Council** would be acting sensibly and correctly if it were **immediately** to dispatch to Cyprus a special mission which would acquaint itself with the situation on the spot and present a report on it to the **Council**.

The meeting rose at 7p.m.


Notes

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2275th meeting.*

² *Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Special Political Committee Summary Records, 18 September-4 December 1974, 922nd meeting: para. 69.*

Ibid., Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings. 2241st meeting.

⁴ *Ibid., 2239th meeting.*



كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة
يمكن الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة من المكتبات ودور التوزيع في جميع أنحاء العالم . استعلم عنها من المكتبة التي تتعامل معها
أو اكتب إلى : الأمم المتحدة ، قسم البيع في نيويورك أو في جنيف .

如何购取联合国出版物

联合国出版物在全世界各地的书店和经售处均有发售。请向书店询问或写信到纽约或日内瓦的联合国销售组。

HOW TO OBTAIN UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS

United Nations publications may be obtained from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to: United Nations, Sales Section, New York or Geneva.

COMMENT SE PROCURER LES PUBLICATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES

Les publications des Nations Unies sont en vente dans les librairies et les agences dépositaires du monde entier. Informez-vous auprès de votre libraire ou adressez-vous à : Nations Unies, Section des ventes, New York ou Genève.

КАК ПОЛУЧИТЬ ИЗДАНИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫХ НАЦИЙ

Издания Организации Объединенных Наций можно купить в книжных магазинах и агентствах во всех районах мира. Наводите справки об изданиях в вашем книжном магазине или пишите по адресу: Организация Объединенных Наций, Секция по продаже изданий, Нью-Йорк или Женева.

COMO CONSEGUIR PUBLICACIONES DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

Las publicaciones de las Naciones Unidas están en venta en librerías y casas distribuidoras en todas partes del mundo. Consulte a su librero o diríjase a: Naciones Unidas, Sección de Ventas, Nueva York o Ginebra.
