

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-NINTH YEAR

1810th MEETING: 13 DECEMBER 1974
NEW YORK

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NOTE

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EIGHTEEN HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 13 December 1974, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1810)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11568)

The meeting was called to order at 5.50 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding to the business before the Council, I should like first of all to pay a tribute to the work of my predecessor in the month of November, Ambassador Scali of the United States. I am sure that the Council would wish me to thank him for the deft performance of his duties during the month. I should also like to congratulate him on being able to keep his duties as light as he was able to during that month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/11568)

2. The PRESIDENT: I have received letters dated 13 December from the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece in which they request that they be invited, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, to participate in the discussion of the question now before the Council. I should mention in this connexion that the representative of Greece in his letter of request has made an explicit reference to Article 32 of the Charter. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, if I hear no objection, and with the consent of the Council, to invite the three representatives I have just mentioned to take places at

the Council table and to participate, without vote, in the discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: At this stage I wish to recall that in the course of our consultations members of the Council agreed that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Çelik. I propose, if I hear no objection, to take it that the Council agrees to invite Mr. Çelik under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, and accordingly, at the appropriate moment I shall invite Mr. Çelik to come to the Council table to make a statement.

4. The Council will now return to the consideration of the item concerning the situation in Cyprus, and I should like to draw particular attention to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 23 May to 5 December 1974 [S/11568]. I further want to draw the attention of members of the Council to two draft resolutions which have just been distributed [S/11573 and S/11574]. These two draft resolutions were prepared in the course of extensive consultations among all members of the Council. Members of the Council also agreed in those consultations that the draft resolutions should be voted upon before I call upon the first speaker inscribed on my list.

5. Accordingly, if there is no objection, I shall put the two draft resolutions to the vote. I shall first put to the vote draft resolution S/11573.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none.¹

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

6. The PRESIDENT: I shall now proceed to put to the vote draft resolution S/11574. It is my belief that the general feeling of the Council at the stage when we were considering this draft resolution in our private consultations was that it might be adopted by consensus. If I hear no objection to the adoption of the draft resolution by consensus I shall take it that the Council decides that draft resolution S/11574 shall be adopted by consensus.

¹ See resolution 364 (1974).

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus.²

7. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey.

8. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): In view of the protracted negotiations that took place before the presentation of draft resolution S/11573, and in order to determine who are the interested parties who have a voice in the decision concerning the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and bearing in mind the reference the document just adopted makes to a Government of Cyprus in its text, I feel constrained through you, Mr. President, to address the following question to the Secretary-General: who are "the parties concerned" referred to in paragraph 81 of the report of the Secretary-General as having been consulted and having given their consent to the extension of the stationing of UNFICYP in Cyprus for a further period of six months? Depending on the answer I hope to receive, I shall indicate my Government's position concerning the extension of the mandate and the resolution as a whole just adopted by the Council.

9. The PRESIDENT: I would ask the Secretary-General if he is in a position to answer the question of the representative of Turkey.

10. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am quite ready to answer the question put to me by the representative of Turkey. I wish to inform the Council that through my Special Representative in Cyprus I consulted then Acting President, Mr. Clerides, and the Vice-President, Mr. Denktaş, and I also consulted the Governments of Greece and Turkey.

11. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey on a point of order.

12. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Mr. President, do you expect me, as I mentioned in my introductory statement, to indicate my Government's position on the basis of what the Secretary-General has said, or would you prefer me to refer to it in my statement? I am entirely at your disposal.

13. The PRESIDENT: In reply to the representative of Turkey, I had assumed he would explain his position when I invited him to speak.

14. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Point of order.

15. The PRESIDENT: I am afraid I must tell the representative of Cyprus that he need not raise a point of order, as I now call upon him since his is the first name on my list of speakers.

16. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I rose on a point of order because I thought the members of the Council were to speak first. In relation to the matter that has been raised here in regard to the report as to the parties concerned, I wish to remind the Council that the parent resolution, which is at the origin of the Security Council meetings and the mandate on Cyprus, resolution 186 (1964), established the United

Nations Force in Cyprus and in its paragraph 4 recommended "the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus". It does not refer to the consent of any other Government or any other party. It merely speaks of the Government of Cyprus, and on that basis every renewal of the mandate was made. I shall not cite them all; I shall merely cite the last renewal, which took place on 29 May 1974 [resolution 349 (1974)]. I do not know how many renewals there have been over the 10-year period, but the resolutions always contained the following words:

"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond . . .".

What has never been mentioned is the consent of such-and-such a person—no one but the Government of Cyprus.

17. Now, is it useful to create problems by changing things? Why change them after 10 years because of a new reality? What is this new reality? To put it in a few words, it is the reality of aggression and invasion, which was not accepted as a normal or logical or good thing by the Security Council, which in effect condemned it by calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of the foreign troops from the island. I need not go into the whole story now.

18. I do not see that a right can be created out of a crime, unless the Security Council now wishes to start a new idea in that respect. My delegation takes it that the renewal is made by the consent of the Government of Cyprus, and no explanation would alter that reality of the resolution. Therefore, whatever else is said or done is contrary to what should be done. That is all I have to say on that.

19. Now, before I continue with my statement I wish to thank the President and the members of the Council for inviting my delegation to participate in this meeting. I should also like to express to you, Mr. President, our congratulations upon your assumption of the office of the President. We feel sure that your high qualifications, your skill and great experience are significant assets for the proper conduct of the deliberations of the Council.

20. Now, what is the situation? At the present moment a State Member of the United Nations is to a very great extent occupied by the troops of an invading Power. A beautiful and neat island of the Mediterranean now lies to a very considerable extent in ruins. Its economy has been completely shattered.

21. Exploiting its military conquest of the northern half of the island, the State of Turkey is taking a number of steps to assimilate that northern part of Cyprus into Turkey. Turkish money is used freely in the north, replacing the Cypriot currency, and is available in the banks organized by the Turkish Cypriots in Kyrenia to replace those previously owned by Cypriots. Turkish stamps are now used on letters, and Kyrenia is no longer a city in Cyprus but a city in Turkey. The official name the occupying forces have given Kyrenia is Girne. That does not matter; we welcome it. But the address given is not "Girne, Cyprus", but "Girne, Mersin, Turkey". That is a reality the Security Council will of course take into account, and it will act accordingly, with the

² See resolution 365 (1974).

idea that aggression and invasion and the violation of every international law creates a right. That is a new and novel concept in the United Nations which will help the world towards progress, towards peace, I expect. What is the extent of the displacement of the Greek character or the change of the Greek character?

22. By the Greek character, I mean the Cypriot character that it had in the north of Cyprus, occupied 80 per cent by Greek Cypriots. A once bustling and predominantly prosperous town has now become deserted and in ruins. Turkey has moved rapidly to cut the island in two and intends to continue to occupy especially what it believes it can occupy on its own terms, in other words, what it has conquered by violence or force.

23. Two hundred thousand displaced persons have become temporary refugees, out of a very small population of hardly 600,000, expelled from their homes by direct force and by the threat of suffering miserable conditions if they did not leave.

24. Humanitarian aid is welcome, and in spite of difficulties placed with regard to that humanitarian aid, it is still welcome for it is desperately needed. But will that aid assuage the international conscience while the crime continues? How much will the tending of wounds help while the perpetrator of the crime continues his illegal work?

25. What are we to think and what is the world to think of this situation? I am sorry that I have to say things that are unpleasant. They are unpleasant to the ear, but they are tragic in reality. So we might suffer a little unpleasantness at this moment in order to see the reality in Cyprus. Has there been a previous occasion like that since the Second World War and even during the Second World War? In some of the details, you would find no parallel in the Second World War, and even long before it. And this is accepted, I believe, with an easy conscience.

26. If it is not accepted with an easy conscience, then there is hope. But if it is, it is a sign of the times in which humanity finds itself at the present transitory period. Because it is a transitory period and the omens are very clear in various manifestations; I mean manifestations not in words but in deeds, in the United Nations and outside it.

27. What are the small countries, members of the world body, to do who do not belong to an alliance and in that respect have an independent existence, but subject to their security being ensured by international security through the United Nations? If they do not belong to an alliance, and they belong to the non-aligned, what is their security in terms of force?

28. What is the lesson to be learned from Cyprus? That if you are a non-aligned country and you are not also militarily strong you have to belong to an alliance, or else provide your own strength, power and military force. The President of a very respected country in Europe brought this point out at a significant moment when he said that the tragedy of Cyprus now shows that there is no international security in the world whatsoever.

29. And those of you—when he was addressing the people who congregated on certain occasions, referring to the situation in Cyprus—who have been criticizing my Government for trying to strengthen its military force, saying that it is not proper for a neutral country, that it is not quite moral for a neutral country to seek to acquire a great force, now see that we must have a greater force. And he was right. Therefore, how many others thought the same way? And what is the effect of that? It is turning towards more and more armaments, in military alliances, or in their own defence. And the effect of this will necessarily be a deterioration in the world progress towards peace and disarmament.

30. There has not been much progress in disarmament. There has been an arms race and the arms race is continuing. But now the hope is disappearing because by the trends of the world, how can hope persist in face of the situation in Cyprus? The psychological effect is that it is a blow to the hope of mankind, apart from the implication of international security. We are asked to compromise. But what have we to compromise about? What compromise can help Cyprus and make up for the wrongs perpetrated on it in violation of all the principles of the Charter and international law, every obligation, every responsibility and every tenet of law and justice?

31. What have we left to compromise on? We have been compromised by the invader and by the apathy that has been shown. I do not say that we have any complaint about the Security Council having adopted resolutions. It adopted very effective resolutions, intended to be effective, but which remain unimplemented. The first resolution, on the very day of the invasion of Cyprus [*resolution 353 (1974)*], called for a cease-fire, called for the withdrawal of troops, for the immediate cessation of foreign military intervention and withdrawal of foreign troops. It was accepted by all sides and accepted by Turkey.

32. Now, there is a peculiar thing. Although accepted and although the cease-fire was to take effect from 22 July, the invasion and the aggression continued on 23 July. And on 23 July the Council adopted a second resolution, resolution 354 (1974), which was more strict, this time demanding

“... that all parties to the present fighting comply immediately with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 353 (1974) calling for an immediate cessation of all firing in the area and requesting all States to exercise ...”.

So this reaffirms the previous resolution and made the withdrawal of the troops more compelling. But the aggression was continued.

33. Now we come to the time when there was the Geneva Conference, in which a specific agreement was then signed, solemnly agreed upon, that there would be a cease-fire as of 30 July. But that did not mean anything. On 31 July there was a pre-arranged operation carried out by the Turkish forces. And the documents which fell into the hands of the National Guard show that this was a pre-arranged operation which completely disregarded the agreement at Geneva. Those things are past, but I repeat them here because they will lead to a very important conclusion that will have to be recalled. I do not expect the Security Council members

to remember these things; they have to be recalled. Therefore, the aggression continued.

34. Now, after that, we have further resolutions recalling the situation. And on 14 August a new and very ferocious attack and invasion began. But what happened in the meantime? What happened was that during that period of the violation of the cease-fire resolutions and agreements, the invader, in complete command of the sea and the air, brought in new forces, increasing his forces in the island tenfold. The 40 tanks became 400, the troops increased to 40,000. And all this time there was no move made to call the violator of the resolutions to order. No one said, "Look here, we have adopted resolutions unanimously"—we hear about resolutions adopted with a majority vote, but these were unanimous resolutions—"for the withdrawal of the troops. But instead, not only are you not withdrawing your troops but you are bringing in ten times as many". Who objected to that? The Mediterranean Sea was a sea to be used for aggression by Turkey. Cyprus had no air force, no navy and no army worth mentioning, except for a small National Guard. So the result was 400 tanks, modern tanks pitted against 9 old tanks; and what was thought, at the beginning, to be a normal invasion became an outright slaughter. Meanwhile the Security Council was sitting there very calmly, and those who should be the guardians of peace in the Mediterranean never moved a finger.

35. Now, is this a hopeful sign for the future of the world? Maybe it is. Maybe it is a trend of events that will have to take its course. Maybe it is inevitable, predetermined, that this should be the course. And the weapons used were weapons in the possession of the invader as a member of a powerful alliance, under an agreement that they were not to be used for purposes other than defence. But during all those six weeks when those weapons were being transported to Cyprus, not a word was said to the invader. No one said, "You have to stop this, because the weapons you are using are being used illegally". That is another aspect.

36. Should this be covered up? We understood that there is a principle of avoiding cover-ups. Therefore I hope I will be forgiven if I do not participate in the cover-up.

37. This is the situation in which we find ourselves today. The fact that Cyprus is ruined is not very important. One little country less or one little country more does not make much difference in the minds of many people, perhaps. But our world is one and indivisible, and particularly in our era of interdependence, what happens in one little country has repercussions, and its moral effects cannot leave others undisturbed. Whether they like it or not, whether they take notice of it or not, in the very nature of things the repercussions and ripples of this situation in Cyprus, which I need not describe, cannot but affect the entire international community. In fact, they have affected it. We have noticed that since then, within two months, there has been a significant deterioration in the situation in the Middle East. This has been remarked and commented upon in the international press, at least in some publications that I have read. And we must not forget that the Middle East is the most dangerous spot, where every effort should be exerted towards keeping the concept of peace, the concept of the United Nations, the concepts of justice, non-aggression and the non-use of force, in the foreground, so as to avoid creating circumstances that

would give some people and some international publications the right to say, "Well, after the affair of Cyprus, we can now say that only force wins".

38. Is that a good example to set for the world? Is that a wise thing to do—to do these things in the Middle East, to choose that vulnerable point? I must tell you—I feel this and I am sure I am right—that if there is to be a world conflagration, it will start from the Middle East, that area with which we are playing now. To satisfy the whims of A and B, we are playing with this situation. Where is our wisdom? That reminds me of a poem by T. S. Eliot: "Where is our wisdom? We have lost it in knowledge". As humanity acquires more and more knowledge scientifically and technologically, it loses its wisdom. The poem goes on: "Where is our knowledge? We have lost it in information". We are flooded with information from all sides, from the news media, from television, from newspapers, from all kinds of things. But does that help humanity in its wisdom?

39. I am sorry if my words disturb some and make others want to go to sleep. But the fact remains that we have lost our wisdom through our knowledge, and that is the only explanation for why the world today appears so much worse than it was before. Can moral degradation be compatible with the progress of science? We have this problem now.

40. I am not going to elaborate on the global issue, which is, as a matter of fact, the most important one. I am, however, going to elaborate on this question of Cyprus. So many months have passed since the tragic days of the Security Council meetings on Cyprus and the resolutions that were adopted. But where is the implementation of those resolutions? Are resolutions to be adopted by the United Nations only to remain forever unimplemented, with nothing being done to put them into effect? The Charter provides clearly that Security Council resolutions shall be—the words are "shall be"—implemented, and it provides the means for such implementation. Article 39 makes provision for the determination of a case that calls for intervention by the Council because there has been aggression. And there was intervention, yes, by resolution. But another Article, Article 41, provides for implementation and says that there must be implementation by means falling short of the use of force. Article 41 does not call for the use of force, but provides for various other ways of bringing pressure on an invader or an aggressor so as to stop him. That is provided for in Article 41. And Article 42 says clearly that if those measures prove inadequate to stop the aggression and the war, or whatever it may be, then other measures should be taken to that end. But it has been the practice, and some may say it is a very honoured practice, to adopt resolutions without implementation and to patch things up somehow or other.

41. That has sometimes worked; but it will not always work. And we have come to the time when it did not work at all. This case will of course be followed by other cases when it will not work. Wherever it did work, it did so in such a way that allowed the situation of war to continue as, for instance, in the Middle East.

42. Security Council resolution 343 (1973) was adopted but it has not been implemented. In the case of the Middle

East, there was a balance of power in aid of the resolution. In Cyprus, there was no balance of power; it was purely international security; in the circumstances of Cyprus, there was no balance at all. And because there was no balance, it was left quite derelict. But what does it matter?

43. That should really give food for thought. I think that it is time that some means of implementation be found in order to save the situation in Cyprus. It is very easy to say: "Oh, carry on negotiations". But will these negotiations be carried out when the invader is riding astride a significant part of the island and dictating his terms in Cyprus—dictating them even right here in the Security Council? Can these negotiations be equal, just and fair under the pressure of the foreign invader in occupation, who says: "Now, if you do not accept this or that, I am going to attack. And I am free to attack because there is no international security at all." Is that the kind of situation that gives rise to hope?

44. I should like for a moment to return to the resolution that has just been adopted by the Council [*resolution 364 (1974)*]. There were no complaints against this resolution; but I would remind the Council that three points were raised in the letter which I addressed to you today, Mr. President, in respect of this resolution, to the effect that it should contain, directly or by implication—and I hope that it does contain it by implication—a reference to all the interim reports issued by the Secretary-General between 21 July and 31 October, so that the phrase in the resolution

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 6 December 1974...",

would include those reports by implication, because those reports are the ones reflecting the situation in Cyprus, and not the one dated 6 December 1974. Reading the latter report only is not sufficient to understand the situation there.

45. Therefore, I shall take it that where the draft resolution mentions

"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 6 December 1974...",

that necessarily implies all the reports that have been issued by the Secretary-General after the report of May 1974—and these reports are most significant.

46. That was the first point which I raised, and I consider it very important. Anyone wishing to know the situation in Cyprus as of today has to be made aware of what has been happening in Cyprus that led to this situation.

47. If you read those reports, you will see something that does not appear at all elsewhere. It is the repeated reference to napalm bombings. If you read the report of the Secretary-General dated 6 December 1974, you will find nothing showing this fact. I shall quote from some of those reports.

48. Paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report contained in document S/11353 says that in Famagusta district there was napalm bombing. If you give these reports a thorough reading, you will find that there has been a continuous use of napalm. I did not know that there was such extensive napalm bombing until I read these reports in

sequence. I read them in sequence in order to supplement this present report. Leaving out the other things, I find in document S/11353/Add.25 that, only with respect to UNFICYP,

"In Larnaca district, an UNFICYP patrol vehicle, painted white with United Nations markings and carrying a United Nations flag, was attacked by Turkish aircraft in the area two miles south of Goshi. The Turkish aircraft made three passes at the vehicle, firing at it on the second and third passes. Of four soldiers of the Austrian contingent in the vehicle, three were killed. The Force Commander lodged the strongest protest with the Turkish Commander." [S/11353/Add.25, para. 16.]

Later, in the Famagusta area, we find:

"(a) Three killed, all members of the Austrian contingent. In this connexion, an inquiry made after the incident... reveals that the victims were killed by napalm.

"(b) 32 wounded..." [S/11353/Add.28, para. 15].

49. Was that all? No. Napalm fell everywhere; but I mentioned only cases with respect to the United Nations Force. We also find in these reports the destruction of hospitals by repeated bombings—every kind of destruction.

50. Then we come to the humanitarian aspect. Food sent for distribution was not allowed by the Turkish troops to reach the areas for which it was intended. They said: "We shall take it; it is our business to distribute it". But, as a result of this attitude, the Red Cross did not think it worth while to send any more food, according to the cases reported here in these documents. I shall not take up any more time to point out all these things, but I wish to emphasize that anyone who wants to understand the situation in Cyprus cannot read the Secretary-General's last report only. He must take the previous reports into account, the reports which are the true reports of the situation.

51. Now, in paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General's report of 17 October 1974—which is really very instructive—we read:

"The conditions of some 2,000 Greek Cypriots living in central locations in areas under Turkish control give cause for concern." [S/11468/Add.4, para. 11.]

All that is of course an understatement. We know and we agree and we accept the understatement of the United Nations report, because, to a certain extent, they have to keep things quiet. But they cannot keep them so quiet as not to show something of the reality.

"The condition of some 8,000 Greek Cypriots who continue to live in the Karpas area has deteriorated. Little is known of the conditions under which 2,500 Greek Cypriots continue to live in... the Kyrenia area." [*Ibid.*]

Nothing is known. Why? He also refers to the 400 living in Morphou in terrible conditions under Turkish control. Why? Because the United Nations Force is not allowed to enter the area. In this report, it repeatedly says that it is not allowed to enter the area and that it is obstructed in its work; whereas

"In areas under National Guard control, UNFICYP is free to move... without restriction and is therefore in a

position to make a major contribution towards the security and humanitarian needs of the Turkish Cypriots there." [Ibid., para. 4.]

But the UNFICYP contingent was forcibly confined to the Carl Gustav camp at Famagusta by Turkish forces and there was some looting around the perimeter of the walled city.

52. There are other cases, although I shall not go into all of them, of interference and not allowing the Force to operate. And in this report too the Secretary-General refers to the poor conditions of operation of the United Nations Force.

53. All this is said in respect of my letter to the President and that is why in that letter I pointed out that to paragraph 5 of resolution 364 (1974), which reads:

"*Appeals again* to all parties concerned to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force..."

should be added the words "allowing it the needed freedom of movement," and it should then go on as at present "in its continuing performance of its duties". So although it is not there, I take it that it is there by implication, that this appeal means "allow the United Nations Force freedom of movement". I think this is something that the Secretary-General particularly needs, in order for the United Nations Force to be able to function. This was the second point, and I take it that it is contained in the resolution by implication.

54. The third point was about the implementation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and, particularly as the Assembly resolution is endorsed by resolution 365 (1974) just adopted, I consider the latter to be satisfactory, for it implies the other two parts and in fact contains these. Therefore I shall not take up any more time. I know we are at a difficult stage, but it was fundamentally necessary to mention these things.

55. Before concluding, I should like to express once again my Government's deep appreciation and feelings of gratitude to the Secretary-General and his collaborators both here and in Cyprus for their relentless and highly commendable efforts in promoting peace and harmony in Cyprus in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the objectives of the United Nations.

56. The United Nations Force, in very difficult circumstances, is now doing what it can. However, it is my submission that the resolution under which the United Nations Force was established [resolution 186 (1964)] gives it a mandate beyond the intercommunal mandate. It has an international mandate and therefore it can be deployed and can intervene whenever it is necessary at this critical time to preserve the cease-fire between the Turkish forces and the Cypriot positions. The resolution shows very plainly that it has a clear international character since it begins:

"*Noting* that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and secu-

urity and may further deteriorate unless additional measures..."

and then goes on

"*Having in mind* the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads:

"'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. . .'"

I therefore believe it can be used in international relations without its mandate being restricted at all in that respect. I do not wish to elaborate further on this point, but we wish the United Nations Force to be able to operate effectively with respect to both its size and its mandate.

57. Our warm thanks go also to Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, who carries out his grave and difficult work with patience and skill. We are also indebted to the Commander of the United Nations Force, General Prem Chand, who carries out a most demanding and delicate task effectively and with sincerity, patience and devotion to his principles, and to his staff. We express our appreciation also to the officers and men under his command for their selfless service and sacrifice. Our sincere gratitude is due also to the Governments of the countries which, with a noble sense of responsibility and devotion to the concept of preserving the peace of the world through the United Nations, make the operation of UNFICYP possible by means of their generous contributions in men and money.

58. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Turkey.

59. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Mr. President, I never know whether it is proper under the rules of procedure for an outsider like myself, who is yet a frequent participant in the meetings of this august body, to address compliments to the President. Nevertheless, I have done so in the past, so permit me to express to you, as a personal friend, my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you presiding over this meeting of the Security Council. Your well-known and widely acknowledged qualities as an experienced diplomat, the tact and patience you have displayed during some of the most critical meetings of the Council and your close interest in and knowledge of the problem of Cyprus cannot but be considered an assurance of a constructive debate to which we at least, for our part, have been looking forward.

60. My delegation has time and again made it clear that if the reality of the situation in Cyprus is overlooked the effectiveness of the United Nations in its peace-keeping and peace-making endeavours will be seriously impaired. We have made this clear formally in the Council whenever we have been given a chance to express our views. We again made it clear during the extensive consultations that were held before this present meeting.

61. We deeply regret that the present resolution once again fails to note this reality by referring in its fourth preambular paragraph to an entity—namely, "the Government of Cyprus"—which we consider to be non-existent.

62. The Turkish Government will, of course, accept the presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus solely because it sincerely believes that its presence is essential and useful in the existing circumstances in the island.

63. As for resolution 364 (1974) just adopted, I regret to say that my Government does not consider itself bound by its provisions because, as I have explained, it fails to reflect the reality in Cyprus.

64. As regards the second resolution which the Council has adopted [resolution 365 (1974)], I wish to say the following. The resolution bases itself largely on General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). My Government's interpretation of resolution 3212 (XXIX) was given by the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Turan Gunes. My Government still stands firmly by that interpretation.

65. This time the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP is taking place under completely new circumstances. It is precisely because things have changed in Cyprus that the Secretary-General, in his wisdom and as the depositary of the Organization's highest standards of law, has judged it necessary to obtain from the only remaining representatives of legitimacy in Cyprus their consent for an action affecting Cyprus as a whole. This would be our definition of government—if there still is the shadow of a government in Cyprus—and our interpretation of the term "government" is the President and the Vice-President, or, more correctly, the leaders of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, who are striving, it is hoped, to create what is needed more than anything else in Cyprus, a legitimate government.

66. These new circumstances, and the events of last summer that led to them, have been extensively discussed in the United Nations, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Therefore, I do not intend to go into the substance of the Cyprus question. However, I should like to comment on certain realities that seem to have been overlooked, or seem to be out of their true perspective. I shall do so not for the purpose of provoking or entering into any polemics, but simply out of my desire for a healthy approach to a peaceful solution of the problem. This will depend largely on the recognition of certain facts, both by the parties directly concerned and by any other State, for that matter, which is resolved to utilize its efforts in bringing about a peaceful solution that would be acceptable to all.

67. The first point I feel myself in duty bound to make, even at the risk of repeating myself, is the essence of our problem, which consists in the answers to the following questions: What is the Republic of Cyprus? Who is to speak for the Republic of Cyprus? And is there actually a Government in the Republic of Cyprus?

68. We have already listened to the statement of a Greek ambassador; the ambassador of Greece will no doubt make a statement after me. But the Republic of Cyprus was intended to be a State based on two communities whose Government also, naturally, was intended to be a Government of those two communities. The trouble started the moment the Government on the island became the advocate of the interests, aspirations and the supremacy of only one of those communities. It then lost its legitimacy, and gradually

reduced itself to a mere *de facto* administration. That was, and still is, the reason why I have persistently objected to Ambassador Rossides' speaking on behalf of Cyprus as a whole. I do so not out of lack of respect for him: he has always been a faithful representative, as far as I can judge, of the interests of Hellenism; but this is precisely what disqualifies him from the claim of representing the people of Cyprus as a whole.

69. Now, during this General Assembly session, all those who have sat behind the nameplate of Cyprus have shown themselves to be, in the eyes and ears of the whole world, in every single Committee, merely Greek representatives. In fact, their speeches could have been interchanged with the speeches of the representatives of Greece.

70. During this same General Assembly session, the Special Political Committee listened to the representatives of both communities. Had not the Members of the United Nations then become aware of the existing duality and the differences of views? Has the membership of the Council during the last 11 years witnessed any similarity between what the Turkish Cypriot representative said in the Special Political Committee a month ago and what they have heard from those who claim to represent Cyprus as they speak here at the United Nations, or, for that matter, in the various capitals of each and every country represented around this table where Cyprus is purported to be represented?

71. Now, Ambassador Rossides, furthermore, seems to be out of touch with the realities of the island from which he has been absent perhaps too long. After all, after all that has happened, did he not, in an unbelievable display of bad taste, utilize the occasion of the eulogy he pronounced for the late U Thant to speak of the unitary-State formula for Cyprus? On that occasion he usurped his capacity as Chairman of the Asian Group, just as the mission he heads has been usurping the Constitution of Cyprus for over a decade here. That, I submit, should not be tolerated any longer.

72. In all honesty, I must say that that one-sided approach did not contribute to the cause of peace, as events have proved. I doubt that it will do so in future. Therefore, we should have liked to see that duality reflected in clearer terms in the official documents of the United Nations.

73. Having said that, let me turn to another aspect of the question. Anybody who is not very familiar with the problem of Cyprus, when reading the report of the Secretary-General, could easily jump to a false conclusion. I am sure that the image reflected by the report is unintentional; however, it seems to us that what happened in Cyprus last summer was something between the Turkish forces and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, on the one hand, and the Greek Cypriot National Guard, on the other.

74. I notice that in his statement a moment ago, Ambassador Rossides also, in complaining that the report, if read alone, would not give a true picture of the situation, mentioned that earlier reports should be read but he was careful to start with reports from 21 July onwards.

75. Now, things happened before 21 July; yet this very important element is manifestly neglected—an element

which played a vital role in the past, an element which still plays a vital role, and which will no doubt continue to play a vital but, it is hoped, more constructive role in the future.

76. We all know that nothing can occur in Cyprus to which Greece can remain alien. In 1963, when the fighting first broke out, it was the Greek national contingent which actively took part in the attacks against the Turkish community. Later on it was the junta of Papadopoulos, as a result of the agreement which eased the 1967 crisis, which pulled back 10,000 Greek soldiers sent there upon the invitation of Archbishop Makarios by the democratic Greek Governments which preceded the junta. It was the junta of Ioannides, about whose past activities the Archbishop's speech contained horrendous revelations, which later staged the coup that led to the events before 21 July.

77. I would not be disclosing a military secret if I were to say what is known to all that the fiercest battles of July and August were fought between the Turkish and the Greek national forces. Even the so-called army of Cyprus, illegal as it is and as it always has been, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, as it is called, was not only commanded, as it still is, by Greek officers, but also to a large extent was, and is, still composed of Greek soldiers of every rank. This is an element which no student of the Cypriot question should lose sight of.

78. These were the two main points I wished to comment upon. Now, let me briefly reiterate my Government's position to the benefit of some and, I hope, to the relief of all. The Government of Turkey sees no alternative to the peaceful solution of the problem. As we have repeatedly made clear at every official level, we have no territorial claim over Cyprus. Our first and foremost anxiety is the security and the well-being of the Turkish-Cypriot community and, furthermore, of the two communities in Cyprus.

79. For the last 11 years we have tried every possible peaceful channel to accomplish this through securing the well-being of the members of the Turkish Cypriot community threatened in their existence. The stubborn resistance of the other side to recognize certain facts brought us where we are today. Turkey has intervened in Cyprus to put an end to a situation which was not conducive to the peaceful coexistence of the two communities. My Government has no doubts whatsoever over the legitimacy of its action, but it does not consider it as an end in itself.

80. We are prepared, as we have always said, to enter into meaningful negotiations with the other parties directly concerned to settle this question once and for all. Our experience has shown us that a bi-regional federal solution is the only way to deal with the question. Such a solution will not only be within the framework of the principles of the United Nations but it will also satisfy the obligations set out by international treaties which we have solemnly signed. It was in this frame of mind that my Government welcomed the constructive dialogue between the heads of the two communities in Cyprus.

81. It is greatly hoped that the recent adjustments within the Greek Cypriot community will not adversely affect the chances of negotiations. That would be a very sad thing

which would increase the hardships of both communities. In this connexion I must emphasize—because usually little is said on the subject—my Government's deep concern over the Turkish Cypriots, some 30,000 of whom are still living in Greek-controlled areas. We sincerely hope that the parallel between their security and the over-all tranquillity in the island will be rightly appreciated.

82. Before ending my original statement, I should like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General, to his Special Representative and to the Force Commander for their untiring efforts.

83. Since it seems that this is the last time I am addressing the Council this year, I hope, let me also express my delegation's deep appreciation to those outgoing members of the Security Council. Together we have lived through important and sometimes crucial meetings. We shall remember the good faith and understanding we have received from them.

84. Mr. President, that was the end of my original statement. You need not be unduly alarmed and I will not speak for long after this, but I have some things to say and I am prompted to say these things for the reason I am going to explain at this point. First of all, the previous speaker, with his skill, once again succeeded in luring me to answer some of his allegations against my country. This is one of the reasons I am going to add a few more words. Furthermore—and this is a bit more serious—he is also the author of a letter circulated a few days ago [S/11569] which does provoke certain reactions.

85. I have expressed our desire to enter into meaningful negotiations that will bring about a peaceful settlement. This also seems to be the desire of the international community as a whole. To our friends who urge us to negotiate, I have a plea to make. Show us someone to negotiate with. The will to negotiate cannot only be displayed by appointing negotiators. One must be in a mood and in a determination for a dialogue. If I am not clear enough, I would now recommend that the members of the Council read a document which was published on 6 December 1974, the same date as the Secretary-General's report, therefore prepared in advance, under the symbol S/11569, a letter submitted by the representative of the Greek Cypriots. I ask the members of the Council whether they consider that the mentality that produced these pages of hatred, lies and obscenity is ready for negotiations. The letter is signed by the representative of one of the parties to the Cyprus conflict and logically should reflect the views of that particular party. Does it?

86. The official negotiators of that party in Cyprus say one thing. Their so-called leader says another. And here their representative has altogether another voice. Whom are we to believe? And this is the problem of the so-called Government of Cyprus—the Government of an independent and non-aligned country which needs a foreign Government's blessing before entering into negotiations with the other community in its own country. I consider that it is high time to put an end to this masquerade and admit what everybody knows by now to be the true situation.

87. As Ambassador Rossides has published a document which is a compilation, more or less, of his earlier documents—and that makes it even more difficult to understand why he chose that particular moment to present that compilation—I would just, to refresh the memories of the members of the Council, mention other documents which ought to be read in conjunction with the Rossides document. I must say, although I have not that kind of pride of authorship, that their English style, while perhaps not all that it should be, is at least more in consonance with diplomatic language. The documents are the following: S/11365—I shall spare you all the dates, because it is a long list—S/11394, S/11409, S/11410, S/11412, S/11420, S/11422, S/11425, S/11435, S/11439, S/11458, S/11462, S/11466, S/11489, S/11493 and S/11505.

88. Tragic as may be the loss of any innocent life or the suffering through violence of any human being, war will inevitably cause them. It is war itself that we should try to avoid or eliminate. But what to me represents the ultimate depth of the abyss in human behaviour, what none of the individual crimes described in that document can, even if proved to be true, ever reach in horror, is the incident innocently related by the Pastor of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus related to all distinguished representatives Members of the Organization who cared to listen to him, when the Archbishop was referring to an offer made to him by a man wearing the uniform of an honourable army, friendly to the Archbishop, to mass murder the whole of the Turkish population of the island. Mr. President, neither you nor I nor any of the honourable persons in this chamber, including certainly I am sure Ambassador Rossides, are approached in our daily lives by professional murderers offering to get rid of our individual adversaries for us. Nor have I heard or known of any such offer on a wholesale scale addressed to any statesman in any honourable Government. What sinister atmosphere was allowed to reign in the Byzantine court of Nicosia—I prefer to use the name “Nicosia” instead of “Lefkosa” in this particular connexion—for such a conversation to be even possible, to be even thinkable. I am sure that the mind of every person in this august body shrinks at the image. And yet, if memories were not short, we should all remember a picture published by the international press—which is usually ignored by Ambassador Rossides, but to which he has made ample reference in his last letter because Turkey was the object of the press reports—of a photograph of Makarios wearing his pectoral cross and his smile in the act of blessing a hand grenade destined to kill or maim, if well aimed, a crowd of his own countrymen belonging to the wrong faith. That was the man, that is the man, and when I look at it now I see even a kind of poetic justice in the fact that the immediate successor of Makarios was an uncommonly bloodthirsty common murderer. Blood-stained hands seem, for some obscure reason, of which Freud would have perhaps given an analysis, to have a particular appeal to the Greek Cypriots.

89. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece on whom I now call.

90. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): Mr. President, having the feeling that I am by now a client, a good client, I hope, of

the Council, allow me to address to you my congratulations on having assumed the Presidency of this Council. Everybody in this chamber looks to you with confidence. I shall add that I personally look to you with admiration and appreciation for the way you have conducted the difficult consultations which took place for two days before our meeting and all the efforts you deployed in the many days before that.

91. It is fitting, I believe, to start by thanking the Secretary-General. He has always been a key figure in the problem of Cyprus, but in the six-month period covered by his report and resulting in what I shall call the tragedy of Cyprus, his task and role have been very different and very difficult. The people of Cyprus as a whole owe much to him. But I shall rather speak here of the people of Greece. We shall never forget the way he helped during the actual fighting. He did not help us, he helped everybody. That is his merit. And by helping everybody he helped the United Nations. I am sure my Turkish colleague will recognize that. He then helped in establishing a cease-fire, and we all know how frustrating that proved to be. He paid numerous visits to Athens and my Government appreciated each one of them. After the cease-fire, he arranged for the Nicosia talks, the talks on which we all placed many hopes. The Secretary-General helped mainly from New York. His representative, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, helped on the spot. It was very often a very courageous enterprise. We have appreciated his efforts and his wisdom. Being myself in New York, I have in many instances to deal with the Under-Secretaries-General, Mr. Guyer and Mr. Urquhart. I wish to praise their competence and thank them both sincerely for their human approach to the tragedy and to myself.

92. Last but not least I should like to express the appreciation of my Government to the countries which provided the forces for UNFICYP as well as to those which made their operation possible. The gratitude of my Government and the people of Greece goes mainly to the families of those UNFICYP members who perished for peace.

93. The report of the Secretary-General is the story of a tragedy desperately trying not to appear tragic. It is reserved and cautious. But we have never expected or wanted it to be otherwise. It is not for the Secretary-General to pass judgement; we can do that, and the report provides us with ample information and factual elements for us to do so were that our purpose. It records the number of cease-fires and an equal number of violations of the cease-fires and an equal number of advances in the territory of Cyprus. I shall read paragraph 26 of the report, regarding violations and advances:

“In a number of cases, the observations of UNFICYP in this regard were heeded, and the advancing troops were withdrawn. In other cases, areas occupied after 16 August are still being held. This applies in particular to Turkish advances in late August in the Pyroi area, in September in the Galini area, from late September to mid-October north of the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, in late October south of Famagusta in the Dherinia area, and, most recently, in the Yerolakkos area, west of Nicosia.”

I would emphasize and draw attention to the words "most recently". But I shall continue reading the same paragraph, since I like to be objective:

"There have also been some National Guard violations by movement which have been observed and dealt with by UNFICYP."

In another chapter, the report recounts the number of Security Council resolutions and the equal number of their violations.

94. But the most staggering picture—perhaps because it gives a strong sense of actuality—is the comparison made in the report between the occupied north and the free south, especially the comparison with respect to the UNFICYP operation. I quote from paragraphs 31 and 33:

"Since the start of the Turkish intervention UNFICYP has, in general, been restricted in its freedom of movement in areas controlled by the Turkish forces, and in several cases the Turkish military authorities have demanded the removal of UNFICYP observation posts and camps from such areas."

"... In the northern areas the restrictions imposed by the military authorities have made it difficult to carry out some of these tasks ... The inability of the Force to provide the same protection for Greek Cypriots in the north as for the Turkish Cypriots in the south has been protested repeatedly by the Cyprus Government."

95. It is obvious that the life of UNFICYP is deliberately made difficult in the north. That is not fair to UNFICYP, and it is not fair to the Greek Cypriots. And that is possible only because the Turkish Government chooses to disregard the resolutions of the Council. If the Turkish Government had any intention at all of arriving at a negotiated solution, as the Turkish representative has just indicated, it would, I submit, be helpful so to indicate by changing its attitude towards UNFICYP.

96. The Greek Government agrees with the recommendation of the Secretary-General concerning the further extension by six months of the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. We furthermore agree that that extension is necessary and, as a matter of fact, vital not only for the maintenance of the cease-fire, not only for the security of the population and the humanitarian relief assistance it provides, but also, and I would say primarily, the presence of the Force is necessary in the search for a peaceful solution of the present situation. The presence of the Force is making present life a little easier, but it will be a mistake, in our view, if by doing so it prolongs this kind of life. That must be understood by the most directly concerned Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. The tragedy they both went through will help them in that understanding. As a matter of fact I am convinced that they will realize it and understand it, if Turkey allows them to.

97. A speedy solution of the Cyprus problem is necessary to Turkey and Greece alike. It is also necessary to the peace of the whole region. But those who need it most of all are the people of Cyprus, Greeks and Turks alike. The present situation spreads misery not only to the beaten Greek Cypriots. It spreads misery to the victorious Turkish Cypriots

also. Allow me, in this respect, to read a dispatch from Nicosia published in the London *Daily Telegraph* of last Monday, 9 December:

"Disillusion is sweeping the 25,000 Turkish Cypriots who followed their politicians' call to abandon homes in the south of the island and move north.

"Exact figures are impossible to obtain from the military-controlled sector, but it is known that thousands have no homes, jobs or money.

"People I have met say they are living worse lives than the Greek Cypriot refugees in the south.

"Some have managed to slip back to their homes, mainly in the Larnaca and Limassol areas.

"Others would like to leave but believe, with justification, that they would be prevented by the military commanders who are running life in the north—rather than Mr. Denktaş' Turkish Cypriot administration."

98. I should like especially to address this last remark to Mr. Çelik, whom we would all be very happy to hear in a few moments and who recently spent a period of time in New York and not in the occupied part of Cyprus. This is my original statement, to use the phraseology of my colleague from Turkey. I shall have to make two or three points in reference to his speech and I hope to be much briefer than he has been.

99. Referring to resolution 364 (1974), just adopted unanimously by the Security Council, Ambassador Olcay announced to us that his Government would not be bound by the provisions of that resolution. I shall only say that it is regrettable, and it is all the more regrettable that Turkey felt that it was not bound by many other resolutions unanimously accepted by the Council.

100. Ambassador Olcay explained, at some length, why and how his Government is not recognizing the Government of Cyprus. I shall only say that this also is regrettable, especially in view of the fact that there are 137 Governments which recognize the Government of Cyprus, and Turkey is the only one which does not. He ended his statement by referring to a paper which was, I think, circulated to the Council by the representative of Cyprus [*ibid.*]. I was quite astonished to see that the representative of Turkey was horrified by the paper and not by the actions described in the paper. But I shall leave Mr. Rossides to answer that. In his non-recognition of the Cypriot Government, he went so far as to call Mr. Rossides the Greek Ambassador and myself the Ambassador of Greece. Well, I shall not mind as long as he calls me by the right name. I am only afraid that he may spread some confusion in the Council, but I do believe that by now the Council is used to these practices.

101. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is Mr. Çelik, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. In accordance with the decision taken at the outset of the meeting I invite Mr. Çelik to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Çelik took a place at the Security Council table.

102. Mr. ÇELİK: Mr. President, I should like to thank you and all the members of the Security Council for having allowed me to participate in the deliberations of the Council today.

103. Since 1964, when the Turkish Cypriots had been forcefully ousted from their Government, Cyprus had been represented at the United Nations by a Greek Cypriot delegation, which does not and cannot represent the Turkish Cypriot community. I am therefore most grateful for the opportunity given me to present the views of my community.

104. With resolution 364 (1974) just adopted, the mandate of UNFICYP has been extended for another six months, until 15 June 1975. The Vice-President of Cyprus, Mr. Denktaş, who is the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and the President of the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration, who has been consulted on the matter, has signified his consent through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Luis Weckmann-Muñoz, for the extension of the mandate.

105. We believe in the usefulness of UNFICYP and hope that a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem will be found soon and that there will be no need for a further extension after 15 June 1975.

106. I should like to pay a tribute here to all those associated with United Nations efforts: the distinguished Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Force Commander, members of the Force and members of the Secretariat. They all deserve our fullest commendation. I would also express our gratitude to the countries which have contributed men and money to UNFICYP in Cyprus.

107. In the resolution just adopted, the word "Government" has been used. The problem of Cyprus is the problem of government. The question of Cyprus is now not the question of majorities and minorities. A minority can only exist within a nation, and as there is no Cypriot nation there can be no minority community in Cyprus. The fact is that we have two distinct national communities in Cyprus, equal partners and co-founders in the independence of the island. The so-called Government of Cyprus as it stands today does not represent the Turkish Cypriot community. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot delegation at the United Nations can only speak for the Greek Cypriot side.

108. The truth is that since 1964 there have been two completely separate, distinct administrations, one Greek and one Turkish, administering the Greek and Turkish areas respectively. The Greek Cypriot administration has never provided governmental services in the Turkish-controlled areas and Makarios' writ never prevailed in those areas. The Government, as such, therefore, is for all intents and purposes non-existent.

109. The Republic of Cyprus exists as an entity only in international relations, whereas internally it is two separate autonomous administrations. If there is anything at all left that we may refer to as the constitutional Government of Cyprus, it is the institutions of the presidency and the vice-presidency, that is, the Government as represented by the

President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus; this can be the only valid interpretation of the fourth preambular paragraph of the resolution just adopted; because if, by the term "Government", the Greek Cypriot administration is implied—which does not and cannot in any way represent the Turkish Cypriot community—then I would like to put on record that this resolution will not be binding on the Turkish Cypriot community. The General Assembly, having taken into consideration this reality on the island, very wisely avoided using the word "Government" in its resolution 3212 (XXIX) which has been endorsed by the Security Council today.

110. During the debate on the Cyprus question last month in the Special Political Committee, where the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities were given the opportunity to present their views, I presented the Turkish Cypriot case in a lengthy statement. I do not intend to repeat here what I said a month ago, but as I did not find the opportunity to do so in the plenary Assembly, where only the Greek Cypriot side spoke, I would like to put on record now the views of my community regarding resolution 3212 (XXIX) endorsed here today.

111. In principle, the resolution is generally acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community. We welcome the call to all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus.

112. It is an historic fact that the Turkish community, through its relentless efforts and sacrifices, has been the only effective guarantee for the independence of Cyprus. Had it not been for the Turkish community and Turkey's guarantee, the Greek Cypriots, who never wanted independence but instead, in collusion with and with the support of Greece, struggled for enosis, would have destroyed the independent Republic and united the island with Greece long ago. The Turkish community will continue to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus at all costs.

113. We also welcome the commendation of the contacts and negotiations that are taking place—on an equal footing—through the good offices of the Secretary-General between representatives of the two national communities. My community will do everything possible to assist in finding a negotiated settlement.

114. As regards paragraph 5 of the resolution, concerning the refugees, it will be appreciated that the solution of this problem is closely linked to the final political solution. The refugee problem in Cyprus is not new. It is new only for the Greek Cypriot side. The Turkish community has lived with the refugee problem for 11 years.

115. During 1964-1967, when the Cyprus crisis was at its worst and Turkish villages, one after another, were suffering large-scale attacks from united Greek Cypriot and mainland Greek armed forces, so that Turkish Cypriots were afraid to return to their abandoned homes and villages—these were either mixed villages where Turks were in the minority, or small isolated Turkish villages surrounded by large and hostile Greek villages—Makarios kept calling upon the Turks to return to their villages, promising to

repair their homes and to give them financial assistance for rehabilitation, knowing full well that, under the prevailing circumstances, they could not return, for security reasons.

116. But after the Kophinou crisis of November 1967, when Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war, Greece, under pressure, had to withdraw its troops, numbering more than 10,000, from the island and Grivas was recalled to Athens. There was a relatively normal situation on the island and some of the Turks could venture to return to their villages; Makarios, despite his previous official statements at the United Nations, in the international press and in other forums, under various pretexts refused to allow them to do so.

117. The Greek side refused to repair the homes of the Turkish refugees, which were looted and destroyed by the Greek Cypriots soon after they were abandoned in 1964; in cases where the Turkish Cypriot administration could raise the necessary funds for the repair of the houses, Makarios arbitrarily assumed the right to decide who could and who could not return to his home and village. The Greek Cypriot administration started drawing up lists of "undesirables" who should not be, and indeed were not, allowed to return to their homes. Dereliköy village in Potamia is a good example of such practice. Not only were some Turks like Yusuf Ali Kali refused permission to return to the village, but the contractors were physically obstructed and prevented by the Greek Cypriot police from repairing the houses.

118. In other cases, such as Omorphita, on the outskirts of Nicosia, from which 6,000 Turks were forcibly ousted by Greek gunmen in December 1963, it was ruled that the area was "too sensitive" to have any Turks around, and for 11 years Turks were inhumanly denied access to their homes and properties.

119. Repeated applications by the Turkish side to set up a joint committee, under the chairmanship of the United Nations, for the rehabilitation of the Turkish refugees, free from all political considerations and all bias, were rejected.

120. The refugee problem cannot be settled as long as the security risk is present.

121. The illegal Greek mainland officers who carried out the coup of 1 July are still in Cyprus, commanding the well-equipped Greek National Guard. In addition, Stavros Stavrou, alias Syros, who was Grivas' second-in-command in the EOKA-B terrorist organization, has been recalled to Cyprus to command armed Greek elements. Sampson and his armed bandits are still at large and unprosecuted. We are continuously threatened with sabotage and guerrilla warfare, and infiltration attempts into the Turkish area still continue.

122. The question of the refugees, therefore, can only be taken up within the framework of the final political settlement. There is another problem, however, which is more important and more pressing than the problem of displaced persons. There are today about 40,000 Turkish Cypriots in the Greek sector who live in daily fear for their lives and who are seeking asylum in the Turkish region of Cyprus. Recent

reports from Cyprus are not very encouraging. Turkish Cypriots who are being held as hostages or virtual prisoners by the Greeks and who are under the constant threat of murder, looting, rape and arson and who are trying to make their way to the north are being exploited by the Greek Cypriots and some of them are murdered in cold blood for their money—like Nevin Mahmut, age 24; Tijen Mahmut, age 8; Meryem Niyazi, age 16; Ulfet Osman, age 23; and Semay Osman, age 3. These are two young mothers, two children and a young teen-age girl who were murdered in cold blood for their money while trying to make their way to the north in a Greek Cypriot taxi only 10 days ago. This is in the United Nations records, and it was given wide publicity in the international press. The life of the Turkish Cypriots in the south is miserable.

123. In reply to the representative of Greece, Ambassador Carayannis, whom I greatly respect, I should like to quote a recent article from *The New York Times* which appeared on 10 December 1974 about the Turkish Cypriots in Paphos and in southern Cyprus:

"Communal life has to all intents stopped. Schools have not reopened since the fighting. The elementary school now houses refugees whose homes in town were destroyed or looted and villagers who have sought the safety of numbers. The high school burned down mysteriously last month but had not been functioning anyway. Economic life has stopped. Shops have been looted and are for the most part closed. Idleness has brought an increase in one business: the number of coffee-houses has risen from 10 to 23 to provide for the idle men . . . Employees of the Turkish communal administration . . . still get their pay sent from Nicosia's Turkish quarter. The other principal source of funds in Paphos, as in Limassol, is the sale of Turkish belongings to Greeks. Furniture and household appliances go at bargain prices, because the Turks hope eventually to be allowed to leave and have no other source of income."

124. Well, it may be true that the Turkish Cypriot administration as it stands today is not really prosperous; we cannot boast of prosperity. But I can say this much: our people would prefer security and the right to live to luxury, if luxury there is in "free" south Cyprus. The fact remains that Turkish Cypriots want to go to the north to save their lives. When they are intercepted by the Greek Cypriot police or the military and are forced to go back, not only do they not have a home to go to but they have no business or source of income, as they have lost or liquidated all for their livelihood.

125. This very pressing humanitarian problem must be solved immediately. Turks from the south should be allowed to go to the north and Greeks in the north who want to go to the south should be allowed to do so, pending the final political settlement. Any Greek Cypriot living in the north who wishes to go to the south is free to do so.

126. The withdrawal of foreign armed forces and of the foreign military presence and personnel from Cyprus must be carried out again within the framework of a political solution which will settle the Cyprus problem to the satisfaction of both communities on the basis of national equality

and as security and mutual confidence are established on the island.

127. Although this matter concerns more directly the Government of Turkey, as one of the parties to the Cyprus question, the problem has a direct bearing on the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and cannot therefore be dissociated from the political settlement. Only after the Turkish Cypriots, who have been the suffering party for the last two decades, enjoy full security of life and property should the Turkish troops be withdrawn from the island.

128. For 10 years there was no call by the Greek Cypriot side for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus because those troops were the Greek mainland troops which were invited to Cyprus by Archbishop Makarios himself. As Archbishop Makarios admitted during his address before the Security Council on 19 July 1974 [1780th meeting]:

"... it was the Cyprus Government which invited the Greek officers to staff the National Guard. I regret to say that it was a mistake on my part to bestow upon them so much trust and confidence."

129. As I already said, the Greek mainland military presence on the island still continues, the Greek National Guard is still being strengthened and the security risk for the Turkish Cypriot community is still there.

130. The Turkish Cypriot position on Cyprus is clear. As repeatedly stated, we stand for a bi-regional federation. We believe that geographic federation would prevent the recurrence of the bitter experiences of the past and would give the Turkish Cypriot community the actual and physical guarantee which it badly needs and the opportunity to develop economically without pressure and discrimination in the future. Only under bi-regional federation would the two communities treat and respect each other as equals and not as enemies or virtual hostages, as they did in the past or as they do even today. Geographic federation would also be an effective guarantee for the independence and true non-alignment of Cyprus.

131. The Turkish Cypriot community is ready for negotiations with an open mind and sincerity, and we hope that the Greek side will respond favourably to bring about a lasting, peaceful and realistic settlement. My community will not be found lacking in goodwill and co-operation.

132. I do not intend at this late hour to go into detail about the eloquent but unfounded stories that we have just heard from Ambassador Rossides. But there are a few points upon which I should like to touch before I finish my statement.

133. We have heard complaints about Turkish money being used in Cyprus—in Turkish-controlled areas of Cyprus. Turkish money was in use in Cyprus before the July events. Thousands of Turkish tourists used to come to Cyprus and they paid both Turkish and Greek merchants in Turkish money, and that money was acceptable. After the July coup and the events that followed, Turkish money has been more widely used, and I am sure that Ambassador Rossides knows the reason behind it. We are not being allowed to use the facilities of the Central Bank in Cyprus, which is under Greek Cypriot control, and we must have

some money to circulate in Nicosia. I hope that he is not suggesting that we should go back to the old days of the barter system.

134. Turkish stamps are being used in Cyprus. This is true. They have been in use since 1964 when the postal services of the so-called central Government were refused to the Turkish community. There have been whole villages which were refused postal services until July 1974 and there is ample proof, and examples, in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council.

135. Again, there has been an allegation that Girne—that is the Turkish name for Kyrenia, and incidentally Turkish is one of the official languages of the Republic, according to the Constitution, and as we see now the Greek Cypriots cannot suffer even a Turkish name or a Turkish town—has been assimilated into Turkey, but this is not so. Because we have been cut off from the outside world and have no postal service, we have hired a post office box in Mersin—post office box 10, Mersin, is the post office box number in Turkey—in order to enable us to correspond with the outside world. This is a temporary arrangement which we hope will be discontinued after the Cyprus problem is solved.

136. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): First of all I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council. Your Presidency of the Council at the end of last year, as I recall, was not an easy task in view of the important events of that time. You seem to be unlucky, Sir, and complex problems, beginning with the one before us today, are being encountered during your Presidency. So I most sincerely wish you success in overcoming all these difficulties.

137. I should like to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Scali, and express our gratitude to him for not making us work too hard in November, which was very important at the height of the work of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

138. The Security Council is once again considering the question of extending the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. This is, of course, a problem which cannot be solved without taking into account the continuing abnormality of the situation in that country. For more than five months the tragedy of the Cypriot people has continued. That people has become the victim of foreign political interference and military intervention. The future of an independent sovereign State which is an active participant in the non-aligned movement is threatened. The intrigues of certain NATO circles—which were mainly responsible for the Cyprus tragedy—continue. To promote their narrow and selfish strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean they threaten the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

139. From the statement of the representative of the Republic of Cyprus at the United Nations, Ambassador Rossides, it is clear that the situation in Cyprus continues to be tense and fraught with the possibility of new dangerous outbreaks. The foreign military intervention continues, despite the resolutions of the Security Council regarding its

immediate cessation and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Those foreign troops remain on the territory of Cyprus and the decisions of the Council are being ignored.

140. The people of Cyprus are undergoing profound suffering and deprivation. More than 200,000 people—that is, more than one third of the population of the country—remain in a tragic situation, as refugees deprived of their homes, their property and the elementary necessities of life. Their situation is worsening with the coming of winter cold and rain.

141. We should be concerned to ascertain that the resolutions of the Security Council on Cyprus are not being implemented but are being transformed into more scraps of paper by those who, at the present session of the General Assembly, loudly proclaim the need to strengthen the role and the authority of the United Nations and ensure the implementation of its decisions. Those resolutions—and I am thinking in particular of resolution 353 (1974) and 357 (1974)—are directed towards protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They provide for the immediate cessation of foreign military intervention, the withdrawal of foreign troops and military personnel and the restoration of the legitimate constitutional Government and of all the institutions of that Government.

142. The fundamental principles of which the solution of the Cyprus problem must be based, as embodied in the decisions of the Council, were strengthened by the authority of the General Assembly, which discussed the Cyprus question from every angle and a month and a half ago unanimously adopted the important resolution 3212 (XXIX) thereon. The delegation of the USSR believes that this Assembly resolution, which was drawn up and submitted by a large and influential group of non-aligned States and for which all the States Members of the United Nations involved in the question of Cyprus voted, together with the decisions of the Council, provides a sound basis for the peaceful settlement of the problem of Cyprus on the basis of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the interests of the people of Cyprus. This resolution of the General Assembly, which has just been endorsed by the Security Council, contains an appeal to all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it. The General Assembly adopted that resolution, now endorsed by the Council, which demands also the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military personnel from the Republic of Cyprus and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.

143. The General Assembly resolution also contains an important provision to the effect that, if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the resolution, thus ensuring the fundamental right of the Republic of Cyprus to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

144. One specific way of implementing this General Assembly resolution would be by holding an international

conference on Cyprus, representation at which would reflect the political pattern of the present-day world.

145. The Soviet Union has proposed the convening of such a conference since the very beginning of the Cyprus crisis. The Soviet Union continues to insist on that solution, on the basis of the Assembly resolution on negotiations. So far there are no alternatives to such a solution, for to fail to settle the Cyprus problem within the framework of the United Nations, on an open and just basis, would be to leave the fate of the independent, non-aligned State of Cyprus to the caprices of the behind-the-scenes intrigues of the NATO military bloc. But that would be tantamount to international betrayal of the Republic of Cyprus and its people on the part of the United Nations and its majority.

146. In this connexion, it must be stressed once again that the results of the discussion of the Cyprus question in the General Assembly, and the resolution adopted by that body, are convincing proof and confirmation of the fact that the States Members of the United Nations are well aware of the inconsistency and of the complete bankruptcy of the earlier London-Zurich system of guarantees imposed at one time on the Republic of Cyprus.

147. It is now obvious to everyone that that system did not reflect the interests of Cyprus and its people: rather, it was imposed on Cyprus for the sake of foreign interests, and not to guarantee the security and independence of Cyprus. Indeed, it aimed at legitimizing imperialist interference in Cyprus' internal affairs, including military intervention. It was a shameful anachronism of the era of imperialism and gun-boat diplomacy.

148. The Soviet delegation, expressing serious concern over the continuing tense situation in Cyprus, deems it essential to reaffirm the position of principle of the Soviet Union regarding the Cyprus crisis and the means to settle it. Ever since the very beginning of the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union has supported the just struggle of the Cypriot people against the intrigues of certain NATO circles. The USSR steadfastly supported, and continues to support, the guaranteeing of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its internal affairs, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory.

149. The Soviet position of principle on the Cyprus question has been thoroughly and with crystal clarity set forth in the communications of the Soviet Government published as Security Council documents, as well as in the statements of Comrade Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and those of Foreign Minister Gromyko during the general debate at this twenty-ninth General Assembly session.

150. Indeed, from the very beginning of the events on Cyprus, the Soviet Government has, from its position of principle, condemned the aggressive acts against the Republic of Cyprus, and has from the very beginning supported the inalienable right of the Cypriots to be complete masters in their own homeland and freely to determine their own destinies. As was stated by Comrade Gromyko in the plenary of the General Assembly, the main task is to free the

Cyprus problem from its present impasse, to halt the violence against that country and its people, to guarantee respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot State; and, to that end, to convene a representative international conference on Cyprus within the framework of the United Nations.

151. Subsequent events have clearly confirmed the correctness and timeliness of those proposals of the Soviet Union regarding an international conference on Cyprus and the dispatch of a Security Council mission to the island. The active participation of the United Nations in the settlement of the Cyprus problem is feared only by those whose selfish plans for the Republic of Cyprus might be unmasked, or by those who, instead of a settlement, prefer chaos and a worsening of the situation in that region, in pursuing their ignoble designs.

152. The Soviet Union, at the same time, stands ready to give careful consideration and study to any other constructive proposal that may be made, our only condition being that such proposals be honest and specifically directed towards a solution of the Cyprus crisis, on the basis of the restoration and maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a non-aligned State, with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from its territory. That is the approach, and not behind-the-scenes manoeuvres or imperialist dealings, which is in the interest of the Cypriot people and which can be the solution to the crisis. Unfortunately, it must be noted here that no new constructive proposals have been made for the settlement of the Cyprus crisis, either by those who hesitated, or by those who spoke against the Soviet proposals when they were put forward. It should be recalled that some members of the Security Council and Member States of the United Nations had at that time advised the Soviet delegation to delay submission of those proposals, claiming that the parties concerned should be given time to test other ways and means of settling the conflict.

153. However, as is abundantly clear to everyone now, those "other ways and means" have been used by certain foreign circles not to solve the Cyprus problem in the interest of the Cypriot people, openly, through honest discussions, at a representative international forum within the framework of the United Nations, but, in an under-handed manner, to bypass the authority of the United Nations in favour of behind-the-scenes conniving, at the expense of the vital interests of the Cypriot people.

154. The Soviet Union, consistent with its policy of principle and of fair play, is ready to use all the political means available to it in order to promote a settlement of the Cyprus crisis, under United Nations auspices and in keeping with the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

155. As everyone knows, the Cyprus problem occupied an important place in the talks between Comrade Brezhnev and the President of the United States, Mr. Ford, in Vladivostok last November. In the joint Soviet-American com-

muniqué of 24 November on this question, both parties stated the following:

"Having discussed the situation existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, both sides state their firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and will make every effort in this direction.

"They consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus question must be based on the strict implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding Cyprus."

156. In turn, in the Franco-Soviet communiqué of 7 December 1974, released following the visit to France of Comrade Brezhnev and his meetings and talks with the President of the French Republic, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, the following mutual agreement on the Cyprus question was set forth:

"The Soviet Union and France express their concern regarding the continuation of the dangerous situation on Cyprus. They proceed on the premise that the settlement of the Cyprus question should be achieved through negotiations and should be based on full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and on the strict implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations on Cyprus. The Soviet Union and France support the earliest withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Republic of Cyprus and the return to their homes of all refugees in conditions of security."

157. This position regarding Cyprus held by three permanent members of the Security Council, along with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, is a sound basis for the settlement of the Cyprus question. The Soviet Union, as before, will continue to exert all efforts in order to promote the settlement of the Cyprus crisis on the basis of the restoration and maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a non-aligned State in keeping with the lofty purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

158. The Soviet Union resolutely condemns foreign military interference in the affairs of Cyprus. It is firmly against any attempts to partition the island. We stand for the immediate implementation of the decisions of the Security Council regarding the cessation of foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island and consider that a favourable climate must be created for the solution by the Cypriot people themselves of the problems of their own internal government system without any foreign interference. Of course, the solution of these problems concerning the internal structure of Cyprus should be in keeping with desires of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots.

159. It is the duty of the Security Council to take specific and decisive steps in order to achieve the implementation of its own resolutions. The non-implementation of the decisions of the Council not only delays and worsens the tragedy of the Cypriot people and maintains a hotbed of conflict and

tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, to the advantage of those who oppose the strengthening of peace, international security and détente, but it also undermines the authority and prestige of the Council and the United Nations as a whole, the enhancement of whose authority and effectiveness has been so much talked of from this podium at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

160. Concerning the decision of the Security Council regarding the extension of the mandate of the United Nations troops on Cyprus for a new six-month period, the Soviet delegation did not object to such an extension, taking into account the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus agrees with this and that this extension is being implemented through the continuation of the existing, that is, voluntary financing of these troops. However, the extension of the mandate of these troops is just a weak palliative. The Council should implement its decisions regarding the settlement of the Cyprus question. That was and continues to be the main task of the Council and the United Nations as a whole.

161. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, first of all, I should like to extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of our Council. You have already fully deserved these congratulations by the way in which you conducted the delicate consultations prior to this meeting. May I also express, in passing, my delegation's appreciation of the way in which our colleague of the United States performed his duties as President last month.

162. In renewing the mandate of UNFICYP the Security Council certainly did not take a surprising decision, still less was it a decision without precedent in the annals of the Council. A simple reading of the resolution that we have just adopted would remind members that we have acted similarly on more than 25 occasions since 1964. Beyond all doubt, circumstances have changed over the years. But whatever may have been our encouragement to undertake any efforts aimed at ensuring the establishment of harmonious coexistence between the two communities, and however impatient we may have been over the delaying tactics so frequently utilized as regards intercommunity negotiations, these circumstances have never been such as to allow us to envisage a withdrawal of the Force.

163. It goes without saying that today the situation in Cyprus leaves no doubt as to the usefulness of maintaining the Force. My delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Commander of the Force, General Prem Chand, as well as to the contingents composing the Force. Under particularly difficult and exposed conditions, UNFICYP is performing its mission with a devotion to which all of us pay tribute. Unfortunately, in recent months UNFICYP has had to make a very heavy sacrifice to this cause of maintaining peace. I bow to the memory of the nine soldiers who have died in the performance of their duty and I extend my profound sympathy to their Governments.

164. In unreservedly supporting the renewal of the mandate of the Force, my delegation has several considerations in mind. On the one hand, we share the viewpoint expressed by the Secretary-General at the conclusion of his excellent

report, according to which, in this very serious situation in Cyprus, the presence of UNFICYP is essential to assist in maintaining the cease-fire, to ensure the safety of the population and to contribute to the distribution of humanitarian assistance and aid. On the other hand, we are also convinced that the Force is able to serve not so much as a buffer but rather as a link between the parties, until such time as they themselves undertake, in a proper and more complete fashion, negotiations which will make it possible to settle fundamental problems.

165. In that regard, since everything depends on the confidence which should be placed in the Force by the parties concerned, we can only express certain concerns: beyond all doubt, UNFICYP is in a situation which is not that for which it was set up in 1964 and, in any case, since UNFICYP did not and does not have adequate means available, it was hardly able to maintain the positions at the time of the Turkish military intervention; still less was it able to spare the communities from the effects of that intervention. However, today, in the *de facto* situation to which UNFICYP has had to adjust, in order to safeguard its essential mission it must be able to count on the support and co-operation of the parties. The Secretary-General's report states that in the areas held by the Turkish forces it is difficult for UNFICYP to carry out some of its tasks because of the restrictions imposed on it, particularly as regards the dispatch of patrols and the installation of observation posts. We must appeal, therefore, to the Turkish authorities and request them to invite their local commanders to put an end to those restrictions. UNFICYP has a mission assigned to it by the Council; it must perform that mission under similar conditions both in the north and in the south of the island in order to guarantee the same protection to the two communities.

166. The activities of UNFICYP can be evaluated obviously only in terms of the situation in Cyprus. The Council has just endorsed resolution 3212 (XXIX) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. Before concluding, therefore, I should like to briefly reiterate the position of France on the general aspects of the case of Cyprus.

167. I had furthermore, already set forth that position in the General Assembly at the time I spoke on behalf of the nine member countries of the European Community and, as was observed by the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Malik, that position was reaffirmed in the Franco-Soviet communiqué issued at the close of the recent visit made to Rambouillet by General Secretary Brezhnev. I should like to mention the general tenor of our position.

168. First of all, we support the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, principles which, in our view, preclude any settlement leading to partition or to annexation of all or part of the island. This settlement should be based on implementation of the resolution adopted by our Council and by the General Assembly. It should include the withdrawal of all foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

169. Secondly, we consider that the agreement of the two communities is a prerequisite for that settlement, since it is their legitimate interests and the protection of their identity, within the framework of viable realistic institutions, which is

involved. For that reason, we therefore support the dialogue which has been undertaken between their respective representatives, a dialogue to which we attach paramount importance; we hope that that dialogue for which the parties have just reaffirmed their support will be broadened without delay to cover political matters.

170. Thirdly, we attach particular importance to the very distressing question of the refugees, a matter which concerns almost one third of the population of the island. In addition to its humanitarian aspects, which are particularly of concern to us, this matter is at the very heart of any settlement, for if the problem is not solved promptly, it may well degenerate into a very serious international problem. It is therefore essential that a solution should be found in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Council and by the General Assembly, that is to say, one which would enable the refugees to return safe and sound to their homes.

171. I cannot conclude this statement without expressing my deep surprise over the statement made by Ambassador Olcay, according to which his Government does not feel bound by the resolution which the Council has just adopted. I was no less shocked by the statement made to that same effect by Mr. Çelik, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, when he stated that his community would not be bound by the resolution renewing the mandate of UNFICYP. Fortunately, we know through the report of our Secretary-General that all the parties concerned have given their agreement to the continuation of the Force's mission. My delegation sincerely hopes that despite the reservations expressed here, UNFICYP will be able to continue its humanitarian and peaceful role.

172. The case of Cyprus involves States with which my country maintains traditional and friendly relations, not to mention our special relations with them as a member of the European community. Our country intends to avail itself of those relations in order to encourage the parties to embark on the course of a reconciliation for their own benefit and for the State of Cyprus as a whole, as well as for the cause of peace in that part of the Mediterranean.

173. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): This is the last month of Austria's term in the Security Council, and this is thus the last time we can join in the pleasant and time-honoured custom of extending, as members of the Council, congratulations to our President. We take particular pleasure in the fact that these congratulations can be extended to you, Mr. President, who shared with us two years of tenure in the Council and who personally contributed so significantly to the common work in that period. When you, Mr. President, terminate your high office at the end of the month, you will rightly be able to look back on a time of extraordinary personal achievement in the cause of peace and international understanding.

174. I also wish to pay a tribute to the President of the Council for the month of November, the representative of the United States, Ambassador John Scali. Under his Presidency the Council took a very important decision. Furthermore, that decision was taken under circumstances not too often present—co-operation and harmony—in an atmos-

phere, to be brief, which owed a lot to the patient work of Ambassador Scali.

175. The last extension of the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus by the Security Council, on 29 May of this year, took place in a climate of some hope, some expectation and cautious optimism about the prospects for the future of the island, optimism concerning stability at last for the two communities to live together in peace, enjoying equal rights and opportunities and being able to build their common destiny in an independent, sovereign Republic of Cyprus whose territorial integrity would be safeguarded. Events set in motion on 15 July and the ensuing invasion of the island destroyed those hopes.

176. It is not my intention, nor, in our opinion, should it be the task of the Council at this time, to recapitulate events, to point to responsibility and to apportion blame. Over the past months, however, the Council has adopted no less than eight resolutions on the subject. As important, as appropriate and as timely as those resolutions were, viewing them in retrospect we now have the feeling that they were more often adopted in pursuit of events than in control of them. It is, furthermore, a matter of regret to note that they were largely disregarded, with all that implies for the authority of the United Nations. What we must be concerned with at present, therefore, is looking to the future to grasp what is still available in conciliation and settlement. Certainly, the actual fighting has stopped and open hostilities have subsided. Also, as the Secretary-General's report points out, numerous violations of the cease-fire—especially violations by movements—still occur. Yet problems of such a formidable character remain that more than ever the small island needs and will continue to need the help and assistance of the whole international community, its encouragement and its understanding. All that would be in vain, however, were the international community not at the same time to impress upon the countries directly concerned—and here I mean, of course, Greece and Turkey—the need to adopt an attitude of realism, farsightedness and, last but not least, compassion for the fate of the suffering people of both ethnic communities of Cyprus.

177. Resolution 3212 (XXIX), which the General Assembly adopted unanimously this year, contains, in our opinion, all the elements which, provided there is genuine political will for their implementation, point a realistic way towards the solution of the manifold political and humanitarian problems involved.

178. The extension of the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period now appears to be more necessary than ever before, and we draw satisfaction from the fact that that view seems to be held by all the parties concerned. The importance my Government attaches to the United Nations presence in the island—politically, through the representative of the Secretary-General, militarily, and now, of course, also in the humanitarian field—is well known and has repeatedly been emphasized both in the Council and in the Assembly.

179. Here I wish only to record again our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General, his associates and his staff here and in Cyprus, and especially the Force Commander,

Lieutenant-General Prem Chand and the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, for the extraordinary services they have rendered in the cause of peace under most challenging and most difficult conditions. There is no doubt—and the Secretary-General has pointed this out in his report—that the circumstances prevailing at the time of the creation of UNFICYP and for 10 years thereafter have now changed dramatically. When the Force was given its first mandate, in March 1964, it was not possible to contemplate this in the previous resolutions. Nevertheless we believe that at present and for the foreseeable future the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) are broad enough to be adapted to changing circumstances. That is in fact what the Security Council has done on several occasions; without changing the basis for the operation; it has interpreted the guidelines and functions of the Force in a way that has made the continuing operation of the Force and the fulfilment of its duties possible. However, in judging the performance and success of the Force in general, one must take into account not only the degree of willingness of the parties to co-operate fully with it but also its over-all numerical strength.

180. As can be noted from the report, the Secretary-General does not, under present circumstances, suggest an increase in the strength of the Force; nor can any reduction be realistically contemplated at this moment.

181. This brings me to a problem, a serious one, which should be of concern to all Members of the Organization, and not only to the small number of countries which provide troops and/or other means of support for UNFICYP. I am referring to the rapidly worsening financial situation of the operation. As for the further renewal of the continuing commitment to this peace-keeping operation, I can state with all clarity that the apparent lack of success in bringing about new and increased revenue for the operation of the Force, thus reducing the enormous deficit accumulated over the years, is a matter of grave concern to my Government. As my delegation has often stated, the principle of collective financial responsibility should apply not only in cases like the present operation in the Middle East, where the costs are assessed among all Member States, but also in cases such as UNFICYP, where voluntary financing is in effect. Peace and international security are indivisible, and their maintenance in whatever region of the world must be the concern of all States. So, in our view, must be the concrete support of all States for peace-keeping as one of the most fundamental tasks of the Organization.

182. Only two ways seem possible to bring the financial crisis of the Cyprus operation under control: reduction of the Force or new and increased revenues. The first way does not seem to be feasible under present circumstances and would, furthermore, reduce the operating costs without decisively affecting the accumulated deficit. What remains, therefore, is the second way: to seek additional financial means, especially from those States which have not found it possible so far to make a contribution.

183. We have learned with considerable disappointment that the further appeal by the Secretary-General in this direction went almost completely unheeded. Now that the Council has adopted what will be known as resolution 364

(1974), renewing the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, what seem to be the prospects for the future and what possibilities remain for a settlement of the problem?

184. The fundamental provision of the Zurich agreement 14 years ago was the elimination of both enosis and partition. That apparently must be the key to any settlement. Proceeding on this premise, there must be a basic understanding and willingness to implement the provisions contained in previous Security Council resolutions and in particular in General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX). First and foremost, however, the plight of the refugees must be alleviated by all possible means.

185. Inasmuch as we recognize the relationship between this particular question and the general goal of building a new constitutional order, we nevertheless feel that the people uprooted from their homes and living in most miserable conditions—as we have heard tonight from representatives of both communities—should not be used as an instrument of politics. Their fate should not be calculated and exploited in terms of gaining political advantage.

186. Other provisions of the resolutions mentioned above, to which we attach particular importance, relate to the withdrawal of foreign troops. Whatever guidance the Security Council and whatever help and assistance the international community can offer, it will finally be up to the two communities themselves to shape their common destiny without foreign interference.

187. The talks between Mr. Clerides, on the one hand, and Mr. Denktaş, on the other, hold, in our view, the greatest promise, and we would like to express the hope that these talks will be continued and the political issues attacked with vigour and determination. The best opportunity to improve the situation must lie in bringing relief to the refugees now and in permitting them to return to their homes in safety, to revive the agriculture and industry of the island, and thus to embark on a new era of trust and co-operation between the two communities. The paramount objective of these and other indispensable steps is the protection of the Cypriot people from further bloodshed, the prevention of conflict between Greece and Turkey, two countries with which my country, Austria, maintains the most cordial and close relations, and thus ultimately the revival of faith in the authority of the United Nations as the centre of all efforts to solve the crisis.

188. Let me conclude, therefore, by addressing an appeal to the parties, to their leaders, as well as to the people, to adopt a realistic and statesmanlike attitude. Only then will the opportunities which still exist not be thrown away.

189. Mr. CHUANG Yen (China) (*translation from Chinese*): At the plenary meetings of the current session of the General Assembly on 2 October³ and 1 November⁴ respectively, the Chinese delegation stated the position and views of the Chinese Government on the question of Cyprus in a comprehensive way. The Chinese delegation voted in favour

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 2252nd meeting.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2275th meeting.

of resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the question of Cyprus adopted by the current session of the General Assembly. During the voting on the said resolution, the Chinese delegation pointed out that the wording of paragraph 6 of the resolution should in no way be construed as a pretext for permitting the super-Powers to interfere under any name whatsoever. Based on the same position, we also support resolution 365 (1974).

190. Today's meeting of the Security Council is mainly devoted to the consideration of the question of extending the mandate of UNFICYP. The Chinese Government's position on the question under consideration is well known. We have always held different views in principle on the question of the dispatch of United Nations forces. For that reason, the Chinese delegation did not participate in the voting on resolution 364 (1974).

191. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): Mr. President, it is my welcome and my pleasant duty initially to congratulate you upon your assumption of office as President of the Security Council for this month and to express my delegation's entire confidence in your ability to conduct our business in the most efficient and the most skilful manner. And I also take this opportunity of expressing congratulations and regards to Ambassador Scali, who was the President of the Council for the preceding month, for the skill and the efficiency with which he dispatched such business as we had then.

192. We did not understand the speeches of the representative of Turkey and the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community this evening as saying in fact that they would not co-operate with UNFICYP if the mandate were to be renewed. Indeed, rather the contrary, as we understood it, they pledged the co-operation of Mr. Denktas to the continued presence of the United Nations forces in Cyprus, but said that they could not accept, for what they believe to be valid, constitutional and legal reasons, the terms of the resolution by which the mandate was being extended. I hope I am right about this, because otherwise the situation we would be faced with in the Council this evening would indeed be an extremely serious one.

193. Turning now to the business before the Council, my delegation is grateful for the clear and concise and comprehensive report that the Secretary-General has given us on the activities of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for the period from 23 May to 5 December. As he says, the period under review was marked by the gravest crisis undergone by Cyprus since the establishment of the United Nations operation in the island in 1964. In the circumstances we believe that there is a real need for UNFICYP to continue to undertake its present tasks arising from the situation in the island and in the aftermath of this summer's fighting, and we agree, therefore, with the Secretary-General that the mandate of the Force should be extended for a further six months. The United Kingdom was therefore pleased to vote for the resolution we have just adopted giving effect to this, and we were also happy to join in the consensus which approved the second resolution.

194. On the outbreak of hostilities in the island, the United Kingdom Government made additional forces available to

UNFICYP. One armoured car squadron has now been withdrawn. But for the time being we hope to maintain our contingent at its present level. My Government, as members of the Council may know, has recently announced some reductions in our defence expenditure. We are glad to be able to say, however, that in spite of the need for economies in defence spending, we are nonetheless maintaining this commitment to UNFICYP in the belief that in the present circumstances it remains essential to the maintenance of peace in the island.

195. We have noted the statement in the Secretary-General's report that he intends to give careful consideration to the future strength of UNFICYP in consultation with his Special Representative, the Force Commander, the parties concerned and the troop-contributing Governments. We welcome this statement and we would urge the Secretary-General to keep the size of the Force under continuous review in the light of the situation on the ground. My Government hopes that a reduction in the size of our own contingent might be made in the context of an over-all reduction in the size of the Force as and when circumstances might permit this to occur.

196. We have also noted that section of the report which comments on the financial situation of the Force. We are seriously concerned at the growing financial burden carried now by the contributing countries. The costs of the over-all British contribution to UNFICYP in 1974-1975 will be almost double what it was in 1972-1973 if we continue to provide full logistic support to non-United Kingdom contingents. It would be even greater in a full year with the Force at the level to which it was reinforced as a result of events this summer. This situation obviously cannot continue indefinitely. We rely on the Secretary-General to explore, as a matter of urgency, ways in which these costs can be reduced. We also look to those who do not contribute troops to review urgently their financial contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account, in the hope that the deficit may be reduced.

197. In our view, this is not the occasion on which to refer at length to the substance of the Cyprus issue. But may I assure the representative of the Soviet Union—if indeed he needs reassurance—that the United Kingdom shares the views expressed recently by the heads of Government of France, the United States and his own country. It makes perhaps a rare example of unanimity among no less than four of the permanent members of the Security Council, for me to be able to say that, as we stated in the course of the summer in the Council, we of course accept that the solution of the Cyprus problem lies in the implementation of the resolutions of the Council.

198. Those Governments that have contributed men, money and material to the United Nations operation in Cyprus for so many years do have the right now to call upon the parties concerned to do their utmost to achieve real progress in the intercommunal talks. One might conclude from the events of this summer that if little had previously been achieved in the talks, what hope of real progress can there be now? Perhaps we could, however, urge the opposite view. The tragic events must surely give a sense of reality and a sense of urgency to the parties. I believe that if progress is

not made in the near future, the opportunity to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of Cyprus may be lost.

199. In conclusion, I would wish to join with those who have paid a tribute to the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Commander of the Force, its officers and men, and the civilian staff of UNFICYP. I also wish to pay a tribute to the police contingents, not least among them the one from your own country, Mr. President, all of whom have served with conspicuous success and indeed gallantry in Cyprus. During the period reviewed in the Secretary-General's report, nine members of the Force have died. Indeed, Mr. President, I believe that the last death occurring in Cyprus was in fact that of an Australian. Sixty-five have been wounded in serving the cause of peace.

200. I reiterate my Government's appeal to the parties to the dispute to translate into reality the hope often expressed in this Council that the sacrifices that have been made in Cyprus in recent months may not have been futile.

201. Mr. SALAZAR (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, my delegation would like to join in the congratulations expressed to you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council during this month. In you we have a representative of a country which, in the community of nations, has earned both admiration and understanding. But we also have in you an intelligent and respected representative who once previously, in the same high post you occupy today, was able, during one of the most critical periods for the Council, to guide the debates with the same constructive diplomatic skill with which you now preside over our meetings. I am certain that in this new period as President of the Council you will equal your previous successful performance.

202. I also wish to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Scali, who, despite the small number of matters brought before the Council during his Presidency, maintained a continuously attentive and vigilant attitude at his post.

203. We have been convened to examine the appropriateness of extending the mandate of UNFICYP. My delegation is fully aware that the extension of the mandate is an essential measure, if we take into account the precarious situation that prevails today in Cyprus. In a situation that was to a certain extent normal, precisely six months ago, in that the deplorable events that occurred in July 1974 had not yet taken place, my delegation agreed that the United Nations Force, stationed there for more than 10 years, should remain there for an additional period of six months. That period is now coming to a close. My delegation based its opinion then on the report that was before the Council at that time, in which the Secretary-General, among other evaluations of the situation in Cyprus, pointed out that

"... Despite the present quiet, the situation in the island is still tense and potentially dangerous" [S/11294, para. 79].

204. The tragic events that were unleashed in July confirmed the prediction of the Secretary-General and the good judgement of the Council in deciding to extend the mandate of the Force. For it is indisputable that, in spite of the

developments which so deeply affected the peace and territorial integrity of Cyprus, the presence on the island of the United Nations Force served to alleviate the suffering and prevented greater loss of life and property.

205. It cannot be disputed that, in the circumstances prevailing on the island, it is indeed appropriate to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force. The Force plays a decisive role in the cease-fire agreed upon under resolution 353 (1974) of the Security Council of 20 July 1974. It will be recalled that that resolution included other provisions fulfillment of which is still pending. We cherish the hope that the resolution will be implemented in full, and the presence of the United Nations Force should play a decisive role when the parties to the dispute decide to implement the draft resolution with regard to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus.

206. Furthermore, my delegation has carefully considered the report submitted to us at this time by the Secretary-General [S/11568]. Like its predecessor to which I referred, it is a report that sets a clear course, and my delegation would like to offer him our congratulations on the intensive personal efforts that he himself has exerted in order to create favourable conditions for conveying to the parties to this dispute the desires of the Council and the international community that the problem of Cyprus be peacefully settled, without prejudice to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of that country.

207. In conclusion, my delegation, on the basis of the above considerations, voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/11573 in consideration of the fact that, in view of the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus, the Security Council will be thus fulfilling its primary duty of guaranteeing international peace and security.

208. My delegation was also pleased to vote in favour of the draft resolution in document S/11574, which draws the attention of the Council to resolution 3212 (XXIX) on the question of Cyprus recently adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.

209. Mr. NJINE (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to convey to you my delegation's whole-hearted congratulations on your assumption of the responsible office of President of the Security Council for this last month of 1974. Your wide experience in matters of the United Nations, the esteem and the respect which your country enjoys throughout the world, lead my delegation to believe that our work during this month is in good hands and that it will be crowned with success.

210. I should also like to take this opportunity once again to say a few words of appreciation of the talent and the objectivity with which our colleague, Ambassador John Scali of the United States, served as President of the Council during November.

211. Before getting to the heart of the subject, my delegation would like to address its warm congratulations to the Secretary-General for the tireless efforts which he continues to make to bring peace back to Cyprus. The excellent report

which he was kind enough to submit to the Council, dated 6 December 1974, leaves no doubt as to the atmosphere of crisis which still prevails in Cyprus as a result of the tragic events that occurred during July and August this year. This is particularly brought out in paragraph 80 of this report, which reads as follows:

"The situation in Cyprus will undoubtedly remain unstable and potentially dangerous so long as a settlement of the basic problems is not agreed upon."

212. In view of the seriousness of the problems—political, humanitarian and military—now faced in Cyprus, my delegation considers that the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in that country for a new period of six months is fully justified. It is for that reason that my delegation supported the draft resolution we have just adopted.

213. It is my earnest hope that this period will be put to good use by all the parties directly concerned—not to exacerbate the genuine disappointments and the grievances of the past, but rather to find a definitive and just solution to the problem of Cyprus based on the fundamental rights of the Greek and Turkish communities.

214. In this connexion, my delegation is pleased to note that in resolution 3212 (XXIX), which was adopted unanimously, the General Assembly has provided valuable information likely to make it easier to carry out negotiations between the two communities of the island and to make it possible for the Republic of Cyprus to exercise its fundamental rights to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

215. My delegation considers that the solemn commitment of all States of the Organization to respect the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus and rapidly to withdraw from it all the armed forces that may be stationed there will be a positive contribution to speeding up a movement towards peace on the island.

216. The return to Nicosia of Archbishop Makarios was a source of great comfort and confidence to my delegation, which is convinced that the Cypriot head of State will in his wisdom be able to give a decisive stimulus to negotiations aimed at defining the constitutional structure of Cyprus and restore agreement between the Cypriots of the two communities.

217. The financial situation of the Force is hardly encouraging. The \$27 million deficit referred to in paragraph 83 of the Secretary-General's report is all the more disquieting because since last July the task of the Force has been diversified and is more than ever necessary in the field. In the past my Government has been in a position to make voluntary contributions to the financing of the Force; however, in view of the present international economic crisis, the generosity of States, particularly those that have the least, appears more and more hypothetical and, at any rate, it could not be admitted here, unless an effort is made to move genuinely and seriously towards a final settlement of the conflicts which led to the setting up of the emergency Force in the first place. The solution to the financial difficulties of the United Nations should, we believe, be sought in this way.

218. In conclusion, my delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Weckmann-Muñoz, the Commander of the Force, to General Prem Chand, to the officers and to the soldiers of the Force and to the staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for their devotion and the effectiveness which they displayed in discharging their tasks in particularly perilous conditions.

219. Mr. SCHAUFLE (United States of America): Mr. President, I thank you and the other speakers who have said such kind words about Ambassador Scali's Presidency of the Council last month. I shall convey them to him with pleasure.

220. As for you, Mr. President, we were already fully aware of your qualities of wisdom, patience and strength, which you displayed so convincingly when you last presided over the Council. Although you may have some reservations characteristic of your own modesty, we welcome you back to the chair.

221. The action that we have taken today will help to provide further time for a negotiated settlement on Cyprus. Our decision to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is not a substitute for such a settlement, but it is an indispensable prerequisite. The need for a negotiated settlement that brings justice and peace to the people of Cyprus is clear. During the past six months, nine members of the United Nations Force have died in Cyprus performing the task which we have set for them.

222. Thousands of Cypriots from both communities continue to endure great sacrifices and hardship. It is my Government's hope that the parties will make good use of the precious time which our action today provides: time to narrow their differences and bring peace to their people.

223. My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for the lucid, factual and objective report with which he has provided us on the situation in Cyprus. We wish also to commend the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Cyprus and the Commander of the United Nations Force, his staff and all his men for their outstanding contribution to the peace and welfare of all the people of Cyprus.

224. It is also our sad duty to ask the representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, Denmark and Australia to convey our condolences to the families of those men who in the past half-year have given their lives in Cyprus in the service of the United Nations. We do so in the hope that all parties will make every effort to ensure that the task of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is less dangerous in the future than it has proved in the past.

225. My Government is in full agreement with the view of the Secretary-General that peace in Cyprus can only come about through free negotiations among the parties concerned. This view has been affirmed by both the Security Council and the General Assembly. We appeal to the parties to heed the world community's united call for peace in Cyprus. We urge them to pursue immediate negotiations towards a just settlement, in a spirit of good will and conciliation.

226. Mr. DE SOTO (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, the fact that you are presiding over our work is a source of satisfaction and a reason for confidence on the part of my delegation. We know that your ability, your intelligence and your unending patience will on this occasion, as indeed it has in the past, be a guarantee of the success of our work.

227. I should like also to express our gratitude and admiration to Ambassador Scali for his very successful Presidency of the Council last month.

228. The delegation of Peru has studied very carefully the excellent report of the Secretary-General on the operation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. We have no doubt about the need for the continued presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and it was therefore possible for us to support unreservedly the decision to renew its mandate for a further six months.

229. Certainly the consent of the Government of Cyprus is indispensable, but we believe that the additional consent of the other parties concerned, referred to by the Secretary-General in paragraph 81 of his report, should be interpreted as a sign of the readiness which exists to find a solution to the grave problem of Cyprus through co-operation.

230. We are pleased also that the Security Council has unanimously endorsed resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly at this session. This resolution, which was accepted by all the parties to the July-August conflict, contains a statement of principles which, if implemented, could provide the basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

231. A positive step reflected in the report is the beginning of direct negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktaş, concerning the humanitarian aspects of that conflict. We should be happy to see those negotiations broadened to include political aspects.

232. The personal intervention of the Secretary-General had considerable influence in the decision to begin such negotiations. I should like here to convey our thanks to him and to his Special Representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, not forgetting General Chand, for the ability and moderation with which they have adapted to their new and unexpected work in the island. I also pay a tribute to the men of UNFICYP, particularly those who have laid down their lives for peace. We hope that the positive steps referred to in the report will be put to the best possible use.

233. Since at the end of this year Peru will cease to be a member of the Council we shall no longer be directly concerned with the peace-keeping machinery in Cyprus, but I should like to say that the principles embodied in the first three paragraphs of General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) which the Council had just endorsed should provide the best possible basis for coexistence and *rapprochement* between the two Cypriot communities. It is for them, without foreign interference, to resolve their constitutional question.

234. Furthermore, it is clear that the speedy withdrawal of the foreign occupation forces is a prerequisite for respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

235. Cyprus is a country friendly to Peru and, like Peru, non-aligned. We cannot fail to express our solidarity as regards the aspirations to peace of all Cypriots.

236. Mr. EL HASSEN (Mauritania) (*interpretation from French*): I should like first of all, Mr. President, to associate myself with the congratulations which have been addressed to you on your accession to the Presidency of the Security Council for this month. We are convinced that, thanks to your eminent personal qualities, with which we are all familiar, you will conduct our deliberations with success.

237. My delegation would like also to pay a tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Scali, who was President of the Security Council during November.

238. May I now—and I think this is entirely justified—before going to the heart of the matter, express our thanks to the Secretary-General for the tireless efforts which he has constantly made in seeking a solution to the unhappy problem of Cyprus and tell him how satisfied we are with the important results which his action has made possible in the course of recent months.

239. Our satisfaction must also be expressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his colleagues with the exemplary manner in which they continue to carry out their responsible and difficult mission.

240. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. In so doing, we wished to indicate our support for the views of the Secretary-General, as well as for those expressed by the parties concerned, to the effect that the present situation makes it essential for that Force to remain in the island for a further six-month period.

241. It is indeed obvious that the grave situation currently prevailing on the territory of Cyprus requires more than ever before the presence of that international Force, the mission of which is to maintain as rigorous a cease-fire as possible and to give humanitarian assistance of various kinds. That mission is more essential than ever for the creation of conditions conducive to a final peaceful settlement of this problem.

242. Regarding the draft resolution in document S/11574 just adopted unanimously by the Council, my delegation would like to say how gratified it is at that decision, which confirms the General Assembly decision.

243. In conclusion, I should like once again to voice our hope that tolerance and concord will return to the land of Cyprus, finally making it possible for an over-all, final solution to be found, whereby the interests of all Cypriots can be safeguarded in a spirit of peace and brotherhood, with scrupulous respect for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus.

244. The decision just taken by the Council will, we hope, bring us closer to the realization of that hope.

245. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): It is with great pleasure that my delegation welcomes the assumption of the Presidency of the Council for this month by you, Sir, a close friend of long standing, and a distinguished representative of a neighbouring country with which Indonesia maintains the closest ties of friendship and co-operation. Your contribution to the work of the Council, especially during your first Presidency in the most difficult month of October of last year, has earned you the great respect and admiration of all the members of this Council and I am confident that under your wise guidance our work will again come to a fruitful conclusion. What we have achieved this evening is ample proof that that confidence is well merited.

246. My delegation would also like to congratulate the outgoing President, Ambassador Scali of the United States, for the success of his efforts to secure for the Council a relatively quiet month of November.

247. My delegation would like to take this opportunity also to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report [*ibid.*] regarding the operation of UNFICYP during the period from 23 May to 5 December, especially with regard to the developments since the events of last July and August. As the report makes clear, UNFICYP was called upon to perform its functions in an entirely new situation, not conceived in its original mandate. It is therefore with great satisfaction that my delegation notes that in the face of such a difficult and complex situation UNFICYP has not failed to exert its best efforts in order to carry out to the maximum extent possible, both its peace-keeping as well as its humanitarian tasks in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions, while adapting its operations as much as possible to the requirements of the new situation.

248. My delegation commends the constructive role of the Secretary-General which has since resulted in a series of meetings between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus. It is to be hoped that those meetings, which have already achieved some positive results, will pave the way for more substantial progress in the settlement of the basic problems of the island. My delegation subscribes to the view of the Secretary-General that, so long as such settlement is not achieved, the situation in Cyprus will remain unstable and potentially dangerous.

249. The Council has just adopted a resolution extending the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months. My delegation believes that the continued presence of UNFICYP is indeed necessary, not only to help stabilize the situation and to provide humanitarian relief, but also to assist in the establishment of a climate conducive to the peaceful settlement of the basic problems of Cyprus. My delegation expects, in spite of the reservations expressed by one of the parties, that UNFICYP can continue to count upon the full co-operation of all parties in the execution of its mission of peace.

250. My delegation would like to reiterate its view that such a settlement remains the concern primarily of the two communities of the island themselves. Of course, we know

that each community has a special relationship with Greece and Turkey respectively, and we hope that the Governments of those countries will play a constructive role in the endeavour to restore peace to the island.

251. In supporting the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP, my delegation notes that the Force has been present on the island for more than 10 years. In view of the current situation, it can hardly be hoped that the present extension of the mandate would be the last one. We sincerely hope, however, that all parties concerned will exert their best efforts towards the achievement of substantial progress at the negotiating table so as to enable the Force to be withdrawn or substantially reduced in the not-too-distant future. My delegation expects that when the forces are withdrawn they will be able to leave behind a sovereign and independent Cyprus with its territorial integrity as a non-aligned country respected, and with its population on its way towards establishing one true Cypriot nationality.

252. My delegation is happy that the Council has endorsed resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. It is our sincere wish that the parties concerned will loyally implement its provisions in order that the two communities in Cyprus will be able to rebuild their lives and their homes in peace and harmony.

253. In conclusion, my delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and to all members of UNFICYP for carrying out their tasks under the most exacting and perilous conditions with exemplary courage and selfless devotion. To the representatives whose countries' contingents have suffered casualties, my delegation extends its deepest sympathy.

254. Mr. ZAHAWIE (Iraq): Mr. President, may I state at the outset, how gratified my delegation is at seeing the Presidency of the Council in your most capable hands. We congratulate you on the assumption of your high office, and assure you of our co-operation in fulfilling your duties.

255. May I also add my delegation's voice to that of the other members of the Council who have already thanked and expressed their gratitude and appreciation to the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, and all his other staff as well as the international contingents serving on the island for their dedicated and untiring efforts in fulfilling their mandate.

256. My delegation has supported the two resolutions adopted by the Council earlier this evening in the sincere hope that they will make a positive contribution towards the settlement of the crisis in Cyprus. The Council now urges the parties involved in the dispute to implement General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX).

257. First, there must now be new guarantees ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus. There must be a new initiative on the part of the parties concerned to draw up a comprehensive plan dealing with the constitutional necessity to give the Turkish Cypriots the guarantees which

would ensure their security. It is difficult to see how the humanitarian problems could be alleviated without such guarantees which would restore some measure of mutual trust between the two communities. It goes without saying that there must be a movement towards the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the island.

258. We realize that such things are easier said than done. Nevertheless, one must not let an opportunity pass without appealing to the parties concerned to find an alternative to violent confrontation; everything must be done to encourage and assist them towards that end.

259. I must finally add that my delegation's understanding of the statements made by Ambassador Olcay and Mr. Çelik and their reservations concerning the resolution on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP is similar to Ambassador Richard's understanding of those statements. And it is in that context that we welcome the assertion made by Ambassador Olcay when he stated that his Government saw no alternative to the peaceful settlement of the problem.

260. Mr. KITI (Kenya): Mr. President, allow me first of all to join those who have spoken before me in congratulating you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council this month. Your skills for negotiations we all know; they have definitely assisted us during this time to arrive at an agreed text despite numerous obstacles. As we approach the end of the General Assembly session it is most likely that we shall be faced with a number of complicated issues that will come before the Security Council, but we have no doubt that under your experienced guidance we shall discharge our duties promptly and successfully.

261. Allow me also to pay a tribute to your predecessor, the representative of the United States, Ambassador Scali, for the very efficient manner in which he guided the deliberations of the Council last month.

262. My delegation was ready to cast positive votes for the two resolutions that we adopted this evening. As you are aware, Mr. President, one of them was arrived at after lengthy and arduous negotiations.

263. Our negotiations have been made rather difficult at times by the uncompromising attitude of the parties concerned. Thanks to your efforts we managed to overcome that. We do hope, however, now that we have adopted those resolutions, the parties concerned will do their utmost to implement the provisions of those resolutions and all the other previous resolutions that have been adopted with regard to the problem of Cyprus.

264. The positive vote of my delegation was guided primarily by my Government's desire to achieve peace in Cyprus. It should not, however, be construed, as we have always stressed, as a passive endorsement of what has been happening in Cyprus since 15 July of this year. We have condemned and will continue to condemn the illegal and unconstitutional efforts to topple the constitutional Government of Cyprus engineered by Greek military officers attached to the Greek National Guard. Indeed, we condemn

it strongly as one of the outside interferences in the internal affairs of a non-aligned country.

265. In continuing to consider the question of Cyprus, my delegation continues to be guided by the supreme principle: that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus must be respected by all States; we have noted with satisfaction since we started discussing this issue that all member States of the Council have accepted this principle. Because we firmly believe in the territorial integrity of Cyprus, we cannot, therefore, agree to the Council being used to endorse the division of the Republic of Cyprus, against the wishes of the people inhabiting that island.

266. Equally, we cannot accept the stationing of foreign troops in the sister non-aligned country of Cyprus. To this end, we condemn the continued occupation of the island by foreign troops, including those which invaded the island after 20 July. We have called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and we want to repeat it here that in our opinion no lasting peace can come to this territory until all—and I emphasize again all—foreign troops and occupations cease in Cyprus. The positioning of United Nations troops should not be taken as a permanent feature. We have noted that those which have been stationed in Cyprus have stayed there for more than 10 years. In our view it should be viewed as a temporary means of giving the opposing parties the opportunity to sort out their problems without confronting each other by force of arms. We believe the positioning of troops between combating parties is an essential ingredient towards the solution of intricate problems such as the one which we face now in Cyprus. But as I stated before, my Government will not accept the perpetual stationing of troops in Cyprus.

267. We do hope, therefore, that after the six-month period, conditions will have improved sufficiently in Cyprus to make it possible for the United Nations forces there to be withdrawn. We appeal to all parties concerned not to use the United Nations forces as pawns between themselves, but to consider them as a genuine contribution by the international community to assist them in arriving at an acceptable, lasting and just solution to their problems.

268. My delegation has been very much concerned about the displaced people in Cyprus arising out of the violent events that followed the military coup d'état in July this year. We have all called for the parties concerned to exercise restraint, but in the view of my delegation, this is not sufficient. It is the inalienable right accepted by all of us that all displaced people have a right to return to their homes and property and we are calling on the authorities in Turkey to assist all the people displaced from the areas they occupied before the conflict of 20 July to return to their homes safely. We attach great importance to this.

269. The international community has already had an experience of the consequences of denying displaced people the right to return to their homes. We do hope that the international community has learnt a lesson from the question of Palestine. We do hope that the authorities of Turkey also have learnt a lesson from that experience. It is the view of my delegation that we cannot solve the problems of

Cyprus if the displaced people continue to be denied the right to live on their properties across the borders.

270. My delegation, therefore, hopes that the Council will not repeat the mistakes of 1948 and will do all that is in its power to prevent a similar situation from developing in Cyprus.

271. We feel that it is incumbent upon us to stress our disappointment at the non-implementation of the resolutions that we have passed since July this year, particularly on the question of humanitarian problems, and we appeal to those concerned to implement them immediately because we feel that anybody who is suffering has an inherent danger of becoming violent.

272. For its part, Kenya will do the little that it can do to help the people of Cyprus settle their problems. But the Council must at all times remember that it is dealing with a people. It will be folly if the Council were to allow those who are holding advantages now to dictate to the international community all the solutions to the problems of Cyprus. The Council will really make a mistake if it gives up the most valuable weapon it has, namely, its ability to stand between warring combatants and assist them to solve their problems peacefully. We must stress again the need to implement the resolutions of the Council, otherwise what we have been witnessing and the acrimonious debates in the General Assembly about the erosion of the dignity of the United Nations will continue to worsen.

273. We have called previously on the two communities to continue with their direct talks under the auspices of the United Nations, and we urge them to continue. As we stated before, we have great faith in the United Nations as the proper instrument for the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and, as we have stated in the General Assembly, we are not too happy when we see an increasing number of States trying to solve their problems outside the framework of the United Nations, only bringing problems to the Security Council when they appear to be failing to solve them, or, bringing the solutions to the Council to give them the dignity of the United Nations, while in doing that they are trying to use the Council as a rubber stamp for their own interests. To that end, we call on all Member States to assist the Secretary-General to bring about a fruitful dialogue between the communities and a quick return to the negotiating tables where the people of Cyprus as a whole will not be excluded as they were during the previous discussions at Geneva.

274. In conclusion, I should like to pay high tribute to our distinguished Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force. They have done a magnificent job and they all deserve our support.

275. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on presiding over the Security Council for the month of December and to wish you all success in the performance of your very responsible task. My delegation joins in the expression of gratitude to your predecessor in this post, namely, the representative of the United States, Mr. Scali, who guided the Council's work during the month of November.

276. Our delegation voted in favour of continuing the mandate of UNFICYP for a new six-month period. Having done so, we would like to express the hope, which is reflected in paragraph 4 of the resolution, namely that sufficient progress will be achieved during this period to permit a final settlement of the Cypriot problem.

277. Our delegation also voted for the draft resolution in document S/11573 on the understanding that the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP should take place in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) and the subsequent resolutions, on the understanding that the principle of the voluntary financing of UNFICYP should be strictly adhered to.

278. Our delegation considers that the Council has fulfilled its duty by unanimously endorsing General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), which is considered by our delegation to be a decision of the United Nations that creates favourable conditions for a peaceful solution to the Cypriot problem in the interests of the Cypriot people. At the same time, our delegation wishes to express its views briefly on the substance of this question, just as other delegations have done.

279. The extension of the mandate of UNFICYP has been carried out in very complex and tragic circumstances and the report submitted by the Secretary-General speaks very eloquently of that difficult situation. Foreign troops continue to be stationed on the territory of Cyprus, despite the decisions taken in the past on this subject by the Security Council. In the report of the Secretary-General, as in the statements of the representatives in the Council, and also in the statement made by the representative of Cyprus, it was pointed out that it was in the interests of the Cypriot people, both the Greek Cypriots as well as the Turkish Cypriots, that measures should be taken towards an urgent settlement of the Cypriot problem, the cause of which is to be found in the intervention of foreign forces in Cyprus and the intervention of certain aggressive NATO circles in Cypriot affairs. The fate of Cyprus, which is an active participant in the non-aligned movement, has become a matter for barter in those circles.

280. Our delegation considers that there are very real ways and means of solving the Cypriot problem. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council, namely resolution 353 (1974) and 357 (1974), which were confirmed by General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) adopted at this session, all create the necessary basis for a political settlement of this problem and for a just solution to the Cypriot question. That solution should be based on strict implementation of the afore mentioned resolutions—and we have in mind primarily the provisions of the Security Council resolutions and the General Assembly resolution which call for a cessation of foreign military intervention and the immediate withdrawal from Cypriot territory of foreign troops and military personnel—and the need for strict respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

281. Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that the basic provisions of resolutions 353 (1974) and 357 (1974) have not been carried out, and that is the fault of those who

are unsuccessfully trying to solve the Cypriot problem through clandestine NATO circles.

282. The negotiations at Geneva between the guarantor countries demonstrated the lack of viability of the London-Zurich guarantees and the complete bankruptcy of this system to the whole world. The facts have shown that it would be wrong to consider the Cyprus question simply as the problem of the relationship between the two communities on the island and to close one's eyes to the outside interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus. That was the very cause of the Cypriot problem. That foreign intervention has made the problem even more acute.

283. Our delegation considers that we must achieve prompt implementation of all the Council and Assembly resolutions on the Cyprus question. Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) presents a broad pattern of ways and means by which this problem can be solved. It contains important recommendations. Paragraph 6 expresses the hope that

"... if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the present resolution, thus ensuring to the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity".

284. In our view, efforts aimed at solving the Cyprus problem should be continued. We believe the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union calling for the holding of an international conference on the Cyprus question within the United Nations framework and also the proposal calling for the sending of a special mission of the Security Council to Cyprus are very timely. Until now there have been no alternatives. During the discussion of the Cyprus question both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly our delegation has frequently come out in favour of condemning aggressive actions against the Republic of Cyprus and the flouting of the rights of the Cypriot people, particularly its right to decide its own destiny and its own domestic affairs.

285. Our delegation considers that settlement of this problem should be based on full implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. That should be done by means of negotiation, with strict observance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time we consider that the prompt withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus is extremely urgent. We also consider that all refugees should be allowed to return to their homes. Favourable conditions should be created so that the domestic problems of Cyprus could be solved by the Cypriot people themselves without any foreign intervention whatsoever. Those problems should be solved having regard for the interests of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Our delegation also considers that it is in the interests of peace and security in that part of the Mediterranean that a settlement be found to the problem of Cyprus.

286. The PRESIDENT: Speaking now as the representative of AUSTRALIA, I wish to say that by adopting the draft resolution in document S/11573 the Council has rec-

ognized that the continued presence of UNFICYP in Cyprus is essential, in the words of the Secretary-General, in paragraph 81 of his report,

"... not only to help maintain the cease-fire called for by the Security Council, to promote the security of the civilian population and to provide humanitarian relief assistance, but also to facilitate the search for a peaceful solution of the present situation".

287. My delegation has wholeheartedly supported this decision and joins with other delegations in endorsing the invaluable role played by the United Nations Force in Cyprus, in commending it for its many accomplishments and in asking it to carry on its tasks with the same dedication and devotion to duty that has been characteristic of its past performance.

288. To the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Weckmann-Muñoz, to the Commander of the Force, Lieutenant-General Prem Chand, and to the officers and men in the civilian staff of UNFICYP we express our appreciation and our admiration for the courageous and competent manner in which, under difficult conditions, the various elements of the United Nations presence in Cyprus have approached and carried out their task, with losses and casualties, in the performance of their duties that recently extended to my own country's police contingent, as was pointed out by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, whose comments I greatly appreciate.

289. The Secretary-General's report, which provides the details and frank record of events we have come to expect of it, describes clearly the many and varied tasks that have been undertaken to ameliorate the grave problems that have beset the people of Cyprus. It provides for us a picture of a determined effort being made, and it gives us reason to hope that for all the disorganization in the island a semblance of normal life will begin to be restored.

290. More ominously, the report also reveals with stark clarity the parlous financial situation of the UNFICYP operation, which has already been underlined by other Council members and which must give us all cause for serious concern.

291. We are pleased to note that some progress has been made in alleviating the plight of the refugees and other displaced people. The international response to the Secretary-General's appeal on their behalf has been heartening, and we welcome also the co-operation of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot authorities in facilitating the provision of this aid to those areas and to those displaced persons in and of both communities standing in the greatest need.

292. Our over-riding concern must surely be for the people of Cyprus in their present tribulation, for their common good and individual welfare, for their early return to a normal way of life and for a beginning to economic and social reconstruction.

293. We have also, of course, been glad to note that, following the Secretary-General's visit to Cyprus in August,

a series of meetings have been held between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktaş. These talks which paved the way for the exchange of prisoners and detainees in October offer a prospect of further agreements on humanitarian aspects of the problem, and eventually, we would hope and urge, on the difficult political and constitutional problems which in our view only the parties themselves can settle.

294. One of our objectives here must surely be not to distract responsible and enlightened representatives of the two communities from the task of doing what they can to build trust and confidence on the ruins created by suspicion and hostility among and between all the parties that have a direct and acknowledged interest in the future peace, prosperity and independence of Cyprus.

295. I am also mindful of the fact that the Assembly has already debated the question of Cyprus in recent weeks and in its resolution 3212 (XXIX), has recorded its views on the situation and enunciated certain valuable principles and guidelines.

296. The draft resolution, which the Council has adopted today and which was contained in document S/11574, has enjoyed the support of all the parties directly concerned and provides, in our view, an objective appreciation of the issues involved and a useful and positive indication of the direction in which events must now move if a peaceful and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem is to be obtained.

297. Now, as PRESIDENT, I have one request from a representative to be allowed to exercise the right of reply, and I do hope that he and any other representatives who may wish to speak again will have regard for the lateness of the hour. It is not my wish, of course, to place any limit on what the speakers may wish to say, but I do beg them to be as brief as they can be.

298. I call on the representative of Cyprus.

299. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I will bear it in mind that we must be brief at this time of night. But, of course, it is not our fault that we have reached this late hour. When you, Mr. President, informed me that there was a proposal to invite Mr. Çelik to speak in the Council, and you inquired about our reaction, I said that I was hearing this information for the first time just then and in any case it was not normal for these things to happen and I would have wished to have time to communicate with my Government. If he were going to speak as a representative, it would be altogether unacceptable, because then, if he were to be accepted as such, we would have to bring in somebody else from Cyprus to speak on these matters, on behalf of the community.

300. But you assured me, Mr. President, that he was going to come here to give some kind of statement or evidence in his personal capacity as an individual, in accordance with article 35 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council. However, this Mr. Çelik came here and immediately assumed the authority of a representative. He spoke as a representative; he spoke as if he were doing this on behalf of the community he speaks about. And he was not at all interrupted by anyone. Of course, I could not raise a point of order. I am not entitled to do that. And some

representatives who spoke here referred to him as the representative of the Turkish community in Cyprus—and again without any remonstrance at their being out of order.

301. Therefore, that is what is causing the consideration of this question to go on to a much later time. If something is out of order, we have to bear the consequences for it. I do not understand this gentleman, Mr. Çelik, coming here and presuming to answer the representative of Greece and to answer one or the other representative, as if he were here as a duly accredited representative—and this under the cover of his presence in an individual capacity.

302. Very well. Then let us forget about that. If he spoke as a representative, which is abnormal, then I would have to report that to my Government and they will have to consider what to do about it, whether they will want to send someone to reply or otherwise, because I am not going to reply to him. Otherwise, if he appeared here in his personal capacity, this must be made clear in the record, that whatever he said as representative is to be deleted and not to be considered.

303. Let me now turn to my colleague, Ambassador Olcay, for whom I have a special regard—and I wish to continue to have a special regard for him—and let us see what he stated today in the Council.

304. We understood, Mr. President, as you know, that it was necessary somehow or other to get the agreement of the Turkish representative for the form that the draft resolution would take, merely for practical reasons, because otherwise they are not entitled to give or not to give their consent under resolution 186 (1964). But we understood that that was what was going to happen. Finally, we heard that they agreed to the draft resolution. But no sooner was this done than the representative of Turkey, Ambassador Olcay, found it very convenient to say that he would not comply with this resolution. Now that confirms what I said before, that they have been accepting the resolutions of the Security Council and immediately violating them. They have been accepting and signing the agreement at Geneva and at the same time violating it. If I were some other person, I would have rejoiced to have this occasion to expose them: that they say one thing and do another, even on the same day and in the same breath.

305. But I am sad and I am sorry that he does this sort of thing, first because Turkey is a country which is a neighbour of ours and therefore we would like our neighbours not to behave in this way. Secondly, if a Member of the United Nations says one thing and does another, it accelerates the progress towards the kind of dichotomy that I mentioned the other day, the dichotomy between what we say and what we do—which is really one of the threats that endanger the whole world.

306. It is a kind of split personality. You split; you do one thing here and you say another thing there. I should say that there are three splits that threaten humanity today. The first split is the splitting of the atom. Now that splitting of the atom will probably bring the end of the world. The second split is the splitting of countries, a focus for trouble and for war, as is the case of Palestine. Everywhere where there is a

split, a division, a partition, is a focus of trouble. And all the problems—or most of them—that come before the Security Council are cases of partitioned countries. So that is the second split. The third split is what I talked about: the dichotomy between individual and national actions, between words and actions.

307. Therefore, so much about this stand of my colleague Ambassador Olcay. But there are other parts of his statement to which I have to reply. He asks how they can negotiate and says that they are ready to undertake meaningful negotiations—forgetting for a moment that they pretend that it is the Turkish Cypriots that negotiate in Cyprus, that it is not Turkey itself, that Turkey itself is not interfering in Cyprus; it is the Turkish Cypriots.

308. But then of course, they say that in what they are doing the Turkish Cypriots are merely the puppets of the Turkish Government, and they say: “We are ready for meaningful negotiations, but we do not know, because on the other side there is no sort of stable or legitimate government”.

309. That brings to my mind some remarks that I have here from the *Times* of London on this very point. Commenting on the spokesman from Turkey when he said that with the return of the President it would not be possible to have any negotiations because “we do not know where we stand”, the newspaper wrote that it was a remark which came, “well, ironically from the spokesman of a Government that has just been defeated on its first vote of confidence by 358 votes to 17”. This is going on in Turkey, but nobody has said that because of it, Turkey is not able to speak or to negotiate, or anything of that kind.

310. This also struck *The New York Times*. In their main editorial, headed “The return of the Archbishop”, they spoke of what is happening in Turkey—the 358 votes to 17—while the Archbishop was “the constantly re-elected President since independence, unopposed last time, and before that with over 90 per cent of the votes”.

311. Now, what is the effect of that? The effect of that is again, ironically, what it should not be. As a matter of fact, when the attempt to murder the Archbishop was made and he had to flee from Cyprus, Turkey was disturbed over this breach of constitutionality in Cyprus, expressing itself here through Ambassador Olcay to that effect, saying that they would not recognize the new régime because the other was the legitimate one. But now, all of a sudden, it is the other way around. Again we have a split personality: we say one thing, consistently, and then another, inconsistently. This is not, I must say in all fairness, a characteristic of Turkey alone, or of any other country here represented. Unfortunately it is spreading, and the danger is great.

312. Now let us see what else Ambassador Olcay said. He also said that I had abused my position as Chairman of the Asian Group because I spoke about a unitary State. Is it that Ambassador Olcay does not listen well, or that he cannot read the text of my statement well? What I said on that occasion, at the session in the General Assembly in memory of our late lamented Secretary-General U Thant, was that on the question of Cyprus he had taken a positive stand and

he was trying hard to solve it, and that in the statements in his report he proposed the dissolution of Cyprus and the establishment of an independent, sovereign and unitary State. I did not say that I was saying anything at that time about a unitary State. I mention this fact just as I mentioned many other facts in connexion with the life of U Thant, the fact that on the problem of Cyprus he was, until his last moment, in support of that idea. Rightly or wrongly, it was an idea that he had. It may be that Ambassador Olcay does not like that idea, but I was not abusing my position in mentioning it among so many other things that I mentioned and that he must have read.

313. In his report on the renewal of the mandate, U Thant said he believed that both sides in Cyprus realized that the Cyprus problem could not be resolved by force and that they had indicated—they, including Turkey, had indicated—that a settlement could be worked out on the basis of an independent and unitary State of Cyprus. That was what Secretary-General U Thant put in his report of 1971 with regard to the attitude of Turkey and Greece on Cyprus concerning a unitary State. And there was no remonstrance on the part of Turkey or anyone else to that because that was a fact. But, with their split personality, they had changed, and they had changed even on the same day.

314. In that same report of the Secretary-General dated 20 May 1971, he said:

“In my view, what is needed to overcome this difficulty is an exercise of statesmanship by leaders of all the parties concerned whereby they would restate publicly their determination that the problem of Cyprus must be solved by arriving, through peaceful means, at a lasting agreement based on the independence and sovereignty of a unitary State of Cyprus.” [S/10199, para. 83.]

315. Now, in my remarks during the memorial session for U Thant, I said that he had been very constructive and that he had tried to go too far too soon. I said that his idea was that it should be solved through the establishment of an independent and unitary State. To take that statement and distort it, to say that I was abusing my position in order to make propaganda when I said these things, among many others, about U Thant, is surprising indeed. Should I conceal these things in which they themselves believed and which they supported until a year ago? Who is wrong here? Where does the wrong lie? And why should he bring in something like that when he knows very well—or he ought to know, with his degree of intelligence—that he is wrong, that he is saying something that is not true?

316. Next, the representative of Turkey, in his very suave manner, spoke about the mentality that produced my letter to the Secretary-General of 6 December 1974, pages of hatred, lies and obscenity. Which is the document that contains obscenity? Is it my letter to the Secretary-General recounting the actions of Turkish troops in Cyprus, which certainly are obscene? Or should they be kept covered up? Is a criminal court that tries men for rape to be judged a centre of obscenity, or is it the persons who commit the rapes who are obscene? No, the obscenity here lies with the Turkish troops. It is not my fault that I have to report it. I have to do so, and the reports here are authentic reports, not unrelated

to the reports by the United Nations Force on the rapes committed.

317. I am very sorry that these things have to be said, but I am even more sorry that they have happened. And Ambassador Olcay, with his sense of propriety and decorum, should turn to his troops and say, "Why do you do these things?"—unless he shuts his eyes to realities and his ears to the facts and pretends that these are all lies. It is very easy to do that, but it is not a responsible attitude; and I am very sorry for the representative of Turkey for doing that sort of thing, which falls much below the standard that I wish to regard as his.

318. Furthermore, I think that letter has been so carefully studied and examined that I doubt whether there was any part of it that can be challenged, and I am prepared to give the source of every part of it. In fact, I had occasion to ask somebody who knows to point out to me anything that was not true, and he could not, except for one case of which he was not quite sure.

319. Now, therefore, I would request the representative of Turkey, for his own sake, not to pretend that what is true is lies because to merely accuse one of lies without being able to challenge them with facts and documents is irresponsible and below the standards of anyone who is a representative in the United Nations, and I do not for a moment believe that Ambassador Olcay is below that standard, for Ambassador Olcay is an honourable man.

320. Next, what is the next thing he said, because there is nothing that he said which cannot be refuted immediately. He says that there are 30,000 Turkish Cypriots in areas under Greek Government control who are in danger and unprotected there. What does the report of the Secretary-General say about this? It says that UNFICYP, in all areas under the control of the Government and of the National Guard, is free to move freely virtually without restriction and is therefore in a position to make major contributions towards the security and humanitarian needs of the Turkish Cypriots, whereas they are not allowed to enter the other part. And they are free here because there is nothing to hide from UNFICYP. There is much to hide on the other side, so that they can pretend that others are lying.

321. So it is the most ridiculous thing for anyone who is in such a fragile glass to try to throw stones because those stones come back. Therefore, here we are and the Government has asked that there should be a fact-finding committee appointed by the United Nations, by anyone, to inquire into the occupied areas, and in the other part under the Government's control to see what is happening, but they refused, they would not hear of it. They would not allow the Red Cross, or UNFICYP or anyone else to go there. Still, the truth will out and I was able to get all this information verified to the last word, and I had to produce it. I was instructed and I had to produce it. I refused to produce anything that was not solidly supported and proved, and this is solid proof, a kind of White Paper, beyond all challenge.

322. Unfortunately I wish they were lies because if they were lies the people of Cyprus would not have suffered what

they have suffered, and what they are suffering now, and what is happening in Cyprus is not a joke to be played about with whenever one feels like making allegations.

323. Now, another aspect is insinuated by Ambassador Olcay's statement, namely, that the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus have been suffering for 10 years, perhaps 20, in Mr. Çelik's words. He raised the figure. Why should he not exaggerate a little? He could double the number, taking an example from Mr. Olcay. Oh, they were suffering. What were they suffering? They were secluded, they could not go out, their houses were seized, everything they had was burned. Terrible things were happening. Not one reported that, or supported it, nor was there any idea of supporting it. Just statements thrown out like stones. What were the facts? The facts are that the Secretary-General was issuing reports periodically, every six months—sometimes every three months, from 1964 until this date. I have gone through these reports, all of them, and I will here give some of the quotations which show fully how wrong, how untrue, how irresponsible was the statement that they were suffering by reason of the attitude of the Government towards them. The reports say clearly that they were suffering by reason of the attitude of the Turkish leadership in Cyprus. Why? Not because the leadership was so cruel as to make them suffer unreasonably. No, the leadership was under the direction of the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government wanted to have the partition of Cyprus. We know that. We can even go back to prove all the reasons.

324. Now the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We have seen what they have done in Cyprus. After all, they got in to dismember the island. Now, with that idea they wanted to keep the Turkish Cypriots away from the Greek Cypriots. The two elements were working together, living in harmony and peace. They were co-operating. That had to be broken up because otherwise how could they have a situation calling for partition? It was natural that they should do that. It was not honest. It was not straightforward, but it was natural in their frame of mind.

325. So that started what is called an underground organization—the TMT, which was intended to force the Turkish Cypriots to break off their relations with the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots are very nice people. They were getting along very well and they did not like the idea of spoiling their good relations. They were working together. They were living together. They would not, so they had to be forced by an underground organization—officers in disguise sent from Turkey as we very well know. And they made rules that any Turk that was seen to enter a Greek shop would be punished by fines. If he was seen having friendly associations he would go to prison or he would be thrashed. And this was given in the committee—there is a committee on relations between the two countries presided over by UNFICYP, I think—and the details of this list was given. But it was not enough to do that.

326. They perpetrated all sorts of crimes in that respect. They killed Turks who tried to have any association—and I have their names, and even at this moment I can give them, a list of them—and they forced them into enclaves and kept them there to keep them separate, but of course they could not do that to the entire population so they managed to get

about 40 to 45 per cent. The rest were outside living in peace and without trouble. And those who were there had guns at the borders of the enclaves, creating animosity.

327. The Secretary-General, in his reports, and UNFICYP tried repeatedly to make them abandon this confrontation because there was no reason to do this. No, they would not do anything like that. They were not allowed by Turkey to do anything that would lessen the tension. After the first events in which there was trouble the Government raised all restrictions on movement, and the Turkish Cypriots had freedom of movement throughout the whole of the island without exception, but the Greek Cypriots could not enter the Turkish enclaves because it was taboo to have relations with the Greeks, even the most innocent relations.

328. In the Secretary-General's report of 10 June 1965 we read:

"The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adopted a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together"—these are the words of the Secretary-General—"or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of Government agents." [S/6426, para. 106.]

They even cut off electricity in order to prevent the two communities from having any relations. The report goes on to say:

"Indeed, since the Turkish-Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation"—and we see now that it is being done through blood and iron that they want to get geographical separation; then it was not done by blood and iron but by forcing the Turkish Cypriots out and making them suffer for that—"as a political goal"—not for any other reason—"it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy"—that is, a policy of peace and co-operation. "The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots." [Ibid.]

329. We hear now from the other side that this was forced upon the Turkish Cypriots by the Government. Why does the report mention these things, and there were no objections to it? The reports are filled with such instances. The Government's contention is thus borne out that

"... the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file" [ibid.].

330. The Secretary-General states in his report of 10 December 1965 that:

"... the Government was prepared to provide concrete assistance as follows: (a) to repair or totally reconstruct all Turkish Cypriot houses which might have been damaged or destroyed in any village; (b) to give financial assistance for the rehabilitation of all the Turkish Cypriots ... (c) to provide them with the means for the exercise of their profession or vocation ... as well as to give financial assistance to those who, owing to incapacity, were unable to work; and (d) to take all the necessary

measures for their complete safety and protection." [S/7001, para. 157.]

331. The report of 8 December 1966 states:

"But the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages ..." [S/7611, para. 139.]

For some considerable time, the Government has urged the refugees to return to their homes and it has repaired or rebuilt abandoned Turkish Cypriot houses.

332. So, what in the previous report was given as a proposal that the Government was prepared to implement, in the following report is actually indicated as being done. It goes on to say that it is known that the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return, and so on and that to justify this position, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stresses considerations of security and safety of the refugees, although there can be little doubt that one of the reasons for its attitude is a political one.

333. I come now to Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas. In February 1971, Mr. Clerides wrote to Mr. Denktas, giving a list of villages where houses were being repaired and had been repaired and pointing out that:

"You will no doubt appreciate that repaired buildings if unoccupied deteriorate, both due to natural causes as well as due to the unfortunate practice of the furtive removal of building material from houses long deserted."

That was because, although the Government built, although the Government repaired, although the Government did everything required of it, the Turkish Cypriots were not allowed to go back to their houses even though they wanted to do so.

334. In the Secretary-General's report of 10 March 1966, it is stated:

"... UNFICYP feels that ... some steps should be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards relaxing its policy of discouraging Turkish Cypriots from [returning to their houses or even] circulating freely in places outside its control." [S/7191, para. 94.]

335. Now you have a picture of the situation over the years, of what was happening to the Turkish Cypriots who were the victims of their leadership, and that leadership was acting as the instrument of the Turkish Government in keeping them there by force, to the destruction of their economic comfort, in enclaves and under stringent conditions of life.

336. The reports repeatedly said that only in an integrated economy could the Turkish Cypriots live normally. But how could they, since they could not associate? And they now visit this misfortune, this misery, upon the poor victims, the Turkish Cypriots, as an instrument of war and partition which makes greater misery.

337. I can assure you, and I am perfectly certain, that the rank and file of the Turkish Cypriots are not satisfied with

this aggression and this invasion—not the so-called leadership which acts for interests alien to those of the Turkish Cypriots, but the Turkish Cypriots themselves. In this respect I shall quote from another document, because I like to give proof of what I say. It is very easy to make erroneous statements . . .

338. The PRESIDENT: Has the representative of Cyprus completed his statement?

339. Mr. ROSSIDES: No, Mr. President. I am very sorry, but it is not my fault as I said at the beginning . . .

340. The PRESIDENT: It is extremely late.

341. Mr. ROSSIDES: I know that it is late, but I have asked whether we could adjourn until tomorrow, since without notice and at the last moment things have been said which I must disprove. And I want to give proof. I should like to continue, but if you order me to stop, I shall stop.

342. The PRESIDENT: Since I have interrupted the representative of Cyprus, I should say to him—and I of course do not want to become involved in an argument with my friend Ambassador Rossides—that I do not accept that the invitation to Mr. Çelik to speak before the Council was in any way out of order. Ambassador Rossides will remember that I invited Mr. Çelik to speak as an individual, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and not rule 35, I may say. No member of the Council raised any objection, and Mr. Çelik spoke and did so in order.

343. I now invite the representative of Cyprus to continue with his statement.

344. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wish to apologize. What I meant, of course, was not that inviting him to speak was out of order. He could of course be allowed to speak under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. What was out of order was his immediately assuming that he was the representative of the Turkish community, and the President did not call him to order for that. That is all I meant. But his invitation to speak did prolong and add to the discussion tonight. It necessarily did.

345. I refer to the report of the World Council of Churches which sent a mission to Cyprus to report on the situation. It said:

“What is, nevertheless, of absolute significance for the future of Cyprus is that, in spite of everything that has happened, there remarkably still exists to some extent a willingness to reconstitute coexistence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.”

—not between Greek Cypriots and Turkish troops, but between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

“The one major hope for the future is that many Greek Cypriots can still make a distinction between Turkish Cypriots, with whom they are willing to try to live, and the Turkish military forces from Turkey whom they despise. It is absolutely imperative that this position be supported by any means possible. Numerous incidents are related in which Turkish Cypriots aided Greek Cypri-

ots against the Turkish invaders—or even, incredibly enough, in which Turkish Cypriots sought the help of Greek Cypriot friends for protection of themselves from the Turkish invaders.”

346. That is the situation in Cyprus today. That is the role of Turkey, that is the role of the Turkish troops and that is the reality of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.

347. The idea of harmony between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots has been expressed in many of the Secretary-General's reports. He said, it is a reality. In three or four reports he said how eager they both were to live together in peace, if they were allowed to, and to co-operate. This feeling is deep in the hearts of the Turkish Cypriots. They are Cypriots and the others are Cypriots, and despite all these things we are told here about Turkish and Greek Cypriots not being a nation, they are deep in their hearts Cypriots. They love their country and they would love their life in Cyprus if they were allowed, without outside interference, to live in peace and coexist.

348. This is the tragedy of Cyprus, that hatred was imported, forcibly imported. And still it does not flourish, still it is not true. There may be hatred against the Turkish troops because of their behaviour. And since they went there on a peaceful operation it was an occasion for Turkey to show peaceful feelings and create a better atmosphere of co-operation between Cyprus and Turkey as a whole instead of treating the people as it did. But it could not do otherwise because its purpose was to dismember Cyprus, and you cannot dismember a country in a friendly way. It is only through blood and iron that you can do it, and that is the tragedy. And it is true, because Mr. Ismet Inonu, who was Prime Minister at the time, said here:

“Officially we promoted the federation concept rather than the partition thesis so as to remain within the provisions of the Treaty.”

And his Foreign Minister, Mr. Erken, said:

“The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other, closest to the Turkish coast, to Turkey.”

349. So, partition—but how can you get partition when they live intermingled? So we go in on this occasion, we dismember, we uproot and expel the population—200,000 displaced persons, as appears in the latest report—in order to make room to bring populations from Turkey and place them there and have partition.

350. That is the whole problem of Cyprus. You see it now, naked in its truth, and, if there is obscenity in that, I am very sorry, but it has to be presented to the Security Council if it exists.

351. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Turkey, reminding him of my earlier appeal.

352. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): You need not have made that appeal to me, Sir, because my record in the Council is rather different from that of the representative who spoke before me.

353. Were Ambassador Rossides the representative of both the communities in Cyprus I should try to give a full reply to his statement in detail and that would take more time, of course. Thank God, he is not and therefore I need not answer all that he has said. In fact, what he has said would be answered better by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community recognized as such by the General Assembly earlier in the present session. I will confine my remarks to a few points.

354. I would just say for the record that the lie is not an element of Turkish diplomacy's arsenal of weapons and that probably, since the phanariots left the service of the *Sublime Porte*, it has never been used.

355. It is too easy to say that because a list has been established and circulated by Ambassador Rossides it immediately acquires the quality of an historical document which has to be considered as the gospel truth. What we have heard today is Ambassador Rossides saying, "I have produced this paper, therefore it is the truth. I have witnesses who can prove that it is the truth. I have documents which I can provide to anyone who wants to see them." I would just remind the Council that in my previous statement [*para. 87 above*] I mentioned a list of documents which I also consider as the expression of the truth, and every member of the Council who is curious enough about what has happened to the Turks of Cyprus can always consult them.

356. Having said this—and this in a way is a reply to what my colleague from Greece has said—I am sure that he did not listen with the attention he would normally give to my statement, as I give to his, because I did not express any feeling when I mentioned the content of this document; I only mentioned that I was shocked by its tone. This is not really what I meant, and if I have given this impression I really want the record to show that I am sure there have been excesses, and I attributed them to the act of war, and I said how war itself was something to be avoided.

357. Alas, the Turkish Cypriots did not over the past 15 years keep records of their sufferings to be used as documents. Whether or not this period of time is considered exaggerated by Ambassador Rossides, I do not know. I suppose that since Cyprus has existed there have been Turks suffering because of it.

358. Of course, he has carefully avoided the subject I raised, of the Archbishop's adviser on mass murder. I did not expect him to answer it. No mention of it was made in his analysis of the situation—of the "political realities", as he calls them, in Cyprus, of the Greek dreams of enosis—dreams in whose service tens of thousands of Greek "invitees" in uniform were introduced into Cyprus. There was no mention of that.

359. I would say that most of what he has said could be found in his earlier statements, and therefore it is possible for me to produce a written answer to what has been said by Ambassador Rossides, but I consider that even that is not needed. I would merely direct members' attention to the various statements made by my predecessors, by myself and by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community,

each one of which statements can be found to be an answer to many if not all of the assertions of Ambassador Rossides. I would say that most of the statements he has made, especially with regard to the mutual feeling of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots towards the political situation prevailing in the island when they were the absolute masters, can be found to be, if not untrue, at least on many occasions, very far from the truth.

360. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Greece.

361. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): Just for the record, I should like to state that the Government of Turkey, nowadays deprived, I hope, of any phanariots, lied four times by deliberately accepting four cease-fires which they did not honour.

362. The PRESIDENT: I call now on the representative of Cyprus.

363. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I shall not give a long reply; I have said everything that needs to be said. I only want to thank you, Mr. President, for your patience. It is 11 o'clock, and I know I am greatly responsible for this meeting having lasted so long, so I want to apologize to all the members and to you, Sir, for having kept you so long. I do want to thank you for having conducted these proceedings in such a satisfactory manner, and I want to thank all the members who have spoken on the question of Cyprus, and particularly those who have laid emphasis on the need of protecting the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus as a sovereign State, and the need for withdrawing the forces and of permitting the refugees to return to their homes. We are very grateful to all, and we thank them for their contribution, and again apologize for keeping everyone so late.

364. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Turkey.

365. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): My Government has been accused of lying because of non-compliance with cease-fire agreements. Now, as I had occasion to mention several times during the occurrence of those cease-fire violations, the agreements referred to by my colleague from Greece were a package, if I am not mistaken, which included many clauses; if Turkey may not have abided by some of those clauses, at least one of the reasons is that the other side did not comply with its part of the bargain. I want this point to be made clear.

366. The PRESIDENT: Since there are no further speakers, it is my intention to adjourn this meeting. Before doing so, however, I beg to trespass for one moment longer on the patience of the Council on the following matter, which is one of good order, I think.

367. You have noted that the provisional agenda for this meeting, prepared in accordance with rule 7 of the provisional rules of procedure, which was adopted by the Council at the outset of our meeting, contained the agenda item "The situation in Cyprus", which was inscribed on the Council's agenda consistently since the 1779th meeting on

16 July whenever the Council discussed matters affecting Cyprus. Under this item we have just now further extended the mandate of UNFICYP, which was last extended by resolution 349 (1974), at that time under an item which was entitled "Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council". It is thus clear that the item of today has superseded the item under which this matter was formerly considered, and with

the Council's agreement, I would request the Secretary-General to delete from the list of items of which the Council is seized the former item "Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council". I hope I have made myself clear. If I hear no objection, it will be so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.10 p.m.

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