

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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1785th

MEETING: 27 JULY 1974

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held in New York on Saturday, 27 July 1974, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Javier PÉREZ de CUÉLLAR (Peru).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1785/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
 - (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
 - (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
 - (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The Situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
- (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [1779th-1781st meetings], I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania,

India and Mauritius to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Carayannis (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the usual understanding that they will be invited to come to the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kikić (Yugoslavia), Mr. Datcu (Romania), Mr. Jaipal (India) and Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the Secretary-General.

4. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. President, as you will have seen from the reports on developments in Cyprus there have been a series of breaches of the cease-fire. I have received complaints from the parties to the conflict in this regard. The question of interposing the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) between the Turkish forces and the Cypriot National Guard in order to stabilize the cease-fire has also been raised.

5. You will remember that the mandate of UNFICYP was written in the context of preventing a recurrence of fighting between the two communities in Cyprus. It did not envisage the interposition of UNFICYP between the armed forces of another Member State and the armed forces of Cyprus.

6. I have instructed my representative in Geneva, Mr. Guyer, to discuss with the three Foreign Ministers in the negotiations the best way in which UNFICYP can actively assist in limiting further hostilities and cease-fire violations. Obviously, any plan involving the interposition of UNFICYP would require the complete co-operation of both sides. As will be seen from my reports to the Council, I and my colleagues at Headquarters, my representatives in Cyprus and our Force have done whatever we could to limit the

fighting, to assist the civilian population on all sides and to make the cease-fire hold. What is needed now is an agreement on how to stabilize the cease-fire throughout the island so that the negotiations can make progress.

7. In this connexion I feel that I should briefly report to the Council the information I have received concerning the negotiations in Geneva. I understand that intensive efforts are going on to find a basis for working towards a settlement and that the conference has made some progress. At the present time a working group is meeting to reconcile the views of the three parties. We all hope that these negotiations will achieve the goals set in Security Council resolution 353 (1974).

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call now on the representative of Cyprus.

9. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have before us a situation that has arisen from the fact that the negotiations envisaged under paragraph 5 of resolution 353 (1974) are now being held in Geneva. Therefore, partly because of those negotiations, the Council meeting was postponed from yesterday until today to see what progress was achieved. In this respect I want to make clear certain aspects related to how the Council acts in respect of those negotiations in Geneva.

10. The Council has adopted a resolution which contains seven operative paragraphs. The first four of those paragraphs are purely and simply pronouncements of the Council, whose responsibility is not at all affected by the fact of the holding of the conference in Geneva. Of course, as long as the Geneva negotiations go along with the spirit and the tenor of the Council resolution, all well and good. But if we see that the situation deteriorates and does not improve in any sense, and we have very grave violations of the cease-fire, to which I shall refer presently, the Council does not abdicate its responsibility to act immediately in order to save the situation and to protect international peace and security. The Geneva negotiations are based, of course, on agreement. But the Geneva negotiations cannot exercise the authority of the Council to protect international peace or to protect Cyprus, a small country, a Member State of the United Nations.

11. Therefore we believe that, as the Council has decided in paragraph 7 to keep the situation in Cyprus under constant review, it is certainly pertinent that the Council should become aware—aware officially—of the situation in Cyprus which has evolved since its last meeting, at which there was a more emphatic demand for respect of the cease-fire.

12. That is the purpose for which we wanted this meeting—because the situation is becoming very grave. I will not waste the time of the Council in speaking about the gravity of the situation, for it is

stated in all the newspapers, and particularly in today's issue of *The New York Times*.

13. What is the picture that has been unfolding so far in its stark reality? It is this. A small country, a State Member of the United Nations, has been invaded by air and sea. It possesses no air force, no navy, no anti-aircraft defences. It has been invaded with overwhelming force in an aggression against its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. Its open cities are—I will not use any adjective—bombed repeatedly in a fury of destruction. Hospitals, institutions, and everything else are brought down in ruins—not military targets at all. In Famagusta, a seaside place, over £300 million worth of property has been completely destroyed—and I leave aside the loss of life, which has not yet been ascertained exactly, although we know it is very heavy.

14. Now this not only continues but is becoming aggravated, in spite of the cease-fire. The first cease-fire which we had after 20 July was to come into effect on 22 July. It was violated by an attack on the Trakhonas and St. Hilarion area by land, air and sea, in addition to attacks on the airport and bombing. On 23 July the villages of Aglangia, Yerolakkos, Ayios Vasilios, Katrovil, Exo Metochi, Tymbou airport and Nicosia airport were strafed by Turkish jets, after the cease-fire. On the same day the Cypriot contingents in Pyles, Trakhonas and Tsatsos were attacked. On the same day Turkish infantry units attacked Dhikomo, Kaimakli and Trakhonas, villages round Nicosia.

15. Then we had the Security Council resolution demanding an immediate observance of the cease-fire, and on 25 July Turkish forces attacked Kaimakli, Ayios Yeoryios, Mia Milea, Kautsovendis, Omorphita, the central prisons, Yerolakkos and so on. On the same day they also attacked Malia. The purpose of all these attacks was to alter the situation that existed at the time of the cease-fire and enlarge the area occupied by Turkey on the coast of Kyrenia, broadening it to 30 miles, and to broaden also the corridor to Nicosia and at the same time encircle and threaten Nicosia itself.

16. We heard on 25 July that the Turkish troops were trying to encircle Nicosia in order to occupy it.

17. On 25 July the Turkish forces warned the inhabitants of the village of Ayios Ermolaos, all Greek, to abandon the village within 48 hours, saying that otherwise it would be bombed and destroyed completely. It would be understandable that under conditions of war people would be asked not to offer resistance and told that if they did not offer resistance they would not be fired upon; but asking them to abandon their houses and their property and completely evacuate their village in order that it might be occupied by the Turkish troops is completely

outside the concept of any kind of war. But that village was occupied on 26 July.

18. I will not continue to elaborate on the various places that have been occupied, because the Secretary-General has a map on which one can see the extent of the violations.

19. There has been no violation of the cease-fire by Cyprus at all.

20. Now, with regard to supplies of war *matériel* by Turkey, according to reports we have there has been a constant flow of heavy tanks and military personnel—two days ago 15 tanks and 1,200 men had arrived—for the purpose of intensifying the war and continuing the aggression. The resolution calls not only for a cease-fire but for an immediate end to foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus other than those provided for in the Treaty of Guarantee. Therefore these actions have been directly contrary to the spirit and purpose of the resolution. Consideration by the Security Council of the violations of the cease-fire will not interfere with the work of the Geneva conference. On the contrary, it will assist and strengthen the Geneva conference in its efforts to reach a just solution in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council.

21. If the Geneva conference is to act independently of the Council resolution and to arrive at any solution it pleases, then one could say, "Please do not have a Council meeting, so as not to inject concepts that the Geneva conference may not wish to have." However, that conference has to abide by the Council resolution. So long as this resolution is not respected, the prospects for progress in Geneva are very dim. Therefore I believe that a meeting of the Council in the sense of strengthening the cease-fire and strengthening the provisions of the resolution providing for the withdrawal of outside forces and protecting the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Cyprus is a necessary action by the Council in conformity with its resolution.

22. Another reason why the Council has to be apprised of the situation is that there is already the involvement of the United Nations in Cyprus with the presence of the United Nations Force in the island. As the Secretary-General very pertinently pointed out, it is necessary for the United Nations Force to be able to act effectively on the island, and this can be done only if the Council closely follows the situation and decides at the proper moment to do what should be done in order to strengthen the United Nations Force in Cyprus and in that way to save the situation on the island and protect international peace and security. It was in this sense that we wished to have this meeting, hoping that something would be done here to help the work of the conference in accordance with the provisions and the tenor of resolution 353 (1974).

23. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Greece.

24. Mr. CARAYANNIS (Greece): Mr. President, members of the Council and other fellow representatives, I feel like a new-comer among you, who rushed from the plane to the Secretary-General with his credentials in hand, and immediately thereafter had to attend this meeting. This is certainly not the usual practice in the United Nations. I have to address myself to you without even knowing you. It is a disadvantage and I ask your indulgence.

25. I shall be very brief. I came directly from Athens and I am more aware of what happened there—and quite a lot happened there—than of your deliberations here.

26. Greece and Turkey have been on the edge of war. War was averted because a cease-fire was accepted. We are now confronted with four days of continuous violations. I shall not enter into details. Today, news reports and other editorials leave no doubt as to who is doing the violating. I should only like to submit to the representative of Turkey that if his Government was not prepared to honour the cease-fire it should not have accepted it.

27. We are all aware of the Geneva talks and I believe that everyone around this table wishes them success. But they will not succeed without an implementation of the cease-fire. I firmly believe that the best we can do here is to help the talks in Geneva, and the best way to help them is to help in the implementation of the cease-fire. This we can do, not by ignoring violations but by stating the facts and pointing to the responsibilities.

28. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

29. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Yesterday we waited for hours for Mr. Rossides to make up his mind—then to change his mind, then to make up his mind again—about this meeting. So whatever I have to say is based on writings of yesterday, superseded by what has happened since. I shall try, as is my custom—and I see that today at least it seems to be the trend—to be as brief as possible.

30. The hours we spent yesterday would have been much more usefully spent if we had tried to take stock of the situation brought about by years of a megalomaniac policy on the part of certain leaders. Now those same leaders seem to have thought it useful to have a meeting today. I hope that everyone who has a say in the matter was in agreement as far as Mr. Rossides's call was concerned. I do not know who gives him instructions to call for these meetings—whether they come from those who are in charge or those who were in charge.

31. Members of the Council will recall that the Secretary-General, in his oral report to the Security Council at its 1781st meeting on 20 July, had given an account of the efforts of the Turkish community to prevent the spread of hostilities into the area of intercommunal conflict. The Secretary-General informed the Council that

"At 0745 hours there was a telephone call from Mr. Dimitriou"—who then was Foreign Minister—"who said he was speaking on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the National Guard and asked UNFICYP to inform the Turkish side that the National Guard could not be responsible for any attacks on civilian Turks in various parts of the island unless Turkish bombing and attacks on Cyprus ceased." [1781st meeting, para. 24.]

32. I will be recalled also that in various statements and communiqués we have disclosed that the Turkish armed forces were ordered not to open fire unless fired upon, and not to attack civilian targets. We all know that the Turkish forces have encountered great resistance from the Greek military forces and that Turkish Cypriot civilians were also attacked locally by the Greek National Guard all over the island.

33. Now one thing we all know is that there are Greek forces on the island. We knew—although it was never officially known—that there were quite a number of Greek troops on the island. And the Turkish operation has proved how far we were, even in our wildest imagination, from knowing the reality. The military resistance offered by the Greeks is evidence of the fact repeatedly stated by Turkish representatives for over a decade, here in this very chamber, that the Greek armed forces had in fact occupied the island long ago—at times in co-operation, at times in defiance, of the Greek Cypriots, but always in open violation of their solemn undertaking spelled out in international treaties.

34. The members of the Council must realize that it is not a mere thousand Greek officers that Turkey has been fighting for the past week or 10 days. Furthermore, the Greeks have done everything possible to spread the hostilities into civilian areas and to create intercommunal hostilities, relying on the numerical superiority of the Greek Cypriots. I have drawn attention to those acts in my letters contained in various documents I have addressed to the Secretary-General. Since then it has become public knowledge how the Turkish Cypriots are being treated, how their defenceless villages are being attacked, and especially how their properties are being systematically plundered and how the villages are being wiped out. And at one of the Council's previous meetings I explained what this meant in terms of long-term strategy—how the villages which have not been wiped out are being denied supplies of food and water. The methods employed included also the taking of tourists as hostages, besides the Turks, and this has been widely reported in the world press.

35. The 1,750 Turkish Cypriots who surrendered to the Greek National Guard in Limassol have been gathered in a stadium and are being treated in a rather inhuman manner. They are the largest of the groups of Turkish Cypriots undergoing the same type of treatment, but there are many more and I understand that we now have a document which is being processed for presentation to the Council—reluctantly, of course, but as a reply to the many documents which have already been circulated on the same subject of what is happening in Cyprus to indicate the violations of the cease-fire since 22 July by the Greek forces, and the pillaging of the properties of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots.

36. I did not ask for this meeting, and I do not like this kind of meeting, but I found myself forced to attend. Even when what has been happening outside this chamber gives hope for certain progress, when all the news seems to be tending to be better, we are still asked to come here and voice our recriminations. I do not like it, but I have to do it.

37. Many times in the Council Mr. Rossides has said that the Turks—meaning the Turkish Cypriot administration—were the ones who were forcibly separating the Turkish Cypriots from their bosom friends, the Greeks in Cyprus, as a result of the threats they use against them enjoining them not to have communications with these Greek Cypriots who like them so much.

38. Now, is it not interesting to note that not a single Turk—I emphasize, not a single Turk—ever has switched his allegiance in the past ten to fifteen years of the history of the Republic of Cyprus? Not one has served in the ranks of the Greeks. On the other hand, what we see on the other side is a bitter, bloody intermittent feud leading to gang-style murders and culminating recently, after the coup, in the occupation of the seat of power by the most unbelievable, unthinkable type of so-called leaders, whose shame we all felt—so much so that this very body of the United Nations refused to agree to recognize them. I believe that the Turkish action had the effect of giving legality—if not total legality, at least decency—to the seat of the Greek Cypriot administration in Cyprus.

39. Now, reverting to the situation on the island with regard to the cease-fire, the next words of the text I had prepared concern a situation now in the past, yet I shall read them.

40. On many occasions I have said that there will not be a cease-fire unless the attacks against Turkish Cypriots are stopped. In Cyprus, given the geographical situation, which is peculiar in that Turkish Cypriots live all over the island—and God knows how many times that has been used as the basis of political explanations of certain attitudes on the part of the Greek Cypriot administration—it is possible

only to speak about an island-wide cease-fire, and if the firing does not cease in other parts of the island there is no unilateral obligation for Turkey to cease fire in the area it controls.

41. As indicated, those last words were written before the news, which makes us all very happy, that nothing has occurred in the past 24 hours or more. The reason for this attitude of the Turkish Government was and is that the Turkish Government just cannot abandon the members of the Turkish community in Cyprus, which are threatened not only by the Greek National Guard but also by the communities in which they live—those communities which, it is said, cherish the presence of the Turkish Cypriots among them.

42. The firing ceases when it ceases all over the island, and I am happy to say that, at least from this angle, the situation now seems much improved.

43. One thing I should like to mention again, because it needs to be stressed, is that Turkey, whose action is now the object of so much criticism on the part of Mr. Rossides, has always had this military might—which has not developed over the past fortnight—or at least the edge over Cyprus of which there are some complaints in this chamber. But it will be remembered that it has refrained from using it in the hope, which has in the past proved vain, of seeing the Greek Cypriots accept the voice of reason.

44. I hate to take a Cassandra-like attitude—which is not generally pleasing—but how often have I myself and my predecessors had to speak here about the necessity of recognizing the basic elements of the over-all Cyprus settlement, which we mistakenly thought had taken place in the early 1960s? At that time we thought we had created a Republic that was independent and sovereign, whose territorial integrity was total, which was based on the existence of two communities wishing to live together with equal participation in the future of the island and, of course, in its present also, two communities which would be equal partners and share in the prosperity, in the defence, in the political aspirations and in the policy of that island. And we have been striving to obtain that. We have many, many times come almost to the brink of war with our Greek allies, and each time a last-moment solution was found, hopes were reborn, and on the basis of those hopes intercommunal talks took place and were broken off on the merest pretext whenever a Turk had the audacity to claim equality with his Greek partners in Cyprus. That was reason enough to stop the talks. And yet it went on and on and on. And the Turkish action took place only when, finally, as is recognized by everyone around this table, there was not a shred of legality left on the island.

45. And today in Geneva, in one of the most important forums in which this question is being discussed—at

this moment, probably the most important one—three of the Member States which have a special interest in Cyprus and whose role there is recognized by international treaties are trying, in good faith, to find a solution to the problem. I find this to be the worst possible moment for Mr. Rossides, or those from whom he gets instructions, to ask for a meeting of the Council and a discussion which can only make more difficult the finding of a solution in Geneva. I hope that in Geneva none of the representatives of the three countries principally concerned will be much affected by what is said here and that they will continue in a more defused atmosphere to discuss the problem and try to find a solution to it.

46. Discussions are taking place in Geneva right now. I talked with my Foreign Minister just before coming here. Progress has been reported; hope has been expressed. I shall therefore end by saying what I said at the very beginning: I do not see what purpose can be served by this meeting of the Council today. But I happen to know why it is taking place and I fully understand why the members of the Council agreed to the convening of the meeting.

47. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now invite the representative of India to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

48. Mr. JAIPAL (India): Since I spoke last the situation has materially changed, and my delegation feels obliged therefore to make our position clear.

49. As a non-aligned country, we are naturally interested and concerned about the future of non-aligned Cyprus. The situation in Cyprus today must, in our opinion, clearly be contained, defused and normalized as quickly as possible, primarily in the interests of the people of Cyprus, who are the principal sufferers.

50. The original sin of one foreign military intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus has been compounded by another foreign military intervention. As a consequence, the threat to international peace and security has increased and the independence and integrity of Cyprus are imperilled. Perhaps the Security Council might have acted sooner than it did; perhaps it should act again if the situation shows no signs of steady improvement. But in all fairness to the Council it must be said that today the essential ingredients for a peaceful settlement are present and it is worth while mentioning them.

51. Since the adoption of resolution 353 (1974), the National Guard of Cyprus has submitted itself to civil authority. The military régime in Greece, too, has handed over power to civilian leadership. Thus, the two original causes of the crisis have been removed. It now remains for the third element to react positively to the changed situation, because the original provocation is no longer present. It is now, therefore, for

the Council to help this process. Its resolution provides the initial machinery for this purpose, that is, the Geneva talks between the three guarantor Powers under the Treaty of Guarantee. Those three Powers are committed to the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and, indeed, they have recently reaffirmed this commitment. The Geneva talks therefore provide an opportunity for them collectively to fulfil this commitment and to discharge their treaty responsibilities. They have thus assumed an obligation to initiate the steps towards the first goal, which is the restoration of peace.

52. We hope that the three Powers will find it possible to restore peace quickly in Cyprus, for not only is it their collective responsibility to do so under the Treaty of Guarantee: it is also the responsibility of the Security Council to do so. For the present, the Security Council has vested in them—these three Powers—this particular responsibility in terms of resolution 353 (1974). The Geneva talks must therefore be given a fair chance; they cannot be allowed to fail in their task; indeed, they should be helped by the Council to succeed. For our interpretation is that the three Powers are acting for us on a mandate from the Council. We are therefore glad to hear from our Secretary-General that the Geneva talks are beginning to show some signs of promise.

53. The best way in which we can help them at present is by avoiding any recriminations here in this Council, because that will only serve to add fuel to the fires in Cyprus. The *revanchistes* and the hotheads have to be kept under control. It is a very complicated and deep-rooted situation that we are dealing with in Cyprus, one in which, unfortunately, ethnic groups have come to rely on external guarantors for their security. This sort of dependence on external authorities is unhealthy at the best of times and it will take some time for it to wither away.

54. It is interesting that Turkey in its 300-year rule over Cyprus did not find it necessary to divide the island to protect one community from the other. Great Britain also ruled the island as one colony and not two. Greece too is committed to the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

55. It is a dangerous concept to sanction external intervention in an independent State on grounds of ethnic or religious affinities. The future of Cyprus, its constitutional arrangements and so forth are, in our opinion, for the people of Cyprus themselves to determine, in conditions of peace, freedom and democracy. Any other solution, however well-meant, would be unrealistic and would not endure unless it had the full support of the entire population of Cyprus. The three Powers in Geneva will no doubt bear in mind that very fundamental consideration.

56. Lastly, the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is an important and positive factor in the

present situation, and the position of the United Nations Force should not be jeopardized by any party. On the contrary, its position and mandate should be strengthened so as to enable it to cope with the new dimensions of its peace mission, as so rightly pointed out by the Secretary-General.

57. We trust that the parties directly involved in Cyprus will recognize the imperatives of peace and conduct themselves in speech and in action in a manner that is conducive to the return of peace to the people of Cyprus.

58. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): A week ago, on 20 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 353 (1974), which called upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It also demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus and requested the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel.

59. It should also be recalled that on 23 July, in resolution 354 (1974), the Council reaffirmed the basic provisions of resolution 353 (1974). The Soviet delegation, which from the very outset has insisted that the Council should take prompt and decisive measures to put an end to foreign military intervention in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, supported both these resolutions which, as is well known, were adopted unanimously. During all the recent meetings we have repeatedly stressed that resolution 353 (1974) must be implemented in all its parts and provisions, as that is the only way to put an end to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and to allow the people of Cyprus, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots, to settle their own affairs and decide their own future independently, without interference from outside.

60. Soviet and world public opinion are deeply concerned at the continuing foreign intervention in the affairs of the sovereign State of Cyprus. Speaking recently at the celebrations on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Polish People's Republic, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, stated:

“The Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all peace-loving States resolutely demand an end to outside military intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus and the restoration of the status of the Republic as an independent, sovereign State, as it existed before the Greek aggression.”

61. Unfortunately we note that resolutions 353 (1974) and 354 (1974) are not being implemented. That is shown by the facts, including those facts that we have heard today. Foreign personnel has not been recalled from Cyprus. Despite the decisions of the Council,

outside intervention has not ceased. The legitimate constitutional Government of the Republic has been deprived of the possibility of discharging its functions. The President has also been deprived of the possibility of exercising his functions as the lawful head of State. It is obvious that if all the provisions of resolution 353 (1974) had been implemented, we should not today have had to draw the Council's attention once again to what is now happening in Cyprus.

62. It is the opinion of the Soviet delegation that, in view of the situation which has developed, the Council must compel all the parties concerned to implement its decisions on Cyprus fully, unconditionally and without delay. It is the duty of the Council under the Charter not only to take decisions to deal with any given situation but also to adopt concrete measures to ensure that those decisions are carried out and implemented. If the Council does not do that, it is not doing its duty. It also goes without saying that in such a case the responsibility must be borne by those States which are acting in a way that is contrary to the decisions taken by the Council. At previous meetings of the Council, we stressed that because of the delaying tactics employed by certain members, the adoption of effective measures that might contribute to the solution of the crisis along the correct lines was being postponed. That has inevitably led to the further aggravation of the situation in the country. Yesterday, too, we saw how attempts were being made to prevent the Council from taking measures to implement the decisions it had adopted. Time will not stand still and we must take all measures to ensure that the parties concerned implement the decisions of the Council fully and without any delay.

63. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus to exercise his right of reply.

64. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wish to say only a few words. First, I do not think it at all necessary to make any reply to the repetition by the representative of Turkey of unsubstantiated charges and allegations, for which there is no particle of evidence and of which no mention is made in any of the numerous reports of the Secretary-General and of UNFICYP, who are closely following the situation and would have known about and reported any such cases. Nor has there been any mention of these cases in any of the numerous newspaper reports, which are full of charges about Turkey's aggressive war on Cyprus but contain not a word about any ill-treatment of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Greek Cypriot people. Had there been any such treatment, it would have been noted by press correspondents. It is therefore not necessary to deal with statements such as those made by the representative of Turkey; it would be a waste of time.

65. I wish to thank the representatives of the Soviet Union and India for their constructive statements.

Further, I wish to say again that we want to support the work of the Geneva conference through due implementation of the Security Council resolution. That is the one very important aspect which I believe is in the mind of every member of the Council. We feel that this is not helped by allowing the violations of the cease-fire to go unnoticed and unremedied. We consider it a duty to bring them to the knowledge of the Council. I understand the position of the representative of Turkey; it is understandable that he does not want the Council to take note of this situation of violations. But the essential interest of the United Nations as an international organization, and of the world community, is that the Council resolutions be respected and that in this case the Council resolutions for a cease-fire be implemented, particularly as so much danger is involved. And these resolutions are not implemented if the Council takes an attitude that might perhaps be interpreted as indifference to these violations. I must say again that any territory occupied through violation of the cease-fire should be returned by the violator on the basis of the cease-fire line—in this case, that of 22 July—in accordance with the Secretary-General's appeal. That is implicit in the essence of a resolution for a cease-fire. To deprive the resolution of this essential element, particularly after repeated violations of the resolution, may be taken as a mark of indifference to the implementation of Security Council resolutions in general. If the Council thinks that its resolutions need not necessarily be implemented, it might just as well not adopt them.

66. But I confidently hope that the Council will see to it that its resolution is implemented. It is true that today we had a quiet day; but we have had quiet days before. There was a quiet day on 24 July, presumably because it was the day after the Council's imperative demand for a cease-fire. Yet on 25 July the fighting started again. Today it may be quiet, but we do not know what will happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Therefore, action is needed.

67. What I ask is that the Security Council take in hand its responsibilities in the situation and, in accordance with its resolution, follow developments and take appropriate and effective action. That, we believe, is imperative. The situation has to be kept under review so that action may be taken to save a small country, a State Member of the United Nations, so direly threatened in its existence, so direly threatened in its independence, its sovereignty and, above all, its territorial integrity.

68. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): The Council has now been seized for nearly two weeks of the new and extremely dangerous crisis which has erupted in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Republic of Cyprus specifically. The Council, in its deliberations and in the long and intensive consultations which have been conducted among its members, has closely followed and has been, I think we can honestly say, in day-to-day contact with the evolution of the situation, and has

made every effort to contribute, at every stage and in the manner which seemed both appropriate and effective, to a solution or at least, at particular moments, to a scaling down of tension.

69. It was in line with these efforts, in which you, Mr. President, have guided us so ably, and in which the Secretary-General has given us such valuable assistance, that we were able to adopt the resolution of 20 July setting out the main principles which, in the Council's view, must apply in the present situation.

70. Subsequent action by the Council—the adoption of resolution 354 (1974), our private meeting last Wednesday, the consultations held yesterday and the meeting today—has all been undertaken with the same objective in mind: to help towards the re-establishment of peace and constitutional Government in the Republic of Cyprus.

71. My delegation has taken an active part in the work of the Council, and we have not hesitated to take the floor several times in order to express and re-express the guiding principles which are of such fundamental importance.

72. The first and foremost of these principles is the maintenance, and indeed the strengthening, of a State Member of the United Nations—the strengthening of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The Council has strongly and unanimously endorsed this principle, and we believe that all the other objectives the Council has defined in its resolutions must be placed in this broad over-all context.

73. In order to achieve this objective, the strict observance of the cease-fire, demanded by the Council and accepted by all parties is of the utmost importance. Efforts for peace can hardly succeed as long as fighting or military movements continue, as long as the delicate new structures which begin to emerge on the Island appear to be threatened.

74. The Council has furthermore urged the immediate start of political efforts to solve the crisis, and has therefore called for a meeting of the Powers parties to the London and Zurich agreements. It is to be noted with satisfaction that these meetings have started and that the parties to the conference have attempted to lay the basis for future negotiations. We believe that those efforts deserve our full support, as they provide the indispensable basis to arrive at the goals the Council has spelled out for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

75. This development is all the more gratifying as the difficulties and problems to be solved during the first days of these negotiations were enormous and sometimes seemed insurmountable. It is fitting, therefore, to pay a tribute the patience, perseverance

and statesmanship of all involved in the negotiations in Geneva, and we express hope for their final success.

76. It is our sincere hope, further, that whatever success can be achieved at the conference table will find prompt reflection in the island of Cyprus and will contribute to an immediate lessening of tension in the area itself, for which all members of the Council continue to feel grave concern.

77. The dimensions, the complexities and the intricacies of the problem before us have become more than obvious during the past two weeks. We are fully aware that there is no quick and no easy solution of the problems, whose magnitude and whose duration surpass those of many others. We are aware, therefore, that further efforts of the Council may be needed to help on the way towards a settlement. The role of the Organization in the establishment of peace in Cyprus is a long and, I believe, a meritorious one. Full use should be made therefore of the possibilities our Organization can offer in the present circumstances. This is particularly true of the contribution of UNFICYP, whose role and authority have been strengthened by resolution 353 (1974) and whose effectiveness has been increased by the measures taken by the Secretary-General a few days ago in consultation with troop-contributing countries. We hope that, on the basis of agreements between and with the parties, this role can be further expanded for the benefit of all of Cyprus.

78. The ultimate success of all other efforts being conducted will depend, however, on the degree to which they respond to the wishes, to the aspirations and to the hopes of the people immediately concerned—the people of Cyprus. When in 1960 the people of Cyprus acceded to independence and joined the United Nations, it was certainly in the hope that the new Republic would be the master of its destiny. It is therefore, in our belief, the ultimate task of the Council, according to the spirit and the letter of the Charter, to restore to the people of Cyprus as quickly as we can the independence, sovereignty and freedom from foreign interference which they deserve, as do all other Member States of the United Nations.

79. In the days and weeks to come, the utmost restraint and extreme caution on the part of all concerned will remain commands of the hour, as will common determination and patience. We also believe, however, that statesmanship should not be without compassion for the suffering of a people, and restraint and extreme caution are not the same as indifference.

80. It is in this spirit that my delegation will continue to co-operate in all further efforts to bring about a speedy and a peaceful solution of the grave problem before us.

81. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I think that there is a general feeling around this table that the

talks that are at present going on in Geneva should be given a fair wind and a chance to see whether or not they will succeed. I will therefore say very little about the allegations made by the representative of Cyprus, or about the answers and the counter-allegations made by the representative of Turkey. With great respect to them, I do not feel that it is perhaps entirely appropriate that we should spend a lot of time this afternoon engaged in an inquest over something which is not yet a corpse. At this moment talks are continuing in Geneva which we hope will be successful. I really should like to make two observations upon them.

82. First of all, there is today more ground for modified optimism about the result of those talks than there was yesterday. Some progress, I think, has been made in the course of the last 24 hours, and we hope that progress will continue to be made in the course of the rest of today and possibly tomorrow as well.

83. Secondly, I would merely observe that those talks were specifically sanctioned and indeed called for in Security Council resolution 353 (1974). We were very grateful last week that the Soviet Union found itself able to support that resolution so that it was adopted unanimously. Having called for the talks, I hope the Council will feel that they should now be given a fair chance.

84. Mr. NJINÉ (United Republic of Cameroon) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation would have preferred not to speak at this stage, but we are compelled to recall, like the preceding speakers, that in unanimously adopting resolutions 353 (1974) and 354 (1974), the Council was doing its utmost to try to find a solution to the very grave situation on Cyprus.

85. The responsibility of the three guarantor Powers is well known to all States Members of the United Nations, including those Members who were not fortunate enough to know of it at the time.

86. Hence, in calling upon those three Powers in its resolution 353 (1974) to act within the framework of their responsibilities, the Security Council, in the opinion of my delegation, was merely pursuing its efforts to find a solution to the grave situation on Cyprus.

87. I stated at the outset that I did not intend to prolong the debate, but yesterday we had to wait quite a long time before learning that our meeting would be held today. This was because, in the view of my delegation, an effort was being made to give the Geneva conference its chance to take action and to do something, for indeed this conference was requested by the Council and, as we all know, the results of that conference are part of the efforts made by the Council to reach a solution acceptable to all parties as far as possible.

88. I take this opportunity to recall that since the very inception of this debate on Cyprus my delegation has constantly urged all Member States to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and, in so doing it has remained loyal to the fundamental principles of our country. But in the view of my delegation, all the parties concerned, all of them Member States of the United Nations, are requested to be realistic in order to enable the Council to pursue its task and, thus, to give the Geneva conference the possibility of providing us, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General, with a result which we hope will be positive.

89. I take this opportunity to reiterate my delegation's thanks to the Secretary-General. Since we meet several times a week, he certainly must not be able to get much sleep. We urge him to keep government informed of the situation and of the efforts made by his Special Representatives in the field. We hope that this meeting will promote an atmosphere of mutual understanding between the parties, although it is quite normal that they should have recalled what we already knew. But if we want to achieve a solution, the Council must be assisted to the full by all Member States, and we must avoid as much as possible exacerbating the situation and adding fuel to the fire at this stage.

90. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): The French delegation has already expressed its views with regard to the events in Cyprus on several occasions during the discussions which have taken place for almost two weeks. At present, in accordance with the treaties and with resolution 353 (1974), a conference of the three guarantor Powers is being held in Geneva in order to find suitable solutions to the numerous problems that have arisen. As long as that conference continues its work and as long as hope for an agreement has not been abandoned, the Council can only express the wish that the situation in Cyprus itself will not be changed in a unilateral manner, to the detriment of one or the other of the two communities which make up the population of the island. In that connexion my delegation has learned with real concern of the clear violations of the cease-fire which have been reported to this Council in the past few days.

91. My delegation has also on several occasions expressed its sympathy for the unfortunate populations of Cyprus, which have for the past two weeks been the innocent victims of the recent events. We hope that peace and harmony will soon be restored to the island and that the Republic of Cyprus will soon have once again well-balanced institutions working in a legitimate framework in accordance with the treaties and with resolution 353 (1974).

92. I should not want to conclude this brief statement without once again expressing to the Secretary-General our great appreciation for the tireless efforts

he has made for the past two weeks to avoid the dangers of conflict, to put an end to the fighting and to alleviate the suffering of the people concerned. Of course I wish also to pay a tribute also to the representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, to the Force Commander and all the contingents of that Force, who have been subjected to exceptional tension in circumstances which were not at all those that had been foreseen and who have carried out their mission admirably.

93. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I merely wish to call the attention of the Council to two recent reports that have just been handed to me which I think have importance in the situation. One is a dispatch from Nicosia from the Associated Press:

"Turkish troops halted their advance in the Greek Cypriot areas of Cyprus Saturday, and Cypriot Foreign Minister Dimis Dimitriou declared, 'Things are looking better'."

The other dispatch is a Reuters dispatch, also from Nicosia:

"The Turkish forces were reported by a United Nations spokesman here today to have stopped their advance, after pushing out from territory they captured early in their landings in Cyprus a week ago. After yesterday's flare-up, there were no reports of further fighting on the island."

I submit that this is important information and most hopeful information. I think a cessation of the fighting—long as it may have taken to arrive at it—is something we can all welcome. We all know that the situation continues to be extremely fragile, and I would hope that in this Council we could show sufficient restraint not again to stir up a situation which is susceptible to very easy ignition.

94. UNFICYP is on the job in Cyprus. It has been carrying out a thoroughly professional operation in an atmosphere of great uncertainty and great danger, and I have every confidence that it will continue to play a major role in peace-making in Cyprus.

95. The news from Geneva, again, is hopeful. Progress has been made today. I submit that that is the reality of today, rather than the debates which took place yesterday or the day before about events which have happened in the past.

96. The roots of the Cyprus crisis go back many, many years—in fact, centuries. We could trade charges here; we could go through what one of our colleagues earlier described as a "ritual of recrimination", and I suspect we could go on for several weeks and be no closer to an agreement between the disputants

than we are at this moment. So I would urge that we take account of the fact that the fighting has stopped in Cyprus. The authorized parties—those whom this Council in its resolution called on to seek a solution to the problem—are, if I am not mistaken, meeting at this exact hour and may be making progress. Let us go forward from this cessation of fighting to find the political solution to a crisis which affects us all.

97. Mr. TCHERNOUCHTENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): Some of the changes in the situation in Cyprus are certainly not by any means such as to leave us calm and tranquil. Even those statements that we have heard today in the Security Council show that basically very little has yet been done to ensure the unconditional implementation of the decisions adopted earlier by the Council—resolutions 353 (1974) and 354 (1974).

98. For that very reason, our delegation would like to stress at this meeting of the Council that the immediate implementation of resolution 353 (1974), in all its parts and provisions—we should like to stress particularly, in all its parts and provisions—is absolutely essential and important. We should like to note that its basic provisions relating to respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to ending foreign military intervention in the island, and finally, to the withdrawal of foreign military personnel present there, must definitely remain the focus of attention for members of the Security Council.

99. The selective emphasis which certain members of the Council place on only one paragraph of this resolution—however important that paragraph might be—does not give us the right to disregard the main provisions of this resolution. We also see the particular importance of those provisions of the Security Council resolution which I mentioned because, as the representative of Cyprus, Mr. Rossides, noted, there exists a threat to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. We cannot ignore the statement of the representative of Cyprus. For that very reason, the immediate implementation of the Council resolution in all its parts and provisions is an urgent and important task at the present time.

100. The implementation of the resolutions concerned would undoubtedly make it possible to change the situation on the island and would create the conditions in which the people of Cyprus—both communities in Cyprus, Greek and Turkish—could freely decide their future without outside interference.

101. We support the idea that Cyprus as a State should remain independent, sovereign and keep its territorial integrity, and, together with all peace-loving forces, we express our solidarity with the people of Cyprus and call for help and assistance to them in their noble struggle for the future of their country.

102. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

103. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): In response to the tacit appeal implicit in all the speeches made this afternoon and the more explicit appeal of the representative

of the United Kingdom and of the representative of the United States, and in delayed response to an earlier appeal of the representative of Australia, I shall not answer Mr. Rossides.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

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