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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1783)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
The situation in Cyprus:	
(a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);	
(b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);	
(c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348)	

NOTE

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SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 23 July 1974, at 9 p.m.

President: Mr. Javier PÉREZ de CUÉLLAR (Peru).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Costa Rica, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania, Peru, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1783)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in Cyprus:
 - (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
 - (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
 - (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus:

- (a) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/11334);
- (b) Letter dated 16 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11335);
- (c) Letter dated 20 July 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11348)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings [1779th-1781st meetings], I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia,

Romania, India and Mauritius to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. Panayotacos (Greece) took places at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In view of the limited number of places available at the Council table, I propose to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia, Romania, India and Mauritius to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be invited to come to the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Petrić (Yugoslavia), Mr. Datcu (Romania), Mr. Budhiraja (India) and Mr. Ramphul (Mauritius) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): This urgent meeting of the Council has been convened following a request contained in a letter from the representative of Greece, which the President received this evening [S/11366]. In this connexion, I wish to state that only a few minutes ago I received the two telegrams from Mr. Panayotacos referred to in the first paragraph of that document and therefore was not in a position to inform members of the Council earlier of their contents. They read as follows:

“Have honour communicate here below the text of cable sent by Greek Embassy, Nicosia:

“ ‘Building been pounded by heavy arms. Women and children of Embassy members are in basement. Embassy premises have already suffered great damage. There is immediate danger for our lives. Civilian population of Nicosia is at mercy of Turkish tanks and has been suffering great casualties’.

“I am appealing to you and United Nations organs to save lives of innocent people and non-combatants. Please consider present cable most urgent appeal asking for immediate humanitarian action.”¹

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

The second telegram reads:

"Further my first cable have honour bring to your knowledge the text of following cable sent by Greek Embassy, Nicosia:

"Greek Embassy is being pounded by Turkish mortars. We have protested to political adviser of UNFICYP and expressed serious fear for lives of families of embassy staff concentrated in basement".

"Please consider this cable as ultimate appeal to United Nations to save innocent lives."¹

4. In addition, members of the Council are aware that the Secretary-General addressed an appeal this afternoon to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to the Acting President of Cyprus [S/11368].

5. I call on the Secretary-General.

6. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Reports which I have received from my Special Representative in Cyprus and the Force Commander give rise to grave anxiety about the observance of the cease-fire. The cease-fire held fairly well during the night of 22 to 23 July, but after daylight on 23 July violations occurred around the edge of the Turkish enclave. Later in the morning fighting developed in the vicinity of the airport and continued until 12.30 p.m. when the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) arranged a cease-fire. The airport was declared a United Nations-controlled area and occupied by UNFICYP troops after the National Guard troops had agreed to withdraw.

7. Fighting also developed along the green line, which separates the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sectors of Nicosia, particularly in the west of the Old City near the golf course. There were further violations of the cease-fire in the Kyrenia district, where Turkish troops captured the village of Dhikomo during the night and attacked the village of Sykhari. In the Larnaca district the National Guard attacked and captured Kophinou. Throughout the island, UNFICYP has tried to re-establish observation posts and to patrol the lines of confrontation wherever possible. It is also, to the maximum of its capability, investigating complaints and rendering assistance to the victims of the fighting, both Cypriot and foreign nationals. Further details will be given in the regular reports on the situation. In fact, this report has been distributed in the meantime.

8. In view of the evident instability of the cease-fire and the possibilities of further serious violations of the cease-fire tomorrow, 24 July, I have been in contact during the day with various Governments and representatives. I have spoken over the telephone with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, and with the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry in

Athens, expressing my concern at the situation. I have also had a number of conversations with the Permanent Representatives of the Governments concerned. This evening I made a general statement expressing my anxiety at the state of observance of the cease-fire. I also addressed messages to the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece and to the Acting President of Cyprus, the text of which reads as follows:

"I have with the greatest anxiety been following the situation in Cyprus since the coming into force of the cease-fire. I fully realize that the first days of a cease-fire after a bitter contest are always difficult. However, I am deeply concerned at information reaching me from my representatives in Cyprus that serious violations of the cease-fire are still taking place. I therefore ask you most urgently to give instructions to your military forces that no further violations of the cease-fire should take place and that, where territory has been taken over after the time of the cease-fire, that is 1600 hours, Cyprus time, on 22 July, troops should return to the positions which they occupied when the cease-fire came into effect. I feel that the possible repercussions of further violations of the cease-fire are sufficiently grave to warrant my making this appeal to you as Prime Minister, and I must ask you to take the most immediate action for the complete observance of the cease-fire in Cyprus."^[ibid.]

9. In Cyprus, in addition to the activities described above, my Special Representative and the Force Commander have met, in the meantime, with Acting President Clerides and were present during a most useful meeting between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktas. This is an encouraging development.

10. I have instructed UNFICYP to make all possible efforts to stabilize the cease-fire and assure its observance in full co-operation with the parties. In this connexion, I may inform the Council that, at my request, the Prime Minister of Turkey has appointed a senior liaison officer between the Turkish forces and UNFICYP. There was the problem that our Commander-in-Chief did not have the necessary contacts with the Turkish forces, so this will be corrected by the appointment of a Turkish liaison officer by the Turkish Government. I have been informed by the Turkish Prime Minister in the meantime that a high-ranking officer has been appointed as liaison officer.

11. I have also instructed UNFICYP to make the maximum effort to prevent intercommunal strife and to intervene wherever possible to protect members of the civilian population who are in danger from such strife.

12. Yesterday afternoon, 22 July, I met with the Permanent Representatives of the Governments

providing contingents for UNFICYP and made an urgent request to them for reinforcements for their contingents in Cyprus. As a result of that appeal, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom have already undertaken to provide reinforcements to a total of approximately 1,400 men—in addition to the 2,300 men whom we have in Cyprus already.

13. Other Governments are giving favourable and urgent consideration to my appeal. I very much hope that as reinforcements arrive and as the observance of the cease-fire allows for more extensive observation and patrol activity by UNFICYP, the Force will be able to carry out its great responsibilities with ever-increasing effectiveness.

14. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): As a result of the talks and consultations it has been possible to distribute a document containing a draft resolution [S/11369]. In view of the urgency of this question, I hope that it can be put to a vote immediately. Since I understand that no representative wishes to speak now at this stage, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously.²

15. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

16. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): I think that little needs to be said here. The facts as we know them and as we have just heard them from the Secretary-General speak for themselves, and they are sombre enough for all of us. The cease-fire in Cyprus, agreed to yesterday by all the parties, is not being observed. The guns are still firing, the innocent are still dying.

17. The resolution which the Council has just unanimously adopted, as the resolution we adopted on 20 July was unanimous, is short and to the point. In this resolution we demand that the parties, all the parties, comply immediately with the cease-fire provisions of resolution 353 (1974) and cease the hostilities in Cyprus—hostilities which have brought suffering and death to countless innocent people, and which so clearly threaten international peace and security.

18. The United States has joined in supporting the resolution adopted by this Council because of our determination that the cease-fire ordered by the Council on 20 July should be made fully effective at the earliest possible moment. My Government believes that the Governments and peoples of Cyprus,

Greece and Turkey, as well as all the rest of us, want an end to the fighting, and that we want it now.

19. Nothing is more difficult, nothing requires greater political leadership and courage, than to stop hostilities once they have started. I call on the parties to exercise that leadership and that courage now. I call on the parties to stop the blood-letting and turn to the negotiating table. The cease-fire has to be the first step towards peace. It must be the basis for other efforts towards conciliation and for other developments which can lead on to a brighter future for the people of Cyprus.

20. Mr. de GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): At the very time when the cease-fire was going into effect in Cyprus I expressed regret yesterday that violence was continuing to beget violence. Almost 36 hours have now elapsed and, unhappily, as I now speak, the murderous skirmishes are far from having ceased. The statement just made by the Secretary-General and the appeal that, this very evening, he has addressed to the parties were inspired by facts that can scarcely be disputed, the alarming account of which is now coming in from the press agencies. In these circumstances it was our duty to meet.

21. I shall not expatiate on the events which continue to cause bloodshed in the island of Cyprus. Let me simply note that the political developments of the past two days had aroused hopes that the situation might be brought under control.

22. The Ankara Government, yesterday morning, declared that it "would respect Security Council resolutions". It announced—and I quote again—that "peace would now prevail in Cyprus". Today it might have heeded the appeal of the European Community, issued in Brussels yesterday evening, calling on the parties for an effective implementation of the cease-fire and full co-operation with the United Nations Force in the discharge of its mission vis-à-vis the two communities. It has repeatedly reiterated today, through diplomatic channels, and at the highest levels, its willingness to accept a cease-fire.

23. From the Greek community of the island we have news of an encouraging development: the appointment of an interim President, whose experience and whose representative nature confer upon him new authority.

24. No one can now allow blood to go on flowing, death to be piled upon death, and destruction to be added to destruction, in circumstances that are of crucial concern to the populations to whom, purportedly, the intention was to bring peace.

25. May I say here very solemnly that the fund of confidence that my country accords to the Ankara Government, whose interests in Cyprus were affected by the coup d'état of 15 July, would be jeopardized

² See resolution 354 (1974).

if strict orders were not given to the Turkish armed forces to act in such a way that all acts of violence on their part cease.

26. The same thing may be said of the confidence which we should like to place in the Greek Cypriot authorities, who must return to the paths of peaceful coexistence with the Turkish civilian population. We hope that those authorities will understand the importance of the urgent appeal we address to them so that all the populations answerable to them may refrain from further violence.

27. The tragic circumstances still prevailing today in Cyprus cannot be a matter of unconcern to the Council. It is our duty to reiterate the cease-fire decision that we took Saturday last and to make it still more urgent. My delegation has felt that the Council in the very discharge of its functions under the United Nations Charter was in duty bound to call for an end to the firing immediately in conformity with operative paragraph 2 of resolution 353 (1974). We are therefore gratified that the draft resolution introduced this evening has been unanimously adopted and we look to its earliest possible implementation by the authorities to which it is addressed.

28. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Greece.

29. Mr. PANAYOTACOS (Greece): Because of the urgent convening of this meeting, I did not have the time to prepare any written statement. Therefore, I shall be very brief. It would, after all, be a pure waste of time to indulge in words when immediate acts are needed. After all, the documents already circulated speak for themselves. Unfortunately, one of my letters has not yet been circulated, so may I be permitted to read an excerpt from this letter, which was sent yesterday:

"At 0710 hours local time today a Turkish unit attacked with mortar shelling and flat trajectory arms and occupied two Greek outposts east of Trakhonas, itself a location north of Nicosia.

"After this occupation was completed, the same Turkish unit concentrated all the women and children of the Trakhonas area, obliged them to walk in front of it as a protective screen and advanced in this way towards the interior of the Greek positions." [S/11362]

There is no comment on this act, a dastardly one to say the least.

30. Furthermore, I also want to refer to Mr. Ecevit's assertion that after the acceptance by Turkey of the cease-fire there would be peace, there would be freedom and equality in Cyprus. Unfortunately, those promises did not materialize. In the same context I should like to draw the attention of the Council to

the fact that not a single one of the paragraphs of resolution 353 (1974), except paragraph 4, of course, has been implemented by Turkey.

31. Paragraph 1 calls for respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Territorial integrity has been violated after the cease-fire. And not only this, but Mr. Ecevit has said that the Turkish presence on the island is now irrevocably established. In plain English this means that partition is an accomplished fact.

32. Paragraph 2 calls upon all parties to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. That paragraph also has been ignored.

33. Paragraph 3 demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus and so forth. That call for an "immediate end" has been disregarded.

34. Paragraph 5 calls on Greece and Turkey to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus. Those negotiations were scheduled to start tomorrow in Geneva. We agreed immediately to enter into those negotiations as soon as possible. The Turkish Government postponed them—I do not want to say *sine die*, but for an indefinite time.

35. I do not want to waste any more time, but I should like to say this. The Security Council, living up to its mission as a guarantor of international peace and security, as well as being conscious of its responsibilities vis-à-vis history itself, must take urgently all necessary steps to achieve effective respect of the cease-fire. That has already been done. But I think that there is something missing how this resolution, and that missing link is a reference to the Secretary-General's appeal to the three Governments concerned to withdraw their armed forces to the positions they were occupying on 22 July at 4 p.m. local time.

36. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

37. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We have now a new situation again tonight, and we have to comment on it. It is a fact established by the Secretary-General that there were very grave violations of the cease-fire yesterday, and today there are more.

38. The representative of Greece has sent a list of the violations, and they have been borne out by the Secretary-General. It is obvious that there has been a considerable extension of the territory under occupation by the Turkish forces. The details are given and they are here—namely, that there has been violent fighting, and the Turkish forces have occupied

"Mr. Milea, east of Nicosia, advanced westward from Yerolakkos as well as from Karavas in the direction of Lapithos, aiming at enlarging their bridgehead on the northern coast of the island. Heavy fighting is also going on in various other locations." [S/11366]

39. The Secretary-General has recognized these violations of the cease-fire. I do not say that there is no mention of any violations on the Greek side, but they are obviously very minor violations. The net effect of all this is the enlargement of the area of the Turkish occupation.

40. Now, considering that the Turkish occupation is a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of Cyprus, it is important to look at the picture, and behind it is the idea of partition. That is borne out by what is happening. It is vital to see the picture as it continues unfolding today.

41. The Prime Minister of Turkey, in a sweetly worded document he issued at the time of the invasion of Cyprus, made it a point to say that he was doing it—and I quote his words—"as a service of peace for humanity". And then he said, "We are not going for war but to bring peace to the island; not only to the Turks, but to the Greeks as well."

42. So here we are. We have this picture. And what happened afterwards? He made it clear that he was not going for war, nor for conquest, of course, nor for occupation, nor for partition. That was at the beginning, so that world opinion would not obstruct him or any Powers interfere with him. He also made it clear that he wanted to help restore the constituted authority in Cyprus. And some people might have been misled into believing that.

43. But what we see now is very clear—not that we did not know it before; but it might have been misleading to other people. What we see is very clear: once they got over Cyprus there was a fury of destruction, destruction by every possible means; wanton killing by planes, as I have said before, in violation of international conventions, and by napalm bombs; and the deliberate destruction of property. According to information we have received tonight, in Famagusta alone hotels and buildings and places having nothing to do with military operations are reckoned to have sustained damage amounting to over £300 million. There has been destruction of antiquities—the history of Cyprus might be destroyed—destruction of the forests; and deliberate violation of the cease-fire, taking advantage of the fact that the other side believed there was a cease-fire, in order to gain and occupy more territory.

44. The sudden contrast in the events of the past two or three days is characteristic of what is happening in Cyprus, and it is regrettably characteristic of the way the world is going.

45. Now, the Security Council has a very heavy duty, a very heavy responsibility. It must not merely express disapproval—not condemnation, of course, that was never thought of—but must act in an effective way. What is the effective way? May I explain?

46. We already had a resolution providing for a cease-fire. We have seen before, in other cases—not in all, but certainly in a sufficient number to provide a warning—that these resolutions are not always respected. And why are they not always respected? Because one side or the other wants to take advantage and occupy more territory, believing that that will serve its ultimate purposes in what happens after that, whether it be negotiation or anything else. We have seen that done repeatedly, although of course, in some cases resolutions have been respected.

47. And how do we counter that? Is not the Security Council to find a way to counter that? Is the best way of countering it to allow the side that has gained territory by violating a cease-fire to retain that territory? Is that the best way?

48. In his note of today, the Secretary-General clearly states:

"I therefore ask you most urgently to give instructions to your military forces [that the] troops should return to the positions which they occupied when the cease-fire came into effect." [S/11368]

The United Nations Force is there. The Secretary-General knows very well that the United Nations Force is able to ascertain the positions which were held by the respective sides on the date of the cease-fire, and therefore it would be easy to demand that the side which is violating the cease-fire—or if they are both doing so, this would apply to them both—withdraw to the position held at the time of the cease-fire. That would be a lesson for the future: not to waste fire-arms and kill people in occupying territory that will not be held because the Security Council will not allow it to be held. But if the Council assists in the violation of its resolutions, it merely gives inducement for disrespect. Whether it says "demands immediately" or not, it must ensure that the party which disobeys returns the unlawful fruits of its disobedience. If it does not, that will make for an ineffective Security Council. If the world is suffering today, it is not from an over-effective Security Council but from an ineffective one.

49. Therefore, Mr. President, as I had occasion to tell you when I saw you privately tonight, what is most important vis-à-vis this resolution is following up on what the Secretary-General has practically asked of the Council—he has asked this directly of the parties, but indirectly of the Council—and that is provision for a return to the positions held previously.

50. That might be unpleasant; it might be easier not to do it. But that is not the best way. It might be

unpleasant to ask the parties to return to those positions, but is the Council merely to be pleasant? Or is it to be effective?

51. I am very sorry that I, the representative of a small, unimportant country, must say these words to the Council. But, as representative of a Member of the United Nations, and as a citizen of the world, I am interested in the progress of the world towards peace and security. Therefore I have to speak thus.

52. Cyprus aside, in any case in which the Security Council calls for a cease-fire, if that cease-fire is violated the violator must return the profits of its violation. Only thus can the Council become a real security council.

53. Now the Council has demanded what it asked of the parties earlier: that they comply immediately. But that is practically what they were asked to do before, and they did not listen. And they have not suffered at all by not obeying. On the contrary, the side that wanted to obtain property has obtained it. Why should that country listen now? And why should any other country that comes before the Council and is called upon to cease fire when it does not want to do so—or thinks it does not want to do so because it wishes to occupy more territory—obey the Council in the future, since the practice is not to call for a return to the previous positions? I think that that has been called for on past occasions, but not on many—indeed on so few that they may be forgotten.

54. I do not want to waste more time, because we have a fait accompli; a resolution has already been adopted, and we can only hope for the best. I do not think this resolution has sufficient teeth, but never mind. It is a resolution of the Security Council, and we of course respect it. What I am saying is not said out of disrespect for the Council but because of my concern that the Council receive more respect. That is why I make these observations.

55. It has to be remembered that although two sides, Greece and Turkey, are directly interested in this matter, the victim is Cyprus. The people dying are Cypriots. The property destroyed is Cypriot property, whether Greek or Turkish. Those from outside are not the sufferers. The sufferers are the Cypriots. This is the voice of Cyprus complaining of the situation in Cyprus, for which many are responsible or may be responsible. I do not say that the Cypriots too are not responsible. Of course they are; everybody is responsible. But only the Cypriots are the sufferers. Therefore the Security Council should help them by adopting an effective resolution to stop the blood-letting and the suffering. As the representative of the United States very emphatically said, this is a sombre situation. People are continuing to die. There is suffering and death. International peace and security are threatened. Could we not have a more effective Council resolution to deal with these violations? Of course, I know it is too

late now to ask for that. It was too late when I arrived here, because the resolution had already been agreed upon. But I say this for the future, and I hope the suffering voice of Cyprus now may help some other countries in the future to be saved by a more effective resolution.

56. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

57. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): Mr. President, I am indeed grateful to you for convening this meeting at 9 p.m. instead of 8 p.m., because it would have been most difficult for me and the other members of my delegation to come here earlier—despite the most efficient assistance offered by the United States Mission, for which I publicly thank it—in view of the harassment by Greeks who have since yesterday made my office a rallying point where they chant obscenities while expressing certain political views. On one point all these Greeks seem to be in agreement. But there was not such agreement the other day between the factions that were fighting each other on First Avenue, where those who were for Makarios were on one side and those who were for his successor were on the other side. Those who are gathering in front of my office are all agreed on the solution. It is in fact displayed on their placards: "Death to Turks" and "Enosis". These Greeks represent faithfully their kinsmen in the Mediterranean, and their behaviour explains my presence in this Council chamber.

58. Like all the others around this table, I have seen the resolution that has just been adopted. Some consider it insufficient and have said so. I will merely say that I hope that this will be interpreted by Ambassador Rossides' authorities, whoever they are now, as an injunction to prevent further atrocities being directed towards what is left of the Turkish villages, homes and civilians on the islands.

59. The accusations which are contained in the various documents that have been circulated and the accusations which have been voiced seem to reverse totally the prevailing situation in Cyprus. Defenceless Turks all around the island are being subjected by Greeks to extremely inhuman treatment. As opposed to what the media can see in the open war—and we deplore it, but, after all, there is a war—what is happening in the hidden part of Cyprus is also a tragedy. I am afraid that in a few days, when mass graves are discovered, as has been the case in the past, when photographs are taken in the villages, world public opinion will once more shed tears, this time exclusively for Turks. In many areas Turks have had to surrender, since fighting would have been suicidal for the women and children. In all these areas the women and children who have surrendered have been separated from the men and sent to concentration camps or taken as hostages. That is exactly the way Turks in Cyprus have been treated for the past 11 years, each time the intercommunal feuds have degenerated

into active warfare. The vacated villages have been plundered and later burned by Greeks. These Turkish villages, these Turkish enclaves which were attacked were attacked as a result—it seems now when we follow the pattern—of a strategic as well as a tactical aim, and I will explain in a moment what I mean by that. When Turks are requested to stop and when Turkish forces are requested to cease advancing while the Greeks are most brutally wiping out Turkish existence on the island, this can only be described as the blackest kind of humour.

60. We have been told that Turkey has violated the territorial integrity of Cyprus. Today Turkey is being singled out, as opposed to what was said a few days ago in this same room. But the territorial integrity of Cyprus was violated years ago *de facto* by the presence of Greek officers—first at the invitation and then against the will of the then leaders of the Greek Cypriot administration on the island. In saying this I do not condone any form of violation of territorial integrity. What we said the first day we continue to say today: Turkey went on to the island on the basis of internationally recognized agreements.

61. The representative of Greece said that Turkey was postponing a reply concerning its participation in the Geneva meeting. Again, I can only suppose that something is wrong with his information. Indeed, the only reason why it is difficult to decide when the Geneva meeting can take place is that we still do not know who will represent whom with regard to Greece—contrary to the case of Turkey, which has representatives ready to go to Geneva.

62. Mr. Rossides questioned what has happened and what has been proclaimed with regard to the developments in Cyprus. He said that we had spoken of peace, of constitutionality, but that what we were doing was contrary to what we were saying.

63. With regard to peace, of course it takes more than one to make peace. As I had the opportunity to explain yesterday, as I have explained today and as I shall explain, if necessary, each time the Council meets, it is difficult to speak of peace when there are not only troops facing each other but a defenceless population subjected to the most dastardly attacks by armed civilians of an opposing side. As I have already said, firing will cease the moment the killing of civilians ceases. It is inconceivable to leave a defenceless population—the defence of which has also been an object of the Turkish action—to the mercy of people whose action against their own kind we witnessed only a few days ago.

64. It stands to reason that something should be done. I remember having appealed to Mr. Rossides, I remember having asked him if it was possible for him to try to convey to whoever represents any kind of authority on the island the need to stop the merciless killing of defenceless Turks. That would be the greatest step towards genuine peace in Cyprus.

65. I now come back to the question of constitutionality on the island. We have brought constitutionality to the Greeks—I mean, of course, the Greeks of Cyprus. If Mr. Clerides is now in power with a quasi-constitutionality, Mr. Rossides, that is the direct result of Turkish intervention. I suppose that it will be difficult to deny that point, at least.

66. One ironic aspect of the whole situation is the strange collusion in this chamber, when it comes to attacking Turkey and its actions, between the Greek representative of Athens and Ambassador Rossides, whose presence among us is certainly due more to my modest efforts than to the efforts of the representative of Greece.

67. I said a moment ago that in Cyprus the situation of the civilian populations and whatever action they were subjected to had a different meaning; I used the words “strategic as well as. It is hard to use such words when one thinks of human beings. But in Cyprus human lives correspond, in a way, to territories in other areas. They have a strategic meaning as well—it is unfortunate, but I have to say that. Who is going to restore to life the Turkish villages that have been wiped out, the people who have been physically eradicated? Land can be the object of negotiations; it can be returned—but not human lives, Mr. Rossides.

68. We have often heard about the relative percentages of the populations on the island and of the way in which those populations are dispersed. Mr. Rossides refers to these figures in his various speeches here. And he usually ends his speeches by saying, “Do not forget that the Turks are only 18 per cent of the total population”. I would now ask him whether the Greek community in Cyprus is after a further alteration of this demographic situation by mass murder. I cannot help wondering about that.

69. This is a most unpleasant meeting for me. I would have hoped that it would not take place. It is not, unfortunately, through resolutions—and we all want to abide by resolutions—that the situation in the area can be resolved: it is through the goodwill of responsible people. And, unfortunately, when we speak of responsible elements, when we speak of a constituted authority, we see a void in front of us, we Turks, in whatever direction we look. At least that was the situation a few hours ago.

70. Now, despite all that, today the Turkish Cypriot leader, Vice-President Denktaş, made an appeal on the radio. I have the text of that appeal in Turkish, but, although Turkish is one of the official languages of Cyprus, I imagine that no one but me and those sitting behind me in this chamber understand it. Therefore, I am going to try to translate it now into English. It is not a very long text, and I hope members will bear with me while I read it out, for it is important.

71. Addressing the Turkish Cypriots, Vice-President Denktas said:

"We have had conversations today with Mr. Glafcos Clerides, who has come to the post of the presidency of Cyprus on the basis of a lawful authority. We have discussed with him the details and the ways of putting the cease-fire agreement into effect. We hope to be able, he and I, to achieve this. That is why I urgently request all my fellow Turkish Cypriots to refrain from any action against the Greek Cypriots. Despite the fact that for 11 years you have had to endure much suffering, I still appeal to you not to create any irreversible situation."

Of course, that is just a free translation. I hope that tomorrow—if we have finished the discussion around this table by tomorrow—I shall be able to provide the Council with a more faithful translation of the text of Vice-President Denktas's appeal.

72. I shall not take up much more of the time of the Council. I have just one word that I should like to address to the representative of France in his own language, if I may, of course.

[The speaker continued in French.]

73. My Government attaches the greatest importance to its relations with France, and any appeal from that source has special meaning for us. Nevertheless, Mr. representative of France, I would have wished that you had also addressed an appeal for moderation and respect for the cease-fire to the Government of Athens, which continues to exercise control at the present time, either directly or through an intermediary, since the man of its choice, Mr. Sampson of sad memory, and his team still have, it is said, the power conferred upon them by Athens.

74. Mr. RICHARD (United Kingdom): I fear this debate is perhaps taking a somewhat predictable form. We had from the Secretary-General this evening a sombre and an unsettling report. We have had from the representatives of Greece and Cyprus, and Turkey itself, charge and counter-charge, accusation and counter-accusation. It is perhaps for the Council now to grasp hold yet again of the central facts of the situation as we are faced with them this evening.

75. It is good that the Council has acted quickly, comprehensively and as firmly as it has. I think we should emphasize that today's resolution, whatever defects there may be in it—and views on it have been expressed by the representatives of Cyprus and of Turkey, and I think to a lesser detail by the representative of Greece—and whatever else one says about it, it is, by a majority of 15 to none, a very clear and unmistakable call to the parties concerned in the area to stop the fighting.

76. It is not a blueprint for a political settlement of the whole issue of Cyprus. It is not an attempt to

apportion blame as between the parties. It is certainly not an attempt to judge which side in the present fighting is behaving in a way which we would all condemn as being uncivilized. What it is is a simple and a clear call. It is saying to the people in Cyprus, "Stop fighting, because if you do not stop fighting there is no opportunity for talks to take place which, hopefully, may bring about a settlement".

77. It does no good for a Government to say that it accepts a resolution unless its acceptance is effective, unless the fighting actually stops. But if a Government says that it accepts resolution 353 (1974) which we adopted last Saturday, or if it says that it will accept the resolution that we have just adopted tonight, and its forces do not stop firing, there is only one of two conclusions available to us: either that Government is not in control of its own armed forces or, alternatively, its acceptance was not an honest one. Neither of those conclusions is one that I think we should lightly come to. But, on the other hand, neither of those conclusions is one we should necessarily shrink from.

78. But all we can say here is that the Security Council, on behalf of the world community, expects those nations most concerned, namely Turkey and Greece, to live up to the obligations which they have assumed under the Charter and to accept this second unanimous call of the Council, for otherwise it would be a display of open and flagrant contempt by those Governments of this the highest organ of the United Nations itself.

79. I do not propose to go into the details of what is happening on the ground in Cyprus. I do not know the details of what is happening on the ground in Cyprus. None of us round this table can know those details. But it does seem that the cease-fire is, to say the least of it, unstable. One of our great difficulties in all these cases is that accurate information of what is actually happening on the ground is almost impossible to obtain. Moreover, such evidence as one gets is usually committed in the sense that it is inevitably given by human beings and is perhaps therefore committed on one side or the other.

80. May I give one example? The letter from the Greek representative which was sent to the President of the Security Council talked today about "heavy shelling" of his Embassy's premises [S/11366]. I have in front of me a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, of which, if you will permit me, Mr. President, I shall read a paragraph to the Council.

81. The representative of Greece described it as "heavy shelling" of the Embassy's premises. The British High Commissioner in Nicosia says: "There was some mortar fire today around the Greek Embassy". He then goes on: "But there was much more here"—that is, at the British High Commission—"with Greeks and Turks fighting a running

battle through the High Commission compound for two hours, leaving one dead behind". Then he concludes, if you will forgive me reading the sentence: "All of this had quite an explosive effect on us".

82. So that the point I am making is that it is extremely difficult to get accurate evidence of precisely what is happening. But it would appear, regrettably, that the cease-fire is not holding as well as we all would have wished. And there is, of course, the great danger, as has been pointed out this evening already, that one side thinks it may be able to continue to fight in the belief that thereby it is improving its possible future negotiating position, and there is some evidence that this may be happening in Cyprus today.

83. May I say one brief word about two other aspects of the matter? In the last two or three days there has been a massive operation in Cyprus to remove foreign nationals from the scene of the immediate fighting. I am happy to tell the Security Council that perhaps 6,000 to 6,500 people—I am afraid I have not got the exact figure—have been removed from out of the immediate danger areas. Over 4,000 of those have already been flown to England and there are among those people the nationals of no less than 36 different nations. We were very happy, too, to be able to respond as rapidly as we did to the appeal made by the Secretary-General yesterday for reinforcements to the UNFICYP contingent. Not only were we happy to respond to it, but it seemed to us then and seems to us now that if a cease-fire takes place in Cyprus, the size and the effectiveness of the UNFICYP contingent is going to be crucial to the future well-being of the island.

84. In conclusion, let me just say this. What may be profound political developments may have taken place today both in Cyprus and in Greece itself. Again, the precise nature and the precise extent and the precise result of those developments cannot yet be known or even clearly foreseen. No doubt we shall see in the next few days how events are going to move. But despite those developments we are very hopeful that talks will take place this week. Yet, if they are to start, let alone if they are to succeed, the firing must stop. It is idle to pretend that negotiations in a situation like this can conceivably have a chance of success while the fighting is still going on. It is therefore right, in our view, that this resolution should have been introduced as an emergency matter even at this late hour—perhaps particularly at this late hour—to the Security Council so that immediate and urgent measures could be taken to ensure that the prerequisite for a successful start and, hopefully, a successful conclusion to those talks could exist. It was right that the Council should make a clear and an unmistakable call, which I hope this time will be heeded.

85. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet

Union's position on the question of the events in Cyprus was set forth in detail in the statements made by the Soviet Government on 18 and 20 July [S/11340 and S/11367], and I need not now go into detail regarding that position, the more so as I have had the opportunity to explain it to the Council at previous meetings. I shall merely recall that in our statements we decisively condemned the organizers of the military *putsch* in Cyprus against the legitimate Government headed by President Makarios. We decisively condemned those who supported and inspired the *putschists*—the military junta in Athens; judging by press reports, one can apparently say—the former military junta in Athens. Unfortunately we have not yet heard any reports from the representative of Greece to the effect that the Greek officers of the National Guard, whose flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus was in fact the original cause of the whole crisis and also of the subsequent tragic developments, have been recalled from Cyprus.

86. We proposed in our statements that the Security Council should take early and decisive measures to put an end to foreign military intervention in the affairs of Cyprus and to secure the withdrawal of foreign military personnel so that the Cypriot people might themselves decide their future. We supported resolution 353 (1974) which contained appropriate provisions. It is true that in order to solve the crisis which has arisen, a cease-fire is necessary. But it is essential not only to have a cease-fire, but also to implement the other very important provisions of resolution 353 (1974).

87. The Soviet delegation voted in favour of the resolution just adopted by the Security Council, regarding it as an important step towards the implementation of the main resolution—resolution 353 (1974)—in all its parts and provisions.

88. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): The representatives of Greece and Cyprus have asked to be allowed to speak and I shall call on them, but I believe that I should recall that there are two successive Security Council resolutions calling for the utmost restraint, and I should like to see that restraint reflected in the debate. On the other hand, I should like to point out that the time indicated by that clock is not "a.m." but "p.m."

89. I call on the representative of Greece.

90. Mr. PANAYOTACOS (Greece): I do not want to make a long speech; I just want to make a few remarks regarding my Turkish colleague's assertion that Turkish invasion ensures a return to constitutionality. I really wonder how this could happen under foreign occupation, reminding one of methods followed in the early nineteenth century by the so-called *Concert européen*. Or could it be through the *de facto*

enlargement of the existing enclaves, which are a *de facto* partition of the island?

91. After Mr. Ecevit's statement that the Turkish presence on the island is now irrevocably established and that so-called constitutionality can be achieved, I would appreciate it if my Turkish colleague could give me an explanation of this point.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

93. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The purpose of my intervention here is, first of all, to express my deep appreciation to the representatives of the United Kingdom and of France for their very relevant and constructive statements in the debate.

94. The purpose of my original intervention was not to level any accusations against Turkey—other than the fact that it has broken the cease-fire. And, in that connexion, we did not hear any explanation from the representative of Turkey, but only a whole myth of cruelties committed—without any proof, without any evidence, with no reference to anything in the reports of the Secretary-General. He just said that the reason for the attacks and the occupation of the territory was the cruelty of the Greek Cypriots, of which there is no proof whatsoever. If that were the reason they came and invaded Cyprus it would have been stated.

95. Before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots were not suffering at all, according to their own admission. They now say that they are suffering, but they are suffering as a consequence of the Turkish invasion. They and their villages have been bombed, as has already been reported, but those details have no importance now.

96. This meeting is concerned with the cease-fire and my intervention was designed to point out how the cease-fire could be made obligatory and effective by merely adding words saying that they have to return the territory which was occupied. That was within the context of this resolution, and not in any sense by way of recrimination.

97. I wish to say, therefore, that I am grateful for the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.

98. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): A few moments ago, in the same spirit of unanimity and also with the same sense of urgency as last Saturday, the Council—with a brevity which I believe is indicative of its determination—reaffirmed resolution 353 (1974). It has addressed another urgent appeal to all parties to the present fighting to comply immediately with paragraph 2 of that resolution calling for an immediate cessation of all firing in the area and requesting all States to exercise the utmost restraint and refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation.

99. The timeliness and urgency of this action has been amply underscored by the Secretary-General's report, which was furnished to us this evening. What we are now concerned with is, however, more than the mere technicalities of resolutions and of a cease-fire between opposing military forces. What we are concerned with equally and above all is the immensity of human suffering which has beset the people of Cyprus—its Greek and its Turkish communities.

100. Every line of the Secretary-General's report speaks of the suffering of innocent people, of bloodshed and of the loss of human life. And throughout the report another spectre looms, much larger and much more dangerous for the future of the island: the spectre of communal strife which has been unleashed by the events of the last week.

101. There can certainly be no peace, no stability and no justice in this most sensitive area of the eastern Mediterranean unless communal strife, the most powerful root-cause of the present crisis, can be eliminated; unless the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus and, to a larger context, the peoples of Greece and Turkey can live and coexist in harmony.

102. This immense task of reconciliation can only be achieved by the Greek and Turkish nations, by the Greek and Turkish communities of the island themselves, and little can be done from the outside to achieve the profound changes in attitudes that are necessary.

103. However, in showing both concern and goodwill, in abstaining from all acts which can disturb and aggravate the situation, an important contribution can be made; and I believe the resolutions the Council adopted on Saturday and tonight are a sign of such goodwill and such deep human concern.

104. We now feel that the time has come when all parties—when all forces opposing each other—should heed the unanimous appeal of the world community acting through the Security Council. There could hardly be a body more representative of world opinion, but also of the world conscience, than this Council, acting unanimously and with such harmony as it did last Saturday and tonight. No doubt the establishment of a cease-fire can only be the first step on the way back to peace and to peaceful constitutional order in the Republic of Cyprus. Resolution 353 (1974) points to the way to be followed, and to the means to be adopted. The next steps are talks which should begin between the parties with the least possible delay, to be followed by implementation of all the other provisions of resolution 353 (1974).

105. The time has now come, no doubt, for peaceful action by all concerned. This action should not and must not be prejudiced by any further acts of violence or any further military action, for whatever motives. The effects of such action can only cloud

the chances of peace and make it more difficult, more unattainable. We are confident that the Governments and the parties concerned will do their utmost to respond to this renewed and urgent appeal of our Council and offer their full co-operation for

the implementation of our resolutions, especially to UNFICYP, to the Secretary-General and to his representatives in Cyprus.

The meeting rose at 11.35 p.m.

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