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#### NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 24 October 1973, at 6 p.m.

*President:* Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1749)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:  
Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010).

*The meeting was called to order at 6.50 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 1743rd meeting, I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to take their places at the Council table in order to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. M. Z. Ismail (Syrian Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with further decisions taken at previous meetings, I propose also, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Nigeria and Saudi Arabia to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. I shall ask them to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber, on the understanding that they will be called upon to take a place at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. E. Ogbu (Nigeria) and Mr. J. Baroody (Saudi Arabia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.*

3. The PRESIDENT: I wish to stress again that only one seat remains available at the Council table for those representatives who have been or may hereafter be invited, at their request, to address the Council. Accordingly, it will be necessary to request representatives who occupy that seat to withdraw from it when they have concluded their statements.

4. When I adjourned our last meeting I said that the Council would remain ready at any time to meet immediately as circumstances might demand.

5. Today I received an oral request from the representative of Egypt for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Council. The representative of Egypt later addressed to me a letter in the following terms:

“Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the continuing violations committed by Israel of the cease-fire decided by the Security Council in its resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October 1973.”

6. The first name inscribed on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Egypt, on whom I now call.

7. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): These are dangerous times in the history of our country and, indeed, in the history of the Security Council. Dangerous times have a way of developing quickly. I must confess that this morning when we asked for the urgent convening of the Council we intended to discuss the breakdown of the cease-fire and Israel's non-compliance with the resolution the Council adopted only recently [*resolution 338 (1973)*]—that is the text sponsored by the United States of America and the USSR. But in the meantime I have contacted Cairo and I think that a better way of describing the reason for my addressing the Council now is to inform it that a new war, a new aggression, has broken out in the Middle East, and at this moment—1 a.m. Cairo time—is going on.

8. On the East Bank of the Suez Canal, in Egyptian Sinai, our forces are being attacked now with laser-guided missiles and American Phantom jet aircraft. At the same time, on the West Bank of the Canal all the sectors are the battlefield of a new treacherous war, prepared and begun under the guise of the cease-fire suggested to this Council by the United States of America and the USSR and adopted by it. To be very precise, that applies to all the sectors except the north—and I hope I am not inviting an attack on the north, because it has perhaps been spared by an oversight.

9. We are fighting back. The people who heard me in the early days of October answering the question on television whether we were sure we were going to win the war and were dismayed because I said, "I don't care if we do", must now remember the reasons I gave for that answer. I said that there comes a time in the life of a nation when it has no option but to fight and sacrifice the cherished blood of its sons and daughters in order that their country can go on living in dignity and freedom, regardless of the outcome. It is not a question of calculation. It is a question of determination that, to repeat, we are going to live on our feet and fight and die on our feet rather than live on our knees.

10. The story of today is long but simple. At 4 o'clock this morning, New York time, it was my unpleasant task to call the Secretary-General at home and to inform him that United Nations observers had not proceeded to their destinations. At 5 o'clock I knew that in fact they had begun moving but they had reported to their headquarters in Cairo that they were being prevented by Israeli forces from reaching their destinations. When we communicated to Cairo that some patrols—seven of them—had taken their places, they replied that only one had reached Ismailia and, with the full co-operation of the Egyptian authorities, had begun its work but the others were prevented by several means, including a direct call from the Minister of War of Israel, advising them not to go because the fighting was going on and there were no cease-fire lines and stating, "What are they going to do if the cease-fire lines are non-existent? They had better wait until the Israeli battle is won and the new cease-fire lines are demarcated." Then they would perhaps be welcome to come and preserve the *status quo* to be. If there were any sense—and there must have been sense—in the draft resolution the United States and the Soviet Union presented to this Council on Sunday, a draft resolution composed of several parts, one calling for a cease-fire on the spot, then what the Council meant and what the authors of the draft resolution meant was that the cease-fire on the spot must be preserved as it was 12 hours after the Council debate ended with the adoption of the resolution—which, as I have said, would be 1252 hours on 22 October 1973. That is what we have accepted in good faith. If that is what this Council, with great courtesy and great confidence, has accepted in good faith, then this is the meaning, and there cannot be any other meaning, of the Council resolution of yesterday [339 (1973)] asking the forces to go back to the places where they were or should have stayed when the cease-fire went into effect according to the Council's resolution at the given hour on 22 October. If the cease-fire and the perhaps candid behaviour of Egypt in accepting it with the confidence it placed in the names of the two States that submitted the draft resolution are to be misused, if this new war is to take place and have its effects before Israel will agree and allow the United Nations observers to go there, these are going to be post-mortem observers who are going to go there to observe aggression staying in its place.

11. Because we still have confidence, we stated again yesterday the double responsibility that emanates from these two resolutions, the responsibility of the authors of the resolutions and the responsibility of the members of the Council which is indeed theirs by virtue of the Charter and

by virtue of the adoption of the resolutions. In regard to the first part, we ask that all members of the Council do their best to make sure that the observers are in their places observing the cease-fire, as it should have been and should be on the lines when the cease-fire took effect on 22 October. This is still our request. As far as the Secretariat is concerned, we know that it has the authority and I am sure it has the will and the determination to send these observers and more, but, since observers cannot really effect the withdrawal of these forces to the places where they were, it is then our request that the two Powers that brought these resolutions to the Council, including the Power that called on the Council to convene to begin with, should really interfere. I alluded to this yesterday. If it was not understood, I say it now loudly and clearly. These two super-Powers have forces in the Mediterranean. I think the reason they give to their taxpayers is that they are there to preserve the peace of the world. Well, the peace of the world is in danger, and we are calling upon them to make good their promise that these resolutions are going to take effect, by helping the observers of the United Nations and the United Nations itself to bring back the forces of the parties to the conflict to where they were at the time when the cease-fire took effect on 22 October 1973. For this purpose our President has addressed letters directly to the President of the United States and to Chairman Brezhnev of the Soviet Union asking them to send forces for this purpose and has instructed me to call the Council into session in order to hear this message. If paragraph 1 of the resolution of 22 October is going to fall to pieces, other paragraphs are going to do so too, and we shall be exactly where we were, still facing the aggression that was and the aggression that is or is trying to be. We shall be facing the aggression of 1967 and its aftermath and also facing this new aggression, these treacherous attacks under the guise of a cease-fire which have been taking place and are taking place now with fresh soldiers and with fresh equipment—and it is no secret to us where this equipment is coming from.

12. As usual, I want to be brief and clear. If we do not know where the forces were when the cease-fire took effect, or should have taken effect, then perhaps some explanation should be given to us about the flight of two United States aircraft over Egypt and Syria several days ago at the speed of Mach-3. They did not come as aggressors. Obviously they came for reconnaissance, and they must have recognized something. I think they can tell the Council where our forces were.

13. There must be some other means of verification also. We are ready to be where we were on 22 October, when the Security Council resolution ordered a cease-fire to take effect so that a new procedure could be undertaken to put an end to the war and to usher in a new era of peace. Without that, there is no hope for peace in the Middle East.

14. If we are asking for forces to intervene, it is because it is obvious that we cannot ask the United Nations observers to defy the military orders of military ministers of war that they should stay where they were or where they are now. If we are asking the United States and the Soviet Union to send forces, it is because they are two permanent members of the Security Council and have a special responsibility.

They have the power of the veto, and with that power the work of all the other members of the Security Council was brought to nought when we tried to arrive at a peaceful solution in June and July of this year.

15. I have just received a message by phone from Cairo stating that the deputy head of the observers group, Colonel Hogan, had told them at 1910 hours New York time that the Israeli side has refused to allow the observers to go to the middle sector of Sinai. The words used were, "No, not for the time being". Colonel Hogan has told our Deputy Minister that he has contacted the Secretary-General and given him that information. Perhaps the Secretary-General will tell us what he knows about this message from Colonel Hogan and any other messages on this matter.

16. To conclude: First, we not only are reporting to the Security Council on the breakdown of the cease-fire and the total breakdown, therefore, of all resolutions on the cease-fire, but are also asking for a salvage operation because we, at least, do not take lightly the reports appearing in the press today that there have been 15,000 casualties in the Middle East so far—I am not giving Egyptian estimates; I am giving American estimates as they appeared in *The New York Times* today. We think that those 15,000 people who have become casualties could have done something better for their countries alive rather than having been doomed to death and murdered by people drunk with power, who think that this is the only politics they can impose and this is the only action that will succeed. It will not. Other power-drunk nations and régimes of the past do not exist today. We therefore hope that the Security Council resolution submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 22 October will be salvaged by those two States themselves or by any other action deemed necessary by the Council.

17. Secondly, what is happening now is a new aggression. I think that with more details the Council will be in a position to judge better what I am alluding to as the aggression of tonight. The battle is taking place in Sinai and on the West Bank of the Suez Canal.

18. Before I conclude, however, I want to state that I am speaking not only of the soldiers, who are willingly giving their lives; I am speaking also about those civilians who are being brutally attacked and chased away from their homes, thus creating new problems which, of course, are welcome to Israel, but which are welcome to us also, because it is on the basis of the way all these problems are dealt with that Egypt will finally be convinced of the possibility or impossibility of having peace in the Middle East today.

19. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the Secretary-General, who wishes to make a statement.

20. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As the Security Council resumes its examination of the situation in the Middle East, I should like to inform the Council briefly of the action which I and General Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, have taken for the implementation of resolution 339 (1973) adopted by the Council yesterday.

21. Since yesterday I have been in constant touch with General Siilasvuo and have followed step by step the efforts he has been making in this connexion. I have also been in contact with representatives of the parties concerned, whose co-operation, as I indicated yesterday in my statement to the Council, is essential for the success of the United Nations observation effort.

22. Immediately upon the adoption of the Security Council resolution, I instructed General Siilasvuo to take urgent action for its implementation. As I informed the Council at the end of its meeting yesterday, General Siilasvuo immediately instructed the Officer-in-Charge of the Ismailia Control Centre to deploy as soon as possible and as a first step, in co-operation with the Egyptian authorities, three observation teams in the Suez Canal area. As the Council may know it is the invariable practice for security and other reasons that UNTSO patrols be accompanied by liaison officers of the army of the country concerned. As soon as the required liaison officers were made available by the Egyptian authorities, the United Nations observer teams composed of seven patrols set off, and as of 1030 hours GMT on 24 October the seven observer patrols were on the move from Cairo toward the estimated Egyptian forward positions. The latest news received from General Siilasvuo is that four patrols had reached locations about 35 kilometres west of Ismailia at 1315 hours GMT today. The other three patrols were in the vicinity of their destinations by 1700 hours GMT, but had to withdraw westward due to the intense exchange of tank and artillery fire between Egyptian and Israel forces which was in progress there.

23. General Siilasvuo has also tried to dispatch observer patrols from Rabah on the east of the Suez Canal. However, in his discussions with the Israeli authorities, they initially stated that United Nations military observers should not proceed to the battle zone before there was an effective cease-fire. In this connexion General Dayan requested General Siilasvuo to convey to the Egyptian authorities a proposal for a cease-fire to commence at 0500 hours GMT on 24 October. This message was immediately passed by General Siilasvuo to the Egyptian authorities in Cairo, who accepted this cease-fire proposal. During the day of 24 October it was not possible to dispatch United Nations observers to the forward positions from the Israel side. However, after I myself and my collaborators at Headquarters had got in touch with the Israel Permanent Representative and with General Siilasvuo in Jerusalem—by telephone, of course—the Permanent Representative of Israel assured me that the Israeli forces would fully co-operate with General Siilasvuo in regard to the deployment of observers.

24. The foregoing is the information we have received so far from General Siilasvuo. To sum up, on the Egyptian side seven patrols have been dispatched towards the forward defence localities. As I have stated, no United Nations observers have been deployed on the Israeli side as yet. Upon being informed of full Israeli co-operation, however, General Siilasvuo is now taking urgent measures to deploy observers on the Israeli side. Of course, every effort will be made by me, General Siilasvuo and the United Nations observers to fulfil the responsibilities conferred upon us.

25. In the present conditions I must again emphasize that in order for the United Nations observers effectively to fulfil their task two conditions are essential: first, the complete acceptance of the cease-fire by the parties and, secondly, full co-operation by them with the United Nations observer operation.

26. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Israel, upon whom I now call.

27. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I am certain that not only I but millions and millions of people around the world who might have been listening to the statement we have just heard from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt were reminded of the Arab proverb: "He struck me, and he wept. He hit me, and then he preceded me and complained."

28. This Council chamber is accustomed to unfounded charges being flung across it by the representatives of Egypt. I should like, before I speak of today's developments, to refer to one particular point which the Foreign Minister of Egypt repeatedly makes in our meetings, and that is the claim that the purpose of Egypt's calling for the convening of the Security Council last summer was to contribute to progress towards peace. Now it is not clear to me why Foreign Minister El-Zayyat should believe that the Council members, or anyone in the world, should accept that allegation when his own President makes nonsense of these claims, just as his Government made nonsense of his false charges in the course of the present debate concerning an invented air raid on Cairo.

29. On 14 June 1973 President Sadat stated in an interview broadcast over the Libyan radio:

"What has been taken by force can be regained only by force. This has been our belief even while taking diplomatic action in the Security Council. This has been our conviction during all stages and at all times. There is no solution for the problem without a battle."

30. A month later, on 16 July 1973, President Sadat declared in an address to the Central Committee of his ruling party, the Arab Socialist Union:

"I would like here to clarify a basic point which I explained to the armed forces when I visited them last June. We most certainly did not go to the Security Council in anticipation of a peaceful solution. There is no peaceful solution."

That statement was made while the Security Council was still meeting, before the vote on any resolution. This was not a retrospective evaluation of what Egypt had sought by initiating the debate: it was a frank, unequivocal admission that Egypt never searched for a peaceful solution at all, and even less so in the Security Council.

31. The Security Council was convened yesterday on Egypt's initiative, while fighting was going on, because the Egyptian military forces had failed to comply with Security Council resolution 338 (1973), kept on firing, and Israel was reacting to the Egyptian attacks. Today the Security

Council has been called into session when, for the first time since 6 October, the fighting has died down and tranquility has prevailed on the front during the last few hours. True, in the course of this morning the Egyptian forces continued to fire, even after 0700 hours local time, the hour set for the cease-fire, and Israeli forces returned the fire, but that has ended. An effort could now be made to ensure that the cease-fire is effective and to put into execution all the arrangements necessary for its supervision. This is the time for quiet, serious contact, and not for a resumption of sterile public polemics.

32. What have been the developments since last night's meeting of the Security Council?

33. First, immediately after the adoption of Security Council resolution 339 (1973), at about 0400 hours local time, General Siilasvuo, Chief of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization contacted Israel's Defence Minister and discussed with him the need for making arrangements for the despatch of United Nations observers to the cease-fire lines. The Defence Minister requested General Siilasvuo to convey to Egypt our proposal that 0700 hours should be fixed as the time for the cease-fire. General Siilasvuo promised to transmit Egypt's reply in about an hour's time. It was also agreed that the Defence Minister and the General would meet in Tel Aviv at 7 o'clock in the morning in order to determine the appropriate arrangements for the deployment of the observers.

34. Secondly, later General Siilasvuo informed the Israeli authorities of Egypt's agreement to stop the fighting at 0700 hours.

35. Thirdly, during the night the Egyptian forces continued to fire on the Israeli forces in various sectors of the front. The Israeli forces returned the fire.

36. Fourthly, the Israeli Army Chief of Staff instructed all Israeli forces along the Suez Canal front to observe a cease-fire as from 0700 hours local time this morning.

37. Fifthly, the meeting between the Defence Minister and General Siilasvuo was held as scheduled, and at 8 o'clock this morning the following communiqué was issued about it:

"Israel's Defence Minister received at his office General Siilasvuo to discuss the arrangements for posting United Nations observers on the Egyptian front. Israel's Defence Minister suggested to General Siilasvuo to dispatch the observers along the various routes leading from Cairo towards Ismailia and Suez until they meet the advance units of the Israeli defence forces at the localities given by Israel's Defence Minister to General Siilasvuo for the placing of observation posts. General Siilasvuo asked for time to study the situation."

38. Sixthly, in the meantime the Egyptian forces continued firing even after 0700 hours this morning. And at 0820 hours the following communiqué was issued by the spokesman of the Israeli defence forces:

"Until a few minutes before 0755 hours local time exchanges of fire were still taking place at several points

along the front line with the Egyptian Third Army which is surrounded at the southern sector."

39. The Egyptian attacks continued and at 1500 hours the Israel defence forces spokesman issued another communiqué which read:

"Contrary to the Egyptian announcement, transmitted by General Siilasvuo, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, according to which Egypt accepted the cease-fire as from 0700 hours this morning and had instructed its forces to act accordingly, Egyptian forces continued their attacks in the area of the Egyptian Third Army, apparently in order to extricate the forces of the Third Army from the encirclement in which they find themselves in the Suez area. Within this context, the Egyptians employed during the past hour massive aerial forces in support of their ground forces. Fifteen Egyptian planes were shot down in dogfights."

40. At 1600 hours Israel filed the following complaint with UNTSO:

"As of 0700 hours local time today, the Egyptian forces are violating the cease-fire in the area of the Suez-Cairo road and south of the Bitter Lakes, employing tanks, artillery and aircraft."

41. Here at United Nations Headquarters, I dispatched a letter to the Secretary-General today.

*[The speaker read out the text of the letter, which was subsequently issued as document S/11043.]*

42. At 1700 hours local time the following communiqué was issued:

"During the afternoon hours, the firing on the Egyptian front, in the Egyptian Third Army sector, has been diminishing. There was no change in the lines and positions in which our forces were located yesterday. General Siilasvuo, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, announced that a number of observer teams were about to leave Cairo along the various routes leading towards the front. However, no contact has yet been established between these teams and our forces at the front line."

43. In the meantime, all firing has stopped. We hope the cease-fire will continue. A special officer has been appointed to maintain liaison with General Siilasvuo regarding the arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire by the United Nations military observers. I am authorized to reiterate that we shall extend our full co-operation to General Siilasvuo. These are the first hours of the effective cease-fire. Let us strengthen it by responsible endeavours and not weaken it by destructive acrimony. Now that the guns have stopped firing, it is time also to stop shouting at each other and begin to talk.

44. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Egypt.

45. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): The time accepted for a cease-fire today, 24 October, New York time, was indeed,

as stated by the Secretary-General, 0500 hours GMT, which is 0700 hours Cairo time. Just before 0600 hours GMT, 0800 hours Cairo time, an attack by tanks, protected by the air force, on the Egyptian port of Adabiah, took place. That attack succeeded, after inflicting the heaviest casualties on the inhabitants and gallant defenders of that port. At the same time, after the same 0500 hours GMT agreed to as the deadline for the cease-fire, a most concentrated attack took place on the town of Suez. I make the point to the representative of Israel that this latter attack has not succeeded. The struggle is still going on. Mr. Dayan's objective has not yet been reached and therefore the cease-fire has not yet taken place. Also, observers have not yet been permitted to go because of the determination of Israel that there be post-mortem cease-fire observers, receiving the full co-operation of Israel to observe that its conquest is safeguarded.

46. I just mentioned that Colonel Hogan had contacted the Secretary-General; perhaps his message has not yet arrived. It was 1910 hours New York time, which would be 0210 hours on 25 October Cairo time. In this message Colonel Hogan has informed the Secretary-General of what I have just told the Council—namely, that the Israeli side has refused permission for the observers to go into the middle sector of Sinai: "No, not for the time being" was the Israeli reply. And this, I repeat, was 1910 hours New York time, which means less than 35 minutes ago.

47. We have been informed by Cairo that a parallel message was sent to the Secretary-General by Colonel Hogan and I would request the Secretary-General to comment on this and also on what I have said—and he certainly will agree with me and sustain this—namely, that Mr. Dayan advised the observers not to proceed while the firing was taking place and to stay "until Israel attains its objective", those are my words.

48. But, speaking about those inhabitants of El-Adabiah, I should perhaps put on record Israel's violations of the laws of war, its deliberate disrespect for the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel's planes raided Port Said for 15 days, killing about 200 civilians. The Governor of the city reported on Monday, 22 October, that 140 planes had taken part in the raids, in which many civilians had been killed. But these are things we expect from aggressors, people who build their policy on violence and apply it by war and invasion.

49. What we want the Security Council to do now is to make people respect its resolutions. What we are asking those who draft resolutions to do is to make their words, and their guarantees indeed, felt. What we are asking is that the cease-fire which has been ordered by this Council be respected as of the time it was ordered and took effect and not only after Israel's designs have been carried out and after it has used the cease-fire for these treacherous attacks.

50. I repeat, we should like to see these cease-fire resolutions respected. We should like to see them opening the door for a just peace. We hope all the Powers in the Council, in accordance with their responsibilities, will make it possible for the Council to see that its resolutions are respected.

51. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): I shall not go into the details of this question, which has been very well sketched out by Foreign Minister El-Zayyat. But I should like to draw the attention of the Council to certain attitudes of Israel and certain ways it does things which are quite indicative of what is happening today.
52. We are all aware that the Israeli policy has for the last seven years been based on the creation of facts. We know that it has been happening in the occupied territories. We even know it now, because all these attempts at breaches of the cease-fire and at new aggressions are part and parcel of this policy of creating facts and facing the Security Council and the rest of the world with faits accomplis.
53. Another thing which we know about Israel is its pattern of breaking cease-fires in order to create new cease-fires; and after creating these cease-fires, they create a continuous occupation. This the Council is very familiar with. They did it in 1969. Repeatedly they have broken cease-fires called for by this Council, and the Council has had to look into it.
54. But, more than this, Israel, and especially the Zionist policy, is based essentially on militarism. They are born into kibbutzes, which are military camps, oriented militarily, and they are brought up to hate everything else. And for that reason they are made to fight.
55. I was shocked the other day to read in the newspaper a statement by a prominent officer of Israel that the aim is to continue this war despite the cease-fire in order to kill the young non-commissioned officers of Egypt so that in future they will not be able to fight again. "To kill the young, all the young": that is the aim, even after a cease-fire. This is really a shocking attitude; but it is all part and parcel of a child brought up in a military camp, taught, oriented to hate and to kill because of hatred. And, as we all know, the whole policy of the Israeli Government is oriented towards fighting, militarism, occupation, and possession of lands of other people. There are so many things which we have noticed during the last 25 years, but I leave it to Ambassador Baroodi to tell you the rest of the story.
56. I think today we are very much concerned about the application of these attitudes. This Council two days ago adopted a draft resolution, submitted by two permanent members, on a cease-fire and the immediate implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and the starting of negotiations leading to a lasting and just peace. This Council has expressed a lot of apprehensions about all this. But with full confidence in the two permanent members which had submitted this draft resolution the Council accepted it. Even the very important details were not discussed on the assumption that those two countries must have worked out between them and between the conflicting parties certain measures which would assure us in this Council that peace was going to come to the Middle East.
57. Well, the facts which we see today do not bear that out. We know that arms are still being airlifted to Israel. And according to certain versions—I do not know if they are true—they go even as far as the Egyptian Sinai, into El Arish, so that they can feed these people on the West Bank. I hope that this is a wrong journalistic version. But the whole point is that we are entitled to suspect, and indeed to be apprehensive, regarding whether there is really a genuine attempt on the part of the two Powers who submitted this resolution in order to arrive at the implementation of resolution 338 (1973) in its totality. We did not even ask about the details but took it at its face value and in complete confidence. We are still waiting for this resolution to be implemented.
58. Right from the beginning when we were discussing resolution 338 (1973) there were enough reasons to make us very suspicious and very apprehensive by certain clear indications which have been expressed by Mr. Tekoah himself in the form of certain reservations. Those are well known. He mentioned Bab el Mandab and Yemen. He mentioned the guerrilla fighters in Lebanon. He mentioned other things and, of course, these are all pretexts and preparations for doing what is being done today. We even noticed that in the statement of the representative of the United States yesterday in saying that we agreed to the cease-fire taking effect 12 hours after the adoption of resolution 338 (1973) but we do this on principle. I am not so sure. I hope I will be able to check these things. But at the same time it was mentioned by him that the lines where the armies stand 12 hours after the first resolution are not known. I should not like to draw any conclusions, but it is obvious.
59. Apart from these apprehensions, we come to the facts of the matter. The second day after this Council decided on an immediate cease-fire on the terms mentioned in the resolution, that cease-fire was broken by Israel. Again the next day Israel committed its aggression on Port El-Adabiah on the western side of the Canal and on the town of Suez in Egypt. It is always easy, for instance, to come and say, "well, we didn't know; Egypt started it" and so on. But who would say that Moshe Dayan did not stop the observers from going into the place and ascertaining by themselves where the cease-fire ought to have been on the day after our adoption of the resolution. Again, that is the pretext and it is very obvious. We shall not be surprised if tomorrow and the day after tomorrow we come to discuss similar events to this on the part of Israel. That leads me to the whole question: how far is this Council serious about really implementing resolution 338 (1973)? That resolution is not just a question of putting in additional observers—though that is important—or sending somebody specially to ascertain the situation on the ground—which is also important—but more important and in order to avoid these repeated aggressions by Israel, and in order to ensure that this resolution will be implemented, the whole thing has to be looked into again in its totality. But in doing that we cannot absolve the two sponsoring Powers of their duty, indeed the whole Council—and in particular the permanent members—of its duty to give effect to these resolutions. We know that they have the power and the ways to do it. But at least we would like to be assured of their good faith to do so. The Council could go further than this by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, but that is unnecessary for the time being. My delegation thinks that it is very important right now to condemn Israel for its latest aggression which took place yesterday and considers that this Council should immediately and seriously consider the implementation of resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

60. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): When barely two days ago we were adopting resolution 338 (1973), the general understanding among us was that the Council decision rested on the essential premise that two things would immediately take place: first, an immediate cease-fire in place; and secondly, immediately after the cease-fire, the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). At the same time the two sponsors of the text of resolution 338 (1973), the Soviet Union and the United States, in their statements underlined that the basic goal of their action was to open a way for "establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East" and they underlined the wider dangers of a prolonged war. The representative of the United States, in his statement on 21 October, said "And for our part, both the United States and the Soviet Union are ready to make our joint good offices available to the parties as a means to facilitate the negotiating process." [1747th meeting, para. 9.]

61. Since the negotiating process was linked with the immediate start of the implementation of resolution 242 (1967), and that in turn was linked to the immediate cease-fire in place, we can legitimately ask ourselves now, where are those good offices? What was meant by so clearly envisaging them? It was indeed legitimate to assume, as was generally assumed by this Council and by the world at large, that the cease-fire will indeed be made to hold. Instead, we are now faced with a situation in which Israel has been violating the cease-fire for two long days and in fact is continuing to conduct large-scale military operations on the territories of Egypt, which is in reality a new aggressive war against Egypt.

62. The next stage was the adoption at the preceding meeting of resolution 339 (1973) by which the Council established the necessary machinery to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between Egyptian and Israeli forces under the condition of their return to the positions held at the moment the cease-fire was to have taken place in conformity with resolution 338 (1973). But, that was not to be. We are back where we were yesterday before the adoption of resolution 339 (1973) because Israel continues brazenly to flout the directives of the Council. The Foreign Minister of Egypt has just given us new evidence of Israel's refusal to stop violating the cease-fire. We recognize, as we said in our statement yesterday, the repetition of Israel's tactics to utilize the other side's willingness to respect the solemn calls and decisions of the Council and to respond to the expectations and the hopes of the whole world in agreeing to the cessation of all firing, while they proceed with their military activities, the military activities by Israeli armed forces which have as their only goal, that of gaining military advantages by the continuation of fighting to maintain its continuous aggression, military pressures, its policy of trying to impose its will on other peoples by its military *diktat*: all that with the known aim of spreading its hold over other people's territories through occupation and annexation. It would be only ironic if it were not tragic that, at precisely the moment when through the establishment of the cease-fire a way was to be opened for peaceful settlement, Israel is permitted to continue its policies of occupation, which are the only cause of the war that is taking place after both Egypt and Syria had decided—and most formally advised this Council—to observe Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

63. By undertaking their initiative in submitting the two joint resolutions and having them adopted by this Council, the two permanent members of the Security Council, the United States and the USSR, have assumed a clear responsibility that they would act to ensure implementation of the resolutions. We have quoted the statement on their making their joint good offices available. It is known that after this visit to Moscow, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, went to Tel Aviv to secure, as we were told, Israel's observance of what was indicated as agreed. In the communiqué from the presidency of Egypt, stating President Sadat's views and decision to accept resolution 338 (1973), it is clearly stated *inter alia* that:

"President Sadat has also studied carefully the proceedings of the debate which took place in the Security Council and noted the following: that the draft resolution tabled before the Council was submitted by both the USSR and the USA, following intensive contacts at the highest level between the two Powers assuming special responsibility in the present international situation."

64. In the context of all this, the representative of Israel stated here, as did his Government in Tel Aviv, that they too have accepted resolution 338 (1973), but Israel violates this resolution freely in practice.

65. No one is prepared to believe the proposition that the United States is unable to persuade Israel to observe what Israel itself said it would observe, knowing the extent to which it is dependent on United States supplies. Consequently, one has to ask oneself what was the objective, the purpose of the two resolutions we have adopted and, once we have adopted them, what is really being achieved through those two resolutions? It must be clear to everybody, and to the sponsors as well, that the cease-fire will not take hold and the resolutions will not be implemented while Israel is waging a further aggressive war. Yet somehow Israel was and is able to treat those resolutions as scraps of paper. One wonders why. One wonders how. We have to put a stop to this state of affairs. We have to make Israel comply immediately with the provisions of the two resolutions and the two sponsors—two permanent members of the Council—have a special duty and a special obligation to do their share. We, this Council, the world, want them to tell us what they are doing in this direction.

66. But in insisting on underlining the special, grave and willingly assumed responsibilities of the two sponsors which fell within the framework of the United Nations through their coming to the Council and acting partly through the Council by proposing their resolution, in stressing their special share of the collective responsibility we in no way concede that it is the duty or the right of the two great Powers, or of anyone else, unilaterally and alone to manage, control and settle international problems. All international problems always remain the collective concern of the whole international community, of the United Nations, and they can be solved in a just and lasting way only through the collective action of the collective membership of the world Organization.

67. It is, among other things, for that reason that the Yugoslav delegation shares the conviction of so many

around this table that the term "appropriate auspices" mentioned in resolution 338 (1973) should and must mean the Security Council—that those auspices must be the concern, the duty and the task of the United Nations as a whole. That is why we particularly welcomed the fact that resolution 339 (1973) filled a glaring gap which existed in resolution 338 (1973) in this respect.

68. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries warned the world against possible risk, against the danger of the affairs of the world being monopolized by a select group of countries and Powers. But at the same time we are insisting on the duty of the permanent members of the Council to discharge their particular responsibilities, especially the responsibilities of those who, by their heavy involvement in the area, have made themselves directly involved as major factors and who have, by their solemn initiatives in this Council, manifested their intention to play their part in obtaining the results wanted by all of us, and all of us are ready to contribute our share.

69. The cease-fire being only the first step linked to immediate measures for the settlement of the Middle Eastern crisis, we have to concentrate on obtaining it first, and now. If the two sponsors are not willing or able, jointly or separately, to come forward with any further concrete specific proposals, then it is the collective duty of the Security Council, of every one of its members, to do their best to find appropriate means and instrumentalities to cope with the situation created by Israel's constant refusal to respect resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). We can perhaps reinforce yesterday's decision by deciding that the number of United Nations observers should be increased, or that the Secretary-General should send his representative into the field to see the situation on the ground and advise us immediately of necessary measures to be taken to put observers in place to observe the cease-fire. We can perhaps consider the possibility of sending United Nations emergency forces to place themselves in the area in such a way as to assure the implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). We know that the Secretary-General was informed long ago that some Member States have standby forces which, by the decision of the Security Council, can immediately be used as United Nations emergency forces.

70. In a word, the Security Council should not and must not abdicate in this grave situation, and we all have to combine our wisdom and determination to find the best way for the Council to discharge its responsibilities.

71. If we do not take the action required, if Israeli aggression is not stopped, if Israel is not made to respect and observe our decision now, we shall not only be unable to secure any cease-fire in the area, but the war will be permitted to continue and spread wider, with most ominous negative and unforeseeable consequences for international relations and world peace and security.

72. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Security Council is convened again today in emergency session in connexion with the continuing flagrant violation by Israel of the decisions

of the Security Council concerning the cease-fire and the termination of military activity.

73. We have listened carefully to the statement of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. El-Zayyat, who has adduced incontrovertible evidence of new aggression by Israel against Egypt. This evidence cannot but provoke the members of the Security Council to indignation, displeasure and vigorous condemnation of Israel as the aggressor. The Council is again witnessing the fact that Israel, hiding behind the base falsehood that it allegedly accepts the decisions of the Council concerning the cease-fire, is in fact perfidiously continuing military activity, using all types of troops and seizing parts of Egyptian territory after the Council has adopted resolutions concerning the cease-fire and the termination of all military activity. These aggressive actions by the Government of Israel demonstrate brazen disdain for the decisions of the Council and defiance of all the Members of the United Nations and of the world at large. The entire responsibility for this rests with the war criminals of Tel Aviv. The troika of Tel Aviv hawks—Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defence Dayan and Minister for Foreign Affairs Eban—bear direct responsibility for all these criminal and internationally punishable acts. There are international precedents for this.

74. Israel's violation of the Council resolutions concerning the cease-fire are—as is now quite obvious to all—not an accident, not a miscalculation, mistake or misunderstanding. On the contrary, it is a carefully thought out, criminally perfidious imperialist provocation specially planned in order to exploit the cease-fire and take over new positions strategically advantageous to Israeli imperialism in the Middle East and to establish a decisive preponderance of forces in the region in favour of the aggressor.

75. The fact that the Security Council must meet in what is virtually continuous emergency session and day after day adopt decisions on one and the same issue, coming back time and again to repeat its demands for the immediate termination of military activity by Israel, can be explained only by the depth of the cynicism and irresponsibility of an aggressor who is thoughtlessly playing with the fate of the peoples of the Middle East, including the fate of the Israeli people. In recent days, even after the adoption of a decision by the Council concerning the immediate cessation of all firing and the termination of military activity in the Middle East, the Israeli militarists—despite Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), adopted on 22 and 23 October and with the eyes of the whole world upon them—are underhandedly and perfidiously continuing their armed incursion into Egyptian territory, are bombing peaceful communities and are raining napalm on the territory of Arab countries.

76. We must ask whether the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole are going to countenance this cynical affront, this unprecedented international banditry? How long will this flagrant perfidy and flouting of the decisions of the Council continue? During the Second World War the Fascist aggressors pursued aggressive policies and practices and engaged in perfidy and criminal banditry of this very ilk, flouting the fundamental and generally

recognized rules of international law and the generally accepted norms of international conduct.

77. The Soviet Government and the entire Soviet people indignantly protest against the brigandage of the Israeli militarists in the Middle East and the perfidy of the Government in Tel Aviv and demand that Israel immediately cease firing and terminate all military activity against the Arab States, and withdraw its troops to the cease-fire lines of 22 October, in accordance with the two Council resolutions.

78. In view of Israel's continued aggression against the Arab States, the Soviet Government has warned Tel Aviv of the full gravity of its responsibility and the very dire consequences which its aggression and its violation of the Security Council's decisions will entail. The Soviet delegation calls on the Council to take firm and immediate action to ensure Israel's compliance with the resolutions adopted by it. We urgently appeal to the members of the Council, including those permanent members which by virtue of the special obligation placed upon them by the Charter to maintain peace and which by virtue of their special influence with Israel are able to make a significant contribution towards a settlement in the Middle East, to discharge their duty in a full responsible manner at this critical moment in the history of the countries of the Middle East.

79. By acting as a sponsor of the draft resolutions concerning the cease-fire and the settlement of the situation in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967), the United States of America has assumed a great international responsibility and the obligation to guarantee Israel's compliance with these resolutions.

80. The representative of Yugoslavia made reference in the Security Council to the visit by Mr. Kissinger to Tel Aviv. The United States cannot fail to realize that many things are now being put to the test in the Middle East. The stakes are high. The honour and dignity of the United States and international trust in it and in the new United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, are now being subjected to searching scrutiny.

81. We hope—and we insist on this point—that the United States will use every means at its disposal and will bring its weight to bear in order to check the adventurists in Tel Aviv, secure compliance with the Security Council resolutions and make real progress towards establishing a just peace in the Middle East.

82. No reasonable man in today's world will believe that the United States of America is powerless in this matter.

83. The Soviet delegation considers it essential to emphasize that the Security Council decision concerning the cease-fire and the termination of military activity is only a first step, only the minimum that it has been possible to achieve for ending the bloodshed, restraining aggression, averting any further dangerous deterioration in the situation and preventing the spread of a military conflict which represents a serious threat to the cause of peace that is not confined to the Middle East.

84. In view of the most recent developments and the stage which the situation has now reached, the Soviet delegation feels that the time has already passed when the Council must content itself with adopting a decision on the cease-fire. It is no longer sufficient just to repeat or reaffirm resolutions that have already been adopted.

85. Firm steps must be taken to put an end to the aggression and curb the Israeli bandits. The Security Council is obliged to discharge its clear duty under the Charter and compel the unbridled aggressor to respect the decisions of the Council, the Charter of the United Nations and the will of the international community of States.

86. The only possible way of rectifying the situation and directing the course of events in that region towards a peaceful settlement lies in compelling Israel to comply with the decisions of the Security Council at once. And the United States, as a permanent member of the Council and a sponsor of the two resolutions, should and must play a decisive role in this.

87. The delegation of the Soviet Union has carefully listened to the appeal by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt to the United States and the Soviet Union for the urgent adoption of measures—including even the dispatch of their own military contingents—necessary to ensure the implementation of the Security Council resolution concerning the cease-fire.

88. In answer to this, I am empowered to say that in the light of the fact that Israel is brazenly disregarding the Security Council's decision, this appeal and the measure proposed by Egypt are fully warranted and are in accord with the Charter and the recent decisions of the Council.

89. The Soviet delegation further believes that in the present situation the Security Council should consider the possibility of applying the provisions of Charter VII of the Charter and, on the basis of the provisions of that Charter, should adopt appropriate strict sanctions against Israel.

90. The Soviet delegation considers that the time has come also for the Council to adopt a decision calling upon or appealing to all States Members of the United Nations to sever diplomatic relations and all other ties with Israel on the grounds that it is an aggressor State which constantly violates the decisions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations as a whole.

91. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the United Nations observers. I should like to inform the Council that, on instructions of my Government, I duly notified the Secretary-General early this morning that, on the basis of information received from Cairo, the Security Council decision concerning the immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observances of the cease-fire between the Egyptian and Israeli armed forces was not being carried out.

92. As of 24 October, at 0900 hours GMT, there was not a single observer in the cease-fire area, and it was reported that the headquarters of the United Nations observers in Jerusalem "does not show any signs of life".

93. Such a state of affairs—such inaction and inertia—in the implementation of the Security Council's decisions concerning the immediate dispatch of observers to the cease-fire line is intolerable.

94. On instructions of the Soviet Government, I appealed to the Secretary-General for the adoption of urgent measures. He told me that he had spent a sleepless night working on this matter throughout the night in response to an appeal received directly from Cairo and another from the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. El-Zayyat, in New York.

95. Action was taken, but the situation remains very complex, delicate and tense.

96. We see from today's discussion that Israel is disregarding the decision of the Security Council concerning the dispatch of United Nations observers to the cease-fire line. It is not allowing United Nations observers on its side of the line. This is a most flagrant violation of the Council's decision. And no cynical statements by the representative of Israel larded with references to Arab proverbs can cover up this flagrant violation by Israel of the Security Council's decision both with regard to the cease-fire and with regard to the refusal to let the United Nations observers go to the cease-fire line.

97. We would point out to the Israeli representative that this is a serious matter, a matter of war and peace—and not only in the Middle East. And yet he is trying to cover up the felonious policies of his Government by quoting Arab proverbs. This shows that he has no serious and convincing arguments.

98. He is trying to lead the Council astray and divert its attention.

99. Inasmuch as the question of the United Nations observers has arisen, I have inquired into the matter of the composition of the observer staff. In our opinion, the Security Council should know the composition of the United Nations observer staff.

100. Having carefully studied the official data of the United Nations Secretariat concerning the members of the United Nations observer staff already in the Middle East, we cannot help but point out that they include only representatives of the Western States. With all due respect to the experience of their officers, their training and their ability to carry out an international mission, I nevertheless cannot agree with the one-sided selection of the United Nations observers by the Secretariat of the United Nations. They were, of course, recruited long before Mr. Waldheim became Secretary-General. However, the fact remains that the practice of such one-sided recruitment has been going on for a long time.

101. Let us review the facts in this matter. Of the 212 United Nations observers who are in the Middle East, more than half are the citizens of countries which belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to other Western military alliances. This is a matter for regret and reflection. They include citizens of the United States, Canada, the

Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France, Norway, Denmark, and a few representatives of other military alliances, such as Australia and New Zealand. The rest are also from various Western countries. There are no citizens of any of the non-aligned countries or of the socialist countries among the United Nations observers. That is the situation which I bring to the notice of the members of the Council.

102. I think the Security Council would be justified in focusing its attention on this. People say that times have changed. Indeed, they have. The aforementioned composition of the observer staff was probably selected when the United Nations had only 51 Member States. Subsequently, however, another 70 to 80 were added, and now there are 135. We are constantly fighting for equitable geographical representation in the staff of the Secretariat where, as we all know very well, representatives of Western countries predominate. It is difficult for a representative of a socialist country to make his way into the staff of the Secretariat. Thus, if we are truly to follow the Charter, we shall have to give some thought to equitable geographical distribution in the matter of observers. If it becomes necessary to increase the number of United Nations observers in the Middle East, I believe that the socialist countries and the countries of the third world, or the non-aligned countries as they are called, will find a sufficient number of experienced, well-trained, literate and competent persons among their citizens capable of carrying out this important international mission, including officers with military training.

103. I would put this proposal before the members of the Council and would request those who are responsible for selecting the members of the observer staff to take these comments into consideration and to put into practical effect, at long last, the principle of the Charter concerning equitable geographical distribution.

104. The PRESIDENT: I now call on the representative of Israel.

105. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I asked to speak in order to exercise briefly my right of reply to an allegation made by the Foreign Minister of Egypt. The statement of the speaker who preceded me compels me, however, to refer first of all to what he said.

106. I should like to put on record first that I was inscribed on the list before the representative of the Soviet Union. I should like to put on record that according to rule 27 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council:

“The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.”

107. However, the Soviet representative, faithful to what he holds as principles of equality and democracy and freedom of speech, pressured, warned and threatened, and finally got what he wanted—to speak before me, to prevent me from expressing my views at the time when I was to do so.

108. What was his contribution to this debate? The usual one—nothing but diatribe, nothing but malice and venom,

nothing but slander and abuse, nothing but distortion and falsity. That is not new in the behaviour of the representative of the Soviet Union. It was only a fortnight ago that it was he who, on the basis of a completely false report alleging the death of a number of Soviet diplomats in the Soviet Embassy in Damascus, created in this Council an atmosphere which was described by international media of information as an atmosphere of a lynch mob.

109. He has repeated it again today, because, on the basis of transparent falsifications and completely unfounded allegations, he has heaped once again calumny, hatred and fanatical hostility on a State Member of the United Nations and on its people, the Jewish people, simply because the Foreign Minister of Egypt found it appropriate to come before the Security Council and invent a lie about the situation in the area. Simply because he claimed that a new war has broken out in the last few hours, the representative of the Soviet Union launched another of his aggressive attacks against the fundamental rights of a small people, an attack against truth, an attack against the Jewish people's right to live at peace, free from the threat of force, in equality with other nations.

110. I have here a heap of telegrams dispatched from Cairo by international news agencies sent out only a few minutes ago speaking of continuing quiet, as I reported, during the entire afternoon and evening and night of today. Yet a false allegation, completely unsubstantiated, was sufficient for the representative of the Soviet Union to come out once again with his customary assault, a completely unfounded falsehood, regarding the arrangements concerning the deployment of United Nations military observers to the front lines. A falsehood which found no confirmation in the statement we heard from the Secretary-General, was sufficient for him to demand steps which he failed to demand, and which he failed even to consider, when Egypt and Syria renewed their aggression against Israel on Judaism's holiest of days, Yom Kippur, on 6 October. There was no need for any action or even thought of action, not to speak of words calling for action, at that time. It was the representative of the Soviet Union who, in this very chamber at the first meeting of the Security Council called on 8 October to discuss Egypt's and Syria's aggression, suggested that the Council had no business to meet, that there was no reason to examine the situation at that time. When Soviet Frog missiles were falling on Israeli villages and towns, there was no need for any meeting, not to speak of any action on the part of the Security Council. When murderous Katyushas were being aimed at innocent Israeli civilians by Arab terrorists, there was no word of concern or of grief, no suggestion that this Organization should even take any interest in the situation.

111. When Soviet guns, Soviet tanks and Soviet planes made it possible for Egypt and Syria to choose bloodshed instead of peace, to shoot rather than talk, there was not the slightest thought on the part of the representative who preceded me that something should be done about the situation, that perhaps talking is better than shooting, that perhaps peace is better than war, that perhaps understanding is better than blood lust. It is only now, in the last few days, when Israel has once again—for which time in its

history of independence: the fourth, fifth, sixth? — succeeded in repelling the attack on its very existence; only now, when the people of Israel can once again breathe with a little more security and ease, that the representative of the Soviet Union rushes to the Security Council to invoke all the possible measures and all the possible Articles of the Charter—the very same Articles which his Government, his State, has been violating for years and years. Who is it that preaches to us and to world public opinion about aggression? The conqueror, the violator of the rights of small nations in Europe. Who is it that comes to give us counsel on international law, on respect for the Charter of the United Nations, on observance of United Nations resolutions? The representative of a Government whose Foreign Minister once said about United Nations resolutions: "They are only scraps of paper."; the representative of a Government which has used its veto power more than 120 times in order to prevent the adoption of resolutions in the Security Council that would have contributed to international peace and security; the representative of a Government which has continuously, for years, ignored scores and scores of resolutions of the General Assembly.

112. Is it surprising then, that when the world, and indeed Member States, find themselves facing a spectacle of the kind that we were confronted with a while ago, all the enlightened world looks upon what is being said here, especially by that representative and those who support his views, with, shall we say, a measure of scepticism, if not of condescension?

113. If the statement which we have just listened to, a statement that was made in violation of the rules of procedure, a statement that was insisted upon in flagrant breach of the fundamental principles of the equality of States Members of the United Nations, did contribute anything at all, it was that it showed the true face of the speaker, of his Government, of his Government's policies; the true face, not the mask of peace, not the mask of détente, but the mask of hatred, of malice, of resort to falsehood, of support for aggression; the true face of a Government which followed such policies and actions during the last few decades that had it not done so there would by now been peace in the area and not war; the true face of a Government which made possible the very aggression of 6 October by Egypt and Syria, now under discussion in the Security Council.

114. As I pointed out earlier, the Security Council is accustomed to hearing baseless charges made by Egyptian representatives. But human lives and consideration for humanity are far too dear to be treated as mere propaganda gimmicks. That is why I should like to refer to what we heard from Egypt's Foreign Minister regarding the Geneva Convention. We have heard it here and we have heard it in various Committees of the General Assembly.

115. I should like to put on record the following letter which, on the instructions of my Government, I addressed today to the Secretary-General; a letter which shows in its true light the attitude of the Governments which decided to try again, on 6 October, to deprive Israel of its right to exist as a sovereign State, to deny the Jewish people its right to

life, to freedom, to equality with all nations. The letter reads as follows:

*[The speaker read out the text of the letter, which was subsequently circulated as document S/11042.]*

116. The PRESIDENT: I think I should say to the representative of Israel, for the record, that I allowed the representative of the Soviet Union to take the floor ahead of him because my attention has been drawn to statements made by former Presidents of the Council which lead me to the view that it has been the generally recognized practice in the Council to accord to Council members priority in speaking, if they wish to exercise it, over representatives not members of the Council who have asked to participate in discussions.

117. The next speaker inscribed on the list is the representative of Egypt, on whom I now call.

118. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Charged with carrying out these delaying tactics so as to protect as long as possible the ongoing aggression by the military masters of Israel, its representatives here indeed breathe easily, engaging in insults—which it is my privilege to share with this Council—such as telling the Council to its face that it has further debased itself.

119. I am not going to reply to those insults. I do not want to debase myself.

120. The representative of Israel dares speak about renewed aggression on Yom Kippur, the Day of Repentance. What a joke in a name. For if they were really repenting aggression, they should speak about their own aggression. How dare they, how dare anyone, use the word "aggression" to describe Egyptians fighting for Egypt's land on Egyptian territory, or Syrians fighting for Syria's land on Syrian territory? But I have not asked for the floor to say that.

121. I am not going to speak about the invincible Israel, or the small Israel, or the small invincible Israel—or whatever it is. This is a State with an army in occupation of our territories; it has usurped the rights of all Palestinian and Arab peoples. I want to put this brief question and I want an answer to it. If indeed there is no breaching of the cease-fire, can the Israeli representative tell the Council here that his Government is ready to go back to the lines where its forces were at the time at which the cease-fire took effect, 12 hours after the adoption of the first resolution of the Council? If he can make that commitment before the Council, I would like it to be heard and registered. If not, this is really an admission that they are indeed in an action geared to try, through aggression, to get as much territory as possible before it is their pleasure to cease fire.

122. I repeat again that it is our intention, still in good faith, to abide by the Council's two resolutions on the cease-fire. They are important, historical resolutions, especially the first one. They engage the responsibility of those in whose hands the attainment of peace in the area really lies. We are addressing them. We are not addressing their clients.

123. We are asking the United States of America to tell us if there was really no intention on the part of the Israeli forces to abide by the cease-fire of this Council 12 hours after the resolution was adopted. Can they and the Israelis engage themselves, commit themselves to ensure that the Israelis will abide by the resolutions and withdraw to their lines? That is my question.

124. As for the innocent civilians and the human aspects, I would like to say to the leaders of Israel that some time they will have to tell the people of Israel how many people were killed in this war, by their orders. When that number exceeds the thousands, then they can see the blood on their hands.

125. Mrs. Jeanne Martin Cisse (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Earlier, when I asked to speak, I had the intention of requesting, on behalf of the representatives of the non-aligned members of the Security Council and in accordance with rule 33, a suspension of the meeting. However, I was later informed that the representatives of the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia insisted on speaking. That being the case, I shall not press the motion for suspension that I was going to propose.

126. I would ask that, after those two representatives have spoken, the meeting be suspended for one hour to allow the non-aligned nations to hold consultations.

127. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Saudi Arabia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table.

128. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union on a point of order.

129. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I had asked to speak on a point of order; however, in view of the request made by our colleague, Mrs. Cissé, I shall with all due respect accede to her gracious request. I had intended to reply to some points raised by the representative of Israel, who as usual has been resorting to the tactic of diverting the attention of the Council from the essence of the question at hand, but I shall yield the floor and refrain from speaking to give an opportunity and more time to the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council in order to permit immediate consultations on the matter which has prompted their request for time to confer among themselves.

130. I would also ask my old friend Ambassador Baroodi to follow my example so that the members of the Council on behalf of whom Mrs. Cissé has spoken may have an opportunity to consider the question that they wish to discuss. Let us postpone our statements to the next meeting.

131. The PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the representative of the Soviet Union has suggested that the representative of Guinea might proceed to make her motion for a suspension of the meeting for one hour to enable consultations to take place. Does the representative of Guinea wish to do that?

132. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I would be extremely happy if the representative of Saudi Arabia would be good enough to comply with the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union, namely, to follow his example. These are very grave times and the members of the non-aligned countries would like to contribute concretely to the work of the Council. It is for this reason that I appeal to the representative of Saudi Arabia to be good enough to agree to this suspension that we ask for. It is a pressing appeal that I am addressing to him.

133. The PRESIDENT: May I ask the representative of Saudi Arabia if he is prepared to respond to the appeal addressed to him by the representative of Guinea?

134. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): May I through you, Sir, address the representative of Guinea in regard to her appeal for a suspension of one hour?

135. The PRESIDENT: I am inviting the representative of Saudi Arabia to do just that.

136. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I appeal to the representative of Guinea to give me 20 minutes before the suspension because, after all, I am not going to be consulted—and I am a party to this struggle. From the beginning nobody has consulted me. So please let me proceed; it will not be long. Every time I want to speak, somebody or other asks me to postpone my speech. That is not fair. Now, if she wants to make a motion, I will see—but I will know how to act in the future. I will not yield to anybody anymore. They come to me to yield my place. For years I have done so. I have never asked anybody to yield. So does she insist?

137. Ambassador Malik, I want to tell you, my dear friend, do not feel nervous about what I am going to say; maybe something will come out of it. It will spare you a lot of trouble.

138. Well, may I speak? It is in the hands of the members of the Council. Do you insist on the suspension? I did not sleep much last night; it does not matter; I do not sleep much. But it is important that I, as the representative of a sovereign State who has been invited to participate in the debate, be accorded this courtesy. I have been accorded a lot of discourtesies, I must say, and I have swallowed them—after all, people err.

139. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I am sorry that the representative of Saudi Arabia is taking this attitude regarding my appeal because a little while ago I was very careful to consult him. I could have omitted consulting him since my name was on the list before his. Only I did have the courtesy to consult him and to tell him that I was going to ask for a suspension of the meeting. I employed courtesy to show him my good faith. I do not insist. If the members of the Council are ready to hear the representative of Saudi Arabia, I shall not press my motion for suspension.

140. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

141. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I thank my colleague from Guinea for having graciously allowed me to speak because had it not been for her generosity I would have had to wait, not for an hour but maybe until midnight. I know what an hour for consultations in the Council means; sometimes it stretches to two hours and then they say, "We are tired, let us have another meeting tomorrow." Thank you, Madam.

142. What a waste of time and effort to address ourselves repeatedly to resolutions and texts that are subject to multifarious interpretations.

143. The essence of war is action. Bullets and bombs are the language of war. In any conflict peace cannot be achieved by resorting to oratory and rhetoric. Peace, like war, demands action. Like most of the members of the Council I am a layman in military matters. I am totally ignorant of how cease-fire lines are established. Peace cries for action. In such a conflict only the super-Powers can initiate genuine action for peace.

144. Objectively speaking, suppose the two parties to the conflict observed the cease-fire in letter and spirit. What would happen next? Negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. What a waste of effort when such negotiations are embarked upon. Why should we go to ancient history? The unjust partition of Palestine 26 years ago has been at the root of the whole trouble. Both super-Powers made a great mistake in supporting the partition of Palestine and recognizing the State of Israel. Surely the super-Powers are human and err like anybody else. We have repeatedly warned the Council that there will be no peace so long as Israel is a foreign element in the body social and body politic of the Arab world and so long as there are Palestinians whose right of self-determination has not been restituted. You are suggesting that negotiations should be initiated immediately after the cease-fire. Have you forgotten how the late Stalin and the late Harry Truman—the same people—had decided between them to partition Korea on ideological grounds? That was before the United Nations was established.

145. The same thing happened in Viet-Nam when France finally withdrew gracefully from that land. The two super-Powers, not heeding General de Gaulle's advice, engrossed themselves in the imbroglio of Viet-Nam. The intervention of external Powers in the internal affairs of Korea and Viet-Nam brought untold suffering to millions who were killed, maimed and rendered destitute. Negotiations went on—and here the emphasis is on negotiations—for years and years while innocent people perished. And unfortunately there is still no peace in the Far East. Why do not the super-Powers depart from past practices and adopt a new approach which may perhaps bring about peace in the Middle East?

146. The silence of our colleague from the United States, my good friend Mr. Scali, is ominous. He is a very articulate person and I do not know why he keeps so silent. I see him always scribbling with his pencil. Whatever may be said about the alleged—I repeat, alleged—collusion between the super-Powers, I must say in fairness to Ambassador Malik that he has not kept us in the dark—especially yesterday

when he told us about the warning to Israel that the Soviet Government had asked him to transmit through the Council. I asked him, "Suppose the United States is forced by its legislative bodies to pursue the same policy of commitment of Israel at any price, how can that warning be implemented? ". I still have had no answer.

147. Therefore, I ask the Council, and more so my Arab colleagues from Egypt, Syria, the Sudan and other countries, not to have faith that negotiations will bring about a just peace. For the United States is committed to Israel and the United States does not seem to be free to act otherwise. One has only to read in the papers about the Senators, Congressmen and Governors—like Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who is trying to prepare himself for the Presidency now that Mr. Nixon is in trouble—to see that everyone wants to jump on the band-wagon of Israel to get the Jewish votes in this country.

148. It seems that what I said about West Germany, not in secret but in the Council, carried some weight. I now want to read out something which is really very serious and I hope that my good friend Ambassador Scali will stop writing and listen to me. I am not going to embarrass him and ask him questions, but to state facts that have not been fabricated by anyone.

"Bonn, October 24, Reuter"

and that is not a Middle East Agency, it is a British agency and a respected agency—

"The West German Foreign Ministry tonight summoned the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, Frank Cash, in connection with the loading of Israeli ships with American military equipment in the West German North Sea port of Bremerhaven.

"A spokesman for the Foreign Minister confirmed tonight that Cash"—

meaning the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States—

"was told by a senior Foreign Ministry official of West Germany's intention to maintain its 'neutral position' in the Middle East conflict.

"According to West German marine authorities in Bremerhaven the Israeli freighter *Galila* had been loaded with U.S. tanks and other military vehicles yesterday and was now on its way to Haifa.

"A second ship, the *Narcis*"—

it does not say whether it is Israeli or under some other flag—

"is in Bremerhaven and sails for Israel with U.S. weapons at 1 a.m. EDT tomorrow.

"West Germany has repeatedly stressed its strict neutrality in the Middle East conflict and Chancellor Willy Brandt has made it clear that the Germans wished a peaceful settlement . . ." etc.

"The Foreign Ministry spokesman said the war in the Middle East was in fact a 'successful test of Bonn's neutral and balanced foreign policy.'

"He gave no details about the discussion with Cash.

"A spokesman for the US Embassy in Bonn also declined to give any comment on the issue.

"According to the Bremerhaven marine police, a third Israeli freighter was on its way to the West German port. Bremerhaven is the port facility for US supplies for the American troops stationed in West Germany.

"The police said American military police had cordoned off the immediate area around the *Narcis*. They said that contrary to usual practice, West German port authorities had not been informed about the arrival of the Israeli ships."

149. I want to remind the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany that inasmuch—is he there? He is absent. He will get the warning. Inasmuch as Germany would not like to incur the enmity of the Arab world, they will undertake not to ship any weapons to Israel. During the days of the late Adenauer and subsequently repeatedly the Germans seemed to make sure that they would not incur the disfavour of the Arab world. And what did the United States do? Secretly they issued instructions to West Germany to supply Israel with arms, which led to the severing of diplomatic ties between Germany and many other States. Recently they have undertaken to keep neutral, and we warned them that if they sent American or German arms to Israel, we would consider that a very hostile act. If some Arab countries failed to sever, I, as a pan-Arab, will declare them traitors and will declare the Germans as being under the thumb of the United States.

150. In deference to my colleague from Guinea, I hope now that she understands why I asked her to be gracious enough to give me the floor.

151. The United States, in spite of its declaring that it wants a just peace, is resorting to its old methods of supplying Israel clandestinely or openly with a stream of arms. What have we done to you, United States? When I say "we" I mean all the Arab world. What have we done to you, United States, that we should be mistreated like that? We opened our gates to you. Are you committed to Israel because one of your past Presidents erred? Where is the right of self-determination which you respected, which you said you respected? You cannot ride two horses at the same time.

152. Thank you, Sir, for having been indulgent with me, and again I thank the representative of Guinea. I ask you to maintain at the proper time—maybe this evening, maybe tomorrow—my name on the list of speakers. I have no bombs but I have words that are revealing and, after all, our stock in trade here is words and not bombs.

153. The PRESIDENT: I have two more speakers inscribed on my list. The first is the representative of the Soviet Union, and I ask him whether he wishes to speak at this time.

154. Mr. SAFRONCHUK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): As Mr. Malik said, we yield in order to accelerate the suspension that Mme. Cissé has requested.

155. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of the United States of America, but I first give the floor to the representative of India on a point of order.

156. Mr. SEN (India): I shall be very glad to hear the representative of the United States, but since so much time has been wasted on procedure, I thought it right to point out that Mme. Cissé had moved the suspension of this meeting for an hour. Would that motion for suspension not take precedence over all other motions, Sir?

157. The PRESIDENT: In reply to the representative of India, I would regard that motion for suspension of the meeting as itself in suspense at the moment, and therefore I give the floor to the representative of the United States.

158. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): The Security Council meets tonight for the third time in four days on a note of increasing urgency. In spite of two Security Council resolutions adopted without a dissenting vote, calling upon the parties in the strongest terms to cease all fighting and to terminate all military activity, military operations have recurred in the zones of combat. As long as the fighting goes on even intermittently the parties incur increasing losses, the forces of hate and fear are strengthened, the difficulties of attaining a lasting peace deepen and the task of reconciliation becomes more difficult.

159. Tonight this Council is convened at the request of the delegation of Egypt. The Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested that the Security Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to the area to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire on the part of Israel and to assure its effectiveness. At the same time, the Council is confronted by claims from the Israeli side that Egyptian forces failed to abide by the cease-fire and are accordingly responsible for the fact that hostilities have recurred.

160. Let me say again, as I said yesterday, that it remains impossible to determine the accuracy of these contradictory charges. Until the impartial observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) can reach their posts in the areas of contact and can report to the Chief of Staff of the Organization we will be unable to assess with certainty these conflicting claims. Accordingly, the United States believes that the Council has before it two urgent tasks: first, it must impress upon the parties, with renewed vigour, that each of them must comply immediately and fully with the cease-fire resolutions that we have adopted; and second, it should urge and encourage the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to move as promptly as possible to place additional observers on the spot.

161. The Foreign Minister of Egypt has suggested that the Council invite the Soviet Union and the United States to send armed forces to the area of fighting in order to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. In the view of

the United States this is not a time in which involvement by the great Powers, through the dispatch of their armed forces, could be helpful in creating conditions of peace. Our objective in the Middle East has not been to produce a military confrontation but rather to encourage restraint and caution on both sides.

162. The United States remains committed to Security Council resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) in all their parts. We believe that the parties, with the assistance of the United Nations observers, can and will bring the fighting to an end. For our part, I can state that we have been in active and serious consultation with the Government of Israel to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to Security Council cease-fire resolutions. We will continue to make these representations as required.

163. We also agree, as I said yesterday, that the forces of the parties should return to the positions they occupied when the cease-fire became effective. Mr. Malik, I believe, knows that we have exerted all our efforts to put the cease-fire into effect, to translate it from a carefully balanced appeal to a reality which will end the killing.

164. In keeping with the understanding that Secretary of State Kissinger negotiated with Soviet leaders in Moscow, in a spirit of friendship, as part of our effort to improve relations on a broad front with the Soviet Union, we have done our part to carry out that agreement calmly and without seeking to extract propaganda advantage. But this cannot be done merely by snapping our fingers. In a highly emotional state of affairs, in time of war, it is not easy.

165. As a matter of principle, the United States believes today, as it made clear in my statement of 8 October [1743rd meeting], that return to positions held before hostilities broke out is the preferred means of opening the way to genuine reconciliation. We will continue to support this principle. But it can be applied only in the context of agreement as to the geographical and physical facts. Until actual cease-fire lines are demarcated and it becomes clear where the opposing forces were stationed at a given moment in time, there can be no agreed basis for firm truce lines. This emphasizes still further the need for completing the organization and placement of the truce supervision force and for ensuring that the Council and the parties are fully informed of the developments and the military commanders of the two sides instructed in compelling terms to stop the fighting.

166. The PRESIDENT: There are no more names on the list of speakers. I should like to ask the representative of Guinea if she wishes to maintain her motion for suspension of the meeting for one hour. I would comment only that there would indeed be merit if a one-hour consultation could result in the submission to the Council of a proposal on which members could comment immediately. But it is rather late and it seems quite possible that at the end of the one-hour suspension we might find ourselves without any specific proposal before us and with no representatives wishing to speak tonight. In that case, it seems to me that I should have to adjourn the meeting and set a time for our next meeting—perhaps at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, in order to allow time for consultations to take place.

167. However, I am completely in the hands of the representative of Guinea if she wishes to maintain her motion for a suspension.

168. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to maintain my request so that we can consult one another; I am sure that within one hour the non-aligned members will be in a position to propose something to the Council.

169. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Guinea has asked for a suspension of the meeting for one hour to enable consultations to take place.

170. As there is no objection, the meeting is suspended.

*The meeting was suspended at 9.40 p.m. and resumed at 12 midnight.*

171. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): On 22 October 1973, the Council adopted resolution 338 (1973) which states:

*[The speaker read out the text of the resolution.]*

172. On 23 October 1973, the Council adopted resolution 339 (1973) which states:

*[The speaker read out the operative part of the resolution.]*

173. This evening the Council heard more evidence, and indeed the Council has before it clear evidence, of a complete breakdown in the cease-fire it ordered in resolution 338 (1973) and reinforced in resolution 339 (1973). The fourth Middle East war is continuing, and it is a war on a large scale; it is an unrelenting war, bringing with it death, carnage and scourge to the people of the area.

174. When we voted for resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), we had hoped that the two super-Powers which were the sponsors of the two draft resolutions would spare no effort to stop the war; we had hoped that they would use all their influence, and indeed all their power, to vindicate peace and ensure the cease-fire called for by the Council. But these hopes have been in vain, and there is ample evidence that war is still raging in the Middle East.

175. In the current tragic Middle East situation, we have heard an appeal this evening from one of the parties to the conflict. We have heard an appeal from the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt for urgent action by this Council, and especially by two powerful permanent members of this Council, to stop the war. Egypt has asked for action to preserve life and property of the parties to the conflict in the Middle East. Indeed Egypt's appeal goes further than that. Egypt is appealing to this Council to help roll back the clouds of a potential world-wide conflict now hanging over our globe. This is the challenge this Council is facing this evening, and this is the objective of a draft resolution [S/11046] which I have the privilege of introducing on behalf of the delegations of India, Indonesia, Guinea, Yugoslavia, Sudan, Peru and Panama and on behalf of my own delegation.

176. The first paragraph of the preamble to that draft resolution recalls, as it must, resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of 22 and 23 October 1973.

177. In the second paragraph of the preamble we note with regret the reported repeated violations of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

178. In the third paragraph of the preamble we note with concern from the Secretary-General's report that the United Nations observers have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both sides of the cease-fire line.

179. I think enough has been said on both sides on the whole of this tragic situation, and I should like to spare the Council the burden of a repetition of what has already been said and is amply documented.

180. The operative part of the draft resolution reads as follows:

*[The speaker read out the text of the operative part of the draft resolution contained in document S/11046.]*

181. I have already made reference to resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). I should like to make only a brief and passing reference to resolution 242 (1967), which, in the view of my delegation—and I am sure on this I am speaking for all the sponsors of this draft resolution—is the crux or the key to the solution of the Middle East problem. Resolution 338 (1973) calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Now, the relevant paragraphs of resolution 242 (1967), which should be implemented under resolution 338 (1973), are paragraphs 1 and 2.

182. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 242 (1967) lay down certain steps to be taken by the Secretary-General to ensure the fulfilment of the conditions set out in paragraphs 1 and 2. Now it is those provisions that resolution 338 (1973) seeks to vindicate and implement.

183. The sponsors of this draft resolution are not going to press for a vote now, because we would like its provisions to be discussed freely and to have the widest consultations on it. But we do hope that this will take place as speedily as possible to enable the Council to adopt this draft resolution, possibly later this morning.

184. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): I shall be very brief since my colleague from Kenya has just very eloquently introduced the draft resolution which the eight non-aligned members of the Council wanted to submit to the Council.

185. I am sure that the other members of the Council will understand that, in accordance with the desire of the two Powers that proposed two draft resolutions, on 21 and 23 October, which the Council adopted, we want to show the Security Council's concern that it discharge its responsibilities regarding the preservation of peace and security.

186. In submitting this resolution, we have studied all points of view, taking into account not only the concern shown by the non-aligned members but also the concern to have all the members of the Council support a draft resolution that would be realistic and that could be adopted by the Council in the next few hours. That concern will be evident to the members of the Council from reading the text that we have submitted.

187. I am sure that, despite certain divergences of view that might appear, the Council will adopt our draft resolution. As our colleague from Kenya has just said so eloquently, the members from the non-aligned countries will not press for the immediate adoption of their draft resolution. But we hope that later this morning, after broad consultations, the Council will be able to adopt this text as a whole, since we wanted it to be conciliatory, agreeable to all the members of the Council. I am sure that the adoption of our text will not encounter too much difficulty.

188. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

189. Mr. TEKOA (Israel): This meeting of the Council was convened by Egypt to hear two central charges. One was "that a whole new war has broken out today in the Middle East, that it is taking place, that it is continuing". Six and a half hours have now passed since that fantastic, baseless allegation was made to the Council. Six and a half hours have passed with not a single report from the area confirming the statements, the claims, put forward by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt.

190. The second charge which was placed before the Security Council was Israel's alleged opposition to the deployment of United Nations military observers.

191. The statement which we heard today from the Secretary-General immediately refuted those allegations. I denied them unequivocally, reiterating Israel's policy of full co-operation with General Siilasvuo and the United Nations military observers.

192. The latest items of news on this matter from the area are the following two reports.

193. The first, from *Reuter's*, states the following:

"Early this evening"—that is, while we were still hearing the unfounded charges regarding Israel's attitude—"the first group of United Nations observers to leave Cairo to supervise the cease-fire had reached Israel lines on the West Bank near Guneifa, south-west of the Great Bitter Lake. The first point of the cease-fire line was established between Israel and Egypt about 22 miles west of the 100-mile-long Suez waterway."

This took place, as I pointed out earlier, only a few hours after the cease-fire became effective for the first time since 6 October.

194. The second report relates to a conversation which took place in the evening of 24 October between an Israeli liaison officer and General Siilasvuo's deputy:

"The suggestion made by the Israeli authorities to the headquarters of the United Nations military observers was

that they should go out as early as they felt they should and could to the front lines from the Israeli side, in addition to their arrival along the front lines from the Egyptian side. The Israeli authorities placed at the disposal of General Siilasvuo helicopters should he feel that this would hasten the arrival of the United Nations military observers along the cease-fire lines. General Siilasvuo expressed his preference that the observers should leave [this morning] in the early hours of 25 October by vehicles of their own."

195. I think the experience of this meeting will make many, not only in this Council but those all over the world who are following our discussions, ponder over the manner in which evaluations of situations are sometimes made here, the haste with which conclusions are at times reached and formulations arrived at. That undoubtedly applies also to the text submitted today to the Security Council.

196. The PRESIDENT: I call upon the representative of Egypt.

197. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): Not in exercise of my right of reply but in defence of the Secretary-General, may I be permitted to refer to the allegation just made, that he has refuted my allegation that the Israelis did not allow the observers to proceed. Banking on the short memories of mankind should not go as far as banking on the short memories of members of the Council, especially when we have verbatim records.

198. The Secretary-General said "in [General Siilasvuo's] discussions with the Israeli authorities, they initially stated that United Nations Military Observers should not proceed to the battle zone before there was an effective cease-fire."

199. I have never accused the Israelis of not wanting observers. I have accused, and I do accuse, the Israelis of wanting the observers to come after the Israelis have finished their treacherous conquest.

200. With the full authority of my Government I report to the Council that the battle is going on now, in the early hours, in Egypt. Missiles, laser-guided missiles, and napalm are right now being used on our forces and our citizens in the town of Suez.

201. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): I most reluctantly exercise my right of reply in connexion with the statement just made by the representative of Israel. If the aspersions he tried to cast on the draft resolution just introduced by my delegation on behalf of the sponsors were meant to cast doubts on the merits of the text, I should like to inform him that this was a draft conceived in good will and couched in the most sober language; and it was not meant to introduce any further polemics into the debate in this Council. It may be that his allegation that there is a complete cease-fire in the area is true. If that is so, well and good. If not, it is the responsibility of members of this Council to act in order to stop war and prevent the killing of human beings.

202. The PRESIDENT: As no other representative wishes to speak, I now call upon the Secretary-General, who wishes to make a statement.

203. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have hesitated to ask for the floor at this late hour. I feel, however, that I should mention briefly to the Council the situation concerning observation of the cease-fire in the Syrian sector.

204. As the Council is aware, the United Nations military observers in the Syrian cease-fire sector have continued to report throughout the recent period of hostilities, and eight observations posts are still operating in the area. On the morning of 24 October, I discussed the cease-fire observation in this sector both with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Syria and with the Permanent Representative of Israel. I also requested the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to contact the military authorities on both sides concerning the possibility of adjusting the existing observation arrangements to the current situation. The Chief of Staff has formulated a plan for this purpose which could be carried out quickly and would not, for the moment at any rate, require additional observers.

205. It is my understanding that the reaction of the Syrian authorities to this plan is favourable and that the Israeli authorities have undertaken to give their reaction by tomorrow morning.

206. Should both parties concerned agree to this readjustment of the existing observation operation, I assume that the Security Council would have no objection.

207. As I have the floor, I should like to refer briefly to a point raised by the representative of the Soviet Union earlier in this meeting.

208. I have already informed the Council of the measures immediately taken by me and by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General Siilasvuo, to implement resolution 339 (1973).

209. I wish to assure the representative of the Soviet Union that there was no lack of activity either at UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem or at United Nations Headquarters in New York. As I stated in my report to the Council earlier in this meeting, as soon as the necessary Egyptian liaison officers were available, United Nations observation teams set off from Cairo.

210. Our difficulties in immediately setting up an observation system arose from the conflict situation in the area and the fact that the cease-fire called for by the Security Council was not being observed. It is extremely difficult in such a situation to station rapidly small groups of military observers effectively to observe a cease-fire the geographical framework of which has not been defined and is not known and which is in any case is not practically in effect.

211. As I have reported, seven teams of observers are now attempting to establish a system which can carry out effectively the mandate of the Security Council from the Egyptian side, and a similar arrangement is being set up on the Israeli side. The difficulties and dangers which these observers face should not be underestimated. I hope, however, to be able to report in the near future the increasing effectiveness of the observation operation.

*The meeting rose on Thursday, 25 October, at 12.30 a.m.*