

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**1743<sup>rd</sup>** MEETING: 8 OCTOBER 1973

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 8 October 1973, at 6 p.m.

*President:* Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1743)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010).

*The meeting was called to order at 6.10 p.m.*

### Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT: Before the Council takes up its work I should like to pay a sincere tribute to my predecessor as President during the month of September, Ambassador Mojsov of Yugoslavia. We have all come to know Ambassador Mojsov as a distinguished lawyer, an able diplomat and a most agreeable colleague, and his performance last month in this chair provided abundant evidence of those qualities.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### The situation in the Middle East:

Letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/11010)

2. The PRESIDENT: I have received letters from the representatives of Egypt, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic requesting participation, without the right to vote, in the consideration of the question on the Council's agenda in accordance with the relevant provisions of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. Accordingly I propose, if the Council agrees and in accordance with the usual practice, to invite the representatives I have just mentioned to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. A. Eban (Israel) and Mr. M. Z. Ismail (Syrian Arab Republic) took places at the Council table.*

3. The PRESIDENT: I wish to draw attention to the following Security Council documents which have recently been issued: letter dated 6 October 1973 from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the President of the Security Council [S/11009 and Corr.1]; letter dated 7 October 1973 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel to the Secretary-General [S/11011]; letter dated 7 October 1973 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General [S/11012]; and letter dated 8 October 1973 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council [S/11013].

4. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): Before making my prepared remarks, I should like on behalf of my Mission to express appreciation to Ambassador Mojsov of Yugoslavia for his services as President of the Security Council during the month of September.

5. Mr. President, I wish to offer my congratulations also to you. This is the first time I have had an opportunity to do so publicly. During the busy days of consultations that have just passed, I have already had occasion to recognize and appreciate your diplomatic skill, your vast experience and the fairmindedness and gentlemanly firmness that you bring to the presidency.

6. The United States has requested that the Security Council be convened today in order that it might deal urgently with the current situation in the Middle East.

7. For the first time in more than three years, armed hostilities have broken out on a massive scale in the Middle East. The cease-fire we have sought to maintain has been broken. The recourse to tragic violence we have sought to avoid is upon us.

8. Reports based on United Nations sources appear to indicate that the air attacks in the Golan Heights were initiated by Syrian MIG aircraft and that the first firing on the Suez front, which took place at the same time as the Syrian attack, was from west to east. The subsequent development of the fighting has been fully covered in the press.

9. In the days before fighting broke out, we received reports of intensified military activities in the Middle East area. We watched these developments closely, but until a

few hours before military operations started we were unable to conclude that these activities were a prelude to actual fighting. This is a region in which alarms and alerts are fairly frequent. In themselves, military movements would not necessarily indicate that combat was about to begin. When, very shortly before the initial attacks took place, we received indications that this was the fact, we immediately undertook intensive diplomatic efforts in hopes that the outbreak of hostilities might be prevented. We discussed the situation directly with Israel and Egypt. We consulted other permanent members and exchanged views with many Governments represented in this Council. Others in and outside of the area pursued parallel efforts. We kept in close touch with the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, who also lent his great weight and prestige to the efforts. Unfortunately, those efforts did not prevent the outbreak, and intensive fighting continues.

10. In so serious a situation we felt that we could not fail to exercise our responsibility, as a permanent member of the Security Council to request a meeting of the Council, in order that it might be seized of the grave situation which has arisen. Not to have done this would have been to fail in our obligations under the Charter. We hope that in the days ahead the Council by its deliberations can restore in some measure its historic role of constructive ameliorator in the most critical and explosive area in the world.

11. Definitive judgements as to constructive action are difficult in view of the fluidity of the situation. My Government has itself made no such judgements. Nor have we felt it would be constructive to divert the Council's energies and attention to the question of assessing blame.

12. Our purpose today is not to sift conflicting reports or to assess responsibility for what has occurred. Our purpose is to help promote a solution for the tense and dangerous situation confronting us.

13. We recognize that it is difficult to separate proximate from underlying causes. The former may be clearcut, but the latter are complex, and perceptions of right and wrong inevitably vary. It has been over six years since the present abnormal situation was created in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. That war in turn followed 18 years of abnormal armistice. For the failure to move from abnormal armistice and cease-fire to political accommodation and peace there is more than enough blame to go around. All concerned have missed opportunities to make the transition over the past 25 years.

14. We have given preliminary thought to the direction in which this Council might move in dealing with this problem, so that new opportunities to make practical progress towards peace can be created, and the present tragedy can be made a new beginning rather than simply another lost opportunity. As we see it, there are a number of principles which the Council must seek to apply.

15. First, in a situation where fighting is raging unchecked, the most appropriate means must be found for bringing the hostilities to an end. Military operations must be halted. The guns must fall silent so that additional human suffering may be avoided and the search for peace may proceed.

16. Second, conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of the long-standing differences in the Middle East. There must be respect for the rights and positions of all the States in the region. A beginning must be made towards converting the sharp confrontation of violently opposing claims and counter-claims, which for over a quarter of a century has made true stability impossible, to a more reasoned discourse aimed at genuine reconciliation. The least damaging way to bring this about is to have the parties concerned return to the positions held before hostilities broke out.

17. Third, in all its efforts the Council must be mindful of the need for universal respect for the integrity of those instruments and principles of settlement for the Middle Eastern dispute which have received the adherence of the interested parties and the support of the Council's authority. The foundations so laboriously achieved in the past for negotiations looking towards a Middle Eastern peace must not be destroyed under the stress of a military emergency.

18. These principles, in the opinion of my Government, constitute the framework within which we can act in this Council to reduce the prevailing tension in the Middle East and to prepare for a reinvigoration of the process of peacemaking. We are prepared to discuss these principles, and any others which other members may put forward, as a basis for our further action.

19. What we seek in this Council is not a war of words, but a broad consensus which will enable the Council to put the full weight of its influence behind the task of restoring peace, so that the Middle East can be set on a new course pointing towards a better era in the region.

20. Let us then renounce the sterile gains of propaganda and turn to serious discussion. The situation is urgent; the need is great; and time presses.

21. The PRESIDENT: The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Egypt, on whom I now call.

22. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for having granted me the honour of participating in this debate.

23. Until we heard the beginning of the statement of the representative of the United States of America, we had not intended to ask to be allowed to speak. But he has asserted some facts and proposed some action. I am very grateful to him and would like to register our thanks for the assertion of his responsibilities as the representative of a permanent member of the Security Council. According to his letter [S/11010], in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council and have given special responsibilities to the permanent members of the Council. It is good to hear that the permanent members of the Council are conscious of their responsibility and of the Council's responsibility.

24. But I have been in this Council before. On 6 June this year [1717th meeting] I came here to give a full review of our efforts to secure the implementation of the peaceful settlement prescribed and endorsed by the principal political organs of the United Nations. I concluded my statement by quoting some words used by the Emperor of Ethiopia on 30 June 1936 in his speech before the League of Nations, when his country was facing a situation similar to that which we face. This is what he said:

"The issue before the Assembly today . . . is a question of collective security. . . .

"I ask the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States . . . what measures do they intend to take?

"Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the Head of a State. What answer am I to take back to my people?"<sup>1</sup>

25. I asked the Security Council in June: What message am I to take back to my people as a result of these meetings? And at the end of the meetings I said that I had got two messages: the first was that of full support by world public opinion; the second, unfortunately, was that of the blocking of the Council's action by the veto of the representative of the United States of America.

26. We came to the Council seeking its support to put an end to an occupation maintained and consolidated for some six years on a part of Egypt's land and soil, as well as on parts of two sister States. Fourteen of the 15 members around this table firmly supported Egypt's claim. Egypt's position was fully anchored in the most sacred principles of the Charter. Yet we all witnessed how the collective will of the members of the Council was paralysed and rendered inoperative by the veto of the representative of the United States of America [1735th meeting].

27. Israel advocated the policy of conquest, of occupation and, in the end, territorial expansion; the policy of the fruits of war. Assailing the principles of non-acquisition of territory by war and of territorial integrity, Israel's representative claimed that its occupation of Arab territories was an act of defence. He proclaimed that no principle and no rule could prejudice the right to self-preservation and defence. He mentioned Article 51 of the Charter and at that point, the Council will recall, I took note of Article 51 of the Charter.

28. A settlement of the Middle East question could not and cannot be sought—according to the Israeli representative—in this very well-lit room. He asked us to leave it and leave the United Nations and go somewhere else, in the Middle East, away from the responsibility for the preservation of peace and security conferred upon the Council by the Members of the United Nations—so that, away from the special responsibility of the permanent members of the Council, the conqueror could deal with the vanquished.

<sup>1</sup> League of Nations, *Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 151, part II*, p. 25.

29. Another violent attack was carried on against the Jarring aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [S/10403, annex I]. Now we hear that we must respect all the instruments that were designed to achieve a peaceful settlement. The one we have in mind—the one to which we adhered, the one which the General Assembly supported, the one which 14 members of the Council supported—is the aide-mémoire addressed to us and to Israel on 8 February 1971 by Gunnar Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who prepared that document in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), giving him a specific mission. He received a reply to his aide-mémoire from Egypt [*ibid.*, annex II], and a reply from Israel [*ibid.*, annex III] describing the aide-mémoire as a travesty of international law and calling for negotiations.

30. We asked: What kind of negotiations? Are they to be negotiations in which Israel would decide what part of occupied Egyptian territory was to be returned and what part of occupied Egyptian territory was to be annexed to Israel? That is the only kind of negotiations they propose; all their talk about negotiations are accompanied by the declaration that Israel will never go back to the international borders of Egypt or to the lines from which Israel attacked on 5 June 1967.

31. The policy of violence, aggression and occupation would then have yielded its ultimate result: the imposition of territorial concession. Were that policy allowed to succeed, the whole international legal order based on the principles of the Charter would crumble.

32. Israel's obstruction of Ambassador Jarring's mandate has been coupled with a systematic policy of colonization of the occupied territories. United Nations records are full of testimony to this effect.

33. It was only a few weeks after Israel launched its aggression of 1967 that Arab Jerusalem was illegally annexed to Israel, under the pretext of municipal unification, or electricity and water unification, or whatever it was. The last count of Israel's settlements in the occupied territories was given by Israel's official radio on 18 August as 44, in addition to 5 more to be built in the Golan Heights; in the West Bank of Jordan, the area of Raffah, partly in the Gaza Strip and partly in Egyptian Sinai and in southern Sinai. In Sharm-el-Sheikh there are hotels and invitations for tourists to go there, and some airlines—I think Scandinavian ones—are being invited to have regular flights there to bring tourists to the newly acquired possession of Israel. Sharm-el-Sheikh is an Egyptian town.

34. Those settlements were described by the Prime Minister of Israel, as reported in the *Jerusalem Post* of 26 July 1973, in the following way:

"These outposts and settlements are seeds which will develop in the future, growing in population and becoming more firmly rooted. The settlement activity has deepened our roots in the land and strengthened the foundations of the State. Preparations and plans are under way for the continuation of this important activity, whether rural or urban settlement."

All this in the occupied land of Egypt, in the occupied land of Syria, in the occupied land of Jordan.

35. The policy of territorial expansion was best described by Israel's Defence Minister in July 1968. Please, Mr. President and members of the Council, listen attentively to what he said while standing on the Golan Heights:

"During the last 100 years, our peoples have been in the process of building up the country and the nation, in the process of expansion, of giving additional Jews additional settlements in order to expand the borders here. Let no Jew say that the process has ended. Let no Jew say that we are near the end of the road."

36. While the policy of colonization was going on in full swing, Israel was planning for further aggression and acts of war—so that no one would say that the process had ended.

37. This attack on 6 October, mentioned in my letter to the General Assembly<sup>2</sup> is not an isolated act; it is the pursuit of the same policy of arrogant power recently escalated by Israel against all Arab countries neighbouring it.

38. On that day Israeli air formations attacked the Egyptian forces stationed in the area of El Zaafarana and El Sukhna on the Western Bank of the Gulf of Suez, while Israeli naval units were approaching the Western coast of the Gulf. The time and place for this attack were carefully and deliberately selected. The attack was aimed at El Sukhna, where the construction of an oil pipeline carrying oil from Suez to the Mediterranean was to begin. They chose to make the attack only a few days after the announcement of an agreement to construct the pipeline.

39. I do not want to speak about what holiday this attack took place on, but it seems that people in the area should know that this is also the Moslem holy month of Ramadan. Israel's latest act of aggression was preceded by the large-scale aerial attack against Syria on 13 September, in preparation for the co-ordinated further aggression against the two countries. Israel, having found itself isolated from world public opinion, resorted to the only language which it can speak, unfortunately—the language of war.

40. The policy of closing all options before the Arabs, before Egypt, except the option of surrender, the policy of making despair the element to induce us to kneel and accept Israel's *diktat*, has failed.

41. Following the attack of 6 October, our sons have responded to the policy of arrogance. They have crossed to Egyptian territory east of the Suez Canal and raised the flag of Egypt on the territory of Egypt. They are fighting, and even while I am speaking now, the town of Port Said is being heavily bombarded. I wish that the name of Port Said did not have to be evoked again in the hearts of Egyptians. But it is a town which has been assailed before and which has emerged victorious; and it will emerge victorious again.

42. In the few notes which I took of the speech of the representative of the United States of America, I see that there was an assertion that the cease-fire has been broken. What cease-fire? After Israel had launched its armed attack

on 5 June 1967, the following resolutions were adopted by this Council: First, there was resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967, which *inter alia* "calls upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step"—as a first step—"all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area". Resolution 234 (1967) of 7 June demanded "that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967".

43. The Security Council members, in adopting those resolutions, stressed that they were provisional in nature and that they were really only a first step. It was clear from the debate in the Council that the settlement of the conflict would require time, at least a few days, and that the most urgent task was the cessation of hostilities. But later on, on 22 November 1967, the Council decreed [resolution 242 (1967)] withdrawal to the lines from which the attack had begun; it decreed withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel in the recent conflict. I am using the word "the" because all of the other languages use it and because there is no other way by which the principle of the non-admissibility of the acquisition of territories by force could be respected.

44. However, what was supposed to be a first step remained until it was really almost a permission and licence for the occupation of these lands. But—and this is most important—on 19 June 1970 the United States Government made a proposal to both Egypt and Israel to cease fire for 90 days and to start talks with Mr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. That cease-fire was to end on 5 November 1970. One day earlier, on 4 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2628 (XXV), which, *inter alia*, recommended

"... to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative [of the Secretary-General] with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967)."

Thus the Assembly clarified once more the close and integral link between the implementation of the United Nations resolutions and the observance of the cease-fire. Furthermore, it laid down a short, defined duration, after which there would be no cease-fire, of course.

45. President Sadat announced on 4 February, when the cease-fire should no longer have been in existence, that Egypt would refrain from opening fire for a period of 30 days, ending on 7 March 1971. On that date we declared that our country "no longer considered itself further committed to a cease-fire or to withholding fire" [S/10929, para. 89].

46. Israel's attempt to make the cease-fire an established legal régime, disregarding its obligations under the Charter and under Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the political settlement, is not only baseless: it is really a mockery of the Charter and of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, since in the end it means that this Council has given a country a licence to occupy the lands of other countries until it desires and agrees to

<sup>2</sup> A/9190.

leave them by agreeing to new borders to be established by its will, or the will of others, but subject to its will.

47. This is a situation which cannot really be considered seriously. Let us take a hypothetical case. Let us say that Egypt occupied Sweden, and then there was a cease-fire order. Would that mean that Egypt had permission to occupy Sweden eternally? That is unbelievable, undiscussable, and, as I said, it makes a mockery of the Charter, of the United Nations, of the Council and of its resolutions.

48. That this is exactly what Israel is seeking is evident from the well-established fact that Israel has created a large number of settlements and colonies in the occupied territories, as I said just now. It has also taken measures towards the creation of so-called new facts in the occupied territories. It seems that, confident in its forces, sure that nothing could move it except force and sure also that it would have all the force it needed and all the assistance it needed to maintain that occupation, it was really building as if this was going to be a part of Israel.

49. Foreign Minister Eban, on television here in the United States, was told, "The Egyptians say that they are going back to their territories?" His reply was, "Yes; they claim also Jerusalem to be their territory, and Israel to be their territory"—thus equating exactly their positions in Sinai, the Golan, the West Bank of Jordan and Jerusalem with Israel.

50. It has been said here that no effort is going to be made to assess blame. We welcome that, although we know where the blame lies; but perhaps that is a negative thing. However, I do not know how to marry that assertion with the statement that United Nations observers have found that Egypt began attacking and is attacking. May I ask the Secretary-General, through you, Mr. President, if his observers are at El Sukhna and El Zaafarana? May I ask him if he, in the name of the United Nations, can tell you that there has been no firing, no attack on El Sukhna and El Zaafarana? Why use the name of the United Nations? Leave this to the radio and television stations and other managed-mass-information media, but do not use it in the Security Council. I would like the Secretary-General to tell me whether they really have ascertained whether there was an attack on El Sukhna and El Zaafarana on 6 October or not, and if this attack took place prior to the events which I have described to the Council now. Why use the name of the United Nations?

51. Then there were a number of suggestions and principles. One was to return to the positions before hostilities broke out. If that means the positions before hostilities broke out in June 1967, then I must say that it was the wish of the Council in July this year precisely to condemn the continuation of the occupation since that date. That would be a very good sign that the United States was withdrawing its veto of the draft resolution [S/10974]. But if it means something else, if it means that we are called upon to give up part of our country for another to occupy, then I fail to understand it and will not reply to it.

52. An invitation to a country and people to offer part of their territory to be occupied by another Power may come

from the palaces of emperors or dictators, but it cannot come from the United Nations, not from this house, not from this hall. The Foreign Minister of France has asked: "Does an attempt to set one's feet back in one's own house constitute surprise aggression?" The occupied land of Egypt is our home. The people who are dying today, now, in Egypt, are our sons, brothers, colleagues; they are dying so that their Egypt may live intact with its territorial integrity preserved, so that no territory can be taken as a result of war, so that war will have no fruit. They are not dying for Egypt alone; they are dying for us, for you, for the world, for this United Nations.

53. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): With the connivance and support of the super Powers, the Israeli Zionists have been frantically pursuing a policy of aggression and expansion over a long period. They have not only maintained the occupation of large tracts of Arab territories they illegally seized during the 1967 war of aggression, but flagrantly launched on 6 October fresh military attacks on a large scale in expanded aggression against Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian guerillas. This is a serious provocation not only to the entire Arab people but to those countries and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the rest of the world who uphold justice. The Chinese Government and people express great indignation at and most strongly condemn these new acts of aggression committed by the Israeli Zionists.

54. With the support of other Arab countries, the army-men and civilians of Egypt, Syria and Palestine are heroically resisting Israeli aggression and have dealt blows at its aggressive arrogance. It is perfectly just for them to rise in resistance to the invading enemies on their own sacred territories. The Chinese Government and people admire them for their bold and just action and express firm support to them.

55. Since 1967 the United Nations has adopted a series of resolutions, calling for or demanding Israeli withdrawal from the large tracts of Arab territories it illegally occupied during its war of aggression in 1967. To date, who has ever seen Israel withdrawing even an inch from the illegally occupied Arab territories? In Article 1, paragraph 1, the Charter of the United Nations expressly provides for "the suppression of acts of aggression". One may ask: what has the United Nations done for the "suppression" of Israeli acts of aggression? Today, when the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian army-men and people are courageously resisting the Israeli aggressors in face of the fresh aggression by the Israeli Zionists, some people, under the pretence of fairness, are pointing their fingers at this or that, instead of supporting and praising their resistance. Some people have even made the preposterous proposal that Egypt and Syria withdraw to their positions prior to their counter-attack against the aggressors. Is this not an open encouragement to acts of aggression and permission for the Israeli aggressors to perpetuate their occupation of Arab territories?

56. Overtly and covertly conniving at and supporting the Israeli policies of expansion and aggression, the two super-Powers have directly inflated the aggressive arrogance of the Israeli Zionists. In energetically advertising the fallacious argument about the so-called "détente", their

purpose is none other than to lull the will of the Arab and Palestinian people to fight against aggression. Driven beyond the limit of their forbearance by the fresh military aggression launched by the Israeli Zionists, the army-men and civilians of Egypt, Syria and Palestine this time have broken through the situation of "no war, no peace" deliberately maintained by the super-Powers in the Middle East, and have taken courageous and bold actions for resistance to and expulsion of the aggressors. This reflects a new awakening of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people. Even though they might yet encounter some temporary difficulties and setbacks in the struggle against aggression, we are convinced that so long as they persevere in struggle and strengthen their unity, they will certainly recover their lost territories and enable the Palestinian people finally to attain their national rights.

57. If the Security Council is to adopt any resolution at all, it must condemn all the acts of aggression by the Israeli Zionists in the strongest terms, give the firmest support to the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian peoples in the just action they are taking to resist the aggressors, demand the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli Zionists from all the Arab territories they have occupied and explicitly provide for the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people.

58. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Israel.

59. Mr. EBAN (Israel): I thank the members of the Security Council for inviting me to participate in the Council's work—and not for the first time.

60. I made a statement on Israel's behalf this morning<sup>3</sup> in another organ of the United Nations concerning the massive armed attack launched against us on the Day of Atonement from the west and the north, and the very cruel loss and suffering which have resulted from that attack.

61. After studying the addresses made today by the representatives of the United States and China and by the Foreign Minister of Egypt I shall seek to address the Security Council at a future meeting. It would, I think, be helpful if at the next meeting the Foreign Minister of Egypt would bring to the table some evidence for the odious falsehood about an attack by Israeli naval forces at El Sukhna and El Zaafarana, an attack which, as he knows and as I know, did not take place. I almost think it would be more courteous to manufacture some evidence than not to bring any at all, because he and I know that no such thing took place.

62. But tonight I would answer only one very fundamental question which the Foreign Minister of Egypt asked in June of this year and reiterated tonight: What, he asked, could he have brought back then to his people? The answer is, he could have brought back to his people the fact that the door of negotiation is open to Middle Eastern Governments—negotiation that would replace war by peace, hostility by co-operation, cease-fire lines by agreed and

secure boundaries. And when I say "negotiation", I mean not any unilateral imposition but a detailed, precise study by both parties of what it is that concerns and preoccupies and afflicts the other, and how those concerns, those preoccupations and those anxieties may be brought into maximal harmony.

63. After all, everything else has been tried. War has been tried, with nothing but tragic results; fragile, vulnerable, provisional armistices and cease-fires have been tried; public accusation has been tried; endless Egyptian statements threatening Israel's destruction have been tried. One thing alone has not been tried: building peace by negotiation has not been tried. Surely the time has come to embark upon the adventure of negotiated peace. That is what should have been said in June of this year and on many other occasions before and since, and it is what should be said on the problems that face us as a result of the attacks from the west and the north—and they came, as has been said tonight, from the west and the north—as well as on the perspectives which open out from this crisis.

64. As I have said, Mr. President, I should like to address the Council more fully at a future meeting.

65. Sir Donald MAITLAND (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to extend to you the good wishes of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency. Your skilful handling of the difficult informal consultations which led up to this meeting has already shown us how fortunate we are that the presidency is in such experienced hands as we embark on this important debate.

66. As soon as my Government learned of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East last Saturday, it instructed me to explore urgently with you and with our colleagues how best the Security Council could discharge its responsibilities. We were gratified that you set immediate consultations in hand. It is right that this meeting should now be taking place. The Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and I do not believe that responsible opinion across the world would have understood it if the Council had not become actively seized of this crisis.

67. The first objective for the Council must be to secure the earliest possible end to the fighting. That is the first concern of my Government. We must all deplore the loss of young lives that has already taken place and continues even as we talk in this chamber. In addition to our humanitarian concern, we must recognize that fighting in that vitally important area of the world carries with it grave risks that the conflagration will spread. The situation is far too dangerous for this Council to stand by while large-scale hostilities continue unchecked.

68. That is the urgent task that faces us. We should not allow ourselves to be deflected from it by engaging now in attempts to apportion blame or attribute responsibility. The ultimate verdict may well be that the basic factor was the frustration of the international community in its efforts to bring about that just and lasting peace in the Middle East of which the promise was held out by Security Council resolution 242 (1967) nearly six years ago.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2143rd meeting.



69. But we should resist the temptation to look backwards. Once we have accomplished our first task of bringing the fighting to an end, we may find that we have a new opportunity to overcome the frustration of which I have spoken, to break the political deadlock.

70. On the basic aspects of the problem I wish to make it clear that my Government's position is unchanged. We still regard the prescription set out in resolution 242 (1967) as the corner-stone of any settlement. We maintain the views set out by my Secretary of State at Harrogate on 31 October 1970, when he described in detailed terms how a settlement might be achieved.

71. Ever since 1967, and particularly over the past three years, my Government has been urging on all concerned, at every opportunity, in every possible forum, the overriding necessity for a peaceful settlement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). If there was anyone who was still disposed to doubt this, surely the present outbreak of hostilities will have convinced him.

72. What I am suggesting is that this Council has two immediate responsibilities: first, to issue an urgent call for a cessation of the fighting; and, secondly, to treat these tragic events as a catalyst for starting a genuine diplomatic process in order to achieve the peaceful settlement that has for far too long eluded us.

73. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Before making my statement on behalf of the Soviet delegation on the substance of the question under discussion, I should like to express my gratitude to our distinguished friend and colleague Ambassador Mojsov, representative of Yugoslavia, for the brilliant way in which he presided over the Council.

74. I should like to pay a tribute to you, Mr. President, for your skilful guidance of the Security Council's work and to express the wish of the Soviet delegation to co-operate with you in the performance of the Council's functions at such an important time.

75. The Council is once more required, upon the proposal of one of its members, to consider the question of the situation in the Middle East. The attitude of the Soviet Union with regard to the convening of the Council on this question at the present time was expressed in the course of consultations held by the President of the Security Council with members of the Council on 6 October. Our basic view was, and still is, that it was inappropriate to convene the Council. Since, however, a meeting of the Council has been convened, the USSR delegation would like to make the following statement.

76. The general approach of the Soviet Union to the situation in the Middle East cannot but depend upon such a decisive fact that a war is going on there between Israel, which has occupied the lands belonging to others, and the victims of its aggression, the Arab States, which are striving to recover those lands which belong to them. The war is continuing between the aggressor, Israel, which has invaded Arab lands and is trying to appropriate them by force, and the Arab States, whose peoples are fully determined to

liberate their lands from the foreign aggressors and, as was rightly stated today in the General Assembly<sup>4</sup> by Mr. El-Zayyat, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, have a legitimate and just desire to return to their own homes.

77. Mr. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in his statement today, 8 October, in Moscow at a luncheon given in the Kremlin in honour of the official visit to the Soviet Union of Mr. Tanaka, Prime Minister of Japan, made the following remarks in connexion with the situation in the Middle East:

"The process of international *détente* is gathering force. But in various parts of the world, it is being interrupted by fresh outbreaks of conflict and tension. One proof of this is the war that has now broken out again in the Middle East. Close fighting is taking place there between Israel, the aggressor, and Egypt and Syria, the victims of aggression, which are trying to liberate their lands. It is only natural that all our sympathies lie with the victims of aggression. As to the Soviet Union, it has been, and remains, a convinced advocate of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and of guaranteed security for all countries and peoples of that region, which is so close to our frontiers. As in the past, we are ready to play our part in ensuring such peace."

78. Who, apart from the aggressor himself, would dare to deny the correctness, the justice and the legitimacy of the desire and aspiration of the Arabs to drive the foreign invaders from Arab soil and from Arab homes, and to return to those homes themselves? It is this which is the dominant consideration, essential to any appreciation or understanding of the situation that has arisen in the Middle East, and it is the determining factor in the search for ways to solve the Middle East problem.

79. What should be our way out of this situation and in which direction should we seek a solution to the problem? We are profoundly convinced that the way out of this situation should be sought first and foremost in the settlement of the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. It should be perfectly obvious to everyone—and it is high time that this was also understood by the aggressor and by those who continue to protect him—that the situation in the Middle East requires no new decision on the Middle East by the United Nations. What is required is a way of ensuring that the sound decisions already adopted in the relevant resolutions of the principal organs of the United Nations—the Security Council and the General Assembly—are put into effect. What does this require? First of all, this requires that both sides in the conflict clearly and explicitly declare before the United Nations and the whole world their readiness to comply with those decisions. The Arab Republic of Egypt—as Mr. El-Zayyat reminded us in his statement—has given its consent. Israel has not given its consent—at least not yet—and in the statement made today by Mr. Eban, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, we heard no such consent. However, it is quite obvious that, as a beginning, it is first of all absolutely essential that Israel,

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

which has occupied Arab territories, should clearly and distinctly state its readiness to withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories, and set about withdrawing them immediately. In the light of this immutable and undeniable truth, the discussion in the Security Council on the situation in the Middle East cannot be separated from the whole complex of the Middle East problem and particularly from the substance of the earlier decisions taken by the Council and the Assembly calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied by them in 1967. This demand by the United Nations for the total withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967 is embodied in repeated decisions of the Council and the Assembly, and only recently was once again unanimously supported and reaffirmed by all the countries of the African continent in a resolution adopted by the Organization of African Unity at its tenth session [see S/10943], and also by all the non-aligned countries—or, as they are otherwise known in United Nations circles, the countries of the third world—in the decisions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers.

80. Without a solution of this fundamental, cardinal question and without a clear statement by Israel that it is prepared to withdraw all its troops from the occupied territories, the Security Council cannot take a single constructive decision in the present circumstances in the Middle East. The adoption of any new resolution, in the absence of a settlement of this major, key issue, would once

again be utilized by the aggressor, as in the past, merely to divert attention from this key issue and to continue the occupation, appropriation and annexation of the lands belonging to others which are occupied by the Israeli aggressors.

81. That is the position of the Soviet Union. It has once again been reaffirmed by the Soviet Government in its statement of 7 October, which I consider it necessary to bring to the attention of the Security Council and all its members.

Allow me, Mr. President, to read out the text of that statement.

*[The speaker read out the text of the statement which is contained in document S/11012.]*

82. The PRESIDENT: I wish to refer to the letter from the Secretary-General [S/11013], which concerns a request received by the Secretary-General in connexion with the United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal area. As this appears to be of some urgency, I would, with some apology considering the lateness of the hour, invite members of the Council into the President's office immediately following the adjournment of this meeting for brief consultations on the issue raised in that letter.

*The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.*

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