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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 12 June 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Yakov MALIK
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1723)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
 - (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929).

The meeting was called to order at 4.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Security Council resolution 331 (1973);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council resolution 331 (1973) (S/10929)

1. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions adopted earlier by the Security Council I intend, with the Council's consent, to invite the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Chad, the Syrian Arab Republic, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Guyana, Mauritania, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran and Bahrain to take part, without the right to vote, in the Council's examination of the situation in the Middle East.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. M. H. El-Zayyat (Egypt), Mr. Y. Tekoah (Israel) and Mr. A. H. Sharaf (Jordan) took places at the Council table; and Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. H. G. Ouang-motching (Chad), Mr. H. Kelani (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. E. O. Ogbu (Nigeria), Mr. A. Bouteflika (Algeria), Mr. M. Zentar (Morocco), Mr. A. Al-Pachachi (United Arab Emirates), Mr. H. Nur Elmi (Somalia), Mr. R. E. Jackson (Guyana), Mr. M. El Hassen (Mauritania), Mr. A. Y. Bishara (Kuwait), Mr. J. Y. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. O. Sakkaf (Saudi Arabia), Mr. E. Ghorra (Lebanon), Mr. F. Hoveyda

(Iran) and Mr. S. M. Al Saffar (Bahrain) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): The first speaker on the list for this afternoon's meeting is the Soviet Union. I should like to address the Council as the representative of the SOVIET UNION. I should like first of all, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to welcome the distinguished Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of a number of Arab and African States, who are taking part in the Security Council's examination of the situation in the Middle East. The fact that the Ministers have come to New York to take part in this discussion is a clear confirmation of the constant attention and concern with which world public opinion, the Arab peoples and the peoples of Africa view the dangerous situation in the Middle East and Israel's aggressive policy.

3. Indeed, it would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of the fact that, essentially for the first time since 1967, the Council is considering the situation in the Middle East as a whole and in all its aspects. The examination of this item on the initiative of the Arab Republic of Egypt is evidence of the urgent need for a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the problem and testifies to the sincere desire of the Arab States to seek a peaceful political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression within the framework and with the co-operation of the United Nations.

4. The course of the discussion and the statements which have been made show that the Council's examination of this urgent problem, which is fraught with serious threats to the cause of peace, gives the Security Council a real opportunity to adopt effective measures for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East—a conflict which complicates the international situation and, at a time when there is a genuine relaxation of international tension, constitutes a most dangerous hotbed of war threatening our whole planet.

5. In his statement on 30 January of this year, Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, noted the positive influence of the political settlement in Viet-Nam on the improvement of the whole international situation; he stressed that:

“... this example indicates that it is also possible to find a peaceful and just solution to other conflicts and to

eliminate the remaining dangerous hotbeds of war, above all in the Middle East, since the situation in that area is fraught with great danger for the cause of peace”.

6. The examination of this item by the Council and the participation in it of so many States Members of the United Nations also show that the members of the Council and the other participants are unanimous in their concern with the situation in this area and believe that any perpetuation of such an abnormal and intolerable situation in the Middle East may lead to events fraught with extremely dangerous consequences for the cause of universal peace and security.

7. A similar conclusion as to the danger of the situation in this area may be found in the report which the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on this item. The numerous specific facts adduced both in the statements and in the report provide convincing evidence and clear confirmation that it is above all Israel which is the main culprit and bears the entire weight of responsibility for the continuation of the dangerous situation in the Middle East and whose fault it is that the sharp and dangerous conflict in that area has not yet been settled.

8. A large part of the blame also lies with Israel's protectors. Israel itself bears responsibility for this with its policy of aggression and expansionism and its constant violations of one of the most important and fundamental principles of contemporary international law, adopted and approved in numerous United Nations decisions—the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force—Israel, with its policy of disregarding the numerous United Nations decisions on non-use of force with regard to the Arab countries. As a direct consequence of its aggressive and obstructionist policy Israel arrogantly refuses to return lands belonging to others or to withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories.

9. In this sense, the Secretary-General's report can be regarded and understood only as a serious international accusation and indictment of Israel as an aggressor and violator of the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations on non-use of force in international relations.

10. All this is further confirmed by the fact that, as has already been pointed out here, since the adoption by the Security Council, in November 1967, of the well-known resolution 242 (1967), the Council has considered the question of Israel's further acts of aggression against Arab States no less than 20 times. On each occasion, it has drawn attention to the situation and warned Israel against continuing its policy of aggression and against using force in its relations with other States. On more than 10 occasions the Security Council—the principal organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security—has directly condemned Israel for acts of aggression and for the use of force. Even its powerful protectors have been unable to save Israel from this stern international condemnation.

11. This is precisely the accusation which the whole world and the States Members of the United Nations are making when they sternly condemn Israel and categorically demand that it cease its aggression against the Arab States, refrain

from using force in its relations with them, and immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories.

12. This is the opinion and the severe international sentence pronounced against Israel in the name of the entire world, the United Nations, the States of the socialist community, all the non-aligned countries expressing the view of the third world, and, finally, of the whole of Africa in the form of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which unites more than 40 sovereign States of that continent.

13. Simply by enumerating the Security Council resolutions adopted since 1967, a list of which may be found in the Secretary-General's report, it is possible to establish with the utmost clarity Israel's responsibility and guilt in systematically carrying out military operations by land and air against the Arab countries on false and specially invented pretexts, in defiance and in violation of Security Council decisions and General Assembly resolutions demanding that Israel cease its aggression and refrain from appropriating the lands of other States by force and changing the status of the Arab section of Jerusalem.

14. It is also perfectly clear from the report that all Israel's actions are flagrantly contrary to the provisions of resolution 242 (1967). Furthermore, these actions are deliberately designed to distort the meaning of the resolution, to cause it to be disregarded and in fact to undermine and sabotage efforts to implement it, despite the fact that the resolution is recognized by the United Nations and practically all States, including even Israel's protectors, as the basis for a political settlement in the Middle East. Israel hypocritically declares that it, too, recognizes the resolution. But, while paying lip-service to the resolution, Israel in fact distorts and violates it. It is worth while recalling, in this connexion, that the Council has repeatedly warned the Israeli Government that if its aggressive actions continue, the Council will be compelled to consider the question of the adoption of effective measures to curb the aggressor and eliminate the dangerous situation in the Middle East.

15. Thus, there can be no doubt as to who is really responsible for the tension in the Middle East and for the failure so far to settle the dangerous conflict in that area. The root of the problem lies in the arrogant and obstructionist line taken by the ruling circles of Israel, which continues to maintain its hold on the occupied Arab territories by force.

16. The Government of Israel is flagrantly flouting all the norms of international law and defying the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. Israel and its protectors are in fact undermining all the peaceful efforts of the United Nations to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East; they are preventing the establishment of a just and lasting peace and the creation of a situation in which all States in the area could exist in conditions where their national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity were recognized.

17. It is perfectly clear—and practically all those who have taken part in consideration of this item are agreed on

this—that the fundamental pre-condition for peace in the Middle East is, and must be, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the territories which Israel made victims of its aggression and has occupied since June 1967, i.e., from the territories of the independent Arab States Members of the United Nations. And none of Israel's verbal exercises in semantics and English grammar or the endless quoting of the statements of private individuals can in any way justify Israel's policy of international piracy and plundering of foreign lands or its refusal to return them to their lawful owners and withdraw its troops.

18. It is common knowledge that it is precisely these demands, as well as the provision on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, which are the very foundation of resolution 242 (1967). The crucial provisions on the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the need for States to renounce the use of force in international relations have been adopted and embodied in many other fundamental documents of the United Nations: in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the Declaration on Principles concerning Friendly Relations among States, in a whole series of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East and Jerusalem, and in other United Nations decisions.

19. These provisions have now become one of the cornerstones of United Nations policy and practice. There is no doubt that peace cannot be established on our planet or in the Middle East unless States renounce the use of force in international relations. The rulers of Israel and their protectors should bear that in mind when they profess their desire for peace with their Arab neighbours while in fact opposing the establishment of peace and doing everything in their power to maintain Israel's hold on the foreign lands which it seized.

20. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) also contains a clear and direct request that parties indirectly involved in the conflict should apply the following principle:

“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force”.

In this connexion, it must be stressed that resolution 242 (1967) speaks of this right as belonging to every State in the area, and not just to one State which has temporarily proved stronger than the other States and is trying to impose its terms on them.

21. Since the foundation of the State of Israel and especially since Israel's aggression in 1967, the whole policy, conduct and propaganda of Israeli ruling circles and their protectors testify to the fact that expansion and the desire for territorial annexations at the expense of neighbouring Arab States have become the basis of Israel's foreign policy.

22. The world is tired of the importunate, aggressive, demagogic propaganda repeated daily by the Israeli leaders,

their diplomatic agents and mass communications media—propaganda designed to justify, cover up and provide a basis for Israel's policy of aggression and its use of force against neighbouring Arab States on the pretext of ensuring Israel's security.

23. This propaganda in defence of aggression and the acquisition of the lands of other States arouses the conscience of the world and calls forth condemnation and indignation. No one now believes this propaganda. The Security Council does not believe it—read its decisions demanding the withdrawal of troops. The United Nations does not believe it—read the General Assembly resolutions containing the same demand. The third world does not believe it—read the decisions on the Middle East of the Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries held in Lusaka and Georgetown. Read, too, the historic document on the International Development Strategy, which was sponsored by 99 countries and unanimously adopted by the 132 States Members of the United Nations at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*]. This document stresses that the success of international development activities will depend on the achievement of concrete progress in the solution of a number of problems, primarily problems of general and complete disarmament and the elimination of occupation of territories of any State. I repeat: the elimination of occupation of territories of any State. A resolution of the third session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in which more than 140 countries participated, concerning the economic effects of the closure of the Suez Canal, lays particular and decisive emphasis on the need for full implementation of resolution 242 (1967) and expresses the conviction that the Israeli withdrawal—I repeat—the Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories is a requisite for the reopening of the Canal.

24. That is the opinion of the whole world and not simply of the private individuals whose opinions the representative of Israel tried to bring in yesterday in connexion with this decisive question of a Middle East settlement. Let me stress once again: this is the opinion of the whole world and not of private individuals. The whole of Africa, too, disbelieves Israel—read the resolutions on the Middle East of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU and, in particular, the recent resolution of the anniversary session of the Assembly opposing the continued occupation by Israel of part of the territory of Egypt [*see S/10943*]. All these international documents stress the need for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied by them in 1967. This is not the opinion—let me draw attention to this point yet again—of private individuals—no matter how lofty a position they occupy. This is the voice of the world speaking through the United Nations, the voice of the third world representing the majority of States in the United Nations; it is the voice of Africa and the Arab world; it is the voice of the countries of the socialist world.

25. Thus, Israel has lost the trust of the world. It bears the ill-omened brand of the aggressor, the violator of the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations and of the principle of the inadmissibility of annexation by force and acquisition of the lands of other States, the violator of the

principle of non-use of force in international relations. And if the deep trust of the whole world and international public opinion is to be restored, Israel has no alternative but to withdraw its occupying troops from all the Arab territories and seek a peaceful political settlement in accordance with United Nations decisions.

26. If Israel and its leaders were really concerned for the security of their country and people, who can hardly want to live forever with the economy and the whole internal life of the country in a state of monstrous militarization, then Israel's leaders would long ago have found a way to achieve a mutually acceptable settlement with the Arab countries and would have agreed that it was necessary to withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories. The only reason why Israel has not yet done this is that it is seeking, not security based on peace and friendship with its neighbours, but rather territorial expansion and the annexation of the territory of other States. The renunciation of expansion would be a sure guarantee of Israel's security.

27. Instead of seeking a peaceful political settlement, Israel is making feverish efforts to acquire and assimilate the Arab territories which it has seized. Israel is establishing militarized settlements there, it is wiping Arab towns and villages from the face of the earth, driving out the Arab inhabitants and pursuing a policy of Israelization of these foreign lands in defiance and in violation of United Nations decisions. In a word, Israel is doing everything possible to justify the territorial annexations carried out in 1967 and to confront the world with a fait accompli.

28. Members of the Security Council have no doubt studied Mr. Bulloch's article in the magazine section of *The Daily Telegraph* of 1 June 1973 concerning the situation in the Arab territories occupied by Israel, which has been circulated, at the request of Mr. Abdel Meguid, the representative of Egypt to the United Nations, as a document of the Security Council [S/10941]. The article contains extensive factual material which exposes Israel's policy of annexation and plunder in the occupied Arab territories, Israel's violation of fundamental human rights, the deliberate destruction of the houses and settlements of the indigenous Arab inhabitants of these territories, the expulsion of the Arab population by force from their birth-places and their forced deportation.

29. It is not difficult to see in all this a repetition by the Israeli aggressors of the familiar bloody terrorist tactics of the aggressors of the Second World War.

30. In contrast, the facts presented in the Secretary-General's report are convincing evidence of the formally stated readiness of Egypt, Jordan and the other Arab countries to carry out all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and to comply with the provisions of Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire, which is based strictly on that resolution. Egypt has formally declared its readiness to terminate all claims and states of belligerency and its willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel, provided, of course—and this is quite logical and legitimate—that Israel returns to the Arab countries, including Egypt, their lawful possessions which have been seized by force. Israel, however, maintains its notoriously unrealistic and short-

sighted policy of disregarding and scorning the goodwill of the Arab countries, all the efforts of the United Nations and the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

31. In this connexion, the statement by the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, reported in *The New York Post* of 22 May 1973 is characteristically cynical. He provocatively stated that consideration by the Security Council of the situation in the Middle East cannot produce a constructive result. Mr. Eban went so far as publicly to insult the Security Council—this principal international organ for the maintenance of universal peace. He called the Council "an arena for waging conflicts, not for solving them". This statement cannot be regarded as anything but an inadmissible and hostile attack by an aggressor and a violator of the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations against the principal organ of that Organization—the Security Council—against its members and the United Nations as a whole.

32. When the question of the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations was under consideration 25 years ago, Israel gave its solemn oath to respect the United Nations Charter and to ensure that its policies conformed to the lofty and noble principles embodied in the Charter—to live in peace with other States as good neighbours. History, however, shows that subsequently Israel adopted a policy of systematically violating the United Nations Charter, a policy of the use of force, seeking to accuse the Arab countries and blame them for its own faults. The Israeli leaders, as has now become apparent to everyone, are interested only in the kind of security for their State which is based on the territorial expansion of Israel by means of the annexation and acquisition of the lands of neighbouring Arab countries. But this is a risky and dangerous policy. History teaches that there has never been an aggressor which has won all its wars, and Israel cannot count on succeeding in refuting this law of history.

33. Many speakers have already drawn attention to the fact that Israel's policies are in direct and sharp contradiction to the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations on the fundamental questions of international relations and on the situation in the Middle East. Israel, as we all know, has disregarded the aide-mémoire dated 8 February 1971 of Ambassador Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Middle East, in the hope that everyone would forget about the aide-mémoire and that the author himself would repudiate it. This aide-mémoire has gained wide recognition and is an important component in the general complex of efforts which the United Nations has made and is continuing to make in order to achieve a just settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

34. Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire is based strictly on resolution 242 (1967), and the Council should give credit to Ambassador Jarring for his efforts to carry out the lofty and noble mission entrusted to him. The importance and usefulness of Ambassador Jarring's mission have been recognized and confirmed by the United Nations as a whole in decisions of the General Assembly. General Assembly resolution 2799 (XXVI) recognized and stressed the need for, and the importance of, Ambassador Jarring's mission

and his aide-mémoire. In that resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to take measures to reactivate the mission of his Special Representative to the Middle East "in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to reach a peace agreement as envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971". Thus, the General Assembly approved Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire. In the course of their consultations on the Middle East in 1971, four of the Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council confirmed that the aide-mémoire is fully in accordance with resolution 242 (1967) and acknowledged its importance for a settlement in the Middle East. At that time, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union noted with satisfaction the initiative taken on 8 February 1971 by the Secretary-General's Special Representative; they considered this initiative fully in keeping with his mandate under resolution 242 (1967). We are all well aware, too, that Egypt responded positively to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire and expressed its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel, provided that Israel withdrew its troops from the occupied Arab territories. Egypt's position in this matter was reaffirmed in the statement in the Council by its Foreign Minister, Mr. El-Zayyat at the outset of the Council's present examination of the situation in the Middle East [1717th meeting]. Is any other proof of Egypt's peaceful intentions needed? Is any new information needed to confirm the fact that Egypt is firmly in favour of the implementation of United Nations decisions on the Middle East?

35. But what is Israel's position in this matter? It is sabotaging the aide-mémoire and calling on Ambassador Jarring to repudiate it. To the whole world and to the United Nations Israel has stated formally in writing that "Israel will not return to the frontier lines which existed before 5 June 1967". Is any further, any weightier proof needed of the aggressiveness of Israel's policy and its desire to bury all the United Nations decisions concerning a peaceful settlement in the Middle East? It seems to us that the Council must draw the appropriate, just conclusions, taking account of Israel's attitude, which is so openly obstructionist towards the United Nations and aggressive and piratical towards the Arab countries.

36. Israel's rulers and their representatives in the United Nations pretend to be offended when the Security Council and the General Assembly condemn Israel and designate it an aggressor and a violator of United Nations decisions. But how else can we describe the policy of a State Member of the United Nations which has seized by force the lands of other States and refuses to return them to their lawful owners?

37. Ever since Israel's aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967, the question of the situation in the Middle East has constantly held the attention of the principal organs of the United Nations—the Security Council and General Assembly. In resolution 2949 (XXVII) the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session emphasized in particular that the Security Council must "take all appropriate steps with a view to the full and speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), taking into account all the relevant resolutions and docu-

ments of the United Nations in this connexion". The General Assembly also made a special appeal to all States not to recognize—I stress—not to recognize any changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories. It invited all States to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid to Israel, that could constitute recognition of that occupation.

38. The USSR fully supported all these United Nations decisions and voted in favour of them both in the Security Council and at sessions of the General Assembly, categorically condemning any violent actions undertaken by the Israeli rulers against the Arab countries or against the Arab people of Palestine. We demand that the United Nations decisions on the question of Palestine should also be carried out and we consider that this question should be resolved within the framework of a general settlement in the Middle East.

39. Attempts by Israel or any other State, no matter how powerful, to settle the Middle East problem and the question of the future of the Palestinians unilaterally without implementation of United Nations decisions not only cannot guarantee a just settlement, but cannot even help to establish lasting peace in the Middle East.

40. During the Council's examination of this item, all speakers have drawn attention to the dangerous nature of the situation in the Middle East and have stressed the concern of their States, Governments and peoples to see that peace is speedily established in this important area.

41. I should like to single out the well-argued and extremely cogent statement by Mr. El-Zayyat, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt. What Mr. El-Zayyat said demonstrates yet again the respect which Egypt and the other Arab countries have for the decisions of the United Nations, the Security Council and the General Assembly.

42. In sharp contrast, the representative of Israel stuck to his usual story in his numerous statements. Like an old, worn-out gramophone record, he repeated his stereotyped phrases in justification of the policy of aggression and directed unconvincing accusations against the Arab countries. The statement by the representative of Israel concerning recognition of resolution 242 (1967) is truly hypocritical, for it is not borne out by the daily policy and actions of the Israeli leaders. It is sufficient to point to the attitude of Israel and its protectors to the question of the Arab-Israeli frontiers, which is an important aspect of a settlement of the Middle East conflict. All of us, and especially those who took part in the four-Power consultations on the Middle East, remember very well that the representatives of Israel and of their protectors talked and made formal statements about the possibility of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories on condition of only "minor rectifications" to the Arab-Israeli frontiers. Then a new formula appeared—"insubstantial alterations" of those frontiers—and now they are talking about "substantial alterations". In other words, Israel is laying claim to major increases in its territory at the expense of neighbouring Arab countries. The appetite of the annexationist grows with eating.

43. And in these circumstances the representative of Israel could find no more persuasive argument than to repeat his usual wearisome accusations against the Arab countries, as if they were to blame for the perpetuation of the tension in the Middle East, which is so dangerous for the cause of peace, and as if the Arabs wanted to "destroy Israel". But that is not true. What the Arabs want—and this is perfectly legitimate and justified, and any State or people in their situation would feel the same—is to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. That is the noble goal to which the Arab peoples aspire, and the Security Council supports this aspiration—read the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other international bodies. In this aspiration the Arab countries are backed by the decisions of the United Nations and the support of the whole world. It has been repeatedly shown and proved, both in the past and now, that the blame for the tension in the Middle East lies entirely with Israel, and that no one in the world any longer gives credence to Israel's attempts to inculpate others. The whole world is witness to the fact that it is only the patience and restraint displayed by the Arab countries and their constant seeking for a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East which have contained the dangerous trend towards a new armed conflict in that area. But Israel and its protectors cannot fail to understand that the patience of the Arab peoples—and not only of the Arab peoples—is not unlimited.

44. In this connexion it is necessary to draw special attention, over and over again, to the unanimous opinion of such a representative and authoritative international organization as the Organization of African Unity, which unites almost one third of the States Members of the United Nations. The tenth anniversary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU, as I have already remarked, affirmed yet again that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the basis for a Middle East settlement. It noted with satisfaction that Egypt, for its part, has spared no effort to reach a just and durable solution of the Middle East problem in accordance with that resolution. The OAU Assembly once again strongly condemned Israel's obstruction of such a settlement. Expressing the hope that the Security Council would take every appropriate measure to implement immediately the relevant United Nations resolutions, the Heads of State and Government of OAU called on the Powers granting Israel military, moral and political support to refrain from so doing. Israel was warned that the countries of OAU, individually or collectively, would take the appropriate political and economic measures against Israel. The Israeli leaders and their protectors cannot fail to take account of this stern warning.

45. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated and continues to advocate a peaceful political settlement of the Middle East crisis. Our policy in this matter remains unchanged. In advocating the implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and supporting Ambassador Jarring's mission and his aide-mémoire, the Soviet Union is maintaining a position of principle in its Middle East policy. The essence of this position is to render comprehensive support and assistance to the Arab States which are victims of Israeli aggression. At the same time, we energetically and decisively denounce any attempt to bypass the Security Council and the United Nations in

seeking a solution to the Middle East problem. We are against attempts by individual States to substitute unilateral interference and mediation for the machinery of the United Nations. During the consultations among four permanent members of the Security Council, we duly issued a warning that such attempts were bound to fail. Events have proved us right. Any new attempts to supplant the machinery of the United Nations will inevitably alert those who are sincerely concerned to achieve a truly just and lasting settlement in the Middle East. In the matter of a Middle East settlement, there is no justification for disregarding and bypassing the existing machinery of the United Nations.

46. The Soviet Union is concerned to see a lasting and just peace established in the Middle East, an area which lies very near to its frontiers. The USSR has taken and continues to take a very active part in all efforts to achieve peace in this area. The Soviet proposals concerning a Middle East settlement are widely known: they are rightly considered to be balanced and capable of guaranteeing security and a peaceful, tranquil life for all the States of the Middle East area, including Israel, but not for Israel alone—despite the fact that this is what Israel itself and its few protectors are out to achieve. In this matter, the Soviet Union bases its policy on the need to establish a genuine peace in the Middle East and not merely a precarious truce which would be to the advantage of the aggressor. But it is perfectly natural—and now quite obvious to the whole world—that it is impossible to guarantee such a peace in the Middle East unless the Israeli troops are withdrawn from all the occupied Arab territories.

47. The Soviet delegation and all sincere advocates of a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East cannot fail to express their deep satisfaction at the fact that the Security Council is giving such detailed and thorough consideration to the situation in the Middle East. There has long been an urgent need for this. Here, we would like to draw attention to one aspect of the problem, which has been touched on in the statements of certain representatives and frequently comes up in Israeli propaganda. This aspect of the problem has considerable significance. I am referring to the role of the Security Council and its responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of international peace and, consequently, the role which the Council is called upon to play in the matter of a Middle East settlement. The Council must categorically demand that Israel respect and carry out the Council's decisions and must, in the end, find means of bringing vigorous and effective pressure to bear on those who are sabotaging and blocking a settlement and pursuing a bankrupt policy, rejected by the peoples of the world, of negotiating "from a position of strength". Some of Israel's more zealous supporters and its official representatives persistently adduce the propagandistic argument that the Security Council somehow has no right to "impose" its decision or decisions on Israel. That argument is false from beginning to end. It is nothing but an attempt to paralyse the Security Council's efforts, to ease the position of the aggressor and to remove him from the scope of the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations and the Security Council.

48. It would be salutary for the advocates of this approach to reread the provisions of Chapter VII of the United

Nations Charter. Security Council decisions adopted in conformity with the Charter are binding on all Members of the United Nations. Israel was aware of this when it became a Member of the United Nations and it solemnly undertook to fulfil the Charter obligations. That is why the peoples of the world expect the Security Council and its permanent members to make a practical and genuine, and not just a verbal, contribution to a Middle East settlement. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, as the principal organ for the maintenance of peace, is able and entitled to take the most rigorous measures to bring pressure to bear on an aggressor State and to defend States which are victims of aggression. The members of the Security Council, which enjoy the deep trust of the whole United Nations, must do everything in their power to ensure that a just and lasting peace triumphs in the Middle East, for only a just peace, a peace unsullied by plunder and annexation, can endure.

49. This is what is expected and demanded of the United Nations by all peoples of the world, the peoples of Africa, the peoples of the third world and the peoples of the socialist world. This is the expectation of the whole of world public opinion, which insistently demands that urgent measures be taken to establish peace and justice in the Middle East. But these legitimate aspirations can be satisfied only if none—I repeat—none of the permanent members of the Security Council uses its veto unjustly to paralyse the efforts of the Security Council and provided that no permanent member comes to the defence of the aggressor.

50. As in the past, the Soviet Union is ready to support any constructive efforts by the United Nations or the Security Council to achieve a just, durable and lasting peace in the Middle East. The USSR is ready to resume consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and to take part in them if all the other permanent members of the Security Council are ready to do likewise. We are ready to continue to co-operate actively in the mission of Ambassador Jarring, the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Middle East. We value highly his efforts to carry out the mandate entrusted to him in accordance with the decision of the Security Council.

51. By all its policies and all the concrete action it has taken in connexion with a Middle East settlement the Soviet Union confirms its desire for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the elimination of the dangerous hotbed of military tension in that area and the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression are a component part of the Programme of Peace adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of our Party.

52. The Decree of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in April of this year, concerning the report of Comrade Brezhnev on the international activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reaffirmed once more the Soviet State's policy of supporting the lawful rights of the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israeli aggression and seeking a settlement of the Middle East conflict in conformity with resolution 242 (1967).

53. The Soviet Union, true to its fundamental policy of support for the just struggle of peoples for freedom, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, was and remains on the side of the Arab peoples, which are seeking to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. The Soviet Government still considers that there is only one way to bring about détente and a lasting peace in the Middle East: the Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967 must be completely liberated and all the peoples of that area must be guaranteed the opportunity to live in conditions of peace and security.

54. The Soviet Union is ready to continue to render all possible support to United Nations efforts to achieve a settlement of the Middle East problem on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of resolution 242 (1967) and other United Nations decisions. This is how we see our task and this has been, and continues to be, the goal of the Soviet delegation.

55. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I now invite the next speaker on the list, the representative of Iran, to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

56. Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): Mr. President, we are grateful to you and to the members of the Council for the opportunity to appear before this Council. In grave moments such as this, one is not disposed to go through the familiar ritual. However, as you are in the Chair, I need not go to great lengths to express my admiration and deep sense of respect. Your experience with the United Nations and your outstanding qualities are too well known to need elaboration. I can say—and, I think, with justification—that anyone who knows the United Nations knows you.

57. I shall strive to be extremely brief and, I hope, to the point. First of all, I should like to say that we have studied the report of the Secretary-General, which we find thorough, objective and enlightening. I wish to congratulate him on having prepared this remarkable piece of work at such short notice, and I hope the Council and all parties concerned will be inspired by the spirit of this document.

58. The position of Iran on the Middle East dispute has been echoed in various forums both within and outside the United Nations on numerous occasions. It was last elaborated in the United Nations when I, on behalf of my Government, took part in the General Assembly debate of last year on the question of the Middle East.¹ The gist of that position can be described in two basic propositions.

59. First, Iran is vehemently against acquisition by the use of force of territories belonging to other States. This is a general principle of international law, but Iran was quick to apply it to the Middle East conflict when, as early as June 1967, my Sovereign denounced the acquisition of territories by force as an anachronism. He then said:

“The days of occupation and retention of one country's territory by another are over. Undoubtedly arrangements should be made whereby that part of Arab territory occupied by Israel during the present hostilities be returned to them as soon as possible.”

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 2099th meeting.*

I think that that declaration is clear enough to need no elaboration.

60. The second basic premise is that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 remains to this day the only viable, practicable and realistic framework for making peace in the Middle East.

61. As recently as 2 June 1973, in the course of a communiqué issued on the termination of a State visit by my Sovereign to Yugoslavia, the leaders of the two countries expressed the opinion that

“The attainment of peace in this region must be made through the implementation of all the provisions of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from occupied territories, and respect for the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine.”

62. However, we have not come here today to restate our position. Nor do we think that at this point of time, when the burden of a rapidly crystallizing impasse in the Middle East dispute is so heavily felt, the opportunity afforded by this debate should be wrecked by reopening recriminations and attempts to win a battle of words. Enough of that has been said and tried in the past 25 years—not to any avail as far as peace is concerned but to its detriment and without in the least lessening the burden of injustice long carried by the Arab people of Palestine.

63. The reasons prompting us to be heard in this Council have to do with a mixture of apprehensions and hopes. The state of stalemate in the Middle East conflict is becoming increasingly more entrenched and is gradually acquiring an air of permanence. The freezing of the *status quo* is no longer merely a desire on the part of an isolated segment within one side of the conflict but an ever-growing menace. This is the single most perturbing element of the Middle East conflict.

64. Another reason is that, as has been pointed out by the Secretary-General in his report, since the adoption of resolution 242 (1967) the Security Council has not considered the problem of the Middle East as a whole. Against the backdrop of six years of frustrated peace-making efforts, the Security Council is now confronted with a crucial test of credibility. This challenge cannot be taken lightly. Should the Council fail to register some forward movement now, it will have justified the reasoning of those who, in their scepticism about the ability of the United Nations to cope with the problem of the Middle East, regard force as the ultimate arbiter of this tragic conflict.

65. To give voice to these apprehensions perhaps in itself justifies the taking up of a few minutes of the time of the Council, but we are compelled by yet another reason. As we see it, the debate held in this Council in the last few days has produced signs that perhaps justify a guarded optimism. The Foreign Minister of Egypt said on 6 June [1717th meeting]—and he has stuck to his word—that he was not seeking to score debating points or win a verbal victory. The debate has been conducted at a high level and,

generally speaking, in a restrained tone. It is perhaps too early to speak of the impact these signs are ultimately likely to produce. But the fact that the Arab Republic of Egypt, through the authoritative voice of its Foreign Minister, has announced in this solemn organ of the United Nations its agreement, as a matter of principle, to talk with Israel without prior conditions by either side warrants much credit and significance. This is yet another indication of the genuine desire for peace which President Sadat has so manifestly demonstrated on several occasions during the past years.

66. In this connexion we take note also of the statement of the representative of Israel on 6 June 1973 in this Council [*ibid.*] to the effect that Israel was prepared to enter into talks without pre-conditions and that it did not ask Egypt to accept in advance any Israeli views or positions on any point.

67. As we see it, resolution 242 (1967), accepted by the Arab Republic of Egypt, Israel and Jordan, has already set the tone for any future talks which might take place among the parties concerned. By “emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” the resolution has set forth the requirements for peace in the Middle East: withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied territories; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and the right of all parties to live in peace and within agreed and recognized boundaries, guaranteeing freedom of navigation through waterways in the area; achievement of a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problems; establishment of demilitarized zones.

68. This remains the most appropriate framework for a solution. There can be little doubt that a sincere application of that resolution, including withdrawal of Israel from the territories belonging to Egypt, Jordan and Syria, can and must lead to an equitable settlement. But if this has unfortunately not been the case so far, it is due above all, to Israel’s negative attitude, to say the least, in regard to such application. The Government of Iran has constantly held the opinion that the refusal of Israel to commit itself to withdraw from territories of Egypt, Jordan and Syria is an obstacle for meaningful dialogue to start. This negative attitude of Israel seems to us all the more unjustified as the Government of Egypt has shown courage and goodwill in responding positively to Ambassador Jarring’s questionnaire.

69. Obviously, if meaningful dialogue is desired, some concrete action now is required to form a climate of confidence that is pathetically lacking. And can there be any ambivalence as to who carries the burden of this responsibility? We have often heard representatives of Israel alarmingly recalling the co-called Khartoum resolution of September 1967 epitomizing it rhetorically in the phrase, “no recognition, no negotiation, no peace with Israel”.

70. Much as this recollection dramatizes an intransigence which is now a relic of the past, it brings into focus a contrast which is very much relevant to the situation today. Indeed from what we can learn from Egypt’s reply to Ambassador Jarring’s questionnaire of February 1971, it

has moved to accepting in principle to acknowledge the sovereignty of Israel and to make peace with Israel. We also heard, a few days ago, the position of Egypt concerning talks with Israel. Is it not now the time for the other side to ease its intransigence and move a step forward to meet the Egyptian position?

71. We agree with the representative of Israel when he says that peace is not an abstract concept, that it must be built and preserved by those who aspire to live in peace together. But is it not also a truism that peace cannot be built while the seeds of dissension still remain? Is it not also a truism that it cannot be achieved by gnawing away lands that belong to others? Is it not also a truism that claims to security, no matter how justified and understandable, cannot be hinged on the insecurity of others?

72. The time has come when all concerned should, in the words of the Secretary-General, try:

“...to look to the future and to take advantage of international instrumentalities at their disposal and of the general and fervent desire of the international community to open a new and more harmonious chapter in the history of the Middle East”. [S/10929, para. 118.]

The Secretary-General also stated that:

“... the procedures of the Council still offer valuable possibilities for limiting conflict and also for assisting the countries of the region to find the way to a solution to their problems, if they so wish. The Security Council is, as far as I know, the only forum where all the parties to the conflict have been able to meet together in the same room. In the forthcoming debate it is to be hoped that this advantage may be used for constructive moves towards a settlement.” [Ibid., para. 116.]

These, in our view, are words of wisdom with which we cannot agree more.

73. We do have the frame of action in the form of resolution 242 (1967). Ambassador Jarring—to whose wisdom and dedication I should pay special tribute—is present here. We have the advantage of the presence of the Foreign Minister of Egypt and high-level representation of all other parties directly concerned. The pressure of time and that of world public opinion weighs heavily on our shoulders; this is a historical moment to be seized upon. I earnestly hope that it will not be missed.

74. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Israel, who has requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

75. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): I wish the United Nations could have recognized the right of membership of the 12 tribes of Israel as it has the right of membership of the 18 branches of the Arab nation. We would have felt much happier sitting around this table and leaving it to some other representatives to speak on behalf of the Jewish people.

76. We heard earlier today the representative of Morocco, and to him I would simply say that my reaction to the Arab

spokesmen yesterday applies equally to his statement. After all, Morocco only recently sent troops to Syria to support a Government which openly rejects all peaceful solution of the conflict in the Middle East and insists on pursuing war against Israel.

77. To the representative of Yugoslavia, who spoke this morning [1722nd meeting], I could have simply answered that his Government is hardly entitled to judge the rights and wrongs of the present situation in the Middle East. By bowing to President Nasser's first war step in 1967, the demand to remove the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai and Gaza, and by withdrawing the Yugoslav contingent from that Force even before the Secretary-General had time to react to Egypt's demands, Yugoslavia contributed in no small measure to the deterioration of the situation culminating in the outbreak of full-scale hostilities.

78. Instead, however, I shall say to Yugoslavia: We are Mediterranean countries. The Mediterranean should bind together the States on its shores and not divide them. You spoke of contributions to peace. Why do you not then contribute? Why do you not bring Israel and the neighbouring Arab States together as part of the Mediterranean family? You will not be able to do that however—you will not be able to help the parties reach agreement—if you take a totally one-sided attitude as expressed in your statement today.

79. Mr. President, on several occasions you have expressed unhappiness with the fact that I single out your statements for reaction. But how could it be otherwise? Here we were listening to the statement made by you as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a statement longer than most of those delivered in this debate, a statement of singular interest if only because you not only expressed your Government's views but also claimed to express the views of the Arab States regarding Israel's fundamental rights to sovereignty. The trouble is that the Arab speeches, to which we listened here in this debate, reflected a different attitude from the one attributed to the Arab States by the Soviet representative on this very question of Israel's basic right to independence. I think that if there were any doubts that debates in the Security Council can serve no useful purpose because they inevitably lead to polemics and recrimination, the statement by the Soviet representative has removed them. If there were need to convince anyone that, as declared by Israel's Foreign Minister, debates in the Security Council cannot contribute to harmony and understanding but generally widen and deepen the differences, the Soviet representative's statement has been a most convincing factor.

80. There was nothing new in the speech by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: the usual unfounded charges, the old clichés, the customary references to one-sided resolutions, proving only one thing, that Israel is a small people in the family of nations and is outnumbered by 18 Arab States and their supporters. Nothing constructive, nothing forward looking.

81. The Soviet representative, for instance, charged Israel with propaganda. In this Security Council some time ago, on 4 March 1949, Ambassador Malik said on that point:

"I would like to draw the attention of the President and of the Council to the fact that some representatives in the Council, as well as in other organs of the United Nations, have developed the habit of loudly uttering the word 'propaganda' whenever they are short of arguments . . .". [414th meeting, p. 14.]

82. The Soviet Ambassador also charged Israel with having, shall we say, a rather reserved view about automatic majorities in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. But he himself, at a meeting in this Security Council of 22 August 1968 had the following to say about automatic majorities:

"They have acted illegally. They have violated the Charter of the United Nations by dragging this question into the Security Council and by the use of their automatic majority." [1443rd meeting, para. 276.]

83. In my opening statement in this debate I stressed that there can be no peace without truth. Now, the truth of the situation in the Middle East is entirely different from the picture painted here by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This is so regarding his references to the situation in Israeli-administered territories, for instance. I shall not burden the Council with detailed analysis of conditions in those areas. I made some comments on that matter on previous occasions. Suffice it to quote from a report published in various international media of information on 15 April 1971:

"Mohammad Khalaf, a Minister in King Hussein's Government, put it the other day:

"The workers over there have everything to attract them: unemployment insurance, social security, three weeks' vacation, unions. It is absurd to want to make that proletariat into the driving force of a Palestine revolution'."

84. Now, this is the very opposite of what the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics alleged about the grim conditions of life in Israeli-held territories. Indeed, I would add that if the citizens of such Arab countries as Syria and Iraq enjoyed as many social rights and freedoms of movement, thought and expression as prevail in the Israeli-administered areas, then the Soviet Union would find itself supporting progressive governments rather than lending its name and its prestige to feudal military régimes.

85. There is an equally great gap between the Soviet statement and the truth about the fundamental nature of the conflict and its present repercussions. This is evident even from a study of relevant Soviet pronouncements. The conflict, we remember, started in 1948, and on 29 May 1948, Mr. Gromyko, today the Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, spoke of how "the Arab States organized the invasion of Palestine". Two days earlier, on 27 May 1948, the representative of the

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mr. Tarasenko, stated in the Security Council:

"... an armed struggle is taking place in Palestine as a result of the unlawful invasion by a number of States of the territory of Palestine, which does not form part of the territory of any of the States whose armed forces have invaded it." [306th meeting, p. 7.]

86. On 30 May 1948, *Pravda* had the following to say about the situation in the Middle East:

"The operations being conducted by the Arab States cannot be defined otherwise than as aggression committed without any provocation."

87. On 9 June 1948 *New Times* stated:

"Soviet public opinion decisively condemns the aggression of the Arab States against the State of Israel and their attempts to interfere with the people of Israel in the creation of its State."

88. The Arab war against Israel to which these pronouncements refer has not ended. It continues till this very day. The fact that the victim of Arab aggression has succeeded in repelling and defeating those who sought to destroy it has not turned the aggressor into a righteous one, in the same way as the defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad and the crossing of the German borders by Soviet armies did not make the USSR an aggressor. Truth cannot be subject to the whims of the moment of one or another Government, including that of the USSR.

89. On 2 September 1964 an article appeared in *Pravda* in reply to various international demands that the Soviet Union should relinquish territories it had acquired as a consequence of the Second World War. The article stated:

"A people which has been attacked, has defended itself and wins the war is bound in sacred duty to establish in perpetuity a political situation which will ensure the liquidation of the sources of aggression. It is entitled to maintain this state of affairs as long as the danger of aggression does not cease. A nation which has attained security at the cost of numerous victims will never agree to the restoration of previous borders. No territories are to be returned as long as the danger of aggression still prevails."

90. On more than one occasion I have stressed that there must be one law equally applicable to all States. Yet Israel does not go as far as the precepts expressed by *Pravda*. What Israel is saying is that, in accordance with resolution 242 (1967), for the first time in Israeli-Arab relations secure and recognized boundaries should be established by negotiation and agreement between the parties.

91. The only agreements ever concluded and signed by Israel and the Arab States were achieved through negotiations. At the time, the Security Council played an important role in bringing about those negotiations. On 10 November 1948 the Acting Mediator, the late Mr. Ralph Bunche, reported to the Security Council on the situation

in the Middle East and suggested that an armistice be established between Israel and the Arab States [see 379th meeting]. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed [ibid.] that the central provisions of the resolution based on Mr. Bunche's report should read:

"The Security Council,

"...

"Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, in order to eliminate this threat to peace, immediately to begin negotiations, directly or through the good offices of the Acting United Nations Mediator in Palestine, ... [for]

"(b) The establishment of a formal peace".

92. At its 381st meeting, on 16 November 1948, the Security Council adopted resolution 62 (1948) which contained the basic idea of the USSR text, calling, however, for the establishment of an armistice. The Council called upon

"the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator [on Palestine]".

93. In the course of the debates which preceded the adoption of that resolution, representatives around the Council table addressed themselves to the mechanism of negotiation and its advantages in promoting the cause of peace. During one of his interventions in the debate the representative of Egypt, Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, declared:

"... I cannot agree with the observations made by the representative of the USSR in connexion with the principle of negotiations ... " [377th meeting, para. 45].

94. At the 380th meeting of the Security Council, on 15 November 1948, Ambassador Malik, today the President of the Security Council, replied:

"As a result of a preliminary exchange of views, most members of the Security Council as well as the Acting Mediator have recently stated [that they were] in favour of general talks between the two parties involved in the Palestinian conflict and that these talks might develop into the next stage on the way to a peaceful solution to the situation in Palestine. ... it was indeed time for the parties in Palestine to begin negotiations directly or through the Acting Mediator.

"In view of that, it would be impolitic to adopt any decision on details that might complicate these bilateral negotiations. Needless to say that in the course of such negotiations any question may be discussed". [380th meeting, pp. 12-13.]

95. At the same meeting, Ambassador Malik also declared:

"In our view, it would be preferable to adopt fewer decisions, but when adopted they should be such as to be

effective and helpful in securing a genuine settlement by peaceful means ... " [Ibid., pp. 13-14].

96. The Ambassador went on in words most pertinent to the present situation under discussion by the Security Council:

"Thus the bitter lesson of events in Palestine teaches us that all the means so far employed for solving this problem have proved fruitless. The situation now is such that probably none of us would be surprised if the interested parties themselves, impelled by their own interests, were suddenly to cease to heed what was being imposed on them from outside and entered into direct negotiations with the object of settling all the outstanding questions, thus confronting the Security Council and the Mediator with a fait accompli.

"The USSR delegation feels that those who genuinely desire a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in the interests ... of Palestine would welcome this turn of events and would do all in their power to bring it about." [Ibid., pp. 17-18.]

97. Then he added:

"... the USSR delegation considers that the wisest and most expedient proposal would be to offer the parties concerned the opportunity to try to settle all outstanding questions by direct negotiations or negotiations with the assistance of the Acting Mediator". [Ibid., p. 18.]

98. Speaking on the draft resolution the representative of the United States declared:

"The effect of this new resolution, if adopted by the Council, would be to suggest a new direction for those negotiations." [Ibid., p. 27.]

99. The representative of Belgium stated *inter alia*:

"The draft gives very specific indications: by negotiations conducted either directly between the parties or through the Acting Mediator". [Ibid., p. 20.]

100. The representative of Canada observed:

"I associate myself with these remarks of the Belgian representative." [381st meeting, p. 25.]

101. The Syrian representative, Mr. El-Khoury, explained at the 381st meeting of the Security Council, on 16 November 1948, why the Arab States rejected the method of negotiations, and I quote from his statement:

"Such negotiations as have been called for—and the Arabs have been invited to enter into direct negotiation with the Jews—would be possible only if there were no dispute between them regarding the essence of the situation in Palestine. Broadly speaking, negotiations would take place between two States in conflict over any matter such as frontiers or any other things, but negotiation implies mutual recognition of the sovereignty of both States; but in this case, this does not exist. We

should understand the question from the beginning: not this year, or last year, but for a quarter of a century, or even for thirty years, since the Balfour Declaration was made known in November 1917, the Arabs have never accepted the creation of a Jewish sovereign State in Palestine; they have never accepted immigration into Palestine on a large scale.

"Now, the negotiations which are intended, either by the Security Council or by other parties inviting the Arabs to enter into negotiations, would entail recognition by the Arabs of the state of things as it stands, the consideration of the Jews in Palestine as a State, and that they should negotiate regarding frontiers, economic matters, communications, transport, or any other matters which may arise between two sovereign States. But this is the focal point of the dispute. The whole dispute in Palestine hangs on this point: whether or not there is to be a Jewish State in Palestine." [381st meeting, p. 9.]

102. The Egyptian representative offered the same explanation:

"I shall stop here for a moment on this point. In so far as negotiations are concerned I have already stated more than once to the Council my point of view and the determination of my Government not to negotiate with the Zionists. We do not recognize them as a party. We still stand by our position which was upheld by the United Kingdom Government more than once. As I have mentioned to the Council before, in London, although we were all there, we usually used to call them the London Conferences. The British were negotiating with the Jews and with the Arabs, but the Jews and the Arabs were not negotiating through the British. This to some people might seem a mere technicality, but it touches the very crux of the whole matter.

"If there are negotiations at all, we certainly welcome the idea that they should be carried out with representatives of the United Nations. We not only encourage them but we welcome negotiations with representatives of the United Nations; however we should not be forced to negotiate with people with whom we do not want to negotiate and whom we do not recognize as a party." [Ibid., p. 21.]

103. Here was, therefore, the same Arab opposition to negotiations as today. The Arab delegations at the time were perhaps somewhat more explicit in indicating the motivation of their refusal to negotiate. It is precisely the motivation which, we submit, lurks also behind the present refusal—unwillingness to abandon definitely and unequivocally any claims on Israel's fundamental right to exist as a sovereign State.

104. It is for this reason that readiness to enter into negotiations is not merely a question of applying the only method that could bring agreement between the parties, but a test of the Arab States' genuine desire for real peace with Israel.

105. The most important development in the 1948 experience was that despite the strong Arab opposition to

negotiate with Israel, the Security Council adopted the resolution which called for negotiations. That was a bold and decisive move. In the wake of the resolution the Arab States dropped their objections and entered into the talks that led to the Armistice Agreements.

106. With regard to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Acting Mediator, Mr. Ralph Bunche, stated:

"negotiations, either directly or through a United Nations intermediary, are to be promptly undertaken". [Ibid., p. 41.]

107. On the next day, 17 November 1948, he sent a letter [S/1090] to the Provisional Government of Israel and to the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Yemen in which he stated *inter alia*:

"I wish to reiterate my sincere belief that the interests of all parties to this dispute would be best served by direct negotiations undertaken by the parties themselves. But whether the parties decide that the negotiations should proceed directly or through a United Nations intermediary, the services and good offices of myself and staff are always at their disposal for every possible assistance in the effort to achieve peace in Palestine."

108. In his report to the President of the Security Council dated 6 January 1949 [S/1187], the Acting Mediator wrote:

"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel have notified my representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv, respectively, of their unconditional acceptance of a proposal providing for a cease-fire to be immediately followed by direct negotiations between representatives of the two Governments under United Nations chairmanship".

109. In his cablegram [S/1205] dated 12 January 1949 also addressed to the President of the Security Council, Mr. Bunche reported the arrival of the Israeli and Egyptian delegations in Rhodes. He said:

"Both delegations are empowered to negotiate. . . I shall hold further meetings with each delegation tomorrow morning, 13 January, and the first joint meeting under United Nations chairmanship is fixed for 3.30 p.m. on the same day."

110. And in another cablegram [S/1209] dated 13 January 1949 he states:

"This afternoon, 13 January, the first joint meeting was held. At this meeting the delegations were introduced. . . Meetings will now proceed on the substantive items on three levels as follows: (1) Preliminary discussions separately with each delegation; (2) Informal meetings between heads of delegations and United Nations; (3) Joint formal meetings of the two delegations. The conciliatory spirit of both parties and the progress made in

matters of procedure continue to inspire hope for successful results."

111. In a telegram [S/1225] dated 25 January 1949 he insists:

"... that the proceedings of the negotiations are not to be released in any way"—I repeat, the proceedings of the negotiations are not to be released in any way—"until the negotiations are concluded."

112. Mr. Bunche, as we all know, succeeded in bringing about the conclusion of four Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

113. On 3 March 1949, Ambassador Malik commented in the Council on the Israeli-Egyptian agreement as follows:

"The USSR delegation notes with satisfaction the successful outcome of the negotiations between Egypt and the State of Israel, which it regards as a most favourable development in the Palestine question. Ever since the Palestine question first arose, the USSR delegation has maintained that direct negotiations between the two parties were the best way of settling the disputes which have arisen between the State of Israel and the Arab States.

"Events have justified this stand. Only direct conversations have enabled both sides to bring the negotiations to a successful close, and thus, to a certain extent, to take the first step towards the settlement of their disputes." [413th meeting, p. 4.]

114. When all four of the Armistice Agreements were signed, Mr. Bunche reported to the Secretary-General by letter of 21 July 1949, in which he said, *inter alia*:

"The negotiations leading to these agreements were, in each case, tortuous and difficult. But they demonstrate that once the parties could be brought together, they could, with United Nations assistance, be led to reasonable and honourable agreement." [S/1357, part I, para. 5.]

115. That was the only Security Council experience with the Middle East situation in 25 years which bore fruit. The 1948 Council call for negotiations between the parties produced the only step towards peace that Israel and the Arab States ever took together. It was not a big step. It did not bring about the final peaceful settlement which the Arab States undertook to reach with Israel. Yet it was a significant step in the right direction.

116. If Egypt and the other Arab States really desire to attain genuine peace with Israel, there can be no reason, no reason whatever, that would justify their refusal to enter negotiations with Israel without pre-conditions as they did in response to the 1948 Security Council resolution.

117. Egypt's Minister for Foreign Affairs tried in the present debate to explain his Government's rejection of negotiations by alleging that Israeli occupation constitutes an impediment, indeed, a prior condition. This claim has no

foundation whatever in law, logic or in international conduct. There can be no Israeli withdrawal without agreement between the parties on the line to which withdrawal would take place. The sequence can only be negotiation, agreement, withdrawal, and not the other way around. The refusal to negotiate on the grounds of occupation is unprecedented in history. Moreover, it is to be recalled that when in 1948 the Security Council called upon Israel and the Arab States to negotiate, a situation of occupation obtained as well. At that time, however, it was Israeli territory that was under occupation. Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces occupied large areas of Israel. Yet neither Israel nor anyone else considered it even possible to suggest that the occupation constituted an obstacle to negotiation. All understood that negotiation and agreement was the only way to end the occupation. In fact, it was only after the signature of the Armistice that the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria withdrew from Israeli territory behind the demarcation lines established by agreement between the parties.

118. Egypt's objections to negotiations now must therefore be considered as mere pretexts. Israel was ready to conform with international practice and negotiate when its territory was occupied by Arab States. There is no valid reason why Egypt should not conform with the general usage and negotiate with Israel now. The real question is whether the Security Council will encourage Egypt to do it. In 1948 the Council rose above the claims and counter-claims of the parties, above the truce and its violations, and looked to the future and called for negotiations. The Council faces a similar choice today. It could continue to remain enmeshed in the sterility of partisan views or it could elevate itself and call for negotiations. This is the only constructive contribution the Security Council could make to the Middle East situation at this juncture.

119. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): A number of delegations have requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply. However, in view of the fact that in his statement in exercise of the right of reply the representative of Israel devoted most attention to me, both in connexion with my statement today and in connexion with my statements on the Middle East in the Security Council in 1948 and 1949, I reserve the right to speak first in exercise of the right of reply, as the representative of the SOVIET UNION, and then I shall give the other delegations on my list an opportunity to do likewise.

120. The representative of Israel produces a great number of quotations. I imagine that many representatives in the United Nations may be envious of him. Judging from the quotations he produced yesterday and today, he apparently has a huge army at work gathering quotations. They say that he has a large number of people gathering quotations not only in the Israeli Mission but also in the editorial offices of certain American newspapers. He is lucky. But his quotations miss the mark. They missed the mark yesterday because he quoted the personal opinions of private individuals. Despite the lofty positions which these individuals may occupy—although, it is true, he did not quote only highly placed persons, but any journalist who came to hand—the opinion of one individual is unconvincing. But the opinion of 140 States in the United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the opinion of 132 States in the General Assembly, the opinion of 99 States of the third world, which submitted a proposal to UNCTAD demanding the withdrawal of troops and the ending of Israel's occupation of Arab territory—this is on a world scale. It is not a quotation from a private individual; it is the opinion of the whole world.

121. The statements quoted by the representative of Israel were countered with quotations from recent resolutions of the anniversary session of OAU. This is not quoting private individuals, this is the voice of the whole of Africa. And even though Israel disregards it, no quotations culled either from newspapers or from the records of the Security Council can justify or cover up Israel's aggressive policy or the injustice of the demands it makes here that the Council should sanction this aggression and recognize Israel's right to hold the foreign territories which it has seized. I can officially assure Israel that it will never obtain that from the Security Council, no matter how many quotations it produces.

122. The representative of Israel is using methods which a Russian proverb describes as mixing eggs with boots and offering the result as a tasty dish. But he has not succeeded with these methods so far and he will not do so now. The situation in 1948 was one thing, the present situation is another. In 1948 there were no Israeli troops occupying the east bank of the Suez Canal; in 1948 there were no Security Council decisions accusing and condemning Israel for its aggression against the Arab countries; in 1948 and 1949 there was no resolution 242 (1967). There was no United Nations machinery, in the form of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General authorized by the Security Council to take steps to promote a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East without annexation or plunder. Israel's acts of aggression had not been considered on more than 20 occasions in the Security Council. At that time the 10 Security Council resolutions condemning Israel for its aggression and failure to comply with United Nations decisions did not exist. None of this existed at that time.

123. But according to the laws of dialectics—and Marxist-Leninist philosophy is based on dialectics—the realities have changed. The development of international relations over the past two or three years shows that even the most hard-nosed proponents of the "cold war" and apostles of the policy of solving international problems "from a position of strength" have come to the conclusion that this policy is bankrupt and that it is better to pursue a policy which takes account of contemporary realities. The only State which has not yet come to that conclusion is Israel. It continues to live by the legends of 4,000 years ago and by the situation as it was in 1948 and it tries to draw a parallel.

124. The only useful thing which the representative of Israel did was to remind us, by quoting my statement, that I was in favour of effective measures at that time. Yes, I was in favour of effective measures then, and I am now. But as to which effective measures—read the statement I made today more carefully.

125. He mentioned the Council resolution on the need for talks. Well, what of it; the Council, if it wishes, can now

adopt a resolution on talks, similar to the 1948 resolution, pointing out that Israel commits itself, and gives a solemn undertaking and promise, to withdraw all its troops from Arab territories. If the representative of Israel will make a formal statement to that effect on behalf of the Israeli Government at a meeting of the Security Council, I think that the members of the Council will consider the matter and, possibly, will adopt an appropriate resolution. I shall wait and see. If he is authorized to make such a statement, then let him state that Israel is in favour of talks and that it undertakes, giving a solemn pledge at a meeting of the Security Council, to agree to withdraw all its troops from all the occupied Arab territories. I think that it would then be possible to find a basis for agreement.

126. These are the contemporary realities, and no quotations from 1948, 1949 or subsequent years can either cover up or justify Israel's aggression and its disregard and violation of the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations. These are the realities, these the facts.

127. Mr. Tekoah mentioned the history of the Second World War. Mr. Tekoah, read Article 107 of the Charter. Article 107 of the Charter states:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action."

128. And your quotation from *Pravda* concerning frontier changes after the Second World War was based on this provision of the Charter. Israel has nothing like that. There are, and will be, no decisions of the United Nations or of any other international organization justifying Israel's aggression and annexation of the territories of other States. Do not expect any such decisions. You will not obtain them from the Security Council. You will not obtain them from UNCTAD, because UNCTAD has defined its position by condemning Israel's aggression and demanding the withdrawal of its troops. You will not obtain them from OAU. More than 40 African States in OAU voted to condemn Israel's aggression and demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops. You will not obtain the approval of the countries of the socialist community. You will not obtain the approval of the third world. Where, then, will you obtain approval? From your protectors? Your policy will gain no strength from that source; on the contrary, you are isolated throughout the world; no one will justify your aggression and still less the annexation of the territories of other States. The whole world demands the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. Therefore, do not hide behind quotations from the late President Johnson or American journalists or quotations from the records of the Security Council of 1948. That will not help. The only circumstance to which I wish to draw attention is this. By repeating all this, the representative of Israel is trying to distract the Security Council from consideration of the substance of the item. But he will not succeed. So far everyone who has spoken, apart from one biased representative, has demanded the withdrawal of troops and the liberation of the territories as a fundamental condition of a

settlement in the Middle East. You, Mr. Tekoah, should take account of this opinion and of the opinion of the United Nations expressed through the General Assembly and the Security Council; you should also take account of the voice of the third world speaking through UNCTAD, the voice of Africa in the resolutions adopted by OAU, and the voice of the third world in the resolutions adopted at Lusaka and Georgetown. That is the voice of the world. Except for a few individuals, no one in the world supports you. This is the contemporary reality that you must reckon with. You have no choice. If you want to distract the Security Council with your quotations, you will not succeed. The Council will continue to consider the situation in the Middle East; we shall consider Israeli aggression and we shall consider how to solve this problem without abandoning the condition of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

129. As PRESIDENT of the Security Council, I call on the representative of Egypt to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

130. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): The Israeli representatives have always made us understand that they wish the United Nations to have nothing to do with the present war situation in our area, that they insist today on what they insisted upon in November 1967—that is, that the victor sit with his victim and dictate the terms of surrender, or of peace, as they may call it. Today I suspect there is a little change in tactics, because now they speak about Ralph Bunche and they speak about 1947 and they speak about the possibilities of getting the United Nations involved in a peace effort.

131. First, in regard to Ralph Bunche, it was my good luck—perhaps not such good luck for the Israelis—that I was able to speak to that man at length about the 1967 aggression. I am not going to quote persons who are not with us. I am only going to make a very short reference to him. They speak about Bunche and about the agreements that came out of his work. What happened to those agreements? Where are the Armistice Agreements? What happened to them in 1956, when the Prime Minister of Israel declared them dead and buried, when the Prime Minister of Israel in the Knesset officially annexed the peninsula of Sinai? What happened to those agreements and what happened to the other agreement, that of Lausanne? In the third progress report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission, dated 21 June 1949,² the story of the Israelis' renunciation of their signature on the Conciliation Commission's Lausanne agreement is given, but I do not want to quote it now. Where are those agreements?

132. Mr. President, you asked for a statement; I am asking for one: Let the Israeli delegation say now that it respects and wants us to respect those Agreements. Then we will see what we will say. We may agree. If I understand the Israeli representative well—and I think I do—Israel accepts, of all the United Nations resolutions, only two: General Assembly resolution of 1947 on partition [181 (II)] and the Security Council resolution of November 1967 [242 (1967)]. But it accepts the first resolution—that of

1947—as the first step towards further annexation and expansion, as indeed is shown by what happened to the armistice lines in other wars and in other annexations and in other occupations. There are many maps that can be shown about this. I think we even had one of those maps placed at the disposal of the Council a long time ago. As for the second resolution—that of November 1967—Israel accepts it provided it is going to be the pretext also for more annexations and occupations. In order to get the second resolution to read as Israel wants, the Council heard yesterday the explanation given by the State of Israel in regard to that resolution. Thus, we are now officially confronted here by the distortions and the twisted explanations registered by the Government of Israel before the Security Council. There are distortions even in the wording—they say “the establishment of frontiers”, but that does not appear in the text. These distortions we deplore. These twisted explanations we totally reject. We have already shown how we understand this same resolution, basing our understanding on its preamble, on the Charter, on the declarations of the United Nations and on other resolutions of the United Nations.

133. We have a hoard of quotations which I do not wish to read out now, but I wish them to be made part of the verbatim records of the Security Council. These are statements by members of the Council in 1967 explaining their votes: the representative of India, the representative of Ethiopia, the representative of Nigeria, the representative of France, the representative of Bulgaria, the representative of the Soviet Union, the representative of Argentina, the representative of Japan and, if we do not distort their statements or take them out of context, the representative of Brazil and the representative of the United Kingdom; and, last but certainly not least, there are the explanations given by the President of the Council for the month of November 1967, the representative of Mali. I have these quotations. I do not have any intention of reading them out, but, with your permission, Mr. President, I wish them to be made part of the verbatim records for the benefit of the Council members.³

134. The Israeli authorities now declare publicly in this Council that these understandings are unacceptable to them. As a matter of fact that is how they have frozen the mission of Ambassador Jarring until today and decreed him to be out of a mandate. What do we do then? What is the natural, simple and obvious step we should take? We obviously come to this Council. We obviously ask the Council what it did mean. We are not faced with a text in a book whose author is long dead. We are not faced with a text of a mystical poem which the poet wishes to remain provocative and mysterious. We have a resolution by the highest Council in the world, dealing with such unmythical matters as matters of peace and war, a Council which is permanently in session and permanently available. Its resolutions are and should be precise texts, built on precise principles of the Charter, easily translatable and easily transmittable to all parties. We not only ask, as we are entitled to ask, “What did you mean by your November 1967 resolution?” We ask, as we are entitled to ask, “What do you mean now?”

² *Ibid.*, Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Annex, vol. II, document A/927.

³ The quotations referred to by the Foreign Minister of Egypt were issued on 13 June 1973, as document S/10948.

135. I am gratified that the representative of the United Kingdom, the original author of the 1967 resolution, has spoken in such clear terms about at least two main points of that resolution. We appeal to the members of the Council to give us such clear declarations. We like to know where we are.

136. The purpose of the present intervention, the purpose of my calling on the Council, the purpose of my coming here, is to find out whether or not we understand the United Nations Charter well, whether or not we understand the Council well, when we say that this Council must affirm again, first, the principle of non-acquisition of territories by war, and of course the negation of any action against this principle; second, the principle of the territorial integrity of States and the collective responsibility of all Member States to preserve that territorial integrity; third, the principle of self-determination acclaimed by all United Nations Members and its application to all the nations of the world.

137. Let me put before the Council and before the representative of the United Kingdom an example of how serious and grave are the explanations given on behalf of the Israeli authorities last night. The representative of Israel was speaking about an interim arrangement, and I think that he said that this could be useful if linked with a commitment that resolution 242 (1967) would be implemented in all its parts. What resolution 242 (1967)? The one about whose interpretation by the representative of Israel we have now been informed? The one that gives Israel a part of Egypt and a part of Syria and a part of Jordan? The one that says: Yes, by war you can change international borders? The one that wishes all the nation of Palestinians away by not wanting to see them exist, and by saying only that there are some refugees and that some philanthropic help can perhaps be provided for them? If this is the link, where are we?

138. Also—and I must speak very frankly—any task entrusted or to be entrusted by this Council to our distinguished Secretary-General or to his representative, or to anyone, would surely reach the same deadlock if we were to leave the terms of reference as vague as to warrant—although they never did—the explanations given by the Israeli representative last night.

139. We do not have another six years of our lives in Egypt to give away. The Council should leave no shadow of doubt about what it means in application of the principles enshrined in the Charter.

140. Regarding those who spoke about negotiations, in thanking my colleague from Iran I wish to tell him that the pre-conditions put by the Israelis are the occupation and their statement to Ambassador Jarring that they will never withdraw to the lines from which they attacked. My statement should be read in full. We stand by it. We are ready for any talks within the framework of the United Nations, as I said in my statement, when these pre-conditions are removed.

141. Those who speak about negotiations or about negotiating processes on the basis of resolution 242 (1967), with the present interpretations and explanations of Israel, are

certainly aware that such a process would end in the occupied, defeated countries accepting the dictation of the occupier and the victor. And as I have said before, for this there is no need for the Council's efforts, there is no need for General Assembly efforts, there is no need for the effort of the United States of America, or the efforts of the USSR or France or the United Kingdom or India or Indo-China. If, God forbid, we should do that, we would not want the help of anyone in this very simple act of surrender. If, on the other hand, we resist—and we will—then the negotiations would be only the entrance to a situation where the parties would have to face each other, on our part defending our destiny.

142. The situation which warrants my presence here and the presence of the Foreign Ministers of Africa and the Arab countries, the situation which warrants the time that the Council has given to this examination of it, the situation which warrants the voyage of Ambassador Jarring from Moscow to here, is indeed grave. We have summarized our position.

143. We have come to the Council in search of hope. Closing all doors to hope is an Israeli policy, is the Israeli policy. Israel has sought to close every door, to kill every hope, and to marshal the forces of despair to stifle our resistance to their occupation. Our policy is to counteract that. We solicit your help. We solicit gratefully the help of all nations and their national councils and international gatherings. We abstain as long as we humanly can from taking any steps, even steps legally accorded to every nation for self-defence under the Charter, until it has been proven that no other course at all is open to us. When there is no hope, when the Israeli policy succeeds in killing every hope. I beg you to know that there remain two doors, not one, and the door of surrender we will never take.

144. Again we have come to this Council to win a battle against despair.

145. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Jordan to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

146. Mr. SHARAF (Jordan): The representative of Israel has resorted again to a flight from a constructive look at the future to a sterile look at the past. But this is not only sterile, it is also self-defeating.

147. The Arab position can be understood better only in its historic context. It can only be understood against the background of the Palestinian holocaust of 1947-1948 and the successive waves of Israel's expansion at the expense of its neighbours from 1948 until this moment. Nor does the sterile flight to the past add credibility to Israel's analysis of the concept of negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis as advanced by it in the context of our present debate.

148. The Foreign Minister of Egypt made references to the agreements made between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1949. It was the Israeli representative who raised the question and referred to the negotiations which led to them. Well, it is good of him to mention them. The

Armistice Agreements which were negotiated by the Arabs and the Israelis under the auspices of the United Nations were unilaterally abrogated by Israel when the political and territorial advantage accruing from them was achieved.

149. The Protocol of Lausanne of 12 May 1949, which again was referred to by the representative of Israel, was something that was arrived at by a negotiation between the Arabs and the Israelis under the auspices of the United Nations and was unilaterally detracted from by Israel because it redefined the borders to be established for Israel in accordance with the partition resolution of 29 November 1947. It was upon the basis of that agreement—the Protocol of Lausanne—that Israel was awarded its seat in the United Nations and it was shortly afterwards that the Foreign Minister of Israel came to the hall of the General Assembly and said, “The clock cannot be turned back. Having achieved the agreement and the signature of the Arabs, we will not return to the borders which we ourselves signed and accepted”.

150. So, if there is any lesson to be drawn from the Israeli reference to the past, it is a lesson that erodes the credibility of the Israeli insistence on negotiations with the Arabs outside the context of the United Nations and gives added credibility to the Arab position which says that the problem of the Middle East ought to be discussed within the framework of the United Nations, its Charter and its resolutions, and within the objective operation of a parallel application of the obligation to peace and the obligation to total withdrawal.

151. However, I shall not dwell too much on that aspect. I shall refer briefly to two aspects which, I think, are remarkable, in the statement of the Israeli representative. The first was a comment by the Israeli representative on your statement, Mr. President, in which you criticized the situation of the occupied territories. The Israeli representative, marshalling the traditional arguments, gave the wrong impression of prosperous occupied territories. I need not reiterate that the very essential principle for judgement on any aspect of the Israeli occupation is the rejection of the occupation.

152. The modern world has advanced beyond the anachronistic and immoral argument for alien domination on the basis of alleged economic benefit for the people under it. Colonialism is dying. Its arguments are dead. The struggle of people for freedom and national liberation has been reflected in a speedy process of decolonization in which the United Nations helped. At least the argument for colonialism, racial discrimination and unlawful occupation has been rejected in this body, particularly when the argument invokes alleged material benefit for the oppressed people. Yet the Israeli representative engages in this cynical line of argument. The level of progress before the Israeli occupation is treated as non-existent. Natural progress must be attributed to the efforts of the occupying Power. One Arab writer, living under the occupation, commented with painful sarcasm: “My daughter’s age was one year when the occupation came. She is nearly seven years old now thanks to the Israeli efforts”.

153. The Israeli economic measures in the occupied territories cannot be isolated from the over-all policies of

the occupying Power. They cannot be isolated from the policies of settlement in those territories. They cannot be isolated from the transfer of population. They cannot be isolated from the physical and demographic dissolution of the structure of the most prominent area of Arab existence under occupation, namely, Jerusalem.

154. In this context, Israel’s economic policy, pursued gradually but consistently, is to swallow the occupied territories. How can we refer to the agricultural sector without referring to the Israeli agricultural military settlements established in the fertile occupied areas? Over half a million dunams have been confiscated. Industrial activity is also directed to the needs of the Israeli market.

155. Some months ago, the Israeli Government opened a campaign to encourage Israeli businessmen and industrialists to invest in permanent industrial projects in the occupied Arab territories. Subsidies and tax exemptions are provided for such investments.

156. The sources of energy in the West Bank are gradually tied up with the sources of energy in Israel, including the electric network. The purpose of this policy is clear: to render the future of industry in the West Bank wholly dependent on Israeli policies and control. Israel’s trade relationship with the West Bank has been manipulated through a variety of measures to increase the volume of the Israeli exports to the West Bank. Even in 1970, Israel’s exports to the West Bank amounted to more than five times its imports.

157. And if there are many Arabs under occupation working in Israeli industry, it is a natural thing. Even during the Second World War, when the continent of Europe fell victim to occupation, more than 15 million Europeans were employed or conscripted to work in the service of Nazi occupation. Some were conscripted to work even in warplants to produce ammunition which could only have prolonged the occupation and their own agony.

158. So I go back to the overriding factor. The occupation cannot justify itself by alleged or real economic benefits in the occupied territories. That was one point I wanted to make as a brief comment on the Israeli statement.

159. The other point relates to the remarkable and often-repeated reference in the statements of the Israeli representatives to so-called one-sided positions. Any third party is bound at one stage or another of his development and knowledge of the area to develop a one-sided position. What you can ask of an impartial observer viewing a problem is to start out open-minded. But you cannot deny him the right and duty to become increasingly one sided in the sense of supporting and finding legitimacy and soundness in the position of the aggrieved party. That process is not unnatural. It is very human. It is also the record and history of the Arab-Israeli problem.

160. Need I mention the names of impartial people—some of whom perhaps initially sympathized with Israel—who descended upon the area and became sympathetic to a different camp? Need I mention Count Bernadotte of Sweden? Need I mention General Carl Von Horn, who was

in charge of the armistice, or Commander Hutchison, a Canadian? Need I mention intellectuals such as Rabbi Elmer Berger, or Arnold Toynbee, or statesmen such as Senator Fulbright, or President de Gaulle, or Governor Scranton?

161. We cannot continue this process of denying everyone who considers the Arab-Israeli problem the right to develop his sympathies, moral position and moral commitment with a developing awareness of the realities and the facts of the situation and the problem.

162. I shall not in this context mention the names of people at present engaged in the peace-making effort, in order not to prejudice their positions. But, again, we cannot accept this continued attack against impartial observers, people who represent the United Nations or who represent international objective sources, who develop this kind of position and this kind of feeling.

163. It is the duty of this Council once it has heard a case from a totally open-minded position to move to a one-sided position. And by "one-sided" we mean a position of firm support for the aggrieved party, the party presenting a valid case of grievance and having a sense of injustice.

164. Finally, the Israeli representative stated that the Security Council debate does not serve a useful purpose. Our being here and the fact that our nations are Members of this Organization attest to the fact that we do not think the United Nations obsolete; we do not think the Security Council obsolete; nor do we think the debates and deliberations of the Security Council obsolete. Only one aspect of the deliberations of the Security Council is obsolete. And that is when a constructive dialogue—a sincere and determined attempt in a positive spirit to achieve solutions to problems—is thwarted by the creation of a polemical atmosphere. That is when the Security Council debates become obsolete.

165. It is the duty of all of us—including, perhaps, the representative of Israel—to turn the atmosphere of the Council from one of a war of words, to use the expression of the Foreign Minister of Egypt, to one of a constructive resolution of problems. We have come here in that spirit, and we hope everyone will match it.

166. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): I call on the representative of Israel to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

167. Mr. TEKOAH (Israel): Mr. President, it is out of respect for you and the views you have expressed that I have asked to speak in order to react to some of the points made by you.

168. Before I do so, however, I should just like to express a certain degree of amazement that the representative of Jordan found it necessary to come immediately to the support of the Foreign Minister of Egypt. I addressed my previous intervention to him, to Egypt, and not to Ambassador Sharaf or his country. I am particularly surprised because today, for instance, the governmental radio of Jordan in Amman declared that signs are being

revealed in the Security Council debate which do not accord with the process of Arab co-ordination. That was followed by an explanation that that official commentary was directed to the problem created by the suggestions made here that Jordan should in fact be dismembered and a new entity established on part of its territory.

169. Mr. President, you referred to Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations to explain the acquisition of territory by the Soviet Union as result of war and to suggest that the *Pravda* article quoted by me referred to those acquisitions. I should like first of all to draw your attention to the fact that Article 107 refers to a State which "during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the . . . Charter"—an enemy State.

170. Nothing that is said here suggests that the territorial changes and acquisition of territory by the Soviet Union from enemy States is to be considered illegal under international law or the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, the Article refers to action which should not be invalidated or precluded in relation to enemy States, action in the past and action in the future by no means only and not necessarily territorial questions.

171. But what is even more important, there were territorial changes after the Second World War which did not affect enemy States—for instance, Poland, for instance, Czechoslovakia. There were territorial changes on the Soviet-Polish border and on the Czechoslovak-Soviet border which brought about acquisition of territory through agreement. There is nothing at all in the Charter that would make such acquisition through agreement appear illegal.

172. You spoke, Mr. President, in your capacity as the representative of the USSR, of changes in the situation and that one should have regard for them. Yes, Israel is perfectly aware of the change of attitude that has occurred on the part of the Soviet Union as far as the Middle East situation is concerned, but those changes of policy and attitude cannot modify the realities of the situation and historic facts, and that is what I spoke about when I gave the examples of 1948 and the descriptions of the developments in 1948 in the words of Soviet representatives.

173. The war which started then is still on. As I pointed out yesterday, we went through a period of truce. We had truce lines during that period. This was followed by a period of armistice. We had armistice lines during that period. And now we are in a situation of cease-fire, and we have cease-fire lines. All these are and have been military provisional lines. The war is still on.

174. For the first time in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict an attempt is being made to attain peace. For the first time in the history of the Arab war against Israel which has been pursued since 1948 an attempt is being made to establish secure, recognized, agreed State boundaries which never existed before.

175. Now the variations of Soviet policy in respect of a particular region of the world cannot affect the truth, they cannot affect the situation, they cannot affect the realities of the situation. Those that started the war in 1948 as

aggressors cannot suddenly become the victims of aggression simply because Israel has succeeded in repulsing and defeating them. In fact, what we are facing is a somewhat bizarre spectacle.

176. What is the essence of the Egyptian complaint here before the Security Council in 1973? Egypt tried to prevent Israel's birth as an independent sovereign nation in 1948—tried to prevent that by force. It failed. It tried to shatter Israel by force after the proclamation of our independence. It failed again. It tried to undermine us by blockade and by terror warfare throughout all the years. Terror warfare is not a new phenomenon. It goes back all the way to the 1950s. Then it tried to mount the final strike at Israel's existence in 1967. We remember the situation very clearly. No one concealed the facts at the time, no one concealed the Egyptian intentions. They failed again in 1967. Then they tried to force us to bow to their *diktat* by the war of attrition in violation of the Security Council cease-fire, a war which continued for a year and a half, from 1969 to August 1970, when the United States saved the area from over-all conflagration by initiating the restoration of the cease-fire. Now Egypt comes before the Security Council to plead for sympathy for these failures. It demands support to remedy the consequences of these failures. That is the essence of the Egyptian appearance here.

177. For 25 years Egypt has remained at war with Israel, seeking openly to annihilate the State, spreading violence and bloodshed, resorting to the barbaric method of terrorist attacks against innocent civilians. But once Israel in self-defence seizes the aggressor's arm, Egypt cries to it to let go, laments its situation, as the Foreign Minister of Egypt did a while ago, and protests its innocence. That is the spectacle we have been witnessing during the last few days and especially today. Nothing could be more ludicrous than an aggressor pretending to be a victim of violence when his aggression is defeated.

178. What would have been the reaction of the world had a Hitler complained of aggression and expansionism by the Allies when their forces crossed the German frontiers? What would have been the reaction had Germany demanded then that before anything else could take place, third parties should obtain the withdrawal of the American, Soviet, British and French forces to the old borders of the Reich? That is the historic parallel, that is what we have been subjected to in the last few days.

179. These are the facts and no modifications of Soviet policy can affect them. You spoke, Mr. President, of the situation being different in 1948 from that in 1973 and that is why you felt it was appropriate at that time to call for negotiations between the parties. Let me quote to you your own Foreign Minister's statement six years later—not in 1948, not at the time when the Egyptian and other Arab forces invaded Israel, but in 1954. This is not a quotation from a journalist and I do not remember having made any. We do pay attention to statements made by Foreign Ministers, official statements on behalf of Governments.

180. We do attach importance to statements made in the Security Council by representatives on the Council who

interpret a resolution sponsored by them. That is the normal procedure here.

181. This is what Mr. Vyshinsky said on 29 March 1954 in the Security Council:

“... international disputes must be settled otherwise than by imposing a decision on either party in contravention of all its arguments. [664th meeting, para. 49.]

“... ”

“What is the proper method for this? The method is that of direct negotiation between the interested parties. On one side we have the representative of Israel and on the other the representative of Egypt; they are sitting opposite one another. Let them sit down together at one table and try to settle the questions which the Security Council cannot settle now. I am deeply convinced that they can find a better solution.” [Ibid., para. 96.]

182. Now, Mr. President, if you really wish to contribute constructively to the situation, here is your opportunity. Simply follow the advice given you by Foreign Minister Vyshinsky: bring about meetings between the representatives of Egypt and Israel. We are ready for it right here, right now.

183. I should like to make two brief observations regarding the statement we heard from Egypt's Foreign Minister. First of all, as a reaction to the analysis of the developments in the last 25 years, as a reaction to my pointing out that the only time the Security Council brought about an effective, constructive development in the Israeli-Arab conflict was when it called for negotiations between the parties in 1948, Mr. El-Zayyat responded with a question: What happened to the Armistice Agreements that resulted from those negotiations?

184. Now we know exactly what happened to those Armistice Agreements. The Security Council protocols and the protocols of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East are replete with answers to that question. The reports of the Secretary-General at the time, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, describe very clearly what happened to the Armistice Agreements and describe how despite the focal obligation undertaken in those Armistice Agreements by the Arab Governments to proceed immediately to final peace, to an over-all peace settlement, they refused to move in that direction; so much so that Mr. Hammarskjöld informed the Security Council at the time that he was completely helpless to call upon the Arab Governments to conform with article 1, the central provision of the Armistice Agreements, which obliged the parties to conclude a permanent peace.

185. What happened to the Armistice Agreements? We know that before there was time for the ink of the signatures on them to dry, Egypt was already sending the terror squads from Gaza and from Sinai to murder Israeli children and women, declaring that now that total confrontation between the regular armies was impossible this would be the way to undermine and destroy the Jewish State.

186. That is what happened to the Armistice Agreements. And if the Foreign Minister of Egypt comes before the Security Council in 1973 and supposes that members around this table are not in a position to turn back and examine the documents on that situation he must be assuming a great degree of ignorance and gullibility on the part of the representatives present in this chamber.

187. My second observation refers to his statement that Israel's aim is to close the door. Israel's aim is to open and to keep open the only door that might bring about peace in the Middle East—the door of negotiations without any prior conditions. That is the only way, and we are the ones who are saying “Here it is, it is open, let us enter through it; let us get started on the road of dialogue leading to agreement”. Is this surrender? Is this humiliation?

188. I shall end by quoting from the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Israel addressed to the President of Egypt, a statement broadcast in Arabic on 7 May 1973. Mr. Eban said:

“Negotiation is not dictation, not degradation and it is not capitulation. It is an expression of the honourable free will of the two sides. Negotiation is not the bargaining of rights, but a joint search for a path and an attempt to find a just and honourable solution, just and honourable without exception.”

189. That is what we suggest. We tried it in 1948. We made a step—not a big one, as I said, but a significant one—the only constructive step in the direction of harmony and understanding. It failed not because of Israel.

190. Today, 25 years later, we are once again inviting Egypt and other Arab Governments to join us in building peace, because the only way to build peace in our area is to do it together.

191. The PRESIDENT (*translation from Russian*): As the representative of the SOVIET UNION, I find it necessary to make a few comments on the second statement of the representative of Israel.

192. On many occasions already we have taken part with him in consideration of the question of the Middle East, and it is time he understood that the Security Council is not here to discuss the policy of the Soviet Union, but Israel's aggression against the Arab States. This is an elementary truth, and we should not confuse the two matters. You will prove nothing, Mr. Tekoah, by references to the USSR, nor will you justify your country's aggression. In seeking to justify that aggression you can take whatever quotations you like from any sources, books, newspapers or records. But that is the weakness, not the strength of your position. By referring to the statement of the late Mr. Vyshinsky, you are acknowledging my argument that contemporary realities do not resemble the realities of 1948. But in order to demonstrate the truth of your position you quote Mr. Vyshinsky's words, which were also uttered some 20 years ago. But the situation of 20 years ago was different from that of today. Thus, you are exposing still further the weakness of your position and arguments. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this:

Israel, and you as its representative, are completely and hopelessly on the defensive, and no quotations will save you or justify Israel's aggression, its disregard of United Nations and Security Council decisions and its stubborn unwillingness to agree to a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict on the basis, primarily, of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the restitution of the plundered lands to their lawful owners. Without that, of course, there can be no serious talk of a settlement. You have avoided answering the question put by Mr. El-Zayyat, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and the question which I put—does Israel recognize the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force, by means of war? That is Mr. El-Zayyat's question. And is Israel ready to state formally, at a meeting of the Security Council, that it will undertake to withdraw its troops from the occupied Arab territories? You also passed over this question in silence and referred to your statement. I have read your statement—there is nothing in it, it contains no answer to this question.

193. You like to make comparisons with the Second World War and draw parallels with Hitler. Such comparisons are not to your advantage. Therefore, it would be better for you not to introduce them.

194. Can you, the representative of Israel, conceive, for example, of the possibility of talks between the Soviet Union and Hitler—between the Soviet Government and Hitler—when Hitler's troops were at the walls of Moscow? Well, that is a parallel—think about it if you like parallels so much.

195. One more comment, my last. You propound the “theory of the prosperity of slaves” in the occupied territories, which are groaning under the heel of the occupying forces. Now this is where a parallel may be drawn with Hitler. Hitler, who annexed and enslaved the countries of Europe and tried to destroy the Soviet Union and enslave the Soviet peoples, promised all of them his “new order”. The whole world knows this. But the peoples of Europe and of the Soviet Union did not believe him, and they were not mistaken. Is that not so? In my view, this is an elementary truth.

196. Thus, it would be better for you not to draw parallels. The imperialists and colonialists propounded the “theory” that they were bringing benefits to the oppressed colonial peoples, but the peoples of Africa and other parts of the world, groaning under the heel of the colonialists, did not believe this “theory”, and they were not mistaken, they were proved right. And we are happy to have in the United Nations an enormous number of Member States which have overthrown the imperialists and colonialists and attained independence, which have proclaimed their freedom and independence and became sovereign States, enjoying equal rights with all other countries, taking part in international life and international relations as Members of the United Nations and partners in its work.

197. The colonial peoples did not believe the promises of the imperialists and colonialists, and they were not mistaken. And if we are to make an analogy between these two important historical events, then the peoples of the Arab

East do not believe you and your "theory of the prosperity" of the peoples enslaved by the occupying forces. And no one will believe your assertion that the Arabs who are subjected to Israeli occupation are happy or that they are prospering. The Arabs will not believe it, and no one in

the world will believe it. Thus, you should stop propagating that "theory" for the purposes of justifying your country's annexations and the enslavement of other peoples.

The meeting rose at 7.15 p.m.

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