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NOTE

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The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 22 May 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Rahmatalla ABDULLA (Sudan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1716)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
 - (b) Second special report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1).

The meeting was called to order at 12 noon.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 8 May 1973 from the representatives of Guinea and Kenya to the President of the Security Council (S/10925);
- (b) Second special report of the committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia (S/10920 and Corr.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: I wish to recall at this juncture the decision taken earlier by the Council [1713th meeting] to invite the representative of Somalia, at his request, to participate in the discussion under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter. A place has been reserved for that representative in the Council chamber.

2. Members of the Council are aware that there are two draft resolutions on the question before the Council [S/10927 and S/10928].

3. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): Before we launch into deciding the fate of the two draft resolutions before the Council, we should ponder for a moment and ask ourselves

what it is that we expect of the Council and each of its members.

4. It will be recalled that on 11 November 1965 the illegal minority régime of Ian Smith seized power in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia in defiance of the British Crown, the British Government and the British legal principles governing the handing over of power to a generally supported Government of all peoples in a colony. As a consequence, the United Kingdom Government undertook to deal with the rebels firmly, in accordance with known British vigour where such defiance sets foot, and to restore the colony to a constitutional path of development.

5. It is now nearly nine years later, and the rebels still remain in power. The United Kingdom Government has had a series of dialogues with the rebels, but to no avail, save making the world and Africa fearful of a selling out of the 5 million Africans to the quarter-million white minority whose aspirations have been to gang up with the racist régime of South Africa and the colonial régime of Portugal to continue the enslavement of African peoples for economic ends. It is worth comparing the British handling of the Southern Rhodesian question with their handling of the so-called Kenyan rebellion of 1952, and, subsequently, the Anguilla uprising of 1967. Why such a vast difference in treatment?

6. It would be sad to believe that in each case the difference in the swiftness and rigour of the measures taken would appear to depend on who rebelled against whom. Rebellion by a minority of colonial residents of British or white origin is fine; rebellion by indigenous people must be smashed and the natives must be contained. This characterization hardly accords with the known British concern for legal and just considerations.

7. Aside from the position taken by the United Kingdom, the General Assembly and the Security Council reflecting the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, and the view of numerous organizations and bodies throughout the world which have condemned the unilateral declaration of independence by the rebels, we call for the adoption by Britain of measures which will facilitate realization by the people of Zimbabwe of their independence and right to self-determination. Indeed, that has been the untainted message of the General Assembly and to some extent—and to some extent only, as I shall show later—of this Council since 1965.

8. The Council has patently been pained by the realization that the measures it has taken since 1965 have so far been

ineffective. It is for that reason that resolution 320 (1972), and in particular its paragraphs 4 and 5, requested the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) to undertake, as a matter of urgency, consideration of the type of action which would be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions against the illegal régime and to submit a report *inter alia* for extending the scope and improving the effectiveness of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

9. I do not find it necessary to repeat that the Committee's report to the Council contained in document S/10920 and Corr.1 hardly meets the mandate of the Council. The reason is quite clear. It is that in spite of modest African proposals supported and significantly improved upon by the delegations of China and the USSR, to which my delegation is grateful, the United Kingdom and the United States would not let down Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal by enabling the Committee, and subsequently the Council, to discharge its mandate by adopting measures likely to bring about the fall of the Southern Rhodesian illegal régime.

10. We might therefore ask how serious are some of the members of the Council concerning the effectiveness of the Council's decisions. Indeed, we must ask whether the doings of those members and their generous protection of illegalities in the case of the Southern Rhodesian and South African questions in the exercise of veto accords with the original intention of the provision of that privilege in the Charter. We must ask ourselves to what extent that privilege serves the interests of the weak and of international public opinion. We must ask whether it was intended that the goals set by the Council should be subject to automatic frustration by one or two of the members of the Council.

11. My delegation is at a loss to appreciate the seriousness of some members of the Council concerning the intent to terminate the state of rebellion in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. I wish I were wrong in this impression. My impression will be clarified by the vote on the draft resolution in document S/10928, which, if adopted and faithfully implemented, would bend not only the Ian Smith clique in Southern Rhodesia but also its two allies, South Africa and Portugal.

12. However, the draft resolution seems a target of those aiding, abetting and facilitating the breach of sanctions for apparently they hold that the Council should not adopt any decision which comes to grips with the problem of Southern Rhodesia. I need not recall that of the recent vetoes on African questions, and in particular on Southern Rhodesia, the Africans have been dismayed by the readiness with which the United Kingdom, the administering Power of the colony, and the United States, the open importer of chrome from the rebel colony, have been willing to ignore, ridicule and caricature the African stand and international public opinion. We watch the deeds of those friends of independent Africa, and equally, if not more, the friends of Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa, with bleeding hearts. They give with the right hand and at the same time they take away with the left hand. We find this very strange.

13. The United Kingdom Government is the administering Power of the rebel colony; this we all acknowledge. My delegation would have thought therefore that the United Kingdom would welcome any practical measures such as those provided in draft resolution S/10928, which, coming about nine years after the unilateral declaration of independence, might, together with measures provided in resolution 253 (1968), be given a fair trial. Yet, the contempt with which the delegation of the United Kingdom holds out against that draft resolution is implicit from the statement made by that delegation to the Council on Friday, 18 May [1715th meeting]. The United Kingdom made no reference to that draft—the only draft that requests States to protest, in a meaningful manner, the recalcitrant, open and persistent violation of sanctions by Portugal and South Africa. When they refer to effective sanctions and the toppling of the Smith régime, I wonder whether the United Kingdom delegation and mine are talking about the same thing. Clearly not. If the United Kingdom wants to disavow the responsibility for its colonial possession, it should make no pretences; it should come out in the open, as it has persistently done in the exercise of the veto, and say so.

14. In his statement on 18 May, the United Kingdom representative recognized the following:

“In considering what should be done now, therefore, the touchstone—the criterion—must be the effectiveness of what is proposed as a means towards stopping the illegal trade which continues and, therefore, towards promoting the chances of a just and acceptable settlement in Southern Rhodesia.” [*ibid.*, para. 21.]

Yet, in spite of the fact that it is known and accepted by all that the most substantial violators of the sanctions are South Africa and Portugal, the United Kingdom itself has proposed no measures to rectify this situation, and is not willing that any action be taken against those two. The statement of disavowal of extension of sanctions which would amount “to a declaration of economic warfare against the whole of southern Africa and which my Government, for one, could not countenance” [*ibid.*] does not demonstrate the seriousness of the United Kingdom Government in the discharge of its responsibilities to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, other than the racist minority. Nor has the United Kingdom come out with measures, even protests, against other known violators of sanctions, such as the United States.

15. It would appear, therefore, that the United Kingdom has colluded or connived with its collaborators in encouraging, by action or inaction, the breach of Security Council sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and therefore the continuation of the illegal régime of Ian Smith. The point made by you, Mr. President, as a representative of the Sudan, that the United Kingdom naval patrol at Beira has been relaxed in its work, gives credence to the theory of collusion. It is obviously with concern that my delegation heard you say:

“It [*the Committee*] should have been aware of the fact that the British naval patrol, at Beira Port, has not only been relaxed but that Lourenço Marques and Durban Ports have extended their port facilities in the service of

contraband trade from and to Southern Rhodesia." *[Ibid., para. 51.]*

All these things, in the view of my delegation, do not enhance the seriousness of the United Kingdom, either in enforcing sanctions, or in terminating the state of rebellion in Southern Rhodesia or in observing the spirit of the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960.

16. The Southern Rhodesian question cannot be divorced or examined in isolation from the southern African question. It is an integral part of that area. Thus, the Council should recall that the southern African question, be it the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, the Namibian question, the brutal colonial policies of Portugal, or the Rhodesian rebellion, has, taking its aspects individually or together, been rightly determined as constituting a threat to international peace and security. The special responsibility to maintain international peace and security and to arrest situations that may threaten them falls on the Security Council, with the permanent members assuming a major role in this.

17. Yet, what is the posture of some key permanent members on the question before the Council? I will be disclosing no secrets in pointing out that short-term economic benefits in trade and investments, with cheap labour, amounting to a new form of slavery under the capitalism of the twentieth century, and military strategy juxtaposed with dying colonialism have regrettably, in the short run, won over principles, the Charter of the United Nations, international law, justice and morality. These are the overriding forces of the United States and the United Kingdom in their mis-exercise of the privilege of the veto, and hence perpetuation of the racial policies of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

18. May I remind the Council, however, that Africa, and Kenya for that matter, shall not give up until all Africa is free, and until a just order reigns in Southern Rhodesia, in the Territories under Portuguese rule, and in South Africa itself. The sooner all understand and accept this, the better it will be for all, so that a beginning in a constructive relationship of all races and peoples can be made.

19. In *The Observer* of London of 20 May 1973, the lobbying operations of the Rhodesian Government's information office in Washington are brought into question. The hosting of such an agency of an illegal régime in the United States, and according it facilities to propagate the views of the illegal régime, scores yet another black mark on the United States Government's handling of the Southern Rhodesian question. My delegation commends the investigation being carried out by United States citizens on the activities of the so-called Rhodesian information office in the United States. The position of my delegation is that any manifestation that would give the semblance of any Government recognizing the illegal Ian Smith clique should not be permitted to operate in any form by any Government in its territory, whether through Southern Rhodesian individuals or not. We would therefore urge all Governments to scrutinize closely the activities of individuals

believed to work for the Southern Rhodesian régime or to further its ends.

20. To sum up, we have before us two draft resolutions which have been under consideration by the Council since last week. It is the hope of my Government that the Governments represented here in the Council have had adequate time to study the two drafts and that, after reflection, members of this Council will react to them in a positive and credible manner which would help this Council take concrete and meaningful steps towards a solution of the Rhodesian question.

21. It will be recalled that one of the draft resolutions, document S/10927, is currently sponsored by Australia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. This is a support our delegation welcomes because it is a reflection of the enlightened concern and thinking that prevails amongst the majority of the members of this Council. My delegation hopes that more Member States will put their names as sponsors of the draft resolution, for the draft is nothing but a direct response to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 320 (1972), which urged the sanctions Committee to extend the scope and improve the effectiveness of sanctions. My delegation again hopes and trusts that this draft will be supported unanimously by the collective membership of the Council.

22. The second draft resolution is in document S/10928 and is another response to resolution 320 (1972), calling on the sanctions Committee to consider what action could "be taken in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions". In other words, this draft is not a bolt from the blue, but it answers a call made to the Committee by this Council itself. At the moment, this draft is sponsored by Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia. I would again appeal to more members of the Council to join us in sponsoring this draft so that whatever action the Council takes goes out to the world as a united and unanimous Council decision.

23. We meet in the shadow of the "velvet veto". We call it velvet because the deadly weapon is presented, as it were, in a velvet glove, giving the impression that it is being used to obstruct "precipitate and hasty actions on the part of irresponsible and hot-headed Afro-Asian delegations". It may again perhaps be worth while to concentrate for a moment or two on this brazen brandishing of the veto and to see whether its intended use would conform to the original ideas that led to its inscription in the Charter in those smoky chambers in San Francisco 27 years ago.

24. If the veto is used, as we fear it might very well be, its use will, in the humble opinion of my delegation, have the effect of nullifying the previous decisions of this Council, or at least frustrating them. As I explained earlier, the action envisaged in the draft in document S/10928 is in response to and is calculated to further an earlier Council decision to take meaningful steps to meet the situation whereby South Africa and Portugal persistently flout the decisions of the Council. It is the view of my delegation that such a veto will be exercised and executed to thwart the step-by-step consideration and action by this Council.

In the view of my delegation, this will be a very serious situation, in view of the Council's earlier verdict that the situation in southern Africa is a threat to international peace and security.

25. The posture of some of the big Powers here is, as we all know, designed to protect their capitalist interests in southern Africa. Those interests are of such paramount importance to them that the ideals enshrined in the Charter, the operations of the Security Council and so forth, could be subjugated to serve those interests. We have at the moment a permanent member of the Security Council openly defying the sanctions by importing minerals from Southern Rhodesia. But that very same country is doing more. We have situated right here in New York the office of Air Rhodesia; we have situated in Washington the Rhodesian information office, operated by two officers—Mr. Kenneth Towsey, and Mr. John Hooper. They have been operating that office since the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. One wonders, therefore, how serious some permanent members of the Security Council are when they proclaim to the world that they support United Nations action to put an end to the illegal régime in Rhodesia. We would again appeal to the United States Government to reconsider its action and close down those two offices and abandon the ill-fated open breach of sanctions.

26. There is today in southern Africa what actually amounts to a new form of slavery. What we have been trying to do all these years in the United Nations is to put an end to this slavery. This slavery is as odious, sordid and dehumanizing as that which men of faith and foresight campaigned against in the last century. People like Abraham Lincoln were faced with fierce opposition from racial fanatics, capitalists, and other vested interests, who were reaping enormous gains out of slavery, and it took a civil war in this country to put an end to slavery.

27. We cannot be expected to speak with moderation when it comes to the question of the enslavement of our people in Southern Rhodesia. That is because their enslavement is our enslavement. We cannot compromise with the evil forces which, in Southern Rhodesia, turn our people into chattels. We are up against what Prime Minister Heath has called "the unpleasant and unacceptable face of capitalism". We know that for the rebels in Rhodesia this capitalism is not ugly, for it means to them and affords them economic and political domination, comfort, wealth and profit. We equally know that for our people in Southern Rhodesia it brings humiliation, oppression, agony and poverty. We cannot abandon our brothers and sisters in Rhodesia, for their fate is our fate, and those who oppress them also oppress us. Let those who wish to compromise with these evils veto our draft resolution, and may God have mercy on their souls.

28. I should like to make a few brief comments on an editorial appearing in *The New York Times* of today, which I think bears some relevance to what the Council is now discussing. The heading of the editorial is "Priorities for Africans" and the editors of *The New York Times* are advising Africans to re-order their priorities correctly. We are being told that our opposition to racial and minority

régimes in southern Africa is a wrong priority. We should make it priority number ten, or perhaps give it no priority at all.

29. I am not surprised that this type of advice comes from *The New York Times*. It comes from those who believe that Africans do not know how to order their own business, nor how to order their own priorities. We are being told that, instead of obsessing ourselves with opposition against white minorities in southern Africa, we should put as priority number one the question of the famine now ravaging some parts of Africa, and perhaps, as number one also, we should halt the killing of Africans by other Africans for ethnic and tribal reasons. I must say that *The New York Times* has recognized the fact that the white rulers of South Africa are not holy, for the newspaper says: "The white rulers of South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique deserve the world's censure for repressing African majorities . . .". I do not know whether I should repeat that for the benefit of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, but they can read it for themselves.

30. My remarks are as follows. It is true that at the moment we have a calamity, a natural disaster: a drought which is going to afflict a number of African countries with famine. This is a disaster not of our making; it is a natural disaster. And instead of ridiculing us for falling victim to this natural disaster the editors of *The New York Times* should come out and help and appeal for help so that those of our people who are faced with famine can get some help and some comfort.

31. As regards the halting of the killing of Africans by other Africans for ethnic and tribal reasons, let me say that all countries in the world have their problems and we have ours. I do not want to compare our problems with problems existing in other countries. We are doing our best through the machinery of the Organization of African Unity to unify Africa and to ensure that peace reigns through understanding and through the abolition and overcoming of problems like tribalism and others which are still dividing our countries. We are doing our best within our means. Instead of ridiculing us, please join hands with us to help us unify our continent.

32. The Organization of African Unity is celebrating its tenth anniversary after an impressive record of achievements. Through the machinery of OAU we have avoided many disasters, many conflicts on the African continent, and OAU ought to be congratulated because I think it is the one and only regional organization with a membership of 41 States that is working smoothly and is showing results. I do not want to compare it with other regional organizations, but as far as we are concerned we are happy with its achievements.

33. As regards our obsession with our opposition to white minority rule in southern Africa, I should like to inform *The New York Times* that it is more than an obsession because to us it is a matter of life and death.

34. The PRESIDENT: As no other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I would suggest that the Council now proceed to vote on the two draft resolutions before it in

accordance with rule 32, first paragraph of the provisional rules of procedure, that is, in the order of their submission. As there is no objection I shall put to the vote first the draft resolution in document S/10927 and afterwards the draft resolution in document S/10928.

35. I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia in document S/10927.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Austria, China, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.¹

36. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes on the draft resolution just adopted before the Council votes on the second draft resolution.

37. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): When I explained my delegation's position on the second special report of the Committee [1714th meeting], I expressed our support for the suggestions contained in section III as well as our conviction that their adoption by the Council was a most urgent matter. This was our foremost consideration in voting in favour of the draft resolution in document S/10927 which proposes in operative paragraph 1 the approval of the recommendations and suggestions contained in paragraphs 10 to 22 of the report.

38. The resolution contains on the other hand a number of proposals drawn from section IV on which the Committee could not reach agreement. The Council will recall, however, that I referred to these proposals in expressing the hope of my delegation that further agreement can be reached on them and in expressing our readiness to co-operate in such an effort. My delegation has also stated in paragraph 36 of the report that it could support some of the proposals on which there was no agreement but that it had difficulty with some others because of their incompatibility with present Austrian legislation.

39. Let me say in this context that, with many other delegations, we share the belief that appropriate legislation is without any doubt a useful instrument within the context of preventing sanctions violations. Nevertheless, we have to take into account the differing legal orders of Member States, which might make certain specific legislation difficult to enact. This, however, would in no way prevent them from taking other measures, legislative or administrative, which could achieve the same aims.

¹ See resolution 333 (1973).

40. Therefore my delegation understands the proposals in question as an invitation to seek, within the Austrian legal order, adequate legislative solutions to achieve the aims behind the relevant parts of the resolution. With this understanding, and in order to express our full support for the political objectives behind this and previous resolutions of the Council on the same matter, namely, the ending of the rebellion against the British Crown in Salisbury, and to give the people of Zimbabwe the right of self-determination at the earliest possible moment, my delegation has voted in favour of the draft resolution.

41. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to state the position of the Soviet Union on the substance of the question of Southern Rhodesia and on the second special report of the Committee on Southern Rhodesia during the discussion of this item in the Security Council.

42. In relation to the question of Southern Rhodesia, the Soviet Union is guided by the fundamental Leninist position of support for peoples struggling against imperialism, colonialism and racism. In the United Nations, the Soviet Union supports all proposals which are genuinely designed to achieve the earliest possible elimination of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, to give the Zimbabwe people an opportunity to enjoy its lawful and inalienable right to freedom, independence and sovereignty, and to ensure the implementation of Security Council decisions and the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in respect of that people.

43. The discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council has clearly demonstrated that the situation in that country does indeed cause serious concern to the world community, and above all to the countries of Africa. The distinguished representatives of Kenya, the Sudan, Somalia and Guinea, speaking in the Council, have convincingly demonstrated that the policies of the colonial racist régime in Salisbury are becoming increasingly harsh, despite the decisions taken and the efforts made by the United Nations. This inevitably leads to a deterioration of the situation both in Southern Rhodesia and in southern Africa as a whole.

44. The situation is made still worse by the fact that the racist régime of Ian Smith continues to exist as a result of military, political, financial and economic support from certain Western countries and international imperialist monopolies, in circumvention and violation of United Nations decisions.

45. The Soviet delegation has already referred to the particularly sinister and pernicious role played by South Africa and Portugal in the provision of direct support to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia, and this was fully confirmed in the statements by the representatives of the African countries.

46. The Council cannot fail to take all this into account in considering the recommendations submitted by the Committee on Southern Rhodesia and in adopting a decision on these recommendations.

47. The Soviet delegation wishes to confirm its view that in the light of the actual situation in Southern Rhodesia and southern Africa, the recommendations of the Committee on Southern Rhodesia cannot be regarded as fully satisfactory. However, since the sponsors of the draft resolution requested support for the text they submitted, the delegation of the Soviet Union, taking this fact into account, voted in favour of the draft resolution just adopted by the Council, with the reservations I have stated.

48. The PRESIDENT: If no other representatives wish to explain their votes, the Council will now vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/10928, submitted by Guinea, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, China, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, France.

The result of the vote was 11 in favour, 2 against, with 2 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative votes being those of permanent members.

49. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in explanation of vote.

50. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of France wishes to explain its vote on the two draft resolutions.

51. In regard to the first draft resolution, it goes without saying that we could have voted in favour of the provisions contained therein had they been limited to approving section III of the special report, with which we are, nevertheless, determined to comply. We regret that, in the Council, procedures which were not the subject of a consensus in the Committee were reintroduced. The result was that we had to abstain.

52. As we indicated very clearly in our statement on 16 May [1713th meeting], we are in favour of strengthening sanctions against Rhodesia, and we wish to recall that we voted for them at the request of the administering Power and in order to meet the expectations of Africa on condition that an agreement could be reached on the practical modalities for the application of sanctions, a prerequisite for their actual effectiveness. In this spirit we proposed that in the text of the draft resolution contained in document S/10927 there be introduced amendments to take account of the concern we had expressed to the sponsors. The latter, however, did not see fit to accept the changes we had hoped for. Therefore the delegation of France felt compelled to maintain the position that it had consistently upheld in the Committee.

53. I would add that, for our part, we confirm the commitments we undertook in 1966 when the sanctions were voted. This follows from the explanations we gave in the Committee and the clarification we gave when it debated certain points. Furthermore, we are now studying measures intended to make possible a firmer application of sanctions in so far as this is compatible with the needs of international trade. This means that our abstention on this first draft resolution is not and cannot be interpreted as inaction. We have reservations on the procedures proposed as a result of the Committee's work but we have no reservations in regard to implementing stronger sanctions.

54. As regards the draft resolution contained in document S/10928, the French delegation indicated in the course of its previous statement why it could not endorse the provisions contained therein.

55. Mr. CHUANG YEN (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese representative, Mr. Huang Hua, pointed out in his earlier statement [1715th meeting] that the two draft resolutions before the Security Council were only preliminary measures for strengthening and expanding the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Regrettably, however, the second draft resolution has been vetoed by two permanent members, the United Kingdom and the United States. This cannot but offer food for deep thought.

56. Certain representatives who are stubbornly against the second draft resolution have kept on saying that they are also "in favour of strengthening sanctions against Southern Rhodesia" and have even stated on many occasions that they are "second to none" in implementing the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. They also admit that the South African and Portuguese authorities are doing their utmost to undermine sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; they too notice the "plain fact" that many products from Southern Rhodesia have been exported under the cover of South African or Portuguese certificates. They say that they are in favour of stalling all illegal trade with Southern Rhodesia so as to implement thoroughly the relevant resolutions. They allege that "paper sanctions are useless", which implies that they intend earnestly to strengthen the sanctions in deed.

57. These words sound so nice that people have expected that their deeds would be consistent with their words and that they would translate their pious wishes into action. Unfortunately, when it comes to concrete acts, they have completely changed: They will say, "This will not do" and "That cannot be done either". They say either that the suggested measures are "inoperative" or "have brought practical and legal difficulties". In short, they are unwilling either to stop their open violations of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia or to strengthen and expand the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

58. No amount of flowery words can cover up their true features of saying yes and meaning no. Since they have arbitrarily vetoed such an elementary draft resolution, it is not difficult to see even more clearly what force is obstinately working to obstruct the adoption of effective measures against the Southern Rhodesia racist régime and what force is abetting and supporting the authorities of

Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal in violating the sanctions and in forming a reactionary alliance for joint suppression of the national liberation movements of the people of Zimbabwe and southern Africa. They can in no way shirk the responsibility for their criminal acts. In so doing, they can only make the people of Zimbabwe and the whole of southern Africa further enhance their political consciousness, get united, cast away illusions and redouble their efforts to carry on struggles. In this sense, the current event will undoubtedly serve as a useful lesson for the African people.

59. Mr. SEN (India): After the moving and cogent statement by our friend and colleague from Kenya, with whom I of course agree, there is not very much I want to say on the merits of these two draft resolutions. I should like, however, to explain briefly our attitude towards the second draft resolution, which we supported.

60. In our view, that draft resolution did not ask for extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal; so there need not have been any hesitation or any illusion that by adopting it we would be imposing sanctions against South Africa and Portugal. My delegation would have been very happy to agree to any such sanctions. In fact, as is well known, India has no trade with South Africa or Portugal. What we were asking for in that draft resolution was implementation of sanctions already agreed upon, and I was under the impression that all members of the Council had already agreed on the need to redouble our efforts to implement those sanctions.

61. The negative votes cast today against that draft resolution simply mean that those members who tell us again and again about the need for effective implementation really do not wish to take the concrete steps which were suggested in the draft resolution.

62. What were the three concrete steps in that draft resolution? One was to respect the trading level in terms of 1965 figures. If the 1965 figures are supposed to be troublesome, let us have an increase of 10 per cent over those of the last eight years. We could allow for that, perhaps. But there is no such desire. Yet we all know that more and more stuff is going to various countries through South Africa and Portugal.

63. When, therefore, we talk about blatant violations having been brought to our notice and we suggest measures to stop those violations, we seem to be paralysed by the veto. No reasons are given, and therefore we are entitled to draw the conclusion that those who voted for sanctions do not wish to enforce them. What it means in terms of eventual majority rule in Zimbabwe is that the people of that country, as indeed of Africa as a whole, must redouble their efforts to wrest power by violence. Now the Council will know, as will indeed the outside world, who has encouraged this state of affairs, in spite of their protestations that violence must be given up in order to achieve political settlement. I am, of course, assuming that the illegal régime of Smith will not countenance any just and civilized solution through negotiations with the majority of black people.

64. In a very quick review, I find that the Council has passed 11 resolutions on this subject. In addition, on a related subject the General Assembly has adopted six resolutions referred to it by the Council. If despite all these efforts there is no desire to implement the measures for sanctions, I think it would be right to give the widest publicity to our decision today and to prove that all that the Council has done until now for imposing sanctions has not really been meant seriously.

65. Mr. MOJISOV (Yugoslavia): In my statement before the Council on Monday, 14 May [1712th meeting], I clearly stated the Yugoslav delegation's views and position concerning the whole Southern Rhodesian situation in the context of the over-all developments in the south of Africa, concerning the role of the United Nations sanctions policies in securing the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe and, particularly, concerning sections III and IV of the Committee's second special report and the decisions that the Council, as we saw it, should therefore adopt.

66. It was in keeping with those views and that position of our delegation, and it was along the lines of Yugoslavia's essential stands on African matters and its friendly relations with African and non-aligned States, that we sponsored from the outset the two draft resolutions contained in documents S/10927 and S/10928.

67. We are now reasonably gratified by the very impressive adoption of the first draft resolution because it contains the recommendations and suggestions forming section III of the report. That part, those recommendations, although inadequate when confronted with the present-day realities of wholesale sanctions violations, do constitute an advance and an improvement, and the main reason for the violations of the sanctions is, as was stated in Security Council resolution 320 (1972) "the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions".

68. But we are almost more heartened by the fact that the Council recognized that it should take several steps more and that it was able to correct the situation to a certain degree by adopting the text that, in addition to the recommendations and suggestions in section III, contained some important African proposals from the unagreed section IV. This, perhaps, proves once more that persistence in the pursuance of a good and right cause can often bring better results than those that seemed possible in the first place.

69. As one of the sponsors of the text just adopted, we appreciate the understanding and co-operation of all those who made that advance possible, however modest it may be. Of course, as has been stated here so often by everybody, everything depends on the political will of all of us, of all States, to implement the resolutions of the Security Council regardless of how good they might be in themselves.

70. We sponsored the second draft resolution because we fully adhered to the idea contained in its third preambular paragraph, that there was an "urgent and simultaneous need for more stringent measures in order to meet the requirements of paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972)". We

thought, and think, that that second draft resolution was complementary to the first one we have just adopted, that in it was contained the further logical step—the concrete measures for the extension of sanctions. All its operative paragraphs, from 1 to 5, contained the decisions and requirements that simply have to become an inseparable part of the United Nations sanctions policies if they are to become more effective, with more telling effects. Let me here add that that draft resolution would have answered the Council's directive in its resolution 320 (1972) asking the Committee, *inter alia*, to submit proposals and suggestions for "extending the scope" of sanctions. The second draft resolution, which was not adopted because of the negative votes of two permanent members of the Council, stopped well short of asking for an extension of the sanctions themselves against South Africa and Portugal. May I recall that it was my Government's view, officially expressed to the United Nations, that "sanctions against Southern Rhodesia can be fully effective only if they are applied against Portugal and South Africa as well".

71. In regretting very much the Council's inability to adopt this second draft resolution, although a large majority of members supported it, I would just mention that the Committee and the Council have been able in the past to adopt later what earlier seemed impossible. The Council can and should therefore return to the matters and proposals contained in the second draft resolution.

72. We think that there are ample reasons to believe—and that that has been the case all along here—that the Council is progressively becoming more and more ready to give wider and wider support to the just cause of the liberation of all the peoples of Africa. The fact that the first draft resolution was, uniquely, sponsored by nine members, which is an important event perhaps without precedent in the Council's history, is most encouraging in that respect.

73. On the whole, the outcome of the consideration of the second special report, while disappointing in some important aspects, does represent a step forward, in my opinion, a step that can materially contribute to the more effective implementation of better sanctions policies. As I have already said, that will require persistent political readiness and struggle to make them effective. We are confident that the forthcoming meetings of the Organization of African Unity and the summit of the non-aligned countries will contribute to that.

74. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): I much regret that the sponsors found it necessary to press to the vote the draft resolutions in documents S/10927 and S/10928 despite the fact that they go beyond the agreed conclusions of the report submitted to us by the sanctions Committee and that they were introduced without prior consultation.

75. As I said in my statement on 18 May [1715th meeting], the logical and effective course would have been for the Council to consolidate on the substantial area of agreement which is reflected in the report, whose practical recommendations we do indeed welcome and will support. A unanimously adopted resolution would have had a real impact, not least on those who doubt the willingness or the ability of the Council to achieve the proper application of the sanctions provided for in resolution 253 (1968). How-

ever, once that course was not adopted, it can hardly have come as a surprise to find that my delegation would have to abstain on one draft resolution since we could not vote for a draft resolution containing certain proposals which we would not think it right to put into effect and, if necessary, to cast a negative vote on the other.

76. It is the report of the sanctions Committee which we have been discussing. I shall refrain from following other speakers into a discussion of the Rhodesian situation as a whole or of the general question of the veto. I must however point out that my Government's position on the question of sanctions, and more specifically on the extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal, was made abundantly clear throughout the prolonged discussions in the sanctions Committee of the report we have been debating. It has indeed been made clear whenever the question of sanctions has been discussed here. I made it clear in my statement before Security Council resolution 320 (1972) was adopted on 29 September last year [1666th meeting], explaining my delegation's attitude towards certain paragraphs of that resolution, in the vote on which my delegation abstained. I made it clear again in addressing the Council last Friday.

77. It has been suggested that the wording of resolution 320 (1972) somehow commits the Council to deciding on an extension of sanctions to South Africa and Portugal and that this has been frustrated by my delegation's attitude in the sanctions Committee and here in the Council. That really is rather far-fetched. There seem to be two arguments. The first concerns the instruction to the Committee, in paragraph 4 of resolution 320 (1972), to consider the type of action to be taken "in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions". This, of course, is just what the Committee did; and it gave us agreed recommendations which reflect the perhaps obvious conclusion that "in view of the open and persistent refusal of South Africa and Portugal to implement sanctions", all Governments professing to support sanctions must be diligent to ensure that their countries' trade with southern Africa is legitimate trade. The second argument seems to hinge on the instructions in paragraph 5 of resolution 320 (1972) requesting the Committee to examine and report on proposals for extending the scope of sanctions. This too is what the Committee did; it examined a number of proposals in this sense, but as the report makes clear there was no unanimity on them. To argue that in order to conform with the terms of resolution 320 (1972) any proposal which is made and examined has to be adopted is really going too far.

78. As I have said, I do not intend to go beyond the report of the sanctions Committee into a discussion of the Rhodesian situation as a whole. But I must make it quite clear that my delegation firmly rejects the charges of collusion and ill faith which have been made against my Government and its predecessors. I repeat that their purpose remains the purpose which is common to us all: a just and acceptable settlement of the problem of Southern Rhodesia.

79. I would only add that the prospects would be greatly improved if the Council could ensure the effective applica-

tion of the present sanctions as provided for in resolution 253 (1968). That is why I deeply regret that it has not been possible for us to put our differences on one side and adopt unanimously a resolution reflecting the agreed proposals in the sanctions Committee's report.

80. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): My delegation has voted in favour of the draft resolutions in documents S/10927 and S/10928. The first draft resolution, which my delegation has sponsored, endorses the recommendations and suggestions of the sanctions Committee and also draws on the Committee's report to make a number of other practical suggestions, which my delegation can readily accept, regarding ways in which appropriate regulatory measures can be used to impede further the flow of trade into and out of Southern Rhodesia.

81. The second draft resolution, in document S/10928, is the kind of measure that I foreshadowed in my statement here last week [1714th meeting] when I said that if States did not play their full part in applying the existing range of sanctions, the Council would find itself having to consider more drastic steps. The vote just taken has shown that this draft resolution is at present too far-reaching to be acceptable to two members, whose negative vote is to be regretted. I wish to make it clear that had it been adopted and its provisions generally applied, my Government would have been prepared to co-operate fully in seeking to apply them.

82. Mr. SCALI (United States of America): When I spoke in the Council on 16 May [1713th meeting], I underlined the importance that my Government places on the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Looking at the draft resolution in document S/10927 as a whole, I wish to emphasize that my delegation is in sympathy with its general aims. We strongly hope that the recommendations it contains will contribute significantly to making sanctions more effective. We would, therefore, have liked very much to have voted in favour of the draft resolution, but were unable to do so because of our domestic legislation and practical problems with some of its recommendations which were discussed but not agreed to in the sanctions Committee.

83. The importation of certain strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia into the United States has again been raised in the Council. I wish it noted that these materials in 1972 amounted to less than 5 per cent of the projected total of Rhodesian export earnings for that year. My Government has co-operated with the sanctions Committee in fully reporting these imports. We wish other importers of Rhodesian commodities would do the same. We would then know a great deal more than we know now about how Southern Rhodesia is surviving sanctions. This does not detract, however, from our complete support for the recommendations for improving sanctions made in paragraphs 10 through 22 of the sanctions Committee's second special report. We are also fully in favour of paragraphs 2 and 8 of the resolution. In particular, we believe the information called for in paragraph 8 will prove useful in evaluating the sanctions programme and we hope all States will co-operate.

84. Our difficulties with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 were made clear by my delegation during the sanctions Committee's long deliberations, and there is no need to elaborate further. However, I wish to assure this Council that we will adhere strictly to the basic purposes and intents of these paragraphs.

85. The subject of the sale of three Boeing aircraft to Southern Rhodesia has been raised by several speakers during these meetings of the Security Council. The United States representative noted before the sanctions Committee on 16 April that three Boeing aircraft, actually 720s, had appeared in Southern Rhodesia. It was explained that the United States had authorized neither the sale of any Boeing aircraft to Southern Rhodesia nor the re-export of such aircraft to Rhodesia. I can add that the United States will not authorize the servicing of these aircraft or the sale of spare parts. It was also explained that the United States would look into the details of when and how the sale took place. This investigation continues and we assume that Governments whose nationals may be involved are also looking into the matter.

86. There is less to say about the second draft resolution, contained in document S/10928. We regret that it was introduced for Council consideration. It includes several proposals that were debated fully in the sanctions Committee, on which my delegation and others expressed their strong reservations. While we can well understand the sentiment behind the draft resolution, we consider it unrealistic to call for broader sanctions until the full membership of the United Nations has demonstrated its willingness to take more seriously the sanctions already in force. In the circumstances we do not believe this draft resolution would enhance the ability of the United Nations to act effectively. In our view, to adopt a resolution which is clearly unenforceable will seriously damage the reputation and credibility of the United Nations and further erode public confidence in United Nations ability to act in a meaningful way.

87. This consideration, and this consideration alone, underlies my Government's decision to vote against the draft resolution. Those who impute other motives stray far, far, far from the facts and I reject these accusations. They have no foundation and deserve no further reply.

88. Mr. GONTHA (Indonesia): After the statements of the other sponsors and supporters of the draft resolutions in documents S/10927 and S/10928, my delegation will be very brief since we made our views quite clear during our intervention last week [1713th meeting].

89. My delegation is of the opinion that the two draft resolutions only tried to comply with the requests in paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 320 (1972) as the logical and positive response to that resolution. The substantive parts of those two draft resolutions are in line with the recommendations and suggestions of the Committee contained in its second special report. As we stated earlier in the debate, my delegation is not entirely satisfied with the recommendations and suggestions. We would have been happier if the proposals submitted by the African members could have been adopted in their entirety.

90. The debates in the Council have clearly demonstrated that the sanctions are being inadequately implemented. The latter must be attributed to the loop-holes in the present system that provide the opportunity for certain forces to defy strict and complete implementation of those sanctions. If, therefore, we seriously desire the sanctions to become more effective than has been the case, it will be imperative to plug those loop-holes wherever they exist. My delegation therefore very much regrets that the draft resolution in document S/10928 has been vetoed, since adoption by the Council of both draft resolutions would have helped a great deal towards the plugging of those loop-holes.

91. Of course, we understand that the problem of the elimination of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia will not dissolve merely by the adoption of sanctions. The problem is certainly more complicated than that. On the other hand, the adoption of both draft resolutions would have been proof to the world and especially to the people of Zimbabwe of the serious concern and support of the Security Council for the just struggle of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia.

92. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. Malik intended to speak himself, but in view of the lateness of the hour and the fact that he had other obligations, he asked me to make the following statement.

93. The Soviet delegation associates itself with the statements of the representatives of African and other countries which are members of the Security Council who expressed dissatisfaction at the latest instance of obstruction by the United Kingdom, with United States support, of the adoption of a resolution on Rhodesia. The delegation of the United Kingdom used an unjust veto against the adoption of this draft resolution. The United Kingdom has once again shown the world whose side it is on, who it is protecting, and whose advantage it is working for. By its vote against this draft resolution, the United Kingdom delegation has yet again shown that the United Kingdom callously and cynically ignores the national interests of the Zimbabwe people, which is groaning under the heel of bloody racism. It is protecting the racist Smith régime which oppresses and exploits that people.

94. This latest veto by the United Kingdom is yet another unjust veto on its part. It is the United Kingdom's fifth veto in the Security Council on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

95. What prevented the United Kingdom delegation from voting in favour of this draft resolution proposed by African and other countries? Let us make no bones about it, the draft was more than modest. It provided for further curtailment of the possibilities of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia of transporting its goods to other countries. This draft resolution, which did not even directly proclaim sanctions against South Africa and Portugal, called simply for curtailment of purchases of goods from those

countries, in order to prevent them from reselling Southern Rhodesian goods.

96. The adoption of such measures would not have contradicted the oral statements by the United Kingdom Government that it is in favour of the application of sanctions. By voting against this draft resolution, the United Kingdom has shown yet again that it says one thing, but in fact acts contrary to its declared intentions.

97. Thus, the triple alliance of Salisbury, Pretoria and Lisbon, that stronghold of imperialism, reaction, colonialism and racism in the south of the African continent, has again been defended, in the United Nations and in the Security Council, by two permanent members of the Security Council.

98. But no one can halt the onward march of history. Whatever obstacles are put in its path, whatever help the Southern Rhodesian racists receive from their overt and covert friends, the Zimbabwe people, with the support of all freedom-loving peoples of the world, will achieve inevitable and irreversible victory in its just struggle against colonialism and racism, and will win its right to freedom, independence and sovereignty. And the Zimbabwe people will never forget those who, when it was facing a difficult time, uttered words of sympathy for it, while in fact siding with and helping its enemies.

99. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Having heard all the flattering statements and the rather overwhelming justifications, we were in fact right in insisting on a vote on the two draft resolutions. The outcome of the discussions has proved that the illusion of sanctions could only lead to the embarrassing situation of the United Kingdom, which has proposed this measure that in fact was designed to assist it to protect those who are violating the economic blockade against the rebel colony of Zimbabwe and those who proclaim their support for the struggle of the peoples while at the same time helping those who are selling the cannons to be used to crush them. This illusion of sanctions, I repeat, is also a manoeuvre designed to maintain and strengthen the Ian Smith régime in order to enable new proposals to be made, proposals based on selective suffrage rather than on the universal suffrage demanded by the Zimbabwe people.

100. Another lesson that we have learned from these discussions is that those who are against the economic war are the very ones who are the instigators of a racial war, a war of liberation which, as we all know, has already begun in Rhodesia and is raging in southern Africa as well as in the other territories in Africa that are still not independent. It is the same Powers also which, by their support for the white minority régimes in southern Africa, provoke the independent States neighbours of those colonies. The independent neighbouring States of Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique, Angola and Namibia have been the victims of repeated aggressions in recent times and are constantly expecting them to be repeated. But what is certain is that the peoples of Africa are determined not only to defend their national sovereignty but also to do everything in their power to hasten the liberation of peoples that are still subjugated.

101. Articles in the press, which are but the reflection of the political and social environment of the countries where they are published, cannot intimidate us. We call on the authors to echo this morning's double veto—a double veto that will be noted by the Council of Ministers which is now meeting in Addis Ababa, and by the people of Zimbabwe. We invite those journalists to cover the debate extensively, but what matters, what is essential for us, is not the veto but the overwhelming support the two draft resolutions received this morning, which proves resoundingly that history does not lie, that history always favours just causes and people who fight for their liberation, whichever colonizing Power is involved and despite alliances.

102. Mr. ODERO-JOWI (Kenya): I should only like to thank the members of the Council which voted with us on the two draft resolutions. I should like particularly to mention the two permanent members of the Council—the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China—which were good enough to support our position in the two draft resolutions.

103. I do not know whether to thank the two permanent members of the Council which vetoed the draft resolution in document S/10928, because what they are trying to work against, what they are opposing, is inevitable. These changes will take place and justice will prevail in Rhodesia and ultimately in South Africa, whether they like it or not. This is a lesson of history which, I am sure, every one of them knows. But by refusing to take the same stand as we Africans who are familiar with what is going on in Southern Rhodesia, they have merely rejected the position of negotiation. However, they have created a situation in which the people of Africa, and indeed the people of Zimbabwe, will now learn that they have no friends in some members of this Council. This will give them the determination to fight even more. What I regret is for this Council to treat the situation the way it has been treated because by this veto we have left the people of Zimbabwe with no alternative except to fight.

104. The Security Council was established precisely to try to pre-empt situations such as the one we are now running

into. But perhaps this is the way it should go, namely, that the people of Zimbabwe must fight and shed blood in order to win their independence and gain dignity for themselves. And in that sense I should like to say to the two permanent members of the Council that they have done a job. It is not enough to reject our arguments and to accuse us of imputing improper motives when we know that what we say is a fact. The three Boeing jetliners did not descend into Rhodesia from heaven. They were not sent by Satan from hell. They came from some country in the world where there are corporations, individuals and Governments willing to connive and work in collusion to break the sanctions. That is what happened and that is what we are pointing out.

105. The PRESIDENT: There are no further names on the list of speakers. I shall, with the Council's consent, say a few words as the representative of the SUDAN.

106. I would not wish to add anything since our position has been made clear during this debate and before. I wish only to join my colleague from Kenya in expressing our sincerest wishes to all those who gave the African cause their full support during this debate.

107. I wish also to add that the aim of draft resolution S/10928 is really a genuine attempt to strengthen sanctions a little bit further and to hurry up the emancipation of the people of Zimbabwe. It is most regrettable that this draft resolution was not adopted because of the negative votes. But I should like to say that the negative vote will not deter the African group and its friends from continuing in the Council for the same purposes which they have initiated. Of course, that means we will continue to test the sincerity of those who share our views and differ from us regarding the methods. Lastly, I think the negative vote is not really a lost one because I am sure its political implication is that it gives an impetus and added stimulus to the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe to escalate their struggle for liberation.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

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