

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

**1692<sup>nd</sup>** MEETING: 8 MARCH 1973

NEW YORK

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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1692) .....	1
Statement by the President .....	1
Adoption of the agenda .....	2
Complaint by Zambia:	
Report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) (S/10896 and Add.1) .....	2

## NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 8 March 1973, at 3.30 p.m.

*President:* Mr. Aquilino E. BOYD (Panama).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1692)

#### 1. Adoption of the agenda.

#### 2. Complaint by Zambia:

Report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) (S/10896 and Add.1).

*The meeting was called to order at 3.55 p.m.*

### Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before we start consideration of the question on which we are meeting today, I should like to refer briefly to three events which have shaken the international community since the Security Council last met.

2. First, on 21 February a Libyan commercial aircraft was shot down by Israeli fighter planes in Sinai, a tragedy in which 106 innocent civilians lost their lives. The Republic of Panama, like almost all the countries of the world, expressed—through its head of Government, General Omar Torrijos—its vehement censure of this act and extended its most sincere condolences to the families of the victims. Regarding this question, the representative of Egypt, Mr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, has requested us to circulate a letter from his Government dated 2 March [S/10893]. On the same item the representative of Israel, Mr. Yosef Tekoah, has requested us to circulate a letter from his Government dated 5 March [S/10895].

3. Secondly, the International Conference on Viet-Nam was held in Paris from 26 February to 2 March. Besides the 12 participants, the Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, was invited to attend those meetings so that they could be held in his presence, as was recorded in the Final Act. In one part of that document it is also established that any violation of the cease-fire in Viet-Nam must be reported to the United Nations. We place on record our gratitude for the explanation given on 6 March last by the Secretary-General to members of the Security Council on the outstanding events of the Paris Conference, and we also

congratulate him for his responsible, serious and dignified conduct at that Conference.

4. Thirdly, mankind was still commenting on the horror of the Libyan plane tragedy when, on 2 March, the Black September organization cruelly assassinated three distinguished diplomats—two North Americans and one Belgian—in the Saudi Arabian Embassy in the Sudan. In a cable on that very day, we communicated our condolences to the representatives of the United States and Belgium.

5. We are concerned that violence may recur in the Middle East, and we should like to do something to prevent it. Our earnest desire is to work zealously for a just and lasting peace in that afflicted area.

6. We are fully aware of the great responsibility and honour entailed in being President of the Security Council when we are about to discuss matters of great importance, in order to prepare ourselves for the proper functioning of the meetings scheduled to be held in Panama from 15 to 21 March.

7. Last year we had an opportunity to co-operate with a view to ensuring the success of the meetings held away from Headquarters, on the African continent. Those meetings, in our opinion, proved to be very useful, not only for the countries of the area but also for the third world and mankind in general. We are sure that that experience will serve us in discharging the task entrusted to us and we are most grateful for the support given us by our colleagues on the Council—in particular the delegation of Peru—the Latin American Group, the African Group, the countries of Asia and the Arab world.

8. So far we are assured of the presence at the meetings of the Security Council in Panama of nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs: those of Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. We are certain that the presence of more than half of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the region will ensure the lofty level that will serve as an inspiration for our debates.

9. The technical and administrative preparations have been carried out in the desired manner, with the co-operation of the Secretariat and the Government of Panama, in accordance with its commitments, has taken every step to guarantee the atmosphere of order, peace and calm required for the serious work which we intend to do. We are certain that we shall achieve positive results from these meetings in Panama and that our trip to the Isthmus will be useful in eliminating threats to peace and in preventing situations of tension from becoming dangerous conflicts.

10. It is our intention to exercise the presidency of the Security Council with a clear sense of impartiality and within the provisions of the rules of procedure so as to promote by our deeds the good will and good understanding that should exist among the delegations in the Council and in the international community in general.

11. We wish to express our appreciation for the wise and courteous manner in which the outgoing President, Ambassador Odero-Jowi of Kenya, guided our debates.

12. Departing from the traditional procedure, I should like, as President, to express appreciation once again for the fact that the historical decision which we have taken, to meet for the first time on the Latin American continent, was in large measure the result of the intelligence, tact and firmness with which our work was guided in the month of January by the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Anwar Sani.

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

### Complaint by Zambia

**Report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) (S/10896 and Add.1)**

13. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): In accordance with the decisions taken by the Council when it considered this item last month [1687th meeting], I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representative of Zambia to take a place at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. P. J. F. Lusaka (Zambia) took a place at the Council table.*

14. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Again in accordance with our previous decisions [1687th, 1689th and 1690th meetings] I propose now, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Ghana, Morocco, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Chile, Algeria, Senegal, Egypt, Somalia, Cuba, Cameroon and Guyana to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber in order to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the item on our agenda under the terms of Article 31 of the Charter. It is understood that they will be invited to take a place at the Council table when they wish to speak.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. A. Rahal (Algeria), Mr. R. Alarcón (Cuba), Mr. A. Teymour (Egypt), Mr. L. Samuels (Guyana), Mr. M. Fall (Senegal), Mr. S. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania) and Mr. Ipoto Eyebu Bakandasi (Zaire) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.*

15. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before calling on the first speaker on the list, I would draw

the attention of representatives to the report of the Security Council Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973). That report, which is contained in document S/10896 and Add.1, will be the subject of our consideration.

16. The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Anwar Sani, Chairman of the Special Mission, who will introduce the report.

17. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): Mr. President, before I introduce the report of the Special Mission allow me, on behalf of my delegation, to express my great satisfaction at seeing you, Sir, in the Chair in your capacity as President of the Security Council for this month. Indonesia remembers with appreciation and gratitude the efficient and effective way you presided over the difficult and delicate concluding debates on the problem of West Irian during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969, and how you guided the discussions to a successful conclusion. Recently we witnessed your capable handling of the invitation extended by your Government to the Security Council to meet in Panama, which led to its acceptance by the Council. My delegation is therefore convinced that, under your able and experienced guidance, the Council can look forward to a fruitful month of work and achievement here and in Panama. To that end, my delegation promises you its full support and co-operation.

18. I should like also to take this opportunity to express the appreciation and thanks of my delegation to the outgoing President, our colleague from Kenya, Ambassador Odero-Jowi, who successfully guided the work of the Council during the month of February in a most efficient and capable manner.

19. Turning now to the business before us, I have the honour to submit, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, for the consideration of the Security Council the report of the Special Mission established under resolution 326 (1973) of 2 February 1973.

20. It may be recalled that paragraph 9 of that resolution decided to:

"dispatch immediately a special mission, consisting of four members of the Security Council, to be appointed by the President of the Security Council after consultations with the members, to assess the situation in the area",

that area being, of course, the regions near the border between Zambia and the Territory of Southern Rhodesia. The Council will furthermore recall that the Special Mission was also directed by paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 327 (1973) of the same date "to assess the needs of Zambia, in maintaining alternative systems of road, rail, air and sea communications for the normal flow of traffic", in which task it was to be assisted by a team of six United Nations experts.

21. It was a great honour for me to have been chosen by my colleagues to be Chairman of such an important mission. It was a privilege as well as a pleasure to carry out

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently published as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-eighth Year, Special Supplement No. 2*.

the Mission's duties together with such esteemed colleagues and friends as representatives on the Security Council, Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch of Austria, Ambassador Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru, and Ambassador Rahmatalla Abdulla of the Sudan. The participation and intellectual contributions of these colleagues made it possible for the Special Mission to work productively in an atmosphere of friendship and congeniality. I welcome this opportunity to thank them again for their valuable co-operation.

22. I should like also to take this opportunity to thank the very competent team of United Nations economic experts, headed by Professor Gordon Goundrey of Canada, without whose dedicated efforts our report would not have been possible. May I also express the Mission's gratitude to the devoted and competent members of the Secretariat who accompanied us, thus making a meaningful contribution to the successful accomplishment of our task. It would not be proper to conclude these acknowledgements without expressing the profound appreciation and gratitude of the Mission to the Governments of the United Kingdom, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya and to their officials who collaborated so whole-heartedly with our efforts to carry out our assignment and who have provided the information on which our report is based. The officials of those Governments who helped us during the work of our Mission are too numerous to mention by name, but we wish to extend to each of them our gratitude for their assistance.

23. The members of the Special Mission hope that the members of the Security Council will read our report in full; we believe it merits such attention. However, I should like to mention briefly a few pertinent points. I have in mind chapter VII: "Assessment under Security Council resolution 326 (1973)" and chapter VIII: "Assessment under Security Council resolution 327 (1973)".

24. In our assessment, as called for by resolution 326 (1973), the Special Mission was able to ascertain that a considerable measure of tension continued to exist in the area, the origins of which did not stem exclusively from recent events on the Zambian/Southern Rhodesian border. It is necessary to bear in mind also the situation pertaining to the whole of southern Africa. The developments with which the Security Council has been seized are, in great part, a result of the denial of the right to self-determination to the majority of the African peoples living under the domination of the racist, minority and colonial régimes in southern Africa. None the less, the state of tension has been heightened to a measurable degree following the provocative and aggressive acts committed by the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia against the Republic of Zambia. The effects of those acts were reflected in the political, military and economic fields. The considered view of the Zambian Government is that it is unable to exercise any influence over the activities of liberation movements inside Territories subjected to colonialism, racism and minority rule. It could not, therefore, be held responsible for developments occurring in those Territories.

25. The state of tension in the area is aggravated by the military preparations confronting large portions of Zambia's frontier along the Zambezi river and by incidents

along the border. A recurrence of those events could lead to a dangerous escalation of already existing tension and could have an adverse effect on the attitude of restraint adopted so far by Zambia. The continued deployment of South African armed forces in the proximity of the border with Zambia and their undented presence in other neighbouring Territories is also a very significant factor in prolonging the current state of tension.

26. The Special Mission believes that the key to the solution of these problems lies in the implementation of mandatory sanctions against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia, as well as of other relevant resolutions of the Security Council with regard to the whole area, and in the application of majority rule in the Territory of Southern Rhodesia.

27. In its assessment under Security Council resolution 327 (1973), the Special Mission estimated, in quantitative terms, specific needs of Zambia to maintain alternative systems of road, rail, air and sea communications for the normal flow of traffic. Rather than going into details, I prefer to leave it to the members of the Council to study those needs. I should like to emphasize, however, that they are of considerable magnitude; for example, the original capital costs alone are already estimated at \$124 million, while higher transport costs would amount to about \$50 million annually. Moreover, at the beginning, additional air freight requirements would require \$6.5 million per month. In addition to these sums, significant amounts of technical assistance, including operating personnel, will be needed to assist Zambia in handling the major task of rerouting imports and exports.

28. It does not require much imagination to envisage that the economy of Zambia will be seriously and adversely affected if assistance is not soon forthcoming. Only adequate and timely assistance will make it possible for that country to develop its economy constructively.

29. I should like to conclude my remarks by asking the members of the Council to study the Special Mission's report with care and attention. Finally, may I repeat, on behalf of the members of the Mission, our thanks to you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council for the honour of this assignment and the confidence which the Council has placed in us.

30. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Spanish*): I wish to express my warmest gratitude to the Chairman of the Special Mission for his very clear introduction of the report. I am also very grateful to him for the kind words he has addressed to me.

31. I feel that the representatives of Austria, Indonesia, Peru and the Sudan have rendered most valuable services to the Security Council in the mission with which we entrusted them and we congratulate them most warmly.

32. The next name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Zambia, on whom I now call.

33. Mr. LUSAKA (Zambia): Mr. President, I wish to begin by congratulating you upon your assumption of the high

office of President of this Council for the month of March. It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation to see you presiding over the Council, not only because of the good relations that exist between your country of Panama and mine, but also because of your personal qualities and abilities, your skilful diplomacy and your wealth of experience. Your assumption of the presidency could not have been at a more fitting period than this month when the Council will hold meetings in your beautiful capital city.

34. Permit me, Mr. President, also to express my gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Joseph Odero-Jowi of Kenya, a country with which we enjoy the best of relations, for the very wise counsel he brought to bear on the proceedings of the Council during the month of February.

35. My delegation had the opportunity to address its sentiments to Ambassador Anwar Sanli of Indonesia when he presided over the proceedings of this Council during the month of January. I said then, *inter alia*, that we were fortunate to have him presiding over the deliberations of the Council during that month. We have again become indebted to him for leading the Special Mission of the Council. We wish to express our gratitude for his valuable leadership and counsel which enabled the Mission to accomplish its responsibility expeditiously and efficiently.

36. Under resolution 326 (1973), paragraph 10, the Zambian Government, among others, was called upon to provide the Special Mission with the necessary co-operation and assistance in the discharge of its task. We in Zambia welcomed the Mission. My Government was only too happy to receive a team of impartial observers to make an independent assessment of the situation created by the acts of aggression committed by minority régimes in southern Africa against Zambia and the black masses. The Zambian Government put at the disposal of the Mission the limited facilities at its command to enable the members to execute the purpose of the Mission within the short time available. We should have wished the Mission to stay longer, visit more places, gather more evidence, see more refugees and hear for itself the sad and distressing tales of savage torture, massacre, terror and deprivation at the hands of outlaws—to hear of hardships which drove these innocent men, women and children away from their homes to seek a new home and breathe the air of freedom in Zambia.

37. We accepted that the Mission had to do its work rapidly. It was urgent. For the problems we face as a result of the rebellion in Rhodesia and the activities of the illegal régime are immense.

38. We are happy that, within the time available, the Mission was able to confirm our convictions. A serious crisis, a dangerous confrontation, exist in our part of the world. There is real tension now, particularly on our border with the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia. We are happy that the Mission has confirmed that the border closure is only one of the many manifestations of the growing confrontation on the Zambezi River. The state of tension has its origins very deep in the past. But there are also current catalytic factors which impinge on the situation and thus contribute to the escalation of tension.

39. I wish to inform the Council of the most recent incidents on the Southern Rhodesian-Zambian border since the visit of the Special Mission. On Sunday, 25 February, a vehicle was blown up by a landmine in the Chirundu area, killing two civilians and injuring two others who later died in hospital. On 2 March another landmine exploded in the same area injuring one man. It can therefore be seen that there has been an intensification of calculated, provocative acts of aggression against Zambia.

40. It is important for the Security Council to understand the underlying causes of tension in this area; it is important to define the fundamental elements in this confrontation. Only in this way can we realistically prescribe solutions to the causes of the crisis in southern Africa. Among the fundamental causes are: (a) the rebellion in Rhodesia; (b) the tyrannical, oppressive and minority rule in the whole of southern Africa compounded by racialism, *apartheid* and exploitation; (c) South Africa's militarism and its offensive policy of extending its lines of defence further north beyond the Limpopo and beyond the Zambezi; (d) the African liberation struggle as the inevitable reaction of the oppressed masses against the tyranny and terror of the minority.

41. Those are the fundamental causes, but there are also catalytic and other factors which have a decisive role in the nature or character of the confrontation, its magnitude and the direction and pace of change. Among those factors are: (a) the failure of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to quell the rebellion in Rhodesia; (b) the failure of the measures so far taken to topple the illegal régime in Salisbury; (c) political, economic and military support given the minority régimes in southern Africa by some Members of the United Nations; (d) the deliberate flouting of the United Nations sanctions by certain States; (e) the closure of the Rhodesian-Zambian border by Smith, together with the explosions of landmines laid on Zambian territory by the Rhodesian illegal forces in collusion with their South African supporters.

42. We list these factors in confirmation of the statement made by the Special Mission in its assessment of the situation, namely: that the tension does not stem exclusively from recent events on the border with the rebel colony; it is the product of the situation in the entire southern African area, which has been developing over the years from bad to worse, particularly since the unilateral declaration of independence. We also list them to demonstrate that Zambia is not responsible for the current tension in southern Africa.

43. The solution of the current crisis lies in honesty and truthfulness on the part of all those people responsible for the current situation. It also lies in positive action by the United Nations.

44. In the case of the first fundamental cause—namely, the rebellion in Rhodesia—the Security Council recognized the dangers inherent in the rebellion as early as 12 November 1965, a day after the unilateral declaration of independence, when, under paragraph 2 of resolution 216 (1965), it called upon all States not to recognize the illegal régime and to refrain from rendering any assistance to that régime.

Eight days later, on 20 November, in resolution 217 (1965), the Council expressed, *inter alia*, its fears about the dangers inherent in the situation. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to quote the relevant provisions of that resolution.

*[The speaker read paragraphs 1, 4 and 8 of resolution 217 (1965).]*

45. Since the adoption of that resolution, subsequent decisions have been made by the Security Council, confirming that the Rhodesian situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security; Member States were called upon to take effective measures to deal with the situation and to bring the Smith régime to heel. Member States have from time to time been called upon to desist from giving assistance and comfort to that régime.

46. Despite all these resolutions, the Smith régime still remains in power in Salisbury. The move of the illegal régime this year to close the border with Zambia demonstrates very clearly the basic intention of the Salisbury clique to extend its war against the African majority beyond its borders. Many acts of aggression have been committed against Zambia—acts which, except for our policy of maximum restraint, would already have led to a shooting war with this band of outlaws.

47. The strength of the Smith régime lies outside the borders of Rhodesia. Internally the régime is very weak because the masses are against it. Every Zimbabwean is essentially a freedom fighter. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom has given Ian Smith treatment not befitting a rebel. Since 1965, the statements made by the British Government and the decisions taken by the Security Council and other international organizations have reaffirmed the international policy on Southern Rhodesia as one of quelling the rebellion and thus bringing down the Smith régime. It remains one of denying any assistance to the rebels. That remains the policy, at least on paper.

48. But certain countries have undermined the measures taken by the international community against the rebel régime by, for example, violating the United Nations sanctions and by giving moral and material support which furthers the aims and objectives of the rebellion. We have witnessed a definite change of policy on the part of the British Government from that of quelling the rebellion and punishing the traitors to one of maintaining the *status quo*. This means recognizing the illegal régime and sanctifying Smith and his rebellion. Smith is now being regarded by his protectors as a liberal, and they claim that, if he were removed, a much more ruthless leader would take over the leadership of the Rhodesian front. So whatever the measures taken against Smith, they are neutralized by those who want him to remain in power.

49. We are not interested in the internal politics of the Rhodesian front. Rhodesia is in a state of rebellion led by Smith. We are interested in the removal of the illegal régime and the introduction of majority rule. That remains the objective of the Security Council.

50. The criminal activities of Smith are being swept under the carpet. For some time now the rebellion has been

systematically relegated to the status of a mere Anglo-Rhodesian independence dispute; indeed attempts are being made to turn it into a Zambian-Rhodesian dispute. Each year has witnessed a definite and clear shift of emphasis from rebellion to something which favours Smith. Indeed, had it not been for the Pearce Commission, we should probably by now have had a dishonourable settlement based on racialism, regardless of the wishes of the people.

51. It is against that background that we now have to ask the question: What is the policy of the international community towards Smith and his rebellion? Is it to topple the illegal régime? We say yes. Nothing has taken place to necessitate a reversal of international policy on this issue. This policy is derived from the fundamental and noble principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

52. We are therefore amazed that certain countries have undermined the objectives of this worthy policy. Every positive move has been counteracted and sabotaged in order to protect Smith and the rebellion. These countries are busy pulling the wool over the eyes of others. This is the greatest paradox of the developments in southern Africa.

53. If there has been a change in policy, why brag about sanctions? Why deceive others into continuing to make sacrifices such as Zambia is making to bring down the Smith régime while, at the same time, undermining their efforts to maintain Smith in power? Just as "you cannot have your cake and eat it", you cannot topple Smith and at the same time give him all the support he needs to maintain himself in power.

54. We say that if the rebellion is the fundamental cause of tension in Southern Rhodesia, then it must be brought to an end by removing the Smith régime, including Smith himself. We disagree with the idea that Smith is a moderate or liberal. Look at his record of crimes committed against the masses of the people in Zimbabwe. He is just a rebel—in fact, a Nazi in practice.

55. We must deal also with the second element of the confrontation: that is, oppression and racism in the whole of southern Africa. The answer lies in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). We must honour and implement this resolution in full and then there will be peace in southern Africa. If we ignore the masses, then trouble is inevitable. The masses should participate in working out their own future, in determining what they want, what they need and what they deserve; then there will be peace. The struggle for freedom in southern Africa need not be violent. It should not be violent. However, this will come about only if the minority régimes accept civilized and democratic principles. Supporting the minority régimes means denying to the masses their rights. These people want to achieve their independence by peaceful means. No one condones violence. We in Zambia abhor it.

56. South African military activities in Rhodesia place further obstacles in the way of democratic change. Those who want peaceful change must bring pressure to bear on South Africa to remove its military forces from Rhodesia. The military occupation of Rhodesia by South African

forces will continue to contribute to the escalation of tension in our area. The South African Government maintains that its troops will remain as long as the struggle for majority rule continues in Rhodesia. This is the greatest immediate threat to peace and security in the area for, as long as the South African forces remain on Rhodesian soil and as long as violations of our territory continue to result in the killing of our innocent civilians, we shall reserve the right to take whatever measures are necessary to protect life and property. We shall protect Zambian independence with the assistance of any friend in the world. We have no choice in the matter. Therefore, those who want peace and security must ensure the immediate removal of South African forces from Zimbabwe.

57. We must also deal with the catalytic factors. The United Kingdom must discharge its responsibilities. The decisions made by the United Nations and all its agencies must be implemented urgently and effectively. Sanctions must be intensified and made more comprehensive; no assistance must be given to Smith and his clique. Smith is synonymous with rebellion. Smith stands for rebellion; he is rebellion personified. If we do not take a firm decision and positive action, then the policy of sanctions is a costly gamble—indeed, a farce.

58. Zambia is the innocent victim of many unjustified accusations. We have been accused of harbouring freedom fighters. We have been accused of breaking sanctions. We have been accused of encouraging terrorism and escalation of tension. We have been accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. All these charges are baseless.

59. Smith himself has already acknowledged that the freedom fighters in the Centenary district of Rhodesia did not come from Zambia. In a television interview on 8 February in Salisbury he said:

"The terrorists in the north-east are not operating from Zambian soil; they haven't come across from Zambian soil, and we had to face up to this problem. We couldn't possibly expect Zambia to take action against people who are operating from soil other than Zambian soil."

However, in contradiction, the message dated 14 February from the South African Government addressed to the President of the Security Council charged:

"This situation"—that is, the escalation of tension—"was created entirely by increased activity on the part of the terrorists based in Zambia which led to increased counter-activity on the part of the security units on the Rhodesian side of the border."

You can see the confusion.

60. Smith accepts the fact that we are not responsible for the situation in Rhodesia. We never have been. We are not responsible for the conflagration which followed the visit of the Pearce Commission. The people of Zimbabwe have feelings, they have wishes and desires, they have aspirations to fulfil, and they will accomplish the objectives of their struggle with or without external assistance, provided that no one supports Smith.

61. In this connexion, the Council should consider the following lines of action: (a) press for the release of all political detainees and prisoners and end the rebellion; (b) press for the elimination of discriminatory and repressive legislation; (c) reaffirm "no independence before majority rule"; (d) make the sanctions more comprehensive and effective. And, while these measures are in force, the British Government should convene a constitutional conference truly representative of all races and interests. The African majority must not be a third party, merely to be informed of the results.

62. It is against this background that we reaffirm our belief in the policy of toppling the Smith régime as a solution to the current tension; it is against this background that we reaffirm our policy against racism, *apartheid*, colonialism, exploitation and minority rule. We reaffirm our decision not to resume the use of the southern route while Smith remains in power. We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations sanctions policy. We reaffirm our policy of non-racism. We reaffirm our commitment to freedom, peace and peaceful change in southern Africa. We have made sacrifices in the past and we will continue to do so if this will serve the interests of humanity and strengthen peace and security, not only in southern Africa but in the world as a whole.

63. I should now like to draw the attention of the Council to the problems faced by Zambia in the implementation of sanctions.

64. Before independence, the Zambian economy was closely tied to that of Southern Rhodesia. At the time of independence the Zambian Government decided to disengage itself from the south. This policy was accelerated after the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime in November 1965. The immediate consequences of the rebellion for Zambia were the denial to Zambia by the rebel régime of petroleum, oils, lubricants, coal and other essential supplies which were coming in by the southern routes. These issues were considered by the Security Council at the time. The international community responded in various ways to the needs of Zambia, including the mounting of air lifts of essential supplies and fuel.

65. Despite declarations by certain countries that the rebellion was going to be quelled in a matter of weeks, Zambia made it clear that this would not happen unless force was used. We went ahead in developing alternate routes to the north at tremendous cost and sacrifice to our economy. We embarked on the construction of an oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam and we also invested substantial amounts of money in roads to the north. We developed our own local coal resources to substitute for the erratic coal supply from Rhodesia. We also established a number of industries to substitute for those from the south. We established a road transport corporation with the United Republic of Tanzania and we also embarked on the construction of a new railway with the general assistance of the Chinese Government.

66. If Zambia had not gone ahead with those investments, we should have been approaching this Council again for another massive air lift of petroleum, oil, lubricants and



other essential supplies when the illegal régime of Rhodesia closed its border on 9 January this year. As my President has said, we cannot put our eggs into the fragile basket of Ian Smith. This would disrupt our economy, as the Smith régime can, at will, delay the transportation of essential goods, increase the freight rates at any time and even completely close the border and thus impose economic sanctions on Zambia.

67. So long as the illegal régime continues to exist in Rhodesia, Zambia will be unable to utilize the southern routes for its imports and exports. The decision by Zambia to close its side of the border remains irrevocable.

68. The sacrifices we have made in fighting the Smith régime and on behalf of the British Government and the masses in Zimbabwe require no catalogue. The Security Council recognized our plight in resolutions 253 (1968) and 277 (1970). In those resolutions the international community was called upon to render assistance to Zambia, for this is not our battle alone—it is a battle for humanity for which the British Government must accept primary responsibility.

69. When the border was closed early this year we had immediately to divert ships on the high seas destined for the port of Beira to bring Zambian imports through Southern Rhodesia. Those ships have now to call at alternative ports which are not adequate to handle the unexpected volume of traffic. As an illustration of the magnitude of the problem brought about by the closure of the border, over 900,000 tons of imports a year and over 400,000 tons of exports were still passing through Southern Rhodesian routes. The issue, therefore, is for Zambia to find alternative routes to handle this volume of traffic.

70. In accordance with the relevant resolution of the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against the

illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia and its decision in implementation of this policy, I now formally appeal to the international community, on behalf of my President, to assist us in carrying out our share of obligations to bring about the necessary and desirable political change. It is necessary, therefore, that assistance be provided to Zambia to maintain the normal flow of traffic through alternative routes. To that end, I have been instructed by my Government formally to put the following requests to the Council: (a) additional heavy vehicles; (b) additions to workshops and installations for the vehicles; (c) man-power requirements; (d) housing for additional manpower; (e) storage facilities; (f) handling equipment; (g) communication improvements; (h) training costs for drivers and other personnel; (i) spare parts; (j) rolling stock; (k) mobilization costs and additional costs of handling traffic along the new routes; and (l) airlifts to bring in essential supplies.

71. I am pleased to inform the Council that some countries have already responded positively to our situation by giving material and financial support, and we thank them most sincerely. We also thank the other members of the international community for their expression of solidarity. The situation in southern Africa has entered a very crucial and decisive phase. This is a time for all democratic forces to unite in the interests of peace and security.

72. Finally, we hope that we can now call on all nations to join hands in discharging our responsibility in the elimination of tension in southern Africa. It is my hope that the report of the Special Mission will not be controversial and that it will be adopted unanimously. We know that even those who directly or indirectly oppose the current international policy against the rebellious régime will finally be relieved after the rebellion has been ended.

*The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.*

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