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CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1623) | 1 |
| Adoption of the agenda | 1 |
| Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: | |
| (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396); | |
| (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2); | |
| (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408) | 1 |

(38p.)

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SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 30 December 1971, at 3.00 p.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1623)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
 - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);
 - (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);*
- (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Council [1602nd, 1603rd and 1604th meetings], I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Ghana to participate in the discussion of this item without the right to vote.

* Subsequently issued as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum and Special Supplement No. 2A*.

2. I have received letters from the representatives of Uganda [S/10478], Nigeria [S/10482], Algeria [S/10483] and India [S/10484] requesting that they also be invited to participate in the current discussion on the question before the Council. In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure, and with the consent of the Council, I propose to invite the representatives of Uganda, Nigeria, Algeria and India to participate in the discussion of this item without the right to vote.

3. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council, and in view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Uganda, Nigeria, Algeria and India to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber, it being understood that they will be invited to sit at the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. M. Baroodi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. K. S. B. Nyirenda (Zambia), Mr. G. S. Ibingira (Uganda), Mr. E. O. Ogbu (Nigeria), Mr. A. Rahal (Algeria) and Mr. S. Sen (India) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

4. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland): Almost two years ago when my delegation took its seat in this Council, the first item it had to deal with was the question of Namibia. Today, as our term comes to a close, the Council is deliberating on the question of Rhodesia. Nothing could point up more vividly how deeply the problems of decolonization in Africa and of ensuring African rights to liberty in equality, dignity and justice, have permeated our debates and our resolutions, if not—unfortunately—our accomplishments. It has become equally clear to my delegation in this span of time how imperialism and colonialism have passed from a position of passive resistance towards the norms, the principles and the resolutions of the United Nations, through sabotage of their content, and into an open reneging of all those norms, principles and resolutions. In practical terms, it amounts to strengthening colonialism in some parts of Africa, to attempts at colonial reconquest in other parts of Africa; and I base this conclusion on direct experience from my participation in two Special Missions of the Security Council.

5. If ever a case could prove the point I have made it is that of Southern Rhodesia. This case is perhaps a unique one in the field of decolonization inasmuch as not only has the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV)

been unequivocally affirmed by the United Nations and the Security Council, but also decisions of a coercive character, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, have been taken in order to bring about the overthrow of a racist régime that has been defying the fulfilment of this inalienable right. We have only to compare United Nations principles, decisions and courses of action with the position of the United Kingdom to see that what we have been facing since the so-called unilateral declaration of independence, and before, and what we are facing now, is a consistent and purposeful policy of the administering Power, contrary to the demands of the United Nations and contrary to the interests and aspirations of the Zimbabwe people.

6. Let us first take the right to self-determination and to independence of the Zimbabwe people. It is contained in the Charter of the United Nations; it has been developed in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; it has been reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolutions, including the latest one on the subject, resolution 288 (1970) of November 1970. The approach of the administering Power—which, as was pointed out again yesterday [1622nd meeting], itself voted for the above-mentioned Security Council resolution—to the implementation of that right finds its culmination in the “proposals for a settlement” [S/10405]¹ elaborated jointly by the British Government and the Smith régime and presented to us by the representative of the United Kingdom on 25 November 1971 [1602nd meeting]. The time that has since passed is more than sufficient for grasping both the real objectives and the wider significance of those proposals. It has also made it possible for us to learn about reactions to them in Zimbabwe, in Africa and in the world. Indeed, in this very building the General Assembly, then in session, did not take long to react by, in its resolution 2877 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, rejecting the proposals as a violation of the Zimbabwe people’s right to self-determination and independence.

7. In the debate in this Council, representatives of African States characterized the agreement as a “betrayal of the Zimbabwe people”, as a “sell-out”, as a capitulation of the British Government before the racist minority régime, and as a flagrant violation of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions as well as of the principles and obligations embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The representative of Zambia, Ambassador Mwaanga, has told this Council [1605th meeting] that his delegation had been requested by the leaders of the Zimbabwe people, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to inform the Council of their total rejection of the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement.

8. The picture is therefore clear, and this outright rejection, this indignation and protest, in which my delegation fully shares, come to us as no surprise.

9. A second principle is that of the free exercise of the right to self-determination of colonial peoples. Here, according to the United Kingdom position, it is not the representatives of 5 million people who are the *inter-*

locuteurs valables. A confirmation of that position can be seen in the reply of the United Kingdom Government to the decision of the Security Council [1604th meeting] to invite Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, two representative leaders of their people, to appear before the Security Council. For the British Government, the condemned rebel régime not only has been an *interlocuteur valable*—whether on board H.M.S. *Tiger* or H.M.S. *Fearless* or in Salisbury—but has been the only *interlocuteur valable*. The abyss between such an attitude and that of the United Nations could not be deeper, and the so-called test of acceptability proposed by the United Kingdom has already been put to the test by the United Nations and has been found unacceptable.

10. It has always been the United Nations policy that the independence of Rhodesia could be based only on the principles of majority rule and one man, one vote. To these principles we have a reply which consists of acrobatic electoral arithmetic. This point has been sufficiently explained by representatives around this table, including Ambassador Farah in his statement yesterday, and I need not return to it.

11. Thirdly, the United Nations has been and stands committed to the abolition of the rule of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia as the only way to enable the people of Zimbabwe to achieve their freedom and independence. The United Kingdom has, it is clear, never really pursued this goal. What it now openly aims at is the recognition of the independent status of the racist régime—a goal contrary to that of the United Nations, which has been and remains, independence for the Zimbabwe people.

12. Fourthly, the story of the economic sanctions against the Smith régime is a very instructive one indeed. At first, there was a gradual imposition of sanctions which enabled the Smith régime to prepare itself to evade them. Selective at first, the sanctions were later enlarged under the pressure of the majority of United Nations membership and with the evident reluctance of the minority. They have never become really comprehensive and effective, because from the very beginning there have been large-scale and wilful violations—the violators being protected in the Security Council by some of its permanent members. The erosion of sanctions which has followed is now being adduced as a justification for the possible lifting of those sanctions. But that course is in clear contradiction with the United Nations policy in respect of Southern Rhodesia, that is, the maintenance of the boycott and the isolation of the white minority régime as long as it does not give way to majority rule.

13. Fifthly, there has been and there still is an obviously fundamental contradiction between the United Kingdom and the United Nations in the understanding of the United Kingdom responsibility in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, we were surprised to hear Sir Colin Crowe quote the words of Sir Alec Douglas-Home to the effect that

“... the only reason we are in this business at all is that we want to help the Africans towards a better future than they are otherwise likely to have.” [1602nd meeting, para. 52.]

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*.

14. We have always thought that, as affirmed and reaffirmed in Security Council resolutions, it is the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence. In our opinion, the United Nations should and will hold the United Kingdom responsible as long as this goal is not achieved, and the "proposals for a settlement" certainly do not provide for that.

15. The analysis of particular elements of the present attitude of the United Kingdom Government on the question of Southern Rhodesia, as reflected in the "proposals for a settlement", certainly shows that it is in contradiction with the established positions of the United Nations as expressed in, among others, the resolutions of this Council. Certainly, the United Nations and the Security Council cannot become a party to an act of colonial and racist entrenchment, to a deal that is dooming an African people—the people of Zimbabwe—to many years of colonial and racist enslavement. Certainly the Council, facing a new and dangerous development in a situation which it has itself found serious enough to require that it invoke and apply Chapter VII of the Charter, is bound to pronounce itself against this, just as the General Assembly has done in no uncertain terms.

16. In view of those considerations and motivated by our consistent policy concerning decolonization, and in accordance with our support for all United Nations actions against the illegal white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, we are prepared to support the draft resolution contained in the working paper presented by the representative of Somalia, Ambassador Farah [see 1622nd meeting, para. 8].

17. This being in all probability our last intervention in the Council during our present term of office, I should like to say that in the Security Council, as in all other bodies of the United Nations, we have tried our best to contribute to the solution of the important problems with which we have been faced. Valuing highly our membership in this Council, we have tried to contribute to the consolidation of its position and authority. We greatly value and shall continue to value the friendship and co-operation that you, Mr. President, and other members of the Council have extended to us in the course of our stay here. We wish to thank you for that.

18. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In the emergence of independent Africa, Southern Rhodesia represents one of the anomalies surviving in that continent. The process of decolonization halted at the borders of that Territory where a handful of white settlers, defying the metropolitan Power, have established their domination over millions of Africans. The white minority, trying to set back the clock of history, has up to now denied to the African majority any participation in the Government of the country and, in order to consolidate its power, has not refrained from turning to the hideous practice of racial discrimination. This abnormal situation has caused serious concern to the Italian Government.

19. Indeed, morally and historically speaking, there could not be a more disturbing factor hampering the political development of the peoples of southern Africa. We fully understand that the independent African countries cannot

accept the denial to millions of Africans of the most fundamental political rights. We fully realize that this situation may have upsetting effects on neighbouring countries; it will surely engender a difficult future for Rhodesia itself.

20. How, in fact, can a small group of settlers maintain its domination over a country whose vast African population is growing at the rate of 3 per cent a year, and bring it into the modern world without the full social, economic and political participation of the great majority of its people?

21. It is for those reasons that Italy has given its unconditional, whole-hearted support to the measures adopted by the Security Council to bring the Salisbury régime to an end. The Italian Government has severed all relations with Rhodesia and has adopted special legislation to enforce the sanctions imposed on that régime.

22. The economic sanctions were devised by this Council upon the request of the United Kingdom in order to help—as is clearly stated in Security Council resolution 253 (1968)—the British Government "to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia". The sanctions which have been adopted have not yet enabled us to attain that objective. They have weakened the Rhodesian economy, they have paralysed certain sectors and increased the difficulties of the Rhodesian foreign exchange; they have not, unfortunately, brought the régime to its knees. I will not dwell on the reasons for the somewhat insufficient effect of the sanctions, because those reasons are known to all of us.

23. Bent on attaining this objective, namely, the economic downfall of the Salisbury régime, we have neglected our main goal which is closely connected with the complex process of self-determination. We have neglected it to the point of forgetting that the sanctions may even slow down the progress towards nationhood and the development of the aspirations to self-determination when they cut off—as indeed they did—the people mainly concerned from all contacts with the outside world, a fact which goes against the whole experience through which the peoples of Europe and other continents passed on their march towards independence. History shows that the more open were the contacts with the outside world, the quicker was the exercise of self-determination.

24. It is in the light of those considerations that we should, in our view, evaluate the recent developments that have led to the proposals for a settlement. The representative of the United Kingdom reminded this Council, convened at his request, that if the sanctions hurt the Rhodesian economy and therefore induced the Salisbury régime to try the path of negotiations, they did not bring that régime to the extremity of having to accept anything London might propose.

25. On the other hand, the British Government decided to pursue the negotiations because it was convinced that the situation was deadlocked and might even become more detrimental to the interest of the African population, following the further development of legislation and the further practice of racial discrimination.

26. Those, then, are the conditions under which the proposals were negotiated: on the one hand, a white illegal régime not on the verge of capitulation; on the other hand, no better alternative than negotiations, limited in scope—namely, to prevent deterioration of the situation. Those are the facts as we see them—unpleasant, but inescapable.

27. Now I shall turn very briefly, and in very general terms, to the proposals. I do not need, in fact, to take them one by one, since they have been submitted to very close and accurate scrutiny by several members of the Council. And, as a matter of fact, we can hardly object to what has been said, or fail to sympathize with some of the views—and especially feelings—expressed. But *quid agendi*? As has been rightly remarked during our debate, no practical idea has been offered in the place of the British proposals. As far as we are concerned, having for some years lost all contact with the Territory, we do not have up-to-date information which might perhaps give us a clue to find our way, like Theseus, through the labyrinth of these proposals. Certainly, if we consider them in the light of principles or in the face of our ultimate objectives, they fall very short of our ideas and our hopes. As often happens in matters of compromise, a shadow looms over the real result whose achievement they might make possible.

28. Whatever shortcomings and misgivings these proposals produce, they have been practically submitted as an attempt by the administering Power, in fulfilment of its responsibility, to overcome the present deadlock and to create conditions that might help improve the situation of the Africans and lead them towards self-determination. As to how successful this attempt might be and how long this process might take, much has been said, and my delegation will not try to make its own guess. What time has in store is always difficult to predict, since conditions change—and very rapidly in our times—and what has been planned in certain circumstances is subject to radical revision, adjusted to new, unforeseen developments.

29. Since I am speaking of future tests, let me refer to the test of acceptability. The test is not, of course, the exercise of self-determination. Nobody has assumed that it would constitute that exercise. But self-determination may well be preceded by one or more tests that may prepare for it. I have already mentioned that the main problem in this respect is to make a majority of the people aware of their fundamental rights; it is to awaken in their hearts the aspiration to be a nation—in other words, to have them strive for self-determination.

30. Now, the test of acceptability provides really the first opportunity to reach individuals and groups of people in each corner of the Territory and to begin doing what has been badly needed for a very long time: namely, to make the adult African population of Rhodesia think about its future and its fundamental rights. However unsatisfactory and incomplete this process may seem, especially to the theorists of the principle of self-determination, it is the first concrete approach to the real problems with which we are confronted. Our main concern in this respect is to have a test performed in fair and democratic conditions. Furthermore, we think the administering Power would be well advised to try to associate the United Nations more closely with the conduct of the test.

31. In conclusion, my delegation feels that at this stage the Council should, in spite of the reservations raised by the proposals in question, confine itself to the reaffirmation—which is essential—of certain principles shared by all of us, as well as of the ultimate goals of this Organization for Rhodesia: namely, independence based on majority rule. And once we have been assured that the administering Power will do its best in order to carry out the test of acceptability in the most objective way, we should postpone any further decision until the results of that test become known and have been carefully studied.

32. It is on the basis of the foregoing considerations that my delegation will take its position in the voting on any draft resolution introduced before the Council, whatever its possible merits and particular positions of principle which might be similar to our own.

33. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): At this stage, the French delegation has no intention of giving its evaluation of the draft settlement we are discussing here. In today's circumstances, the important thing in our view, is that the British Government is thus reaffirming its own responsibility as administering Power to lead Rhodesia towards self-determination in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

34. The British Government proposes, in the initial stage, to conduct a comprehensive survey to determine whether the settlement—with which we are familiar—is acceptable to the people. That is what is known as the test of acceptability. The French delegation feels that we should not prejudge the results of this test of acceptability. In our view, we should leave it up to the Commission established for that purpose to undertake all the necessary investigations which it has been called upon to conduct, and await the results of that first operation. That does not mean that a number of the criticisms uttered around this table are not echoed by us. We note that the process contemplated is, in many respects, far different from what was done in other parts of Africa by the United Kingdom itself and by France, and we are not seeking to conceal our perplexity over certain aspects of the system described to us. The right of suffrage is not recognized in it as being universal, and the emancipation enshrined in the application of the majority principle occurs only after the completion of a series of stages. However, the draft we are discussing does have the merit of putting an end to the *status quo*, of introducing movement into a stagnant situation; and when that momentum has the support of the will of a people, it can no longer be halted or braked, because it will be for the people of Rhodesia to take the final decision.

35. An opportunity is being offered, perhaps, to set in motion the machinery which can and must transform institutions. We do not want to condemn it *a priori*, or to question the intentions of those willing to try it. It is in this spirit that the French delegation will cast its vote on the draft resolution to be submitted to us.

36. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Somalia, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

37. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I feel it is necessary for me to intervene at this stage because there seems to be some

misunderstanding about what this proposed test of acceptability will lead to.

38. Some members believe that it is the beginning of a process. My delegation maintains that it is going to be the beginning and end of a process. In a statement made in Salisbury, in the Rhodesian House of Assembly, on 25 November, Mr. Smith had this to say on the proposals agreed to between himself and Lord Home:

"Paragraph 8 deals with the implementation of the Agreement. If the British Government signifies that it is satisfied that the proposals are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, the Rhodesian Government will introduce the necessary legislation to amend the Constitution and the Electoral Act. The British Government will, in turn, introduce legislation to confer independence on Rhodesia as a Republic and they will terminate sanctions when this legislation takes effect. Rhodesian legislation will take effect on the same day as the British legislation."

39. It grieves me to hear the statements made by the representatives of Italy and France as they relate to the political destiny of 5 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia, particularly in view of those representatives' own experience of the African continent.

40. Yesterday I said: How can we here deny to others, whether in principle or in form, what we hold so sacred for ourselves, that is, the right of self-determination, the right of universal adult suffrage, the right of one man, one vote, regardless of colour or creed? How can we in this Council give international sanction to an exercise which denies the implementation of those principles, no matter what the so-called realities are? What are realities without morality? Surely we must lift ourselves above the animal.

41. I felt it necessary to make those remarks in the hope that we can steer our debate on a right and proper course.

42. The PRESIDENT: The next name inscribed on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Uganda. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

43. Mr. IBINGIRA (Uganda): I express the gratitude of my delegation at being allowed to speak before you on this matter of critical importance, although I may not have the right to vote.

44. Most of us seated around this table have at one time or another in the history of our nations been through some sort of subjection on the part of some other, exterior Power. Our people, in the course of history, have known what it is to be free and what it is to be unfree and subject to another Power. All that my delegation asks is that before this Council takes a final decision on the proposals submitted to it, constituting the settlement between the United Kingdom Government and Ian Smith, it should know fully and exactly what those proposals are, what it is being asked to endorse and what it is being asked to legitimize.

45. I see no better course than to comment on these proposals before the Council, paragraph by paragraph, and as briefly as I possibly can. I will commence by reading from the proposals for a settlement published as Command Paper No. 4835 by Her Majesty's Stationery Office in London [see S/10405].

46. The first proposal for a settlement is the so-called test of acceptability, which the Ambassador of Somalia so ably clarified just before I started to speak. It is our view that the only test of acceptability in the colonial history of the people of the United Kingdom, who have brought to independence hundreds of millions of persons in all the continents of the world, has been by universal franchise, through an electoral process that has been tested for a period of almost 350 years and found to be the most satisfactory method. We have all gone through it—in Asia, in North America, in Africa. The question is: Why are we now being requested to exempt Southern Rhodesia and to let Southern Rhodesia hold not a referendum, a plebiscite or a general election on a universal and adult franchise, but a consultation intended to seek the opinion of "the people of Rhodesia as a whole"?

47. What does the expression "as a whole" mean? Who is going to determine what constitutes "as a whole"? It is supposed to be a Commission. But that Commission will go there, unsupervised by the independent eye of the members of this Council, unsupervised by any exterior force. It is to operate through the apparatus of Mr. Ian Smith. I would be most surprised if that Commission did not come out and say: "We have tested the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole and have conclusively found that the people of Rhodesia as a whole want these proposals to be implemented." That is what is going to happen because it is what Ian Smith wants and because the Africans are not going to be fully consulted as they were in all the other Territories which the British in their wisdom and experience have led to independence.

48. We do not voice this concern simply because we come from States in Africa. We are perfectly aware that within the policy-making institution of the British House of Commons and the House of Lords there is a substantial number of morally minded distinguished people who share our concern. I should like to quote the expressions of concern by some of these people. I have before me a House of Commons official report of the Parliamentary debate which took place on Thursday, 25 November, when these proposals were put forward to the House of Commons by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. We find that a distinguished member of the Shadow Cabinet, Mr. Healey, said:

"In his statement"—that is, the Minister's statement—"he said that normal political activity would be permitted, and I asked him whether that meant that the apparatus of the police state would be removed. . . . May I tell him frankly that no one on this side of the House will treat the test of acceptability as in any sense serious or committing unless there is freedom of African political activity for all those other than those interned on criminal charges."²

² See *Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series*, vol. 826 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), col. 1551.

49. It is well known that the African leaders who are interned in Southern Rhodesia, specifically Mr. Nkomo and the Reverend Sithole, are not interned on criminal charges; they are interned on political grounds. It is also well known that the question was not properly answered by Sir Alec Douglas-Home. The record is full of interjections and uproars in the House of Commons because of the dissatisfaction of Members who, unfortunately, were outvoted because of an automatic majority in the House.

50. But we feel that without fully consulting the leaders of the African masses and of the political parties which are now banned in Southern Rhodesia, there cannot be a just test of the acceptability of these proposals in Southern Rhodesia. Therefore, we cannot be induced to agree that that test is going to be any good. For, in any case, if I were a Rhodesian and were asked to judge the proposals which I was expected to accept, I should want to examine them myself to see if I found them acceptable. We cannot honestly say, as people who have been through a colonial tutelage, that the proposals contained here are acceptable to a people seeking independence. Obviously they are not.

51. I will now turn to the Constitution—paragraph II in the proposals for a settlement. Much has been said concerning the House of Assembly and the electoral rolls. It is very perplexing to us because, in spite of wide experience, in spite of what we all know about the evolution of the electoral process in British dependencies, through which many of us have gone, this is a completely strange and novel adventure in the British constitutional theory of colonial administration. We know that these proposals for qualitative franchise, for people having to be qualified because of ownership of property or education or something of that kind, comprise a process that has been gone through long before the actual time of independence, because no Territory—apart from the minority-dominated Territories which are in a minority in any case in British colonial history—has gone to independence on the basis of the proposals put before us. We have all gone to independence on the principle of universal adult franchise, and we do not see any reason why our brothers in Southern Rhodesia should be placed at a disadvantage through an electoral process which would be manipulated by an executive over which they would have no control. We know that those proposals cannot be acceptable to them, just as they are not acceptable to us.

52. I should like to comment on subparagraph 4 of that paragraph, concerning the renewal of declarations of emergency. It states:

“Section 61 of the Constitution will be amended so as to reduce the period within which a Declaration of Emergency requires renewal by resolution of the House of Assembly from 12 months to 9 months.”

That is meaningless. Even if a declaration of emergency were to be renewable every two months, it can extend for a period in perpetuity. We have seen it happen in other nations on that continent, where states of emergency have been prolonged for a period of six or seven years, having to be renewed every three, four or five months. Therefore we cannot say that because the period for extension of

emergency has been reduced from 12 to 9 months, it is an improvement. It hardly is.

53. Another point is the amendment of the Constitution. In our view, this is a very critical point. We know that the amendment of the Constitution—other than amendment by armed force, which is an abrogation of the Constitution—is of cardinal importance, because it is upon it that the rights of people are entrenched and safeguarded. If it is abused, there are no such things as rights, whether it be a treaty or an agreement of any kind or a constitutional instrument such as we are considering now. It is stated here in subparagraph 5 (a):

“The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance to the British Government that they will not introduce or support in the Rhodesian Parliament any amendment of the specially entrenched provisions of the Constitution relating to the composition of the House of Assembly or of the specially entrenched provisions of the Electoral Act until the first two African higher roll seats have been created and filled or until three years have elapsed since the Constitutional changes provided for by these proposals have come into force, whichever is the sooner.”

54. We are being requested to accept an intention and an assurance on the part of the Southern Rhodesian Government. The question that is so basic to all this discussion is: are we in a position to trust that Government? Are we in a position to accept the credibility of the Ian Smith Government in Southern Rhodesia? What evidence is before this Council to persuade us to accept that all these beautiful phrases will be honoured, since they depend purely on expressed intention and an expressed commitment by that Government? On the contrary, the evidence before this Council is that they will be dishonoured, because we have a Government in power which has already been guilty of breaking a constitution. They had a constitution which they received from the United Kingdom. They revoked that constitution and were prepared to fight by force of arms to assert their independence unlawfully. They are the very same people we are being requested to trust to fulfil these obligations. I ask the Council in its wisdom to consider whether actually it is realistic or proper for us to accept these provisions because that Government in Salisbury is sufficiently honest to be bound by the commitments it makes on paper. We have seen a similar case in the history of our continent—in South Africa, to be specific—where the United Kingdom gave independence to a minority Government; there were in the Constitution of that State, in the South African Independence Act, provisions of entrenchment more or less similar to these here, which stated in effect that certain rights were reserved to the Coloured population and to the African population and that those rights could not be abrogated or taken away except through a complicated system of voting in two Houses, requiring two thirds voting simultaneously and things like that. We know that actually that never worked. We have a precedent to indicate that entrenchment of the kind we are being persuaded to accept cannot work, because it has failed in a country that is so close to Southern Rhodesia and has such influence over it. How then can we accept or hope that it will work in Southern Rhodesia? This question was indeed raised in the House of

Commons by an honourable member, Mr. James Johnson, and I read from the *Hansard* from which I have already quoted:

"In view of the black history of South Africa and all other similar communities in Africa, does the Foreign Secretary really expect white oligarchies to hand over power to the African masses? It has happened nowhere else. None of us who has been to Africa expects this to happen unless it is a genuine Christian community, which is not so. Why does he not demand external safeguards for the future of these black African masses?"³

That is the question. Can we reasonably expect that a resolution passed by this Council to the effect that we support these proposals will be of value, knowing very well that the oligarchy is there and the gentleman to whom I referred has said: "We will not honour the majority rule principle"?

55. We feel that there must be some kind of external guarantee if these proposals are going to be put into operation—which we would regret very much. But if they are to be put into operation, the United Kingdom must have the right, and indeed the obligation, to intervene and enforce the rights of these people. The ultimate obligation is not going to be with Smith; the ultimate obligation must remain vested in the United Kingdom. British constitutional law is quite clear. It is not in dispute that the United Kingdom is legally the lawful authority over Rhodesia, within the British municipal law, and that it can and does have the right in Parliament to pass any legislation for Smith and his Government to follow. That is what all of us have gone through, either by an order in council or by a statute of Parliament.

56. I shall now turn to paragraph III, which concerns the review of existing legislation. The paragraph states, in part:

"The Rhodesian Government have intimated to the British Government their firm intention, within the spirit of these proposals, to make progress towards ending racial discrimination."

It is a long paragraph, and I shall not read it all. Here again it is a question of "firm intention, within the spirit of these proposals". Can this august Council accept the genuineness of this kind of "firm intention", considering the antecedents of the Government with which the Council is dealing in Salisbury? It is our submission humbly to put to the Council that it is not possible because of the glaring fact of rebellion that has emanated from that Government. Therefore, there can be no review of existing legislation on the part of the Smith government, which itself has enacted that legislation to entrench its minority interests. If it were really to review this legislation and end it, the question must be asked: Why in the first place was it necessary to pass it? It was necessary to pass it because they wanted to hang on to power at all costs. If they wanted to hang on to power at all costs, surely they are going to continue to do so and they are not going to be deterred by any nice phrases enshrined in this report.

³ *Ibid.*, col. 1549.

57. I shall now turn to paragraph IV, which concerns the review of cases of detainees and restrictees. The world is full of detention and detention is not peculiar to racist white régimes. It is a phenomenon that reflects the sad aspects of human nature all over the globe. It happens everywhere. But that is no excuse for Smith. Smith is detaining people because he is afraid of them, and not because they have committed crimes. If they had committed crimes, they would have been tried in a court of law and convicted by the criminal law of that land. They have been detained not because of any criminal offence, but because of their political support for the majority of the people in Southern Rhodesia. And we are being here requested to believe that if we accept these proposals, then Sithole and Nkomo and others might be released. That surely is too much of a price to pay. Whether those people are detained or not, the fact remains that the principle is wrong. It is wrong that the political opponents of that Government should be detained for no crime other than demanding their inalienable rights to which they were born as human beings.

58. I shall now turn to paragraph V, which concerns land. Land is a very critical factor in African history. We are an agrarian people. We live on the land and are rather a rural people. We live on the land and we till the land. We are not city dwellers. And there is no shame in this. In Southern Rhodesia millions of acres of land have been taken away from the Africans and designated as being special for white occupation or settlement. Paragraph V states:

"The Rhodesian Government have given an assurance that they will not take steps to evict African tenants or other occupants from these two areas"—those are the areas from which Africans are awaiting eviction—"or from other areas in which they are living until such time as the Commission referred to in paragraph III above has reported and its recommendations have been fully considered."

That is absolutely meaningless. It is a procedural clause. Let us suppose that the Commission makes an inquiry and finds that the Africans must not move from their land. Smith is still perfectly entitled legally to say, "Oh, yes; we have considered your report but we are not bound by it. We feel that they must still move and they are going to move under the law of Southern Rhodesia, and even under the law enshrined in these proposals."

59. We cannot, therefore, be persuaded to accept that the proposals concerning land are humane or reasonable. They must be rejected. I cannot possibly foresee the possibility that Africans will accept the so-called test of acceptability, that they will accept these proposals when they are going to be evicted from the land of their ancestors. It does not make sense.

60. I shall now turn to paragraph VI, which concerns the development programme under which the United Kingdom, in its magnanimity, would give up to £5 million per year for 10 years to improve the condition of Africans in Southern Rhodesia. If that were to be done when Southern Rhodesia was being governed by the majority, it would be an excellent proposition. We all have had programmes of

development like this one, where the United Kingdom has graciously given some aid to its former colonies. That has been a very worth-while experience, because the aid was exchanged among equals. But this is a different proposition. This is a proposition where the majority of Africans are not going to have a say in how that money is to be administered on their behalf and in their interests. Who determines what is right for the Africans? Why should somebody else determine how that money should be utilized on behalf of the Africans?

61. I shall now turn to the final part, which is the so-called "Declaration of Rights" [*ibid.*, appendix III]. This is very fundamental, and we have heard it enshrined in many constitutions of those of us who have been through British colonial tutelage. We have heard that Declaration in the Malaysian Constitution, the Nigerian Constitution, the Uganda Constitution and so on. It contains excellent propositions because they spell out the fundamental human rights to which every citizen in society must be entitled. But these proposals are rendered completely meaningless by the exceptions that are attached to each of them, considering the fact that it will be the executive branch of the Smith government that will be determining those exceptions—to what extent they can be stretched, to whom they can apply and where. The Declaration speaks of protection of the right to life. That is an excellent thing. It states: "No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally, save in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted."

62. Granted. But then we are told that "a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this paragraph if he dies as the result of the use of force to such extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case", and about five cases are enumerated.

63. Now, what is "reasonably justifiable in the circumstances"? Who is going to decide? Supposing there was a mass rally by an African nationalist, and ordinary peasants were flocking to hear some complaints lodged against oppressive legislation. And supposing the police urged these people to disperse, and the people were hesitant and angry at the denial of their right of association and freedom of expression, and some of them were shot in the scuffles, and so on. Those people, I can assure the Council, would have lost their lives perfectly lawfully and there would be no case whatsoever for taking the authorities to task for it.

64. Next we have "Protection of right to personal liberty". That is a right to which we all aspire. But it also has exceptions, because it can be taken away for purposes of public safety or public order, or in the interests of defence. Again, who determines these exceptions? Who determines what constitutes public order? What is public order? And would it not be perfectly proper, as he sees it, for Smith to say that it is against public order to hold a rally of 50,000 people—when he himself cannot hold a rally of 10,000—because they are going to shout slogans in support of detained politicians? He is going to say that it is contrary to public order. And the courts, which are paid by him and which have already upheld the revocation of a proper constitution, are going to uphold his act, the act of

the Executive, in detaining political detainees without justification.

65. We therefore feel that it is these exceptions, more than the rights themselves, that are going to matter, because the rights are going to be rendered completely meaningless when the authorities hide in the exceptions—and they are the people who interpret the rules.

66. It has been the usual practice that there is an ultimate right of appeal to the Privy Council from a colony when it is getting independence, on the assumption that the Privy Council, being so detached in London from the local situation, may be in a position to assess a situation independently. Now, why is that right not here? Why is the ultimate course of appeal remaining in Rhodesia? It is because they are afraid that at some stage the courts are going to take rulings in support of the Executive, which would be looked at with disfavour by courts in London, by the Privy Council, by the House of Lords. And it is for that reason that this thing is being shielded to take place only within the confines of Southern Rhodesia.

67. The idea expressed in paragraph 2, subparagraph 7, of establishing a tribunal for the purpose of reviewing cases of detainees, is quite meaningless because they can review your case for years and you will never get out. Their decisions are not binding. These provisions are standard provisions. We have seen them in constitutions of former British dependencies and we know how they have been carried out in practice—without just theorizing about it. We know that they can be abused by an Executive which is prepared to disregard them, with impunity.

68. Then we come to paragraph 5, under "Protection"—here are the fundamental rights—"from deprivation of property", which says:

"(1) No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken possession of, and no interest in or right over property of any description shall be compulsorily acquired, except by or under the authority of a written law and where provisions applying to that acquisition or taking of possession is made by a written law—"

And the exceptions then start:

"(3) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this paragraph to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the taking of possession or the acquisition of any interest in or right over property—"

I will just quote one example with regard to land, which appears in subparagraph (3) (q):

"(q) in the case of land, for so long only as may be necessary for the purpose of the carrying out thereon—

"..

"(ii) of agricultural development or improvement which the owner or occupier of the land has been required, and has without reasonable or lawful excuse refused or failed, to carry out".

69. Having given the African the right to own his property—let us take land, which is so basic to him—that right is then taken away. Because if the Executive should say, “You have not complied with certain requirements under certain laws for directing farming, laws on how to develop the land, it is going to be taken away from you”, I think that would put the vast majority of the Africans in that country to tremendous hardship, because they would not be in a position to comply with the developments that are envisaged by the minority régime, since they have neither the capital nor as yet, most of them, the skill to do so.

70. Then there is “Protection from arbitrary search or entry”, in paragraph 6, which says:

“(1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or to entry into or the search of his dwelling-house.”

71. People in every country read about secret police bursting in, in the middle of the night, to disturb the privacy of a home. We know very well that none of us would like such an experience in his own home. But here we have exceptions which actually take away that right of protection from arbitrary search or entry, because it recurs again and again all the time—if it is for the sake of public order, if it is for public safety, or for public morality. The ultimate question that we must come to again is: who determines these things? Who determines whether a police officer is going to search Nkomo's house? It is Ian Smith who has put him in jail. It is Ian Smith who has banned his party, who has stifled all the other freedoms. Now why should he not actually, under these exceptions of public order, public safety, public morality, take advantage and go further to probe into the affairs of everybody without what we may term acceptable standards of reasonable justification? We therefore find that even that paragraph is no protection; it is no guarantee of any human right whatsoever.

72. Then, of course, there is the proverbial “Protection of freedom of conscience”, permitting individuals to worship where they want, to express their beliefs, to associate, and so on. But within that very same paragraph, there is a provision which gives the Government the right to stop you from associating to worship together, if it “is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society . . . in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health”. And we go back. Who is there to determine where I should go to church, where I should not go to church, with whom I should go to church?

73. It is the very same régime which has violated the Constitution, which has passed discriminatory laws, and which is going to sit in the judgement chair and say “We determine”—and no court of law can question that because it would be perfectly legitimate.

74. I do not believe we have separate Gods—a God for the white, a God for the black, a God for the yellow, and so on. We have one supreme being, those of us who believe in God, and he is God of all, irrespective of race and, I would

go so far as to say, even of creed. Creed may be a method of access to God. But if we are to have a government that says that because of his colour Mr. X. cannot go to church in a certain parish because that parish belongs to another colour, I think we are discrediting the religions to which we often pay lip service.

75. The protection of freedom of expression mentioned in paragraph 9 is what we all exercise here. We may annoy our friends and colleagues, but they accept that because it is part and parcel of our rights; we are expressing our own views. But if we approve this document we shall be sanctioning the denial of that very right to our friends in Southern Rhodesia, because it says “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with . . . correspondence” can be taken away if it is “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society . . . in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or public health”. Again we must ask who determines what is in the interests of public order or public safety. You see, it is the same Government. And how can that Government actually implement this clause? It will only hide behind these exceptions and render the clause completely inoperative, and it will still be within the confines of the law, as it is proposed in this settlement.

76. We feel we are living in a world of too many relative standards. When we talk of what is “reasonably justifiable”, what do we mean? What may be reasonably justifiable in my State may not be in Mr. X's State. Ian Smith is going to say, “Well, what is reasonably justifiable in Salisbury is not reasonably justifiable in London; therefore, as far as I am concerned, in Salisbury it is reasonably justifiable and proper.” And he will be entitled to say that in the context of these proposals.

77. And what is a democratic society? We ask this question again. We all aspire to democracy, but we all have different interpretations of democracy. The cardinal point we must determine is whether we accept that the Smith régime heads a democratic society by any standard that we use here.

78. Does any honourable member of the Security Council subscribe to the view that despite our divergent opinions on what constitutes a democratic society the Smith régime is in fact a democratic society? I doubt it. I am sure we all agree that it is not a democratic society. There must be an element of consent predominant in our definition of a democratic society—the will of the people to be governed by that government.

79. We have seen—many times with appreciation—what the United Kingdom Government has done and has tried to do to bring Territories to independence. That is a fact of history, and there is no point in denying it. But it is most extraordinary that at this time, when the United Kingdom is winding up its empire on the African continent, it should actually perpetuate a most disagreeable and most objectionable racial-minority Government, when it knows very well that this is contrary to everything we have all accepted in history and in the current situation of the world.

80. We believe that if it really was true that Smith was convinced that the United Kingdom meant business when it said, "Do not secede or we shall take tough measures against you", Smith would have capitulated a long time ago. It was the idea, not publicly expressed but nevertheless real and strong, that, after all, in the final analysis, the United Kingdom would never move to force the Southern Rhodesian minority régime to capitulate that actually gave them strength to continue with their rebellion.

81. We know that with the exception of the loss of the American colonies in 1776 the United Kingdom has in its colonial experience never accepted rebellion on the part of any colony in Asia, North America or Africa. And wars have been fought to subject princely States which asserted independence from British authority. They were fought by Clive and Warren Hastings in India; they were fought on the African continent to suppress the Mau-Mau; they have been fought in all sorts of places.

82. Now, why is it that, after almost 350 years, for the first time our friends in the United Kingdom are saying, "Oh no; in the case of Southern Rhodesia we are not going to fight." Why? We know of the Boer Wars, which were fought in the 1880s and 1890s in South Africa when the Boers wanted independence in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. They had to fight pitched battles with the British army. They were conquered and subjected to British rule.

83. We cannot understand why Southern Rhodesia should be an exception to that trend of history. If there were cogent humanitarian reasons for such an exception to be made—after all, it is said that exceptions prove the rule—we might consider them. But there are no cogent reasons. This is simply a request to endorse and legitimize a racial régime. We would prefer that that Government remain with the stigma of a rebellious Government in the world community of nations rather than give it the stamp of acceptability of no less authorities than the Security Council and the General Assembly and have no less an authority than the community of world nations accept it in its councils as a properly established State and Government. That would negate any pressures that may come from Member States of this Organization in trying to bring the situation to a more rational end.

84. We read in paragraph 11 of protection from discrimination. We are told that people shall be protected from discrimination. But at the same time, and it is extraordinary, there is a certain clause saying that all the discriminatory laws passed in Rhodesia up to the time of the implementation of the Declaration shall be enforced. The legislation on land apportionment; the legislation on the police State, detrimental to Africans; the legislation on all aspects of life in Southern Rhodesia—all will continue in operation, it is said here, and we are told it is a provision for safeguarding against discrimination. That is absolutely meaningless. What does Smith need? He already has it. If he wants to move Africans from place A to place B, according to all tenets of common sense he will do so with the legislation already on the Southern Rhodesian statute book. He does not need to enact any other law. And that law is saved in these proposals. That discriminatory

legislation is saved—and we are told that Southern Rhodesia has no *apartheid*. Unless *apartheid* is becoming another of those elastic, meaningless words, in my submission it does apply to Southern Rhodesia.

85. We do hope that this august Council, despite its many problems, will come to grips with this problem. We are living day by day in a world of interdependence which is, because of technological advances and other important factors, becoming closer and closer together. Ideas travel fast in communications of all sorts, and it is most regrettable that we are having a situation created in Southern Rhodesia with the masses of the people being deprived, as they will be, of their most basic, elementary rights—not the right to live in mansions, not the right to drive Cadillacs, but the right to the basic elements of living as human beings with self-respect. When those people are deprived of their rights they are going to seek help, and there are going to be States which, either out of selfish interest or out of humanitarian motives, are going to come to the rescue of those people in all sorts of ways. A situation is going to be created of a magnitude difficult to foresee in certain details, but certainly, in principle, very real and present, and it is going to be most regrettable. Because when a people is by law subjugated and deprived of its rights in the name of civilization, in the name of Christian doctrine, in the name of all that all of us have held dear, all these things lose meaning in the eyes of the subjected people, and we are laying, in fact, the foundations for a situation of chaos, a situation that none of us, certainly not the United Kingdom, would like to see come into being. I do hope that the United Kingdom Government will listen first to views within its own house—the House of Commons, the House of Lords, public opinion in the United Kingdom which is seeking to reshape and modify these proposals—and then also to you, and accept modifications that will not allow a legitimization of a rebellion.

86. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Nigeria. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

87. Mr. OGBU (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am grateful to you for allowing me to participate in your debate on this item, which is of the utmost importance to my country.

88. The urge to speak on this item immediately after the representative of the United Kingdom formally brought to the attention of the Security Council the so-called agreement between the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and the rebel leader, Ian Smith, was irresistible. A cursory look at the agreement would have convinced anyone that it did not remotely seek to take account of the interest of the 5 million African Rhodesians, and that it was arrived at mainly with a view to satisfying the quarter-million white Rhodesians. What is more, one had the feeling, even on glancing at the agreement for the first time, that the British Government, in its desperation to get the Rhodesian problem off its hands, had arranged a document with Ian Smith, behind the backs of the recognized leaders of the Africans in Rhodesia. If I resisted the urge to speak at that point, shortly after His Excellency Sir Colin Crowe introduced the so-called agreement to the Security Council, it was to avoid the accusation which has

been voiced all too often, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, that African delegations are apt to dismiss any effort by the British Government at settling the Rhodesian problem even before they have permitted themselves enough time to study the result of such efforts.

89. It is now over a month since the agreement was made public. My Government has studied and restudied the document in the hope that it might find in it whatever it was that convinced the British Government that it was an agreement in the best interest of all Rhodesians. I regret to say that the more the document was studied by my Government, the more it was found that our very first reaction to it was—and still is—quite justified. The so-called agreement has absolutely nothing to commend it to anyone who is desirous of settling the Rhodesian problem in the interest of all Rhodesians. Of course, it has a lot to commend it to those whose preoccupation is to give satisfaction to the white minority element so as to lend respectability to their rebellion. The agreement in all its aspects is tantamount to a British Government endorsement of the perpetual subjugation of the black people of Southern Rhodesia by the white minority.

90. On 23 December 1971, my Foreign Minister, His Excellency Dr. Okoi Arikpo, held a press conference in Lagos on the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement, in which he issued the following statement, and with your permission I shall quote it:

"After the most careful examination, the Federal Military Government has concluded that the new British proposals for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem are completely unacceptable to Nigeria and cannot be recommended for acceptance by the African population of Zimbabwe as they are designed neither to prevent the perpetuation of white minority rule nor to guarantee progress to majority rule in Rhodesia.

"The proposals do not even satisfy the so-called five principles promised by the British Government as a basis for the settlement of the Rhodesian problem. Indeed, one of the five principles—progress towards ending racial discrimination—implicit in the 1961 Constitution has been abandoned. All that remains of it is Mr. Smith's reported promise to make progress towards ending racial discrimination.

"The new proposal will not eliminate racialism and inequality in Zimbabwe. The two main racial groups will operate parallel and separate electoral rolls; and even after parity has been achieved, there will be no legal guarantee to secure a unified multiracial electorate.

"On a more basic level, the proposals violate United Nations resolution 1514 (XV), of 14 December 1960, on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which principally declares, in paragraph 1, that

"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation."

"All the disguises of the proposed electoral reforms do not conceal the most important truth about the new arrangements which will enable Mr. Smith to frustrate and prevent African advancement: They leave him with the control of the economy and the schools and the power to regulate the number of Africans to be admitted to the electoral register.

"The Federal Government recalls that the then British Government under Lord Balfour similarly abandoned the African and Coloured population in 1909-1910 by agreeing to constitutional guarantees undertaken by the South African Government to respect African interests and promote African advancement. After independence, the South African Government fundamentally changed the 1909 Constitution. The result today is total *apartheid* and the enslavement of Africans.

"In the circumstances, the Nigerian Government reaffirms its stand with regard to the principle of no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe. It will not support the admission of an independent Zimbabwe under a minority régime into the United Nations, the Commonwealth or any other international organization of sovereign States. Nor will it agree to the lifting of United Nations sanctions against the minority régime in Zimbabwe.

"The Federal Government, therefore, urges:

"First, effective United Nations intervention in Zimbabwe;

"Second, the immediate introduction of a constitution in Zimbabwe which will provide for majority rule under the supervision of a United Nations commission;

"Third, arrangement for massive international aid for economic reconstruction and educational development of the African population in Zimbabwe; and

"Fourth, the provision of a United Nations guarantee of the territorial integrity of the new independent Zimbabwe.

"Britain rejects these just demands and persists in opposing African aspirations in collusion with racist régimes and in threatening thereby the security of Nigeria and other African countries, the Federal Government will be constrained to re-examine its obligations as a member of the Commonwealth and will take other appropriate measures to safeguard Nigerian and African interests and security."

91. The United Nations cannot and must not be an accomplice to the British attempt at abandoning the people of Zimbabwe to perpetual bondage. If the British Government finds that as administering Power it cannot discharge its responsibility to all the people of Zimbabwe it should say so in clear terms and enable the United Nations to take direct responsibility for the Territory. The indecent haste with which the British Government plans to grant independence to Zimbabwe under the rebel minority régime constitutes a great indictment of the British sense of justice

and fair play and if this plan is carried out it will be an indelible blot on the British record of decolonization.

92. Thank God there are many people even in Britain itself who recognize the irreparable damage which this so-called agreement is likely to do to the British image, not only in Africa but throughout the world. One such distinguished Briton recently—during the debate on Rhodesia on 2 December this year in the House of Lords—called the Rhodesian settlement proposals a fraud. He continued:

“it is a cunning fraud and there is nothing in this for the people of Rhodesia. The Smith régime has been able to win its maximum advantage with a minimum of expenditure . . . and now we have therefore come to a situation where we have betrayed the Africans, we have flouted the Commonwealth and we have undermined the United Nations.”

In the same statement that noble Lord warned the British Government of the consequences of persisting in this course of action in Southern Rhodesia. He said:

“I am sorry to say that what is going to be done now does not avoid bloodshed. It may postpone it, perhaps. Certainly what is going to be done will cause great misery in the hearts of many millions of Africans and Asians throughout the world. It is a setback, yes, for all of them. It is going to cause great joy in Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon, but the bloodshed will not be averted . . . we have put off the evil end but when it comes the end will be far more evil. This is an insurance that in southern Africa bloodshed will take place, and the responsibility will lie on those who today are saying that they have taken this action in the interest of the Africans. That sort of cant is, I think, the most terrible thing to listen to—to say they do it for the Africans.”

93. I agree with the views expressed yesterday in this Council by the Ambassador of Syria to the effect that resolutions will not liberate Zimbabwe, or any other dependent Territories in southern Africa for that matter. The people of the Territory themselves will have to take their destinies firmly in their own hands and to meet tyranny with force. Nevertheless, the United Nations—and in particular the Security Council—cannot stand idly by while provisions of the Charter are being trampled underfoot with the aid and assistance of influential Members of the Organization.

94. If Britain will not use force to meet a situation which has clearly got out of hand, at least it should not put obstacles in the way of the people of Zimbabwe by aiding and abetting the illegal régime of Ian Smith. My delegation cannot subscribe to the double standard underlying the whole negotiation and agreement between the British Government and Ian Smith. We will not be party to the attempt by the British Government to convert Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence into a Home-Ian Smith bilateral declaration of independence.

95. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of India to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

96. Mr. SEN (India): Mr. President, I am grateful to you and the Council for allowing me to speak on the important problem of Zimbabwe. India has constantly and consistently taken great interest in the struggle for independence of all colonial Territories. Quite naturally, our first concern was with the countries of Asia, where most of the Territories are now independent. Unfortunately, in Africa a large number of Territories have still to achieve their goal of independence.

97. On the specific question of Zimbabwe, we cannot help feeling that the discussion in the Council over so many years has had an air of fiction, and yet of finality.

98. We cannot ignore the fact that the Council is a political body, and not a forum for deciding legal issues, for which we have a separate, expensive and generally under-employed organ. However, as is inevitable, legal issues are brought up to support different political views.

99. The first fiction is that the United Kingdom has claimed, and we have accepted, that it is responsible for the administration and defence and external relations of Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom delegation has admitted more than once that it has neither the administrative machinery nor the power to enforce any decision on Southern Rhodesia or on its rebel régime. Responsibility without power is the first fictitious responsibility the Council is faced with.

100. The second fiction is that no British Government can be expected to use force against its kith and kin. We consider, from such knowledge of history as we have, that there is not a single instance where white people have used force against other white people for the simple benefit of the blacks. If this is accepted, the question is not one of using force against kith and kin—the example of Northern Ireland cannot be overlooked—but one of historical conflict of the races. We wish it were not so and, in any event, we have to take note of the British declaration that they cannot and will not use force to solve this problem.

101. The third element—another fiction—is that sanctions as such could bring down the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia. I shall not delve here into the details of the evolution of the sanctions in the Council, but it has been well established that the sanctions have not been effective and that they cannot be effective unless they are extended to South Africa, South West Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in Africa. Such an approach too has been rejected.

102. Given those important considerations, the question is why we are discussing Rhodesia, and what we hope to achieve through this discussion. It is also pertinent to ask why the United Kingdom Government has brought this question before the Council, not only when the sanctions were to be imposed, but on many other occasions. A careful study of the documents makes it clear that the United Kingdom's decision to have this subject thoroughly debated in the United Nations is closely connected with the requirements of its domestic politics. At various stages, if the United Nations could or would underwrite the decisions of the British Government of the day, it would, of course, be of great advantage; but so far as the decisions themselves

are concerned, it seems to us that they are taken in London without any inhibition about what the Security Council and the United Nations may or may not have recommended or decided.

103. The finality I have referred to is to be seen in the present proposals for a settlement. It is quite clear to us that, irrespective of what the Council may decide, the British Government has charted a course of action which it is determined to follow. Many other speakers have already referred to the various ways in which the present proposals conflict with the attitude, decisions, and recommendations of the United Nations, and it is not necessary for me to elaborate on them.

104. The representative of the United Kingdom has pointed out that, in the absence of the kind of settlement that has now been worked out, the system of *apartheid* would have been extended in all its evil aspects to Southern Rhodesia, that Zimbabwe would have formed some kind of hegemony with South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, and thus would have further impaired the welfare, if not the progress, of the black people in Zimbabwe.

105. On the other hand, it is evident not only that *apartheid* is rampant in Rhodesia, but that in the present proposal every word breathes the doctrine of racial discrimination. Its basic assumption is that the blacks are backward and irresponsible and have to be ruled by the whites for many, many long years to come.

106. We do not see any significant difference between the policy of *apartheid* as practised in South Africa and the system prevailing or proposed in Zimbabwe. Secondly, Southern Rhodesia is already closely allied to South Africa and the Portuguese colonies. We do not see that the present proposals would in any way weaken Southern Rhodesia's links with those neighbouring colonial Territories or the racist Government of South Africa, which also illegally controls South West Africa, or Namibia. The danger that if some such settlement as has been proposed by the United Kingdom Government were not put into effect South African hegemony would be consolidated in those parts of Africa is therefore not established.

107. Even on the assumption that such hegemony will take place, what greater harm could come to the black population than what it is already suffering and is expected to suffer for an indeterminate period of time? We would rather put up with these dangers and difficulties and hope that black nationalism will assert itself, with such help as it can obtain from outside, than give the impression that some visible progress is being made by perpetuating white domination over millions of black Africans.

108. It is in this context that we find that none of the five principles which British Command Paper No. 4835 [see S/10405] mentions in its opening paragraph has been respected. I shall examine the fifth principle first, as it is of paramount importance, for the other four principles depend on it, whatever detailed interpretations one may give to them.

109. The fifth principle states that the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for

independence was "acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole". A commission, under Lord Pearce—whose ability, integrity and capacity to understand the black people of Southern Rhodesia need not be questioned—will explain the proposals, which are complicated enough, and obtain African reaction.

110. We should not at this stage anticipate what the result of this consultation will be; but, clearly, the explanation will be limited to only the present proposals, without any alternative, and there will also be no public criticisms or discussions of these proposals by the political parties and leaders, many of whom are in gaol and are not likely to be released for this purpose. Certainly, they will not be allowed the normal political work which a matter of this importance would require.

111. It is of utmost importance that the people as a whole be informed by supporters and critics of the settlement of its substance and significance. This right has been denied to the people. The Emergency Powers Act and Regulations, the African Affairs (Maintenance) Act, the Unlawful Organization Act, among many others, will continue to operate. These measures give extraordinary executive and police control over the movement of persons, the holding of public meetings, the publication of newspapers, and all other devices for any democratic discussion. Anyone expressing an opinion—or even not expressing any opinion at all—is subject to possible detention at the discretion of the authorities.

112. The Commission under Lord Pearce will, therefore, have an impossible task in ascertaining the genuine wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia under a state of emergency with the police State intact, recognized political leaders detained, the major political parties banned, and all channels of communication—radio and television included—available only to the parties in Parliament. Some delegations have suggested that the association of the United Nations with the task which Lord Pearce will undertake, as also with various other stages of the settlement, would be an improvement. We do not share that view, for the conditions in Southern Rhodesia are such that nothing which is not to the liking of the white illegal and racist régime of Ian Smith can be expressed—far less approved. It is for that reason that the representatives of the Zimbabwe people cannot appear before the Council, and the opinions collected by the British Foreign Secretary cannot be made available.

113. In those circumstances, the association of the United Nations would simply give respectability to the suppression and oppression of the black people in Southern Rhodesia, and we hope that the United Nations will not be an instrument for such a folly.

114. I shall now turn to the first principle, of "unimpeded progress to majority rule". Every ingenious method of impeding progress has been employed: the impediment of time, the impediment of immigration, and, finally, the Commission will be impeded from looking over the whole question again. The basis of voting is money and education. I wonder how many people, even in the United Kingdom, would be qualified to vote if those criteria were applied. In

my own country we have given the voting right to all people, men and women, at the age of 18. We do not regret it—in fact, we are proud of it—and our experiment has shown that people do not need money or four years of secondary education to exercise their franchise in a responsible manner. There are many independent African countries where these criteria do not apply, and it cannot be seriously argued that the blacks in Southern Rhodesia are less responsible than any other group of people anywhere in the world. The whole basis of voting there is built on *apartheid* and a determined attempt to continue the white rule. Even if everything goes well—which is more than doubtful, as has been explained by various speakers before me—the total number of African seats in the House of Assembly will be only 10 more than the number of white seats, and this too will be achieved some time in the future—perhaps 50 years hence—and will depend, to a great extent, on the good faith of the white minority. This is indeed very far from majority rule based on the principle of universal adult franchise.

115. The second principle speaks of guarantees to be given by a Government which has not shrunk from rebellion and by a Prime Minister who has not hesitated to break his oath to his own Sovereign. Is he or his successor likely to be deterred from breaking or circumventing the entrenched guarantees if he finds them inconvenient at any time?

116. The third principle, about the improvement of the political status of the African population, does not even come up to the standards of the 1961 Constitution—and they are deplorable enough.

117. The fourth principle, on progress towards ending racial discrimination, is to be applied in such a manner as to bring about some slight improvement in some distant future. The progress foreseen is so marginal that it hardly merits any real recognition.

118. I could take up any and every detail of the complicated proposals and demonstrate, as indeed has been done by many others, that in its entirety it simply means the maintenance of the *status quo* with some promises and faint hopes, here and there, and leaving the entire future of this country to the white racist minority régime. It has further been proposed that once these proposals have been given effect to, the sanctions should be withdrawn, and the independence of Southern Rhodesia recognized. In due course, I suppose, we shall be witnessing diplomatic relations with that country, and perhaps we shall even face an application for its membership in the United Nations. We have indeed moved a long way from the days when the British Government declared that it would use every practicable means available to it to bring down the régime of Ian Smith.

119. In these circumstances, the United Nations can certainly adopt resolutions rejecting the British proposals, but in our view, since the decision of the British Government has been approved by the British Parliament, that Government is not likely to be deflected by whatever resolution the Council may adopt. On the other hand, the British Government has indicated that it is prepared to maintain sanctions until the present proposals have been

worked out. We think that these sanctions should be strengthened, universally and compulsorily applied, and all escapes prevented to the best of the ability of the United Nations and the other Governments. This will neither bring down the régime of Ian Smith nor introduce majority rule in Southern Rhodesia. It will, however, prove that international opinion is anxious to put up as many obstacles as possible for Mr. Ian Smith, and will in no way be a party to giving respectability or recognition to his régime. Meanwhile, one would hope that nationalism of the Africans, particularly of the black people of Zimbabwe, would be strengthened to a point where the white racists of that area, as also of South Africa and the Portuguese colonies in Africa, will have no alternative but to deal with the blacks as men and women of equal worth, and of equal merit and equal dignity. We would rather wait than compromise with human lives and human values. No self-respecting Asian or African can take any other view.

120. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi): During previous meetings, the delegation of Burundi dealt with the substance of the permanent crisis in Rhodesia. This perpetuated state of affairs can only be cured by the unconditional granting of independence to the Zimbabwe people. Far from being tantamount to unwarranted sufferings or sacrifices imposed upon the white settlers, independence will signal the dawn of national happiness shared by a multiracial society in Southern Rhodesia. The fruit of the political and full independence, the harvest of the economic resources will be beneficial and profitable to both the black majority and the white community.

121. As to the agreement reached between London and Salisbury last month [*see S/10405*], it represents an obvious political imbroglio, whose terms can scarcely be digested even by the most erudite scholars. The phases established by this intricate system are totally unnecessary and as such shun the real issue, which is independence according to the normal democratic process.

122. The decision of the Security Council on 2 December [*1604th meeting*] to invite Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to address this body had made it unnecessary for my delegation to intervene in this matter. Nevertheless, in view of the reply by the British Government to the Council's decision in this respect, my delegation is compelled to state that this is the first acid test of Great Britain's ability to implement the so-called agreement.

123. My delegation therefore has serious doubts about the success of the administering Power in attaining the ultimate goal, namely, independence, if the United Kingdom fails to produce the legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwe people before the Council. In other words, to disclaim the ability to bring Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to New York before this highest organ is tantamount to disclaiming the ability to implement the agreement.

124. On behalf of my delegation, I am pleased to express sincerely a deserved gratitude to Ambassador Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for his resolute plea [*1622nd meeting*] for a hearing of the true representatives of Zimbabwe before this supreme organ.

125. In departing from the Council my delegation is bound to take note of the universally expressed disappointment in the inability of the Council to function in accordance with general hopes and expectations. There was a wave of criticism when the Council failed to act promptly in the Indo-Pakistan crisis, primarily because of the divided views of the permanent members. There is criticism that when the Council attained unanimity on the Middle East resolution it fell short of fruitful implementation of that resolution.

126. As Burundi leaves the Council to other capable hands, we see 1972 as a year in which this criticism—valid as we all must agree it is—can be in some measure appeased. With the happy arrival of the People's Republic of China, 1972 will be the first full year in which it will function with the full complement of the five permanent members. This new voice in the person of Ambassador Huang Hua should add greatly to its authority.

127. The authority of the Council in the Middle East has also been augmented. Whatever hesitation prevailed on the question of the interpretation of resolution 242 (1967) should now be dispelled by the guidelines laid down by the General Assembly session which closed a few days ago.

128. In the India-Pakistan subcontinent the unhappy beginning fortunately ended in the constructive resolution of 21 December [resolution 307 (1971)], and the developments that followed appear to be a good augury for that resolution. However, that resolution deals mainly with the bilateral aspect of the problem, and this, it appears to my Government, is not enough. All the events preceding the resolution, here and in the region, show that the tragedy of the subcontinent is only a reflection of a great-Power struggle that is engulfing the whole of Asia. This is all too clear and needs no enlargement. It seems to my delegation that the Council may take an initiative to try to stem this fatalistic drift without reopening the Indo-Pakistan case as such and without tampering with the resolution of 21 December.

129. I refer, of course, to the consensus of the Council in June 1970 [1544th meeting], providing for periodic high-level meetings of the Council in an endeavour to anticipate and to give thought to those incipient threats to international peace and security which might be dealt with informally in a spirit of prevention before they develop into stubborn and intractable symptoms. Without going further, I will merely respectfully suggest that, especially with China—the real China—here, such a high-level session might be devoted to the item of “an Asian peace”, because Asia is the most troubled continent.

130. In conclusion, the delegation of Burundi departs with the prayerful hope that the Council will deal constructively with the African items on its agenda and with a sensitive response to the hopes and expectations of the suffering peoples of Africa.

131. My delegation wishes to express its profound satisfaction at having been able to co-operate with all members of the Council during our tenure and especially to pay tribute to our President, Mr. Taylor-Kamara of Sierra

Leone, under whose presidency, conducted with great skill, business-like efficiency and exemplary patience, the Council was seized of the difficult and vexing issues of the subcontinent and Rhodesia. We extend to him and all our colleagues our best wishes for the New Year and many years ahead.

132. This Organization and mankind as a whole owe a great debt of gratitude to our retiring Secretary-General, U Thant, who has held his office for the unprecedented time of 10 years—10 long and historic years which witnessed great changes and an important transition. He dedicated himself to the United Nations during the first years of the first decade of economic development. He navigated between the eras of *détente* and violence, which do not make a statesman's leadership an easy task. The world presents a rather simple problem when there is a sharp confrontation between good and evil; but it is complicated when evil and good are developing side by side. My delegation believes that U Thant succeeded in dealing with this complicated world when it was suspended between hope and fear. One of his greatest contributions was his refusal to conceal fear and his determination to hold up high the torch of hope. This he was able to do by a unique contribution of his own. It is often debated whether the office of Secretary-General should be political or administrative. U Thant added a third alternative, spiritual leadership, which is a great legacy in a world that is shaken by a moral erosion. The Burundese delegation holds that a book can be written on his many other virtues; but my delegation is content to settle for that one single contribution to the international community. We extend to him our sincere wish for a happy New Year and a long life of service and dedication, which we are confident he will continue to render.

133. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Algeria to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

134. Mr. RAHAL (Algeria) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, permit me first to extend to you my thanks, and I should like to thank the members of the Council also, for permitting me to take the floor in this debate on Southern Rhodesia.

135. Before going into the subject itself, I must say that my statement must be understood to lie within the framework of the mandate entrusted by the Organization of African Unity to three African countries, Algeria, Senegal and Zambia, to follow the debates on Rhodesia in the Security Council. It is under this mandate that we addressed the Council at previous meetings to reaffirm the great interest of the Organization of African Unity in the situation in Rhodesia and to request that all possible measures be taken to put an end to the illegal situation created by the unilateral declaration of independence by the racist minority of Salisbury and to permit the African majority to exercise its rights to self-determination and independence.

136. We do not think that it is indispensable to go once again into the details of the problem. They are very well known to the Council, which for many years now has had

the question of Rhodesia before it. Many resolutions have already been adopted, both by the Council itself and by the Assembly. These have reaffirmed the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination; they have requested the administering Power to take the necessary measures to put an end to the system of racial discrimination and to permit the African majority to exercise its responsibilities in the government of the country.

137. In the light of the failure of the administering Power to discharge its obligations, if necessary by making use of armed force, the Council took economic sanctions against the Salisbury régime which were meant to be binding.

138. However, the British Government began negotiations with Smith and, after the talks had been broken off several times, now announces that it has reached an agreement [*see S/10405*] which may bring about a solution to the problem of Rhodesia.

139. It was at the request of the United Kingdom that the Security Council began its debate on Rhodesia devoted to the examination of this agreement. I do not know whether the British delegation had in mind simply to provide information to the Council in order to keep it abreast of the way in which the administering Power intended to discharge its responsibilities, or whether it wanted to submit those proposals to this august body in order to ensure that they received its approval.

140. In dealing with the problem of Rhodesia and discussing it regularly since 1965, the Security Council has recognized its own responsibility in this matter, and the British delegation, in associating itself with the decisions taken by the Council, sometimes on its own initiative, has confirmed that responsibility. Of course, Great Britain has always been considered the administering Power, and it is as such that the Council requested it to ensure the application of the measures which it advocated. While the Council has always given a great deal of liberty and room for manoeuvre to the administering Power in the search for ways and means to be used, none the less it specified the inviolable principles which should provide the basis for any acceptable solution. The Council is therefore obliged to say today whether the solution proposed by Great Britain is in keeping with the decisions it has already taken and the rules it has already laid down. It cannot, under any circumstances, merely take note of the British communication and, on the basis of more or less vague assurances, relinquish its own responsibility in favour of the British Government.

141. We should like to reaffirm here most categorically and firmly that whatever the importance of the obligations which we recognize as belonging to the administering Power, the primary and ultimate responsibility for the solution of the problem of Rhodesia rests with the Security Council.

142. The British proposal must therefore be considered in the light of previous recommendations of the Council. It is not so much a matter of considering whether the process contained in the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement is in keeping with the six or five principles unilaterally laid down by the

British Government, as of ensuring that it respects the principles adopted and often reaffirmed by the Security Council and by the General Assembly.

143. I do not want to strain the patience of members of the Council by entering into a critical analysis of the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement. Such an analysis has already been made, and very well made, by previous speakers, and I have nothing to add to what they have said on this subject.

144. The extreme complexity of the measures contemplated would be enough in any case to condemn them, and the same can be said for the gaps which were so subtly introduced into the text and which leave the way open to all kinds of departures from the application of those principles. And what are we to think of the fact that it is the minority, the very minority in Salisbury, which has been entrusted with the task, once the independence of Rhodesia has been accepted and legalized, of implementing the measures which theoretically are supposed to bring the African majority to the government of the country?

145. But I shall not dwell on those provisions, which are certainly the result of a praiseworthy effort of intellectual acrobatics. Their ineffectiveness has already been amply demonstrated. For us the only fundamental element of the problem is and remains the future of the people of Zimbabwe. It is to the people of Zimbabwe that justice is owed first and foremost, and it is for that people to decide on its own future in complete freedom and independence.

146. The agreement submitted to the Council was between the British Government and the racist and rebel régime of Ian Smith. The representative of the United Kingdom did state [*1605th meeting*] that Lord Home was able to make contact with 97 representatives of the African majority. But the provisions of the agreement were negotiated solely with the representatives of the minority in power. It is difficult to know to what extent account was taken of the views expressed by the Africans. There can be no doubt that it would be very important for the Council to have some knowledge at least of the memoranda presented by the leaders of the two African parties in Rhodesia, ZAPU and ZANU. The reluctance of Great Britain to publish these documents is difficult to endorse. It is particularly regrettable because that action deprives the Council of information which would be of the utmost importance in its deliberation.

147. But, we are told, the agreement will come into effect only when it receives the approval of the Rhodesian people as a whole. That is the famous acceptability clause, which was particularly stressed by the representative of the United Kingdom, and quite rightly so. I say quite rightly because that clause should make it possible to destroy one of the principal objections to the agreement, namely, the non-participation of Africans. To this end, a commission made up of British representatives will be entrusted with the task of going around the country, explaining the provisions of the agreement and obtaining the views of the people. It is on the basis of that information that it will be decided whether the Rhodesian people as a whole do or do not approve the text submitted to them.

148. It is far from our intention to question the honesty of the members of the commission, but is this not rather a strange way of consulting a population of more than 5 million people? While the future of a whole people is at stake are we going to content ourselves with this procedure which is so difficult to put into effect and inevitably imperfect? And what choice will be offered to those who are going to be consulted, apart from that of simply accepting or refusing a set of measures which were worked out without their participation? If the British Government really wants to ascertain the views of the people on the agreement it negotiated with Smith, there is only one way of doing it. One way only which will yield a clear and unequivocal reply, and that is a referendum involving the whole population of Rhodesia, on the basis of one man, one vote. There is no other honest way of finding out the views of the Rhodesian people about these proposals. We will deny in advance any validity to a decision taken by the British Government on the basis of the opinions gathered by the commission to which it wants to give the task of applying what it calls the test of acceptability.

149. In fact, the political leaders of the African people of Rhodesia have already made known their opposition to the Home-Smith agreement. The Organization of African Unity, for its part, has rejected the whole Anglo-Rhodesian plan as a plan that will lead to the final alienation of the Zimbabwe people doomed indefinitely, and in a manner legalized by the British Government, to endure the oppression of a racist minority which has never concealed its intention and its will to perpetuate its domination and to maintain a régime of racial segregation.

150. The Council can find out the views of the African people of Rhodesia. This people has qualified representatives to express its wishes and make known its aspirations. These representatives, who for many years now have been rotting in Ian Smith's prisons, are entitled to speak on behalf of their people. Let them come here and speak to this Council and set forth their views and objectives directly. They can say what they think of the plan presented by the British Government. For us, there could be no better test of acceptability of this plan.

151. I shall confine my statement to these few thoughts, which of course do not exhaust the question, but do lay stress on the fact that the British proposals can make no claim whatsoever to complying with the principles laid down by the Security Council. In following the British Government in its intentions, we would end up by legalizing a rebellion which the Council has always condemned. We would be consolidating the power of a minority régime which the Council has already attempted to overthrow by economic sanctions, and we would encourage the establishment and strengthening of a system of racial segregation which arouses the indignation of international opinion.

152. The African people of Rhodesia, whose right to self-determination has been recognized and repeatedly reaffirmed in this very place, is entitled to decide on its own future in some other way than by this travesty of consultation which we denounce most categorically. The Security Council must defend the rights of this people and

it must help it to defend itself because, in effect, a people must wrest its own freedom for itself and recover its dignity by its own sacrifices.

153. Under the mandate entrusted to Algeria by the Organization of African Unity, I therefore ask the Council to reject the Anglo-Rhodesian agreement as not complying with the principles it has laid down for a solution of the Rhodesian problem.

154. Mr. LONGERSTAEY (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation has followed with great interest the debate which the Security Council has devoted to the question of Southern Rhodesia. Although the debate was interrupted by the urgent consideration of the grave events which occurred in the Indian subcontinent, it is nevertheless true that my Government has remained attentive to the new prospects which are opening up in connexion with the revolution of the political situation in Rhodesia, following the proposals for a settlement agreed to in Salisbury.

155. On several occasions the Belgian Government has clearly stated that it does not recognize any legal existence of the Ian Smith régime, which unilaterally proclaimed independence in 1965 and which ignored the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Territory. It is for that reason that Belgium has scrupulously implemented the decisions taken by the Council in connexion with the breaking off of consular relations and the application of economic sanctions.

156. My delegation has participated actively in the work of the Committee created by the Security Council under the terms of resolution 253 (1968). Since the fourth report of that Committee of the Council is mentioned in our agenda [*S/10229 and Add.1 and 2*], I must emphasize here that the implementation of sanctions has resulted in the loss of very important traditional markets for Belgium.

157. Therefore, it is a function of a fundamental principle—namely, the inalienable right of the whole of the Rhodesian population to self-determination and independence—that my delegation has taken note of the proposals for a settlement known as the Salisbury agreement.

158. We have appreciated very much the initiative undertaken by the British Government to unfreeze the political situation in Rhodesia. The state of stagnation and paralysis which had occurred in the Territory was becoming more and more dangerous, since it was leading inevitably to the creation of a new citadel of racism and intolerance.

159. The Security Council should take note of the decision of the Government of the United Kingdom to act as administering Power and elaborate a programme of action in Rhodesia, designed to establish a government founded upon the basis of the majority. We share the opinion expressed by several members of the Council that it is for the United Kingdom to take the necessary measures appropriate to the special conditions which prevail in the Territory, so as to set up machinery that would make it possible for all inhabitants of Rhodesia to voice their opinion freely, without pressure or constraint. On the other

hand, it seems to us dangerous for the Council, or any other organ of the United Nations, to arrogate unto itself the right to dictate or to impose, so to speak, behind the back of the administering Power, some political settlement. However, the Council must follow very closely the implementation of the test of acceptability advocated under the Salisbury agreement. We rely upon the loyalty and diligence with which London will undertake the consultations with the African people. Those consultations should be organized without delay and should make it possible for all parties concerned to make known their opinion.

160. In these two respects, namely the duty of the Council and the prerogatives of the administering Power, we wonder whether the United Kingdom, within the framework of its responsibilities, could not undertake the initiative, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of inviting some personality to participate in the work of the Pearce Commission.

161. Furthermore, we would also have been in favour of having the consultations undertaken among members of the Council lead to a hearing by the Council of representatives of the ZAPU and ZANU parties.

162. With regard to the draft resolution which the representative of Somalia submitted yesterday to the Council [1622nd meeting, para. 8], my delegation will not be in a position to support it. In addition to the arguments adduced a few moments ago, we continue to believe that it seems premature to pass judgement on the Salisbury agreement under present conditions, since that agreement is only a proposed settlement and is not yet final. It seems indispensable that we await the results, and the possible recommendations, of the Pearce Commission. My delegation will therefore have to abstain on the draft resolution. We can hardly accept a text which takes a decision on the substance of the matter without having all the necessary elements in our possession in advance.

163. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Before I get on to the substance of my statement, and as this may be the last chance for me to do so before the end of the year, may I take this opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your tenure of presidency during what must have been one of the most strenuous months for a President of the Security Council in many years—indeed, perhaps in the history of the United Nations. The number and importance of the subjects we have had to deal with in this month are astonishing, and they were, indeed, extremely exhausting, but you stood up to the pressures nobly.

164. I should also like to bid farewell to you and to our colleagues from Nicaragua, Poland, Burundi and Syria, who will be leaving the Council at the end of the year, to wish them well and to say how much we have appreciated and valued their wisdom and co-operation. It has been a pleasure to work with them.

165. Before further consideration is given to the preliminary draft resolution which was outlined to us yesterday by the distinguished representative of Somalia [*ibid.*], I feel I should perhaps make a few further observations in the light of the debate which has taken place, which has on the

whole been thoughtful and deeply concerned. Indeed, concern has been the principal element in this debate—concern shared by us all for the future of the Rhodesian Africans. If there is a difference between us, it would seem to be this: some delegations are looking for what I might call the ideal solution. My Government, on the other hand, the Power which the Security Council has all along insisted is the one which carries responsibility for achieving a settlement, has had to take account of the harsh realities of the situation and of the limitations on our effective power. That, I believe, is the only real difference between us—the difference between the ideal and the practicable.

166. I think that in the course of our discussions I have dealt with most of the questions that have been raised in so far as they are answerable or have not already been answered in the text of the proposals themselves. There is, however, the question of the participation of United Nations observers in the test of acceptability, about which questions have been raised in the past and which is covered in operative paragraph 6 of the preliminary draft resolution. My Government has carefully considered the suggestion for United Nations involvement in the conduct of the test of acceptability. It does not see, however, how such involvement could be reconciled with the principle—on which the draft resolution is no less insistent—that the British Government is the administering Power and must carry full responsibility for the exercise of its obligations. The first and most important obligation we have laid on ourselves is to be satisfied that any basis for independence is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. That is the task of the Pearce Commission, which will, I can assure the Council, carry it out thoroughly and impartially.

167. Perhaps this would be an appropriate moment to say something more about the Commission. Since my statement of 2 December [1605th meeting] the two other Deputy Chairmen have been named. They are Sir Glyn Jones and Sir Frederick Pedler. Both men have had distinguished careers in Africa, in and out of Government service. Sir Glyn Jones served for many years in central and southern Africa. He was Governor-General of Malawi from 1964 until 1966, and before that his service included eighteen years in what was then known as Northern Rhodesia. The earlier part of Sir Frederick Pedler's career in Africa was also in Government service. He spent three years in Tanganyika and was Secretary to the Commission on Higher Education in East Africa and the Sudan in 1937. Since 1947 his main interests in Africa have been of a commercial nature, as he has been with the United Africa Company for many years, becoming a director of Unilever and its Deputy Chairman from 1965 to 1968. He is currently Chairman of the Council for Technical Education and Training for Overseas Countries.

168. The sixteen Commissioners to help Lord Pearce and his four Deputy Chairmen are now being recruited. They are being chosen amongst people with a background knowledge of Africa, some of whom will be from within the British Government service and some from outside. The Commission will be supported by accurate and unbiased interpreters in Shona and Sindebele. The Council may also wish to know that the settlement proposals are being translated into Shona and Sindebele, and half a million copies are being printed in the first instance.

169. I have assured the Council that the Pearce Commission will carry out its task thoroughly and impartially. As I have pointed out, it is composed of members who have judicial, administrative, commercial and political experience of Africa, and they will not require any form of international supervision in order to establish whether or not the proposed settlement is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. I should emphasize that there will be nothing clandestine about the Commission's approach or method of operation. As Lord Pearce himself said on 20 December, "We have a strong feeling that the media should be kept informed of what is going on, and we hope that adequate coverage of our work can be arranged".

170. My Government is therefore confident that the Pearce Commission has the integrity, qualifications and experience necessary to carry out the task with which it is charged, and we do not believe that any outside involvement is either necessary or justified in order that we may carry out our responsibility. If, as has been suggested, the Commission does not find the conditions required to enable it to carry out its task I have no doubt it will promptly report accordingly.

171. The debate has shown one or two possible misconceptions which I think it would be desirable to clear up.

172. In the first place, I have been asked more than once what is the alternative if the test of acceptability shows that these proposals are not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. As I said in my statement on 2 December, this is a good example of an unanswerable question, because we cannot make commitments about hypothetical situations. I can, however, say that my Government has no alternative proposals up its sleeve to advance if the present proposals should prove unacceptable. Indeed, it is difficult to see what other proposals could be made. In another sense, however, the question is perhaps a misdirected one. We should instead be asking ourselves what the alternative is for the African majority in Rhodesia. Are they to choose the road to which these proposals point, hard and arduous though that road may be? Or are they to choose the road which, as we see it, would lead to an intensification of racial discrimination and *apartheid*? This question of a practicable—I repeat, practicable—alternative is one to which the critics of our proposals have not addressed themselves, as the distinguished representative of Italy has rightly pointed out.

173. Secondly, there have been a good many questions about guarantees to prevent the settlement's being overturned, and in particular to prevent any retrogressive amendment of the constitutional provisions. Now, we must all admit that no constitution is foolproof against a coup d'état. The only effective external guarantee against a coup d'état would be the use of force, which has always been ruled out for good reasons I do not need to repeat. Leaving this aside, however, we believe that the internal guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitutional provisions can indeed achieve their purpose. It has, for example, been suggested that the white Members of Parliament, together with the indirectly elected African representatives, can put through retrogressive amendments to the Constitution. That is not so, as a study of the proposals will make clear.

174. Right up to the stage of parity, for any amendment of the Constitution to be accepted, it will require not only the affirmative votes of at least two thirds of the total membership of the House of Assembly, but also the affirmative votes of a majority of the total African membership. This means that at all stages the directly elected Africans cannot be bypassed. And in case there should be any fear that such a majority could be obtained through a prearranged absenteeism, let me quote what Lord Goodman, who did much of the negotiating, had to say about this in the House of Lords on 1 December:

"The idea that you have only to have one African who has a cold or another who is knocked down and the blocking mechanism ceases to function is, if I may say so, disposed of by the terms of the White Paper which refers to the majority of the total number of Africans in the House. It is not a majority of the total number present at any moment, but a majority of those eligible to have seats and to vote; one need have no apprehension that if an African is detained by a social event, or is kidnapped or is suborned so that he does not attend, that will enable the blocking mechanism to be defeated."

Lord Goodman, added: "We were not, if I may say so, so simple as that".

175. In his intervention yesterday [*1622nd meeting*] the representative of Somalia suggested that the concept of parity was a myth, since the 50 African members would include what he called 24 "appointed" members. This overlooks two essential facts. First, the indirectly elected members are not nominees of the Government or of the chiefs; they are elected by an electoral college in which the majority of the members are themselves elected councillors. These indirectly elected members of the House of Assembly are not Government pensioners, and, as I pointed out in an earlier intervention, their voting record shows that they have aligned themselves with their directly elected colleagues on all contentious issues. Secondly, the representative of Somalia overlooks the fact that as soon as parity is reached there is to be a referendum among the African voters to decide on the future of the indirectly elected seats.

176. A further misunderstanding that has been prevalent concerns subparagraph 1 (*k*) of paragraph II of the proposals. It has been widely suggested that this subparagraph means that the establishment of the Common Roll seats after parity will be subject to a white veto. Again, I must stress that this is not so. The establishment of the Common Roll seats after parity will be an especially entrenched provision of the Constitution. The Commission which is provided for in subparagraph (*k*) will have no power to prevent the establishment of the Common Roll seats. Any alternative arrangements, whether based on the recommendation of the Commission or otherwise, can be made only by amending the Constitution, and this would require a two-thirds majority. By the time the Commission has reported, the African voters will already have held their referendum to decide the future of the indirectly elected seats. And at least 17 African votes in the House of Assembly would be necessary for any change in the constitutional provision for the creation of the Common

Roll seats. Thus the Africans can effectively block any proposals which would frustrate majority rule. I hope, therefore, that this misunderstanding is now cleared up.

177. Perhaps I should also at this stage say something about the proposal to invite Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to appear before the Council in order to state their views, although in fact there is not much that I can add to my letter of 21 December 1971 to the President of the Council, which has been reproduced in document S/10470. As I explained to you during our consultations, we have no objection to these invitations being issued by the Council. Equally, however, I made it clear that my Government was in no position to require the Rhodesian authorities to allow the persons concerned to come to New York. Perhaps, since at any rate in the English interpretation there was a misquotation from my letter in the intervention of the representative of the Soviet Union, I should stress that the word I used was "require", not "request". An attempt has been made to blow this question up out of all proportion. The fact is that for the purposes of the test of acceptability, the action lies not in New York but in Rhodesia itself. That is where Mr. Nkomo's and Mr. Sithole's views can be made known to the Pearce Commission.

178. It is the test of acceptability which is the crucial next stage. What we are concerned with at the present time is not whether these proposals are acceptable to the United Nations, but whether they are acceptable to the people of Rhodesia. We do not feel that it is either necessary or desirable for the United Nations to adopt resolutions at this stage; let us suspend judgement until we can see what will emerge from the test of acceptability.

179. But we now have before us a preliminary draft resolution. I have already said that I do not believe that any resolution by the Security Council is called for at present, and that before contemplating any further action we should all await the views of the people of Rhodesia as a whole, as expressed by the Pearce Commission. This view is reinforced by an examination of the draft. I recognize that this draft shows the deep concern of its author for the future of the people of Rhodesia, but in all honesty I must say that it seems to me to suffer from a basic defect. It fails to distinguish effectively between, on the one hand, the legitimate concern of the United Nations in this matter and, on the other hand, the fundamental responsibility which, as successive Security Council resolutions have insisted, lies with the British Government and the British Government alone. Thus it seeks to impose conditions and obligations on us in the discharge of that responsibility. In operative paragraphs 5 and 6 it seeks to tell us how we should ascertain the views of the people of Rhodesia on their political future. As I have already explained, this is a matter which the British Government, as the administering Power, must handle for itself. Moreover, in the earlier operative paragraphs the draft takes a view on, and rejects, the proposals. But this is precisely the matter on which we shall be seeking the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole, and prior judgement by the Security Council would be premature. It also imposes conditions which successive British Governments have made plain are not acceptable because they do not lie within the realm of practical possibility.

180. I said at the outset that the difference between my delegation and some of the other delegations represented in the Security Council was the difference between what was ideal and what was practicable. The present draft is, I regret to say, far removed from what is practicable.

181. To sum up, may I suggest that there are six propositions by which we should be guided in our approach to this very difficult problem. One: The position of the Africans in Rhodesia is not yet as bleak and hopeless as it is in South Africa; but it has steadily deteriorated in the last six years. The biggest danger is that they and their children and their children's children may be condemned to the degradation and misery of *apartheid*; Two: Nobody in this room wants that. But ruling out, as we must do, the possibility of military intervention, the British Government, even with the support of the United Nations, cannot physically impose its will; Three: Therefore an agreed settlement is the only way to avert the danger; Four: Some details of the agreed proposals may be open to criticism. I have already admitted freely that they are not ideal; Five: Nevertheless the agreed proposals, if they are accepted, will bring about a change of direction. They will give an opportunity to halt and reverse the present downhill course which is leading inexorably to the precipice of *apartheid*. They can lead towards majority rule in a multiracial society and in a prosperous and expanding economy; Six: The last word on these proposals must rest with the Rhodesians themselves. It is their views, based on a full understanding of what the proposals mean in practice, that we shall now be ascertaining in an open, impartial, painstaking and protracted process of consultation.

182. We all owe it to the people of Rhodesia to allow them to make up their own minds on their own future after mature and quiet deliberation. Until they have done so, let us suspend our own judgement.

183. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I have not asked for the floor to object to the arguments which my good and esteemed friend Ambassador Farah has used in his remarks concerning my statement. I have asked to be allowed to speak simply to dispel or correct some impressions which our colleague of Somalia appears to have drawn from my statement.

184. Let me start by saying that we are not requested, as far as we understand and even more so after what Sir Colin Crowe has just stated, to endorse the proposals for a settlement which have been reported to the Council by the British Government; nor should we anticipate the result of the test of acceptability.

185. I have made clear in my statement the limited scope which, in our view, the negotiations held by the British Government had from the beginning and the reasons which, apparently, made the United Kingdom decide to resume the negotiations with Salisbury in the light of the incomplete results of the sanctions applied against Rhodesia and of some unpleasant but inescapable realities. In short, the limited scope seems to be to break the present deadlock which has lasted for so many years and to put a new process in motion. We are at the same time giving our assessment in general of the substance of the proposals.

186. There is not a word in my statement which can be construed as a denial of the will of the majority or the principle of one man, one vote. Italy's record on this point is unquestionable, and I would ask my good friend Ambassador Farah to read my statement carefully. He will notice also that we are not prejudging in any way the future deliberations of the Council. My simple comment on the test of acceptability was that it would provide the first real opportunity to reach individuals and groups of people in each corner of the Territory and to begin doing what has been badly needed for a very long time, namely, to bring the adult African population of Rhodesia to think about its future and its fundamental rights—however unsatisfactory and incomplete this process may seem, it can be of some use—in order to have millions of people know what they have ignored until now and could go on ignoring for many years to come. In other words, in spite of its shortcomings that test could serve a useful purpose if it really succeeded in breaking the deadlock and at the same time making the people concerned aware of their fundamental rights. And we all know that once an idea, revolutionary by nature, is placed in the mind of a nation there is no will, no power on earth, which can stop that nation from taking hold of its own destiny. To recall the words of a well-known author, "Nothing is stronger than an idea whose time has come".

187. Of course, our modest expectations could also be frustrated. That is why we have submitted some suggestions related to the test of acceptability and added that the results of that test should be carefully studied by the Security Council.

188. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): The few remarks I should like to make are basically similar to those just expressed by the Ambassador of Italy. Their purpose is to clarify our position following the comments made immediately after my statement by the representative of Somalia.

189. If I understood correctly what Ambassador Farah has said, he considers that the position of my delegation, at least to some extent, amounts to internationally endorsing the proposals we are discussing. He points out also that the solution proposed is not in keeping with the principles on which my Government, among others, based itself when seeking solutions to the problems which faced it in Africa.

190. On the first point, I should like to say that the idea of granting international standing to the proposals in question or the test of acceptability has never occurred to us. For us it is simply a matter of following the experiment and awaiting its results in the hope that maybe this experiment will mark the end of the *status quo* and, as I said just now, reintroduce momentum into a stagnant situation.

191. As to the second comment of the Ambassador of Somalia, I certainly concede his point; and I would remind him that I said precisely that just now, when I noted that the process of emancipation implemented by France in other African countries was very different from the system described in the proposals which we are discussing—and that, of course, for us the Rhodesian problem should be solved in keeping with the freely expressed will of the

people as a whole. The position we have taken is based on our concern to refuse no chance, however small, to open the way to the implementation of this principle.

192. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, I should like, in exercise of the right of reply, to answer some of the remarks made by the United Kingdom representative. The important thing is not which English verb the Soviet delegate used—"request", "demand" or any other English verb. The important thing is the substance of the question. We must not conceal the essence of the problem by arguments having to do with semantics. For the Security Council the essence of the problem is perfectly clear. The United Kingdom Government has refused to co-operate with the Council and enable two leading political figures of Southern Rhodesia—Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole—to appear at a meeting of the Council, set forth their views concerning the situation in Rhodesia and give their assessment of the Smith-Home agreement.

193. This is how we must assess the attitude of the United Kingdom Government to the Security Council's decision. The United Kingdom has violated that decision, it has not complied with it, and the Council must take note of the refusal of the United Kingdom Government to implement the Security Council's decision that the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power bearing full responsibility for the situation in Southern Rhodesia, should provide an opportunity for the Council to hear the views of those two political leaders who represent the two major political parties of the people of Zimbabwe. No semantic arguments about English verbs—stronger or weaker verbs—can conceal this essence of the question.

194. I believe that in the decision to be adopted by the Council on the question under discussion we must take note of the failure of the United Kingdom Government to implement the Security Council's decision concerning the invitation to Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole.

195. That is the real picture and no arguments about semantics can change the situation.

196. Now, as for the United Kingdom representative's proposal that the Council should do nothing and should cease to consider the matter of Southern Rhodesia, a question naturally arises: Why was he in such haste to put the matter before the Security Council? What did the United Kingdom want? What aim was it pursuing? Was it merely to inform the Council of that racist-imperialist deal between the British lord and the Southern Rhodesian racist and have the matter end there—in other words, to secure the Council's silent assent to that deal? I do not think that the majority of members of the Council would agree with that approach to the question under discussion. So why have we been wasting time? If that were the case, there would have been no need for the United Kingdom to inform the Council about that deal; it could simply have done whatever it, as the administering Power, saw fit.

197. But the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia now has an international dimension. It is being dealt with by the United Nations and by the appropriate

United Nations bodies. This question now falls within the competence of the Security Council. The Council has heard the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom and his report on the Home-Smith agreement. The members of the Council have spoken and an overwhelming majority of them have condemned that deal, regarding it as an imperialist, colonialist, racist arrangement depriving the people of Zimbabwe of the opportunity to attain national independence and become full masters of their own country in the near future. Many delegations of States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Council have taken part in the discussion. Not a single voice has been raised here in support of this deal, in support of the position of the United Kingdom Government and the Southern Rhodesian racists. Consequently, that aspect of the question too is perfectly clear. The overwhelming majority in the Security Council and those States whose representatives have taken part in the discussion of this question not only do not approve of this deal but they decisively condemn and reject it.

198. For the representative of the United Kingdom it would, of course, be more convenient to put an end to the discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia and forget that the question has been discussed in the Security Council. But it was the United Kingdom which initiated the discussion of this question, the United Kingdom put it before the Council. We have discussed it and how, when dealing with such an important question which has now become a United Nations question, i.e., an international question and not just a Home-Smith question, could we fail to take any decision?

199. I think that the distinguished representative of Somalia was acting correctly when he introduced his proposals and considerations to the Security Council in the form of a working document. We are expecting him to formulate those proposals as a draft resolution and submit it formally to the Council. The Council will consider that draft resolution, continue the discussion and conclude by voting.

200. It is possible, of course, that the United Kingdom representative will invoke the veto. But that will be an unjust veto. It will be a veto in support of the racist régime of Southern Rhodesia. It will be at variance with and in violation of all the decisions of the United Nations on the question of the granting of help to colonial peoples in their efforts to attain freedom and independence. Whoever does such a thing will appear before the whole world in that ugly light, and that is perfectly clear.

201. The United Kingdom has spoken about ascertaining what are the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia. But those views have long been known to the United Nations. Those views are one—the desire for immediate independence, immediate national freedom. So why does the United Kingdom still find it necessary to conduct a lengthy process of “ascertaining views”? The answer is, of course, that it seeks to muddy the waters and perpetuate the rule of the racists in Southern Rhodesia. That is its only purpose. That, too, is the purpose of the Home-Smith agreement. What could “ascertaining the views” of a people mean when they are struggling for their freedom and their

leaders are in prison? They are not being allowed to appear before the Security Council, their documents are being hidden from the Security Council and the United Nations. The Council would know the views of the people if the United Kingdom would submit to the Security Council—as the Council has insisted and in accordance with the special decision it has taken—the memorandums of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, which were handed by them to Lord Home. The views of the people of Southern Rhodesia would be clear and there would be no need to talk of “ascertaining views”. That is a totally unnecessary exercise and I am not inclined to think that the Council would approve such a procedure, which would clearly be calculated to delay matters and to sanction the perpetuation of the terrorist rule of the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

202. The United Kingdom representative contrasts “idealism” with “reality”. But that is a play on words. Idealism is not at issue here. We are dealing here with a definite reality, the reality that the people of Zimbabwe aspire to independence, that they wish to rid themselves of racist rule. That is reality. And that reality has been known for many years to the United Nations and the Security Council. That is indeed the reality. And what can be held up in contrast to it? That which the distinguished representative of Nigeria spoke of here when he characterized the Home-Smith deal as a fraud.

203. Therefore, if we are going to make comparisons, we must compare not idealism with reality but reality with fraud. The Home-Smith deal, as the representative of Nigeria said in his statement to the Security Council, is a fraud. And that is a fact.

204. In view of all these circumstances, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to continue the discussion of Southern Rhodesia. We reserve the right to speak again on this matter after studying the proposal submitted by the distinguished representative of Somalia. The Council should adopt a resolution on the question so that we will not be in the position of having discussed all this here in vain. For if we end the discussion and fail to adopt a resolution in the Security Council, that will enable the Southern Rhodesian racists and their protectors to say that the Council has, allegedly, discussed the question, has considered it at great length with the participation of many delegations, but has not taken any decision and has put off the question until “views” have been “ascertained” on the spot. In doing so the Council would in effect be formally cloaking with its authority the Home-Smith deal and the fraud being perpetrated by the Southern Rhodesian racists and their protectors.

205. We insist that the discussion be continued and that the Council take a decision on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

206. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): We have listened carefully to the statements made by all the representatives here concerning this question. It seems that there is an argument that we should suspend any judgement on the question of Southern Rhodesia. There seems to be another argument that we should stop interference with the question of Southern Rhodesia, asking us to wait here for

the result of some experiment—the so-called test of acceptability. We feel that we can accept neither of these arguments.

207. The question of Southern Rhodesia involves the basic interests of 5 million people of Zimbabwe. It also involves the basic interests of the African people and African countries. In accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations and the Security Council are entitled to discuss, to intervene, to judge and to take a decision on this question. On the other hand, the United Nations has no right to relegate its own responsibility to the Government of the United Kingdom or to Ian Smith. The United Nations has no right to ask a few people chosen by the British Government and the Smith régime to ascertain or to make decisions.

208. Whether it is the colonial domination of the United Kingdom in the past or the present Smith racist régime in this Territory of Southern Rhodesia, in substance both are racial domination. The domination of the régime of Ian Smith is the direct result of the colonial domination of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the colonial domination of Britain in the past and the racist régime of Ian Smith at present are both illegal, are in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and are against fundamental human rights. Therefore, they have no right to decide the future of the people of Zimbabwe.

209. The Chinese delegation maintains that the Security Council should continue discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia. It cannot evade its political and moral responsibility to the people of Zimbabwe and to the African countries and peoples. We have spoken on this question of Southern Rhodesia in the past. We reserve our right to comment again on this question.

210. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): First, I should like to address my colleagues from France and Italy, pursuant to the rights of reply which they exercised in reply to the statements that I had made earlier in this meeting.

211. The statement I made was made in all sincerity because I know that these two great countries are founded on a great love and respect for the democratic rights of people. I believe that here in this Council the least we can do is to make sure that in our decisions we do not compromise on commitments to principle, that any decision emanating from this Council must fully respect those principles upon which we feel human dignity is founded and which we ourselves wish to enjoy in our own communities.

212. Unfortunately, in the course of consultations that my delegation has conducted over the past 24 hours, we have to our great surprise encountered positions which amount to the fact that whatever changes may be made to the draft resolution, delegations will adopt either a negative position or a position of abstention—as if their positions had been shaped out months in advance. This is a most regrettable fact because in a Council of this importance, it is only by an exchange of views and ideas and the production of facts that we should be able to hammer out

resolutions or decisions which would reflect the thinking of such an august forum.

213. The draft resolution which my delegation had the privilege of introducing yesterday [*see 1622nd meeting, para. 8*] does not condemn any country, but it speaks to principle. In the course of the debate—and I trust it will not be long—my delegation will ask that this draft resolution be put to the vote and I will call for separate votes on certain paragraphs which involve principle. I want to know then whether or not delegations here believe that the principle of adult universal suffrage should be applicable to the people of Southern Rhodesia; whether or not they believe that in the ascertainment of the political wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia the best course and the only course should be through referendum by secret balloting; and whether or not they believe that in the course of the ascertainment of such views the principle of one man, one vote, should be allowed or should at least be promoted. It will certainly be a refreshing experience to see any delegation voting contrary to those principles.

214. The representative of the United Kingdom spoke at great length. I appreciate his difficult position in trying to explain a most unwelcome, unsatisfactory and unhappy settlement—a settlement which has been condemned by the whole of Africa, a settlement which has been condemned by the vast majority of Member States of the Organization. What we are asking the United Kingdom to do at this late stage is to re-examine its position. The United Kingdom is not infallible. Surely, if the United Kingdom believes that it can at one time seek the co-operation of the Security Council and of the United Nations as a whole in assisting it to solve the problems of Southern Rhodesia, it must not take exception when members of this Council come forward with proposals as to how best the matter can be approached.

215. Here we are dealing with the modalities of ascertaining the political wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia. I believe that if the test of acceptability, the conditions which have been approved by the United Kingdom, were to be applied to any other country it would be rejected outright. I do not say that I know more about Southern Rhodesia than most members here. I know something of it, but I can tell you this. After the several weeks during which I have studied this complicated piece of constitutional trickery, I am still lost in its technical details. Yet I have been blessed with an education and I have been blessed with time in which to study these proposals. Can you imagine what is going to happen to the 5 million Africans who have not been privileged enough to have an education, on being asked to commit their political future, being asked to decide upon a constitution of such intricate and complicated detail, through interpreters and without the assistance of their political leaders?

216. The representative of the Soviet Union quite rightly said the other day that it was time we had the views of Mr. Sithole and Mr. Nkomo. When he made the proposal my delegation supported it. Now we have seen the reply from the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, it is a negative reply. But one would have thought that in such circumstances the least the United Kingdom Government could

have done was provide this Council with authenticated copies of the submissions made to Sir Alec Douglas-Home by those two leaders when he went to Salisbury. Of course, the press has carried details of those memoranda. In fact I have here, from *The Times* of London of 7 December 1971, a dispatch from Salisbury which says:

"A Rhodesian African Nationalist leader today called on his countrymen to try to force Britain to renegotiate the settlement terms reached with the Government of Mr. Smith.

"Mr. Edson Zvobgo, former deputy secretary-general of the banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) rejected the terms 'totally and without qualification'.

"He said: 'The African people should recognize that they and their country are on auction for £50 million—the so-called British development aid promised in the proposals. The promises of more jobs, more schools and more development will not gratify our desire to rule our country and our yearning for a dignified existence.'"

217. I am not more erudite or knowledgeable about conditions in Southern Rhodesia than perhaps some of the white Rhodesian leaders. Yet we have Mr. Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, who came out against the settlement terms only a few days ago in these words: "Now I have been able to study the White Paper more fully I will not recommend anyone to accept its terms."

218. Of course, there is a campaign going on in Southern Rhodesia to the effect that these terms of settlement must be accepted. There is growing opposition, but always opposition within those limits allowed by the police State. However, it is coming to the surface and it has compelled Mr. Ian Smith to tell former African detainees that his Government would take action against them if they tried to intimidate Africans into rejecting the Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals. The word "intimidation" naturally is subject to very wide interpretation.

219. The representative of the United Kingdom said that this was the best settlement that could be obtained under current circumstances. It is not a settlement for which the Africans asked. It is a settlement which was arranged between a delegation from the United Kingdom and the Smith régime. When this Organization was asked to enforce sanctions against the Smith régime, the United Kingdom Government did not tell us we should first of all ascertain exactly what the black majority felt about it, because it realized that the black majority was muzzled, manacled, unable to express itself politically. But we, because of our position, felt that the best we could do would be to assist, and we did assist in some respects. Now we are told by the United Kingdom Government that we have no right to spell out or even to suggest ways and means by which conditions could be created to allow the people of Southern Rhodesia to express themselves freely and equally on their political future.

220. Lord Caradon, who used to be here, wrote at great length on the proposals of the British Government in a

— letter to *The Observer* of London of 12 December. He spoke about the so-called constitutional arrangements by which after several decades the black majority might reach parity and eventually might reach majority rule. He said this:

"... This is the most impeded constitutional progress ever devised, impeded mainly by indefinite delay, but also impeded by a complicated series of formidable electoral obstacles, impeded by the banning of African nationalist parties and the elimination by detention of African nationalist leaders; impeded by the system of indirect election; impeded by dependence on the readiness of the illegal régime (a régime utterly opposed to treating the Africans as equals) to facilitate African economic and educational advance, impeded by white immigration and impeded by the elimination, probably for ever, of the majority of Africans from the exercise of the franchise. If these are not impediments, I don't know what impediments are."

221. He spoke about white immigration. In this respect I should like to refer to two reports. One is an extract from Mr. Smith's statement in the Rhodesian House of Assembly on 25 November. He had this to say on the proposals:

"Rhodesians will no doubt try to assess how long it would take under this system for the Africans to reach parity of representation with Europeans in Parliament. This, I would suggest, is a fruitless exercise for there are many imponderables which could affect the position. It is our carefully considered assessment that in view of the expansion of the economy and the increase in immigration to which we can confidently look forward, no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his future in Rhodesia."

222. On immigration, this report from *The Daily Telegraph* dated 7 December said:

"Rhodesia is planning to attract 15,000 white immigrants a year with a big campaign if the agreement with Britain is ratified . . .

"Salisbury City Council has already taken steps to strengthen its forward planning department to prepare for an immigrant influx. The decision was taken after Councillor Jock Alves, Chairman of the Public Works Committee, declared that Rhodesia 'might have to cope with 50,000 or more immigrants, within the next two years'."

223. While the representatives of Italy, France and Belgium speak about waiting until the test of acceptability has been concluded, it is not simply the modalities which are to govern that test but the substance of the Constitution which these people are being asked to accept. This seems to have eluded those gentlemen.

224. The representative of the United Kingdom spoke about *apartheid* and said that the constitutional changes which might result if this test of acceptability had positive results could lead to a halt in the spread of *apartheid* to Southern Rhodesia. Yet on 26 December, just four days

ago and one month after the Home-Smith agreement was concluded, we received a report from Salisbury stating that the Rhodesia Government was examining a plan to issue identity cards to adults living and working outside their designated racial areas in order to control the flow of blacks into towns and cities.

225. The hour is late, but the situation is serious. My delegation will reserve its right to speak, perhaps in some detail, on some of the other points which it has not had time to cover in this very brief intervention. But it is our hope that delegations will not sit on the fence. What is at stake is the future of 5 million Africans. Two hundred and fifty million Africans are watching this Council to see what action it will take. The least that this Council can do is to ask the United Kingdom to re-examine its position, to renegotiate its so-called agreement with Smith, to ensure that the rights of the Africans are fully protected, are fully respected and are fully implemented.

226. The PRESIDENT: The list of speakers has now been exhausted.

227. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): I was prevailed upon at the outset of this meeting to endeavour to conclude our work on this question so as to enable some delegations to have a little rest. My delegation is always happy to co-operate with other delegations. We would have no objection to having a brief recess, after which we could resume and I would submit a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. If that draft resolution is voted upon, the Council would be spared the task of having to meet again tomorrow. However, if some delegations would like to have time in which to reconsider their position on the draft resolution, or to receive instructions, naturally my delegation would be quite happy to wait until tomorrow or the day after.

228. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Somalia has made his position quite clear with respect to his draft resolution. While that draft resolution has been discussed by members in the Council, it has in fact not yet been formally submitted to the Council. The representative of Somalia has suggested that, either we should suspend the meeting and he should formally present his draft resolution after we resume, or we should adjourn the meeting and meet tomorrow or at a later date. I am in the hands of the members of the Council on this matter. If it is the wish of the members of the Council to meet tomorrow, I would strongly suggest that the meeting be held tomorrow afternoon, because there should be sufficient time for all members to have a last opportunity to decide whether or not a vote should be taken.

229. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Since I am always given to further reflection, it strikes me that if we do not deal with this matter before the end of the year, we shall lose the presence of four members who will be leaving the Council and who have been quite familiar with the progress on this problem since its inception. Rather than confront new members with this whole problem, I would suggest that we either dispose of the draft resolution this evening or meet tomorrow morning and do so.

230. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi): I think that the suggestion of the representative of Somalia is subject to the reaction of those members who have some reservations with respect to the draft resolution. Therefore, if those members who have expressed some reservations do not need additional time, we can recess the meeting and resume tonight in order to take a decision. I do not think that the fact that some members are to leave the Council is a sufficient reason to vote prematurely. I think rather the most fundamental reason to act quickly would be to give the 5 million people of Zimbabwe a New Year's gift from the Security Council. That is why I think it would be of the utmost importance to take a decision, if not tonight, then at the latest tomorrow.

231. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): In order to speed up matters, I shall now introduce the draft resolution. The draft resolution is more or less contained in the working paper which my delegation read into the record at yesterday's meeting [see 1622nd meeting, para. 8].

232. The preambular paragraphs remain the same. The operative paragraphs also remain the same, except for paragraph 6, which should read as follows:

"6. Further calls upon the United Kingdom, after ensuring the establishment of conditions under which all the people of Southern Rhodesia are able to exercise freely and equally their right to self-determination on the basis of paragraphs 3 and 5 above, to facilitate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the preparation for, and in the actual conduct of, any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future;"

233. It is my hope that the Council will give this draft resolution a better welcome than it has so far received, and that some delegation that has hitherto decided to abstain will be in a position to vote for it. However, if those delegations have any amendments to suggest, my delegation will be happy to receive them.

234. The PRESIDENT: I do not know whether members have before them the latest amendment to the draft resolution.

235. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): There is only one version, the version which was read into the record yesterday, together with the amendment I have just read out. I had hoped to draw up a revised version had it been possible to secure the support of two or three delegations that I thought were sitting on the fence. But since they have decided to abstain no matter what I do to the draft resolution, I feel that I should adhere to the original draft resolution as I read it out yesterday.

236. The PRESIDENT: It appears now that the representative of Somalia, as well as other members, would wish the draft resolution to be put to the vote. So I have no alternative but to put it to the Council for decision. However, I understand that it will take some 60 minutes to process the draft resolution.

237. As a result of past experience, I feel that members of the Council may wish to have some time to consider their

position further. It is for the Council to decide whether it wants to suspend and come back again this evening, or adjourn until tomorrow morning or tomorrow afternoon, in order to dispose of this question. The representative of Somalia is most anxious that the outgoing members be present when the draft resolution is finally disposed of.

238. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): Since there seems to be a general disposition to finish with the item this evening, I suggest that we stay here and vote. We have the draft resolution before us. It is in the record.

239. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation would like to support the suggestion that we dispose of the matter this evening. The text of the draft resolution has been known to us since yesterday, with only the slight modification made this evening by the Ambassador of Somalia. Therefore, from our point of view, we would prefer the matter to be decided this evening. We would support a short suspension; we would then reconvene to proceed to the vote.

240. The PRESIDENT: I understand that it will take about one hour to process the draft resolution.

241. As there is no objection, we shall suspend for one hour.

The meeting was suspended at 7.35 p.m. and resumed at 9.55 p.m.

242. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I feel I must address the Council because the name of one of the African members of the Council has been omitted from document S/10489—perhaps because Burundi is about to leave the Security Council. My country however is an integral part of Africa not only by reason but by nature, since it occupies a central position in Africa. Therefore I believe I should claim the right to representation, and I should be grateful if Burundi could be listed as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution. I reserve my right to intervene again at a later stage if necessary.

243. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Burundi for his statement. The necessary action will be taken.

244. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): To console the representative of Burundi I would tell him that the letter B is much further removed from the letter S than is the letter S from the letter S. As can be seen, Syria also has not been named in the draft, and it is one of the sponsors. I would ask you to take that into consideration, Mr. President.

245. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Syria for his statement. His request will be attended to. I would add that the final version of the document will show the additional sponsors.

246. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): First, I apologize profusely for omitting to inform the Secretariat of the co-sponsorship of both Burundi and Syria. It has been a very trying day, and I think this is one of the reasons why I have had a lapse

of memory. It would, in fact, be unusual at this time of the year, when they are about to leave the Council, for both Burundi and Syria to be omitted from the list of sponsors of a draft resolution which promotes an African cause so dear to their hearts. I am glad they have reminded me of the omission. Their names will no doubt appear on the next version of the draft resolution.

247. There is one slight correction that we made to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which should read as follows:

"Rejects the 'proposals for a settlement' as they do not guarantee the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia;"

248. Apart from that one amendment and apart from the addition of the names of the two co-sponsors, the draft resolution as it stands is the final draft resolution submitted by the four delegations.

249. Yesterday in my statement to the Council I explained at length the consideration that was paid to the formulation of each paragraph of this draft resolution. Having listened to the views expressed by members since the submission of the working paper, and knowing, also, that there is a feeling within the Council that members would like to express themselves on certain principles of political action which they themselves accept as part and parcel of their own normal lives and, no doubt, wish also to accord to people abroad in whose fate the Council has been involved for the past five years, I will ask that separate voting take place on two of the preambular paragraphs, namely the second and the fifth.

250. The second preambular paragraph reads:

"Having noted that these proposals were not negotiated in consultation with the accredited political leaders of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia,"

Of course, much has been said on this point, and I do not wish to repeat all the facts and all the views that have been advanced on so many occasions when this particular point has been raised.

251. The fifth preambular paragraph reads:

"Mindful of the conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination,"

Well, of course, this is most fundamental to the draft resolution and is likewise most fundamental to the attitude which the Council must adopt upon this very important political exercise. The right to self-determination does not exist in a vacuum; it has to exist within a certain framework, and that framework must involve a climate where people have the right of assembly and can assemble, where they have the right of free speech, the right of full political activity within their society, and the right to be informed upon all aspects of any proposal that affects their political destiny.

252. My delegation will also ask for separate voting to take place on three of the operative paragraphs. The first is operative paragraph 3 which asks this Council to consider

“that the principle of universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour or race must be the basis for any constitutional and political arrangements for the Territory;”.

As a member of a delegation that has served for the past six and a half years on the Special Committee on *Apartheid*, and having been involved in many issues concerning the rights of peoples, it would be difficult for me, having heard the positions of principle taken by practically every delegation around this table on human rights, to envisage not having this principle put before the Council and voted upon. This is a principle on which there cannot be any compromise.

253. The second operative paragraph on which we shall ask for a separate vote is paragraph 4, which

“*Urges* the United Kingdom, pursuant to paragraph 3 above, not to accord any form of recognition to an independent State of Southern Rhodesia which is not based on majority rule or on the will of the majority as determined by universal adult suffrage;”.

254. The last paragraph upon which my delegation asks for a separate vote is operative paragraph 5, which

“*Calls upon* the United Kingdom to ensure that in any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future, the procedure to be followed will be by secret referendum on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to race or colour or to educational, property or income considerations;”.

255. I trust that members will be in a position to express themselves fully and clearly on this very important draft resolution, and that they will take into account in their voting that what is good for them can also be good for Southern Rhodesians, for the black man in Southern Rhodesia. What we want, what my delegation and the other sponsors are asking for here, is a commitment to principle. We know that no society is perfect, but this Council must at least go on record as trying to seek a commitment to principle which cannot be compromised.

256. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): During the discussions on the question of Southern Rhodesia in the Security Council meeting of 8 December [1609th meeting] the Chinese delegation already stated the Chinese Government's position on this question. Now I should like to add the following remarks in connexion with the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Somalia.

257. First, it should be pointed out that the racist régime of Ian Smith is in itself a direct product of the British colonialist policy. Back in 1923, when the British colonialist authorities declared the so-called “internal self-government” of Southern Rhodesia, all power was concentrated in the hands of the minority white racists of that

country. Since the Second World War the storm of the struggle for national liberation has swept the whole of Africa. In order to preserve its colonial interests in central and southern Africa British imperialism rigged up in 1953 a so-called “Federation of Central Africa” with the white colonialists as the main body. It devised a “new Constitution” for Southern Rhodesia, which provides in explicit terms for white minority rule and for deprivation of the political rights of the Zimbabwe people.

258. However, those tactics have failed one after another. With the disintegration of the “Federation of Central Africa” in 1963 and the mounting struggle of the Zimbabwe people for national independence and liberation, the colonial interests of British imperialism in Southern Rhodesia have been jeopardized. In these circumstances the white racists headed by Ian Smith, with the connivance and support of Britain, declared their so-called “independence” on 11 November 1965. The British Government sanctimoniously indicated its readiness to impose “sanctions” on them, but in fact it is giving direct military, political and economic support to them in many respects through the South African racists and Portuguese colonialist régimes. Such double dealings of sham sanctions and genuine support employed by the British Government have long been seen through by the African people and the peoples throughout the world.

259. Second, the recent agreement between the British Government and the racist régime in Rhodesia on what they call ending their dispute on the question of the “independence” of Rhodesia is a new fraud played by the British Government and the reactionary authorities of Southern Rhodesia, as well as a big revelation of the hypocritical features of British imperialism. Under this agreement Britain will have a free hand to recognize the “independence” of Rhodesia under the camouflage of the so-called “final” realization of “majority rule”, thus placing a legal mantle on the notorious white racist régime of Ian Smith, and Britain even tries to make the United Nations annul its resolutions on imposing sanctions against the Smith régime.

260. Internally, the racist régime in Rhodesia headed by Ian Smith has been practising an extreme fascist rule and a barbarous policy of racial discrimination, depriving the African people, who comprise the overwhelming majority of the population, of all their political rights; externally, it has acted in collusion with the South African white colonialist régime and the Portuguese colonial rulers in jointly repressing the national liberation movement of the people of southern Africa. It is a criminal tool for the colonialists and neo-colonialists in opposing the people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa.

261. Not long ago the British Government openly resumed its selling of arms to South Africa in defiance of the opposition of the people of Africa and the world, as well as the United Nations resolution on sanctions. Furthermore, the British Government has now openly reached a so-called “agreement” with the reactionary authorities in Southern Rhodesia. This is a new step taken by the British Government to preserve its colonial interests in southern Africa and to support the white racist régime in Rhodesia,

as well as a grave provocation to the 5 million African people of Zimbabwe and the people of other African countries.

262. Third, it must also be pointed out that the British Government has received the support of the United States Government in its act of blatantly shielding the reactionary authorities of Rhodesia. Not long ago, in disregard of the opposition of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, the United States Government openly approved the decree to import chrome from Rhodesia. And the United States State Department expressed its satisfaction immediately upon the release of the news about the agreement reached in the talks between the British Government and the colonial authorities in Rhodesia. In giving such hasty support to Britain the United States Government has once again revealed its imperialist features before the peoples of the world.

263. Fourth, the fraud played by the British Government and the reactionary authorities in Southern Rhodesia is like a rock they have lifted only to drop it on their own feet. Where there is oppression there is resistance. The national independence of the Zimbabwe people will never come from the favours of British imperialism, nor from the so-called "constitutional reform" by the Smith white racist régime. It can only rely on the unity and struggle of the Zimbabwe people. Therefore, no matter how obdurate the British Government and the Smith régime may be, whether or not the United Nations can earnestly safeguard the principles of its Charter and whether or not it can give support to the just struggle of the Zimbabwe people, the 5 million Zimbabwe people will further strengthen their unity and intensify their struggle for national liberation. The Chinese Government and people are deeply convinced that the heroic Zimbabwe people, with the solidarity and support of the peoples of the world and the countries that uphold justice, will certainly overcome all difficulties and obstacles, shatter all schemes and tricks of colonialism and neo-colonialism and finally win true national independence.

264. Fifth, the Chinese delegation maintains that in order to safeguard the principles of the Charter of the United Nations it stands to reason that the Security Council should sternly condemn the fraud played by the British Government and the racist régime of Rhodesia; condemn the United States Government and the British Government for their open violation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; and condemn the South African and Portuguese authorities for their collusion with the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Charter it stands to reason that the Security Council should call upon all the Governments and peoples of the world to give firm support to the Zimbabwe people's struggle against British imperialism and white colonialist rule and for national liberation.

265. The present draft resolution fails to contain the above and is therefore quite inadequate. With the above statement in mind, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Somali and other representatives.

266. The PRESIDENT: As I have no other names on my list of speakers, I take it that the Council is ready to

proceed to the vote on draft resolution S/10489. Members of the Council have heard the request of the representative of Somalia on behalf of all the sponsors that separate votes be taken on the second and fifth paragraphs of the preamble, and on operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. Accordingly, I intend to put those paragraphs to the vote separately. After the separate votes, the Council will vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

267. I shall not put to the vote the Second preambular paragraph.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Burundi, China, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The second preambular paragraph was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against, and 5 abstentions.

268. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the fifth preambular paragraph.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The fifth preambular paragraph was adopted by 14 votes in favour, none against, and 1 abstention.

269. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on operative paragraph 3.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

Against: None.

Abstaining: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Operative paragraph 3 was adopted by 14 votes in favour, none against, and 1 abstention.

270. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on operative paragraph 4.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Burundi, China, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against, and 5 abstentions.

271. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on operative paragraph 5.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Burundi, China, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Operative paragraph 5 was adopted by 10 votes in favour, none against, and 5 abstentions.

272. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Argentina, Burundi, China, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, United States of America.

The result of the vote was 9 in favour, 1 against, and 5 abstentions.

The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative vote being that of a permanent member of the Council.

273. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on representatives who wish to explain their votes.

274. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): Although, as I indicated in my intervention of yesterday [1622nd meeting], my delegation has serious doubts and reservations regarding the so-called proposals for a settlement, we do not consider it appropriate for the Security Council to reject them at this stage.

275. As the Government of the United Kingdom, the administering Power, is going to ascertain the will of the Zimbabwe people with regard to these proposals, we think that we should wait until such a survey of the popular will has been conducted and the result is known.

276. In the view of my delegation, whether or not the international community accepts a settlement on the basis of the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom Government depends, after all, on the freely expressed will of the Zimbabwe people itself.

277. Of course, in the meantime, the Security Council can fully reserve its position vis-à-vis the so-called proposals for a settlement. We can consider all the relevant elements, including the method utilized in conducting the survey and the results arrived at, in rendering our final judgement on those proposals.

278. For those reasons, my delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole. However, we should like to place on record that we fully share the basic thinking underlying the draft resolution, and that we fully support the principle of universal adult suffrage and majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe.

279. As this meeting seems to be the last one of 1971, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to five of our fellow members who are leaving after finishing their terms as non-permanent members. Their contributions to the noble work with which this Council has been vested have been very remarkable indeed. It has been the great privilege of my delegation to have worked during the course of the current year in close collaboration with the delegations of Burundi, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone and the Syrian Arab Republic.

280. I also wish to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to you, Mr. President. You have conducted the proceedings of the Council with utmost skill, moral force and perseverance during one of the busiest months in the history of this Council. My delegation wishes to associate itself with the other delegations in thanking you for your untiring efforts in conducting the affairs of the Council.

281. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): For six years the question of Southern Rhodesia has been before the United Nations, which in an action by the Security Council approved a programme of sanctions that the United States has faithfully observed. A good many Members of the United Nations have not so faithfully observed this programme. All during this period the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, has attempted at various times and places to negotiate the future status of the Territory, a process that has finally culminated in the settlement proposals we are discussing here. As our colleague from the United Kingdom pointed out when he presented them to this body [1602nd meeting], the proposals for a settlement are complicated and detailed, covering many elements of the question and including the test of acceptability.

282. The draft resolution on which we have just voted makes a judgement opposing the proposals for a settlement

between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia before the people of Southern Rhodesia have been consulted. We believe it inappropriate for the Security Council to make such a judgement before the test of acceptability has run its course. Therefore the United States, which strongly supports the right of the people of Southern Rhodesia to self-determination, has found it necessary to abstain on the draft resolution as a whole. We voted in favour of two paragraphs on which separate votes were asked, since they represented principles which we generally support and wished to support in this voting.

283. I would not wish to close my remarks without saluting and paying a tribute to those members of the Council that are leaving us at the end of the year for the contributions they have made to the work of this important body and for the dedication with which they have pursued their responsibilities.

284. Similarly, Mr. President, we all are indebted to you for your devotion during a most trying month and for the good humour with which you have guided us during this month. We thank you and we wish you a Happy New Year.

285. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): The statement that I made this afternoon is sufficient explanation of our vote and the reason for our abstention on the draft resolution as a whole. I should simply like to say a few words to explain the abstentions of my delegation on two paragraphs of the operative part of the draft resolution. The French delegation voted in favour of operative paragraph 3, which reaffirms the principle of universal suffrage and proclaims that this principle must be the basis for constitutional arrangements in Southern Rhodesia. However, we abstained on operative paragraphs 4 and 5, and this flows logically from our vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

286. I said before that in spite of the reservations we had about the proposed settlement, it did perhaps offer a chance to put an end to the deplorable *status quo*, and to introduce momentum into a stagnant situation. That is why in our view we should not prejudge the results of the test of acceptability but let the experiment run its course and await results. The sense of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 is hardly, therefore, compatible with the position we adopted on this point. My delegation was unable to vote in favour of these two paragraphs. Of course, there is hardly need for me to say that our abstention is due to the very special circumstances of this debate and detracts in no way from our absolute attachment to the principles mentioned in these three paragraphs.

287. I should like to add a word to associate myself with previous speakers who have expressed their good wishes and thanks to those who leave the Council at the end of the year. I should like to say how much we regret their departure. But perhaps in a few days' time they will be rather less regretful of the night meetings which we may have next year, and I presume that they will think of us with some compassion. However, I should like to assure them that we will preserve excellent memories of their presence amongst us, and to express our gratitude for their valuable contributions to the work of this Council.

288. Finally, I should like to express to you, Mr. President, my congratulations on the way in which you have conducted our deliberations in a particularly turbulent and eventful period. I should also like to express our respectful wishes for a Happy New Year.

289. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): I should like quite briefly to explain the vote of my delegation on certain operative paragraphs of draft resolution S/10489.

290. We voted in favour of operative paragraph 3 because Belgium fully supports the principle of universal adult suffrage without regard to colour or race. This principle appears in our Constitution and it is implemented without any restriction every time the people vote. We would express the hope that this fundamental principle will not be just the privilege of a few countries, but rather will enter into the constitutional practice of all Member States of our Organization.

291. As to operative paragraphs 4 and 5, my delegation abstained not because we are opposed to the principles expressed in these paragraphs, but because we continue to believe that it is for the administering Power to determine the manner of voting and the most appropriate procedure to lead Southern Rhodesia to independence. On the other hand, we feel that it is not proper to isolate certain paragraphs from the whole of the operative part. The first five operative paragraphs form a whole and cannot be dissociated one from the other. But once again I should like to recall that Belgium is greatly attached to the universalization of the principle of majority adult suffrage, just as we have used the procedure of the referendum on several occasions.

292. I should also like to join my colleagues who have preceded me and express the deep regret which my delegation feels that the Council will soon be deprived of five members. During this first year of Belgium's tenure, we have been able to benefit from the very fine co-operation of the five member States which will be leaving the Council and from the friendship of their eminent representatives. We should like to express our gratitude to them and our great esteem for them.

293. To you, Mr. President, we would address our congratulations upon the masterly and orderly manner in which you have presided over the debates in the Security Council during the month of December. We wish you a very Happy New Year.

294. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): The vote that the Council has just taken has much more meaning than appears at first glance. On the final vote this draft resolution, which obtained 9 votes, namely, the necessary number of votes to pass, received the negative vote of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the votes taken separately on the second and fifth preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 are very significant. They are significant because those preambular paragraphs contain principles on which the majority of members of the Security Council and of the United Nations at large agree. The first of these principles is that no negotiations should

ke place except with the accredited political leaders of a majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia. The second principle is that the necessity to establish conditions permit the free expression of the right to self-determination is universally acknowledged. It is on those principles that the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are based. The record will show that those basic principles and the operative paragraphs which ensue, flowing from them logically and by necessity, have been proved by a large majority of the members of the Council.

5. The vote is meaningful in the sense that it has shown polarization and a contradiction. On the one hand, we see the forces that defend the freedom of people and see it that principles which they acclaim piously are carried out meticulously. It is a contradiction too evident and too far to need explaining that whereas we accept, vote for, and say very clearly that we are in favour of the right of self-determination and that we are in favour of the free expression of the right of self-determination, yet, when it comes to the actual practical measures to apply those principles, we deny the measures to apply them. That by itself is a condemnation of those who have placed themselves at one of the two poles on this issue, those who, instead of standing for principles and the application of principles, stand for principles without their application.

6. As for the negative vote of the United Kingdom, in view of the large number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, by the Security Council, by the Committee on Decolonization⁴ and by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly concerning the very clear condemnation of Ian Smith's rebellious minority régime, it means only one thing: that the negative vote cast against this draft resolution is designed to support and co-operate with the Ian Smith minority régime, in other words, to oppress the rights of 4 million or 5 million Africans against a minority of 250,000. It means only that and nothing else. Therefore my delegation is greatly amazed that people and representatives should uphold principles and simultaneously, in the same context and on the same problem, negate those same principles. Actions speak louder than words.

7. However, the problem is not ended, for what is involved is more than a vote taken by the Security Council. What is involved is the right of a whole people to self-determination. Neither the people nor their right will die because a draft resolution was not adopted. Those who are obstructing the application of the right to self-determination are only giving power and force to those who defend these sacred rights and stand for them.

8. As my delegation is finishing its term on the Security Council and as it is a sponsor of this draft resolution, I wish to pay a special tribute to Mr. Farah of Somalia for his tireless efforts in working out this draft resolution. I wish also to thank those delegations that have been courteous enough to refer to the fact that my delegation is finishing its term on the Security Council.

⁴ Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

299. Last but not least, Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with all those who paid tribute to you, because you have conducted the work of the Council in a most trying month and, as has already been said by many before me, in a month perhaps unique in the annals of the Security Council, because it was so filled with great events, and you displayed patience, wisdom and endurance in the face of great odds and great difficulties.

300. Mr. VINCI (Italy): The Italian delegation has already had the opportunity of explaining its position on the draft resolution as a whole, in the statement I made a few hours ago, which makes clear the reasons why we abstained on the draft resolution.

301. As far as the separate votes are concerned, I wish to state that my delegation was able to vote in favour of the fifth preambular paragraph and of operative paragraph 3, both of which in clear terms reaffirmed principles we have always supported and will continue to support. My delegation had to abstain, on the other hand, on the second preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 4 and 5, because, although they referred to principles which we fully share, they were related to fundamental provisions of the draft resolution which, for the reasons I have given, my delegation could not support.

302. I wish only to add one simple remark, and it relates to operative paragraph 4. The reasons why we abstained from voting on that paragraph are not, I reiterate, that we do not share the principle contained in it, but because of the position which we have explained concerning the test of acceptability, a matter on which I dealt at great length this afternoon when I gave the reasons why we thought that this could start a new process to break the deadlock and give some useful results. Besides, we feel that it is not up to us to decide this matter, but that it is the whole population of Zimbabwe which should freely express its will. Of course, we shall have the opportunity to consider the results of that test of acceptability and to see, in the light of those results, the developments to which they might lead.

303. Since this is the last meeting in which some of our colleagues are taking part, we would wish to join previous speakers in saying a heartfelt farewell to the five outgoing members. I refer to our colleagues from Burundi, Nicaragua, Poland, Syria and Sierra Leone. My delegation also joins in paying a tribute to them for the way in which they have carried out their high responsibilities in participating in the work of the Security Council. I should like to add that we had the closest co-operation with some of these colleagues, and we shall cherish the memory of some constructive work that was done together in the most active moments of the activities of the Security Council.

304. Mr. President, this brings me to say a few words to you, since, as previous speakers have stated, you were President during the most active and hectic month ever lived through by the Security Council during its whole existence. This is what I have been told and I believe it is true. We have highly appreciated and admired the way you assumed your responsibilities, faced all the complications of procedural problems and met your high responsibilities with great good humour and a sense of friendship,

co-operation and understanding with respect to each of us. We shall miss you. In expressing our gratitude we wish you a Happy New Year and great success in your further career.

305. Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation did not ask to speak in order to explain its vote in connexion with the draft resolution on which the Council voted a few moments ago. Our vote was very clear and, I think, self-explanatory.

306. My delegation asked to speak in order to express its great regret that the delegations of Burundi, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria and our Latin American brother from Nicaragua are bound to leave the Council. During the past year, since Argentina joined the Council, we have had many occasions to admire the spirit of co-operation always shown by these delegations, as well as their constant determination to work in order to find constructive solutions for the various problems which have been considered by the Council. The delegation of Argentina has the very best memories of that co-operation, and hopes to continue to find it in other organs of the United Nations.

307. Mr. President, I should like to pay a tribute to you for the patience, serenity and kindness with which you have presided over our work during this difficult month of December. During the prolonged and sometimes tense meetings we have held we have had an opportunity to appreciate those personal qualities very highly. Therefore, we extend to you our most sincere congratulations, as well as our wishes for happiness in the coming year.

308. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): The vote which has just been taken on the draft resolution submitted by a group of countries on the initiative of the distinguished representative of Somalia reminds me of the years long ago when the cold war was in its infancy. There were many votes of this kind at that time, particularly when the question of the admission of socialist countries to membership in the United Nations was discussed. The Western countries did not cast negative votes, they abstained and thus frustrated the possibility of the admission to the United Nations of a number of socialist countries. The Soviet Union, protecting the interests of the socialist countries, was obliged to apply the veto; we used the veto often but we used it in a just cause. The Soviet veto secured membership for Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and other socialist countries. It was only this which helped overcome the opposition of the Western countries with their tactics and practice of abstention.

309. There were abstentions again today when the voting took place. But those abstentions were virtually negative votes, which means that a certain group of countries is against Southern Rhodesia becoming free and independent, against the 5 million people of Zimbabwe ridding themselves of the tyranny of the racists, against the liquidation of the last bastion of colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism in southern Africa, against the African continent finally becoming fully free and cleansed of the last stains of colonialism and racism.

310. The distinguished representative of Syria has already presented an analysis of the separate votes on individual

paragraphs. The separate votes on individual paragraphs of the preamble and the operative part of the draft show that two thirds and more of the members of the Security Council definitely not only took a stand but voted to condemn the United Kingdom Government, which has refused to make it possible for Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, leading political figures in Southern Rhodesia, to take part in the discussion of the question in a meeting of the Security Council.

311. More than two thirds of the votes favoured enabling the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise the right to self-determination. More than two thirds voted in favour of giving the population of Southern Rhodesia the opportunity, regardless of colour or race, to take part in any constitutional and political settlement. More than two thirds voted in favour of a referendum by secret ballot on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to race or colour or to educational or property considerations. This is a positive factor, it reflects the attitude of an overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, who stand for genuine justice and equality among peoples, for the liberation of those peoples who are still subject to colonialist oppression. But, unfortunately, the draft resolution could not be adopted because the United Kingdom representative used the veto, an unjust veto, in defence of racism and a racist régime and against the freedom and independence of the people of Zimbabwe. This is a challenge first of all to the whole of Africa and a challenge to the whole of world public opinion. There will be very few people anywhere in the world who will approve today's veto by the United Kingdom of such a draft resolution.

312. Objectively speaking, the Security Council has badly ended 1971, its last meeting, on the eve of the new year, and has failed to adopt a just resolution. The reason is that the United Kingdom used the veto and its NATO allies abstained. The outcome, on the eve of the new year, at the end of 1971, is a major failure of imperialism in the United Nations and its principal organ, that is, the Security Council, the isolation of imperialism, the isolation of NATO. Everyone will remember the history of the establishment of NATO, when that aggressive military bloc was aimed against the countries of socialism. Even at that time the representatives of the socialist countries said that that alliance was directed not only against the countries of socialism, but also against the national liberation movements, against the national liberation struggle. Today's vote confirms this. Only by reaching such a political conclusion can we interpret the results of today's vote. And the peoples of the world will, of course, draw the appropriate conclusions.

313. The Soviet delegation believes that this does not conclude the discussion of the question of Southern Rhodesia; that discussion must be continued, for the issue involves the fate of 5 million people who, in the second half of the twentieth century, are groaning under the oppression of the racists, imperialists and colonialists. Furthermore, in discussing the Home-Smith agreement—that document which was designed to cover up and assist the racist régime in perpetuating its existence in Southern Rhodesia—the Security Council did not consider two other questions which were on its agenda. I refer to subitem (b)—“Fourth

report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)"—in other words, the report on the question of the application and violation of sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. That report should have been considered by the Security Council and the appropriate decision should have been taken, condemning those States which have violated the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the application of sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime. There was also subitem (c), the interim report of that Committee, relating to a single question—the violation of the United Nations resolution on sanctions by the United States in connexion with the problem of chrome. I feel that the Council should request the next Council President, Ambassador Farah, the distinguished representative of Somalia, to convene the Security Council with its new membership in the very near future, at the beginning of January, in order to continue discussion of the question we have been considering and discuss the two questions which I have mentioned.

314. Thus, the Security Council has not concluded its work in this field and must continue it.

315. In conclusion, I should like to associate myself, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, with the words that have been addressed to our five colleagues who are leaving us. We should like to express to them our gratitude for their co-operation, mutual understanding and friendship, and for their useful contribution to the work of the Security Council in the course of their two-year terms as members of the Council, to extend our best wishes to them for the new year and to wish them personally good health and success and further co-operation in the strengthening of the cause of peace, the strengthening of international security and friendship among peoples and the liberation of all peoples who are still groaning under the oppression of the colonialist yoke.

316. I should also like to congratulate the President of the Security Council on his tireless efforts and commend him for making the members of the Security Council work hard. This past month under the leadership of our distinguished President was most eventful; I should say that it was one of the months in which the Council has had to work hardest. The one who worked hardest of all was, of course, the President. We sympathize with him and we congratulate him on the successful completion of his term as President.

317. On behalf of the Soviet delegation I should also like to associate myself with the words addressed by the representative of Syria to the representative of Somalia on his very active work in formulating the draft resolution and organizing the discussion of the problem of Southern Rhodesia. We often call him the "freedom fighter" and I feel that he has earned that title and that is what we shall continue to call him: Ambassador Farah, freedom fighter—fighter for the freedom of peoples. We wish him happiness, the best of health and great success in that lofty endeavour in the new year.

318. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): In taking up where the representative of the Soviet Union left off, I would say that I would like to be known more or less as a peacemaker,

because I feel that what we are trying to seek here is peace, peace through justice. And this is what I think our whole debate has been about in connexion with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

319. My delegation, first of all, fully subscribes to the very careful analysis which the representative of Syria gave to the voting pattern on the two preambular paragraphs and on the three operative paragraphs. Yet, it is distressing to note that those delegations which abstained on the paragraphs made no mention whatsoever in their interventions about the modalities for carrying out this so-called test of acceptability. They acted as if everything was in order and in full accord with accepted political standards and the wishes of the Africans.

320. The former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, speaking on this particular aspect very recently, on 24 December, said:

"The African nationalist leaders may be brought like animals in a cage to be seen and heard by the Commission, but they will not be allowed to speak to anyone else. Freedom of political organization and assembly will be subject to long-standing emergency regulations. The interned African leaders cannot communicate with their own people. The great debate which is supposed to settle the future of Rhodesia for generations to come is to take place without the participation of the nationalist parties and their leaders."

321. Yet not one of the delegations that abstained on the draft resolution addressed itself to this particular point. They dismissed any idea of having normal political conditions restored or of individuals being able to vote in a secret referendum. In fact, there were five abstentions on this very important paragraph, in which it is asked that the procedure for determining the political future of the people of Southern Rhodesia be "by secret referendum on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to race or colour or to educational, property or income considerations".

322. Nor did they address themselves to a very important point I raised quite early in the debate, which the representative of the United Kingdom attempted to answer today, but not satisfactorily. I asked what was the alternative for the people of Southern Rhodesia if they said no to the so-called test of acceptability. That very same question has even been asked by a white Southern Rhodesian, the former Rhodesian Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky. Now, while I do not subscribe to his politics, it is quite pertinent to point out that even he was baffled by the whole purpose of this Commission's visit to Southern Rhodesia. He said that the Commission was seeking only a "yes" or a "no" answer on the question of acceptability. It was a package deal. If the answer was yes, Rhodesia's Constitution would be amended, but if the answer was no Rhodesia would continue to be governed under the 1969 Constitution.

323. Now what would Britain's position be then? Would Britain then say to the Africans, "Because you voted no, this is all we can do for you, so goodbye! "? Or would it maintain its hostility towards the Smith régime until such

time as the African people decide their own political future? That is a question to which I would have thought five delegations here would have been able to address themselves, but none did, and that is a matter for great regret.

324. The African people are watching and listening carefully to the proceedings of this Council. The issue is by no means dead. As the representative of the Soviet Union has pointed out, perhaps the first item on the agenda for the next year will be the issue of Rhodesia. The fact that this draft resolution, which was sponsored by four delegations, was vetoed does not mean that the Council will have to abandon its consideration of this matter, nor will we refrain from considering other aspects of the Southern Rhodesian question, as was quite rightly pointed out by the representatives of China and the Soviet Union. We must go into the whole substance of the Southern Rhodesian question. We must examine the mandate of the Committee on sanctions. We must examine its report. We must determine in what way sanctions can be extended and intensified. We must also take into account the very serious development that has taken place with the United States decision to enact legislation which would permit, when that Government so decides, importation of chrome into the United States from Southern Rhodesia.

325. Mr. President, I should like to associate myself with what other speakers have said about your good self and the delegations of Burundi, Poland, Nicaragua and Syria. In the one year my delegation has been a member of the Council it has been an enlightening, refreshing and encouraging experience to be closely associated with five eminent diplomatic representatives. I have learned a great deal from them. I have been encouraged by their actions, and I am sure they will support the many causes in which we have joined hands in other forums of the Council. But certainly on African causes these five delegations have always given Africa the fullest possible support, without any qualification, and my delegation appreciates it, as I am sure the whole of Africa does.

326. Mr. TERENCE (Burundi) (*interpretation from French*): I have a very brief statement to make despite the lateness of the hour. However, I know how patient you are, Mr. President, so perhaps I may be allowed to voice my final thoughts here. This is not my last will, as it were, for I shall never abandon the cause of Africa or the cause of peace throughout the world.

327. Recently I read an article entitled "Alice in Wonderland", and although it was written in English, I feel I have correctly translated it into French. It criticises the position of the Afro-Asian Group in connexion with certain African problems. According to its author, the Afro-Asians forced the Security Council and other organs to vote on certain resolutions not acceptable to the great Powers. According to that author, it is the Afro-Asians that are visionaries and not realistic. Yet, we do not think we should always take a defeatist attitude just because we know in advance that we may not be successful. In my delegation's opinion we should try all means to triumph in such a vital cause. Thus, at the beginning of this meeting, I was hoping that the Security Council might be ready to make a pleasant gift to

the 5 million people of Zimbabwe. But, alas, now we are going to send them a very bitter gift for the new year. Thus we are deeply disillusioned. But it comes as no surprise to my delegation because we know the position of the administering Power in connexion with Rhodesia.

328. It is true that we attach very little importance, for our part, to the details of the draft resolution, to a given word or paragraph or clause, because these are factors that will not prevent the people of Zimbabwe from acceding to their independence. Rather, we should concentrate upon the need to grant independence to the Zimbabwe people without requiring them to go through a process which I have often labelled as inextricable. I might give a few examples, those of Zambia and Malawi: at one time they were part of a confederation with the present Southern Rhodesia, and culturally and from the point of view of tradition and custom, their peoples are essentially very akin to the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia. The Malawians and Zambians attained independence without being required to go through a complicated process in which, as I said in my statement just now, even the most erudite experts find it difficult to understand the terms of the agreement.

329. You will easily understand that there may well be a snake in the grass, since a double standard is being used. From the beginning we expressed doubts as to the viability of this agreement and as to the good intentions of the administering Power to grant independence to the colonized people. We trust that the Security Council, in spite of the departure of five non-permanent members, including Burundi, will continue to keep this matter on its agenda and to try to get out of the impasse in which we have found ourselves this evening. But I would repeat once again that it is not resolutions that will solve the fundamental problem that persists in Southern Rhodesia; rather it will be the will of the people of Zimbabwe together with genuine co-operation on the part of the United Kingdom that will allow the Zimbabwe people finally to enjoy the fundamental rights enjoyed in the adjacent and fraternal African countries that have succeeded in achieving an independence not hemmed in by so many conditions that are so perplexing to the Zimbabwe people.

330. The PRESIDENT: My humble duties having thus been concluded, may I be permitted now to speak as representative of SIERRA LEONE.

331. I should like to state that my delegation voted in favour of draft resolution S/10489 because of our commitment to help erase colonialism in all its manifestations from the continent of Africa. My delegation would be remiss in its duty to our brothers and sisters in Zimbabwe if it failed to take a strong stand on the issue and allowed political control in that Territory to remain permanently entrenched in the hands of a handful of white settlers. Many of the 5 million black people of Zimbabwe are men and women who, had they been fortunate enough to live north of the Limpopo River, could have been eminent politicians, ambassadors and statesmen of their countries. Colonial usurpation has, however, robbed them of their dignity and pride. How long this state of things will continue will depend on the will of the international community. We hope it will not be too long.

332. Still speaking as the representative of Sierra Leone, I wish to thank all of you, my dear colleagues, for the deep understanding and the co-operation you have shown the President during his tenure of office at a time when the Council was seized of problems of grave magnitude. But for your co-operation, my delegation and I would have been immobilized and it would have been virtually impossible to achieve even a modicum of success. It is not an overstatement to say that during our presidency the Council has had a hectic and exhausting month, replete with numerous activities. We have dealt with matters ranging from the admission of a new Member State to the handling of an ultra-delicate situation involving a shooting war between two Member States. While in some areas the Council was able to reach agreement in a relatively short time and after comparatively brief deliberations, in others no such quick solutions were forthcoming. The main reason for this is not difficult to come by. My delegation is left to reason whether some of the great Powers that possess the veto have always used it in a genuine and responsible manner. We are more than convinced that a few of them often do so either out of spite or out of a feeling that their special or vested national interests have been threatened. Of course, I do conceive that on a few occasions we do within these precincts agree to disagree on problems of which this Council is seized, although we do not disagree to deter progress.

333. Our long-sustained efforts in calling for an immediate end to the tragic situation in the Asian subcontinent met with little immediate success. The reason was obvious. National power politics was being injected into matters of which the Council was seized and thus criticisms have been levelled—and often rightly so—by well-meaning people within and outside the United Nations at the apparently selfish cynicism manifested by some at a time when thousands of human lives were being summarily annihilated.

334. The deep sense of frustration that surrounds the work of the Council, as well as the lack of accomplishment that envelops this body, cannot be better observed than in situations involving breaches of the peace. Although the Council, like a policeman, is expected not only to arrest but also to prevent the commission of crime, yet we have often

witnessed this august body stricken with paralysis during dire moments of international crisis. It would be unjust to accuse the Council of a lack of direction or initiative. The root of this problem can be found essentially in the unworthy use of the veto to stifle demands for resolute actions which run counter to the great-Power interests. Is it not possible that one way to improve the efficiency of the Council would be to eliminate the veto completely? This is a question that members of the Council, and in fact all Members of the United Nations, should reflect on.

335. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I should like to thank the representatives who spoke today for the kind remarks they made about me.

336. As we take our leave of the Council, as well as of the presidency, we wish to reiterate our gratitude to each member individually and collectively for the co-operation and courtesy extended to my delegation and me during our membership.

337. Our sincere thanks go also to our retiring Secretary-General, U Thant, whom we shall miss in these halls. To his able assistants at all levels and to the silent or unseen staff whose contribution to the Organization is essential to its effective operation we also extend our thanks.

338. To the verbatim reporters, the interpreters, and the security staff which has been protecting us all along, I also extend our deep appreciation.

339. I cannot end without registering my gratitude to my President and Government for affording me this opportunity to serve my country and to be involved in the very important activities of the international community.

340. To all of you I wish a happy and prosperous New Year.

341. In order to allow my successor an opportunity to hold consultations before convening meetings I shall, subject to the Council's approval, adjourn this meeting *sine die*. Since there is no objection, it is so decided.

The meeting rose at 11.35 p.m.

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