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
SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

1622th

MEETING: 29 DECEMBER 1971

NEW YORK



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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 29 December 1971, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1622)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
 - (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);
 - (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408).

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:

- (a) Letter dated 24 November 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10396);
- (b) Fourth report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10229 and Add.1 and 2);*
- (c) Interim report of the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) (S/10408)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken previously by the Council [1602nd, 1603rd and 1604th meetings], I invite the representatives of Saudi Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia

and Ghana to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the present item.

2. In accordance with the usual practice of the Council and in view of the limited number of seats available at the Council table, I invite the above-mentioned representatives to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber on the understanding that they will be invited to the Council table when it is their turn to address the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. J. M. Baroodi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. S. A. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. K. S. B. Nyirenda (Zambia) and Mr. R. M. Akwei (Ghana) took the places reserved for them in the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: Before calling on the first speaker, I wish to draw the attention of the Council to a note by the President of the Security Council which appears in document S/10470, dated 23 December 1971.

4. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): As members are aware, the question of Rhodesia was under active consideration by the Security Council in the days preceding the India-Pakistan conflict, but the question was overshadowed by the crisis on the Indian subcontinent. My delegation has asked the Council to resume consideration of the Rhodesian question at the present time rather than in January, as some members had suggested, because we understand from reports in the press that the Commission to carry out the test of acceptability of the proposed changes in the Rhodesian Constitution will be leaving shortly for Rhodesia. These reports have not been denied by the United Kingdom delegation, and we must presume that they are true.

5. Obviously it is important that the Security Council, which has a direct involvement in the Rhodesian question, should make clear its view of recent developments in that country before the United Kingdom Government begins to implement the terms of settlement that have been worked out with the Smith régime [S/10405].¹

6. My delegation, therefore, has taken the initiative in drawing up a working paper which we hope can form a basis for a resolution expressing the Council's stand on a problem which is one of its gravest concerns and responsibilities. There has now been time for a careful and detailed examination of the agreement which has been

* Subsequently issued as *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Special Supplement No. 2 and Corrigendum and Special Supplement No. 2A*.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971*.

arrived at between the British Government and the Smith régime. Close study has confirmed those grave doubts and fears which my delegation expressed initially about the nature of the agreement and its possible effect on the struggle of the African people of Rhodesia for self-determination. My delegation had asked several questions about the implications of the agreement—questions which bear on the relationship of the agreement to those principles which the United Nations and the United Kingdom Government itself have laid down as being fundamental to any Rhodesian settlement—and we have had no reply to those questions.

7. We do not believe that there can be any satisfactory replies for the simple reason that the agreement fulfils neither the conditions for a just settlement, demanded by the United Nations, nor those to which the British Government had declared itself committed in the so-called five principles. My delegation, therefore, believes that the Security Council must express, in strong and unequivocal terms, its view that the agreement is not merely an unsatisfactory compromise but is irrelevant to the just aspirations of the African people of Southern Rhodesia.

8. The working paper which my delegation has drawn up has already been circulated to delegations, but I take this opportunity to introduce the paper officially so that it may go into the record. The working paper takes the form of an informal draft resolution and reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the 'proposals for a settlement' agreed upon by the Government of the United Kingdom and the rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia on the political and constitutional future of the Territory,

"Having noted that these proposals were not negotiated in consultation with the accredited political leaders of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia,

"Taking note of General Assembly resolution 2877 (XXVI),

"Reaffirming Security Council resolution 288 (1970) of 17 November 1970, and in particular its paragraph 2 in which the Council called upon 'the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, in the discharge of its responsibility, to take urgent and effective measures to bring to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and enable the people to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960',

"Mindful of the conditions necessary to permit the free expression of the right to self-determination,

"Recalling Security Council resolution 202 (1965) of 6 May 1965 which endorsed the request of the General Assembly, addressed to the United Kingdom, to obtain:

"(a) The release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees,

"(b) The repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act,

"(c) The removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights,

"Recognizing, without prejudice to the primary role of the administering Power, the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people of Southern Rhodesia in securing their inalienable rights,

"1. Decides that the terms of these proposals do not fulfil the conditions necessary to ensure that all the people of Southern Rhodesia would be able to exercise freely and equally their right to self-determination;

"2. Rejects the 'proposals for a settlement' as they do not recognize the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia;

"3. Considers that the principle of universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour or race must be the basis for any constitutional and political arrangements for the Territory;

"4. Urges the United Kingdom, pursuant to paragraph 3 above, not to accord any form of recognition to an independent State of Southern Rhodesia which is not based on majority rule or on the will of the majority as determined by universal adult suffrage;

"5. Calls upon the United Kingdom to ensure that in any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future, the procedure to be followed will be by secret referendum on the basis of one man, one vote, without regard to race or colour or to educational, property or income considerations;

"6. Further calls upon the United Kingdom to facilitate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the preparation for, and in the actual conduct of, any exercise to ascertain the wishes of the people of Southern Rhodesia as to their political future;

"7. Decides to continue with the imposition of political, diplomatic and economic sanctions on Southern Rhodesia until the rebellious régime in that territory is brought to an end;

"8. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom not to transfer under any circumstances to its colony of Southern Rhodesia, as at present governed, any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a democratic system of Government in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population."

9. I ask members to consider first the second preambular paragraph of the working paper, which notes that the proposals were not negotiated in consultation with the

accredited leaders of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia. It is true that the British Foreign Secretary held interviews with individual African leaders. But where are the official reports of those interviews? The British Government has refused to release the records of the representations made by the detained leaders of the main African political parties, Mr. Sithole and Mr. Nkomo. We know, however, from the memorandum smuggled out by Mr. Sithole and the clandestine interview held by Mr. Nkomo with a journalist from the London newspaper *The Observer*, accounts of which have appeared in the press in many countries, that both these leaders have rejected the agreement, stand by their demand for immediate majority rule and continue to insist that there should be no independence before majority rule.

10. Mr. Nkomo echoed the views of several other African nationalist leaders in exile when he said that there could be no settlement of the Rhodesian problem when it involved only discussions between two groups of white people, and that since Africans were not invited to the conference table, the settlement could not be anything else but a sell-out.

11. My delegation submits that the validity of the agreement is immediately undermined by the fact that it is not an agreement between the British Government and the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, but an agreement between the British Government and the rebel white minority régime.

12. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs of the working paper all concern positions of principle which the United Nations has taken with regard to the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The General Assembly, for example, uncompromisingly rejected the proposed agreement during the recently concluded twenty-sixth session, on the ground that there should be no independence before majority rule [*resolution 2877 (XXVI)*]. Certainly, the agreement is not in accord with Security Council resolution 288 (1970) of November 1970 which gained the unanimous approval of this Council, including the approval of the delegation of the United Kingdom. The agreement does not have the effect of bringing to an end the illegal rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, as that resolution called on the United Kingdom Government to do, and it does not enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to exercise their right to self-determination, in accordance with the Charter and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

13. The United Nations has also made specific commitments with regard to the establishment of conditions for the free expression of the will of the people. As far back as May 1965 this Council, in its resolution 202 (1965), recognized that the first step towards the re-establishment of normal political conditions would be the release of political prisoners and detainees, the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation and the removal of all restrictions on political activity.

14. These conditions have not been established. Popular leaders of the people are still detained for political reasons, or have been removed from the political scene and sent to prison on trumped-up charges, and the main African

political parties are still proscribed. It is only the white minority which is free to express its political will.

15. One of the questions I asked at the beginning of the debate some weeks ago was whether the police State apparatus of Southern Rhodesia would continue to be aimed against the free expression of the political will of the African majority during the period of the test of acceptability, or whether the United Kingdom Government would be responsible for establishing conditions for the free expression of the will of the people. There is no evidence that the test will be held within any framework or under any conditions other than those provided by an avowedly racist and oppressive régime.

16. *The Times* of London of 22 December quotes the Agence France Presse on a report being privately circulated in Rhodesia, which will be made available to the Pearce Commission. The report describes official pressure on African chiefs to accept the agreement and the intimidation of Africans by policemen where the question of organizing meetings to discuss the terms of the proposal is concerned.

17. My delegation is not suggesting that every newspaper report can be taken as a firm source of proof, but the fact remains that neither the climate nor the conditions which might prevent such occurrences have been changed.

18. The last preambular paragraph of the working paper recognizes the special responsibilities of the United Nations towards the people of Southern Rhodesia in securing their inalienable rights. The United Nations has long accepted its responsibilities towards Southern Rhodesia, as it has done in the case of other colonial Territories. Those responsibilities stem from the Charter and are spelled out in greater detail in three resolutions of the General Assembly: resolution 1514 (XV), on the granting of self-determination to colonial countries and peoples; resolution 2734 (XXV), on the strengthening of international security and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*].

19. The active involvement of the Security Council began, of course, in 1965, when the administering Power, the United Kingdom, itself called for international action to help it put down the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. The involvement of the international community in the question entailed considerable economic sacrifice for some countries. But there was more at stake than helping an administering Power to maintain order. Various principles the United Nations is committed to upholding were at stake; the fundamental human rights of five million people were at stake.

20. With those facts in mind we must ask ourselves whether the terms of settlement have vindicated the position taken by the international community at the request of the administering Power and whether they protect and promote the rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia. These questions lead us to the operative part of the working paper.

21. Operative paragraphs 1 and 2 would reject these proposals for their failure to recognize the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia and their failure to allow all the people to exercise freely and fully their right to self-determination. It is indeed difficult to see how this Council could be expected to endorse an agreement aiming at anything less than the full, free and equal participation of all the people of Southern Rhodesia in the political, social and economic life of the Territory. These are the inalienable rights which the leaders of the African majority have claimed, and the United Nations is pledged to support that claim.

22. Operative paragraph 3 brings us to the heart of the matter because it sets forth the basis for the practical expression of the principles relevant to the Rhodesian situation. That basis is universal adult suffrage for the people of Southern Rhodesia without regard to colour and race. "One man, one vote" is a principle we accept as a norm for ourselves. Are we prepared to deny that principle to others?

23. During the last thirty years more than forty countries which were formerly dependencies of colonial Powers seated at this table, including the United Kingdom, have been brought to independence on the basis of majority rule, on the basis of "one man, one vote". One may well ask, "Why the difference in Rhodesia?" The answer is, of course, that in Rhodesia there is a racist minority which insists on maintaining its power and privileges, and the administering Power has not chosen to exercise to the fullest either its moral or its practical authority. That is a path the United Nations must not follow.

24. The United Kingdom has reneged even on its moderate goal of unimpeded progress towards majority rule. By no stretch of the imagination can the agreement be said to provide such progress. My delegation has already commented on the educational and economic hurdles that have been set up on the obstacle course to majority rule. I should like at this point to comment on a purely political aspect of the proposed arrangement which illustrates its fundamental dishonesty. It is contended that political parity between black and white will be reached when there are 50 black and 50 white Members of Parliament in Rhodesia. But that is not the case. When there are 50 African Members, only 26 of those will be popularly elected Members and the others will be appointed African Members. Whenever the term "parity" is used, the fact is conveniently ignored that almost half the African Members will be nominees who depend on the white minority régime for their position and must therefore be considered as under settler control. The so-called parity is more likely to represent 26 African votes and 74 white or white-controlled votes.

25. But the most fundamental defect of the proposal, and perhaps its most dishonest aspect, lies in its deliberate postponement of majority rule for an indeterminate period.

26. The time-scale of the proposal has been analysed by Dr. Claire Palley, a professor of politics at Queens University, Belfast, and the analysis was published in detail in *The Sunday Times* of 28 November 1971. After an exhaustive

study of the complicated factors involved, Dr. Palley concluded that, assuming scrupulous honesty from Mr. Smith and his successors—an assumption that only the most naïve would make—the earliest possible date for majority rule would be the year 2035, and a more likely date is 2055, 83 years from now.

27. The United Nations cannot renege on its undertaking, an undertaking spelled out in various resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council, to make every effort to bring about majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, so that all the people of the Territory may have the opportunity to benefit from its resources and to play their part in determining its future.

28. Operative paragraph 4 of the working paper recognizes and seeks to uphold the principle of "no independence without majority rule". This is a cardinal principle of the political leaders of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia; it is a principle which has the unanimous support of the Organization of African Unity; and it formed the basis for the General Assembly resolution on Rhodesia of 22 November, which was adopted by a vote of 102 in favour [*resolution 2769 (XXVI)*]. Why is this principle so important to all who seriously seek a just solution to the Rhodesian problem? It is important because without this principle there is a grave danger of the entrenchment of the political, economic and social disabilities of the African majority. In the view of my delegation, that danger has been brought a step nearer by the proposed agreement between the British Government and the Smith régime. To grant independence to Southern Rhodesia while it is still under the control of the racist minority régime and while the African majority is still denied its rightful place in the life of the country is to play into the hands of the rebels and to betray the African majority. In a recent letter to *The Observer*, the distinguished predecessor of the current permanent representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, whose wide and varied experience of colonial situations cannot be questioned, deplored

"... proposals by which the Smith régime would win the permanent prize of independence and freedom of action by an expenditure of minimum concessions, and by which the Africans, after many decades still in the political wilderness, would, if they ever emerged from it, be saddled for ever with a weighted, divisive and undemocratic constitution".

29. In the view of my delegation, the United Nations cannot approve of a settlement which would allow the rebel régime to remove itself completely from the authority of the administering Power and legalize its existence, while there is no safeguard for the rights of the African majority beyond the hope that the white minority will change its racism overnight. The only safeguard for the rights of the African majority is for that majority to be able to exercise immediately the political power which is its due. As matters stand, the political rights of the African majority can be postponed indefinitely and racial discrimination can continue to operate—as it does in the voting arrangements, in the Land Tenure Act, and in other facets of Rhodesian life—with no more effective checks than the recommendations of a commission which the Smith régime is at liberty

to reject, and the workings of the court which legalized the illegal unilateral declaration of independence.

30. Operative paragraph 5 calls for the proper determination of the wishes of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia—a determination which would be in conformity with the principles and goals of the Charter and with resolution 1514 (XV). Such a determination can be achieved only by a referendum carried out on the basis of the secret ballot and the principle of “one man, one vote”. It cannot be achieved by the proposed test of acceptability, which will be carried out by a group of expatriates in any way that they think fit, and which, as I have already pointed out, will not be carried out under conditions of free political expression for both the black and the white sections of the population. In any case, the proposals whose acceptability is to be tested fall far short of what justice requires, of what the African people of Southern Rhodesia require and of what the United Nations requires in the light of the Charter and of those resolutions that spell out its principles in detail.

31. Operative paragraph 6 is the practical expression of the preambular paragraph of the working paper, which emphasizes the responsibilities and the obligations of the United Nations towards the Territory and people of Southern Rhodesia. My delegation does not believe that the United Kingdom can, with propriety, call on the United Nations for assistance on the Rhodesian question at one time and ignore the involvement of the United Nations in this problem when it chooses to do so. Certainly the presence and the co-operation of the United Nations ensured, in many colonial situations, that just and impartial exercises to ascertain the wishes of former colonial peoples were carried out, and it seems important to my delegation that the United Nations should establish at this time both its interest and its duty to participate in any such exercise.

32. It had been claimed by the Government of the United Kingdom that the proposals we are now discussing are the best that could be obtained under the circumstances and are a reflection of the realities of the situation. The realities which the Somali Government recognizes were clearly described in its policy statement on Southern Rhodesia adopted earlier this month. The Government of the Somali Democratic Republic has rejected the so-called settlement because it does not entail any fundamental retreat from the provisions of the racist 1969 Constitution of the rebel régime; because the cardinal principle of “no independence before majority rule” has been ignored; because in the absence of a referendum for ascertaining the aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe, the so-called acceptability test would be meaningless; because the implementation of the terms of settlement, bad as they are, is left to the goodwill of the Smith régime, which has already demonstrated its disregard for human rights and international public opinion; because the terms of the settlement were concluded behind the backs of the African population and their legitimate representatives; and finally, because the British Government, in accommodating the rebel régime, is seeking a face-saving means of lifting sanctions and conferring legal independence on the minority régime, in defiance of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, world

public opinion and, above all, the interests of the majority in Southern Rhodesia.

33. This last consideration brings me to operative paragraph 7 of the working paper—a most important paragraph because it states the alternative to the course of action proposed by the British Government, namely, the continuation of political, diplomatic and economic sanctions until the rebellious régime is brought to an end.

34. In an earlier statement on the Rhodesian question [1604th meeting] my delegation called on the United Kingdom Government to continue to act in concert with the world community and on the basis of the objectives established by this Organization; to continue to apply the force of moral, political and economic pressure against the rebel régime; and to remain committed to the proposition that the only sure guarantee of justice for the African people of Southern Rhodesia lies in their being able to control their destiny through the full exercise of their political and human rights. My delegation repeats that call and hopes that other Member States will join with us in our appeal.

35. Finally, my delegation would note that the question of the repeal or continuation of sanctions is one that depends not on the outcome of the arrangements agreed upon between the British Government and the rebel régime but on the decision of the Security Council, arrived at after due consideration of the best interests of all the people of Southern Rhodesia.

36. It is in these words and in this spirit that my delegation trusts that the working paper, which it has had the privilege of introducing and explaining, will be considered by all delegations and that as a result of consultations to be carried on during the remainder of this day it will be possible for a draft resolution to be officially submitted tomorrow morning so that the Council can act upon it before the close of this year and before the Commission leaves London for Southern Rhodesia.

37. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Argentina has followed with the greatest interest the consideration of item 2 (a) of our agenda for today, which is directly related to a serious problem that the United Nations has faced for some time.

38. The question of Southern Rhodesia has been the subject of prolonged and intense debates in this Council and in the General Assembly which have been reflected in resolutions intended to find a way for a just outcome for the people of Zimbabwe, within the framework of the statute of our Organization. This very Council decided to establish a Committee to supervise the implementation of the sanctions imposed on the illegal régime of Ian Smith, being confident that that procedure would lead to a correct solution.

39. Argentina has at all times supported action by the Organization in this field. We have endeavoured to co-operate within the margin of our possibilities in this joint endeavour. Our endeavour ever since we have had a seat on the Council has been marked by the desire to obtain

unanimous and unbroken support of the guidelines adopted on the basis of the San Francisco Charter. But, together with that duty of the Council and of the United Nations, there is another primary obligation which has been reiterated in the General Assembly and that is, the responsibility of the United Kingdom over Southern Rhodesia. That responsibility was particularly emphasized in Security Council resolution 288 (1970) which, in its fourth preambular paragraph, states:

"Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility of bringing the illegal declaration of independence to an end."

40. We therefore acknowledged and welcomed the attitude of the United Kingdom in informing this Council about the talks held in Salisbury. We believe that the burden of that difficult responsibility has been an important motive in inducing that Government to seek a negotiated solution which would allow it to settle the difficult and reprehensible situation created by the illegal régime of Ian Smith.

41. We believe that action should be assessed in the light of the thinking expressed by Sir Colin Crowe in his statement on 25 November last. The representative of the United Kingdom said at that time:

"We are therefore for the present and perhaps for the next few months confronted only with a hypothesis. If the evidence—which will be fully, freely and fairly collected—is to the effect that the Rhodesian people as a whole do not accept these proposals, then they will have been made in vain. If it is found that they do accept them, then we shall be able to press ahead with the appropriate legislation and with making them work. It is only at that stage and when the British Government is fully satisfied that the Rhodesian Government has enacted the necessary legislation and taken the necessary steps to give effect to the proposals that the final section of the proposals, which envisages the conferring of legal independence upon Rhodesia and the lifting of sanctions, will come into effect." [1602nd meeting, para. 54.]

42. Thus it is clear that the United Kingdom has taken the decision not to impose a settlement on the population of Southern Rhodesia. For that wish to be duly fulfilled, we believe that when the time comes, special consideration should be given to the machinery which has been called "the test of acceptability", and to which the representative of the United Kingdom referred in his statement.

43. But what is more, in that same statement from which I have already quoted, Sir Colin Crowe assured us that until the assent of the people of Zimbabwe is obtained, freely and with proof,

"... the situation will remain exactly as it is now. No legislation will be required or will be undertaken by my Government and all existing measures will remain in force." [Ibid., para. 55.]

44. That is the approach of one of the parties to this agreement. But at the same time we must wonder what motives might have influenced the illegal régime of Ian Smith to accept such a solution, bearing in mind its obstinate attitude of so many years. It is fitting for us to ask ourselves whether Salisbury, in giving its assent, has not started from the premise that the agreement can in no way, for an extremely long period of time, harm its own well-known and reprehensible points of view. We should also wonder whether the interest of the illegal régime does not consist in giving itself a veneer of respectability before the concert of nations, while in practice it remains entrenched in its well-known position. Further—and here I would refer to action already taken by this Council—we must, finally, wonder whether perhaps the sanctions have somehow started to bear fruit.

45. Reports on the subject are fragmentary and conflicting. Some consider they have real negative effect; others, on the contrary, feel they not only have not caused the régime any damage, but have acted as spurs to new local industries. If the sanctions are really a source of difficulty to the illegal Salisbury régime, it is our duty to persist in standing firm on that course until terms are reached which are absolutely fair to the overwhelming African majority in Southern Rhodesia.

46. In regard to some parts of the agreement, my delegation wishes at this stage in the debate to place on record two fundamental objections. The system of voting and representation, so carefully elaborated in this instrument, is, as we understand it, a reason for justified criticisms. We believe in the equality of man, whatever his creed, race or economic or social condition. That equality must be reflected with pristine clarity in any system which aspires to an integral and equal representation. All must have the same right to vote.

47. Secondly, the clauses of the agreement described to us by Sir Colin Crowe make us lose our sense of time. Decades would have to elapse before the allegorical ship mentioned by the United Kingdom representative reached a safe harbour.

48. Having said that, we would also wish to add that we can well understand the obstacles encountered by the British Government and the good intentions which have inspired it.

49. I should like to end by pointing out that for Argentina a country's independence is strengthened when, among other factors, the entire population enjoys the same rights. We hope that time will come in the near future for the people of Zimbabwe and for all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia, in a peaceful fashion. In this connexion it is fitting to recall the contents of the fifth principle formulated by the Government of the United Kingdom [see S/10405] in relation to a possible solution of the Rhodesian problem, when it declares that any basis proposed for independence of the Territory must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In brief, independence must be our final objective, but in seeking it we must never forget the conditions of equality which its real achievement implies.

50. My delegation has listened most carefully to the statement just made by the representative of Somalia, Ambassador Farah. We shall, with the same interest and attention, study the working document he has submitted, and in due course shall state our views on it.

51. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, the USSR delegation would like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to document S/10470 of 23 December. We are referring to your note concerning the implementation of the Security Council decision to invite two outstanding Southern Rhodesian political leaders, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to the meetings of the Council.

52. At the beginning of this month, on 2 December [*1604th meeting*], the Security Council adopted a correct and sensible decision to invite the leaders of the ZAPU and ZANU parties, Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, to its meetings so that the Council could hear them and obtain from them information concerning the true state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia and their appraisal of the Home-Smith agreements.

53. At the last Council meeting on the question of Southern Rhodesia [*1609th meeting*], the USSR delegation raised the issue of the need for speedier compliance with that Council decision and requested information on what had been done by the administering Power, the United Kingdom, to implement that Council decision.

54. As shown by the note by the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom did not reply to the President of the Council until three weeks after the Council had adopted the decision. In his official letter on the question, his official statement was, in essence, that the United Kingdom Government would not take any steps whatsoever to ensure compliance with that decision of the Security Council.

55. To justify that refusal, an exceedingly strange argument is used in the letter. It is, in fact, not even an argument but a purely formal answer and sounds like a mockery of the Security Council decision. The letter states that Mr. Nkomo is in detention and Mr. Sithole is serving a prison sentence in Southern Rhodesia. But that is not an argument; it is simply a statement of the well-known scandalous facts concerning the lawlessness and racist and terrorist arbitrariness with regard to those two political leaders of the Zimbabwe people.

56. However, the Security Council did not ask the Government of the United Kingdom where Messrs. Nkomo and Sithole are at present—in prison or free. The Council requested the United Kingdom Government to take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with its decision so that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole would be able to come to New York, to the Headquarters of the United Nations, and so that the Security Council would be able to hear those two well-known political leaders of Southern Rhodesia at its meetings. In this case, it was the Council's decision which was the essence of the request to the United Kingdom Government; it was not a request that the Council

should be informed where these two leaders are—one in detention and the other in prison.

57. In debates in the Third Committee of the General Assembly and in other Committees the representatives of the United Kingdom and of a number of other countries make a great fuss about respect for human rights, but here we have a flagrant violation of elementary human rights, a continuation of a policy of colonialist terror and violence. The Council is entitled to turn its attention to this question once again, since in reply to the Council's decision the United Kingdom Government, in its letter, or more precisely in the letter of the United Kingdom representative, testifies to its own powerlessness. It states in its official reply that it is not in a position to require the Southern Rhodesian authorities to allow the African leaders in question to come to New York. What is this? Is it political powerlessness on the part of the Government of a country which has always hitherto borne full responsibility for the situation and events in Southern Rhodesia, or is it a premeditated attempt by the British Tory Government to agree to the illegal actions of the Southern Rhodesian racists, a reluctance to oppose those actions and, in essence, an attempt to cover up and justify the lawless acts committed by the racists? If that is the case, the Security Council must take note of the colonialist and racist solidarity which exists between British ruling circles and the Southern Rhodesian racists who have illegally seized power in Southern Rhodesia and are pursuing a bloody terrorist colonial policy with regard to the 5 million people of Zimbabwe and the Southern Rhodesian political leaders who are defending the interests of the people of Zimbabwe.

58. At the international political level, the issue is precisely this: either the United Kingdom Government is making common cause with the Southern Rhodesian racists and is at one with them on this question, in which case, its actions are understandable and their political colouration is fully obvious. If this is so, then it is naked, undisguised colonialism and imperialism. Or the United Kingdom Government is able and ready to take even one small realistic step in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe, who are being oppressed by the racists, in which case it is obliged to make it possible for the two Southern Rhodesian political leaders to come to New York to take part in the Council's debate on the question of Southern Rhodesia. The Council is entitled to put the question precisely in those terms to the United Kingdom Government and to insist, in this connexion, on the adoption of measures and on a definite answer by the United Kingdom representative in the Council.

59. In connexion with the consideration of the question of Southern Rhodesia and in the interests of a fuller and more comprehensive examination of the question, the Security Council can also not ignore the following circumstance. It was proposed to the United Kingdom representative in a very clear fashion that he should submit to the Security Council the documents which the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had received from the leaders of the African parties and political groups in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, the documents which he had received for Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole, as the two best-known and most prominent political leaders of

the Zimbabwe people. However, at a meeting of the Council the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government could not submit those documents to the Council in view of their confidential nature [*see 1605th meeting, para. 116*]. That is an unsatisfactory explanation. Such an argument on the part of the United Kingdom representative is more than strange. It seems that the Security Council can only be given such documents and information as suit the United Kingdom and the leader of the southern African racists, Mr. Smith, that is to say, information which has passed through British censorship. As members of the Council well remember, the United Kingdom decided in very great haste, one might say in burning haste, to submit to the Council information on the Home-Smith agreement and the text of that agreement. As to the views of the representatives of the Zimbabwe people on the matter, those views are confidential and secret and the Security Council is not entitled to know them. How can the Security Council, confronted with such restrictive conditions, seriously discuss the situation in Southern Rhodesia and the substance of the Home-Smith agreement? Because of all this we have reason to believe that the interests of the United Kingdom and the Smith racist régime in Southern Rhodesia are one and the same, that they coincide. Smith is keeping those who are fighting to liberate the Zimbabwe people in detention and in prison while the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power, is not only not taking any steps to enable those leaders of the Zimbabwe people to express to the Security Council their point of view, their assessment of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and their assessment of the substance of the Home-Smith deal, but, what is more, it is refusing to submit to the Security Council even the written memoranda from those leaders. Can the Security Council accept such a situation? If the Council is serious in its approach to the discussion of this question, it cannot reconcile itself to such a situation. This is firstly a kind of conspiracy of silence on the part of the colonialists and racists who are withholding from the Security Council documents which might throw light on the substance of the Home-Smith agreement; secondly, it is a kind of protection of the policy of terror which is being pursued by the Southern Rhodesian racists against those fighting for the freedom of the Zimbabwe people.

60. The Security Council must ensure that these political leaders of the Zimbabwe people have an opportunity to speak here, in the Security Council. It must also ensure that the documents which were submitted by those two political leaders to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Home, come to light and are submitted to the Security Council, too. Only in such a way can the Security Council have a full and comprehensive picture of the events taking place in Southern Rhodesia and also a good idea of the substance of the Home-Smith agreement. Otherwise, the Council will be considering this question only in the light of the one-sided British information, agreed upon with the leader of the southern African racists, Ian Smith.

61. In conclusion, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to stress that the Security Council must demand that the United Kingdom respect the decisions of the Council and comply with them with regard to the invitation

of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole to Security Council meetings.

62. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): In less than three days our term on the Security Council will come to an end and our seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council—more truly as an invited guest to this horseshoe table—will be vacated and we shall cease witnessing its sad festivities.

63. In such hours, when men under the weight of time look at human problems such as the problem we are considering, they do so in prospect and retrospect. Thus, looking at the problem of Southern Rhodesia as the year comes to an end and the memories of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly are still living with us, we cannot but underline the fact that the problem with which we are dealing within the context of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly is not and has not been an isolated one. Specifically I am referring to the agreement that was concluded between the United Kingdom Government and the rebellious régime of Ian Smith. I say so because, if we look back at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we shall notice that, besides that fact, there have been other similar grave facts of which, I am sure, all the members of this Council are aware. Besides the agreement with Ian Smith, there was the lifting of the embargo on the import of chrome from Southern Rhodesia by the United States Government. There was the occupation of three Arab islands in the Arabian peninsula by force. Finally, while the Middle East was debated in the General Assembly the United States Government gave to its 51st State, Israel, over \$500 million and a further number of Skyhawk offensive aircraft, in order to perpetuate the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

64. There were other great tragedies to which I do not want to refer but of which I am sure all the members are fully aware. In a word—and here I am speaking within my limited experience and departing for a little while from the routine statements to which we are used—the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly has been characterized by the defiance of right and of the principles of the Charter in an unprecedented manner while the General Assembly was meeting. Is that accidental, I ask? Certainly not; but surely the question remains there for future historians, political analysts and students of political science to answer.

65. The working paper submitted to us during this meeting by the representative of Somalia, who so far has distinguished his career and himself by a very genuine and dedicated stand for the rights of people and the right of self-determination, states a position which every fair-minded delegation cannot fail to recognize, that is, that the so-called proposals for settlement do not really settle anything. They relegate the inalienable rights of the people of Zimbabwe to a remote, uncertain, unknown future. They consolidate the usurpation of power by the minority, thereby asserting again the rule of force over the rule of law. They subject the practices of racial discrimination and suppression of the political and economic rights of the majority to study and consideration instead of eliminating them outright. They introduce fictitious guarantees enabling the minority régime to acquire international recog-

dition without committing itself in any way to respect the will of the overwhelming majority. The administering Power discharges its responsibility in the worst conceivable manner and drops the whole case as if the lives, the rights and the future of 4 million people were not at stake. In our view, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) has adequately set the conditions and the modalities for the transfer of power to the legitimate representatives of the colonial people. That is why my delegation fully supports and will look most carefully into the working paper that has been presented to us by the representative of Somalia, Mr. Farah.

66. While on this subject, Mr. President, I cannot but express the very great concern of my delegation at the contents of your note to the Security Council [S/10470]. In your own words, the Security Council decided that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole should "be invited to appear before the Council to state their views of the proposals on Southern Rhodesia". It is a well-known fact that both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Sithole are well-recognized leaders of a well-known liberation movement concerned with a problem of which the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Committee on Decolonization² and other bodies of the United Nations have been seized for over a decade now. The answer given to us by the representative of the United Kingdom states in its conclusion:

"In these circumstances my Government regrets that, as I said during our consultations before you announced that there were no objections to the issuance of the invitation, it is not in a position to require the Rhodesian authorities to allow either Mr. Nkomo or the Reverend Sithole to come to New York." [Ibid.]

It is indeed very strange that the United Kingdom Government can conclude an agreement with Ian Smith and his rebellious régime—an agreement which has the force to last for 20 or 30 years, or God knows how many years to come, before the people can obtain their rights—while declaring at the same time its inability to require two leaders of the liberation movement to come to address the Council in accordance with a decision taken by the Council. Thus we witness once more that it is the rule of force, not the rule of law, that prevails. The will of the Security Council is defeated by one of its permanent members entrusted with the special task of world peace—and human rights and their implementation go hand in hand with world peace.

67. As the curtain falls on a departing year, tragedies such as the one with which we are dealing are perpetuated. We have nothing to do except to vote on a draft resolution emanating from a working paper—a fitting epitaph indeed for another Palestine, another South Africa, another Southern Rhodesia, all the legacy of the same Power, the United Kingdom.

68. And what about the sacred and inalienable rights of self-determination and the rule of the majority, and all the principles enshrined in the Charter and alluded to in the

many speeches made during the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in the Third Committee, in the Sixth Committee, in the Fourth Committee, in the Special Political Committee and in the First Committee? There remain nothing but words, and those principles which were worked out during the quarter of a century of the life of this world Organization are buried under the heaps of speeches and bundles of resolutions.

69. Unfortunately, we speak from bitter and sad experience. History—I should like to tell my African brothers—is not made by adopting resolutions regretting or condemning this or that. History is made—as has been proved to us—by a people's legitimate use of force to obtain and enjoy its inalienable rights. Thus, throughout history, rights have always been taken and never given. These are some thoughts perhaps for the cynic to doubt, for the statesman to ponder and for the thinker, in the silence of his meditation, to confess the truth of.

70. Mr. SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We all know that in Africa a territory exists where a people live who are anxious and waiting to discover what their future will be. Security Council resolution 288 (1970), adopted on 17 November 1970, is quite specific with respect to what is desired and sought in the light of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the purposes of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

71. The people of Southern Rhodesia have the right to express themselves with complete freedom in accordance with the sacred principle of self-determination, which we must observe. We hope that the honourable Government of the United Kingdom will continue to analyse every facet of this question and, with the nobility of character and ability which are characteristic of it, will contribute to a solution which will meet the principles of the Charter and the will of the people of Southern Rhodesia. Let us not lose hope.

72. The calendar of our activities shows us that today is 29 December. A few hours before the expiration of my term of office as the representative of Nicaragua on the Security Council, I am duty-bound to state that I shall leave carrying with me the most gratifying memories of each and every representative. It has been a signal honour for me to have participated for two years in the work of this respected forum for peace and international security. I shall always esteem as a highly valued treasure the experience I have acquired working with the members of the Council.

73. During July 1970 and then last October it was my privilege to preside over the Security Council. I repeat to members my gratitude for the friendly assistance which all generously offered me. It was my fate to have had to deal with important and delicate matters, and I am certain that I acted conscientiously and with a sense of responsibility in keeping with the confidence which the General Assembly placed in my country when it elected us a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

74. I shall not forget the distinction which was offered me when I became a member and Chairman of the Special Mission which went to Senegal last July, a duty which we

² Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

performed in the honoured company of illustrious ambassadors with whom I shared the sacred duties entrusted to us. Our report was useful to the Council in its immediate adoption of the resolution of which we are aware on the case which motivated our trip to Africa and our activities in Senegal.

75. I recall that in my first statement in the Council almost two years ago I said:

"If power without justice is tyranny, while justice without power is a mockery, in the wise words of Pascal, let us make every effort to combine power with justice, so that power will always be just and justice will never cease to be powerful." [1527th meeting, para. 94.]

76. In bidding the Council farewell, I reiterate these ideas, confident as I am in the destiny of our Organization. Strength and justice, justice and strength—this is the key to our success. I shall see the members of the Council again when I visit this august chamber from time to time with the intention of attentively following your debates. From the observer seats, I shall be with the Council in thought, and wish the members continued success in their endeavours.

77. I congratulate the representative of Sierra Leone on his intense work as President. This must be a source of well earned satisfaction to him, and of course to his noble country and his esteemed Government.

78. I reiterate my tribute to U Thant, our beloved apostle of peace, who for many reasons deserves the undying gratitude of the world. He knows how much we esteem him.

79. In advance, I should like to congratulate Ambassador Farah, the representative of Somalia, because he will become President of the Council on 1 January 1972. I am certain of the success which our friend Ambassador Farah will achieve, with his recognized experience in international affairs.

80. As members well know, Panama will replace Nicaragua as a non-permanent member—the Republic of Panama, a nation which we all so dearly love, where, as though by a miracle, the oceans are joined, and where north and south meet as members of a family on the continent of hope.

81. It has been said, and it is true, that parting is sweet sorrow—but this occasion is made somewhat less sorrowful for me since I carry with me the very happiest memories of all your personalities and the friendship you have so generously proffered me. Distinguished Ambassadors, I wish you a new year filled with the greatest personal successes, for yourselves and for your distinguished families, and for the nations which you so worthily represent.

82. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nicaragua for the nice things he said about my country and about me.

83. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): In the opinion of my delegation, the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, has the primary responsibility and

obligation to restore constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia and to ensure that the African majority can enjoy all political and economic rights. We have consistently supported the principle of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia on the basis of universal suffrage. However, we do not subscribe to the view that the United Kingdom should use force as the means to bring down the Smith régime and establish majority rule. We have stated on a number of occasions that all peaceful means should be fully explored for the settlement of the problem.

84. In the light of those considerations, although we take due note of the efforts made by the Government of the United Kingdom to achieve a settlement, we are obliged to make a few comments on the "Proposals for a Settlement" [see S/10405] which were worked out at Salisbury in the negotiation between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Ian Smith.

85. In our view, the proposals for a settlement do not seem to guarantee majority rule in the near future. Even the process of achieving parity of representation in the House of Assembly seems to be unduly long and complicated. I shall not elaborate this point further because so much has already been said about it in the Council.

86. We are also not very clear about how to guarantee the faithful implementation of the agreement through all its stages, once it passed the test of acceptability. On the surface at least, it would appear that the only guarantee is the good faith of the authorities now headed by Mr. Smith or a similar successor régime. We might assume that Mr. Smith and any successor will make every effort to implement the agreement. But, speaking frankly, I would feel much more assured if I were told that throughout the whole process of implementation, from the beginning to the end objective of majority rule, the United Kingdom would continuously and positively participate in an appropriate way in the process of implementation.

87. I should like to mention another element which is essential for the effective implementation of these proposals once they are accepted—essential because the best hope for achieving majority rule in the foreseeable future depends on it. I am referring to the development programme agreed upon by Sir Alec and Mr. Smith, the purpose of which is "to increase significantly educational and job opportunities for Africans". In the view of my delegation, it would be absolutely necessary to establish effective supervision over the implementation of each project so as to ensure the effective use of the funds made available for the purpose of providing better economic opportunities for Africans. This would have the effect of accelerating the pace of attaining the economic qualifications necessary for Africans to be registered on the so-called African higher roll. It would be most advisable that the Government of the United Kingdom directly associate itself, in an appropriate way, in the carrying out of the development programme.

88. There is some merit in the argument that although the situation in Southern Rhodesia has continued to deteriorate, this new set of proposals, if implemented in full, might contribute to the improvement of the status of Africans

and help to halt, if not actually reverse, the deteriorating trend.

89. It has been rightly pointed out that the key issue is the test of acceptability, because, whatever merit or demerit these proposals may have, it is up to the majority of the Rhodesian people itself to decide whether it would prefer the change in the present situation foreseen in the proposals. It is vitally important, therefore, that the method employed be such as to persuade the Rhodesian people, as well as the international community, that the test is conducted in a just and fair manner and that the genuine will of the African population is ascertained. In this connexion very pertinent points were raised by the representative of Somalia in his statement to the Council on 2 December this year [1604th meeting].

90. In order to ensure that the test is conducted in a just and fair manner, that all views are expressed freely and that the population is fully informed of the details of the proposals, my delegation would like to lend its strong support to the suggestion that arrangements be made for the participation of United Nations observers in the process of carrying out the test of acceptability.

91. The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

92. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Mr. President, you may recall that I inscribed my name on the list of speakers on this intractable problem. I have followed the debates and listened very carefully to my colleagues who are non-permanent members of the Council, as also to the permanent members, beside those who, like me, wish to address themselves to the item.

93. I have felt discouraged throughout, but have not given up hope that the United Kingdom may be able to do something in the future if it still exercises a semblance of power over Southern Rhodesia. We find that the United Kingdom is trying to normalize its relationship with Southern Rhodesia on the basis of proposals which were explained by our British colleague, Sir Colin Crowe. These proposals envisage limited and indeed very slow political development. It would take from two to three decades to accomplish that development. The consequence would be that the white minority would still govern the black bulk of the population.

94. I recently read some statistics according to which the black population of Southern Rhodesia is increasing at the rate of approximately a quarter million annually. The white population amounts to only 250,000 at present. Before the end of the century the black population may conceivably number 8 to 10 million, if not more, while the whites of Southern Rhodesia can hardly attain a half million in the same period.

95. Let us face the facts. Between 5 and 8 per cent of the population—the whites—would still dominate 8 to 10 million blacks in less than three decades. The United Kingdom wishes to gain time so as to adjust itself to the demands of Mr. Ian Smith and his successors, whose political power

would remain paramount and permanent. On the other hand, it is quite understandable that should the whites relinquish their grip on the Government the blacks would by their sheer number gain complete control.

96. I do not believe that the fear of the whites of Southern Rhodesia can be dissipated now or in the foreseeable future, and any political formula that would not leave them in the ascendancy would be rejected. As long as Western Europe supports the United Kingdom and, both directly and indirectly, the Government of Southern Rhodesia, there is no hope for the partial—let alone the complete—political emancipation of the blacks.

97. As I mentioned in my last intervention on this item [1604th meeting], economic sanctions will not work out. I am not going to adduce the reasons I have already given, which are contained in the Council's records. Subduing the present white régime in Southern Rhodesia is impossible as long as our African brothers, on the one hand, and the major Powers—I repeat, the major Powers—on the other, are in no position to use force.

98. Protracted negotiations for the just settlement of the question have so far failed. The whites of Southern Rhodesia are not prepared to allow themselves to be submerged by the blacks, nor do the blacks feel free so long as they do not enjoy the amenities of representative government in their native land. As I see it, the only possible solution for the time being seems to be for the United Kingdom to come up with fair, if not adequately just, proposals as a basis for new negotiations with the Ian Smith régime.

99. The working paper presented by my colleague and friend Ambassador Abby Farah of Somalia constitutes a rejection of the British proposal, but at the same time it contains some constructive suggestions for future negotiations. Criticism in the Council of so-called British imperialist circles without any effective action is of no avail. I should like to address that particular comment to my good friend Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union. What do we gain from calling certain people "imperialist circles"? What can you do about it? You do not want a confrontation with the West, let us face it. Do we just give our African brothers a lollipop, sugar candy?

100. Furthermore, under the present circumstances I do not believe that the white régime in Southern Rhodesia would allow black leaders to come to New York to testify before the Council. Let us face these facts. Assuming that some leaders surreptitiously found their way to New York and appeared before you gentlemen and in unmistakable terms decried Ian Smith's régime, do you believe it would be safe for them to return to Southern Rhodesia? Or will some representatives of the Council perhaps encourage them to form the nucleus of a government in exile—somewhere in Africa or on some other continent, perhaps here in New York City? Such governments in exile have in my humble experience proven academic in the past—unless, of course, resort to force changed the internal situation in the country from which they had fled, as happened in the Second World War.

101. I find it useful to recall that I made a suggestion, in my last intervention, which should merit some consideration on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom. The blacks are segregated from the whites in Southern Rhodesia. I would like to ask a question of my good friend Sir Colin Crowe in this connexion. Pending the negotiation of a final and just solution that will ensure fully democratic and representative government in the whole of Southern Rhodesia, would he consider broaching this question with his own Government: Would the British Government be willing to try to convince the Ian Smith government that the blacks should gain autonomy by political arrangements that are characteristic of cantonments or full-fledged municipalities?

102. The United Kingdom is still considered the administering Power. Is it the administering Power or is it not? If it is still the administering Power, it should assert itself. How? It is not for me to suggest. After all, they have long experience in colonial affairs. It is true that, as Sir Colin Crowe has told us, Southern Rhodesia is a peculiar case. But for every peculiar case there should be a special solution. Otherwise, Mr. President and members of the Council, you are wasting your time—and we cannot afford to waste more time in such fruitless debates, especially since we are on the threshold of 1972, which should mark the turning of a new leaf in the history of the United Nations.

103. What is the alternative? Do you want to give the Africans a sort of opium—which they will not want to take any more—by telling them that we will bring petitioners from abroad and establish a government in exile? The only ones who can exercise power are the major Powers in the Council. Some of them may not be in a position to do so; but how is it that some can wage war ten thousand miles from their own soil when their interests are at stake? Why do not some of the Powers look upon this case not in the light of special national interests, but in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter? You gentlemen, especially the five permanent members of the Council, you are the ones who can tip the scale either to the side of justice or to the side of expediency.

104. The PRESIDENT: There are no further names on the list of speakers. Members may wish to accept the suggestion of the representative of Somalia for an adjournment until tomorrow morning. He has submitted to the Council a working paper which he has taken considerable time and

pains to explain to all of us, and it appears to be the majority view that there should be an adjournment to tomorrow afternoon, so as to allow adequate time to study it. I incline to agree to an adjournment to tomorrow afternoon, in the hope that the permanent members, after having full consultations, will be able to concur in whatever draft may emerge, as I hope many non-permanent members will also do.

Point of order by the representative of Somalia

105. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Somalia on a point of order.

106. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): Before you adjourn our meeting, Mr. President, I wish to speak on an entirely different subject, relating to the request made by the Organization of African Unity that the Security Council should perhaps consider holding a series of meetings in Africa in 1972. The General Assembly, by a resolution adopted on 20 December 1971 by a vote of 113 in favour and only 2 against [*resolution 2863 (XXVI)*], invited the Security Council to consider the request of the Organization of African Unity concerning the holding of such meetings in an African capital. I was wondering whether the time might not be opportune, Mr. President, for you to begin consultations with delegations here, in the hope that we could perhaps reach some agreement as to how we should proceed on the matter. I understand that this matter has not yet been officially transmitted to the Security Council by the relevant Department of the Secretariat which deals with the transmission of General Assembly resolutions; but because of the time factor, I think it is important that we take up this matter, and I hope it will be possible to conclude it in fact during your term as President.

107. The PRESIDENT: As far as I know, the resolution the representative of Somalia has referred to has not yet officially reached me. I shall take steps as suggested by the representative of Somalia. In this connexion, may I add that I have received an application from the delegation of Guinea which I have already passed on to the Secretariat so that copies may be made and circulated to members.³

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

³ Subsequently circulated as document S/10477.

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