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
# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR

**1613<sup>th</sup>**

MEETING: 13 DECEMBER 1971

NEW YORK



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#### NOTE

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## SIXTEEN HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 13 December 1971, at 4 p.m.

*President:* Mr. I. B. TAYLOR-KAMARA (Sierra Leone).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, France, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1613)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):  
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10401).
3. Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10444).

### Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT: Before I proceed, I must inform representatives that we have received a communication from Ambassador Gerogrozev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations. The communication reads as follows:

"Please accept, on behalf of the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and on my own behalf, our sincere gratitude for the condolences which you expressed on the occasion of the untimely and tragic death of Bulgaria's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ivan Bachev.

"May I be permitted, Mr. President, to convey through you our gratitude to the distinguished members of the Security Council for the expressions of condolence they offered in this connexion."

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):  
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/10401)

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. S. Kyprianou (Cyprus), Mr. U. H. Bayülken (Turkey) and Mr. D. S. Bitsios (Greece) took places at the Council table.*

2. The PRESIDENT: I have a list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting and I should like to appeal to all members to bear in mind that we have another item which was scheduled to start this afternoon, but because this item on the agenda has not been completed, that other item has been postponed. That item is very important, because it involves the life and death of millions of people. I would therefore appeal to speakers to make their interventions as brief as possible, without in any way restricting the rights of freedom of speech.

3. The first speaker on my list is the representative of Poland to whom I now give the floor, trusting he will heed my remarks.

4. Mr. LUDWICZAK (Poland): First of all I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my delegation's deep sorrow on the occasion of the sudden and tragic death of Comrade Ivan Bachev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, a country which which Poland maintains the best friendly and fraternal relations. Mr. Bachev made a significant contribution to the development of relations between our two countries and to the promotion of international peace and security, particularly in Europe. I should like to ask our Bulgarian friends to convey to the Government of Bulgaria and to the family of the late Comrade Minister Bachev our deep-felt sorrow and condolences.

5. At its meeting this morning the Security Council voted on a resolution extending for a further six months the mandate of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus [resolution 305 (1971)], as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 November 1971 [S/10401], and with the concurrence of Cyprus and the parties concerned. Motivated by its interest in the preservation of peace and security, the Polish delegation supported that resolution. We did so in the hope, which we share with the Secretary-General, that despite the difficulties so far encountered the parties to the problem will soon find it possible to make progress towards a settlement in the spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation. Our position as to the conditions for such a settlement remains un-

changed. We continue to consider that the situation in Cyprus can be normalized only through full recognition and respect of the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, normalization based on mutual understanding and agreement of all Cypriot people. In the view of my delegation such a normalization requires above all full respect for the sovereign rights of the peoples of Cyprus to pursue their policy of peace and non-alignment. It requires the elimination of outside interference of all imperialist military influences which now stand in the way of the achievement of a lasting and peaceful solution of the problem. Poland has always supported and continues to support such a solution. We look forward to the early resumption and reactivation of the talks between the Greek and Turkish communities, talks which constitute an important internal factor for the settlement of the over-all problem, a problem which is still outstanding in this very sensitive part of the world.

6. Before concluding, I should like on behalf of my delegation to most warmly congratulate Ambassador Bayülken on the occasion of his promotion to the high office of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, a country which which Poland is interested in developing further relations in all possible fields. I should like to extend to Ambassador Bayülken my delegation's best wishes.

7. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): I should like to join others round this table in extending our condolences to the Government of Bulgaria on the untimely death of the Foreign Minister.

8. Now I have the distinct pleasure of extending congratulations, both official and personal, to our friend Ambassador Bayülken on his nomination to a new and very high office in his Government. We look forward to a continuation of the co-operation and understanding that has long characterized our relationship.

9. Once again the Security Council has considered the question of Cyprus and has agreed on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for another six months. The United States delegation wishes first of all to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his particularly comprehensive and penetrating report to the Security Council, which is yet further evidence of his devotion and dedication to the work of peaceful solutions to a most complex problem.

10. For over seven years UNFICYP has played an invaluable role in Cyprus, conducting a truly effective and indispensable peace-keeping operation. My Government is convinced that UNFICYP has been instrumental in preventing several serious intercommunal incidents from escalating into violence on the island. However, the excellent work of UNFICYP in maintaining the uneasy peace is no substitute for concrete progress towards a permanent settlement of the problems facing Cyprus, a settlement which would permit the Greek and Turkish communities to live in harmony and prosperity within a single independent and sovereign Cyprus.

11. The United States delegation notes with deep regret that, rather than progress, there has been a significant

deterioration in the general situation on Cyprus, as demonstrated by the increase in tension between the two communities. There has also been a regrettable trend towards aggressive actions and lack of co-operation, apparently aimed at changing the military *status quo*. We share the Secretary-General's concern over the apparent deadlock in the intercommunal talks. We believe that the best hope for progress in negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict is the reactivation of the intercommunal talks. The United States therefore supports wholeheartedly the Secretary-General's proposal contained in paragraph 79 of his report, to reactivate the intercommunal talks under a new procedural formula. We appeal to all parties to accept the Secretary-General's suggestion. We welcome the progress thus far made in this direction, particularly the expressed intention of the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Mr. Kyprianou, to accept the Secretary-General's proposal, and the statement of the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Bayülken, that his Government intends to pursue consultations to find a consensus [1612th meeting]. If problems still remain concerning the modalities of the discussions, we suggest that they be worked out in Cyprus in connexion with the reactivation of the intercommunal talks.

12. While our main concern is the over-all peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem, we would likewise urge that determined efforts be made to achieve progress in the area of normalization of relations between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities.

13. We share the Secretary-General's disappointment that, since our last meeting to consider the renewal of UNFICYP's mandate, there has been no progress made towards normalization, particularly in the important areas of deconfrontation, freedom of movement, economic development and refugee resettlement. We appeal to all parties concerned to exert their most statesmanlike efforts to reach mutually acceptable interim accommodations which would allow all elements of the Cypriot population to participate fully and without fear in all aspects of the life of their country.

14. Finally, I should like to turn to UNFICYP's financial problems, which are discussed in paragraphs 105 and 106 of the Secretary-General's report. The United States has given consistent financial support to UNFICYP and will continue to do so as long as other Governments do their part. However, we wish to associate ourselves with the Secretary-General's comments in his report that:

"the maintenance of international peace and security is a collective responsibility . . . which must be shared by all its Members. In the case of UNFICYP, the financial burden has been borne by a limited number of Governments, including some States not Members of the Organization. Many Members of the United Nations, on the other hand, including some of those who have special responsibilities with regard to the United Nations actions in Cyprus, have not contributed to UNFICYP or have omitted to do so for a long period of time." [S/10461, para. 106.]

15. We appeal to all Members of the United Nations, and in particular to the members of the Security Council, to

contribute their fair share to this peace-keeping operation, which has probably averted a much more costly war on Cyprus.

16. We note that even if \$9,600,000 in payments is received on all the assured pledges, the UNFICYP deficit would still total \$16,400,000 as of 15 December. The United States has pledged up to 40 per cent of the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations. Much of that sum has already been paid into the Organization, but we have been unable to turn over all of it because pledges and payments to cover the other 60 per cent have been lacking.

17. In light of the serious financial crisis facing this vital peace-keeping operation, we are at present consulting with other interested Governments in an effort to work out an approach which would eliminate the deficit and place future UNFICYP financing on a sound and sustainable basis.

18. In this connexion, the United States would be prepared to make a substantial additional payment on its pledges to UNFICYP in the near future. We appeal to all other Member States for their assistance in these efforts to ensure that the United Nations activities in Cyprus, as well as other vital peace-keeping efforts, can be effectively maintained in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

19. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from French*): We were deeply saddened by the tragic news of the sudden death of the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, a distinguished and energetic statesman devoted to the cause of peace. We fully share the sorrow of the people and Government of Bulgaria, and my delegation would like to associate itself with the messages of condolences and sympathy which were sent this morning.

20. I should now like to refer to two facts which are a source of pleasure to us. The first was that the Secretary-General once again participated in our work this morning after his period of indisposition. We should like to express our best wishes to him. The second relates to the appointment of Ambassador Bayülken as Foreign Minister of Turkey, a fraternal and neighbouring country. We have always been proud of the brilliant career of Ambassador Bayülken, and we wish him every possible success in the service of his country and in the service of the cause of international peace and justice. Within the context of the question before us, his appointment as Foreign Minister of Turkey is a good sign for the peaceful and satisfactory solution of this problem. We share his hope that we shall very shortly see peace and conciliation reign in Cyprus.

21. In our view, the present deadlock in the inter-communal talks in Cyprus should not continue very long. There are differences between the representatives who are parties to this dialogue, differences which at the present time seem insurmountable, particularly with respect to the two major problems of local administration and guarantees for independence. These differences are due more to the complexity of these problems than to any lack of goodwill. The goodwill is there, which makes it almost certain that these differences will be reduced. Everyone is attached to

the unity of the country. Everyone cherishes the independence of the country. It is necessary to find the optimum formula to ensure peace, equality and prosperity for everyone. That is not impossible to find. At the top of the hierarchy of preoccupations we find the need to re-establish fraternity and the common membership of a country with a fine and promising future. The sense of a common destiny and a spirit of accommodation and flexibility should triumph.

22. The statements we heard this morning [*1612th meeting*] from the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus and Turkey and from the Ambassador of Greece are very edifying in this respect. To resume the dialogue is an imperative duty. As the Ambassador of Greece quite rightly pointed out, the dialogue is irreplaceable, because it is precisely in the success of the dialogue that we shall find the true unity of Cyprus and of its sons. To accelerate these talks and to tackle the many problems in a spirit of flexibility and accommodation would bring the hour of final reconciliation much closer and, at the same time, would facilitate the task of the Security Council.

23. The relative calm reigning in the island should be strengthened in order to bring about a normal climate and not to maintain an exceptional one. Conditions would then be propitious for bringing the two sides closer together. The representatives of the two communities could benefit from the report of the Secretary-General and draw from it any suggestions to bring about a rapprochement.

24. It is in this spirit that we voted in favour of the draft resolution which the Security Council adopted this morning.

25. I should not like to conclude without expressing our sincere gratitude for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as of the Commander of the Force and his staff.

26. Mr. SEVILLA-SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My first words will be to most cordially congratulate Ambassador Bayülken for his well-deserved promotion to the lofty post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey. We congratulate him, knowing that his talents and international experience will contribute to the success he will achieve in his post, a success which we, his friends, will of course greet with satisfaction.

27. For Secretary-General U Thant it must be a source of genuine satisfaction to know that the recovery of his health is celebrated by all his friends in all parts of the world, this strife-torn world to serve which he has dedicated his talents, his experience and his academic erudition, winning universal recognition for his noble effort and sacrifice.

28. Naturally, the tragic death of Mr. Ivan Bashev, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, has caused great sorrow. The delegation of Nicaragua associates itself with the expressions of condolence on the occasion of this painful loss which Bulgaria has suffered.

29. With regard to the Cyprus problem, all of us who feel affection and warm friendship for that noble nation

continue to hope that a solution may be found. This is a case for which the best solution must be found, and it must be found soon with the friendly co-operation which, in various forms and ways, the nations friendly to Cyprus in this Organization will provide.

30. May I extend my greetings to the distinguished representatives of that esteemed country, a land bathed by the Mediterranean, and devotedly guarded by history. I greet them and declare to them that the favourable vote cast by Nicaragua for the resolution we adopted this morning carries with it the hope that in the near future the United Nations Force will no longer be necessary to secure the maintenance of peace in that friendly nation. When that Force is withdrawn, joyful applause will be heard throughout the world, applause in praise of the United Nations for the effort it has exerted and applause for Cyprus because of its patriotic cooperation in the cause of peace. The hour will come, and it will mark a new day in the annals of that nation, born for freedom and glory.

31. Greek and Turkish Cypriots must remember that they are today citizens of a single fatherland, independent and sovereign, which enjoys great sympathy in the world; a sympathy that will be all the greater the more Cyprus is honoured by its sons.

32. The report of Secretary-General U Thant deserves our praise. It is the record of an excellent job which means yet another success for its distinguished author. The Secretary-General and his representatives must feel very happy at this Council's recognition of that success.

33. We hope that our dear friends the Cypriot Greeks and the Cypriot Turks will go on with their talks. We hope they will continue those talks as brothers, without flagging in their endeavours and efforts which we here will applaud with satisfaction.

34. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): This Council has had ample evidence of the danger to international peace and security of long-standing and bitter regional conflicts where the contending parties are supported by other States with competing interests in the area. The Security Council has had to deal with this kind of situation in Cyprus and has been seized of the question since December 1963. As we know from the Secretary-General's reports—in particular the most recent one, dated 30 November 1971—the United Nations efforts to bring peace to that troubled island have not been able to proceed beyond the more superficial task of peace-keeping to the fundamental one of peace-making. And indeed, over the years, instead of accommodation and mutual acceptance by Greek and Turkish Cypriots of each other's legitimate claims, there has been a consolidation of inflexible attitudes and increased tension.

35. It seems clear to my delegation that when a peace-keeping effort planned originally for a three-month period extends for seven years, and there is no sign that the passage of the years has calmed mutual fears and suspicions, then the time is more than ripe for a determined effort to remove the need for a peace-keeping operation.

36. For this reason, my delegation was glad to note the Secretary-General's suggestion of 18 October 1971

[S/10401, para. 79] concerning the broadening of the intercommunal talks, with the participation in an advisory capacity of constitutional experts from Turkey and Greece, and that of his Special Representative in the exercise of good offices.

37. In paragraph 99 of his report, the Secretary-General states his conviction that the best way of achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem is through a negotiated agreement between the two communities on its constitutional aspects. But in paragraph 103, the Secretary-General has pointed to the need to give those intercommunal talks some new impetus and has suggested that on some of the basic issues this Council might become more actively involved in assisting the parties concerned in their search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

38. In the view of my delegation, the present time would not be appropriate for the Council to take any new initiative until the extended and expanded intercommunal talks proposed by the Secretary-General have been given a chance to succeed. It is gratifying to my delegation to note that all parties have agreed to take part in those talks.

39. If, after six months, the Secretary-General is unable to report any progress on these talks, then the Council should seriously consider what new initiatives it should take to solve the problem. But this should be only the last resort, and not the first. In any such initiative taken by or on behalf of the Council, the terms of reference should be sufficiently wide to allow the greatest flexibility in dealing with this complex problem, and it would be necessary to predicate any approach on certain broad considerations.

40. In the view of my delegation, one consideration must be that the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, which have the effect of entrenching certain features of the Cyprus Constitution, were formulated in the light of an exceedingly complex and delicate situation. If, as the March 1965 report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus [S/6235] suggests, there cannot be a complete return to the constitutional situation that prevailed before 1963, certainly there should be no unilateral abrogation of those agreements, and their intent must be preserved in so far as they relate to the rights and obligations of the two communities.

41. Two other considerations which my delegation believes must be fundamental to any solution of the Cyprus problem are these: that Cyprus must retain its status as an independent, sovereign State, and that it must retain its national and territorial unity. The most basic fears and suspicions of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively, are engendered by the possibility that either the independence or the unity of Cyprus might be brought to an end, and both these fears should be allayed once and for all.

42. In the final analysis, it is for the two communities of Cyprus to choose between the present situation where all are threatened by the possibility of a return to violent conflict, and a genuine movement towards a permanent solution. The Security Council, however, has a grave responsibility in this matter. It can provide the modalities for a process of reconciliation and reconstruction. It must work actively for a settlement in a situation where the

competing interests of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus can seriously disturb the equilibrium of the eastern Mediterranean and can threaten international peace and security. My delegation will support any effort, along the lines I have mentioned, to try to bring peace to the people of Cyprus and security to the Mediterranean region.

43. Finally, my delegation would like to pay tribute to the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to promote an atmosphere of confidence in which the parties involved can move towards a solution of the problem.

44. Having expressed the view of my delegation on this question, I now wish to make a few complimentary remarks to my friend, the Ambassador of Turkey, on his new appointment. I am sure that he will carry with him all our best wishes and that he will discharge the responsibilities of his new post as well as he has discharged those of his present position.

45. The PRESIDENT: Speaking as the representative of SIERRA LEONE, I should like now to say a few words.

46. The Council has been convened for the second time this year to consider the extension of the life of UNFICYP. The report of the Secretary-General, contained in document S/10401, now before the Council, covers the period 20 May to 30 November 1971 and leaves in our minds the impression that the period under review has been characterized by an atmosphere of instability.

47. Since our last meeting on this question the situation in the island has been marked by an increased number of shooting incidents. The Secretary-General's report indicates clearly that a total of 10 additional incidents over a comparable period last year were reported.

48. After almost eight years of peace-keeping efforts on the island and hundreds of millions of dollars expended in this connexion, it is a matter of deep regret that a solution of the Cyprus question is still not in sight. But we must not lose hope because, in our opinion, the question is capable of solution, and a solution should be found in the interests of the well-being of the people of that island and in the cause of international peace and security. The situation in Cyprus should not be allowed to deteriorate into one of the hotbeds of disaster in the world. The fear of partition, on the side of the Greek Cypriots, and the fear of *enosis*, on the side of the Turkish Cypriots, should be completely eliminated. The apprehensions arising from these two fears are understandable, but unless they are dispelled the chances of a lasting peace between the two communities in the island will remain a wishful concept.

49. Attention has again and again been called to the question of financing the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. The report clearly indicates that contributions totalling \$22.9 million must be received if the cost of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1971 is to be met. Unless new ways and means are devised to finance important peace-keeping efforts of this nature, I am afraid that little progress will be achieved in this important area.

50. My delegation has on a number of occasions emphasized the need for a continuation of the intercommunal talks between the two interlocutors. We have always held the position that progress in these talks will contribute significantly to the reduction of tension between the parties and to bringing peace and stability to the island. We are, therefore, gravely disturbed to be apprised of the deadlock, if not the complete breakdown in this area. My delegation joins with the Secretary-General in appealing to all concerned to resume these talks without further delay.

51. With the extension of the stationing of UNFICYP for a further six months, and with the Secretary-General's suggestion to reactivate the talks, there exists some ground for optimism. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution unanimously adopted this morning because we sincerely hope that within that six-month period the reactivation of the intercommunal talks will set the pace for a satisfactory solution to this problem.

52. Last, but not least, may I associate myself with all the agreeable and moving sentiments expressed by the representatives regarding the elevation of the representative of Turkey to the post of Foreign Minister of his country. I came to know this distinguished gentleman a few weeks ago, and the more I meet him the more I am coming to know and like him as a person of great quality such as will enable him to solve the Cyprus problem. We hope that he will prove worthy of the confidence which his country, and, for that matter, this Council repose in him.

53. As PRESIDENT, I give the floor to the representative of Cyprus.

54. Mr. KYPRIANOU (Cyprus): I should like to say just a few words. First of all, I wish to express my gratitude to the Council for giving so much of its valuable time, in the present circumstances, to dealing with the Cyprus situation. It was not, of course, appropriate and the occasion was not the right one, to go into all the aspects of the Cyprus problem which, after all, have been discussed over and over and over again in the main forums of the United Nations, in the General Assembly, and, in particular, in the Security Council.

55. In exercising my right of reply, I would only like to point out one or two things which I believe to be essential; I do not wish to enter into polemics or to open a debate.

56. In a low key and, if I may say so, in a not polemic statement by the Foreign Minister of Turkey, there were certain remarks concerning the internal situation in Cyprus as arising from the Secretary-General's report. I will not discuss them. But with your permission, I would simply like to quote from the observations of the report of the Secretary-General [S/10401]. In paragraph 97, *inter alia*, he says:

"In this connexion, while the Cyprus Government has continued to co-operate with UNFICYP in most cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has been reluctant to extend to UNFICYP the same measure of co-operation as in the past. . . ."

57. The second quotation I would like to add from the same observations is in paragraph 96. This is in connexion with the situation which prevails in the island because there has been some talk of suffering and hardship on the part of a section of the population of Cyprus. The Secretary-General here says:

"Despite UNFICYP's efforts, the Turkish Cypriot leadership has continued to deny freedom of movement in the area it controls to unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians. The leadership ascribes its negative attitude to security reasons, but the fact remains that some 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus are deprived of their basic right to travel freely on the public roads of that area."

I do not wish to add any further remarks in this connexion because I do believe this covers the substance of what has been said. Of course there are many other details, but this is not the proper time to go into them.

58. I come to one particular point before I conclude which, though essential, gives rise to misunderstandings. This phrase "two communities" has become a slogan. If it is a slogan for the purpose of proving that the people of Cyprus have equal status, I must remind the members of the Security Council that the Greek people of Cyprus comprise 82 per cent of the population and the Turkish people 18 per cent of the population. If the idea of putting forward the slogan of two communities is for the purpose of emphasizing the need of co-operating and creating common interests as one people, despite their different ethnic and religious characteristics, which no one would deprive them of, then it is a different question. But if the slogan of the two communities is used as it was in the past for the purpose of emphasizing division, to this we very strongly object. Because if we speak of two communities, where is the people of Cyprus? Well, the people of Cyprus are the 82 per cent Greek and the 18 per cent Turkish. Nobody denies to them their ethnic or religious characteristics. And in this connexion I should add what the representative of Greece said this morning in the course of his statement. It was not only the question of autonomy in religious, educational and cultural affairs which was considered for the minority community—if I may use the phrase without having any difficulty in calling it the Turkish community. But there were also other things which have been considered, such as the guaranteed participation in all the organs of State in proportion to the population—something which I do not think exists in many other countries. Further, certain things were also discussed in connexion with local government. But what we have been trying to avoid is precisely creating conditions which would lead to division. We are trying to create conditions which would lead to unity. From what I have heard in the course of this debate, the word "unity" has been used by most of the speakers.

59. Regarding the treaties to which one or two speakers referred, our position is well known. They have their political aspect as well as their legal aspect. We have dealt with that in the Security Council on many occasions. I am not going to go into that. We have our legal stand on the question of the treaties, as to how they came into being, as to how they are in conflict with the Charter, and so on and

so forth. But let us not discuss that. In so far as our position on the treaties is concerned, if any one of the parties were to challenge the position which we take on the legal aspect, we would be quite willing and prepared to see that party make recourse to the International Court of Justice. But this is not the subject matter of the discussion. As it was properly stated, our effort is to try and achieve a political solution, taking into consideration, of course, the whole background. We start from the constitutional structure. We have tried for three years and we have failed.

60. The Secretary-General has now put forward a new formula. As I stated this morning, we have a number of reservations. However, we declared in this Council that we accepted the formula, and we accept this formula. And now, what remains to be done, I believe quite humbly, is for the Turkish Government to accept it. I think we have been consulting for the last three months, and I think we were the ones who were maintaining the reservations on grounds of principle, on grounds of persistent fears. I must admit again that both the Secretary-General and his collaborators have tried to remove these fears from us.

61. Therefore, in view of the urgency which has been stressed in the Council of trying to achieve something, of trying to reactivate the talks, of trying to see what can be done in the months that lie ahead, whether it is two months or three or six months, as the representative of Somalia has said, I think we must decide. As far as we are concerned, we have accepted the formula as it stands in the report of the Secretary-General and as it has been proposed in the relevant paragraph, which I think is paragraph 79. I do not think this should be a matter of negotiation any more because we have had our consultations and our discussions. We have aired our reservations. We now remove our reservations and we are ready to start reactivating the talks immediately. So what remains to be done before the next step? From what I see from the debate, if we fail again the Security Council may have to act, or we may have to ask the Council to act in accordance with the letter and spirit of paragraph 103 of the report. What remains to be done now in the months which lie ahead is not to continue with consultations and try to change the formula but to start immediately. Otherwise we shall find ourselves in exactly the same situation as now, and then again hear complaints of not having made progress with regard to the substance of the problem.

62. I would ask my colleague whether we may take it that the proposal, as it has been put forward by the Secretary-General, is acceptable to him as it has been accepted by us. If so, we can move on quickly to reactivate the talks and act in accordance with the spirit of what we have heard today in the Security Council.

63. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of Turkey.

64. Mr. BAYÜLKEN (Turkey): My exercise of the right of reply will be different. I believe it will be rather on a happy note of thanks. Mr. President, I am indeed very much touched by your kind words and good wishes and those of the members of the Council and the representative of Greece. I wish to express my gratitude and thanks. I regard



these very kind remarks also as recognition and appreciation of my country's peaceful and constructive policies in general and its unswerving support for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations both in the letter and in the spirit. My country entertains good and cordial relations with all the countries that are represented around this table. Certainly we are desirous of further promoting those relations, and in my new capacity I shall see to it that no additional efforts on our part in that direction are spared. It will be my pleasant duty to work in that direction.

65. As to the United Nations, where I have served one third of my official career of about 30 years and where I spent 10 years of my life, I had the honour and privilege of participating in 15 General Assembly regular sessions and four emergency sessions. I have come to know that this Organization is a most democratic Organization where titles and ranks do not mean much. It is possible to know one another better here than in any other place. There is a collegial feeling of friendship and a sense of working together. While I regret my departure from the Organization because of my new duties, I can assure all my colleagues and friends that I shall always cherish these memories and I shall see to it that I shall come at quite frequent intervals to this Organization to bring my modest contribution.

66. Possibly it might be of interest to my colleagues to know that in the Cabinet of Turkey three members are closely linked with the United Nations. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erim, participated as a legal counsel at the San Francisco Conference on the founding of the United Nations, at which my country participated as one of the founding Members, and contributed to the work of this Organization. He participated in different organs as well as serving in the International Law Commission. Another member of the new Cabinet, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Bilge, was a regular participant in the Sixth Committee and has been newly elected to the International Law Commission. I hope that my modest experience in this Organization and these connexions I have cited as regards the members of the Turkish Cabinet will prove how much importance we attach to this Organization.

67. With regard to some of the points raised by Mr. Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, I will of course take the same line and I shall not exercise my right of reply. However, he quoted one paragraph of the Secretary-General's report, and I will quote from only one paragraph of the same report, about the difficulties that exist. In paragraph 98, where the Secretary-General speaks of the tension, uneasiness and frustration, he says the following:

"This tension has been recently deepened by rumours of the presence of General Grivas in the island and a related resurgence of the pro-*enosis* campaign among some sections of the Greek Cypriot population."

68. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Kyprianou, asked, "What is the people of Cyprus?" I think he himself gave the answer. He said: "the Greek people of Cyprus and the Turkish people of Cyprus". Those are his words. Those are the

people of Cyprus—the peoples of Cyprus. With regard to the percentages, it would be much more realistic to say that for every four Greek Cypriots there is one Turkish Cypriot on the island.

69. With regard to the treaties, I shall not go into the substance of the question, although he makes his points with his customary brilliance and with a gentle voice. He stated his position about treaties. The Council knows our position with regard to treaties. The archives abound with our statements about them. Of course, our position is in line with the precepts of international law.

70. As regards the suggestions of the Secretary-General and the responses given by the different parties, I think it is true that the suggestions were made on 18 October. The Turkish Government responded on 24 November, and today we have heard the Foreign Minister of Cyprus say that they accepted them. It is now 13 December. So I think there has been no delay on our part in answering the suggestions of the Secretary-General. I can restate what I said in my main statement [1612th meeting], that a consensus will be soon found and the talks will be reactivated. I am glad to hear that Mr. Kyprianou said that they are ready to reactivate the talks.

71. In conclusion, I should like again to thank all the representatives for their constructive contributions through their interventions at the present meeting of the Council. I appreciate their fair approach to the problem, which I am sure will help to facilitate the resumption of the inter-communal talks. The bicomunal basis of the Republic of Cyprus not only emerges from international treaties but is also a fact of life. The treaties took this reality into account when the independent status of Cyprus was framed. Therefore respect for these international obligations is equally respect for the realistic situation in Cyprus. I am sure that a common will should exist on the part of all the parties in order to arrive at an agreed solution and I hope that such a common will will not fail to emerge soon.

72. The PRESIDENT: There seems to be a general feeling among the members that the interested parties should be encouraged to agree on the modalities of reactivating the talks, with the participation of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and representatives of Turkey and Greece, as suggested by the Secretary-General.

73. I hope that the feeling of optimism that has been raised at this session in that connexion will bear fruit and that by the time this Council convenes at the end of this six-month period final peace and understanding will be very near, if not fully established. The Council has now concluded consideration of this item.

*Mr. Kyprianou (Cyprus), Mr. Bayülken (Turkey) and Mr. Bitsios (Greece) withdrew.*

Letter dated 12 December 1971 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10444)

74. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council will recall that at a previous meeting [1606th meeting] the Council

decided to invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to participate, without vote, in the consideration of the item currently under discussion before the Council. In accordance with that decision, and with the consent of the Council, I shall invite the representatives of India and Pakistan to take places at the Council table.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Swaran Singh (India) and Mr. Z. A. Bhutto (Pakistan) took places at the Council table.*

75. The PRESIDENT: The Council had also decided [1607th meeting] to extend invitations to the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the places reserved for them in the Council chamber, on the understanding that they would be invited to take a place at the Council table when it was their turn to address the Council. Accordingly, I shall, with the consent of the Council, invite the representatives of Tunisia and Saudi Arabia to take the seats reserved for them in the Council chamber.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. R. Driss (Tunisia) and Mr. J. M. Baroodi (Saudi Arabia) took places in the Council chamber.*

76. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a point or order.

77. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As you will recall, at the meetings when the situation on the Indian subcontinent was first discussed, the wish was expressed and a formal proposal was made that we should invite the representatives of Bangla Desh to the meeting of the Security Council. Yesterday [1611th meeting], as we were all able to hear, the distinguished representative of India, Mr. Singh, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, also expressed the wish that the representatives of Bangla Desh should be invited to the Security Council meeting.

78. The point is that, as a result of the recent development of events, this circumstance has become a reality and there has arisen, if I may put it that way, a definite and real third force. Indeed, as we learned from the statement by the distinguished Foreign Minister of India, the force is an impressive one—approximately 150,000 partisans. If they constitute Bangla Desh, it would be appropriate for the Security Council to issue an invitation to the representatives of Bangla Desh and to hear their opinion and assessment of the events which have occurred in recent months in East Pakistan and which have led to, or, if I may say so, have been the consequence of the tragic mistakes which the distinguished Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, admitted in his statement yesterday [ibid.]. Of course, I think the members of the Security Council expected to hear more from the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan about what has happened in East Pakistan. But he merely limited himself at the beginning of his statement to the word "mistakes" or "mistake" and subsequently used the two words "tragic mistake" or "tragic mistakes"; he did not disclose the true nature of the situation.

79. Under these conditions it would be especially useful to hear the representatives of those who have lived through

the serious political crisis and suffered all the conditions of hardship created in East Pakistan, and who, if one may use a figurative expression, voted with their hands and by their ballot-papers in which appear to have been the first parliamentary elections in the history of Pakistan in December of last year, and then, as a result of the acts of aggression and terror committed by the armed forces in East Pakistan, they voted with their feet; in other words, they were forced to flee their own country to another, neighbouring country in order to save their lives. That is a sort of vote with one's feet against the people who created such conditions. All this is undoubtedly a reality and a factual situation and it would be useful for each member of the Security Council, as an individual, and for the Council as a whole to hear these representatives in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Under this rule, the Security Council may invite to a meeting and hear persons who are competent to speak on the matter under discussion. Surely no one can deny that these people are, in fact, competent to speak on the question under discussion, or that it would be useful to give them a hearing. But judging by the question which was raised some time ago by the distinguished representative of Argentina, when the Council first discussed this problem, there was uncertainty about the category in which to place them. Place them in any category you like. I have before me a note about invitations issued by the Council to individuals so that they could be heard on matters on which those persons were competent to speak. There have been 10 cases during the whole history, so to speak, of the Security Council. I do not know how complete this list is and whether it mentions all cases, but such cases there have been. It is sufficient to recall such incidents as that on 3 May 1968 [1421st meeting] when the Council heard the Mayor of Jerusalem. And quite recently, on 2 December this year [1604th meeting], the Council took a decision to invite the two well-known leaders of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole. So, there have been cases in the past when the Council has applied rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure and this provides a basis for applying this rule in the present case in respect of the representatives of Bangla Desh. We are firmly convinced that it would be extremely useful to invite and to hear those representatives and that to hear them might throw light on many aspects of the cause, the main cause, the consequence of which was the conflict on the Indian subcontinent, a conflict which has grown into an international problem and with which both the Security Council and the General Assembly now have to deal.

80. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR who has raised a point of order and under rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure I have to give a ruling immediately on the point of order. The point is that certain persons should be invited under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure to participate.

81. Members will recall that the representative of India, by a letter dated 4 December [S/10415], had forwarded a letter from Mr. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, requesting to make a statement before the Council. In that respect I might also point out that at the 1606th meeting representative of the USSR proposed that the Council should grant a hearing to a representative of Bangla Desh and he has

repeated this proposal now. The Council, in accordance with the suggestion made there by its President, had then decided to defer a decision on this matter.

82. Now a decision has to be taken. I should like to give a ruling but I notice that the representative of Argentina would like to take the floor. I call on the representative of Argentina.

83. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): It is precisely to the point of order raised by the representative of the Soviet Union that I wish to refer. Indeed, Mr. President, you were correctly guiding our deliberations when you recalled that at a recent meeting the Council had decided to postpone consideration of this question. Strictly speaking this postponement came about because the representative of the Soviet Union himself explained to us that it was necessary to continue consultations on this problem. My delegation has not been consulted nor are we aware that in the meantime, since Sunday a week ago, any consultations have been held. But, in any case, I think I will repeat the points of view expressed by my delegation at the time when the same proposal was made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

84. The proposal we have is born of document S/10415, a request submitted to the Council for consideration, which is signed by the head of the delegation of Bangla Desh to the United Nations. In the last paragraph of that submission he requests to be heard as the representative of the people and Government of Bangla Desh. Now, it is really rather difficult to dissociate the individual from the request made on behalf of the people of Bangla Desh. Does that person renounce the role of representative of the Government and people of Bangla Desh to be heard by the Security Council? That is my first question.

85. Secondly, a great deal has been said here about realities. The term "realities" or "realism" is the one which has most been used in the tragic debate which is now under way in the Council. Since that is the term which two or three delegations use most, let us refer to "realities". I submit that to accede to the request made by the representative of the Soviet Union also constitutes, if it is a reality, a serious and very dangerous precedent which the Council should take into account. Why is this? Because the reality is—even though it may be said that there are no two situations which are identical—that it would be enough if in the convulsed world of today secession were encouraged in any country in the world, and then we were told that we must hear one of the representatives of that secessionist movement for the Council to have to proceed in the same manner once a precedent such as we are now analysing was established.

86. Thirdly, it would be enough for subversion to be encouraged in one country for us to be told we must hear the representatives of that subversive movement evoking this precedent.

87. Fourthly, it would be sufficient for a country to interfere in the internal affairs of another State, saying that it was pleased or displeased with the manner in which

certain elections had been held or because certain elections had not been held, to claim later that we must hear the representatives of those sectors which have not been listened to in their own country. That is to say, if we are in the process of recognizing realities, we must recognize that this precedent is a very serious reality.

88. Considering the entire debate, it is my impression that one delegation of one country which is directly concerned has not only stated its own views on the crisis but has also, with great eloquence and a wealth of detail, reported to us on what is happening in the other country which is directly concerned. And if it can speak for the second country, I wonder why it could not then state the views of that movement which the Council would have to hear if it accepted the proposal made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

89. For all the reasons which I have now stated and which I also had an opportunity to state on another occasion before the Council, my delegation continues to be against any invitation to the representatives of a Government which, to my knowledge in any case, has not been recognized by more than two countries.

90. The PRESIDENT: For the benefit of members, I shall read rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure:

"If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled."

91. The representative of the Soviet Union has raised a point of order. I propose immediately to give my ruling on his point of order and if my ruling is overruled I shall then put it forward to the Council.

92. In giving my ruling under rule 30, I want to make it clear that there is a difference in international law between the recognition of a Government and the recognition of a State. Before a new State is recognized in accordance with international law, certain basic criteria must be in existence. This is the difference from the recognition of a Government in an existing State. A new State known as Bangla Desh has been mentioned in this Council and the representative of the USSR has asked, not that individuals should come or be invited under rule 39, but that representatives of this new State should be invited.

93. I am not satisfied from the points adduced that a new State with the necessary criteria for recognition exists, known as Bangla Desh. Accordingly, I rule that in accordance with rule 39, I cannot allow the presence in the Security Council of any representatives from a State, the criteria of existence of which have not fully satisfied my mind. This does not mean that, if individuals who are concerned in the matter before the Council wish to be heard, they cannot be heard in accordance with the provisions of rule 39.

94. I therefore overrule the point of order of the representative of the USSR.

95. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, I would request you to read the verbatim record of my statement. You will not find the word "State" there. I spoke of inviting the representatives as "competent persons", and in this respect I based myself solely on rule 39. I should like to make this clear, since in making your ruling you made an assumption which is not entirely accurate. For my part, I spoke of hearing competent persons, and not the representatives of a State, in the Security Council. Your ruling refers to a State. I, therefore, submit that there has been a misunderstanding. It is not my intention to challenge your ruling or your right to introduce any ruling which you consider appropriate in view of your rights and prerogatives and of the importance of the post you occupy. But I reserve nonetheless my right to revert to this matter at some later stage and to explain once again that I am talking about inviting competent people who might enlighten the Security Council and give it some consistent and useful explanations, some information which would be of use in the consideration by the Council of the matter under discussion. I am deeply convinced that this would cause no harm to anyone, but that it would, on the contrary, be of benefit to all.

96. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR and I note his statement that he is not challenging the decision of the Chair but that it is his intention to bring the matter forward, when I do trust he will come strictly within rule 39 so that, if we are inviting persons, we should identify them by whatever means we have to identify persons, so as to reach a proper decision at that stage.

97. I have on my list the Foreign Minister of India. I do not know whether he wishes to talk on the matter decided upon or on the item on the agenda. He has the floor.

98. Mr. Swaran SINGH (India): Mr. President, it is not my intention to challenge your ruling, but I thought it better that the position should be clarified. You stated that your ruling did not mean that persons who might be competent to give information about what is happening there would be barred. The representative of the Soviet Union has pointed out that he had not suggested that they should be invited as representatives of the State, but under rule 39 as persons competent to supply the Council with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

99. This is a matter which is not denied by anyone—and I suppose it will not be denied even by the representative of Pakistan—that apart from the armed forces of India and Pakistan being engaged in the conflict in Bangla Desh, there is also a large number of persons armed, organized and accepting the orders of the Government of Bangla Desh who are participating in partisan activities and carrying on their fight for maintaining their freedom. Whereas I can understand the reluctance to invite them as representatives of the State, any discussion which is calculated to restore normalcy in that area and create conditions in which the hostile armed activities should come to an end is not practical and does not have any content or meaning unless a group which is functioning there, according to us in their capacity as persons who belong to the armed forces of the Government of Bangla Desh, is heard by the Council. Other

countries may not recognize them, but the reality is there, and in that capacity persons who might be competent to give information regarding what is happening in the area, information which will enable the Security Council to decide on adequate measures in accordance with whatever may be the wish and desire of the Council, should give that information within the meaning of rule 39. Those decisions will actually have to be implemented in the area. By that process those persons will also be involved in establishing a durable peace. It appears to be absolutely essential that an opportunity should be given to such persons to enable the Security Council to understand the issues involved and also to allow them to assist the Security Council in enforcing any decisions that it may take to restore peace and to bring about normalcy in that region.

100. With these observations, I would strongly urge the Security Council or you, Mr. President, to consider the desirability of affording an opportunity to such persons, within the meaning of rule 39.

101. The PRESIDENT: I want to make my ruling clear. My ruling is that all persons who can assist the Council, if they are properly identified, can, with the consent of the Council, be admitted. But we cannot invite persons of whose existence we are unaware. We do not have any concrete proposal for the invitation of Mr. X or Mr. Y or of someone who might even be designated by a function so that he can be identified. The only application we have, and I have consulted the record, is for representatives of Bangla Desh. I have given my reasons why I cannot admit that application. My reasons have not been challenged. If now or at any subsequent occasion a concrete proposal is made to invite Mr. X or Mr. Y, or for a certain type of person who can assist us to come here, that matter will be put before the Council.

102. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to state very briefly that I, too, had understood the proposal of the representative of the Soviet Union as one based on rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. I supported that proposal last week, and I continue to consider it to be a proposal which is important for the work of the Security Council.

103. The fact that the persons mentioned are competent to bring information to the Security Council, information which can assist it in its work, does not give rise to any doubt on the part of anyone. I think that no one can dispute that. That they are concerned in the matter is not doubted either. That they constitute a political movement is in the opinion of my delegation also beyond doubt.

104. For all these reasons, my delegation, as already stated at the beginning of our debate on this item, is in favour of the proposal and we shall continue to be in favour of this proposal. I have taken note of what the President has said today.

105. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

106. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): Usually States invited by the Security Council to participate in debates of the

Security Council do not take part in procedural discussions. This has been the practice in the past and I presume it continues to be the practice. However, even if we were not invited and we had to participate in our own right as a non-permanent member of the Security Council at this moment of time I would think that every minute is vital. Precious lives are being lost in my country. There is hand-to-hand fighting going on. If the Security Council is not conscious of the priorities involved, I would feel that it is not conscious of the magnitude of the crisis and is not aware of the bloodshed and atrocities that are being committed in my country. My country is bleeding. If the Security Council could proceed with the debate, we would appreciate it very much. Yesterday also we bowed to the will of the Security Council. We adjourned for almost 18 hours. I would request the Security Council, and you, Mr. President, that we proceed with the debate. An important draft resolution is before the members of the Security Council. I would appreciate it if this point of view is taken into consideration.

107. The PRESIDENT: I want to make it clear that I have already given a ruling, and we are now on the debate of the substance of the agenda item before the Council.

108. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I have already stated that I am not challenging your ruling. For your part, you have stated that you will consider the question if a concrete proposal is introduced and a specific person named. So be it. Before proceeding on this matter, I should like to say a few words for the benefit of the distinguished representative of Argentina, who raised an objection on this point. I should like to draw his attention to the fact that he attempted, if I may so put it, to frighten us into thinking that this would create a dangerous precedent. I think that such a danger is purely hypothetical. The point is that the events in East Pakistan, which by their development have outgrown the confines of that region and spilled over the borders of East Pakistan, have become a major cause of inter-State conflict, of a conflict between two States and this, in its turn, has transformed the conflict into an international problem which is now before the Security Council. Consequently, it is an unusual event, unusual in both character and form. Who can cite a similar situation, where 10 million people, figuratively speaking, voted with their feet as a sign of protest against the intolerable conditions created for them in their own homeland and moved to another country?

109. In any case, it can be stated with confidence that no such danger threatens 88 States Members of the United Nations, since in 88 States Members of the United Nations, as has already been pointed out during the discussion in the Security Council, the population comprises less than 10 million people.

110. Here we have a case which is unusual and without precedent in peace time. There are well-known cases in history of populations fleeing before an advancing enemy. Millions moved their homes within my own country when the Hitlerite hordes approached the centres of the Ukraine, which is my homeland, and Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. Millions of people fled from the enemy who burnt all in his path and destroyed all living things,

especially people. That was a war, a horrible, unprecedented war.

111. But here, in peace time, 10 million people have moved from one State to another. That is an unprecedented, extraordinary event. It is completely impossible to understand or to explain why certain members of the Security Council close their eyes to this reality, to this unprecedented situation and attempt to disregard it.

112. Given such an approach, it is impossible to find the correct solution either in procedural terms or in terms of the substance of the matter under discussion. We can already see the consequences of this, when, under the pressure and influence of two permanent members of the Security Council, the Council has not followed the course it should have taken in the light of this reality, the unprecedented event we are discussing and the consequences of that event.

113. Therefore, to claim here that it will create a precedent, that it is dangerous for other States, is to employ a trumped-up argument. But let us leave this argument aside since it was connected with the concept of a State. The President has given his ruling on that basis. At the same time he stated that, if it was a question of inviting an individual, a competent person who could help the Council, he would consider the matter.

114. I am naming such a competent person, namely, Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, who was mentioned by the distinguished Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in his letter to the President of the Security Council. I am not linking him with anyone or anything; I am mentioning his name and raising the possibility of inviting him as a person competent to speak on the matter under discussion, and that is all.

115. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Soviet Union has put forward a definite proposal—I would take it as a point of order—that someone whom he has named, Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, should be invited as an individual because he has information which will assist the Security Council in coming to a decision on this matter. I must make a decision on this point of order, an individual having been named. However, I notice that the representative of China would like to speak, I would call attention to rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure in calling on him.

116. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Mr. Malik, from the time when the question of the conflict between India and Pakistan on the subcontinent first came up, has continuously raised the question of the so-called representative of Bangla Desh in this debate. A lot of time has been wasted and the proceedings of this meeting are being obstructed. We all know, we can see clearly, that his purpose is to obstruct the course of the meeting of the Security Council from substantive discussions on the current tension between India and Pakistan. His purpose is to use this toy in his pocket which is called Bangla Desh—in essence really a mere puppet—to obstruct the proceedings of the Security Council. The delegation of China resolutely opposes this. Furthermore, we consider it deeply regret-

table that the Soviet representative should adopt these tactics. What is the so-called Bangla Desh? It is nothing but a toy in the pocket of the Indian expansionists and the Soviet social-imperialists. By conferring on these rebels for armed subversion the title of prime minister or foreign minister can they turn the "Bangla Desh" into a State?

117. Mr. Malik goes so far as to suggest that we recognize them as the representatives of a so-called national liberation movement. It would be an insult to the national liberation movement to call the national traitor of Pakistan, the rebels for armed subversion reared by the Indian expansionists and the Soviet social-imperialists, the representatives of a national liberation movement.

118. Not long ago the Soviet agency TASS called the establishment of "Bangla Desh" a most important milestone in the history of the national liberation movement. This is a sheer lie. On one occasion you consider them as the representatives of "Bangla Desh". On another occasion, you call them Mr. X and Mr. Y in order to impose this person on the Security Council. What you have in mind is to move this farce which you and the Government of India staged in Calcutta and New Delhi to the forum of the Security Council. This is impermissible. Therefore, I request that the Council stop the discussion and waste of time of this question and immediately proceed with the substantive discussions.

119. The PRESIDENT: There is a saying: Nero fiddles while Rome burns. It is not my intention to allow the Security Council to fiddle while the grave situation deteriorates in the Hindustani subcontinent. Therefore, I shall proceed in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure which reads: "The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose". It is not the President who invites, it is the Security Council. The President merely decides on a point of order as to whether the matter comes before the Council or not. On this occasion I am satisfied that the representative of the Soviet Union has named a person who, he assures me, can be of assistance to the Council in examining the matter within its competence. I therefore propose to put the matter immediately before the Council as to whether it is disposed to invite an individual known as Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury.

120. Is the Soviet representative challenging my decision on his point of order to allow Mr. Justice Chowdhury to come to the table?

121. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I am not casting doubt on the manner in which you are conducting the meeting, but I would ask you to give me the opportunity, in exercise of the right of reply, to make some comments about the routine attack on the Soviet Union made by Mr. Huang Hua.

122. The PRESIDENT: I realize that the representative of the Soviet Union wishes to exercise the right of reply. I shall give him that opportunity later. Let us first deal with the matter before us, which is whether the Council agrees

to my inviting Mr. Justice Chowdhury to participate, or whether it has to be decided by a vote. It is a procedural question—the veto does not apply. I can see an objection already, so the matter will have to be put to the vote.

123. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I am not insisting on a vote. I think my proposal should be studied more carefully.

124. The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. My understanding is that when Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Security Council are invited, it is a purely procedural matter, and if the President sees no objection, such and such a State is invited. It implies a vote. If the representative of the Soviet Union is withdrawing his point of order with regard to Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury's being invited to the Council table under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, I shall be disposed to act accordingly.

125. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I do not insist on a vote.

126. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): Mr. President . . .

127. The PRESIDENT: I am sorry, but I am not going to give the floor to anyone until we have decided on the point of procedure. We cannot have a point of order on a point of order. I believe you suggested, your Excellency, that it was not proper for India to have participated in the discussion on procedure, and you want to do the same thing.

128. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): This individual mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union does not, in any case, fall under rule 39. He styles himself as a representative of the Government of so-called Bangla Desh. You have already ruled, Mr. President, that there is a difference between recognizing a State or a Government, and that comes under another article. The person mentioned styles himself as a representative of the Government of the so-called Bangla Desh State, so this does not fall within the terms of rule 39. But this is without prejudice to any other name that might be proposed.

129. The PRESIDENT: I have listened with interest to the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. I maintain that it is not for the Council to look into the qualifications when such identification has been made by a member of the Council. I therefore proceed, on the point of order, to put to the Council whether Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury should be invited to participate in the discussion. I repeat this, because the gavel will go down if I see no objection. I can see objections. I call on the representative of China.

130. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Will you be kind enough, Mr. President, to repeat your ruling?

131. The PRESIDENT: I shall repeat the ruling after I have heard the representative of Argentina.

132. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. President, since you had asked whether there were any objections, I would like to remind you that



in my statement I said I objected to the proposal which had been made. So that if it is to be decided, let it be by a vote. Later I shall request you to give me the floor too, so as to exercise my right of reply.

133. The PRESIDENT: The matter of explanations of vote and rights of reply will be taken care of.

134. There is no objection, and the representative of China wishes me to repeat my ruling. My ruling is to the following effect. The recognition of a new State is different from the recognition of a new Government within an existing State. For the recognition of a new State, certain basic principles have been hammered out throughout the years in international law. A new State known as Bangla Desh has been mentioned here. I am not satisfied that the principles of international law concerning the recognition of a new State have been fulfilled, and therefore I rule against admitting any representative of a State known as Bangla Desh to the Security Council table.

135. If there had been any objection to my ruling, under rule 30 I would have had to put my ruling to the Council without further debate. There was no objection and the ruling stands. I made it clear, however, that any individual properly identified by name, function or other description might be considered under rule 39. The representative of the Soviet Union has properly identified an individual known as Mr. Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury. I have ruled that he comes within rule 39 as an individual, and unless I hear any objection, I would invite him to the deliberations.

136. I have heard an objection, and in accordance with the conventions of the Security Council, having had an objection, I now put the matter to a vote.

137. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Mr. President, I made a proposal, but since you are putting the matter to a vote, I am not insisting on a vote. And if the person who makes a proposal does not ask for a vote, then there is no point in voting.

138. The PRESIDENT: I take this to mean that the representative of the Soviet Union has withdrawn his proposal. I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fact that when we adjourned early this morning, we had document S/10446, the draft resolution submitted by the United States, before us. It was our intention in coming here this afternoon—possibly this morning—that we would resume the discussion of this draft resolution. Bearing in mind that the Soviet Union has already closed this matter, unless I have any indication to the contrary I now propose that we start a discussion on the draft resolution contained in document S/10446.

139. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): At the last meeting the question did not arise that we should discuss only the United States draft resolution. If any delegation expresses the wish to speak on the substance of the matter under discussion, I submit that there are no grounds for depriving any member of the Security Council of such an opportunity. Only the

representative of the United States of America and the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan spoke at the last meeting. But the members of the Security Council had no opportunity to express their views. I consider that no one has the right to deprive them of the opportunity to express themselves, whether it be on the United States draft resolution or on the matter under discussion as a whole.

140. The PRESIDENT: I am certain we are on the same wave length. I was saying that we left off early this morning with this draft resolution. Unless I have any objections or indications to the contrary, I propose that we now have the opportunity of a further discussion of the draft resolution. We have already heard the representative of the United States, the Foreign Minister of India, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, and it is my belief that other members of the Security Council would now want to participate in the discussion of this draft resolution. I can see no objections to this procedure. It is therefore so decided.

141. Before we call on the first speaker on the draft resolution, the representative of the United States has indicated that he has something to say.

142. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I will be very brief because I understand that our distinguished colleague from Nicaragua, in a most gracious way, has permitted me a minute to explain that the United States has accepted the suggestion for a change in our draft resolution, which I believe was originated by the representative of Japan. We have asked that that change be circulated. In essence, without going into the substance and thus keeping the floor away from the representative of Nicaragua any longer, I would simply point out that what it does is to delete operative paragraph 1, and it inserts a new preambular paragraph which will go in as the fourth preambular paragraph. It will read:

*"Regretting that the Government of India has not yet accepted an unconditional and immediate cease-fire and withdrawal as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI),"*

143. The United States has accepted this suggestion for a change, and it will be incorporated in the revised draft resolution which should be before the members as this matter is discussed. I think we need not speak on the substance of this change. It is a helpful suggestion by the Government of Japan and it meets with our full approval.

144. The PRESIDENT: I note that the representative of the United States has in essence deleted the operative paragraph 1 of his draft resolution and inserted a new preambular paragraph which will now be the fourth preambular paragraph.

145. The first speaker on my list this afternoon for the substantive discussion is the representative of Nicaragua.

146. Mr. SEVILLA SACASA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At the meeting on 6 December [1608th meeting] we were the first to recall the resolution "Uniting for peace" [General Assembly resolution 377(V)]. We

recalled it on observing that it was impossible for the Security Council to adopt a resolution, or, to be exact, the resolution, to which the vast majority of the members of the Security Council aspired. We quoted the resolution with personal pleasure because the honour fell to us to participate as a representative of Nicaragua in the fifth session of the General Assembly which adopted it on 3 November 1950 at Lake Success. In order to adopt this resolution, it was rightly adduced that if the Security Council were to be paralysed because of the use of the veto, the General Assembly should take action at an extraordinary session in order to adopt the measures it deems appropriate to impose order and maintain international peace and security.

147. The draft resolution submitted on 6 December by the representative of Somalia immediately won the support of several delegations, among them the delegation of Nicaragua. Thus it was that the Council adopted the resolution [303 (1971)] whereby it immediately transmitted consideration of the crisis to the General Assembly in accordance with the procedure established in the "Uniting for peace" resolution. The Security Council transmitted the problem to the General Assembly, which, as we said yesterday, is the most representative and democratic organ of the Organization, and this is so because in the General Assembly vetoes are not operative. What prevail in the General Assembly are the votes of the majority, precisely because they are a majority.

148. The General Assembly at its 2002nd and 2003rd meetings of 7 December adopted, by 104 votes to 11 with 10 abstentions, resolution 2793 (XXVI) which called upon India and Pakistan to arrange a cease-fire and to withdraw their troops to their respective territories. The number of votes in favour speaks volumes: one hundred and four votes of the General Assembly speak for themselves.

149. Since that resolution has not been complied with so far, the delegation of the United States, quite rightly, once again has called on the Security Council to assume its responsibility in this serious case, which beyond any doubt constitutes a threat to peace—and not only peace in the area but also peace in the world. Why not say it? Why not say that the tragedy which overwhelms the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent is being talked about throughout the world with pain and also with surprise as something that cannot be understood or apprehended? I repeat, the world cannot understand or apprehend it. And, of course, far less will it understand tomorrow that the legal political system which we built in San Francisco with such great effort does not adopt concrete measures in the case of two States Members of the Organization.

150. Ambassador Bush was very clear and explicit and he has been so again, when he explained the purpose of his Government in regard to the grave problem before us. The revised draft resolution which he has submitted to us for consideration is in itself important. It was preceded by his letter of 12 December addressed to the President of the Security Council, in which Ambassador Bush states, when requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council, that the Council "has an obligation to end this threat to world peace on a most urgent basis" [S/10444].

151. The delegation of Nicaragua firmly supports the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States of America, because we consider that this is the minimum the Council should do in order to fulfil the sacred mission entrusted to it under the Charter. The case is so grave that we can affirm without fear of contradiction that the Organization is subject to a hard trial in this month of December. Let us say so bravely and without any fear, it is on trial during this month of December. Therefore let us save its prestige. We have the right to save its prestige, and it is also an obligation for us. This is the voice of Nicaragua in these difficult hours our Organization is living through.

152. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Once more the Security Council has met to consider the situation in the Hindustan peninsula where, as a result of well-known causes of which many delegations have spoken in detail in their statements at previous meetings of the Security Council, there has arisen acute international tension which has grown into an armed conflict between two States in the Indian subcontinent. The States Members of the United Nations and the entire world community are now well aware of the causes of the complications which have arisen. As was convincingly demonstrated at earlier meetings of the Council and in yesterday's statement [1611th meeting] by the Foreign Minister of India, Mr. Singh, the main cause of the constantly increasing strain on relations between India and Pakistan, which has led to armed conflict, was the situation brought about in East Pakistan as a result of the anti-democratic, violent actions of the Pakistan authorities against the people of East Pakistan. As a result of the use of the armed forces and the inhuman oppression of the population of East Pakistan, hundreds of thousands of its peaceful inhabitants have perished and almost 10 million people have been forced to flee to neighbouring India in order to escape deadly danger. The opposition of the population of East Pakistan to the punitive and terrorist actions of the Pakistan armed forces was not caused by any intrigues on the part of India, but is the natural reaction of people who are being subjected to cruel methods of terrorism, violence and repression.

153. India, as a neighbouring State, became the victim of the consequences of the unprecedented and monstrous events in East Pakistan. Into its territory there poured a 10-million-strong flood of refugees from East Pakistan. This event, which, as has already been pointed out, is without precedent in peace time, placed India in an extremely difficult situation. And only those who are capable of closing their eyes to reality could fail to understand the true tragedy of these events.

154. The fundamental position of the Soviet Union has always been and still is based on the desire to maintain and develop good and friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. Guided by the desire to maintain peace in the Indian subcontinent, the Soviet Government more than once expressed to the President of Pakistan, Mr. Yahya Khan, and to the Pakistan Government its concern at the situation which was developing as a result of the aggravation of the political crisis in East Pakistan. A message from the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade N. V.



Podgorny, was sent to the Government of Pakistan and to President Yahya Khan in person as early as April, immediately following the commencement of these events in March.

155. As we learned from yesterday's statement in the Security Council by the representative of the United States, Mr. Bush, the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan was also recognized by the United States Government. The members of the Security Council heard such a statement by the United States representative for the first time; during previous discussions on this matter in the Security Council there had been no such statement. It is clear, therefore, that the Government of the United States also advised the Government of Pakistan to take the measures necessary for a political settlement. The Governments of other countries also offered similar advice. However, the Government of Pakistan ignored those appeals from many countries, and the military authorities in East Pakistan continued their bloody orgy, sowing death, violence, and destruction.

156. Millions of people found themselves faced with a fearful dilemma: to perish or to flee to a neighbouring country to save their lives. Ten million people—a number which, as has already been pointed out, represents the population of an entire State—fled from their birthplaces to another country. That is an unusual expression of political distrust and protest against the Government and régime, that is one of the unusual phenomena of the struggle of the national liberation movement against bloody repression and terror. And, in point of fact, the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan failed to mention any of this in his statement in the Security Council [*ibid.*]. In December of last year that population expressed its will and its protest by voting, as I have already pointed out, with its hands and ballot-papers, and then “voted with its feet”—almost 10 million people fled from East Pakistan. And that is the will of the people.

157. The distinguished Mr. Bhutto talked about everything, beginning with the Roman Empire; he talked about anything and everything, he talked loud and long, but he mentioned this fearful tragedy only in passing. He limited himself to the single word “mistakes”, and then he added “tragic mistakes”. But to say this is to say nothing, it is to side-step the real crux of the matter, the substance of the question. But without that it is impossible to understand the true nature of the events, the root of the evil, and to find the correct solution to the problem, whether on the spot or in the United Nations. And that should be completely obvious and intelligible to such an experienced politician as Mr. Bhutto.

158. The Soviet Union is and always has been firmly opposed to repression and persecution as a method of settling serious political problems. It favours a political settlement in East Pakistan in accordance with the will of its population as expressed in the elections in December 1970. The delegation of the Soviet Union has held and defended this view in the Security Council and the General Assembly during the consideration of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. Life itself and the further development of events have fully confirmed the correctness of this attitude, the correctness of the Soviet position.

159. We insist on a simultaneous cease-fire, the cessation of hostilities and a political settlement. United States propaganda attempts to distort our position. As I pointed out yesterday, such attempts are now being made even from White House circles. But the documents available to the Security Council do not confirm the slanderous accusation that the Soviet Union is against a cease-fire. If Mr. Bush had supplied Mr. Ziegler<sup>1</sup> at the appropriate time with the text of the Soviet proposal in the Security Council, Mr. Ziegler would, no doubt, not have made such a fanciful and unfounded statement as the one he made on Sunday.

160. In this way, the United States and its propaganda have embarked on the path of distorting reality. As you know, the Soviet delegation to the Security Council itself first introduced an amendment [*S/10426/Rev.1*] and then a draft resolution [*S/10428*] calling for a cease-fire and for the cessation of hostilities. It was also introducing another proposal, calling for an immediate political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of the people's will, as expressed in the elections in 1970. This was opposed by the United States, China and certain others. It was for this very reason that the Security Council could not find the correct and realistic approach, the correct and realistic course towards a solution of this problem. By its words the United States, as Mr. Bush said yesterday, recognized the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan, but by its deeds, by its failure to support the Soviet Union's proposal on this matter, it rejected such a solution. It is this very position which has brought the Security Council and the General Assembly to an impasse.

161. Now the delegation of the United States has introduced its own new proposal. But what is there about it that is new? In actual fact it is a repetition of the old approach and an attempt to push through the old solution. Once again, for the second time, the United States is trying to push the Security Council into an incorrect and unrealistic course of action. For example, the United States is proposing to the refugees that they should voluntarily return to East Pakistan. I should like to ask Mr. Bush a direct question: where, and to whom should they voluntarily return? To the people who were killing them and from whom they fled to save their lives? Can the sponsor of such a proposal consider it seriously or believe that what he suggests is possible or realistic? No one who has fled from a place where he is threatened with death will return unless there has been a fundamental change in conditions and his safety is guaranteed. There is no mention of a political settlement in any of the draft resolutions submitted so far, or in the draft resolution submitted by Mr. Bush. There is not a single word about any kind of political settlement. But none the less, the United States representative has informed the Council that his Government long ago approached the Government of Pakistan concerning the need for a political settlement.

162. Consequently, we have grounds for stating that there is a discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the United States. Instead of a relaxation of tension and the adoption of measures to bring about a political settlement,

<sup>1</sup> Press secretary to the President of the United States of America.

there has been further aggravation of the political crisis in East Pakistan, which has led to armed conflict in that region. The hostilities between Pakistan and India broke out because the Government of Pakistan, unable to cope with the opposition of the East Pakistan population in its just struggle for its life and freedom, instead of removing the real causes of the crisis, made an armed attack on India, began bombing Indian towns, attacking Indian posts and shelling Indian territory. It was indeed Pakistan which began military action against India, as has been convincingly shown by the facts and documentary evidence and, above all, the statements by the representative of India, the report of the Secretary-General, the statements by other delegations and yesterday's statement by the Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Singh.

163. India did not want a war. The military conflict was thrust upon it by the tragic development of events in East Pakistan, on its eastern frontier. The constructive and thorough discussion of the events in that region has left no doubt that the main cause and the source of the outbreak of the conflict there are the acts of violence and repression committed against the population of East Pakistan and the subsequent military actions against India.

164. In these circumstances the Soviet Union, whether in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, was unable to support the adoption of draft resolutions which touched upon only one side of the problem, which mentioned only a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities between the two parties in complete isolation from the other question, which is indissolubly linked with it, that of a political settlement in East Pakistan.

165. From the very outset we have been entirely convinced that the detailed way, the only proper way, to eliminate the causes leading to the aggravation of the situation and the armed conflict could only be a course which led simultaneously and unswervingly to a cease-fire, the cessation of hostilities and a solution of the question which is indissolubly linked with this, namely, the question of a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights, the interests and the will of its 75 million people. Any other approach would be one-sided and unrealistic and would only give an illusory impression that the United Nations had taken measures towards such a settlement.

166. The new proposals introduced by the representative of the United States avoid this fundamental question, as before. For this reason they are totally unacceptable. The real elimination of the armed conflict and the cessation of bloodshed in this region cannot be achieved without bearing in mind that the question of a cease-fire must be closely, indissolubly and organically linked with the solution of the question of a political settlement in East Pakistan.

167. The members of the Council are well aware of who really expresses the will of the 75 million people of East Pakistan. As events have shown, the spokesman for their interests is the Awami League party, which received unanimous support at the elections in December 1970 and won 167 of the 313 seats in the Parliament, as the Council

has already been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India. Mr. Singh [1611th meeting]. If this decisive political fact is not borne in mind, if this reality is overlooked, it will be impossible to achieve the rapid and effective elimination of the conflict in the Hindustan subcontinent and a political solution to the problem of East Pakistan.

168. In his statement yesterday, Mr. Bhutto touched on the matter of the Leninist principle of the self-determination of peoples [ibid.]. Yes, there is such a principle and we consider it one of Lenin's greatest legacies. But Mr. Bhutto did not go far enough. He did not mention the second part of that Leninist principle. And incidentally that principle is based on the proclamation by the revolutionary proletariat of the right of nations to self-determination, that is to say, on the right of the workers of each nationality to organize their own State unit and to decide whether it should, as before, be included within a multinational State or whether it should secede and become a separate State. Lenin wrote in "The right of nations to self-determination": "... the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state."

169. Lenin's understanding of the principle of self-determination places the matter in the sphere of social and class liberation. Self-determination right up to the stage of the formation of an independent State—that is the essence of the Leninist principle of self-determination. That principle lies at the very basis of the creation of the Soviet State, which was founded by the great Lenin. We are honoured, fortunate and proud that more than 100 nationalities are united within the Soviet Union. Article 17 of the All-Union Constitution, the Constitution of the USSR, states that every Union Republic shall retain the right of free secession from the USSR.

170. That is how the Leninist principle is embodied in the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That is how we understand and interpret that Leninist principle, the principle of self-determination of peoples. Consequently, only the people of East Pakistan, in the person of their elected representatives can decide their own fate, can decide whether East Pakistan will remain part of Pakistan or whether it will form a separate and independent State. In the person of their elected representatives, the people of East Pakistan are also free to settle the question of the resumption of contacts, talks or any form of relations with the Pakistan Government.

171. It is this same approach to the settlement of the conflict which has broken out that has invariably guided the Soviet Union, both in the organs of the United Nations and outside this Organization. The Soviet Union has unfailingly supported and continues to support an immediate cessation of the bloodshed and the implementation of a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people. This position was set forth yet again with complete clarity and lack of ambiguity in the statement by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade A.I. Brezhnev, at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on

7 December at Warsaw, and also in the official TASS communiqué, published on 6 December. The members of the Security Council are familiar with this document [S/10422] and there is no need for me to repeat or to describe its contents in detail here.

172. The events of the last few days have fully confirmed and, as we note with great satisfaction, have convinced some of those who were confused and in doubt that this same approach of the Soviet Union to the matter of finding ways to settle the conflict in the Indian subcontinent is correct and just and is based on an awareness of the true political situation which has arisen in East Pakistan and in that region as a whole. To tell the truth, one of those members of the Security Council who was confused about this point admitted as much in a conversation with us, directly, openly and honestly. He acknowledged the correctness and realistic nature of the position and approach of the Soviet Union, the correctness and realism of the proposals introduced by the Soviet delegation at that stage in our discussion of the matter and in the development of events. Judging from press reports, some important military and political figures, Pakistan officials in East Pakistan itself, are now inclined to approach the situation realistically. This is shown, for example, by the statement of General Farman to the Secretary-General, of which the whole world has now learned through the American press. If the Pakistan Government, too, will now adopt the position of taking reality into account, it might be possible to come to an agreement relatively quickly on the adoption by the Security Council of a decision on the two interconnected questions—the cessation of bloodshed and a political settlement in East Pakistan.

173. No one who cherishes peace and the fundamental rights of peoples can overlook the demands of the 75 million people of East Pakistan or close his eyes to their legitimate national liberation struggle for their civil rights and freedom. It is, however, to be regretted that some members of the Council, either because of their failure to understand the true situation or under the influence and pressure of the two permanent members of the Security Council who from the beginning of the events in East Pakistan and throughout the discussion of this matter in the Council have taken a one-sided and unrealistic position, have agreed to separate the question of the cessation of hostilities and bloodshed from that of the need for an urgent and simultaneous political settlement in East Pakistan. Such a position has from the very beginning been unrealistic and one-sided, since both those questions have formed and still do form one indivisible whole.

174. What did those two great Powers do in practical terms in order to put an end to the violence, terror and acts of repression in East Pakistan, to halt the dangerous development of events there and to avert the outbreak and spread of a conflict between India and Pakistan? In practical terms, they did nothing. By their position they merely helped to arouse passions and aggravate the situation; they poured oil on the fire.

175. The United States, by continuing to grant military aid to Pakistan throughout the many months during which the crisis was becoming more acute, in effect encouraged

the Pakistan military authorities to continue their policy of armed repression and violence against the East Pakistan population. United States military aid to Pakistan was only formally cut off literally on the eve of the beginning of military actions against India. It is obviously not necessary to explain to members of the Council the role played by such a policy in aggravating the situation in the subcontinent. By lavishing praise upon the United States position as an allegedly "just" position, Mr. Bhutto is justifying United States aggression in Indo-China.

176. In the aggravation of the situation in the Indian peninsula the Peking leadership has constantly played the unseen role of the instigator. Peking is directly connected with these events and plays in them a two-faced, provocative role. On the one hand, the Maoist clique has tried by all possible means to insinuate itself into East Pakistan where it has, with the help of its agents, propagated its own conception of a "people's war", inflated the situation and promoted and assisted the aggravation of the political crisis in East Pakistan. On the other hand, this clique has widely proclaimed its support for Pakistan, attempting to turn it into a weapon of its own ultra-chauvinistic, great-Power policy in Asia, for the purpose of strengthening its own influence and control both in the Indian subcontinent and in South-East Asia as a whole.

177. It is not hard to see that the essence of Peking's policy lies in stirring up the conflict between India and Pakistan, pouring oil on the fire and striving to reach its own expansionist, selfish, great-Power chauvinistic goals. The Maoists are profoundly indifferent to the genuine national interests both of the people of East Pakistan and of the people of Pakistan as a whole. They look upon Pakistan merely as a springboard and puppet in the unscrupulous game they are playing in that region and in the whole of the international arena.

178. The efforts of the current Chinese leadership are aimed at attempting by all possible means to strengthen their own position in Asia. Peking is constantly stepping up its military aid to Pakistan; it has frequently made statements about its willingness to give unlimited assistance to Pakistan in its struggle against India. It is appropriate to recall that even at the current stage in the aggravation of relations between India and Pakistan, the Peking clique has taken steps to give military aid to Pakistan. At the beginning of November of this year a delegation, headed by the same Mr. Bhutto who is present here, was invited to Peking. The members of that delegation also included the Commander of the Air Force, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of Staff of the Navy of Pakistan. It is not surprising that Mr. Bhutto has lavished such praise on the position of Peking. But it is in vain, it is a mistaken interpretation of Peking's position. In actual fact, by provoking the intensification of the crisis in East Pakistan and by inflaming the India-Pakistan conflict, the Maoists are in essence attempting to implement a policy of setting Asians against Asians in order to achieve their own great-Power goals in South-East Asia. As everyone now understands, this is not a policy which they invented for themselves; they have borrowed it from the United States, which long ago proclaimed the notorious "Guam doctrine", the essence of which is expressed in the slogan "Use Asians against Asians".

179. It is not hard to see that this hypocritical, two-faced policy and the actions of the Maoists in East Pakistan and in the India-Pakistan conflict are directed against the interests both of the peoples of India and of the peoples of Pakistan and of the other countries of South-East Asia. Such a policy is an open betrayal of the struggle of the people of East Pakistan for their fundamental rights and interests, for their national freedom. Such actions by Peking divert the attention of international public opinion from the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle in Indo-China and the Middle East and play into the hands of imperialism and reaction. That is something which really deserves to be termed social treachery.

180. In the light of this, how can anyone really be surprised at the fact that China shares a common approach in the Security Council with another permanent member of the Security Council? The Peking delegation has found itself in the same camp as the United States delegation in the discussion in the United Nations of the question of the events in the Indian subcontinent. The fact that the positions of the United States and China on this matter coincide confirms the truth of the Russian saying: "If you go too far to the left, you will find yourself too far to the right." The Chinese and United States delegations have tried to lead the Security Council and the entire United Nations along a false path and have attempted to impose upon the Security Council a solution to the problem which would mean in practice a "freezing" of the conflict in the Indian subcontinent, its endless continuation with all the tragic consequences that implies, since it would not deal with or solve the main cause of the conflict, namely, the question of the position of the millions and millions of inhabitants of East Pakistan, the question of a political settlement.

181. The Soviet Union firmly and consistently favours the adoption by the Security Council of effective measures to provide for an immediate halt to the bloodshed and the implementation of a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and interests of its people and the implementation of the will of its people.

182. At the same time, the Soviet Union considers it extremely important that the Governments of all countries should refrain in the current highly critical situation from any measures which in one way or another would mean their involvement in the conflict and would lead to the further complication of the situation in the Indian subcontinent. It is, however, no secret that some people would like to warm their hands by fanning the military conflagration in that region. In this connexion, it is impossible not to feel alarm at the dissemination by the press in several countries of nonsensical fables to the effect that some Indian military aircraft and naval vessels are manned by Soviet military personnel. There can be no doubt about the malicious nature of such insinuations, which are hostile to India and the Soviet Union. Permit me in this respect to read the official statement issued by TASS on 10 December 1971, in which these fables and fabrications of imperialist propaganda are categorically rejected:

"Moscow, 10 December (TASS)—On 9 December the official representative of Pakistan asserted at a press

conference in Rawalpindi that Indian military aircraft and missile-carrying launches were manned by Soviet personnel.

"TASS is authorized to state that the above remarks are entirely unfounded and are from beginning to end nothing but a provocative invention."

183. The same could be said with equal justification about the fantastic statement by Mr. Bhutto to the effect that the Soviet Union is participating "in the dismemberment of Pakistan". That is nothing other than a provocative invention. His aim is to distort the truth of the matter, to slander the Soviet Union and to side-step the real issue under discussion. The East Pakistan people, in answer to the "mistakes" admitted by Mr. Bhutto, have begun to express their own will. Mr. Bhutto, blame yourself and your Government, and do not shift the blame on to others. You have tried here to shift the blame onto the Soviet Union, onto France, the United Kingdom and many other countries. But that is not an argument.

184. We should like to stress once again in this connexion that no attempts to distort or to slander the clear, just and realistic position of the Soviet Union on the question of the events in the Indian subcontinent will be successful. They merely unmask and expose those who are stirring up and carrying on this slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union.

185. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Security Council now have before them the revised text of the draft resolution which appears in document S/10446/Rev.1.

186. Mr. KUŁAGA (Poland) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to speak before the draft resolution is put to the vote in order to present the position of my delegation once again on this question, because in fact once again the Security Council is being called upon to consider the consequences of the conflict to which we are witnesses, setting aside the fundamental facts of the problem and closing its eyes to the essential part of the problem.

187. As we see it, the conflict is fundamentally and without any doubt within East Pakistan. It is part of the process which started with the crisis of confidence. It grew into a political crisis and it then became an internal military conflict. Finally, the international consequences which we know occurred.

188. The solution of the conflict must therefore start and end with the solution of this fundamental internal conflict on the basis of political realities, that is to say, on the basis of the existing balance of power. If the latest events in East Bengal have proved anything, it is the completion of the process which we described a few days ago as a process of alienation of Pakistani authorities from the people of East Bengal; from the entire population of East Bengal. The information that we have recently received through the press clearly indicates how far this process of disintegration has advanced. It demonstrates once again the absolute need for a political solution based on the balance of political forces in East Bengal.

189. The relationship between these forces seems to me clear; even the representatives of the Central Government of Pakistan recognize the strength and the representative character of Bangla Desh. Any solution that fails to take account of this fact seems to us unrealistic and incapable, *a priori*, of leading to a political settlement. Any other approach to the problem would be mistaken. What is more, it would be dangerous, for it would imply recognition of the right of the Pakistani authorities to continue repression that has already caused so many victims and would inevitably lead to an intensification of that repression and the resistance against it on a scale the vastness of which we do not even dare to imagine. Furthermore, it would be impossible, for it is impossible to change political realities, to reverse the irreversible.

190. We listened with the greatest interest to the statements made during our meeting yesterday [1611th meeting]. The Foreign Minister of India, in his very sober statement, stressed precisely this problem, after having described the slow process of alienation of the Pakistani authorities from the people of East Bengal. The analysis he gave of the causes and effects of that process confirms us in the view that we have held since the beginning of the conflict—and by “beginning” we mean not December 1971, but December 1970. We likewise listened to the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He spoke with a great deal of ideas, which led him to cite certain historical parallels that are erroneous, out of place and obsolete. On the other hand, he avoided what we consider to be the substance of the problem, namely the situation in East Bengal.

191. We have said, and we repeat it, that our principal concern is to see a solution come about at the earliest possible moment on the Indian subcontinent. We have said, and we repeat it, we do not intervene in this debate in a spirit of acrimony and recrimination. It is rather our view—and events have borne this out—that the source of conflict is not to be found, as some have sought to make us believe again yesterday, everywhere but in East Pakistan, but precisely in East Pakistan. It is only starting from these realities that we can arrive at a viable solution, a realistic solution, a lasting solution to a conflict which my delegation profoundly regrets and which we would like to see resolved in conformity with the expressed wishes of the people of East Pakistan. This attitude determines our active support for any realistic, fair and lasting solution to the conflict with which we are confronted, a solution that would take into account the development of the present situation, the will and the legitimate interests of all the parties; for, we are firmly convinced, this is the only possible way to restore peace and security to the Indian subcontinent in the interests of all the peoples of that region.

192. The PRESIDENT: I call on the Foreign Minister of India.

193. Mr. Swaran SINGH (India): I listened with great attention to the speakers and the interventions made yesterday [1611th meeting]. I was deeply impressed by the anxiety and sincere desire of the Security Council to find a lasting and durable solution to the tragic situation that has

developed in the subcontinent. I should like to pay a special tribute to you, Mr. President, for the able manner in which you conducted the deliberations on such an important and delicate subject. I should also like to say that whether we agree with the points made by various delegations or not, we appreciate their efforts to find a solution that is acceptable to the parties concerned as well as to the members of this Council. It is in this spirit of co-operation and understanding of the necessity of viewing all aspects of this problem that I should like to place before you the point of view of the Government of India on some of the issues that have been raised.

194. I hope I shall not be misunderstood if I refer to some of the points made so vehemently and rhetorically by my friend the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. I have admiration for his ability, and we in India recognize him as the democratically elected leader of the largest single party of West Pakistan. We hope that the time is not far off when the military rulers of West Pakistan will also respect the verdict of their people and give Mr. Bhutto an opportunity to form a representative Government with whom, we hope, it will be possible for us to deal in order to remove the root-causes of tension existing between our two countries and usher in an era of peace, friendship and mutual co-operation.

195. I should like to emphasize that we have nothing but the friendliest feelings for the people of Pakistan. We wish them well. There are many historical links that bind us together. Geography makes us close neighbours. I was, therefore, very happy to hear from my friend the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, when he said that both India and Pakistan, which are poor countries in spite of their vast natural resources, could work together towards social and economic progress of both of their peoples and for peace on the subcontinent. I wish to assure him that we sincerely share those feelings.

196. While it is necessary and laudable to cherish these common objectives, it is not enough. We have to work together in order to achieve them. Let us examine what are the impediments in our way. If India has done anything to hamper the development of friendly relations between our two countries and peoples, I would be the first to admit it. If Pakistan or other countries have wittingly or unwittingly created conditions which have made it difficult for our two countries to come closer in peace and friendship, they must make amends so that the situation improves.

197. We accepted the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 without reservations. We respected the sovereignty and independence of Pakistan and made every possible effort to come closer to it. I need not go into past history to prove this. What is much more important is the present and the future relationship of our two countries.

198. Taking the present situation, let us examine how and why it has arisen and come to its present dangerous pass. The distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan rightly emphasized the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. But what is Pakistan's record in this respect? May I ask him who armed and trained some of the tribal dissidents on our eastern frontiers for a number of

years? May I also ask him who started the war in Kashmir in 1947? It is well known that up to May 1948, Pakistan had denied the presence of its troops in Kashmir, and it was only when the United Nations Commission discovered their presence that the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sir Zafrulla Khan, had to admit that Pakistani regular troops had been sent into Kashmir. I am referring to this fact not because I wish to convert the present debate into a debate on Kashmir, but only to remind the members of this Council that it is necessary to bear in mind the past history of the relations between India and Pakistan in order to assess the present situation.

199. I was somewhat shocked, but not surprised, to hear from my friend, Mr. Bhutto, references to the past 1,000 years and more in which he mentioned the incursion by Mohammad Bin Qasim. I was shocked to hear from him that, according to his reading of history, Pakistan had been denied areas or territories in the subcontinent at the time of partition. However, I was not surprised to hear Mr. Bhutto's threat about 1,000 years of war because we have heard these threats from him from time to time. Is Mr. Bhutto still harbouring dreams and visions of conquering India and coming to Delhi as a victor? He made the astonishing statement yesterday that if Pakistan had received half the military aid that India had received, Mr. Bhutto would be sitting in Delhi today. May I remind him of the \$2,000 million worth of military hardware that Pakistan received from its great benefactor and ally from 1954 onwards, which enabled Pakistan to invade India in 1965 and which is being used again today against both Bangla Desh and India. I do not wish to go into all these facts, but I think it necessary to do so because Mr. Bhutto's reading of history throws more light on his dreams and ambitions than on historical facts.

200. I shall not take it upon myself to reply to the charges which he has levelled against the USSR. The representative of the Soviet Union has already made some comments in this respect. I, however, feel duty-bound to answer some of these uncalled-for attacks that he has made about the implications of the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation which was signed on 9 August of this year. It hardly lies with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to shed crocodile tears on the so-called abandonment of India's policy of non-alignment when, according to Mr. Bhutto himself, Pakistan is still a member of two military alliances. However, just to set the record straight, I should like to draw his attention to article IV in the Indo-Soviet treaty, which expresses the Soviet Union's respect for India's policy of non-alignment as an important factor for peace. Mr. Bhutto's concept of non-alignment does not carry conviction. The Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship is not aimed against any country. It seems, however, that Mr. Bhutto, who perhaps harbours dreams and visions of conquering the whole subcontinent, regards this treaty as an impediment in the achievement of these aims.

201. Mr. Bhutto made a reference to the United States Seventh Fleet. I do not wish to take this up with him. That is a matter for the representative of the United States of America to deal with. But I should like to correct him on an incorrect statement that he made, perhaps out of

ignorance, or maybe deliberately. India has not made a declaration about the blockade of the Bay of Bengal, as Mr. Bhutto asserted. India has issued only a contraband control order, which every country against which a state of war has been proclaimed by another country is entitled to do under international law. India has no desire to interfere with the freedom of the high seas, or genuine trade and commerce, or the shipments of food and relief goods to Bangla Desh. But India has the right to ensure that no contraband goods reach Pakistan, which has declared war on India. Nothing in the Charter or in international law prevents a country from taking steps to safeguard its security and defend its territorial integrity if another country declares war on it.

202. We should like to assure all Governments of the world that India will do everything possible to protect the persons and properties of their nationals who are entrapped in the areas of conflict. We are signatories to the Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. We have issued strict instructions to our armed forces to adhere faithfully to the letter and spirit of these Conventions. We do not think that there is any reason for any Government to feel unduly concerned about the safety and security of their nationals in this area so far as India is concerned. It is for them to consider whether they should approach the authorities of Bangla Desh, who are in effective control of most of these areas, and ask the forces of West Pakistan not to take any steps which may endanger the lives of their nationals there.

203. In this connexion I should like to inform the members of this Council that India, on more than three occasions, had given categorical assurances to the Secretary-General that India would give facilities for foreign and United Nations personnel to be evacuated from Karachi as well as Dacca. It was not India, but Pakistan, which put obstacles to this operation. However, we are glad that almost all the persons have been safely evacuated from those areas and only a handful remain, at their own wish.

204. May I revert to some other observations made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto seems to be suffering from some imaginary fears. No one has asked Pakistan not to be friendly with other countries. We would ourselves like to be friends with Pakistan. But we will not give up our friendship with other countries if Pakistan demands this as the price for our friendship with it. We welcome the trends towards lessening of tension and normalization of relations between all countries of the world. It is our earnest desire to be able to normalize our own relations with Pakistan in the not too distant future.

205. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan referred to a number of countries, neighbours of India, with which India has the friendliest of relations. He took it upon himself to insinuate that they were in danger of being gobbled up, as he described it, by India. I do not know who gave him the authority to speak on behalf of these friendly neighbours of India. However, it is Mr. Bhutto's privilege to speak as he likes and I should not like to reply to these baseless and deliberate calumnies levelled against my country. Suffice it to say that India harbours no designs on the Territory,



sovereignty or integrity of any of its neighbours. Mr. Bhutto is perhaps irked by the fact that these countries do not see eye to eye with him about the genesis and the solution of the situation in Bangla Desh.

206. Mr. Bhutto gave a long discourse on secession and autonomy. He even went so far as to threaten the creation of Bangla Deshes in Europe, in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. If the majority population of any country is oppressed by a militant minority, as is the case in Bangla Desh and in southern Africa, or in Palestine, it is the inalienable right of the majority population to overthrow the tyranny of the minority rulers and decide its destiny according to the wishes of its own people. The birthright of the majority of the population of a country to revolt against the tyranny and oppression of a militant minority cannot be denied under the principles and purposes of the Charter or according to international law.

207. Mr. Bhutto has painted a picture of India as a big predatory Power which is trying to bulldoze small nations. He has argued that Pakistan which is smaller than India could not possibly have any aggressive designs against its big neighbour. Perhaps Mr. Bhutto is deliberately forgetting that there are instances in history—if I may add, recent history—where military dictatorships of smaller countries have launched aggressive wars against larger countries. I need quote only the example of Hitler's Germany and its aggression on the Western allies and the Soviet Union.

208. I do not wish to elaborate on the brief description I gave yesterday of how the present tragedy started. I should, however, like to re-emphasize that India did not start this war and is prepared to stop it if Pakistan is also prepared to do so and remove the root causes of this conflict so that we will not have to go from cease-fire to cease-fire and from one war to another war. The people of Bangla Desh, who formed a majority of the population of what was Pakistan and who have today declared their independence, have to be a necessary party to any cease-fire or withdrawal of troops. This must be recognized. There cannot be any effective cease-fire or durable peace in the subcontinent without this. Whether Pakistan likes it or not, whether we like it or not, the reality of the sovereign State of Bangla Desh is there for all to see.

209. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan waxed eloquent about the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. Was it India that drove 10 million refugees into another country or was it Pakistan that drove them out of East Bengal at the point of the bayonet? Is this interference or not in India's internal affairs? Who trained the Nagas and the Mizos whose cause Mr. Bhutto chose to champion? Who violated our borders on the land and in the air before the present conflict escalated? Who flouted the will of the 75 million people of Bangla Desh? Certainly not India. It was Pakistan and not India. And yet Mr. Bhutto waxed eloquent and praised the Bandung principles and Pancha Shila. Deeds surely are much more eloquent than words.

210. It was not India that sought to dismember Pakistan. It is the oppressive régime of West Pakistan which has dismembered Pakistan by its own actions. The struggle for

freedom of the 75 million people of Bangla Desh, which has now been crowned with success, speaks for itself. History is replete with examples of people's struggles to form new States free from domination by others. This is what the freedom of Bangla Desh represents. No one can twist the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to deny the rights of the majority of a nation to assert its independence from a minority military dictatorship which denies them fundamental freedoms, human rights and democratic liberties.

211. An attempt has been made by the representative of Pakistan to say today that if Bangla Desh is accepted and recognized, every other country will be threatened with dismemberment. This is a grave misrepresentation of the issues at stake. Of course, there are in every country some people who are discontented or dissatisfied. But what holds a nation together is a spirit of understanding and accommodation, which is a political process, and not tanks or machine guns. What is distinctive and unique about the Bangla Desh situation is that it represents the majority of the people of Pakistan as a whole, and its demands for autonomy expressed through approved constitutional channels were met by a military repression which killed more people than the Viet-Nam war or the Middle East war and resulted in 10 million human beings fleeing to a neighbouring country for refuge.

212. The representative of the United States raised a number of points yesterday and addressed some questions to me. I answered some of them very briefly yesterday. I should like to answer him in greater detail now.

213. The representative of the United States tried to argue that the United States efforts towards a political settlement had been making good progress and seemed to imply that India had impatiently precipitated the conflict and therefore bore the major responsibility for it. This one-sided and partisan attitude of the representative of the United States has shocked and surprised us. The United States is entitled to its own opinions and interpretations. So are we. But facts are facts and must be stated.

214. Right from the beginning of this unfortunate situation that has arisen in the subcontinent, India had been asking for a political settlement acceptable to the elected and acknowledged representatives of the people of Bangla Desh. Last September I had the honour of urging this on the President of the United States, when he was good enough to grant me an audience. More than a month ago, our Prime Minister came to re-emphasize the urgency of this problem. We went so far as to suggest that a gesture by President Yahya Khan to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would automatically defuse the situation and pave the way for a peaceful political settlement. But after all these months of so-called quiet diplomacy by the United States, what has been the result? According to the statements of the United States Government itself, no United States representatives have been allowed to catch even a glimpse of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. All that the United States got from President Yahya Khan was permission to have access to the defence counsel of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. We do not know whether they have so far been able to use this privilege granted to them by President Yahya Khan, and if

so, with what results. Nothing has been told to us. We are entitled to ask this question of the representative of the United States.

215. The second declaration made by the representative of the United States was that the President of Pakistan was prepared to consider—only consider—appointing a nominee who would have a dialogue with a nominee of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, while Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who could have been either the Prime Minister or the President of the whole of Pakistan, remained incommunicado in prison, unaware of what is happening, and while no one would know if the nominee was really his or that of President Yahya Khan. This generous offer of President Yahya Khan speaks for itself and needs no comment. The United States Government may have been satisfied with it, but no one in Bangla Desh was.

216. The third proposal conveyed to us by the United States Government was that President Yahya Khan was willing to appoint a nominee who would talk to an approved Awami League leader in Bangla Desh against whom there was no major charge levelled by Pakistan. I need hardly remind the representative of the United States that such a member of the Awami League hand-picked by President Yahya Khan could hardly be expected to speak on behalf of the 75 million people of Bangla Desh. In fact the President, the Prime Minister and other leaders of the Bangla Desh Government have all been charged with heinous crimes. No wonder this so-called proposal was not taken seriously by anyone.

217. While these were the proposals which the United States Government had been able to extract from President Yahya Khan for a political settlement, the realities were quite different. There was a deliberate attempt by President Yahya Khan to obstruct and defy the will of the people through a number of measures that he undertook, such as banning the Awami League as a political party, declaring 78 out of the 167 elected leaders of the Awami League as disqualified, as having lost their membership, holding farcical by-elections and declaring 58 discredited and previously defeated candidates as having been elected unopposed to these very seats. What is more, he had promised to hand over power to these stooges and quislings and to hold a session of the National Assembly represented by these people by 27 December 1971. This was the "one month more" to which the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was referring so frequently yesterday. He asked with his usual rhetoric, if India could wait patiently for nine months, why it could not wait for one month more.

218. I should like to tell the representatives of both the United States and Pakistan that all these proposals were categorically rejected by the elected leaders of the people of Bangla Desh, who now form the Government of Bangla Desh. A Government formed by stooges and quislings could not exist even for a single day except with the help of the West Pakistan army in Bangla Desh. In fact the people's wrath was roused to such an extent that some of those quislings and stooges had to be given protection by the Pakistani police and armed forces in their very homes. They cannot even move about.

219. It was not India that did not wait but Pakistan which thought it necessary to start military aggression against India on 3 December in order to cover up its failure in the East and to internationalize the conflict. Far from being able to persuade President Yahya Khan to agree to a political settlement or to the withdrawal of West Pakistani forces from East Bengal, we are now being accused by the United States of intransigence. It is indeed strange logic to put the blame on India for the intransigence of President Yahya Khan or for the United States failure to persuade him to come to the path of peace and reason.

220. The representative of the United States wanted to ask me a few more questions about India's intentions. I should like to ask the representative of the United States whether he has asked Pakistan what its intentions are, and what were its intentions in declaring a war, as President Yahya Khan did on 4 December, and in committing aggression against our land and air frontiers. I shall refrain from asking the representative of the United States some questions about the intentions of the United States in other parts of the world, thousands of miles away from America, where United States troops have been engaged for years in bloody conflict which has not been brought to the Security Council, where appeals have been rejected and where withdrawal of foreign forces has been resisted. I shall refrain from asking those questions, because this is not the occasion to do so. I shall, however, not hesitate to answer the three questions that he asked me.

221. Let me reiterate what I stated yesterday. First, we have no intention whatsoever of acquiring any part of West Pakistan or of Bangla Desh by conquest or otherwise. Our recognition of the People's Republic of Bangla Desh makes it quite clear that we have no territorial designs on Bangla Desh. Secondly, if Pakistan removes the threat to our security, we shall be glad to consider any reasonable proposals for a cease-fire and mutual withdrawals in the wake of a political settlement in the East acceptable to the elected representatives of Bangla Desh.

222. As for Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, I would suggest to the representative of the United States that he put a question to Pakistan concerning its intentions, because it appears to be concentrating only on that part of Jammu and Kashmir which is on our side of the cease-fire line. Pakistan has used force against our territory of Kashmir on two occasions in the past, in 1947 and 1965, and is at this very time concentrating practically all its infantry, artillery, armour and air force in a massive attack across the cease-fire line in order to extend its occupation and aggression in Kashmir. We shall certainly use force to repel Pakistan's renewed aggression, whether it is in Kashmir or anywhere else in India. Let there be no mistake about it. It is Pakistan that has violated, and is violating, the cease-fire line, as is proved by the fact that we had to lodge about 1,000 complaints of violations of the cease-fire line by Pakistani forces with the military observers of the United Nations between the end of March and the end of November this year. The violation of the cease-fire line by Pakistan on 3 December, by the mounting of a massive attack on the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir, which is on our side of the cease-fire line, was confirmed by the report by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in document S/10412.



223. We are shocked and surprised that, instead of tackling the basic cause of this grim tragedy and its consequences, the United States Government should think fit to apportion blame without ascertaining the correct facts and to lay the major responsibility for this situation on India and not on Pakistan, on which the entire responsibility for the situation rests.

224. We hope that, even at this late stage, a great country like the United States will not try to score debating points and thereby further complicate the already complicated situation and make it even more difficult to defuse the situation and thus de-escalate the conflict.

225. I now turn to the draft resolution in document S/10446, which is before the Council. The one-sided approach in the statement of the representative of the United States to which I have referred is amply reflected in this draft. While the sixth preambular paragraph pays lip service to the desirability of finding a political solution, there is nothing in the operative paragraphs to implement this pious wish. No resolution which does not recognize the existence and the rights and obligations of the people of Bangla Desh in any cease-fire agreement can be effective or of any practical value.

226. The draft resolution is also defective in that it applies principles of the Charter selectively, instead of applying them consistently. For example, it totally ignores those principles of the Charter, as well as other instruments, which prohibit the massive violations of human rights. The world has not so far seen such a massive violation of human rights since the Charter was promulgated as in Bangla Desh during the past nine months. This has been recognized by the world. Even the other instruments suggested in the draft resolution are selectively applied. For example, the eighth preambular paragraph recalls the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security adopted unanimously last year [General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)]. I should like to point out that paragraph 22 of that Declaration makes it clear that the massive violation of human rights is a direct threat to the security of nations. And yet, this principle accepted by us all last year and so relevant to the Bangla Desh situation finds no place in the draft resolution.

227. It has been suggested that the vote in the General Assembly is a vote against the Indian position on this question. We do not regard it as such; the resolution in the General Assembly acknowledged that the root cause of the trouble lay inside East Pakistan, even though no effective formula to solve the basic problem was suggested. It therefore becomes the duty of the Security Council to ensure that this is incorporated in the operative part of any resolution that the Security Council might adopt. Furthermore, a vast majority of the delegations which supported the resolution did not take a position on Bangla Desh, as Mr. Bhutto has asserted.

228. A cease-fire and withdrawal in any resolution of the General Assembly dealing with the situation of the armed conflict is natural and understandable, and we respect these sentiments. We have ourselves advocated such measures in other appropriate situations. We are not opposed either to a

cease-fire or to a withdrawal. However, there can be no viable cease-fire or durable peace without going into the reasons, the origin and the development of the situation which has resulted in an armed conflict. No two situations are exactly similar. Nor can a simple formula be applied to all situations some of which are more complex than others. I have already stated that India has no desire or intention to continue this armed conflict a day longer than necessary in the right of our self-defence. Any assessment, any resolution, any recommendation on the present situation must, therefore, take into account all the basic factors which have led to the present situation. I would, therefore, earnestly urge this august Council to consider the following important suggestions for dealing with the situation effectively: first, the right of the people of Bangla Desh to be heard in any discussion of the problem; secondly, the right of the people of Bangla Desh to be made a party to any cease-fire arrangements that may be proposed; thirdly, a political solution of the situation in Bangla Desh in accordance with the wishes of the people of Bangla Desh as already declared by their representatives elected in the December 1970 elections.

229. If the above three essential ingredients are accepted as an integrated whole then we are confident that a cease-fire can be brought about without any further delay and withdrawals of the armed forces of Pakistan from Bangla Desh as well as the armed forces of India from there and mutual withdrawals of both India and Pakistan from each other's territory arranged through appropriate consultations.

230. In order to achieve the above objectives it is necessary to recognize the fact that Golden Bengal, as graphically described by the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan, belongs neither to Pakistan nor to India. Golden Bengal belongs to the people of Bangla Desh and to nobody else.

231. The PRESIDENT: Since no other representative wishes to speak at this stage, I shall put to the vote the United States draft resolution as revised, contained in document S/10446/Rev.1.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:* Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America.

*Against:* Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Abstentions:* France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*The result of the vote was 11 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions.*

*The draft resolution was not adopted, one of the negative votes being that of a permanent member of the Council.*

232. The PRESIDENT: I now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

233. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): I will try to be brief. I do want to reply to the comments by the Ambassador of the Soviet Union that the United States Government slandered him in a statement issued yesterday. There is no slander in that statement. I think the only mention of the representative from the Soviet Union in it was a recitation of the fact that the resolution had previously been vetoed. I do not believe that this should be interpreted as a slander. In fact, I am not even clear that it said that. So, I would reject the contention that the United States Government has slandered our distinguished colleague.

234. I should like to reply very briefly to the Foreign Minister of India. He asked a question of me about whether we had—appropriately, I might add—inquired of Pakistan as to whether they sought territory and, Mr. Minister, our answer is that we felt when they replied affirmatively to the resolution of the General Assembly, when indeed they did accept that resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal, that they had positively replied. I could indeed endeavour to see bilaterally if such an inquiry has been made and I would be happy to do it and I would be happy to furnish the Foreign Minister with the results of our findings. But, let me say here and now that what the United States endeavoured to do bilaterally, we did, not to seek advantage of one party over another but simply because we thought we might be helpful in bringing about a peace. We did it in the hope, the frail hope it seemed certainly at times, that we could be useful in ending before it began the kind of war that now engulfs the subcontinent. The American people look at this war miles away with horror at the suffering and I think it was this that guided and moved our Government to take the steps that it tried to.

235. As for the blame: it is true that we made certain allegations and I think it is most appropriate that the Foreign Minister bring this up. But I think it is only fair that the statement be read very carefully and you will see that where we felt Pakistan was in error, admissions of error that Minister Bhutto very frankly faced up to in this Council, we levelled the blame in those areas. We laid that at the door of Pakistan. So, it was not a unilateral attempt to lay blame. What our business here in the United Nations has been is to try to end the war; if our statements seem harsh it is because Pakistan was being—it appeared to us and I think to an overwhelming number of the members of the Council—dismantled. It is East Pakistan that is subject to a massive invasion and so I would simply and very respectfully request of the Minister, in reply to this question, that the statement be reviewed in its full context.

236. As to the three questions that the United States Government did ask: I am not sure that we have yet received an answer to the question about destroying the Pakistan army in the West. I am not sure that the Minister's answer—and I will read the text very carefully tomorrow—addressed itself to that question: does India intend to use the present situation to destroy the Pakistan army in the West? I will review the record carefully to see if that question was indeed answered.

237. The second question: does India intend to use as a pretext the counter-attacks in the West to annex territory

in West Pakistan? I feel that question was very positively answered here by the Foreign Minister, if I understood the answer correctly.

238. As to the third question: is it India's aim to take parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir?—regretfully I did not get a clear answer to that question—not that the Foreign Minister owes us an answer. But again I will read the record carefully to see if there was a total rejection to any claim to any territory in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. I did want to clarify this because I do feel the Foreign Minister endeavoured to answer our inquiry. I simply must say at this preliminary listening that I should like to have further information on questions one and three.

239. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10446/Rev.1 because it reflected almost in its entirety the text of a draft resolution which my delegation co-sponsored both in this Council and in the General Assembly. The present draft resolution in the view of my delegation, as in the case of the other two which I have mentioned, did not apportion blame to either of the parties involved in the conflict. It did not prejudge the issues involved in the situation. It is in accord with the principles of international law and the principles and purposes of the Charter. Finally, it has a positive and concerned approach to the question since it recognizes the overriding need for a political solution, not only to the situation between the Pakistan Government and East Pakistan but also between Pakistan and India.

240. When this regrettable conflict came formally to the attention of this Council the majority view of members was that hostilities should be brought to an immediate halt and that the armed forces of both sides should be withdrawn to their own national territories. My delegation was concerned not only with adopting a course of action consonant with the Charter of the United Nations but to prevent East Pakistan and other areas from becoming a battlefield where only the civilian population—and they number more than 55 million in East Pakistan alone—would suffer. We tried to prevent, or halt, a situation involving the mortal combat between two powerful armies using all modern conventional armaments. There is an African saying which says that when two elephants fight only the grass suffers. The civilian population in the areas of conflict—and these areas are not only confined to East Pakistan—has become, figuratively speaking, "the grass".

241. Our duty to the parties to the dispute must be to bring to a halt this tragedy, this suffering, this destruction and to establish without delay the modalities for effecting a reconciliation.

242. Mr. VAN USSEL (Belgium) (*interpretation from French*): Once again my delegation has supported a draft resolution the objective of which is to put an end without any delay to hostilities and fighting in the Indian subcontinent and which calls for the withdrawal of armed forces. In the course of our earlier meetings, I have had occasion to convey to you the great concern of Belgium over the tragic events dividing two countries at the present time which, because of their geographical position, their spiritual

affinities and especially their desire to contribute to international peace and security and the improvement of the living conditions of hundreds of millions of men and women, should now share trials and tribulations rather than fight and destroy each other.

243. Once again I should like to bear witness to the firm determination of my country not to miss any opportunity to make a contribution to all attempts made by the United Nations to restore peace in the Indian subcontinent. We will not conceal the fact, however, that we had entertained certain doubts about the effectiveness of the draft resolution which has just been rejected. My delegation would have preferred to have had the Council presented with perhaps a less ambitious but more realistic text, one which, at the present time, would have been confined to requiring that there be an immediate cessation of hostilities, a text asking the combatants scrupulously to respect all the Geneva Conventions and, finally, deciding that the Council should continue its deliberations and consideration of the question of the withdrawal of forces in the light of the action taken by the Government of Pakistan to normalize the situation in its eastern province.

244. I should like to make it perfectly clear in this connexion that my delegation has absolutely no intention of dissociating the military and humanitarian aspects on the one hand from political imperatives on the other in this matter which is before the Council. That is why I suggested that, while requiring that the hostilities be ended immediately, we should remain in session to study realistically and constructively the ways and means of restoring political peace in East Pakistan, and in so doing to reconcile all the combating parties. Perhaps we should have had a private meeting to consider the second part of my suggestion.

245. Thus far we have on a number of occasions discussed the problems dividing Pakistan and India, but, unfortunately, the Council has been unable to reach an agreement. Time is of the essence, however. Day by day, hour by hour, men fall as innocent victims in a land which should be a land of peace, not one of war, a land which should be a united land and not a divided land. We must not, however, allow ourselves to lose heart, for we owe it to the international community to pursue our work in the search for a solution.

246. We still recall various conflicts in other areas of the world which, while not having the same features, while perhaps not even being analogous to the serious crisis at present before us, can to some extent be compared, especially in terms of their causes and roots. In one of these situations a concerted international initiative was successful in preparing and implementing a lasting settlement in accordance with the desires of the people concerned.

247. Yesterday evening we heard a statement by the Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He referred to Pancha Shila. For three and a half years I was ambassador in Jakarta and so I am very familiar with the five principles of Pancha Shila. One of those principles, the second and the most important, the one which has been the force and the greatness of Indonesia, is the principle of fraternity. I hope that this lesson of Pancha Shila will be

heeded and that we shall soon see reconciled two fraternal countries who are friends.

248. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation has just voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10446/Rev.1. However; it deems it necessary to state that this resolution has failed to draw a line of distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. It has failed to condemn the Indian Government which is carrying out barefaced aggression and has failed to voice support for Pakistan which is a victim of the aggression. Therefore this resolution is highly unsatisfactory.

249. Secondly, the sixth preambular paragraph of this resolution mentions:

"the need to deal appropriately at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities".

The seventh preambular paragraph expresses the conviction:

"that an early political solution would be necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees to their homes".

250. In view of the fact that India and a certain big Power have absolutely insisted on interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan, the Chinese delegation declares that at no time and under no conditions should the above clauses in any way be distorted as a pretext for any interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan.

251. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): The reasons for my delegation's abstention on the draft resolution in S/10446/Rev.1 are essentially the same as those that underlay our attitude to the two previous draft resolutions in this Council and to the General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971. We sympathize with the feeling of urgency expressed by the representative of the United States. We appreciated his readiness nevertheless to allow the Council time to reflect on the draft resolution which he tabled yesterday. That time has not been wasted and many efforts are currently being made involving many delegations, as well as my own, to find the basis for agreement that has so far eluded us.

252. But the draft resolution in S/10446/Rev.1 does not represent agreement. As long as that agreement remains a reasonable possibility, and until it has been reached, my delegation does not believe that there is any practical advantage, and it does not bring a cease-fire any nearer to achievement, to support resolutions that it is clear from the outset have no chance of success. We shall rather continue and intensify our efforts to find a formula that will be acceptable to all concerned, since this alone can bring about the practical end we desire in the cessation of fighting and suffering.

253. Mr. DE LA GORCE (France) (*interpretation from French*): In politics as in physics the same causes produce

the same effects, and we have once again seen this fact proved. My delegation has just now abstained for the same reasons as it abstained in the Council's vote on a draft resolution, which was almost identical to the one that the American delegation presented this time, as indeed we did in the vote in the General Assembly on a draft resolution that was also almost identical. On each occasion we explained our position. What we wish is to see the Security Council take a position conducive to a settlement, conducive to serving the cause of peace, a position therefore which takes into account all aspects of the problem as it appears today. Therefore this position must be acceptable to the Council itself, taking a stand in accordance with the conditions of the Charter. It must also be acceptable to the parties. The vote held a few minutes ago has shown that the contents of the draft just rejected did not meet those conditions. We do not see this vote as either a justification or a reason to abandon all action. On the contrary, this vote must pave the way to further unanimous and positive action.

254. We are convinced that other initiatives are necessary and that they are possible. They are necessary if we wish to stop the fighting, effect disengagement and ensure justice, that is to say, the political settlement mentioned by all here. This is possible since a growing number of delegations agree on the need to reach together the objectives which I have just mentioned.

255. That hope exists if we take into account not one single principle, as we were asked to do, but all the principles which are at issue and all the facts, even though it may appear awkward to ensure respect for them simultaneously. We must make that hope a reality, and that is why we have met here.

256. Mr. NAKAGAWA (Japan): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10446/Rev.1 because it is essentially the same as the draft resolution that we co-sponsored both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

257. My delegation asked the United States delegation to revise the original text of the draft, because in the view of my delegation what was needed at this juncture was not to put blame on one party or the other to the conflict, but to induce the parties concerned to agree to a comprehensive political settlement of the problem. My delegation is grateful to the United States delegation for kindly accepting our request.

258. We think that the Security Council should not stop its work in the search for a formula that would be acceptable to the parties concerned to solve this very difficult problem. My delegation is ready to contribute its share in that direction.

259. Mr. TOMEH (Syrian Arab Republic): I wish to explain at this stage what our preoccupations were before the vote was taken, since I was not able to do so at that time because of the ruling of the President.

260. I should like to explain why my delegation voted in the way it did, in the hope that there will be no

misinterpretation of our action. We are very deeply touched and profoundly saddened by the fratricidal war which is exacting an untold number of lives and suffering on the part of both parties, both indeed brothers to us. We were no less profoundly saddened to watch the deterioration of the previous situation, in which a fratricidal conflict also pitted brothers against each other and inflicted an enormous and unnecessary loss of life and resources.

261. We did our best to mediate and to ameliorate the situation. Since we felt seriously handicapped, our sorrow was increased. How then were we going to vote for the draft which, as was clear, satisfied one brother but did not satisfy the other brother? We voted in favour of it because we understood the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the preamble to emphasize very strongly the need for a rapid political solution, without which no settlement can be achieved, a settlement which would be conducive to the normalization of relations and to the return of the refugees. Likewise, we understood paragraph 2 to be an emphatic insistence on creating conditions for the return of the refugees, not to the midst of hostilities, but to a peaceful climate where they could fully enjoy their human and political rights, without any infringement of those rights.

262. The imperfection of the draft resolution lay in its failure to detail the measures to create those favourable conditions for the political solution which we urged. But our anxiety for the bloodshed to stop forthwith on all fronts and our confidence that Pakistan was indeed now serious about repairing the tragic mistakes, as the Deputy Prime Minister assured us last night, made us set the higher consideration of peace above even the highest consideration of perfection.

263. We most emphatically recognize the intolerable burden which India has had to bear because of the flight of the refugees. We experienced a flight of refugees in our own land, although on a minor scale: *toutes proportions gardées*, as the French say. The resulting wounds have so far not been healed. But we hope that there is now a definitive opportunity to eliminate this burden from the shoulders of India. We still see an opportunity to harmonize East and West, normalizing the relations between the two big brother States of the subcontinent.

264. Last but not least, our interpretation of the draft resolution is that it is a whole—cease-fire is accompanied by withdrawal; withdrawal is simultaneous with effective political remedies for the political turmoil in East Pakistan and with better conditions immediately conducive to the pacific and voluntary return of the refugees. This was a political as well as a humanitarian solution. The draft, in our view, did not admit of division. It was with this understanding that we voted for it, and we hope that no party will misunderstand our genuine motives of principle.

265. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution S/10446/Rev.1. We did so for the same reasons that we co-sponsored and supported a similar draft resolution which was adopted by an overwhelming majority at the meeting of the General Assembly on 7 December [resolution 2793 (XXVI)].

266. The purpose of the draft was to restore peace in the area on the basis of three preliminary points: first, the cease-fire; secondly, the withdrawal of troops to both sides of the border, which is an indispensable complement of the first point; and thirdly, the creation of conditions necessary for the return of the refugees to their homes.

267. Argentina is dismayed to witness the tragedy which is pitting two nations against each other, nations with which we have close and friendly relations. For this reason, we shall support every effort to restore peace and to have proclaimed a spirit of co-operation between these two countries instead of hostility.

268. As we have done in recent days, we shall continue to give our support to any draft resolution that will resolve the dilemma before the Security Council and reconcile the differences between these two nations which are our friends.

269. The PRESIDENT: The Deputy Foreign Minister of Pakistan did not participate in the vote and has no right of explanation of vote. He did, however, indicate that he would like to have the right of reply, and I am quite certain the members of the Security Council will not deny him that right. I now therefore call upon him to exercise the right of reply.

270. Mr. BHUTTO (Pakistan): I made the request to exercise the right of reply after the voting because of the urgency of the dispute before the Security Council. Now that the Council has taken its decision on the draft resolution sponsored by the United States of America, I deem it appropriate to exercise the right of reply, but again taking into account the urgency of the matter, as it affects us most directly. We are the ones most concerned, as our people are shedding their blood, fighting heroically. As I said earlier, there is street fighting going on, from house to house. Therefore, on account of the urgency of the matter, I shall confine myself to the main points raised yesterday by the Foreign Minister of India, and also briefly touch upon some of the main points he raised today in his right of reply.

271. I said last night that there were many points in the Indian Foreign Minister's statement which needed detailed rebuttal. When I consulted the text this morning I found that it was mostly a restatement of the characteristically self-righteous position which India has adopted during this crisis and also in the past. However, one thing was quite obvious. After committing a brazen aggression against Pakistan, after assaulting our territorial integrity and political independence, after defying the United Nations openly and blatantly, after ignoring the fervent appeal of 104 Member States, India is attempting to assume a posture of reasonableness. The gist of the Indian Foreign Minister's statement was this: a situation arose in Pakistan which was not of our creation. We were inundated with refugees. We sought nothing more than that these refugees be repatriated. Pakistan refused to allow this repatriation. We had therefore no choice but to invade Pakistan.

272. Shorn of all verbiage, stripped of its sanctimoniousness, the whole Indian argument amounts to saying that

India had the right to invade Pakistan in order to bring about a settlement of refugees. I leave it to any fair-minded person to judge how hollow the pretence is. Even if the principle be disregarded that nothing can justify invasion, the reality remains that the armed attack has multiplied rather than eased the poignant humanitarian problem of East Pakistan; that it has resulted in vastly greater destruction and devastation than had been brought about during the civil strife; that it has done a damage to the infrastructure of East Pakistan that will take decades to repair; and that a calamity has been turned into a catastrophe. Forget the legal rights and wrongs of the conflict for a moment; consider only the human problems in their concreteness, and you cannot but be appalled. Nobody can be more grieved at the desolation caused in East Pakistan by Indian aggression than the people of West Pakistan. I must stress that the problem cannot be rightly appraised if the picture is not correctly visualized or if it is put in a wrong focus. The picture that India presents is that of an invading army coming to the rescue of those who are fighting for their freedom. This picture has no resemblance to reality. Let me mention some basic facts. Among the Pakistani soldiers today who are fighting with their backs to the wall in East Pakistan there are a considerable number of East Pakistanis. A good part of the personnel of the East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles are fighting side by side with their comrades from West Pakistan for the unity of their country. A hundred thousand volunteers representing the flower of East Pakistan youth are laying down their lives at this very moment for the honour and freedom and integrity of Pakistan, from which the honour and freedom and integrity of Bangla Desh are totally inseparable.

273. Much has been said about the Mukti Bahini as if it were an army of freedom fighters. India itself admits that it is an army raised in India, trained in India, armed by India, directed by India, and that through all these nine months it operated from bases in India. What else is it therefore except an irregular Indian army? People will say that there is no use in dubbing them as Indian agents and dismissing them at that. But I do not call them Indian agents. I consider them nothing more than Indian auxiliaries, and no one who bears in mind their origin and organization and command can consider them as anything else. It is true that some among them have been recruited from those persons who were uprooted from East Pakistan. Whatever their proportion might be, whether it is high or low, it cannot change the character of this army; because a fighting group armed and equipped and trained, financed and directed by India is nothing but an Indian force. There is ample evidence that many among the refugees joined that force because they had no choice; you either starve or you join the Mukti Bahini. What wonder that many joined.

274. So the first important requirement for an objective assessment of the situation is to dismiss the myth that has been artfully propagated by India, the myth that India has been moved by sympathy and solicitude for the welfare of Muslim Bengal or East Pakistan. If India had so much feeling for the Bengalis, what explains its indiscriminate raids on purely civilian targets? Even an orphanage situated in a residential area of Dacca, with 300 innocent children inside, was not spared. What explains a blockade which

prevents even the supplies of food and medicine from reaching the people of East Pakistan? What explains India's approval of the slaughter of thousands of innocent people, men, women and children, and even newborn babies, which was rampant in East Pakistan from 2 March to 25 March 1971? And finally, what explains India's direct encouragement of terror and sabotage and destruction in an area where the margin of survival is lower perhaps than anywhere else in the world?

275. In my statement yesterday and on previous occasions the Pakistan delegation has dwelt extensively on the legal issues involved in the conflict with which the Security Council is confronted. Those real issues are of paramount importance because they directly involve the fundamental principles of the territorial integrity of States, non-intervention in domestic affairs of other States, and the non-use of force in international relations, which constitute the very basis of a peaceful world order. If you compromise them, if you qualify them, if you impose conditions on their validity, you usher in total anarchy in the world. But today I would rather stress the human peculiarity of the Indo-Pakistan situation.

276. A colossal human wrong is being perpetrated in East Pakistan today by Indian invasion, and it cries to be righted. It can be righted by the collective will of the world community. If that fails, then other forces or a combination of forces will inevitably set in.

277. The first process would be corrective and of immediate effect. The second would take longer and would inevitably involve larger conflicts entailing much hardship for all the peoples of the subcontinent. What course the events will take will depend in great part on the wisdom and the courage of the Security Council today.

278. It has been said during this debate that the problem is to be viewed in context and that its root cause should not be forgotten. Let me make it clear that such an approach, if sincere and genuine, is entirely consistent with Pakistan's point of view. In fact, it is the approach which Pakistan urges; in fact, it is the approach that my party, which is the single largest party of West Pakistan, has been advocating since 27 March. We have made many statements on these matters and on the mistakes that have been committed; and from 27 March right up to the present we have been talking about them. On 29 September I issued a policy statement of my party spelling out these problems and also suggesting how they could be resolved. So I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that these matters are urgent and that they require to be tackled realistically.

279. If India and Pakistan had been two friendly States, two neighbours with a co-operative relationship, is it imaginable that an internal conflict in Pakistan would have assumed such dimensions? After all, the discontent of the people of East Pakistan was not a new problem which arose suddenly. It has been there and though I acknowledge that it was not approached with the courage and resolution which were required and which only a democratic Government in Pakistan could have surmounted, it had received considerable attention, and many adjustments and readjustments were made or contemplated for its solution.

280. The immediate issue before and after the elections was of a constitutional nature. No heads need be broken over constitutional issues. The crisis may have been severe for Pakistan, but there is not the slightest ground to suppose that the people of Pakistan were incapable of the dynamic adjustments that were necessary.

281. It was Indian intervention and Indian manipulation that so aggravated the crisis as to cause a most tragic strife. Therefore, when you talk of the root cause of the problem, you have to consider India's persistent hostility against Pakistan. When you talk of the context, you have to bear in mind the multitude of aggressions that have been committed by India.

282. In October 1947, just two months after the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent States, India invaded Kashmir which, as a Muslim majority state, should have acceded to Pakistan. In early November 1947, India marched into Junagar, an area whose future would have been settled amicably. In September 1948 India sent its armies into Hyderabad, again an area whose problem would have been solved peacefully and not by invasion. In October 1962 India launched a forward policy of incursions across the Chinese frontier. It was Chinese magnanimity that halted the conflict, but India persisted in rejecting negotiations towards concluding a boundary agreement with China. In September 1965 India invaded Pakistan, an act which it repeated six years later.

283. Even in the very early years of India's independence a most distinguished and far-sighted British statesman, the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, said about India that "this young State has pronounced war-like proclivities". His apprehension has been proved entirely justified. What other State in the contemporary world has committed as many as six major invasions during the last 24 years?

284. I have not mentioned India's invasion of Goa because India often pretends that it has placed all African States under some kind of obligation by expelling Portugal by force from that tiny enclave. Be that as it may, the fact remains that after ousting Portugal, India has not treated the inhabitants of Goa with justice, but has sought to obliterate their identity.

285. Much more infamous is India's campaign in Nagaland, which was begun in the middle of the 1950s and whose aim is the subjugation of a people which are culturally and racially distinct from India and whose homeland was never juridically a part of India.

286. So this is the context of the problem: India's record of one aggression after another, its fatal tendency to have recourse to arms and its aims of establishing a hegemony over South Asia. Had it not been for this, no internal problem of Pakistan, however acute, could possibly have led to a violent explosion.

287. India alleges that Pakistan has been planning a war in order to draw attention from its democratic crisis. If this were true, why would Pakistan have initiated or accepted every proposal by which hostilities would have been averted?



288. Let me mention briefly the moves that were made or supported by Pakistan during the last five months. First, Pakistan sought the good offices of the Security Council in August. What was wrong with that proposal? But India blocked the move. Secondly, Pakistan accepted the proposal for a pull-back of Indian and Pakistani armed forces from the borders to peace-time stations. India rejected it. Who was seeking peace, and who was plotting a war? Thirdly, Pakistan proposed that the two sides withdraw their armed forces at least to agreed safe distances, to meet India's contention that its lines of communication were longer. This was the proposal made by Pakistan in October. Could it be the proposal of a Government that was planning a war? India's Prime Minister dismissed it summarily. Did she intend to prevent a war by doing that? Fourthly, when the Secretary-General offered his good offices in October, Pakistan promptly welcomed the offer. How did India respond? The Indian Prime Minister gave a lecture to the Secretary-General. The message was: if you, Mr. Secretary-General, are prepared to exceed your competence, see the problem as we view it and execute our designs, you are welcome; otherwise, not. Fifthly, Pakistan also asked for United Nations observers to be stationed on both sides of the border to prevent any encroachment from either side. Does a Government planning a war ask for observers? And does a Government which seeks to prevent a war reject such a proposal? But India spurned that suggestion also. Sixthly, on 29 November, eight days after India's massive invasion of East Pakistan, Pakistan went so far as to signify its willingness to accept United Nations observers on its own side of the East Pakistan borders. Did we want the observers to witness our preparations for war?

289. All these moves for peace made by Pakistan are apparent from the Secretary-General's reports of 3 and 4 December [S/10410 and Add.1]. Let any representative seated around this table disregard any partisan sympathies and considerations of expediency and come to an impartial judgement on this question. Does not this whole sequence bear out the premeditated nature of India's aggression?

290. I know that members of the Security Council are not always free to state their positions candidly, but I shall be content if they make an impartial judgement about the origin and causes of this war. Let them face the issue in the privacy of their own minds. If they do, they cannot but realize what the imperatives of the situation are.

291. These imperatives are, first, a cease-fire; secondly, withdrawal from Pakistani territory of Indian forces and other armed personnel which entered Pakistan from India; thirdly, the stationing of United Nations observers to supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal; fourthly, the devising of means to ensure that the Geneva Conventions on armed conflict are scrupulously adhered to and that no reprisals take place in East Pakistan. The withdrawal of forces is, of course, a reciprocal obligation; therefore, Pakistani forces also have to withdraw from Indian territory simultaneously.

292. Let me make it clear that if these imperatives are fulfilled, Pakistan will heed the appeal of its friends for a cessation of all military activity in East Pakistan, provided that no sabotage, massacre or large-scale violence continues.

293. As regards the political settlement, it need hardly be said that Pakistan will spare no effort in achieving a solution of its internal problem consistent with the will of the people and its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The *sine qua non* of the success of the efforts towards a political solution is that they should be free from any outside pressure and foreign participation. It is also an inescapable essential that the negotiations must be without preconditions from either side. Given such an atmosphere, there is not the slightest warrant to suppose that a political solution will not emerge which will end the nightmare of the last nine months and induce the speedy repatriation of the people who have been uprooted from East Pakistan.

294. This is Pakistan's attitude even in this hour of destructive conflict. If the Security Council responds to it positively, the conflict will be ended. In doing so, the Council will uphold the principles of the United Nations. It will show that it is not swayed by power politics but moved by compassion and courage. It will demonstrate that it has the resources to bring about a reconciliation. If it bears in mind the principles involved, the Security Council can feel assured of Pakistan's co-operation. I have come here to seek peace, a peace with honour and justice. I do not want to go back a disappointed man. Should my mission fail, it will be the defeat of not only our hopes but those of the entire people of Pakistan, both in the East and in the West. The disruptive impact of such disappointment on the fabric of peace can hardly be exaggerated.

295. So I reiterate Pakistan's earnest desire to seek a peaceful solution, a peaceful settlement of the internal problems of Pakistan. Within the concept of one united Pakistan, we are prepared to spare no measures to find a peaceful solution of the problems that have aggravated the present tension. This is our hope and we believe that given the determination, vision and confidence, the democratic, elected elements of Pakistan who have the support of the people of Pakistan can come to a correct and just solution in the interests of the whole nation of Pakistan.

296. I repeat, this has been our point of view right from the day the crisis arose. From 25 March we have been pressing for this, that there must be a political solution. Again and again we have been impressing on the present military régime that there must be a political solution to the problems of Pakistan. I repeat, on 29 September we issued a policy statement on this matter. Today I represent my nation. I have come in this hour of trial. I have been summoned at the last moment to be at the call of Pakistan. I have responded to this because my nation needs my services, and that is why, at the eleventh hour, I have been summoned by my country to come and represent it in its gravest crisis.

297. We want a political settlement. The Foreign Minister of India talks about a political solution but has applied a military solution to the problem. He wants the repatriation of refugees but he has brought those refugees on Indian tanks and poised on Indian bayonets back into East Pakistan. It is India that is seeking a military solution to the problem. Pakistan wants a political solution and Pakistan will have a political solution once Indian intervention is removed from the soil of Pakistan.

298. Mr. VINCI (Italy): The delegations of Japan and Italy have decided to introduce a new draft resolution in a new attempt to break the deadlock which we were afraid we would face again. Before presenting our text I would start with a foreword. My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/10446/Rev.1 mainly because it embodied all the provisions contained in the eight-Power draft resolution [S/10423] of which Italy was a sponsor in the Security Council and resolution 2793 (XXVI) adopted by the General Assembly by 104 votes in favour, a resolution of which we were equally a sponsor with more than 30 other Member States. We could not fail to stand by a General Assembly resolution which supported positions of principle which are of vital importance for any country in the world, big or small.

299. As I stated in the General Assembly, in acting as we did throughout all this tragic crisis involving the lives of millions of men, women and children, we were not taking sides. We were siding with the United Nations. I added on another occasion that this resolution had great moral value since it showed that most Member States, when confronted with a choice between their friends or allies and the principles of the Charter, choose the Charter. This is a very encouraging factor, in our view, and we believe that this moral message should not be forgotten or weakened. On the contrary, it should be kept intact and alive. The moral message should be spread throughout the world.

300. Now, when the same text was introduced, with some additions, in the Security Council, in the light of some developments we were not so sure that this was the best course to follow. However, since the representative of the United States had improved the text by accepting the suggestion of the representative of Japan, we decided to vote in favour of it. Nevertheless, since we foresaw the outcome of the vote we, with our Japanese friends, prepared the draft resolution which is being circulated right now [S/10451].

301. We do not pretend that this draft resolution will receive at once the consent of all members of the Council and of the main parties concerned. It was drafted rather hurriedly and will show some imperfections.

302. Since last summer my delegation has tried very hard to prevent the tragedy which has involved two friendly countries and which has brought untold suffering, misery and destruction on millions of innocent people. We were and are moved by the conviction that war should be not only limited but eliminated forever. In the present world the Clausewitz doctrine must be repudiated once and for all. It is no longer possible or admissible to achieve political ends by force wherever and for whichever reason force is used. It is against the conscience of mankind; it is against the aspirations, hopes and expectations of all peoples, especially of the developing countries, as it was so forcefully stated in this chamber and in the General Assembly by so many representatives.

303. We were very impressed indeed yesterday and today by the statements of the Foreign Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan. We were especially moved by the concern they have both shown for the

well-being of their people, by their reiterated will to reconcile their differences, to leave the path of war and to turn to peaceful means in order to restore peace in the area and to pave the way towards a peaceful solution of their dispute. Finally, we detected in their statements less intransigence, a desire for reconciliation.

304. The delegations of Japan and Italy were moved, for all these reasons, to draft a text which has also tried to take into full account these encouraging developments and attempts to be as realistic as possible, as advocated by India and some members of the Council. Our main objective is to set up machinery which would strengthen these encouraging new trends that we have detected, and to assist the parties in turning their backs to war and finding a way to reconciliation and a political settlement based on justice and on respect for the rights and interests of all the peoples involved.

305. This draft has been circulated, but I will, with your permission, read out the text, which will require very few comments after what I have said. At the same time I will draw the attention of the Council to the fact that it will be followed by the circulation of a modified text, since, following consultations, we have already introduced some changes. The modified text reads as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and 4 December 1971 and Security Council resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,*

*"Mindful of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and of the Security Council's responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Charter,*

*"Noting General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971,*

*"Noting with appreciation the reply of the Government of Pakistan to the letter of the Secretary-General concerning General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) contained in document S/10440,*

*"Noting further the reply of the Government of India, contained in document S/10445,*

*"Gravely concerned that hostilities continue between India and Pakistan which constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,*

*"Recognizing the need to deal also, within the framework of the Charter, with the issues which have given rise to these hostilities,*

*"Recognizing that a lasting solution must be based on a political settlement in Pakistan which respects the rights and interests of its people,*

*"Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5 and 6,*

*"Recognizing further the need to take immediate measures to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all armed forces,*



"1. *Calls upon* all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent or to endanger international peace;

"2. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to take forthwith, as a first step, all measures to bring about an immediate cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities;

"3. *Urges* India and Pakistan both to carry on operations of disengagement and withdrawal so as to bring about the end of confrontation and the return to normalcy in the area of conflict;

"4. *Calls for* immediate steps aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement;

"5. *Calls for* the full co-operation of all States with the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and relieving the distress of the East Pakistan refugees;

"6. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to take all possible measures and precautions to safeguard the lives and well-being of the civilian population in the area and to ensure the full observation of all the Geneva Conventions;

"7. *Decides* to appoint, with the consent of India and Pakistan, a Committee composed of three members of the Security Council to assist them in their efforts to bring about normalcy in the area of conflict as well as to achieve reconciliation in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in keeping with the aforesaid resolutions and to report to the Council;"

At this point I would draw attention to the fact that, although we have introduced the words "three members", this is not the final text. It is intended that we should put the names of the members of the Security Council or whatever other formulation we may find in order to establish this committee. It is just a reminder of what we have in mind.

"8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the present resolution;

"9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet again as circumstances warrant."

306. As I have mentioned in the course of my statement, our two delegations have drafted this text in haste, because of the pressure of our work in this body and in other bodies of the United Nations. We do not regard this text as a final one. We understand that members of the Council and the main parties concerned will wish to study the draft and let us know their views and their suggestions. These views and suggestions will be most welcome.

307. In our view, the Security Council cannot remain at a standstill while bloodshed is going on, while soldiers and men, women and children are dying and while millions of innocent people are subject to increasing misery and suffering. We are, of course, in your hands, Mr. President,

and in the hands of the whole Council. We could have a short suspension or an adjournment for a few hours. For our part we shall abide by the will of the Council.

308. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Italy has carefully explained the version of the draft resolution [S/10451] prepared by the delegations of Italy and Japan and he has explained the reasons for presenting the draft resolution and interpreted clearly what it means. We have already had sufficient experience in the past to know that we should not do too much at once. I think we should not rush. Perhaps it would be the view of members that we should sleep on this draft resolution and come back tomorrow by 3.30 p.m. to consider it. If that is agreed upon, we may perhaps also consider holding consultations between 11.30 a.m. and 1 p.m. tomorrow and also between 3 p.m. and 3.30 p.m. before the meeting.

309. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): In view of the fact that Indian troops are still committing aggression against East Pakistan and large-scale slaughter is still continuing, we feel that the members of the Security Council must go on with their work and should convene a meeting as soon as possible. Therefore we suggest that the Security Council should be convened for consultations from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. tomorrow, and after 11 a.m. we should have a formal meeting of the Council.

310. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I should like to have a clarification from the sponsors of the draft, in particular, of course, Ambassador Vinci. In the eighth preambular paragraph of the draft the words "East Pakistan" appear. When Ambassador Vinci was introducing the draft he used only the one word "Pakistan". Was that an inadvertence, or did he deliberately omit the word "East"?

311. There is another question. How is it that operative paragraph 4 of the text reads "immediate opening of negotiations with a view to achieving" but Ambassador Vinci in his statement changed those words, replacing them by "steps aimed at". I should like a precise explanation of this, a clarification.

312. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I hope that I can answer satisfactorily the questions put to me by Ambassador Malik. As I have stated, I said in presenting this draft resolution that the text I was going to read was already a revised draft, in which we had introduced some changes following upon consultations with some of the members of the Council, but not all, I must acknowledge. We did not have enough time to consult all the members of the Council and the main parties concerned. So I have to say that it is true that in the modified text, in the eighth preambular paragraph, the word "East" has been deleted.

313. Secondly, it is also true that operative paragraph 4 has been changed following those consultations with which, I believe, the Soviet delegation was at least acquainted. It reads:

"*Calls for immediate steps aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement;*"

314. But again I would reiterate that the sponsors of the draft resolution are willing to hold consultations and are willing to consider the views and suggestions of all the members of the Council and of the main parties concerned. Our common will is to draft a text which, we hope, could gain the consent of all the members as well as the main parties concerned in order that we can take a step forward to stop the war which is still going on and to set up machinery which will enable the United Nations to help the main parties concerned to pave the way towards a final political settlement.

315. The PRESIDENT: I listened carefully to the suggestion of the representative of China. As a result of consultations, however, the majority of the members seem to agree to a meeting for 3.30 tomorrow afternoon.

316. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): I just wanted to say that we will support any move for an earlier meeting. We feel that the situation is urgent and we are ready to meet at an earlier time.

317. The PRESIDENT: What would you consider to be an earlier time?

318. Mr. BENNETT (United States of America): The suggestion of 9 a.m. has been made. As this is perhaps a little early for some members, 10.30 a.m. would be acceptable to us.

319. Mr. FARAH (Somalia): My delegation has no objection to the proposal that we meet tomorrow morning rather than tomorrow afternoon.

320. Mr. OGISO (Japan): My delegation also has no objection to an early meeting tomorrow morning.

321. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): As far as I know, an understanding was reached during the meeting that consultations would begin at 11 a.m., and that the Council meeting would start at 3.30 p.m. However, it could be convened earlier, half an hour earlier, at 3 p.m. It would hardly be appropriate, however, to change the understanding, especially as there is no certainty that all of us will be able to receive a reply and instructions on this new and very important draft resolution by 9 a.m. That would be unrealistic. While the United States delegation can receive such information in an hour, as I am always pointing out, we are in a less privileged position in this respect, and I cannot guarantee that I shall be able to receive instructions by 9 o'clock in order to participate in the consultations.

322. In view of the importance of the draft resolution and the seriousness of the question, I do not think that two extra hours will settle matters, and it would, therefore, be best to keep to the understanding reached earlier by all members of the Council.

323. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The representative of the Soviet Union just mentioned that an understanding had been reached in the Council. Such an understanding should include all the members of the Security Council. We did not agree to that understanding.

We made our statement earlier concerning this point. Therefore, what the representative of the Soviet Union said was inaccurate. I just suggested that we should proceed with consultations from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. tomorrow morning. If that is too early perhaps 9.30 a.m. would be a better time and then the formal meeting of the Security Council could be convened at 11 a.m. I hope that this will be acceptable to the representative of the Soviet Union.

324. The PRESIDENT: I may add that yesterday there was much talk about "understanding" or "misunderstanding", and some talk today about "understanding". The members of the Council will realize that no one here is responsible for the interpretation of the interpreters. Thus, when we speak English our statements are interpreted into either Spanish, Chinese, French or Russian. I am almost certain that the words I use in my statements are not exactly reflected during the interpretation of those words in the other languages. If a French translation happens to be given, it might be an elegant interpretation, it might be a rigid interpretation but we are not responsible. So, when the word "understanding" is used it may take many meanings. Just now I said: "As a result of consultations, however, the majority of the members seem to agree to a meeting for 3.30 tomorrow afternoon." That is clear but it may bring some difficulties to those who do not understand English. Yesterday too, the word "understanding" was used but I had the impression that when "understanding" was used, I interpreted it to mean "impression". I understood the Minister to say that he had an impression that a certain course was to be taken.

325. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): I think there is a misunderstanding between us. I mentioned the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union because he just mentioned that an understanding was reached among all the members of the Security Council. I said that during the process of the consultations we did not agree to this understanding. We did not agree to convene the meeting at such a late hour. We suggested that the meeting could be held earlier. I did not mean what you said, Mr. President.

326. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): I would rather prefer that we stick to your original suggestion, understanding or not, because quite honestly we do in fact do much more productive work when we are not meeting around this table but in consultations elsewhere and I think the progress of finding a satisfactory resolution would be vastly accelerated. Otherwise I am afraid what we may find is that although we meet at 11 a.m. in fact nobody will actually sit down at the table until 3 p.m.

327. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): I assume that by the end of your term as President you will pronounce the name of my country correctly.

328. I submit that the Chinese representative has no grounds for ascribing inaccuracy to me. I did not consult him. I consulted the President of the Council and, when I had heard his statement, I concluded that there was a majority opinion, and that is what I told the Council.

329. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I believe that the reasons which have been put forward by both sides to justify different times are perfectly justified and well-founded. On the one hand there are those who are anxious to meet for they are aware of the tragedy on the Indian subcontinent and of course they want a solution as soon as possible. Then there are those who want a meeting somewhat later, and they are anxious to achieve a final settlement.

330. Both arguments are very sound indeed, and I think the best thing would be a compromise. The proposal by the representative of China to have consultations in the morning seems to me very helpful. We could do that at a time perhaps somewhat later than the time he suggested, perhaps around 11 a.m., and then have a formal meeting early in the afternoon, at 3 p.m. say. That would give delegations who need instructions time to receive them, and then the consultations, which are the most fundamental thing in achieving a unanimous settlement in the Council, can take place in the morning. I believe that would be a harmonious solution which would spare us a long procedural debate which could go on for a long time and keep the Council, which is surely now somewhat weary, in session longer than is necessary.

331. Mr. VINCI (Italy): In order to accommodate the views of all members, including the representative of China, I thought that perhaps we should start consultations tomorrow at 9.30 a.m. or 10.00 a.m. and, in principle, convene a meeting of the Council in the morning if possible. But, I am ready also to go along with the suggestion made by Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas—one of the two, whichever can accommodate members of the Council.

332. The PRESIDENT: Does the representative of China wish to reply to the suggestion which has just been put forward by the representative of Italy?

333. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): I agree with the suggestion put forward by the representative of Italy.

334. Sir Colin CROWE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, will you make up our minds for us, please?

335. The PRESIDENT: As far as I see it, it is still the majority view that we should have a meeting at 3.30 p.m. tomorrow unless there are more statements to the contrary.

336. Mr. ROMAN (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I could not agree more with you, Sir. Tomorrow at 3.30 p.m. Otherwise we will not be through here until 3 a.m.

337. Mr. VINCI (Italy): I do not see any incompatibility between the two suggestions. What I had in mind was to say that we could start consultations tomorrow morning and plan a meeting for the morning if that is possible—in other words, if consultations produce the results we all hope for in one or two hours then we can have a meeting in the morning. If that does not happen then we will meet only at 3 p.m. We have it in your hands, in other words. You can decide in view of the results of the consultations we have in the morning to convene in the morning at 11 or even later, or at 3 p.m. in the afternoon.

338. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) (*interpretation from French*): I just wish to say we are very flexible and open to all suggestions. The wisest course would be to confer tomorrow morning, and you might convene the Council as soon as a solution appears likely, at the end of the morning or the beginning of the afternoon. That should leave matters very clear.

339. Mr. BENNETT (United States): I think the Italian representative has made an eminently practical suggestion and I would support it, that is, to meet for consultations.

340. The PRESIDENT: Subject to what you may say, I am proposing that we hold consultations between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. tomorrow and then hold a meeting at 3 p.m. We have to be realistic. I have been arranging to have consultations here but unfortunately the representatives have been so busy that they have not been turning up. I am almost certain that if we arrange to hold a meeting tomorrow morning it will not be possible for representatives to hold consultations before the meeting, and we know what that means. I am providing for consultations between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. tomorrow, to give us sufficient opportunity to look at the draft and see how much we will be able to revise it before the afternoon.

341. Mr. HUANG Hua (China) (*translation from Chinese*): Mr. President, I agree with what you have stated.

342. The PRESIDENT: I therefore adjourn the meeting until 3.00 p.m. tomorrow.

*The meeting rose at 9.40 p.m.*

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